Bullrun AFF

Plan Text
Plan: The United States federal government should
substantially curtail the National Security Agencys
Project Bullrun.

1AC Technology Sector

Advantage (

) is the Technology Sector:

The US economy is stable and growing now but

shocks are coming that create the conditions for
another economic collapse The Economist 14 (12-20, Past and future tense: The world economy in
2015 will carry troubling echoes of the late 1990s,
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21636742-world-economy-2015-willcarry-troubling-echoes-late-1990s-past-and-future-tense)
A financial crash in Russia; falling oil prices and a strong dollar; a
new gold rush in Silicon Valley and a resurgent American economy;
weakness in Germany and Japan; tumbling currencies in emerging
markets from Brazil to Indonesia; an embattled Democrat in the
White House. Is that a forecast of the world in 2015 or a portrait of
the late 1990s? Recent economic history has been so dominated by the
credit crunch of 2008-09 that it is easy to forget what happened in the
decades before. But looking back 15 years or so is instructivein terms of
both what to do and what to avoid. Then, as now, the United States was in
the vanguard of a disruptive digital revolution. The advent of the internet
spawned a burst of innovation and euphoria about Americas
prospects. By 1999 GDP was rising by more than 4% a year, almost
twice the rich-country average. Unemployment fell to 4%, a 30-year low.
Foreign investors piled in, boosting both the dollar and share prices.
The S&P 500 index rose to almost 30 times earnings; tech stocks went wild.
The optimism in America stood in stark contrast to gloom elsewhere,
as it does today. Japans economy had slipped into deflation in 1997.
Germany was the sick man of Europe, its firms held back by rigid
labour markets and other high costs. Emerging markets, having
soared ahead, were in crisis: between 1997 and 1999 countries from
Thailand to Brazil saw their currencies crash as foreign capital fled
and dollar-denominated debts proved unpayable. Eventually,
America ran into trouble too. The tech-stock bubble burst in early 2000,
prompting a broader share price slump. Business investment, particularly in
technology, sank; and as share prices fell, consumers cut back. By early 2001
America, along with most of the rich world, had slipped into recession, albeit
a mild one. America the powerful Inevitably the parallels are not perfect. The
biggest difference is China, a bit-part player in 1999 and now the worlds
second-biggest economy, contributing disproportionately to global growth.
But there are three trends at work that destabilised the world
economy then and could do the same now. The first is the gap
between America, where growth is accelerating, and almost
everywhere else, where it is slowing. In the late 1990s Larry Summers,
then the US deputy treasury secretary, warned that the world economy was
flying on one engine. For 2015 The Economists panel of forecasters
expects 3% growth in America, compared with 1.1% in Japan and the euro
area. Chinas growth rate may fall to around 7%. Americans can comfort

themselves that, as in the late 1990s, the optimism gap is partially

warranted. Jobs are being created in their country faster than at any time
since 1999, cheap petrol has buoyed consumer spending and business
investment has picked up. But the news is not all good: cheaper oil could tip
plenty of Americas shale producers into bankruptcy in 2015, while a stronger
dollar and weakness abroad will hurt exportersjust as they did 15 years
ago. Britain, the other Anglosphere champion, may also be clobbered by the
euro zones woes. The second worrying parallel with the late 1990s is the
dismal outlook for the rich worlds two other big economies.
Germanys growth rate has tumbled to around 1% and there is a
deeper malaise caused by years of underinvestment, a disastrous
energy policy and a government that is too obsessed by its fiscal
targets to spend money and too frightened of its voters to push
through the sort of structural reforms that Gerhard Schrder
implemented in 2003. Meanwhile Japan has repeated the error it
made in 1997thwarting its escape from stagnation with a
premature rise in consumption tax. The third echo of the 1990s is
the danger in emerging markets. Back then the problem was fixed
exchange rates and hefty foreign debt. Now the debts are lower, the
exchange rates float and most governments have built up reserves. Still,
there are growing signs of trouble, especially in Russia (see article). But other
commodity exporters also look vulnerable, especially in Africa. Oil accounts
for 95% of Nigerias exports and 75% of its government revenue. Ghana has
already gone to the IMF for support. In other countries the danger lies in the
corporate sector. Many Brazilian firms are heavily indebted in dollars. A rash
of corporate defaults may prove less spectacular than Asias sovereign-debt
crises in the 1990s, but they will make investors nervous and push up the
dollar. Fear the hangover Add all this up and 2015 seems likely to be
bumpy. Bears will bet that a surging dollar coupled with euro-zone
torpor and a few emerging-market crises will eventually prompt a
downturn in America. On the plus side, stockmarkets do not look as frothy
as they did in the 1990s: the price/earnings ratio of the S&P 500 is 18, not far
above its historical average. Although many big tech firms are investing
recklessly, most have decent balance-sheets (see article). And the global
financial system is less leveraged and hence less vulnerable to contagion. In
1998 Russias default felled LTCM, a big American hedge fund. Such knock-on
effects are less likely today. But if the world economy does stumble,
restoring stability will be harder this time round because
policymakers have so little room for manoeuvre. Back in 1999 the
Federal Reserves policy rate was around 5%, leaving plenty of scope for
cutting when the economy slowed. Nowadays interest rates all over the rich
world are close to zero. The political scene is also different, and not in a good
way. At the end of the 1990s most people in the rich world had enjoyed the
fruits of the boom: median American wages rose by 7.7% in real terms in
1995-2000. Since 2007, by contrast, they have been flat in America, and
have fallen in Britain and much of the euro zone. All over the rich world
voters are already grumpy with their governments, as polling
numbers and their willingness to vote for protest parties show. If
they are squeezed next year discontent will turn to anger. The

economics of 2015 may look similar to the late 1990s, but the
politics will probably be rather worse.

Project Bullrun collapses the technology sector - We

have two internal links
First Consumer Confidence: Data center customers
are shying away from business in the USBullrun
raises concerns about the safety of individual
information
Miller 14 (Claire Cain, reporter for the NY Times, 3-21, Revelations of NSA
Spying Cost US Tech Companies,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-from-snowden-hurtingbottom-line-of-tech-companies.html, AL)
Data center customers are beginning to avoid the U.S. and place
their infrastructure elsewhere because of data sovereignty concerns
caused by revelations about NSA surveillance, according to David
Snead, founder of the Internet Infrastructure Coalition (I2C). Our
members are seeing a very real shift in putting data outside the U.S.
rather than inside the U.S., said Snead, whose group includes more
than 100 companies in the hosting and data center business. The NSA
disclosures have undermined worldwide confidence in U.S.
infrastructure. Its not an accident, Snead said, that a large hosting
company in Switzerland recently reported a 45-percent increase in
business in the wake of the revelations of former NSA contractor
Edward Snowden. One coalition member reports that it used to get
70 percent of its new business from overseas customers, but that
now has dropped to 35 percent. Spying and surveillance by state
agencies is nothing new, and the U.S. isnt the only country engaged in
surveillance and requesting information from service providers. But the U.S.
has more at stake because it is the leading player in Internet
infrastructure . The vast majority of data transfer traffic touches the
United States, said Snead. The U.S. remains an enormous market for the
data center industry. Secret process erodes confidence The key issue is
the secret nature of information requests by the NSA and other agencies.
Service providers are barred from discussing whether theyve received
classified requests for user data. The I2C argues that companies should be
able to explain how the process works and disclose the number of requests
they have received from the government. Most of you have never received
these requests, and your users assume that you have, said Snead, who said
providers should be allowed to make this clear to their users. One way for
cloud platforms and service providers to defuse data sovereignty concerns
from international clients would be to add infrastructure in other countries,
allowing customer data to stay within their borders, rather than traveling
through U.S. infrastructure where it might be accessed by federal agencies.
But this approach has been complicated by the U.S. governments effort

to access data stored by Microsoft in a data center in Ireland, a case

that has broad consequences for the data center industry, making it
difficult for American providers to communicate with customers and
assess how to expand their global networks. Providers should pay
attention In April, a judge ruled that Microsoft must comply with search
warrants from U.S. law enforcement agencies seeking customer data
regardless of where that data is stored. In this case, the data is in a Microsoft
facility in Dublin. Microsoft refused to comply with the request, arguing that a
U.S. warrant did not apply to data located overseas, and the dispute ended
up in court. Were convinced that the law and the U.S. Constitution are on
our side, and we are committed to pursuing this case as far and as long as
needed, said Microsoft General Counsel Brad Smith. Snead said the Microsoft
decision is extremely troublesome to U.S. companies. This is a huge issue
that the industry is not paying very much attention to, he said. Companies
should be able to place data where they think is necessary, and respect how
the local law works. Invite the FBI to visit Snead noted that the relationship
between data centers and law enforcement need not be adversarial. In fact,
he said, there are times when it can be a good thing to have the FBI visit your
facility. Develop a relationship with law enforcement, he said. Call the local
FBI office and invite them over for coffee, and then give them a tour of your
data center. If theres no relationship, theyll just come in looking for a single
customers data and take the entire server. Thats a huge problem, since you
have other customers and SLAs. You never want to figure out your subpoena
and access policy when the FBI knocks on your door, said Snead. You have
to work it out beforehand. The last thing you want to do is ask the FBI to sit in
your conference room while you go call your lawyer.

Second Business Innovation NSA surveillance

measures are costing technology businesses billions
of dollars in revenue causing downsizing,
protectionism, and unemployment
Arce 6/10/15 (Nicole, Journalist for the Tech Times. "Effect of NSA Spying
on US Tech Industry? $35 Billion? No. Way More,"
http://www.techtimes.com/articles/59316/20150610/effect-of-nsa-spying-onus-tech-industry-35-billion-no-way-more.htm)
American technology companies are losing billions of dollars in
business overseas due to Edward Snowden's revelations about the
National Security Agency's (NSA) sweeping surveillance programs.

Two years ago, the industry-funded think tank Information Technology

and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) estimated that the NSA surveillance

would cost cloud computing companies such as Microsoft, Amazon

and IBM somewhere around $21.5 billion to $35 billion in lost
revenue due to the Snowden revelations. However, privacy and
security concerns continue to grow well into 2015, and ITIF says the
figure could be far more than its early estimate of $35 billion . "Since
then, it has become clear that the U.S. tech industry as a whole, not
just the cloud computing sector, has under-performed as a result of

the Snowden revelations," say [pdf] Daniel Castro and Alan McQuinn,
authors of a new ITIF report. "Therefore, the economic impact of U.S.
surveillance practices will likely far exceed ITIF's initial $35 billion
estimate." ITIF cites a string of financial reports by technology
companies and cloud providers showing disappointing earnings and
lower-than-expected sales figures, with only Apple making

considerable headway overseas with its growing iPhone market in

China. The foundation says the dismal figures are partly a result of

customers who are increasingly turning to local providers over fears

that the NSA will claw its way into their private information via U.S.
firms. Foreign governments, which were expending significant
amounts of money to invest in IT, are turning away and encouraging
their citizens to patronize local providers. Russia, for instance, has

passed a new law requiring all tech firms operating within its borders
to store information about their customers in servers located within the
Russian territory, a requirement that forces companies to spend more
as they decentralize operations and build new data centers. France
and Germany also have a similar law, forcing Amazon to build new
facilities in Frankfurt and Microsoft in Vienna, while China, India and
Australia have their own data localization laws. China, in particular,
has extreme conditions for U.S. tech companies by requiring them to
provide access to valuable intellectual property, such as source code.
To make matters worse, U.S. lawmakers are not helping as they fail to
create new laws that scale back government surveillance , which
"sacrifices robust competitiveness of the U.S. tech sector for vague
and unconvincing promises of improved national security ," says ITIF.

President Barack Obama recently signed into law a bill ending the
NSA's bulk collection of telephone metadata, but ITIF says the agency
has several other surveillance programs in place that need to be
reformed. PRISM, for instance, allows the NSA to obtain private data

about a customer in the U.S. or abroad without the need for a warrant,
while Bullrun aims to undermine encryption standards. "In the short

term, U.S. companies lose out on contracts, and over the long term,
other countries create protectionist policies that lock U.S.
businesses out of foreign markets," says ITIF. "This not only hurts
U.S. technology companies but costs American jobs and weakens the
U.S. trade balance."

The technology sector is critical to overall economic

growth it increases the GDP, creates a massive
number of jobs, and creates a new market for
companies
Kvochko 13 (Elana kvochko 4/11/13 (Elena Kvochko is Manager in
Information Technology Industry at World Economic Forum. She manages the
global partnership programs on cyber resilience and the internet of things

and is responsible for developing relationships with top information

technology industry partners. Prior to her position at the Forum, she worked
as Information and Communication Technology specialist at the World Bank.
Elena focused on a portfolio of projects aimed at leveraging ICT for economic
growth and transparency in emerging economies, Agenda, "Five ways
technology can help the economy," https://agenda.weforum.org/2013/04/fiveways-technology-can-help-the-economy/)
At a time of slowed growth and continued volatility, many countries
are looking for policies that will stimulate growth and create new
jobs. Information communications technology (ICT) is not only one of
the fastest growing industries directly creating millions of jobs
but it is also an important enabler of innovation and development.

The number of mobile subscriptions (6.8 billion) is approaching global

population figures, with 40% of people in the world already online. In

this new environment, the competitiveness of economies depends

on their ability to leverage new technologies. Here are the five
common economic effects of ICT. 1. Direct job creation The ICT
sector is, and is expected to remain, one of the largest employers. In
the US alone, computer and information technology jobs are
expected to grow by 22% up to 2020, creating 758,800 new jobs. In

Australia, building and running the new super-fast National Broadband

Network will support 25,000 jobs annually. Naturally, the growth in

different segments is uneven. In the US, for each job in the high-tech
industry, five additional jobs, on average, are created in other
sectors. In 2013, the global tech market will grow by 8%, creating jobs,
salaries and a widening range of services and products. 2.
Contribution to GDP growth Findings from various countries confirm
the positive effect of ICT on growth. For example, a 10% increase in
broadband penetration is associated with a 1.4% increase in GDP
growth in emerging markets. In China, this number can reach 2.5%.

The doubling of mobile data use caused by the increase in 3G

connections boosts GDP per capita growth rate by 0.5% globally. The

Internet accounts for 3.4% of overall GDP in some economies. Most

of this effect is driven by e-commerce people advertising and
selling goods online. 3. Emergence of new services and industries
Numerous public services have become available online and through
mobile phones. The transition to cloud computing is one of the key

trends for modernization. The government of Moldova is one of the first

countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia to shift its government IT
infrastructure into the cloud and launch mobile and e-services for
citizens and businesses. ICT has enabled the emergence of a

completely new sector: the app industry. Research shows that

Facebook apps alone created over 182,000 jobs in 2011, and that the
aggregate value of the Facebook app economy exceeds $$12 billion.
4. Workforce transformation New microwork platforms, developed
by companies like oDesk, Amazon and Samasource, help to divide
tasks into small components that can then be outsourced to contract
workers. The contractors are often based in emerging economies.

Microwork platforms allow entrepreneurs to significantly cut costs

and get access to qualified workers. In 2012, oDesk alone had over 3
million registered contractors who performed 1.5 million tasks . This
trend had spillover effects on other industries, such as online
payment systems. ICT has also contributed to the rise of
entrepreneurship, making it much easier for self-starters to access
best practices, legal and regulatory information, marketing and
investment resources. 5. Business innovation In OECD countries,
more than 95% of businesses have an online presence . The Internet
provides them with new ways of reaching out to customers and
competing for market share. Over the past few years, social media
has established itself as a powerful marketing tool . ICT tools
employed within companies help to streamline business processes
and improve efficiency. The unprecedented explosion of connected

devices throughout the world has created new ways for businesses to
serve their customers.

Global economic down turn triggers multiple

scenarios for conflict and nuclear escalation.
Duncan, Blackhorse Asset Management chief economist, 2012

(Richard, The New Depression: The Breakdown of the Paper Money Economy,
google books)
a New Great Depression would extend far beyond the realm of
economics. Hungry people will fight to survive . Governments will use force to maintain
The consequences of

internal order at home. This section considers the geopolitical repercussion of economic collapse, beginning with the
United States. First,

the U.S. governments tax revenues would collapse

with the

because global trade would shrivel up , other countries

would no longer help finance the U.S. budget deficit by buying government bonds
because they would no longer have the money to do so. At present, the rest of the world
depression. Second,

has a $500 billion annual trade surplus with the United States. The central banks of the United States trading partners
accumulate that surplus as foreign exchange reserves and invest most of those reserves into U.S. government bonds.

An economic collapse would cause global trade to plummet and drastically reduce (if
not eliminate altogether) the U.S. trade deficit. Therefore, this source of foreign
funding for the U.S. budget deficit would dry up. Consequently, the government
would have to sharply curtail its spending, both at home and abroad. Domestically,
social programs for the old, the sick, and the unemployed would have to be slashed. Government spending on education

Much less government spending would result

in a dramatic increase in poverty and, consequently, in crime. This would combine to
and infrastructure would also have to be curtailed.

produce a crisis of the current two-party political system. Astonishment, frustration, and anger at the economic
breakdown

would radicalize politics . New parties would form at both extremes of the political

spectrum. Given the great and growing income inequality going into the crisis, the hungry have-nots would substantially
outnumber the remaining wealthy. On the one hand, a hard swing to the left would be the outcome most likely to result
from democratic elections. In that case, the tax rates on the top income brackets could be raised to 80 percent or more, a
level last seen in 1963. On the other hand, the possibility of a right-wing putsch could not be ruled out. During the Great
Depression, the U.S. military was tiny in comparison with what it became during World War II and during the decades of

In this New Great Depression, it might be the

military that ultimately determines how the country would be

hot, cold, and terrorist wars that followed.

governed. The political battle over Americas future would be bitter, and quite possibly bloody. It cannot

be guaranteed that the U.S. Constitution would survive . Foreign affairs would
also confront the United States with enormous challenges. During the Great Depression, the United States did not have a
global empire. Now it does.

The United States maintains hundreds of military

bases across dozens of countries around the world. Added to this is a fleet of 11 aircraft carriers and 18 nucleararmed submarines. The country spends more than $650 billion a year on its military . If
the U.S. economy collapses into a New Great Depression, the United States could
not afford to maintain its worldwide military presence or to continue in its role
as global peacekeeper. Or, at least, it could not finance its military in the same way it
does at present. Therefore, either the United States would have to find an alternative funding method for its
global military presence or else it would have to radically scale it back. Historically, empires were financed with plunder
and territorial expropriation. The estates of the vanquished ruling classes were given to the conquering generals, while

The U.S. model of empire has been

unique. It has financed its global military presence by issuing government
debt, thereby taxing future generations of Americans to pay for this generations global supremacy. That
the rest of the population was forced to pay imperial taxes.

would no longer be possible if the economy collapsed. Costbenefit analysis

would quickly reveal that much of Americas global presence was simply no longer affordable. Manyor even most
of the outposts that did not pay for themselves would have to be abandoned . Priority would
be given to those places that were of vital economic interests to the United States. The Middle East oil fields would be at
the top of that list. The United States would have to maintain control over them whatever the price. In this global

the price of oil could collapse to $3 per barrel . Oil

consumption would fall by half and there would be no speculators left to manipulate prices higher. Oil
at that level would impoverish the oil-producing nations, with
depression scenario,

extremely destabilizing political consequences. Maintaining control

over the Middle East oil fields would become much more difficult for the United
States. It would require a much larger military presence than it does now. On the one hand, it might become
necessary for the United States to reinstate the draft (which would possibly
meet with violent resistance from draftees, as it did during the Vietnam War). On the other hand, Americas all-volunteer
army might find it had more than enough volunteers with the national unemployment rate in excess of 20 percent.

The

army might have to be employed to keep order at home, given that mass
unemployment would inevitably lead to a sharp spike in crime. Only after the Middle East oil was secured would the
country know how much more of its global military presence it could afford to maintain. If international trade had broken
down, would there be any reason for the United States to keep a military presence in Asia when there was no obvious way

In a global depression, the United States allies in

Asia would most likely be unwilling or unable to finance Americas
military bases there or to pay for the upkeep of the U.S. Pacific fleet. Nor would the United
States have the strength to force them to pay for U.S. protection. Retreat from Asia might
to finance that presence?

become unavoidable. And Europe? What would a costbenefit analysis conclude about the wisdom of the United States
maintaining military bases there? What valued added does Europe provide to the United States? Necessity may mean

Europe will have to defend itself. Should a New Great Depression put an
end to the Pax Americana, the world would become a much more
dangerous place . When the Great Depression began, Japan was the rising industrial power in Asia. It invaded
Manchuria in 1931 and conquered much of the rest of Asia in the early 1940s. Would China, Asias new rising power,
behave the same way in the event of a new global economic collapse? Possibly. China is the only nuclear power in Asia
east of India (other than North Korea, which is largely a Chinese satellite state). However, in this disaster scenario ,

it is
not certain that China would survive in its current configuration. Its economy
would be in ruins . Most of its factories and banks would be closed. Unemployment could exceed 30 percent.
There would most likely be starvation both in the cities and in the countryside. The Communist Party
could lose its grip on power, in which case the country could break apart , as
it has numerous times in the past. It was less than 100 years ago that Chinas provinces, ruled by warlords, were at war
with one another. United or divided, Chinas nuclear arsenal would make it Asias undisputed superpower if the United
States were to withdraw from the region. From Korea and Japan in the North to New Zealand in the South to Burma in the
West, all of Asia would be at Chinas mercy. And

hunger among Chinas population of 1.3 billion

people could necessitate territorial expansion into Southeast Asia. In fact, the central
government might not be able to prevent mass migration southward, even if it wanted to. In Europe, severe economic
hardship would revive the centuries-old struggle between the left and the right. During the 1930s, the Fascists movement
arose and imposed a police state on most of Western Europe. In the East, the Soviet Union had become a communist

It is
difficult to judge whether Europes democratic institutions would
hold up better this time that they did last time. England had an empire during the Great Depression.
police state even earlier. The far right and the far left of the political spectrum converge in totalitarianism.

Now it only has banks. In a severe worldwide depression, the country or, at least Londoncould become ungovernable.

Frustration over poverty and a lack of jobs would erupt into antiimmigration riots not only in the United Kingdom but also across most of Europe. The extent to which Russia
would menace its European neighbors is unclear. On the one hand, Russia would be impoverished
by the collapse in oil prices and might be too preoccupied with internal unrest to threaten anyone. On
the other hand, it could provoke a war with the goal of maintaining
internal order through emergency wartime powers. Germany is very nearly
demilitarized today when compared with the late 1930s. Lacking a nuclear deterrent of its own, it could be subject to
Russian intimidation. While Germany could appeal for protection from England and France, who do have nuclear
capabilities, it is uncertain that would buy Germany enough time to remilitarize before it became a victim of Eastern
aggression. As for the rest of the world, its prospects in this disaster scenario can be summed up in only a couple of
sentences. Global economic output could fall by as much as half, from $60 trillion to $30 trillion. Not all of the worlds

Food riots
would provoke political upheaval and myriad big and small conflicts around the world. It
seven billion people would survive in a $30 trillion global economy. Starvation would be widespread.

would be a humanitarian catastrophe so extreme as to be unimaginable for the current generation, who, at least in the
industrialized world, has known only prosperity. Nor would there be reason to hope that the New Great Depression would
end quickly. The Great Depression was only ended by an even more calamitous global war that killed approximately 60
million people.

And, Ending Project Bullrun solves reigning the NSA

restores public confidence and encourages a climate
for business innovation.
Wyden 14 (Ron Wyden Senator for Oregon www.wyden.senate.gov
10/4/14 Ron Wydens publicity/office page, Wyden Introduces Bill to Ban
Government Mandated Backdoors Into American's Cellphones and
Computers" http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wydenintroduces-bill-to-ban-government-mandated-backdoors-into-americanscellphones-and-computers)
Washington, D.C. U.S. Senator Ron Wyden, D-Ore., today
introduced the Secure Data Act to protect Americans privacy and
data security. The bill prohibits government mandates to build
backdoors or security vulnerabilities into U.S. software and
electronics. U.S. government officials have recently proposed to
compel companies to build backdoors in the security features of
their products. These proposals threaten to undermine the
development and deployment of strong data security technologies
and the overwhelming economic and national security interest in
better data security. Strong encryption and sound computer
security is the best way to keep Americans data safe from hackers
and foreign threats. It is the best way to protect our constitutional rights at
a time when a persons whole life can often be found on his or her
smartphone. And strong computer security can rebuild consumer trust
that has been shaken by years of misstatements by intelligence
agencies about mass surveillance of Americans, Wyden said. This
bill sends a message to leaders of those agencies to stop recklessly
pushing for new ways to vacuum up Americans private information,
and instead put that effort into rebuilding public trust.

Government-driven technology mandates to weaken data security

for the purpose of aiding government investigations would
compromise national security, economic security and personal privacy:
Cyber vulnerabilities weaken cybersecurity. Once a backdoor is built
in a security system, the security of the system is inherently
compromised. For example, in 2005 it was revealed that an unknown entity
had exploited a lawful intercept capability built into Greek cellphone
systems and had used it to listen to users phone calls, including those of
dozens of senior government officials. Technology mandates thwart
innovation. Companies have less incentive to invest in the
development and deployment of strong new data security technologies
if they are required to compromise them from the outset. Mandating
weak security would further erode trust in American products and
services. Information technology companies are working to regain the
trust of consumers upset by revelations of government intrusions
into their personal communications. A mandate requiring companies
to facilitate additional government surveillance would undermine
those efforts. Senator Wydens legislation builds on a bipartisan
effort in the U.S. House of Representatives, which approved an amendment
by Reps. Thomas Massie, R-Ky., and Zoe Lofgren, D-Calif., to prohibit
electronic vulnerability mandates on a 293-123 vote in June 2014.

1AC Cyber Attacks Advantage

Advantage ( ) is Cyber Security
A Risk of cyber attacks is high now and becoming the
top terror threat.
Hoover, senior editor for InformationWeek Governments
where he covers the federal IT sector, 2012
(J. Nicholas, 2/12/2012, Dark Reading, Cyber Attacks Becoming Top Terror
Threat, FBI Says, http://www.darkreading.com/risk-management/cyberattacks-becoming-top-terror-threat-fbi-says/d/d-id/1102582, accessed
6/26/2015, JAK)
Hackers will one day outstrip terrorists as top threat to U.S., FBI
director tells a Senate committee. Attacks predicted to become more
complex and frequent. Cyber attacks against government agencies and
businesses in the United States continue to rise, and cyber threats
will one day surpass the danger of terrorism to the United States,
intelligence community officials said in an open hearing of the Senate select
intelligence community Tuesday. "Stopping terrorists is the number one
priority," said FBI director Robert Mueller. "But down the road, the cyber
threat will be the number one threat to the country. I do not think
today it is necessarily [the] number one threat, but it will be
tomorrow." The rare open hearing of the Senate's intelligence committee,
an annual one that surveys the threats to the United States from around the
globe, included testimony by Mueller, director of national intelligence James
Clapper, and CIA director David Petraeus. Tuesday's hearing looked at the
broad spectrum of threats to the nation, but numerous administration officials
will brief Congress in a classified hearing today that will focus more pointedly
on cybersecurity. Congress' interest in cybersecurity remains high.
Both the House and Senate continue to work toward comprehensive
legislation on the issue. The House Committee on Homeland Security is
marking up cybersecurity legislation Wednesday, and the Senate will move to
consider a comprehensive cybersecurity bill later this month, though industry
has raised concerns about cost over the Senate bill. The Senate homeland
security and governmental affairs committee has indicated that it may hold a
hearing on that bill within the next two weeks. Clapper said that
cybersecurity is already at the forefront of national security
concerns, right there with terrorism, proliferation of weapons, and
espionage. "In the last year, we observed increased breadth and
sophistication of computer network operations by both state and non-state
actors," he said inprepared testimony.

Project Bullrun allows the NSA to build backdoors and

defeat encryption on major companies Markoff, Senior Writer for the New York Times, 13
(John, September 6, New York Times, N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of
Privacy on Web, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-muchinternet-encryption.html, June 23, 2015, GG)

The agency, according to the documents and interviews with industry

officials, deployed custom-built, superfast computers to break codes,
and began collaborating with technology companies in the
United States and abroad to build entry points into their
products. The documents do not identify which companies have
participated. The N.S.A. hacked into target computers to snare messages
before they were encrypted. In some cases, companies say they
were coerced by the government into handing over their
master encryption keys or building in a back door. And the
agency used its influence as the worlds most experienced code
maker to covertly introduce weaknesses into the encryption
standards followed by hardware and software developers around the
world. For the past decade, N.S.A. has led an aggressive,
multipronged effort to break widely used Internet encryption
technologies, said a 2010 memo describing a briefing about N.S.A.
accomplishments for employees of its British counterpart, Government
Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ. Cryptanalytic capabilities
are now coming online. Vast amounts of encrypted Internet data
which have up till now been discarded are now exploitable. The
agencys success in defeating many of the privacy protections offered
by encryption does not change the rules that prohibit the
deliberate targeting of Americans e-mails or phone calls
without a warrant. But it shows that the agency, which
was sharply rebuked by a federal judge in 2011 for violating the
rules and misleading the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, cannot necessarily be restrained by privacy technology. N.S.A.
rules permit the agency to store any encrypted communication,
domestic or foreign, for as long as the agency is trying to decrypt it or
analyze its technical features.

These programs COLLAPSE cyber-security they show

hackers the vulnerabilities to exploit
Kehl, Policy Analyst and New Americas Open Technology
Institute, 14
(Danielle, July 31, Future Tense with Arizona State University, How the NSA
Hurts Our Economy, Cybersecurity, and Foreign,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/07/31/usa_freedom_act_update
_how_the_nsa_hurts_our_economy_cybersecurity_and_foreign.html, June 25,
2015, GG)

Lastly, theres growing evidence that certain NSA surveillance

techniques are actually bad for cybersecurity. As the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers recently explained: The United States
might have compromised both security and privacy in a failed
attempt to improve security. Weve learned in the past year that the
NSA has been deliberately weakening the security of the Internet,
including commercial products that we rely on every day, in order to
improve its own spying capabilities. The agency has apparently tried
everything from secretly undermining essential encryption tools and
standards to inserting backdoors into widely used computer hardware
and software products, stockpiling vulnerabilities in commercial
software, and building a vast network of spyware inserted onto
computers and routers around the world. A former U.S. ambassador to the
U.N. Human Rights Council, Eileen Donahoe, wrote a forceful article back in
March about how the NSAs actions threaten our national security.
When you weigh these costs against the questionable benefits of the
programs, the need to rein in the NSA and restore international
confidence in the U.S. becomes obvious. The USA FREEDOM Act is
historic not because it would solve all of our problems, but rather because
it would be a much-needed first step in the long road to recovery from the
effects of widespread NSA surveillance. As the Times points out, encryption
"guards global commerce and banking systems, protects sensitive
data like trade secrets and medical records, and automatically
secures the e-mails, Web searches, Internet chats and phone calls of
Americans and others around the world."

Cyber terror is an existential threat Nuclear

retaliation and the end of the world
Pizzi, foreign affairs writer for Al Jazeera, 14 (Michael Pizzi, 1-72014, "Cyberwarfare greater threat to US than terrorism, say security
experts," Al Jazeera America,
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/1/7/defense-leaderssaycyberwarfaregreatestthreattous.html //NK)
Cyberwarfare is the greatest threat facing the United States
outstripping even terrorism according to defense, military, and national security leaders
in a Defense News poll, a sign that hawkish warnings about an imminent cyber Pearl Harbor have been
absorbed in defense circles. That warning, issued by then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in Oct. 2012,
struck many as a fear-mongering plug for defense and intelligence funding at a moment when many in the
United States, including 32 percent of those polled by the same Defense News Leadership Poll, believe the
government spends too much on defense. But 45 percent of the 352 industry leaders polled said

cyberwarfare is the gravest danger to the U.S., underlining the

governments shift in priority and resources towards the burgeoning digital

arena of warfare. In 2010, the Pentagon created the U.S. Cyber Command, under the helm of NSA director
Gen. Keith Alexander, to better prepare the U.S. for a potential attack on digital infrastructure. Later that
year, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn said cyberspace had become just as critical to
military operations as land, sea, air, and space. The nebulous term "cyberwarfare" refers to full-on conflict
between countries or terror groups featuring digital attacks on computer systems. But its more
devastating, violent impacts are considered by many analysts to be largely theoretical at this point.
Looming fears of cyber attacks on pacemakers of world leaders, for instance, have inspired movie plots
and television shows but are not known to have occurred, noted Morgan Marquis-Boire, a security
researcher at the University of Toronto's Citizen Lab. At the moment, this is all set in the realm of science
fiction."

Marquis-Boire said the most kinetic cyberattack to date was

probably the Stuxnet worm that attacked Irans Natanz nuclear

enrichment facility in 2010, stoking fears of a cyber-triggered
nuclear terror attack. In the U.S., the most prominent cyber attacks
have targeted websites, including the Syrian Electronic Army's
infamous White House bomb hoax that briefly caused a 140-point
drop in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. But the classic fear is that
enemy hackers from countries like Iran, China, or Russia could
infiltrate the U.S. power grid, shutting down government agencies,
crashing planes into buildings, and grinding the economy to a halt.
And though it has yet to happen, security experts say a large-scale
attack on the U.S. power grid that could inflict mass casualties is
within the realm of possibility. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation
reported in 2009 that the U.S. grid remains susceptible to infiltration despite substantial government
investment in securing it. We do have a security problem whereby life is rushing towards the Internet
faster than were developing Internet security, said Marquis-Boire. Many

of these systems
werent built in a cyberwarfare age. We werent worried about
cyberwarfare when we built the national power grid, and its difficult
to retrofit security. The impact of such an attack could be
devastating. Massive power outages could not only unleash chaos,
they could also distract from a simultaneous military or terrorist
attack. That latter concern that cyber war tactics might blur with
traditional terrorism were underlined in June 2012, when information security expert Eugene
Kaspersky announced his labs discovery of the Flame virus that targeted computers in Iran. Its not
cyber war, its cyber terrorism and Im afraid its just the beginning
of the game, Kaspersky said at a conference in Tel Aviv. Im afraid it will be the
end of the world as we know it. A few months later, Panetta compounded fears when he
warned of a new, profound sense of vulnerability in the U.S. due to the prospect of cyberwarfare. But
with the exception of several high-profile hacking incidents of websites, the American public has yet to
experience any sort of large-scale attack on U.S. infrastructure, let alone American lives. Despite the
improbability of a full-on cyber conflict, analysts say they are not surprised the nebulous threat posed by
cyberwarfare has struck fear in American hearts. " The

capability is out there to launch

a large-scale cyberattack resulting in loss of life or property
damage, and potential targets are in some sense infinite, because
everything is connected to computers in one way or the other, said
Tara Maller, a research fellow with the National Security Studies program at the New America Foundation
and a former military analyst for the CIA.

Removal of NSA backdoors enable decrease of risk in

cyber hacking- better strengthening of systems,
detect intrusions, and identify emerging threats
McQuinn , research assistant with the Information Technology and
Innovation Foundation, 2014
[The hill, The Secure Data Act could help law enforcement protect against
cybercrime, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/227594-thesecure-data-act-could-help-law-enforcement-protect-against, 6/25/15,CY]
Last Sunday, Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) wrote an op-ed describing the role that
U.S. law enforcement should play in fostering stronger data
encryption to make information technology (IT) systems more
secure. This op-ed explains Wydens introduction of the the Secure Data Act,

which would prohibit the government from mandating that U.S.

companies build backdoors in their products for the purpose of
surveillance. This legislation responds directly to recent comments by U.S.
officials, most notably the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director
James Comey, chastising Apple and Google for creating encrypted devices to
which law enforcement cannot gain access. Comey and others have argued
that U.S. tech companies should design a way for law enforcement officials to
access consumer data stored on those devices. In this environment, the
Secure Data Act is a homerun for security and privacy and is a good
step towards reasserting U.S. competitiveness in building secure
systems for a global market. By adopting its position on the issue
the FBI is working against its own goal of preventing cybercrime as
well as broader government efforts to improve cybersecurity. Just a
few years ago, the Bureau was counseling people to better encrypt their data
to safeguard it from hackers. Creating backdoor access for law enforcement
fundamentally weakens IT systems because it creates a new pathway for
malicious hackers, foreign governments, and other unauthorized parties to
gain illicit access. Requiring backdoors is a step backwards for companies
actively working to eliminate security vulnerabilities in their products. In this
way, security is a lot like a ship at sea, the more holes you put in the system
government mandated or notthe faster it will sink. The better solution is
to patch up all the holes in the system and work to prevent any new ones.
Rather than decreasing security to suit its appetite for surveillance, the FBI
should recognize that better security is needed to bolster U.S. defenses
against online threats. The Secure Data Act is an important step in that
direction because it will stop U.S. law enforcement agencies from
requiring companies to introduce vulnerabilities in their products. If
this bill is enacted, law enforcement will be forced to use other means to
solve crimes, such as by using metadata from cellular providers, call records,
text messages, and even old-fashioned detective work. This will also allow
U.S. tech companies, with the help of law enforcement, to continue to
strengthen their systems, better detect intrusions, and identify
emerging threats. Law enforcement, such as the recently announced
U.S. Department of Justice Cybersecurity Unita unit designed
solely to deter, investigate, and prosecute cyber criminals, should
work in cooperation with the private sector to create a safer
environment online. A change of course is also necessary to restore the
ability of U.S. tech companies to compete globally, where mistrust has run
rampant following the revelations of mass government surveillance. With the
113th Congress at an end, Wyden has promised to reintroduce the Data
Secure Act again in the next Congress. Congress should move expediently to
advance Senator Wydens bill to promote security and privacy in U.S. devices
and software. Furthermore, as Congress marks up the legislation and
considers amendments, it should restrict not just government access to
devices, but also government control of those devices. These efforts will
move the efforts of our law enforcement agencies away from
creating cyber vulnerabilities and allow electronics manufacturers to
produce the most secure devices imaginable.

