G.R. No.

106296 July 5, 1996

ISABELO T. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:p
This is a petition to review the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1992, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the present petition is partially
granted. The questioned Orders and writs
directing (1) "reinstatement" of respondent
Isabelo T. Crisostomo to the position of
"President of the Polytechnic University of
the Philippines", and (2) payment of
"salaries and benefits" which said
respondent failed to receive during his
suspension insofar as such payment
includes those accruing after the abolition of
the PCC and its transfer to the PUP, are
hereby set aside. Accordingly, further
proceedings consistent with this decision
may be taken by the court a quo to
determine the correct amounts due and
payable to said respondent by the said
university.
The background of this case is as follows:
Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President
of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC),
having been appointed to that position by
the President of the Philippines on July 17,
1974.

During his incumbency as president of the

PCC, two administrative cases were filed
against petitioner for illegal use of
government vehicles, misappropriation of
construction materials belonging to the
college, oppression and harassment, grave
misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty. The
administrative cases, which were filed with
the Office of the President, were
subsequently referred to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation.

COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC

UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES,
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS
CURRICULAR OFFERINGS.

Charges of violations of R.A. No. 3019, 3(e)

and R.A. No. 992, 20-21 and R.A. No. 733,
14 were likewise filed against him with the
Office of Tanodbayan.

On July 11, 1980, the Circuit Criminal Court

of Manila rendered judgment acquitting
petitioner of the charges against him. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

On June 14, 1976, three (3) informations for

violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019, as
amended) were filed against him. The
informations alleged that he appropriated
for himself a bahay kubo, which was
intended for the College, and construction
materials worth P250,000.00, more or less.
Petitioner was also accused of using a driver
of the College as his personal and family
driver. 1

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused,

Isabelo T. Crisostomo, not guilty of the
violations charged in all these three cases
and hereby acquits him therefrom, with
costs de officio. The bail bonds filed by said
accused for his provisional liberty are hereby
cancelled and released.

On October 22, 1976, petitioner was

preventively suspended from office pursuant
to R.A. No. 3019, 13, as amended. In his
place Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated
as officer-in-charge on November 10, 1976,
and then as Acting President on May 13,
1977.

On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued

by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF

Mateo continued as the head of the new

University. On April 3, 1979, he was
appointed Acting President and on March 28,
1980, as President for a term of six (6)
years.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 13, R.A.

No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and
under which the accused has been
suspended by this Court in an Order dated
October 22, 1976, said accused is hereby
ordered reinstated to the position of
President of the Philippine College of
Commerce, now known as the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, from which he
has been suspended. By virtue of said
reinstatement, he is entitled to receive the
salaries and other benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.

The bail bonds filed by the accused for his

provisional liberty in these cases are hereby
cancelled and released.
SO ORDERED.
The cases filed before the Tanodbayan (now
the Ombudsman) were likewise dismissed on
August 8, 1991 on the ground that they had
become moot and academic. On the other
hand, the administrative cases were
dismissed for failure of the complainants to
prosecute them.
On February 12, 1992, petitioner filed with
the Regional Trial Court a motion for
execution of the judgment, particularly the
part ordering his reinstatement to the
position of president of the PUP and the
payment of his salaries and other benefits
during the period of suspension.
The motion was granted and a partial writ of
execution was issued by the trial court on
March 6, 1992. On March 26, 1992, however,
President Corazon C. Aquino appointed Dr.
Jaime Gellor as acting president of the PUP,
following the expiration of the term of office
of Dr. Nemesio Prudente, who had
succeeded Dr. Mateo. Petitioner was one of
the five nominees considered by the
President of the Philippines for the position.
On April 24, 1992, the Regional Trial Court,
through respondent Judge Teresita Dy-Liaco
Flores, issued another order, reiterating her
earlier order for the reinstatement of
petitioner to the position of PUP president. A
writ of execution, ordering the sheriff to
implement the order of reinstatement, was
issued.

