People v.

Mendoza
95 Phil. 645

September 28, 1954

People of the Philippines
Arturo Mendoza

C.J. Paras

Nuez

petitioners
respondents
summary Second wife charged accused with bigamy for contracting a third marriage. Turns out that

the marriage to #2 was void as he already had a first wife. Because the second marriage was
void, there was no valid marriage to speak of and therefore the third marriage was not
bigamous. According to the prevailing law at that time, there was no need for a court order
to establish the invalidity of marriages.

facts of the case

August 5, 1936 - Mendoza was married to Jovita de Asis in Marikina.
May 14, 1941 - while the first marriage was subsisting, Mendoza was married to Olga Lema in Manila.
February 2, 1943 - de Asis died.
August 19, 1949 - Mendoza married CarmencitaPanlilio in Laguna. This gave rise to prosecution for
bigamy.
Mendoza - the marriage to Lema being void as the marriage to de Asis was subsisting, the marriage with
Panlilio could not have been bigamous, the first marriage being void.
SolGen - the voidness of the marriage to Lema given, there should have been a court order declaring the
nullity of the marriage before he can validly marry Panlilio.

issue
Whether Mendoza was guilty of bigamy. NO
Should there have been a previous court order declaring the nullity of the first marriage? NO NEED, BUT
THE DISSENT SAYS YES.

ratio
It is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted during the existence of his
first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the appellant
contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as follows:
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of
the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and
void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting
such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null
and void by a competent court.

This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime
of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its
invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second
1

marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for
seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null
and void by a competent court.

People v. Aragon
G.R. No. L-10016
28 February 1957
J. Labrador
petitioners THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
respondents PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant-appellant.

Ortiz

summary Accused married Gorrea on 28 September 1925. He contracted a subsequent marriage on 27

August 1934 with Faicol. Gorrea then died on 05 August 1939. The accused contracted a
third marriage on 03 October 1953 with Maglasang. Because of this, a case for bigamy was
filed by Faicol against the accused. The court ruled that the 1953 marriage with Maglasang
was not bigamous since the first marriage with Gorrea was already extinguished because of
her death. The 1934 marriage with Faicol has not become valid upon the death of Gorrea.

facts of the case

On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a certain
Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu. While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was
subsisting, the accused under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol
on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.
The accused maintained Maria Faicol in Iloiolo and Maria Gorrea in Cebu. Gorrea then died on August 5,
1939. After her death, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a teachernurse.
The accused and Faicol did not live a happy marital life. She was always being maltreated by the accused.
The accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight.
During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3,
1953, in Sibonga, Cebu.
A complaint was filed by Faicol with the CFI
CFI: The accused is guilty of the crime of bigamy. The defendant could not legally contract marriage with
Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or
by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage.

issue
WON the accused is guilty of bigamy. NO

ratio
The court reversed the ruling of the CFI. The action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife,
whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third
marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for
contracting this marriage cannot prosper.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendantappellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the second
bigamous marriage. So ordered.
Dissent by J. Reyes: There should be a judicial declaration of nullity before one can marry again. It is not
for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts

Tolentino v. Paras
G.R. No. L-43905
May 30, 1983
MELENCIO-HERRERA
Ramos
petitioners SERAFIA G. TOLENTINO
respondents HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, MARIA CLEMENTE and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
PAOMBONG, BULACAN

summary Husband was charged with a bigamy case by his wife. He admitted to the offense, served
his prison sentence, but once out of jail, continued to live with his second wife. Upon his
death, the name of the second wife was indicated in his death certificate as his wife. First
wife now files a case for the rectification in the entry of the Local Civil Registrar.
SC held that since Amado (the husband) himself admitted to the act, there is no better proof
that he had an existing marriage when he married his second wife. As such, the second
marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is
null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. Further, no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage and rectification can be made in the
records of the LCR.

facts of the case

Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent herein, Maria Clemente, at
Bulacan, on November 1, 1948, while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, celebrated on July 31,
1943, was still subsisting.
Petitioner charged Amado with bigamy, where the latter pleaded guilty. He served his prison sentence, but
continued to live with respondent until his death. In his death certificate, it noted that respondent was his
wife.
Petitioner filed a SpecProfor the Correction of Entry where she sought to correct the name of the surviving
spouse in the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name.The lower Court
dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law" and indicated the need for a more
detailed proceeding. Conformably, she filed a case against respondent and the Local Civil Registrar of
Paomobong, Bulacan. The Court however dismissed her petition.

issue
Who should be named as the wife of the deceased?(Serafia)

ratio
Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the
necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of marriage than
the admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage.The second marriage that he contracted with
private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no
force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage.Rectification
of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly made.

Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy
G.R. No. L-53703
August 19, 1986
Paras
Recto
petitioners Lilia OlivaWiegel
respondents Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy (presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan
City) and Karl Heinz Wiegel

summary Lilia contracted a first marriage with Eduardo. She contracted a second marriage with Karl.

Karl asked for a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of the prior existing
marriage. Lilia wanted to present evidence that her first marriage was vitiated by force and
that at the time of the first marriage, her first husband was already married to someone else.
There is no need to present evidence because assuming Marriage#1 was vitiated by force, it
would be merely VOIDABLE (valid until annulled) thus when she contracted Marriage #2,
she was still validly married making Marriage #2 VOID.
Assuming Husband#1 already had a wife at the time of celebration of their marriage, there
was no judicial declaration of nullity and therefore at the time of Marriage #2, Marriage #1
was still valid making Marriage #2 VOID.

facts of the case

Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia OlivaWiegel. They were
married on July 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church in Makati. He filed before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court with presiding judge Alicia Sempio-Dy on the ground of Lilias previous
existing marriage to Eduardo Maxion (ceremony was performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes
Church in QC).
Lilia admitted the existence of the prior marriage but claimed that it was null and void because they were
allegedly forced into marriage. At the pre-trial, the parties agreed that the issue was the status of the first
marriage: assuming the presence of force, was the first marriage void or merely voidable?
Lilia asked the court to present evidence: (1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon
both parties; and (2) that the first husband was already married to someone else at the time of their marriage.
Judge Sempio-Dy ruled against presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both
parties were already agreed upon.

issue
Whether or not Lilia could present evidence on those facts NO
(Real issue: status of Lilias marriage to her first husband (VOIDABLE) and to her second husband (VOID)

ratio
No need for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force because assuming it was true, her
first marriage is not void but merely VOIDABLE (CC 85), and therefore valid until annulled.
Since no annulment has been made, she married her second husband while still validly married to the first.
Her second marriage is VOID (CC 80).
No need for Lilia to introduce evidence about the first husbands existing prior marriage at the time they
married each other because their marriage although void, still needs a judicial declaration of such fact. At the
time she contracted her second marriage she was still considered as a married woman, therefore, the marriage
with the second husband is still regarded as VOID.

Donato v. Luna
G.R. No. 53642
April 15, 1988
Gancayco
Reynes
petitioners Leonilo C. Donato
respondents Artemon Luna, Presiding Judge of the Manila CFI; Jose Flaminiano, City Fiscal of Manila; Paz
Abayan

summary An information for bigamy was filed against Donato, based on a complaint filed by the wife

in the alleged bigamous marriage. Afterwards, the same wife filed a civil case for annulment
based on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit. The court ruled that the
issue raised in the civil case did not constitute a prejudicial question sufficient to forestall
the criminal proceedings.

facts of the case

1. [Jan. 23, 1979] An Information for the crime of bigamy was filed by the City Fiscal of Manila
against petitioner DONATO. It was based on the complaint of Paz ABAYAN (the alleged second
wife).
2. [Sept. 28, 1979] Before arraignment, ABAYAN filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
(JDRC)of Manila a civil action for annulment of her marriage with DONATO contracted on Sept.
26, 1978, based on the ground that ABAYAN consented to marrying DONATO since she had no
previous knowledge that DONATO was already married to a certain Rosalinda MALUPING
(celebrated June 30, 1978).
a. DONATO interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized
without a marriage license, and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were
employed by ABAYAN to obtain DONATOs consent.
b. [It was noted, however, that the marriage license was dispensed with due to a joint affidavit
executed by the spouses on Sept. 26, 1978 stating that they had lived together and deported
themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five
years.]
3. Prior to the date set for trial in the criminal case, DONATO filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings contending that the pending civil case raises a prejudicial question which must first be
determined and decided before the criminal case can proceed.
a. This motion was denied by the judge, relying on the case of Landico v. Relova.
b. DONATO filed a motion for reconsideration, relying on the later case of De la Cruz v.
Ejercito. This was also denied.

issue
W/N the pending civil case for annulment raises a prejudicial question to merit the suspension of the criminal
case for bigamy NO, it does not.

ratio

A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved the said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal.
o It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate form the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain here.
o The issue before the JDRC touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not
determinative of DONATOs guilt or innocence in the criminal case for bigamy.
6

It was DONATOs second wife, ABAYAN, who filed the complaint for annulment of the second
marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.
Landico v. Relova, and not De la Cruz v. Ejercito, applies in the case at bar.
o The Court in Landicoruled that the mere fact that there are action to annul the marriages entered
into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that prejudicial questions are automatically
raised to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order for the annulment case to
forestall the criminal proceedings, it must be shown that petitioners consent was obtained by
means of duress, force, and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage was
involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
DONATO has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage had
been obtained by the use of threats, force, and intimidation.
o De la Cruz is markedly different. There, it was the accused who was charged with bigamy and
who was likewise the one who filed a civil case for annulment. Here, it was the ABAYANthe
second wifewho filed a complaint for annulment. Moreover, in De la Cruz, there was already
a judgment in the civil case declaring the second marriage null and void; here, there is no such
judgment.
DONATO only raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade prosecution of the criminal case.
o DONATOs averments of vitiated consent is belied by the fact that DONATO and ABAYAN
executed a joint affidavit mentioned in facts.2.b. above.
o Also, it was only when the civil case was filed (or more than one year from the solemnization of
the second marriage) that DONATO came up with his vitiated consent angle.
o

TERREv. TERRE
A.M. No. 2349
July 3, 1992
petitioners Dorothy B. Terre
respondents Atty. Jordan Terre

PER CURIAM

Villarroya

summary Respondent Jordan Terre married complainant Dorothy Terre after he convinced her that
her first marriage to MerlitoBercenilla was void ab initio and had no need for judicial
declaration. Thereafter, he abandoned her and married another woman. The SC declared
him guilty of grossly immoral conduct and disbarred him.

facts of the case

Complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar, with
"grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman, while
his prior marriage with complainant subsisted.
She and respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates. She was then
married to MerlitoBercenilla, while respondent was single. Respondent was aware of her marital status but
still he persistently courted her. She decided nothing would come of it since she was married but he
respondent explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her first husband were first
cousins. Convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him. In their marriage license, respondent wrote "single" as her status
explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such.
They were married in 1977. However, respondent disappeared in 1981. Complainant was unaware of the
reason for his disappearance until she found out that respondent married a certain HelinaMalicdem.
Respondent sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage
with complainant was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was
necessary.

issue
Whether or not respondent is guilty of grossly immoral conduct. YES, respondent is disbarred!

ratio
Respondents pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into
believing that her prior marriage to MerlitoBercenilla, being incestuous and void ab initio, she was free to
contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that
such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that respondent held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same
result will follow. For if we are to hold him to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy
Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to HelinaMalicdem must be regarded as
bigamous and criminal in character.
The conduct of respondent inveigling complainant to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning
complainant after she had cared for him and supported him through law school, leaving her without means
for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with HelinaMalicdem while his first
marriage was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the
first place.

REPUBLIC vs. GRANADA

G.R. No. 187512
June 13, 2012
Sereno, J.
petitioners Republic of the Philippines
respondents Yolanda Cadacio Granada
summary Yolanda and Cyrus were married. When the company where they worked closed down,

Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Nine years have passed and still no news from
him. Yolanda filed for petition to declare Cyrus presumptively dead. RTC declared Cyrus as
presumptively dead. OSG filed a notice of appeal. CA dismissed the case for appeal was not
the proper remedy. SC ruled that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a
summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and
executory and that the correct remedy was to file a petition for certiorari with the CA.

