Documente Academic
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Theoretical Criminology
15(3) 239254
The Author(s) 2011
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DOI: 10.1177/1362480610396650
tcr.sagepub.com
Tyler Wall
Torin Monahan
Abstract
As surveillance and military devices, dronesor unmanned aerial vehiclesoffer a
prism for theorizing the technological politics of warfare and governance. This prism
reveals some violent articulations of US imperialism and nationalism, the dehumanizing
translation of bodies into targets for remote monitoring and destruction, and the
insidious application of militarized systems and rationalities to domestic territories and
populations. In this article, we analyze the deployment of drones within warzones in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan and borderzones and urban areas in the USA. What
we call the drone stare is a type of surveillance that abstracts people from contexts,
thereby reducing variation, difference, and noise that may impede action or introduce
moral ambiguity. Through these processes, drones further normalize the ongoing
subjugation of those marked as Other.
Keywords
drones, militarization, risk management, surveillance, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
The corporeal politics of space, place, and identity are powerfully inflected by technological systems of remote surveillance and violence. This is especially evident with
drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which the US and other governments have
been deploying with greater frequency across a diverse range of territories (CNN, 2010;
Lewis, 2010). Drones have garnered recent media attention as remote-controlled, kill-ata-distance technologies, which allow soldier pilots stationed potentially thousands of
miles away to collect military intelligence, identify targets, and fire missiles at suspected
Corresponding author:
Tyler Wall, Department of Criminal Justice, Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond, KY 40475, USA
Email: tyler.wall@eku.edu
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A new program dubbed the Gorgon Starenamed after the Greek mythological
figure whose gaze could turn victims into stonewill reportedly increase the single
video feed capable of being transmitted and recorded by standard drones to first 12 and
in due course to 65 video feeds (Barnes, 2009). A primary goal of drone surveillance is
to collect overhead imagery that might prove tactically useful for US commanders and
soldiers. As one journalist writes, By capturing images, the drones help soldiers determine how many houses there have power, for example, or where roads are, and other
quality of life data (Lubold, 2010). In the words of an anonymous intelligence officer:
For Afghanistan, for example, every day were analyzing imagery that includes the need
to distinguish between normal agriculture and poppy production, and in Iraq to distinguish between plastics production or concrete batching and homemade explosives production (Lubold, 2010).
The desire for omniscience through total vision is a common motif in theoretical treatments of surveillance (e.g. Foucault, 1977). It is also a product of an Enlightenment
rationality that aspires toward reason and progress through the cold, objective pursuit
of knowledge. As feminist science-studies scholars remind us, these longings for pure
knowledge, which seek to eviscerate bias and politics, are nonetheless marked forms of
knowledge that simply deny the values and prejudices inherent in their modes and
addresses of production (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1991; Monahan and Fisher, 2010).
These rationalities of so-called objective knowledge valorize the status quo while enforcing an exclusionary politics that denies or subjugates alternative ways of knowing. In the
case of drone surveillance in combat settings, the exclusionary politics of omniscient
vision not only harm ethnic and cultural others with great prejudice, but they also instigate an additional violence of radically homogenizing local difference, lumping together
innocent civilians with enemy combatants, women and children with wanted terrorist
leaders. From the sky, differences among people may be less detectable, orperhaps
more accuratelythe motivations to make such fine-grained distinctions may be attenuated in the drive to engage the enemy. When these mechanisms and logics of surveillance
are imported to non-combat settings, such as borderzones and civilian territories, they
may in turn further the violent dehumanization and non-differentiation of people while
expanding the scope of who could be included in the drones gaze. It is to these noncombat geographies and their populations that we next turn.
244
and surveilled USMexico border (Dunn, 1996; Pallitto and Heyman, 2008), conservative Arizona Governor Jan Brewer wrote a letter to Obama urging him to send also what
she referred to as aviation assets, specifically military UAVs and helicopters (Lach,
2010). Brewer asserted that drones have proven effective in US military campaigns overseas and that they would therefore assist in securing the US border:
I would also ask you, as overseas operations in Iraq and Afghanistan permit, to consider wider
deployment of UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] along our nations southern border. I am
aware of how effective these assets have become in Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom,
and it seems UAVs operations would be ideal for border security and counter-drug missions.
(Quoted in Lach, 2010)
This appeal for drones at the border obscures the fact that UAVs have already been providing aerial surveillance over US border regions (Shachtman, 2005; Gilson, 2010).