In his return dated April 28, 1992, the sheriff

stated that he had executed the writ by
installing petitioner as President of the PUP,
although Dr. Gellor did not vacate the office
as he wanted to consult with the President of
the Philippines first. This led to a contempt
citation against Dr. Gellor. A hearing was set
on May 7, 1992. On May 5, 1992, petitioner
also moved to cite Department of Education,
Culture and Sports Secretary Isidro Cario in
contempt of court. Petitioner assumed the
office of president of the PUP.
On May 18, 1992, therefore, the People of
the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition (CA G.R. No. 27931),
assailing the two orders and the writs of
execution issued by the trial court. It also
asked for a temporary restraining order.
On June 25, 1992, the Court of Appeals
issued a temporary restraining order,
enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from
acting as president of the PUP pursuant to
the reinstatement orders of the trial court,
and enjoining further proceedings in
Criminal Cases Nos. VI-2329-2331.
On July 15, 1992, the Seventh Division of the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision, 2 the
dispositive portion of which is set forth at
the beginning of this opinion. Said decision
set aside the orders and writ of
reinstatement issued by the trial court. The
payment of salaries and benefits to
petitioner accruing after the conversion of
the PCC to the PUP was disallowed. Recovery
of salaries and benefits was limited to those
accruing from the time of petitioner's
suspension until the conversion of the PCC
to the PUP. The case was remanded to the

trial court for a determination of the

amounts due and payable to petitioner.
Hence this petition. Petitioner argues that
P.D. No. 1341, which converted the PCC into
the PUP, did not abolish the PCC. He
contends that if the law had intended the
PCC to lose its existence, it would have
specified that the PCC was being "abolished"
rather than "converted" and that if the PUP
was intended to be a new institution, the law
would have said it was being "created."
Petitioner claims that the PUP is merely a
continuation of the existence of the PCC,
and, hence, he could be reinstated to his
former position as president.
In part the contention is well taken, but, as
will presently be explained, reinstatement is
no longer possible because of the
promulgation of P.D. No. 1437 by the
President of the Philippines on June 10,
1978.
P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only
changed, the former Philippine College of
Commerce into what is now the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, in the same
way that earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had
converted what was then the Philippine
School of Commerce into the Philippine
College of Commerce. What took place was
a change in academic status of the
educational institution, not in its corporate
life. Hence the change in its name, the
expansion of its curricular offerings, and the
changes in its structure and organization.
As petitioner correctly points out, when the
purpose is to abolish a department or an
office or an organization and to replace it

with another one, the lawmaking authority

says so. He cites the following examples:
E.O. No. 709:
1. There is hereby created a Ministry of
Trade and Industry, hereinafter referred to as
the Ministry. The existing Ministry of Trade
established pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 721 as amended, and the existing
Ministry established pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 488 as amended, are abolished
together with their services, bureaus and
similar agencies, regional offices, and all
other entities under their supervision and
control.
E.O. No. 710:
1. There is hereby created a Ministry of
Public Works and Highways, hereinafter
referred to as the Ministry. The existing
Ministry of Public Works established
pursuant to Executive Order No. 546 as
amended, and the existing Ministry of Public
Highways established pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 458 as amended, are
abolished together with their services,
bureaus and similar agencies, regional
offices, and all other entities within their
supervision and control. . . .
R.A. No. 6975:
13. Creation and Composition. -- A National
Police Commission, hereinafter referred to as
the Commission, is hereby created for the
purpose of effectively discharging the
functions prescribed in the Constitution and
provided in this Act. The Commission shall
be a collegial body within the Department. It
shall be composed of a Chairman and four

(4) regular commissioners, one (1) of whom

shall be designated as Vice-Chairman by the
President. The Secretary of the Department
shall be theex-officio Chairman of the
Commission, while the Vice-Chairman shall
act as the executive officer of the
Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. Upon the effectivity of this Act, the present
National Police Commission, and the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National
Police shall cease to exist. The Philippine
Constabulary, which is the nucleus of the
integrated Philippine ConstabularyIntegrated National Police, shall cease to be
a major service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The Integrated National Police,
which is the civilian component of the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National
Police, shall cease to be the national police
force and in lieu thereof, a new police force
shall be established and constituted
pursuant to this Act.
In contrast, P.D. No. 1341, provides:
1. The present Philippine College of
Commerce is hereby converted into a
university to be known as the "Polytechnic
University of the Philippines," hereinafter
referred to in this Decree as the University.
As already noted, R.A. No. 778 earlier
provided:
1. The present Philippine School of
Commerce, located in the City of Manila,
Philippines, is hereby granted full college
status and converted into the Philippine