1AC Internet Freedom

Advantage (

) is Internet Freedom

Current NSA surveillance hinders any chance of

Internet freedom- lack of oversight makes matters
worse
Wadhwa, researcher with the Hybrid Reality Institute, 13 (Tarun, 6-132013, "NSA Surveillance May Have Dealt Major Blow To Global Internet
Freedom Efforts," Forbes,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tarunwadhwa/2013/06/13/with-nsa-surveillanceus-government-may-have-dealt-major-blow-to-global-internet-freedomefforts/)//GL
One thing has become clear though: the credibility of the idea that
the internet can be a positive, freedom-promoting global force is
facing its largest challenge to date. And it comes directly from one of its most
outspoken supporters: the US government. Simply put, our government has failed in its role as the
caretaker of the internet. Although this was never an official designation, America controls much of the
infrastructure, and many of the most popular services online are provided by a handful of American

The world is starting to sober up to the fact that much of

what theyve done online in the last decade is now cataloged in a
top-secret facility somewhere in the United States. Reasonable
minds can disagree over the necessity of these programs and how to
strike the proper balance between security and privacy. These
matters aside, what has been the most disturbing part of this entire
scandal has to do with the lack of accountability and oversight. Not only
companies.

were the American people kept in the dark they were lied to by intelligence officials, misled about
possible constitutional violations, and potentially undermined by the very courts that were supposed to
protect their rights. The government has used peculiar interpretations of laws that they are not even
willing to discuss to defend an invasive collection of personal data beyond anything even the paranoid
among us would have thought was possible. And while President Obama welcomes the debate over an
issue he has worked hard to keep secret, we are now starting to see the usual Washington tactics of
political spin, feverish scapegoating, and patriotic grandstanding in lieu of a real discussion. We should all
be extremely concerned about the colossal surveillance infrastructure that is being built in the name of our
safety. In trying to reassure the public, our leaders have told us that these programs are not meant to
target us, but instead, foreigners who may pose a threat to our security. But this is merely a decision on
how the data is being used today we are getting into very dangerous territory by hoping for the best
intentions of whoever is in power in the future. American history holds many lessons for us here:
circumstances can change, the perception of who is a threat can vary with whoever is in office, and we

In the
court of global public opinion, America may have tarnished its moral
authority to question the surveillance practices of other nations
whether it be Russia on monitoring journalists, or China on
conducting cyber espionage. Declarations by the State Department
that were once statements of principle now ring hollow and
hypocritical to some. No nation can rival the American surveillance
state, but they no longer need support to build their own massive
systems of espionage and oppression. The costs of surveillance and data storage
cannot predict what our political situation will look like decades, or even years, from now.

technologies are plummeting these will no longer be prohibitive factors. Diplomatic pressures and legal

The goal has been

to promote internet freedom around the world, but we may have
barriers that had also once served as major deterrents will soon fade away.

also potentially created a blueprint for how authoritarian

governments can store, track, and mine their citizens digital lives.

BULLRUN undermines US Internet freedom agendapromotes hypocrisy

Kehl et al, Open Technology Institute Policy Analyst, 14
(Danielle, July, Open Technology Institute, Surveillance Costs: The NSAs
Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/534-surveillance-costs-the-nsasimpact-on-the-economy-internet-freedomcybersecurity/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf, page #14-15, 06/25/15, MM)
As the birthplace for so many of these technologies, including the
internet itself, we have a responsibility to see them used for good,
declared Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in January 2010.175 Her
speech at the Newseum in Washington DC effectively launched the
United States Internet Freedom agenda, articulating a leading role
for the U.S. in using the Internet to promote freedom of expression,
freedom of worship, and the freedom to connect around the world.
Clinton went on to give two other major addresses on Internet
Freedom, becoming the first global leader to emphasize Internet
Freedom as a foreign policy priority and urging countries everywhere to join us in
the bet we have made, a bet that an open internet will lead to stronger, more prosperous countries.176
As Richard Fontaine and Will Rogers describe in a seminal paper on the subject in June 2011, Internet
Freedom, broadly defined, is the notion that universal rights, including the freedoms of expression,
assembly and association, extend to the digital sphere.177 Although there were questions from the
beginning about whether the United States would hold itself to the same high standards domestically that

the American government has successfully

built up a policy and programming agenda in the past few years
based on promoting an open Internet.179 These efforts include
raising concerns over Internet repression in bilateral dialogues with
countries such as Vietnam and China,180 supporting initiatives
including the Freedom Online Coalition, and providing over $120
million in funding for groups working to advance Internet freedom
supporting counter-censorship and secure communications
technology, digital safety training, and policy and research programs
for people facing Internet repression.181 However, the legitimacy
of these efforts has been thrown into question since the NSA
disclosures began. Trust has been the principal casualty in this
unfortunate affair, wrote Ben FitzGerald and Richard Butler in
December 2013. The American public, our nations allies, leading
businesses and Internet users around the world are losing faith in
the U.S. governments role as the leading proponent of a free, open
and integrated global Internet.182
it holds others to internationally,178

BULLRUN subverts US internet governance beliefsRussia and China want more sovereignty
Kehl et al, Open Technology Institute Policy Analyst, 14
(Danielle, July, Open Technology Institute, Surveillance Costs: The NSAs
Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,

https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/534-surveillance-costs-the-nsasimpact-on-the-economy-internet-freedomcybersecurity/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf, page #21-22, 06/25/15, MM)

Prior to the NSA revelations, the United States was already facing an
increasingly challenging political climate as it promoted the Internet
Freedom agenda in global Internet governance conversations. At the
2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT),
the U.S. and diverse group of other countries refused to sign the
updated International Telecommunications Regulations based on
concerns that the document pushed for greater governmental
control of the Internet and would ultimately harm Internet
Freedom.183 Many observers noted that the split hardened the
division between two opposing camps in the Internet governance
debate: proponents of a status quo multistakeholder Internet
governance model, like the United States, who argued that the
existing system was the best way to preserve key online freedoms,
and those seeking to disrupt or challenge that multistakeholder
model for a variety of political and economic reasons, including
governments like Russia and China pushing for greater national
sovereignty over the Internet.184 Many of the proposals for more governmental control
over the network could be understood as attempts by authoritarian countries to more effectively monitor
and censor their citizens, which allowed the U.S. to reasonably maintain some moral high ground as its
delegates walked out of the treaty conference.185 Although few stakeholders seemed particularly pleased
by the outcome of the WCIT, reports indicate that by the middle of 2013 the tone had shifted in a more
collaborative and positive direction following the meetings of the 2013 World Telecommunications/ICT
Policy Forum (WTPF) and the World Summit on Information Society + 10 (WSIS+10) review.186 However,
the Internet governance conversation took a dramatic turn after the Snowden disclosures. The annual
meeting of the Freedom Online Coalition occurred in Tunis in June 2013, just a few weeks after the initial
leaks. Unsurprisingly, surveillance dominated the conference even though the agenda covered a wide
range of topics from Internet access and affordability to cybersecurity.187 Throughout the two-day event,
representatives from civil society used the platform to confront and criticize governments about their

NSA surveillance would continue to be the focus of

international convenings on Internet Freedom and Internet
governance for months to come, making civil society representatives
and foreign governments far less willing to embrace the United
States Internet Freedom agenda or to accept its defense of the
multistakeholder model of Internet governance as a anything other
than self-serving. One can come up with all kinds of excuses for why US surveillance is not
monitoring practices.188

hypocrisy. For example, one might argue that US policies are more benevolent than those of many other
regimes And one might recognize that in several cases, some branches of government dont know what
other branches are doing and therefore US policy is not so much hypocritical as it is inadvertently
contradictory, wrote Eli Dourado, a researcher from the Mercatus Center at George Mason University in

But the fact is that the NSA is galvanizing opposition to

Americas internet freedom agenda.189 The scandal revived
proposals from both Russia and Brazil for global management of
technical standards and domain names, whether through the ITU or
other avenues. Even developing countries, many of whom have
traditionally aligned with the U.S. and prioritize access and
affordability as top issues, dont want US assistance because they
assume the equipment comes with a backdoor for the NSA. They are
August 2013.

walking straight into the arms of Russia, China, and the ITU.190 Consequently, NSA surveillance has
shifted the dynamics of the Internet governance debate in a potentially destabilizing manner. The Snowden
revelations have also been well-received by those who seek to discredit existing approaches to Internet
governance, wrote the Center for Democracy & Technologys Matthew Shears. There has been a longrunning antipathy among a number of stakeholders to the United States governments perceived control of
the Internet and the dominance of US Internet companies. There has also been a long-running antipathy,

particularly among some governments, to the distributed and open management of the Internet.191
Shears points out that evidence of the NSAs wide-ranging capabilities has fueled general concerns about
the current Internet governance system, bolstering the arguments of those calling for a new government-

At the UN Human Rights Council in September 2013,

the representative from Pakistanspeaking on behalf of Cuba,
Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Ecuador, Russia, Indonesia, Bolivia,
Iran, and Chinaexplicitly linked the revelations about surveillance
programs to the need for reforming Internet governance processes
and institutions to give governments a larger role.192 Surveillance
issues continued to dominate the conversation at the 2013 Internet
Governance Forum in Bali as well, where debates on child
protection, education and infrastructure were overshadowed by
widespread concerns from delegates who said the publics trust in
the internet was being undermined by reports of US and British
government surveillance.193
centric governance order.

Destroying internet freedom kills democracy

movements
Genachowski, Chairman of the U.S. Federal Communications
Commission, 13
(Julius, April 16, Foreign Press, The Plot to Block Internet Freedom,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/16/the-plot-to-block-internet-freedom/?
wp_login_redirect=0, June 28, 2015, GG)
But this growth trajectory is not inevitable, and threats are mounting to
the global spread of an open and truly "worldwide" web. The
expansion of the open Internet must be allowed to continue: The
mobile and social media revolutions are critical not only for
democratic institutions ability to solve the collective problems of a
shrinking world, but also to a dynamic and innovative global
economy that depends on financial transparency and the free flow of
information. The threats to the open Internet were on stark display at
last Decembers World Conference on International
Telecommunications in Dubai, where the United States fought
attempts by a number of countries including Russia, China, and
Saudi Arabia to give a U.N. organization, the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), new regulatory authority over the
Internet. Ultimately, over the objection of the United States and many
others, 89 countries voted to approve a treaty that could strengthen
the power of governments to control online content and deter
broadband deployment. In Dubai, two deeply worrisome trends came to a
head. First, we see that the Arab Spring and similar events have
awakened nondemocratic governments to the danger that the
Internet poses to their regimes. In Dubai, they pushed for a treaty that
would give the ITUs imprimatur to governments blocking or favoring of
online content under the guise of preventing spam and increasing network
security. Authoritarian countries real goal is to legitimize content
regulation, opening the door for governments to block any content
they do not like, such as political speech. Second, the basic

commercial model underlying the open Internet is also under threat.

In particular, some proposals, like the one made last year by major European
network operators, would change the ground rules for payments for
transferring Internet content. One species of these proposals is called
"sender pays" or "sending party pays." Since the beginning of the Internet,
content creators individuals, news outlets, search engines, social media
sites have been able to make their content available to Internet
users without paying a fee to Internet service providers. A senderpays rule would change that, empowering governments to require
Internet content creators to pay a fee to connect with an end user in
that country. Sender pays may look merely like a commercial issue, a
different way to divide the pie. And proponents of sender pays and similar
changes claim they would benefit Internet deployment and Internet users.
But the opposite is true: If a country imposed a payment requirement,
content creators would be less likely to serve that country. The loss
of content would make the Internet less attractive and would lessen
demand for the deployment of Internet infrastructure in that country. Repeat
the process in a few more countries, and the growth of global
connectivity as well as its attendant benefits for democracy
would slow dramatically. So too would the benefits accruing to the
global economy. Without continuing improvements in transparency and
information sharing, the innovation that springs from new commercial ideas
and creative breakthroughs is sure to be severely inhibited. To their credit,
American Internet service providers have joined with the broader U.S.
technology industry, civil society, and others in opposing these changes.
Together, we were able to win the battle in Dubai over sender pays, but we
have not yet won the war. Issues affecting global Internet openness,
broadband deployment, and free speech will return in upcoming international
forums, including an important meeting in Geneva in May, the World
Telecommunication/ICT Policy Forum. The massive investment in wired and
wireless broadband infrastructure in the United States demonstrates that
preserving an open Internet is completely compatible with broadband
deployment. According to a recent UBS report, annual wireless capital
investment in the United States increased 40 percent from 2009 to 2012,
while investment in the rest of the world has barely inched upward. And
according to the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, more
fiber-optic cable was laid in the United States in 2011 and 2012 than in any
year since 2000, and 15 percent more than in Europe. All Internet users
lose something when some countries are cut off from the World Wide
Web. Each person who is unable to connect to the Internet
diminishes our own access to information. We become less able to
understand the world and formulate policies to respond to our shrinking
planet. Conversely, we gain a richer understanding of global events as more
people connect around the world, and those societies nurturing nascent
democracy movements become more familiar with Americas traditions of
free speech and pluralism. Thats why we believe that the Internet should
remain free of gatekeepers and that no entity public or private
should be able to pick and choose the information web users can
receive. That is a principle the United States adopted in the Federal
Communications Commissions 2010 Open Internet Order. And its why we

are deeply concerned about arguments by some in the United States that
broadband providers should be able to block, edit, or favor Internet traffic
that travels over their networks, or adopt economic models similar to
international sender pays. We must preserve the Internet as the most
open and robust platform for the free exchange of information ever
devised. Keeping the Internet open is perhaps the most important
free speech issue of our time.

Democracy solves great power war more likely to negotiate,

and when they do fight they choose easy targets

Tarzi 7 (Shah, Professor of Economic Affairs @ Bradley, Democratic Peace,

Illiberal Democracy and Conflict Behavior, International Journal on World

Peace, vol 24)
Bueno de Mequita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith are among the few who have
sought to overcome the conceptual dilemmas noted above. Specifically they
have provided insights on the link between institutions and foreign policy
choices with reference to international disputes and conflicts. They find that
democratic leaders, when faced with a choice, are more likely to shift greater
resources to war efforts than leaders of the autocratic governments because
political survival of the elected democratic regime demands successful policy
performance, especially as the winning coalition grows. Thus, democratic
regimes tend to have a military edge over autocratic regimes in war because
of the extra efforts required. Also, "democratic leaders only choose to
fight when they are confident of victory. Otherwise they prefer to
negotiate." (22) Bueno de Mequita and his colleagues conclude,
Democrats make relatively unattractive targets because domestic
reselection pressures cause leaders to mobilize resources for the
war effort. This makes it harder for other states to target them for
aggression. In addition to trying harder than autocrats, democrats
are more selective in their choice of targets. Defeat typically leads
to domestic replacement for democrats, so they only initiate war
when they expect to win. These two factors lead to the interaction
between polities that is often termed the democratic peace. Autocrats
need a slight expected advantage over other autocratic adversaries
in devoting additional resources to the war effort. In order to
initiate war, democrats need overwhelming odds of victory, but that
does not mean they are passive. Because democrats use their resources for
the war effort rather than reserve them to reward backers, they are
generally able, given their selection criteria for fighting, to overwhelm
autocracies, which results in short and relatively less costly wars. Yet,
democracies find it hard to overwhelm other democracies because
they also try hard. In general, democracies make unattractive
targets, particularly for other democracies. Hence, democratic
states rarely attack one another. (23)

1AC Solvency
Congress should curtail BULLRUN by passing the
Secure Data Act
Castro, Vice President of Information Technology &
Innovation Foundation and McQuinn, Research Assistant at
ITIF 15 (Daniel and Alan, June, Information Technology & Innovation
Foundation, Beyond the USA Freedom Act: How U.S. Surveillance Still
Subverts U.S. Competitiveness, http://www2.itif.org/2015-beyond-usafreedom-act.pdf, 06/25/15, MM)

The free and open Internet that powers the globally networked economy is dependent on the ability of
individuals and companies to engage in commerce without geographic restrictions. To turn back the tide of
technology protectionism, U.S. trade negotiators will need a stronger hand to play. They cannot go to other
nations and tell them to not discriminate against U.S. tech firms if the U.S. intelligence system continues to

it is incumbent on the
Congress and the Obama administration to take the lead in showing
the world the best standards for transparency, cooperation, and
accountability. First, the U.S. government should be forthcoming and
transparent about its surveillance practices and clearly inform the
public about the data it collects domestically and abroad. The U.S.
follow policies that threaten their citizens and businesses. As a result,

government should set the gold standard for international transparency requirements, so that it is clear
what information both U.S. and non-U.S. companies are disclosing to governments at home and abroad.
The U.S. government should then work THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION FOUNDATION |
JUNE 2015 PAGE 6 with its allies to create an international transparency requirement that illuminates when

Second, the U.S.

government should draw a clear line in the sand and declare that the
policy of the U.S. government is to strengthen not weaken
information security. The U.S. Congress should pass legislation, such
as the Secure Data Act introduced by Sen. Wyden (D-OR), banning
any government efforts to introduce backdoors in software or
weaken encryption.43 In the short term, President Obama, or his successor, should sign an
executive order formalizing this policy as well. In addition, when U.S. government
agencies discover vulnerabilities in software or hardware products,
they should responsibly notify these companies in a timely manner
so that the companies can fix these flaws. The best way to protect
U.S. citizens from digital threats is to promote strong cybersecurity
practices in the private sector.
countries conduct surveillance that accesses foreign companies information.

Congress is capable of ending NSA BULLRUN

programs-passing legislation closes backdoors
Kayyali 5-13 (Nadia, surveillance and national security activist, The Time
to Shut the NSAs Backdoors is NowNot in Two Years,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/time-shut-nsas-backdoors-now-nottwo-years)
As weve noted, our support for the current version of USA Freedom that is
moving through the Senate and the House is conditional on amendments that
improve the bill. While we hope to see such amendments, we also know that
they may not be possible, since Judiciary Committee leaders noted during the
USA Freedom markup that it is the product of painstaking and careful

negotiations, that would be killed by any changes. And yesterday, the

hearing on HR. 2048 in the House Rules Committee made it clear that USA
Freedom Act will not be amended. However, several members of the
House Judiciary Committee made some significant statements about
what reform they might support going forwardincluding statements
about reforming Section 702. So did members of the Rules Committee.
Now, we have a chance to see whether theyre willing to act on
those statements. Thats because Representatives Ted Poe, Thomas
Massie, and Zoe Lofgren have introduced the bipartisan End
Warrantless Surveillance of Americans Act (H.R. 2233). EFF joined 29
groups to send a letter in support of the legislation this week, and
we look forward to seeing which lawmakers support it as it moves
through the house. H.R. 2233 has goals similar to last years MassieLofgren amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act for FY 2015, which passed overwhelmingly with strong
bipartisan support: 293 ayes, 123 nays, and 1 present. That
legislation would have closed the so-called National Security Agency
backdoorssecurity flaws engineered into products and services
to enable or facilitate government access to, and warrantless
searches of, the contents of Americans communicationsby
prohibiting NSA and the Central Intelligence Agency from using
appropriated funds to mandate or request that companies build
backdoors into products or services. H.R. 2233 goes further, because
the prohibition on mandating or requesting backdoors would apply
to any federal agency. This change is especially important for U.S.
companies, who have suffered reputational harm overseas, and even
lost business, in the wake of revelations about the extent of NSA
spying. H.R. 2233, like the Massie-Lofgren amendment, does have an
exception for backdoors mandated by the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, a law that weve long had
concerns about. H.R. 2233 would also address the backdoor search
loophole by prohibiting any officer or employee of the United States
from searching through communications collected under Section 702
for communications of a particular U.S. person without a court order.
This provision has exceptions for certain limited circumstances. Whats new is
that H.R. 2233unlike last years Massie-Lofgren amendmentaims to
prohibit backdoor searches for particular U.S. persons of communications
collected under authorities other than Section 702including, according to
Rep. Lofgren, Executive Order 12333. While many people have never even
heard of this presidential order, as the Washington Post pointed out in
October, Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.)
has acknowledged that Congress conducts little oversight of intelligencegathering under the presidential authority of Executive Order 12333 , which
defines the basic powers and responsibilities of the intelligence agencies.
H.R. 2233 does have flaws. The above prohibition on EO 12333 searches
would be an amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2015, so it
presumably would limit only funds appropriated under that Act. And while the
bill prohibits backdoors, its not clear how that prohibition would be enforced
or where it would be published. That being said, the legislation is a good
start to shutting backdoors. As the coalition letter states: All three

of these measures would make appreciable changes that would

advance government surveillance reform and help rebuild lost trust
among Internet users and businesses, while also preserving national
security and intelligence authorities. We urge the Congress to move
speedily to enact this legislation. While the House Judiciary Committee
repeatedly noted that they thought the FISA Amendments Act should be fixed
when it is up for reauthorization, and some members of the Rules Committee
noted that they would be happy to see another appropriations amendment,
Rep. Massie made it clear why these changes cant wait: The
constitution is not negotiable, and we have a crisis right nowif we
wait two years, we are prolonging a constitutional crisis, and that is
dangerous. He also pointed out that business are suffering right
now: If we put it off, I dont think you can undo the damage that
will be done to U.S. businesses. We couldnt agree morethe time
to fix the backdoor problem is now. But while USA Freedom attempts to
rein in overbroad surveillance, and H.R. 2233 focuses on the governments
backdoors, some in Congress are trying to ensure that intelligence agencies
get to keep doing exactly what they have been doing. Legislation introduced
by Senate Majority leader Mitch McConnell and Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Chair Richard Burr would reauthorize three sections of the Patriot
Act, including Section 215, through 2020. If you want to see Congress end
mass surveillance under the Patriot Act, let your elected representatives
know at Fight215.org.

--Tech Leadership--

UQ Economy High
US econ high now, but recession coming by end of
2015
Matthews, journalist, 10/28
(Chris, 2014, Fortune, The case for a global recession in 2015,
http://fortune.com/2014/10/28/global-recession-us-europe-china/, June 26,
2015. GG)
Four years after the end of the Great Recession, it looks as if the U.S.
economy might finally be poised for breakout growth. Monthly job
growth in 2014 is, on average, faster than at any point since the financial
crisis. Overall economic growth appears to picking up too, with real GDP
growing by more than 4% in the second quarter of this year, and many
economists predicting higher overall growth compared to last year. But news
outside the U.S. isnt so bright. European economies are still battling
depression-era levels of unemployment and the threat of deflation.
And emerging economies, like China, are having trouble maintaining
the kind of growth they have become accustomed to in recent years.
The most recent readings out of China have the worlds second-largest
economy growing at roughly 7.5% per year, down from the 10% growth it
averaged for two decades before its economy began to slow in 2012. And this
pattern holds for other emerging economies like Brazil and Russia. Optimists
hope that an accelerating U.S. economy will have what it takes to drag the
rest of the world out of the doldrums, as it has done during so many past
recoveries. But David Levy, economist and chairman of the Jerome
Levy Forecasting Center, argues that the problems of the rest of the
world will end up taking the U.S. down, rather than the other way
around. Levy is calling for a 65% chance that there will be a global
recession by the end of 2015, based on the simple fact that
emerging markets have continued to invest in an export
infrastructure to sell goods to the West that it no longer has the
wherewithal to buy.

Economic Downturn coming in 2015- dollar index, oil

prove
Newberg, Fast Money Segment Producer, 3/11
(Mark, 2015, CNBC, US could go into recession in 2015: Expert,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/102496659, June 26, 2015, GG)
Plunging oil prices and a strengthening dollar could force the United
States into a recession by the end of 2015, according to Raoul Pal of
The Global Macro Investor newsletter. The greenback's strength has
pushed oil prices lower and sent fear across the markets. Pal said he now
feels that the U.S. is heading toward a recession in the near future.
"There's a probability that the U.S. goes into recession this year alone," Pal
said in an interview on CNBC's "Fast Money" on Tuesday. Pal based his

prediction on a number of factors, centered on his view that current

trends in the dollar and oil are likely to not only continue, but
accelerate. Regarding the strength in the dollar, Pal said the dollar index
could climb another 25 percent before the bull run is over. "If we look
back historically at how these big dollar bull markets go, I think it's going to
go, using the (dollar index), at least to 125, maybe even further." Historically
the price of oil moves inversely to the strength of the U.S. dollar. Pal said that
the historical relationship, along with weakness in Europe and China, has led
oil companies to put crude into storage in hopes of waiting out the downturn
in prices. Crude stores are filling "at an incredible rate" and could be full by
summer, he said. That could lead to even more dire consequences.

Recent predictions read that the economy will crash

in 2015- tensions, rising interest, and unemployment
contribute
Whitefoot, editor at Lombardi Financial, 15 (John, 6-19-2015, "Economic
Collapse Headed for U.S. in 2015, U.S. Economic Collapse 2015," Stock
Market Advice | Investment Newsletters - Profit Confidential,
http://www.profitconfidential.com/economic-analysis/economic-collapse2015/)//GLee
In 2015, investors will pay the price for the euphoria. Businesses and
investors will also pay the price for their addiction to artificially low
interest rates, especially as the markets transition away from QE. In
November 2008, the Federal Reserve stepped in with its generous bond-buying program (QE) to help kickstart the economy after it slipped into a recession. Artificially lowering the short-term lending rate to nearly
zero was supposed to make banks lend more money to businesses and people. The ultra-low-interest-rate
environment has made it cheaper to borrow moneyand is recognized as being the fuel that has propelled

The Federal Reserve has hinted it will start to wean

investors off cheap money in 2015, when it begins to raise interest
rates. Raising interest rates by just 50 basis points could have a
serious, negative impact on the broader economy and, by extension,
the U.S. stock market. Continued economic challenges in the eurozone and Asia will also have
a detrimental affect on the U.S. stock market. Not to mention geopolitical tensions
between Russia, Ukraine, and the entire eurozone; icy relations
between the U.S. and Russia; growing issues between China and the
U.S; and concerns arising between China and Japan. All of this,
accompanied by high underemployment, stagnant wages, and high
debt, will undercut consumer spending, crippling any chance for
sustained economic growth. The road to higher returns on the heels
of actual revenue and earnings will be a tough haul. These factors
will push the U.S. stock market back onto the brink of a stock market
crash in 2015.
the stock market higher.

Fears of a global crash have surfaced- value of a

dollar and debts of multiple countries continue to rise
Stewart, Observer's economics editor, 15 (Heather, 3-28-2015, "Fears of a
new global crash as debts and dollars value rise," Guardian,

http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/mar/28/rising-dollar-debt-fearsglobal-economic-crash)//GLee
As Janet Yellens Federal Reserve prepares to raise interest rates,
boosting the value of the dollar, while the plunging price of crude
puts intense pressure on the finances of oil-exporting countries,
there are growing fears of a new debt crisis in the making. Ann
Pettifor of Prime Economics, who foreshadowed the credit crunch in
her 2003 book The Coming First World Debt Crisis, says: Were
going to have another financial crisis. Brazils already in great
trouble with the strength of the dollar; I dread to think whats
happening in South Africa; then theres Malaysia. Were back to
where we were, and that for me is really frightening. Since the aftershocks
of the global financial crisis of 2008 died away, the worlds policymakers have spent countless hours
rewriting the banking rulebook and rethinking monetary policy. But next to nothing has been done about
the question of what to do about countries that cant repay their debts, or how to stop them getting into
trouble in the first place. Developing countries are using the UN to demand a change in the way sovereign
defaults are dealt with. Led by Bolivian ambassador to the UN Sacha Sergio Llorenti, they are calling for a
bankruptcy process akin to the Chapter 11 procedure for companies to be applied to governments.
Unctad, the UNs Geneva-based trade and investment arm, has been working for several years to draw up
a roadmap for sovereign debt resolution. It recommends a series of principles, including a moratorium on
repayments while a solution is negotiated; the imposition of currency controls to prevent capital fleeing the
troubled country; and continued lending by the IMF to prevent the kind of existential financial threat that
roils world markets and causes severe economic hardship. If

a new set of rules could be

established, Unctad believes, they should help prevent financial
meltdown in countries facing difficulties servicing their external
obligations, which often results in a loss of market confidence,
currency collapse and drastic interest rates hikes, inflicting serious
damage on public and private balance sheets and leading to large
losses in output and employment and a sharp increase in poverty.
It calls for a once-and-for-all write-off, instead of the piecemeal Greek-style approach involving harsh terms
and conditions that knock the economy off course and can ultimately make the debt even harder to repay.
The threat of a genuine default of this kind could also help to constrain reckless lending by the private
sector in the first place. However, when these proposals were put to the UN general assembly last
September, a number of developed countries, including the UK and the US, voted against it, claiming the
UN was the wrong forum to discuss the proposal, which is anathema to powerful financial institutions.
Pettifor shares some of the UK and USs scepticism. The problem for me is that the UN has no leverage
here, she says. It can make these moralistic pronouncements but ultimately its the IMF and the
governments that make the decisions. Nevertheless, Llorenti has been touring the worlds capitals
making the case for change, and hopes to bring the issue back for fresh discussions next month .

And
while the debate rages, developing countries have been taking
advantage of rock-bottom interest rates and the cheap money
created by quantitative easing to stack up billions in new debt.
Using recently released World Bank data, the Jubilee Debt Campaign
calculates that in 2013 alone the latest period for which figures are
available borrowing by developing countries was up 40% to
$17.3bn. Brazils economy is likely to be seriously tested as the
greenback rises; Turkey, Malaysia and Chile have large dollardenominated debts and sliding currencies; and a string of African
countries face sharp rises in debt repayments. Ghana and Zambia
have already had to turn to the IMF to ask for help. Its as if, as
Pettifor warns, absolutely nothing has changed since the crisis.

Despite recent success, the US economy remains

incredibly vulnerable-it relies almost entirely on the
big banks
Snyder 14 (Michael, lawyer and economics writer, Market Daily News,
How Long Do We Have Before An Economic Collapse Hits The USA,
http://marketdailynews.com/2014/11/03/how-long-do-we-have-before-aneconomic-collapse-hits-the-usa/)
The idea that the United States is on the brink of a horrifying economic crash
is absolutely inconceivable to most Americans. After all, the economy has
been relatively stable for quite a few years and the stock market
continues to surge to new heights. On Friday, the Dow and the S&P
500 both closed at brand new all-time record highs. For the year, the
S&P 500 is now up 9 percent and the Nasdaq is now up close to 11
percent. And American consumers are getting ready to spend more
than 600 billion dollars this Christmas season. That is an amount of
money that is larger than the entire economy of Sweden. So how in
the world can anyone be talking about economic collapse? Yes, many
will concede, we had a few bumps in the road back in 2008 but things have
pretty much gotten back to normal since then. Why be concerned about
economic collapse when there is so much stability all around us?
Unfortunately, this brief period of stability that we have been
enjoying is just an illusion. The fundamental problems that caused
the financial crisis of 2008 have not been fixed. In fact, most of our
long-term economic problems have gotten even worse. But most
Americans have such short attention spans these days. In a world where we
are accustomed to getting everything instantly, news cycles only last for 48
hours and 2008 might as well be an eternity ago. In the United States
today, our entire economic system is based on debt. Without debt,
very little economic activity happens. We need mortgages to buy our
homes, we need auto loans to buy our vehicles and we need our credit cards
to do our shopping during the holiday season. So where does all of that
debt come from? It comes from the banks. In particular, the too big
to fail banks are the heart of this debt-based system. Do you have
a mortgage, an auto loan or a credit card from one of these too big
to fail institutions? A very large percentage of the people that will
read this article do. And a lot of people might not like to hear this,
but without those banks we essentially do not have an economy.
When Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008, it almost resulted in the meltdown
of our entire system. The stock market collapsed and we experienced an
absolutely wicked credit crunch. Unfortunately, that was just a small preview
of what is coming. Even though a few prominent experts such as
New York Times columnist Paul Krugman have declared that the too
big to fail problem is over, the truth is that it is now a bigger
crisis than ever before. Compared to five years ago, the four largest
banks in the country are now almost 40 percent larger. The following
numbers come from a recent article in the Los Angeles Times Just before
the financial crisis hit, Wells Fargo & Co. had $609 billion in assets. Now it has
$1.4 trillion. Bank of America Corp. had $1.7 trillion in assets. Thats up to
$2.1 trillion. And the assets of JPMorgan Chase & Co., the nations biggest

bank, have ballooned to $2.4 trillion from $1.8 trillion. At the same time
that those banks have been getting bigger, 1,400 smaller banks have
completely disappeared from the banking industry. That means that
we are now more dependent on these gigantic banks than ever. At
this point, the five largest banks account for 42 percent of all loans
in the United States, and the six largest banks account for 67
percent of all assets in our financial system. If someone came along
and zapped those banks out of existence, our economy would totally
collapse overnight. So the health of this handful of immensely
powerful banking institutions is absolutely critical to our economy.
Unfortunately, these banks have become deeply addicted to
gambling. Have you ever known people that allowed their lives to be
destroyed by addictions that they could never shake? Well, that is what is
happening to these banks. They have transformed Wall Street into the
largest casino in the history of the world. Most of the time, their
bets pay off and they make lots of money. But as we saw back in
2008, when they miscalculate things can fall apart very rapidly. The
bets that I am most concerned about are known as derivatives. In essence,
they are bets about what will or will not happen in the future. The big banks
use very sophisticated algorithms that are supposed to help them be on the
winning side of these bets the vast majority of the time, but these algorithms
are not perfect. The reason these algorithms are not perfect is because they
are based on assumptions, and those assumptions come from people. They
might be really smart people, but they are still just people. If things stay fairly
stable like they have the past few years, the algorithms tend to work very
well. But if there is a black swan event such as a major stock
market crash, a collapse of European or Asian banks, a historic shift
in interest rates, an Ebola pandemic, a horrific natural disaster or a
massive EMP blast is unleashed by the sun, everything can be
suddenly thrown out of balance. Acrobat Nik Wallenda has been
making headlines all over the world for crossing vast distances on a
high-wire without a safety net. Well, that is essentially what our
too big to fail banks are doing every single day. With each passing
year, these banks have become even more reckless, and so far there
have not been any serious consequences. But without a doubt, someday
there will be. What would you say about a bookie that took $200,000 in bets
but that only had $10,000 to cover those bets? You would certainly call that
bookie a fool. But that is what our big banks are doing. Right now, JPMorgan
Chase has more than 67 trillion dollars in exposure to derivatives but it only
has 2.5 trillion dollars in assets. Right now, Citibank has nearly 60 trillion
dollars in exposure to derivatives but it only has 1.9 trillion dollars in assets.
Right now, Goldman Sachs has more than 54 trillion dollars in exposure to
derivatives but it has less than a trillion dollars in assets. Right now, Bank of
America has more than 54 trillion dollars in exposure to derivatives but it only
has 2.2 trillion dollars in assets. Right now, Morgan Stanley has more than 44
trillion dollars in exposure to derivatives but it has less than a trillion dollars
in assets. Most people have absolutely no idea how incredibly
vulnerable our financial system really is. The truth is that these too
big to fail banks could collapse at any time. And when they fail, our
economy will fail too. So let us hope and pray that this brief period of false

stability lasts for as long as possible. Because when it ends, all hell is going to
break loose. So what do you think?

Economy is safe now but there are still risksconsumer spending and unemployment threaten
Conerly, he has a Ph.D. from Duke and is the longest-tenured
member of the Oregon Governors Council of Economic
Advisors, chairman of the board of Cascade Policy Institute
and senior fellow at the National Center for Policy Analysis ,
15 (Bill, 1/16/25, Forbes, Economic Forecast 2015-2017,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2015/01/06/economic-forecast-20152017/, 6/26/15, WG*)
The economic outlook for the United States in 2015 looks solid,
though longer term forecasts must wrestle with the question of
when the next recession will occur. A downturn is likely to come from
an error by the Federal Reserve, as I explained in The Next Recession:
Cause and Timing. However, 2015 is safe, because the Fed has yet to
begin tightening. (The end of Quantitative Easing is not tightening.) The
first possible Fed error, tightening too soon and too aggressively,
would put 2017 or 2018 in jeopardy. The time lag between Fed action
and a recession is about one year, so tell me when the Fed starts to
overtighten and Ill tell you when the next recession begins. The alternative
Fed error is to tighten too late. In that case, we first get an
acceleration of inflation and then the Fed slams on the brakes. This
sort of recession would be harsher than the Fed-tightens-too-soon
recession, but it wouldnt start until 2017 or 2018. The third
possibility is that the Fed gets it right, in both timing and
magnitude. Perhaps they are smart enough, or perhaps they are
lucky enough.