Since 2006, the USA has spent approximately $100 million for UAVs on both the southern and northern US borders as part of its efforts to create a so-called virtual fence
(Canwest News Service, 2007). As of 2010 the US Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) was operating six unarmed Predator drones for overhead surveillance missions
along the USMexico border, five of which were based in Brewers state of Arizona
(Gilson, 2010). Since late 2007 or early 2008, the CBP has been testing drones in US/
Canada border regions (Canwest News Service, 2007). CBP officials credit their drones
with helping bust 15,000 lbs of pot and 4,000 illegal immigrants (Gilson, 2010). In the
words of a defense executive: It is quite easy to envision a future in which (UAVs), unaffected by pilot fatigue, provide 247 border and port surveillance to protect against terrorist intrusion Other examples [of possible uses] are limited only by our imagination
(McCullagh, 2006).
Clearly, drones have been enlisted in efforts to restrict illegal immigration and combat
the war on drugs. The notion of drug drones has become fashionable in international
drug enforcement, especially for use in maritime operations (Padgett, 2009). For instance,
under the name Monitoreo, which is Spanish for monitoring, the US Southern Command
recently conducted a drone testing project that mobilized an Israeli-made $6.5 million
Heron drone from El Salvadors Comalapa Air Base to track down suspected drug cartel
members who were allegedly using the open waters to smuggle drugs into the USA
(Padgett, 2009; see also Shachtman, 2009). By remaining thousands of feet in the air for
up to 20-hours while being equipped with a set of sensors better suited for spotting the
subs [mini-submarines] that have become so popular among narco-cartels (Shachtman,
2009), this particular Heron drone promises to be a longer endurance technology than
conventional planes commonly used in drug surveillance. As Time magazine journalist
Tim Padgett (2009) writes,
If battlefield drones like the Predator can scan and bomb Taliban targets in the mountains of
Afghanistan, the logic goes, a similar drone like the Heron should be able to find the go fast
boats and submarines used by drug cartels in the waters of this hemisphere.
UAVs are also currently flying in the skies over some cities in both the USA and
United Kingdom. As reported in 2006,
245
one North Carolina county is using a UAV equipped with low-light and infrared cameras to
keep watch on its citizens. The aircraft has been dispatched to monitor gatherings of motorcycle
riders at the Gaston County fairgrounds from just a few hundred feet in the airclose enough
to identify facesand many more uses, such as the aerial detection of marijuana fields, are
planned.
(McCullagh, 2006)
In 2007, the Houston Police Department in Texas controversially tested the use of
unarmed surveillance drones, with the eventual objective of monitoring traffic, aiding
evacuations during natural disasters, helping with search and rescue operations, and
assisting with other tactical police incidents (Dean, 2007). The Executive Assistant
Police Chief admitted that UAVs over the skies of Houston could include covert police
actions and that the police force was not ruling out someday using the drones for writing traffic tickets (Dean, 2007). In another example, a confidential document revealed
that the Las Vegas Police Department may have been using UAVs above the city of Las
Vegas as early as 2007 (Public Intelligence, 2010). The document further outlines a plan
for UAVs to help monitor special events and discusses ways in which the Las Vegas
UAVs are integrated into Department of Homeland Security (DHS) fusion centers to
assist with the investigation of suspicious activity reports (Public Intelligence, 2010). As
noted in other work on the militarization of cities, the application of drone technologies
to urban areas promises to extend the surveillance networks within which people are
caught (Murakami Wood, 2007) and intensify the policing of cultural difference and
political dissent that have historically marked cities as vibrant, democratic spaces
(Graham, 2010).
Within the current political and cultural milieu, this particular movement of military technology to civilian spheres reveals a symbiotic relationship between the war
on crime and war on terror. Jonathan Simon (2007: 11) persuasively argues that in
some respects the war on terror is an unacknowledged continuation of the war on
crime, sharing with it similar discourses and institutional arrangements. When the
rationalities and technologies of the war on terror are applied to other domains and
other perceived threats, there is a heightened danger that existing legal protections and
rights will be vitiated in the process, thereby ratcheting up cultures of control
that already disproportionately harm marginalized populations (Wacquant, 2009). For
instance, DHS fusion centers may have originated as organizations to share data
on terrorist threats, but they have since been linked to spying on non-violent antiwar protesters, environmentalists, students at historically black colleges, and others
(Monahan, 2011).
In contemporary cultures of control, all populations may be called uponor be
responsibilizedto manage risk in highly individualized ways and through increasingly
privatized means (Rose, 1999), but this in no way indicates a diminished role for the
state, or state-corporate apparatuses, in extending discipline and control into domestic
territories (Garland, 2001; Monahan, 2010). The use of drones in non-combat settings
may symbolically transform those sites to arenas of agonistic engagement and further
militarize domestic police departments and government agencies to the detriment of
individual liberties and the public good.