College of Commerce, which will offer not

only its present one-year and two-year
vocational commercial curricula, the latter
leading to the titles of Associate in Business
Education and/or Associate in Commerce,
but also four-year courses leading to the
degrees of Bachelor of Science in Business
in Education and Bachelor of Science in
Commerce, and five-year courses leading to
the degrees of Master of Arts in Business
Education and Master of Arts in Commerce,
respectively.
The appellate court ruled, however, that the
PUP and the PCC are not "one and the same
institution" but "two different entities" and
that since petitioner Crisostomo's term was
coterminous with the legal existence of the
PCC, petitioner's term expired upon the
abolition of the PCC. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court of Appeals took into
account the following:
a) After respondent Crisostomo's
suspension, P.D. No. 1341 (entitled
"CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF
COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC
UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES,
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS
CURRICULAR OFFERINGS") was issued on
April 1, 1978. This decree explicitly provides
that PUP's objectives and purposes cover not
only PCC's offering of programs "in the field
of commerce and business administration"
but also "programs in other polytechnic
areas" and "in other fields such as
agriculture, arts and trades and
fisheries . . ." (section 2). Being a university,
PUP was conceived as a bigger institution
absorbing, merging and integrating the

entire PCC and other "national schools" as

may be "transferred" to this new state
university.
b) The manner of selection and appointment
of the university head is substantially
different from that provided by the PCC
Charter. The PUP President "shall be
appointed by the President of the Philippines
upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Education and Culture after consultation
with the University Board of Regents"
(section 4, P.D. 1341). The President of PCC,
on the other hand, was appointed "by the
President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Board of Trustees"
(Section 4, R.A. 778).
c) The composition of the new university's
Board of Regents in likewise different from
that of the PCC Board of Trustees (which
included the chairman of the Senate
Committee on Education and the chairman
of the House Committee on Education, the
President of the PCC Alumni Association as
well as the President of the Chamber of
Commerce of the Philippines). Whereas,
among others, the NEDA Director-General,
the Secretary of Industry and the Secretary
of Labor are members of the PUP Board of
Regents. (section 6, P.D. 1341)
d) The decree moreover transferred to the
new university all the properties including
"equipment and facilities:"
". . . owned by the Philippine College of
Commerce and such other National Schools
as may be integrated . . . including their
obligations and appropriations . . ." (sec. 12;
emphasis supplied) 3

But these are hardly indicia of an intent to

abolish an existing institution and to create
a new one. New course offerings can be
added to the curriculum of a school without
affecting its legal existence. Nor will changes
in its existing structure and organization
bring about its abolition and the creation of
a new one. Only an express declaration to
that effect by the lawmaking authority will.
The Court of Appeals also cites the provision
of P.D. No. 1341 as allegedly implying the
abolition of the PCC and the creation of a
new one - the PUP - in its stead:
12. All parcels of land, buildings, equipment
and facilities owned by the Philippine
College of Commerce and such other
national schools as may be integrated by
virtue of this decree, including their
obligations and appropriations thereof, shall
stand transferred to the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, provided,
however, that said national schools shall
continue to receive their corresponding
shares from the special education fund of
the municipal/provincial/city government
concerned as are now enjoyed by them in
accordance with existing laws and/or
decrees.
The law does not state that the lands,
buildings and equipment owned by the PCC
were being "transferred" to the PUP but only
that they "stand transferred" to it. "Stand
transferred" simply means, for example, that
lands transferred to the PCC were to be
understood as transferred to the PUP as the
new name of the institution.

But the reinstatement of petitioner to the

position of president of the PUP could not be
ordered by the trial court because on June
10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had been
promulgated fixing the term of office of
presidents of state universities and colleges
at six (6) years, renewable for another term
of six (6) years, and authorizing the
President of the Philippines to terminate the
terms of incumbents who were not
reappointed. P.D. No. 1437 provides:
6. The head of the university or college
shall be known as the President of the
university or college. He shall be qualified
for the position and appointed for a term of
six (6) years by the President of the
Philippines upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Education and Culture after
consulting with the Board which may be
renewed for another term upon
recommendation of the Secretary of
Education and Culture after consulting the
Board. In case of vacancy by reason of
death, absence or resignation, the Secretary
of Education and Culture shall have the
authority to designate an officer in charge of
the college or university pending the
appointment of the President.
The powers and duties of the President of
the university or college, in addition to those
specifically provided for in this Decree shall
be those usually pertaining to the office of
the president of a university or college.
7. The incumbent president of a chartered
state college or university whose term may
be terminated according to this Decree, shall
be entitled to full retirement benefits:
provided that he has served the government

for at least twenty (20) years; and provided,

further that in case the number of years
served is less than 20 years, he shall be
entitled to one month pay for every year of
service.
In this case, Dr. Pablo T. Mateo Jr., who had
been acting president of the university since
April 3, 1979, was appointed president of
PUP for a term of six (6) years on March 28,
1980, with the result that petitioner's term
was cut short. In accordance with 7 of the
law, therefore, petitioner became entitled
only to retirement benefits or the payment
of separation pay. Petitioner must have
recognized this fact, that is why in 1992 he
asked then President Aquino to consider him
for appointment to the same position after it
had become vacant in consequence of the
retirement of Dr. Prudente.

the termination of their incumbency that for

question of any impairment of security of

petitioners justify a suit of this character, it

tenure does not arise.

being alleged that thereby the security of

tenure provision of the Constitution has
been ignored and disregarded.