Global economy on a brink and US economy is key to

its success Other countries falling behind
CNBC 10/30/14 (Consumer News and Business Channel, The Oregonian,
"U.S. poised to lead global growth in 2015,"
www.oregonlive.com/money/index.ssf/2014/12/us_set_to_lead_global_growth_
in_2015.html)
The United States is back, and ready to drive global growth in 2015.
After long struggling to claw its way out of the Great Recession, the world's
biggest economy is on an extended win streak that is edging it
closer to full health. But the new year doesn't look quite so bright in
other major countries. China is slowing as it transitions from
investment to consumption. Japan has slid into a recession. Russia
appears headed for one. Europe is barely growing. Six years after its

financial system nearly sank and nearly that long since the recession ended,
the United States is expected to grow in 2015 at its fastest pace in a
decade. Its expansion from July through Septembera 5 percent annual rate
was the swiftest for any quarter since 2003. That pace will likely ease a bit.
Still, the economy is expected to expand 3.1 percent next year, according
to a survey by the National Association for Business Economics. It would be
the first year of 3 percent growth since 2005. The acceleration of U.S. growth
is a key reason the global economy is also expected to grow faster, at about 3
percent, up from 2.5 percent in 2014, according to economists at JPMorgan
Chase and IHS Global Insight. Even if the U.S. economy does strengthen
further, the rest of the world could struggle. For one thing, faster
growth will likely lead the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates in 2015,
which could draw more investment from overseas. The inflow of capital would
raise the dollar's value and potentially cause destabilizing drops in other
currencies. Governments and businesses overseas that borrowed in dollars
would find it harder to repay those debts. The hot economies of the last
decadethe emerging markets of Brazil, Russia, India and China collectively
known as the "BRICs"will likely grow in 2015 at their slowest pace in
six years, according to Oxford Economics, a forecasting firm. Falling oil
and commodity prices have smacked Brazil and Russia particularly
hard. China may expand 6.5 percent or more. Yet that's a far cry from the
nearly double-digit growth it enjoyed for decades. Europe and Japan will
be lucky to expand even 1 percent.

UQ Businesses NSA
Encryption key to US businesses- NSA undermines
security of medical, financial, and research industries
Clarke et al, The Presidents Review Group on Intelligence
and Communications Technologies 13 (Richard A, December 12th,
Liberty and Security in a Changing World: Report and Recommendations of
The Presidents Review Group on Intelligence and Communications
Technologies, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-1212_rg_final_report.pdf, page #24-25, 06/24/15, MM)
Encryption is an essential basis for trust on the Internet; without
such trust, valuable communications would not be possible. For the
entire system to work, encryption software itself must be
trustworthy. Users of encryption must be confident, and justifiably
confident, that only those people they designate can decrypt their
data. The use of reliable encryption software to safeguard data is
critical to many sectors and organizations, including financial
services, medicine and health care, research and development, and
other critical infrastructures in the United States and around the
world. Encryption allows users of 217 information technology systems to trust that their data, including
their financial transactions, will not be altered or stolen. Encryption-related software, including pervasive
examples such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), is essential to online
commerce and user authentication. It is part of the underpinning of current communications networks.

in light of the massive increase in cyber-crime and intellectual

property theft on-line, the use of encryption should be greatly
expanded to protect not only data in transit, but also data at rest on
networks, in storage, and in the cloud. We are aware of recent
allegations that the United States Government has intentionally
introduced backdoors into commercially available software,
enabling decryption of apparently secure software. We are also
aware that some people have expressed concern that such
backdoors could be discovered and used by criminal cartels and
other governments, and hence that some commercially available
software is not trustworthy today.
Indeed,

UQ Business Confidence
The security of the US economy is on the brink
consumer and businesses confidence are declining
and the world is second guessing America
EWING, He has been a German Marshall Fund Journalism
Fellow and in 2011 received a Publisher's Award from The
Times for his coverage of the European debt crisis, 13 (Jeff,
10/15/15, NYTImes, Prospect of U.S. Default Keeps European Business on
Edge, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/16/business/international/prospectof-us-default-keeps-business-on-edge.html?_r=0, 6/24,15, WG*)
Businesspeople around the world are generally a pro-American lot.
But there is rising concern among them that, even if the White
House and Congress find a way out of their debt-ceiling impasse in

the coming hours or days, the world economy may suffer damage that
may not be so easy to reverse. The prospect of similar deadlocks in
the future has raised questions about the ability of Washington to
function and remain a source of stability in the world , according to
some European executives, who worry there could be lasting damage
to consumer and business confidence that could act as a brake on
investment and spending. ''This is a critical situation,'' said Mario

Moretti Polegato, founder of the Italian shoemaker Geox, which is

trying to build up its relatively small presence in the United States. ''It
could be really, really bad for business in general and for my business.''
As an Italian, Mr. Polegato knows a thing or two about political
dysfunction. But the deadlock in Washington is even more alarming
than the chronic instability in Rome, he said, because the United States
is so much more important to world affairs. ''America represents
democracy and stability. America is America!'' Mr. Polegato said by
telephone from the Geox headquarters in Biadene di Montebelluna.
''And now there are questions about America.'' Some of the damage
from the Washington stalemate is immediate and concrete. The
American Chamber of Commerce in Germany expressed concern
Monday that the U.S. government shutdown had already delayed
negotiations on a trans-Atlantic trade agreement. Businesses on both

sides of the ocean see the agreement as a way to stimulate growth

and job creation. Europe's own fragile recovery rests on demand for its
exports, especially from the United States, the largest customer for
German products outside the European Union. The United States is also
by far the largest export market for the Union as a whole, buying goods
worth 143 billion euros, or $193 billion, in the first six months of 2013.
That was double the value of European exports to China. It would not
take much of a stutter in U.S. growth to undermine the euro zone
economy, which is still burdened by weak banks and 12 percent

unemployment. In fact, exports to the United States were down 2

percent through June compared with the period a year earlier. Bernhard
Mattes, a Ford executive who is president of the American Chamber of
Commerce in Germany, said members of the group were not yet
feeling a direct impact on sales. But he added, ' 'We are hearing
concern from our member companies about the development in the
U.S. and worry about consumer confidence.'' Other chamber

members worry that public works projects in the United States could
be delayed by the government shutdown, Mr. Mattes said in an
interview Tuesday. That could be bad for German companies like
Hochtief, a German builder, or Liebherr, a supplier of construction
equipment. A Hochtief spokesman said, however, that so far none of its
U.S. business had suffered. There was palpable relief in European stock
markets Tuesday as Senate leaders neared completion of a deal that
would raise the debt ceiling and reopen the federal government. But
with the U.S. House of Representatives still showing no signs of buying
in, European investors might have been thinking wishfully. And there
remained anxiety abroad that any agreement would be a stopgap,
leading to another round of brinkmanship in a few months. ''We would
very much appreciate not only a short-term solution,'' Mr. Mattes said,
''but also a long-term framework for strong investment and trade
between the European Union and the U.S.'' Euro zone businesspeople

also worry that further turmoil in Washington would push down the
value of the dollar against the euro. A weaker dollar makes European
products more expensive not only in the United States but also in
countries like China whose currencies tend to move in concert with
the dollar. On Tuesday, the dollar rose sharply against the euro,

evidently on optimism about Senate developments. But some analysts

expressed concern that a deal, even if it came before the Thursday
deadline for a nominal default on United States Treasury debt, would
already be too late to prevent the Treasury from missing payments on
government bonds coming due. A default, even if short-lived, would
have consequences abroad that are impossible to calculate but clearly
frightening. United States Treasury bonds are the most widely held
securities in the world and are used as collateral in countless financial
transactions. China and Japan are the two biggest holders of U.S.
government bonds by far, with about $1.3 trillion and $1.1 trillion. But
many other countries are also heavily exposed to U.S. bonds, including
Brazil, Taiwan, Belgium and Switzerland. Any default would probably be
temporary, Rob Carnell, chief international economist at ING Bank, said
in a note to clients Tuesday. But he added, ''a prolonged default really
would start to damage faith in the U.S. Treasury markets.'' Investors
would shift their money to other assets considered low risk, Mr.

Carnell said, like gold or currencies like the Swiss franc. A migration
away from Treasury bonds would ultimately be costly for American
taxpayers. The use of United States debt as a kind of international
wampum makes it possible for Washington to borrow more cheaply

than it would otherwise. A study published by the Federal Reserve last

year found that a monthly reduction of $100 billion in foreign
purchases of United States bonds would raise the interest rate on fiveyear debt by 0.4 percent to 0.6 percent. Interest rates in some of the
more debt-stressed European countries like Italy would probably also
rise, making it even harder for companies and individuals to get loans
and prolonging the economic downturn there. Italian and Spanish bond
yields both rose slightly on Tuesday, though they remained below
levels considered dangerous to government fiscal health. For people
outside the United States, though, the biggest damage from the
political impasse in Washington may be to their morale. If the
government of the world's most powerful nation cannot keep
operating, what can you believe in anymore? Carl Weinberg, chief

economist of High Frequency Economics in Valhalla, New York, noted

that the United States had suffered other blows to its prestige
recently, including revelations of Internet spying by the National

Security Agency and indecisiveness in dealing with chemical

weapons in Syria. China has stepped into the vacuum, taking
advantage of President Barack Obama's absence from world affairs
to forge new trade deal in Asia, Mr. Weinberg wrote in a note to clients

Tuesday. ''And now we have this debt limit stupidity,'' he said.

NSA presence creates foreign customers to withdraw- costs

companies billions
Kim, Enterprise Tech Reporter for Business Insider, 14 (Eugene, 7-30-2014,
"New Report Shows Edward Snowden's Revelations Are Seriously Damaging
US Tech Firms," Business Insider, <span class="skimlinksunlinked">http://www.businessinsider.com/edward-snowden-us-tech-firms2014-7</span>)//GLee
The nonprofit New America Foundation released a new report this week that summarizes the impact of

Within weeks of the first NSA

revelation last year, companies like Dropbox and Amazon Web
Services reported immediate drops in their sales, the report said.
Citing a previous report, it said the NSAs PRISM program could cost
cloud-computing companies from $22 billion to $180 billion over the
next there years. This erosion in trust threatens to do the most
immediate damage to the cloud computing industry, which would
lose billions of dollars in the next three to five years as a result, it
said. In particular, U.S. tech firms are being severely hit in overseas markets, the report said.
Companies such as Cisco, Qualcomm, IBM, Microsoft, and HP have all
reported declines in sales in China following the NSA revelations . In
Edward Snowdens NSA revelation on U.S. tech firms.

fact, according to The Wall Street Journal, Cisco said its expecting roughly a 10% loss in quarterly revenue

A web-hosting company called Servint

reportedly lost more than half of its overseas clients following the
revelation. American firms are also losing the trust of foreign
governments because of this. The German government said it would
end its contract with Verizon last month, while Brazil picked Swedish
because of the "Snowden effect."

firm Saab over Boeing for a deal to replace its fighter jets, according
to the report. It said more and more foreign competitors are benefiting from the perceived image of
being NSA-proof or safer than U.S. firms. As a result, countries like Germany, Brazil, and India are
close to enacting a new law that would require companies to use local data centers. For example, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel, after refusing to visit the U.S. for months after the NSA disclosures, has called
for data localization laws. Brazil and India are proposing IT companies to either set up or keep their data
centers within local boundaries, while Greece, Brunei, and Vietnam are following suit with similar

All of this could slow the growth of the U.S. tech

industry by as much as 4% and seriously undermine Americas
credibility around the world, the report concluded.
measures, the report said.

I/L Trust
NSA programs deal significant harm to tech
businessesloss of trust in foreign markets
Timm 13 (Trevor, co-founder and executive director of Freedom of the
Press Foundation, 11-25, How NSA Mass Surveillance is Hurting the Global
Economy, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/how-nsa-mass-surveillancehurting-us-economy, AL)
Privacy may not be the only casualty of the National Security Agencys
massive surveillance program. Major sectors of the US economy are
reporting financial damage as the recent revelations shake
consumer confidence and US trade partners distance themselves
from companies that may have been compromised by the NSA or,
worse, are secretly collaborating with the spy agency. Member of Congress,
especially those who champion Americas competitiveness in the global
marketplace, should take note and rein in the NSA now if they want to stem
the damage. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that AT&Ts
desired acquisition of the European company Vodafone is in danger
due to the companys well-documented involvement in the NSAs
data-collection programs. European officials said the
telecommunications giant would face intense scrutiny in its bid to
purchase a major cell phone carrier. The Journal went on to say:
Resistance to such a deal, voiced by officials in interviews across
Europe, suggests the impact of the NSA affair could extend beyond
the diplomatic sphere and damage US economic interests in key
markets. In September, analysts at Cisco Systems reported that the
fallout reached another level, when the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) told companies not to use
cryptographic standards that may have been undermined by the
NSAs BULLRUN program. The Cisco analysts said that if
cryptography was compromised it would be a critical blow to trust
required across the Internet and the security community. This
forecast was proven true in mid-November, when Cisco reported a 12
percent slump in its sales in the developing world due to the NSA
revelations. As the Financial Times reported, new orders fell by 25
percent in Brazil and 30 percent in Russia and Cisco predicts its
overall sales could drop by as much 10 percent this quarter. Cisco
executives were quoted saying the NSAs activities have created "a
level of uncertainty or concern" that will have a deleterious impact
on a wide-range of tech companies. It is hard for civil libertarians to shed
tears over AT&T losing business because of NSA spying, considering the
company allowed the NSA to directly tap into its fiber optic cables to copy
vast amounts of innocent Americans Internet traffic. AT&T was also recently
revealed as having partnered with both the DEA and the CIA on separate
mass surveillance programs. It is also hard to feel sorry for Cisco, which
stands accused of helping China spy on dissidents and religious minorities.
But the fact that the spying is hurting these major companies is
indicative of the size of the problem. This summer, European

Parliaments civil liberties committee was presented with a proposal to

require every American website to place surveillance notices to EU citizens in
order to force the US government to reverse course: The users should be
made aware that the data may be subject to surveillance (under FISA 702) by
the US government for any purpose which furthers US foreign policy. A
consent requirement will raise EU citizen awareness and favour growth of
services solely within EU jurisdiction. This will thus have economic impact on
US business and increase pressure on the US government to reach a
settlement. [emphasis ours] Meanwhile, Telenor, Norways largest
telecom provider has reportedly halted its plans to move its
customers to a US-based cloud provider. Brazil seems to be moving
ahead to create its own email service and require US companies
locate an office there if they wish to do business with Brazilian
customers. Laws like this mean that companies like Google could be
barred from doing business in one of the worlds most significant
markets, according to Googles director for law enforcement and
information security at Google, Richard Selgado. Google has been
warning of this as far back as July, when in FISA court documents it argued
that the continued secrecy surrounding government surveillance demands
would harm its business. Many commentators have been warning about the
economic ramifications for months. Princeton technologist Ed Felten,
who previously at the Federal Trade Commission, best explained why
the NSA revelations could end up hurting US businesses: This is
going to put US companies at a competitive disadvantage, because
people will believe that U.S. companies lack the ability to protect
their customersand people will suspect that U.S. companies may
feel compelled to lie to their customers about security. The fallout
may worsen. One study released shortly after the first Edward
Snowden leaks said the economy would lose $22 to $35 billion in the
next three years. Another study by Forrester said the $35 billion
estimate was too low and pegged the real loss figure around $180
billion for the US tech industry by 2016. Much of the economic problem
stems for the US governments view that its open season when it comes to
spying on non-U.S. persons. As Mark Zuckerberg said in September, the
governments position isdont worry, were not spying on any Americans.
Wonderful, thats really helpful for companies trying to work with people
around the world. Googles Chief Legal Officer David Drummond echoed this
sentiment last week, saying: The justification has been couched as 'Don't
worry. We're only snooping on foreigners.' For a company like ours, where
most of our business and most of our users are non-American, that's not very
helpful." Members of Congress who care about the US economy
should take note: the companies losing their competitive edge due
to NSA surveillance are mainstream economic drivers. Just as their
constituents are paying attention, so are the customers who vote
with their dollars. As Sen. Ron Wyden remarked last month, If a
foreign enemy was doing this much damage to the economy, people
would be in the streets with pitchforks.

NSA BULLRUN has scared the tech industrymany

companies are trying to implement security measures
against it
Swartz 14 (Jon, Silicon Valley-based tech reporter for USA Today, 2-28,
NSA surveillance hurting tech firms businesses,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/02/27/nsa-resistant-productsobama-tech-companies-encryption-overseas/5290553/, AL)
It used to be that tech titans such as Cisco Systems and IBM could bank on
fertile markets in Asia and Europe in their quest for worldwide financial
domination. Not so much anymore. The National Security Agency, and
revelations about its extensive surveillance operations sometimes
with the cooperation of tech firms have undermined the ability of
many U.S. companies to sell products in key foreign countries,
creating a fissure with the U.S. government and prompting some to
scramble to create "NSA-resistant" products. The fallout could cost
the tech industry billions of dollars in potential contracts, which has
executives seething at the White House. "Suspicion of U.S. vendors
is running at an all-time high," says Andrew Jaquith, chief technology
officer at cloud-security firm SilverSky. Cisco, IBM, Microsoft and
Hewlett-Packard have reported declines in business in China since the NSA
surveillance program was exposed. The Information Technology & Innovation
Foundation estimates the NSA imbroglio will cost U.S. businesses $22 billion
through 2016. Forrester Research pegs potential losses at $180 billion, which
includes tech firms and managed service providers The conflagration took on
political tones this month when German Chancellor Angela Merkel whose
mobile phone was tapped by U.S. spy agencies said she would press
France President Francois Hollande to back a push for EU-based alternatives
to the current U.S.-dominated Internet infrastructure. "We'll talk with France
about how we can maintain a high level of data protection," Merkel said in
her weekly podcast in mid-February. "Above all, we'll talk with European
providers that offer security for our citizens, so that one shouldn't have to
send e-mails and other information across the Atlantic." The situation is more
combustible at home. Disclosures that the NSA routinely cracked
encryption, or data-scrambling, technology has heightened the
anxiety of industry leaders. But in their pursuit of NSA-proof products,
they've alarmed some intelligence officials, who argue that without the ability
to break encryption and create "back doors" to enter computer systems
abroad, the USA would be disarming at a moment of heightened
cyberconflict. During a speech on NSA reforms on Jan. 17, President Obama
angered tech leaders when he did not embrace two recommendations by a
panel he appointed to review the surveillance that are of pressing concern to
Silicon Valley and the business community. It had recommended the NSA "not
in any way subvert, undermine, weaken or make vulnerable" commercial
software, and that it move away from exploiting flaws in software to conduct
cyberattacks or surveillance. NSA-resistant products Many tech companies
feel they have no choice but to try to develop NSA-resistant
products because customers from China to Germany threaten to
boycott American hardware and cloud services they view as
compromised. It's already happening, with large corporate deals

either lost or in danger of falling by the wayside. The United Arab

Emirates is threatening to scrap a $926 million intelligent-satellite
deal with two French firms unless they remove U.S.-built
components. The UAE fears the equipment would contain digital
backdoors that compromise the security of data. About 25% of 300
British and Canadian businesses surveyed by Canadian cloud firm
Peer 1 Hosting said they intend to move their computer-hosting
operations out of the U.S. While Internet service providers question the
practicalities of how e-mail between the U.S. and other countries would work
in such an undefined new service suggested by Merkel, American tech
companies caution secure regional networks would fragment the Internet.
With the exception of Microsoft which says it will let overseas customers
have personal data stored on servers outside the U.S. tech companies such
as Facebook and Google have opposed such private European clouds. Their
fear: Regional data systems could Balkanize the Internet and undercut its
efficiency. Because they are not U.S. companies, "larger telecoms in Europe
can rapidly take advantage of the situation," to the detriment of a Google,
Yahoo and Dropbox, says Eric Cowperthwaite, vice president of advanced
security and strategy at Core Security. Silicon Valley's biggest players are
loath to publicly discuss their efforts to counter government
snooping, but several have taken significant steps. Yahoo plans to
have all its data encrypted by March to make it more difficult for
unauthorized parties to decipher data. Google intensified its
program to encrypt data passed between data centers physical
facilities scattered across the globe that house computer systems
and telecommunications and storage systems. It also employs
network links between data centers that run at high speeds
typically on its own fiber-optic lines that are harder to tap,
according to a source familiar with the company's plans but not
authorized to speak publicly about them. Facebook has added an
encryption method that limits access to data even if a security key is
breached. Start-ups such as SGP Technologies, meanwhile, have
created products such as BlackPhone, touted as one of the most
secure smartphones ever. Others are looking into ways to more
efficiently encrypt or scramble data that's stored on hard
drives, network storage devices and clouds. But nothing is
impenetrable, especially if faced with a court order or determined hackers,
says Carson Sweet, CEO of CloudPassage, a 4-year-old cloud-security
company. "The only way to really make anything that is NSA proof is to not
have it connect to the Internet," says Domingo Guerra, co-founder of
Appthority, which helps organizations analyze iOS and Android apps for
security risks. "There are several apps that are self-contained and don't need
to send and receive data to online servers to operate." Customers need to be
aware that as much as they might worry about the NSA, the agency can
always use its signals-intelligence capabilities and links with broadband
carriers to understand who, when and how often parties communicate
without knowing what the contents actually are, says SilverSky's Jaquith.
Analyzing that "metadata" remains the most powerful tool in the NSA arsenal
and it will continue to be so regardless of whatever "NSA-proof" gear
vendors convince customers to buy, he says. Safer in the USA? In trying to

avoid the prying ears and eyes of the NSA in America, companies may face a
worse situation overseas. "Where is the safest place to house your data? It
may be the United States," says Trevor Timm, executive director of Freedom
of the Press Foundation. "The natural reaction is to move outside the U.S. if
you are trying to get away from the NSA. But mass surveillance happens with
more frequency overseas, because the NSA thinks there are little to no legal
protections for data overseas." Indeed, the NSA secretly spied on the main
communications links that connect Google and Yahoo data centers around the
world, according to a report in The Washington Post last October. Every
country has its rationale for digital snooping, says Matthew Prince, CEO of
CloudFlare, maker of a website security product. "In the U.S., it's terrorism; in
Germany, it's hate crimes." "Unless you are a nation-state, there aren't any
nation-state proof products," says Greg Young, a network security analyst at
market researcher Gartner. "Some operating systems and browsers we see
having a lot of exploits used on them today got their start as small
alternatives. ... But as they grew in popularity, they, too, entered the
mainstream and became the targets of general attacks."

The NSA hurts the economy foreign companies are

deterred by lack of privacy rights.
Salles, staff writer for the United Liberty, 13, (Anna, 11/23/13, United
Liberty, Are the NSA data collection programs hurting the economy?
http://www.unitedliberty.org/articles/15732-are-the-nsa-data-collectionprograms-hurting-the-economy, accessed 6/23/2015, JAK)
What happens when businesses arent able to provide the service that
customers were promised? Thats right: customers get mad. The Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) has published a report indicating that the
National Security Agencys massive surveillance programs arent
simply putting an end only to our privacy rights; they are also
causing major damage to the economy. Once revelations surfaced and
the public was made aware that the spying programs were collecting phone
and Internet data from average Americans, major sectors of the U.S
economy started to feel the financial damage caused by the loss of
consumer confidence. According to EEF, companies that have been
compromised by the revelations regarding the surveillance programs are
watching as U.S. trade partners simply distance themselves to avoid any
potential problems or even lawsuits in the future. Vodafone, a major
European company, was on its way to becoming a sister company to
AT&T, whose desire to purchase the European giant was well
documented, until the moment details concerning the NSAs datacollection programs came to light. According to the Wall Street
Journal, AT&T could face major issues trying to purchase Vodafone
since the company has been under scrutiny for participating in the
NSAs surveillance programs. The revelations have also made things
rocky for Verizon shareholders. According to recent news, shareholders of
both Verizon and AT&T are concerned about the companies participation in
the surveillance programs and demand more details concerning their
participation in the data-collection programs. Many have suggested that
these companies have their hands tied since section 215 of the

Patriot Act requires companies like AT&T to hand over all tangible
things they are urged to provide the National Security Agency,
which includes customer data. Companies were being told by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology back in September to stop
using cryptographic standards, which was later reported by analysts at Cisco
Systems. According to their testimony, NIST wanted Cisco Systems and other
companies to refrain from using the cryptographic standards if they were
compromised after being run through the National Security Agencys
BULLRUN program. According to the companys analysts, consumers will lose
their trust in the company if they learn that the cryptography it has promised
its consumers were to be compromised, which could make consumers data
vulnerable. Cisco also reported that, as a result of the scandal involving the
surveillance programs, the company saw a 12 percent slump in sales all over
the world. Cisco executives went on to attest that the NSAs programs
created a level of uncertainty or concern that is hard to fight,
considering the NSAs overwhelming power. This problem could also
present a major problem for other tech companies AT&T could be seeing a
decrease in the number of consumers since reports concerning the
companys willingness to allow the NSA to directly tap into its fiber optics to
make copies of Internet traffic data of millions of Americans were released. It
has been said that AT&T has even worked alongside the CIA in other mass
surveillance programs.. According to Google, the governments position
regarding the NSA spying programs and how they are only being used to
target foreigners is only making it worse for certain tech and
Internet companies that work not only with Americans, but with
other users across the globe as well.

Bull Run hacks business data bases- backdoors,

forced business cooperation, unauthorized company
data collection
Perlroth, technology reporter and winner of the society of American
business editors and writers award, 2013
[New York Times, NSA Able to foil basic safeguards of privacy on Web,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internetencryption.html, 6/23/15, CY]
The National Security Agency is winning its long-running secret war on encryption, using supercomputers,
technical trickery, court orders and behind-the-scenes persuasion to undermine the major tools protecting
the privacy of everyday communications in the Internet age, according to newly disclosed documents. The
agency has circumvented or cracked much of the encryption, or digital scrambling, that guards global
commerce and banking systems, protects sensitive data like trade secrets and medical records, and
automatically secures the e-mails, Web searches, Internet chats and phone calls of Americans and others
around the world, the documents show. Many users assume or have been assured by Internet
companies that their data is safe from prying eyes, including those of the government, and the N.S.A.
wants to keep it that way. The agency treats its recent successes in deciphering protected information as
among its most closely guarded secrets, restricted to those cleared for a highly classified program code-

Bullrun, according to the documents, provided by Edward J.

Snowden, the former N.S.A. contractor. Beginning in 2000, as
encryption tools were gradually blanketing the Web, the N.S.A.
invested billions of dollars in a clandestine campaign to preserve its
ability to eavesdrop. Having lost a public battle in the 1990s to insert its own back door in all
encryption, it set out to accomplish the same goal by stealth . The agency, according to the
named

documents and interviews with industry officials, deployed custombuilt, superfast computers to break codes, and began collaborating
with technology companies in the United States and abroad to build
entry points into their products. The documents do not identify which companies have
participated. The N.S.A. hacked into target computers to snare messages
before they were encrypted. In some cases, companies say they were
coerced by the government into handing over their master
encryption keys or building in a back door. And the agency used its
influence as the worlds most experienced code maker to covertly
introduce weaknesses into the encryption standards followed by
hardware and software developers around the world. For the past decade,
N.S.A. has led an aggressive, multipronged effort to break widely
used Internet encryption technologies, said a 2010 memo describing a briefing
about N.S.A. accomplishments for employees of its British counterpart, Government Communications

Vast amounts of
encrypted Internet data which have up till now been discarded are
now exploitable. When the British analysts, who often work side by side with N.S.A. officers,
Headquarters, or GCHQ. Cryptanalytic capabilities are now coming online.

were first told about the program, another memo said, those not already briefed were gobsmacked! An
intelligence budget document makes clear that the effort is still going strong. We are investing in
groundbreaking cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat adversarial cryptography and exploit Internet traffic,
the director of national intelligence, James R. Clapper Jr., wrote in his budget request for the current year.

Snowden have described the

N.S.A.s reach in scooping up vast amounts of communications
around the world. The encryption documents now show, in striking
detail, how the agency works to ensure that it is actually able to
read the information it collects. The agencys success in defeating
many of the privacy protections offered by encryption does not
change the rules that prohibit the deliberate targeting of Americans
e-mails or phone calls without a warrant. But it shows that the
agency, which was sharply rebuked by a federal judge in 2011 for
violating the rules and misleading the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, cannot necessarily be restrained by privacy
technology. N.S.A. rules permit the agency to store any encrypted communication, domestic or
In recent months, the documents disclosed by Mr.

foreign, for as long as the agency is trying to decrypt it or analyze its technical features. The N.S.A., which
has specialized in code-breaking since its creation in 1952, sees that task as essential to its mission. If it
cannot decipher the messages of terrorists, foreign spies and other adversaries, the United States will be
at serious risk, agency officials say. Just in recent weeks, the Obama administration has called on the
intelligence agencies for details of communications by leaders of Al Qaeda about a terrorist plot and of
Syrian officials messages about the chemical weapons attack outside Damascus. If such communications

But
some experts say the N.S.A.s campaign to bypass and weaken
communications security may have serious unintended
consequences. They say the agency is working at cross-purposes with its other major mission,
can be hidden by unbreakable encryption, N.S.A. officials say, the agency cannot do its work.

apart from eavesdropping: ensuring the security of American communications. Some of the agencys most
intensive efforts have focused on the encryption in universal use in the United States, including Secure
Sockets Layer, or SSL; virtual private networks, or VPNs; and the protection used on fourth-generation, or
4G, smartphones. Many Americans, often without realizing it, rely on such protection every time they send
an e-mail, buy something online, consult with colleagues via their companys computer network, or use a
phone or a tablet on a 4G network. For at least three years, one document says, GCHQ, almost certainly in
collaboration with the N.S.A., has been looking for ways into protected traffic of popular Internet
companies: Google, Yahoo, Facebook and Microsofts Hotmail. By 2012, GCHQ had developed new access
opportunities into Googles systems, according to the document. (Google denied giving any government
access and said it had no evidence its systems had been breached). The risk is that when you build a
back door into systems, youre not the only one to exploit it, said Matthew D. Green, a cryptography
researcher at Johns Hopkins University. Those back doors could work against U.S. communications, too.
Paul Kocher, a leading cryptographer who helped design the SSL protocol, recalled how the N.S.A. lost the
heated national debate in the 1990s about inserting into all encryption a government back door called the

Clipper Chip. And they went and did it anyway, without telling anyone, Mr. Kocher said. He said he
understood the agencys mission but was concerned about the danger of allowing it unbridled access to
private information. The intelligence community has worried about going dark forever, but today they
are conducting instant, total invasion of privacy with limited effort, he said. This is the golden age of
spying. A Vital Capability The documents are among more than 50,000 shared by The Guardian with The
New York Times and ProPublica, the nonprofit news organization. They focus on GCHQ but include
thousands from or about the N.S.A. Intelligence officials asked The Times and ProPublica not to publish this
article, saying it might prompt foreign targets to switch to new forms of encryption or communications that
would be harder to collect or read. The news organizations removed some specific facts but decided to
publish the article because of the value of a public debate about government actions that weaken the most
powerful privacy tools. The files show that the agency is still stymied by some encryption, as Mr. Snowden
suggested in a question-and-answer session on The Guardians Web site in June. Properly implemented
strong crypto systems are one of the few things that you can rely on, he said, though cautioning that the
N.S.A. often bypasses the encryption altogether by targeting the computers at one end or the other and
grabbing text before it is encrypted or after it is decrypted. The documents make clear that the N.S.A.
considers its ability to decrypt information a vital capability, one in which it competes with China, Russia
and other intelligence powers. In the future, superpowers will be made or broken based on the strength of
their cryptanalytic programs, a 2007 document said. It is the price of admission for the U.S. to maintain
unrestricted access to and use of cyberspace. The full extent of the N.S.A.s decoding capabilities is
known only to a limited group of top analysts from the so-called Five Eyes: the N.S.A. and its counterparts
in Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Only they are cleared for the Bullrun program, the
successor to one called Manassas both names of an American Civil War battle. A parallel GCHQ
counterencryption program is called Edgehill, named for the first battle of the English Civil War of the 17th
century. Unlike some classified information that can be parceled out on a strict need to know basis, one
document makes clear that with Bullrun, there will be NO need to know. Only a small cadre of trusted
contractors were allowed to join Bullrun. It does not appear that Mr. Snowden was among them, but he
nonetheless managed to obtain dozens of classified documents referring to the programs capabilities,
methods and sources. Photo CITING EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT WEB James R. Clapper Jr., the director of national
intelligence. Credit Susan Walsh/Associated Press Advertisement Continue reading the main story Ties to
Internet Companies When the N.S.A. was founded, encryption was an obscure technology used mainly by
diplomats and military officers. Over the last 20 years, it has become ubiquitous. Even novices can tell that
their exchanges are being automatically encrypted when a tiny padlock appears next to a Web address.
Because strong encryption can be so effective, classified N.S.A. documents make clear, the agencys
success depends on working with Internet companies by getting their voluntary collaboration, forcing
their cooperation with court orders or surreptitiously stealing their encryption keys or altering their
software or hardware. According to an intelligence budget document leaked by Mr. Snowden, the N.S.A.
spends more than $250 million a year on its Sigint Enabling Project, which actively engages the U.S. and
foreign IT industries to covertly influence and/or overtly leverage their commercial products designs to
make them exploitable. Sigint is the acronym for signals intelligence, the technical term for electronic
eavesdropping. By this year, the Sigint Enabling Project had found ways inside some of the encryption
chips that scramble information for businesses and governments, either by working with chipmakers to
insert back doors or by exploiting security flaws, according to the documents. The agency also expected to
gain full unencrypted access to an unnamed major Internet phone call and text service; to a Middle Eastern
Internet service; and to the communications of three foreign governments. In one case, after the
government learned that a foreign intelligence target had ordered new computer hardware, the American
manufacturer agreed to insert a back door into the product before it was shipped, someone familiar with

The 2013 N.S.A. budget request highlights

partnerships with major telecommunications carriers to shape the
global network to benefit other collection accesses that is, to
allow more eavesdropping. At Microsoft, as The Guardian has reported, the N.S.A.
worked with company officials to get pre-encryption access to
Microsofts most popular services, including Outlook e-mail, Skype
Internet phone calls and chats, and SkyDrive, the companys cloud
storage service. Microsoft asserted that it had merely complied with
lawful demands of the government, and in some cases, the
collaboration was clearly coerced. Some companies have been asked
to hand the government the encryption keys to all customer
communications, according to people familiar with the governments
requests. N.S.A. documents show that the agency maintains an
internal database of encryption keys for specific commercial
products, called a Key Provisioning Service, which can automatically
decode many messages. If the necessary key is not in the collection,
a request goes to the separate Key Recovery Service, which tries to
the request told The Times.

obtain it. How keys are acquired is shrouded in secrecy, but

independent cryptographers say many are probably collected by
hacking into companies computer servers, where they are stored . To
keep such methods secret, the N.S.A. shares decrypted messages with other agencies only if the keys
could have been acquired through legal means. Approval to release to non-Sigint agencies, a GCHQ
document says, will depend on there being a proven non-Sigint method of acquiring keys.
Simultaneously, the N.S.A. has been deliberately weakening the international encryption standards
adopted by developers. One goal in the agencys 2013 budget request was to influence policies,
standards and specifications for commercial public key technologies, the most common encryption
method. Cryptographers have long suspected that the agency planted vulnerabilities in a standard
adopted in 2006 by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and later by the International
Organization for Standardization, which has 163 countries as members. Classified N.S.A. memos appear to
confirm that the fatal weakness, discovered by two Microsoft cryptographers in 2007, was engineered by
the agency. The N.S.A. wrote the standard and aggressively pushed it on the international group, privately
calling the effort a challenge in finesse. Eventually, N.S.A. became the sole editor, the memo says.
Even agency programs ostensibly intended to guard American communications are sometimes used to
weaken protections. The N.S.A.s Commercial Solutions Center, for instance, invites the makers of
encryption technologies to present their products to the agency with the goal of improving American
cybersecurity. But a top-secret N.S.A. document suggests that the agencys hacking division uses that
same program to develop and leverage sensitive, cooperative relationships with specific industry
partners to insert vulnerabilities into Internet security products. By introducing such back doors, the
N.S.A. has surreptitiously accomplished what it had failed to do in the open. Two decades ago, officials
grew concerned about the spread of strong encryption software like Pretty Good Privacy, designed by a

The Clinton administration fought back by

proposing the Clipper Chip, which would have effectively neutered
digital encryption by ensuring that the N.S.A. always had the key.
That proposal met a backlash from an unlikely coalition that included
political opposites like Senator John Ashcroft, the Missouri
Republican, and Senator John Kerry, the Massachusetts Democrat, as
well as the televangelist Pat Robertson, Silicon Valley executives
and the American Civil Liberties Union. All argued that the Clipper
would kill not only the Fourth Amendment, but also Americas global technology
programmer named Phil Zimmermann.

edge. By 1996, the White House backed down. But soon the N.S.A. began trying to anticipate and thwart
encryption tools before they became mainstream. Each novel encryption effort generated anxiety. When
Mr. Zimmermann introduced the Zfone, an encrypted phone technology, N.S.A. analysts circulated the
announcement in an e-mail titled This cant be good. But by 2006, an N.S.A. document notes, the agency
had broken into communications for three foreign airlines, one travel reservation system, one foreign
governments nuclear department and anothers Internet service by cracking the virtual private networks
that protected them. By 2010, the Edgehill program, the British counterencryption effort, was
unscrambling VPN traffic for 30 targets and had set a goal of an additional 300. But the agencies goal was
to move away from decrypting targets tools one by one and instead decode, in real time, all of the
information flying over the worlds fiber optic cables and through its Internet hubs, only afterward
searching the decrypted material for valuable intelligence. A 2010 document calls for a new approach for
opportunistic decryption, rather than targeted. By that year, a Bullrun briefing document claims that the
agency had developed groundbreaking capabilities against encrypted Web chats and phone calls. Its
successes against Secure Sockets Layer and virtual private networks were gaining momentum. But the
agency was concerned that it could lose the advantage it had worked so long to gain, if the mere fact of
decryption became widely known.