246
The technological mediation vital to what we call the drone stare is most often framed
by advocates of UAV systems as an unproblematic ability to see the truth of a particular
situation (see Rattansi, 2010) or to achieve a totalizing view of the object under cosmic
control. In the words of Robins and Levidow (1995: 121): Enemy threatsreal or imaginary, human or machinebecame precise grid locations, abstracted from their human
context. To the extent that this description is accurate, it would appear to hold true for
the use of drones in combat as well as non-combat settings.
Journalist Noah Shachtman (2005), who observed drone operators monitoring the
USMexico border, betrays through his description the dehumanizing tendency of dronemediated perceptions: Everyone looks like germs, like ants, from the Hunters 15,000foot point of view. Especially when the ant hill breaks apart, and everybody scatters in a
dozen different directions. But this particular articulation makes no distinction between
illegal immigrants, political refugees, or Mexican-American citizens. In this sense, the
drone system radically homogenizes these identities into a single cluster of racialized
information that is used for remote-controlled processes of control and harm. Bodies
below become things to track, monitor, apprehend, and kill, while the pilot and other
allies on the network remain differentiated and proximate, at least culturally if not
physically.
In the case of the use of military drones for precision killing, the practical action of
firing a Hellfire missile is translated and transformed by the informational system into a
computerized checklist of things to do. As one journalist writes concerning US Air
Force drones, Now, pilots say, it takes up to 17 stepsincluding entering data into a
pull-down windowto fire a missile (Drew, 2009). In this respect, as Kevin Haggerty
(2006) has pointed out, the speed and mobility of informatized warfare is perforce slowed
by attendant complex systems of control, which is a generalizable finding that presents
247
But as we have discussed, this knowing when to say when is not a decision that is
made in a vacuum but is rather a sovereign act shaped by social and political norms,
which are encoded in both the institutional practices and technological systems of drone
warfare.
The state killing enacted by UAV systems exists in a discursive and symbolic context
where a steadfast belief in precision technology helps justify the techno-scientific violence of the West (Shaw, 2005). Central to common representations of virtuous warfare,
and especially aerial warfare, is the idea that the USA is technologically superior to other
countries in its war capabilities, particularly because of its reliance on smart bombs and
precision-guided missiles that distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets
(Der Derian, 2001). This, in turn, brings about an expectation that militaries should go to
great lengths to use their violence in discriminatory ways that target combatants while
avoiding civilians (Beier, 2003). Militaries in technologically advanced countries such as
the US embrace this rhetoric to assert that they have the capacity to conduct war in more
legal and moral ways than less technologically advanced countries (Beier, 2003).
Of course, claims to technological sophistication are always relative ones that can
invite hubris on the part of those parties presuming superiority. This was revealed when
it was discovered in 2009 that Iraqi insurgents had accessed unencrypted video footage
from US Predator drones (Gorman et al., 2009). This example, while embarrassing for
US military officials, illustrates a paradox in the construction of the enemy other.
Insurgents were apparently presumed too backward and unsophisticated to tap unencrypted signals broadcasted by the USA. By intercepting these signals with apparent ease
using $26 off-the-shelf software (Gorman et al., 2009) and storing the feeds on laptop
computers, the enemy effectively elevated its own symbolic legitimacy as civilized peoples, in large part because in the West technological achievement and ability are often
equated with civilization (Adas, 1989). The enemy moreover demonstrated its agency
and its refusal to become a legible and docile object for western control.
People who are aware of adversarial monitoring from the skies also engage in tactics
to evade the drone stare. Specifically, subjects of drone surveillance have tried to be
stealthier and camouflage themselves better than they have in the past. In the North
248
Waziristan region of Pakistan where drone surveillance and violence has been heavily
concentrated, the standard ways in which militants have traditionally traveled, slept, and
communicated has been significantly altered by the aerial gaze of UAVs, according to
some local sources (Perlez and Shah, 2010). Combatants have allegedly abandoned satellite phones and large gatherings in favor of communicating by courier and moving
stealthily in small groups while also establishing hide-outs in mountainside tunnels and
relying more on civilian-looking transportation as opposed to all-terrain vehicles
(Perlez and Shah, 2010). In addition, if past ruses of camouflage and spatial deception
employed by undocumented immigrants along US border regions are good indicators,
undocumented migrants seeking entrance to the USA will find new ways of subverting
and disappearing from the gaze of UAVs (Corchado, 2003).
Still, discourses of technological accuracy and hegemonic control persist. According
to one drone operator:
unlike all the other weapons systems out there, I can control collateral damage to a much
greater degree in this and I can minimize it and negate it because if I see a high-value
individualone of those jackpot guysthat I want to prosecute an attack on Im not limited by
gas. Im not limited by the physiological constraints of the air crew. Ill swap another air crew
out. Ill bring another plane out and have them run in there and I will stay with that individual
until the time is right by my making.