Facts of the case

In May 1991, Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric
Philippines, an electronics company in Paraaque where both were then working. They got married at the
Manila City Hall on March 3, 1993.
Their marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.
On May 1994, Sumida Electric closed down, thus Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead.
o Yolanda now claims that since then, she has not received any communication from her husband,
notwithstanding efforts to locate him.
o

Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts, to no

avail.
RTC: Declared Cyrus as presumptively dead.
OSG filed an MR alleging that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to
prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead.
RTC: Denied MR.
OSG appealed via Rule 41.
Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal for it was a
summary judicial proceeding in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not
appealable.
CA: Granted Motion to Dismiss

Issue
Whether or not CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and,
hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal? - NO

Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA noted that a petition for declaration of presumptive death for the
purpose of remarriage is a summary judicial proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision therein
is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the same
Code. The decision is therefore not subject to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to question it through a Notice of
Appeal is unavailing.
A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent
9

marriage under Art. 411 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding as provided for under the Family Code.
Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law. Subsumed
thereunder are Articles 238 and 247, which provide:
o Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases
provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an
expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
o Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:
o ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings
filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.
Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of
presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and
executory.

OSG: Bermudez- Lorino has been superseded by the subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic v. Jomoc

SC: We do not agree. The Supreme Court in Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a summary
proceeding under the Family Code. In contrast, the Court in Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its ruling on
the impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning the trial courts Decision in a summary
proceeding for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code was intended to set the
records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar.
Furthermore, four years after Jomoc, the SC ruled in the case of Republic v. Tango that:
o By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code.
In sum, under Article 41, the losing party in a summary proceeding may file a petition for certiorari with the CA
on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Whether or not CA erred in affirming the RTC decision based on the evidence presented by Yolanda? NO

OSG: Yolanda has not adduced evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was
already dead. It also cited Republic v. Nolasco, US v. Biasbas, and Republic v. CA and Alegro.
In Nolasco, SC ruled that Art. 41 imposes more stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the Civil Code.
o Civil Code - merely requires either that there be no news that the absentee is still alive; or that the
absentee is generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed
dead under Articles 390 and 391.
o Family Code - prescribes a well-founded belief that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
o SC also gave the four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well- founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case
of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

10

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.
In Biasbas, the SC ruled that Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts of his first
wife, considering his admission that that he only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that
suspicion was the fact of her absence.
In RP v. CA and Alegro, the SC provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a well-founded
belief under Article 41. It ruled that:
o The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts
to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already
dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate
a diligent search to locate her absent husband.
o Relatives of Cyrus which Yolandas brother (Diosdado) inquired about where not presented as witnesses.
o Yolanda failed to seek information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other
government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines
HOWEVER, although such arguments are well-taken, the judgment of the RTC is final and executory and could
no longer be modified or reversed, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law.

11

G.R. No. 184621

Petitioner
Respondent
Summary

Republic vs. Cantor

December 10, 2013
J. BRION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR

On Jan. 1998, the married couple, Maria & Jerry, fought and as a result Jerry left their conjugal dwelling. On May
21, 2002, 4 yrs from Jerrys disappearance, Maria Fe filed a petition for her husbands declaration of presumptive
death, allegedly, under a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead. She allegedly inquired from her in laws,
neighbors and friends, as to Jerrys whereabouts and made it a point to check the patients directory whenever
she went to a hospital but to no avail. RTC, affirmed by CA, declared Jerry presumptively dead. SC reversed and
held that Marias earnest efforts fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. She merely engaged in a
"passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries. She did not report Jerrys absence to the police
nor did she seek their aid him. She did not present as witnesses (or even name) Jerrys relatives or their
neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts.

facts of the case

Sept. 20, 1997: Maria Fe and Jerry married and lived together in their conjugal dwelling in Koronadal City, South Cotabato.

Jan.1998: They quarreled bec. of: (1) Maria Fes inability to reach "sexual climax"; and (2) Jerrys animosity toward Maria Fes
father.

After their fight, Jerry left and this was the last time that Maria Fe ever saw him.

May 21, 2002 (>4 yrs from Jerrys disappearance): Maria Fe filed before the RTC a petition for her husbands declaration of
presumptive death
o She allegedly inquired from Jerrys family, neighbors and friends, as to his whereabouts but to no avail.
o She also made it a point to check the patients directory whenever she went to a hospital.

RTC: Granted Marias petition and declared Jerry presumptively dead pursuant to FC 41.

CA: Dismissed the Republics petition for certiorari and affirmed the RTC.

The Republic thru the OSG now argues that Maria did not have a well-founded belief to justify the declaration of her husbands
presumptive death and failed to conduct the requisite diligent search for her missing husband.
issues
(1) Whether Maria Fe had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead? (NO)
(2) Whether certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse under FC 41? (YES)
ratio
On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief

Marias earnest efforts fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence to form a wellfounded belief that her husband was already dead. She merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on
uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends.
o She did not actively look for her missing husband. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as
her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him; they were unintentional.
o She did not report Jerrys absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him.
o She did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate
Jerry. They were not even named.
o There was no other corroborative evidence to support her claim that she conducted a diligent search.

Four Essential Requisites for the Declaration of Presumptive Death Under FC 41

o That the absent spouse has been missing for 4 consecutive years, or 2 consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in NCC 391;
o That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
o That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;
o That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

Burden of proof: Present spouse to show that all the requisites under FC 41 are present.

FC 41, compared to NCC 83, imposes a stricter standard before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted
(Republic v. Nolasco)
FC 41
NCC 83
Time required for the presumption to arise
4 consec yrs
7 consec yrs
Need for a judicial declaration of Yes
No
presumptive death to enable the spouse
present to remarry
Standard
"well founded belief" that the absentee is There be no news that such absentee is
already dead
still alive; or the absentee is generally

12

considered to be dead and believed to be

so by the spouse present, or is presumed
dead under NCC 390 and 391

"Well-founded belief" depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere
passive one).

Criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded belief" under FC 41 (Republic v. CA): The belief of the present
spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent
spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded
belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before
and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse.

Reason for Strict Standard Approach:

o States policy to protect and strengthen marriage (prevent collusion)
o For the Present Spouses Benefit: to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy under RPC 349 which might
come into play if he/she would prematurely remarry sans the court's declaration.

Upon the issuance of the courts decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the present
spouse's good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively established and his/her criminal intent in
case of remarriage is effectively negated.
On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy

Republics resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC to question the RTCs order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was
proper.

Pursuant to FC 41 in rel. to FC 247, the courts judgment in summary proceedings, such as the declaration of presumptive death of
an absent spouse, shall be immediately final and executory; hence, unappealable.

However, an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such
petition should be filed in the CA in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.
Petition granted. CA reversed.

13

JONES v. HORTIGUELA
G.R. No. 43701
Mar 6, 1937
Concepcion, J.
Casila
petitioner Angelita Jones
oppositor Felix Hortiguela
summary Jones, the daughter of the decedent from her first husband, contends that the marriage of her mother
and Hortiguela was void because her father A. Jones had only been judicially declared absent for 6
years and 14 days (not 7 years) at the time of the second marriage. SC held that for the purposes of
the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee.
The law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be
living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. The date shall be reckoned from the date on which the
last news was received.

facts of the case

Marciana Escano had died intestate. In an order, Jones, her daughter by her first marriage and Hortiguela,
her widower by second marriage were declared her only heirs. Hortiguela was appointed judicial administrator
of the entire estate. (June 1933) The project of partition and final account were approved in an order and the
properties were turned over to the grantees.
(May 1934) Jones filed a motion alleging that she was the only heir of her mother and there never was a
valid marriage between her mother and Hortiguela. CFI denied the motion.

issue
W/N Hortguelas alleged marriage to Escano was celebrated - YES

ratio
Important dates:
Dec 1914: Escano married Arthur W. Jones
Jan 10, 1918: A. Jones secured a passport to go abroad and nothing was ever heard of him
Oct 1919: Escano instituted proceedings to judicially declare A. Jones an absentee.
Oct 25, 1919: CFI declared him an absentee from the Philippines
Dec 1919-June 1920: The order was published in the Official Gazette and in the newspaper El Ideal
April 23, 1921: CFI issued an order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence
May 6, 1927: Hortiguela and Escano were married before the justice of peace of Malitbog, Leyte and
they signed the certificate of marriage
Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been made when the CFI issed an order
for the taking effect of the declaration of absence not when CFI declared A. Jones an absentee. From the latter date to the
date of marriage of Hortiguela and Escano, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed and in accordance with General Order 68,
the marriage is null and void.

The Court held that for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such
former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The absence of A. Jones should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on
which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than
nine years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.
14

As regards the failure to record the marriage in the register of the municipality:
General Order 68 does not provide that failure to transmit such certificate to the municipal secretary
annuls the marriage.
Madridejo v. De Leon: It does not appear that in the celebration of marriage forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate is a requisite for the validity of the marriage.
US v. De Vera: Certificates of marriages recorded in registrars are not the only ones that can attest and
prove such facts to such an extent that other proofs established by law may not be presented or
admitted at trial.
Further, according to the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not heard from in seven years is presumed to be
dead.

15

Petition for the presumption of death of Nicolai Szatraw

G.R. No. L-1780
April 31, 1948
Padilla J
Chua
Petitioners Counselo Sors
Respondents N/A
Summary Consuelo married a Polish citizen named Nicolas. They had a son but almost 4 years
into the marriage, Nicolas left and took with him their sons. She had neither seen nor
heard of them since then. After her husbands absence for more than seven years,
Consuelo filed a petition to declare her husband presumptively dead. Court
dismissed her petition on the ground that independently of an action or special
proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the
subject of an action or special proceeding. A judicial pronouncement to this effect,
even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. Since it is
merely disputable, it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or
declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
competent court has to pass.
Facts of the Case

Counselo Sors is the lawful wife of Nicolas Szatraw, a Polish citizen, to whom she was married in
Manila on November 1936 and whom she bore a child.
She lived with Nicolas from the time they were married until February, 1940, when her husband,
on the pretext that he would call on some friends, departed from their home with their child
and never returned,
She made inquiries and learned that her husband and child had left for Shanghai. However,
according to Polish citizens who had arrived from that place, he and the child had not been
seen and could not be found.
Because of her husband's absence for more than seven years during which there was no news
from him, she believes that he is dead, thus, Consuelo Sors prays that her husband be
declared dead and that her parental authority over her child, should the latter be alive and
later on appear, be preserved.
TC: Dismiss. (1) It is not for the settlement of the estate of the absentee, and (2) The rule of
evidence establishing the presumption that a person unheard from in seven years is dead,
does not create a right upon which a judicial pronouncement of a decree may be
predicated.

Issue
Whether or not Consuelos petition for her husband to be declared presumptively dead may be
granted. NO.
Ratio

Petition is not for the settlement of estate. Nicolas neither possessed property brought to the
marriage nor had he acquired any property during his married life. The rule invoked by
Consuelo is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is dead
after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been established.
16

This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a
special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent
court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death
cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding.
In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner
against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or
status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact, for the petition does not pray for a
declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be
presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years.
The petition is for a declaration that Consuelo's husband is presumptively dead. But this
declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve her situation, because such a
presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if
final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. Since it is merely disputable,
it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or
matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass.
Once a Court decides a controversy by a final decree, the judgment upon the right or status
of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact becomes res judicata, subject to no
collateral attack, with a few exceptions.
It is therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because
he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to
contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final.
A declaration such as the one prayed for by Consuelo, if granted, might lead her to believe
that the marital bonds which bind her to her husband are torn asunder and that for that
reason she is or may feel free to enter into a new marriage contract. The framers did not
intend and mean that a judicial declaration based solely upon that presumption may be
made. A petition for a declaration such as the one filed in this case may be made in collusion
with the other spouse. If that were the case, then a decree of divorce that cannot be
obtained under the Divorce Law (Act No. 2710) could easily be secured by means of a judicial
decree declaring a person unheard from in seven years to be presumptively dead.

17

Republic v CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763
Feb. 13, 1997
petitioners Republic of the Philippines
respondents CA and Roridel Olaviano Molina (wife)

Panganiban, J.