These capabilities are among the Sigint

communitys most fragile, and the inadvertent disclosure of the
simple fact of could alert the adversary and result in immediate
loss of the capability, a GCHQ document warned. Since Mr.
Snowdens disclosures ignited criticism of overreach and privacy
infringements by the N.S.A., American technology companies have
faced scrutiny from customers and the public over what some see as
too cozy a relationship with the government. In response, some companies have
begun to push back against what they describe as government bullying. Google, Yahoo, Microsoft and
Facebook have pressed for permission to reveal more about the governments requests for cooperation.
One e-mail encryption company, Lavabit, closed rather than comply with the agencys demands for
customer information; another, Silent Circle, ended its e-mail service rather than face such demands. In
effect, facing the N.S.A.s relentless advance, the companies surrendered. Ladar Levison, the founder of

Lavabit, wrote a public letter to his disappointed customers, offering an ominous warning. Without

Congressional action or a strong judicial precedent, he wrote, I

would strongly recommend against anyone trusting their private
data to a company with physical ties to the United States.

NSA surveillance hurts business confidence- lack of

public trust and privacy rights
Trevor, EFF Journalist and activist 2013,
[Electronic Frontier foundation, How NSA mass surveillance is hurting the US
economy, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/how-nsa-mass-surveillancehurting-us-economy, 6/23/15, CY]
Privacy may not be the only casualty of the National Security Agencys massive surveillance program.

Major sectors of the US economy are reporting financial damage as

the recent revelations shake consumer confidence and US trade
partners distance themselves from companies that may have been
compromised by the NSA or, worse, are secretly collaborating with
the spy agency. Member of Congress, especially those who champion Americas competitiveness
in the global marketplace, should take note and rein in the NSA now if they want to stem the damage.

The Wall Street Journal recently reported that AT&Ts desired

acquisition of the European company Vodafone is in danger due to
the companys well-documented involvement in the NSAs datacollection programs. European officials said the telecommunications giant would face
intense scrutiny in its bid to purchase a major cell phone carrier. The Journal went on to say: Resistance

the impact of the NSA

affair could extend beyond the diplomatic sphere and damage US
economic interests in key markets. In September, analysts at Cisco Systems reported
that the fallout reached another level, when the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) told companies not to use cryptographic
standards that may have been undermined by the NSAs BULLRUN
program. The Cisco analysts said that if cryptography was
compromised it would be a critical blow to trust required across the
Internet and the security community. This forecast was proven true in midto such a deal, voiced by officials in interviews across Europe, suggests

November, when Cisco reported a 12 percent slump in its sales in the developing world due to the NSA
revelations. As the Financial Times reported, new orders fell by 25 percent in Brazil and 30 percent in
Russia and Cisco predicts its overall sales could drop by as much 10 percent this quarter. Cisco executives

the NSAs activities have created "a level of uncertainty

or concern" that will have a deleterious impact on a wide-range of
tech companies. It is hard for civil libertarians to shed tears over AT&T losing business because of
were quoted saying

NSA spying, considering the company allowed the NSA to directly tap into its fiber optic cables to copy vast
amounts of innocent Americans Internet traffic.

AT&T was also recently revealed as

having partnered with both the DEA and the CIA on separate mass
surveillance programs. It is also hard to feel sorry for Cisco, which
stands accused of helping China spy on dissidents and religious
minorities. But the fact that the spying is hurting these major
companies is indicative of the size of the problem. This summer, European

Parliaments civil liberties committee was presented with a proposal to require every American website to
place surveillance notices to EU citizens in order to force the US government to reverse course: The users
should be made aware that the data may be subject to surveillance (under FISA 702) by the US
government for any purpose which furthers US foreign policy. A consent requirement will raise EU citizen
awareness and favour growth of services solely within EU jurisdiction. This will thus have economic impact
on US business and increase pressure on the US government to reach a settlement. [emphasis ours]
Meanwhile, Telenor, Norways largest telecom provider has reportedly halted its plans to move its
customers to a US-based cloud provider.

Brazil seems to be moving ahead to create

its own email service and require US companies locate an office

there if they wish to do business with Brazilian customers. Laws like
this mean that companies like Google could be barred from doing
business in one of the worlds most significant markets, according
to Googles director for law enforcement and information security at
Google, Richard Selgado. Google has been warning of this as far
back as July, when in FISA court documents it argued that the
continued secrecy surrounding government surveillance demands
would harm its business. Many commentators have been warning
about the economic ramifications for months. Princeton technologist
Ed Felten, who previously at the Federal Trade Commission, best
explained why the NSA revelations could end up hurting US
businesses: This is going to put US companies at a competitive
disadvantage, because people will believe that U.S. companies lack
the ability to protect their customersand people will suspect that
U.S. companies may feel compelled to lie to their customers about
security. The fallout may worsen. One study released shortly after the first
Edward Snowden leaks said the economy would lose $22 to $35
billion in the next three years. Another study by Forrester said the $35
billion estimate was too low and pegged the real loss figure around
$180 billion for the US tech industry by 2016. Much of the economic problem
stems for the US governments view that its open season when it comes to spying on non-U.S. persons. As
Mark Zuckerberg said in September, the governments position isdont worry, were not spying on any
Americans. Wonderful, thats really helpful for companies trying to work with people around the world.
Googles Chief Legal Officer David Drummond echoed this sentiment last week, saying: The justification
has been couched as 'Don't worry. We're only snooping on foreigners.' For a company like ours, where most

Members of
Congress who care about the US economy should take note: the
companies losing their competitive edge due to NSA surveillance are
mainstream economic drivers. Just as their constituents are paying attention, so are the
of our business and most of our users are non-American, that's not very helpful."

customers who vote with their dollars. As Sen. Ron Wyden remarked last month, If a foreign enemy was
doing this much damage to the economy, people would be in the streets with pitchforks.

NSA backdoors caused by BULLRUN undermine US

tech industry-lessens confidence in US tech goods
Reese, Award Winning Data Journalist, 13 (Fredrick, October 3rd,
MintPress News, How Does the NSA Bypass Online Encryption?
http://www.mintpressnews.com/how-does-the-nsa-bypass-onlineencryption/169916/, 06/23/15, MM)

This seemingly continuous drama about the NSAs overreaches comes into play due to conflicting

While the National Institute of Standards

and Technology the federal agency charged with the
standardization of official measures in the United States officially institutes
the nations encryption standards, the NSA, which is charged with
ensuring the safety of the nations communications, unofficially
consults the NIST on its official standards. As the NSA also carries the Reaganobligations under a single organization.

era mandate of monitoring electronic communications, this creates a blatant conflict of interest. This

if Internet traffic cannot be ruled safe

even if the transmission is secure, trust of the Internet suffers and
Internet commerce may take a hit. Cryptography forms the basis
for trust online, said Bruce Schneier, an encryption specialist and fellow at Harvards Berkman
creates a multilayered problem. First,

By deliberately undermining online security in

a short-sighted effort to eavesdrop, the NSA is undermining the very
fabric of the internet. Classified briefings between the agencies celebrate their success at
Center for Internet and Society.

defeating network security and privacy. Loss of confidence in our ability to adhere to confidentiality
agreements would lead to loss of access to proprietary information that can save time when developing
new capability, reads one communique to GCHQ workers. Some exploitable products are used by the
general public; some exploitable weaknesses are well known eg possibility of recovering poorly chosen
passwords. Knowledge that GCHQ exploits these products and the scale of our capability would raise public

this activity
undermines the federal governments moral authority to pursue and
prosecute computer crimes, as this alleged creation of a backdoor
network is a computer crime within itself. In effect, the federal
government is creating a do as I say, not as I do scenario in which
the government is perceived as violating the very laws it
aggressively enforces. Finally, it calls into question the trustworthiness
of Silicon Valley, which serves as a major component to the nations
economy. A slowdown in buyers confidence in electronic consumer
goods could have a stalling effect on the nations recovery.
Backdoors are fundamentally in conflict with good security, said
Christopher Soghoian, principal technologist and senior policy analyst at the
American Civil Liberties Union. Backdoors expose all users of a
backdoored system, not just intelligence agency targets, to
heightened risk of data compromise. This is because the insertion of backdoors in a
awareness generating unwelcome publicity for us and our political masters. Second,

software product, particularly those that can be used to obtain unencrypted user communications or data,
significantly increases the difficulty of designing a secure product.

BULLRUN undermining US technology- blow to

products created by US tech
Schwartz, InformationWeek Security reporter, 13 (Matthew J,

September 9th, InformationWeek, NSA Crypto Revelations: 7 Things to

Watch, http://www.darkreading.com/risk-management/nsa-cryptorevelations-7-issues-to-watch/d/d-id/1111464?page_number=2, 06/23/15,
MM)
Will reports that the NSA has added back doors to equipment and
software sold by U.S. technology firms lead businesses in other countries to avoid
buying from American manufacturers? "I think it'll have a detrimental effect on both
foreign and U.S. businesses when considering using U.S. products
and services that may have been compromised by the NSA ," said Taia

Global's Carr via email. Callas echoed that assessment, saying that the revelations would "undoubtedly"
have an effect. Then again, the NSA isn't the only intelligence agency in the world, and when it comes to
building back doors into commercial equipment, "we know that other countries are doing it, too," he said.

all security vendors will face some bigger questions

from their customers, as well as a push for carefully vetted opensource alternatives. "This is a big blow to the security industry, the
cloud, and the IT industry in general; especially for the companies
headquartered in the U.S.," he said. "Nothing's going to change over
night, but we should expect to see big movement of data and
services in the following months and years."
As a result, Ristic predicts

BULLRUN reducing trust in US Business- erodes

economy through lack of security
Pagnani, Member of EU Agency on Information Security, 13

(Pierluigi, September 7th, Security Affairs, NSA Bullrun program, encryption

and false perception of security,
http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/17577/intelligence/nsa-bullrun-programfalse-perception-security.html, 06/23/15, MM)
The latest nightmare for US Administration is named Bullrun, another US
program for massive surveillance. Snowdens revelations represented a
heartquake for IT security, the image of NSA and US IT companies
are seriously compromised such the trust of worldwide consumers.
The extension of US surveillance activities seems to have no limits
neither borderlines, every communication and data despite protected with
sophisticated encryption mechanisms were accessible by US Intelligence and
its partners like Britains GCHQ. The New York Times and The Guardian
newspapers and the journalism non-profit ProPublica revealed details of the
new super secret program, codenamed Bullrun, sustained by the NSA to have
the possibility to bypass encryption adopted worldwide by corporates,
governments and institutions. The Bullrun program is considered the
second choice of U.S. Government to the failure in place a backdoor,
the so-called Clipper chip, into encryption that would have allowed it
to eavesdrop on communications. Be aware we are not speaking of
cracking algorithms, Snowden warned that NSA bypass encryption targeting
end point of communications: Properly implemented strong crypto systems
are one of the few things that you can rely on, Snowden said to the
Guardian. The Intelligence Agency has inducted vendors and manufactures to
include backdoors in their products or to disclose related encryption keys to
allow the access data, this is the core of the Bullrun program. Snowden
revelations are causing the collapse of many certainties, last in
order of time is the integrity of encryption standards, according the
popular newspapers NSA has worked to undermine the security of
those standards. The repercussions are critical, the diffusion of the
defective encryption standard has exposed the same data accessed
by NSA to the concrete risk of stealing operated by third party
actors such as foreign state-sponsored hackers and cybercriminals.
The encryption technologies that the NSA has exploited to enable its secret
dragnet surveillance are the same technologies that protect our most
sensitive information, including medical records, financial transactions, and
commercial secrets, Even as the NSA demands more powers to invade our
privacy in the name of cybersecurity, it is making the internet less secure and
exposing us to criminal hacking, foreign espionage, and unlawful surveillance.
The NSAs efforts to secretly defeat encryption are recklessly
shortsighted and will further erode not only the United States
reputation as a global champion of civil liberties and privacy but the
economic competitiveness of its largest companies.commented
Christopher Soghoian, principal technologist of the ACLUs Speech, Privacy
and Technology Project. Suddenly the IT world discovered that has
perceived a false sense of security, the repercussion on the global
security market are enormous, customers have put their trust in the

wrong companies, too often they have been deceived by false myths
and new paradigms (e.g. Cloud computing) designed to facilitate the
surveillance operated by intelligence agencies. Bullrun program is the
last revelation on a nefarious policy conducted by one of the major security
agencies, ironically because of its willingness to supervise each and every
date of the largest Internet has made it unsafe. Chasing the concept of
security NSA has actually opened loopholes in the global information systems
that could have benefited powers such as China or terrorist groups

Customers have lost trust in businesses due to NSA

tracking access to internet data, multiple forms of
communications, bullied businesses to give them info,
no warrants to search
Larson ,Data Editor at ProPublica. He is a winner of the
Livingston Award for the 2011 series Redistricting: How
Powerful Interests are Drawing You Out of a Vote, 13 (Jeff,
9/5/13, ProPublica, Revealed: The NSAs Secret Campaign to Crack,
Undermine Internet Security http://www.propublica.org/article/the-nsassecret-campaign-to-crack-undermine-internet-encryption,6/23/15) W/G*
The National Security Agency is winning its long-running secret war
on encryption, using supercomputers, technical trickery, court orders

and behind-the-scenes persuasion to undermine the major tools

protecting the privacy of everyday communications in the Internet age,
according to newly disclosed documents. This story has been reported
in partnership between The New York Times, the Guardian and
ProPublica based on documents obtained by The Guardian. The agency
has circumvented or cracked much of the encryption, or digital
scrambling, that guards global commerce and banking systems,
protects sensitive data like trade secrets and medical records, and
automatically secures the e-mails, Web searches, Internet chats and
phone calls of Americans and others around the world, the
documents show. Many users assume or have been assured by
Internet companies that their data is safe from prying eyes,
including those of the government, and the N.S.A. wants to keep it
that way. The agency treats its recent successes in deciphering

protected information as among its most closely guarded secrets,

restricted to those cleared for a highly classified program code-named
Bullrun, according to the documents, provided by Edward J. Snowden,
the former N.S.A. contractor. Beginning in 2000, as encryption tools
were gradually blanketing the Web, the N.S.A. invested billions of
dollars in a clandestine campaign to preserve its ability to
eavesdrop. Having lost a public battle in the 1990s to insert its own

back door in all encryption, it set out to accomplish the same goal by
stealth. The agency, according to the documents and interviews with
industry officials, deployed custom-built, superfast computers to

break codes, and began collaborating with technology companies in

the United States and abroad to build entry points into their
products. The documents do not identify which companies have
participated. The N.S.A. hacked into target computers to snare
messages before they were encrypted. And the agency used its

influence as the worlds most experienced code maker to covertly

introduce weaknesses into the encryption standards followed by
hardware and software developers around the world. For the past

decade, N.S.A. has led an aggressive, multipronged effort to break

widely used Internet encryption technologies, said a 2010 memo

describing a briefing about N.S.A. accomplishments for employees of

its British counterpart, Government Communications Headquarters, or
GCHQ. Cryptanalytic capabilities are now coming online. Vast
amounts of encrypted Internet data which have up till now been
discarded are now exploitable. When the British analysts, who often

work side by side with N.S.A. officers, were first told about the
program, another memo said, those not already briefed were
gobsmacked! An intelligence budget document makes clear that the
effort is still going strong. We are investing in groundbreaking
cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat adversarial cryptography and
exploit Internet traffic, the director of national intelligence, James R.
Clapper Jr., wrote in his budget request for the current year. In recent
months, the documents disclosed by Mr. Snowden have described
the N.S.A.s broad reach in scooping up vast amounts of
communications around the world. The encryption documents now

show, in striking detail, how the agency works to ensure that it is

actually able to read the information it collects. The agencys success

in defeating many of the privacy protections offered by encryption

does not change the rules that prohibit the deliberate targeting of
Americans e-mails or phone calls without a warrant. But it shows
that the agency, which was sharply rebuked by a federal judge in
2011 for violating the rules and misleading the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, cannot necessarily be restrained by privacy
technology. N.S.A. rules permit the agency to store any encrypted
communication, domestic or foreign, for as long as the agency is
trying to decrypt it or analyze its technical features. The N.S.A.,
which has specialized in code-breaking since its creation in 1952,
sees that task as essential to its mission. If it cannot decipher the
messages of terrorists, foreign spies and other adversaries, the
United States will be at serious risk, agency officials say. Just in
recent weeks, the Obama administration has called on the
intelligence agencies for details of communications by Qaeda
leaders about a terrorist plot and of Syrian officials messages about
the chemical weapons attack outside Damascus. If such

communications can be hidden by unbreakable encryption, N.S.A.

officials say, the agency cannot do its work. But some experts say the
N.S.A.s campaign to bypass and weaken communications security may

have serious unintended consequences. They say the agency is

working at cross-purposes with its other major mission, apart from
eavesdropping: ensuring the security of American communications.

Some of the agencys most intensive efforts have focused on the

encryption in universal use in the United States, including Secure
Sockets Layer, or SSL, virtual private networks, or VPNs, and the
protection used on fourth generation, or 4G, smartphones. Many

Americans, often without realizing it, rely on such protection every

time they send an e-mail, buy something online, consult with
colleagues via their companys computer network, or use a phone or a
tablet on a 4G network. For at least three years, one document says,
GCHQ, almost certainly in close collaboration with the N.S.A., has been
looking for ways into protected traffic of the most popular Internet
companies: Google, Yahoo, Facebook and Microsofts Hotmail. By 2012,

GCHQ had developed new access opportunities into Googles

systems, according to the document. The risk is that when you build a

back door into systems, youre not the only one to exploit it, said
Matthew D. Green, a cryptography researcher at Johns Hopkins
University. Those back doors could work against U.S. communications,
too. Paul Kocher, a leading cryptographer who helped design the SSL
protocol, recalled how the N.S.A. lost the heated national debate in
the 1990s about inserting into all encryption a government back
door called the Clipper Chip. And they went and did it anyway,
without telling anyone, Mr. Kocher said. He said he understood the

agencys mission but was concerned about the danger of allowing it

unbridled access to private information. The intelligence community
has worried about going dark forever, but today they are
conducting instant, total invasion of privacy with limited effort, he

said. This is the golden age of spying. A Vital Capability The

documents are among more than 50,000 shared by The Guardian with
The New York Times and ProPublica, the nonprofit news organization.
They focus primarily on GCHQ but include thousands either from or
about the N.S.A. Intelligence officials asked The Times and ProPublica
not to publish this article, saying that it might prompt foreign targets to
switch to new forms of encryption or communications that would be
harder to collect or read. The news organizations removed some
specific facts but decided to publish the article because of the value of
a public debate about government actions that weaken the most
powerful tools for protecting the privacy of Americans and others. The
files show that the agency is still stymied by some encryption , as Mr.
Snowden suggested in a question-and-answer session on The
Guardians Web site in June. Properly implemented strong crypto
systems are one of the few things that you can rely on, he said,
though cautioning that the N.S.A. often bypasses the encryption
altogether by targeting the computers at one end or the other and
grabbing text before it is encrypted or after it is decrypted. The

documents make clear that the N.S.A. considers its ability to decrypt
information a vital capability, one in which it competes with China,
Russia and other intelligence powers. In the future, superpowers
will be made or broken based on the strength of their cryptanalytic
programs, a 2007 document said. It is the price of admission for
the U.S. to maintain unrestricted access to and use of cyberspace.

The full extent of the N.S.A.s decoding capabilities is known only to a

limited group of top analysts from the so-called Five Eyes: the N.S.A.
and its counterparts in Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
Only they are cleared for the Bullrun program, the successor to one
called Manassas both names of American Civil War battles. A parallel
GCHQ counterencryption program is called Edgehill, named for the first
battle of the English Civil War of the 17th century. Unlike some
classified information that can be parceled out on a strict need to
know basis, one document makes clear that with Bullrun, there will
be NO need to know. Only a small cadre of trusted contractors were
allowed to join Bullrun. It does not appear that Mr. Snowden was
among them, but he nonetheless managed to obtain dozens of
classified documents referring to the programs capabilities, methods
and sources. Ties to Internet Companies When the N.S.A. was
founded, encryption was an obscure technology used mainly by
diplomats and military officers. Over the last 20 years, with the rise of

the Internet, it has become ubiquitous. Even novices can tell that their
exchanges are being automatically encrypted when a tiny padlock
appears next to the Web address on their computer screen. Because
strong encryption can be so effective, classified N.S.A. documents
make clear, the agencys success depends on working with Internet
companies by getting their voluntary collaboration, forcing their

cooperation with court orders or surreptitiously stealing their

encryption keys or altering their software or hardware. According to an
intelligence budget document leaked by Mr. Snowden, the N.S.A.
spends more than $250 million a year on its Sigint Enabling Project,
which actively engages the U.S. and foreign IT industries to
covertly influence and/or overtly leverage their commercial
products designs to make them exploitable. Sigint is the

abbreviation for signals intelligence, the technical term for electronic

eavesdropping. By this year, the Sigint Enabling Project had found

ways inside some of the encryption chips that scramble information

for businesses and governments, either by working with chipmakers

to insert back doors or by surreptitiously exploiting existing security

flaws, according to the documents. The agency also expected to gain
full unencrypted access to an unnamed major Internet phone call and
text service; to a Middle Eastern Internet service; and to the
communications of three foreign governments. In one case, after the
government learned that a foreign intelligence target had ordered new
computer hardware, the American manufacturer agreed to insert a
back door into the product before it was shipped, someone familiar

with the request told The Times. The 2013 N.S.A. budget request
highlights partnerships with major telecommunications carriers to
shape the global network to benefit other collection accesses that
is, to allow more eavesdropping. At Microsoft, as The Guardian has
reported, the N.S.A. worked with company officials to get pre-

encryption access to Microsofts most popular services, including

Outlook e-mail, Skype Internet phone calls and chats, and SkyDrive,
the companys cloud storage service. Microsoft asserted that it had
merely complied with lawful demands of the government, and in
some cases, the collaboration was clearly coerced. Executives who
refuse to comply with secret court orders can face fines or jail time.
N.S.A. documents show that the agency maintains an internal
database of encryption keys for specific commercial products, called
a Key Provisioning Service, which can automatically decode many
messages. If the necessary key is not in the collection, a request goes
to the separate Key Recovery Service, which tries to obtain it. How
keys are acquired is shrouded in secrecy, but independent
cryptographers say many are probably collected by hacking into
companies computer servers, where they are stored. To keep such
methods secret, the N.S.A. shares decrypted messages with other
agencies only if the keys could have been acquired through legal
means. Approval to release to non-Sigint agencies, a GCHQ

document says, will depend on there being a proven non-Sigint

method of acquiring keys. Simultaneously, the N.S.A. has been

deliberately weakening the international encryption standards

adopted by developers. One goal in the agencys 2013 budget request

was to influence policies, standards and specifications for commercial

public key technologies, the most common encryption method.
Cryptographers have long suspected that the agency planted
vulnerabilities in a standard adopted in 2006 by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology, the United States encryption standards
body, and later by the International Organization for Standardization,
which has 163 countries as members. Classified N.S.A. memos appear
to confirm that the fatal weakness, discovered by two Microsoft
cryptographers in 2007, was engineered by the agency. The N.S.A.
wrote the standard and aggressively pushed it on the international
group, privately calling the effort a challenge in finesse. Eventually,
N.S.A. became the sole editor, the memo says. Even agency

programs ostensibly intended to guard American communications

are sometimes used to weaken protections. The N.S.A.s Commercial
Solutions Center, for instance, invites the makers of encryption
technologies to present their products and services to the agency
with the goal of improving American cybersecurity . But a top-secret

N.S.A. document suggests that the agencys hacking division uses that
same program to develop and leverage sensitive, cooperative
relationships with specific industry partners to insert vulnerabilities
into Internet security products. A Way Around By introducing such back

doors, the N.S.A. has surreptitiously accomplished what it had failed to

do in the open. Two decades ago, officials grew concerned about the
spread of strong encryption software like Pretty Good Privacy, or P.G.P.,
designed by a programmer named Phil Zimmermann. The Clinton
administration fought back by proposing the Clipper Chip, which would
have effectively neutered digital encryption by ensuring that the N.S.A.
always had the key. That proposal met a broad backlash from an
unlikely coalition that included political opposites like Senator John
Ashcroft, the Missouri Republican, and Senator John Kerry, the
Massachusetts Democrat, as well as the televangelist Pat Robertson,
Silicon Valley executives and the American Civil Liberties Union. All
argued that the Clipper would kill not only the Fourth Amendment, but
also Americas global edge in technology. By 1996, the White House
backed down. But soon the N.S.A. began trying to anticipate and
thwart encryption tools before they became mainstream. Every new
technology required new expertise in exploiting it, as soon as
possible, one classified document says. Each novel encryption effort
generated anxiety. When Mr. Zimmermann introduced the Zfone, an
encrypted phone technology, N.S.A. analysts circulated the
announcement in an e-mail titled This cant be good. But by 2006, an
N.S.A. document notes, the agency had broken into communications
for three foreign airlines, one travel reservation system, one foreign
governments nuclear department and anothers Internet service by
cracking the virtual private networks that protected them. By 2010, the
Edgehill program, the British counterencryption effort, was
unscrambling VPN traffic for 30 targets and had set a goal of an
additional 300. But the agencies goal was to move away from
decrypting targets tools one by one and instead decode, in real
time, all of the information flying over the worlds fiber optic cables
and through its Internet hubs, only afterward searching the
decrypted material for valuable intelligence . A 2010 document calls

for a new approach for opportunistic decryption, rather than

targeted. By that year, a Bullrun briefing document claims that the

agency had developed groundbreaking capabilities against

encrypted Web chats and phone calls. Its successes against Secure
Sockets Layer and virtual private networks were gaining momentum.

But the agency was concerned that it could lose the advantage it had
worked so long to gain, if the mere fact of decryption became widely
known. These capabilities are among the Sigint communitys most
fragile, and the inadvertent disclosure of the simple fact of could alert
the adversary and result in immediate loss of the capability, a GCHQ
document outlining the Bullrun program warned. Corporate Pushback

Since Mr. Snowdens disclosures ignited criticism of overreach and

privacy infringements by the N.S.A., American technology companies
have faced scrutiny from customers and the public over what some
see as too cozy a relationship with the government. In response,
some companies have begun to push back against what they

describe as government bullying. Google, Yahoo and Facebook have

pressed for permission to reveal more about the governments
secret requests for cooperation. One small e-mail encryption
company, Lavabit, shut down rather than comply with the agencys
demands for what it considered confidential customer information;
another, Silent Circle, ended its e-mail service rather than face
similar demands. In effect, facing the N.S.A.s relentless advance, the

companies surrendered. Ladar Levison, the founder of Lavabit, wrote a

public letter to his disappointed customers, offering an ominous
warning. Without Congressional action or a strong judicial precedent,
he wrote, I would strongly recommend against anyone trusting their
private data to a company with physical ties to the United States.
Update (9/6): Statement from the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence: It should hardly be surprising that our intelligence
agencies seek ways to counteract our adversaries use of encryption.
Throughout history, nations have used encryption to protect their
secrets, and today, terrorists, cybercriminals, human traffickers and
others also use code to hide their activities. Our intelligence
community would not be doing its job if we did not try to counter that.
While the specifics of how our intelligence agencies carry out this
cryptanalytic mission have been kept secret, the fact that NSAs
mission includes deciphering enciphered communications is not a
secret, and is not news. Indeed, NSAs public website states that its
mission includes leading the U.S. Government in cryptology in
order to gain a decision advantage for the Nation and our allies. The
stories published yesterday, however, reveal specific and classified
details about how we conduct this critical intelligence activity. Anything
that yesterdays disclosures add to the ongoing public debate is
outweighed by the road map they give to our adversaries about the
specific techniques we are using to try to intercept their
communications in our attempts to keep America and our allies safe
and to provide our leaders with the information they need to make
difficult and critical national security decisions.

NSA revelations have constricted consumer

confidence in data security-prominent surveys show
Brandon 13 (Jonathan, editor for Business Cloud News, 12-4, Trust in data
storage security hits ten-year low,
http://www.businesscloudnews.com/2013/12/04/trust-in-data-storagesecurity-hits-ten-year-low/)
A report published today by Fujistu suggests that trust in businesses
to keep customer data secure has hit a ten-year low, with less than
ten per cent of consumers claiming they have faith in organisations
to protect their data. David Robinson, chief security officer, UK &
Ireland at Fujitsu, explained that recent NSA spying activities are in
part responsible for the shift in attitudes, which could have

implications for businesses using big data. Fujitsu worked in

conjunction with OnePoll and surveyed 3,000 consumers in the UK
on their attitudes towards how organisations in the private and
public sector manage their data. And according to Fujitsu, faith in
these organisations to keep customer data safe has hit a ten year
low: just nine per cent of consumers said they have faith in the
ability of these organisations to keep their data safe from loss. 29
per cent said they have experienced a decline in trust this past year,
with more than ten per cent reporting an instance of data loss
during the same period. The results of our research showed
consumer tolerance for data loss is at an all-time low, Robinson
said. With consumers battling to understand the impact on their
personal information if a company is hacked, there is no room for
error anymore. To remain ahead of their competitors and trusted in
the eyes of the consumer organisations need to ensure they are
robust in their security. Robinson explained that much of this shift
in attitudes can be attributed to increased visibility of data-related
scandals, particularly recent revelations on the NSA data
surveillance activities, which is reflected in the report. 69 per cent of
survey respondents said this decline in faith was simply down to a
lack of trust in organisations, and two thirds of consumers said that
fears over the governments ability to safeguard their information
has contributed to an overall erosion of trust around data. The
report suggests organisations need to be more transparent with how they use
customer data, particularly in relation to their security practices. The effort
required here is industrial, as companies are no longer fighting against
individuals, but a sophisticated criminal industry, designed solely to access
their data, Robinson said. We describe organisations in two groups, those
who have been hacked, and those who will be. But beyond security the
survey also suggests that trust is being eroded because consumers fail to see
how their information improves a particular service, which may have
implications for how these organisations balance their use of big data with
the need to maintain transparency and trust in their services. Over a quarter
of those surveyed believe their data is simply being used to extract more
money from them, and 63 per cent said they do not want organisations to
use their data to improve customer experience. The results may put many
businesses keen to use big data to improve their bottom line or
personalise services in a bit of an awkward position. The report
suggests most consumers simply dont trust these organisations to
adequately safeguard their data, nor do they seem to want these
businesses. Added transparency around how that data is collected and used
could backfire unless the benefits of using said data can be effectively
communicated and demonstrated. As our results show there is a desire for
transparency, and a real need to showcase the benefits of data to the
average shopper, Robinson said, adding that to really change perception
organisations need to show value. In order to build trust with their
customer base, it is imperative for businesses to be open and transparent
around data collection. Given the growth in awareness, and the recent
spate of data breach stories, it is inevitable that consumers are
feeling more protective than ever around the information they

share, he said. The successful businesses of the future will be

those that reinstate the consumer organisation contract, that gives
them a significantly improved experience, which is highly personal
to them. That doesnt mean a need for more data what it means is the
smart use of it, he concluded.

Gov intrusion into internet security bad for

economics- empirics prove
Ranger, UK editor of Tech Republic, 15
(Steve, 3/23, Tech Republic, The undercover war on your internet secrets:
How online surveillance cracked our trust in the web,
http://www.techrepublic.com/article/the-undercover-war-on-your-internetsecrets-how-online-surveillance-cracked-our-trust-in-the-web/, June 26, 2015,
GG)
But the rise of the internet suddenly meant that access to
cryptography became an issue of privacy and economics as well as
one of national security, immediately sparking the clash that came to be
known as 'the crypto wars'. Governments fought to control the use
of encryption, while privacy advocates insisted its use was essential not
just for individual freedom, but also to protect the commercial development
of the nascent internet. What followed was a series of skirmishes, as the US
government and others made increasingly desperate and
unsuccessful efforts to reassert control over encryption
technologies. One example in the mid-90s involved the NSA designing the
Clipper chip, which was a way to give the agency access to the
communications on any devices on which the chip was installed. Another
attempt at government control during this period came with the introduction
of key escrow. Under the scheme, the US government would agree to license
encryption providers, if they gave the state access to the keys used to
decode communications. On top of this were rules which only allowed
products that used weak and easily-cracked encryption to be exported from
the US. Remarkably there was an unwelcome reminder of those days of
watered-down encryption with the appearance of the recent FREAK flaw in
the SSL security standard. The vulnerability could be used to force web
browsers to default to the weaker "export-strength" encryption,
which can be easily broken. Few experts even knew that the option
to use the weaker encryption still existed in the browsers commonly
used today a good example of the dangerous and unexpected
consequences of attempts to control privacy technologies, long after the
political decisions affecting it had been reversed and forgotten. But by the
early 2000s, it appeared that the privacy advocates had effectively
won the crypto wars. The Clipper chip was abandoned, strong encryption
software exports were allowed, key escrow failed, and governments
realised it was all but impossible for them to control the use of
encryption. It was understood that if they tried, the damage they
would do to the internet economy would be too great. Individual
freedoms, and simple economics, had overwhelmed national security.
In 2005, one campaigning group even cheerfully announced "The crypto wars
are finally over and we won!"

NSA is costing large tech companies billions- it erodes

businesses and competition
Gustin, reporter at TIME, 13 (Sam, 12-10-2013, "NSA Spying Scandal Could
Cost U.S. Tech Giants Billions," TIME,
http://business.time.com/2013/12/10/nsa-spying-scandal-could-cost-u-s-techgiants-billions/)//GLee
After Snowdens leak, the Information Technology & Innovation
Foundation (ITIF), a non-partisan, D.C.-based think tank, published a
report saying that U.S. cloud computing providers could lose as
much as $35 billion by 2016 because of the NSA revelations. ITIF senior
analyst Daniel Castro, the reports author, wrote that Snowdens disclosures will likely have an immediate
and lasting impact on the competitiveness of the U.S. cloud computing industry if foreign customers decide

Analysts at Forrester,
the respected tech industry research firm, went even further. In a
blog post, Forrester analyst James Staten projected a net loss for the
Internet service provider industry of as much as $180 billion by
2016, which would amount to a 25% decline in the overall
information technology services market. All from the unveiling of a
single kangaroo-court action called PRISM, Staten wrote. His estimate
the risks of storing data with a U.S. company outweigh the benefits.

includes domestic clients, which could bypass U.S. cloud providers for international rivals, as well as nonU.S. cloud providers, which could lose as much as 20% of their business due to foreign governments like
Germany which have their own secret snooping programs. With numbers at that scale, its not hard to
understand why the top U.S. Internet companies are vehemently protesting the governments secret
surveillance programs. Silicon Valley executives frequently tout their belief in idealistic principles like free
speech, transparency and privacy. But it would be naive to think that they also arent deeply concerned

Businesses increasingly
recognize that our governments out-of-control surveillance hurts
their bottom line and costs American jobs, Rep. Justin Amash, the
Michigan Republican and outspoken critic of the NSAs secret
programs, told TIME by email. It violates the privacy of their
customers and it erodes American businesses competitive edge. On
about the impact of the NSA revelations on the bottom line.

Monday, a coalition of the largest U.S. Internet companies launched a campaign to pressure the

People wont use technology they

dont trust, said Microsoft general counsel Brad Smith.
Governments have put this trust at risk, and governments need to
help restore it. Several tech CEOs, including Googles Larry Page,
Yahoos Marissa Mayer and Facebooks Mark Zuckerberg, are
personally throwing their weight behind the effort. Its the most high-profile
government to reform its surveillance programs.

effort yet by the tech titans to repair the damage to their corporate reputations caused by the NSA
revelations. The coalition is calling for limits on government authority to collect user information; better
oversight and accountability; greater transparency about the governments demands; respect for the free

Recent
revelations about government surveillance activities have shaken
the trust of our users, and it is time for the United States
government to act to restore the confidence of citizens around the
world, said Mayer, Yahoos CEO. Page, Googles CEO, said: The
security of users data is critical, which is why weve invested so
much in encryption and fight for transparency around government
requests for information. This is undermined by the apparent
wholesale collection of data, in secret and without independent
oversight, by many governments around the world.
flow of data across borders; and the avoidance of conflict between governments.

