DOMINGO vs.

RAYALA
G.R. No. 155831; 155840; 158700/ February 18, 2008/ Nachura, J./ Administrative
procedure /JBMORETO

NATURE Petition for Review on Certiorari

PETITIONERS
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo.
RESPONDENTS Rogelio I. Rayala
SUMMARY. Lourdes filed a complaint for sexual harassment against
Chairman Rayala. The Committee formed by the DOLE, the Office of the
President, and the CA all agreed that he was guilty. The only real issue was
the appropriate penalty the OP fired Rayala, but the CA held that he was
only to be suspended for one year. The SC agreed with the CA, ruling that
the Presidents power to discipline appointees was qualified by the phrase
as provided by law, meaning the penalty to be imposed was not what the
President felt like imposing, but what is laid down by statute.
DOCTRINE. , In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has
been recognized to include the following
a. The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights;
b. A real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to
defend ones rights;
c. A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as
to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee
of honesty as well as impartiality; and
d. A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the
records, or made known to the parties affected.
FACTS.
Ms. Domingo was a Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC. On November
16, 1998, she filed a complaint for sexual harassment against then
NLRC Chairman Rayala before then Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma.
Lourdes alleged that the Chairman started off by complimenting her on
her appearance frequently, and making a habit of standing behind her
and squeezing her shoulders while she typed whatever hed dictate. She
always felt uncomfortable and her tension mounted as time passed
because shed heard about other secretaries resigning over the
Chairmans frisky fingers. After some time he called her into a private
meeting apparently to correct an error shed made, but instead he asked
her personal questions about her family and lovelife. Then he offered to
send her to law school and handed her a bunch of cash which she
accepted because she didnt think hed let her leave if she didnt. She
was persuaded later on by officemates to return it.
The whole thing began to escalate when the Chairman began asking her
if she had a live-in partner because she had very wide hips. Then he
started to corner her and give her really lascivious looks. After one
particularly quick groping incident Lourdes filed for leave of absence and

asked to be transferred, after which she filed the complaint on the basis
of Administrative Order No. 250, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. 7877 in the DOLE.
Since Rayala was a presidential appointee, Laguesma referred the
complaint to the OP. Laguesma was later ordered by Secretary Zamora to
create a committee to investigate the allegations. Accordingly, Laguesma
created the Committee on Decorum and Investigation. The Committee
heard the parties and received their respective evidence. In March 2000
the Committee submitted its report and recommendation to Laguesma,
finding Rayala guilty of the offense charged and recommending the
minimum penalty provided under the AO. Laguesma forwarded the report
to Zamora, who issued A.O. 119 concurring with the Committees
findings but ruling that the penalty was too light, considering Rayalas
elevated rank. Considering his disgraceful and immoral conduct, Zamora
dismissed Rayala.
On petition for certiorari before the CA, the CA upheld the validity of the
order of Rayalas dismissal for violation of R.A. 6713, the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Rayala
filed an MR and CA Justice Reyes dissented from the decision to affirm
because under AO 250 the imposable penalty was suspension for a
minimum of 6 months and 1 day. A Special Division had to be constituted
to settle the disagreement and the CA modified its earlier decision so
that Rayala was only suspended for one year.
Domingo and Rayala filed Petitions for Review before the SC. Domingo
wanted Sec. Zamoras original order to be upheld, Rayala wanted to be
cleared of all charges of sexual harassment, i.e. no punishment at all.
The Republic did not like the CAs resolution and filed its own Petition for
Review
because
it
wanted
Rayala
dismissed
ISSUES & RATIO.
1.
Did Rayala commit sexual harassment? YES.
It must be pointed out that despite Rayalas protests and allegations of
conspiracy, he was found guilty by THREE independent bodies: the
Committee, the OP, and the CA. They differed only as to the appropriate
penalty. The assessments of the Committee and OP were found by the CA
and SC to be a meticulous and dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of
the complainant and respondent. When supported by substantial evidence,
factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are
accorded great respect by the courts.
2.
Was AO 250 an unlawful expansion of sexual harassment
under R.A. 7877? NO
Issue was raised by Rayala. he argued that in Aquino v. Acosta the SC laid
down what truly constitutes sexual harassment, and such is what is
applicable not AO 250. Under R.A. 7877 there needs to be a demand of a
sexual favor which is a pre-condition to hiring or continued employment,
the denial of which results in discrimination against the employee. He
argued that the acts imputed to him were without malice, and contrary to
the CAs findings sexual harassment is not malum prohibitum, hence

malice is an essential element of the crime. AO 250 expanded the

definition of sexual harassment under R.A. 7877.

a.

