Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the
series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground
that they "offend and constitute an attack against
other religions which is expressly prohibited by law."
EN BANC
PUNO, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated
March 24, 1995 of the respondent Court of Appeals
affirming the action of the respondent Board of
Review for Moving Pictures and Television which xrated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo."
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious
organization, has a television program entitled "Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday
and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program
presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs,
doctrines and practices often times in comparative
studies with other religions.
Sometime in the months of September, October and
November 1992 petitioner submitted to the
respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and
Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series
REMARKS:
This program is criticizing different
religions, based on their own
interpretation of the Bible.
REMARKS:
We have viewed
a tape of the
television episode
in question, as
well as studied
the passages
found by
MTRCB to be
objectionable and
we find no
indication that the
episode poses any
clear and present
danger sufficient
to limit the said
constitutional
guarantee.
(9) Exhibits "H," "H-1," letter dated
November 26, 1992 of Teofilo C.
Ramos, Sr., addressed to President
Fidel V. Ramos appealing the
action of the respondent Board xrating petitioner's Series No. 128.
On its part, respondent Board submitted the following
exhibits, viz.:
(1) Exhibit "1," Permit Certificate
for Television Exhibition No.
15181 dated December 18, 1992
allowing the showing of Series No.
128 under parental guidance.
(2) Exhibit "2," which is Exhibit
"G" of petitioner.
(3) Exhibit "3," letter dated October
12, 1992 of Henrietta S. Mendez,
addressed to the Christian Era
The trial court set the pre-trial of the case and the
parties submitted their pre-trial briefs. 9 The pre-trial
briefs show that the parties' evidence is basically the
evidence they submitted in the hearing of the issue of
preliminary injunction. The trial of the case was set
and reset several times as the parties tried to reach an
amicable accord. Their efforts failed and the records
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE
HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT BEING AN
EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, THE "ANG IGLESIA
NI CRISTO" PROGRAM IS
SUBJECT TO THE POLICE
POWER OF THE STATE ONLY
IN THE EXTREME CASE THAT
IT POSES A CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER.
III
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE
HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE "ANG IGLESIA NI
CRISTO," A PURELY
RELIGIOUS PROGRAM IS
INDECENT AND CONTRARY
TO LAW AND GOOD
CUSTOMS.
The basic issues can be reduced into two: (1) first,
whether the respondent Board has the power to
review petitioner's TV program "Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo," and (2) second, assuming it has the power,
or condone
crimes;
iv) Those which
serve no other
purpose but to
satisfy the market
for violence or
pornography;
v) Those which
tend to abet the
traffic in and use
of prohibited
drugs;
vi) Those which
are libelous or
defamatory to the
good name and
reputation of any
person, whether
living or dead;
vii) Those which
may constitute
contempt of court
or of any quasijudicial tribunal,
or pertain to
matters which are
subjudice in
nature (emphasis
ours).
The law gives the Board the power to
screen, review and examine all "television
programs." By the clear terms of the law, the
Board has the power to "approve, delete . . .
and/or prohibit the . . . exhibition and/or
can not tell, dictate any other religion that they are
right and the rest are wrong
. . ." Exhibit "D" also shows that Series No. 128 was
not favorably recommended because it ". . . outrages
Catholic and Protestant's beliefs." On second review,
it was x-rated because of its "unbalanced
interpretations of some parts of the bible." 18 In sum,
the respondent Board x-rated petitioner's TV program
series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128 because of
petitioner's controversial biblical interpretations and
its "attacks" against contrary religious beliefs. The
respondent appellate court agreed and even held that
the said "attacks" are indecent, contrary to law and
good customs.
We reverse the ruling of the appellate court.
First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its
hostility against all prior restraints on speech,
including religious speech. Hence, any act that
restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of
invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed
brows. 19 It is the burden of the respondent Board to
overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge
this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down.
It failed in the case at bar.
Second. The evidence shows that the respondent
Board x-rated petitioners TV series for "attacking"
either religions, especially the Catholic church. An
examination of the evidence, especially Exhibits "A,"
"A-1," "B," "C," and "D" will show that the so-called
"attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply
held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The
videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court
as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were
considered by the respondent court as indecent,
contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be
prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of
PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's
August 4, 2003
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A:
Declaration of Pledge of
faithfulness.
Q:
What are the relations of the
document Declaration of Pledge of
faithfulness, who are suppose (sic) to
execute this document?
A:
This must be signed, the document
must be signed by the elders of the
congregation; the couple, who is a member
(sic) of the congregation, baptized member
and true member of the congregation.
Q:
What standard rules and regulations
do you have in relation with this document?
A:
Actually, sir, the signing of that
document, ah, with the couple has consent to
marital relationship (sic) gives the Christian
Congregation view that the couple has put
themselves on record before God and man
that they are faithful to each other. As if that
relation is validated by God.
Q:
From your explanation, Minister, do
you consider it a pledge or a document
between the parties, who are members of the
congregation?
A:
It is a pledge and a document. It is a
declaration, pledge of a (sic) pledge of
faithfulness.
Q:
A:
It means to me that they have
contracted, let us say, I am the one who
contracted with the opposite member of my
Yes, Sir.
Q:
But it does not necessarily mean that
the parties, cohabiting or living under the
same roof?
A:
Well, the Pledge of faithfulness
document is (sic) already approved as to the
marital relationship.
Q:
Do you mean to say, Minister, by
executing this document the contracting
parties have the right to cohabit?
