Evanston Carlena - "We Take No Prisoners

Evanston
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We Take No Prisoners !!!
Evanston
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K Security
Evanston
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Table of Contents
K Security..........................................................................2
Shells.........................................................................................5
1NC Kritik................................................................................................... 6
2NC Overview.......................................................................................... 12
1NC Security Critique...............................................................................14
1NC Reps First.......................................................................................... 22
Framework................................................................................24
AT: Framework [Ks Bad]..........................................................................25
AT: Reps not Key....................................................................................... 27
AT: Judge Choice...................................................................................... 29
Discourse................................................................................................. 30
Judge Choice Card *look at the author.....................................................31
AT: Your K is just Defense.........................................................................34
Specific Relations Reps Card....................................................................35
AT: Incommensurability............................................................................36
AT: Solt..................................................................................................... 37
Perm........................................................................................40
Generic Rant............................................................................................ 41
DA to Perms............................................................................................. 42
AT: Perm do Both...................................................................................... 44
AT: Perm do the Plan then the Alt.............................................................45
AT: Perm do the Plan and Non-Mutually Exclusive Aspects......................46
AT: Perm do the Plan without Security Discourse.....................................47
Link/Impact Answers.................................................................48
AT: Threats Real....................................................................................... 49
AT: Cede the Political................................................................................51
AT: Experts............................................................................................... 53
AT: Empirics.............................................................................................. 54
AT: No Root Cause.................................................................................... 55
AT: Predictions Good................................................................................56
AT: Realism Good..................................................................................... 59
AT: Realism Inevitable.............................................................................. 61
AT: Realism = Science..............................................................................62
AT: Thayer................................................................................................ 64
AT: Securitization Hyperbolic....................................................................67
AT: Fear is Worse...................................................................................... 68
AT: Thornhill and Palmer...........................................................................69
AT: Shaw and Wong.................................................................................. 72
AT: Guzzini................................................................................................ 74
AT: Jarvis.................................................................................................. 75
AT: Murray................................................................................................ 77
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AT: Popper................................................................................................ 78
AT: Mearsheimer...................................................................................... 79
Links........................................................................................80
2NC Military Data Turns Case................................................................81
2NC Enviro K............................................................................................ 83
Link: Multilateralism.................................................................................85
Link: Relations.......................................................................................... 86
Link: Islamic Wars.................................................................................... 87
Link: Fear of Death...................................................................................88
Link: Mideast............................................................................................ 91
Link: Great Power War..............................................................................94
Link: Environment.................................................................................... 95
Link: Koreas............................................................................................. 98
Link: South China Sea Threat.................................................................101
Link: Identity Politics..............................................................................103
Link: Russia............................................................................................ 104
Link: Iran Threat..................................................................................... 106
Link: Kagan............................................................................................ 108
David Campbell, Geography @ Durham ET AL 7 Performing Security:
The Imaginative Geographies of current US strategy Political Geography
26 (4)..................................................................................................... 108
Link: International Law...........................................................................110
Bowden 04 Brett Bowden 4 In the Name of Progress and Peace (PhD
from The Australian National University and his undergraduate degrees
from Flinders University of South Australia associate Professor of Politics
and International Studies. He holds appointments at the University of
Western Sydney, The Australian National University, Canberra, and at the
University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy,
Canberr, Alernatives 29.........................................................................110
Link: Economy........................................................................................ 111
Mark Neocleous, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel
University, 08 (Critique of Security, McGill-Queens University, pp. 9497, Published 2008)...............................................................................111
Link: NATO............................................................................................. 114
Link: War Between States......................................................................115
Link: Positive Peace................................................................................ 116
Link: Rhetoric......................................................................................... 117
Link: Human Rights................................................................................119
Link: China............................................................................................. 120
Link: CBA................................................................................................ 122
Link: Cyber-Terrorism..............................................................................124
Link: Disease.......................................................................................... 125
Link: Democracy.................................................................................... 126
Link: K Affs............................................................................................. 128
Link: Prolif.............................................................................................. 130
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Link: Technology.................................................................................... 131

Link: Competitiveness............................................................................133
Link: Geography..................................................................................... 135
Link: Indo-Pak War................................................................................. 137
Link: Immigration................................................................................... 138
Link: Economic Engagement..................................................................142
Link: Drug Trade..................................................................................... 143
Link: Mexico-specific.............................................................................. 148
Link: Border-security.............................................................................. 150
Alternative..............................................................................152
2NC Overview........................................................................................ 153
AT: Alt will Be Rejected...........................................................................155
AT: Alt has No Timeframe.......................................................................156
AT: Utopian Alt....................................................................................... 157
AT: Vague Alts Bad................................................................................. 158
AT: Alt=Extinction..................................................................................159
AT: Mindset Fiat...................................................................................... 160
Impacts..................................................................................161
Genocide................................................................................................ 162
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Shells
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1NC Kritik
The concept of security is a social construct. Their claims

of war and conflict create a false dichotomy between the
evil them and the good us ignoring our role in
provoking the aggression. The social context of realist
security discourse outweighs Affirmative advantage
claims.
David Grondin, Masters in Political Science and Ph.D. Candidate
University of Ottawa, 2004, ((Re)Writing the National Security State,
Center for United States Studies, p. 12-17)
Approaches that deconstruct theoretical practices in order to disclose
what is hidden in the use of concepts such as national security have something
valuable to say. Their more reflexive and critically-inclined view illustrates
how terms used in realist discourses, such as state, anarchy, world order, revolution in
military affairs, and security dilemmas, are produced by a specific historical,
geographical and socio-political context as well as historical forces and social
relations of power (Klein, 1994: 22). Since realist analysts do not question
their ontology and yet purport to provide a neutral and objective
analysis of a given world order based on military power and interactions between the most important
political units, namely states, realist discourses constitute a political act in
defense of the state. Indeed, [] it is important to recognize that to employ a
textualizing approach to social policy involving conflict and war is not to
attempt to reduce social phenomena to various concrete manifestations of language.
Rather, it is an attempt to analyze the interpretations governing policy
thinking. And it is important to recognize that policy thinking is not unsituated
(Shapiro, 1989a: 71). Policy thinking is practical thinking since it imposes an analytic
order on the real world, a world that only exists in the analysts own
narratives. In this light, Barry Posens political role in legitimizing American hegemonic power and
national security conduct seems obvious: U.S. command of the commons provides an impressive
Command of the
gives the United States a tremendous capability to harm others.
Marrying that capability to a conservative policy of selective engagement
helps make U.S. military power appear less threatening and more
tolerable. Command of the commons creates additional collective goods for U.S. allies. These
foundation for selective engagement. It is not adequate for a policy of primacy. []
commons
collective goods help connect U.S. military power to seemingly prosaic welfare concerns. U.S. military
power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, and commercial remote sensing, which
all depend on peace and order in the commons (Posen, 2003: 44 and 46). Adopting a more critical stance,
David Campbell points out that [d]anger
is not an objective condition. It (sic) is not

a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become
a threat. [] Nothing is a risk in itself; [...] it all depends on how one
analyses the danger, considers the event (Campbell, 1998: 1-2). In the same vein, national
security discourse does not evaluate objective threats; rather, it is itself
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a product of historical processes and structures in the state and

society that produces it. Whoever has the power to define security is
then the one who has the authority to write legitimate security
discourses and conduct the policies that legitimize them. The realist
analysts and state leaders who invoke national security and act in its name are the
same individuals who hold the power to securitize threats by inserting
them in a discourse that frames national identity and freezes it.9 Like
many concepts, realism is essentially contested. In a critical reinterpretation of realism, James Der
Derian offers a genealogy of realism that deconstructs the uniform realism
represented in IR: he reveals many other versions of realism that are never
mentioned in International Relations texts (Der Derian, 1995: 367). I am aware that there are many
realist discourses in International Relations, but they all share a set of assumptions,
such as the state is a rational unitary actor, the state is the main actor in international relations,
realism is one
way of representing reality, not the reflection of reality. While my aim here
is not to rehearse Der Derians genealogy of realism, I do want to spell out the problems with a
positivist theory of realism and a correspondence philosophy of language. Such a
philosophy accepts nominalism, wherein language as neutral
description corresponds to reality. This is precisely the problem of epistemic realism
and of the realism characteristic of American realist theoretical discourses. And since for
poststructuralists language constitutes reality, a reinterpretation of
realism as constructed in these discourses is called for.10 These scholars cannot
refer to the essentially contested nature of realism and then use
realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon (Der
Derian, 1995: 374). Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that the many neorealist and
neoclassical realist discourses in International Relations are not useful. Rather, I want
to argue that these technicist and scientist forms of realism serve political
purposes, used as they are in many think tanks and foreign policy bureaucracies to inform
American political leaders. This is the relevance of deconstructing
the uniform realism (as used in International Relations): it brings to light its
locatedness in a hermeneutic circle in which it is unwittingly trapped (Der
Derian, 1995: 371). And as Friedrich Kratochwil argues, [] the rejection of a
correspondence theory of truth does not condemn us, as it is often
maintained, to mere relativism and/or to endless deconstruction in which
anything goes but it leaves us with criteria that allows us to distinguish
and evaluate competing theoretical creations (Kratochwil, 2000 : 52). Given that
states pursue power defined as a national interest, and so on. I want to show that
political language is not a neutral medium that gives expression to ideas formed independently of
structures of signification that sustain political action and thought, American realist discourses belonging
We
are trapped in the production of discourses in which national leaders
and security speech acts emanating from realist discourses develop
and reinforce a notion of national identity as synonymous with
national security. U.S. national security conduct should thus be understood
through the prism of the theoretical discourses of American political
leaders and realist scholars that co-constitute it. Realist discourses depict
to the neorealist or neoclassical realist traditions cannot be taken as mere descriptions of reality.
American political leaders acting in defense of national security, and political leaders act in the name of
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national security. In the end, what distinguishes realist discourses is that they depict the United States as
having behaved like a national security state since World War II, while legitimating the idea that the United
States should continue to do so.
Political scientists and historians are engaged in

making (poesis), not merely recording or reporting (Medhurst, 2000: 17). Precisely
in this sense, rhetoric is not the description of national security conduct; it constitutes it. It is difficult to
trace the exact origins of the concept of national security. It seems however that its currency in
policymaking circles corresponds to the American experience of the Second World War and of the early
years of what came to be known as the Cold War. In this light, it is fair to say that the meaning of the
If one is engaged in
deciphering the meaning of the Cold War prism for American leaders, what matters is
not uncovering the reality of the Cold War as such, but how, it conferred meaning
and led people to act upon it as reality. The Cold War can thus be seen as a
American national security state is bound up with the Cold War context.
rhetorical construction, in which its rhetorical dimensions gave meaning to its material manifestations,
such as the national security state apparatus. This is not to say that the Cold War never existed per se, nor
does it make [it] any less real or less significant for being rhetorical (Medhurst, 2000: 6). As Lynn Boyd
Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. stress, political rhetoric creates political reality, structures belief
systems, and provides the fundamental bases for decisions (Hinds and Windt, cited in Medhurst, 2000: 6).
War ceases to be a historical period which meaning

can be written permanently and becomes instead a struggle that is
not context-specific and not geared towards one specific enemy. It is
In this sense, the Cold
an orientation towards difference in which those acting on behalf of an assumed but never fixed identity
are tempted by the lure of otherness to interpret all dangers as fundamental threats which require the
mobilization of a population (Campbell, 2000: 227). Indeed, if the meaning of the Cold War is not contextspecific, the concept of national security cannot be disconnected from what is known as the Cold War,
since its very meaning(s) emerged within it (Rosenberg, 1993 : 277).11 If the American national security
state is a given for realist analysts,12 it is important to ask whether we can conceive the United States
during the Cold War as anything other than a national security state.13 To be clear, I am not suggesting
that there is any such essentialized entity as a national security state.14 When I refer to the American
national security state, I mean the representation of the American state in the early years of the Cold War,
the spirit of which is embodied in the National Security Act of 1947 (Der Derian, 1992: 76). The term
national security state designates both an institutionalization of a new governmental architecture
designed to prepare the United States politically and militarily to face any foreign threat and the ideology
the discourse that gave rise to as well as symbolized it. In other words, to understand the idea of a
national security state, one needs to grasp the discursive power of national security in shaping the reality
A national security
state feeds on threats as it channels all its efforts into meeting
current and future military or security threats. The creation of the CIA, the
of the Cold War in both language and institutions (Rosenberg, 1993 : 281).
Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council at the onset of the Cold
construction
of threats is thus essential to its well-being, making intelligence agencies
War gave impetus to a state mentality geared to permanent preparedness for war. The
privileged tools in accomplishing this task. As American historian of U.S. foreign relations Michael Hogan
observes in his study on the rise of the national security state during the Truman administration, the
national security ideology framed the Cold War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that
defined Americas national identity by reference to the un-American other, usually the Soviet Union, Nazi
a binary system made it

difficult for any domestic dissent from U.S. policy to emerge it would have
amounted to an act of disloyalty (Hogan, 1998: 18).15 While Hogan distinguishes
Germany, or some other totalitarian power (Hogan, 1998: 17). Such
advocates from critics of the American national security state, his view takes for granted that there is a
given and fixed American political culture that differs from the new national security ideology. It posits an
American way, produced by its cultural, political, and historical experience. Although he stresses that
differences between the two sides of the discourse are superficial, pertaining solely to the means, rather
than the ends of the national security state, Hogan sees the national security state as a finished and
legitimate state: an American state suited to the Cold War context of permanent war, while stopping short
of a garrison state: Although government would grow larger, taxes would go up, and budget deficits would
become a matter of routine, none of these and other transformations would add up to the crushing regime
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symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state. The outcome instead would be an American national
security state that was shaped as much by the countrys democratic political culture as it was by the
I disagree with this

essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. The United States does
not need to be a national security state. If it was and is still constructed as such by many
perceived military imperatives of the Cold War (Hogan, 1998: 22).
realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some political purpose. Moreover, in keeping with
identity need not be, and indeed never is,

fixed. In a scheme in which to say is to do, that is, from a perspective that accepts
the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site where
identity politics happens rather than being a substantive phenomenon.
In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy
decision-making. Culture is a signifying part of the conditions of
possibility for social being, [] the way in which culturalist
arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose
name they speak (Campbell, 1998: 221). The Cold War national security culture represented in
my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that
realist discourses was constitutive of the American national security state. There was certainly a conflation
of theory and policy in the Cold War military-intellectual complex, which were observers of, and active
participants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to portray the enemy that both
reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body politic. As scholarly partners
in the national security state, they were instrumental in defining and disseminating a Cold War culture
(Rubin, 2001: 15). This national security culture was a complex space where various representations and
representatives of the national security state compete to draw the boundaries and dominate the murkier
security culture
has been maintained by political practice (on the part of realist analysts and
political leaders) through realist discourses in the post-9/11 era and once again
reproduces the idea of a national security state. This (implicit) state identification is
neither accidental nor inconsequential. From a poststructuralist vantage point, the
identification process of the state and the nation is always a negative process for
it is achieved by exclusion, violence, and marginalization. Thus, a
deconstruction of practices that constitute and consolidate state identity
is necessary: the writing of the state must be revealed through the
analysis of the discourses that constitute it. The state and the
discourses that (re)constitute it thus frame its very identity and
impose a fictitious national unity on society; it is from this fictive
and arbitrary creation of the modernist dichotomous discourses of
inside/outside that the discourses (re)constructing the state emerge .
It is in the creation of a Self and an Other in which the state uses it
monopolistic power of legitimate violence a power socially constructed, following
Max Webers work on the ethic of responsibility to construct a threatening Other
differentiated from the unified Self, the national society (the nation).16
It is through this very practice of normative statecraft,17 which
produces threatening Others, that the international sphere comes
into being. David Campbell adds that it is by constantly articulating danger through foreign policy
margins of international relations (Der Derian, 1992: 41). The same Cold War
that the states very conditions of existence are generated18.
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Securitization is a precondition to genocide- their

advantage descriptions will be used to justify massive
violence
Karsten Friis, UN Sector @ the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs,
2k [Peace and Conflict Studies 7.2, From Liminars to Others: Securitization
Through Myths, http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=2]
The problem with societal securitization is one of representation . It is rarely clear in advance who it is
that speaks for a community. There is no system of representation as in a state. Since literately anyone can stand up as representatives,
there is room for entrepreneurs. It is not surprising if we experience a struggle between different
representatives and also their different representations of the society. What they do share,
however, is a conviction that they are best at providing (a new) order. If they can do this convincingly, they
gain legitimacy. What must be done is to make the uncertain certain and make the unknown an
object of knowledge. To present a discernable Other is a way of doing this. The Other is represented as an Other -- as
an unified single actor with a similar unquestionable set of core values (i.e. the capital O). They are objectified, made into
an object of knowledge, by re-presentation of their identity and values. In other words, the representation of
the Other is depoliticized in the sense that its inner qualities are treated as given and non-negotiable. In Jef Huysmans (1998:241)
words, there is both a need for a mediation of chaos as well as of threat. A mediation of chaos is more
it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing

representation of the Self and its surroundings . It is a mediation of ontological security, which means ...a
basic than a mediation of threat, as
strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity ... by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order (Huysmans
1998:242). As he and others (like Hansen 1998:240) have pointed out, the importance of a threat construction for political
identification, is often overstated. The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order in general, is just
as important. This may imply naming an Other but not necessarily as a threat. Such a dichotomization implies a
necessity to get rid of all the liminars (what Huysmans calls strangers). This is because
they ...connote a challenge to categorizing practices through the impossibility of being categorized, and does
not threaten the community, ...but the possibility of ordering itself (Huysmans 1998:241). They are a challenge to the entrepreneur
by their very existence. They confuse the dichotomy of Self and Other and thereby the entrepreneurs mediation of chaos. As
mentioned, a liminar can for instance be people of mixed ethnical ancestry but also representations of
competing world-pictures. As Eide (1998:76) notes: Over and over again we see that the liberals within a
group undergoing a mobilisation process for group conflict are the first ones to go. The liminars threaten the
ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately
undermines the legitimacy of his policy. The liminars may be securitized by some sort of disciplination,
from suppression of cultural symbols to ethnic cleansing and expatriation. This is a threat to the ontological
order of the entrepreneur, stemming from inside and thus repoliticizing the inside/outside dichotomy. Therefore the liminar
must disappear. It must be made into a Self, as several minority groups throughout the world have experienced,
or it must be forced out of the territory. A liminar may also become an Other, as its connection to the Self
is cut and their former common culture is renounced and made insignificant. In Anne Nortons (1988:55) words, The presence of
difference in the ambiguous other leads to its classification as wholly unlike and identifies it unqualifiedly with the archetypal other,
denying the resemblance to the self. Then the liminar is no longer an ontological danger (chaos), but what Huysmans (1998:242)
calls a mediation of daily security. This is not challenging the order or the system as such but has become a visible, clear-cut Other.
In places like Bosnia, this naming and replacement of an Other, has been regarded by the securitizing actors as the solution to the
ontological problem they have posed. Securitization was not considered a political move , in the sense that there
were any choices. It was a necessity : Securitization was a solution based on a depoliticized ontology.10 This way the worldpicture of the securitizing actor is not only a representation but also made into reality. The mythical second-order language is made
into first-order language, and its innocent reality is forced upon the world. To the entrepreneurs and other actors involved it has
become a natural necessity with a need to make order , even if it implies making the world
match the map. Maybe that is why war against liminars are so often total; it attempts a total
expatriation or a total solution (like the Holocaust) and not only a victory on the
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battlefield. If the enemy is not even considered a legitimate Other, the door may be more open to a kind of
violence that is way beyond any war conventions, any jus in bello. This way, securitizing is
legitimized: The entrepreneur has succeeded both in launching his world-view and in
prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the myths, by
speaking on behalf of the natural and eternal, where truth is never questioned.
The Alternative is to Vote Negative to reject the

securitization of the 1AC this opens up space for
emancipatory political engagement more likely to deal
with real world problems
Mark Neocleous, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of
Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ 2008 [Critique of Security, 1856]
The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to
eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically
loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the
authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly
something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought
and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual.
It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an
insecure world'and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after
another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of
securitysuggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of
the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now
become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the
constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The
constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political
end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term.
That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which
the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for
and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is
possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed.
Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly
addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political
questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security',
despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what
might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an antipolitics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the
security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism
and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We
therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it
in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state
intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a
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personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important

text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away
security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to
agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think
that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or
revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or
humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the
statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as
the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to
fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an
alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of
bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the
arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new
political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while
much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the
tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the
positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme
concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism,
then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more
security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage
our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives
to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves
against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect
achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues,
debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the
existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even
the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of
politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of
thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond
security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the
word.What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it
certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it
is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as
solidarity;it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition,
and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead
learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come
with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not
mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the
state;it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'
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2NC Overview
The 1AC claims their impacts as threats for the realist

interests of the United States this leads to the
construction of a false other through securitization. Our
alternative rejects realist processes in favor of critically
re-evaluating the motives behind the plan. There are
multiple implications:
A. Structural violence- hyper militarism creates and
sustains hierarchies of inequality directly responsible for
global economic inequality, racialized oppression, and
gender binaries. This system of structural violence not
only outweighs deaths caused from war and conflict- it
fuels the psychological enemy creation needed to
legitimize militarized violence- thats Friis.
B. Self-fullfilling prophecy: threats to security dont exist
independent of our own mental contributions to them.
Representations of war and conflict add fuel to the fires of
war by establishing hostile cognitive filters that are the
psychic precondition to war-Thats Grondin
C. Root Cause: failure to grapple with the psychological
roots of enemy creation guarantees continued conflictentrenched ways of thinking cause us to move from
enemy to enemy because we need them to exist- the end
of the cold war caused demonization of Japan, China, and
now Islam to sustain our mental desire for conflict. In this
instance root cause outweighs proximate cause- their
description of the triggers of war is a false constructacting to solve it accomplishes nothing
All of our arguments are both prior and relevant to policy
we need to reject linear thinking and challenge problems
first.
Bauman 00 [Zygmunt Bauman, prominent sociology writer and Professor
of sociology at the University of Leeds (since 1990 emeritus); Liquid
Modernity; Polity Press 2000; pgs. 215-216]
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To diagnose a disease does not mean the same as curing it - this

general rule applies to sociological diagnoses as much as it does to
medical verdicts. But let us note that the illness of society differs from
bodily illnesses in one tremendously important respect: in the the case of
an ailing social order, the absence of an adequate diagnosis
( elbowed out o r silenced by the tendency t o 'interpret away' the risks
spotted by Ulrich Beck) is a crucial, perhaps decisive, part of the
disease . As Cornelius Castoriadis famously put it, society is ill if it stops
questioning itself; and it cannot be otherwise, considering that whether it knows it or not - society is autonomous ( its institutions are
nothing but human-made and so, potentially, human-unmade), and that
suspension of self-questioning bars the awareness of autonomy while
promoting the illusion of heteronomy with its unavoidably fatalistic
consequences. To restart questioning means to take a take a long
step towards the cure. If in the history of human condition
discovery equals creation, if in thinking about the human condition
explanation and understanding are one - so in the efforts to improve
human condition diagnosis and therapy merge. Pierre Bourdieu
expressed this perfectly in the conclusion of La Misere du monde: 'To
become aware of the mechanisms which make life painful, even
unliveable, does not mean to neutralize them; to bring to light the
contradictions does not mean to resolve them. ' And yet, sceptical as
one can be about the social effectiveness of the sociological message, the
effects of allowing those who suffer to discover the possibility of
relating their sufferings to social causes cannot be denied; nor can
we dismiss the effects of effects of becoming aware of the social
origin of unhappiness 'in all its forms, including the most intimate
and most secret of them' . Nothing is less innocent, Bourdieu reminds us,
than laissez-faire. Watching human misery with equanimity while placating
the pangs of conscience with the ritual incantation of the TINA ( 'there is no
alternative' ) creed, means complicity. Whoever willingly or by default
partakes of the cover-up or, worse still, the denial of -the human-made, noninevitable, contingent and alterable nature of social order, notably of the kind
of order responsible for unhappiness, is guilty of immorality - of refusing help
to a person in danger. Doing sociology and writing sociology is aimed
at disclosing the possibility of living together differently, with less
misery or no misery: the possibility daily withheld, overlooked or unbelieved.
Not-seeing, not-seeking and thereby suppressing this possibility is itself part
of human misery and a major factor in its perpetuation. Its disclosure does
not by itself predetermine its use; also, when known, possibilities may not be
trusted enough to be put to the test of reality. Disclosure is the
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beginning, not the end of the war against human misery. But that
war cannot be waged in earnest , let alone with a chance of at least
partial success, unless the scale of human freedom is revealed and
recognized, so that freedom can be fully deployed in the fight against the
social sources of all, including the most individual and private, unhappiness.
There is no choice between 'engaged' and 'neutral' ways of doing sociology.
A non-committal sociology is an impossibility. Seeking a morally
neutral stance among the many brands of sociology practised today,
brands stretching all the way from the outspokenly libertarian to the
staunchly communitarian , would be a vain effort. Sociologists may deny
or forget the 'world-view' effects of their work, and the impact of that view on
human singular or j oint actions, only at the expense of forfeiting that
responsibility of choice which every other human being faces daily. The job
of sociology is to see to it that the choices are genuinely free, and
that they remain so, increasingly so, for the duration of humanity
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1NC Security Critique
The affirmative represents an inherently unstable world

needing innovative solutions to constant problems, which
entrenches insecurity logic. The impact is a circular
apocalyptic impulse that makes violence inevitable
Chernus 1Ira Chernus, Professor of Religious Studies at the University of
Colorado at Boulder [Fighting Terror in The National Insecurity State,
http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/WaronTerrorismEssays/FightingTerror.htm]
Just as the outcome of World War I sowed the seeds of World War II, and the outcome of World War II the
this
newest war is already, quite visibly, sowing the seeds of insecurity to come.
It may be most useful to view the whole period from the early cold
war years through the present war as a single historical era: the era
seeds of the cold war, so the outcome of the cold war sowed the seeds of the war on terrorism. And
of the national insecurity state . Throughout that era, U.S. policy decisions
made in the name of national security consistently breed a greater
sense of vulnerability, frustration, and insecurity .
It is not hard to see why. Four decades of cold war enshrined two fundamental
principles at the heart of our public life: there is a mortal threat to
the very existence of our nation, and our own policies play no role in
generating the threat. The belief structure of the national insecurity state flows logically from
these premises. If our nation bears no responsibility, then we are powerless to eradicate the threat. If
There is no hope for a truly

better world, nor for ending the danger by mutual compromise with
"the other side." The threat is effectively eternal . The best to hope for is to
others threaten us through no fault of our own, what can we do?
hold the threat forever at bay.
Yet the sense of powerlessness is oddly satisfying , because it

preserves the conviction of innocence : if our policies are so
ineffectual, the troubles of the world can hardly be our fault. And the
vision of an endless status quo is equally satisfying, because it
promises to prevent historical change. If peril is permanent, the
world is an endless reservoir of potential enemies. Any fundamental
change in the status quo portends only catastrophe.
The only path to security, it seems, is to prevent change by imposing
control over others. When those others fight back, the national
insecurity state protests its innocence: we act only in self-defense; we want
only stability. The state sees no reason to re-evaluate its policies;
that would risk the change it seeks, above all, to avoid. So it can only
meet violence with more violence . Of course, the inevitable frustration
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is blamed on the enemy, reinforcing the sense of peril and the

demand for absolute control through violence.
The goal of total control is self-defeating ; each step toward security
becomes a source of, and is taken as proof of, continuing insecurity. This
makes the logic of the insecurity state viciously circular. Why are we
always fighting? Because we always have enemies. How do we know
we always have enemies? Because we are always fighting . And knowing
that we have enemies, how can we afford to stop fighting? In the insecurity state, there is
no way to talk about security without voicing fears of insecurity, no
way to express optimism without expressing despair. On every front, it is
a self-fulfilling prophecy; a self-confirming and self-perpetuating
spiral of violence; a trap that seems to offer no way out .
It is not surprising, then, that the pattern of insecurity crystallized during the cold war survived that war.
The "experts" insisted that now we were less secure. September 11 proved them
indisputably right. Now they offer an official story that pretends to see an
end to insecurity, but actually promises the endless insecurity of another
cold war. And the policies based on that story virtually guarantee
that the promise will be fulfilled.
But that is just what most Americans expect, in any event. Caged inside the logic of the
insecurity state, they can see no other possibility. So the official story hardly
seems to be one option among many. Its premises and conclusions seem so
necessary, so inevitable, that no other story can be imagined. For huge
numbers of Americans, the peace movements alternative story is not mistaken. It is simply
incomprehensible, like a foreign language, for it assumes that we can take steps to address the very
sources of insecurity. That denies the most basic foundations of the prevailing public discourse. Quite
naturally, then, the majority embraces the only story it can understand. The story is persuasive because
the alternative seems to be having no story at all.
The official story prevails by default, as the nation faces the prospect of further war around the world. Yet
that is only half its power. The other half comes from the paradoxical consolation it provides as we look
back to what happened here at home, on September 11, when four hijacked planes crashed headlong into
the national insecurity state.
The cold war is long over, the Reds are long gone, and now the twin towers
are gone, too. But the national insecurity state still stands. Indeed, it
stands stronger and taller precisely because the towers are gone.
Our sense of insecurity has grown. But it is not fundamentally
different in kind. The attacks did not create a pervasive sense of
insecurity. Rather, the insecurity that was already pervasive shaped
the dominant interpretation of and response to the attacks .
The first response was the nearly universal cry: "Pearl Harbor." But "this was not Pearl Harbor," as National
Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice recognized. There is no rivalry between great nation states. No foreign
nation has attacked the U.S. No long-standing diplomatic and economic maneuvering preceded the attacks
of September 11, 2001. Why, then, did they so quickly evoke the imagery of December 7, 1941? The
common thread was not a hope for redemption, but only a conviction that the nations very existence was
threatened.
In 2001, that judgment is debatable, to say the least. Assuming that the attacks were indeed the work of a
Muslim splinter group, such groups have been trying to attack U.S. interests for a quarter-century or more.
One massive act of destruction, as horrendous as it was, hardly constitutes evidence of their overwhelming
power. Nor is there any real evidence for Bushs charge that these groups aim to impose their "radical
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evidence is irrelevant in the

national insecurity state. The fear comes first, before any evidence
that it is warranted. How do we know that our existence is
threatened? Because it is so obviously threatened! QED.
This circular argument seems to be confirmed by the expressions of
fear that have filled the mass media since September 11. They are certainly
sincere. Yet it has become almost obligatory to say, "Life will never
be the same because now, for the first time, we feel vulnerable." Most who say
beliefs on people everywhere and end a way of life." Yet
this can still remember, if they care to, the long cold war years of living on the brink of nuclear
annihilation. Many are old enough to recall the Cuban missile crisis. Even more can remember the Reagan
Are we really more vulnerable

now, or only vulnerable in a different way? Are we really less secure
than the days when one push of the button could trigger a thousand
September 11s? True, the September 11 attack was actual rather than merely potential. Yet the
administrations serious plans to fight a nuclear war.
scale of the potential attack we feared for so long was so much greater than the actual attack. Why should
so many say that the actual attack marked a quantum leap in national anxiety?
The notoriously poor historical memory of Americans is only part of

the answer. A larger part is the need to contain this new eruption of
disorder within a familiar meaning structure. The study of human culture shows,
over and over, that anxiety can be held in check, if not banished, by the
way people talk about it. People can feel relatively secure amidst the
most extraordinary disruption and anxiety, as long as they have
familiar words that put the disruption into some larger, dependable,
enduring order. The lifeline of security is a language that affirms the
enduring truth of the prevailing discourse and worldview .
Today, the discourse of the national insecurity state is the nations
most familiar structure. How natural, then, to reaffirm the fundamental
truth of that discourse, especially when its truth seems to be so empirically proven. Certainly,
there is a very real danger of more attacks on U.S. soil. But the magnitude of the danger is
measured by cultural needs rather than empirical considerations. In
the insecurity state, universal cries of alarm, massive preparations
for future attack, and protestations that life is fundamentally changed all show how
little has really changed. They serve to confirm the basic premise
that danger is eternal and unavoidable .
The name of the danger changes from time to time; for now, its name is
"terrorism." But the underlying reality remains the same. In the face of a
massive shock to our cultural assumptions, that promise of
continuity is immensely reassuring. This is the paradox that keeps
so many millions trapped in the insecurity state. In order to feel
culturally and psychologically secure, one must feel physically and
politically insecure .
Thus the problem the fear of terrorist attack becomes the solution. The film of the towers
bursting into flame is shown over and over again. The sheriffs stockpiling gas masks and anthrax vaccine
are interviewed over and over again. "Experts" explain "the psychology of the terrorist" over and over
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All of this has a ritualistic quality, for it serves much the same
function as every ritual. It acts out the basic worldview of the
insecurity state, confirming that it endures in the face of a massive
challenge.
again.
The dominant response to the tragedy in the U.S. also confirms that our own policies play no role in
evoking the danger. This message takes ritual form in prayer meetings, civic gatherings, charity drives,
and the Bush administrations humanitarian gestures for starving Afghans. All enact the essential goodness
of Americans. Even the most benign and laudable responses to the tragedy the national pride in heroic
rescue efforts, the outpouring of generous contributions, the genuine concern for the welfare of Muslimand Arab-Americans are seized and twisted in the overpowering cultural grasp of the national insecurity
state. As symbols of innocence, all reinforce the basic assumption that the U.S. is powerless to affect the
sources of continuing insecurity.
Bush has often stated the logical corollary of innocence. if our policies are not relevant to the problem,
the U.S. will not contemplate policy

changes that might lead to any fundamental change in political or
economic power relationships. Therefore the only remaining course is to
heighten the nations guard and use force to control the behavior of
would-be attackers.
there is nothing to negotiate. In other words,
Much of the response to the tragedy reinforces these interlocked assumptions of powerlessness and
The cries of alarm and defensive preparations create the

impression that the nation is circling the wagons and hunkering
down for a long siege, because there is nothing else to do. The ubiquitous
innocence.
American flag becomes a symbol, not of abolishing evil, but of banding together to withstand the assault of
Yet there is almost a palpable eagerness to feel vulnerable.

