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Diplomatic and Consular Procedures

Diplomacy and the Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cold War was the economic, geopolitical and ideological battle between two
superpowers: the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) that started at the end World War II and lasted until the disunion of the Soviet Union.
The era was marked by continuous conflict between two superpower states that ranged from
nuclear submarines to most advanced technology at the time.
The two nations, the Soviet Union and the United States were never enemies before on
any field, in fact, they have fought side by side during World War II. One of the biggest conflict
in the Cold War is its nuclear warheads. John F. Kennedy was elected in 1960, and in 1961, the
USSR built the Berlin Wall, designed to stop the increasing number of East Germans who were
escaping communist East Berlin to the West. A year after that, in October 1962, the Cuban
Missile Crisis a 14 day crisis erupted and the whole world was suddenly an inch away from a
nuclear war.
On October 16, 1962, President John F. Kennedy and his advisers were stunned to learn
that the Soviet Union was installing nuclear armed medium and intermediate range ballistic
missiles in Cuba. With these offensive weapons which represented a new and existential threat to
America, Moscow significantly raised the cost in the nuclear rivalry in the superpowers. On
October 22, President JFK with no other recourse, proclaimed in a televised address that his
administration knew of the illegal missiles and delivered an ultimatum insisting on the removal,
announcing an American quarantine of Cuba to force compliance with his demands. (Schwarz,
2013). In Soviets defense, the Soviets premier, Nikita Khrushchev decided that stationing the
Soviet missiles in Cuba would help compensate for the imbalance between Soviet and American
ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), gaining leverage for Soviet policy goals in Europe
and deter United States from invading Cuba after examining the American threats against Cuba.
What happened was, after receiving permission from President Fidel Castro to deploy the
weapons, the support equipment left the Soviet Union for Cuba. The U-2 overflights, the
American reconnaissance flights, were part of a broad continuing effort to monitor and contain
Cuba. The ministers as well as the Organization of American States were largely in agreement
with Dean Rusk regarding the Soviet buildup. Both stated that the Soviet presence in Cuba
constituted a threat to hemispheric unity and democracy that leads to the lookout for offensive
weapons in Cuba. (Weaver, 2014). The Executive Committee of the National Security Council
(EXCOMM) was tasked to analyze the problems the missiles presented and options for removing
them. As a result of their discussion, many of the policymakers concluded within a couple of
days that solving the crisis required a strategy utilizing diplomacy and military force that built
upon the preceding efforts of the State and Defense Departments. (McCone, 1962). The strategy

debate focused on two options: (1) should the president task the Air Force with destroying
missiles with a preemptive strike without any warning or effort to negotiate the missiles removal
or (2) should efforts concentrate on reaching a resolution through diplomacy. They soon
concluded that the military and diplomatic options complemented with each other. Diplomatic
efforts not only held the possibility of success in their own right, they also paved way for
military action should that prove necessary by justifying such actions to the world. (Weaver,
2014)
There have been several factors combined to alarm the JFK administration. The missiles
that were caught in a photograph could reach eighteen Strategic Air Command bases as well as
Washington, DC and installing warheads required only a couple of hours and the launch
preparations as little as two to three more. The time until completion of the missile sites was one
of the critical factor in determining USs strategy because once they were operational, USs
options will become more limited so its better to destroy them before they were ready to fire.
Because of the technological limitations, there was no defense against ballistic missiles short of
destroying them before they were launched. Even if the Soviets did not intend to fire them
against US, several EXCOMM members believed that Moscow could use the missiles as a
distraction while they moved against Berlin. Others believed Khrushchev also wished to
established leverage against the US missiles in Turkey in addition to bringing the Berlin issue to
a head. The inability to ensure 100% destruction of the missiles raised a higher level for the
administration. Military action generates consequences beyond the target zone and killing Soviet
citizens was just one of the many problems with using military force without any diplomatic
preparation ahead of time. Dean Rusk advised to the JFK administration that there was no such
thing as unilateral action by the United States and reminded that the 42 allies that the US have
would probably bear the brunt of any retaliation if the USSR decided to respond militarily to an
US conventional air strike against Cuba. Therefore, the US have to consult with its closest allies
on any military actions it might take and merely informing them about the details of the plan
against Cuba was inadequate. Diplomats at the time were very important because they convey
messages to the country they represent in. Charles Bohlen, the ambassador to the Soviet Union
warned the US about striking first without trying peaceful negotiations with the Union. He was
also the one who proposed sending letters to Khrushchev and Castro. (Bohlen, 1962)
JFK decided that he could best achieve his goals through a naval blockade in combination
with diplomacy and a threatening military mobilization. He favored a coercive strategy that
applied diplomatic pressure and gave negotiation a chance to succeed. Utilizing a naval blockade
as the keystone of his strategy allowed Kennedy to be assertive and diplomatic at the same time.
The strategy of diplomacy backed by military force was not too risky; it also signaled to allies
and nonaligned states that the US protected its interest with measured responses. The blockade
supported one of JFKs central concern: preserving common cause with Western Europe and
Latin America. (Weaver, 2014)
Self-interest was the final arbiter arbitrator for all parties. The Cuban Missile Crisis
revealed a characteristic of the relationship of United States and neighbors to the South. Before
the crisis began, US would coordinate and consult with its neighboring South at least with its

independent sovereigns, once the photo of the missiles was discovered, the JFK administration
formulated its strategy and was going to carry it out regardless if it was okay with its neighboring
country in the South or not. The success to end the Cuban Missile Crisis did lie with having
strong military support and diplomatic groundwork. Having just strong military support is not
enough either is having only diplomatic groundwork. In the end, diplomacy and military actions
supports and worked hand in hand to end the problem.

Sources:

Weaver, M. (2014). The Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force: An

Example from the Cuban Missile Crisis. Diplomatic History, 38(1), 137-181. Retrieved
July 21, 2015, from http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=7&sid=1a70a398-d6774dbb-a7b70dfd6ea26ba2@sessionmgr4001&hid=4107&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbG12ZQ==#d
b=a9h&AN=93571440

Pious, R. (2001). The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Limits of Crisis Management.
Political Science Quarterly (Academy of Political Science), 116(1), 81-105. Retrieved
July 21, 2015, from http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=9&sid=1a70a398d677-4dbb-a7b70dfd6ea26ba2@sessionmgr4001&hid=4107&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ==#d
b=mth&AN=4477252

Laffey, M., & Weldes, J. (2008). Decolonizing the Cuban Missile Crisis. International
Studies Quarterly, 52(3), 555-577. Retrieved July 21, 2015, from
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=11&sid=1a70a398-d677-4dbb-a7b70dfd6ea26ba2@sessionmgr4001&hid=4107&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ==#d
b=a9h&AN=33543979

Schwarz, B. (2013). The Real Cuban Missile Crisis. Atlantic, 73-81.