US tech industry decreasing- NSA has lost foreign

consumers trust
Timm, J.D. from New York Law School and is a co-founder and
the executive director of the Freedom of the Press
Foundation. He is a journalist, activist, and lawyer who writes
a twice weekly column for The Guardian on privacy, free
speech, and national security, 13 (Trevor, 11/25/13, Electronic
Frontier Foundation, How NSA Mass Surveillance is Hurting the US
Economy, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/how-nsa-mass-surveillancehurting-us-economy, 6/26/15, WG*)
Privacy may not be the only casualty of the National Security
Agencys massive surveillance program. Major sectors of the US
economy are reporting financial damage as the recent revelations
shake consumer confidence and US trade partners distance
themselves from companies that may have been compromised by
the NSA or, worse, are secretly collaborating with the spy agency.
Members of Congress, especially those who champion Americas
competitiveness in the global marketplace, should take note and
rein in the NSA now if they want to stem the damage. The Wall Street
Journal recently reported that AT&Ts desired acquisition of the
European company Vodafone is in danger due to the companys welldocumented involvement in the NSAs data-collection programs.
European officials said the telecommunications giant would face
intense scrutiny in its bid to purchase a major cell phone carrier.

The Journal went on to say: Resistance to such a deal, voiced by

officials in interviews across Europe, suggests the impact of the NSA

affair could extend beyond the diplomatic sphere and damage US

economic interests in key markets. In September, analysts at Cisco
Systems reported that the fallout reached another level, when the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) told
companies not to use cryptographic standards that may have been
undermined by the NSAs BULLRUN program. The Cisco analysts said
that if cryptography was compromised it would be a critical blow to
trust required across the Internet and the security community. This

forecast was proven true in mid-November, when Cisco reported a 12

percent slump in its sales in the developing world due to the NSA
revelations. As the Financial Times reported, new orders fell by 25
percent in Brazil and 30 percent in Russia and Cisco predicts its overall
sales could drop by as much 10 percent this quarter. Cisco executives
were quoted saying the NSAs activities have created "a level of
uncertainty or concern" that will have a deleterious impact on a widerange of tech companies. It is hard for civil libertarians to shed tears
over AT&T losing business because of NSA spying, considering the
company allowed the NSA to directly tap into its fiber optic cables to

copy vast amounts of innocent Americans Internet traffic. AT&T was

also recently revealed as having partnered with both the DEA and the
CIA on separate mass surveillance programs. It is also hard to feel
sorry for Cisco, which stands accused of helping China spy on
dissidents and religious minorities. But the fact that the spying is

hurting these major companies is indicative of the size of the

problem. This summer, European Parliaments civil liberties
committee was presented with a proposal to require every American
website to place surveillance notices to EU citizens in order to force
the US government to reverse course: The users should be made
aware that the data may be subject to surveillance (under FISA 702)
by the US government for any purpose which furthers US foreign
policy. A consent requirement will raise EU citizen awareness and
favour growth of services solely within EU jurisdiction. This will thus
have economic impact on US business and increase pressure on the
US government to reach a settlement. [emphasis ours] Meanwhile,

Telenor, Norways largest telecom provider has reportedly halted its

plans to move its customers to a US-based cloud provider. Brazil seems
to be moving ahead to create its own email service and require US
companies locate an office there if they wish to do business with
Brazilian customers. Laws like this mean that companies like Google
could be barred from doing business in one of the worlds most
significant markets, according to Googles director for law
enforcement and information security at Google, Richard Selgado.
Google has been warning of this as far back as July, when in FISA court
documents it argued that the continued secrecy surrounding
government surveillance demands would harm its business. Many
commentators have been warning about the economic ramifications
for months. Princeton technologist Ed Felten, who previously at the
Federal Trade Commission, best explained why the NSA revelations
could end up hurting US businesses: This is going to put US
companies at a competitive disadvantage, because people will
believe that U.S. companies lack the ability to protect their
customersand people will suspect that U.S. companies may feel
compelled to lie to their customers about security. The fallout may
worsen. One study released shortly after the first Edward Snowden
leaks said the economy would lose $22 to $35 billion in the next three

years. Another study by Forrester said the $35 billion estimate was too
low and pegged the real loss figure around $180 billion for the US
tech industry by 2016. Much of the economic problem stems for the
US governments view that its open season when it comes to spying
on non-U.S. persons. As Mark Zuckerberg said in September, the
governments position isdont worry, were not spying on any
Americans. Wonderful, thats really helpful for companies trying to
work with people around the world. Googles Chief Legal Officer David
Drummond echoed this sentiment last week, saying: The justification
has been couched as 'Don't worry. We're only snooping on foreigners.'

For a company like ours, where most of our business and most of our
users are non-American, that's not very helpful." Members of Congress
who care about the US economy should take note: the companies
losing their competitive edge due to NSA surveillance are
mainstream economic drivers. Just as their constituents are paying

attention, so are the customers who vote with their dollars. As Sen.
Ron Wyden remarked last month, If a foreign enemy was doing this
much damage to the economy, people would be in the streets with
pitchforks.

NSA damaging the tech industry- fear of spying and

governmental bans of US data storing companies
Enderle, 15 (Rob, 6/13/15, CIO, U.S. surveillance programs are killing the
tech industry, http://www.cio.com.au/article/577338/u-surveillanceprograms-killing-tech-industry/, 6/26/15, WG*)
The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, ranked as the
most authoritative science and technology think tank in the U.S.
(second in the world behind Max Planck Institutes of Germany), has
just released its latest report on the impact of the existence and
disclosure of the broad NSA national and international spying
programs. It was initially reported that the revenue loss range would

be between $21.5 billion and $35 billion, mostly affecting U.S. cloud
service providers. However, they have gone back and researched the
impact and found it to be both far larger and far broader than originally
estimated. In fact, it appears the surveillance programs could cause a

number of U.S. technology firms to fail outright or to be forced into

bankruptcy as they reorganize for survival. The damage has also since
spread to domestic aerospace and telephony service providers. The
programs identified in the report are PRISM; the program authorized
by the FISA Amendments act, which allowed search without the need
for a warrant domestically and abroad, and Bullrun; the program
designed to compromise encryption technology worldwide . The
report ends in the following recommendations: Increase
transparency about U.S. surveillance activities both at home and
abroad. Strengthen information security by opposing any
government efforts to introduce backdoors in software or weaken
encryption. Strengthen U.S. mutual legal assistance treaties
(MLATs). Work to establish international legal standards for
government access to data. Complete trade agreements like the
Trans Pacific Partnership that ban digital protectionism, and
pressure nations that seek to erect protectionist barriers to abandon
those efforts. The 2014 survey indicates that 25 percent of companies
in the UK and Canada plan to pull data out of the U.S. Of those

responding, 82 percent indicated they now look at national laws as the

major deciding factor with regard to where they put their data.
Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) company Birst indicated that its

European customers are refusing to host information in the U.S. for

fear of spying. Salesforce, another SaaS company, revealed that its

German insurance client pulled out of using the firm. In fact, Salesforce
faced major short-term sales losses and suffered a $124 million deficit
in the fiscal quarter after the NSA revelations according to the report.

Cisco, the U.S. firm that leads the networking market, reported that
sales was interrupted in Brazil, China and Russia as a result of the
belief that the U.S. had placed backdoors in its networking products .

Ciscos CEO, John Chambers, tied his revenue shortfall to the NSA
disclosure. Servint, a U.S. Web Hosting company, reported losing half
of its international clients as a result of the NSA Disclosure. Qualcomm,
IBM, Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard have all reported significant
adverse revenue impact in China from the NSA disclosure. A variety
of U.S. companies including Cisco, McAfee/Intel, Apple and Citrix
Systems were all dropped from the approved list for the Chinese
government as a result of the NSA disclosure. But it isnt even just

tech companies that have lost significant customers and revenues.

Boeing lost a major defense contract to Saab AB to replace Brazils
aging fighter jets due to the disclosure. Verizon was dropped by a

large number German government facilities for fear Verizon would

open them up to wiretapping and other surveillance. NSA
surveillance hurts U.S., creates opportunity for competing foreign
firms. This has created significant opportunity for foreign firms
competing with U.S. firms. For instance, Hortensecurity (Germany)

now markets itself as Cloud Services Made in Germany and safe from
the NSA. Cloudwatt (France) has joined a nationalistic consortium of
companies called Sovereign Cloud (cool name) and advertises as
being resistant to NSA spying. F-Secure which competes with Dropbox
and Microsoft OneDrive, has altered its marketing to include the
language that they will not share data with the U.S. government as
they move against these U.S. firms. Additional findings include broad
protectionist measures in a variety of regions using this disclosure to
lock U.S. firms out of the country and favor local firms and the creation
of anti-U.S. technology networks. In addition, the governments are
aggressively funding domestic startups that can replace U.S.
companies in their country. Australia, China, Russia, and India have
passed laws making it illegal for personal information to be stored
out of the country making it far more difficult for U.S. firms to do
business there. China further launched an IOE movement to prevent
banks from buying from IBM, Oracle and EMC. Government

surveillance might just cripple and eliminate U.S. tech dominance.

The report concludes that these changes taken in total will cripple and
could virtually eliminate U.S. dominance in technology
internationally. While it doesnt address what U.S. companies are

doing, it is likely many of them are looking at U.S. tech companies

adversely because of the double hit of both the spying program and
the inability to adequately secure either the information about the
program itself or information in general (thus the information that was
captured is also at risk). The irony here is that if the U.S. loses the
technology industry and it moves to Asia and Europe the U.S. spy
agencies will lose virtually all of their spying digital capability anyway,
or it will drop to the same level as a non-tech third-world country,
because they wont be able to force the foreign firms to give them
inside access. It could also be noted that they will also lose the
capability to develop leading tech-based tools and weapons as those
skills also migrate out of the U.S. So, in a foolish effort to make the
country safer, not only is the collateral damage unacceptable to the
U.S. economy it will likely result in a dramatically reduced
intelligence capability. This is a level of self-correction the U.S.
might not recover from.

Encryption codes used in programs to spy use of

backdoors in Bullrun and Edgehill
Greenwald, is a former columnist on civil liberties and US
national security issues for the Guardian. An exconstitutional lawyer, he was until 2012 a contributing writer
at Salon. He is the author of How Would a Patriot Act? (May
2006), 13 ( Glenn, 9/6/13, The Guardian, Revealed: how US and UK spy
agencies defeat internet privacy and security,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codessecurity, 6/26/15, WG*)

US and British intelligence agencies have successfully cracked much of

the online encryption relied upon by hundreds of millions of people to
protect the privacy of their personal data, online transactions and
emails, according to top-secret documents revealed by former
contractor Edward Snowden. The files show that the National Security
Agency and its UK counterpart GCHQ have broadly compromised the

guarantees that internet companies have given consumers to

reassure them that their communications, online banking and
medical records would be indecipherable to criminals or
governments. The agencies, the documents reveal, have adopted a
battery of methods in their systematic and ongoing assault on what
they see as one of the biggest threats to their ability to access huge
swathes of internet traffic "the use of ubiquitous encryption across
the internet". Those methods include covert measures to ensure NSA
control over setting of international encryption standards, the use of
supercomputers to break encryption with "brute force", and the
most closely guarded secret of all collaboration with technology

companies and internet service providers themselves. Through these

covert partnerships, the agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities

known as backdoors or trapdoors into commercial encryption
software. The files, from both the NSA and GCHQ, were obtained by the
Guardian, and the details are being published today in partnership with
the New York Times and ProPublica. They reveal: A 10-year NSA
program against encryption technologies made a breakthrough in 2010
which made "vast amounts" of data collected through internet cable
taps newly "exploitable". The NSA spends $250m a year on a
program which, among other goals, works with technology
companies to "covertly influence" their product designs. The

secrecy of their capabilities against encryption is closely guarded, with

analysts warned: "Do not ask about or speculate on sources or
methods." The NSA describes strong decryption programs as the

"price of admission for the US to maintain unrestricted access to and

use of cyberspace". A GCHQ team has been working to develop ways

into encrypted traffic on the "big four" service providers, named as

Hotmail, Google, Yahoo and Facebook. The agencies insist that the

ability to defeat encryption is vital to their core missions of counterterrorism and foreign intelligence gathering. But security experts
accused them of attacking the internet itself and the privacy of all
users. "Cryptography forms the basis for trust online," said Bruce

Schneier, an encryption specialist and fellow at Harvard's Berkman

Center for Internet and Society. "By deliberately undermining online
security in a short-sighted effort to eavesdrop, the NSA is
undermining the very fabric of the internet." Classified briefings

between the agencies celebrate their success at "defeating network

security and privacy". "For the past decade, NSA has lead [sic] an
aggressive, multi-pronged effort to break widely used internet
encryption technologies," stated a 2010 GCHQ document. "Vast
amounts of encrypted internet data which have up till now been
discarded are now exploitable." An internal agency memo noted that
among British analysts shown a presentation on the NSA's progress:
"Those not already briefed were gobsmacked!" The breakthrough,
which was not described in detail in the documents, meant the
intelligence agencies were able to monitor "large amounts" of data
flowing through the world's fibre-optic cables and break its encryption,
despite assurances from internet company executives that this data
was beyond the reach of government. The key component of the NSA's
battle against encryption, its collaboration with technology companies,
is detailed in the US intelligence community's top-secret 2013 budget
request under the heading "Sigint [signals intelligence] enabling".
Funding for the program $254.9m for this year dwarfs that of the
Prism program, which operates at a cost of $20m a year, according to
previous NSA documents. Since 2011, the total spending on Sigint
enabling has topped $800m. The program "actively engages US and

foreign IT industries to covertly influence and/or overtly leverage

their commercial products' designs", the document states. None of

the companies involved in such partnerships are named; these details

are guarded by still higher levels of classification. Among other things,
the program is designed to "insert vulnerabilities into commercial
encryption systems". These would be known to the NSA, but to no one
else, including ordinary customers, who are tellingly referred to in the
document as "adversaries". "These design changes make the systems
in question exploitable through Sigint collection with foreknowledge
of the modification. To the consumer and other adversaries, however,
the systems' security remains intact." The document sets out in clear
terms the program's broad aims, including making commercial
encryption software "more tractable" to NSA attacks by "shaping" the
worldwide marketplace and continuing efforts to break into the
encryption used by the next generation of 4G phones. Among the
specific accomplishments for 2013, the NSA expects the program to
obtain access to "data flowing through a hub for a major
communications provider" and to a "major internet peer-to-peer voice
and text communications system". Technology companies maintain
that they work with the intelligence agencies only when legally
compelled to do so. The Guardian has previously reported that

Microsoft co-operated with the NSA to circumvent encryption on the

Outlook.com email and chat services. The company insisted that it

was obliged to comply with "existing or future lawful demands" when

designing its products. The documents show that the agency has
already achieved another of the goals laid out in the budget request: to
influence the international standards upon which encryption systems
rely. Independent security experts have long suspected that the NSA
has been introducing weaknesses into security standards, a fact
confirmed for the first time by another secret document. It shows the
agency worked covertly to get its own version of a draft security
standard issued by the US National Institute of Standards and
Technology approved for worldwide use in 2006. "Eventually, NSA
became the sole editor," the document states. The NSA's codeword for
its decryption program, Bullrun, is taken from a major battle of the
American civil war. Its British counterpart, Edgehill, is named after the
first major engagement of the English civil war, more than 200 years
earlier. A classification guide for NSA employees and contractors on
Bullrun outlines in broad terms its goals. "Project Bullrun deals with

NSA's abilities to defeat the encryption used in specific network

communication technologies. Bullrun involves multiple sources, all of
which are extremely sensitive." The document reveals that the

agency has capabilities against widely used online protocols, such as

HTTPS, voice-over-IP and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), used to protect
online shopping and banking. The document also shows that the NSA's
Commercial Solutions Center, ostensibly the body through which

technology companies can have their security products assessed and

presented to prospective government buyers, has another, more
clandestine role. It is used by the NSA to "to leverage sensitive, cooperative relationships with specific industry partners" to insert
vulnerabilities into security products. Operatives were warned that

this information must be kept top secret "at a minimum". A more

general NSA classification guide reveals more detail on the agency's
deep partnerships with industry, and its ability to modify products. It
cautions analysts that two facts must remain top secret: that NSA
makes modifications to commercial encryption software and devices
"to make them exploitable", and that NSA "obtains cryptographic
details of commercial cryptographic information security systems
through industry relationships". The agencies have not yet cracked all
encryption technologies, however, the documents suggest. Snowden
appeared to confirm this during a live Q&A with Guardian readers in
June. "Encryption works. Properly implemented strong crypto systems
are one of the few things that you can rely on," he said before warning
that NSA can frequently find ways around it as a result of weak security
on the computers at either end of the communication. The documents
are scattered with warnings over the importance of maintaining
absolute secrecy around decryption capabilities. Strict guidelines were
laid down at the GCHQ complex in Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, on
how to discuss projects relating to decryption. Analysts were
instructed: "Do not ask about or speculate on sources or methods
underpinning Bullrun." This informaton was so closely guarded,
according to one document, that even those with access to aspects of
the program were warned: "There will be no 'need to know'." The
agencies were supposed to be "selective in which contractors are given
exposure to this information", but it was ultimately seen by Snowden,
one of 850,000 people in the US with top-secret clearance.A 2009
GCHQ document spells out the significant potential consequences of
any leaks, including "damage to industry relationships". "Loss of
confidence in our ability to adhere to confidentiality agreements would
lead to loss of access to proprietary information that can save time
when developing new capability," intelligence workers were told.
Somewhat less important to GCHQ was the public's trust which was
marked as a moderate risk, the document stated. "Some exploitable
products are used by the general public; some exploitable weaknesses
are well known eg possibility of recovering poorly chosen passwords,"
it said. "Knowledge that GCHQ exploits these products and the scale of
our capability would raise public awareness generating unwelcome
publicity for us and our political masters." The decryption effort is
particularly important to GCHQ. Its strategic advantage from its
Tempora program direct taps on transatlantic fibre-optic cables of
major telecommunications corporations was in danger of eroding as
more and more big internet companies encrypted their traffic,

responding to customer demands for guaranteed privacy. Without

attention, the 2010 GCHQ document warned, the UK's "Sigint utility will
degrade as information flows changes, new applications are developed
(and deployed) at pace and widespread encryption becomes more
commonplace." Documents show that Edgehill's initial aim was to
decode the encrypted traffic certified by three major (unnamed)
internet companies and 30 types of Virtual Private Network (VPN)
used by businesses to provide secure remote access to their systems.
By 2015, GCHQ hoped to have cracked the codes used by 15 major
internet companies, and 300 VPNs. Another program, codenamed
Cheesy Name, was aimed at singling out encryption keys, known as
'certificates', that might be vulnerable to being cracked by GCHQ
supercomputers. Analysts on the Edgehill project were working on
ways into the networks of major webmail providers as part of the
decryption project. A quarterly update from 2012 notes the project's
team "continue to work on understanding" the big four communication
providers, named in the document as Hotmail, Google, Yahoo and
Facebook, adding "work has predominantly been focused this quarter
on Google due to new access opportunities being developed". To help
secure an insider advantage, GCHQ also established a Humint
Operations Team (HOT). Humint, short for "human intelligence" refers
to information gleaned directly from sources or undercover agents.
This GCHQ team was, according to an internal document, "responsible
for identifying, recruiting and running covert agents in the global
telecommunications industry." "This enables GCHQ to tackle some of
its most challenging targets," the report said. The efforts made by the
NSA and GCHQ against encryption technologies may have negative
consequences for all internet users, experts warn. "Backdoors are
fundamentally in conflict with good security," said Christopher
Soghoian, principal technologist and senior policy analyst at the
American Civil Liberties Union. "Backdoors expose all users of a
backdoored system, not just intelligence agency targets, to heightened
risk of data compromise." This is because the insertion of backdoors in
a software product, particularly those that can be used to obtain
unencrypted user communications or data, significantly increases the
difficulty of designing a secure product." This was a view echoed in a
recent paper by Stephanie Pell, a former prosecutor at the US
Department of Justice and non-resident fellow at the Center for Internet
and Security at Stanford Law School. "[An] encrypted communications
system with a lawful interception back door is far more likely to result
in the catastrophic loss of communications confidentiality than a
system that never has access to the unencrypted communications of
its users," she states. Intelligence officials asked the Guardian, New
York Times and ProPublica not to publish this article, saying that it
might prompt foreign targets to switch to new forms of encryption or
communications that would be harder to collect or read. The three

organisations removed some specific facts but decided to publish the

story because of the value of a public debate about government
actions that weaken the most powerful tools for protecting the privacy
of internet users in the US and worldwide.

Businesses are being forced to gives their information

to the NSA- hurting businesses and
Messmer, senior editor at Network World, an IDG website,
where she covers news and technology trends related to
information security, 14 (Ellen, 6/2/14, Network World, 10 IT security
risks that small businesses can't afford to ignore,
http://www.networkworld.com/article/2358151/network-security/10-itsecurity-risks-that-small-businesses-can-t-afford-to-ignore.html, 6/25/15,
WG*)

Generally thought of as having up to 500 employees, small businesses

constitute the vast majority of companies in the United States, making
them a critical part of the economy. Their customers naturally expect

personal and financial data to be kept secure, and a data breach is a

painful and expensive ordeal. Like the larger enterprises, small

businesses that accept payment cards have to follow Payment Card

Industry rules. It can be daunting for a small business that may not

even have an IT department to think about how to tackle network

security. Buildings don't fall down, why should network security? + But
here are 10 top tips to get started: 1. Business managers need to gain
the basic knowledge of where the most important data is held,
whether it's on site in traditional desktops and servers, or in cloud
services and mobile devices (including possibly those in "Bring Your

Own Device' arrangements). Whether this knowledge is presented by

the in-house IT manager or an outside technology provider, the data
storage, access permissions and data processing should be
documented, including whatever security controls are in place. There
needs to be a conscious decision by business and technology
managers, preferably with legal advice, that these security controls are
adequate relative to risk. That lays the foundation for what is also
needed: a back-up and disaster recovery plan. 2. Bad things happen to
good businesses. Floods, fires, earthquakes, the outside thief and the
insider threat, and of course malware are all factors that can impact
the safety of stored data. Automate the back-up process. Since
virtually every business now depends on some form of computer
processing, ask the question how employees could proceed if your
physical site is suddenly not available. Plan for disruptions that could
last weeks if not months -- and test it to make sure it's viable. 3. Train
employees about the nature of today's cyber-attacks. SMBs tend to

think that cyber-criminals are going after the really big guys, not them,
but that's simply not true. Cyber-criminals in particular target SMBs to
compromise the PCs they use for online banking and payments in order
to commit fraud in a big way by emptying out business accounts.
Unfortunately, there's actually less protection for recovery of stolen
funds under the law for businesses than for consumers. Banks may
even give the small business a hard time, questioning the security it
has in place. How does cybercrime often begin? In many cases, the
victim opens a "phishing" e-mail message with an attachment laden
with malware that will let the attacker begin infiltrating the network. To
tamp this down, spam filters should be in place to try and catch
phishing e-mails and other junk. But some of it, especially highly
targeted, will get through and employees should be trained not to open
anything that seems even remotely unusual. Because web-based
malware is also commonplace, applying Web-surfing controls on
employees' Internet use is also a good idea. The big companies are
starting to use advanced malware protection systems that can track
targeted attacks in various ways, and small businesses should too -- if

it's affordable

I/L Business Confidence

NSA PRISM program could cost the cloud business up
to $180 dollars in the next three years companies
shifting away.
Henderson, Editor in chief of WHIR, 2013 (Nicole, 7/15/2013,
WHIR, Forrester to Cloud Providers: NSA Impact Worse Than You Thought,
http://www.thewhir.com/web-hosting-news/forrester-to-cloud-providers-nsaimpact-worse-than-you-thought, accessed 6/25/2015, JAK).
US cloud providers could lose up to $180 billion in business over the
next three years due to concerns around the scope of NSAs PRISM
program, Forrester Research analyst James Staten said in a blog
post on Wednesday. This number is $145 billion more than an earlier
estimate from the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation which
predicted $35 billion of cloud business could be driven away from the US by
2016. Staten said that US companies should not only be concerned
that businesses overseas will be less likely to use US-based cloud
services, but also that businesses in their own country will bypass
domestic cloud services in favor of international options, which they
may perceive to be more secure. Its not just US cloud companies that
should be concerned either, Staten says. Other countries could model after
the US and introduce PRISM-like programs of their own; in fact, he said, it is
nave and dangerous to think that the NSAs actions are unique. This could
mean that non-US cloud providers could lose up to 20 percent of their own
available overseas and domestic opportunities. Prior to todays mediahyped paranoia about government surveillance, corporate IT
spending has been trending toward outsourcing for many years. Few
corporations have no data in the cloud let alone no data with a
hosting company, colocation provider or outsourcing firm, Staten
said. Think your firm is the exception? Do a quick travel and expense audit
against Evernote, DropBox or similar services. Swear on a Bible that none of
your employees have company data sucked up into iCloud. Sign a legal
tender that none of your partners are storing your data or data about your
company in the cloud or with a service provider. Oh well.

I/L Consumer Confidence

BULLRUN decreasing consumer confidence- cloud
computing companies struggling
Kehl et al, Open Technology Institute Policy Analyst, 14
(Danielle, July, Open Technology Institute, Surveillance Costs: The NSAs
Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/534-surveillance-costs-the-nsasimpact-on-the-economy-internet-freedomcybersecurity/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf, page #9-11, 06/25/15, MM)
Given heightened concerns about the NSAs ability to access data stored by
U.S. companies, it is no surprise that American companies offering cloud
computing and webhosting services are among those experiencing the most
acute economic fallout from NSA surveillance. Within just a few weeks of
the first disclosures, reports began to emerge that American cloud
computing companies like Dropbox and Amazon Web Services were
starting to lose business to overseas competitors.32 The CEO of
Artmotion, one of Switzerlands largest offshore providers, reported
in July 2013 that his company had seen a 45 percent jump in revenue
since the first leaks,33 an early sign that the countrys perceived
neutrality and strong data and privacy protections34 could
potentially be turned into a serious competitive advantage.35 Foreign
companies are clearly poised to benefit from growing fears about the security
ramifications of keeping data in the United States. In a survey of 300
British and Canadian businesses released by PEER 1 in January
2014,36 25 percent of respondents indicated that they were moving
data outside of the U.S. as a result of the NSA revelations. An
overwhelming number of the companies surveyed indicated that
security and data privacy were their top concerns, with 81 percent
stating that they want to know exactly where their data is being
hosted. Seventy percent were even willing to sacrifice performance
in order to ensure that their data was protected.37 It appears that little
consideration was given over the past decade to the potential economic
repercussions if the NSAs secret programs were revealed.38 This failure was
acutely demonstrated by the Obama Administrations initial focus on
reassuring the public that its programs primarily affect non-Americans, even
though non-Americans are also heavy users of American companies
products. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg put a fine point on the
issue, saying that the government blew it in its response to the
scandal. He noted sarcastically: The government response was, Oh
dont worry, were not spying on any Americans. Oh, wonderful:
thats really helpful to companies [like Facebook] trying to serve
people around the world, and thats really going to inspire
confidence in American internet companies.39 As Zuckerbergs
comments reflect, certain parts of the American technology industry are
particularly vulnerable to international backlash since growth is heavily
dependent on foreign markets. For example, the U.S. cloud computing
industry has grown from an estimated $46 billion in 2008 to $150 billion in

2014, with nearly 50 percent of worldwide cloud-computing revenues coming

from the U.S.40 R Street Institutes January 2014 policy study concluded that
in the next few years, new products and services that rely on cloud
computing will become increasingly pervasive. Cloud computing is also the
root of development for the emerging generation of Web-based applications
home security, outpatient care, mobile payment, distance learning, efficient
energy use and driverless cars, writes R Streets Steven Titch in the study.
And it is a research area where the United States is an undisputed leader.41
This trajectory may be dramatically altered, however, as a consequence of
the NSAs surveillance programs. Economic forecasts after the Snowden leaks
have predicted significant, ongoing losses for the cloud-computing industry in
the next few years. An August 2013 study by the Information
Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) estimated that
revelations about the NSAs PRISM program could cost the American
cloud computing industry $22 to $35 billion over the next three
years.42 On the low end, the ITIF projection suggests that U.S. cloud
computing providers would lose 10 percent of the foreign market
share to European or Asian competitors, totaling in about $21.5
billion in losses; on the high-end, the $35 billion figure represents
about 20 percent of the companies foreign market share. Because
the cloud computing industry is undergoing rapid growth right nowa 2012
Gartner study predicted global spending on cloud computing would increase
by 100 percent from 2012 to 2016, compared to a 3 percent overall growth
rate in the tech industry as a whole43vendors in this sector are particularly
vulnerable to shifts in the market. Failing to recruit new customers or
losing a competitive advantage due to exploitation by rival
companies in other countries can quickly lead to a dwindling market
share. The ITIF study further notes that the percentage lost to foreign
competitors could go higher if foreign governments enact protectionist trade
barriers that effectively cut out U.S. providers, citing early calls from German
data protection authorities to suspend the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor program
(which will be discussed at length in the next section).44 As the R Street
Policy Study highlights, Ironically, the NSA turned the competitive edge U.S.
companies have in cloud computing into a liability, especially in Europe.45
In a follow up to the ITIF study, Forrester New Americas Open
Technology Institute 9 Research analyst James Staten argued that
the think tanks estimates were low, suggesting that the actual
figure could be as high as $180 billion over three years.46 Staten
highlighted two additional impacts not considered in the ITIF study. The first is
that U.S. customersnot just foreign companieswould also avoid US cloud
providers, especially for international and overseas business. The ITIF study
predicted that American companies would retain their domestic market
shar4e, but Staten argued that the economic blowback from the revelations
would be felt at home, too. You dont have to be a French company, for
example, to be worried about the US government snooping in the data about
your French clients, he wrote.47 Moreover, the analysis highlighted a second
and far more costly impact: that foreign cloud providers, too, would lose as
much as 20 percent of overseas and domestic business because of similar
spying programs conducted by other governments. Indeed, the NSA
disclosures have prompted a fundamental re-examination of the role of

intelligence services in conducting coordinated cross-border surveillance,

according to a November 2013 report by Privacy International on the Five
Eyes intelligence partnership between the United States, the United
Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.48 Staten predicts that as the
surveillance landscape around the world becomes more clear, it could have a
serious negative impact on all hosting and outsourcing services, resulting in a
25 percent decline in the overall IT services market, or about $180 billion in
losses.4

NSA surveillance weaken US sales abroad-revenues

and foreign relations declining
Kehl et al, Open Technology Institute Policy Analyst, 14
(Danielle, July, Open Technology Institute, Surveillance Costs: The NSAs
Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/534-surveillance-costs-the-nsasimpact-on-the-economy-internet-freedomcybersecurity/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf, page #12-13, 06/25/15, MM)
There is already significant evidence linking NSA surveillance to direct harm
to U.S. economic interests. In November 2013, Cisco became one of the
first companies to publicly discuss the impact of the NSA on its
business, reporting that orders from China fell 18 percent and that
its worldwide revenue would decline 8 to 10 percent in the fourth
quarter, in part because of continued sales weakness in China.60
New orders in the developing world fell 12 percent in the third
quarter, with the Brazilian market dropping roughly 25 percent of its
Cisco sales.61 Although John Chambers, Ciscos CEO, was hesitant to
blame all losses on the NSA, he acknowledged that it was likely a factor
in declining Chinese sales62 and later admitted that he had never
seen as fast a decline in an emerging market as the drop in China in
late 2013.63 These numbers were also released before documents in May
2014 revealed that the NSAs Tailored Access Operations unit had intercepted
network gearincluding Cisco routersbeing shipped to target organizations
in order to covertly install implant firmware on them before they were
delivered.64 In response, Chambers wrote in a letter to the Obama
Administration that if these allegations are true, these actions will
undermine confidence in our industry and in the ability of technology
companies to deliver products globally.65 Much like Cisco, Qualcomm,
IBM, Microsoft, and Hewlett-Packard all reported in late 2013 that
sales were down in China as a result of the NSA revelations.66
Sanford C. Bernstein analyst Toni Sacconaghi has predicted that after the NSA
revelations, US technology companies face the most revenue risk in China
by a wide margin, followed by Brazil and other emerging markets.67
Industry observers have also questioned whether companies like Apple
which hopes to bring in significant revenue from iPhone sales in Chinawill
feel the impact overseas.68 Even AT&T reportedly faced intense scrutiny
regarding its proposed acquisition of Vodafone, a European wireless carrier,
after journalists revealed the extent of AT&Ts collaboration with the NSA.69
American companies are also losing out on business opportunities and
contracts with large companies and foreign governments as a result of NSA
spying. According to an article in The New York Times, American businesses

are being left off some requests for proposals from foreign customers that
previously would have included them.70 This refers to German companies,
for example, that are increasingly uncomfortable giving their business to
American firms. Meanwhile, the German government plans to change
its procurement rules to prevent American companies that cooperate
with the NSA or other intelligence organizations from being awarded
federal IT contracts.71 The government has already announced it
intends to end its contract with Verizon, which provides Internet
service to a number of government departments.72 There are
indications that Verizon is legally required to provide certain things
to the NSA, and thats one of the reasons the cooperation with
Verizon wont continue, a spokesman for the German Interior Ministry
told the Associated Press in June.73 Major commercial actors on both
continents are preparing offensive and defensive strategies to battle in the
market for a competitive advantage drawn from Snowdens revelations.
-Georg Mascolo and Ben Scott, Lessons from the Summer of Snowden ,,
New Americas Open Technology Institute 11 The NSA disclosures have
similarly been blamed for Brazils December 2013 decision to award
a $4.5 billion contract to Saab over Boeing, an American company
that had previously been the frontrunner in a deal to replace Brazils
fleet of fighter jets.74 Welber Barral, a former Brazilian trade
secretary, suggested to Bloomberg News that Boeing would have
won the contract a year earlier,75 while a source in the Brazilian
government told Reuters that the NSA problem ruined it for the
Americans.76 As we will discuss in greater depth in the next section,
Germany and Brazil are also considering data localization proposals that
could harm U.S. business interests and prevent American companies from
entering into new markets because of high compliance costs.

NSA coercion weakens US industry-forces companies

to shut down
Kehl et al, Open Technology Institute Policy Analyst, 14
(Danielle, July, Open Technology Institute, Surveillance Costs: The NSAs
Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/534-surveillance-costs-the-nsasimpact-on-the-economy-internet-freedomcybersecurity/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf, page #14-15, 06/25/15, MM)
Finally, faced with an impossible choice between maintaining user
trust and complying with government requests, a handful of
American companies that provide secure email services have had to
shut down their operations altogether. Lavabit, a secure email service
provider that experienced a 1,900 percent increase in account
registrations after the Snowden revelations, shuttered its business
after it became clear that user data could not be protected from
government surveillance. When the NSA could not read Lavibits
communications directly by breaking its encryption, the agency
obtained orders compelling the company to hand over information
related to its encryption keys, which would have given the NSA the
ability to decrypt the communications of all 400,000 of Lavabits
customers.96 Silent Circle, a secure communications provider that saw a

400 percent revenue increase following the Snowden revelations, followed

Lavabits lead and shut down its secure mail service, explaining that the
decision was made because we see the writing on the wall.97

US internet surveillance harms cloud computing

industry OR US internet surveillance threatens
internet freedoms- provides excuse for oppressive
regulations
Adomaitis, journalist, 13
(Nerijus, 11/7, Reuters, U.S. spying harms cloud computing, Internet
freedom: Wikipedia founder, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/07/netus-wikipedia-spying-idUSBRE9A613A20131107, June 26, 2015, GG)
The United States' alleged large-scale surveillance of global
communications networks will badly harm the U.S. cloud computing
industry, the founder of Wikipedia said on Thursday. Jimmy Wales, who
launched the online encyclopaedia service 12 year ago, said the U.S.
eavesdropping, revealed by leaks from former U.S. intelligence contractor
Edward Snowden, also poses a threat to Internet freedoms by giving
an excuse to oppressive regimes to introduce more censorship. "It's
going to have a big impact on the cloud computing industry as
people are afraid to put data in the U.S., but it's also devastating for the
kind of work I do," Wales told reporters after speaking at an IT event in
Norway. "If you are BMW, a car maker in Germany,... you probably are not
that comfortable putting your data into the U.S. any more," said the
former futures trader who is still a key player at Wikipedia, one of the most
popular websites in the world. Cloud computing is an umbrella term for
activities ranging from web-based email to business software that is
run remotely via the Internet instead of on-site. It is being adopted
by big companies and governments globally to cut costs and give
flexibility to their IT departments. Snowden's leaks revealing the reach and
methods of U.S. surveillance have prompted angry calls for explanations from
France to Brazil. Germany has been particularly annoyed by revelations that
the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) monitored Chancellor Angela Merkel.
"EMBARRASSING" Wales said the revelations made it more difficult to
convince oppressive regimes to respect basic freedoms and privacy
as Wikipedia seeks to limit censorship of its content. "They (spying
revelations) give the Chinese every excuse to be as bad as they have
been... It's really embarrassing," he said. "It's an enormous problem, an
enormous danger."