The new sense of national unity comes less from a common
commitment to victory than from a common conviction of
victimization.
Powerful vestiges of the crusading spirit do remain. There is still a
longing for unconditional triumph over the foreign foe . The constant
allusions to Pearl Harbor, FDR, and World War II express these longings. More importantly, they
create the illusion that genuine security is still possible. It is
disconcerting to live amidst insecurity and even more disconcerting
to acknowledge it openly. So the story of the "good war" is evoked
endlessly, because it would be so reassuring to be able to wage
another "good war." But the gestures of apocalyptic hope have a
peculiarly forced, artificial quality, as if the public is trying to draw
the last vestiges of living marrow out of an increasingly dead husk .
evil forever.
The symbols, rituals, and mantras of the redeemer nation serve a very different role when public culture no
longer really believes in the redemption. The problem is defined in apocalyptic terms. But no apocalyptic
solution is available, nor even suggested. Talk of hope for security still elicits powerful images of the peril
we hope to be secure from. But talk of peril is simply talk of peril, not a prelude to hope. There are no safe
homes we can return to, for we must assume that the enemy, in one form or another, will always be at our
gates.
Political leaders and pundits offer only an endless horizon of unflagging

efforts to maintain relative stability. In an inherently unstable world,
made less stable by a superpower pursuing control, this is indeed "a
task that does not end." All that once symbolized hope for the Kingdom of God on earth
(whether in religious or secular form) now locks us into a future of inconclusive struggle and mounting
the more we are convinced that insecurity is perpetual, the

more we will resist fundamental change.
anxiety. And
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That, of course, is the ultimate point. The prospect of another long,

twilight struggle returns our culture to the certitude of simplistic
absolutes. It erases the uncertainties of the 90s. It reassures us
that nothing has really changed and nothing need ever change. It
offers the best reason to go on resisting change. All of the
preparations for and acts of war, all the warnings of and protections
against future attacks, all the patriotic singing and flag-waving, all the gestures of
hope that things will be better in the future, indeed all the dominant cultural
responses to the attacks all are now representations of the overriding
conviction that security is still an impossible dream, that the future
will not be fundamentally different from the present .
In a society so fearful of change, where constant change provokes widespread despair, the conviction of
unchanging insecurity engenders a strange kind of confidence. Millions now look ahead with more hope
precisely because they can now believe that there is nothing really new to hope for. They cling to the
insecurity that justifies their resistance to change. They take comfort in knowing that the explosions of
September 11, which we are told changed everything, could not shake the foundations of the national
insecurity state. The official story of the war on terrorism gives them that perverse comfort.
For years to come, we shall live in the shadow of the tragic deaths of September 11, 2001. As long as the
The national
insecurity state affords no prospect beyond death and suffering . So
official story prevails, death will be piled upon death, and suffering upon suffering.
this war pushes us further into the shadow of the most tragic death of all: the death of hope for a better, a
more peaceful, a genuinely secure future.
This fantasy of control will only produce a never-ending

war for securityblowback ensures efforts to create
order out of disorder will fail and result in more violence.
Ritchie 11Nick, PhD, Research Fellow at the Department of Peace
Studies @ University of Bradford, Executive Committee of the British Pugwash
Group and the Board of the Nuclear Information Service [Rethinking security:
a critical analysis of the Strategic Defence and Security Review International
Affairs Volume 87, Issue 2, Article first published online: 17 MAR 2011]
the legitimating narrative of acting as a force for good that
emerged in the 1998 SDR to justify an expensive, expeditionary, warfighting military doctrine in the name of enlightened self-interest
must be scrutinized. But the relationship between the rhetoric and the reality is highly
questionable. From a critical perspective it can be argued that successive governments
have framed interventionist policy choices as positive, progressive
and good to generate support for risk transfer military operations of
choice that are presented as essential to the security of UK citizens but
in fact reproduce a state-centric construction of a particular
national role. This reflects Hirshbergs contention that the maintenance of a positive national
Third,
self-image is crucial to continued public acquiescence and support for government, and thus to the
Afghanistan is a noble cause for the

reflects a state-centric concern with ideas of status and
prestige and the legitimating moral gloss of the force for good
smooth, on-going functioning of the state. 86 The notion that
British state
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rhetoric. 87 Furthermore, the rhetoric of enlightened self-interest implies

that the exercise of UK military force as a force for good will lessen
security risks to the British state and citizenry by resolving current
security threats and pre-empting future risks. But, returning again to Iraq and
Afghanistan, we must ask whether sacrificing solders lives, killing over
100,000 Iraqi civilians including a disproportionate number of
women and children, destroying the immediate human security of
several million others through injury, displacement, persecution and
trauma, and sparking long-term trends of rising crime rates,
property destruction, economic disruption, and deterioration of
health-care resources and food production and distribution
capabilities, all while providing profits for largely western
corporations through arms deals, service contracts and private
military contractors, constitutes being a force for good when the
outcomes of these major military interventions have proven at best
indeterminate. 88 The legitimacy of this question is reinforced by Curtiss analysis of the deadly
impact of British foreign policy since the 1950s. Curtis argues that the history of British foreign policy is
partly one of complicity in some of the worlds worst horrors contrary to the extraordinary rhetoric of
New Labour leaders and other elites, policies are continuing on this traditional course, systematically
making the world more abusive of human rights as well as more unequal and less secure. 89 Add to this
the statistic that the UK was involved in more wars between 1946 and 2003 (21 in total) than any other
the militarized
force for good narrative encompasses the active defence of the
rules-based system as a global good. But it is clear that the current
rules-based system of western-dominated multilateral institutions
and processes of global governance does not work for billions of
people or for planetary ecological systems . The Human Development Reports
produced by the United Nations Development Programme routinely highlight the global political
and economic structures and systems that keep hundreds of millions
of people poor, starving, jobless, diseased and repressed. 91 A stable
state, and the force for good rationale begins to unravel. 90 Furthermore,
rules-based system is no doubt in the interests of UK citizens and the interests of global human society.
there is a
growing consensus that long-term stability, particularly the
reduction of violent conflict, will require far greater political,
economic and environmental equity on a global scale, as advocated in the
Department for International Developments 2009 white paper on Eliminating world poverty. 92 An
interventionist, military-oriented, state-centric, global risk
management doctrine and the risks it can generate are unlikely to
stabilize and transform the rules-based system into a more
equitable form. A growing literature now argues that prevailing western
approaches to understanding, managing and ameliorating global
insecurity and its violent symptoms are inadequate and
unsustainable. They are proving, and will continue to prove,
increasingly incapable of providing security for both the worlds
poor and immiserated, concentrated in the Global South, and the
With stability comes predictability, which can minimize uncertainty, risk and insecurity. But
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worlds elite of around one billion, mainly located in the North

Atlantic community, Australasia and parts of East Asia, which will
remain unable to insulate itself from violent responses to pervasive
insecurity. 93 This is not to suggest that the UK should not exercise elements of national power to
alleviate others suffering as a consequence of natural or man-made disasters. Indeed, the Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereigntys 2001 responsibility to protect doctrine sets out clearly the principle
of conditional sovereignty and the grounds for legitimate intervention when a state cannot or will not
protect its citizens from pervasive and severe harm. 94 More broadly, if we accept that in an increasingly
complex, interdependent world the human security of UK citizens enmeshed in global networks of risk and
opportunity is intertwined with the human security of others, particularly in conflict-prone regions often
characterized by poverty, weak governance and underdevelopment, then actions to improve others longterm human security does constitute a form of enlightened self-interest. But we must question the
assumption that war-fighting interventionist missions of choice do, in fact, serve the long-term human
security interests of UK citizens as opposed to the interests of the state based on prevailing conceptions of
national role. Utility of force Connected to this critique is a reappraisal of the utility of force within the
conception of national security as global risk management, on two counts. First, security risks are
increasingly likely to arise from a complex mixture of interdependent factors. Environmental, economic,
military and political sources of insecurity could include the effects of climate change, mass poverty and
economic injustice, global pandemic disease, mass migration and refugee flows, poor governance, weak
and failing states, international terrorism and asymmetric warfare, the spread of WMD and advanced
conventional military technologies, ethnic and sectarian nationalism, and competition over access to key
resources such as oil and water. Future conflicts are therefore likely to be complex and diverse. They are
unlikely to be susceptible to purely military solutions, and the use of military force in regional crises will be
messy, indeterminate and of limited value and effectiveness. 95 It is not obvious that the armed forces
have a significant war-fighting role to play in mitigating these risks, as opposed to supporting police,
intelligence and security forces in countering terrorist plotsand possibly launching a limited, precision
strike against WMD capabilities in the event of the extreme scenario of robust intelligence that a WMD
attack is imminent. In fact, the 2009 National Security Strategy limited the role of the armed forces to
defence against direct threats to the UK and its overseas territories (which one could qualify as direct
violent, or military, threats) together with a contributory role in tackling threats to our security overseas
by helping to address conflict, instability and crises across the globe. 96 This broad but essentially
supportive remit for the military was reinforced in the 2010 National Security Strategys catalogue of
priority risks. The three-tiered list enumerated 15 risks, which can be reduced to five: terrorism, civil
emergencies, international crime, trade disputes and an attack by another state. 97 The role of military
force is limited in all of these except the last, which remains by far the least likely. As Jenkins argues,
almost none of the above is a threat. They are crimes, catastrophes, or, in the case of being drawn in to a
foreign conflict, a matter of political choice as for the threat of conventional attack on the British Isles by
another state, we can only ask who? The threat is so negligible as to be insignificant. It is like insuring
ones house for billions of pounds against an asteroid attack. 98 Bob Ainsworth, then Defence Secretary,
seemed to grasp this in 2009, arguing that our initial conclusions on the character of warfare should be
first that international intervention will be more difficult not less. We will have to consider carefully how to
apply military force in pursuit of national security. And second, and related to this, that the timely
application of soft power and methods of conflict prevention will be a high priority. 99 Yet the government
also insists on maintaining an interventionist, expeditionary military doctrine and corresponding
capabilities based on a seemingly unquestioned national security role as a force for good in global risk
risk management through military

intervention in a complex international security environment
characterized by asymmetric cultures, actors and distributions of
power and knowledge, and interconnections on many levels, can
generate significant negative feedback, or blowback , from
management operations. Second,
unintended outcomes that create more risk . This challenges notions of effective
risk management and control through linear change via the exercise of military power. 100 In fact, as
the decision to act to mitigate a risk itself becomes risky:

in the attempt to maintain control, negative feedback from the
effects of a decision inevitably leads to a loss of control . 101 The
Williams argues,
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danger is that military-based risk management becomes a cyclical

process with no end in sight. 102 Rogers, for example, presciently envisaged a post-9/11
never-ending war of military-led risk mitigation generating new
and potentially more dangerous risks deemed susceptible to further
military solutions, and so on. 103 This risk is not limited to distant
theatres of conflict, but also applies to the very way of life the
current militarized risk management doctrine is meant to protect,
through the erosion of civil liberties and the securitization of daily
life. There is a powerful argument that the exercise of UK military force for optional expeditionary warfighting operations will be an increasingly dangerous, expensive and
ethically dubious doctrine that could generate more, and potentially
more lethal, risks than it resolves or contains. Since absolute security
cannot be achieved , the value of any potential, discretionary increment in UK security through
the exercise of military force must take into account its political, economic and human cost. As Wolfers
argues, at a certain point, by something like the economic law of diminishing returns, the gain in security
the exercise of military

force becomes ineffective or, worse, wholly counterproductive. 104 After
no longer compensates for the added costs of attaining it, and
following George W. Bush on a risky adventure into Iraq, the UK must question the effectiveness of a
militarized risk transfer strategy as the foundation for managing globalized security risks in relation to the
long-term human security needs of British citizens.
Our alternative is to reject the affirmative in favor of a

critical approach to security. This is crucial to open space
for emancipatory perspectivesour critique is mutually
exclusive with the affirmative.
Bilgin 5Pinar Bilgin, Associate Professor of International Relations at
Bilkent University (Turkey) [Conclusion, Regional Security in the Middle
East: A Critical Perspective, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415325498, p.
205-207]
Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between

intellectuals and social movements should not be taken to suggest
that the only way for intellectuals to make a change is to get directly
involved in political action. They can also intervene by providing a
critique of the existing situation, calling attention to what future
outcomes may result if necessary action is not taken at present, and
by pointing to potential for change immanent in regional politics.
Students of security could help create the political space for
alternative agents of security to take action by presenting
appropriate critiques. It should be emphasised however that such thinking should be anchored
in the potential immanent in world politics. The hope is that non-state actors (who may or may not be
aware of their potential to make a change) may constitute themselves as agents of security when
presented with an alternative reading of their situation.
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Thinking about the future becomes even more crucial once theory is
[end page 205] conceptualised as constitutive of the reality it seeks to
respond to. In other words, our ideas about the futureour conjectures
and prognoseshave a self-constitutive potential. What the students of Cold
War Security Studies consider as a more realistic picture of the future becomes real through practice,
albeit under circumstances inherited from the past. Thinking about what a desired future would look like
is significant for the very same reason; that is, in order to be able to turn it into a reality through adopting
having a vision of a desired future empowers

people(s) in the present.
emancipatory practices. For,
Presenting pictures of what a desired future might look like, and pointing to the security community
approach as the start of a path that could take us from an insecure past to a more secure future is not to
suggest that the creation of a security community is the most likely outcome. On the contrary, the
dynamics pointed to throughout the book indicate that there exists a potential for descent into chaos if no
action is taken to prevent militarisation and fragmentation of societies, and the marginalisation of peoples
as well as economies in an increasingly globalising world. However, these dynamics exist as threats to the
future to use Becks terminology; and only by thinking and writing about them that can one mobilise
critical approaches present

not an optimistic, but a more realistic picture of the future .
Considering how the realism of Cold War Security Studies failed not only
when judged by its own standards, by failing to provide an adequate explanation of the
world out there, but also when judged by the standards of critical
approaches, as it was argued, it could be concluded that there is a need for more realistic
preventive action to be taken in the present. Viewed as such,
approaches to regional security in theory and practice.

The foregoing suggests three broad conclusions. First, Cold War Security Studies did not present the
realistic picture it purported to provide. On the contrary, the pro-status quo leanings of the Cold War
security discourse failed to allow for (let alone foresee) changes such as the end of the Cold War,
dissolution of some states and integration of some others. Second, notwithstanding the important inroads
critical approaches to security made in the post-Cold War era, much traditionalist thinking remains and
critical approaches offer

a fuller or more adequate picture of security in different parts of the
world (including the Middle East). Cold War Security Studies is limited not only
because of its narrow (military-focused), pro-status quo and state-centric (if
not statist) approach to security in theory and practice, but also because
of its objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice
relationship that obscured the mutually constitutive relationship
between them. Students of critical approaches have sought to challenge Cold War Security Studies,
maintains its grip over the security practices of many actors. Third,
its claim to knowledge and its hold over security practices by pointing to the mutually constitutive
relationship between theory and practice and revealing [end page 206] how the Cold War security
discourse has been complicit in constituting (in)security in different parts of the world. The ways in which
the Cold War security discourse helped constitute the Middle East by way of representing it as a region,
and contributed to regional insecurity in the Middle East by shaping security practices, is exemplary of the
argument that theories do not leave the world untouched.
becoming aware of the politics

behind the geographical specification of politics and exploring the
relationship between (inventing) regions and (conceptions and practices of) security
helps reveal the role human agency has played in the past and could
play in the future. An alternative approach to security , that of critical
approaches to security, could inform alternative (emancipatory) practices thereby
helping constitute a new region in the form of a security community .
It should be noted, however, that to argue that everything is socially
constructed or that all approaches have normative concerns
The implication of these conclusions for practice is that
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embedded in them is a significant first step that does not by itself

help one adopt emancipatory practices. As long as people rely on traditional practices
shaped by the Cold War security discourse - which remains prevalent in the post-Cold War era - they help
constitute a reality in line with the tenets of realist Cold War Security Studies. This is why seeking to
address evolving crises through traditional practices whilst leaving a critical security perspective to be
traditionalist thinking and practices, by

helping shape the reality out there, foreclose the political space
necessary for emancipatory practices to be adopted by multiple
actors at numerous levels. Hence the need for the adoption of a
critical perspective that emphasises the roles human agency has
played in the past and could play in the future in shaping what
human beings choose to call reality. Generating such an awareness
of the potentialities of human agency could enable one to begin
thinking differently about regional security in different parts of the
world whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors multiple and
contending conceptions of security, what they view as referent(s)
and how they think security should be sought in different parts of
the world.
After decades of statist, military-focused and zero-sum thinking and
practices that privileged the security of some whilst marginalising
the security of others, the time has come for all those interested in
security in the Middle East to decide whether they want to be agents of a
world view that produces more of the same, thereby contributing
towards a threat to the future, or of alternative futures that try to
address the multiple dimensions of regional insecurity. The choice is
not one between presenting a more optimistic or pessimistic
vision of the future, but between stumbling into the future
expecting more of the same, or stepping into a future equipped with
a perspective that not only has a conception of a desired future but
is also cognisant of threats to the future.
adopted for the long-term will not work. For,
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1NC Reps First
Representations come before the policy effects of the

planseparating discursive and non-discursive practices
is impossible. The representations used are vital to
testing the truth claims of the affirmative. Even if fiat
exists and policy is important, we could concede that
because representations outweighthey shape policy
outcomes and ignoring them would prevent finding the
best policy option.
Crawford 2 [Neta Crawford, PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Political Science at
Boston University, Argument and Change in World Politics, 2002, p. 19-21]
Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at
least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary
resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of
prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we
decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the
situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- must occur before
specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take
place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there
is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such
arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it
are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science.
Meta-arguments over the good are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know
the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of good
so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular
situation.
More common are meta-arguments over representations or
frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes

actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas
Argument and debate occur when people

try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world. For example,
is the war defensive or aggressive?. Defining and controlling representations
and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at
stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case . An actor
Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest,
fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions.
Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic
actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation

accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the reality
through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of
a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively
re-present situations in a way that makes sense. mimesis is a metaphoric or
iconic argumentation of the real. Imitating not the effectively of events but
their logical structure and meaning. Certain features are
meta-arguments,
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emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as

their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a
constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific
organization of conceptual knowledge. The dominant representation
delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how
actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, the possibility of practices
presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of
action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in
place. If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, politics involves the selective
privileging of representations, it may not matter whether one
representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether
frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the
rhetorical import of representation- how frames affect what is seen
or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over
representation are thus crucial elements of political argument
because an actors arguments about what to do will be more
persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds
sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively
wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling. Hence framing is a meta-argument.
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Framework
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AT: Framework [Ks Bad]
Offense First:
Representations come before the policy effects of the
planour 1nc evidence says that separating discursive
and nondiscursive practices is impossible and that the
representations used are vital to testing the truth claims
of the affirmative. Even if fiat exists and policy is
important, we could concede that because
representations outweigh thisthey shape policy
outcomes and ignoring them would prevent finding the
best policy option.
We are the middle ground- we allow them to access policy
questions as long as they can defend their
representations. In their framework discussion of
representations is excluded entirely.
Exclusively Fiat frameworks are bad:
-they arent real world and destroy education by creating
role confusiontheres no benefit to policy if we cant put
it into effect
-it makes the affirmative non-topicalthe resolution says
should , not will ; fiat assumes the USFG willthis
unlimits the topic by allowing the aff to claim infinite
policy-based advantages, and is a voting issue because it
destroys negative preparedness
-they beg the question Our arg calls into question the
basis of their aff- you cant make a decision about policy
without choosing an understanding of the world
Next our DefenseIts predictable: representations are clearly defended in
the literature and the affirmative chose their advantages
they should defend them
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-Reps Ks are now a staple in Debate, they have been run

by multiple teams on multiple past topics
No regress- we can only critique things you CHOSE to put
in your 1AC, which is basically limited by the number of
advantages you claim. AND our literature proves there is
no regress- it will be impossible for us to prove things like
1 dirty word INFORMS the entirety of your project, we can
only critique foundational notions that effect your whole
1AC
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AT: Reps not Key
1. Representations come first

A. Coherence- our understanding of the world necessarily
structures our interrogations of policy proposals- it is
logically incoherent to act based on flawed conceptions of
reality. This makes representations a meta level concern
for policy makers-discussion of them MUST occur before
we decide if the plan is a good idea.
B. Policy education- our understanding of the problem
limits our consideration of potential solutions- absent a
discussion of representation the process of policy making
becomes tunnel vision defending itself. These constraints
on reasoning guarantee error replication
C. Truth is not a defense- Representations may have a
grain of truth, that doesnt deny that their primary
purpose is ideological and political.
D. Representations cause material violence as well as
intangible violence such as to the environment, the way
we frame and represent issues is critical to how people
understand and react to them.
Chow 2006 (Rey, Ph.D in Modern Thought and Literature from Stanford
University, Professor in the Comparative Literature Program at the University

of California Irvine., The Age of the World Target, Published Duke university
press 2006, p. 40-41)
Language matter in the most concrete, immediate way possible : its
use, by political and military leaders, leads directly to violence in the
form of war, mass murder (including genocide), the physical destruction
of human communities, and the devastation of the natural
environment, Indeed , if the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust , it
will probably be because leaders in more than one country have succeeded in
convincing their people through the use of political language, that the use of
nuclear weapons and , if necessary, the destruction of the earth itself, is
justifiable. From our perspective, the, every act of political violence from
the horrors perpetrated against Natives Americans to the murder of political
dissident in the Soviet Union to the destruction of the World Trade Center,
and now the bombing of Afghanistan is intimately linked with the use of
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language. Partly what we are talking about here, of course, are the processes
of manufacturing consent and shaping peoples perception of the
world around them; people are more likely to support acts of
violence committed in their name if the recipients of the violence have been
defined as terrorists, for if the violence is presented as a defense of
freedom. Media analyst such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently
about the corrosive effects that this kind of process has on the political
culture of supposedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious,
however, the most fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited
upon the object of violence; the language that shapes public opinion is
the same language that burns villages, besieges entire populations ,
kills and maims human bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb
craters and littered with land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated
in his work, acts of violence can easily be made more palatable through the
use of euphemisms such as pacification or , to use an example discussed in
this book, targets. It is important to point out, however, that the need for
such language derives from the simple fact that the violence itself is
abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of vital interests and
surgical strikes and the flattering language of civilization and just wars,
we would be less likely to avert our mental gaze from the physical effects of
violence.
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AT: Judge Choice
First, Judge choice relies on the assumption of plan focusits impossible to articulate a coherent rational for judge
choice without presupposing the plan is the focus of the
debate, thats debated elsewhere.
Second, Our critique will engage all representations- the
justification for this model is that the judge can chose
only the good ones, there will be none after we have
properly done our job.
But if there are- the remedy is the affirmative should be
able to leverage those representations as offense. Just
like if we read a cap K and only turned one advantage- the
fact that our link was to the plan shouldnt make a
difference in impact comparison vs a reps K
Third, Town hall model is false the affirmative isnt
tacking on good representations to the negative
representations of another party, they are directly
responsible for the good and the bad.
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Discourse
Discursive analysis of spatial politics should precede

policy decisions. Resist naturalizing hierarchical spatial
imaginaries.
Michael SHAPIRO Poli Sci @ Hawaii 92 Reading the Postmodern Polity p. 88-89
The kind of discursive practice implicit in spatial arrangements is rarely
available as part of political understandings because in most contemporary
policy talk, the shape of the arena within which policy is conceived is taken
for granted. These arenas, the resultants of spatial practices, are not an
audible part of policy talk. They exist at a silent level, or, to turn to a lexic
metaphor, they are a series of power inscriptions that do their effective work
without being read. They belong, in effect to a political rhetoric that is implicit
in society's spatial practices, as part of its "ground plan," which situates the
sets of eligible speaker/actors who can produce meaningful and effective
policy utterances and actions. 5 And, in general, they contextualize and
render coherent the discourses that bestow meaning and value on things ,
actions, and relationships. The shape of a society's spaces-leisure space,
work space, public space, military space, and so forth -tends to remain
largely implicit for a variety of reasons. One is of course that the shaping of
such spaces takes place so slowly that few can perceive a process of actual
boundary establishment or movement. However, part of the inattention to
spatial predicates of policy discourse is positively administered. Dominant
forms of social theory, for example both liberal and Marxist, fail, with some
exceptions, to encode the spatial dimensions of human association.6 For the
dominant tendencies in both these theoretical traditions, space is either
natural or neutral; it is either the empty arena within which political
association and contention develop or it is the sanctified, historically destined
places whose boundaries should remain inviolable. Yet there are good
reasons to resist this naturalizing of space. At a minimum, careful attention to
the irredeemably contextual contribution of a speaker's or writer's situation to
the meaning of utterances should provide a clue . The meaning and value that
statements confer are inseparable from the mapping of persons within which
the statements are deposited. Intelligibility is intimately connected to
standing, to the sites and locations from which meanings are shaped. And the
spaces from which discourse is produced are just as much constituted as sets
of practices as the discourses themselves. Social relations thus form a
complex in which spatial and discursive practices are inseparable. 7 Those
who use a discourse -an institutionalized practice through which meaning and
value is imposed, reaffirmed, and exchanged-generally fail to discern the
historically developed, presupposed practices, spatial among others, that
ventriloquate themselves through the discourse. This is the case, in part,
because, as Jacques Derrida has pointed out, our utterances seem to be
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wholly present to us: "The subject can hear or speak to himself and be
affected by the signifier he produces without passing through an external
detour, the world, the sphere of what is not 'his own'." Nevertheless, the
rhetorical contributions of space can be registered. At least their in- direct
culects are available to the gaze. What is often required is that one manage
to suspend the usual aggressive practices through which everyday life is
constructed.
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Judge Choice Card *look at the author

Judge choice obscures affirmative responsibility for
advantage selection, the part of the case the aff is most
responsible for. It also relies on flawed conceptions of
judge, choice, and discourse
Turner, BA Dartmouth, Grad Student UGA, 11-7-09
http://www.georgiadebate.org/2009/11/the-illogic-of-judgechoice
The terminology used here reveals the problem with the theory of judge-choice. The
focus is on the necessary connection between the plan and a justification for the
plan. We should not start with a model of policy -formation and advocacy that
presumes we are likely to identify necessary connections between action and result.
Though the constraints of time mean that components of an affirmative will not be challenged if weve
there are no necessary connections

only possibilities/probabilities. If we can say that any relationship in a debate is necessary
it is that a plan requires a justification in order for the judge to vote affirmative* (Im not
learned anything from the process of debate it is that
addressing a form of affirmation disconnected from rationalitybut thats not at issue for the discussing
extreme plan-focus of judge-choice breaks down

if we acknowledge that the judge endorses something like a 1AC, not simply the
plan text (The theory of judge-choice is not significantly different from plan-focus. Judge-choice seems
the limitations of judge-choice). The
for the most part a way to move the locus of deciding what portions of the affirmative to endorse from the
evidence on the importance of framing and

derives from our ability to demonstrate that
what appears natural and necessary should be treated as contingent .
Representational kritiks ask the question why given such terminology is not necessarily
an outcome of a plan the affirmative decided to make the connection
between the two. What are the conditions of the possibility for the appearance of the 1AC? Why
did the stories that the 1AC initially told make sense to us so as to appear
necessary? If we take Harrigans formulation of judge-choice at its word it is not intended to
affirmative team to the judge.) Most of the
representation claims the importance of kritik
prevent the introduction of representational kritiks. Instead of being a reason to vote negative, in this
The
world encouraged by this theory is one of increasingly poorly articulated
advantages supplemented by more obscure add-ons . Extra-T presents an analogous
theory they would be used to exclude certain reasons presented from the reasons for affirmation.
situationintroducing any number of reasons to support the plan allows the negative to kritik those
advantages but at most to take them out and then have to win any number of other positions to win the
This would fit with a general move

away from probability/possibility at the level of link and internal link towards
probability and magnitude at the level of impact. In a sense, judge-choice will
make the already unfortunate aspects of the combination of plan-focus and
quality evidence about the relevance of language/rhetoric/representation
even worse. Extreme plan-focus makes any problematic terms in the resolution/implementation
debate. Sure, this isnt zero-cost but its pretty close.
literature immediate fodder for any number of negative arguments (see: biofuels, nuclear weapons, CAFO,
Sub-Saharan Africa, persons living in poverty, and many many others) that become quite difficult to defeat
or increasingly awkward and annoying to avoid in spite of the fact that the 1AC is most constrained when it
comes to wording plans. The area where the 1AC exercised less constrained choices *
(choice here sits uncomfortably with many critical theories that we might draw on for the arguments, but
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it is required by the terminology of judge choice obviously and if we problematize the notion of choice
that makes for a different way of breaking down the theory) advantage construction/justification
receives the least critical scrutiny. So, for example, an aff about animal liberation on the
subsidies topic that articulated a set of advantages based on breaking down anthropocentrism and
highlighted their use of the term CAFO as a strategic choice for reasons of implementation and access to
exiting discursive framings/structures would be highly likely in our current understanding to lose to a PIC
out of CAFO as sanitizing language (because theres no offense grrrr) but an aff that represents the
issue of factory-farming purely in terms human-self interest or through connection to disease security can
just read an add-on about how factory-farming makes animals suffer and the question of anthropocentrism
is settled. On the issue of the judges interaction with the debate the theory of judge-choice as
presumes a problematic and contestable understanding of the

position and role of a judge. First, the theory presumes a purely consequentialist
form of evaluation as given by treating outcomes as entirely separate from
reason-giving. For example, this sentence, Good ideas are good if they have beneficial outcomes,
regardless of how they are justified. This is a theory of decision-making that presumes
that one of the most contentious issues in ethical and political theory has
already been resolved. Quality evidence suggests that reason-giving substantially effects
presented
outcomes. This issue is likely resolved in this theory by pointing out that even if reason-giving cannot be
strictly separated from consquence there is still the ability of the judge to choose not to use those
reasons that would have negative effects. However, this brings us to another important issue in the
understanding of judging. The judge Harrigan refers to chooses which reasons to use in their decision.
This understanding of the judge-subject is itself the subject of many representational kritiks. The theory of
judge-choice constructs the judge as an agent who believes that

justification/rhetoric/representation can be separated strongly from action that
type of judgment may itself be responsible for many of the negative
effects of particularly problematic representational systems. Judge-choice
presumes that rhetoric is a set of discrete objects over which a detached
subject can exercise choice. Negatives could characterize the role of rhetoric as constitutive
thus an affirmative hails us/interpellates us as subjects of a particular type. Alternatively, the subject-
There are a variety

possibilitiesall of which we should resolve through substantive argument
rather than by theoretical fiat. Adding complexity to our understanding of possible judges also
helps clarify the claim that only judge-choice presumes an interactive judge . Interactivity here
is constrained to easily detachable reasons that a judge can choose between
easily. Affective, constitutive, or ideological effects of speech clearly do not
interact with this type of judge. Interaction also occurs in this vision only at the moment of
position of judge and decision could be an effect of discourse rather than an agent.
of other
decision. It is odd to say that this is the only way to preserve a dynamic judge given the static
understanding of language and subject that it accompanies. Consider Harrigans explanation of the effects
this has on our theory of judging: that you should hold speakers to every reason they cite as justification
and use it to assess their policyis one of the most reactionary and anti-critical stances one could take. It
prioritizes who speaks over what is spoken about. It ignores content for form. It punishes instead of
compromises. And, fundamentally, it is a tactic used by conservative political forces to crush
progressivism. Do the critique folk really want to be in this company? I agree that reliance on some
punishment/severance could be a good argument against the phrasing/theory of language

isnt our only option
(more on this below). However, this groups all criticisms of this style together and
presumes they are progressive or that content and form can be strictly
separated. Ironically, if obnoxiously, we could at this point write a representational kritik of Harrigans
language of
and judgement. That way of explaining what is going on in these debates
post regarding the language of progress. What seems like one word might indicate a whole system of
thought about the end goal of pure consequentialism and a use oriented theory of the relationship
between language and the subject. At the very least, we should acknowledge that for much of the critical
theory were drawing on for this type of position would say that what is spoken about constitutes the who
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Rather than associating the construction of the 1AC with

the debaters (the who speaks) as a type of personal corruption most of these
positions rely on evidence about the role of criticism/negation as productive .
They do not have to be about punishing individuals but instead about engaging
in criticism of processes that all to often occur without much thought because
they appear necessary. Severance is probably problematic and I agree that importation of
that is speaking or judging.
counteprlan theory into debating alternatives has typically obscured issues instead of clarified them. The
use of terms like severance seems more a symptom of judge-adaptation or inertia/debate-laziness than an
intrinsic characteristic of criticism. If we take this claim from Harrigan, Thus, the judge, at the end of the
debate, should be able to choose (for themselves) why to vote Aff or Neg. Logically, one can choose the
best arguments from the set of available reasons presented in the debate, I think it potentially works if we
permit plan-inclusive or aff-inclusive alternatives. People fear the number of different arguments that can
be raised about individual words. I think that we ought to treat these issues on a case-by-case basis (and
with less commitment to offense-defense) in terms of how important a particular set of representations
appear for an aff. Frankly, affirmatives should also be thinking about these issues. Also ignored in this fear
is that there are significant circumstances where the negative cannot separate the plan from the
problematic reasons presented by an affirmative. Negatives have often been dishonest about the degree
to which something purely a contingent connection between justification and policy. Particularly in
adopting a language that implies a strict separation between the plan (action) and advantage
(justification/frame) the negative may be using a model of discourse/representation etc. that is in tension
with the overall theoretical vocabulary. However, much of the responsibility for this phenomenon lies in the
hands of affirmatives desperate to protect the special status of the plan. We have typically debated all of
these as questions of absolute priority (the K equivalent of offense-defense). Rather, most of the evidence
read for these claims (including Doty) indicates that these are issues worth engaging, not issues that are
logically prior to consequncebut something that should shape how/whether we ought to evaluate
consequences (particularly in the manner described by many affs). I think that the analogy to the town-hall
is loaded and misleading (we would change a lot more about debate than the question of representational
kritiks and plan focus if we were actually concerned with modeling a town-hall format). However, even if
we take it as a guiding analogy for evaluating debate the theory of judge-choice fails to account for the
potentially productive components of the analogy. First, I would hope that in listening to the various
proposals made in public deliberation that attendees would investigate not only the policies being
presented or believe that advocacy for a policy could easily be detached from the rhetoric that often
surrounds it. If one fails to pay attention to the connections between ideology and advocacy then we will
have serious problems in deliberation. In a town-hall style exchange wed likely witness AIK style
advocaciesI agree with the general course of action, but in order not to have the course of action create
X set of issues we ought to frame our actions differently.
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AT: Your K is just Defense
The K isnt defense- while accuracy is one element we

contest; we also present offense about why the
affirmatives representations have negative effects on the
real world. This isnt the equivalent of saying collapse of
heg doesnt cause war as impact defense on the case.
Their downplaying of our impacts is an independent linkself serving categorization of what impacts matter is
the ideological process that sustains representational
violence.
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Specific Relations Reps Card
Its impossible to make sense of a political reality absent

an interrogation of representations The aff doesnt get
access to plan based offense prior to winning their
worldview is productive
Cedric Jourde 2006 [Ph.D., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-
Madison, Madison, 2002 * M.A., Political Science, University of WisconsinMadison, Madison, 1996 * B.Sc., Political Science, Universit de Montral,
Montral, 1995 Hegemony or Empire?: The redefinition of US Power under
George W Bush Ed. David and Grondin p. 182-3 2006]
Relations between states are, at least in part, constructed upon
representations. Representations are interpretative prisms through which
decision-makers make sense of a political reality, through which they
define and assign a subjective value to the other states and non-state
actors of the international system, and through which they determine what
are significant international political issues.2 For instance, officials of a
given state will represent other states as 'allies', 'rivals', or simply
'insignificant', thus assigning a subjective value to these states. Such
subjective categorizations often derive from representations of these states'
domestic politics, which can for instance be perceived as 'unstable*,
'prosperous', or 'ethnically divided'. It must be clear that representations are
not objective or truthful depictions of reality; rather they are subjective and
political ways of seeing the world, making certain things 'seen' by and
significant for an actor while making other things 'unseen' and
'insignificant'.3 In other words, they are founded on each actor's and group of
actors' cognitive, cultural-social, and emotional standpoints. Being
fundamentally political, representations are the object of tense struggles and
tensions, as some actors or groups of actors can impose on others their own
representations of the world, of what they consider to be appropriate political
orders, or appropriate economic relations, while others may in turn accept,
subvert or contest these representations. Representations of a foreign
political reality influence how decision-making actors will act upon that
reality. In other words, as subjective and politically infused interpretations of
reality, representations constrain and enable the policies that decisionmakers will adopt vis-a-vis other states; they limit the courses of action that
are politically thinkable and imaginable, making certain policies
conceivable while relegating other policies to the realm of the unthinkable.4
Accordingly, identifying how a state represents another state or non-state
actor helps to understand how and why certain foreign policies have
been adopted while other policies have been excluded. To take a now
famous example, if a transnational organization is represented as a group of
'freedom fighters', such as the multi-national mujahideen in Afghanistan in
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the 1980s, then military cooperation is conceivable with that organization; if

on the other hand the same organization is represented as a 'terrorist
network', such as Al-Qaida, then military cooperation as a policy is simply not
an option. In sum. the way in which one sees, interprets and imagines the
'other* delineates the course of action one will adopt in order to deal with this
'other'.
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AT: Incommensurability
One slight editorial- incommensurability does not mean

cant weigh things, though that is the way it has
recently been thrown around in debate. The conclusion
drawn by some, cant weigh things, throw out K is also
so contrary to the theory it is mind boggling. I will write
responses, however, assuming Battermans articulation.
First, Its inevitable- rights vs death, Economy vs
Hegemony, intrinsic perms vs conditionality, debates
always have to compare the incomparable. To dodge the
harsh questions through theoretical fiat does an
educational disservice- the alternative is that the
affirmative could argue the positive benefits of the plan
outweigh representational damage
Third, representations critiques are the FOUNDATION of a
coherent concept of incommensurability
Ruth Ronen, Tel Aviv University, Incommensurability and Representation
AS/SA N5, Article 3 : 1998
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/french/as-sa/ASSA-No5/RR1.htm (Applied
Semiotics is a peer reviewed journal)
Incommensurability occurs in science where two theories lack a common
measure, a standard reference, or an external criterion that could have
served as grounds for comparison. Yet, although incommensurability appears
to stem from the absence of a world beyond theory , I will claim that there
would be no place for the notion of incommensurability in our
epistemology were we not giving our theories realistic interpretations. In
other words, in order to assume that theories are incommensurable, we
have to assume that each theory works as a conceptual net through
which the world is seen differently. We have to assume that a theory
employing the term 'star' sees an object through this term; and each theory
can give the term 'star' a different realistic interpretation, that is, identify the
term with another celestial body. Incommensurable theories, while each
sees the star differently, all represent stars. Without realism towards
theories and towards the entities they assume, theories would have been
straightforwardly intertranslatable and commensurable.
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AT: Solt
Solt presupposes a rationalist mode of policy making that

is incomplete
Pat J. Gehrke (MA. California State University, Chico) is a doctoral student
in Speech Communication at Penn State University. CONTEMPORARY

ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 19 (1998)
One of the primary criticisms leveled against all such critiques is that they fail
to address policy questions (Jinks A14; Shors and Mancuso A 1 5; Solt, AntiKritik xiii; Solt, "Demystifying" A9). Most debate theorists who oppose critique
arguments advance a rationalist paradigm of policy evaluation. In their
minds, a strict cost-benefit analysis, particularly a quantitative analysis based
on the preservation of human life, is the only means by which an advocate
can justify or dejustify a policy. In his criticism of scientific models of public
policy, Robert Formaini, the former vice president for public policy at the Cato
Institute, explains the rationalist policy paradigm: According to the policy
rationalist, if the risks are "acceptable" and the "benefits" are greater than
"costs," what person can argue that the proposed policy ought not be done,
and on what inductive basis? It will not work to say that the proposed policy is
"wrong," "immoral," "unjust," and a "waste of time and effort." These
arguments are "unscientific" and "value-laden" with the citizen's personal,
irrational prejudices. (69) In policy debate, the rationalist perspective
marginalizes critiques by mistakenly representing a particular approach
to policy evaluation as the essential means of policy deliberation, implying
that one theoretical perspective is both appropriate for all policy questions
and preferable to all other means of policy comparison. Marouf Hasian and
Edward Panetta argue that "both the promise and the peril of the critique
come from its use as a method of questioning some of the assumptions
behind `policy' debate itself" (47). They continue, "the use of 'the critique' in
policy debate means a virtual abandonment of many of the cherished
assumptions of policy decision making" (53). If by policy debate and policy
decision making, Hasian and Panetta are referring only to the conventional
practices of academic debate, they would be correct. However, their criticism
is not that critiques simply challenge academic policy debate as we
commonly practice it, but rather that critiques are "politically irrelevant and
counterproductive" (54). This conclusion is arrived at by giving primacy to
rationalist policy models, including claims such as that "debating is an
inherently rationalistic activity" (54). Faith in rationalism as the core element
of policy debate leads Derek Jinks to posit that if critiques have any
theoretical legitimacy, "they should take the form of disadvantages,
counterplans, solvency arguments, etc." (A14). Jinks argues that resolutions
imply the context for academic debates, and since contemporary resolutions
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are interpreted as policy questions, they should be addressed from a policy

perspective (Al2). While this line of reasoning may bear some merit, Jinks
begs the question of whether the rationalist model is the only possible policy
perspective. Jinks relies on a rationalist cost-benefit analysis model for
decision making. He argues that policy decisions cannot be made without
comparing unique costs and benefits of proposed courses of action (A14).
Jinks likewise contends that policy debate should begin from a set of shared
assumptions about the values at stake, which should simply be taken as true
(A13). Matthew Shors and Steve Mancuso propose an extreme division
between critiques and policy discourse. Shors and Mancuso make the same
error as Jinks by generalizing from rationalist policy models to all policy
deliberation. They claim that critiques are "utterly irrelevant" and that
critiques ask us to believe that "it is pointless to discuss policies" (A16). Shors
and Mancuso would have us believe that critiques "ignore policy issues
altogether" (A16). It is because critiques do not argue unique
commensurable costs or benefits that they contend that critiques carry
"little, if any, weight in policy comparison" (A16). Only by failing to
recognize the broad diversity of policy perspectives can Shors and
Mancuso come to conclude that "the Critique is wholly incompatible with, and
non-germane to, policy debate" (A17). Perhaps the most vehement opponent
of critiques has been Solt. Solt makes many of the same assumptions about
policy analysis as do Jinks, Shors, and Mancuso. Solt so strongly believes that
critiques challenge the assumption that "what we are essentially engaged in
is a policy debate" that he recommends the first response to critiques be to
reestablish the policy framework ("Demystifying" A9). For Solt, "the kritik is a
non-policy argument" (Anti-Kritik ii). He sees debate as a policy forum, and
critiques are considered not to be "germane to the subject at hand" (AntiKritik xxii). Solt argues that "at root, the kritik misunderstands the nature of
the policy calculus" (Anti-Kritik xxiii). Solt's rationalist assumptions are
apparent in arguments encouraging us to "take an a priori ethical and
political framework for granted" ("Demystifying" A 11). Similarly, he ignores a
whole body of interpretive and communicative policy analysis literature when
he claims that "ideas are more important than the rhetoric with which
they are expressed" ("Demystifying" All). Here, Solt is attempting to refute
language critiques by retreating to a separation of policies and the words that
express, present, and form those policies. For Solt, the policy has a pure form
outside of language, and it is that form that is to be evaluated, rather than
any of the words that might malign it. Such a position is distant from
much of both contemporary communication studies and policy
studies literature. The arguments against critiques advanced by the policy
debate rationalists are suspect because they are grounded in the
traditions of academic debate rather than contemporary theories of
policy studies. Consequently, they dismiss questions they can not force-fit
into policy rationalism as neither worthwhile nor relevant to policy
discussions. As two policy analysts wrote of the hegemony of the rationalist
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paradigm, "When all you have is a hammer the whole world looks like a nail"
(House and Shull 163-164). Berube attacks critiques from a perspective not
overtly founded on policy rationalism, holding that critiques are
fundamentally pre-fiat arguments and that they disregard post-fiat
substantive claims ("Criticizing" 68-72). Nonetheless, he bases his arguments
upon similar assumptions about the relationship between critiques and policy
debate. Here, "fiat" is a stand-in for "policy focus," in that fiat represents an
enacted policy. To claim that critiques disregard issues that arise after fiat is
to claim that they disregard questions raised by enacting policies. Berube's
argument is also predicated upon the assumption that academic debate
should extend no further than "intentional, intended, nave, objective, and
rogate" meanings ("Criticizing" 77). This means that debaters and critics
should not question any of the assumptions or presuppositions of texts or
advocacies, uncritically accepting the premises inherent in propositions. In
the context of policy analysis, Berube's standards require that policy
advocates and analysts not ask of each other: "But what are your
assumptions? Are they valid, or consistent, or morally acceptable?" This
position is extraordinarily dangerous. Wayne Booth argues that we must
consider precisely those questions texts attempt to foreclose: Each literary
work implicates within itself a set of norms about what questions are
appropriate. Hemingway, to choose a favorite example of the new feminist
critics, does not demand of us that we ask of his works, "Is it good for men or
women to accept uncritically my machismo bravado?" Indeed, he seems to
work quite hard to prevent our asking such a question. But surely, the
feminist critics say, and I think they are right, surely any teacher who teaches
A Farewell to Arms without inviting, somewhere along the line, a critical
consideration of Hemingway's heroes as human ideals, and of his portraits of
women as reflecting a peculiarly maimed creative vision, and of his vision of
the good life as a singularly immature onesurely any such teacher is doing
only half the job. (301) Similarly, we might say that any policy debater who
does not seek a critical consideration of the questions that a policy proposal
tries to foreclose is only doing half the job of a policy analyst. 22-5
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Perm
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Generic Rant
1. The plan isn't the basis of assessing competition since

our links are to their representations. The affirmative
should be responsible for their justifications (separate
block), so the test should be is it desirable to represent
things in the alternative fashion outlined by the negative
AND the way the affirmative represented it, or is it more
desirable to only use the negatives representations. Any
permutation based on the plan is irrelevant
2. They need to have a stable advocacy for the debate to
occur. If they can advocate inconsistent positions from
speech to speech being negative is impossible- we can
never answer their 2AR clarification. The permutation
violates this standard-this is proven by the link
arguments and is facially obvious. They could just have
easily selected non security advantages in their infinite
prep time, they picked these particular advantages with a
strategic purpose in mind and they should have to bear
the costs.
3. Permutations are a risk issue- the affirmative has to
win offense for why the permutation is superior to the
alternative alone. Presumption still goes negative
because we are the side arguing against change. Any risk
of our specific links not being resolved by the permutation
means you err negative.
4. Framework resolves the perm - in our framework the aff
has no reason to prefer the permutation since you ignore
their plan based advantages since they are socially
constructed.
The perm is an example of realistic radicalism. It claims
to be revolutionary, but works through existing structures
of conservative thought, making it incapable of change.
Dillon 96 (Michael, Prof@Lancaster, Politics of Security, p. 2)JFS
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Reimagining politics is, of course, easier said than done. Resistance

to it especially in International Relations nonetheless gives us a
clue toone of the places where we may begin.For although I think of this
project as a kind of political project, resistance to it does not arise from
a political conservatism. Modern exponents of political modernity
pride themselves on their realistic radicalism. Opposition always
arises,instead, from an extraordinarily deep and profound
conservatism of thought. Indeed, conservatism of thought in
respect of the modern political imagination is required of the
modern political subject.Reimagining politics therefore means
thinking differently. Moreover, the project of that thinking differently
leads to thinking ' difference' itself.
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DA to Perms
A. The permutation footnotes our criticism- bracketing it

off allowing assumptions to remain unchallenged
Richard K. ASHLEY, Professor of Political Science at Arizona State
University, AND R.B.J. WALKER, Professor of International Relations at the
University of Victoria, 1990 [Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/ Writing the
Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies,