SC: Rayala admitted to doing what Lourdes said he did, but insisted that
such was not sexual harassment within the purview of the law. However,
the SC pointed out that basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold
liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public
officer may give rise to civil, criminal, and administrative liability which can
proceed independently of the others. This rule applies with full force to
sexual harassment.
While Rayala correctly pointed out that under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7877 certain
elements were required in order for the crime to be committed, this is with
respect to CRIMINAL LIABILITY only.

b.

Under Sec. 4 of the Act, which governs administrative cases, the employer
or head of the institution shall provide a procedure for the resolution,
settlement, and prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. The rules and
regulations promulgated in this respect shall include, among others,
guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace.
Hence, the CA correctly ruled that Rayalas culpability was not determined
solely under Sec. 3, since he was charged with the administrative offense.
Under AO 250, in relation to Sec. 4 of R.A. 7877, he could be charged for
sexual harassment for violating the guidelines on proper decorum set down
in the AO.
However, EVEN IF Sec. 3 were the only standard, Rayala would still be
administratively liable. The demand, request, or requirement of a sexual
favor need not be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It
may be discerned from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Ms.
Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her
ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money
allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and
making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones all these acts of
Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual
favor. Furthermore, it is not necessary that the demand be a precondition
to employment it is enough that the acts result in creating and
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee
3.

c.

d.

The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution

of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal
rights;
A real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
ones favor, and to defend ones rights;
A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively
a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality;
and
A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records, or made known to the parties
affected.

The records show that Rayala was afforded all these procedural due
process safeguards. He appeared personally and with counsel and
participated in the proceedings.
As to the designation of the offense (disgraceful and immoral conduct)
even in criminal cases such is not controlling. What is controlling is the
description of the offense charged and the particular facts therein recited.
It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to
disgraceful and immoral conduct, which is punished by the RAC. Hence, it
can be concluded that any finding of liability for sexual harassment may
also be the basis of culpability for a charge for disgraceful and immoral
conduct.
4.
Did the CA err in modifying the penalty imposed by the OP?
NO.
The only limitations to the Presidents power to remove the NLRC
Chairman are the requirements under the law and the due process
clause.
Issue raised by Lourdes and the Republic. They argued that the President
had the prerogative to determine the proper penalty to be imposed on the
erring presidential appointee, since the President has control of the entire
Executive Department. The limitation of AO 250 referred only to instances
where the DOLE Secretary was the disciplining authority.

Was Rayala denied due process? NO.

Rayala argued that in the OPs decision he was dismissed for disgraceful
and immoral conduct under the Revised Administrative Code. Considering
that he was tried for a violation of R.A. 7877 and not for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, he argued that he was denied the right to procedural
due process.
The SC disagreed. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process
has been recognized to include the following

SC: It was error for the OP to dismiss Rayala. Under AO 250 the penalty for
the first offense is suspension is 6 months and one day to 1 year, while the
penalty for the second offense is dismissal. This is the same penalty
prescribed by Sec. 22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 52 A(15) of the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Under
the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during good
behaviour until he or she reaches the age of 65, unless sooner removed for
cause as provided by law or becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties
of the office.

In the order issued by Sec. Zamora, he cited these provisions but failed to
apply the appropriate penalty. It was proper that the President, as the
proper disciplining authority, determined whether there was valid cause for
Rayalas removal. This power, however, is qualified by the phrase for
cause as provided by law. In short, when the OP found that Rayala was
guilty the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a
penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense. Whether
the OP found him guilty under AO 250 or the RAC, the penalty was the
same: suspension, not dismissal. The high office occupied by Rayala [rank
equivalent of a CA Justice] and his abuse of it would only constitute an
aggravating circumstance meriting the maximum penalty one year
suspension, as correctly found by the CA.
DECISION.
CA affirmed, all petitions denied