Spying revelations harm US cloud computing

industry- customers wary of data gathering
Arthur, journalist, 13
(Charles, 8/8, The Guardian, Fears over NSA surveillance revelations
endanger US cloud computing industry,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/08/nsa-revelations-fears-cloudcomputing, June 26, 2015, G)

American technology businesses fear they could lose between $21.5bn

and $35bn in cloud computing contracts worldwide over the next
three years, as part of the fallout from the NSA revelations. Some US
companies said they have already lost business, while UK rivals said that
UK and European businesses are increasingly wary of trusting their
data to American organisations, which might have to turn it over
secretly to the National Security Agency, its government surveillance
organisation. One British executive, Simon Wardley at the Leading Edge
Forum thinktank, celebrated the publication of the information about the
NSA's spying and its Prism data collection program: "Do I like Prism ... yes,
and god bless America and the NSA for handing this golden opportunity to
us," he wrote on his blog. "Do I think we should be prepared to go the whole
hog, ban US services and create a 100bn investment fund for small tech
startups in Europe to boost the market ... oh yes, without hesitation." A
survey by the US-based Cloud Security Alliance, quoted by the Information
Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) found that American companies
which offer file storage and computing in cloud systems so they can be
stored and accessed anywhere in the world are gloomy about the effects
of the Guardian's revelations of the extent of US government
snooping and data gathering through projects such as Prism and
Xkeyscore. Daniel Castro, author of the ITIF survey, said that it seemed
reasonable to suggest that US cloud businesses could lose between
10% and 20% of the overseas market to rivals.

Impact Trust Key to Economy

Public lost of trust in companies threaten the
economy- loss is around 180 billion dollars
Timm, The Guardian, 13 (Trevor 11-25-2013, "How NSA Mass
Surveillance is Hurting the US Economy," Electronic Frontier Foundation,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/how-nsa-mass-surveillance-hurting-useconomy)//GL
Meanwhile, Telenor, Norways largest telecom provider has
reportedly halted its plans to move its customers to a US-based
cloud provider. Brazil seems to be moving ahead to create its own
email service and require US companies locate an office there if they
wish to do business with Brazilian customers. Laws like this mean that
companies like Google could be barred from doing business in one of the worlds most significant
markets, according to Googles director for law enforcement and information security at Google, Richard
Selgado. Google has been warning of this as far back as July, when in FISA court documents it argued that
the continued secrecy surrounding government surveillance demands would harm its business. Many
commentators have been warning about the economic ramifications for months .

Princeton
technologist Ed Felten, who previously at the Federal Trade
Commission, best explained why the NSA revelations could end up
hurting US businesses: This is going to put US companies at a
competitive disadvantage, because people will believe that U.S.
companies lack the ability to protect their customersand people
will suspect that U.S. companies may feel compelled to lie to their
customers about security. The fallout may worsen. One study released
shortly after the first Edward Snowden leaks said the economy
would lose $22 to $35 billion in the next three years. Another study
by Forrester said the $35 billion estimate was too low and pegged
the real loss figure around $180 billion for the US tech industry by
2016.

Impact US Key Global Tech

US improves global tech innovation- one of the
leading global innovators
Du Preez, Tech Reporter, 14 (Derek, September 3rd, Diginomica, US
and UK climb global competitiveness list tech and innovation key,
http://diginomica.com/2014/09/03/us-uk-climb-global-competitiveness-listtech-innovation-key/, 06/25/15, MM)
Both the US and the UK have climbed the rankings of the World
Economic Forums (WEF) annual competitiveness report, where they
feature in the top ten and do well in the areas of technology
adoption and advancements in innovation. The report has been released annually
for the past thirty five years and has monitored the economic and competitive progress of 144 countries

The report
revealed today that the US has improved its competitiveness
position for the second year running, climbing two places to third.
across the world, shedding light on each of their strengths and weaknesses.

Whilst the UK rose one spot to take up ninth position in the global ranks. Switzerland and Singapore hold

The WEF defines competitiveness as

the set of institutions, policies and factors that determine the level
of productivity of a country. It divides these up into the 12 pillars of competitiveness,
the two top spots for the second year running.

which include: Institutions, Infrastructure, Macroeconomic Environment, Health and Primary Education,
Higher Education and Training, Goods Market Efficiency, Labour Market Efficiency, Financial Market
Development, Technological Readiness, Market Size, Business Sophistication, Innovation. Obviously many
of these pillars play into a lot of the themes and stories we write about on diginomica wether that be a
lack of skills in the market, access to finance for businesses, the economic environment, etc.

However, the WEF noted that whilst many of these areas are
important to establishing a competitive market, there is one pillar
that will continuously boost a countrys global economic ranking
that one pillar being innovation. The report states (excuse the lengthy quote): Although
substantial gains can be obtained by improving institutions, building infrastructure, reducing
macroeconomic instability, or improving human capital, all these factors eventually run into diminishing

In the long
run, standards of living can be largely enhanced by technological
innovation. Technological breakthroughs have been at the basis of
many of the productivity gains that our economies have historically
experienced. These range from the industrial revolution in the 18th
century and the invention of the steam engine and the generation of
electricity to the more recent digital revolution. The latter is not only
transforming the way things are being done, but also opening a
wider range of new possibilities in terms of products and services.
Innovation is particularly important for economies as they approach
the frontiers of knowledge, and the possibility of generating more
value by merely integrating and adapting exogenous technologies
tends to disappear. In other words, for economies such as the US
and UK, innovation and digital are key if they want to continue to be
global economic forces. Innovation is the only area (according to the
WEF), that doesnt eventually suffer from diminishing returns. On
the United States, WEF said that its economy is extremely
productive because its companies are highly sophisticated and
innovative and supported by an excellent university system that
collaborates well with the business sector in R&D. It also has flexible labour
returns. The same is true for the efficiency of the labor, financial, and goods markets.

markets and benefits from the size of its domestic market. However, the US isnt without its weaknesses
and some of the things holding it back from further growth include cynicism amongst the business
community, where there is poor trust in politicians and a general view that the government spends its
resources wastefully. Heres some more detail about some of the key pillars for the United States. The first
figure to the right of the category is rated out of 7 (unless stated otherwise), with 7 being the best. The

It is
evident from the results that the US is a technology and innovation
behemoth, scoring well across most categories including the
availability of latest technologies, firm-level tech absorption,
capacity for innovation, availability of engineers and R&D.
second figure is the countrys global ranking for that specific category, out of 144 countrie

US Key to Global Innovation-produces high quality

innovation
World Intellectual Property Organization 14 (July 8th, World
Intellectual Property Organization, Global Innovation Index 2014:
Switzerland, UK and Sweden Lead Rankings with Encouraging Signs from SubSaharan Africa,
http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2014/article_0010.html, 06/25/15,
MM)
The quality of innovation is assessed as well. In terms of innovation
quality as measured by university performance, the reach of
scholarly articles and the international dimension of patent
applications - the United States of America (USA) holds the top place
within the high-income group, followed by Japan, Germany and
Switzerland. Top-scoring middle-income economies are narrowing the gap
on innovation quality with China in the lead, followed by Brazil and India.
Soumitra Dutta Anne and Elmer Lindseth Dean, Samuel Curtis Johnson
Graduate School of Management, Cornell University and co-author of the
report points out that "When reviewing the GII quality indicators, top
performing middle-income economies are closing the gap with high-income
economies. China significantly outperforms the average score of high-income
economies across the combined quality indicators. To close the gap even
further, middle-income economies must continue to invest in
strengthening their innovation ecosystems closely monitor the
quality of their innovation indicators." The GII 2014 confirms the
persistence of global innovation divides. Among the top 10 and top 25,
rankings have changed but the list of economies remains unaltered. A
difficult-to-bridge divide exists where less-innovative economies
have difficulty keeping up with the rate of progress of higherranking economies, even when making notable gains themselves.
This can be partially explained by their difficulties to grow and retain
the human resources necessary for sustained innovation, which is
the focus of this years report.

Impact Cloud Computing Companies

Cloud computing key to innovation- frees up
resources
Microsoft, 10
(November, Microsoft, The Economics of the Cloud,
https://news.microsoft.com/download/archived/presskits/cloud/docs/theeconomics-of-the-cloud.pdf, June 26, 2015, GG)
The economics we described in section 2 will have a profound impact on
IT. Many IT leaders today are faced with the problem that 80% of the budget
is spent on keeping the lights on, maintaining existing services and
infrastructure. This leaves few resources available for innovation or
addressing the never-ending queue of new business and user requests.
Cloud computing will free up significant resources that can be
redirected to innovation. Demand for general purpose technologies like IT
has historically proven to be very price elastic (Fig. 18). Thus, many IT
projects that previously were cost prohibitive will now become
viable thanks to cloud economics. However, lower TCO is only one of the
key drivers that will lead to a renewed level of innovation within IT: thin IT: 1.
Elasticity is a game-changer because, as described before, renting 1
machine for 1,000 hours will be nearly equivalent to renting 1,000 machines
for 1 hour in the cloud. This will enable users and organizations to
rapidly accomplish complex tasks that were previously prohibited by
cost or time constraints. Being able to both scale up and scale down
resource intensity nearly instantly enables a new class of
experimentation and entrepreneurship. 2. Elimination of capital
expenditure will significantly lower the risk premium of projects, allowing for
more experimentation. This both lowers the costs of starting an operation and
lowers the cost of failure or exit if an application no longer needs certain
resources, they can be decommissioned with no further expense or write-off.
3. Self-service Provisioning servers through a simple web portal rather than
through a complex IT procurement and approval chain can lower friction in
the consumption model, enabling rapid provisioning and integration of new
services. Such a system also allows projects to be completed in less
time with less risk and lower administrative overhead than
previously. 4. Reduction of complexity. Complexity has been a long standing
inhibitor of IT innovation. From an end-user perspective SaaS is setting a new
bar for user friendly software. From a developer perspective Platform as a
Service (PaaS) greatly simplifies the process of writing new applications, in
the same way as cars greatly reduced the complexity of transportation by
eliminating, for example, the need to care for a horse. These factors will
significantly increase the value add delivered by IT. Elasticity enables
applications like yield management, complex event processing, logistics
optimization, and Monte Carlo simulation, as these workloads exhibit nearly
infinite demand for IT resources. The result will be massively improved
experience, including scenarios like real-time business intelligence analytics
and HPC for the masses.

Cloud computing becoming increasing key to economy

Microsoft, 10
(November, Microsoft, The Economics of the Cloud,
https://news.microsoft.com/download/archived/presskits/cloud/docs/theeconomics-of-the-cloud.pdf, June 26, 2015, GG)
As we pointed out in the introduction of this paper, it is dangerous to make
decisions during the early stages of a disruption without a clear vision of the
end state. IT leaders need to design their architecture with a long
term vision in mind. We therefore need to consider how the long term
forces will impact the position of the bubbles on Fig. 23. We expect two
important shifts to take place. First, the economic benefit of public cloud
will grow over time. As more and more work is done on public
clouds, the economies of scale we described in Section 2 will kick in,
and the cost premium on private clouds will increase over time.
Customers will increasingly be able to tap into the supply-side, demand-side
and multi-tenancy savings as discussed previously. As shown in Fig. 27 this
leads to an upward shift along the vertical axis. At the same time, some of
the barriers to cloud adoption will begin to fall. Many technology case
studies show that, over time, concerns over issues like compatibility, security,
reliability, and privacy will be addressed. This will likely also happen for the
cloud, which would represent a shift to the left on Fig. 27. Below we will
explore some of the factors that cause this latter shift.

Cloud computing to continue growing economically

Etro, Professor of Economics at University of Venice, 09
(Federico, 5/1, The Economic Impact of Cloud Computing on Business
Creation, Employment and Output in Europe, http://www.intertic.org/Policy
%20Papers/CC.pdf, June 26, 2015, GG)
In front of these rapid evolution, it is crucial to understand the economic
impact of the introduction of this general purpose technology. For sure, the
diffusion of cloud computing is going to create a solid and pervasive
impact on the global economy. The first and most relevant benefit is
associated with a generalized reduction of the fixed costs of entry
and production, in terms of shifting fixed capital expenditure in ICT into
operative costs depending on the size of demand and production. This
contributes to reduce the barriers to entry especially for SMEs [small and
medium-sized enterprises], as infrastructure is owned by the provider, it does
not need to be purchased for one-time or infrequent intensive computing
tasks, and it generates quick scalability and growth. The consequences
on the endogenous structure of the markets with largest cost savings will
be wide, with entry of new SMEs, a reduction of the mark ups, and an
increase in average and total production. Another important benefit is
associated with the creation of multidimensional network effects due
to the new possibilities of product creation in the clouds, that is between
companies exploiting in different ways the potentialities of cloud computing
through the same platform or different ones. This is related to another new
possibility, the rapid adoption of changes: it is not uncommon, that

applications in the clouds are modified on a daily base (to accommodate new
requirements, or enable new economic venues), which is impossible with onpremise solutions. It is important to notice that the aggregate role of these
network effects can be relevant but it is extremely difficult to measure.
Finally, cloud computing is going to introduce the possibility of a)
sharing resources (and costs) among a large pool of users, b) allowing for
centralization of infrastructures in areas with lower costs, and c)
allowing for peak-load capacity increases (generating efficiency
improvements for systems that are often only 9 10-20% utilized). These
features will lead to additional savings in energy and to greater
environmental sustainability, whose measure, however, is again subject
to large uncertainty.11 A recent study of the International Data Corporation
(2008) has examined the role of IT cloud services across five major product
segments representing almost two-thirds of total enterprise IT spending
(excluding PCs): business applications (SaaS), infrastructure software,
application development & deployment software, servers and storage. Out of
the $ 383 billion that firms have spent in 2008 for these IT services only $
16.2 billion (4%) could be classified as cloud services. In 2012 the total
figure was expected to be at $ 494 billion and the cloud part at $ 42
billion, which would correspond to 9% of customer spending, but also to a
large part of the growth in IT spending. The majority of cloud spending is
and will remain allocated to business applications, with a relative
increase of investment in data storage. Even if the relative size of IT cloud
services may remain limited in the next few years, it is destined to
increase and to have a relevant macroeconomic impact, especially in
terms of creation of new SMEs and of employment. In times of global
crisis, this could be an important contribution to promote the recovery and to
foster growth. Cloud platforms and new data centres are creating a new level
of infrastructures that global developers can exploit, especially SMEs that are
so common in Europe. This will open new investment and business
opportunities currently blocked by the need of massive up-front
investments.

Impact Tech Sector Key

Economy increasingly reliant on internet economy
OECD, 2013
(September, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, The
Internet Economy on the Rise: Progress since the Seoul Declaration,
http://www.oecd.org/internet/internet-economy-on-the-rise.htm, June 24,
2015, GG)
Overall, the review shows that the Internet economy has become a
new source of growth, with the potential to boost the whole
economy, to foster innovation, competitiveness and user
participation, and to contribute effectively to the prosperity of
society as a whole. Between 1996 and 2005, with preparation and

follow-up to the 1998 Ottawa Ministerial Conference on electronic

commerce, OECD work on ICT policy primarily focused on creating the
framework conditions to ensure the development of the ICT sector, ecommerce and Internet infrastructure. From 2006, with the preparation
of the Seoul Ministerial on the Future of the Internet Economy held in
2008, much of the OECD work aimed to: build the evidence case that
the Internet was becoming a platform for productivity, innovation, as
well as for social and economic growth; and elaborate a policy
framework providing the necessary building blocks for the Internet
economy to continue to develop. 2008: The Seoul Ministerial: The
Seoul Ministerial marked a turning point with regard to Internet policy.
It considered the social, economic and technological trends shaping
the development of the Internet and envisioned its potential to
evolve from a useful platform to an essential infrastructure for all
economic and social actors, thereby for the basic functioning of the
economy and society (Internet economy). Seoul Ministerial on the
Future of the Internet Economy: The overall objectives of the Seoul
Ministerial were to provide an enabling policy environment for the Internet
economy by facilitating the convergence of digital networks, devices,

applications and services, by fostering creativity in the development,

use and application of the internet, and by strengthening confidence
and security. This meeting also served to raise awareness at the highest
levels of government that the Internet has become a core economic
and social infrastructure. This attention ultimately led to discussions
about areas where governments can play a facilitating role via policy
making. Following Seoul, the OECD deepened its work in the main
policy areas identified during the meeting. These include important
areas such as broadband deployment, security and privacy, consumer
protection, and digital content.2011: High Level Meeting on the
Internet Economy: Generating Innovation and Growth: Economic
difficulties persisted through 2011 for most OECD countries and the
Internet was increasingly viewed as an economic engine that could

be leveraged to help countries return to growth. As with all economic

platforms, governments wanted to ensure that conditions supported

the maximum amount of social benefit and economic gain. With this in
mind, the OECD organised a high-level meeting in Paris in June 2011,
building upon the Seoul Ministerial and drawing together leaders from
all stakeholder communities. The meeting aimed to continue fostering
the development of the Internet economy and to reach a consensus on
adopting shared principles for an open Internet economy that would
support the Internets role as a platform for the entire economy. In
particular, the meeting served as a forum to exchange best practices
in the areas of supply, demand, measurement, and principles for an
open Internet. One of the highest-profile items emerging from the
meeting was the OECD Council Recommendation on Principles for
Internet Policy Making. This recommendation includes 14 key principles
including the promotion of the open, distributed and interconnected
nature of the Internet, and the need to encourage multi-stakeholder
co-operation in policy development processes.

Internet economy key to better global living

conditions
Nedeltchev, P.H.d., Distinguised I.D. technician, no date
(Plamen, Cisco, The Internet of Everything is the New Economy,
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/enterprise/cisco-oncisco/Cisco_IT_Trends_IoE_Is_the_New_Economy.html, June 24, 2015, GG)
All businesses, including healthcare, agricultural, industrial, and
manufacturing, are now digital businesses. Thats why this revolution

is based on the transformational role of digital technologies. Once

again, the technology innovation will change the world, similar to the
industrial revolution of the 18th century. But there is a difference:
Todays laws are IT laws (Moore and Metcalf), and the current market
disruptions are Internet-based (cloud, mobility, and applications). The
change is much bigger than technology alone. The new economy will
improve global living conditions. The new urban and big city

technologies that we are about to enable will help people save energy,
and drastically reduce urban traffic, public waste, and railway system
accidents. CEOs and government leaders will become the IT managers
of the future.
Although we may never solve world hunger, in this new economy,
some aspects of utopia could likely become reality . Imagine the
following scenarios: If resources were allocated based on peoples
needs, perhaps poverty and hunger could be significantly alleviated;
If we could track any device, virtual or physical, lost and stolen
property would no longer be commonplace; If we could eliminate
parking problems and reduce urban traffic by 20 to 30 percent, auto
accidents and road deaths could also decrease; If improvements were

made in waste reduction and management of street lighting,

emergency notifications, traffic lights, and environmental monitoring,
which saved South Korea $13 billion in 2013, other countries and cities
could achieve similar gains; If factories could decide how to better
produce goods on the assembly line, they could optimize energy and
save about 20 to 30 percent on their energy bill; If healthcare is
location-agnostic, perhaps accessibility to equitable healthcare for
everyone, regardless of socio-economic status, would improve; If
doctors and emergency responders could be alerted the moment that
a patient falls or is injured, the comeback rate among elderly people
who fall in their homes could improve; If people were made aware of
dangerous heart conditions, perhaps the rate of first-time heart
attack victims who dont survive could be lowered; If we could
monitor the daily routines of our loved ones when they are discharged
from the hospital, could we help them avoid feelings of alienation, or
maybe even help them with their daily routine and extend their lives?;
If built-in sensors were available for pill containers, could they reduce
the 55 percent of the worlds population who do not take medication
prescribed by their doctors, and thereby save or extend lives?; If
remote home healthcare was commonly offered, it might help
eliminate the estimated 70 percent of doctor visits that are
unnecessary and alleviate the baby boomer healthcare crisis; If every
part on an aircraft was monitored and could be quickly replaced at the
slightest sign of failure, fewer plane crashes might occur; If vineyard
operators could know precisely when their grapes are perfectly
ripened, wines would get even better (good news for California!); If
thousands of trashcans in college campuses and other busy places
could be made smart, waste-management officials could view online
the amount of garbage accumulating in each container. Meanwhile, the
following scenarios are already unfolding: In Essex, England, cows
are being connected to the Internet so that their movements from
place to place can be tracked and illness detected immediately ; In

Croatia, milking sensors collect and send data about cows milk
production. Farmers can track feed consumption of their animals and
quickly analyze the data; In October 2013, Starbucks unveiled plans to
double the number of its Internet-linked coffee brewers, which track
customer preferences. Starbucks also might hook up its refrigerators to
the web, so the machines can order new supplies when needed;
Monsanto, the giant agricultural company, is extending predictive data
analytics into the world of big agriculture, disrupting established
industries in a way that traditional computing never could. Monsanto
will acquire knowledge about the condition of each of the 20 million
crop lands in the United States: what is grown on each crop land
annually, the crop yields, and the water-holding capacity of the soil.
Each of Monsantos predictive simulations analyzes 5 trillion data
points. As technological, social, and economic advancements continue,

the new economy will present us with great innovative opportunities

and great new challenges. IoE is inevitable. It is happening. It is here.

Are we ready? Quoting a speaker at the World Internet of Things Forum

in Barcelona, If we dont wake up now, well sleep forever.

Internet economy key to global prosperity

White House, no date
(White House, Technology, https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/technology,
June 24, 2015, GG)
President Obama recognizes that technology is an essential
ingredient of economic growth and job creation. Ensuring America
has 21st century digital infrastructuresuch as high-speed broadband
Internet access, fourth-generation (4G) wireless networks, new health care
information technology and a modernized electrical gridis critical to our
long-term prosperity and competitiveness. The President is
committed to ensuring America has a thriving and growing Internet
economy. The Internet has become a global platform for
communication, commerce and individual expression, and now

promises to support breakthroughs in important national priorities such

as health care, education and energy. Additionally, the Internet and
information technology can be applied to make government more
effective, transparent and accessible to all Americans. Americans

deserve an Internet that is safe and secure, so they can shop, bank,
communicate, and learn online without fear their accounts will be
hacked or their identity stolen. President Obama has declared that
the cyber threat is one of the most serious economic and national
security challenges we face as a nation and that America's economic
prosperity in the 21st century will depend on cybersecurity. To help
the country meet this challenge and to ensure the Internet can
continue as an engine of growth and prosperity, the Administration is
implementing the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in
Cyberspace. The Administration also released the International
Strategy for Cyberspace to promote the free flow of information, the
security and privacy of data, and the integrity of the interconnected
networks, which are all essential to American and global economic
prosperity and security. High-speed internet infrastructure is key to a
21st century information economy. Through $7 billion in targeted
investments from the Recovery Act, the Administration has expanded
broadband access nationwide, improved high-speed connectivity in
rural areas and public computer centers, and increased Internet
capacity in schools, libraries, public safety offices, and other
community buildings. A 21st century electric system is essential to
America's ability to lead the world and create jobs in the cleanenergy economy of the future. As part of the Recovery Act, this

Administration invested $4.5 billion in electricity delivery and energy

reliability modernization, with total public-private investment

amounting to over $10 billion To ensure that all Americans benefit

from these smart grid investments, the Administration released a
policy framework and a series of new initiatives in June 2011 that will
empower consumers with tools to better manage their electricity and
cut costs, improve the reliability of the electric grid, and help utilities
recover from natural disasters faster. A first generation of innovative
consumer products and servicessuch as thermostats that can be
controlled from a smart phone, or websites that show how much
energy a house is usingare already helping Americans save money
on their electricity bills

Facebook alone contributes over 200 billion dollars to

the global economy
Jain, leads VeRa FinServ, a Financial Research firm, 15 (Aman, 1-21-2015,
"Facebook Inc (FB) And Its Impact On The Global Economy," ValueWalk,
http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/01/facebook-fb-impact-economy/)//GLee
Facebook Inc (NASDAQ:FB) is the worlds largest social network at
present, and it has a very significant impact on the global economy,
according to a Facebook-commissioned study. Facebook Inc (NASDAQ:FB)
supported 4.5 million jobs in 2014 around the world and has
contributed $227 billion to the global economy, claims the study's
researchers. The study conducted by Deloitte was released on
Tuesday, and it revealed that the social networking giant had a $100
billion impact on the U.S. economy and supported as many as 1
million jobs. After the U.S., the second biggest benefactor of
Facebook is the U.K., with 154,000 Facebook Inc (NASDAQ:FB)-supported
jobs and an economic impact of $11 billion. The study conducted by Deloitte and
its findings are not based on Facebook's 8,000 employees. Instead, it focused on how third parties benefit

Facebook Inc (NASDAQ:FB) is a social networking platform through

which third parties benefit from marketing activities, creating thirdparty apps and engaging in Web businesses. The social networking
giant is a good mode of reaching out to customers and also reduces
marketing barriers along with supporting entrepreneurship, claims
the study's authors. Three items were measured by the study,
according to Deloitte: direct impact, supply chain impact and
employee-spending impact. The research firm also studied the
"marketing effect" and its "ripple effects" to determine the
contribution of Facebook through its corporate pages, advertising
and referrals. There are several companies that "use Facebook Inc (NASDAQ:FB) or whose products
from it.

and services are used to access it," and the gross revenues of such companies are measured by direct
impact. Several business activities use or leverage Facebook and in turn lead to increases in demand,
which is described as supply chain impact. Finally, the employee spending impact takes into account the
money spent by employees at companies that work at "businesses that use Facebook and at their
suppliers."

Economic growth is induced by technological

innovation empirically and statistically proven to do
so.
Mandel, is a economist, economics journalist and holds a Ph.D in economics
from Harvard, 04, (Michael, 5/27/2004, Bloomberg Business, Innovation =
Economic Growth, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2004-0527/innovation-equals-economic-growth,
accessed 6/24/2015, JAK)
I'm going to talk this morning where we've been, where we're going, and
what the obstacles are. Here's the place where we want to start: Economic
growth is driven by new technologies and its applications, always
and in all places. So that we know that periods of rapid innovation
are also periods of strong growth, we have new jobs and new
industries. Historically, half of productivity growth comes from new
technology. It doesn't have very much to do with budget deficits. It doesn't
have very much to do with tax rates. It doesn't have very much to do with a
lot of the things that you hear the presidential candidates arguing about. At
the end of the day, if you want real growth, you have to have new
technologies and you have to have the will to use them. This is a
very important point. It really helps you think about what's
happening in the economy now and the link between the economy
and technology. When you have slow growth in technology, when
you have a lack of innovation, then you have slow growth in the
economy. So that you go back to the 1970s, the microprocessor was
invented in the early part of the 1970s; the first one was 1971, I think. But it
really wasn't economically significant. Part of the reason why the 1970s
was such a weak decade economically was because we had a
technological drought and there was actually a lot that was written
about that at that point. Then, of course, we have the 1990s, when
we had the internet, very exciting. Comes in, drives the stock market
up, drives wages up, drives the job market, drives profits, does all
sorts of terrific things. It's not a coincidence that you have a new
technology in an era of an economic boom.

Technological innovation is the driving force behind

the economy innovation correlates with success.
Gallagher, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and
Technology and NIST Director, 2012, (Patrick, 6/20/2012, Innovation
as a Key Driver of Economic Growth & Competitiveness,
http://www.nist.gov/director/speeches/innovation-summit.cfm, accessed
6/24/2015, JAK)
I think one of the reasons that we're talking about innovation is that it is now
sexy. This is something that everyone is excited about. But I want to back up
a little bit and from a very government-centric viewpoint, talk about why
we're talking about innovation. And I'm going to be more specificwe're
talking about technological innovation. The reason we're focused
on it, the reason the President, for me, did this rather startling thing

of putting it at the centerpiece of our economic agenda, is because

the truth of the matter is it has been the key driver to our economy.
Well over half of the economic growth in this country since the end
of World War II has been directly attributable to technological
innovation. It accounts for most of the positive difference in per capita
income. It drives almost all of the growth in economic output and
productivity. And it's really the key to competitiveness for almost every
company that's there. If you look at how innovative companies are, you
can directly correlate that with how competitive and successful they
are. So in the midst of one of the deepest recessions this country
has had since the Great Depression, the reason we're talking about
innovation is because it matters. It drives our economy. The other
problems, or a thought about innovation, is that we tend to talk about
innovation in the context of its moving parts. We talk about research and
development, the generation of new ideas, science, obviously a critical part.
We talk about the role of the creative engines of innovation, the
entrepreneurial community, the risk takers, the ones who have that vision
and took a chance to make it happen. Increasingly, we're talking about
manufacturing, the producers, the ones who take those ideas to scale and
generate the products and services in our economy. It's actually an
interesting development, as an aside, that the focus on manufacturing, from
my perspective, was an inevitable consequence I didn't foresee it coming
but it was an inevitable consequence of raising innovation as a centerpiece.
And one of the reasons for that is that's where a lot of the innovation takes
place.

The IT sector is key to economic growth history and

other countries proves
Economy Watch 6/29/10 (The core Content Team our economy,
industry, investing and personal finance reference articles.)
Information technology, and the hardware and software associated
with the IT industry, are an integral part of nearly every major global
industry. The information technology (IT) industry has become of the
most robust industries in the world. IT, more than any other industry
or economic facet, has an increased productivity, particularly in the
developed world, and therefore is a key driver of global economic
growth. Economies of scale and insatiable demand from both

consumers and enterprises characterize this rapidly growing sector.

The Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) explains
'information technology' as encompassing all possible aspects of
information systems based on computers. Both software development
and the hardware involved in the IT industry include everything from
computer systems, to the design, implementation, study and
development of IT and management systems. Owing to its easy
accessibility and the wide range of IT products available, the
demand for IT services has increased substantially over the years.

The IT sector has emerged as a major global source of both growth

and employment. Features of the IT Industry at a Glance. Economies
of scale for the information technology industry are high. The

marginal cost of each unit of additional software or hardware is

insignificant compared to the value addition that results from it. Unlike
other common industries, the IT industry is knowledge-based. Efficient
utilization of skilled labor forces in the IT sector can help an
economy achieve a rapid pace of economic growth. The IT industry
helps many other sectors in the growth process of the economy
including the services and manufacturing sectors. The role of the IT
Industry The IT industry can serve as a medium of e-governance, as
it assures easy accessibility to information. The use of information
technology in the service sector improves operational efficiency and
adds to transparency. It also serves as a medium of skill formation.

The Tech industry is net beneficial-boosts education

and creates a healthy political and economic
environment
Zhou, school of reliability and systems engineering, Zhang,
school of reliability and systems engineering, Chang, school
of reliability and systems engineering, Zhao, school of
economics and management, 12
(Sheng Han, Jia Ning, Wen Bing, Jun, the Fundamental Research Funds for the
Central Universities and the Technical Research Foundation, Research on
Influence of High-tech Manufacturing on Higher Education,
http://www.google.com/url?
sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCAQFjAA&url=http%3A
%2F%2Fwww.atlantis-press.com%2Fphp%2Fdownload_paper.php%3Fid
%3D21403&ei=06LVYjDK8OxogT13ImYAQ&usg=AFQjCNFyHWYsG3EtQAQLya7Blqai3QD_Ag&sig2
=7AI8CvOC1L1kFXgDBUCwdA&bvm=bv.96782255,d.cGU, 6-24-15, YA)
Through this research, we find some interesting conclusions. Firstly,
the development of high-tech manufacturing, not only can improve
the overall level of manufacturing industry to enhance national
economic strength, but also the higher education personnel training
mode and the output level of talents. So the best way to the better
higher education is to develop the high-tech manufacturing
vigorously and realize the rapid upgrading of manufacturing. Secondly, higher
education is to cultivate innovative talents of high level for hightech manufacturing. The development of higher education should
attach importance to the development trend of high-tech in
manufacturing talent training for high-tech manufacturing
development needs, because the process of output talents also is
the process of evaluation of higher education quality. Thirdly, on
one hand, provide a healthy political and economic environment for
the development of high-tech manufacturing and higher education,
establish a typical case of perfect joint between high-tech

manufacturing and higher education as an example for other

universities and high-tech
167 manufacturing; on the other hand, carry out the supervision
work of cooperation between high-tech manufacturing and higher
education. Both ensure high-tech manufacturing has talents
available that adapts to the development needs, and avoid the waste
of higher education resources. So we need to strengthen the
guidance and supervision of the national policy. Fourthly, we need to
encourage cooperative education between university and
enterprises in order to make the high-tech manufacturing qualified
and sufficient reserves of talents. And it is necessary to encourage
enterprises to take part in teaching and cooperation between
university and enterprises in order to make the higher education and
high-tech manufacturing develop closely. The participation of
enterprise in higher education not only can share the responsibility
with colleges; but also can strengthen the communication between
enterprises and university, which is beneficial to exchange ideas in
talent training and improve the quality of talent training.

The high tech industry is providing job opportunities

in a time of need-more than just technicians are hired
DiNapoli, New York State Comptroller, Bleiwas, deputy
comptroller, 14
(Thomas P., Kenneth B. 4/2014, State of New York comptroller, New York
Citys Growing High-Tech Industry, http://www.google.com/url?
sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=http%3A
%2F%2Fwww.osc.state.ny.us%2Fosdc%2Frpt22015.pdf&ei=fKqLVf6yIcrloAT0pJHgBg&usg=AFQjCNE36dWParuKyy6hAaJw2uy71MY7w&sig2=Sn2CgPap4MCO57DzPBjbDQ&bvm=bv.967
82255,d.cGU, 6-24-15, YA)
Technology is playing a growing role in personal and business
activities. While there is a broad range of firms that are engaged in
technology-related activities, at the heart of this trend are high-tech
companies. These companies, which range in size from small startups to large multinational firms, are creating new products and new
technologies, which in turn are being integrated into other
industries, such as media, retail and finance.
In New York City, these high-tech companies have been flourishing,
creating a source of well-paying jobs at a time when employment in
many other traditionally well-paying industries has not been growing
as quickly.
Like other industries, the high-tech industry employs workers in a
wide range of job titles, including nontech-related positions such as
accountants, administrative assistants, managers and sales
representatives. The growth of the high-tech industry offers
employment opportunities to workers with a broad range of skills,
not just those with technical backgrounds.

The high-tech industrys young, creative workforce is attracted to New

York City because of its culture, diversity, public transportation
system and the opportunities it offers to live and work in the same
community. World-class academic institutions and creative
industries also draw people to New York City, providing new ideas
and talent for the industry.
Another benefit of locating in New York City is access to many
sources of capital. The New York State Common Retirement Fund is
taking an active role, making profitable investments in New York
Citys technology industry that have helped companies expand and
create new jobs.

Tech innovation key to US economy- key reason for

global economic strength
Du Preez, Tech Reporter, 14 (Derek, September 3rd, Diginomica, US
and UK climb global competitiveness list tech and innovation key,
http://diginomica.com/2014/09/03/us-uk-climb-global-competitiveness-listtech-innovation-key/, 06/25/15, MM)
Both the US and the UK have climbed the rankings of the World
Economic Forums (WEF) annual competitiveness report, where they
feature in the top ten and do well in the areas of technology
adoption and advancements in innovation. The report has been released annually
for the past thirty five years and has monitored the economic and competitive progress of 144 countries

The report
revealed today that the US has improved its competitiveness
position for the second year running, climbing two places to third.
across the world, shedding light on each of their strengths and weaknesses.

Whilst the UK rose one spot to take up ninth position in the global ranks. Switzerland and Singapore hold

The WEF defines competitiveness as

the set of institutions, policies and factors that determine the level
of productivity of a country. It divides these up into the 12 pillars of competitiveness,
the two top spots for the second year running.

which include: Institutions, Infrastructure, Macroeconomic Environment, Health and Primary Education,
Higher Education and Training, Goods Market Efficiency, Labour Market Efficiency, Financial Market
Development, Technological Readiness, Market Size, Business Sophistication, Innovation. Obviously many
of these pillars play into a lot of the themes and stories we write about on diginomica wether that be a
lack of skills in the market, access to finance for businesses, the economic environment, etc.