International Studies Quarterly, Volume 34, Available Online via JSTOR, p.
370]
These fragments of critical readings provide but a few examples of
increasingly familiar ways in which scholars of international relations and the
social sciences in general often interpret, interrogate, and reply to works of
dissidence that speak from disciplinary margins. No doubt other examples
could be offered. We think these fragments suffice, however, to illustrate a
considerable range of likely critical responses that spans from left to right.
Five things about these snippets are notable. First, such critical commentary
is not typically offered or received as the normal, proper activity of a
discipline or tradition, however that discipline or tradition be defined. Such
commentary is typically encountered in a footnote, a review essay, a
contribution to the occasional symposium on the disciplines future, a reading
semi- nar, or the banter and sideplay of professional conferences. Rarely is it
encountered as the main theme of a refereed journal article or a formal
research presentation at a professional meeting. In brief, such commentary is
offered as parenthesis. It is put forth as a pause that is occasioned by the
passing encounter with the moment of dissidence and that is bracketed and
set off from the real projects to which the commentators and their audiences
are soon to return. Second, when critical comments such as these are offered,
they are typically pronounced in a cool, collected, self-assured voice of an I
or we that neither stumbles nor quavers with self-doubt. Sometimes, this
posture of self-assurance takes the form of nonchalance, even indifference,
as if the commentary were roughly comparable to a remark about the
shrubbery overgrowing the side of a highway one travels. An air of
nonchalance is difficult to sustain, however, when dissident events disturb a
sense of direction or when marginal works of thought pose questions that are
difficult to ignore. On such occasions, equanimity often gives way to
exasperation tinged with embarrassment, a sense that it would be better if
these things did not have to be said, a regret that voices of dissidence-though
sometimes raising interesting questions-are somehow oblivious to the
obvious things that truly refined scholars should already know. On still other
occasions, such as conversations between teacher and student, when the
addressee of these critical readings cannot yet be presumed to be a mature
member of the profession, an air of cool detachment might be replaced by a
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tone of sobriety, even solemnity, that reminds the potentially wayward novice
that the reading is a kind of vow that he, like all members, must earnestly
recite. Yet all these reading postures-nonchalance, exasperation, solemnity
during the rite of passage-have something in common. As gestures in
themselves, they at once presuppose and indicate the same location. These
postures indicate that such critical remarks belong not at the center of the
discipline where its serious and productive work is proudly presented and
logically weighed, but at its boundaries, at its edges, at the thresholds or
checkpoints of entry and exit. They indicate, in the same stroke, that the
disciplines territorial boundaries are already marked, that the difference
between outside and inside is already given, and that the discipline, the
tradition, the everybody who knows and agrees with this reading is already
assuredly there.
B.This results in worse epistemological crimes

Der Derian 95James, A Reinterpretation of Realism: Geneology,
Semiology, Dromology in International Theory: Critical Investigations , page

374
But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we'
fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of
meaning itself is up for grabs? A stop-gap solution is to supplement the
definitional gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist, mindful of a
creeping pluralism, will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism duly backed up with a footnote to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - and then
get down to business as usual, that is, using realism as the best language
to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of
nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the charge that the meaning
of realism is contestable, the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and
commit worse epistemological crimes. In honor of the most notorious
benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call
this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations.
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AT: Perm do Both
1. Still leads to a vicious cycle of fear and violence

because they continue to construct these crazy levels of
threats.
2. The Perm is another Link: the perm is another link to
our K, it shows that you are still immersed in the mindset
of securitization where constructing any threat legitimizes
violence from that threat.
3. Allows for future exceptionswe must stop the
securitization and construction of threats, the perm opens
the floodgates to future exceptions.
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AT: Perm do the Plan then the Alt

1. Impossible to dothe plan is what creates the threat.
2. The delay that will result would delegitimize these new
schools of thought.
3. Allows for future exceptions to the Alternative which is
unsustainable
4. Perm hardens aggression and is another link to the
planit shows they are still immersed in security.
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AT: Perm do the Plan and Non-Mutually

Exclusive Aspects
1. This perm doesnt workthey cannot name anything
that is not mutually exclusive.
2. The link is a reason to reject the plan.
3. The alternative competesno need to challenge it.
4. The perm is another link to the Kit shows they are
still immersed in securitization.
(if they say Double bind)
NO DOUBLE BIND the alternative is to reject the aff

completely, there is NO non mutually exclusive part.
Including ANY security discourse of the plan makes the alt
fail independent reason to reject the perm.
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AT: Perm do the Plan without Security

Discourse
1. This is impossiblethe plan is inherently going to be
done through security discourse.
2. The perm is another link showing that they still want to
do their plan and continue with security discourse.
3. Even if they did the perm, they would never solve for
their impacts because they are based on securitythe alt
is the only way.
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Link/Impact Answers
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AT: Threats Real
1. Epistemology first- threats real logically presupposes

that our systems for knowing, determining, and
understanding threats are accurate and reliable. If we win
epistemology, you can write off the affirmatives threats as
neurotic rambling-thats Neocleous.
2. Security is intersubjective
A. Their threats don't exist independently of the discourse
of danger used to describe them.
Dr. Jef Huysmans, MA (University of Hull), Ph.D. (University of Leuven))
Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Studies, Director of the Center for
Citizenship, Identities, Governance, " Defining Social Constructivism in
Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security", Alternatives
January 02 (questia)
The critical position this literature articulates consists of "denaturalizing" the
taken-for-granted discourses structuring international or domestic conditions.
For example, they show how Slovenian nationalist discourses developed and
mobilized social dispositions in the lead-up to the Yugoslavian crisis. The
crucial point is that the analysis shows how others or outsiders are not
natural enemies but become enemies because of the way the nationalist
discourses construct history, social deprivation, and so forth. Crucial for the
author's distancing from the dominant discourse is that the work articulates
how a discursive construction that retrospectively looks as if it was the
natural or necessary way for things to develop is actually contingent. The
critical quality rests on the assumption that representations of the world
make a difference (performative force of language) and that there is no
natural or neutral arbiter of a true representation. Consequently, any
representation, to become true, has to establish itself as hegemonic (often by
claiming it is a true representation, while the others are false) at the cost of
silencing alternative representations. This is shown by indicating how
alternative options "circulated"--and still are around--in the political struggle
for founding a hegemonic discourse and how they were silenced by the now
dominant discourse.
B. Even if threats are real, it is only because of a cycle of

enmity the affirmatives method can't deal with
Mack, MD, Psychodynamics of International Relationships Vol 1 p. 58-59
1991
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Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with
an argument that, reduced to its essentials , goes something like this: Its
very well to psychologize but my enemy is real. The Russians (or Germans,
Arabs, Israelis, Americans) are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm.
Furthermore, there are real struggles between us and them and differing
national interests: competition over oil, land or scarce resources and genuine
conflicts of values between our two nations (or political systems) It is
essential that we be strong and maintain a balance of superiority of (military
and political) power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness.
This argument is neither wrong nor right, but instead simply limited. It fails
to grapple with a critical distinction that informs the entire subject. Is the
threat really generated by the enemy as it appears to be at any given
moment, or is it based on ones own contribution to the threat, derived from
distortion of perception by provocative words and actions in a cycle of enmity
and externalization of responsibility? In sum, the enemy IS real, but we
have not learned to identify our own role in creating that enemy or in
elaborating the threatening image we hold of the other group or country and
its actual intentions or purposes. we never see our enemys motives and we
never labor to asses his will with anything approaching objectivity.
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AT: Cede the Political
1. No Link- because we didnt read a plan doesnt mean

we cede the political- in the particular instance of the
affirmative we dont agree that traditional legislative
action is warranted. Actomania where we think only the
government can solve all problems is the flip side of the
radical disengagement they criticize. We strike the best
middle ground because we require that we have a firm
understanding of the psychology of politics before
engaging it- voting negative is like advocating gun safety
classes, not gun control.
2. Non unique- the military industrial complex controls
politics now- Obamas promise of change has rung hollow.
He is expanding the war in Afghanistan, drone attacks in
Pakistan, refusing to cut the military budget, and his
domestic agenda has totally stalled. Even the most radical
forms of traditional politics have failed totally- empirics
are on our side.
3. Systemic change is the only hope for reform.
Pragmatism invests resources in failed strategies of
single issue politics that leaves oppression intact.
Reinsborough, (Organizer, Rainforest Action Network and Wake Up
America Campaign) 2003 (Journal of Aesthetics and Protest, August 2003,
Volume 1, Issue 2, Patrick).
The worst thing that can happen to our movements right now is to settle for
too little. But tragically that is exactly what is happening. We are failing to
frame the ecological, social and economic crisis as a symptom of a deeper
values crisis and a pathological system. Too many of our social change
resources are getting bogged down in arenas of struggle that cant
deliver the systemic shifts we need. Most of the conventional venues
for political engagement legislation, elections, courts, single issue
campaigns, labor fights have been so co-opted by elite rule that its very
difficult to imagine how to use strategies that name the system, undermine
the control mythology or articulate values crisis from within their limited
parameters. One of the most telling symptoms of our colonized imaginations
has been the limited scope of social change institutions. Most social change
resources get directed towards enforcing inadequate regulations, trying to
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pass watered-down legislation, working to elect mediocre people or to win

concessions that dont threaten the current corporate order. One of the main
reasons that so many social change resources get limited to the regulatory,
electoral and concessionary arenas is the fact that much of social change has
become a professionalized industry. The NGO non-governmental
organization a term made popular by the United Nations policy discussion
process have become the most familiar social change institution. These
groups are frequently made up of hard working, under-paid, dedicated people
and NGOs as a group do lots of amazing work. However we must also
acknowledge that generally the explosion of NGO's globally is a loose attempt
to patch the holes that neoliberalism has punched in the social safety net. As
government cedes its role in public welfare to corporations, even the
unlucrative sectors have to be handed off to someone. A recent article in the
Economist revealingly explains the growth of NGO's as " not a matter of
charity but of privatiziation." 21 My intention is not to fall into the all too
easy trap of lumping the thousands of different NGOs into one dismissable
category but rather to label a disturbing trend particularly among social
change NGO's. Just as service oriented NGO's have been tapped to fill the
voids left by the state or the market, so have social change NGO's arisen to
streamline the chaotic business of dissent. Let's call this trend NGOism, that
terrifyingly widespread conceit among professional "campaigners" that social
change is a highly specialized profession best left to experienced strategists,
negotiators and policy wonks. NGOism is the conceit that paid staff will be
enough to save the world. This very dangerous trend ignores the historic
reality that collective struggle and mass movements organized from the
bottom up have always been the springboard for true progress and social
change. The goal of radical institutions whether well funded NGOs or gritty
grassroots group should be to help build movements to change the world.
But NGOism institutionalizes the amnesia of the colonized imagination and
presents a major obstacle to moving into the post-issue activism framework.
After all who needs a social movement when you've got a six figure
advertising budget and access to all the decision makers? A professional
NGO is structured exactly like a corporation, down to having employee payroll
and a Board of Directors. This is not an accident. Just like their for-profit
cousins this structure creates an institutional self-interest which can
transform an organization from being a catalyst for social change into being a
limit. NGOism views change in reference to the status quo power relations by
accepting a set of rules written by the powerful to insure the status quo.
These rules have already been stacked against social change. NGOism
represents institutional confusion about the different types of power and
become overly dependant on strategies that speak exclusively to the existing
powers funding sources, the media, decision makers. As a consequence
strategies get locked in the regulatory and concessionary arenas focused on
pressure and attempt to re-direct existing power rather than focusing on
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confronting illegitimate authority and revealing systemic flaws. Frequently

political pragmatism is used as an excuse for a lack of vision.
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AT: Experts
1. Expertise isn't objective, like security it is a narrative

PRODUCED for explicit political purposes. Security cloaks
itself in the language of expertise in order to shut down
democratic debate. Appeals to authority shouldn't be
evaluated because critical theory reveals expertise is not
natural , its historically and culturally contingent.
2. The 1AC is not expert testimony- they take random
factoids from a variety of authors and construct a
narrative from them. Even if their individual authors are
experts, none of them signed off on the way the 1AC
strung their claims together as a political artifact
designed to win a debate round. The idea that the 1AC is
a unified, coherent piece of scholarship is highly
problematic.
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AT: Empirics
1. Pepsi Challenge name some security is a flawed

paradigm:
A.) Iraq War we invaded on the 1% risk of nuclear war
doctrine look where that got us
B.) North Korea whenever something happens in the
Asian region, we think its them even if were wrong.
2. Their empirics are politically motivated to persuade you
to vote for them all of our reps arguments are a turn to
this.
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AT: No Root Cause
1. No link we never said theres a single root cause we

are simply a questioning of the surrounding environment
behind the plan.
2. This argument is like saying we need to send some
peacemakers to Iran its a cover-up for actual realist
policy.
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AT: Predictions Good
1. Prediction is a self fulfilling prophecy- realism predicts

violence and responds with militarism which in turn
causes violence. Their advantage claims can't be
evaluated outside of the project of neorealism that
created it, they are merely social constructions.
2. Future narratives must be deconstructed- predictions
are not value neutral, they are highly political
Carr 10 [Matt, Writer and Journalist Slouching towards dystopia: the new
military futurism Institute of Race Relations,
http://rac.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/51/3/13]
The military has also shown a keen interest in the study of the possible
future in the early twenty-first century, particularly in the United States. In 1997, the US National
Intelligence Council (NIC) published Global Trends 2010, the first of three reports in its ambitious 2020
Project that aims to predict the forces that will shape our world over a two-decade period. In 2001, the
prestigious US Air Force thinktank, the RAND Corporation, established the Frederick S. Pardee Center for
Longer Range Global Policy and the Future Human Condition. Since 2000, the US Joint Forces Command
has published two studies of the international military and security environment over the next two decades
and its implications for the military. Military and national security research institutions such as the US
Armys Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) regularly stage conferences and symposia on Long Range Planning
and Forecasting, Scenario Planning and Projecting Future Battlespaces and Scenarios. These studies are
Military futurists also devote considerable

attention to more mainstream futurological subjects, such as social and economic
transformation, demographics, urbanism, cultural trends and climate
change. What explains the militarys interest in the future and what does this fascination tell us about
the present? Military futurism is not a historical novelty in itself. Armies have routinely engaged
in contingency planning ever since the German armed forces pioneered long range planning in
the late nineteenth century. Military futurism really came into its own during the cold
war, when the RAND Corporation began conducting regular war games and simulations to
predict the likely outcomes of nuclear and conventional military confrontations with
not limited to purely military concerns.
the Soviet Union. In the 1950s and 1960s, RAND luminaries such as Herman Kahn, Leo Roster and Albert
scenario planning and systems thinking,

attempted to provide US policymakers with the conceptual tools to
anticipate alternate or surprising military futures by thinking the
unthinkable. By the 1980s, forecasting, war-gaming and scenario planning had become routinely
Wohlstetter built illustrious careers around
which
integrated into US military practice. While studies such as Innovation Task Force 2025 (1988) and AirLand
Battle 2000 (1982) considered the transformation of the armed forces or rehearsed NATO war plans
against the Warsaw Pact, others continued to explore the outer limits of the unthinkable future. One report
published by the Department of Defense in the early years of the Reagan presidency imagined a nuclear
war in which the White House, the Pentagon and much of civilisation were destroyed, but computers
continued in the aftermath to run a war no human mind can control, directing space satellites, nuclear
weapons and armies of robots that can gallop like horses and walk like men, carrying out computerised
orders as they roam the radioactive battlefield.2 Cold war military futurism also spilled over into the
private sector. In 1961, Herman Kahn founded the Hudson Institute, a conservative thinktank and research
centre which aspires to provide global leaders in government and business with the tools to manage
strategic transitions to the future.3 In the 1970s, Royal Dutch Shell pioneered the corporate use of
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scenario planning in the oil industry in response to what was perceived as a new climate of uncertainty and
This overlapping nexus between the military

and corporate futurism has continued ever since. Not only do the US military
and the private sector share the same concern with geopolitical and
international developments pertaining to US national security and the future
of the capitalist world economy, but private companies and institutions
specialising in scenario planning and risk management also work closely
with the military in developing futuristic analyses. The Hudson Institutes Center for
unpredictability following the OPEC oil embargo.
Political-Military Analysis produces regular studies for the military on the critical variables and nonlinear
forces affecting international politics.4 Both the Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security have
also commissioned futuristic studies from scenario planning specialists such as the Global Business
Network (GBN) and the giant management consultancy firm Booz Allen Hamilton. In 2006, Booz Allen won
a $32 million contract to provide the Pentagons Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) with wargaming materials and simulations, whose aim, according to the company spokesman, was to write the
history of the future and provide the Pentagon with a picture of the world between 2001 and 2025.5 All
this is in keeping with the tradition developed by Kahn and his RAND colleagues but the new military
futurism is also strikingly different from its predecessors. Where the cold war futurists were primarily
concerned with the Soviet Union and scenario planning for nuclear war, twenty-first century futurists are
concerned with very different threats and challenges. One of the most prolific producers of futurological
studies is the Pentagons Office of Net Assessment (ONA), an obscure but influential thinktank run by the
veteran RAND intellectual and military futurist Andrew Marshall. Each year, the ONA commissions dozens
of studies from academics and thinktanks like the Hudson Institute and private consulting companies. Most
of these reports are classified but the talkingpointsmemo.com website recently used the Freedom of
Information Act to obtain an index of ONA publications. These include titles such as Pandoras Boxes: the
mind of jihad (June 2007), Why they Wont Know What Hit Them: are Arabs thinking about the
consequences of another 9/11 (July 2006), Europe 2025: mounting security challenges amidst declining
competitiveness (September 2008), Role of High Power Microwave Weapons in Future Intercontinental War
(July 2007) and even German Liberals and the Integration of Muslim Minorities in Germany (December
new
military futurists also differ from their predecessors in their generally grim
perspective on the future. In Rethinking the Unthinkable (1963), Herman Kahn attempted
to demonstrate that a nuclear war might not be survivable and therefore
thinkable. This scenario was intended to be positive albeit from a hawkish foreign
policy perspective but contemporary military futurism is often extremely
pessimistic in its depictions of the twenty-first century security
environment. Such pessimism is partly a reflection of the prevailing mood in
the US national security establishment. Ever since the end of the cold war, US security
analysts have argued that the US was vulnerable to attack by elusive and
unpredictable enemies that were potentially more dangerous than the former Soviet Union. Such
predictions appeared to be confirmed by the catastrophic events of September 11.
On the one hand, the 9/11 attacks were predictable, in the sense that an
attack of some kind had been expected. At the same time, the attacks constituted
what futurologists call wild cards, discontinuities or surprising events
with huge consequences, which force a new set of expectations about what
the future might contain. Some US security analysts have since added the Iraq
insurgency to the category of strategic shocks and attributed the failure to
predict it to the same failure of imagination that helped make the 9/11 attacks possible.
The result is a new willingness amongst the US national security
establishment to consider further strategic shocks by imagining the
unimaginable a tendency which has generated imaginative scenarios that
sometimes owe more to apocalyptic Hollywood movies, manga comics and science fiction
2006).6 These titles are an indication of the new concerns of contemporary military futurism. The
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than they do to sober analysis. Faced with a future that seems fraught with unpleasant
surprises, the Pentagon has embarked on some outlandish and even bizarre
attempts to try to reduce the element of uncertainty and unpredictability .
One ongoing project aims to recruit social scientists to compile a
computerised database of cultural, religious and political beliefs in every country in
the world that will supposedly enable the military to predict which countries
are most likely to succumb to unrest, insurgency or terrorism . In 2002, the
Pentagons cutting edge Defense and Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) came close to
introducing a terrorism futures market based on the financial futures market, which invited bets on when
and where terrorist events were likely to occur in order to predict them beforehand. This scheme was
abandoned when it was pointed out that some organisations might deliberately carry out attacks in order
to profit from them. In 2007, DARPA awarded Lockheed Martin a contract to develop an Integrated Crises
Early Warning System (ICEWS) that its designers claimed will anticipate and respond to worldwide
political crises and predict events of interest and stability of countries of interest with greater than 80
percent accuracy in the same way that meteorologists predict the weather.7 These initiatives cannot be
broad
scope of contemporary military futurism is partly a consequence of changing
concepts of warfare in the early twenty-first century, with its new emphasis on asymmetric
attributed simply to an overzealous desire to protect the US homeland from another 9/11. The
warfare, terrorism and insurgency across the global battlespace rather than conventional wars between
The commitment to fourth generation warfare is fuelled by a new

sense of the fragility and instability of the international state system , coupled
states.
with the belief that the nation-state in the early twenty-first century is increasingly vulnerable to global
economic turbulence, civil and ethnic conflict and the violent activities of non-state actors all of which
The
uncertainty, instability and risk that military futurists project onto the
future not only emanates from nuclear-armed rogue states or non-state
actors, however. A recurring theme in military futurist scenarios concerns the
possibility that the emergence of China, India and Brazil as major economic
powers may be accompanied by a decline in US and western global
hegemony and that the unipolar world of the post-cold war era may be
drawing to an end. With the demise of the Soviet Union, US military thinking has been
dominated by the concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) a term
used to describe periods of history in which one particular military power or group of
powers outstrips all potential rivals. The display of US technological firepower in the first Gulf
War convinced many military planners that this position is now occupied by the US. But this belief is
often accompanied by a realisation of the limitations of US military power
and anxiety that the RMA may not be permanent . The notion of the US RMA is often
are perceived to pose threats to global security and even the future of globalisation itself.
attributed to the Pentagons futurist-in-chief Andrew Marshall at the ONA. Celebrated as a visionary
genius by his admirers and denounced as a paranoiac by his enemies, Marshall is a long-time associate of
Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, and was given a major role by Rumsfeld in the preparation of the
2002 Quadrennial Defense Review, which the US Armed Forces use as a medium-range planning guide to
justify its budget requests to Congress. That same year, Marshall commissioned an 85-page monograph for
the ONA from Booz Allen Hamilton entitled Military Advantage in History, which studied some of the most
successful military conquerors of the past for lessons on how the United States should think about
Though the study identified the

United States as the dominant military power in the world, it nevertheless
warned that such dominance might not be permanent and that barring a
more innovative approach the process leading to its substantial erosion has
already been set in motion. To contribute to this process of innovation, the
report sought inspiration from imperial conquerors such as Alexander the
maintaining military advantage in the twenty-first century.8
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Great, Genghis Khan and particularly from Rome, whose 600-year

dominance, the authors argued, suggests that it is possible for the United
States to maintain its military advantage for centuries if it remains capable
of transforming its forces before an opponent can develop countercapabilities.9 Stripped of its anachronistic application of contemporary
military jargon, its shallow scholarship and its unproblematic comparisons
between the United States and previous empires, this document was
essentially a variant on ONA futuristic studies such as Preserving American Primacy
(January 2006) and Preserving US Military Supremacy (August 2001). The same objectives are shared by
the neoconservative thinktank Project for the New American Century (PNAC) in its 2000 call for US military
The PNAC couples a boyish fascination

with sci-fi weaponry with a strident insistence on the need to preserve US
primacy, geo-political pre-eminence, dominance and a global security
order that is uniquely friendly to American principles and prosperity .10 This
determination to shape, control and dominate the turbulent and conflictprone twenty-first century in the foreseeable (and unforeseeable) future is a
key component of the new military futurism. On the one hand, military futurism is a byproduct of the megalomaniac military doctrine of full spectrum dominance. At the same time, its
predictions about the future express very real fears amongst the US ruling
elite that the United States is inextricably connected to a world that may be
slipping out of its control. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, the new military futurists
are often considerably more pessimistic than their predecessors and tend to
paint a very bleak future of an unsafe and unstable world that demands a
constant military presence to hold it together . From Yevgeny Zemyatins We to
transformation, Rebuilding Americas Defenses.
Brave New World and Orwells Nineteen Eighty-Four, twentieth-century writers have used dystopian visions
of the future as a warning or as a satirical commentary on the often lethal consequences of twentieth-
The dystopias of the new military futurists have a very

different purpose. The US military often tends to perceive itself as the last
bastion of civilisation against encroaching chaos and disorder. The worse the
future is perceived to be, the more these dark visions of chaos and disorder
serve to justify limitless military interventions, techno-warfare ,
techno-surveillance and weapons procurement programmes, and the
predictions of the military futurists are often very grim indeed.
century utopianism.
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AT: Realism Good
1. Realism fails extend Grondin:

A.) Wrong era realism was developed in the Cold War to
explain superpowers it cant account for modern
terrorism, corporations, and the Bush Docrtine.
B.) Excludes reality their claims are politically framed in
one direction.
C.) Security is a social construct Deconstructing these
assumptions reveals that most conflicts evolve from the
self fulfilling prophecy of aggression the security dilemma
initiates.
Realism is a degenerative research programmodifications have made it incoherent and ruined its
scientific rigor
dr. A. (Annette) Freyberg Inan Associate Professor, the Director of the
Master's Program in Political Science, Univ of Amsterdam, PhD in Political
Science at the University of Georgia, USA. Her MA degrees in Political Science
and English were obtained at the University of Stuttgart in her native
Germany. Editorial Board Member: International Studies Review,
Globalizations Journal, Advisory Board Member: Millennium, What Moves
Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human
Nature 2004
In a recent article, John Vasquez sets out to evaluate the realist claim to
scientific rigor. He acknowledges three criteria by which scientific theories
and paradigms may be judged: empirical accuracy, falsifiability, and the
criterion established by Lakatos that legitimate scientific theory must
produce progressive research programs.35 Observing that a number of
analysts . . . argue that, despite anomalies, the realist paradigm is dominant
because it is more enlightening and fertile than its rivals, he holds that,
instead, what some see as a theoretical enrichment of the realist paradigm
is actually a proliferation of emendations that prevent it from being
falsified.36 Vasquez holds with Lakatos that no single theory can ever
be falsified because auxiliary propositions can be added to account for
discrepant evidence and that the appropriate task is, thus, to evaluate a
series of theories that are intellectually related. 37 He observes that realist
and neorealist theories do constitute such a family of theories, or paradigm.
Vasquez notes that a paradigm can only be appraised indirectly by
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examining the abilit y of the theories it generates to satisfy criteria of

adequacy. 38 He focuses his examination on a core research program within
the realist paradigm: the empirical research conducted to test Kenneth
Waltzs balancing proposition. He then sets out to determine whether this
research program is degenerating or progressive by Lakatosian
standards.39 A research program is degenerating if its auxiliary propositions
increasingly take on the characteristic of ad hoc explanations that do not
produce any novel (theoretical) facts as well as empirical content. 40 To find
out whether a research program is degenerating or not, we must examine
whether its problemshifts, that is, its theoretical emendations, are
progressive or ad hoc. According to Lakatos, progressive problemshifts
must be both theoretically and empirically progressive, that is, they must
explain novel facts as well as be able to corroborate their claims, while also
being able to account for the findings of their rivals. By comparison, a
degenerating problemshift or research program . . . is characterized by the
use of semantic devices that hide the actual contentdecreasing
nature of the research program through reinterpretation. 41 Vasquez
observes that, while some latitude may be permitted for the development of
ad hoc explanations, the longer this goes on in the face of discrepant
evidence, the greater is the likelihood that scientists are engaged in a
research program that is constantly repairing one flawed theor y after
another without any incremental advancement in the empirical
content of these theories. What changes is not what is known about the
world, but semantic labels to describe discrepant evidence that the
original theory( ies) did not anticipate.42 One effect of such a
development is that collectively the paradigm begins to embody
contradictory propositions, such as (1) war is likely when power is not
balanced and one side is preponderant and (2) war is likely when power is
relatively equal. The development of two or more contradictory propositions
increases the probability that at least one of them will pass an empirical
test. . . . Carried to an extreme, the paradigm could prevent any kind of
falsification, because collectively its propositions in effect pose the bet:
heads, I win; tails, you lose. A research program can be considered
blatantly degenerative if one or more of the behaviors predicted is only
predicted after the fact.43 Vasquez finds that this realist research program is
degenerating because of (1) a protean character in its theoretical
development, which plays into (2) an unwillingness to specify what form(s) of
the theory constitutes the true theory, which if falsified would lead to a
rejection of the paradigm, as well as (3) a continual and persistent adoption
of auxiliary propositions to explain away empirical and theoretical f laws that
greatly exceed the abilit y of researchers to test the propositions and (4) a
general dearth of strong empirical findings.44 He concludes that there have
been too many empirical failures and anomalies, and theoretical emendations
have taken on an entirely too ad hoc nonfalsifying character for adherents to
say that the paradigm cannot be displaced until there is a clearly better
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theory available. Such a position makes collective inertia work to the

advantage of the dominant paradigm and makes the field less rather than
more rigorous.45 The judgment of Vasquez is supported by Bahman Fozouni,
whose analysis of its epistemological liabilities leads him to the conclusion
that political realism, properly understood, is empirically an untenable
theory.46 Fozouni examines various attempts to rescue realism from
potential falsifying evidence, among them strategies of qualifying realisms
universal claim by means of additional auxiliary assumptions, incorporating
additional explanator y variables and/or changing functional relationships
among them, or diluting the theories nomothetic-deterministic claim by
using statistical generalization (507). He finds that the epistemological
liabilities of realism are primarily a function of such attempts by realists
and neorealists to save the theory from refutation. He holds that in many
cases such efforts have had the unsalutory effect of impoverishing the
paradigm and that they all detract in varying degrees from the theor ys
most desirable epistemic features amenabilit y to falsification (testabilit y),
parsimony, scope, and content (ibid.). His judgment is that none of these
modifications produces any apparent compensating gains in either the
explanatory power or predictive accuracy of the theory (ibid.). (148-150)
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AT: Realism Inevitable
1. Their claims are constructed they produce these

facts but they are politically motivated. Thats Grondin.
2. Diversity in the literature proves this argument is
wrong there are even like 20 different types of realist
scholars.
3. Even if it is, the rejection of the Aff is key if we win
our framework arguments, this goes away.
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AT: Realism = Science
Realism is empirically and scientifically untenable

-pluralism better captures their offense
dr. A. (Annette) Freyberg Inan Associate Professor, the Director of the
Master's Program in Political Science, Univ of Amsterdam, PhD in Political

Science at the University of Georgia, USA. Her MA degrees in Political Science
and English were obtained at the University of Stuttgart in her native
Germany. Editorial Board Member: International Studies Review,
Globalizations Journal, Advisory Board Member: Millennium, What Moves
Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human
Nature 2004
Realist international relations theory takes a particular perspective on world
politics that is by no means inclusive of all relevant aspects of the realit y in
question. This is a natural consequence of the fact that this perspective has
been developed and refined in opposition to other frameworks of
understanding. In fact, over the course of millennia, it has been specifically
designed, for political and moral purposes, to counteract such other ways of
looking at the world as, most notably, political idealism. This is why both E. H.
Carr and Reinhold Niebuhr were prepared to admit that, while realism has
potential as a negative and normative theory, it is not, and should not be,
understood as a positive and empirical theory of international politics.8 A
positive theory needs to be not primarily designed to point out the
weaknesses in other theories, or to counterbalance a view of the world that
may be equally skewed in the opposite direction, but it needs to be designed
with the purpose of developing the most useful explanations possible for the
phenomena of concern. The usefulness of all strictly empirical theory
ultimately depends on realistic assumptions and accurate observation.
Deductive empirical theory, which is only implicitly built on observation, is,
ultimately, only as useful as its assumptions; similarly, inductive empirical
theory, which attempts to draw its conclusions directly from an examination
of realit y, is only as useful as its observations. In view of the limitations
caused by its assumptions about human nature, and of the dangers these
assumptions pose for accurate observation, realism is empirically,
scientifically, and normatively an untenable theory. It is empirically
untenable because it is not realistic. Its assumptions concerning human
nature do not merely constitute a harmless simplification, but they create
and propagate a one-sided and thus biased view of man. Realism is
scientifically untenable because, in Lakatosian terms, its research programs
are degenerative. To restate, research conducted within the paradigm is too
concerned with sustaining the paradigm and not concerned enough with
providing new insight. It is possible that such is the fate of all paradigms, yet
even if this were the case, such a judgment is no reason to let paradigmatic
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hegemony continue forever. If we were to come to such a conclusion, it would

be far more commonsensical to attempt to foster theoretical and
methodological pluralism. Finally, realism is normatively untenable,
because it poses risks for the role and functioning of morality and community
in human life. At the same time, there exists some evidence that it may
influence the process of foreign policy making and, thus, the conduct of
international politics, in ways that are difficult to accept as long as we believe
that we have the option not to. (158-9)
Constant modification to help it account for change

degrades the interpretive and predictive power of the
theory. This makes their conception of scientific
legitimacy a rigged game- its' the theoretical equivalent
of teaching to the test, the theory is molded to meet a
specific conception of falsifiability.
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AT: Thayer
[read other realism arguments]