112 SCRA 294 Political law

ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violate
the security of tenure of justices and judges

GR No. L-57883 March 12 1982

FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition,

and the Minister of Justice from taking any

action implementing BP 129 which
mandates that Justices and judges of inferior
courts from the CA to MTCs, except the
occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the
CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such act, would be
considered separated from the judiciary. It is

if there is no question of law involved

BP 129
FACTS: In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,

RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the
removal or separation of the judges and
justices from their services. What is
important is the validity of the abolition of

entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,

Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la
Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its
validity because, first of all, he would be one
of

the

judges

that

would

be

removed

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of

because of the reorganization and second,

an office does not amount to an illegal

he said such law would contravene the

removal of its incumbent is the principle

constitutional provision which provides the

that, in order to be valid, the abolition must

be made in good faith.

seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget,

the Chairman of the Commission on Audit,

Constitutional Law Political Question

as provided for under the Constitution.

their offices.
DE LA LLANA VS ALBA

Gualberto De La Llana vs Manuel Alba

security of tenure of judges of the courts. He

averred that only the Supreme Court can
remove judges NOT the Congress.

Removal is to be distinguished from

termination by virtue of valid abolition of the
office. There can be no tenure to a nonexistent office. After the abolition, there is in

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De

La Llana can be validly removed by the
legislature by such statute (BP 129).

law no occupant. In case of removal, there is

HELD: Yes. The

an office with an occupant who would

way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to

thereby lose his position. It is in that sense

discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a

that from the standpoint of strict law, the

SC

ruled

the

following

vote of at least eight members, order their

dismissal.

Thus

respect to the basic principle that this Court

and

competence to remove judges. Under the

does

statute, the former is to be preferred.

Judiciary Act, it was the President who was

question of law is involved. If such were

vested with such power. Removal is, of

the case, certainly this Court could not have

course,

from

its say prior to the action taken by either of

termination by virtue of the abolition of

the two departments. Even then, it could do

the office. There can be no tenure to a

so but only by way of deciding a case where

non-existent office. After the abolition,

the matter has been put in issue. Neither is

there is in law no occupant. In case of

there

removal, there is an office with an

appointed to the vacant positions created by

occupant who would thereby lose his

the reorganization. That remains in the

position. It is in that sense that from

hands of the Executive to whom it properly

the

the

belongs. There is no departure therefore

question of any impairment of security

from the tried and tested ways of judicial

of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for

power. Rather what is sought to be achieved

the incumbents of inferior courts abolished,

by this liberal interpretation is to preclude

the effect is one of separation. As to its

any plausibility to the charge that in the

effect, no distinction exists between removal

exercise

and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it

reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of

is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a

removal of the present incumbents vested in

member

the

this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The

implementation of the assailed legislation,

challenged Act would thus be free from any

therefore, it would be in accordance with

unconstitutional taint, even one not readily

accepted

discernible except to those predisposed to

to

be

standpoint

of

construction

it

distinguished

of

the

strict

judiciary.

principles
that

possesses

as

of
far

law,

In

the

constitutional
as

not

render

any

advisory

intrusion

of

the

into

opinions. No

who

conceded

shall

power

be

of

incumbent

view it with distrust. Moreover, such a

justices and judges are concerned, this Court

construction would be in accordance with

be consulted and that its view be accorded

the basic principle that in the choice of

the fullest consideration. No fear need be

alternatives between one which would save

entertained that there is a failure to accord

another

which

would

invalidate

Viola vs. Alunan III (1997)