However, the WEF noted that whilst many of these areas are
important to establishing a competitive market, there is one pillar
that will continuously boost a countrys global economic ranking
that one pillar being innovation. The report states (excuse the lengthy quote): Although
substantial gains can be obtained by improving institutions, building infrastructure, reducing
macroeconomic instability, or improving human capital, all these factors eventually run into diminishing

In the long
run, standards of living can be largely enhanced by technological
innovation. Technological breakthroughs have been at the basis of
many of the productivity gains that our economies have historically
experienced. These range from the industrial revolution in the 18th
century and the invention of the steam engine and the generation of
electricity to the more recent digital revolution. The latter is not only
transforming the way things are being done, but also opening a
wider range of new possibilities in terms of products and services.
Innovation is particularly important for economies as they approach
returns. The same is true for the efficiency of the labor, financial, and goods markets.

the frontiers of knowledge, and the possibility of generating more

value by merely integrating and adapting exogenous technologies
tends to disappear. In other words, for economies such as the US
and UK, innovation and digital are key if they want to continue to be
global economic forces. Innovation is the only area (according to the
WEF), that doesnt eventually suffer from diminishing returns. On
the United States, WEF said that its economy is extremely
productive because its companies are highly sophisticated and
innovative and supported by an excellent university system that
collaborates well with the business sector in R&D. It also has flexible labour
markets and benefits from the size of its domestic market. However, the US isnt without its weaknesses
and some of the things holding it back from further growth include cynicism amongst the business
community, where there is poor trust in politicians and a general view that the government spends its
resources wastefully. Heres some more detail about some of the key pillars for the United States. The first
figure to the right of the category is rated out of 7 (unless stated otherwise), with 7 being the best. The

It is
evident from the results that the US is a technology and innovation
behemoth, scoring well across most categories including the
availability of latest technologies, firm-level tech absorption,
capacity for innovation, availability of engineers and R&D.
second figure is the countrys global ranking for that specific category, out of 144 countrie

Studies show that innovation is crucial for economic

prosperity- creates jobs and creates long term
development
West, founding director of the Center for Technology Innovation at
Brookings, 11(Darrell M., 10-19-2011, "Technology and the Innovation
Economy," Brookings Institution,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/10/19-technologyinnovation-west)//GLee
Researchers have found a link between technology innovation and
national economic prosperity. For example, a study of 120 nations
between 1980 and 2006 undertaken by Christine Qiang estimated that each
10 percentage point increase in broadband penetration adds 1.3 percent to a
high income countrys gross domestic product and 1.21 percent for low to
middle-income nations.[i] In addition, Taylor Reynolds has analyzed the
role of communication infrastructure investment in economic
recoveries among OECD countries and found that nearly all view
technology development as crucial to their economic stimulus
packages.[ii] He demonstrates that there is a strong connection
between telecommunication investment and economic growth,
especially following recessions. These kinds of investments help
countries create jobs and lay the groundwork for long-term
economic development. As a result, many nations around the world are
investing in digital infrastructure as a way to jump-start economies weakened
by the recent financial collapse. The decline in stock market valuations, rise
in unemployment, and reduction in overall economic growth has highlighted
the need to target financial resources and develop national priorities. In
conditions of economic scarcity, countries no longer have the luxury
of being passive and reactive. Instead, they must be proactive and

forward-looking, and think clearly about how to create the basis for
sustainable economic recoveries. Not surprisingly, given its long-term
potential, a number of countries have identified information technology as a
crucial infrastructure need for national development. Broadband is viewed in
many places as a way to stimulate economic development, social
connections, and civic engagement. National leaders understand that crosscutting technology speeds innovation in areas such as health care, education,
communications, and social networking. When combined with
organizational changes, digital technology can generate powerful
new efficiencies and economies of scale.[iii]

Econ Impact War

Slow economic growth leads to war- rapid growth
reduces risk
Collier, Professor of Economics at Oxford, 06
(Paul, April, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for
Policy, University of Oxford Department of Economics, pg. 6,
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/pdfs/EconomicCausesofCivilConflictImplicationsforPolicy.pdf, GG)
Economic opportunities also matter. Conflict is concentrated in countries
with little education. The average country in our sample had only 45% of its
young males in secondary education. A country which has ten percentage
points more of its youths in schools- say 55% instead of 45% - cuts its risk of
conflict from 14% to around 10%. Conflict is more likely in countries with fast
population growth: each percentage point on the rate of population growth
raises the risk of conflict by around 2.5 percentage points. Conflict is also
more likely in countries in economic decline. Each percentage point
off the growth rate of per capita income raises the risk of conflict by
around one percentage point. Conceivably, the apparently adverse
effect of slow growth might be spurious, due to reverse causation. If there is
a high risk of civil war, investment might decline and hence growth would
slow: the slow growth would appear to cause subsequent conflict but
actually causality would be the other way around. This problem has recently
addressed in a valuable contribution by Miguel et al. (2004). They manage to
isolate variations in the growth rate that are completely unrelated to the risk
of civil war. They isolate these growth shocks by studying the impact of
rainfall shocks on growth using long time series on rainfall, country-bycountry across Africa. Essentially, in a year when rainfall is above its normal
level for that country, growth is also atypically high, and conversely when
rainfall is below normal. They show that the growth shocks predicted from
rainfall shocks powerfully affect the risk of civil war. By design, these growth
shocks are uncontaminated by the risk of war and so the direction of
causality is unambiguous. So, rapid growth really does reduce the risk
of civil war.

Econ Impact Global Economy

The US is key to the global economy- price stability
and stock markets
Wiedemer, Economist and Author, 11 (Robert, June 29th, Newsmax
Finance, If US Loses Economic Stability, so Will the World,
http://www.newsmax.com/Finance/RobertWiedemer/robert-wiedemer-useconomic/2011/06/29/id/401881/, 06/25/14, MM)
Although the U.S. may be less important as a driver of world economic
growth than it was 20 years ago--China has obviously grown substantially and
Europe has grown as wellit is absolutely the fundamental driver of
world economic stability. An example of that came last week when
the Fed quietly extended its lending program to European, Canadian
and Japanese central banks. Under this program, central banks can
get loans in dollars from the Fed to give to their nations commercial
banks. At the peak of the financial crisis, the Fed lent out more than
$600 billion to other governments central banks under this
program. The reason the Fed extended its lending program is to help
commercial banks around the world to weather any storm created by Greece
not passing its austerity program this week and thus triggering a default on
its massive debts. The Fed is concerned, as are many investors, that such a
default would trigger waves of financial problems around the world. The
power to lend such vast amounts of money to other central banks is
part of the reason we are the driver of world economic stability.
However, the other reason is that our government debt is so massive
and so widely held that it is terribly important to the world economy.
Our stock market is also a bellwether and leader of other stock
markets. When our market crashes, so do the worlds stock markets.
Look at the price charts for the worlds stock markets and see how similar
they are to the US in 2008 and 2009. Finally, our leadership in financial
stability is not only due to our size, but our track record. The US has been a
pinnacle of financial responsibility for most of its history. But dont mistake
this power to borrow and print money for real stability. In fact, it is the
foundation for real instability. The surest way to lose such power is
to abuse it time and again. Recently, we have relied far too much
and far too often on our governments enormous power to borrow
money and to print money to provide economic growth and stability.
We are abusing this power and when we lose it, we and the rest of the world
will suffer mightily.

Solvency Transparency Key

Greater transparency could reinforce consumer
confidenceimproves the perception of tech
companies
Burlij 13 (Terence, deputy politics editor for PBS, 6-12, Tech Giants Take
Government Spying Feud to the Public,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/technology-giants-engage-in-spyingdebate/)
Technology companies can be a powerful force in Washington. As domestic
spying remains in the headlines, Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Yahoo
and Twitter are urging the government to lift the veil of secrecy from
its surveillance programs. The tech giants want to convince anxious
consumers that theyre concerned about their users privacy. Craig
Timberg and Cecilia Kang write on the Washington Post front page
that the tech giants have struggled to stanch the damage to their
reputations. The requests for transparency came in waves Tuesday,
as Google went public with a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder
asking for the ability to detail the numbers and scope of the national
security data the courts mandate they hand over. Yahoo issued a
statement saying it recognizes the importance of privacy and
security but also believes that transparency ... will help build
public trust. Politicos Alex Byers & Michelle Quinn write that the
calls for transparency help save face, but also kicks things up a
notch in the public relations game, where consumer confidence will
be crucial for Internet companies going forward. From their story:
The Valley is absolutely absorbed by this story, said Paul Saffo, a longtime
Silicon Valley technology forecaster. Its the perfect confluence of tech
geeks, privacy hawks and Libertarians. The discussion is to put it bluntly, Is
Google evil? The consensus so far is that no they arent, and Google and
Facebook and the others will not get swept up in this. Politico also
reported that Mozilla and civil liberties groups launched
StopWatching.us, which they describe as a campaign to call on
citizens to demand a full accounting of the extent to which our
online data, communications and interactions are monitored.'

Solvency Ending Bullrun Key

Ending NSA surveillance boosts tech sector- increases
trust in US tech again
The United State Senate Committee on Finance 14 (October
8th, The United State Senate Committee on Finance, Wyden, Top Tech
Executives: End Mass Surveillance to Boost Digital Economy,
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=2e57f5e4fe29-4ca3-9342-f567d19e7a05, 06/24/15, MM)
Senate Finance Committee Chairman Ron Wyden and executives
from Dropbox, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft today said
immediately ending dragnet surveillance will provide an economic
booster shot to the U.S. tech sector and make America more
competitive in the global digital economy. The tech leaders said mass surveillance

has cost American tech companies profits, sales and exports to growing markets around the world. "When
the actions of a foreign government threaten red-white-and-blue jobs, Washington gets up at arms. But,
even today, almost no one in Washington is talking about how overly broad surveillance is hurting the US
economy, Wyden said. Let me be clear: It is time to end the digital dragnet, which harms American
liberty and the American economy without making the country safer. Google Executive Chairman Eric
Schmidt, Microsoft Executive Vice President and General Counsel Brad Smith, Facebook General Counsel
Colin Stretch, Dropbox General Counsel Ramsey Homsany, and John Lilly of the venture capital firm

These tech industry leaders agreed that

ending overreaching spying programs is a necessary first step to
restoring the values of Americas digital brand, and improving
consumer trust. Brad Smith, General Counsel and Executive Vice President, Microsoft: People
Greylock Partners spoke at the roundtable.

wont use technology they dont trust. Globally we need better ways to protect public safety, preserve our
fundamental freedoms, and promote privacy and trust. Todays roundtable is helping forward that
important global conversation. Colin Stretch, General Counsel, Facebook: " We

continue to
believe meaningful surveillance reform is critical to restoring
peoples faith in the Internet. The government has a vital role to
play in keeping the public safe, but we believe they can do this while
being more transparent about their actions. Thats why we'll
continue to work with leaders like Senator Wyden and his colleagues
in Congress to address all of the reforms necessary to restore
confidence in the internet. Ramsey Homsany, General Counsel, Dropbox: Users around the
world trust Dropbox to be a home for their most important information. Safeguarding that information is a
top priority for us and our business. Well keep working hard on our users behalf, but we also need
Congress to pass the USA Freedom Act so the law does its part to protect their information.

Removal of Backdoors enable more public trusthigher incentive to invest, increase in innovation
Voltz, writer of the National Journal, 15
[National Security, House Lawmakers to Reintroduce Bill to Limit NSA
'Backdoor' Spying, http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/house-lawmakers-toreintroduce-bill-to-end-nsa-backdoor-exploits-20141204, 6/25/15, CY]
Washington, D.C. U.S. Senator Ron Wyden, D-Ore., today introduced the
Secure Data Act to protect Americans privacy and data security. The bill
prohibits government mandates to build backdoors or security
vulnerabilities into U.S. software and electronics. U.S. government
officials have recently proposed to compel companies to build backdoors in

the security features of their products. These proposals threaten to

undermine the development and deployment of strong data security
technologies and the overwhelming economic and national security
interest in better data security. Strong encryption and sound
computer security is the best way to keep Americans data safe from
hackers and foreign threats. It is the best way to protect our
constitutional rights at a time when a persons whole life can often
be found on his or her smartphone. And strong computer security
can rebuild consumer trust that has been shaken by years of
misstatements by intelligence agencies about mass surveillance of
Americans, Wyden said. This bill sends a message to leaders of
those agencies to stop recklessly pushing for new ways to vacuum
up Americans private information, and instead put that effort into
rebuilding public trust. Government-driven technology mandates to
weaken data security for the purpose of aiding government investigations
would compromise national security, economic security and personal privacy:
Cyber vulnerabilities weaken cybersecurity. Once a backdoor is built in a
security system, the security of the system is inherently compromised. For
example, in 2005 it was revealed that an unknown entity had exploited a
lawful intercept capability built into Greek cellphone systems and had used
it to listen to users phone calls, including those of dozens of senior
government officials. Technology mandates thwart innovation.
Companies have less incentive to invest in the development and
deployment of strong new data security technologies if they are
required to compromise them from the outset. Mandating weak
security would further erode trust in American products and
services. Information technology companies are working to regain
the trust of consumers upset by revelations of government
intrusions into their personal communications. A mandate requiring
companies to facilitate additional government surveillance would
undermine those efforts. Senator Wydens legislation builds on a
bipartisan effort in the U.S. House of Representatives, which approved an
amendment by Reps. Thomas Massie, R-Ky., and Zoe Lofgren, D-Calif., to
prohibit electronic vulnerability mandates on a 293-123 vote in June 2014.

Stopping Bullrun prevents more damage to businessa solution to end loopholes

Kayyali, EFF writer, 15
(Nadia, 5/13/15, electronic frontier foundation, The time to shut the NSAs
backdoors is now not in two years,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/time-shut-nsas-backdoors-now-nottwo-years, 6/25/15, YA)
H.R. 2233 has goals similar to last years Massie-Lofgren amendment
to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY 2015, which
passed overwhelmingly with strong bipartisan support: 293 ayes,
123 nays, and 1 present. That legislation would have closed the socalled National Security Agency backdoorssecurity flaws
engineered into products and services to enable or facilitate
government access to, and warrantless searches of, the contents of

Americans communicationsby prohibiting NSA and the Central

Intelligence Agency from using appropriated funds to mandate or
request that companies build backdoors into products or services.
H.R. 2233 goes further, because the prohibition on mandating or
requesting backdoors would apply to any federal agency. This
change is especially important for U.S. companies, who have
suffered reputational harm overseas, and even lost business, in the
wake of revelations about the extent of NSA spying. H.R. 2233, like the
Massie-Lofgren amendment, does have an exception for backdoors mandated by the Communications

H.R. 2233 would

also address the backdoor search loophole by prohibiting any
officer or employee of the United States from searching through
communications collected under Section 702 for communications of
a particular U.S. person without a court order. This provision has exceptions for certain
limited circumstances. Whats new is that H.R. 2233unlike last years Massie-Lofgren
amendmentaims to prohibit backdoor searches for particular U.S.
persons of communications collected under authorities other than
Section 702including, according to Rep. Lofgren, Executive Order 12333.
While many people have never even heard of this presidential order, as the Washington Post pointed out
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, a law that weve long had concerns about.

in October, Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) has acknowledged that
Congress conducts little oversight of intelligence-gathering under the presidential authority of Executive
Order 12333 , which defines the basic powers and responsibilities of the intelligence agencies.

Back doors weaken cyber security ending bullrun

would solve
Ron Wyden Senator for Oregon www.wyden.senate.gov 10/4/14 (Ron
Wydens publicity/office page)
Washington, D.C. U.S. Senator Ron Wyden, D-Ore., today
introduced the Secure Data Act to protect Americans privacy and
data security. The bill prohibits government mandates to build
backdoors or security vulnerabilities into U.S. software and
electronics. U.S. government officials have recently proposed to
compel companies to build backdoors in the security features of
their products. These proposals threaten to undermine the
development and deployment of strong data security technologies
and the overwhelming economic and national security interest in
better data security. Strong encryption and sound computer
security is the best way to keep Americans data safe from hackers
and foreign threats. It is the best way to protect our constitutional rights at
a time when a persons whole life can often be found on his or her
smartphone. And strong computer security can rebuild consumer trust
that has been shaken by years of misstatements by intelligence
agencies about mass surveillance of Americans, Wyden said. This
bill sends a message to leaders of those agencies to stop recklessly
pushing for new ways to vacuum up Americans private information,
and instead put that effort into rebuilding public trust.
Government-driven technology mandates to weaken data security
for the purpose of aiding government investigations would
compromise national security, economic security and personal privacy:
Cyber vulnerabilities weaken cybersecurity. Once a backdoor is built

in a security system, the security of the system is inherently

compromised. For example, in 2005 it was revealed that an unknown entity
had exploited a lawful intercept capability built into Greek cellphone
systems and had used it to listen to users phone calls, including those of
dozens of senior government officials. Technology mandates thwart
innovation. Companies have less incentive to invest in the
development and deployment of strong new data security technologies
if they are required to compromise them from the outset. Mandating
weak security would further erode trust in American products and
services. Information technology companies are working to regain the
trust of consumers upset by revelations of government intrusions
into their personal communications. A mandate requiring companies
to facilitate additional government surveillance would undermine
those efforts. Senator Wydens legislation builds on a bipartisan
effort in the U.S. House of Representatives, which approved an amendment
by Reps. Thomas Massie, R-Ky., and Zoe Lofgren, D-Calif., to prohibit
electronic vulnerability mandates on a 293-123 vote in June 2014.

BULLRUN reform needed to preserve privacy,

cybersecurity, and strength of the economy
Kehl et al, Open Technology Institute Policy Analyst, 14
(Danielle, July, Open Technology Institute, Surveillance Costs: The NSAs
Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/534-surveillance-costs-the-nsasimpact-on-the-economy-internet-freedomcybersecurity/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf, page 35, 06/26/15, MM)
The U.S. government has already taken limited steps to mitigate this damage and begin the slow, difficult
process of rebuilding trust in the United States as a responsible steward of the Internet. However ,

the
reform efforts to date have been relatively narrow, focusing
primarily on the surveillance programs impact on the rights of U.S.
citizens, and failing to address other key concerns. In addition to the risk of

violating the privacy and civil liberties of Americans, the Presidents NSA Review Group highlights a
number of other areas where the NSA programs threaten our national interests. The potential effects of
surveillance in our relations with other nations are concerning, especially among our close allies and
others with whom we share values, interests, or both. Unnecessary or excessive surveillance can create
risks that outweigh any gain.322 The Review Group adds that surveillance and the acquisition of
information might have harmful effects on commerce, especially if it discourages people either citizens of

Given the
diverse array of concerns, we make the following recommendations
aimed at restoring trust in American companies and the credibility of
the U.S. government, as well as fostering a more open and secure
Internet for users worldwide: 1. Strengthen privacy protections for
both Americans and non-Americans, within the United States and
extraterritorially. 2. Provide for increased transparency around
government surveillance, both from the government and companies.
3. Recommit to the Internet Freedom agenda in a way that directly
addresses issues raised by NSA surveillance, including moving
toward international human rights-based standards on surveillance.
4. Begin the process of restoring trust in cryptography standards
through the National Institute of Standards and Technology. 5.
the United States or others from using certain communications providers.323

Ensure that the U.S. government does not undermine cybersecurity

by inserting surveillance backdoors into hardware or software
products. 6. Help to eliminate security vulnerabilities in software,
rather than stockpile them. 7. Develop clear policies about whether,
when, and under what legal standards it is permissible for the
government to secretly install malware on a computer or in a
network. 8. Separate the offensive and defensive functions of the
NSA in order to minimize conflicts of interest.

Adopting measures to prevent the NSA from

undermining encryption standards increases US
cybersecurity and business confidence
The Presidents Review Group on Intelligence and
Communications Technologies 13 (December 12th, Liberty and
Security in a Changing World,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-1212_rg_final_report.pdf, page #24-25, 06/24/15, MM)
Clarke et al 2013 (Richard A, December 12th, Liberty and Security in a
Changing World: Report and Recommendations of The Presidents Review
Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-1212_rg_final_report.pdf, page #24-25, 06/24/15, MM)
Substantial steps should be taken to protect prosperity, security, and openness in a networked world. A

The United
States Government should reaffirm the 2011 International Strategy
for Cyberspace. It should stress that Internet governance must not be limited to governments, but
free and open Internet is critical to both self-government and economic growth.

should include all appropriate stakeholders, including businesses, civil society, and technology specialists.

The US Government should take additional steps to promote

security, by (1) fully supporting and not undermining efforts to
create encryption standards; (2) making clear that it will not in any
way subvert, undermine, weaken, or make vulnerable generally
available commercial encryption; and (3) supporting efforts to
encourage the greater use of encryption technology for data in
transit, at rest, in the cloud, and in storage. Among other measures relevant to
the Internet, the US Government should also support international norms or agreements to increase
confidence in the security of online communications .

For big data and data-mining

programs directed at communications, the US Government should
develop Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessments to ensure
that such efforts are statistically reliable, cost effective, and
protective of privacy and civil liberties. 23 Protecting What We Do Collect We

recommend a series of steps to reduce the risks associated with insider threats. A governing principle is

Classified information should be shared only with those who

genuinely need to know. We recommend specific changes to improve
the efficacy of the personnel vetting system. The use of for-profit
corporations to conduct personnel investigations should be reduced
or terminated. Security clearance levels should be further differentiated. Departments and
plain:

agencies should institute a Work-Related Access approach to the dissemination of sensitive, classified
information. Employees with high-level security clearances should be subject to a Personnel Continuous
Monitoring Program. Ongoing security clearance vetting of individuals should use a risk management

approach and depend on the sensitivity and quantity of the programs and information to which individuals
are given access.

Amending NSAs encryption guidelines improves

trust- prevents undermining security
Clarke et al The Presidents Review Group on Intelligence and
Communications Technologies 13
(Richard A, December 12th, Liberty and Security in a Changing World:
Report and Recommendations of The Presidents Review Group on
Intelligence and Communications Technologies,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-1212_rg_final_report.pdf, page #24-25, 06/24/15, MM)
Nonetheless, it is important to take strong steps to enhance trust in this basic underpinning of information

trust in
encryption standards, and in the resulting software, must be
maintained. Although NSA has made clear that it has not and is not
now doing the activities listed below, the US Government should
make it clear that: NSA will not engineer vulnerabilities into the
encryption algorithms that guard global commerce; The United
States will not provide competitive advantage to US firms by the
provision to those corporations of industrial espionage; NSA will
not demand changes in any product by any vendor for the purpose
of undermining the security or integrity of the product, or to ease
NSAs clandestine collection of information by users of the product;
and NSA will not hold encrypted communication as a way to avoid
retention limits
technology. Recommendation 32 is designed to describe those steps. The central point is that

NOTE: Im a little unsure if the card directly above would work as a solvency card.

Bullrun program killing tech industry

Enderle, President/principal analyst of the Enderle Group,
6/12/15
(Rob, CIO, U.S. surveillance programs are killing the tech industry,
http://www.cio.com/article/2934887/privacy/u-s-surveillance-programs-arekilling-the-tech-industry.html, June 24, 2015, GG)
Thanks to massive government surveillance, specifically the NSA s
national and international spy programs, the U.S. tech industry is
likely to lose more than $35 billion from foreign customers by 2016 .

The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, ranked as the

most authoritative science and technology think tank in the U.S.
(second in the world behind Max Planck Institutes of Germany), has
just released its latest report on the impact of the existence and
disclosure of the broad NSA national and international spying
programs. It was initially reported that the revenue loss range would be
between $21.5 billion and $35 billion, mostly affecting U.S. cloud service
providers. However, they have gone back and researched the impact
and found it to be both far larger and far broader than originally
estimated. In fact, it appears the surveillance programs could cause a
number of U.S. technology firms to fail outright or to be forced into

bankruptcy as they reorganize for survival. The damage has also since
spread to domestic aerospace and telephony service providers. The
programs identified in the report are PRISM; the program authorized

by the FISA Amendments act, which allowed search without the need
for a warrant domestically and abroad, and Bullrun; the program

designed to compromise encryption technology worldwide. The 2014

survey indicates that 25 percent of companies in the UK and Canada
plan to pull data out of the U.S. Of those responding, 82 percent
indicated they now look at national laws as the major deciding factor
with regard to where they put their data.

--Cybersecurity--

UQ Cyberterror Risk High

Risk of Cyber Terror High Low Range, Speed,
Sophistication
Ashley, Air Force Network Integration Center, 14 - Bradley K.
Ashley is the Executive Director, Air Force Network Integration Center, Scott
Air Force Base, Ill. (Bradley Ashley, 3/x/2014, "The United States Is Vulnerable
to Cyberterrorism," SIGNAL Magazine, http://www.afcea.org/content/?
q=united-states-vulnerable-cyberterrorism)
Todays battlefields transcend national borders . Cyberspace adds an entirely new
dimension to military operations, and the ubiquitous dependence on information
technology in both the government and commercial sectors increases exponentially the opportunities for
adversaries as well as the potential ramification of attacks. To understand cyberterrorism fully, it is
necessary first to understand the cyberspace environment and its particular attributes. The various
components of the cyberterror anatomy reveal the answers to the basic questions about who, what, how,
where, why and when. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario where the global media is buzzing with
reports of U.S. military systems under relentless electronic assault from computers in the Middle East. An
unknown adversary controls military logistics, transportation and administration systems essential to
deploying troops to the Persian Gulf. Many of the largest U.S. commercial Web sites are flooded with
connection requests, paralyzing significant portions of the Internet. Deadly viruses begin to infect
computers around the world, including many military systems. More than 60 million computers are
affected, costing billions of dollars. Consider other scenarios. People around the globe join in electronic

Osama bin Laden calls

for a cyber Jihad on an Afghanistan-hosted Web site. Computers at U.S. infrastructure sites such
attacks simply by clicking on a Web site to begin flooding campaigns.

as dams are infiltrated, and more than a million liters of raw sewage are released into coastal waters.
Agents tied to al Qaida buy useful information to penetrate U.S. Defense Department computer networks.

Power grids in California are infiltrated and held captive for weeks.
The stock market closes early because of computer problems after a
record-setting one-week loss. Americans are alarmed at the
devastation, and the cost of these cyberattacks comes on the heels
of a major attack on U.S. soil. The competitive media help spread the
cyberterrorism panic throughout the world. Each of these situations
is 100-percent plausible because each one has occurred. Fortunately,
they took place at different times during the past several years.
However, they could occur in an orchestrated fashion in a short time
frame in the future. Cyberspace is a unique environment. It is
ageographic and borderless, and attacks can be asymmetric and
clandestine. Attacks have virtually unlimited range and speed. Massive
results can be achieved without massing forces. These attacks are fast, easy and relatively inexpensive.
Many regional conflicts have cyberspace dimensions where battles are fought by hackers on both sides
with their own rules of engagement. This occurred in Bosnia, Kosovo and several Middle Eastern countries.
Cyberspace security is an international challenge that is not constrained by national boundaries. The
diversity of information system adversaries ranges from individuals to nation-states. Enemies of the United
States are conducting information operations against the nation daily. Hackers are probing while wellorganized and well-financed foreign intelligence collection organizations are performing intelligence
preparation of the cyberbattlefield to gain unauthorized knowledge and access to Defense Department

Over time, the level of sophistication required to hack into an

information system has decreased dramatically. At the same time,
the quantity and availability of hacking tools have increased
substantially, and the quality has improved greatly. This creates an
environment where even teenagers can successfully infiltrate
Defense Department and other U.S. government systems , in turn
creating a dangerous target-rich and low-risk combination. Cyberattacks
systems.

are rising exponentially, and several factors contribute to this equation. The growth of the Internet raises

the number of both attackers and targets. Vulnerabilities of new software versions continue to grow.

The weapons of cyberwar are

available for download on the Internet. Unlike the weapons of
conventional warfare, the tools of this trade require no long-term
acquisition, training or fielding to mount an attack . As the typical PC has
Sophisticated hacking tools are easily accessible.

become more powerful and easier to use, so has the sophistication of the weapons that information
adversaries have at their disposal. An adversary with minimal technology, funding, training, staff and
defense infrastructure can employ these limited resources as weapons on short notice from anywhere in
the world. An intruder could take countless specific actions after gaining access to an information system;
however, these acts can be grouped into four general categories: modification, fabrication, interception

For years, the world has witnessed unauthorized

intrusions and Web hacks from a myriad of actors, including teenagers,
and interruption.

industrial espionage experts, hacker groups and nation-states. Newcomers to this area have infiltrated
very sensitive systems with relative ease. These people use many tactics, techniques and procedures,
such as polymorphic viruses or polymorphic code, worms, software vulnerability exploits, other viruses and
denial-of-service attacks. The challenge is that all critical infrastructures must be defended. The Presidents
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection divided U.S. infrastructures into five sectors: information
and communication, physical distribution, energy, banking and finance, and vital human services.

Although structures like the Hoover Dam are vulnerable to physical

attack, the increased reliance on computers and networks in the
utilities infrastructure means that homeland security agencies also
must be concerned about cyberterrorist attacks on the controls of
such facilities. In an asymmetric world, terrorists look for alternative methods to spread terror. The
cyberworld may prove to be the simplest and quickest alternative to traditional physical attacks. The
motives of cyberterrorists in this realm likely will be the same as those that incite physical attack. They
generally seek financial gain, disruption, decreased military capability, fear/panic, publicity and news
impact, decreased confidence in critical infrastructures/psychological operations, great physical damage
and even loss of life. The dilemma in the cyberworld is not only to detect attackers but also to understand
why they are attacking. Cyberattacks, whether stand-alone or coordinated, occur at the time and choosing
of the adversary. They are inherently stealthy and can be used at critical periods such as when U.S. forces
deploy, at a crucial point in a war or at high-profile events. They can be used as retaliation for trials or
sentencing. Terror attacks are often randomly timed and sporadically targeted to maximize the aspect of

It is likely that cyberattacks

will accompany physical attacks to enhance the impact and reduce
U.S. response capabilities. Combining physical attacks with
cyberattacks magnifies their impact and limits first responders and
other assistance. This type of attack will serve as a force multiplier
for terrorists. Today, al Qaida is Americas primary terrorist adversary. The organization already
surprise, and cyberattacks have the same characteristics.

operates within the cyberworld. The television network al Jazeera reported that Osama bin Ladens senior
aides transmitted the instructions for the attacks on September 11, 2001, to Mohammed Atta via encoded
e-mail. Al Qaida terrorists are using the Internet to research infrastructure information about U.S. water
and wastewater systems. Federal Bureau of Investigation bulletins say that U.S. law enforcement and
intelligence agencies have received indications that al Qaida members have sought information on
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems available on multiple SCADA-related Web sites.
SCADA systems allow utility and transportation companies to monitor and direct equipment at unmanned
facilities from a central location. The computers of bin Laden associates were found to include structural
engineering data and programs related to dams and other water retaining structures. Ramzi Yousef, the
first World Trade Center bomber,

stored detailed plans to destroy U.S. airliners

in encrypted files on his laptop computer. Terrorist groups also are using the Internet
to recruit like-minded people to their cause. Hacktivists is a term that has recently emerged to describe
those who carry out cyberprotests, e-mail floods, denials of service and hacks for a political cause. These
actions undertaken immediately following real-world events also are on the rise. Al Qaida has not been
known to use cyberattacks in the past. However, bin Laden has suggested that he has the expertise to use
the computer as a weapon. After the September 11 attacks, he was quoted in the newspaper Ausaf as
saying that hundreds of young men had pledged to him that they were ready to die and that hundreds of
Muslim scientists were with him who would use their knowledge in chemistry and biology as well as in
areas ranging from computers to electronics against the infidels. This statement implies that bin Laden is
threatening computer attacks against the United States. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is already
alert to the possibility of cyberwarfare by al Qaida and describes this group as becoming more adept at
using the Internet and computer technologies. Al Qaida is believed by some government officials to be
developing cyberterrorism plans. The Washington Post and CBS News have reported that al Qaida
prisoners have informed interrogators about their intent to use cyberattack tools. Captives have said al

Qaida is on the threshold of using the Internet as a direct instrument for bloodshed. Terrorists must go
beyond Web page defacements, simple hacks or pranks .

To gain publicity for their

cause, cyberterrorists must cause widespread damage, destruction,
or death. An example of how this could be accomplished already has occurred. In 1998, a 12-year-old

hacker broke into the SCADA computer systems that run Arizonas Roosevelt Dam. Federal authorities said
the hacker had complete control of the dams massive floodgates. This dam holds back as much as 489
trillion gallons of water above a flood plain inhabited by more than a million people. More than 3 million
SCADA devices are in use today. Members of Congress have expressed concern. There

is a 50
percent chance that the next time al Qaida terrorists strike the
United States, their attack will include a cyberattack , Rep. Lamar Smith (RTX) said. Al Qaida has the capabilities, has the intention, has a history of gathering reconnaissance and has
targeted the United States. This makes the organization a very serious cyberthreat. A June 2002 survey of
technology industry experts revealed that 74 percent thought it was nearly certain that there would be a
cyberattack against the United States within one year. Nearly 60 percent said they expect a major
cyberattack against the federal government within one year. A February 2002 CIA memorandum indicates
that al Qaida had far more interest in cyberterrorism than previously believed and had contemplated the
use of hackers for hire to speed the acquisition of capabilities. As a relatively new dimension of warfare,
the cyberenvironment must be thoroughly studied and analyzed. The events of September 11 caught the
United States by surprise. Unless appropriate steps are taken to protect the country against cyberattacks
now, it surely will suffer tragic cyberterrorist attacks that could include loss of life. Terrorists are pursuing
this capability. Major cyberterror attacks against the United States will occur. It is a matter of when, not if.

Cyber terrorism and attacks are one of the biggest

economic and security risks of 2015 lack of empirics
and previous data make gauging the impacts hard.
Bender, editorial intern at National Underwriter P&C, 2014
(Hannah, 11/12/2014, Cyber attacks, cyber terrorism rank among top
emerging risks of 2015,
http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2014/11/12/cyber-attacks-cyberterrorism-rank-among-top-emerg, accessed 6/26/2015, JAK)
According to the latest Guy Carpenter & Co. survey, cyber attacks and
cyber terrorism rank among the top emerging risks concerning the
reinsurance industry in the year ahead. The third annual survey polled
insurance and reinsurance executives at the 2014 Property Casualty Insurers
Assn. of America (PCI) Annual Meeting held this year in Scottsdale, Ariz. The
survey was designed to identify what reinsurance professionals believe are
the key drivers and threats to profitable growth in the industry. This years
survey examines which emerging risk respondents felt to be most
threatening to the industry in the coming year. Forty percent of the
survey participants ranked cyber attacks as the most threatening
emerging risk, while 31% and 29% cited terrorism and climate
change as the most threatening. In comparison, 82% of survey
respondents felt that space risk was the least threatening to the industry.
Cyber-attacks are one of the most serious economic and national
security challenges facing not only the insurance industry, but
governments and businesses around the world, said Andrew Marcell,
managing director and chief executive officer of U.S. operations at Guy
Carpenter. The challenge in facing emerging risks such as cyberattacks or terrorism, where there is less of a historical precedence
and data available, rests in modeling and quantifying the potential
impacts. Assessing and managing current and future risks will continue to be
critically important for the industry to realize its growth objectives.

I/L Backdoors
N.S.A. illegally gathers information- secretly builds
backdoors into computer systems
Markoff, Senior Writer for the New York Times, 13
(John, September 6, New York Times, N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of
Privacy on Web, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-muchinternet-encryption.html, June 23, 2015, GG)
The agency, according to the documents and interviews with industry
officials, deployed custom-built, superfast computers to break codes, and
began collaborating with technology companies in the United States
and abroad to build entry points into their products. The documents do
not identify which companies have participated. The N.S.A. hacked into target
computers to snare messages before they were encrypted. In some cases,
companies say they were coerced by the government into handing
over their master encryption keys or building in a back door. And the
agency used its influence as the worlds most experienced code maker to
covertly introduce weaknesses into the encryption standards followed
by hardware and software developers around the world. For the past decade,
N.S.A. has led an aggressive, multipronged effort to break widely
used Internet encryption technologies, said a 2010 memo describing a
briefing about N.S.A. accomplishments for employees of its British
counterpart, Government Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ.
Cryptanalytic capabilities are now coming online. Vast amounts of
encrypted Internet data which have up till now been discarded are now
exploitable. The agencys success in defeating many of the privacy
protections offered by encryption does not change the rules that
prohibit the deliberate targeting of Americans e-mails or phone
calls without a warrant. But it shows that the agency, which
was sharply rebuked by a federal judge in 2011 for violating the rules
and misleading the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, cannot
necessarily be restrained by privacy technology. N.S.A. rules permit the
agency to store any encrypted communication, domestic or foreign, for as
long as the agency is trying to decrypt it or analyze its technical features.

NSA activities make systems more vulnerable to

hackinginstallation of backdoors and secret
influences
Zetter 14 (Kim, award-winning cybercrime and security reporter, 7-29,
Personal Privacy Is Only One of the Costs of NSA Surveillance,
http://www.wired.com/2014/07/the-big-costs-of-nsa-surveillance-that-no-onestalking-about/)
Out of all the revelations to come to light in the past year, the most
shocking may well be the NSAs persistent campaign to undermine
encryption, install backdoors in hardware and software and amass a
stockpile of zero-day vulnerabilities and exploits. For the past

decade, N.S.A. has led an aggressive, multipronged effort to break

widely used Internet encryption technologies, according to a 2010
memo from Government Communications Headquarters, the NSAs
counterpart in the UK, leaked by Edward Snowden. Furthermore, a
story from Pro Publica noted, the NSA actively engages the US and
foreign IT industries to covertly influence and/or overtly leverage
their commercial products designs to make them more amenable
to the NSAs data collection programs and more susceptible to
exploitation by the spy agency. The NSA, with help from the CIA and FBI,
also has intercepted network routers from US manufacturers like
Cisco to install spy tools before theyre shipped to overseas buyers,
further undermining customer trust in US companies. Cisco senior vice
president Mark Chandler wrote in a company blog post that his and other
companies ought to be able to count on the government not interfering with
the lawful delivery of our products in the form in which we have
manufactured them. To do otherwise, and to violate legitimate privacy
rights of individuals and institutions around the world, undermines
confidence in our industry. All of these activities are at direct odds
with the Obama administrations stated goal of securing the internet
and critical infrastructure and undermine global trust in the internet
and the safety of communications. The actions are particularly
troubling because the insertion of backdoors and vulnerabilities in
systems doesnt just undermine them for exploitation by the NSA
but makes them more susceptible for exploitation by other
governments as well as by criminal hackers. The existence of these
programs, in addition to undermining confidence in the internet
industry, creates real security concerns, the authors of the report
note.