Thayer exaggerates and misinterprets scientific evidence
Mark Busser, Master's Candidate Dept of Poli Sci York University, YCISS
Working Paper No. 40 The Evolution of Security: Revisiting the Human Nature
Debate in International Relations, August 2006
According to Thayer, the goal of evolutionary theory is to understand the
ultimate causes of behaviour, and because these causes are testable they
provide a solid foundation for a realist approach to the study of politics.32
This description oversimplifies the goals of evolutionary science and
conflates evolutionary theory writ large with the specific intentions and
goals of sociobiology, a controversial field. Furthermore, Thayer
exaggerates the scientific consensus about sociobiology within
evolutionary studies, as Duncan Bell and Paul MacDonald have noted.33 This
is not a minor point, for while his argument seeks to unify the natural and
social sciences, Thayer has selectively chosen his scientific sources (both
social and natural), read them selectively, and turned a blind eye to
alternative explanations and interpretations. His article rests on two major
claims, both underpinned by arguable sociobiological evidence. The first
argument Thayer puts forward is that natural selection favours egoistic
individuals over altruistic ones. Following evolutionary theory, he recalls that
a member of a species is relatively fit in biological terms if it is better able to
survive and reproduce than other members of the same community or
species. For Thayer, this underscores the important concept of the survival of
the fittest. He suggests that since what is most important is relative, not
absolute fitness, it is only logical to emphasize a competitive aspect to
evolution within groups.In a hostile environment where resources are scarce
and thus survival precarious, organisms typically satisfy their own
physiological needs for food, shelter, and so on before assisting others.34
Thayer conveys a simple version of basic principles within evolutionary
science, but delves into a scientific niche by incorporating Richard Dawkins
controversial selfish gene theory. Thayer asserts that because selfishness in
genes increased fitness, the same sort of selfishness has spread to behaviour
patterns in modern animals, including humans.35 Shaw and Wong, for
example, suggest that altruism and nepotism can be explained through the
concept of inclusive fitness, wherein natural selection favours specific genes
that cause individuals to act on behalf of their gene pool. The authors use
complex mathematical experiments to construct models of evolutionary
humankind and explain its likely behaviours as individualistic rational
choices.The second argument in Thayers essay deals with domination and
hierarchy. To prove classical realisms theory of a natural human tendency
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towards domination, Thayer points to the dominance hierarchies observed

in many social animals. The ubiquity of hierarchical, alpha-male-dominated
social orders suggests to Thayer that such a pattern of organization
contributes to fitness because the alternative is perpetual conflict over
resources. Dominance hierarchies, he argues, avoid conflict because weaker
members submit resources to dominant members instead of engaging in
costly conflicts.37 According to Edward O. Wilson, humans naturally evolve a
mental framework for engaging in dominance hierarchies. Human beings,
Wilson suggests, Are absurdly easy to indoctrinate they seek it.38 Thayer
suggests that survival in a hostile world produces a fear of ostracism and a
desire for the protection of a group, and argues that conformity to a
dominance hierarchy lowers conflict and keeps groups together. This, in turn,
results in the clash of opposing hierarchical societies. The broad goal of
Thayers paper is to unite his two arguments to demonstrate that universal
biological impulses drive human beings towards war. His argument revolves
around the idea of an evolved human antipathy towards difference. Thayer
suggests that xenophobia and ethnocentrism would have been helpful
attributes to groups seeking to protect limited resources, and concludes that
given the contribution of xenophobia and ethnocentrism to fitness during
human evolution, ethnic conflict is likely to be a recurring social phenomenon.
Therefore ethnic conflict, like war and peace, is part of the fabric of
international politics.39 While Thayer acknowledges that culture and religion
can dampen or exacerbate xenophobia and ethnocentrism, he still argues
that these phenomena are an integral part of an evolved biological human
nature. In this he follows Edward O. Wilson, who has argued that war as we
know it is the evolutionary result of a phenomenon known as kin selection.
This refers to the particular selective mechanism whereby genetic relatives
affect each others evolutionary fitness through interactions that make
survival of the relatives as well of the gene or trait encouraging such
interactions more likely. According to Wilson, the continual processes of kin
selection have encouraged warlike behaviours because of various
competitive advantages to violent ethnocentrism.40 With this starting point,
Thayer, Shaw and Wong attempt to explain a human propensity for warfare in
terms of central tendencies in aggression and lethal conflict, which [they]
maintain have been adapted to serve humans in hunter/gatherer groups for
99 percent of humanitys existence.41 To prove this claim, Shaw and Wong
attempt to formalize a cost-benefit analysis model supported by the concept
of inclusive fitness. Theoretical decisions are mapped out in terms of
mathematical probabilities to show how aggressive tendencies would lend
individuals communities relative fitness and encourage such traits to be
passed along. Responding directly to Thayer, Duncan Bell and Paul
MacDonald have expressed concern at the intellectual functionalism inherent
in sociobiological explanations, suggesting that too often analysts choose a
specific behaviour and read backwards into evolutionary epochs in an
attempt to rationalize explanations for that behaviour. These arguments, Bell
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and MacDonald write, often fall into what Richard Lewontin and Stephen Jay
Gould have called adaptionism, or the attempt to understand all
physiological and behavioural traits of an organism as evolutionary
adaptations.42 Arguments such as these are hand-crafted by their makers,
and tend to carry forward their assumptions and biases. In an insightful
article, Jason Edwards suggests that sociobiology and its successor,
evolutionary psychology, are fundamentally political because they frame
their major questions in terms of an assumed individualism. Edwards
suggests that the main question in both subfields is: given human nature,
how is politics possible?43 The problem is that the givens of human nature
are drawn backward from common knowledges and truths about humans in
society, and the game-theory experiments which seek to prove them are
often created with such assumptions in mind. These arguments are seen by
their critics as politicized from the very start. Sociobiology in particular has
been widely interpreted as a conservative politico-scientific tool because of
these basic assumptions, and because of the political writings of many
sociobiologists.44 Because sociobiology naturalizes certain behaviours like
conflict, inequality and prejudice, Lewontin et al. suggest that it sets the
stage for legitimation of things as they are.45 The danger inherent in
arguments that incorporate sociobiological arguments into examinations of
modern political life, the authors say, is that such arguments naturalize
variable behaviours and support discriminatory political structures. Even if
certain behaviours are found to have a biological drives behind them,
dismissing those behaviours as natural precludes the possibility that
human actors can make choices and can avoid anti-social, violent, or
undesirable action.46 While the attempt to discover a geneticallydetermined
human nature has usually been justified under the argument that knowing
humankinds basic genetic programming will help to solve the resulting social
problems, discourse about human nature seems to generate selffulfilling prophesies by putting limits on what is considered
politically possible. While sociobiologists tend to distance themselves from
the naturalistic fallacy that what is is what should be, there is still a
problem with employing adaptionism to explain how existing political
structures because conclusions tend to be drawn in terms of conclusions that
assert what must be because of biologicallyingrained constraints.47 Too firm
a focus on sociobiological arguments about natural laws draws attention
away from humanitys potential for social and political solutions that can
counteract and mediate any inherent biological impulses, whatever
they may be. A revived classical realism based on biological arguments casts
biology as destiny in a manner that parallels the neo-realist sentiment that
the international sphere is doomed to everlasting anarchy. Jim George quotes
the English School scholar Martin Wight as writing that hope is not a political
virtue: it is a theological virtue.48 George questions the practical result of
traditional realsist claims, arguing that the suggestion that fallen mans sinful
state can only be redeemed by a higher power puts limitations on what is
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considered politically possible. Thayers argument rejects the religious

version of the fallen man for a scientific version, but similar problems remain
with his scientific conclusions. (9-13)
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AT: Securitization Hyperbolic
1. Were not hyping the security risksour Lipshutz and

Grondin cards both talk about the real problem that the
securitization now is having.
2. The 1ACs assumptions are still based on realism, or
securitizing and justifying anything for the self-interest of
the country.
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AT: Fear is Worse
1. Turnwe solve the fear with the new practices and new
theories because we will be looking for new ways to cope
with problems besides constructing threats.
2. There is fear nowthe whole 1AC is based off the
threat and the problems of other nations and what the
U.S. must do to avoid that.
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AT: Thornhill and Palmer
Thornhill and Palmer have a crappy theory supported by

questionable evidence
Jerry A. Coyne is in the Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of
Chicago, AND Andrew Berry is at the Museum of Comparative Zoology
Labs, Harvard University, Rape as an adaptation , Nature (404) 2000 p.
121-2
In A Natural History of Rape, Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer argue that
rape is an adaptation that it has evolved to increase the reproductive
success of men who would otherwise have little sexual access to women.
Their analysis of rape then forms the basis of a protracted sales pitch for
evolutionary psychology, the latest incarnation of sociobiology: not only do
the authors believe that this should be the explanatory model of choice in the
human behavioural sciences, but they also want to see its insights
incorporated into social policy. Thus, in a single, slim volume, Thornhill and
Palmer give us both an inflammatory analysis of a sensitive topic, and a
manifesto outlining evolutionary biology's future conquest of the social
sciences. In the furore that has greeted the book's publication, the scientific
evidence for the authors' arguments has been largely ignored. However, it is
here that we must start. If their specific claims about rape are not
scientifically sound, then the authors' grand vision of the centrality of natural
selection to every aspect of our behaviour collapses as well. In their media
appearances, Thornhill and Palmer cloak themselves in the authority of
science, implying that the controversy over their ideas is purely political, and
that the underlying biology is unimpeachable. This is a serious
misrepresentation. What persuasiveness the book does possess rests on an
ingenious rhetorical trick. The authors lay out two alternative evolutionary
hypotheses: rape is either a 'specific adaptation' (that is, natural selection
explicitly promoted the act) or a 'by-product of evolution' (there was no direct
selection for rape; rather it is an accidental product of selection for, say, male
promiscuity and aggression). Readers unconvinced by the specific-adaptation
argument therefore find themselves embracing by default the by-product
alternative. Either way, Thornhill and Palmer claim a convert. But what, in
behavioural terms, is an evolutionary by-product? Everything that is not a
specific adaptation. Thus, playing the piano an activity unlikely to have
been instrumental in the evolution of the brain is an evolutionary byproduct, because it depends on a brain that was itself produced by natural
selection. If every human behaviour can be seen as a by-product of evolution,
then the by-product idea is useless, for a theory that explains everything is
merely a truism. The claims that rape and playing the piano are by-products
of evolution are claims without content. It is not surprising, then, that A
Natural History of Rape is largely an argument for the specific-adaptation
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theory. The authors' evidence, however, either fails to support their case, is
presented in a misleading and/or biased way, or equally supports alternative
explanations. The following examples illustrate each of these failings. First,
Thornhill and Palmer make much of the claim that rape victims tend to be in
their prime reproductive years, suggesting that reproduction is indeed a
central part of the rapist's agenda. But the data they present contradict this
claim. In a 1992 survey that attempted to deal with the substantial statistical
problem of unreported rape, 29% of US rape victims were under the age of
11. As that age group comprises approximately 15% of the female
population, under-11s were over-represented among rape victims by a factor
of two. So invested are the authors in their specific-adaptation hypothesis
that they try to explain this non-adaptive anomaly by noting that the data do
not indicate the "proportion of the victims under 11 who were exhibiting
secondary sexual traits". Further, "the increasingly early age of menarche in
Western females contributes to the enhanced sexual attractiveness of some
females under 12". In the end, the hopelessness of this special pleading
merely draws attention to the failure of the data to support the authors'
hypothesis. Second, the authors contend that, based on sociological studies,
female rape victims of reproductive age are more traumatized by the
experience than are women either too old or too young to reproduce. The
rationale is that reproductive-age women are in effect mourning the lost
opportunity for mate choice which rape, in the world view of evolutionary
psychology, represents to them. The authors see this apparent heterogeneity
in the reaction to rape as supporting their claims about the reproductive
essence of the act. In checking the cited reference (one of its authors is
Thornhill himself), we find that the original work's conclusions differ critically
from those given in the book. According to Thornhill and Palmer, the cited
study shows post-rape trauma to be higher in reproductive-age women (age
1244) than in the two other age classes (under 12 and over 44). In fact, the
data show that the only heterogeneity in response to rape comes from the
under-12 class: the over-44 class is just as traumatized as the 1244 one.
However, when the over-44 and under-12 classes are pooled, the under-12
effect of less trauma makes this combined 'non-reproductive' class
significantly different from the 1244 one. The authors have used statistical
sleight of hand to buttress their argument. And we need hardly point out that
the relative lack of trauma in the youngest age group may be unrelated to
sexual immaturity: rather, children may be less able to express their feelings.
Furthermore, the original study's data are questionable because much of the
assessment of trauma in the under-12 class was necessarily based on reports
from the child's care-givers rather than from the child herself. Direct
comparison of observer-reported and self-reported data on such a subjective
issue is extremely problematic. Finally, the fact that women of reproductive
age experience more violence during rape than do older women or children
suggesting that they fight back harder is taken by the authors as evidence
that they have more to defend. There is, they contend, more at stake
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reproduction, no less for reproductive-age women. While it is true that

women of reproductive age who resist rape may be partly motivated by the
fear of unwanted conception, it is also true that such women, at the peak of
their bodily strength, are most physically capable of fighting back. Children
cannot fight off a full-grown man, and older women may also find resistance
beyond them. In exclusively championing their preferred explanation of a
phenomenon, even when it is less plausible than alternatives, the authors
reveal their true colours. A Natural History of Rape is advocacy, not science.
We have highlighted just three examples of the book's flawed arguments.
There are many more. The evidence that rape is a specific adaptation is weak
at best. In keeping with the traditions established early in the evolution of
sociobiology, Thornhill and Palmer's evidence comes down to a series of
untestable 'just-so' stories. Sociobiological approaches to human behaviour
may yield interesting insights. But it is disciplinary hubris a long-standing
feature of evolutionary psychology to suppose that natural selection
underlies our every action. Because of the central role of reproduction in
Darwin's theory, sexual behaviour is, in principle, a good candidate for fruitful
sociobiological study, but even here it usually fails dismally. The most
imaginative and committed sociobiologist would be hard-pressed to show
that masturbation, sadomasochism, bestiality, and pornography's enthusiasm
for high heels are all direct adaptations. In its insistence on forcing everything
into the strait-jacket of adaptation, evolutionary psychology offers a woefully
incomplete perspective on human behaviour. Thornhill and Palmer have
inadvertently revealed just how deficient that perspective is.
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AT: Shaw and Wong
Shaw and Wong mistate the science behind their position,

ignore culture, and back doors conservative politics
masquerading as science
Joshua Goldstein , Professor Emeritus, School of International Service,
American University Nonresident Sadat Senior Fellow, CIDCM, University of
Maryland and Research Scholar, Dept. of Political Science, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst , The Emperor's New Genes: Sociobiology and War,
International Studies Quarterly 1987
The article by Shaw and Wong, published in this issue of ISQ, restates the
premises of Wilson's sociobiology, but contributes nothing new. There is no
cumulation of knowledge or theory here. Shaw and Wong treat inclusive
fitness not as a disputed theory but as an axiom. Other than restating old and
questionable theories without addressing their critics, the article contains
only two original aspects. First, seven mathematical equations are presented.
Second, the authors conclude with some speculation about modern societies,
which they hope to consider in the future. Shaw and Wong's restatement of
controversial theories from sociobiology contains the following points:
Humans form themselves into ethnic or "kinship" groups sharing a genetic
stock. Genetic relatedness increases solidarity and internal order within a
group. Human behavior is cooperative and even altruistic within a group; and
competitive and hostile toward other groups.29 In-group cooperation and outgroup enmity are explained by inclusive fitness (groups that can mobilize to
prevail in conflict would have better prospects for long-term survival and
reproduction). And individuals may "rationally" sacrifice themselves for the
sake of preserving their genes in other members of the group.30 Shaw and
Wong justify none of these assertions theoretically or empirically. They make
no reference to the debates on aggression, nor those on the genetic basis of
behavior. They ignore the arguments of Boorman and Levitt, and of Corningboth of which imply that Hamilton's "inclusive fitness" model would not
extend to human societies. Furthermore, Shaw and Wong do not adequately
acknowledge the difficulties of applying a kinship-based theory of war
to a world that has been divided into genetically- mixed nation-states for
centuries. Israel, for example, is a prime example of a modern nation-state
showing strong in-group cohesion (out-group enmity) despite being
genetically heterogeneous (half of IsraeliJews are more closely related
genetically to the Arab world than to the other IsraeliJews). Shaw and Wong
do not tackle such problems. Shaw and Wong do not show why biology,
rather than solely culture, should explain: (1) the spread of warlike behavior;
(2) the creation of "information networks;" (3) in- group cohesion and
problems in cooperation between groups; or (4) the willingness to sacrifice for
one's group.31 Shaw and Wong (p. 7) acknowledge that culture dis-
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tinguishes human from animal behavior, a gap they claim to address in their
article. But instead they presume that genetics defines groups, and exclude
cultural considerations from their model altogether. Shaw and
Wong's argument, then, consists of propositions borrowed from sociobiology,
which they neither support with new evidence, nor elaborate in light of
previous criticisms. What about the mathematical equations? They accurately
reflect the propositions that Shaw and Wong advance. But what is gained
from such formalisms in this instance? They are put to no significant cause,
and seem only to seek legitimacy for a theory that otherwise lacks
support. Everything said here in mathematical equations could be stated
verbally in less space and with greater clarity. Equations [1]-[4] state that
individuals compete ("e.g., undertake a war") only if their net gain (gains less
costs) from doing so is less than from not doing so-a proposition taken from
the rational choice model. The variable under study-to compete, to start a
war, etc. -is completely vague in definition and does not take account of the
many variations and interpretations of such acts and their meanings. Thus
the mathematical language here encourages theoretical imprecision rather
than forcing theoretical precision. Furthermore, the specification is wrong,
because the comparison should not be "start a war" versus "do nothing" but
rather "start a war versus a wide range of alternative types of behavior in the
human repertoire. By excluding these nonwarlike behaviors, Shaw and Wong
reveal a presumption that human beings are inherently pre- disposed
toward war. Equation [5] says that the expected net gain from competition
depends in part on the probability of winning the competition, the outcome
being indeterminate ahead of time. This is a component of many "rational
choice" models. But in itself it is trivial. Equation [6] states that gains from
competition include gains to the individual's group, as well as to the
individual. The group is defined, unnecessarily, by genetic relatedness. To
include altruism toward a group as an individual utility in a rational choice
model is reasonable; but even if so, that utility need not be genetically based.
Equation [7] repeats that "competition" will be desirable if the net gains, as
extended by Equations [5] and [6], are greater than the gains of not
competing. What about the political aspects of this argument? Shaw and
Wong (p. 12) claim that warlike behavior has been both "rational" and
"positively functional in humanity's evolution." This is a political rather than
scientific statement. Shaw and Wong seem to believe that war and racism are
the natural order of things, and have contributed to human progress. If so,
they should come out and say so in plain language, rather than couching
their beliefs in scientific terms. (40-41)
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AT: Guzzini
Guzzinis view of realism is inherently flawed

Rologas, 00 Professor of International Studies at the University of St.
Andrews (Mitchell, 76 International Affiars 1, Review (untitled) (review of
Realism in international relations and international political economy: the
continuing story of a death foretold, by Stefano Guzzini),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626202, JPW)
This is a stimulating work which, for all the excellence of some of its
individual components, nevertheless does not add up to a convincing whole.
Guzzini's interpretation of realism as 'the attempt to translate the rules of the
diplomatic practice of the nineteenth century into scientific rules of social
science which developed mainly in the US' (p. ii) is plausible enough but his
treatment of the historical assimilation is questionable. He repeats the tired
old myth that there was an interwar 'debate' between idealism and realism
(p. 32). Not only do scholars investigating the period find little evidence for
such a debate, but they also have considerable difficulty in separating the
idealists from the realists (see for example the essays in David Long and
Peter Wilson, eds., Thinkers of the twenty-year crisis: inter-war realism
reassessed, I995). Was Chamberlain an idealist or a realist? E. H. Carr, as
Guzzini is aware, gave different answers to this question in consecutive
editions of his Twenty-year crisis. Certainly, if we accept Guzzini's summary
that 'in short, idealism holds that through reason alone mankind can
overcome the state of nature in inter-state relations' (p. I7) we will be hard
pressed to identify very many idealists at all. This is important because
Guzzini wishes to resurrect the Kuhnian notion of 'paradigms' in suggesting
that there was a paradigmatic shift from idealism to realism as the dominant
paradigm after the Second World War. I doubt whether realism has ever
enjoyed quite the unchallenged status that Guzzini ascribes to it, certainly
nothing that would approach the Kuhnian state of 'normal science.' Hans
Morgenthau-whose Politics among nations is described by Guzzini as 'the
paradigmatic text of the emerging US social science' (p. i6)-had numerous
detractors both within academe and in the broader policy-shaping networks.
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AT: Jarvis
Jarvis misreads and essentializes critical scholarship

making his claims worthless
Michael J Shapiro, Professor of Politial Science at the University of Hawaii. International
Studies Association review of Books 2001 p. 126-128
D. S. L. Jarvis's International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism:

Defending the Discipline constitutes a radical alternative to Cochran's
practice of critique. Manifesting a serious allergy to critique and especially to
what he calls "postmodernism," Jarvis presumes that he must defend tradi tional, neopositivist IR against (in the words of the book jacket) "the various
postmodern and poststructuralist theories currently sweeping the discipline of
International Relations."To put the matter simply at the outset, Jarvis appears
to be almost entirely ignorant of the philosophical predicates of the critical
IR literature he attacks. He invents a model of thought that he finds
vulnerable and then proceeds with his method of argumentation, mostly to
scoff at the enemy he has invented. But Jarvis's scoffing amounts to
whistling in the dark. He has entered a field of critique with predicates that
are mysterious to him, and he shows signs of being genuinely anxious about
the consequences of critical work.The monster Jarvis creates is a work of
fiction, for he begins with the presumption that postmodern orientations are
"sweeping" and therefore threatening the discipline. (I estimate that roughly
one percent of the papers at the annual meeting of the International Studies
Association reference postructuralist philosophy.) Returning to the Victorian
genre of Gothic fiction in which the constitutive practice involves two primary
rolesthe monster and the victimJarvis portrays Richard Ashley as the
Frankenstein monster and the victim as the entire IR discipline. Moreover,
Jarvis's overwrought style of characterization of the dangers of postmodern IR
fits Gothic fiction's motivational profile as well. As is noted in Fred Botting's
treatment of the genre: "The terrors and horrors of transgression in Gothic
writing become powerful means to reassert the values of society, virtue and
propriety. . . . They warn of dangers by putting them in their darkest and most
threatening form" (p. 5).Why fiction? Jarvis' makes "the postmodern" (which
he seems to know primarily on the basis of rumor, for most of his citations
are not to postructuralist texts but to thinkers hostile to them) an elastic
category that applies to everything that he perceives to be antagonistic to his
pre-Kantian empiricism. It encompasses most of feminist IR and anything that
uses interpretive method. Although the use of a deconstructive mode of
critique is extremely rare in international studies (the major practitioner is
David Campbell), Jarvis frequently uses the term "deconstruction" as a
synonym for postmodernist method. He assumes, without showing any
evidence that he has read a word of Jacques Derrida's writings, that
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deconstruction is hostile to theory building and is opposed to all forms of

affirmation. This characterization is belied by Derrida's state-ments and
demonstrations and by Campbell's deconstruction-inspired writing on war,
security, and the ethics of responsibility. Symptomatic of his woeful ignorance
of critical work in general, Jarvis refers at one point to the expression
"structure of feeling" as a "postmodern phrase" (p. 32). Structure of feeling is
initiated in the work of Raymond Williams, the late (and famousthough not
sufficiently to alert Jarvis) Marxist literary critic whose work cannot be
remotely related to poststructuralist critique and has inspired such prominent
postmodernism bashers as Terry Eagleton.Jarvis's ignorance is not confined to
contemporary critical interpretive theory (postmodern or otherwise); it even
extends to the neoempiricist philosophy of science. For example, he chides
postmodernists for holding the outrageous view that theorizing constitutes
fact (p. 27), while he wants to uphold a model in which the integrity of theory
in international studies or elsewhererequires that the domains of theory
and fact be understood as radically separate. One need not resort to a
Foucauldian treatment of discourse as event or a Deleuzian critique of
representational thinking to challenge Jarvis's approach to theory.
Jarvis's view of the theorydata relationship was seriously impeached by
enough neoempiricist philosophers by the 1960s to field a softball team
(among the heavy hitters in the starting lineup would be Willard V. Quine,
Patrick Suppes, and Norwood Russell Hanson).The critical work for which
Jarvis has contempt is not the threat he imag ines to "the discipline," unless
we construct the IR discipline as a trained inat tention to the problematics,
within which the work of theory proceeds. The writings of Michel Foucault
(some of whose work Jarvis seems to have read) have implications for a
critical and affirmative perspective that does not compromise the kind of
theory building that IR empiricists do. It extends the arenain which to
theorize while encouraging a historical sensitivityto regimes of discourse
and suggests an ethico-politics of freedom from the impo sitions of identity.
Although Foucault's conception of the problematic points to how concepts
and the modes of fact assigned to them are historically contingent, explicable
in contexts of value, and complicit with modes of power and authority, this
does not thereby invalidate theory. Rather, it opens the way to work on the
ethico-political context of theory and, among other things, to theo rize with a
sensitivity to theory's constituencies (beyond the policymakers that seem
to be prized by Jarvis). As Molly Cochran, whose work is based on knowledge
and critique rather than rumor and contempt, implies, an important legacy of
contemporary critical work is the expansion of political and moral inclusion.
Finally, there is one other genre that is (regrettably) embedded in Jarvis's
fable of the dangers of postmodernism, a biographical speculation about a
five-year hiatus in Richard Ashley's publishing life. Obsessed with the dangers
of postmodernism, Jarvis attributes these years of silence to the "deep
resignation" (p. 183) that he thinks Ashley's version of postmodern theorizing
invites. Without insisting on a counterspeculation, I want to point out that
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Ashley's publishing hiatus coincides with the period shortly after an

automobile accident claimed the life of his wife and seriously maimed his two
sons. At a minimum, the information renders Jarvis's biographical
fable crass and uninformedlike the rest of the book.
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AT: Murray
Murrays theories fail to solve any of realisms flaws

Smith 99
Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard, Lecturer in Politics at Merton College, Assistant Professor of
Government and Social Studies at Harvard, Professor of Political and Social Thought at the University of Virginia (Michael,
75 International Affairs 4, Review: [untitled] (review of Reconstructing Realism, by Alistair J. H. Murray),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626286, JPW)
If Trollope had written this thoughtful book, it would be called Realism redux,
for not only does it seek to vindicate its protagonist-in this case the whole
realist school of thought-in the face of unfair attacks, it also insists upon the
hero's continuing importance, relevance, and wisdom. The author succeeds
more fully in the first task than in the second. Realism may yet suffer from
misinterpretation and oversimplification, but it remains difficult to see how it
can provide a compass to guide us though the dilemmas of ethics and foreign
policy. Murray's summary on the latter issue aptly restates the realist
fondness for paradox, without really going beyond it: 'Realism teaches us that
politics is, in the final analysis, a process of dealing with unending moral
dilemmas; we must simply cope with them as best we can' (p. I 5 5). Realism
invokes prudence, restraint, and is rightly sceptical of self-righteous crusades;
at the same time it contains a 'universalist' element that Murray describes 'as
existing in its own space, detached from both rationalism and reflectivism,
beholden to neither'. But what defines this space? In the close readings of
realist texts that comprise the most convincing parts of this book, Murray
adopts an Augustinian reading of these texts that might provide a clue. And
indeed there is much in the rich, interpretative chapters of this book that will
repay careful reading. Students of realist thought, qua political theory, will
now regard Murray as an essential addition to the literature. As a sometime
foil for his views, I appreciate his careful and respectful readings-yet I still
think he is too credulous of the realist invocation to synthesis without
defining its specific content. Of course Weber says we should combine the
ethic of conviction with the ethic of responsibility (p. I I I)-but how, precisely?
Neither Weber nor Murray has much to say here.
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AT: Popper
Poppers attempt to distance himself from classical

positivist is fruitless- Doesnt reject the fundamental
thesis
George 94 (Jim, Senior lecturer in international relations in the Department of Political Science,
Australian National University, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International
Relations, p. 61-62 AM)
The question of Popper's relationship to positivism is, again, a complex issue,

but basically it concerns an intellectual sleight of hand on Popper's part,
carried out for an uncritical audience at a time when, above all, Western
scholars required confirmation of their identity as the agents of progressive
"scientific" knowledge in the struggle with "ideology" and closure. This sleight of
hand concerned the way Popper defined positivism (in a narrow and restricted
way, as logical positivism) and the way that he sought to detach himself from
this definition.49 In short, Popper rejected Positivism (i.e., logical positivism) on
the basis that it misinterpreted the essence of the Enlightenment and the
modern quest for scientific philosophy. He argued, in the process, that the
(logical) positivist insistence on a 'dichotomy between science and metaphysics
lacked logical credibility. Moreover, in confronting seriously the Humean selfcritique of positivism, Popper (ostensibly) repudiated logical atomism, the
extreme nominalism that underpinned it, and the inductivist methodology built
upon it. Just as significant, he repudiated the phenomenalism (or
sensationalism) that, via direct sensory experience, provided (logical) positivists
their "protocol sentences" of real meaning.)
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AT: Mearsheimer
Mearsheimer rejects any possibility of diplomacy and

peacemaking
Rosecrance, 02
Research Professor of Political Science at the University of California, former Professor in

Public Policy at the University of Harvard (Richard, 55 World Politics 1, Review: War and Peace,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054212, JSTOR, pg. 166, JPW)
In the future, as Mearsheimer sees it, the world will have to deal with a strong
but uncertain China. But unlike Mearsheimer's prescription for restraining
Beijing, the best way to assure Beijing's long-term cooperation is to couple de
facto limits with an invitation to China to join a preponderant coalition of
nations. Socializing China will not be an easy task, but it will become
immensely more difficult if it is conjoined with an American attempt to cut the
Chinese growth rate.94 There are better, positive ways to influence China's
course. Historically speaking, the argument is clear. The benefits to a rising
power of joining such a coalition are far greater than seeking to oppose all
others by force of arms. Napoleon, the kaiser, and Hitler did not improve the
international positions of their respective countries: they worsened and
diminished them. Opposing nations, Great Britain, the United States, and for
a while the Soviet Union, were longer-term beneficiaries of the aggressor's
atavistic expansionism and ultimate isolation. China is among the most subtle
of foreign observers, and we can scarcely conceal the benefits of joining such
a group from her astute diplomatists. The same point applies to Mearsheimer.
In his effort to account for the causes of war, Mearsheimer has neglected the
potentiality for peace that diplomacy and inclusive alignments can bring to
modern international politics.
Mearsheimers theory is too offensive in nature and cant

predict periods of peace
Rosecrance, 02
Research Professor of Political Science at the University of California, former Professor in

Public Policy at the University of Harvard (Richard, 55 World Politics 1, Review: War and Peace,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054212, JSTOR, pg. 156, JPW)
Is the future likely to be as malign as Mearsheimer supposes? An important

limitation of offensive realist theory is that it focuses on war more than on
peace and also neglects past periods in which peace ob tained.64 This is not
entirely surprising. The "tragedy" of offensive real ism consists in repetitive
violence among great powers. Nations, though 61 aware of the tragedy, can
do little to overcome it. Besides, a theory of war is obversely a theory of
peace, so that in one sense Mearsheimer has already answered the question
by empirically concluding that bipolarity and balanced multipolarity are
associated with the fewest instances of major war. In addition, Mearsheimer's
inability to find a secure theoretical foundation for peace is simply a reflection
of the offensive cast of this theory.
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Links
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2NC Military Data Turns Case
Increased data is causing information overload leading

to ineffective military and bad warfare
Shanker & Richtel 11 (Thom Shanker & Matt Richtel, 1/16/2011, In
New Military, Data Overload Can Be Deadly, New York Times. <
http://www.umsl.edu/~sauterv/DSS4BI/links/17brain.pdf>. apanday)
When military investigators looked into an attack by American helicopters
last February that left 23 Afghan civilians dead, they found that the operator
of a Predator drone had failed to pass along crucial information about the
makeup of a gathering crowd of villagers. But Air Force and Army officials
now say there was also an underlying cause for that mistake: information
overload. At an Air Force base in Nevada, the drone operator and his team struggled to work out what
was happening in the village, where a convoy was forming. They had to monitor the drones
video feeds while participating in dozens of instant-message and radio
exchanges with intelligence analysts and troops on the ground . There were
solid reports that the group included children, but the team did not
adequately focus on them amid the swirl of data much like a cubicle
worker who loses track of an important e-mail under the mounting pile. The
team was under intense pressure to protect American forces nearby, and in
the end it determined, incorrectly, that the villagers convoy posed an
imminent threat, resulting in one of the worst losses of civilian lives in the
war in Afghanistan. Information overload an accurate description, said
one senior military officer, who was briefed on the inquiry and spoke on the
condition of anonymity because the case might yet result in a court martial.
The deaths would have been prevented, he said, if we had just slowed things
down and thought deliberately. Data is among the most potent weapons of the 21st century.
Unprecedented amounts of raw information help the military determine what targets to hit and what to
avoid. And drone-based sensors have given rise to a new class of wired warriors who must filter the
information sea. But sometimes they are drowning. Research shows that the kind of intense multitasking
required in such situations can make it hard to tell good information from bad. The military faces a
Across the
military, the data flow has surged; since the attacks of 9/11, the amount of
intelligence gathered by remotely piloted drones and other surveillance
technologies has risen 1,600 percent. On the ground, troops increasingly use
hand-held devices to communicate, get directions and set bombing
coordinates. And the screens in jets can be so packed with data that some
pilots call them drool buckets because, they say, they can get lost staring
into them. There is information overload at every level of the military from the general to the
soldier on the ground, said Art Kramer, a neuroscientist and director of the
Beckman Institute, a research lab at the University of Illinois. The military has
engaged researchers like Mr. Kramer to help it understand the brain s limits and potential. Just as the
military has long pushed technology forward , it is now at the forefront in
figuring out how humans can cope with technology without being
balancing act: how to help soldiers exploit masses of data without succumbing to overload.
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overwhelmed by it. At George Mason University in Virginia, researchers

measure the brain waves of study subjects as they use a simulation of the
work done at the Nevada Air Force base. On a computer screen, the subjects
see a video feed from one drone and the locations of others, along with
instructions on where to direct them. The subjects wear a cap with electrodes
attached, measuring brain waves. As the number of drones and the pace of
instructions increases, the brain shows sharp spikes in a kind of electrical
activity called theta cause for concern among the researchers. Its usually an
index of extreme overload, said Raja Parasuraman, a director of the university s human factors and
applied cognition program. As the technology allows soldiers to pull in more information, it strains their
And military researchers say the stress of combat makes matters worse.
Some research even suggests that younger people wind up having more
trouble focusing because they have grown up constantly switching their
attention. For the soldier who has been using computers and phones all his life, multitasking might
brains.
actually have negative effects, said Michael Barnes, research psychologist at the Army Research Lab at
Aberdeen, Md., citing several university studies on the subject. In tests at a base in Orlando, Mr. Barness
when soldiers operate a tank while monitoring remote video

feeds, they often fail to see targets right around them. Mr. Barnes said soldiers could
group has found that
be trained to use new technology, but were not going to improve the neurological capability.
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2NC Enviro K
Ecology and transportation always go together a holistic

approach is better than their simple solutions.
Wheeler 9 [STEPHEN WHEELER Department of Environmental Design,
University of California; Regional Studies, Vol. 43.6, pp. 863876, July 2009;
Sustainability planning can be seen as having a strong theoretical foundation
rooted in ecological ways of viewing the worl d as opposed to the Cartesian mindset of
modernist science (WHEELER, 2004, 27ff.). These theoretical dimensions have a number
of implications for efforts towards regionalism . The first main consideration is a long-term
time horizon, implicit in the term sustain. Currently regional planning frameworks in North America are
It would also be desirable for

regional planners to develop and use more actively indicators showing
whether the regions development is headed in sustainable directions or not
in the long-term. Bureaucratic, political, and economic structures should be modified to the extent
possible to encourage such longer-term thinking. A second main implication of
ecological thought is to emphasize holistic approaches, in particular
often twenty years; expanding these to 50 or 100 would be good.
interrelationships between goals (for example, the oft-cited three Es of environment, economy, and
equity), disciplines, research methodologies, analytic perspectives, scales of planning, and time horizons.
Integration of regional planning topics such as transportation and land use is

common in rhetoric but less followed in practice , especially in locations with singlepurpose functional regional agencies. Integration of perspectives such as design and policy is difficult as
Integration of scales is yet another challenge, one that may require the
formation of new patterns of incentives, assistance, or reinforcement
between institutions at different levels. SAVITCH (1997, p. 1) and others have termed this
well.
quality institutional thickness, defined as: horizontal, vertical, and coalitional relationships among the
private sector, mass organizations, and nonprofit and governmental bodies (AMIN and THRIFT, 1994, p. 14)
identify four determinants of institutional thickness: (1) a strong institutional presence in the region (and a
multitude of institutions); (2) high levels of interactions between them; (3) development of patterns of
coalition that serve to normalize constructive action, and (4) development of mutual awareness and a
sense of common enterprise among participants. Many of these relationships can be facilitated or
incentivized by higher levels of government. Political organizing and coalition building, both within and
outside government, will also often be necessary to support effective regional action, as COUNSELL and
HAUGHTON (2006), WEIR (2000), and others suggest. Another consideration of sustainability theory has to
do with the concept of limits. The catalytic work The Limits to Growth (MEADOWS et al., 1972), in which
the term sustainable development seems to have been used in print for the first time, championed this
The acknowledgement of limits to regional growth might

mean more vigorously managing or ending physical expansion, stabilizing
population, reducing or ending non-renewable resource use, and adopting
economic development policies that aim for qualitative improvement in the
region rather than quantitative expansion of its output . The importance of local and
theme on a global scale.
regional sense of place is a further implication of ecological thought, since sustainable solutions to
problems must take context into account. Bioregional thinkers have stressed this point extensively (SALE,
1985; HOUGH, 1990; THAYER, 2003), emphasizing long-term relationships between human communities
and their ecological contexts. Rather than continue on the current path toward a geography of nowhere
(KUNSTLER, 1993), regional planners and designers can highlight those ecological settings, materials,
architectural styles, technologies, cultural practices, and traditions that reflect the uniqueness of the place.
KELBAUGH (1997) proposes that a critical regionalism form the basis for ecological design, while KEIL
(1996) emphasizes the role that place-oriented politics can play in helping communities pursue
sustainability planning in the face of globalization.
A final implication of sustainability
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planning theory is that regional planners should become more actively

engaged in helping to bring about regional sustainability . Within an ecological
worldview knowledge and action are part of a seamless whole. The era of the regional scientist studying
the region abstractly and leaving practical action up to policy-makers is over; moral responsibility for the
future of the region extends to all, especially to those with the knowledge or power to affect its
development. In practice, this means a number of things. Regional scholars can proactively develop
Civic officials can take more proactive leadership to

build regional vision and institutions. Planners can call attention to long-term
trends, expand the range of policy options under consideration, help educate
the public, and ensure that underrepresented perspectives are heard in
debates.
options for a sustainable future.
A systems evaluation of the environment: Viewing nature

and the environment through a holistic set of functions is
best turns case.
Nhanenge 07 (2007, Jytte, MA in Philosophy at the University of South
Africa, Ecofeminism: Towards Integrating the Concerns of Women, Poor

People, and Nature into Development, published by University Press,
available online, DH)
It is worthwhile here to state that often the terms ecological and holistic are
used simultaneously, there are, however, differences . A holistic perception
means simply that the object under consideration is perceived as an
integrated whole, a total gestalt, rather than being reduced to the mere sum of
its parts. A holistic approach therefore does not have to go beyond the system under consideration.
However, a holistic perception should not be confused with Smuts' holism, which
is a part of an ecological approach. An ecological approach deals with certain
kinds of wholes, being living organisms or living systems. The main
emphasis is on life, on the living world of which humans are a part
and on which we depend. An ecological approach needs to understand
how a particular system is embedded in larger systems. For example, an
ecological approach to economics will have to understand how economic
activities are embedded in the cyclical processes of nature and in the value
system of a particular culture. It should also be added that not all systems theorists have a
holistic outlook. They claim that they have because they believe they are taking
into account the ways in which all the parts in a given system affect the
whole. Yet their need mathematically to formalize "facts" in a system means that parts, which cannot be
quantified are excluded. Moreover, the method can also not include the infinite number of facts, which
exist in a system. The human computers are too limited to contain them. This consequently means that
their mechanical approach is likely to exclude some potentially relevant factors. The rather important issue
of excluding qualitative elements in systems theory will be discussed further in chapter 5. (Merchant 1980:
Hence, according to the systems view

and Smuts' holistic world-view, the essential properties of an organism or a
living system are properties of the whole, which includes parts, relationships
and context. None of the parts has all of the properties of the whole. These arise from the interactions
and relationships between the parts. Consequently, if a system is dissected into its parts,
these relationships are severed and the properties are destroyed . Although one
291; Capra 1989: 261; Kotze and Kotze 1995: 17).
may talk about individual parts in any system, these parts are not isolated. Thus, the nature of the whole is
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always different from the mere sum of its parts. This way of perceiving reality is a revolution compared to
the thoughts of traditional mechanistic science. Newtonian view decided that the whole's behaviour could
be understood entirely from the properties of its parts. Thus, mechanistic science concentrates their
Alternatively, systems theory and Smuts'

holism find that due to integration, properties of the parts can be understood
only from the organisation of the larger whole . The organic theories consequently focus
studies on basic building blocks or parts.
on basic principles of organisation or relationships. This means that systems thinking and holistic thinking
cannot be understood by analytic thinking. Analysis means taking something apart in order to understand
it. In Smuts' holism and systems theory, the idea is oppositely about putting all into the context of a larger
whole. Hence, Smuts' holistic concepts and those of systems theory are all contextual. They also have
Every structure is seen as the manifestation of

underlying processes. Hence, when one is dealing with Smuts' holism and organic systems one
must apply process thinking. Consequently, Smuts holism, like systems theory is
related to a specific context and to specific processes. Explanation of
activities can only be done in terms of their environment and its processes .
another important common element:
Systems thinking and Smuts' holistic thinking may conclusively also be called environmental thinking.
(Merchant 1980: 292-293; Capra 1997: 29-30, 37, 42; Kotze and Kotze 1995: 18-19, 20-21).
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Link: Multilateralism
Multilateralism is key to legitimizing securitization. Cold