Facts: Cesar G. Viola, filed petition for
prohibition challenging the validity of Art. III,
1-2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and
Guidelines for the General Elections of the
Liga ng mga Barangay Officers in so far as
they provide for the election of first, second
and third vice presidents and for auditors for
the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its
chapters.
The issue: is whether or not Section 1-2 of
the Implementing Rules are valid?
Held: The creation of the additional
positions is authorized by 493 of LGC which
in fact requiresand not merely authorizes
the board of directors to "create such
other positions as it may deem necessary for
the management of the chapter" and belies
petitioner's claim that 493limits the officers
of a chapter to the president, VP, 5 members
of the board of directors, secretary, and
treasurer. Also, the creation of these
positions was actually made in the
constitution and by-laws of the Liga ng mga
Barangay adopted by the 1st Barangay
National Assembly. Congress can delegate
the power to create positions such as these.
Section493embo

dies a fairly intelligible standard deemed

necessary for the management of the
chapters,". There is no
undue delegation of power by Congress. SC
decisions have upheld the validity of
reorganization statutes authorizing the
President of the Philippines to create, abolish
or merge offices in the executive
department.

Viola v Alunan
G.R. No. 115844. August 15, 1997
FACTS: Viola, as a barangay chairman, filed
a petition for prohibition challenging the
validity of the Art III, Sec.1-2 of the Revised
Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the
General Elections of the Liga ng mga
Barangay Officers insofar as they provide for
the election of first, second, and third vice
presidents and for auditors for the National
Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters.
He contended that the questioned positions
are in excess of those provided in the LGC
Sec.493 which mentions as elective
positions only those of the president, vice
president, and five members of the board of
directors in each chapter at the municipal,
city, provincial, metropolitan political
subdivision, and national levels and thus the
implementing rules expand the numbers in
the LGC in violation of the principle that
implementing rules and regulations cannot
add or detract from the provisions of the law
they are designed to implement.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 1-2 of the
Implementing Rules are valid.

RULING: Yes. The creation of additional

positions is authorized by Sec. 493 of the
LGC which in fact requires and not merely
authorizes the board of directors to create
such other positions as it may deem
necessary for the management of the
chapter. To begin with, the creation of
these positions was actually made in the
Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng mga
barangay which was adopted by the First
Barangay National Assembly.
There is no undue delegation of power by
Congress in this case. SC decisions have
upheld the validity of reorganization statutes
authorizing the President of the Philippines
to create, abolish, or merge offices in the
executive management.
While the board of directors of a local
chapter can create additional positions to
provide for the needs of the chapter, the
board of directors of the National Liga must
be deemed to have the power to create
additional positions not only for its
management but also for that of all the
chapters at the municipal, city, provincial
and metropolitan political subdivision
levels. Otherwise the National Liga would be
no different from the local chapters. The
fact is that Sec. 493 grants the power to
create positions not only to the boards of the
local chapters but to the board of the Liga at
the national level as well.
Petition dismissed.
NOTE: LGC, Sec. 493. Organization The
liga at the municipal, city, provincial,
metropolitan political subdivision, and
national levels directly elect a president, a
vice-president, and five (5) members of the
board of directors. The board shall appoint
its secretary and treasurer and create such
other positions as it may deem necessary for

the management of the chapter. A

secretary-general shall be elected from
among the members of the national liga and
shall be charged with the overall operation
of the liga on the national level. The board
shall coordinate the activities of the
chapters of the liga.
Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines :
Sec. 1. Local Liga Chapters. The Municipal,
City, Metropolitan and Provincial Chapters
shall directly elect the following officers and
directors to constitute their respective Board
of Directors, namely:
1.1 President, 1.2 Executive Vice-President,
1.3 First Vice-President, 1.4 Second VicePresident, 1.5 Third Vice-President,
1.6 Auditor, 1.7 Five (5) Directors
Sec. 2. National Liga. The National Liga
shall directly elect the following officers and
directors to constitute the National Liga
Board of Directors namely:
2.1 President, 2.2 Executive Vice-President
2.3 First Vice-President, 2.4 Second VicePresident, 2.5 Third Vice-President,
2.6 Secretary General, 2.7 Auditor, 2.8 Five
(5) Directors
BIRAOGO VS PTC
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF
2010
FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1
establishing Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the

Office of the President with the primary task
to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers
of an investigative body. But it is not a quasijudicial body as it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in
disputes between contending parties. All it
can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena
powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause
exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of
powers as it arrogates the power of
the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its
operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10,
Section 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O.
No. 1 because the delegated

authority of the President to

structurally reorganize the Office of
the President to achieve economy,
simplicity and efficiency does not
include the power to create an
entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the
Constitution and statutes when it vested the
Truth Commission with quasi-judicial
powers duplicating, if not superseding, those
of the Office of the Ombudsman created
under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ
created under the Administrative Code of
1987.

event, the Constitution, Revised

Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616
(as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to
create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of
Congress to appropriate funds because there
is no appropriation but a mere allocation of
funds already appropriated by Congress.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection

clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and
personnel of the previous administration as
if corruption is their peculiar species even as
it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may
be indictable.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate

the equal protection clause because it was
validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing
to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of
separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of
the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the

legal standing of petitioners and argued
that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers
of Congress because the Presidents
executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed and that, in any

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate

or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a
fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an

actual case or controversy calling for the

exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing
to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
1.