Cristobal

summary Annulment of Marriage case on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Court handed

down the Molina Doctrine:

1. Burden of proof on plaintiff, to be investigated for collusion by the OSG
2.Root cause must be medically/clinically identified, alleged in the complaint and explained
in the decision
3.Exists at the time of the marriage
4.Incurable relative to spouse (ie nurse not caring for own children)
5.Grave enough to bring about incapability to fulfill marital obligation (disabling factor)
6.Essential marital obligations refer to: Art 68-71, 220-221 and 225
7.Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of Catholic Church should be
observed (respected, persuasive)
8.State participation to protect sanctity of marriage through the fiscal or prosecuting
attorney - serve OSG a copy of the petition

facts of the case

Roridel married Reynaldo Molina on April 14, 1985 and they had a son. After a year, Reynaldo showed
signs of immaturity and irresponsibility, as he preferred to spend more time with friends on whom he
squandered his money, he depended on his parents for aid and was never honest with Roridel regarding
finances, resulting to frequent quarrels between them. Sometime in 1986, he was relieved of his job and Roridel
became the sole breadwinner. In October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of whichtheir
relationship was estranged. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from herjob in Manila and went to live with her
parents in Baguio City, and a few weekslater, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them.
Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground that Reynaldo was
psychologically incapable of complyingwith essential marital obligations.
In his answer, Reynaldo alleged that their quarrels were due to Roridels refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking and running the household, and her failure to handle their finances.
TC declared the marriage void. CA affirmed, concluding that psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment is a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct which, considered as a whole, tends to cause the
union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage. Thus, there is enough reason to leave
the spouses to their individual fates.
Hence this appeal by the Republic represented by the SolGen, contending that opposing and conflicting
personalities is not equivalent to PI.

issue
WON the marriage should be declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity? NO

ratio
There is no clear showing that the psychological defect is an incapacity. It appears to be more of
adifficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of somemarital obligations. Mere
showing of irreconciliable differences and conflictingpersonalities in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough toprove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
marriedpersons it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, dueto some psychological
(not physical) illness.
18

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husbandcould not get along
with each other.The experttestimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but
onlyincompatibility, not psychological incapacity (she testified that the spouses are not unfit for other partners
or for their professions). There is no showing that Reynaldos alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriagecelebration.
Through the help of amici curiae Oscar Cruz of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines and Justice Ricardo Puno, member of the Family Code Revision Committee,
the Court handed down the following guidelines: (Molina doctrine)
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs tothe plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existenceand continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution andnullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c)sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of thecelebration of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinicallypermanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or evenrelative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity mustbe relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarilyto those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability ofthe party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The illness must beshown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
ordifficulty, much less ill will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68-71, 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate MatrimonialTribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controllingor decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clearthat Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee fromCanon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable toassume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal andthe Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decisionshall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues acertification.

19

CHOA v. CHOA
G.R. No. 143376
petitioners Leni Choa
respondents Alfonso Choa

Nov. 26, 2002

Panganiban

Enad

summary Respondent-husband filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of his marriage with

Petitioner-wife for the latters alleged psychological incapacity. The relevant issue here is
WoN respondent presented evidence to establish his wifes psych incapacity such that the
RTC was correct in denying the wifes demurrer to evidence.
Held: The RTC was in GAD when it denied the demurrer. The evidence presented by the
husband (docs showing charges filed against him by his wife; his oral testimony that his
wife was immature, lacked attention to children, and lacked the intention to procreate; the
expert testimony of Dr. Gauzon stating that they were incompatible) failed to show that the
wifes incapacity was characterized by: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.

facts of the case

Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. They have 2 children. In 1993, respondent filed
with the RTC of Negros Occidental a complaint for the annulment of their marriage. He subsequently filed an
amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner based on her alleged
psychological incapacity. After respondent finished presenting his evidence, petitioner filed a MTD (Demurrer
to Evidence).
RTC: denied demurrer. Respondent established a quantum of evidence that petitioner must controvert.
CA: denial of demurrer interlocutory = certiorari under Rule 65 not available. Remedy is for petitioner to
present evidence.

issue
WoN the RTC was in GAD in denying the demurrer. YES. The evidence failed to establish petitioners
psychological incapacity.
WoN certiorari is available to correct and order denying a demurrer to evidence. YES.

ratio
Evidence against petitioner is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that
would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.
Evidence presented by respondent:
(1) He claims that petitioner filed a series of charges against him (perjury, false testimony concubinage, and
deportation). The filing and the prosecution of these cases clearly showed that his wife wanted not only to put
him behind bars, but also to banish him from the country.
SC: Docs presented by respondent do not show the alleged psych incapacity of petitioner. They merely
establish the prosecution of cases against him, not that his wife is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
her marital obligations.
(2) Respondents testimony that his wife wanted to have an abortion before they were even married, that
she was immature, lacked attention to their children, and lacked the intention of procreative sexuality (ano daw).
SC: None of these traits, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Psych incapacity must
be characterized by: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. (Santos v CA)
Psych incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
20

parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Art. 68 FC, include their mutual obligs to live together,
observe love, respect, and fidelity, and render help and support. It must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in the performance of marital
obligations. There should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligs essential to marriage.
Applied: Evidence merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other. There was no
showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union. It
did not show that the psych incapacity was grave enough to bring about the disability of a party to assume the
essential obligs of marriage. Also, how could they have had 2 children if petitioner lacked the intention of
procreative sexuality? Moreover, there was no proof that the defect already existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
(3) Expert testimony of Dr. Gauzon.
SC: The testimony utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psych incapacity. It did
not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically/clinically permanent or incurable. Nor did he testify
that it was grave enough to bring about disability of the party to assume the essential obligs of marriage.
His testimony only establishes that the sps were incompatible, a defect that could possibly be treated or
alleviated through psychotherapy.
Furthermore, the assessment made by the doctor was based merely on descriptions communicated to
him by respondentthere was no examination conducted on petitioner. Thus, he had no personal knowledge
of the facts he testified to, making his testimony unscientific and unreliable.
Thus, the ct was in GAD when it denied petitioners demurrer to evidence.
Re: certiorari availability
GR: interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings.
EXC: certiorari allowed when lower ct acts with GAD in the issuance of an interlocutory order.

21

Barcelona v. CA &Bengzon
G.R. No. 130087
24 September 2003
petitioners Diana M. Barcelona
respondents Court of Appeals and Tadeo R. Bengzon

J. Carpio

Espaola

summary TadeoBengzon filed a petition for Annulment of Marriage against his wife, Diana Barcelona,

which he then moved to withdraw. He then filed a second petition for the same cause of
action based on Article 36 of the Family Code, alleging psychological incapacity that
rendered her unable to fulfill the essential obligations of their marriage. Diana moved to
dismiss the second petition on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action, primarily
because the petition was unable to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity.
The Court disagreed, and held that under the 2, paragraph 6 of the Rules on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, expert
opinion need not be alleged. The root cause of psychological incapacity would be a matter
best determined by experts in the fields of neurological or behavioral science; hence, it
constitutes expert opinion that need not be alleged in the petition. It suffices that the petition
allege the physical manifestations of the psychological incapacitya requisite that Tadeos
petition complies with.

facts of the case

In March 1995, respondent TadeoBengzon filed a petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner
Diana Barcelona, but later filed a Motion to Withdraw the petition, which was granted in June 1995.
In July 1995, Tadeo filed a new Petition for Annulment of Marriage against Dianabased on Article 36 of
the Family Code. In the petition, Tadeo alleged that he and Diana were legally married after a whirlwind
courtship, established their home in Quezon City, and begot five children. However, petitioner Diana was
allegedly psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage, rendering her unable to
comply with the essential obligations of the marriage, to wit:
(a) They frequently quarreled because of their varied upbringing; since Diana came from a rich family, she
was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house, playing tennis all day;
(b) Diana suffered several miscarriages, and one of their children fell ill, causing Diana to withdraw into
herself and refuse to speak to her husband;
(c) During her pregnancy with their fifth child, Diana requested that Tadeo leave their conjugal dwelling,
and in spite of Tadeos attempts at compromise (i.e. occupying another room in the house), he was
forced to leave;
(d) The separation resulted in complete estrangement;
(e) Dianas psychological incapacity, which subsisted up to the present, was conclusively found in a
psychological examination conducted between her and Tadeo.
In response, Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was predicated on two grounds.The first isthat the
petition fails to state a cause of action, because the petition does not allege the following:
(1) The root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity;
(2) That the alleged psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage; and
(3) That it is permanent and incurable.
Second, the petition violates the rule against forum shopping.
The trial court denied Dianas Motion to Dismiss on the ground that contrary to her claim, the allegations
in the second petition show a cause of action, and that the filing of the second petition did not amount to
forum shopping since the first petition had already been dismissed without prejudice.
Diana assailed the trial courts ruling before the Court of Appeals, which sustained the finding that the
allegations in Tadeos second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to
be true. Neither did Tadeo violate the rule against forum shopping: there is no litispendentia since the first
22

petition had been dismissed, and neither was thereres judicata because the dismissal was not a final decision on
the merits of the case. Hence, this petition.

issues
(1) Whether the allegations of the second Petition for Annulment of Marriage sufficiently state a cause of
action. YES. The rules of procedure on absolute nullity and annulment of void and voidable
marriages provide that expert opinion need not be alleged. The root of the psychological incapacity
would constitute expert opinion. It thus need not be alleged in the petition.
(2) [Minor issue] Whether Tadeo violated the rule against forum shopping in filing the second Petition.
NO. The dismissal of the first petition precluded litispendentia, and that dismissal, not being one on
the merits, does not constitute res judicata.

ratio
(1) The second petition complies with the new procedural rules governing absolute nullity and annulment
of void and voidable marriages.
The case of Santos v. CA defined psychological incapacity as
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
Further, Santos states that the law refers to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The
psychological condition must exist at the time of celebration of the marriage.
Subsequent to Santos and the case of Republic v. Molina, the Court adopted the Rules on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, where 2, paragraph (d) states:
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
These new Rules are applicable to the case at hand, given that procedural rules apply to actions pending
and unresolved at the time of their passage. The obvious effect of the new rules in providing that expert
opinion need not be alleged is that there is no need to allege the root cause of psychological incapacity, since
only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine such root
cause.
All that the new Rules require is that the petition allege the physical manifestations indicative of
psychological incapacity; Tadeos second petition complies with this requirement.
Moreover, the second petition definitely states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent
Tadeo, the correlative legal obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana in
violation of Tadeos legal right.
(2) There was neither litispendentianor res judicata.
The Court upheld the CAs findings that there was no litispendentia, since the first petition had already
been dismissed. Neither does the dismissal of the first petition constitute res judicata, since the dismissal was
not a decision on the merits, but was in fact a dismissal without prejudice.

23

RP v. QUINTERO-HAMANO
G.R. No. 149498
May 20, 2004
petitioners REPUBLIC
respondents LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO

Corona

Fernandez

summary Lolita Quintero and Toshio Hamano started a common-law relationship while they were in
Japan. They moved back to the Philippines and had a child. After their marriage, Toshio
went back to Japan and after some time, did no longer responded to the letters of Lolita.
Lolita filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. The trial court ruled that
Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to fulfil his marital obligations as shown by his
irresponsibility and lack of concern to the needs of his family. The CA affirmed this ruling.
The Court however ruled otherwise. Citing Molina, it ruled that the totality of evidence
presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it
was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.

facts of the case

In her complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, Lolita Quintero-Hamano,alleged that in October
1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. Later, they lived in the Philippines for a
month. In 1987, Toshio went back to Japan. In the same year, she gave birth to their child. In 1988,Lolita
and Toshio in MTC Cavite.
Lolita alleged that unknown to her, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage.
o One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas.
Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded.
Sometime in 1991, Lolita learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not
bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given address.
o In 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication.
o Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication,
Lolita filed a to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation which was granted by the court.
The prosecutor filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the parties.
o He prayed that the OCP to be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not
fabricated.
o The trial courtallowed Lolita to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
Trial court rendered declaring the marriage between Lolita and Toshio null and void after finding that
Toshio failed to fulfil his obligations as a husband and as a father. According to the court, Toshio remained
irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of
the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which
characterizes a very immature person.
OSG appealed to the CA but the appellate court upheld the ruling of the trial court.

issue
(1) Did Lolita successfully proved Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities
?NO.

ratio
24

In the ruling in Molina, the court provided guidance in the interpretation and application of FC 36:
o [] (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision []
o The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos:
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability.
o The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically identified.
o However, what is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.
Lolita showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He
abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. She sent him several letters but he never
replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
The totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
assume his marital responsibilities.
o Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to
be due to some kind of psychological illness. After Lolita testified on how Toshio abandoned his
family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological
disorder.
o Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly
helped respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his
illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.There was no showing that the case at bar was not just
an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect
from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage.
o It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,
not physical, illness.
According to the CA, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case
involves a mixed marriage, the husband being a Japanese national.
o In proving psychological incapacity, there is no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino
spouse.