War proves.
Barry Buzan, Professor of International Relations at the London School of
Economics, February 2-4, 2006, "The 'War on Terrorism' as the New
'Macrosecuritisation'?", Unpublished, for Oslo Workshop,
http://www.nupi.no/IPS/filestore/Paper-BarryBuzan.pdf
The US successfully generated and led the macro-securitisation of the Cold
War against communism generally and the military power of the Soviet
Union in particular. It was aided in this both by the broad acceptability of its
owngualities as a leader, quite generally in the West, and up to a point even
in the third world, and by the fact that other states, especially Western
European ones, plus Turkey, Japan and South Korea, had reason to fear
communism and Soviet military power. The WoT has the potential to draw
together an even wider grouping, comprising not just the Western states and
Japan, but also other major states such as Russia, China and India all of which
have reason to bandwagon with the WoT as a way of addressing their own
internal conflicts. It is, however, hardly controversial at this point to observe
that the legitimacy and acceptability of the US as a leader have declined
sharply under the stewardship of the Bush administration since 2000. The
embracing of unipolarity as a justification for unilateralism by that
administration shocked and alienated many of its allies who had got used to
working within the multilateral system largely constructed by the US during
the half-century following the end of the Second World War. Within that
general move has been a whole host of well rehearsed specific
disagreements about issues ranging from the International Criminal Court,
through the environment and arms control, to the invasion of Iraq, torture
and the treatment of prisoners of war. A weight of punditry agrees that the
Atlantic has got wider to the point where even the idea that there is a
Western community is now under serious threat (see, e.g. Cox, 2005).>
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Link: Relations
Mapping relations and resources is a tool of colonial biopolitics used for management and the enforcement of
docility.
ArjunAppadurai, Director of humanities institute and Prof of humanities at
Univ Chicago,1993 Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament, Eds. Carol
Breckenridge & Peter van der Veer, Number in the Colonial Imagination, U
Penn Press: Philadelphia, p. 333-334
The net result was something critically different from all other
complex state-apparatuses in regard to the politics of the body and
the construction of communities as bodies. Put very simply, other
regimes may have had numerical concerns and they may also have had
classificatory concerns. But these remained largely separate, and it was
only in the complex conjuncture of variables that constituted the project of
the mature colonial state that these two forms of "dynamic nominalism"
came together, to create a polity centered around self-consciously
enumerated communities. When these communities were also
embedded in a wider official discourses of space, time, resources,
and relations that was also numerical in critical ways, what was
generated was a specifically colonial political arithmetic, in which
essentializing and enumerating human communities became not only
concurrent activities but unimaginable without one another. This
arithmetic is a critical part of colonial bio-politics (at least as regards
the British in India) not only because it involved abstractions of
number whereas other state regimes had more concrete numerical
purposes (such as taxes, corvee labor, and the like). The modern colonial
state brings together the exoticizing vision of orientalism with the
familiarizing discourse of statistics. In the process, the body of the
colonial subject is made simultaneously strange and docile. Its
strangeness lies in the fact that it comes to be seen as the site of
cruel and unusual practices and bizarre subjectivities. But colonial
body-countscreate not only types and classes the first move toward
domesticating differences, but also homogeneous bodies (within
categories), because number, by its nature, flattens idiosyncrasies and
creates boundaries around these homogeneous bodies, since it
performatively limits their extent. In this latter regard, statistics are to bodies
and social types what maps are to territories: they flatten and enclose. The
link between colonialism and orientalism, therefore,is most strongly
reinforced not at the loci of classification and typification (as has often been
suggested) but at the loci of enumeration, where bodies are counted,
homogenized, and bounded in their extent. Thus the unruly body of the
colonial subject (fasting, feasting, hook-swinging, abluting, burning, and
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bleeding) is recuperated through the language of numbers that allows these

very bodies to be brought back, now counted and accounted, for the
humdrum projects of taxation, sanitation, education, warfare, and loyalty.
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Link: Islamic Wars
The concept of Islamic terror justifies the perception of a

threat to US security
Richard Jackson, Ph.D in conflict resolution, 2007, Government and Opposition, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp.
394426, Constructing Enemies: Islamic Terrorism in Political and Academic Discourse
Another core narrative of the discourse is that Islamic terrorism is motivated largely
by religious or sacred causes rather than political or ideological concerns. Typically,
it asserts that Islamic terrorists aim primarily to destroy Israel and the West, overthrow
apostate regimes in Muslim lands, return the Muslim world to a true and pure form of Islam and reestablish an Islamic Caliphate. Shaul Mishal and Maoz Rosenthal for example, argue that Islamic
extremists more far-reaching goal is the replacement of the existing non-Islamic social and
political order in the Arab nations with an Islamic state ruled by the Islamic law.38 David Cook
goes even further, suggesting that radical Muslims aim at uniting all Muslims into one
state, and dominating the world.39 Associated with this discursive formulation of religiously
motivated aims is the frequent portrayal of Islamic terrorism as anti-modern, anti-secular and antidemocratic. Ranstorp suggests that, the threat of secularization from foreign sources is the catalyst
for springing religious terrorists into action; these groups are motivated by a xenophobia against
everything alien or secular and a vehement rejection of western culture.40 Similarly, Benjamin
Barber argues that These Jihadic warriors detest modernity the secular, scientific, rational and
commercial civilization created by the Enlightenment as it is defined . . . in its virtues (freedom,
democracy, tolerance and diversity).41 An extremely crass expression of this narrative,
published in a prominent terrorism studies journal, st ates: the Islamic worlds rejection of
democracy and modernity as well as their ongoing Islamic resurgence and propensity to
violence was because the concept of nation-state and democracy is, to most contemporary
Muslim nations, as alien to them as pork rinds.42 Moreover, Islamic terrorists are said to be
motivated by a deep hatred of America and the West, which is in turn caused by rage and a sense of
impotence brought about by the failure of the Muslim world to achieve economic development and
modernization, successive military defeats by Israel and an inability to resist intrusive processes of
globalization and secularization. Takeyh and Gvosdev suggest that Radical Islamism is an ideology
of wrath directed against an existing order,43 while Bernard Lewis argues that Islamic fundamentalism has given an aim and a form to the otherwise aimless and formless resentment and anger of
the Muslim masses at the forces that have devalued their traditional values and loyalties.44
Consequently, it is assumed that Part of the mission of jihad is thus to restore Muslims
pride in the face of a humiliating New World Order.45 Perhaps the most important
narrative of Islamic terrorism, however, is that it poses a massive threat to the security of the West.
In most texts, it is seen as self-evident that Islamic terrorism remains one of the most
significant threats to the Western world in general and U.S. national security in particular.46
Sageman, employing several of the primary Islamic terrorism narratives, describes the threat thus: A
new type of terrorism threatens the world, driven by networks of fanatics determined to inflict
maximum civilian and economic damages on distant targets in pursuit of their extremist goals. Armed
with modern technology, they are capable of devastating destruction worldwide. They
target the West, but their operations mercilessly slaughter thousands of people . . .47
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Link: Fear of Death
The affirmatives anxiety towards death is only intelligible

from a position of ontological anxiety. Their impact
scenarios prevent an authentic relationship to death
which makes the fear their 1ac inspires inevitable
JamesPark, University of Minnesota and activist in Unitarian Church, 2K1Our
existential predicament; loneliness, depression, anxiety & death pg. 183-184
The 'fear of death' is a composite experience encompassing: (1) the
abstract, objective, external, empirical fact ofbiological death; (2) our
personal, subjective, emotional fear of ceasing-to-be, which arises from
our awareness of our own finitude;& (3) our own most ontological
anxiety, our Existential Predicament disguised as the fear of ceasing-tobe. This least understood and most repressed existential dimension
of death (which has also been called "being-towards-death" and "the anxiety
of nonbeing"), will be the focus of this phenomenological
investigation. Whenever "death" is mentioned, we think first of
biological death, but this tendency to focus exclusively on the
objective, terminal fact of dying might well be a trick of thought
designed to protect us from noticing our fear of ceasing-to-be or our
even deeper ontological anxiety. We have other protective techniques as
well: religious illusions, philosophical desensitization, & diversionary smalltalk. Most of these distracting ploys amount to seeing death
exclusively as an objective event, which befalls all plants, animals, &
people eventually. All such attempts to picture and talk about death
as a fact are (at least in part) attempts to evade the two deeper
dimensions of death by interpreting death only from the point of
view of a spectator. Even our scholarly symposia about death often provide
only an objective understanding of death. Such approaches keep death
outside of ourselves -a phenomenon we know about only as
observers, never as participants. Here, however, we will push in the
opposite direction: First, we will attempt to get beyond the objective
fact of death to our deeper, subjective response to finitude-our fear
of ceasing-to-be. And, not being satisfied with that dimension, we will
seek to probe even deeper behind our fear of ceasing-to-be to
uncover our repressed ontological anxiety -the threatening inner
state-of-being that possesses us continuously from the time we
become aware of ourselves but which has very little connection with
the fact of death. It will be relatively easy to move beyond the objective,
public, external, spectator's vision of death as a once-in-a-life-time event-in
fact, the end-event of life to feeling subjectively our deep fear of ceasing-tobe. But it will be more difficult to separate the deeper dimensions of
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death: our terrifying fear of ceasing-to-be and our underlying ontological

anxiety. If we probe even below our personal fear of ceasing-to-be-in-theworld, we might discover the cause of much of our evasive talk and deceptive
posturing; we might pull the covers off our trembling, naked ontological
anxiety. If we find ways to look deeply into ourselves, exposing even our most
clever tricks of thought, then not only will we begin truly to fear our own
deaths, but we might even confront our underlying ontological anxiety. This
ontological anxiety is obscurely felt by all of us as a subjective awareness
drifting up from our inner depths, a pervasive haunting of our whole
being, which we are reluctant to confront because we have no easy way to
handle it. This continuous inner state-of-being is not the result of the fact of
dying; it is not worry arising from the inevitability of actual death. Rather, our
ontological anxiety is the deepest truth of our existence, obviously
deeper than the external, objective, empirical fact of biological
death, but even deeper than our inward, subjective, personal fear of
ceasing-to-be. Our ontological anxiety does not arise from the fact of
death, but much of our concern about death arises from our
ontological anxiety! (This paradoxical statement should become clear in
the next 70 pages.) If our ontological anxiety truly grips us, we can go
either of two possible ways: (1) We can organize our lives around this
all-pervasive 'threat', courageously embracing our ontological
anxiety, moving ourselves toward "Authentic Existence". Or (2) we can be
freed from our ontological anxiety after having fully acknowledged it
(and attained some Authenticity), thereby coming into the new inner
state-of-being "Existential Freedom".
This confrontation with anxiety outweighs their

extinctions scenarios because destruction has already
occurred in the inner-space
Walter a.Davis, Professor of English at Ohio State, 2001, Deracination:
historocity, hiroshima, and the tragic imperative, p. 103-104
We begin with an effort to describe what is the deepest experiencethe one most
deeply denied. Catastrophic anxiety is that fear that haunts us
from within,7the fear that one has already been annihilated; that, like
Beckett, one has never been born properly and never will be because inner
paralysis is the psyches defining conditiona truth attested each time
when, striving to cohere as a subject, one collapses before the tidal wave of
an aggression against oneself that rises up from within. An unspeakable
dread weds the psyche to terror. All other forms of anxiety are pale afterthoughts. There is a threat worse than extinction. The deepest selfknowledge we harbor, the knowledge that haunts us as perhaps our
deepest self-reference is the fear that our inner world is ruled by a force
opposed to our being. Death is the icy wind that blows through all we do.
This is the anxiety from which other anxieties derive as displacements,
delays, and vain attempts to deny or attenuate our terror before a dread
that is nameless and must remain so lest despair finalize its hold on us.
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In catastrophic anxiety the destruction of ones power to be and the ceaseless

unraveling of all attempts to surmount this condition is experienced as an event
that has already happened. That event forms the first self-reference: the negative
judgment of an Other on ones beinginternalized as self-undoing.
Postmodern posturing before the phrase I am an other here receives the
concretization that shatters free play. There is a wound at the heart of
subjectivity, a self-ulceration that incessantly bleeds itself out into the world. The
issue of the wound is a soul caked in ice, in a despair that apparently cannot
be mediated: the nightmare state of a consciousness utterly awake, alone
and arrested, all exits barred, facing inner paralysis as the truth of ones life.
We ceaselessly flee this experience because if it ever comes down full
upon us an even more terrifying process begins: an implosion in which
ones subjective being is resolved into fragments of pure anxiety that
leave one incapable of existing as subject except in the howl to which
each suffered state descends in a final, chilling recognitionthat
everything one has done and suffered is but sound and fury, signifying
nothing. One has become a corpse with insomnia. Identity and selfreference thereafter ceaselessly circle about that void. This is the hour of
the wolf, where one is arrested before the primary fact: at the deepest register of
the psyche one finds a voice of terror. Fear of psychic dissolution is the
ground condition of our being as subjects. Subjectivity is founded in
anguish before the dread of becoming no more than bits and pieces of
pure horror, fleeing in panic a voice that has already overtaken us,
resolving our subjective being into traumatic episodes of pure
persecution. At the heart of inwardness a malevolent spirit presides. To
put it in nuclear metaphors: catastrophic anxiety is the threat of implosion
into the others unlimited destructiveness. To complete the picture we need
only add Winnicotts point: people live in dread of this situation, projecting
fear of a breakdown into the future, because the breakdown has
already occurred.8
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Link: Mideast
Representations are the root cause of policy failures and

middle east conflict.
Pinar Bilgin,PhD International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth,
Department of International Relations Bilkent Univ., Regional Security in the
Middle East 2005 p. 12-5
Reflecting upon the history of US engagement with the Middle East, Douglas
Little identifies representations of the region as the problem behind
policy failures. According to Little, it is 'American Orientalism' defined as 'a
tendency to underestimate the peoples of the region and to overestimate
America's ability to make a bad situation better' that has often misled US
policy-makers in their dealings with the region. Regarding the future, Little
(2002:314) writes: Although there is greater appreciation for the complexities
of the Muslim world than a generation ago, most Americans still view radical
Islam as a cause for instant alarm. Having been fed a steady diet of books,
films and news reports depicting Arabs as demonic anti-Western others and
Israelis as heroic pro-Western partners and having watched in horror the
events of 11 September, the American public understandably fears Osama
bin Laden and cheers Aladdin. Little's argument builds upon that of Edward
Said in his 1978 book Orientalism, where the author pointed to the
relationship between representations and practice. Said's point was that the
academic discourse of Orientalism (defined as 'a style of thought based upon
an ontological and epistemological distinction made between the Orient
and [most of the time] the Occident' [Said 1995a: 2]) had not only helped
to make the Middle East what it has become but also made it difficult to
become something else: a book on how to handle a fierce lion might
cause a series of books to be produced on such subjects as the fierceness of
lions, the origins of fierceness, and so forth. Similarly, as the focus of the text
centers more narrowly on the subject - no longer lions but their fierceness we might expect that the ways by which it is recommended that a lion's
fierceness be handled will actually increase its fierceness, force it to be fierce
since that is what it is, and that is what in essence what we know or can only
know about it. (Said 1995a: 94) This is because the Orientalist discourse does
not merely represent the 'Orient' but also lays down the rules that enable one
to 'write, speak and act meaningfully' (Agnew and Corbridge 1995:45). In
his later works (see Said 1994b, 1995b, 1997, 2001) Said went on to show
how contemporary representations of the Middle East (and Islam) in the
media (as well as academia) have reduced it to terrorism and very little else.
Said's argument is in line with E.P. Thompson's observation on the impact
British historical representations of India have had on Indian politics (Said
2001:44-5). According to Thompson, writings on India in English 'simply left
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out the Indian side of things' thereby deepening the irreconcilability between
Indians and the British. Thompson wrote: Our misrepresentation of Indian
history and character is one of the things that have so alienated the educated
classes of India that even their moderate elements have refused to help the
Reforms [of colonial policy]. Those measures, because of this sullenness,
have failed, when they deserved a better fate. (quoted in Said 2001:45)
Reading Thompson, one is reminded of the numerous attempts made by US
policy-makers during the Cold War to generate reform and modernisation
movements in the Middle East; some of which attempts have backfired (as
with Iraq, Libya and Iran) (Little 2002:193-227). What Little, Thompson and
Said are pointing to are the different impact representations have on those
who produce the representations and those who are represented. What all
share is the damaging effect representations have had on both groups of
actors. According to Said, the Middle East as a spatial representation has
been repressive in that it has had 'the kind of authority [that] doesn't
permit or make room for interventions on the part of those represented'
(Said 2001:42). The Middle Eastern security discourse, which is informed by
this representation, has reflected the Cold War security concerns of the great
powers while neglecting that of regional states and peoples. Hence the
argument that the current state of regional insecurity in the Middle
East has its roots in practices that have been informed by its
dominant representation: the 'Middle East'. By way of adopting this spatial
representation, the Middle East has been categorised in terms of its politics
(as the region that 'best fits the realist theory of international politics' [Nye
2000:163]) and the type of foreign policy its 'nature' demands. In the
immediate aftermath of the US-led war on Iraq, one newspaper columnist
warned: 'Middle East is not Europe' (Zaharna 2003). Indeed. Yet, this should
not be taken to suggest that the Middle East is destined to relive its insecure
past. Such representations that emphasised Middle Eastern insecurities
without reflecting upon their roots have had the effect of privileging certain
security practices (such as the 1998-99 bombing campaign directed at
obtaining Iraqi cooperation with the UN team inspecting the Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction programme) whilst marginalising others (such as the
adoption of a more comprehensive long-term policy of creating a nuclear-free
zone in the Middle East). Becoming aware of the 'politics of the geographical
specification of politics' (Dalby 1991:274) and exploring the mutually
constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and
practices of) security is not mere intellectual exercise; it helps reveal the
role human agency has played in the past and could play in the future. Such
awareness, in turn, would enable one to begin thinking differently about
regional securityto help constitute an alternative future whilst remaining
sensitive to regional actors' multiple and contending conceptions of security,
what they view as referent object(s), and how they think security should
be sought in this part of the world.
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Desire for stability in the middle east represent violent

unconscious desires for global control
Engelhardt 9
Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project and contributor to Foreign
Policy In Focus, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com, 3/1/09 Foreign Policy In Focus, The Imperial
Unconscious Google
Here, according to Bloomberg News, is part of Secretary of Defense Robert Gatess recent testimony
on the Afghan War before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: U.S. goals in Afghanistan must be
'modest, realistic,' and 'above all, there must be an Afghan face on this war ,' Gates said. 'The
Afghan people must believe this is their war and we are there to help them. If they think we are there for
our own purposes, then we will go the way of every other foreign army that has been in Afghanistan. Now,
in our world, a statement like this seems so obvious, so reasonable as to be beyond comment. And yet, stop
a moment and think about this part of it: There must be an Afghan face on this war. U.S. military and
civilian officials used an equivalent phrase in 2005-2006 when things were going really,
really wrong in Iraq. It was then commonplace and no less unremarked upon for them to
urgently suggest that an Iraqi face be put on events there . Evidently back in vogue for a
different war, the phrase is revelatory and oddly blunt . As an image, theres really only one way
to understand it (not that anyone here stops to do so). After all, what does it mean to put a face on
something that assumedly already has a face? In this case, it has to mean putting an Afghan
mask over what we know to be the actual face of the Afghan War ours a foreign
face that men like Gates recognize, quite correctly, is not the one most Afghans want to see.
Its hardly surprising that the Secretary of Defense would pick up such a phrase, part of
Washingtons everyday arsenal of words and images when it comes to geopolitics, power,
and war. And yet, make no mistake, this is Empire-speak, American-style. Its the language
behind which lies a deeper structure of argument and thought that is essential to
Washingtons vision of itself as a planet-straddling goliath. Think of that Afghan face
mask, in fact, as part of the flotsam and jetsam that regularly bubbles up from the
American imperial unconscious. Of course, words create realities even though such language,
in all its strangeness, essentially passes unnoticed here. Largely uncommented upon, it helps
normalize American practices in the world, comfortably shielding us from certain global
realities; but it also has the potential to blind us to those realities, which, in perilous times,
can be dangerous indeed. So lets consider just a few entries in what might be thought of as The
Dictionary of American Empire-Speak.
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Link: Great Power War
Focus on great powers and the security dilemma obscures

the issues most relevant to the majority of the world
PINAR BILGIN Department of International Relations, Bilkent University,
Turkey, Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security International Studies
Review (2003)
The security predicament of individuals and social groups was also pointed
out by Brian Job (1992) who observed that the security environment of the
majority of the worlds population did not improve with the end of the Cold
War and the disappearance of the superpower conflict. Indeed, people in the
developing world, who constitute a significant portion of the globes
population, continue to suffer gross injustices, often at the hands of their own
governments. According to Job, simply criticizing governments or
pointing to societal insecurities is not going to help students of
security understand this complex problem. The security dilemma of
Third World states is often rooted in their colonial past and currently
sustained by the international system. Hence, a need exists for an alternative
framework that can provide a better analytical handle on the security
problems of peoples in the Third World. This framework, Job believed, could
be built around the concept of insecurity dilemma. Jobs (1992) argument
is that the security dilemma metaphor hinders more than it reveals
when used within the Third World context. The security dilemma is premised
upon the distinction between what goes on within and what goes on outside a
country. It assumes that the inside of the state is safe and that threats
come from outside state boundaries. However, this insideoutside
distinction makes little sense in the Third World where international
boundaries are safeguarded by the constitutive norms of international society
(namely, sovereignty, the nonviolability of borders, and nonintervention)
whereas domestic threats dominate governmental security agendas. In such
cases, the concept insecurity dilemma provides an enhanced
understanding of the difficulties faced in the Third World where states are
preoccupied with internal rather than external security, and weak states have
a guaranteed existence in what is supposedly an anarchic international
system ( Job 1992:18). Accordingly, Job called for a more comprehensive
framework to understand the insecurities faced by individuals and social
groups a framework that would allow students of security to understand the
ways in which security problems in the developing world are created by the
developed world and sustained by the norms and institutions of international
society. (210)
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Link: Environment
Securitization of the environment perpetuates the notion

of the nation-state and perpetuates geopolitical borders
Rasa Ostrauskaite, Third Secretary of Lithuania to the United Nations, December, 2001
Rubikon Environmental Security as an Ambiguous Symbol: Can We Securitize the Environment?,
http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/rasa2.htm
In the previous section we have seen that transboundary nature of environmental threats makes it difficult
to categorize them. The task becomes even more complicated when it comes to labeling them for
securitization, especially if we try to do so in the framework of national security. As societies come to
recognize the planetary scale of destruction of the environment, we increasingly realize that the traditional
forms of national sovereignty are challenged by the realities of ecological interdependence. At the same
time, we are not yet ready to sideline the principle of national sovereignty. Despite some calls for a
complete rejection of sovereignty[29] or warnings against the privileging of national security in the face of
global problems,[30] we are not ready to give up conventional political arrangements of nation states. The
present-day political map of the world is a map of independent states. Notwithstanding the fact that they
are merely local normative arrangements for promoting the good of humankind in the area of the world
where they are located, nobody wants to challenge the principle of sovereignty - the fundamental principle
on which the rest of international relations is constructed. This view has been so eloquently expressed by
R.B.J. Walker, that despite its length, it is worth quoting:[E]ven if we admit that we are all now
participating in common global structures, that we are all rendered increasingly vulnerable to processes that
are planetary in scale, and that our prost parochial activities are shaped by forces that encompass the world
and not just particular states, it is far from clear what such an admission implies for the way we organize
politically. The state is a political category in a way that the world, or the globe, or the planet, or humanity
is not. The security of states is something we can comprehend in political terms in a way that, at the
moment, world security cannot be understood.[31] In this context, security discourse remains entangled
with state politics, and so long as conventional understanding of security prevails, states will remain the
main providers of security. Thus, it seems reasonable to be conservative about national security as the
security of the state, since, as Waever rightly points out, neither individual security nor international
security exists[32].
The Affirmative discourse that we should act to protect the

environment only contributes to the source of the
problem; it allows the state to redeploy the environment
threat as a tool of control
Whelk 97 ,Associate Director of the Environmental Change and Security
Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and
Simmons, Director of the Environmental Change and Security Project
(WWICS) 1997 , (Geoffrey, and J.P. Environment and Security: Core Ideas
and US Government Initiatives SAIS Review - Volume 17, Number 1,
Winter-Spring 1997, pp. 127-146 Article
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v017/17.1dabelko.html [accessed
July 10, 2006]
<A third category of debates inverts the causal relationship of environment
and security by arguing that security institutions can dramatically affect
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the environment in either a harmful or beneficial way. One argument is

that the military and intelligence communities have unique and powerful
capacities to help analyze, predict, and ameliorate international
environmental problems. These include monitoring and enforcing
international environmental agreements; gathering, analyzing and
disseminating scientific data on the natural environment; responding to
and mitigating environmental crises and disasters; guaranteeing access to
natural resources; and protecting natural parks and reserves. 30 The
intelligence community combines environmental monitoring capabilities
with multidisciplinary analytical tools to integrate environmental factors
into complex [End Page 1371 political and economic assessments. The US
military has sought to share its specialized knowledge about resource
management and pollution clean-up and prevention with other nations'
militaries. Given DOD's enormous land holdings worldwide and its vast
network of foreign military contacts, the US military wields considerable
control over the natural environment both within and outside the United
States. One perspective focuses on the deleterious environmental effects
of military operations and war. 31 Based on this record of incurring
environmental damage, some argue that the tangible and theoretical
instruments of traditional security conceptions should be excluded from
playing a role in addressing environmental problems. The military should
be viewed as part of the problem, not part of the solution. Critics also
maintain that the national security orientation towards conflict makes
military and intelligence tools designed to safeguard the state inappropriate
for addressing transnational environmental problems. The conflictual and
secretive security structure is inappropriate for the cooperative and
transparent responses deemed most effective in addressing
environmental threats. While potentially useful, such assistance could be
problematic if the incriminating data were gathered by classified means
and could not be readily declassified. Finally, a more traditional security
perspective argues that the armed forces should not sacrifice operational
readiness for involvement in non-traditional activities like environmental
protection.>
Securitizing the environment justifies the state protecting

it through military means
Waever 1998 [Ole, professor of International Relations at the Department of
Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Securitization and
Desecuritization, On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz,
http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html]
Still, in the final analysis, is it all to the good that problems such as
environmental degradation be addressed in terms of security? After all, in
spite of all the changes of the last few years, security, as with any other
concept, carries with it a history and a set of connotations that it cannot
escape. At the heart of the concept we still find something to do with defense
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and the state. As a result, addressing an issue in security terms still evokes
an image of threat-defense, allocating to the state an important role in
addressing it. This is not always an improvement. Why not turn this
procedure upside down? In place of accepting implicitly the meaning of
"security" as given and then attempting to broaden its coverage, why not try
instead to put a mark on the concept itself , by entering into and through its
core? This means changing the tradition by taking it seriously rather than
criticizing it from the outside. 2 I begin by considering security as a concept
and a word. Next, I discuss security as a speech act . In the third part of the
essay, I describe four cases of securitization and de-securitization . Finally, I
ask whether we might not want to use "security" as it is classically
understood, after all.
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Link: Koreas
Realists misunderstand power politics in North Korea

they should employ a comprehensive historical view of
the world to figure out why the misconstruction came
about.
Kang, 3.
David (Professor of International Relations and Business, Director of Korean Studies Institute),
Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical FrameworksInternational Security, Volume 27, Number 4,
Spring 2003, pp.65 MUSE
More than a dozen years after the end of the Cold War, much of Asia bears little resemblance to the
picture painted by the pessimists. Although the years 195080 saw numerous armed conicts, since
then there has been no major interstate war in either Northeast or Southeast Asia. Countries do not
fear for their survival in either area. In Northeast Asia, rivalry and power politics remain muted.
Japan has not rearmed, China shows little sign of having revi- sionist tendencies, and North Korea
has neither imploded nor exploded. Southeast Asia, as well, remains free of the kinds of arms races
and power politics that some have expected. As Muthiah Alagappa writes, Viewed through the
ahistorical realist lens, the contemporary security challenges could indeed suggest that Asia is a
dangerous place. But a comprehensive historical view would suggest otherwise. Although Asia still
faces serious internal and international challenges, there are fewer challenges than before and most
of the regions disputes and conicts have stabilized.23The field of international relations would
be better served if the pessimists not only admitted this reality but also asked why this might be the
case. Because China has such an important inuence on Northeast, Southeast, and even South Asia, I
offer the tenta- tive outline of such an explanation in the following section.
US creation of and involvement with South Korea is

rooted in a stabilization of the land for Western gain.
Representations of the region entrench American purpose
and further unnecessary dichotomies.
Wilson, 91.
Rob (Professor of English at the University of Hawaii) Theory's Imaginal Other: American Encounters with
South Korea and Japan in boundary 2, Vol. 18, No. 3, Japan in the World (Autumn, 1991), pp. 220-241
The larger question of textual misrepresentation, as I have outlined in several genres, still distorts,
warps, and pressures the cross-cultural interactions and political dynamics obtaining between
America and South Korea. These allied misrepresentations have taken place at least since the Korean
War ended unresolved in 1953. As a function of Cold War oppositionality, this language of bipolarity
had to be invented, propagated, and maintained in a once-unified country and culture. Whatever the
rhetoric of liberty and populist pluralism that was used to disseminate andliberally cloak its historical
origin, the invention of "South Korea" by the United States in 1945 had much to do with a right-wing
stabilizing of land in the power elite (who had for the most part survived under Japanese
colonization) and everything to do with repressing the emergence of "people's collectives" seeking
land reforms from Seoul, like those in the Communist North. In other words, with the 38th parallel
and the DMZ, "Korea" was reinvented as a Cold War bastion of unresolved and belligerent polarities
between two powerful worldviews and alternative hegemonies, with America holding the economic
cards and calling the democratic shots in the South, despite long-standing claims from the grass-roots
level for a redistribution of land, power, wealth, and choice. These historical origins called for, and
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have resulted in, much American forgetting. Can any seriously engaged writer or scholar, whether
historian or poet, anthropologist or tourist, political strategist or journalist, nowadays claim a stance of
neutrality or objectivity, or assume some cloak of textual immunity from distortion when treating
("representing") these Cold War materials of South Korea from the perspective of the political and
economic victor? In other words, confronting the return of the Cold War repressed to a level of
symbolic reengagement, by working "North/South Korea" up into language, can any writer do
anything but misrepresent, misrecognize, mystify, liberalize, and thereby further entrench the
American presence and purpose in inventing and differentiating the Republic of South Korea from its
communist rival to the North? Despite this once-hermit country's tormented engagement as a geographical bargaining chip in the Cold War struggle between America and the Soviet Union for postwar
hegemony, and even notwithstanding the spectacles of modernity of the 1988 Olympics held in Seoul,
North/South "Korea" still comprises for postmodern Americans a forbidding and forgotten landscape
of belligerency wherein, as Cumings and John Halliday now document, an "unknown war" once took
place. (Indeed, the way Ameri- can discourse uses "Korea" to refer to South Korea alone effectively
elides the ongoing claims of the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea to be known as
"Korea" at all.)
Western conceptions of Asian security create a hierarchy

that they assume is objectively correct when approaching
issues such as the Korean peninsula.
Goh, 8.
Evelyn (Director of Graduate Study at the University of London in International Relations),

Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia AnalyzingRegional Security Strategies in
International Security, Volume 32, Number 3, Winter 2007/08,pp. 150-151 MUSE
The Southeast Asian states postCold War strategy of involving in regional

security affairs all the major powers that have a stake in East Asian security
has helped to facilitate a hierarchical regional order that approximates the
following preferred power distribution:121 (1) superpower overlay: United
States; (2) regional great power: China; (3) major regional powers: Japan and
India; and (4) major regional players:122 ASEAN, Australia, and South Korea.
This notion of a regional hierarchy is significant because the perpetuation of
U.S. preponderance makes it essentially a unipolar system, and thus a hierarmilitary presence in the region indicates that they still recognize the relative
benignity of the aims of the United States in the region, its lack of territorial
ambition, and its management and containment of hot spots such as Korea
and Taiwan. This view of the United States as a sheriff or honest broker of
regional security relies on its position as a superpower external to the Asian
region. While this mediates threat perceptions, the price is uncertainty
about the U.S. commitment at crucial times, such as after the end of the
Vietnam and Cold Wars. This uncertainty has lain at the heart of Southeast
Asian dilemmas about regional security order, which, especially since 1989,
have centered on better securing this superpower overlay by deepening U.S.
involvement and integration into the region.128
Representations of North Korea are rooted in ideological

hegemony not objective data
David Shim, Phd Candidate @ GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, 8 [Paper prepared for presentation at the
2008 ISA, Production, Hegemonization and Contestation of Discursive Hegemony: The Case of the Six-
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Party Talks in Northeast Asia, www.allacademic.com/meta/p253290_index.html]

Laclau and Mouffes (2001: chapter 2) concept of hegemony, which is used here, rely on a notion
developed by Antonio Gramsci (1971). Gramsci broadened the traditional notion of hegemony
beyond the view of mapping hegemony in terms of leadership and dominance, which are based on material
capabilities, by introducing inter-subjective and ideological aspects into this concept .
Accordingly, hegemony contains the ability of a class (bourgeois) to project the world view
over another (workers, peasantry) in terms of the former, so that it is accepted as common sense or
reality. His merit was to conceptualize hegemony in terms of power without the use of force to reach
consent by the dominated class through education and, what he calls, the role of intellectuals (men of
letters) such as philosophers, journalists and artists (Gramsci 1971: 5-43). The process of fixing meaning,
that is, in terms of Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 105), when an element (sign with unfixed meaning) is
transformed through articulation into a moment (sign with fixed meaning), is hegemonic, since it reduces
the range of possibilities and excludes alternative meanings by determining the ways in which the signs are
related to each other. That is to say, when meaning is fixed, i.e. hegemonized, it determines, what
can be thought, said or done in a meaningful way . 13 Applied to this case, the exclusive
character of a hegemonic discourse makes it unintelligible to make sense of North Koreas

nuclear program in terms of, for instance, energy needs, because as it is argued practices of
problematization hegemonized the ways of thinking, acting and speaking about North Korea .
Discursive hegemony can be regarded as the result of certain practices, in which a particular understanding
or interpretation appears to be the natural order of things (Laclau/Mouffe 2001). This naturalization
consolidates a specific idea, which is taken for granted by involved actors and makes sense
of the(ir) world. As Hall (1998: 1055-7) argues, common sense resembles a hegemonic discourse, which
is a dominant interpretation and representation of reality and therefore accepted to be the valid truth and
knowledge. Referring to the productive character of discursive hegemony, the Six-Party Talks can be
regarded as an outcome of the dominating interpretation of reality (cf. also Jackson 2005: 20; Cox 1983;
Hajer 2005). The hegemonic discourse regarding North Korea provides the framework for a
specific interpretation in which the words , actions or policies of it are attached with meaning ,
that is, are problematized. As Jacob Torfing argues a discursive truth regime [] specifies the
criteria for judging something to be true of false , and further states, that within such a discursive
framework the criteria for acknowledging something as true , right or good are negotiated and
defined (Torfing 2005a: 14; 19; cf. also Mills 2004: 14-20). However, important to note is, if one is able to
define this yardstick, not only one is able to define what is right, good or true, but also what kinds of action
are possible. In other words, if you can mark someone or something with a specific label, then
certain kinds of acts become feasible.14 Basically, it can be stated that discursive hegemony depends
on the interpretation and representation by actors of real events since the interpretation of non-existent facts
would not make sense. But the existence of real events does not necessarily have to be a prerequisite for
hegemonizing interpretational and representational practices because actions do not need to be carried
out, thus, to become a material fact, in order to be interpreted and represented in a certain
way (Campbell 1998: 3). Suh Jae-Jung (2004: 155) gives an example of this practice. In 1999 US
intelligence agencies indicated to preparing measures taken by North Korea to test fire a
missile. Although the action was not yet executed, it was treated as a fact , which involved and
enabled certain implications and material consequences such as the public criticism of North
Korea, the issuance of statements, diplomatic activity and efforts to hegemonize and secure this
certain kind of reality, i.e. to build a broad majority to confirm this view on North Korea. In other
words, the practices of problematizing North Korea took place even before an action was done.
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Link: South China Sea Threat
Threat of war in the South China Sea is a falsely

constructed maneuver of securitization
CALLAHAN 2004 [PROF IR AND DIRECTOR CENTRE FOR CHINESE STUDIES U
DURHAM, CONTINGENT STATES: GREATER CHINA AND TRANSNATIONAL
RELATIONS, PAGE 71-74]
China further formalized its claim in February 1992, when the National
People's Congress passed the "Law of the People's Republic of China on its
Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas." This action disturbed the region
because it unilaterally made a legal claim for ownership not just of the islands
in the South China Sea but also for Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands, Penghu
Islands, Dongsha Islands, and "other islands that belong to the PRC" ("Law on
Territorial Waters" BBC/SWB 28 November i99z, Wh-2). But even this
aggressive unilateral action is still phrased in the familiar language of state
sovereignty: the law is "to enable the PRC to exercise its sovereignty over its
territorial waters and its rights to exercise control over their adjacent areas,
and to safeguard state security as well as its maritime rights and interests"
("Law on Territorial Waters" BBC/SWB 28 November 1992, W/T-z). The right to
defend this sovereignty through military action is included in this law. Once
again, both sympathetic and critical readings of China's diplomacy in the
South China Sea reaffirm that China is being converted to the Westphalian
notion of the sovereignty of nation-states. To put it another way, Chinese
actions in the South China Sea are quite predictable. China is involved in
the age-old process of "writing security" (Campbell 7yg8a). Through its
military and diplomatic narratives, China-like the other states in the dispute-is
creating a problem in the South China Sea to craft and manage borders that
otherwise do not make sense. Although the South China Sea is commonly
seen as one of the main "security problems" in East Asia, in fact there is little
actual conflict there.As in the Kasmiri conflict between India and Pakistan,
where the greatest casualties are to altitude sickness and frostbite (Krishna
1996, zoo-ZOi), in the South China Sea soldiers do not fight each other so
much as storms and sunstroke. As the newspaper articles tell us, the main
enemy in the South China Sea is the sea itself: "In October 1993, Typhoon No.
Zo hit the main pillbox. High waves rolled over the rooftop of the three-storyhigh building. Erected structures and equipment lying on an area of 60o
square meters of the construction site were swept away" (Hu Zhanfan rgg4,
m). When the sea does not get you, the sun will: "[W]e heard of instances of
asphalt felt melting and thermometers bursting under the scorching sun of
the Nansha islands" (Hu Zhanfan 1994, 11; Whiting 1998, z99). The "Nansha
Spirit" describes enduring the hardship of the weather conditions, rather than
surviving the horrors of battle. Hence equipment upgrading concentrates on
stronger air conditioners and better fresh water supplies, rather than on
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bigger guns (Ling Xingzheng 1998; Zheng Degang 1999; Austin i998, 3r2).
Indeed, although the South China Sea disputes are a hot topic in Englishlanguage security studies journals, the Chinese press, and popular histories,
they are not a common item in Chinese security studies journals (Stenseth
1
999, 36). The White Paper on China's National DefenseZoo2 declares, "The
situation in the South China Sea area has been basically stable, as the
relevant countries have signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea."In other words, there is no "there" there: in addition to a
lack of military conflict, there is no substantial territory to defend, fisheries
are depleted, and there is little sign of the promised petrochemical riches.
National maritime territory has to be created to manufacture threats to
national security that are tied to writing the security of the newly discovered
ancient "sacred territory." It is the conceptualization of "security" itself, which
creates the subjectivity of the state, that has made "a relatively peaceful
area into one of serious security concerns" (Zha, Daojiong zooi, 34). As
Walker puts it, "the subject of security is the subjectof security" (Walker
Ty97, 78; Campbell r9y8a, i9g). The South China Sea disputes thus show how
the primary purpose of state security is not to secure a particular nationstate, but to secure the limitation of politics to the spatio-temporal
demarcations of state sovereignty that limit identity to citizenship. The very
active project of transforming China from a continental power to a maritime
power serves as a cogent example of security not defending us so much as
"tell[ing] us who we must be" (Walker 1997, 7i-72; Campbell z998a, i99).
To rethink security-and to rethink the "problem" and "solution" of the Spratly
Islands disputes-we have to "rethink the character and location of the
political" by asking who or what is to be secured, and under what conditions?
(Walker i997,ti9).
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Link: Identity Politics
The totalizing assumptions of identity politics creates the very violence they are out
to stop
Debrix 95 (Language, Agency, Politics; Francois Debrix, Fellow at the Oxford University, pg. 28)
Doty's aim is to apply a discursive and performative approach to] identity construction to a specific
situation: the US colonization of the Philippines in the 1890s and 1900s. She posits that identities are not
naturally given but that they are not completely social either. Before identities become socially engraved,
they must have been discursively fabricated. Identities are the product of discourses that function by
establishing linguistic oppositions such as developed/underdeveloped, dominant race/inferior race, selfgoverning beings/tutored subjects. "Subjects, objects, and practices are not brute facts," Doty writes (1996,
333). On the contrary, and often in an elementary fashion, "in fixing names to things we establish their
existence and their relationships to other things" (333). We discursively mobilize dichotomies that privilege
the first term to the detriment of the second. For Doty, social identities are never outside language. They
draw their power from language and are reaffirmed through linguistic/textual practices. Once again, Doty's
emphasis is on the discourses produced in the context of the encounter between the Filipino population and
the US colonizing forces. Her point is not merely that discourses create reality, deed, discourses
"naturalize" representations of self and other. They normalize identities. But, more crucially, those
discourses are inherently bout power. Discourses do not merely reflect power constructs found in social
practices. Rather, discourses create power. They ascribe a relation Slower (hierarchy, authority, and
physical force) to the represented ^tfcal reality. This point about the power of discourse is directly derived
in Foucault's analysis of disciplinary power described above. Taking ifr granted s Foucaultian understanding
of disciplinary and discursive power Doty goes on to demonstrate that the development of a potent
colonialist and internationalist identity by the United States in the early 900s was achieved through
discursive/textual depictions and denotations of a weaker, childlike, nonwhite, half-human Filipino subject
in eed of guardianship. Those depictions were produced by the American Colonizers who of course had a
distinct interest in manipulating language, multiple textual sources at that time (congressional reports,
statements by "politicians, American literature) played a crucial part in implementing dichotomous
representations of the American and the Filipino. They c helped to create a sense of us versus them in US
relations with the Philippines and, by extension, justified the adoption by the United States of a new
internationalist and colonialist policy. These discourses of foreign relations were instances of discursive
power, as they were concerned with mobilizing specific linguistic instruments and mani pulating certain
terms that would then produce privileged meanings and ultimately yield powerful political results for the
United States. The idea of mobilizing such linguistic instruments was to modify international political
practice so that the United States' new colonialist power could be justified/normalized.
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Link: Russia
Russian threats of accidents, nuclear use, and

disintegration are falsely constructed and create selffulfilling prophecies
Rumer and Sokolsky 01(*Eugene B. Rumer served at the State