The petition primarily invokes

usurpation of the power of the
Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. To the extent
the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office
confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that
institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it

that the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office
remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to
question the validity of any official action
which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown
that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury

attributable to the implementation of E. O.

No. 1.

their seriousness, novelty and weight as

precedents

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a

court of justice on a given question. In
private suits, standing is governed by the
real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that
every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Real-party-in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises
in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts
a public right in assailing an allegedly
illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He has
to show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. He has to make out a sufficient
interest in the vindication of the public order
and the securing of relief as a citizen or
taxpayer.

The Executive is given much leeway in

ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are
not limited to those specific powers under
the Constitution. One of the recognized
powers of the President granted pursuant to
this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This
flows from the obvious need to ascertain
facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing
ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to
allow an inquiry into matters which the
President is entitled to know so that he can
be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of
the land.

The person who impugns the validity of a

statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as
a result. The Court, however, finds reason
in Biraogos assertion that the petition
covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of

2. There will be no appropriation but only an

allotment or allocations of existing funds
already appropriated. There is no usurpation
on the part of the Executive of the power of
Congress to appropriate funds. There is no
need to specify the amount to be earmarked
for the operation of the commission
because, whatever funds the Congress has
provided for the Office of the President will
be the very source of the funds for the
commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to
existing auditing rules and regulations so
there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or

the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If
at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the
two offices. The function of determining
probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts
remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is
limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the
performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of
the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in
view of its apparent transgression of the
equal protection clause enshrined in Section
1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner.
The purpose of the equal protection clause is
to secure every person within a states
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper

execution through the states duly

constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as
determined according to a valid
classification. Equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose
of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to
all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid
if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred
and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down
as violative of the equal protection clause.
The clear mandate of truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth concerning
the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration only. The
intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member
of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction.
Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a

vehicle for vindictiveness and selective

retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past
administrations. The PTC must, at least,
have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance
with which all private rights determined and
all public authority administered. Laws that
do not conform to the Constitution should be
stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.
Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative
of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION 2010, G. R. No. 192935.
December 7, 2010 (CASE DIGEST)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I CASE DIGEST
FACTS: E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine
Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed
by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere
branch formed under the Office of the
President tasked to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by thirdlevel public officers and employees, their coprincipals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration and

submit their findings and recommendations

to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasijudicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate,
resolve, settle or render awards in disputes
between parties. Its job is to investigate,
collect and asses evidences gathered and
make recommendations. It has subpoena
powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt or even arrest. It cannot
determine for such facts if probable cause
exist as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of
the E.O. on the grounds that.
It violates separation of powers as it
arrogates the power of Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its
operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10,
Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because
the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity,
and efficiency does not include the power to
create an entirely new office was inexistent
like the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution
when it made the Truth Commission and
vesting it the power duplicating and even
exceeding those of the Office of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause

Special Provisions Applicable to All

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is
unconstitutional.

Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal

Autonomy. On the strength of these special

RULING: Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck

down as it is violative of the equal protection
clause. The Chief Executives power to
create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee
cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the
Executive Department, to which respondents
belong, the President has the obligation to
ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law.
With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the
investigation is sustained. Such validity is
not affected by the fact that the
investigating team and the PCAGC had the
same composition, or that the former used
the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry.

provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution

No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and
reclassification scheme among selected
positions in the Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR
collapsed the vacant positions in the body
to provide additional source of funding for
said staffing modification.

The CHR forwarded said staffing

modification and upgrading scheme to the
DBM with a request for its approval, but the

CHREA vs.CHR

then DBM secretary denied the request.

G.R. No. 155336

November 25, 2004

In light of the DBMs disapproval of the

FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522,

proposed personnel modification scheme,

otherwise known as the General

the CSC-National Capital Region Office,

Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for

through a memorandum, recommended to

the CSC-Central Office that the subject

the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification

establish and administer a unified

appointments be rejected owing to the

scheme in the CHR on the justification that

Compensation and Position Classification

DBMs disapproval of the plantilla

such action is within the ambit of CHRs

System.

reclassification.

fiscal autonomy.