25

Republic v. Encelan
January 9, 2013
BRION, J.
SUMMARY: Cesar filed a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas psychological
incapacity, after learning that Lolita had been having an illicit affair and left the conjugal home. A psychological evaluation report was
presented by Cesar where it was found that Lolita was not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness but had been unable to
provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship. SC HELD that Cesar failed to prove Lolitas
psychological incapacity. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital
obligations.
FACTS:

1979: Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny. To support his family, Cesar went to work in
Saudi Arabia in 1984.

While still in Saudi, Cesar learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez.

Sometime in 1991, Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita
had been separated.

1995: Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on
Lolitas psychological incapacity.

Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin (he is an associate in her promotions business). She insisted that she is not
psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.

At trial, Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National
Center for Mental Health.

Dr. Flores report:

o Lolita was not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness[,] but had been unable to provide the
expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship;
o Her transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her
impatience in attaining her ambitions;
o Her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship.

RTC declared the marriage void. CA originally set aside the verdict of RTC but on MR, affirmed RTCs decision. CA found two
circumstances indicative of Lolitas serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity:
o (1) Lolitas unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and
o (2) Lolitas willful and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.

OSG argues that Dr. Flores psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a
psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not
constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation.
ISSUE + RULING: Whether there is sufficient basis to nullify Cesars marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity (NO)
RATIO:
1. Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on Psychological Incapacity

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides
that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."

Psychological incapacity contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage),
gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.
2. Cesar failed to prove Lolitas psychological incapacity

Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of Lolitas alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, as well
]
as his continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair, but he merely mentioned in
passing Lolitas alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be
shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely
prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.

26

The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness. Lolitas
interpersonal problems with co-workers does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was at the time of her
marriage psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar.
o
Aside from the time element involved, a wifes psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her
professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital
counterparts.
o Lolitas refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a mere
generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.

DISPOSITION: Petition GRANTED. CA amended decision SET ASIDE.

27

YAPTINCHAY v. TORRES
G.R. No. L-26462
June 9 1969
Sanchez
Hermosisima
petitioners Teresita Yaptinchay (aka kabit)
respondents Judge Guillermo Torres (CFI Rizal)Virginia Yaptinchay (special administratrix) etc

summary Case of kabit versus the proper heirs. Teresita Yaptinchay filed an application for

appointment as special administratrix of Isidro Yaptinchays estate, which included a house

and lot in Forbes, Makati. Josephina, Isidros legitimate wife, and his children objected to
this, hence the probate court awarded the administration of the property to Isidros
daughter, Virginia. After losing the administration of the estate, Teresita filed a civil case for
replevin with prayer for prelim injunction to prevent Virginia et al from forcing her out of
the Forbes property. She wanted to dissolve the alleged partnership she had with Isidro in
both contributing to build the Forbes house. The court in the civil case denied said right and
instead ordered Teresita to deliver the Forbes house to Virginia. SC sided with the lower
court. SC held that Teresita failed to show a clear right to the said house to grant her prayer
for injunction. First, she has not provided enough proof to rebut the presumption that a
house built on Isidros land, and at his instance, during the existence of his marriage with
Josephina is conjugal property. The loans she argued were used in building the house
didnt show that they were actually used for building the house in Forbes since some of
them also showed that she used it for her own business and personal expenses.
Even if Teresita argues that there is a presumption of co-ownership as to property
purchased by two people who are living together with the impediments to get married (CC
144), court said Teresita failed to build the presumption in the 1st place since she failed to
show that she contributed in building the house.

facts of the case

-

1st case (probate case)

On July 1965, Teresita Yaptinchay filed with the CFI an application to be appointed as special
administratrix of Isidro Yaptinchays estate, claiming that:
o She has lived with Isidro Yaptinchay continuously for 19 years 1946-65.
o That Isidro died without a will and left an estate with an estimate value of around 500k
o That in her knowledge, Isidro only had three daughters: Virgina, Mary and Asuncion
o That certain people have been stealing personalties from his estate, hence the need of a special
administatrix
Court issued an order appointing Teresita as special administatrix 4 days later. Such appointment was
shortlived since Josefina Yaptinchay and other children of Isidro filed an opposition to her
appointment on the ground that Teresita was not an heir of Isidro, since Josefina was the legitimate
wife. Add to this the fact that she has been living with Isidro for a number of years as her kabit,
Josefina et al argued that Teresita cannot be appointed as special administratrix.
The CFI granted such prayer and instead appointed Virginia Yaptinchay (Isidros daughter) as special
administratrix. As special administratrix, Virginia conducted an inventory of Isidros estate, which
includes the subject property of this case, a house in North Forbes.
2nd case (civil case)
Teresita, being defeated in the probate court, filed civil case 8873, a case for replevin and liquidation of
partnership supposedly formed during her cohabitation with Isidro. By filing this separate civil case for
replevin, the court issued a preliminary injunction ordering Virginia et al from interfering with
Teresitas right of possession of the Forbes property
28

Virgina et al opposed this saying the probate court had jurisdiction over the whole estate of Isidro and
that Teresitas title to the property was in doubt. This is why the court in the 2nd case issued a
preliminary injunction, ordering Teresita to give the Forbes property to Virginia and ordered all of her
representatives to leave the premises.
Since Teresitas MR was denied, she filed this case with the SC

issue
Is Teresita entitled to the injunction she is praying for? No

Ratio
-

It is a principle in law that injunction is not be granted for the purpose of taking property out of
possession and/or control of a party and placing it in that of another whose title has not been clearly
established. Here, although Teresita was in possession of the lot, the probate court already acquired
jurisdiction not only over Isidros exclusive property but also over his conjugal property with his
legitimate wife (who is not Teresita) (and since the special administratrix is an agent of the court,
any property under the jurisdiction of the probate court may be possessed and administered by said
special administratrix)
Teresita keeps on arguing that she also contributed in the purchase and construction of the Forbes lot,
showing loans that she obtained while the house was under construction. The SC however found no
direct correlation between the loans and the construction of the house since the loans did not indicate
its purpose. Some of the loans, on the other hand, listed several purposes for the money borrowed.
With this lack of direct proof, Teresita was not able to override the presumption that the house, having
been constructed on the lot of Isidro at his instance, and during the existence of his marriage with
Josephina, is part of the estate that should be under the control of the special administratrix.
Lastly, Teresita cannot rely on Article 144 of the Civil Code which states that When a man and
woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership
o The creation of the civil relationship of co-ownership under Article 144 must 1st meet the
conditions laid out in the law. One such condition is that there must be a clear showing that
the petitioner, during cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property
involved.
o Until such right to co-ownership is established, Teresitas right to the property cannot be
considered as a present right or title that would give her the privilege of an injunction

29

Fujiki vs. Marinay

G.R. No. 196049
June 26, 2013
Carpio J.
petitioners MINORU FUJIKI
respondents MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND
THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE
summary Fujiki and Marinay were married but eventually lost contact with each other. Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay married Maekara. Marinay suffered from physical abuse from Maekara and
thereafter sought the help of Fujiki. Marinay and Fujiki reestablished their relationship. Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Afterwards, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for the
recognition of such foreign judgement.
HELD: Fujiki has personality to file the petition. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. A direct action is not necessary and a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country would be sufficient.
facts of the case
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship.
In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
RTC: dismissed the case and cited cited the provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)2
Fujikis argments: He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply since a petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a
special proceeding.

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been
residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
2

30

It was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable.
Issue
Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-1110-SC) is applicable. --YES
Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.-- YES
Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries
in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.YES if one of the parties is a foreigner.
ratio
1.

2.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-1110-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
a. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy
b. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact
under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence
and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court
c. To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that
the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, the
service of summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the
judgment of the trial court.
d. This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." The interpretation of the RTC is
tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
a. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil
status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to
cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of
the Japanese Family Court.3
b. There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested
in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public
record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or
dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests
that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.6These property interests in marriage
include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the
property regime of the marriage.
c. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the
validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a]

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
3

31

3.

petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage.
d. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in
a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
e. Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil
aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus,
anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and
prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a
bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a
subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and
preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
f. When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is
therefore interested in the judgment of the suit
g. Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous
marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines.
Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage
in the civil registry.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.
The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
a. Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
b. To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage.
c. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention
of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court
"where the corresponding civil registry is located." In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
d. However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based
on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country.
e. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine
law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an
action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
f. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal
prosecution for bigamy.
g. For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with
an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic
ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties."
h. Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis
for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment
32

i.

nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that
needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of
the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of
the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of
the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."

33

Garcia-Quiazon v Belen
Summary: The natural daughter of a 2nd marriage assailed the validity of the 1st marriage. Her
standing to do so was questioned. SC held that the Civil Code (not FC) applies to the 1 st marriage and
thus, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription.
Facts:
A petition for the issuance of letters of administration was filed by the daughter (Elise) and the
common law wife (Lourdes) of Eliseo
o Elise argues that Eliseos 1st marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous
RTC issued the letters to Elise.
On appeal, the CA declared Eliseos marriage with Amelia void ab initio
Elises standing to attack the validity of the first marriage is being questioned
Issues:
Does Elise, the daughter, have standing to attack the validity of the 1st marriage? YES
Is the 1st marriage void? NO.
Ratio:
(1) Standing
In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights.
Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be
questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. It must be pointed out that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and
not the Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog applicable four-square to the case at
hand. In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by
contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
[C]onsequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the
source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
34

Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced
by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death
of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity
thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of
action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the
death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
(2) 1st Marriage is valid
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between
Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued
by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino
in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the
certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does
not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first
marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no
longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote.
Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time
Amelia and Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage
is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.

NEXT CASE: REPUBLIC v OLAYBAR

35

Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy
G.R. No. L-53703
August 19, 1986
Paras
Recto
petitioners Lilia OlivaWiegel
respondents Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy (presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan
City) and Karl Heinz Wiegel

summary Lilia contracted a first marriage with Eduardo. She contracted a second marriage with Karl.

Karl asked for a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of the prior existing
marriage. Lilia wanted to present evidence that her first marriage was vitiated by force and
that at the time of the first marriage, her first husband was already married to someone else.
There is no need to present evidence because assuming Marriage#1 was vitiated by force, it
would be merely VOIDABLE (valid until annulled) thus when she contracted Marriage #2,
she was still validly married making Marriage #2 VOID.
Assuming Husband#1 already had a wife at the time of celebration of their marriage, there
was no judicial declaration of nullity and therefore at the time of Marriage #2, Marriage #1
was still valid making Marriage #2 VOID.

facts of the case

Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia OlivaWiegel. They were
married on July 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church in Makati. He filed before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court with presiding judge Alicia Sempio-Dy on the ground of Lilias previous
existing marriage to Eduardo Maxion (ceremony was performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes
Church in QC).
Lilia admitted the existence of the prior marriage but claimed that it was null and void because they were
allegedly forced into marriage. At the pre-trial, the parties agreed that the issue was the status of the first
marriage: assuming the presence of force, was the first marriage void or merely voidable?
Lilia asked the court to present evidence: (1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon
both parties; and (2) that the first husband was already married to someone else at the time of their marriage.
Judge Sempio-Dy ruled against presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both
parties were already agreed upon.

issue
Whether or not Lilia could present evidence on those facts NO
(Real issue: status of Lilias marriage to her first husband (VOIDABLE) and to her second husband (VOID)

ratio
No need for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force because assuming it was true, her
first marriage is not void but merely VOIDABLE (CC 85), and therefore valid until annulled.
Since no annulment has been made, she married her second husband while still validly married to the first.
Her second marriage is VOID (CC 80).
No need for Lilia to introduce evidence about the first husbands existing prior marriage at the time they
married each other because their marriage although void, still needs a judicial declaration of such fact. At the
time she contracted her second marriage she was still considered as a married woman, therefore, the marriage
with the second husband is still regarded as VOID.