Department, on the staff of the National Security Council, and at the Rand
Corporation. He holds degrees from Boston University (BA), Georgetown (MA),
and MIT (PhD). **Richard D. Sokolsky served as the director of the Office of
Strategic Policy and Negotiations in the Department of State. He has
published numerous articles on foreign and national security policy in leading
journals and newspapers. Normalizing U.S.-Russian Relations Published in
Strategic Forum; Institute for national strategic studies. National Defense
university. April 2001. RC)
Ten years after the end of the Cold War, mutual hopes that a comprehensive
partnership would replace containment as the major organizing theme in
U.S.-Russian relations have not been realized. The record of the 1990s has
left both Russia and the United States unsatisfied. Russia looks back at the
decade with bitterness and a feeling of being marginalized and slighted by
the worlds sole remaining superpower. It is also disappointed by its
experience with Western-style reforms and mistrustful of American intentions.
The United States is equally disappointed with Russias lack of focus, inability
to engage effectively abroad, and failure to implement major reforms at
home. A comprehensive partnership is out of the question. Renewed
competition or active containment are also not credible as organizing
principles. Russias economic, military and political/ideological weakness
makes it an unlikely target of either U.S. competition or containment. Not
only is Russia no longer a superpower, but its status as a regional power is in
doubt. Current thinking about Russia is divided among four basic approaches:
Forget Russia, Enfant Terrible Russia, Evil Russia, and Russia First. The Forget
Russia view holds that Russia is too weak, too corrupt, and too chaotic to
matter. After 10 years of trying to help Russia, the United States should focus
its resources and attention on more deserving and important world issues.
The Enfant Terrible view holds that, although Russia has been an irresponsible
and irritating partner, it is too weak to hurt the United States and therefore
need not be feared in earnest. President Vladimir Putins visits to Cuba and
North Korea, courtship of Slobodan Milosevic, and welcoming of Iranian
President Mohammad Khatami to Moscow are of little strategic consequence
and thus not worth our attention. This view presupposes the existence of an
important U.S.-Russian bilateral agenda and the need to protect it from
childish and irresponsible Russian grandstanding. The Evil Russia view holds
that Russian courtship of Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea is a deliberate
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effort to undermine U.S. influence in the world and recreate the Soviet
empire. Analysts embracing this view take less notice of Russias diminished
capabilities than of ambitious rhetoric by Russian politicians. Given Russias
evil purposes, the United States is already on a collision course with it and
might as well do everything it can to box Russia in. The Russia First view
holds that Russia still is the most important issue on the U.S. foreign policy
agenda. It accepts the premise that the two sides have shared interests and
that Russia, once reborn as a stable, prosperous democracy, can be a U.S.
partner and ally. Therefore, the United States should actively assist Russia in
its transformation and engage it in a broad and intense relationship with
renewed vigor and creativity. There are shortcomings in all of these
approaches. Notwithstanding its precipitous decline, to Forget Russia is
clearly not an option: the countrys geographic expanse, nuclear arsenal, and
proliferation potential simply make it impossible for U.S. policymakers to
ignore. The Enfant Terrible view fails to take Russia seriously and ignores the
very real problems that exist between the two countries.The Evil Russia
view risks inflating the threat and making the myth of evil Russia a
self-fulfilling prophecy. The Russia First view is not grounded in reality.
After a decade of failure, it should be clear that neither the specter of
Russias past nor the promise of its future warrants a position near the top of
the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The Need for Normalcy Russias external
weakness and internal problems have left the United States without an
effective interlocutor, either as partner or competitor.Thus, the United States
should deal with Russia on a case-by-case basis to advance our interests, in
much the same way we deal with most other countries. This path will
sometimes lead toward partnership with Rus- sia and at other times toward
competition. It may even result in a situation where Russia and the United
States find themselves as partners and competitors simultaneously in
different parts of the world or on different issues. Given its size, history,
strategic nuclear capabilities, and future potential, one is tempted to
overstate the importance of relations with Russia and put them at the top of
the U.S. national security agenda. Except for geography and nuclear
weapons, however, there is little at this stage to justify making relations with
Russia a top priority. Undoubtedly, Russia can inflict unacceptable damage on
the United States. But fear of Russian nuclear weapons should not be the
driving element of the relationship. The hostility and ideological differences
that divided the superpowers during the Cold War are gone.The prospect of
Russia consolidating and rebuilding itself under a militant authoritarian,
nationalist regime is remote. Therefore, fears of a deliberate surprise (attack
on the United States are unjustified. Despite a number of bilateral
undertakings outside the Cold War-style security agenda, ranging from
regional diplomacy in the Balkans to investment, U.S. engagement with
Russia, with the notable exception of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Initiative, is limited.
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Link: Iran Threat
Representations of Iran are rooted in failed state and

terror discourse
Adib-Moghaddam, Prof. of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London,
December 2009, Discourse and Violence: The Friend-Enemy Conjunction in Contemporary IranianArshin
American Relations, Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 2 No. 3, pp. 512-526
To those who would immediately interject by saying that Iran was associated
with terror because the country supported a range of movements,
Palestinians, Lebanese, Iraqi, Afghan, etc., organisations such as Fatah,
HAMAS and Hezbollah that use political violence in order to further their
political aims,allow me to respond that 'terrorism' as a noun and 'terroristic'
as an adjective, are the terminological surface effect of discursive
representations: they are concepts that emerge out of a particular
politico-cultural configuration which commands its own signifying powers
out of which the terror label and its derivatives are distilled. I am not saying
that killing civilians is not immoral and taboo of course; it is and it should be .
I am saying that in the reality invented for us, it is not that moral
taboo that represents a country or movement as terroristic, but the
discourse which signifies the fundamental categories of friend and
foe, terrorists and freedom fighter. The normative difference between
these categories cannot be measured and defined in terms of the type of
political violence unleashed, but by its representation in the political and
media discourse of a particular period.
Depictions of Iran as a dangerous proliferating causes

anti-American backlash
Arshin
Adib-Moghaddam, Prof. of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London,
December 2009, Discourse and Violence: The Friend-Enemy Conjunction in Contemporary IranianAmerican Relations, Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 2 No. 3, pp. 512-526
Let me return to the beginning of this essay and recapture the issue of trust
now within such an untrustworthy discursive field. The subject that emerges
out of the turmoil of the revolution and the subsequent devastating war
between Iran and Iraq (1980-88), does not speak to the American side in
order to mitigate conflict, but to accentuate difference. Revolutionary Iran
was adamant to define the Islamic Republic in strict juxtaposition to the West
in general and the United States in particular. This discourse has suggested,
as I mentioned, a bifurcated syntactical order within which the fundamental
boundary between subject and object, self and other has been cemented
with layers and layers of narrated inventions, all of which were meant
to solidify the fundamental difference between the two states. In other words,
the political independence of Iran has been achieved via a discursive
dependency. By defining Iran's new 'self' in relation to the American 'other',
the discourse of the Islamic Republic has become entirely dependent on
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invented images of the United States in particular and the concept of the
'West' more generally. Thus, an oppressive syntactical dependency has been
created which demands that Iran takes the US and the West permanently into
account at each and every twist and turn of the country's official political
discourse: Marg bar Amrika (death to America), marg bar engelis (death to
England), marg bar Israel (death to Israel); calling for the 'death' of America,
Israel and Britain guarantees their syntactical existence in the here and now.
So the 'West' has a rather pronounced presence in Islamic Iran indeed,
particularly amongst the rightwing, the supporters of Ahmadinejad who utter
those slogans and whose iron fist is crushing Iranian pro-democracy activists
at the very moment I am writing these lines. It should not come as a
surprise that these young people are accused of colluding with the
'West': within contemporary Iran it is inevitable that 'you' reappear as a
major focal point of the political discourse. I am emphasising that a discursive
field is always social, but that sociality could be violent, neutral, intimate, or
friendly; it could be charged with negative or positive energy, but it always
remains the loci within which shifts from enemy to friend or ally to
foe can be signified. Note that I am accentuating the effects of discourse,
our language towards the other, as the main source of trust building
measures. I am re-emphasising this because Iran and the United States did
occasionally reach out to each other out of expediencywithout changing
their language towards the other side. When the 'Great Satan' and the 'mad
mullahs' colluded via Israel in what became to be known as the Iran-Contra
Affair in 1986, they remained just that: staunch antagonistswho made a
deal not in order to engender trust, but as a means to achieve
divergent strategic interests. In the case of the Iranian leadership, the
deal was necessary in order to secure the supply of arms and weaponry
during a period when the chemical weapons attacks by Saddam Hussein's
troops were beginning to demoralise the Iranian army. The Israeli
government of Shimon Peres, on the other side, acted on the premise 'that
moderate elements in Iran can come to power if these factions demonstrate
their credibility in defending Iran against Iraq and in deterring Soviet
intervention. To achieve the strategic goal of a more moderate Iranian
government', it is stated in a White House Memorandum (1986, p. 1)
authored by then US National Security Advisor John Poindexter, 'the Israelis
are prepared to unilaterally commence selling military material to Westernoriented Iranian factions . It is their belief that by so doing they can achieve
a heretofore unobtainable penetration of the Iranian governing hierarchy'. In
response to this memo, President Reagan (White House Memorandum 1986,
p. 4) authorised assisting individuals and groups 'sympathetic to U.S.
Governments interests for the purpose of: 1) establishing a more moderate
government in Iran, 2) obtaining from them significant intelligence and 3)
furthering the release of the American hostages held in Beirut'. It should
become clear that in this clandestine transaction none of the stakeholders
were interested in pursuing strategic trust-building measures, which would
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have involved, at minimum, the acknowledgement of the 'trustworthiness' of

the other side (Booth and Wheeler 2008, pp. 229ff.). The first major step
towards that direction after the revolution in Iran was made by former
President Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) via the 'dialogue amongst
civilisation' initiative which did not yield, however, the results he and his
supporters envisaged. Rather the contrary, Iran was named a part of the
'axis of evil' and a major target in the global 'war on terror' pronounced by
the administration of George W. Bush in the aftermath of the terror attacks on
the country in September 2001 (Adib-Moghaddam 2008a, part 3). Thus far,
this narrative-counternarrative dialectic has not delivered a pacified
discursive field in which a strategic leap towards trust could be
signified.
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Link: Kagan
The construction of security by authors such as Kagan has

increasingly influenced how the US has become a global
hegemon and is required to maintain that power
David Campbell, Geography @ Durham ET AL 7 Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies
of current US strategy Political Geography 26 (4)
The scribe in question is Robert Kagan, who in June 2002 published a highly influential piece in the
foreign policy journal Policy Review, later expanded as a book (Kagan, 2003). At the time, Kagan
was a political commentator for the Washington Post and a writer for a number of
conservative monthlies, and had served in the State Department from 1984 to 1998. In the early 1980s
he was a member of the Departments policy planning unit, and worked in the first Bush
Administration as Secretary of State George Schultzs speechwriter. Entitled Power and Weakness,
Kagans essay detailed what he argued was the increasingly evident disparity
between American and European worldviews, particularly with regard to the conduct
of international affairs. But his analysis, as we will argue here, constituted above all a
justification for American power, and its exercise wherever and however necessary.
Kagans analysis e as part of a wider understanding of the ways in which the postCold War world works developed by neoconservative intellectuals e would
prepare the ground, indeed, make indispensable, US unilateralism and its doctrine
of pre-emptive action. Kagans article was highly influential, just as Fukuyamas
(1989, 1992) The End of History had been 13 years before , because of his profile
within the foreign policy establishment, and because Kagan (as Fukuyama) was speaking to friends
and colleagues e and, in many ways, reiterating a set of shared understandings. Kagans claims have
been widely discussed, lauded and refuted by academics and political leaders alike (see, for example
those referenced in Bialasiewicz & Elden, 2006), so we will present them here only in brief. Kagans
central claim was that Europeans and Americans no longer share a common view of
the world and, moreover, that in essential ways they can be understood as occupying
different worlds: Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving
beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and
cooperation. And while Europe has withdrawn into a mirage of Kantian perpetual peace, the US
has no choice but to act in a Hobbesian world of perpetual war . This state of affairs, for Kagan,
is not the result of the strategic choices of a single administration, but a persistent
divide and the reflection of fundamentally different perspectives on the world e and
the role of Europe/ the US within it (Kagan, 2002: 1). Kagan spends a significant part of
his paper (and later book) analyzing what he terms the psychology of power and
weakness. It is a deeply troubling argument, for Kagan claims, at base, that
Europeans believe in diplomacy and multilateralism because they are weak:
Europeans oppose unilateralism [.] because they have no capacity for unilateralism (Kagan, 2002:
7). What is more, he claims, the construction of the European paradise, the geopolitical fantasy
[of] a postmodern system [where] the age-old laws of international relations have been repealed;
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[where] Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of
perpetual peace (2002: 11) was made possible only by American power which assured the Cold War
peace. America continues to hold this role because post-historical Europe will not e
and cannot; the US is forced to remain stuck in history, left to deal with the
Saddams and the ayatollahs, the Kim Jong Ils and the Jiang Zemins, leaving the
happy benefits to others (2002: 16). As we have argued elsewhere, the US is thus invoked
into a number of positions: as global leader (faced with Europes failings/ withdrawal), but
also the only state able, due to its power-position, to perceive threats clearly; the only
one with a Gods eye view of international affairs. It is thus, at once, the worlds geopolitican and its geo-police; the only state with the knowledge but also the
capability to intervene. Such attitudes clearly inform and reinforce the notion of preemptive action articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy . What is more
interesting is that these ideas are also to be found in other contemporary calls for a
proper ordering of the world that have issued from the broader community of nonstate experts previously described. As we have suggested, what constitutes the force of such
understandings is their performative e citational and reiterative e nature. These understandings echo
and speak to each other, resonate with one another, thus reinforcing their validity as a faithful
description of the way the world is.
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Link: International Law
The focus on civilized nations bringing peace to

uncivilized nations represents a new global culture
grounded in securitization.
Bowden 04 Brett Bowden 4 In the Name of Progress and Peace (PhD from The Australian National
University and his undergraduate degrees from Flinders University of South Australia associate Professor
of Politics and International Studies. He holds appointments at the University of Western Sydney, The
Australian National University, Canberra, and at the University of New South Wales at the Australian
Defence Force Academy, Canberr, Alernatives 29
The violence committed against "uncivilized" peoples in the name of "civilizing

missions" in the past five hundred-plus years is evidence enough of this danger . As a
key tool in the pursuit of this enterprise, the principle of a standard of civilization is
implicated in the universalizing project, and as a critical concept in international law
it is neither neutral nor abstract; rather, it "is mired in this history of subordinating
and extinguishing alien cultures." (82) As history forewarns, the division of our world into
varying shades of civilization and the concomitant enforcement of a standard of
civilization has potentially dire consequences for the "uncivilized ." While there is some
need to distinguish between states on the basis of legitimacy, which is essentially the objective of
Rawls's "law of peoples" and like projects, this particular endeavor comes at a (generally
unacknowledged) cost. For distinctions based on civilization are implicated, by one
means or another, in the diminishing of cultural pluralism . That is, such distinctions
lead to (1) the self-fulfilling prophecy of the violent "clash of civilizations" thesis,
(83) resulting in one extinguishing the other(s), or (2) a world in which there is a
more stealthy homogenization of culture to the point at which Western liberal values
represent the global culture. On a similar note, it is widely held that Fukuyama's "end of history"
thesis (and the associated notion of universal civilization) and Huntington's "clash of civilizations"
thesis are competing views of the future state of international politics. On the contrary, in effect they
are two sides of the same coin: The pursuit of the former through the West's strict enforcement of a
standard of civilization almost inevitably risks leading to the latter. But these are not the only
available options or conceivable outcomes. Basic human rights, a decent standard of living, and a just
system of government are achievable in societies that are something other than replicas of the West.
There need not be an arbitrary distinction between "civilized" and "uncivilized"

societies, the former looking down upon the latter with an unjustifiable sense of
superiority closely accompanied by a missionary zeal. The "realistic utopia " of a
Huxleyesque Brave New World is not the answer. People will revolt not only against
totalitarianism, but against any universalizing system, be it well-meaning and
seemingly benign or otherwise.
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Link: Economy
Attempting to save the global economy from disaster is a

liberal order-building method of security
Mark Neocleous, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University,
Security, McGill-Queens University, pp. 94-97, Published 2008)
08 (Critique of
But 'social security' was clearly an inadequate term for this, associated as it now was with 'soft'
domestic policy issues such as old-age insurance. 'Collective security' would not do, associated as it
was with the dull internationalism of Wilson on the one hand and still very much connected to the
institutions of social security on the other." Only one term would do: national security.
This not to imply that 'national security' was simply adopted and adapted
from 'social security'. Rather, what we are dealing with here is another ideological
circuit, this time between 'national security' and 'social security' , in which the policies
'insuring' the security of the population are a means of securing the body politic, and
vice versa;" a circuit in which, to paraphrase David Peace in the epigraph to this chapter, one can
have one's teeth kicked out in the name of national security and put back in through social security.
Social security and national security were woven together : the social and the national were
the warp and the weft of the security fabric. The warp and the welt, that is, of a broader vision of
economic security.
Robert Pollard has suggested that 'the concept of "economic
security'- the idea that American interests would be best sewed by an open and
integrated economic system, as opposed to a large peacetime military establishment was firmly established during the wartime period'. 71 In fact, the concept of 'economic
security' became a concept of international politics in this period, but the concept itself had a longer
history as the underlying idea behind social security in the 1930s, as we have seen. Economic
security, in this sense, provides the important link between social and national
security, becoming liberalism's strategic weapon of choice and the main policy
instrument from 1945. As one State Department memo of February 1944 put it, 'the development
of sound international economic relations is closely related to the problem of security. But it would
also continue to be used to think about the political administration of internal order. Hence Roosevelt's
comment that 'we must plan for, and help to bring about, an expanded economy which will result in
more security [and so that the conditions of 1932 and the beginning of 1933 won't come back again'.'
On security grounds, inside and outside were constantly folding into one another, the
domestic and the foreign never quite On the fabrication of economic order properly
distinguishable. The reason why lay in the kind of economic order to be secured: both domestically
and internationally, 'economic security' is coda for capitalist order.
Giving a lecture at
Harvard University on 5 June 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall recalled the
disruption to the European economy during the war and Europe's continuing inability to feed itself,
and suggested that if the US did not help there would be serious economic, social and political
deterioration which would in turn have a knock-on effect on US capital. The outcome was a joint
plan submitted to the US from European states at the end of August, after much
wrangling with the Soviet Union, requesting $28 billion over a four-year period (the
figure was reduced when finally agreed by Congress). The European Recovery Program (ERE known
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the Marshall Plan) which emerged has gone down as an economic panacea, 'saving'
Europe from economic disaster. But as the first of many such 'Plans', all the way down to
the recent 'reconstruction' of Iraq, it does not take much to read the original Marshall
Plan through the lens of security and liberal order-building. Alan Milward has suggested
that the conventional reading of the Marshall Plan and US aid tends to accept the
picture of post-war Europe on the verge of collapse and with serious social and
economic discontent, such that it needed to be rescued by US aid. In fact, excluding
Germany, no country was actually on the verge of collapse. There were no bank
crashes, very few bankruptcies and the evidence of a slow down in industrial
production is unconvincing. There is also little evidence of grave distress or a general
as
deterioration in the standard of living. By late-1946 production had roughly equalled pre-war levels in
all countries except Germany. And yet Marshall Aid came about. Milward argues that the Marshall
Plan was designed not to increase the rate of recovery in European countries or to
prevent European economies from deteriorating, but to sustain ambitious, new,
expansionary economic and social policies in Western European countries which
were in fact already in full-bloom conditions. In other words, the Marshall Plan was
predominantly designed for political objectives - hence conceived and rushed through by the
Department of State itself."
Milward's figures are compelling, and complicate the
conventional picture of the Marshall Plan as simply a form of economic aid. But to distinguish
reasons that are 'economic' reasons from reasons that are 'political' misses the extent
to which, in terms of security, the economic and the political are entwined. This is why
the Marshall Plan is so inextricably linked to the Truman Doctrine's offer of military aid and
intervention beyond us borders, a new global commitment at the heart of which was the possibility of
intervention in the affairs of other countries. As Joyce and Gabriel Kolko have argued the important
dimension of the Truman Doctrine is revealed in the various drafts of Truman's speech before it was
finally delivered on 12 March, and the private memos of the period. Members of the cabinet and other
top officials understood very clearly that the united States was now defining a strategy and budget
appropriate to its new global commitments, and that a far greater involvement in other countries was
now pending especially on the economic level. Hence the plethora of references to 'a world-
wide trend away from the system of free enterprise's which the state Department's
speech-writers thought a 'grave threat' to American interests. Truman's actual speech
to Congress is therefore more interesting for what it implied than what it stated explicitly. And what it
implied was the politics behind the Marshall Plan: economic security as a means of
maintaining political order against the threat of communism.

The point then, is
not just that the Marshall Plan was 'political' how could any attempt to reshape global
capital be anything but political? It is fairly clear that the Marshall Plan was multidimensional,
and to distinguish reasons that are 'economic' reasons from reasons that are 'political' misses the extent
to which the economic, political and military are entwined The point is that it was very much a project
driven by the ideology of security. The referent object of 'securi here is 'economic order'.
The government and the emerging national security bureaucracy saw the communist
threat as economic rather than military. As Latham notes, at first glance the idea of military
security within a broad context of economic containment merely appears to be one more dimension of
strength within the liberal order. But in another respect the project of economic security might itself
be viewed as the very force that made military security appear to be necessary. In this sense, the
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priority given to economic security was the driving force behind the us commitment
to underwrite military security for Western Europe." The protection and expansion of
capital came to be seen as the path to security, and vice versa. This created the grounds
for a re-ordering of global capital involving a constellation of class and corporate forces as well as
state power, undertaken in the guise of national security. NSC-68, the most significant national
security document to emerge in this period, stated that the 'overall policy at the present time may be
described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive
and flourish'." In this sense we can also read the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, the Brussels Pact of March 1948 and the nascent
movement towards 'European Union' as part and parcel of the security project being mapped out." The
key institutions of 'international order' in this period invoked a particular vision of order with a view
to reshaping global capital as a means of bringing 'security' political, social and economic - from the
communist threat.
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Link: NATO
NATO as an institution exists to stabilize the uncertain

world and create new forms of violence in a search for the
source of the instability
David Campbell, professor of international politics at the university of Newcastle,
Writing Security, 1998, pg. 196-197
Practices of differentiation and modes of exclusion are not unique to the United
States, however. For example, much of the debate about the future political and
strategic horizon of the new Europe embodies this logic.13 With the demise of the
continents neat division into competing blocs, each of which was the negation of
the other, leaders in the West have demonstrated a pronounced aversion to the
spectacle of what they see as anarchy and instability. 14 For political actors who
are most comfortable with discourses of certitude and who decry the
strategic danger of ambiguity, the flux of a political space without a
concomitant political order is too much to handle. Indeed, this very
condition has become the new domain of danger. As a lecturer at the U.S.
Naval War College succinctly stated, The threat is no longer the
Russians. The threat is uncertainty.15 And as the new domain of
danger, contingency is being appropriated as a means of breathing new
life into the exhausted security categories of postwar Europe. To those
who have argued that the loss of the Soviet other puts NATOs existence
into question, Secretary General Manfred Worner in a manner that
explicitly linked the technology of insurance discussed in the
Introduction to international relations responded: NATO doesnt need
a counterpart, or a foe, or an enemy. There are risks, there are
instabilities, so you need insurance.16
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Link: War Between States
Discussing war between states privileges sovereign

entities, ignoring most violence is committed against
individuals. They allow a clear distinction between
dangerous foreign and safe domestic, which replicates
domination
Shapiro 97 (Michael, Prof. of PoliSci @ Hawaii, Violent Cartographies, Pg. 2930)

The omission of native peoples from the discourse on war is evident in a
recent mapping of contemporary armed struggles. Bernard Nietschmann
demonstrates that although in recent years there has been relatively little
warfare between sovereign states, there continue to be enormous casualties
and forced dislocations in the struggles between states and various
indigenous nations (as well as between states and stateless peoples).
Identifying 120 wars in 1987, Nietschmann found only 4 that involved
conflict between two sovereign states, while 100 of the wars were accounted
for by struggles in which states were at war with insurgencies and indigenous
nations. These struggles have received little attention, for media and
academia are anchored in the state. Their tendency is to consider struggles
against the state to be illegitimate or invisible. . . . They are hidden from view
because the fighting is against peoples and countries that are often not even
on the map. Nietschmanns mapping practice is extraordinary because the
dominant war cartography has opposed state to state. This dominance in
representation is matched by a characteristic of narratives of warfare,
histories that represent only interstate antagonisms. At the same time that
European states were subjugating the peoples in the peripheral trade zones
during the seventeenth century, their rulers managed to shift the balance
decisively against both individual citizens and rival power holders within their
own states. This led, as Charles Tilly has noted, to the disarmament of the
civilian population while the states own armed force began to overshadow
the weaponry available to any of its domestic rivals. The most important
result, from the point of view of narratives of warfare, is that whereas the
distinction between internal and external politics previously had been
unclear, it became mare distinct in terms of both power and representation.
The states domination of both coercion and its representation resulted in a
discourse on war that trivializes what is inside, representing within-state
violence in terms of law enforcement, the maintenance of domestic security,
and so on. By ignoring various forms of disorder within the national imaginary
that is, perpetuating the fantasy of an untroubled and unitary order
practices of violence maintain their ontological function. They operate to
protect boundaries between the American people and a dangerous world
out side while the inside is depluralized as a unitary citizen body.
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Link: Positive Peace
Framing security as primarily the prevention of war makes

war inevitable.
Sandy & Perkins 1
(Leo R., co-founder of Peace Studies at Plymouth State College
and Ray, teacher of philosophy at Plymouth State College, The Nature of Peace and Its
Implications for Peace Education Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolutions, 4.2)
In its most myopic and limited definition, peace is the mere absence of
war. O'Kane (1992) sees this definition as a "vacuous, passive, simplistic,
and unresponsive escape mechanism too often resorted to in the past without success." This definition also commits a serious oversight: it
ignores the residual feelings of mistrust and suspicion that the winners
and losers of a war harbor toward each other . The subsequent suppression of
mutual hostile feelings is not taken into account by those who define peace so simply. Their
stance is that as long as people are not actively engaged in overt, mutual, violent, physical,
and destructive activity, then peace exists. This, of course, is just another way of defining
cold war. In other words, this simplistic definition is too broad because it
allows us to attribute the term "peace" to states of affairs that are not
truly peaceful (Copi and Cohen, p. 194). Unfortunately, this definition of peace appears
to be the prevailing one in the world. It is the kind of peace maintained by a "peace
through strength" posture that has led to the arms race, stockpiles of
nuclear weapons, and the ultimate threat of mutually assured
destruction. This version of peace was defended by the "peacekeeper" a name that actually adorns some U.S. nuclear weapons deployed since
1986.
Security rhetoric presumes a conception of peace that

leads to inevitable violence and undermines human
security
Sandy & Perkins 1
(Leo R., co-founder of Peace Studies at Plymouth State College
and Ray, teacher of philosophy at Plymouth State College, The Nature of Peace and Its
Implications for Peace Education Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolutions, 4.2)
Also, versions of this name appear on entrances to some military bases. Keeping
"peace" in this manner evokes the theme in Peggy Lee's old song, "Is That All
There is?" What this really comes down to is the idea of massive and
indiscriminate killing for peace, which represents a morally dubious
notion if not a fault of logic. The point here is that a "peace" that
depends upon the threat and intention to kill vast numbers of human
beings is hardly a stable or justifiable peace worthy of the name. Those in
charge of waging war know that killing is a questionable activity. Otherwise, they
would not use such euphemisms as "collateral damage" and "smart bombs" to
obfuscate it.
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Link: Rhetoric
Security speech acts that create existential threats on a

global scale securitize the global system.
KelstrupWriter and editor for Sage Publications

2004(Morten, Globalisation and Societal Insecurity,Contemporary
Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research, pg.111-2)
The concept of securitisation seems very useful in grasping some phenomena
related to security which otherwise are difficult to identify. Basically,
securitisation can be understood as 'the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency
sufficient to have substantial political effects' (Buzau et al. 1998: 25). Securitisation might be
initiated through a speech act where a securitizing actor designates a threat to a specified referent object
and declares an existential threat implying a right to use extraordinary means to fence it off. The issue is
securitized becomes a security issue, a part of what Is 'security' 'if the relevant
audience accepts this claim and thus grants the actor a right to violate rules that otherwise would bind .
(Waver 2000: 251) It was, in some ways, a part of the events of 11

September (as they were interpreted) that they included a securitisation of
the new 'mass terrorism': the attacks and the threat which such attacks
represent were articulated through 'speech acts' by important actors, not
least the president of the United States, as a threat which made
extraordinary action legitimate. This `securitisation move' by the American
government was followed by most other state leaders and other important
representatives in most societies. There were exceptions, but the reactions to
11 September were remarkable in articulating a 'new' security situation. The
'extraordinary actions' for which the `securitizing actor(s)' sought acceptance and thus some kind of
legitimacy were, in particular, the declared 'war against terror', and this was at
least to a large extent accepted by 'the relevant audience'. Said differently: with the
new terrorism we have experienced not only a new dimension in the

globalisation of societal insecurity. We have also experienced what might be
seen as rather remarkable 'successful' securitisation in the global system.
Security threats are created through security discourse,

like the affirmative
Dr. Stefan
Elbe,
Ph.D. in International Relations and Senior Lecturer in
2006
International Relations at LSE, March,

Should HIV/AIDS be Securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of Linking HIV/AIDS
and Security, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 1, BS
This radically constructivist view of security also generates important new tasks for security analysts, who
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must now begin to reflect in greater depth on the normative consequences of securitizing a particular issue.
Our approach, Buzan, Wver, and de Wilde (1998:212) insist, has the basic merit of
conceptualizing security as a labeling for which actors can be held responsible rather than an objective
feature of threats; securitization theory serves to underline the responsibility of talking security, the
responsibility of actors as well as of analysts who choose to frame an issue as a security issue. They
cannot hide behind the claim that anything in itself constitutes a security
issue (Buzan, Wver, and de Wilde 1998:34). Because security analysts
have a choice about whether or not to present a given issue in the language
of security, they need to reflect on the wider consequences of doing so. This
also means that the debate about HIV/AIDS and security cannot be waged solely on empirical grounds; for
if there is an inevitable choice to speaking security in relation to HIV/AIDS, then the debate about the
security implications of the disease will remain incomplete, unless the wider normative implications of
using such language are assessed as well. Securitization theory was designed with a view to this very task;
with its help it is possible to ask with some force whether it is a good idea to make this issue a security
issue to transfer it to the agenda of panic politicsFor whether it is better handled within normal politics
(Buzan, Wver, and de Wilde 1998:34). Yet because the global AIDS pandemic was
securitized only after the publication of their study, this line of inquiry has not yet been pursued specifically
in relation to HIV/AIDS.
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Link: Human Rights
Human rights are a double edged sword, the majority

uses human rights as an instrument to keep the minority
in check.
POLLMANN 2005 (CHRISTOPHER, Noel Fellow at European Union Center,
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA., USA and Metz University, France )
Neocolonial and Idealist Human Rights Pitfalls Journal of Human Rights,
4:145158. RB
Sense and purpose of Mutuas book remain uncertain. Many claims and
quotations suggest that beyond the concrete, neocolonialist form of human
rights, he intends a fundamental critique of law. He seems to be conscious,
for instance, that the idea of human rights mystifies domination and
exploitation.12 Under the sub-title Rights DiscourseNot a Panacea,
Mutua asks, concerning post-apartheid South Africa: Are rights a sufficient
medium for transforming [. . .] inequalities? [. . .] Or did the ANC capture the
government and lose the power?, in order to conclude then: the rhetoric
of rights is a double-edged sworda weapon but also a shield; the
democratic, rule-of-law, rights-based state has ironically turned out to be an
instrument for the preservation of the privileges and the ill-gotten gains of
the white minority (p. 151). (It would have been helpful, though, to pursue
this critical analysis in a more profound way, e.g., by examining the role of
human rights as a facade of prayer with only limited material effects. Times
of tension, especially after September 11, 2001, offer particularly good
empirical material of study, as human rights protective capacity is then
most needed and most lacking. Since that date, governments all over the
world have indeed been fighting marginal and minority groups and
restricting democratic rights and civil liberties.13 )
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Link: China
The affirmatives discussion of policy is based on a

positivist mode of knowing China. China is not
something that we stand back and observe- this
constructs a mode of thought that can only relate to
China as a threat.
Pan, PhD degree in Political Science and International Relations from the Australian National
University, 2K4 [Chengxin, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive
Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29, 2004]
China and its relationship with the United States has long been a fascinating
subject of study in the mainstream U.S. international relations community.
This is reflected, for example, in the current heated debates over whether
China is primarily a strategic threat to or a market bonanza for the United
States and whether containment or engagement is the best way to deal with
it. (1) While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is,"
their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in
terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is
ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be,
empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his
dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M.
Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China
Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is
today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will
hold for the rest of the world." (2) Like many other China scholars, Lampton
views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from
and observe with clinical detachment." (3) Secondly, associated with the
first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as
"disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive
descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat
or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of
"what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is
believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the
conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to
venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the
"containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to
contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the
seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the
mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will
focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate;
namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that
U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically
linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves
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(as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for

example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an
independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood
as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power
politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into
social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part
of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I
seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other
constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat"
literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible
by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing
new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified
elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as
ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and
international relations. (4) Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general
and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable
resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as
discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international
politics. (5) It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution.
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Link: CBA
Their obsession with causality and the breakdown of

linearized outcomes precludes other modes of knowing
Hilde Zitzelsberger 2K4 (Faculty if nursing at university of Toronto, Concerning technology:
Thinking with Heidegger p 242-250)
Seeking the 'true' through the correct provides a path into unveiling the
essence of technology, obscured by an instrumental definition of technology.
Heidegger questions: 'What is the instrumental itself? Within what do such
things as means and ends belong?' (p. 313). He explains that 'whenever ends
are pursued and means employed, whenever instrumentality reigns, there
reigns causality' (p. 313). For Heidegger, unveiling causality along with
corresponding conceptions of technology is necessary to move beyond the
correct toward uncovering technology's essence. The primal meaning of
causality, as thought by the Greeks and to which means and ends belong,
was once known more completely. The deeper and broader significance of
causality are disclosed by Heidegger through recovering the Aristotelian four
causes: (1) causa materialis (the matter of which something is made); (2)
causa formalis (the form into which matter is shaped); (3) causa finalis (the
telos which binds together the aspect (eidos or idea) and matter that gives
bounds to the form and begins the purposeful life of the creation); and (4)
causa efficiens (that which brings the finished effect). Expanding the complex
forces and elements by which things come forth into appearance, Heidegger
includes notions of responsibility and indebtedness. In Greek thought to
which Heidegger returns us, the four causes are aition'that to which
something else is indebted' and 'being responsible for something else' (p.
314). The four causes together are coresponsible and indebted to one
another for the presencing of what appears. Heidegger states: The principle
characteristic of being responsible is this starting something on its way into
arrival. It is in the sense of such a starting something on its way into arrival
that being responsible is an occasioning or an inducing to go forward. (p. 316)
In the creation of something, the four undividable causes that await ordering
are gathered together contemplatively to manifest something that can
depart, beginning its life and purpose. Heidegger finds that if we understand
the essence of causality as occasioning, a bringing-forth into arrival by way of
the four causes, then we grasp causality as responsibility in the sense that
the Greeks thought it. The revealing movements of the four causes are
punctuated by Heidegger through revisiting the verb cadere, to fall, to which
the word causa belongs. Considering causality as falling rather than
producing an effect or outcome determined in advance suggests other ways
of occasioning than notions of a linear projection of means to end brought
about by the collected elements of the four causes through human mastery.
Significant to our contemporary situation, Heidegger points out that the
notion of cause as producing predetermined effects or outcomes
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conceals all other dimensions of causality. Heidegger draws attention to

our current state in which 'the causa efficiens, but one of the four causes,
sets the standard for all causality.' (p. 314). He states that 'this goes so far
that we no longer count the causa finalis, telic finality, as causality' (p. 314),
that which bound the creation to beginning its purposeful life. When
everything is viewed within this schema of meansends, Heidegger remarks,
even in theologies 'God can sink to the level of a cause, of causa efficiens' (p.
331). Moreover though, in a time of modern technology, we view ourselves as
fundamental agents of production. Technology is held up as the instrumental
means by which we bring about ends which we have scientifically projected
as possible. Taking ourselves to be the domineering cause efficiens,
contained in our attempts to master technology as an instrument is the intent
to order all which can be subject to technological causality. Highlighting the
difference between causality in a more complete sense as occasioning and
the limited modern sense of causality that is related to technology, Heidegger
questions the notion of technology, with us at the helm, as the sole means
that produces effects and attains outcomes. If we recognize that technology
is not merely an instrumental means to an end for human enterprises, then
we can question further the nature of technology. To think about technology
in its essence, Heidegger states, we must 'take seriously the simple question
of what the name "technology" means' (p. 318). He probes the deeper
significance of technology, in conjunction with the four modes of occasioning,
through an etymological understanding of the Greek word techne, from which
technology derives. Heidegger states that techne once meant more than
technology as a 'contrivance in Latin, an instrumentum' (p. 312) as typically
thought in contemporary times.
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Link: Cyber-Terrorism
Worries about cyber-terror are rooted in its opposition to

geographies of exclusion
Bialasiewicz et al 7, -
Luiza Bialasiewicz a, David Campbell b, Stuart Elden b, Stephen Graham

b, Alex Jeffrey c, Alison J. Williams a Department of Geography, Royal Holloway University of London,
United Kingdom b International Boundaries Research Unit, Geography Department, Durham University,
Durham, DH1 3LE, United Kingdom c School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, University of Newcastleupon-Tyne, United Kingdom, Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy
Political Geography 26 (2007) 405e422, via sciencedirect.com)
Abroad, one contradiction between the moral cartography of terror and the
spatiality of globalization can be found in the attention US national security
discourse pays to the deepening connectivity between domestic US space
and burgeoning circuits of computer communication, electronic transaction,
and organized criminal activity. Significant here is the US militarys discussion
of the risk of cyber-terrorism; their efforts to clamp down on transitional
financial dealings of alleged terrorist sympathizers; or their analyses of the
biological pathogens which routinely flow around the worlds airline and
shipping systems (The White House, 2002a). These bring into being a world in
which everything and everywhere is perceived as a border from which a
potentially threatening Other can leap (Hage, 2003: 86). Such a world of
porosity, flow and rhizomatic, fibrous connectivities is deeply at odds with the
imaginative geographies of exclusion and their moral cartography.
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Link: Disease
Disease is used to construct security threats- AIDS

proves.
Campbell 98 (David- PHD, Prof of cultural & poli geog @ U of Durham,
Writing Security, p. 99,ET)
by conflating the stigmata of difference, the tropes and metaphors of sociomedical discourse call to mind certain sensations, dispositions, impressions, and given
the negative valence of such representations doubts, concerns, anxieties, and suspicions,
to be associated with those groups who are the objects of attention . We need only consider
contemporary representations of AIDS in which iconography associated with syphilis,
homosexuals, Africans, drug addicts, and inner-city residents is melded into an allencompassing discursive formation so as to inscribe a boundary between the heterosexual,
non-IV drug using, white community (i.e. those who are 'normal') and those at risk to
appreciate the continued saliency of these representations.67 Indeed, the boundary- producing effects of
the discourse surrounding AIDS recently took a literal turn when the US Immigration and
Naturalization Service overruled the Health and Human Services Department and reinstated
the presence of HIV as grounds for excluding tourists and immigrants f rom the United States.
With over one million Americans already infected with this virus, such an exclusion 'conveys
the message that the danger is outside the US., is a foreigner, a strang er.'68 What we have been
In other words,
discussing here, then, is 'foreign policy': all those practices of differentiation implicated in the confrontation between
self and other, and their modes of figuration. Although it has been argued that the representation of
difference does not functionally necessitate a negative figuration, it has historically more
often than not been the case especially given the force of socio-medical discourse that
danger has been made available for understanding in terms of defilement . And given both the
innately tropical nature of language and the multifarious sensibilities suffused within representations of danger, the
depiction of difference is not carried out within the register of realism: we might say it takes places within an 'orrery of
signification,' through which characteristics are ascribed to `others' on the basis of their associated valuations rather
than on the basis of their ability to describe those being portrayed.69 In this context, foreign policy might be
likened to an 'ethical power of segregation,' whereby moral distinctions can be made

through spatial and temporal delineations, such that a 'geography of evil' is constituted, so
that dangers can be calculated as originating from distinct and distant places .79 This is
especially the case when we are considering the domain of Foreign Policy, where the temptation of otherness has
been uncommonly compelling.
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Link: Democracy
The affirmative sits in an ivory tower and creates a

security discourse through the spread
of democracy/peace
Burger and Villumsen 07
(Christian and Trine, Journal of International Relations and