A:
Can I sir, cite, what the Bible says,
the basis of that Pledge of Faithfulness as we
Christians follow. The basis is herein stated
in the Book of Matthew, Chapter Five, Verse
Twenty-two. So, in that verse of the Bible,
Jesus said "that everyone divorcing his wife,
except on account of fornication, makes her
a subject for adultery, and whoever marries a
divorced woman commits adultery.15
Escritor and Quilapio transferred to Salazar's
Congregation, the Almanza Congregation in Las
Pias, in May 2001. The declarations having been
executed in Atimonan, Quezon in 1991, Salazar had
no personal knowledge of the personal circumstances
of Escritor and Quilapio when they executed their
declarations. However, when the two transferred to
Almanza, Salazar inquired about their status from the
Atimonan Congregation, gathered comments of the
elders therein, and requested a copy of their
declarations. The Almanza Congregation assumed
that the personal circumstances of the couple had
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order that freedoms - including religious freedom may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a
preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable
to an authority higher than the state, and so the state
interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling
that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state
that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a
showing that such state interest exists, man must be
allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant administrative
complaint is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
CORTES, J.:
Before the Court is a contreversy of grave national
importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would
undeniably have a profound effect on the political,
economic and other aspects of national life.
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos
was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent
"people power" revolution and forced into exile. In
The Issue
Th issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in
the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.
According to the petitioners, the resolution of the
case would depend on the resolution of the following
issues:
1. Does the President have the
power to bar the return of former
President Marcos and family to the
Philippines?
a. Is this a political question?
2. Assuming that the President has
the power to bar former President
Marcos and his family from
returning to the Philippines, in the
interest of "national security, public
safety or public health
a. Has the President made a finding
that the return of former President
Marcos and his family to the
Philippines is a clear and present
danger to national security, public
safety or public health?
b. Assuming that she has made that
finding
(1) Have the
requirements of
due process been
complied with in
making such
finding?
law the ruling inLansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 4481 that:]
Article VII of the [1935]
Constitution vests in the Executive
the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus under
specified conditions. Pursuant to
the principle of separation of
powers underlying our system of
government, the Executive is
supreme within his own sphere.
However, the separation of powers,
under the Constitution, is not
absolute. What is more, it goes
hand in hand with the system of
checks and balances, under which
the Executive is supreme, as
regards the suspension of the
privilege, but only if and when he
acts within the sphere alloted to
him by the Basic Law, and the
authority to determine whether or
not he has so acted is vested in the
Judicial Department, which, in this
respect, is, in turn, constitutionally
supreme. In the exercise of such
authority, the function of the Court
is merely to check not to
supplant the Executive, or to
ascertain merely whether he has
gone beyond the constitutional
limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or
to determine the wisdom of his act
[At 479-480.]
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine
is whether or not there exist factual bases for the
President to conclude that it was in the national
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R.
MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR.,
IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC,
TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA,
PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ
and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by
its President, CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS,
CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY
ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO,
FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their
capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration
Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and
Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
RESOLUTION
EN BANC:
In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court,
by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the
petition, after finding that the President did not act
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President
Marcos and his family at the present time and under
present circumstances pose a threat to national
II.
We first proceed to define the proper litigable issues.
Notably, the guilt or innocence of petitioners in
violating Articles 65 and 97 of the Articles of War is
not an issue before this Court, especially considering
that per records, petitioners have not yet been
subjected to court martial proceedings. Owing to the
absence of such proceedings, the correct inquiry
should be limited to whether respondents could
properly initiate such proceedings preparatory to a
formal court-martial, such as the aforementioned
preliminary investigation, on the basis of petitioners
acts surrounding their testimony before the Senate on
28 September 2005. Yet this Court, consistent with
the principle that it is not a trier of facts at first
instance,21 is averse to making any authoritative
findings of fact, for that function is first for the courtmartial court to fulfill.
Thus, we limit ourselves to those facts that are not
controverted before the Court, having been
commonly alleged by petitioners and the OSG (for
respondents). Petitioners were called by the Senate
Committee to testify in its 28 September 2005
hearing. Petitioners attended such hearing and
testified before the Committee, despite the fact that
IV.
We now turn to the central issues.
Petitioners wish to see annulled the "gag order" that
required them to secure presidential consent prior to
their appearance before the Senate, claiming that it
violates the constitutional right to information and
transparency in matters of public concern; or if not, is
tantamount at least to the criminal acts of obstruction
of justice and grave coercion. However, the proper
perspective from which to consider this issue entails
the examination of the basis and authority of the
President to issue such an order in the first place to
members of the AFP and the determination of
whether such an order is subject to any limitations.
The vitality of the tenet that the President is the
commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is most
crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian
supremacy over the military, and to the general
stability of our representative system of government.
The Constitution reposes final authority, control and
supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian
who is not a member of the armed forces, and whose
duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of
the organic duties imposed upon the office, the other
functions being clearly civil in nature.31 Civilian
supremacy over the military also countermands the
notion that the military may bypass civilian
authorities, such as civil courts, on matters such as
conducting warrantless searches and seizures.32
Pursuant to the maintenance of civilian supremacy
over the military, the Constitution has allocated
specific roles to the legislative and executive
branches of government in relation to military affairs.
Military appropriations, as with all other
appropriations, are determined by Congress, as is the
power to declare the existence of a state of
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR
A conscientious objector is a person who refuses to
perform a legal role or responsibility because of
religious beliefs or strong philosophical views.
One example involving the concept of conscientious
objection is the Reproductive Health Law. The last
paragraph of Section 5.24 of the Reproductive Health
Law-Implementing Rules and Regulations reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as
provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of