36

TERREv. TERRE
A.M. No. 2349
July 3, 1992
petitioners Dorothy B. Terre
respondents Atty. Jordan Terre

PER CURIAM

Villarroya

summary Respondent Jordan Terre married complainant Dorothy Terre after he convinced her that
her first marriage to MerlitoBercenilla was void ab initio and had no need for judicial
declaration. Thereafter, he abandoned her and married another woman. The SC declared
him guilty of grossly immoral conduct and disbarred him.

facts of the case

Complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar, with
"grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman, while
his prior marriage with complainant subsisted.
She and respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates. She was then
married to MerlitoBercenilla, while respondent was single. Respondent was aware of her marital status but
still he persistently courted her. She decided nothing would come of it since she was married but he
respondent explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her first husband were first
cousins. Convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him. In their marriage license, respondent wrote "single" as her status
explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such.
They were married in 1977. However, respondent disappeared in 1981. Complainant was unaware of the
reason for his disappearance until she found out that respondent married a certain HelinaMalicdem.
Respondent sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage
with complainant was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was
necessary.

issue
Whether or not respondent is guilty of grossly immoral conduct. YES, respondent is disbarred!

ratio
Respondents pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into
believing that her prior marriage to MerlitoBercenilla, being incestuous and void ab initio, she was free to
contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that
such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that respondent held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same
result will follow. For if we are to hold him to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy
Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to HelinaMalicdem must be regarded as
bigamous and criminal in character.
The conduct of respondent inveigling complainant to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning
complainant after she had cared for him and supported him through law school, leaving her without means
for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with HelinaMalicdem while his first
marriage was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the
first place.

37

MORIGO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 145226
6 Feb 2004
petitioners LUCIO MORIGO Y CACHO
respondents PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Quisumbing, J.

Gan

summary Lucio and Lucia were married. Lucia applied for and was granted a divorce decree by the

Ontario Court. Subsequently, Lucio remarried. He filed for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Lucia on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Instead,
the parties merely signed the marriage contract without the presence of a solemnizing
officer. Lucio was convicted by the RTC for bigamy. While the bigamy case was pending
before the CA, the RTC declared his marriage to Lucia void ab initio.
The Supreme Court acquitted Lucio. Under the principle of retroactivity of marriage being
declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. Petitioner was not
married to Lucia when he married Maria Jececha. Therefore, the first element of bigamy is
lacking.

facts of the case

- LUCIO Morigo and LUCIA Barrete were boardmates at a house in Bohol for four years (from 1974
to 1978). After school year 1977-78, Lucio and Lucia lost contact with each other.
- In 1984, they reconnected and became sweethearts. Lucia worked in Canada but they maintained
constant communication.
- In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and both agreed to get married. On Sep 1990, Lucia
reported back to work in Canada leaving Lucio behind.
- On Aug 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against Lucio.
This was granted on Jan 17, 1992 and took effect on Feb 17, 1992
- On Oct 4, 1992, Lucio married Maria Jececha Lumbago.
- On Sep 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage (with Lucia)
in the RTC of Bohol on ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place (CIVIL CASE)
- On Oct 1993, Lucio was charged with bigamy (CRIM CASE)
- (CRIM CASE) RTC: found Lucio guilty of bigamy.
It ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The
parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be
the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to remarry.
The Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia is not entitled to recognition.
- (CIVIL CASE) RTC: declared the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no
marriage ceremony actually took place.
This decision was rendered while the CRIM CASE was pending with the CA.
- (CRIM CASE) CA: affirmed Lucios conviction for bigamy.
It could not acquit Lucio because what is sought to be punished by Art. 349 RPC is the act of
contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the fact that
the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
38

 The MR was denied but denial was by a split vote. The dissent observed that as the first
marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since
the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was,
in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of
bigamy.
issue
Whether petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.NO. Lucio did not
commit bigamy as his first marriage was declared void ab initio or legally inexistent. Under the eyes of the
law, Luciowas never married to Lucia. His defense of good faith is now moot and academic.

Ratio
Petitioner: submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the
Ontario Court. His lack of criminal intent is material as the crime of bigamy is mala in se, hence, good faith
and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense.
OSG: counters that petitioners contention that he was good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the
Ontario Court is negated by his act of filing the CIVIL CASE seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lucia.

SC:
- The elements of bigamy:
1. the offender has been legally married;
2. the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
3. he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
4. the subsequent marriagewould have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
- The trial court found that no actual marriage ceremony was performed between Lucio and Lucia by
a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the
two, without the presence of the solemnizing officer. Thus, the RTC held that the marriage is void
ab initio in accordance with Art. 3 and 4 FC.
- This means that there was no marriage to begin with and such declaration of nullity retroacts to the
date of the first marriage. Reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab
initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was under the eyes of the law
never married.
- Under the principle of retroactivity of marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never
married from the beginning. Petitioner was not married to Lucia when he married Maria Jececha.
Therefore, the first element of bigamy is lacking.
As distinguished from the case of Mercado v. Tan
- Similarity: the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was obtained AFTER the second
marriage was celebrated.
- Difference:
In Mercado, the first marriage was solemnized not just once, but twice.
39

o First, before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued. Second, six months later
before a priest in religious rites
o Ostensibly, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab
initio
In this case, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing
officer.
o Lucio and Lucia merely signed a marriage contract. This act bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity.
o Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage
for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
- The issue of the validity of Lucios defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent is now moot
and academic.
Held: Acquitted.

40

TENEBRO v. CA
G.R. No. 150758

February 18, 2004

Ynares-Santiago, J.

Gonzales

petitioners VeronicoTenebro
respondents Court of Appeals
summary Tenebro married Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro later left the conjugal dwelling which

he shared with Ancajasstating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes, the woman he is
previously married to (Villareyes marriage not dissolved). On January 1993, Tenebro
contracted another marriage with a certain Villegas. Ancajas filed a criminal case for
bigamy. RTC and CA convicted Tenebro of the crime of bigamy. Tenebro appealed to the
SC. One of his defenses was that the marriage with Ancajas was declared void ab initio due
to psychological incapacity (thus no 2nd marriage to speak of). SC affirmed conviction.
SC: the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally
liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

facts of the case

VeronicoTenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro
and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this
previous marriage, Tenebro left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajasstating that he was going
to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, Tenebro contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to
petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, VeronicoTenebro, was indeed her
husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.RTC found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
In his appeal to the SC, Tenebro presented a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his
first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.

issue
Whether or not the declaration of nullity of the 2nd marriage due to psychological incapacity constitute a valid
defense for bigamyNO.
WoN there was a first marriageYES. Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

ratio
[relevant] Effect of the declaration of absolute nullity of the 2nd marriage due to psychological incapacity
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does
not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned.
As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
41

marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage
is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the
validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties
and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the
solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their
agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner
and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with
the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence
of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that
children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise
of futurity and commitment.
As to the existence of the first marriage
The prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the
first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a
copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the
document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and
certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to
Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, Tenebro presented (1) a certification issued by the National
Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated
February 3, 1997. Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage
celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
The documents presented by Tenebro merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of
such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary
evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying
merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no
requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition
precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate
the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. There is no evidence presented by the defense
that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart
from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter,
Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners
own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
42

Separate Opinion, Vitug:

Except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage,
prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy.
A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The provision has been from
Canon law primarily to reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with those of church
laws.The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the essential marital obligations of the spouses is
completely distinct from other grounds for nullity which are confined to the essential or formal requisites of a
marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence
of a marriage license, or the like.
The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties thereto may be said
to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until it is judicially
decreed to be a nullity. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to assume, that the spouses rights and
obligations, property regime and successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it were a voidable
marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially declared void for basically two reasons: First, psychological
incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage under the Family Code, breaches neither the essential nor
the formal requisites of a valid marriages;and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e., relationship,
minority of the parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties) which are capable of relatively easy
demonstration, psychological incapacity, however, being a mental state, may not so readily be as evident. It would have
been logical for the Family Code to consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it were not
for apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and nomenclature.
Since psychological incapacity does not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal,
in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that
ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of
nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the
marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of
nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection of
the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of the offender who had entered into it.
Dissent, Carpio:
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. The offender is legally married;
2. The marriage is not legally dissolved;
3. The offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. The second or subsequent marriage is valid except for the existence of the first marriage.
The first three elements reiterate the language of the law. The last element, the validity of the second marriage
except for the existence of the first marriage, necessarily follows from the language of the law that the offender
contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
If the second marriage is void ab initio on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, then legally
there exists no second marriage. Article 35 of the Family Code enumerates the marriages that are void from
the beginning. The succeeding article, Article 36, declares that a marriage contracted by one psychologically
incapacitated shall likewise be void. Article 1409 of the Civil Code declares inexistent and void from the
beginning contracts expressly x xx declared void by law. Thus, a marriage contracted by one
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage is legally inexistent and void from the beginning.
43

Such void marriage cannot constitute a second marriage to sustain a conviction for bigamy under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code.

44

CAPILI v PEOPLE
G.R. No. 183805
July 3, 2013
Carpio, J.
James
Walter
P.
Capili
petitioners
respondents PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI

JDG

summary Basically, the petitioner contracted a second marriage (to Shirley) while his first marriage
(Karla)was subsisting. This is a criminal case for bigamy filed against P James by Shirley
(second marriage), while there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second
marriage filed by Karla (first marriage). RTC dismissed the criminal case because the other
court declared the nullity of the second marriage for being bigamous. CA reversed. SC
affirmed CA.

45

facts of the case

On June 28, 2004, P James was charged with the crime of bigamy before RTC Pasig City:
o Because on December 8, 1999 while being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y.
Medina-Capili, James contracted a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo
James filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings:
o there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of
Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili;
o in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge
of bigamy; and
o he pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a
prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
RTC Antipolo: Marriage of James and Shirley is void ab initio on the ground that a subsequent marriage
contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
RTC Pasig: Granted the MTD filed by James and declared that there is no bigamy because there the
second marriage was already declared void and inexistent.
CA: Reversed and remanded back to RTC Pasig.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
W/N the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case
for bigamy. NO. Finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners second marriage does not impede
the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
ratio
1. All elements of bigamy are present when the Information was filed on June 28.
Elements: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or,
in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between James and Shirley was contracted on December 8,
1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili
contracted on September 3, 1999. The RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the
second marriage. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
2. Bigamy exist, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as
the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated
Crime was consummated at the moment of celebration of second marriage.
Even if a spouse eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must
be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that
instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.

disposition
CA affirmed.

People v. Odtuhan
July 17 2013
Ponente: Peralta, J.
R. del Rosario

FACTS:
On July 2, 1980, Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina (Modina). On
October 28, 1993, Odtuhan married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon). Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for
annulment of his marriage with Modina.
On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondents petition and declared his marriage with
Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.
On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned
of respondents previous marriage with Modina. She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent with Bigamy.
RTC: denied Motion to quash
CA: reversed RTC.
ISSUES/HELD:
Whether or not the declaration of nullity after the celebration of subsequent marriage prevents the prosecution for bigamy
(NO)
Whether or not the defense of a declaration of nullity can be raised in a motion to quash (NO)
RATIO:
Elements of Bigamy
(1) That the offender has been legally married;
(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally married to Modina; (2) that
without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted
a second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Respondents evidence showing the courts declaration that his marriage to Modina is null and void from the beginning
because of the absence of a marriage license is only an evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the
information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the second marriage. This should not be
considered at all, because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter
o A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground
for defense. It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.
o Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
o Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy
DISPOSITION: PETITION GRANTED. CA REVERSED. Case REMANDED to RTC for Trial.

GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN
G.R. No. 201061
July 3, 2013
Sally
Go-Bangayan
petitioners
respondents Benjamin Bangayan, Jr.

Carpio, J.