Development, Beyond the gap: relevance, fields of practice and the securitizing consequences of
(democratic peace) research pg. 24, https//secure.palgravejournals.com/jird/journal/v10/n4/full/1800136a.html)
To give empirical flesh to the theoretical discussions and to demonstrate the

difference a practice theory approach makes, we discussed the example of
the democratic peace thesis. We sought to raise the possibility that ivory
tower scientists, US foreign policymakers and NATO politicians and
bureaucrats hang together in a web and use each other as a resource. Our
claim was that the certainty that researchers gave to a philosophical thought
of democratic peace helped weave the web tighter. Scientific authority
became an essential resource in establishing the democratic peace as a
strong principle of contemporary security politics. Peace researchers
translation and depolitization of Kants utopia opened the floor for securitizing
democracy, but they did not govern it. Their creation of the binaries of
democracy/peace and non-democracy/war contributed to constructing nondemocracy as a threat, but did not dictate it. In the end, democratization
became a security issue, increasing the likelihood of the application of
emergency measures. The case of democratic peace stresses a process
similar to the normative dilemma of writing security. In the described
situation, however, the logic seems to be more subtle or hidden. Peace
researchers did not establish a direct between security and non-democracy,
nor did they explicitly utter the signifier security. Rather, the democracy
peace , established and produced with the intention of offering a road to
peace, held the potential of being turned upside down. With hindsight and
after the widespread legitimation of military action on the grounds of the
democratic peace fact this hidden dilemma is becoming increasingly clear:
the US-led Iraq war and other contemporary military peace operations testify
to a dilemma of vast proportions.
Democracy efforts are securitizing and result in the

construction of boundaries between citizens and noncitizens
Pearce 10 Jenny, Professor of Latin American Politics, Director of
International Centre for Participation Studies at Bradford University, UK

(Perverse state formation and securitized democracy in Latin America, April
2010, Routledge Taylor & Francis)
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In some countries, such as Guatemala and Brazil, more evidence emerged during the year of the
involvement of police officers and former officers in the killing of suspected criminals. In Pernambuco in
Brazil,
70% of all homicides in 2008 were attributed to death squads or so-
called extermination groups mostly composed of agents of the state, particularly police.
In Guatemala, the killing of hundreds of young men reminded many of the social cleansing campaigns of
The
targeting by police and others of groups of young men and boys from poor
communities on the basis of their appearance and age aggravated
feelings of exclusion from mainstream society.65 The state here is constructing
its non-citizens, the ones who can be subjected to the pure
violence of the state in a form which is reminiscent of Giorgio Agambens
conceptualization of the State of Exception (2005) and the distinction between political life (bios) of
the included citizen and bare life (zoe) of the noncitizen, which he makes in his book
the 1990s when street children suspected of being petty thieves were tortured and killed.
Homo Sacer (1998). Dennis Rogers has also drawn on Agamben to make similar points in relationship to
the nature of governmentality in contemporary Nicaragua and has also called for a rethink on the nature of
the state in Latin America.66 He discusses the spatial reconfiguration of Managua, Nicaraguas capital city,
in which a new approach to urban governance aimed at protecting the citys elites has led to exclusive
fortified zones protected by privatized security and high-speed road networks. Other cities of
America display
of
similar features, some part of
newly designed geographical
an historical pattern
Latin
and others part
securitization measures which separate
citizens and non-citizens and simultaneously securitize democracy

by controlling who participates in it. However, it is not just the way in which the
state constructs these boundaries and securitizes them that matters. It is
the state positively contributes to the multiplication of
deadly personal interactions and private violences. Youth gangs become targets
not only of the state but of rival gangs and powerful adult-led criminal syndicates. Other groups are
the way in which
targeted also, with little or no reaction from the state. In Colombia, for instance, some 380,000 people
were forcibly evicted from their homes in 2008, according to Amnesty International and Colombian human
rights bodies, bringing the total of internally displaced to between three and four million people.67 AfroCaribbean people and indigenous groups are disproportionally affected by this violence, from which there
has been no state protection and minimal state support for victims. Yet another manifestation of state
perpetuation of societal violences is the lynchings which indigenous communities in rural Guatemala have
resorted to over the last decade, when their frustration at levels of impunity, particularly with respect to
often petty thefts and crimes, boils over. The lynchings reproduce public torture and executions which they
themselves were subjected to during army massacres in the early 1980s .
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Link: K Affs
The project of philosophy seeks to secure knowledge and

being this is the most dangerous type of security
because it secures our fundamental values.
Dillon 96 (Michael, Prof@Lancaster, Politics of Security, p.20-21)JFS
The reduction of metaphysics, and so also of political understanding, to

calculation, results from the very inception of metaphysical thought. Because
the appearance of things is inevitably various, because we ourselves always
encounter them from a manifold of perspectives and because, finally, we ourselves
are also mortal and fallible creatures, whatever the secure ground of things is that metaphysics seeks,
it cannot actually be the sensible world of the appearance of things themselves. For they are too . . .
It has, ultimately, to be supra-sensible, situated outside the realm of the

appearance of things, otherwise the ground that is sought would be as mutable (read insecure)
as the coming and going, and apparently endless variation, of the world itself. It could not serve,
therefore, as the guarantor which the answer to metaphysics' guiding
question requires. Literally, it could not offer any security for the sensible
world of appearances if it were already located within , and therefore also
contaminated by, the very insecurity of the comings and goings of that
world.Metaphysics, then, is the masque of mastery; securing some
foundation upon which to establish the sum total of what is knowable with
certainty, and conforming one's everyday conduct public and private to the
foundation so secured. Such foundations may go by different names but
that of the project itself does not. Hence, the responsibility, traditionally incumbent upon
well, insecure.
the philosopher his 'true' mission consisted in securing ultimate referents or principles.
Philosophy was, as Nietzsche put it, a matter of valuation, 'that is, establishment of the
uppermost value in terms of which and according to which all beings are to be'.14 In as much as
these were precisely what were to be secured, for without them no beings
would be, without them, it was said, where would we be? The philosopher therefore
spoke as a security expert. A security expert not merely in respect of what
the substantial values were, but increasingly only in terms of how they
were to be secured, whatever they were to be taken to be; hence the rise of theory and of
method.The philosopher became a security expert , then, in the sense of being
able to tell you how to secure security. He or she was someone skilled in
determining the means by which the invariable standards to establish
meaning in discourse, soundness in mind, goodness in action, objectivity in
knowledge, beauty in art, or value in life were to be secured ( guaranteed). In
such wise, whatever was said meant; done; understood; esteemed; or valued was
authorised and secured by reference to such a standard, principle or reference. The
philosopher's task had to be to tell you how to secure such a thing even after
they had come-up with an essential value of one description or another. Their security project
could not then cease, but only intensify. For having secured this secure
value, the value then had to be located securely, and securely policed, so
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that it could never be forgotten or lost again. Even with Nietzsche, in order for the will
to power, as the essence of the Being of beings, to secure itself it has continuously to extend itself; that
is to say, it secures itself in its essence as never-ending increase continuously extending itself. Hence,
though Nietzsche's will to power may be differentiated as self- overcoming against the Darwinian, or
even Spinozan, principle of self- preservation it is arguable that this represents the security project a
l'outrance.The charge levelled at philosophy at the end of metaphysics the
'end of philosophy' thesis which has consequently turned philosophical thought into a contemplation of
is that the
philosopher has simply run out of things to say. It is that the philosopher
cannot, in fact, secure any particular value for you and is, therefore, confronted
with the manifest impossibility of discharging the traditional security
function, other than to insist upon securing security itself. All that remains
of the great project of Western philosophy, then, is the continuing,
increasingly violent, insistence upon the need to secure security; hence its
nihilism. The savage irony is that the more this insistence is complied with, the
greater is the violence licensed and the insecurity engendered.The essence of
metaphysics, then, is nihilistic, as the best of the realists fear that it is ,
precisely because it does not matter what you secure so long as security
itself is secured. That is to say, so long as things are made certain, mastered and
thereby controllable. Securing security does not simply create values. In essence
the limit; where limit is, however, thought liminally and not terminally
indifferent to any particular value, and committed as it must ultimately be merely to rendering things
it must relentlessly
also destroy values when they conflict with the fundamental mathesis required
of the imperative to secure. Its raison d'tre, in other words, masquerading as the
preservation of values, is ultimately not valuation at all but calculation . For without
calculation how could security be secured? And calculation requires
calculability. Whatever is must thereby be rendered calculable whatever
calculable so that the political arithmetic of securing security can operate,
other value might once have been placed upon it if we are to be as certain of it as metaphysics
insists that we have to be if we are to secure the world.
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Link: Prolif
The construction of proliferation threats is as much about

the construction of the self as the otherengaging in
anti-proliferation discourse reveals a particular
understanding of ourselves and national identity that is
based on otherization
Mutimer 2000 [David, associate professor of political science at York
University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security
Studies, The Weapons State, pg 25]
There is therefore no need to deny the materiality of bodies, or of any other
object, to assert that there is nothing olltside of discourse. Rather, we must
recognize that to know an object or to act on it or in relation to it, that object
must enter into discourse. Arguing from a rather different position from that
of Campbell or Butler, George Lakoff comes to remarkably similar conclusions
in his more recent work: Categorization is not a matter to be taken lightly.
There is nothing more basic than categorization to our thought, perception,
action and speech. Every time we see something as a kind of thing, for
example, a tree, we are categorizing. Whenever we reason about kinds of
things-chairs, nations, illnesses, emotions, any kind of thing at all-we are
employing categories. Whenever we intentionally perform any kind of action,
say something as mundane as writing with a pencil, hammering with a
hammer, or ironing clothes, we are using categories.... Without the ability to
categorize, we could not function at all, either in the physical world or in our
social and intellectual lives. 36 It is through this act of categorization, or
naming, that an object is constituted as an object for the purposes of
engagement. How we act toward an object depends on what kind of object it
is. How we act in such a relationship also depends on what kind of "we" we
are. That is, our identity is crucial to understanding that engagement. The
way in which other discussants will engage with the prime ministerial terrorist
will vary just as much by how each identifies herself as by which epithet is
used to characterize the other. It is important to recognize, however, that
identity is also the result of categorization, of grouping those "like" as self
and those "different" as other. If we want to understand a particular form of
engagement- for example, international engagement with weapons
proliferation- we need to look at the way the objects and identities of those
engaged have been constructed: What kind of thing is weapons proliferation,
and what is it not? Who is involved in the proliferation agenda, and of what
kind are they? How are the various elements of the proliferation agenda
referred to, and therefore into what discursive contexts are they set? These
are questi~ns I address in the remaining chapters of this book.
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Link: Technology
Technology is inextricably tied to securitization as well,

participating in the liberal global governance with the
military and capitalist complexes, creating a politics of
the elite which stretches across all of society and
dominates the civil sphere
Dillon and Reid 2K (Michael, Professor of Political Science at Lancaster
and internationally renowned author, and Julian, lecturer on international
relations and professor of political Science at Kings College in London; from
Alternatives, Volume 25, Issue 1: Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and
Complex Emergency)
As Foucault's early accounts of governmentality indicate, and as the
extension and application of it subsequently have also shown, the genealogy of
global liberal governance is thus much more varied and diverse than its public claims to a Kantian
heritage especially would imply.[ 14] To say that it is capitalist economically as much as it is
liberal politically and corporately technocratic scientifically, and that this presents a powerful brew of
social, political, economic, and military forces that radically exceed the liberal account of both power and
of politics, is to pose more questions than these phrases answer. Neither capitalism, liberalism, nor science
are simply what they proclaim themselves to be, or what they were once said to be. Each has mutated
locally and globally in dramatic fashion as studies in the history of science, the history of economics, and
the genealogy of governance indicate. Neither are such dynamic enterprises effectively held to account
through the application and operation of the classic liberal distinctions between public-private, civilmilitary, national-international, scientific-industrial, and knowledge-power. Rather, they are obscurely
combined in the globally dynamic military-industrial-scientific complexes of the so-called network
societies and knowledge-based economies of contemporary liberal societies that problematize the
democratizing claims of global civil society as much as they do the pacifying effects of cosmopolitan law.[
15]
Together, these liberal complexes now comprise an extraordinary regime of power/knowledge that has
been disseminated as much globally as it has been intensified locally. It constitutes a regime of
global power that significantly exceeds the Kantian heritage ontologically as

much as it does epistemologically. To the extent that it does so, that tradition is an increasingly
unreliable guide to global liberal governance's operation politically and economically. No longer
exclusively or even primarily legislative in their form, the politics of the elite, the media, and money also
dominate civil institutions in ways that systematically undermine liberalism's standards of disinterestedness
epistemologically, as much as they do its claim to effect representative and accountable government
politically.
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Representation of war is a technological process designed

to lay siege to our senses and condition us to accept
violence
Arthur Kroker is a cultural theorist and Canada Research Chair in Technology, Culture and Theory at the
University of Victoria, Canada. http://www.massivechange.com/ArthurKroker.html 2k4
What does it mean that war is now mediated through technology?
Today not only the act of war itself, but also the perception of war is a technological event. In a significant
way, there are always two theatres of war: actual battlefields with real casualties and immense suffering,
and hyperreal battlefields where the ultimate objective of the war machine is to conquer public opinion and
manipulate human imagination. Particularly since 9/11 and the prosecution of the so-called war on
terrorism, we live in a media environment which is aimed at the total mobilization of the population for
warfare. For example, in the American homeland, mobilization of the population is psychologically
conditioned by an image matrix, fostering deep feelings of fear and insecurity. This is reinforced daily by
the mass media operating as a repetition-machine: repeating, that is, the message of the threatening
terrorist Other. For those living in the increasingly armed bunker of North America and Europe, we dont
experience wars in any way except through the psychological control of perception through mass media,
particularly television. The delivery of weapons themselves intensely sophisticated forms of technology
are part of the same system. So tech-mediated war is the total mobilization for warfare with us as its
primary subjects and targets.
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Link: Competitiveness
The idea of competition between two entities is a social

construct and a link
Rodney Bruce Hall, Sep 2006
[member of the Editorial Board of the journal *Oxford Development Studies* and *International Studies Quarterly*, the
flagship journal of the International Studies Association. He has taught previously at Brown University and the University
of Iowa ,Journal of International Relations and Development. of International Relations and Development. Ljubljana: 2006.
Vol. 9, Iss. 3; pg. 269]
Market behaviour and intersubjectivity Ambiguous or even empty as the

concept of interest might have become in economics, Weber's sociology of
legitimacy by no means exogenized interests from his ontology of social
action, which 'can be driven by habit (tradition) and by emotions, as well as
interests: most often ... it is driven by all three' (Swedberg 1998: 23). Neither
does constructivism exogenize interests. Constructivists in IR theory seek to
explore and explain interests rather than merely imputing them by
definitional fiat. But interests in Weber's thought, as in constructivist thought,
must be contextualized. Many constructivists agree with rationalists that
actors have material interests, and these material interests have causal
significance for their social action. But action is social only 'insofar as its
subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby
oriented in its course' (Swedberg 1998: 23, original emphasis). Taking
account of the behaviour of others means that we do not blindly act upon our
materially defined interests to maximize our materially defined utility. A
sociological as opposed to economic theory 'analyzes economic action that is
also oriented in its meaning to the behavior of others' ( ibid .). But we
generally take account of how others will respond, even when we are
engaged in strategic action. And we meaningfully orient our action towards
others even when we are conducting routine economic transactions. And we
generally rely upon culturally-specific norms and intersubjectively shared
social meanings for the successful completion of those transactions. For
example, when we make an offer to purchase an item at a specified price we
would do well to first consider whether there are any local norms of coordination involved in the sort of market transaction in which we wish to
engage. In the West, if we enter a department store to purchase an umbrella,
we will select an umbrella from the available choices and offer payment of
the price marked in exchange for the umbrella. We do not accost the
salesperson and offer a price less than the price marked because it is
intersubjectively understood on both sides of the transaction that the price
marked is the price that reflects the profit margin at which the store is willing
to execute the transaction. We can pay the price marked and acquire our
umbrella, or we can depart and try to find the umbrella at a lower price
involving the 'opportunity cost' of our time and the risk of getting wet outdoor
in the interim, or we can wait in the hope the store will lower the price at a
later date, at a higher risk of getting wet outdoor while we are waiting.
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However, it is intersubjectively understood between us and the sales staff

that if we want to carry that umbrella away today we will pay the price
marked. The sales staff are not authorized to set prices, and it is a norm of
market behaviour in Western society that it is not legitimate to haggle over
clearly marked, generally competitive prices of relatively inexpensive items in
a department store. However, if we enter an automobile dealership, in North
America for example, to purchase a vehicle, we will certainly haggle over the
price. We expect to reduce the sticker price of the vehicle through the social
convention of negotiation. The negotiation then constitutes a game of coordination to assist the parties to the transaction to bring it to a successful
conclusion. This can involve a number of elaborate rituals, but at a minimum
it requires norms of co-operation, in addition to strategies of negotiation, to
complete the transaction on terms acceptable to both buyer and seller. As
buyers, we might bring with us a quote for a similar vehicle from another
dealership that is lower than the price listed at this one, or a consumer
publication purporting to specify the dealer's true cost, to signal that we
know very well the profit he hopes to glean by asking for the listed price. He
will then show us a computer listing purporting to show a very different, and
invariably higher, 'true dealer's cost' of the vehicle, and will offer an
elaborate explanation of why the consumer publication is incorrect. The
negotiations over the transaction will then move to a new stage, for a skilled
buyer, who will at some point leave or threaten to leave the showroom and to
terminate the negotiation. The seller will then most often draw the buyer
back, and promise to go 'speak to his manager' about what might be done for
the buyer in spite of the 'losses' the seller will suffer by selling the vehicle at
a lower price. Upon cooling his heels in his office, and perhaps ringing his wife
on the phone to inquire as to what he should bring home for supper, the
salesman will then return with a slightly lower price from his 'manager' as his
'best and final offer' and so forth. A variety of strategies were deployed in this
somewhat elaborate game of co-ordination, but also a number of norms of
co-operation. At each stage each player, if he has been socialized into the
game, generally knows the next move of his negotiating partner. However,
the game deteriorates and the transaction falls apart if each player does not
co-operate in letting the other player make his perfectly obvious next move.
There is something almost comforting in watching him make it. This ritual is
the game of co-ordination. The game is constituted by intersubjectively
shared meanings of specific moves, and norms of co-operation, by which we
buy a car in the West (or by which one buys nearly anything in parts of the
East or Middle East). Classical economics and rationalist theory derived from
it assumes we instead play the Prisoner's Dilemma, however, and that game
only works when it is completely dominated by a payoff structure and
completely devoid of norms of co-operation where self-interest alone rules
(Hirschman 1982: 1470). However, norms of co-operation pre-existed the
'market society' in which classical economics would place us. And, contrary to
the strictures of classical economics, they still exist, and we still rely upon
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them even to complete market transactions. Thus the neoclassical notion of

how self-interest functions in human nature must be altered to account for
the manner in which we actually do take into account the interests of others
and rely upon intersubjectively shared understandings to successfully engage
in economic activity. It should not surprise us that theories of international
politics based upon the faulty, first-image understandings of self-interest in
neoclassical economics similarly fail to generate an analytic cut into the
social nature of 'transactions' and other social processes.
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Link: Geography
The identity of map and territory creates principles of

security within geopolitics theory.
Tuathail, 94- Associate Professore, Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University (Gerard, 1994, Problematizing Geopolitics: Survey, Statesmanship, and Strategy, pg.
260, JSTOR)
Though the historical circumstances surrounding the production of surveys

has changed in the twentieth century, the Western will to survey the
territorities of the globe has remained. This will is institutionalized in a
multiplicity of different sites in political and civil society, sites which enable
the sighting (recognition and rendering visible), siting (the delimiting of global
political space; e.g. the 'Middle East', 'Eastern Europe', etc.) and citing of a
world (judging and textualizing of places by means of literatures of
Orientalism, developmentalism, Sovietology, etc.) (Luke 1993; O Tuathail
1994). It finds expression, for example, in the cybernetic 'watching machines'
of late modem states (spy satellites, electronic surveillance regimes, photographic intelligence, etc.) and in Western mass media organizations whose
dispersed networks of reported, electronic systems of access and global
televisual eyes function as the surveying infrastruc-ture of informational
empire (Virilio 1989; De Landa 1991). Built upon enormous electronic and
cyber-netic streams of data, the panoptic surveying eyes of spy satellites and
the global media (from print to the instantaneous global television of CNN)
prom-ise the possibility of a world order more transparent than ever before
(Vattimo 1992). New cyberetic surveying technologies hold out the possibility
of an ever more exact reproduction of reality, of an increasingly total identity
of map and territory. Indeed, as has been widely noted, the forms of reality
generated by the technologies associated with the new mode of information
make the very notion of the referent problematic (Poster 1990). In typically
hyperbolical terms, Baudrillard (1983, 2) has suggested that traditional
principles of represen-tational survey are giving way to principles of
simulation, of representation without reference to an originary 'real'. Territory,
he proclaims, no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Hence-forth, it is
the map which precedes the territory ... it is the map that engenders the
territory. Caught in this disappearance of the referent are the institutional
sites which produce geopolitical surveys of the territoriality of global politics,
seeing sites such as universities, strategic institutes and area study centres.
During the Cold War, these institutions produced many surveys under the
name geopolitics. To produce a geopolitics ('the 261 geopolitics of X' where
X=oil, energy, resources, information, the Middle East, Central America,
Europe, etc.) signified an ability to create a compre-hensive strategic survey
of global political space, to read the manifest features of that which was held
to be 'external reality', and to speculate upon the meaning of the supposedly
transparent features of global politics. Following Foucault, we can read this
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type of geopolitical knowledge production as a form of panopticonism, an

institutionalized strategic gaze that examines, normalizes and judges states
from a central observation point (Foucault 1979; Luke 1993; O Tuathail,
forthcoming). The strategic gaze, like that described by Foucault, seeks to
render the dynamics of states increasingly visible. It com-prises a form of
surveillance that is both global and individualizing (or, better yet, in-stateing), a surveillance that simultaneously sites (i.e. places in a schema of global
political space) and cites (i.e. summonses before a court of knowledge and
judge-ment) states. Its central point of observation and judgement is
represented as detached and objective but its very functioning is dependent
upon the naturalization of hegemonic ways of seeing, siting and citing.
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Link: Indo-Pak War
Nuclear Links Orientalism structures our relations with

the Third World in a series of us-them binaries that
replicate exclusion
Hugh Gusterson april 2006 A Double Standard on Nuclear Weapons? Audit

of the conventional wisdom MIT Center for International Studies
According to the anthropological literature on risk, shared fears often reveal
as much about the identities and solidarities of the fearful as about the actual
dangers that are feared. The immoderate reactions in the West to the
nuclear tests conducted in 1998 by India and Pakistan, and to Iraqs
nuclear weapons program earlier, are examples of an entrenched discourse on nuclear proliferation that has played an important role in
structuring the Third World, and our relation to it, in the Western
imagination. This discourse, dividing the world into nations that can
be trusted with nuclear weapons and those that cannot, dates back,
at least, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970.
Indo-Pakistani conflict is a direct result of western

constructionist ideals
Meghana V. Nayak 2002 (Political Science Department Macarthur Scholar Phd Candidate University Of
Minnesota press) The Links - OrientalismOf Mapping Bodies And Borders: Postcolonial (In) Security And
Feminist Contentions On The India-Pakistan Border
http://www.southwestern.edu/academics/bwp/pdf/2003bwp-nayak.pdf
In the contemporary Indian electoral scene, voter banks are no longer

beefed up by accommodating minorities but by promises to teach Pakistan
tough lessons and to insist on the political construction of religious minorities
as Hindu citizens. Indias security imaginary is under constant threat
by scheming, lurking Muslims who emerged during Partition. The
politics of mapping the Indo-Pakistan border, then, participates in
and draws upon Orientalist logic. I would go so far as to say that the
mapping of the border would not be possible without Orientalism.
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Link: Immigration
The criminalization of migrants is rooted in a securitizing

logic results in a carceral state
Gledhill 9 Professor of Social Anthropology specializing in Latin American
and Caribbean Studies & co-Director of University College Londons interdisciplinary Centre for Latin American and Caribbean Studies (John Gledhill,
Securitization and the security of citizens in the crisis
of neoliberal capitalism, University College London, most recent citation =
2009, http://jg.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/Conferences/Securitization
%20and%20the%20security%20of%20citizens%20in%20the%20crisis%20of
%20neoliberal%20capitalism.pdf)
The response embedded in the SPP and an increasing securitization of
immigration across the US-Mexico border that
the
Obama administration
seems to be endorsing is , however, to maximise the criminalization of

all migrants . Although the presentation of migration to the North as a terrorist threat has tended
to slip out of public discourse, the involvement of Homeland Security in
migration affairs has deepened as the agenda has focused more on containing
transnational organized crime. The fortification of the northern border and vast increase in the number of
border patrol agents has sometimes offended Anglo residents living in run-down frontier towns dependent
on Mexican labour because the security forces are no longer embedded in their communities and tear up
farmland with their vehicles in hot pursuit of migrants who are simply passing through.17 But it has also
Securitization has, however, had an

impact on the migrant condition far inside the United States, creating a
situation in which arrest and deportation is far more likely than in
the past. The new systems built by Homeland security deputize local police
and are based on the premise that the hunt is on for criminal aliens .19
created a climate in which vigilantism can flourish.18
This seems to have come to mean any alien who can be found guilty of any kind of felony, however, minor.
we now have people guilty of minor traffic offences being

incarcerated and deported. Workers who are legal residents of the United States can be
So
deported for having a criminal record, and a broken tail light enables a traffic cop to make enquiries about
a persons migratory status. Using false papers to obtain work is now defined as the crime of aggravated
identity theft. Although this regime is certainly tough on those who consume and possess drugs, albeit in
a somewhat discriminatory way, targeting migrant workers is not likely even to pick up a great many
people involved in the transnational criminal economy even at the most humble level. It is, however,
clearly much easier for the Homeland Security Agencies involved in this drive to root out criminal aliens,
ICE, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and CBP, Customs and Border Protection, to justify their
continuing budget demands by the spectacular results to be achieved by picking easy targets .
What
all this is doing is making a further contribution to the development
of the carceral state and society. New detention facilities have been
opened to support the apparatus of punishment and deportation, and most
of these have been outsourced to private corporations such as the GEO
corporation. GEO offers its services to governments worldwide, but it is particularly at home in the country
that has the worlds largest prison population. But while the fact that someone who has served a sentence
for some sort of felony can now be rearrested and transferred to ICE custody is making the prison industry
recession proof, the most terrifying implication of these changes is that the list of crimes that justify
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deportation is growing. Legal residents can also be deported once the Department of Homeland Security
discovers that they have committed a removable offence at some point in their lives, and this might
occur, ironically, if they were actually to seek US citizenship.
The phrase criminal alien
plays strongly in wedding US public opinion to this policy , whilst

This, then, is
the kind of security that breeds insecurity among relatively powerless people who
immigrants themselves are becoming increasingly nervous of walking down the street.
have, nevertheless, tried to make their voices heard in US society through public protests that emphasized
Movements to gain public

support for the immigrant cause are not aided by the tendency of Latino elites
the economic contributions made by immigrant labour.
who see themselves as Hispanic to dissociate themselves from new immigrants, a process that is
sometimes reinforced by the efforts of less affluent people who have achieved some stability in US society
to do the same thing, particularly when they see their jobs as threatened. But mass street demonstrations
by immigrant workers manifested an enormously significant possibility. One might argue that there is a
broader economic rationality here in that DHS measures complement other laws that diminish the rights of
the public and private

security industry clearly possesses economic interests of its own
immigrants as workers and their capacity to organize. However,
through budget appropriations and contracts. Taxpayers might think again about supporting these policies
if they were more conscious of the full costs of persecuting Latinos for traffic violations in order to deport
them. Yet the other great argument
breeds more crime ,
against the carceral state , that it actually
has been around for a long time.
This, like apparent ease
with which criminal aliens can be painted as a threat,
probably
reflects the vicious circle through which fear of crime draws even
less affluent citizens to favour retributive justice and the mano dura, as Teresa has shown so
brilliantly in her work on So Paulo.20
The affs representations of immigration as a risk to the

liberal world is an outcome of securitizing discourse and
re-actualizes racism
Ibrahim 5 Maggie, Research Officer at Institute of Development Studies,
University of Sussex (The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse,
International Migration Vol. 43, 2005,
http://www.eldis.org/fulltext/Migration_and_Security.pdf)
Our world is increasingly being demarcated, outlining the North from
the South. More and more we are made to understand the globe as pockets of liberality and justice
flourishing amid tyrannical borderlands. Our eyes are fed images of chaos in the
South through the medias depiction of disorder. Threat and
insecurity are being redefined and broadened. Due to the assertions of
international organizations, states, academics and journalists, migration has become
synonymous with a new risk to the liberal world. This discourse has
reached its pinnacle, normalizing the view that migrants are a
threat . Any past thought -- migrants being imperative to capitalist expansion -- is left behind, rarely
being mentioned. According to Michel Foucault, in any society there are
manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize, and constitute
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the social body and these relations of power cannot themselves be

established, consolidated, nor implemented without the production, accumulation and
functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power
without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the
basis of this association. We are subject to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise
power except through the production of truth (1980: 93). Thus the production of a truth, or the creation of
knowledge through a discourse, is an exercise of power. This is the power-knowledge nexus. Thus,
the
securitization of migration can be examined as a discourse through

which relations of power are exercised . In addition, Foucault asserts that
we are also subjected to truth in the sense in which it is truth that makes the laws, that produces the
true discourse which, at least partially, decides, transmits and itself extends upon the
effects of power (1980: 94). Therefore , government laws and policies
are an outcome of discourse, and reaffirm discourse .
With this
understanding of the relation of power and knowledge, the overarching aim is to bring together the
different dispositions, different tools, and methods that form the dominant discourse which has securitized
through discourse, this new

knowledge of migrants defined as a security threat to the social
body, has led to the creation of new exclusionary immigration legislation.
migrants. Furthermore, the main goal is to make explicit how
Just as the power-knowledge maxim brings different pieces into a coherent form, so too will this analysis.
the securitization of migration discourse

is built upon the concept that cultural difference leads to social
breakdown. By examining a shift in racism, from notions of biological
superiority, to exclusion based on cultural difference (termed New Racism), it
is possible to understand that this new migrant-as-a-threat narrative
An investigation of racism will reveal how
reactualizes a racist discourse . This discourse has been possible

through the broadening of the concept of security and the linking of risk and
threat to migrants. The instruments of this new body of knowledge are the discursive practices
of international organizations, politicians, academics, and journalists. To bring such an instrument to light,
The
reproduction of the securitization of migration has taken tangible
form through government policy. Canadas new immigration and refugee legislation offer
an example of how discourse informs government policy making. New racism, the discursive
practices, the illustration of the securitization of migration in the Canadian press, as
well as the new Canadian immigration legislation, reveal the networked nature of
power-knowledge. The nexus of power and knowledge is manifest before our very eyes. Such a
how the Canadian press has transformed a migrant event into a crisis will be examined below.
matrix is hidden in the mundane, the discourse and mechanisms in place, with many of us not even
realizing that this transformation has come to pass.
Constructing border security as a threat to the US is

securitizing causes global injustice and militarization
Gledhill 9 Professor of Social Anthropology specializing in Latin American
and Caribbean Studies & co-Director of University College Londons inter-
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disciplinary Centre for Latin American and Caribbean Studies (John Gledhill,
Securitization and the security of citizens in the crisis
of neoliberal capitalism, University College London, most recent citation =
2009, http://jg.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/Conferences/Securitization
%20and%20the%20security%20of%20citizens%20in%20the%20crisis%20of
%20neoliberal%20capitalism.pdf)
Even if statistics tell us that it is the lives of lower class people that are most degraded by both types of
subjective feelings of security and insecurity play an important role

in shaping the politics of public security policy . If we want to understand what
insecurity,
governments can do in particular historical moments we need to know what members of different social
classes think is happening to their security and how they understand the causes of the changes that they
perceive to be happening in their situations. Nevertheless, it no longer seems particularly contentious to
argue that the decades of neoliberal capitalist development have significantly increased the insecurities of
most of us. This is not simply a matter of failing to provide enough jobs or avoid periodic national crises,
but a matter of systematic adjustment of the relationships between Capital and Labour to the advantage of
The present global crisis may be a product of neoliberal

capitalist financialization, but I do not take the view that the responses of the G20
Capital.1
governments represent any fundamental structural change to the model likely to lead us into a new era. So
In recent years, I am
a politics of securitization of social issues has become
increasingly central to efforts to manage the contradictions of neoliberal
capitalist development. A critical analysis of securitization processes can
help us to grasp the interrelations between economic and social
insecurity issues and violence and conflict. My conclusion is that the
securitization of poverty in furtherance of the current model of capitalist
the politics of what the rest of us do in this conjuncture remains important.
going to argue,
development
dangerous
generally
makes the world more rather than less
for most of us.
It also heaps injustice upon injustice,
deepening sources of inequality that are rooted in social stigma .
My
definition of securitization is the social constructivist one developed by the Copenhagen School of
International Relations.2
When an issue is securitized it is transformed from
a question that is politicized in the normal sense into one that

supposedly threatens the very survival of states and their citizens. This
involves the deployment of a discourse that redefines particular issues
as matters of security and thereby justifies the use of exceptional
measures to deal with them . States and elites, including the executives of
transnational capitalist corporations, tend to be at the forefront in
the construction of such discourses. But other social actors can in principle also
contribute and their contribution can take the form of contesting the redefinition of an issue as one of
security. This opens the way to a sociological kind of analysis of the conditions that reduce or increase the
Consider, for example, how

undocumented migration could be brought together as a package
with issues of drugs and organized crime and even with
international terrorism in a way that justified a more militarized
likelihood of securitization processes being contested.
approach to the security of the US-Mexico border .
The shocking events of 9/11
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2001 clearly had some immediate impact, but the longer-term acquiescence of broad sections of US public
opinion probably reflects deeper anxieties.3 In part this is a question of the everyday insecurities
experienced by large numbers of Americans in a country in which workfare has largely replaced welfare
and medical care is far less accessible than in Europe.
These are the kinds of conditions

that turn poor people against poor people and deprived citizens and
non-citizens against each other as illustrated within the Latino population itself by the
notorious mutual antagonisms between Mexicans and Puertorriqueos.4 But its also a question of the
kinds of social and national identities that are desirable and meaningful to different groups of citizens in
the United States, something that heightens sensibilities in ways that go beyond questions of immediate
economic welfare. The securitization of international migration issues is not restricted to
Mexico border , and migration is
not the only issue now
governments and capitalist corporations
the US-
being securitized by
under a model of accumulation which
aims to break down the remaining barriers to the global mobility of investment and private appropriation
of planetary resources. The issue of who should control water resources illustrates the paths that may be
taken by securitization arguments in relation to justifications for transferring control of resources from the
hands of poorer citizens. As Ecuadorian political sociologist Juan Fernando Tern notes, in this context
securitization turns poor people into menaces to the security of

ecosystems as well as states and other citizens.5
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Link: Economic Engagement
The affs economic engagement attempts to micromanage the populations fears causing alienation and
social fragmentation
Fuentes Rionda et al 9 - Roberto Fuentes-Rionda & Nelson ArteagaBotello, professors of political science at Universidad Autnoma del Estado de
Mxico (ARCHIPELAGOS OF SECURITAZATION: a new logic of security and
surveillance in Latin American cities, March 2009, Surveillance in Latin
America, http://www2.pucpr.br/ssscla/papers/SessaoA_A34_pp32-50.pdf)
After the terrorist attack to the World Trade Center in New York, the governmental reactions towards
insecurity have been based on border reinforcements, by means of extensive surveillance implementation
and the use of classification technologies (the new ID- Cards, biometric devices or the foundation of an
immigration data base); the use of national securitization strategies create a demographic data base
comprising economic, political and social statistics, assembling with some others alike, in terms of region
or hemisphere (like the Plan Colombia or the Merida Initiative) along with the surveillance and sorting in
places likeable to be risky (socially-excluded areas, such as poor neighbourhoods, or wide regions of global
in the
past decade, security strategies in the Latin American area started to
react to a certain logic urged by the United States government, which holds
the normal development of things responsible for the rise of risk
(BOTELLO, 2009). And so, the security strategies applied in recent years
respond to a governmental logic of micro-management of the
economy -such as big financial or commercial spots) (LYON, 2007; BOTELLO, 2009). This way,
populations fears
(DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1989), whose mechanisms lie in population control,
The current securitization paradigm in