The disputation of the CA that the CHR is

ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an

exempt from the long arm of the Salary

Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-

upgrading, reclassification, creation, and

Standardization Law is flawed considering

employees association (CHREA) in

collapsing of plantilla positions in the

that the coverage thereof encompasses the

representation of the rank and file

Commission without the prior approval of

entire gamut of government offices, sans

employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-

the Department of Budget and

qualification.

Central Office to affirm the recommendation

Management?

of the CSC-Regional Office.

HELD: the petition is GRANTED, the

This power to administer is not purely

Decision of the CA and its are hereby

ministerial in character as erroneously held

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling CSC-

by the CA. The word to administer means to

National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The

control or regulate in behalf of others; to

3 CHR Resolutions, without the approval of

direct or superintend the execution,

the DBM are disallowed.

application or conduct of; and to manage or

1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised

conduct public affairs, as to administer the

Compensation and Position Classification

government of the state.

The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs

request in a Resolution and reversedthe
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office
that the upgrading scheme be censured.
CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration,
but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA,
which affirmed the pronouncement of the
CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of

System in the Government and For Other

Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law,
provides that it is the DBM that shall

2. The regulatory power of the DBM on

matters of compensation is encrypted not

only in law, but in jurisprudence as well. In

1597, the compensation system established

implementation of any reclassification or

the recent case of PRA v. Buag, this Court

by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the

upgrading of positions in government. This is

ruled that compensation, allowances, and

review of the DBM.

consonant to the mandate of the DBM under

other benefits received by PRA officials and

the RAC of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title

employees without the requisite approval or

(It should be emphasized that the review by

XVII, to wit:

authority of the DBM are unauthorized and

the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the

SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The

irregular

compensation structure of its personnel

Department of Budget and Management

should not be interpreted to mean that the

shall assist the President in the preparation

In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the

DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of

of a national resources and expenditures

DBM has the sole power and discretion to

Directors and deprive the latter of its

budget, preparation, execution and control

administer the compensation and position

discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBMs

of the National Budget, preparation and

classification system of the national

function is merely to ensure that the action

maintenance of accounting systems

government.

taken by the Board of Directors complies

essential to the budgetary process,

with the requirements of the law,

achievement of more economy and

In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that

specifically, that PPCs compensation system

efficiency in the management of

although the charter of the PPC grants it the

conforms as closely as possible with that

government operations, administration of

power to fix the compensation and benefits

provided for under R.A. No. 6758. )

compensation and position classification

of its employees and exempts PPC from the

systems, assessment of organizational

coverage of the rules and regulations of the

3. As measured by the foregoing legal and

Compensation and Position Classification

jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of

Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No.

the DBM must first be sought prior to

effectiveness and review and evaluation of

legislative proposals having budgetary or
organizational implications.

Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM

Palpably, the CAs Decision was based on

independent, are the Civil Service

Secretary to disallow the upgrading,

the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs

Commission, the Commission on Elections,

reclassification, and creation of additional

to the species of constitutional commissions.

and the Commission on Audit.

plantilla positions in the CHR based on its

But the Constitution states in no uncertain

finding that such scheme lacks legal

terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC, and

SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. The

justification.

the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional

Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal

Commissions with the appurtenant right to

autonomy. The approved annual

fiscal autonomy.

appropriations shall be automatically and

Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the

authority of the DBM to deny or approve the

regularly released.

proposed reclassification of positions as

Along the same vein, the Administrative

evidenced by its three letters to the DBM

Code, on Distribution of Powers of

SEC. 29. Other Bodies. There shall be in

requesting approval thereof. As such, it is

Government, the constitutional commissions

accordance with the Constitution, an Office

now estopped from now claiming that the

shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC,

of the Ombudsman, a Commission on

nod of approval it has previously sought

and the COA, which are granted

Human Rights, and independent central

from the DBM is a superfluity

independence and fiscal autonomy. In

monetary authority, and a national police

contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is

commission. Likewise, as provided in the

4. The CA incorrectly relied on the

silent on the grant of similar powers to the

Constitution, Congress may establish an

pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office

other bodies including the CHR. Thus:

independent economic and planning agency.

SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. The

From the 1987 Constitution and the

Constitutional Commissions, which shall be

Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear

that the CHR is a constitutional commission,

and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.

that the CHR is not among the class of

and the Office of the Ombudsman, which

All told, the CHR, although admittedly a

Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in

enjoy fiscal autonomy.

constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not

the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est

Neither does the fact that the CHR was

included in the genus of offices accorded

exclusio alterius, the express mention of one

admitted as a member by the Constitutional

fiscal autonomy by constitutional or

person, thing, act or consequence excludes

Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto

legislative fiat.

all others. Stated otherwise, expressium

clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal

facit cessare tacitum what is expressed

autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag

Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR

puts an end to what is implied.

obtainable by membership.

enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance

of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy

Nor is there any legal basis to support the

We note with interest that the special

notwithstanding, all government offices

contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal

provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while

must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary

autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy

cited under the heading of the CHR, did not

Standardization Law. We are of the same

entails freedom from outside control and

specifically mention CHR as among those

mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thus-

limitations, other than those provided by

offices to which the special provision to

law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize

formulate and implement organizational

Being a member of the fiscal autonomy

funds granted by law, in accordance with

structures apply, but merely states its

group does not vest the agency with the

law, and pursuant to the wisdom and

coverage to include Constitutional

authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create

dispatch its needs may require from time to

Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal

positions without approval of the DBM. While

time.22 In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v.

autonomy

the members of the Group are authorized to

Drilon,23 it is understood that it is only the

formulate and implement the organizational

Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the COMELEC,

structures of their respective offices and

determine the compensation of their

bona fide organization of its employees nor

of the employees, including those in the

personnel, such authority is not absolute

is there anything in the records to show that

rank and file, are derived.

and must be exercised within the

its president has the authority to sue the

parameters of the Unified Position

CHR.

Further, the personality of petitioner to file

Classification and Compensation System

On petitioners personality to bring this suit,

this case was recognized by the CSC when it

established under RA 6758 more popularly

we held in a multitude of cases that a proper

took cognizance of the CHREAs request to

known as the Compensation Standardization

party is one who has sustained or is in

affirm the recommendation of the CSC-

Law.

immediate danger of sustaining an injury as

National Capital Region Office. CHREAs

a result of the act complained of. Here,

personality to bring the suit was a non-issue

5. The most lucid argument against the

petitioner, which consists of rank and file

in the CA when it passed upon the merits of

stand of respondent, however, is the

employees of respondent CHR, protests that

this case. Thus, neither should our hands be

provision of Rep. Act No. 8522 that the

the upgrading and collapsing of positions

tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is

implementation hereof shall be in

benefited only a select few in the upper level

settled jurisprudence that an issue that was

accordance with salary rates, allowances

positions in the Commission resulting to the

neither raised in the complaint nor in the

and other benefits authorized under

demoralization of the rank and file

court below cannot be raised for the first

compensation standardization laws.26

employees. This sufficiently meets the injury

time on appeal, as to do so would be

NOTES:

test. Indeed, the CHRs upgrading scheme, if

offensive to the basic rules of fair play,

1. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that

found to be valid, potentially entails eating

justice, and due process.

petitioner has no locus standi considering

up the Commissions savings or that portion

that there exists no official written record in

of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for

the Commission recognizing petitioner as a

Personnel Services, from which the benefits

2. In line with its role to breathe life into the

policy behind the Salary Standardization Law

of providing equal pay for substantially

that no organizational unit or changes in

This view of the DBM, as the laws

equal work and to base differences in pay

key positions shall be authorized unless

designated body to implement and

upon substantive differences in duties and

provided by law or directed by the

administer a unified compensation system,

responsibilities, and qualification

President. Here, the DBM discerned that

is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an

requirements of the positions, the DBM, in

there is no law authorizing the creation of a

administrative government agency, which is

the case under review, made a

Finance Management Office and a Public

tasked to implement a statute is accorded

determination, after a thorough evaluation,

Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHRs

great respect and ordinarily controls the

that the reclassification and upgrading

proposal to upgrade twelve positions of

construction of the courts. In Energy

scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal

Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and

Regulatory Board v. CA, we echoed the basic

rationalization.

four positions of Director III, SG-27 to

rule that the courts will not interfere in

Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the

matters which are addressed to the sound

The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the

DBM denied the same as this would change

discretion of government agencies entrusted

general provisions of the General

the context from support to

with the regulation of activities coming

Appropriations Act FY 1998, which the CHR

substantive without actual change in

under the special technical knowledge and

heavily relies upon to justify its

functions.

training of such agencies.

reclassification scheme, explicitly provides