Guidote

summary Respondent Benjamin contracted a first marriage with Azucena. While this marriage was
still subsisting, he cohabited with petitioner Sally. Since Sallys father did not approve of
their arrangement, Benjamin & Sally signed a purported marriage contract. The parties
relationship turned sour, and Sally filed a criminal case for bigamy and falsification against
Benjamin. He responded by filing an action to declare their marriage void. The court ruled
that their marriage was void for want of a marriage license. There was no bigamy
committed because the marriage did not possess all the requisites for its validity (no
marriage license). The property relations of the spouses are governed by Art. 148 of the
Family Code.
N.B. This case seems to have no relation to the topic Requisite for valid remarriage FC40
on page 9 of the syllabus. It will however be discussed again under Unions under FC 148
on page 21.
facts of the case
On 10 Sept. 1973, respondent Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) married Azucena Alegre (Azucena).
This marriage was never declared void or annulled.
Sometime in 1979, he developed a romantic relationship with petitioner Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally). As
Azucena had left for the US, Benjamin and Sally decided to live together without the benefit of
marriage.
To appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Pasig where they signed a purported
contract. The signing of the marriage contract took place on 7 Mar. 1982.
Benjamin and Sally had two children, Bernice and Bentley.
During the period of their cohabitation, the couple acquired a total of 44 properties.
In 1994, Benjamin and Sally separated. Sally filed criminal cases for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin.
In turn, Benjamin filed an action to declare his marriage to Sally void and/or non-existent.
o Grounds:
Bigamous
Lacked formal requisites
In the civil action, Benjamin completed his presentation of evidence. Sally filed a demurrer, which was
denied. She filed a Rule 65 certiorari petition with the CA.
Back in the trial court, trial was reset six times at Sallys insistence. Thus, the judge considered the case
submitted for decision. Sally was no longer able to present any evidence.
RTC: Marriage null and void.
o Not a bigamous marriage since the nullity of the second marriage rests on the lack of a
marriage license.
o Under Art. 148, the properties were partitioned as follows:
37 properties inherited by Benjamin his exclusive property;
Two lots in Benjamins name his exclusive property;
Five other properties part of the conjugal partnership.
o Sally forfeited her share in the properties because she acted in bad faith.
CA: Modified partition of the properties.

o 37 properties exclusive to Benjamin (inheritance);

o 4 properties exclusive to Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamins actual contribution in their
purchase;
o 2 properties exclusive to Benjamin;
o One property conjugal in character.
Hence, this petition.

Issues
1. WoN Sally waived her right to present evidence before the trial court. YES.
2. WoN the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is void and non-existent. YES.
3. WoN the partition of the properties was in accordance with Art. 148, FC. YES.
ratio
3. Sally waived her right to present evidence as the postponements were at her insistence.
There were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October
2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sallys instance.
The trial court warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be
submitted for decision.
By her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her right to present
them.
4. The marriage is void for want of a marriage license.
First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial
court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract.
o At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the
marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
The Registration Officer of the Pasig City Civil Registrar testified that no marriage license was ever
issued to Benjamin and Sally.
o A certification was issued to this effect, and the certification enjoys probative value.
The purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not registered with the local civil registrar
and the NSO.
Although Benjamin was the informant in Bernices birth certificate, such document erroneously states
that he and Sally were married on 8 March 1982, whereas the marriage contract said it was on 7
March.
There is no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab
initio and, at the same time, non-existent.
o The marriage is void under Art. 35 (3).
o The marriage is also non-existent, following NCC1409.4
The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was NOT bigamous.
o If the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other
causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed.
o For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites
for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.

Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

5. The CA correctly partitioned the properties.

Since Benjamin & Sally cohabited without the benefit of marriage, the properties acquired by them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions.
Although some of the disputed properties were registered under the descriptive title married to
Sally/Benjamin, such titles do not prove co-ownership. They merely indicate the civil status of the
registered owner.
Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under
Article 148 of the Family Code.
disposition
CA affirmed.

Jocson v Robles
G.R. No. L-23433
February 10, 1968
GLORIA
G.
JOCSON
petitioners
respondents RICARDO R. ROBLES

REYES

Leynes

summary Plaintiff commenced an action for the annulment of marriage. Defendant also assailed the

marriage and filed a motion for summary judgment. Court denied said motion stating that
the evidentiary requirement to establish that the defendant was previously married was not
established. The SC agreed, stating that the first paragraph of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree of annulment of
a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.

facts of the case

On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced an action for the annulment of marriage to Ricardo R.
Robles on the ground that it was bigamous. Plaintiff alleged that defendant was previously married before
their marriage.
In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage. But he charged plaintiffs' parents with
having compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to contract that marriage with her notwithstanding
their knowledge that he is a married man.
Defendant then filed a MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, on the ground that no genuine issue of
fact is involved.
On December 23, 1963, defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, the court ruling there is
necessity for proof that when he contracted marriage with plaintiff, defendant Robles had a previous and
subsisting valid marriage.
The evidentiary requirement to establish these facts, according to the court, was not met in the motion for
summary judgment.
Defendant's plea to have his marriage declared as having been brought about by force and intimidation,
was also denied, the court finding indications of collusion between the parties in their attempt to secure the
nullification of said marriage.

issue
WON the appeal should prosper. NO. A decree of annulment of marriage cannot be rendered upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.

ratio
ON THE MERITS
The Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in view of the first
paragraph of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of
a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits
annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the
Civil Code.
SIDE NOTE: Procedural
There is no indication or certification or proof that the filing of the appeal notice, bond and record on
appeal on April 17, 1964 were made within the reglementary period, as required by the provisions of Section 6,
Revised Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
The record on appeal must contain "such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time."
This requirement was held to be jurisdictional, failure to comply with which shall cause the dismissal of
the appeal. There is here no showing that the present appeal was perfected within the reglementary period,
which datum should have appeared in the record on appeal.

Tolentino v. Villanueva
56 SCRA 1

Mar. 15, 1974

J. Makasiar

Nuez

petitioners
respondents
summary Plaintiff wanted to annul his marriage. Wife failed to appear despite summons. Judge
Romulo Tolentino
Helen Villanueva and Judge Corazon Agrava

directed fiscal to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties. Plaintiff
refused to cooperate and thus the case was dismissed.
SC upheld the dismissal, saying that since a marriage is a special contract, the law does not
allow its annulment based on stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. The institution
of marriage is so sacred and the State has an interest to protect it against desecration by
collusion or fabricated evidence. Thus, in these cases the fiscal is authorized by law to
investigate whether there was collusion between the parties.

facts of the case

Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to Helen Villanueva, alleging that his consent
was obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he discovered that wife was
pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that
they did not live as husband and wife as immediately after the marriage celebration, Helen Villanueva left his
house and her whereabouts remained unknown to him until January, 1962 when he discovered that she is
residing in San Francisco, Cebu.
Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen failed to file a
responsive pleading, for which reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default.
Judge set the date for presentation of evidence but directed the fiscal to investigate whether there was
collusion between the parties.
Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case, issued a subpoena to petitioner's counsel
requiring him to bring petitioner with him as well as copies of other documents in connection with the
annulment case.
Plaintiff's counsel informed Assistant City Fiscal Jose that he could not comply with the subpoena for it
will unnecessarily expose his evidence.
Judge denied the aforesaid motion of petitioner unless he submits himself for interrogation by the City
Fiscal to enable the latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the parties. Because plaintiff
continued to refuse, the case was dismissed.

issue
Whether the judge's order was correct. YES.

ratio
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in
suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment and direct that in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney
shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff.

Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950 Civil Code of the Philippines, direct that actions for
the annulment of marriage or divorce shall not be decided unless the material facts alleged in the complaint
are proved.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions of
marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses;
because the State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social
institutions against desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition
against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by nonappearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties;
and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting
officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds.

Buccat v. Buccat
G.R. No. 47101
25 April 1941
J. Horrilleno
GODOFREDO
BUCCAT,
demandante-apelante,
petitioners
respondents LUIDA MANGONON DE BUCCAT, demandada-apelada.

Ortiz

summary Godofredo and Luida got married. After 89 days, Luida gave birth to a son. Godofredo

wanted to annul their marriage on the ground that he was led to believe that she was a
virgin. The court ruled that the marriage should not be annulled. It was unlikely that
Godofredo did not suspect anything about the pregnancy given the advanced stage it was
already in. Marriage is a sacred institution: the foundation of the society. Clear and
convincing evidence must be shown in order to nullify a marriage. This was not shown in
this case.

facts of the case

On 26 November 1938, Godofredo and Luida were married in Baguio City.
On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son.
After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her.
Godofredo seeks the annulment of this marriage on the ground that, in consenting to the marriage, he did
it because the defendant had assured him that she was virgin.

issue
WON marriage should be annulled on the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage.
NO

ratio
The court did not find any evidence that the pregnancy was concealed at the time of the marriage. It was
unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about the pregnancy considering
that it was already in an advanced stage when they got married.
Marriage is a sacred institution: the foundation of the society. Clear and convincing evidence must be
shown in order to nullify a marriage. This was not shown in this case.

Aquino v. Delizo
G.R. No. L-15853
July 27, 1960
FERNANDO
AQUINO
petitioners
respondents CONCHITA DELIZO

Guttierez David

Ramos

summary Husband filed an annulment case against wife based on the ground of fraud, alleging that

his wife was pregnant with another man during their marriage. He said that FOUR months
after their marriage, she already gave birth to a child. Only evidence he presented was their
marriage contract and his testimony.
TC dismissed his case saying concealment of pregnancy does not constitute fraud as would
annul a marriage.
CA denied his motion for new trial (coz he wanted to present further evidence) and said
that it was not impossible that he impregnated his wife before they got married and it
would be unbelievable that he would not have noticed that his wife was pregnant during
their marriage.
SC held CA should not have denied husbands motion for new trial since he could have
adduced sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by him. In comparison to Buccatwhere the
wife was 7 months pregnant, in this case the wife was only FOUR months pregnant during
their marriage. The Court said it would be hard to say that her pregnancy was readily
apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by petitioner. CASE
REMANDED.

facts of the case

Petitioner (husband) filed an annulment case against respondent (wife) based on the ground of fraud, it
being alleged that respondent, at the date of her marriage to petitioner, concealed from the latter that fact that
she was pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four months after their marriage,
gave birth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock
between her and the plaintiff.
Only the plaintiff however, testified during trial and the only documentary evidence presented was the
marriage contract between the parties. Defendant neither appeared nor presented any evidence despite the
reservation made by her counsel that he would present evidence on a later date.
TC: dismissed the complaint holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not
constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage.
CA: it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their
engagement so that the child could be their own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not
notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he married her, it affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint.
*Note: Petitioner filed a motion for new trial for the reception of new evidence

issue
WON petitioner is entitled for an annulment (Case remanded)

ratio
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art.
85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat cited in the decision sought to be
reviewed, which was also an action for the annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that

he did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held to be unbelievable, it having been proven
that the latter was already in an advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage.
That pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the defendant wife was alleged to be
only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not
prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat
as alleged by plaintiff (what a douche).It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the
woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general
and apparent.
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together with what has
already been adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The CA
shouldnot have denied the motion praying for new trial simply because defendant failed to file her answer
thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial
fiscal has been ordered of represent the Government precisely to prevent such collusion.

Anaya v. Palaroan
G.R. No. L-27930
November 26, 1970
Aurora
A.
Anaya
petitioners
respondents Fernando O. Palaroan

JBL Reyes

Recto

summary Fernando filed an action for annulment of his marriage to Aurora on the ground that his

consent was obtained through force and intimidation. CFI dismissed the complaint and
while the counterclaim was negotiated, he revealed he had a pre-marital relationship with a
second relative. The non-disclosure of a pre-marital relationship is not a ground for fraud.
The secret intention of her husband not to perform his marital duties must have been
discovered by the wife soon after the marriage. Her action for annulment based on fraud
should have been brought within 4 years after the marriage, now already barred.

facts of the case

Aurora and Fernando were married on Dec. 4, 1953. Fernando filed an action for annulment of marriage on
Jan 7, 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. CFI Manila dismissed
the complaint. While the counterclaim of Aurora was being negotiated, Fernando revealed that several months
prior to their marriage, he had a pre-marital relationship with a close relative. Aurora prayed for annulment of
marriage and moral damages on the ground of fraud in obtaining her consent.
Fernando denied having a pre-marital relationship with a close relative and denied any fraud. He set up
the defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppel for praying for the validity of the marriage. He
counterclaimed for damages for filing a malicious suit. He did not pray for the dismissal fo the complaint but
for its dismissal wrt the alleged moral damages.
Aurora alleged that prior to their marriage, he pretended to shower her with love only because he was
trying to escape marriage to the close relative of his. He contracted the marriage with the secret intent not to
perform the marital duties and obligations. He left for a third girl who he cohabited with and had several
children.
CFI found that Auroras allegation of fraud was legally insufficient to validate her marriage. CFI dismissed
the case.

issue
Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another
woman is a ground for annulment of marriage NO

ratio
Under CC 85 (4)5, fraud as a vice of consent in marriage may be a cause for its annulment. CC 866
enumerated the species of fraud as a vice of consent.
The intent of Congress was to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as a ground for
annulment to those 3 instances in CC 86. This may be deduced from the fact that of all the causes of nullity in
CC 85, fraud is the only one given special treatment in the subsequent article. CC 86 was also enacted to deal

5Art.85.Amarriagemaybeannulledforanyofthefollowingcauses,existingatthetimeofthemarriage:

xxx
(4)Thattheconsentofeitherpartywasobtainedbyfraud, unless
suchpartyafterwards,withfullknowledgeofthefactsconstitutingthefraud,freelycohabitedwiththeotherasherhusbandorhiswife,asthecasemayb
e
6 Article 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty
imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of marriage.

with fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article and proceeds with enumerating the specific
frauds.
Non-disclosure of a husbands pre-marital relationship is not one of those enumerated that constitutes a
ground for annulment. It is further excluded by the last paragraph of CC 86 that no other misrepresentation
or deceit as to chastity shall be a ground to annul a marriage.
Auroras contention in her reply that Fernando paid court to her without any intent to comply with his
marital duties is an entirely new and additional cause of action. Such allegations are improper because a party
is not permitted to amend or change the cause of action set forth in the complaint. Such secret intention of her
husband not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage.
Hence, her action for annulment based on fraud should have been brought within 4 years after the marriage.
Since the wedding was celebrated in December 1953, this ground being pleaded only in 1966, it must be
declared barred.