Latin America is expressed in the spatial planning, reflecting certain exclusion practices,
alienation and social fragmentation . Likewise, this paradigm shows the use of various
exceptional nature, and surveillance policies.
kinds of surveillance routines, which intend to maintain security; in other words, threat removal .
new security logic in Latin America n cities and countries would be

attached to
The
closely
a global logic of risk administration and forecast, located in specific areas inhabited by
social groups defined as dangerous- just like those excluded from
the economic and politic
development process . This is why the current observed status in several Latin American cities
gives this paper its central argument; and it is worth mentioning that in those cities is where there exists a
This process is caused, up to a point, by the

mutation of the securitization discourse; according to which the main
insecurity factor is found in social groups which would normally pursue the weakening of the
democratic organizations. These groups are located in specific urban areas, classified
according to very special characteristics: being poor, immigrant, excluded or unemployed . The new
securitization paradigm in the cities in Latin America indicates the origin
of insecurity, risk and the threat of breaking the balance of the social tissue, in which any
individual represents a potential threat. As a consequence, the new logic
of security in Latin American cities resorts to exceptional strategies or to surveillance and
fragmentation process of the social area.
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social sorting strategies, and so, through
the cessation of civil rights, civilian
monitoring,
as well as the prevention and administration of any risk, the governmental policies have
no choice but to resort to the restriction of any event to fight against democracy weakening, no matter if it
means the sheer expression of daily social relations.
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Link: Drug Trade
The affs hegemonic discourse of the antagonistic drug

Other perpetuates a framework of security and causes
violence
Crick 12 Emily, degree in political and cultural studies from Swansea University (Drugs as an
Existential Threat: An Analysis of the International Securitization of Drugs, International Journal of Drug
Policy, 22 March 2012,
http://www.academia.edu/1555488/Drugs_as_an_existential_threat_An_analysis_of_the_international_securi
tization_of_drugs)
The developing discourses surrounding drugs consistently rely on the

construction of drugs, drug users, drug producers and drug
traffickers as the antagonistic drug Other (Herschinger. 2011) or existential
threat. Initially the Other was seen to be drug users, however gradually drug trafficking organisations
(DTOs) and then narco-terrorists became seen as the most dangerous drug Other: these developments
This regime
articulated the idea that the fulfillment of the global Self was being
hindered by the antagonistic drug Other (Herschinger, 2011. p. 78). By
creating the idea of mankind (Single Convention, 1961) as the global Self
carrying out a humanitarian endeavour (International Opium Convention, 1912) to
rid the world of the drugs threat, the hegemonic discourse was
allowed a broadening of the global drug prohibition regime (Herschinger. 2011, p. 66).
strengthened
and, therefore, the institutionalization of policies designed to negate these
existential threats, even if they are policies that would not normally be acceptable, became strengthened
This global Self was then constructed as being

morally good in contrast to the evil (Single Convention. 1961) of narcotic
drugs. The use of the word evil in the Single Convention is exceptional as no other international
(Herschinger, 2011, p. 87).
convention describes the activity it seeks to prevent in such terms (Lines, 201 1, p. 7). Furthermore,
such language has created the space for policies that themselves
threaten human rights and human security in the name of fighting
this evil (Lines, 2011, p. 8). At each stage of the development of the drugs as
an existential threat discourse, there was an individualization of the antagonistic drug
Other, and this increased the perceived dangerousness of drugs, and
augmented the power of the discourse (Herschinger, 2011, p. 67). At the same
time, it undermined the humanitarian endeavour of the drug
control system by inextricably linking the threat with the behaviour
of individuals
(Lines. 201 1, p. 10). Abrahamsen (2005) argues that Blairs attempted
securitization of poverty in Afrca delineated who belonged to the international community and who was
outside it (Abrahamsen, 2005, p. 69). Those who were perceived as being outside the international
community faced at best abandonment and the withdrawal of development assistance, at worst illiberal
interventions to enforce compliance and ensure survival of the international community (Abrahamsen,
2005, p. 71). This description closely mirrors the securitization of drugs in two ways: firstly,
one can see the creation of an international community or global Self that supports the global drug
prohibition regime with the Single Conventions near universality in terms of support 96% of countries
are currently sig natories to it (Costa. 2008, p. 3). As the former Executive Director of the United Nations
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Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) put it, the entire world agrees that illicit drugs are a threat to health
and that their production, trade and use should be regulated (Costa, 2008, p. 3). High levels of
do not equate to high levels of support for punitive

policies (for example, the dc-penalization of use in Portugal). Secondly, farmers who often live in areas
adherence, however,
of poor governance and insecurity and who grow opium and coca because they have few economic
alternatives (Buxton, 2010, p. 1) risk losing their crops through eradication programmes and therefore
being further impoverished because they do not comply with international community norms. Meanwhile,
the failure to achieve a drug-free world leads to a situation

whereby the only way to defend the Self against the barbaric
Other is through increasingly violent and restrictive policies or war
(Herschinger, 2011, p. 68).
The affs construction of the drug trade as an existential

threat is exaggerated, unfounded, and results in policy
failure
Kushlick 12 Danny, British political activist and founder of the Transform Drug Policy Foundation
(International Security and the Global War on Drugs: The Tragic Irony of Drug Securitization, Harm
Reduction in Substance Use and High Risk Behavior, 2012, http://books.google.com/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=rCVMeQH6czUC&oi=fnd&pg=PA101&dq=%22latin+america
%22+AND+securitization+AND+discourse+AND+drug&ots=fbxvn3mbC&sig=qwCdF0bo4eG6hxFW3DEhGzP6GMw#v=onepage&q&f=false)
Global drug policy is in crisis on many fronts. Deaths in turf wars are undermining Mexican
society, Colombian and Afghan coca and opium production appear singularly intractable and Guinea Bis
sait turned from being a fragile state to a narco state almost overnight. The balance has shifted as the
unintended consequences of the war on drugs are now threatening the security of numerous states. We
have created the ultimate irony whereby
the securitisation of drugs has itself
become one of the greatest threats to international security . The

level of crisis is demonstrated in the recent calls by Presidents
Calderon and Santos for a debate on alternatives to prohibition including
legalisation and regulation. There is a concurrent loss of popular support for the war and increasing
scrutiny of drug war expenditure in the context of a global economic crisis.
war on drugs has not achieved its
stated
The fact that the
objectives of reducing drug
supply and use , as well as its severe unintended consequences,

makes it highly vulnerable to criticism . The most cursory analysis
exposes its overwhelming shortcomings, and many are bewildered by prohibitions
longevity. The resilience of the war on drugs since the mid-twentieth century is
usefully explained by the international relations theory securitisation this forms
the foundation of the geopolitical steel that protects the soft centre within. It expressly excludes other
policy positions, protects the prohibition from criticism and from evidence-based scrutiny. There can be
little doubt that drugs are an international security issue. Fragile and vulnerable states that are involved in
the production, supply and use of drugs proscribed under international prohibition, are politically and
economically destabilised. Producer and transit countries Colombia, Mexico, Afghanistan and West Africa
are prime examples. The UN Associations estimate the value of the global drugs market at $320 billion a
year rivalling the worldwide markets in oil, wheat and arms. The proportions of this anarchic trade dwarf
the GDP of many smaller states. Industrialised countries with low levels of well-being, and that have high
levels of drug misuse, are also doubly afflicted. The UNICEF league table of the level of child wellbeing in
industrialised countries, invariably puts the United States and United Kingdom at or near the bottom. Both
countries have higher than average populations of problematic drug users, operate overwhelmingly
prohibitionist drug policies and have disproportionately high prison numbers. The incendiary combination
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of low societal well-being and high demand for prohibited drugs is a major cause of crime and ill health,
and wastes money, resources and political attention. Securirisation is a theory developed in
the mid-I 990s by the Copenhagen School (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1997). The authors outline a
whereby: a securitising actor identifies an existential threat to a

and makes it a security issue in a speech act to a specific
audience. The actor then applies an extraordinary measure to nullify the perceived threat (see table
process
referent object
8.1) According to the Copenhagen School, in Security: A New Framework for Analysis: Security is the
move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special
kind of politics or as above politics. The significance of this statement should not be underestimated. It is
well understood that much of the political discourse around drug policy appears to be divorced from other
drugs have undergone two

securitisations, drug policy isnt just isolated from other policy
policy issues. However, if, as this chapter argues,
discourses, it exists in a securitised world all of its own . Its

continuation is not subject to democratic input. Rather its
continuance is based on achieving support from world leaders in
non-democratic forums. In the framework of the Copenhagen School, the Audience
for the Speech Act is not voters, but other heads of UN member
states. This total isolation from normal policy-making structures
explains why our failing drug policy is so persisten t. International
policy exists in the rarified world of security, beyond the established rules of the game. above
politics. Before exploring this further, it is useful to present a counterfactual example.
Framing the drug trade in the context of existential

threats creates a securitizing logic that allows for
militarization
Fuentes 11 Ariel Gomez Fuentes, MA in Governance and Democracy
from the International Institute of Social Studies (The Securitization of the

War on Drugs in Mexico and the Intensification of Violence, September 2011)
In this way, Calderons administration (the securitizing actor), with a large support of the US
governments (both Bushs and Obamas)
managed to successfully construct a
securitization act . By using different speeches stating how the actors and
activities related to drug trafficking represent a threat to the Mexican national
security, the families integrity and Mexican institutions and values (the referent objects), his
government succeeded at convincing its relevant audience (the Mexican
society that support the use of the military in the war on drugs, the political elites, the military officers and
that those referent objects are existentially

threatened. Moreover, it was gained support to impose the subsequent
military strategies as the extraordinary measures to fight the threat. This, for
the US governments)
purposes of internal legitimation after emerging from very questioned elections, and for international
support -especially from the US- to also get recognition and foster the collaboration with the US to fight
this war.
This process of securitization took place in the context of
economic liberalization fostered by NAFTA, in which

traffickers enjoy an extra benefit in that higher trade volume
regional integration and
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results in more places to hide drugs and, ceteris paribus, a lower probability of
interdiction and seizure (French 2005: 535). This neoliberal economic process
facilitates the commercialization of drugs, as discussed before, and
undermines the authorities efforts to prevent drugs from crossing
borders, since inspections are more costly and seen as dumping, and for the corruption involved in
them (Raustiala 1999: 120-21). As Gootemberg (2009: 15) puts it, Drug trades are both the underside and
product of trade liberalization: pressures for enhanced commerce and for shrinking states collide with the
Nowhere is this tension clearer than

with NAFTA and intensified smuggling and militarization along the United
States-Mexico border during the 1990s. In addition, the legal framework existing in NAFTA, which
generates the materiality through the liberalization of the economies for legitimizing
specific transactions while criminalizing others -as narcotrafficking-, has created a vicious
cycle. Drug trafficking has been benefited by the opening of borders, the prosecution of drug traffickers
dictates of tighter control over unwanted trades.
has made their activities more complex and profitable and thus- there has been a perceived need to
implement more radical mechanisms to tackle these activities, with the drastic violent consequences
occurring in Mexico nowadays. Moreover, as Raustiala (1999: 97) asserts,
[p]olitically, drug
control has great marquee value for political leaders
and continues
receive high-profile support . This can be seen with the

process of securitization of drug trafficking fostered by
to
analysis of the
Calderons
government, which (initially) gained much support of Mexican population, the political class and the
the US ) community. Significantly as proposed by Emmers (2010: 142), an

act of securitization can lead to the further legitimization of the
armed forces in politics as well as to the curbing of civil liberties in
the name of security in well-established democratic societies, a phenomenon that has already
taken place in Mexico. The strategies implemented by the US and Mexican
governments for dealing with this problem seem to be, at least, insufficient -if not
mistaken-, since the way the problem is defined (prohibition should be
enforced) and how the policies should be implemented (on the supply side), are
at the base of the current Mexican security crises (Cadena-Roa 2011: 142). This
has derived in the escalation of violence in Mexico that has resulted in some 35,000 casualties in
international (specifically
less than five years (Gonzlez, 2011) and the control of larger zones of Mexican territory by drug cartels;
the intrusion of the military apparatus in the civilian state; a harsher fight by drug cartels with more
sophisticated weapons, better strategies, more violent means and more mechanisms to corrupt and
more space for

violations of human rights and immunity by the military , due to the fact that
infiltrate the Mexican state; and, as Cadena-Roa (2011: 160) explains,
they were judge by a special military legislation instead of a civic one.
The affs securitization of the drug trade is rooted in

economic dynamics and political interests that perpetuate
violence
Fuentes 11 Ariel Gomez Fuentes, MA in Governance and Democracy
from the International Institute of Social Studies (The Securitization of the
War on Drugs in Mexico and the Intensification of Violence, September 2011)
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The case of the securitization of narcotrafficking in Mexico reveals

how the convergence and interaction of these economic dynamics, legal
frameworks and political interests, have resulted in a vast escalation
of violence taking place in this territory, rather than in a successful way
to prevent the production, commercialization and consumption of
drugs. It is evident that the strategy chosen by the Mexican government
has harmed its society and has failed to combat these illegal
activities. In this way, a rethinking of the strategy towards the issue
of drugs in Mexico is necessary. A benefit of the constructivist
approaches used in the present analysis is that they allow realizing that
things could be constructed in different ways. So the strategies for
combatting drug trafficking could and should be reconstructed in a
different way, one that involves less harmful outcomes for Mexican
society. The way issues are politically constructed matters , and as a
political construction there is always interests involved in these processes,
but Mexican institutions and population will not be able to handle
much more insecurity and violence if these political interests keep
ignoring the real situation and the populations demands. Nowadays
there are many social movements taking place in Mexico which claim
for a different strategy, for constructing the issue in a different way, being
that the legalization of drugs, the implementation of policies aimed to tackle
other social issues, such as poverty, and the restructuration of the political
and judiciary institutions, as is the case of the movement organized by the
poet Javier Sicilia (Miglierini 2011). Movements like this one and the pressure
of the Mexican society permit to be optimistic about the possibility of a near
change in the governments strategy and a reduction of the harmful effects
that the current tactics have generated.
US securitizes combating of drug violence- portrays drug

traffickers as alien others- uses that to justify imperialist
interventionism
Fuentes, 11 [Airel Gomez, Graduate School of Development Studies,
International Institute of Social Studies, " The Securitization of the War on
Drugs in Mexico
and the Intensification of Violence", Accessed July 27]
However, there was a modification of the governmental strategies during

1980s, when the successful campaign against drugs began to collapse and
Mexico recovered the place it had in the 1970s in terms of drug production
(Chabat 2006: 6). In 1986, President Ronald Reagan signed a document
called National Security Decision Directive 221, where he declared by the
first time that drug trafficking was a national security threat for the
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United States, [and] he authorized the participation of the

Department of Defense in a large number of antidrug activities...
Immediately, the Mexican government discovers that Reagans thesis is also
valid for its case and by decision of president Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado
integrates it in its national security strategy (Astorga 2007: 11-12).
According to Astorga (Ibid: 16), the Reagan thesis caused three effects on
the strategies towards drug-trafficking: First, it seems to generalize the
idea that what is valid for the United States is also for the rest of the
world under its influence. Second, the dominant discourse conceives
the emergence of trafficking and drug traffickers as an activity and
as agents necessarily alienated from the structures of political
power everywhere and at all times Third, the judicial and police
vision is reinforced nowadays with the direct, open and legitimate
participation of the military in leading the operations for fighting
drug trafficking. Also in 1986 the US initiated the annual certifications
process, aimed to punish those countries which, in the eyes of
Washington, did not collaborate sufficiently in the fight against
drugs (Chabat 2006: 7). This punishment was exerted through sanctions
in economic and military aid, loss of trade preferences and votes
against in multilateral lending institutions (Cadena-Roa 2011: 148). Since
this process started, Mexican governments took all the measures to obtain
the US approval on Mexicos anti-drugs programs, although these
certifications indicators measured the will to fight drugs, not the
effectiveness (Chabat 2010: 3). Therefore, since the mid-1980s, drug
trafficking started to become a major political problem in Mexico, both
domestically and internationally, and a closer cooperation between the US
and Mexico was fostered in order to fight this problem. Moreover, the first
step towards portraying narcotrafficking as a threat to national
security was taken by the US under Reagans administration, with a concern
about drug consumption in that country and the objective to intervene
more strongly and decisively in other countries processes of
designing and implementing drug policies. (Astorga 2007: 12). Due to
the tensions in the bilateral relations derived from the scandals of corruption
after the assassination in 1985 of the Drug Trafficking Enforcement (DEA)
agent, Enrique Camarena Salazar, and a Mexican Pilot, Alfredo Zavala Avelar
(Cadena-Roa 2011: 147), and the undeniable power with which the US
executed its anti-drugs policies (imposing the annual national certifications to
other countries, for example), de la Madrids administrations ended up
adopting the US approach and policies for fighting this problem.
Nevertheless, the military forces were still used only for eradication
campaigns (Ibid: 160) and not as the extraordinary means to fight the threat.
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Link: Mexico-specific
Governmental policy towards Latin America, particularily

Mexico, is based on securitized logic- the aff is a further
example of getting involved solely to secure domestic
interests
DAppollonia and Reich, 8 [ARIANE CHEBEL, Associate Professor at
the School of Public Affairs and Administration at Rutgers - State University,
Senior Researcher affiliated to the Center for Political Research, Sciences Po
Paris, Simon, professor of global affairs and former Director of the The
Division of Global Affairs at Rutgers University, " The Securitization of
Immigration Multiple Countries, Multiple Dimensions",
http://www.upress.pitt.edu/htmlSourceFiles/pdfs/9780822959847exr.pdf,
Accessed July 22]
The second finding is related: measures to tighten border controls on both sides of the Atlantic clearly pre-
American con-cern about illegal migrants and

the war on drugsin the context of the growing trade engendered by the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA)had already generated the political pressures needed to lobby ef-fectively
for a shift in resources. Governmental concerns about criminality and
population flows, often fomented by the media and growing disquiet
in public opinion surveys, led to the same in Europe. On both continents, how-ever, this shift
dated the same series of events.
in policy focus (and the accompanying resources) was to the detriment of efforts to integrate already
Keeping more immigrants out

therefore took prece-dence over effectively incorporating those who
had arrived (in the context of scarce resources) on both continents. Third, we have previously noted
domiciled immigrants through eco-nomic and social policies.
that the shift toward initiatives regarding terrorism, immigration, and asylum seekers pre-dated the
9/11. Yet these attacks had a similar impact on both sides of the Atlantic in terms of
Im-migration became part
of a war in the United States, just as poverty and drugs had under prior
presidential administrations. In Europe and the United States, immigration was no longer
primarily an economic or cultural issue about the safety of
vulnerable domestic populations. The immigration issue now had
long tentacles that reached into a variety of policy domains. We have
terrorist attacks of
consolidating the shift toward linking immigration with security.
identified two areas of divergence that are just as worthy of note. The first was the most obvious: the
American focus on the external enemythrough wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the
support of regimes, such as Pakistans, that are engaged in the conflict with Al Qaeda justified by
the U.S. claim that it preferred to fight the enemy abroad rather
than at home. This focus is in direct contrast to the European preference for focusing on the
enemy within, in which the EU did not view limiting immigration as a means of preventing terrorism at
attendant consequences of this approach, however, may have been

both a heightened xenophobia among the general population as well
as the further alienation and isolation of the minority populations
home. One of the
within these countries.
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Adding border security measures are the definition of

securitization against unfounded threats from Mexico
Tirman, 6 [John, executive director of MITs Center for International
Studies, June 9, "Immigration and Insecurity: Post-9/11 Fear in the United
States", Accessed July 23]
It also proceeds while the attention of the public has shifted. Due to a harsh immigration control bill passed
by the House of Representativeswhich would make entry by unau-thorized immigrants an aggravated
felonya
sharp, new focus on the security of the U.S.-Mexican border is

apparent. Several factors are shaping the increasingly fractious debate about Mexican immigration.
Security is most prominent: many politicians and commentators have posed the
Mexican border as a security threat. Migration has long had security implications, but
mostly linked to social securityjobs, welfare, etc.4 Today it is the threat of terrorism
that frames debate. The fearthus far, unfoundedthat al Qaeda will
sneak across the unguarded 2,000-mile border accounts for the urgency.5 In fact,
the House bill is called the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005.
security anxieties mix with the more ordinary opposition to

Mexican migrants, a longstanding tendency in American history. Related to issues of
The
overwhelmed border area hospitals and schools, competition for low-skilled jobs, and the effect on wages,
this oppo-sition focuses its ire on the 10-12 million who are illegals. While the overall impact of
immigration, including unauthorized workers, is a net positive for the U.S. economy, the localized effects
can be difficult for border states, particularly as government support for social services has declined over
time. The effect of unauthorized immigrants on wages of American workers, another hot-button issue, is
measures such as electronic fences, deployment of

national guard troops, roundups of unauthorized workers in places of
employment, and expanded border patrols are advocated to keep illegal
immigrants out and provide an added shield against al Qaeda. Some have
suggested the same for the Canadian border. But do such policies work?
uncertain.6 So
No threat from legal or illegal immigration- all of their

scenarios are constructed
FES, 10 [Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, a non-profit German political foundation committed to advancing
public policy issues based on social democracy, headed in Berlin, July, "The impact of organized crime on
Democratic Governance in latin america", http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/07386.pdf#page=31, Accessed
July 26]
Over the last few decades,
security at the border be-tween the United States and

Mexico has created debate and tension for bilateral relations. The border zone, of course,
is a porous region, but, its porosity must be de-fined in the context of the dimension of the border and the
flows of population that cross it. Every year, more than three hundred and fifty million people legally cross the border; that
is almost one million border crossings per day. Additionally, almost ten thousand commercial cargo trucks cross the border
United States
authorities detain more than one million undocumented immigrants
annually.14 For accuracy, it must be taken into account that an immi-grant can be detained more than once in the
daily. It is hard to calculate precisely the influx of illegal immigrants because they are undocumented.
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same year. Legal influx of immigrants in the United States is about one million people per year.15 Several studies demon-
annual net migration flux from Mexico to the United States

is between 400,000 and 500,000 people, 40 per cent of which is
represented by legal im-migration. There is no evidence that proves
that a single terrorist entered the Untied States through the
Mexican border. Since 2001, the debate has centered on the po-rous nature of the
border, which supposedly makes it vulnerable to the possibility that a
terrorist may eventu-ally use it to enter the country. However, nine
years have passed since the beginning of the debate, and there has
been no concrete evidence to demonstrate any attempt to use the
Mexican frontier to either infiltrate a terror-ist cell or to commit an
act of terrorism. All incidents which seemed to show it was occurring
have all proven to be false alarms. Shortly after September 11th, the United States decided to
strate that the
implement joint border con-trols creating the Smart Border Agreements with Cana-da and Mexico; signed with Canada in
December 2001 and Mexico (Smart Border Agreements) in March of 2002. These accords, or plans of action, were
based on four main objectives: secure movement of people, secure flow of goods, infrastructure to ensure security, and
the exchange of information and intelligence. These were not new themes in bilateral relations between the United States
and its neighbours; as a matter of fact, the treaties were based on similar accords which had existed and been in effect
since before 2001
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Link: Border-security
Tightening border security neccessitates exclusionary and

securitizing logic
Sparke, 5 [Matthew B, Professor of Geography and International Studies at
University of Washington, Adjunct Professor of Global Health, Director of the
University of Washington's Online Integrated Social Science Major, October
25, "A neoliberal nexus: Economy, security and the
biopolitics of citizenship on the border", http://www.iom.int/seguridadfronteriza/lit/stand/us-border-seg2006.pdf, Accessed July 26]
What makes NEXUS an especially worthwhile focus for analysis is the way in which its devel-opment as a
border management program has taken shape as a technological fix mediating two ex-tremely significant
and contradictory sets of contemporary social forces in North America. On the one side, are the economic
forces that continue to generate pressures for liberalized cross-border business movement in the context
political and cultural

forces that are leading to heightened border surveillance and more
militarized border enforcement in the context of the US war on
terror, cultural and po-litical forces that are also based on more long-standing
raciological and class preoccupations with restricting access for nonwhite non-professionals. While the agents of the economic imperatives employ a
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). On the other side, are the
geoeconomic rhetoric of economic facilitation and urge border softening measures, the advocates of
geopolitical case for a harder border that

combines an older, often ethnically exclusivist, xenophobia with the
post-9/11 security script of fighting terror and (at least in the US) defending
homeland security. Clearly, the borderlands between these contradictory social forces are
intensified border policing make a
fraught with tension, and yet the promoters of NEXUS see it as a high-tech bridge that can span the
tensions and facilitate economic development while improving homeland security. The questions that I
Who is being developed and secured by this

What kinds of people are they? What new forms of citizenship might they be
argued to embody? And, lastly, what new forms of sub-citizenship and
subordination are emerging as the underside of expedited border-crossing priviwould therefore like to pose in what follows are:
bridging exercise?
lege? Answering such questions, I want to suggest, should take us much further than a narrow focus on the
national credentials required by the US and Canadian authorities administering programs such as NEXUS.
It also requires us to move beyond the anachronistic methodological nationalismof arguments that posit
the protection of propertied citizens and the defense of national borders as two defining features of liberal
state-making. The deeper and more complexly inter-scalar issues raised by the intersection of
homeland securitization and economic facilitation at the border con-cern the transformation
of citizenship on a continent shaped by a notably neoliberal nexus of securitized nationalism and free market transnationalism. By securitized nationalism I am referring to
the culturalepolitical forces that lead to the imag-ining, surveilling and policing of the
nationestate in especially exclusionary but economically discerning
ways. The increasingly market-mediated methods of such securitization often involve commercial risk
management and dataveillance strategies, but with securitized nationalism they are combined with longstanding nationalistic traditions of imagining the homeland, encod-ing bodies, and e in Campbells (1998)
terms e
writing security through identity-based exclu-sions of people
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deemed to be untrustworthy aliens. By free market transnationalism, by contrast, I am

referring to distinctively incorporative economic imperatives that involve increasing transna-tional
capitalist interdependencies and the associated entrenchment of transnational capitalist mobility rights
through various forms of free market re-regulation. Such a regime of free market transnationalism may
well be considered by many readers to be a rough synonym for neoliber-alism. But here I am proposing a
free
market governmental practices with varied and often quite illiberal forms
of social and political rule (see also Sparke, 2004a, in press). This context contingent
more conjunctural approach to theorising neoliberalism as a con-textually contingent articulation of
definition of neoliberalism should not be taken to imply that it is a form of rule that is all-inclusive or simply
continuous with the long history and heterogeneity of capitalism itself. The neo does mark something
discrete and new historically, including, not least of all, the transnationalism of todays liberalized market
regimes. While neoliberalism certainly repre-sents a revival of classical nineteenth century free market
liberalism, it is also clearly a new kind of capitalist liberalization that is distinct
insofar as it has been imagined and implemented after and in opposition to the state-regulated national
economies of the twentieth century. It is because such imagination and implementation have been worked
out in different ways in different places that neoliberalism
needs to be examined
conjuncturally. The Neoliberal Nexus referred to in the title of this paper is therefore meant to
indicate this conjunctural approach as well as underlining how the Nexus program itself can be understood
as an example of neoliberalization.
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Alternative
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2NC Overview
The Alternative solves the entirety of the case. Every

single thing they read is not the source of the problem. All
of the conflicts that the Affirmative is trying to prevent
right now WONT EVEN EXIST in a world of our Alternative.
Impacts will never happen because they mistake the root
cause of securitytheir impacts are merely constructions
made by them because of the way they portray complex
relationships into a small box.
The Alternative is to Vote Negative to reject the
securitization of the 1AC this opens up space for
emancipatory political engagement more likely to deal
with real world problems. We have to get rid of security
logic once and for all, forever done. There is no hole left
behind when we take away Security. We have to stop
constructing things and believe that insecurity is part of
humanity in general, something that cannot be changed.
Thats Neoclous 8.
Individuals can resist security politics by challenging
everyday forms of discursive violence like the affirmative.
Burke 2 (Anthony, School of Political Science and International Studies
University of Queensland, Aporias of Security, Alternatives 27 pg. 22-23)
It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for
freedom, justice, and social transformation have proved, a sense of
seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge thatmany tools are
already availableand where they are not, the effort to create a
productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a
crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the
sense thatit assumes that power is most effective when it is
absorbed as truth, consented to and desiredwhich creates an
important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought
that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being
credible to the governed as well as the governing. This throws
weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of
subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of
the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to
discover who or what we are so much as to refuse what we are.01 Just as
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security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing

blackmail and promise, it is at these levels that we can intervene.
We can critique the machinic frameworks of possibility
represented by law, policy, economic regulation, and diplomacy,
while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to
draw individual subjects into their consensual web. This suggests, at
least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first asserts the space tor agency
both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger
socioeconomic implications. Roland Bleiker formulates an idea of agency
that shifts away from the lone (male) hero overthrowing the social order in
a decisive act of rebellion to one that understands both the thickness of
social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and "thinness." We must,
he says, "observe how an individual may be able to escape the
discursive order and influence its shifting boundaries. ... By doing
so, discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden appear where
forces of domination previously seemed invincible."*^ Pushing
beyond security requires tactics that can work at many levels
that empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cultural,
and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire,
subjection, and discipline they encounter, to challenge and rewrite
them, and that in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform
the larger structures of being, exchange, and power that sustain
(and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this
is to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question
the boundaries of the self, society, and the international that security
seeks to imagine and police. The second seeks new ethical principles
based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity that
security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose,
William Connolly, and Moira Giatens have sought to imagine a new ethical
relationship that thinks difference not on the basis of the same but on the
basis of a dialogue with the other that might allow space for the unknown
and unfamiliar, for a "debate and engagement with the other's law and the
other's ethics"an encounter that involves a transformation of the self
rather than the other. Thus while the sweep and power of security must be
acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous levels of
individual identity, social order, and macroeconomic: possibility, it would
entail another kind of work on "ourselves"a political refusal of the One,
the imagination of an other that never returns to the same. It would be to
ask if there is a world after security, and what its shimmering possibilities
might be.
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AT: Alt will Be Rejected
1. Once the government starts to advocate and change

and a new strategy, it will not be rejectedthe new
theories will be seen as viable and real.
2. These theories spill overour Burke 2 card both says
that individuals can resist the security policy and that we
will be able to look for the new root causes of things.
3. This is just another link that shows that they are so
immersed in this security rhetoric.
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AT: Alt has No Timeframe
1. The timeframe of the alternative is nowall we have to

prove is that the 1AC is securitizing enough and we do
that.
2. Their attempts to delay the change will further
entrench us into the current policies.
3. This argument is another linkshows that they do not
want to change and it shows how entrenched they are in
wanting to continue enforcing these security threats.
4. We read evidence specific to their construction of those
countriesthat proves.
Evanston
Carlena
AT: Utopian Alt
The alternative is possible- historical epistemologies

prove you should be hopeful about the prospects of
change
Vasquez, 95- Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University (John A., 1995,
International Relations Theory Today, pg. 221)
The second contribution of postmodernism is the realization that what exists
in the world is choice posing as truth. This insight flows naturally from the
first; for if it is the case that nothing is necessary (because historicist
conditions or positivist causes do not determine things as they are), it follows
that the arrangements that do exist were created by human beings either
consciously or unconsciously. Such constructions were in fact choices that
were made. How much freedom went into the choices is a matter for
historical research, but they were choices in the sense that other
arrangements could have been selected by struggles within history. Human
beings, however, have not been satisfied to call these outcomes choices that
were contingent on preference, cultural biases or political fights. Instead they
have sought to cloak them as the outcome of metaphysical categories - God,
Reason or History. Rather than seeing things as arbitrary choices coming out
of power and interests, the victors have justified their choices in terms of
divine law, natural law or scientific analysis. Even when choice is recognized,
these warrants make any other choices sinful, unnatural and unreasonable, or
unscientific. Such claims when seen in the context of Enlightenment beliefs
about the inevitability of progress take on an added weight. The
postmodernist denies all of this.
Evanston
Carlena
AT: Vague Alts Bad
1. Our alt is not vaguewe have a specific alternative text

that we have read since the 1NC.
2. We are not a moving target, we have the alternative
text and extend it in the same way each time which
means that they can attack it.
3. This argument is just a cheap shot for themno proven
abuse in this round that the Alternative is vague. Our alt
evidence proves that it is possible.
Evanston
Carlena
AT: Alt=Extinction
1. The alternative looks at the entire situation in a new

waysaying that it will cause extinction is just an excuse
by them to stay in the current mindset.
2. None of their evidence is specific to securitizationplus
we win timeframethe faster that they continue to
securitize the more likely that we will form this fear and
cause the impacts.
Evanston
Carlena
AT: Mindset Fiat
1. We arent mindset fiat--we open up new space in the

government for new logicwe dont claim to magically
change peoples mindsets without doing anything.
2. In addition to changing logic, most people value morals
anyway--- Thats why there arent many murderers or
rapists here.
3. If we win the role of the ballot that is to play the role of
the critical intellectualthat means the judges ballot
represents the advocacy for change.
4. Isnt a voter
Evanston
Carlena
Impacts
Evanston
Carlena
Genocide
The affs security rhetoric reinforces a genocidal system in Latin

America
Jackson 11 (Nicole, Associate Professor in the School for International Studies at Simon
Fraser University, Security, http://books.google.com/books?id=g9VDeFlmwBIC&pg=PA2004IA79&lpg=PA2004-IA79&dq=%22security+rhetoric%22+AND+%22Latin+America

%22&source=bl&ots=ElyAOFWkCk&sig=ZHvHlEWwHJKa9V6aYW44Wfm12xE&hl=en&sa=X&ei=L4PtUfnMO
MiQyQGZ7YCABA&ved=0CEsQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=%22security%20rhetoric%22%20AND
%20%22Latin%20America%22&f=false,
2011)
Another Western-defined concept that has ap-plicability to the

developing world is securitization, defined as 'the move that takes
politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the
issue either as a special kind of politics or as above poli-tics' (Buzan,
Waever. and de Wilde 1998: 23). The securitization framework highlights how
language is used to construct threats. Although it is a help-ful
descriptive and explanatory tool, particularly in understanding how
states elevate particular threats, again there are difficulties with putting this concept
into practice. There are fears that securitization arguments (that is, the labelling
of an issue as a security threat) could be misused by rulers for domestic purposes. For example, in Latin America there is a
widespread consciousness about how security rhetoric has been
used by military govern-ments in the past against their own people ,
and there is therefore distrust about how it may be applied.

Evanston Carlena - "We Take No Prisoners

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Link: Technology.................................................................................... 131

We Take No Prisoners !!!

We Take No Prisoners !!!

The concept of security is a social construct. Their claims

is not an objective condition. It (sic) is not

We Take No Prisoners !!!

a product of historical processes and structures in the state and

We Take No Prisoners !!!

Political scientists and historians are engaged in

War ceases to be a historical period which meaning

a binary system made it

We Take No Prisoners !!!

I disagree with this

identity need not be, and indeed never is,

that the states very conditions of existence are generated18.

We Take No Prisoners !!!

Securitization is a precondition to genocide- their

it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing

We Take No Prisoners !!!

The Alternative is to Vote Negative to reject the

We Take No Prisoners !!!

personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important

We Take No Prisoners !!!

The 1AC claims their impacts as threats for the realist

We Take No Prisoners !!!

To diagnose a disease does not mean the same as curing it - this

We Take No Prisoners !!!

We Take No Prisoners !!!

The affirmative represents an inherently unstable world

There is no hope for a truly

hold the threat forever at bay.

Yet the sense of powerlessness is oddly satisfying , because it

We Take No Prisoners !!!

is blamed on the enemy, reinforcing the sense of peril and the

We Take No Prisoners !!!

evidence is irrelevant in the

Are we really more vulnerable

The notoriously poor historical memory of Americans is only part of

We Take No Prisoners !!!

the U.S. will not contemplate policy

The cries of alarm and defensive preparations create the

Yet there is almost a palpable eagerness to feel vulnerable.

Political leaders and pundits offer only an endless horizon of unflagging

the more we are convinced that insecurity is perpetual, the

We Take No Prisoners !!!

That, of course, is the ultimate point. The prospect of another long,

This fantasy of control will only produce a never-ending

Afghanistan is a noble cause for the

We Take No Prisoners !!!

rhetoric. 87 Furthermore, the rhetoric of enlightened self-interest implies

We Take No Prisoners !!!

worlds elite of around one billion, mainly located in the North

risk management through military

the decision to act to mitigate a risk itself becomes risky:

We Take No Prisoners !!!

danger is that military-based risk management becomes a cyclical

the exercise of military

Our alternative is to reject the affirmative in favor of a