(Rattansi, 2010)
249
But some military drone operators, who have also flown combat missions in manned
aircraft such as F-16 fighter jets, say that the technological mediation of UAV systems
is more visceral and phenomenologically complex than a video game experience, in
large part because of the advanced camera systems of the drones. With UAVs, one particular pilot claimed to feel:
more connected with the ground fight than I ever did when I was flying over the top at 20,000
feet, the reason being that I am much [more] involved in coordination and contact with those
ground forces that are taking fire than I ever was in a F-16 it comes together to create a much
more tangible, much more real event then [sic] I experienced when I was dropping bombs
from F-16s.
(Rattansi, 2010)
Similarly, another former F-16 pilot comments that when flying an F-16, you come in at
500600 miles per hour, drop a 500-pound bomb and then fly away, you dont see what
happens, but when remotely piloting Predator drones you watch it all the way to impact,
and I mean its very vivid, its right there and personal. So it does stay in peoples minds
for a long time (Lindlaw, 2008). Yet another drone pilot said, When youre on the radio
with a guy on the ground, and he is out of breath and you can hear the weapons fire in the
background, you are every bit as engaged as if you were actually there (Drew, 2009).
Although we should be skeptical of this claim of realistic experiences created
through interactions with drone systems, there have been some reports that drone operators have expressed emotional and psychological difficulties due to this mediated intimacy and physical distanciation. As one drone pilot explains, It is quite different, going
from potentially shooting a missile, then going to your kids soccer game (Lindlaw,
2008). Even after the missiles have been fired and flesh ripped apart, the drone stare is
often ordered to linger in the air to record and observe the destruction produced by the
UAV system. As another drone operator states:
You do stick around and see the aftermath of what you did, and that does personalize the fight
You have a pretty good optical picture of the individuals on the ground. The images can be
pretty graphic, pretty vivid, and those are the things we try to offset [through psychiatric
treatment and psychological and spiritual counseling].
(Lindlaw, 2008)
Previous analyses of the psychological effects of killing suggest that killing is easier
to do from a distance and becomes progressively more difficult the closer one is to ones
victim (Grossman, 2009). In the case of UAVs, however, the pilots may be on the other
side of the globe yet nonetheless feel proximate to those with whom they engage. This
may create the possibility for a re-personalization of distant, technologically mediated
attacks, wherein pilots register some experiences of trauma and responsibility. This phenomenon could vitiate some of the dehumanizing tendencies of remote warfare or, at the
very least, render the experiences visceral for those viewing the monitors, whether they
are pilots or the public.
The technological politics of drone systems hinge upon the productive capabilities of
these devices, which extend beyond their use for missile strikes. By means of the drone
250
Conclusions
As surveillance and military devices, drones offer a prism for theorizing the technological politics of warfare and governance. This prism reveals some violent articulations of
US imperialism and nationalism, the translation of bodies into targets for remote monitoring and destruction, and the insidious application of militarized systems and rationalities to domestic territories and populations. In this article, we analyzed the deployment
of drones primarily within two different liminal security-scapes: warzones in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Pakistan and borderzones and urban areas in the USA. While we readily
acknowledge profound variation and diversity both within and across these securityscapes, extant resonances and dissonances, especially with the use of drones, reveal
broader patterns in forms of state operations. Notably, the drone stare depends upon processes that seek to insulate pilots and allies from direct harm while subjecting targets to
precision scrutiny and/or attack. The drone stare further abstracts targets from political,
cultural, and geographical contexts, thereby reducing variation, difference, and noise that
may impede action or introduce moral ambiguity. In combination, these processes further normalize the ongoing subjugation of those marked as Other, those targeted for
discriminatory observation and attack, those without comparable resources to contest the
harmful categories within which they are placed.
Whether the forms of drone surveillance and violence operate in discursive, representational, and/or physical registers, they are always articulations of identity and
scripted assertions of value that are far from objective or benign. UAVs may reside
within a paradigm of cosmic control that seeks strategic advantage through systems of
verticality, but rather than mirror reality below in some positivistic way, the drone
assemblage executes socio-technical codes that objectify others while blurring all identities within the apparatus. Some of these blurred identities include insurgent and civilian, criminal and undocumented migrant, remotely located pilot and front-line soldier.
Not only does the use of military drones destabilize identities and their representations
in both combat and borderzones, but conceptual categories as well are subjected to
251
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Tyler Wall is Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at Eastern Kentucky University.
Torin Monahan is Associate Professor of Human &Organizational Development and Associate
Professorof Medicine at VanderbiltUniversity.