Juanita Sison vs Te Lay Ti

CA No. 7037-R
May 7, 1952
Reyes J.B.L.
Chua
Petitioners Juanita Sison
Respondents Te Lay Ti
Summary A marriage was arranged by Juanitas father, as was customary among Chinese,
between her and Te. Juanita refused and ran away from home however her father
succeeded in bringing her back. She was kept locked in their house until the day of
her wedding where she was handed a knife and told to choose between losing her
life or his (father) if she did not marry Te. Thus she was married to Te twice, before a
Judge and the Chinese Consul. The Court declared the marriage null and void on
the ground that the brides consent was obtained by force and intimidation.
Although such vice in consent may be ratified by cohabitation, such must be
voluntary. In this case, even though Juanita lived in the same roof with her husband,
she was kept a virtual prisoner thereat. She never acquiesced to her status as Tes
wife.
Facts of the Case

Issue

Juanita wants her two marriages, celebrated one after another on April 28, 1949 to Te
be declared null and void for having been obtained through force and intimidation
employed by her father. They were first married in the morning by Judge Hofilena and
then in the afternoon by Chinese Consul Mih in accordance with the rites of China.
Juanita testified that her father first brought up the topic of marriage two weeks before
its celebration. Prior to this, Te never wooed her. She refused but her father whipped
her as often as she opposed the proposed marriage.
Two days before the wedding she ran away from home. She went to the office of the
Fiscal but her father came to get her with the promise that he would no longer force
her to marry against her will.
However, upon return, she was kept locked in the house. The morning of her wedding
day, her father handed her a knife telling her to choose between losing her life or his if
she did not marry Te. Because of fear that her father might kill her, Juanita consented.
Juanita related that although she married Te, she had always considered him a
stranger. He kept her a prisoner in their house. Even if they sleep in the same room, she
never occupied the same bed but slept in a chair.
They never had sexual intercourse except for one instance, one month after their
wedding in the early morning when Te forced her with a knife to submit to his wishes,
for which she mustered enough courage to escape from her husbands home.
Te claims that their marriage, in all respects, was regular and legal. He said that she
was not kept a prisoner but used to go out often; that one day she left carrying with
her Php1,200; when asked, the latter retorted that it was none of his business; that
because of her scathing remarks and aggressive attitude, he slapped her. She left his
house in the morning and in the afternoon he was summoned by the police for
maltreatment of his wife.

Whether or not Juanitas consent to the marriage was procured by force and intimidation. YES.
Whether or not such was ratified by cohabitation. NO.

Ratio
Juanitas testimony was corroborated by her mother and is even supported by Tes witnesses.
Judge Hofilena who officiated the marriage admitted on cross that Juanita came to him
shortly before her marriage and confided to him that she was being compelled by her father
to marry a man she did not like. It was for this reason that the Judge requested an additional
witness in the person of Mr. Teng as a precautionary measure.
Mr. Teng testified that during the ceremony he noticed that the Judge was irked by the
hesitant attitude displayed by the bride. He also testified that Juanitas father solicited his help
in going to the Fiscal to take his daughter back home, during which the former confessed that
his daughter did not want to marry according to his wishes.
Nowhere in the record was it ever denied by Te that Juanita was induced to marry him only
through fear and compulsion. Her father, which would have been the most logical witness to
refute the allegations, was never presented.
As a general rule, the law will not look behind the appearance of consent which was clearly
manifested to determine its reality. However, mere words without any corresponding intention
will not create the marriage relation. Notwithstanding that the formalities indicating consent
have been complied with, there is no valid marriage where the parties do not intend to enter
into the marriage.
On second point, while a marriage effected by force or intimidation may be ratified and
confirmed by cohabitation, such cohabitation must be voluntary. It is clear from Juanitas
testimony that there was no voluntary cohabitation on her part and she never acquiesced to
the status of wife.

Ruiz v. Atienza
No. 5986 (Ct. App.)
petitioners Jose Ruiz
respondents PelagiaAtienza

March 18, 1941

Bengzon

Reynes

summary Jose Ruiz alleged that he was forced into marrying PelagiaAtienza, i.e. her father threatened

him with bodily harm; her cousin-in-law who was a lawyer threatened to obstruct his
admission to the bar. The CA ruled that Ruiz was not forced into marrying Pelagia. The
threat of bodily harm was not sufficiently proven the threat of obstructing Ruizs admission
to the bar was a lawful threat; and Ruiz had many opportunities to walk away.

facts of the case(case in Spanish; digest based on Dawn Chuas digest available at Blessings)
1. Jose RUIZ and PELAGIA Atienza were both sweethearts prior to Feb. 1938, when they had sex.
PELAGIA became pregnant and gave birth on Nov. 14, 1936.
2. After the babys birth, Jose Atienza and Atty. Villavicencio (PELAGIAs father and cousin-in-law,
respectively), with three other persons, visited RUIZ in his boarding house. There, they requested
and convinced RUIZ to marry PELAGIA.
3. RUIZ went with his cousin, Jose Atienza, and companions to PELAGIA, who joined them to go to
the Aglipayan Church where they secured a marriage license. That evening, they returned to the
church and celebrated the marriage.
4. Four days later, RUIZ filed a suit to secure the avoidance of the marriage, alleging that he had
been forced into wedlock in the following manner:
a. PELAGIAs father threatened him with a balisong;
b. Villavicencio intimidated him by saying that he would have difficulty when he would take
the bar examinations as many have been rejected admission to the bar on the ground of
immorality;
c. Villavicencios promise that RUIZ would be physically safe if he would go with them and
d. He was practically kidnapped until after the ceremony.

issue
W/N the RUIZ was forced into wedlock by violence or duress NO, he was not.

ratio
RUIZ was not forced into wedlock by violence or duress.
PELAGIAs father did not threaten RUIZ.
o It appears that in the course of the visit, RUIZ stated that he could not marry PELAGIA because
he was already a married man. This prompted PELAGIAs father to grab RUIZ by the necktie
and say, So you mean to fool my daughter! This altercation was quickly stopped as those
present quickly intervened.
o It was not established that PELAGIAs father displayed any balisongor made any threat against
the life of RUIZ.
In fact, only a 1.5-inch knife was found in PELAGIAs fathers possession by the
policeman who arrived upon seeing signs of trouble.
Villavicencios threat to obstruct RUIZs admission to the bar does not constitute duress.
o Where a man marries under the threat of or constraint from a lawful prosecution for seduction or
bastardy, he cannot avoid the marriage on the ground of duress.
From Villavicencios promise of safety, it cannot be inferred that Ruiz would not be safe if he did not
follow him.
RUIZ had many occasions to escape. He had companions in the house from whom he could have asked
for help; and there was even a policeman.

Law presumes strongly the validity of marriage once the formal ceremonies have been completed.
RUIZ was not able to successfully meet the issues upholding the judges conclusion of fact that neither
violence nor duress attended the marriage celebration.

SARAOv. GUEVARA
(CA) 40 OG 1st supp. 263
petitioners B. Sarao
respondents Pilar Guevara

Villarroya

summary Plaintiff and respondent were unable to consummate their marriage because the latter

complained of pains in her vagina. Eventually, a tumor was found and her uterus and
ovaries had to be removed, rendering her barren. Plaintiff filed a petition for annulment on
the ground of impotency. The SC dismissed his petition because impotency, to be a valid
ground, must be an inability to copulate and not a mere inability to reproduce. Barrenness
does not invalidate a marriage.

facts of the case

Plaintiff and respondent were married.On their wedding day, plaintiff tried to consummate the marriage.
However, respondent showed reluctance and begged him towait until evening. Although he found theorifice
of her vagina sufficiently large forhis organ, she complained of pains in her vagina later that night. Plaintiff
alsonoticed oozing of some purulent matteroffensive to the smell coming fromdefendants vagina.
Upon the physicians advice, respondents uterus and ovaries were removed dueto the presence of a
tumor. The removal of said organs rendered her incapableof procreation.Plaintiff declared that from the time
hewitnessed the operation, he lost all desireto have sex with his wife and thus filedthis complaint for
annulment of marriageon the ground of impotency.

issue
Whether or not their marriage can be annulled on the ground of impotency. NO

ratio
Plaintiff wants to construe the phrase physically incapable of entering into themarried stateas incapacity
toprocreate. However, impotency is not the inabilityto procreate but the inability to COPULATE.The defect
must be one of copulation and not of reproduction. Barrenness will not invalidate the marriage.The removal
of the organs rendered respondent sterile but it by no means made her unfitfor sexualintercourse.

JIMENEZ v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-12790
Aug 31, 1960
plaintiff Joel Jimenez
defendant Remedios Canizares
intervenor Republic of the Philippines

Padilla, J.

Casila

summary Jimenez seeks the annulment of his marriage to Canizares upon the ground that the orifice of her
vagina is too small to allow copulation. CFI ordered Canizares to submit to a physical examination
but she never did. CFI annulled the marriage. SC set aside the decree and held that the wifes
impotency has not been satisfactorily established. Impotency being an abnormal condition should not
be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency.

facts of the case

Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to Canizares upon the ground that the orifice of her vagina is too
small to allow the penetration of a penis for copulation. For that reason, he left the conjugal home two nights and one day
after they had been married.
Canizares was summoned and served but she did not file an answer. CFI entered an order requiring her to submit to a
physical examination to determine her physical capacity for copulation . She was granted additional five days to comply
with warning that her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the required doctors certificate would be
deemed lack of interest and judgment upon the evidence presented by her husband would be rendered.
CFI entered a decree annulling the marriage. The city attorney filed MR but was denied.

issue
W/N the marriage may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified
that his wife was and is impotent - NO

ratio
Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established because from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein.
A physical examination in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being
compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of the husband is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have
bound them together as husband and wife.

Jocson v Robles
G.R. No. L-23433
February 10, 1968
GLORIA
G.
JOCSON
petitioners
respondents RICARDO R. ROBLES

REYES

Leynes

summary Plaintiff commenced an action for the annulment of marriage. Defendant also assailed the

marriage and filed a motion for summary judgment. Court denied said motion stating that
the evidentiary requirement to establish that the defendant was previously married was not
established. The SC agreed, stating that the first paragraph of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree of annulment of
a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.

facts of the case

On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced an action for the annulment of marriage to Ricardo R.
Robles on the ground that it was bigamous. Plaintiff alleged that defendant was previously married before
their marriage.
In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage. But he charged plaintiffs' parents with
having compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to contract that marriage with her notwithstanding
their knowledge that he is a married man.
Defendant then filed a MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, on the ground that no genuine issue of
fact is involved.
On December 23, 1963, defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, the court ruling there is
necessity for proof that when he contracted marriage with plaintiff, defendant Robles had a previous and
subsisting valid marriage.
The evidentiary requirement to establish these facts, according to the court, was not met in the motion for
summary judgment.
Defendant's plea to have his marriage declared as having been brought about by force and intimidation,
was also denied, the court finding indications of collusion between the parties in their attempt to secure the
nullification of said marriage.

issue
WON the appeal should prosper. NO. A decree of annulment of marriage cannot be rendered upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.

ratio
ON THE MERITS
The Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in view of the first
paragraph of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of
a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits
annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the
Civil Code.
SIDE NOTE: Procedural
There is no indication or certification or proof that the filing of the appeal notice, bond and record on
appeal on April 17, 1964 were made within the reglementary period, as required by the provisions of Section 6,
Revised Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
The record on appeal must contain "such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time."
This requirement was held to be jurisdictional, failure to comply with which shall cause the dismissal of
the appeal. There is here no showing that the present appeal was perfected within the reglementary period,
which datum should have appeared in the record on appeal.

Tolentino v. Villanueva
56 SCRA 1

Mar. 15, 1974

J. Makasiar

Nuez

petitioners
respondents
summary Plaintiff wanted to annul his marriage. Wife failed to appear despite summons. Judge
Romulo Tolentino
Helen Villanueva and Judge Corazon Agrava

directed fiscal to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties. Plaintiff
refused to cooperate and thus the case was dismissed.
SC upheld the dismissal, saying that since a marriage is a special contract, the law does not
allow its annulment based on stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. The institution
of marriage is so sacred and the State has an interest to protect it against desecration by
collusion or fabricated evidence. Thus, in these cases the fiscal is authorized by law to
investigate whether there was collusion between the parties.

facts of the case

Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to Helen Villanueva, alleging that his consent
was obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he discovered that wife was
pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that
they did not live as husband and wife as immediately after the marriage celebration, Helen Villanueva left his
house and her whereabouts remained unknown to him until January, 1962 when he discovered that she is
residing in San Francisco, Cebu.
Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen failed to file a
responsive pleading, for which reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default.
Judge set the date for presentation of evidence but directed the fiscal to investigate whether there was
collusion between the parties.
Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case, issued a subpoena to petitioner's counsel
requiring him to bring petitioner with him as well as copies of other documents in connection with the
annulment case.
Plaintiff's counsel informed Assistant City Fiscal Jose that he could not comply with the subpoena for it
will unnecessarily expose his evidence.
Judge denied the aforesaid motion of petitioner unless he submits himself for interrogation by the City
Fiscal to enable the latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the parties. Because plaintiff
continued to refuse, the case was dismissed.

issue
Whether the judge's order was correct. YES.

ratio
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in
suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment and direct that in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney
shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff.

Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950 Civil Code of the Philippines, direct that actions for
the annulment of marriage or divorce shall not be decided unless the material facts alleged in the complaint
are proved.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions of
marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses;
because the State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social
institutions against desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition
against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by nonappearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties;
and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting
officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds.

JONES v. HORTIGUELA
G.R. No. 43701
Mar 6, 1937
Concepcion, J.
Casila
petitioner Angelita Jones
oppositor Felix Hortiguela
summary Jones, the daughter of the decedent from her first husband, contends that the marriage of her mother
and Hortiguela was void because her father A. Jones had only been judicially declared absent for 6
years and 14 days (not 7 years) at the time of the second marriage. SC held that for the purposes of
the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee.
The law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be
living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. The date shall be reckoned from the date on which the
last news was received.

facts of the case

Marciana Escano had died intestate. In an order, Jones, her daughter by her first marriage and Hortiguela,
her widower by second marriage were declared her only heirs. Hortiguela was appointed judicial administrator
of the entire estate. (June 1933) The project of partition and final account were approved in an order and the
properties were turned over to the grantees.
(May 1934) Jones filed a motion alleging that she was the only heir of her mother and there never was a
valid marriage between her mother and Hortiguela. CFI denied the motion.

issue
W/N Hortguelas alleged marriage to Escano was celebrated - YES

ratio
Important dates:
Dec 1914: Escano married Arthur W. Jones
Jan 10, 1918: A. Jones secured a passport to go abroad and nothing was ever heard of him
Oct 1919: Escano instituted proceedings to judicially declare A. Jones an absentee.
Oct 25, 1919: CFI declared him an absentee from the Philippines
Dec 1919-June 1920: The order was published in the Official Gazette and in the newspaper El Ideal
April 23, 1921: CFI issued an order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence
May 6, 1927: Hortiguela and Escano were married before the justice of peace of Malitbog, Leyte and
they signed the certificate of marriage
Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been made when the CFI issed an order
for the taking effect of the declaration of absence not when CFI declared A. Jones an absentee. From the latter date to the
date of marriage of Hortiguela and Escano, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed and in accordance with General Order 68,
the marriage is null and void.

The Court held that for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such
former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The absence of A. Jones should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on
which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than
nine years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.
As regards the failure to record the marriage in the register of the municipality:

General Order 68 does not provide that failure to transmit such certificate to the municipal secretary
annuls the marriage.
Madridejo v. De Leon: It does not appear that in the celebration of marriage forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate is a requisite for the validity of the marriage.
US v. De Vera: Certificates of marriages recorded in registrars are not the only ones that can attest and
prove such facts to such an extent that other proofs established by law may not be presented or
admitted at trial.

Further, according to the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not heard from in seven years is presumed to be
dead.

In the Matter of the Declaration of the Civil Status of Lourdes G. Lukban

G.R. No. L-8492
February 29, 1956
Bautista Angelo J
Chua
Petitioners Lourdes G. Lukban
Respondents Republic of the Philippines
Summary Lourdes is married to Francisco. However, she has not heard of him since the day he
left after a violent quarrel, merely seventeen days after their weddings. She now
prays that she be declared a widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead.
The Court did not grant the petition. a judicial declaration that a person is

presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years,

being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot
reach the stage of finality or become final. It would have been different had
she sought for the declaration of the death of her husband rather than the
establishment of the presumption of death.
Facts of the Case

Petition for a declaration that Lourdes is a widow of her husband Francisco Chuidian
who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent
marriage.
Lourdes contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933.
Seventeen days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel
and since then he has not been heard from despite diligent search made by her. She
also inquired about him from his parents and friends but no one knew of his
whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he is still alive. She believes that he is already
dead because he had been absent for more than twenty years. Because she intends
to marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in order that she may be
relieved of any liability under the law.

Issue
Whether or not Lourdes petition for a declaration she is a widow of her husband Francisco

Chuidian who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a

subsequent marriage may be granted. NO.
Ratio

Following the ruling in Szatraw, such declaration cannot be made in a special

proceeding; much less can the court determine the status of Lourdes as a widow since
this matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of the husband. The court
can declare upon proper evidence, but not to decree that he is merely presumed to
be dead.
To reiterate the earlier case, A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final
and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for
that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration,
if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court
has to pass. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a

presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final.
Lourdes remedy can be invoked if the purpose is to seek the declaration of death of
the husband, and not, as in the present case, to establish a presumption of death. If it
can be satisfactorily proven that the husband is dead, the court would not certainly
deny a declaration to that effect as has been intimated in the case of Szatraw.
Lourdes also claims that her petition can be entertained because the RPC, in defining
bigamy, provides that a person commits that crime if he contracts a second marriage
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings and, it is claimed, the present petition
comes within the purview of this legal provision.
The words proper proceedings can only refer to those authorized by law such as
those which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased
person.
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the
necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee.
For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former
spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living,
that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so
believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Gue v Republic
G.R. No. L-14058
Mar. 24, 1960
Montemayor, J.
Cristobal
In
the
matter
of
the
petition
for
the
declaration
ofWilliam
Gue,
presumptively
dead.
Angelina L. Gue
petitioners
respondents Republic of the Philippines

summary Angelina petitioned for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband William. TC dismissed
for failure to establish the right. TC: the declaration might make the present spouse think that s/he
can remarry, which is not allowed because the declaration is a mere disputable presumption.

facts of the case

Nov. 20, 1957 Angelina filed a petition to declare her husband William Gue presumptively dead. She
alleged that she was married to William, a Chinese citizen, and they have a child. She also alleged that on Jan.
5, 1946, William left Manila where they were residing and went to Shanghai, China.
She followed him to China in August 1946, and then she came back with their children to the Philippines in
1949. Since then, she had not heard from William. Despite her efforts and diligence (she went to the Bureau of
Immigration in 1955 and 1958 to inquire) she failed to locate him, and that they had not acquired any property
during the marriage.
TC: dismissed because Angelina had not established any right upon which a judicial decree may be based.
Citing the case of Petition for Presumption of death of Nicolai Szatraw, the TC held:
The rule invoked by the latter is merely one ofevidence which permits the court to presume that a
personis dead after the fact that such person had been unheardfrom in seven years had been established.
Thispresumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case,whether in an action or in a special proceeding,
which istried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a specialproceeding. In this case, there is no right to
be enforcednor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner for thefinal determination of his right or status or
of theascertainment of a particular fact, for the petition does not pray for adeclaration that the petitioner's
husband is dead, butmerely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead. A judicialpronouncement to that
effect, even if final and executory,would still be a prima facie presumption only.It is for that reason that it
cannot be thesubject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it isthe only question or matter involved in
a case, or uponwhich a competent court has to pass.
A declarationsuch as the one prayed for by the petitioner, if granted,may make or lead her to believe
that the marital bondswhich binds her to her husband are torn asunder, and that for that reason she is or
may feel free to enter into a newmarriage contract. The framers of the rules of court, by thepresumption
provided for in the rule of evidence inquestion, did not intend and mean that a judicialdeclaration based solely
upon that presumption may bemade. A petition for a declaration such as the one filed inthis case may be
made in collusion with the other spouse. If that were the case, then a decree of divorce that cannotbe
obtained or granted [under the provisions of the DivorceLaw Act No. 2710] could easily be secured by
means of ajudicial decree declaring a person unheard from in sevenyears to be presumptively dead.
At the CA, Angelina contended that under Art. 390 NCC, Courts are now authorized to declare persons
presumptively dead.
The OSG answered her, citing Lukban v Republic which was decided long after the NCC took effect which
also cited Nicolai Szatraw.

issue
WON the petition for the declaration of presumptive death should be granted? NO

ratio
We deem it unnecessary to further discuss the merits of the case. The appealedorder (of CFI Manila)
dismissing the petition is hereby affirmed, with costs.

PEOPLE v. MASINSIN
No. 9157-R

petitioners
respondents
summary

June 4, 1953

Pecson

Enad

People of the Phils

Constancia Masinsin

Constancia was married to Irineo, who was impotent. 5 mos. after the latters death,
Constancia married Guillermo. She was thereafter found guilty of premature marriage
under Art. 351 RPC. Held: Since the purpose of Art. 351 is to avoid cases of doubtful
paternity, the woman will not be liable thereunder if: (a) she has already delivered; and (b)
she has conclusive proof that she was not pregnant by her first spouse since he was
permanently sterile. Thus, Constancia is not liable since Irineo was impotent, and the birth
of her son occurred 2 yrs after the subsequent marriage.

facts of the case (case in Spanish; digest based on Dawn Chuas digest available at Blessings)
Constancia was initially married to Irineo Bermudez. Their marriage lasted for 18 yrs. They had no
children. She claimed that 5 yrs. before they got married, a doctor confirmed that Irineo was impotent.
Feb. 3, 1945: A group of guerillas kidnapped Irineo. His corpse was later found in a creek.
July 5, 1945 (5 mos. after Irineos death): Constancia married Guillermo Mascarias. 2 yrs later, she gave
birth to a baby boy.
She was found guilty of premature marriage by the CFI.

issue
WoN Constancia is guilty of premature marriage. NO.

ratio
The Atty General gave Art. 351 RPC7 a too strict interpretation, ignoring Sec. 68 (3) of the New Civil Code:
The ff are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(3) the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband who is not impotent is indisputably presumed to be
legitimate, if not born within the 180 days immediately succeeding the marriage, or after the expiration of 300
days following its dissolution.
The civil code establishes rebuttable presumptions in order to prevent dubious paternity with the
assumption that the husband is not impotent.
Since the purpose of Art. 351 is to avoid cases of doubtful paternity, the woman will not be liable
thereunder if: (a) she has already delivered; and (b) she has conclusive proof that she was not pregnant by
her first spouse since he was permanently sterile.
Applied: After 18 yrs of not having children, along with the knowledge of the doctors finding that
Irineo was impotent, Constancia remarried after 5 mos. The birth of her son after 2 yrs shows that the
conception of her son happened way beyond 301 days = absence of malice.
The prohibition of 301 days applies only to those cases wherein there exists a possibility of pregnancy
by the deceased husband. In this case, since Irineo was impotent, Constancia is free to remarry.

Art. 351. Premature MarriagesAny widow who shall marry within 301 days from the date of the death of her husband or before having
delivered if she shall have been pregnant at the time of his death, shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding P500.
7