Bullrun makes the Internet unsafe creates

vulnerabilities to criminal hacking, foreign espionage,
unlawful surveillance, and terrorist groups.
Paganini, Cyber security expert, 13
(Pierluigi, 8/7/2013, Security Affairs, NSA Bullrun program, encryption and
false perception of security,
http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/17577/intelligence/nsa-bullrun-programfalse-perception-security.html, accessed 6.23.15, JAK)
The Intelligence Agency has inducted vendors and manufactures to
include backdoors in their products or to disclose related encryption
keys to allow the access data, this is the core of the Bullrun
program. Snowden revelations are causing the collapse of many certainties,
last in order of time is the integrity of encryption standards, according the
popular newspapers NSA has worked to undermine the security of those
standards. The repercussions are critical, the diffusion of the
defective encryption standard has exposed the same data accessed
by NSA to the concrete risk of stealing operated by third party
actors such as foreign state-sponsored hackers and cybercriminals.
The encryption technologies that the NSA has exploited to enable

its secret dragnet surveillance are the same technologies that

protect our most sensitive information, including medical records,
financial transactions, and commercial secrets, Even as the NSA
demands more powers to invade our privacy in the name of
cybersecurity, it is making the internet less secure and exposing us
to criminal hacking, foreign espionage, and unlawful surveillance.
The NSAs efforts to secretly defeat encryption are recklessly shortsighted
and will further erode not only the United States reputation as a global
champion of civil liberties and privacy but the economic competitiveness of
its largest companies.commented Christopher Soghoian, principal
technologist of the ACLUs Speech, Privacy and Technology Project.
Suddenly the IT world discovered that has perceived a false sense of security,
the repercussion on the global security market are enormous, customers
have put their trust in the wrong companies, too often they have been
deceived by false myths and new paradigms (e.g. Cloud computing) designed
to facilitate the surveillance operated by intelligence agencies. Bullrun
program is the last revelation on a nefarious policy conducted by
one of the major security agencies, ironically because of its
willingness to supervise each and every date of the largest Internet
has made it unsafe. Chasing the concept of security NSA has actually
opened loopholes in the global information systems that could have
benefited powers such as China or terrorist groups. The surveillance
programs such as Prism and Bullrun are certainly questionable, as well as the
conduct of major American companies that have gone along with his
demands.

Backdoors leave the US vulnerable to cyber attacks

same backdoors US uses to spy can be used against
us.
Walker, Staff writer for Newsweek covering mainly technology, foreign
affairs, and national security, 15,
(Lauren, 1/25/2015, Newsweek, Snowden on Cyberwar: America Is Its Own
Worst Enemy, http://www.newsweek.com/snowden-cyber-war-america-itsown-worst-enemy-301175, accessed 6/23/2015, JAK)
Part of the problem the U.S. faces when it comes to cybersecurity, Snowden
says, is that the U.S.and the NSA in particularhas focused too much
attention, money and resources on offensive capabilities. While the
U.S. Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force already have their own cyberforces,
the NSA alone has nearly 40,000 employees who are responsible for spying
and network attacks. Another problem: The U.S. wants to create
backdoors into communication services, such as smartphone
operating systems. The president says this is necessary for
counterterrorism surveillance purposes, but Snowden believes it
leaves the U.S. open to cyberattacks. Thats making us more
vulnerable not just to the snooping of our domestic agencies but
also foreign agencies, the former NSA contractor said. The reality is,
when you make those systems vulnerable so that you can spy on
other countries and you share the same standards that those
countries have for their systems, youre also making your own

country more vulnerable to the same attacks. The result, Snowden

predicted, is that when hackers begin to target the U.S. economy, the
country wont be prepared. The next time the lights go off in a hospital,
its going to be in America, not overseas, he warned. Shackelford agrees
that the threat is real. But he cautioned that offensive capabilities are still a
critical part of defense. There does have to be a balancing act that clearly
we havent been the best always at, he said. I think there is an element of
shooting ourselves in the foot here, but at the same time you cant discount
the benefits and security that we gain through this intelligence gathering.
In calling for new legislation, Obama has given renewed attention to
cybersecurity and how the government can reduce the severity of the threat.
Snowden may not agree with the White Houses plan, but he does seem to
agree with the president on one thing: When it comes to cybersecurity,
the U.S. has an awful lot at stake. As Snowden put it: We have more
to lose than any other nation on earth.

Domestic surveillance programs can aid terrorists

can be hacked and used to plot attacks.
Rood, was on Senator Tom Coburns Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee, 08
(Justin, 2/1/2008, ABC News,Domestic Spying Program Could Aid Terrorists,
Experts Say, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=4224513, accessed
6.23.2015, JAK)
Although the Bush administration calls it a vital weapon against
terrorism, its domestic wiretapping effort could become a
devastating tool for terrorists if hacked or penetrated from inside,
according to a new article by a group of America's top computer
security experts. The administration has said little about the program
except to defend it against charges it amounts to illegal spying on U.S.
citizens. When news of the program broke in 2006, then-White House
spokesman Scott McClellan called the program a "limited" effort "targeted at
al Qaeda communications coming into or going out of the United States." But
documents submitted in an ongoing court case indicate the program involves
data centers at major telecommunications hubs that siphon off and analyze
billions of bytes of Americans' emails, phone calls and other data. By
diverting the flow of so much domestic data into a few massive
pools, the administration may have "[built] for its opponents
something that would be too expensive for them to build for
themselves," say the authors: "a system that lets them see the
U.S.'s intelligence interests...[and] that might be turned" to exploit
conversations and information useful for plotting an attack on the
United States. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence referred a
request for comment on the article to the interagency National
Counterterrorism Center, which directed calls to the National Security
Agency, which reportedly runs the program. The NSA declined to comment
for this story.The White House referred calls to the NSA. The article, slated to
appear in an upcoming issue of the journal IEEE Security & Privacy, was
written by six experts from Sun Microsystems, Columbia University, Princeton

University, the University of Pennsylvania and California-based research giant

SRI International. The data centers for the classified program are
reportedly housed in "secure" rooms within telecommunications
hubs around the country, and connect to operations buried within
the NSA's highly classified facilities. But judging by past breaches,
the authors conclude this system could be compromised also from
within or outside. In 2004, hackers cracked a wiretapping function
on a Greek national cell phone network. For 10 months, they
intercepted conversations by the country's prime minister and its
ministers of defense, foreign affairs and justice, and roughly 100
other officials and parliament members, the authors note. The
hackers were never caught. "Although the NSA has extensive experience
in building surveillance systems, that does not mean things cannot go
wrong," the authors state. "When you build a system to spy on yourself,
you entail an awesome risk." Just as dangerous is the possibility
that an insider could access the system undetected, according to the
experts. Poorly-designed surveillance technology used by the FBI
relies on a "primitive" system to track people who use the operation
to wiretap phone conversations, the authors say, creating what they
call a "real risk" of an insider attack. They note that convicted spy
Robert Hanssen, one of the most destructive moles in the bureau's history,
exploited similar weaknesses to steal information and follow the investigation
into himself on FBI computers without leaving a trail. Last August, a federal
judge ruled the program was unconstitutional. The administration is
appealing the decision. The Senate is currently considering a White Housebacked effort to retroactively immunize telecommunications companies which
have participated in the program from civil suits, several of which have been
filed since the program came to light. The legislation, the authors say, would
allow the program to continue without ensuring proper oversight,
accountability and security, creating "a long-term risk

Bull run increases risk of business cyber attacksallows third party actor and cybercriminal invasion
Pierluigi ,Chief Information Security Officer, 2013,
[Security Affairs, NSA Bullrun program, encryption and false perception of
security, http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/17577/intelligence/nsa-bullrunprogram-false-perception-security.html, 6/23/15, CY]
Revelations on Bullrun program demonstrated that NSA has capabilities against widely-used online

The latest nightmare for US

Administration is named Bullrun, another US program for massive
surveillance. Snowdens revelations represented a heartquake for IT
security, the image of NSA and US IT companies are seriously
compromised such the trust of worldwide consumers. The extension
of US surveillance activities seems to have no limits neither
borderlines, every communication and data despite protected with sophisticated encryption
protocols such as HTTPS and encryption standards.

mechanisms were accessible by US Intelligence and its partners like Britains GCHQ. The New York Times
and The Guardian newspapers and the journalism non-profit ProPublica revealed details of the new super
secret program, codenamed Bullrun, sustained by the NSA to have the possibility to bypass encryption
adopted worldwide by corporates, governments and institutions. The Bullrun program is considered the
second choice of U.S. Government to the failure in place a backdoor, the so-called Clipper chip, into

encryption that would have allowed it to eavesdrop on communications. Be aware we are not speaking of

Snowden warned that NSA bypass encryption targeting

end point of communications: Properly implemented strong crypto systems are one of the
few things that you can rely on, Snowden said to the Guardian. Th e Intelligence Agency has
inducted vendors and manufactures to include backdoors in their
products or to disclose related encryption keys to allow the access
data, this is the core of the Bullrun program. Snowden revelations are causing the
cracking algorithms,

collapse of many certainties, last in order of time is the integrity of encryption standards, according the

Following an
image of classification guide to the NSAs Bullrun decryption
program The repercussions are critical, the diffusion of the defective
encryption standard has exposed the same data accessed by NSA to
the concrete risk of stealing operated by third party actors such as
foreign state-sponsored hackers and cybercriminals. The encryption
technologies that the NSA has exploited to enable its secret dragnet
surveillance are the same technologies that protect our most
sensitive information, including medical records, financial
transactions, and commercial secrets, Even as the NSA demands
more powers to invade our privacy in the name of cybersecurity , it is
making the internet less secure and exposing us to criminal hacking ,
foreign espionage, and unlawful surveillance. The NSAs efforts to
secretly defeat encryption are recklessly shortsighted and will
further erode not only the United States reputation as a global
champion of civil liberties and privacy but the economic
competitiveness of its largest companies.commented Christopher Soghoian,
popular newspapers NSA has worked to undermine the security of those standards.

principal technologist of the ACLUs Speech, Privacy and Technology Project. Suddenly the IT world
discovered that has perceived a false sense of security, the repercussion on the global security market are
enormous, customers have put their trust in the wrong companies, too often they have been deceived by
false myths and new paradigms (e.g. Cloud computing) designed to facilitate the surveillance operated by

Bullrun program is the last revelation on a nefarious

policy conducted by one of the major security agencies, ironically
because of its willingness to supervise each and every date of the
largest Internet has made it unsafe. Chasing the concept of security NSA has actually
intelligence agencies.

opened loopholes in the global information systems that could have benefited powers such as China or

The surveillance programs such as Prism and Bullrun are

certainly questionable, as well as the conduct of major American
companies that have gone along with his demands. NSA and other
agencies siphoned data from land and undersea cables, just after
the revelations on PRISM program intelligence has started a
misinformation campaign sustaining that US authorities was working
to find the way to crack encrypted traffic, in reality the agency has
no reason to do it and the Bullrun program is the proof. Misinformation as a
terrorist groups.

pure diversion to influence the global sentiment and keep the lights of the media far from the dirty
collusions of governments and private companies. None of methods used to access to encryption keys
involve in cracking the algorithms and the math underlying the encryption, but rely upon circumventing
and otherwise undermining encryption. The newspapers sustains that NSA maintains an internal

Using
the Key Provisioning Service the NSA is able to automatically decode
communications and access to encrypted data. Every time the
agency needs a key for a new product it formalizes a request to
obtain it, the request is so-called Key Recovery Service. Other news
reported that in one circumstance the US government learned that a
foreign intelligence had ordered new computer hardware and after
database, dubbed Key Provisioning Service, of encryption keys for each commercial product.

pressure of NS A the US vendor agreed to insert a backdoor into the

product before it was deployed. Keys are provided by vendors or
obtained by the intelligence with hacking campaign against
infrastructures of product providers. How keys are acquired is
shrouded in secrecy, but independent cryptographers say many are
probably collected by hacking into companies computer servers,
where they are stored, To keep such methods secret, the N.S.A. shares decrypted messages
with other agencies only if the keys could have been acquired through legal means. states NYT. The most
disturbing revelation involves the NSAs efforts to deliberately weaken international encryption standards
developers use to make their encryption secure, according to a classified NSA memo obtained by NYT the
fatal weakness discovered by two Microsoft cryptographers in 2007 in a 2006 standard was intentionally
engineered by the NSA. Basically, the NSA asks companies to subtly change their products in
undetectable ways: making the random number generator less random, leaking the key somehow, adding
a common exponent to a public-key exchange protocol, and so on,If the backdoor is discovered, its
explained away as a mistake. And as we now know, the NSA has enjoyed enormous success from this
program. said cryptographer Bruce Schneier. Some of the methods involved the deployment of custombuilt, supercomputers to break codes in addition to collaborating with technology companies at home and
abroad to include backdoors in their products. The Snowden documents dont identify the companies that
participated. The

Bullrun program, according to the documents, actively

engages the U.S. and foreign IT industries to covertly influence
and/or overtly leverage their commercial products designs to make
them exploitable. By this year, the Times reports, the program had found ways inside some

of the encryption chips that scramble information for businesses and governments, either by working with
chipmakers to insert back doors or by surreptitiously exploiting existing security flaws. We are therefore
assuming that the U.S. Government has deliberately prompted to enter bugs in software solutions sold
worldwide, the knowledge of those flaws could then have been sold in the black market of zero-day
vulnerabilities about which so much has been discussed. At that point, probably the same U.S. Intelligence
would offer big bucks to buy back the zero-day to cover traces of the shocking activities. Which are the
targets of the NSA? Everyone! The imperative is global monitoring, ISP, Internet phone call and text
services and mobile operators are privileged targets according the paper, and I add social media platforms.
Of course now every internet users desire to stay far from prying eyes, the use of anonymizing network
and secure messaging system is exploding, Tor metrics data revealed an incredible increase of total
number of Tor users. The unique certainties are that the surveillance program will continue and the
expense of monitoring activities will increase exponentially, there is another consideration to do related to
the global commerce for security solutions. The

global market will be seriously

impacted, fall of trust in US security vendors could advantage other
players, the equilibrium is jeopardized when trust is broken and
open source software will live a new peak of popularity waiting for
the next incident.

NSA surveillance causes backdoors for hackers and

foreign countries- creates security gaps and fake
internet flaw introductions
PotRock, Writer of the Berkely Political Review, 2014
[Berkeley Political Review, Suspicious Survellience,
http://bpr.berkeley.edu/2014/12/09/suspicious-surveillance/, 6/23/15, CY]
In June of last year, now-infamous National Security Agency contractor
Edward Snowden began leaking classified documents to the media. Since
then, the steady stream of revelatory documents has generated a firestorm
of criticism against NSA practices. The NSA, which is at the forefront of U.S.
cybersecurity and intelligence operations, is one of the first lines of defense
against both cyber and physical attacks. Unfortunately, the ever-increasing
demand for new intelligence has led the NSA to leave the U.S. potentially
vulnerable. Most often discussed are NSA efforts to tap into phone metadata

and various internet services (metadata is information such as the time an

email or phone call is made/sent, who makes/sends it, and who receives it; it
does not include content). Further documents have revealed that there is
little the NSA has not done in search of intelligence, including breaking into
U.S. companies, hacking foreign corporations, wiretapping allies, and
generally building an arsenal of techniques and backdoors used to attack
valuable targets. These actions raise important privacy, legal, and
constitutional concerns; the justifications for and practicality of such
programs are disputed, and the programs are often approved by secretive
FISA courts, whose decisions and practices have limited oversight and
effectiveness. More critical, however, is the immediate impact that NSA
actions have had on U.S. cybersecurity. The quest for intelligence has left the
United States vulnerable on multiple fronts. In order to gather its intelligence,
the NSA often makes use of unintentional flaws in code or poorly
implemented cryptography to break into target systems (e.g. systems
owned by telecommunications and Internet firms, foreign governments, and
persons of interest). Unfortunately, in order to continue exploiting the
backdoors (unauthorized routes of access into a system) that it finds, the NSA
does not disclose the existence of the flaw. The risk is that hackersor
other countries spy agenciescould also exploit such flaws. By
building a library of flaws, the NSA prevents the affected software
from being repaired. Some evidence suggests that the NSA may have
known about the Heartbleed OpenSSL bug, known as one of most
egregious security catastrophes in the history of the Internet, for
years before it was revealed by private security researchers (the
agency has vigorously denied this). Unfortunately, Heartbleed is just one of
many potential backdoors. Veteran tech analyst Steven Levy notes that It is
a well-known principle of cybersecurity that any flaw will eventually
be discovered and exploited. If in fact the NSA was not reporting known
security holes, then it risked exposing domestic information and secrets to
evildoers. It may even have allowed foreign governments to snatch
high-value corporate secrets. The continued existence of these flaws
makes U.S. consumers, corporations, government facilities, and critical
infrastructure inherently less secure. The NSA has argued that it makes a
judgement call in such situationsformer NSA chief Michael Hayden notes
that if no one but the NSA (no one but us or NOBUS) could exploit such a
flaw for technical reasons, there is no reason to report it rather than use it.
Unfortunately, the NSA seems to have rather lax standards in this regard. For
example, the NSA and other government agencies spend tens of millions of
dollars per year in grey markets to buy exploits found by other hackers. The
U.S. government is the single biggest buyer in these markets. While getting
these exploits out of the market is a good idea, such backdoors should
inherently fail the NOBUS test and be reported rather than exploited.
However, this is not always the case. To make matters worse, when the NSA
cannot find flaws in commercial software, it may attempt to
introduce them itself. In 2007, the National Institute for Standards
and Technology (the national standards body for cryptographers)
added an algorithm called Dual_EC_DRBG, at the NSAs urging, to its
list of approved random number generators, critical for effectively
secured communications. However, it was proven not long afterward

that Dual_EC_DRBG contained what could only be described as a

backdoor. Despite the evidence against it, the algorithm remained in the
NIST standard and was eventually adopted in hundreds of systems, affecting
millions of devices. The Snowden documents appear to have confirmed that
Dual_EC_DRBG was indeed an attempt by the NSA to insert a backdoor.
Questions about the integrity of the algorithm have since prompted NIST to
remove Dual_EC_DRBG from its list of approved algorithms. The NIST
incident is by no means isolated. Documents reveal that it was likely
just one part of the $250 million Bullrun decryption program, a
clandestine war the NSA has been waging for years against
encryption by intentionally inserting flaws into widely used software.
Encryption of data has meant that even if the NSA acquires data, it may be
unable to read it; cracking these systems has become an agency
priority. Sometimes this is achieved covertly, sometimes with
corporate cooperation, and sometimes through secret court orders.
While this increases the NSAs ability to gather and analyze
intelligence, these flaws also present potential security weaknesses
that could be exploited by an enterprising hacker or spy agency to
steal private correspondence or break into key systems . Perhaps most
catastrophic of all in the long-term is the effect that NSA disclosures have
had on cooperation between the government and corporations. As
noted in Part I, U.S. cybersecuritythe privacy of individual communications,
the integrity of intellectual property, the confidentiality of critical business,
government, and diplomatic communications, and the security of key
infrastructuredepends heavily on cooperation between
corporations/individuals and the government. Before the Snowden
revelations, companies from big banks to Google would turn to
the NSA for expertise in dealing with cybersecurity issues.
Unfortunately, youd be crazy to ask the NSA for help now, according to
Alan Davidson, former head of public policy at Google. Companies like RSA, a
major computer security firm which earns millions from government
contracts, discourage even doing business with the NSA. This is a net loss for
national cybersecurity, as firms will not benefit from the technical knowledge
the NSA has, and the NSA will find it difficult to collaborate with top
engineering firms. Furthermore, public disclosure of the NSAs actions has led
to a tech backlash. Companies like Google and Apple, subject to secret court
orders under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act which required them to
turn over data, have begun working to undermine the NSAs surveillance
capabilities. While unable to resist court orders outright, the tech giants (and
others) appear to be doing everything in their power to actively thwart the
NSA. Google has begun encrypting more of its data, particularly in between
data centers, and even laying its own fiber cables in order to thwart the
NSAs ability to tap the fiber optic connections between data centers. Apple
has taken an even harder line, building encryption into iOS 8 so that the
encryption keys are stored on the device, making it technically impossible for
Apple to retrieve data from the device, even if served a warrant. Microsoft,
Facebook, and Yahoo are also beefing up encryption. All are increasingly
fighting requests for data whenever possible, spurred by negative user
reaction, damage to their business, and anger over privacy violations. Tech
companies are not the only ones losing out. It is an unquestionable

loss for our nation that companies are losing the willingness to
cooperate legally and voluntarily, according to Robert Litt, general
counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. However, its
hard to argue that this reaction was unpredictable. Government data
collection, particularly when it targets foreign citizens, has dealt a
serious blow to these companies bottom lines. Some nations are
considering instituting requirements for data to be physically stored
in the country, a move that risks destroying the Internet as we know it
by balkanizing the net into a series of splinternets that dont communicate
with each other. Unfortunately, this is also a loss for law enforcement. In the
case of systems like Apples, law enforcement will now longer be able to
access information on a device, even if it has a legitimate, targeted warrant.
Tech companies will be wary of any requests to access user information, even
if it is for valid purposes. And many will think twice before choosing to
collaborate with or work for the U.S. government. The NSA has clearly taken
its intelligence gathering mission seriously, but at the expense of its mission
to ensure U.S. cybersecurity. Its actions have also been extremely risky;
it almost appears as if the NSA never expected anyone to find out about what
it was doing, an absurd assumption when the program involved hundreds, if
not thousands of people, many of whom were not on government payrolls.
The detriments to U.S. cybersecurity, to the competitiveness of business, to
the privacy of Americans, to public-private partnerships, and to foreign
standing outweigh the benefits that have been presented. Intelligence
gathering is not the NSAs only mission; it is also charged with ensuring U.S.
cybersecurity. The NSA should refocus on this second goal, or risk leaving the
U.S. exposed in the future.

NSA surveillance causes exploitation of powerweakens security and increases vulnerability of

internet security
Schneier, Chief Technology Officer of Resilient Systems, 2014
[Schneier On security, Breaking up the NSA,
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/02/breaking_up_the.html,
6/24/15, CY]
The NSA has become too big and too powerful. What was supposed to
be a single agency with a dual mission -- protecting the security of U.S.
communications and eavesdropping on the communications of our enemies -has become unbalanced in the post-Cold War, all-terrorism-all-the-time era.
Putting the U.S. Cyber Command, the military's cyberwar wing, in the same
location and under the same commander, expanded the NSA's power. The
result is an agency that prioritizes intelligence gathering over
security, and that's increasingly putting us all at risk . It's time we
thought about breaking up the National Security Agency. Broadly
speaking, three types of NSA surveillance programs were exposed by the
documents released by Edward Snowden. And while the media tends to lump
them together, understanding their differences is critical to understanding
how to divide up the NSA's missions. The first is targeted surveillance. This is
best illustrated by the work of the NSA's Tailored Access Operations (TAO)

group, including its catalog of hardware and software "implants" designed to

be surreptitiously installed onto the enemy's computers. This sort of thing
represents the best of the NSA and is exactly what we want it to do. That the
United States has these capabilities, as scary as they might be, is cause for
gratification. The second is bulk surveillance, the NSA's collection of
everything it can obtain on every communications channel to which
it can get access. This includes things such as the NSA's bulk
collection of call records, location data, e-mail messages and text
messages. This is where the NSA overreaches: collecting data on
innocent Americans either incidentally or deliberately, and data on
foreign citizens indiscriminately. It doesn't make us any safer, and it
is liable to be abused. Even the director of national intelligence, James
Clapper, acknowledged that the collection and storage of data was kept a
secret for too long. The third is the deliberate sabotaging of security.
The primary example we have of this is the NSA's BULLRUN program,
which tries to "insert vulnerabilities into commercial encryption
systems, IT systems, networks and endpoint communication
devices." This is the worst of the NSA's excesses, because it destroys our
trust in the Internet, weakens the security all of us rely on and
makes us more vulnerable to attackers worldwide. That's the three:
good, bad, very bad. Reorganizing the U.S. intelligence apparatus so it
concentrates on our enemies requires breaking up the NSA along
those functions.

BULLRUN has a laundry list of violations towards

civilians- causes attacks
Schneier, cryptographer, computer security and privacy specialist 14
(Bruce, 2-20-2014, "Opinion: It's time to break up the NSA," CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/20/opinion/schneier-nsa-too-big/)//GL
Broadly speaking, three types of NSA surveillance programs were
exposed by the documents released by Edward Snowden. And while the
media tends to lump them together, understanding their differences is critical to understanding how to
divide up the NSA's missions. The first is targeted surveillance. This is best illustrated by the work of the
NSA's Tailored Access Operations (TAO) group, including its catalog of hardware and software "implants"
designed to be surreptitiously installed onto the enemy's computers. This sort of thing represents the best
of the NSA and is exactly what we want it to do. That the United States has these capabilities, as scary as
they might be, is cause for gratification. The second is bulk surveillance, the NSA's collection of
everything it can obtain on every communications channel to which it can get access. This includes things
such as the NSA's bulk collection of call records, location data, e-mail messages and text messages. This
is where the NSA overreaches: collecting data on innocent Americans either incidentally or deliberately,
and data on foreign citizens indiscriminately. It doesn't make us any safer, and it is liable to be abused.
Even the director of national intelligence, James Clapper, acknowledged that the collection and storage of

The third is the deliberate sabotaging of

security. The primary example we have of this is the NSA's BULLRUN
program, which tries to "insert vulnerabilities into commercial
encryption systems, IT systems, networks and endpoint
communication devices." This is the worst of the NSA's excesses,
because it destroys our trust in the Internet, weakens the security
all of us rely on and makes us more vulnerable to attackers
worldwide. That's the three: good, bad, very bad. Reorganizing the
data was kept a secret for too long.

U.S. intelligence apparatus so it concentrates on our enemies

requires breaking up the NSA along those functions.

BULLRUN backdoors undermine US cybersecurityundermining privacy of innocent people

Nicks, BA in Political Science and International Studies, 14

(Denver, July 8th, Time, NSA Surveillance Hurts Cybersecurity for All of Us
Say Privacy Advocates, http://time.com/2966463/nsa-spying-surveillancecybersecurity-privacy-advocates-schneier, 06/23/15, MM)
Privacy advocates Monday slammed the National Security Agency for
conducting surveillance in a way they say undermines cybersecurity
for everyone and harms U.S. tech companies. We have examples of the NSA
going in and deliberately weakening security of things that we use so they can eavesdrop on particular
targets, said Bruce Schneier, a prominent cryptography writer and technologist. Schneier referenced a

NSA paid the computer security firm RSA $10 million

to use a deliberately flawed encryption standard to facilitate easier
eavesdropping, a charge RSA has denied. This very act of undermining not only undermines our
Reuters report that the

security. It undermines our fundamental trust in the things we use to achieve security. Its very toxic,
Schneier said. In the year since former NSA contractor Edward Snowdens first leaks, attention has focused
on the Agencys surveillance itself, fueling debates over whether it is legal and ethical to spy on American
citizens or to eavesdrop on the leaders of allied countries. NSA policies that intentionally undermine
cybersecurity too often get left out of the debate, said panelists Monday at a New American Foundation
event titled National Insecurity Agency: How the NSAs Surveillance Programs Undermine Internet
Security. If

the Chinese government had proposed to put in a backdoor

into our computers and then paid a company $10 million to make
that the standard we would be furious, said Joe Hall, chief technologist at the Center
for Democracy and Technology. Thats exactly what the NSA has become: the best
hacker in the entire world. In a statement to TIME, the NSA denied it had made the Internet less secure.
While we cannot comment on specific, alleged intelligence-gathering activities, NSAs interest in any
given technology is driven by the use of that technology by foreign intelligence targets. The United States
pursues its intelligence mission with care to ensure that innocent users of those same technologies are not
affected, spokesperson Vanee Vines said. Our participation in standards development has strengthened
the core encryption technology that underpins the Internet. NSA cannot crack much of the encryption that

The tension arises due to the two

competing missions of the National Security Agency: electronic
surveillance and protecting U.S. systems from cyberattacks. Nearly all of
guards global commerce and we dont want to.

our online communications are encrypted in some way against cyberattack, to protect our bank accounts
from thieves and our intimate lives from nosy neighbors. This poses a challenge for the NSA as the agency,
since September 11, 2001, has focused less on agents of foreign governments and more on ferreting out

the data of innocent people gets caught its

dragnet. A Washington Post report Sunday estimated that 90
percent of those caught in the agencys data surveillance net
including intimate communications like family photographs and
emails between loversare everyday Internet users not suspected of
wrongdoing, many of them American citizens.
terrorist threats. Inevitably

The NSA is collecting data in bulk through Bullrun

works through altering software, creating backdoors,
and internet companies
MIcheal B Kelly 9/5/13 (Michael joined Business Insider as an intern in
February 2012. He became a front-page editor in February 2014 and a senior
news editor in October 2014. Michael earned a bachelor of arts in philosophy

from Northwestern University and a master's degree in journalism from the

Medill School of Journalism at Northwestern. )

The New York Times has published a report, drawing on documents

leaked by Edward Snowden, that reveals the National Security Agency
is able to circumvent the encryption, or digital scrambling, that
guards the privacy of much of the traffic on the Internet. The Times'

report explains how, exactly, the agency has been able to obtain so
much access to the world's web traffic. From The Times: Because

strong encryption can be so effective, classified N.S.A. documents

make clear, the agencys success depends on working with Internet
companies by getting their voluntary collaboration, forcing their
cooperation with court orders or surreptitiously stealing their
encryption keys or altering their software or hardware. So the
world's largest spy agency is paying companies, coercing companies,
stealing from companies, and/or altering the software of companies
to get the access to Internet data. In the words of Bruce Schneier, an

encryption expert and fellow at Harvard's Berkman Center for Internet

and Society, the NSA is "doing it primarily by cheating, not by
mathematics." And the agency can only to this with the voluntary or

involuntary cooperation of Internet companies. That $250-million-ayear effort, called the Sigint Enabling Project, actively engages the
U.S. and foreign IT industries to covertly influence and/or overtly
leverage their commercial products designs to make them
exploitable." From The Guardian, which has published a parallel
report: "For the past decade, NSA has lead [sic] an aggressive, multipronged effort to break widely used internet encryption
technologies," stated a 2010 GCHQ document. "Vast amounts of
encrypted internet data which have up till now been discarded are
now exploitable." Ultimately, beyond the capabilities provided
through the a highly classified program, code-named Bullrun, is that
the NSA and its British counterpart (i.e. GCHQ) want even more
access.

N.S.A. using Bullrun to keep public vulnerable to

encryption
Bello, journalist with degree in computer security, 14
(Gerry, October 24, Free Press, NSA and FBI make a 'Bullrun' to resurrect
vulnerable encryption, http://freepress.org/article/nsa-and-fbi-make-bullrunresurrect-vulnerable-encryption, June 23, 2015, GG)
The BULLRUN program, as partially revealed by Edward Snowden, is a
long standing effort to force the public to use encryption that is
vulnerable to the NSA. The NSA has always had the statutory power to

classify any encryption developed anywhere in the United States as

secret and seize it, even from it's inventors on the basis that they are
not cleared for the secrets they thought of in the first place. BULLRUN
uses this power, along with releasing weak encryption methods for
public use and quietly influencing research in the area, to keep the

NSA's edge over the publicly available encryption well-honed. It

appears that BULLRUN has brought the return of CLIPPER. While

CLIPPER is back, BULLRUN never went away. In recent remarks
reported by the New York Times, FBI director James B. Comey during a
speech given at the Brookings institution on Oct. 10 said the 'postSnowden pendulum' that has driven Apple and Google to offer fully
encrypted cellphones had 'gone too far.' He hinted that as a result,

the administration might seek regulations and laws forcing

companies to create a way for the government to unlock the photos,
emails and contacts stored on the phones. In short, since companies

and the public did not voluntarily adopt the SKIPJACK algorithm as the
encryption standard in the 1990s under Clinton, the FBI will now try to
have it mandatory under Obama twenty years later. BULLRUN has
weakened other encryption standards, and may have been
operational as far back as the 1970s, when the NSA foisted the first
standard method, Data Encryption Standard (or DES) on the public.
DES was criticized for perceived but publicly unproven weaknesses.

NSA has accesses records through backdoors,

collaboration with tech providers
Ball, special projects editor of The Guardian, Borger, The
Guardians diplomatic editor, and Greenwald, former US
National Security columnist for The Guardian, 13
(James, Julian, and Glenn, September 6, The Guardian, Revealed: how US
and UK spy agencies defeat internet privacy and security,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codessecurity, June 23, 2015, GG)
US and British intelligence agencies have successfully cracked much
of the online encryption relied upon by hundreds of millions of
people to protect the privacy of their personal data, online
transactions and emails, according to top-secret documents revealed
by former contractor Edward Snowden. The files show that the National
Security Agency and its UK counterpart GCHQ have broadly
compromised the guarantees that internet companies have given
consumers to reassure them that their communications, online
banking and medical records would be indecipherable to criminals or
governments. The agencies, the documents reveal, have adopted a

battery of methods in their systematic and ongoing assault on what

they see as one of the biggest threats to their ability to access huge
swathes of internet traffic "the use of ubiquitous encryption across
the internet".Those methods include covert measures to ensure NSA
control over setting of international encryption standards, the use of
supercomputers to break encryption with "brute force", and the
most closely guarded secret of all collaboration with technology
companies and internet service providers themselves. Through these

covert partnerships, the agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities

known as backdoors or trapdoors into commercial encryption
software.

NSAs Project Bullrun uses secret skeleton key to

steal internet data
Reese, award winning journalist for Mint Press, 13
(Frederick, October 3, Mint Press News, How Does The NSA Bypass Online
Encryption?, http://www.mintpressnews.com/how-does-the-nsa-bypassonline-encryption/169916/, June 25, 2015, GG)
Starting in 2000, the NSA spent billions to protect and preserve its
ability to eavesdrop online, by influencing and weakening encryption
standards, obtaining keys by agreement, hacking or legal
intimidation, and designing supercomputer nests to conduct optimized
brute-force attacks. Project Bullrun deals with NSAs abilities to
defeat the encryption used in specific network communication

technologies, read a classification guide for NSA employees and

contractors on BULLRUN. Bullrun involves multiple sources, all of
which are extremely sensitive. The document reveals that the agency
has capabilities against widely used online protocols, such as HTTPS,
voice-over-IP and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), used to protect online
shopping and banking. In 2006, cryptography researchers Dan
Shumow and Niels Ferguson floated an informal paper suggesting the
possibility that the NSA created a workaround for the Dual_EC_DRBG
(Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator), the adopted
encryption standard supported by the International Organisation for
Standardisation and used in computer system worldwide. As the
encryption key used random numbers, it is impossible to form a dictionary
of possible key values, forcing the hacker to go through all possible key

values. In 2007, Bruce Schneier, a cryptographer, picked up on

Shumow and Fergusons research and suggested that it is most likely
that the NSA would use a scheme similar to this proposal, as it would
be significantly faster to implement. In his Wired article, Schneier
argued: There are a bunch of constants fixed numbers in the
standard used to define the algorithms elliptic curve What
Shumow and Ferguson showed is that these numbers have a

relationship with a second, secret set of numbers that can act as a

kind of skeleton key. If you know the secret numbers, you can predict

the output of the random-number generator after collecting just 32

bytes of its output. To put that in real terms, you only need to

monitor one TLS internet encryption connection in order to crack the

security of that protocol. If you know the secret numbers, you can

completely break any instantiation of Dual_EC_DRBG. It has recently

been alleged that the NSA has done exactly this to get past the
Internets encryption system.

NSA surveillance worse for cybersecurity- creates

backdoors others can find
Anthony, ExtremeTech's senior editor, 13
(Sebastion, 9/6, ExtremeTech, NSA and GCHQ have broken internet
encryption, created backdoors that anyone could use,
http://www.extremetech.com/computing/165849-nsa-and-gchq-have-brokeninternet-encryption-created-backdoors-that-anyone-could-use, June 26, 2015,
GG)
At first blush, in the words of the NSA itself, these decryption programs are
the price of admission for the US to maintain unrestricted access to and use
of cyberspace. The problem is, by deliberately introducing security
flaws, the NSA and GCHQ have obliterated the concept of trust
online. The whole point of VPNs and TLS is that they are impossible to crack
at least within a reasonable time frame. We now know that our secure
communications can be easily snooped on by the government but
more importantly, due to this plethora of backdoors, we cant be sure that
only the government is listening in. Thats the problem with a
backdoor: Its great while youre the only one who knows about it, but its
game-breakingly awful if someone else an enemy government, for
example stumbles across it. For years the security industry has
speculated that the internet was riddled with NSA backdoors, and
now it seems we have confirmation. It would be foolish to assume that
these backdoors havent been exploited by other, non-authorized
entities. If you require private and secure communications, now would be
the time consider your alternatives. (Have you ever thought about physically
exchanging thumb drives?) Ideally, if the cryptographic systems behind VPN,
SSL, and TLS have been broken (3DES, AES, etc.) then work needs to begin
on new industry-standard ciphers. This would likely take years. For a lot more
information on the NSA and GCHQs sigint (signals intelligence) operations,
hit up the Guardian. I cant say that Im really surprised, but its still a bit
depressing to see the terrifying extent of their sigint operations laid bare
and moreover, I guarantee that, due to the higher levels of classification that
Snowden couldnt access, this is still just the tip of the iceberg.

The NSA has purposefully made technology more

vulnerable with BULLRUN and lowered security
standards
Sanchez, Research fellow at Cato Institute, 2013 (Julian,
November/December, Cato Institute, Decoding the Summer of Snowden,
http://www.cato.org/policy-report/novemberdecember-2013/decodingsummer-snowden, accessed 6-26-2015, CM)
Since its inception, breaking enemy codes and ciphers has been one of the
primary missions of the NSA. In recent years, however, the agency has taken
that a step further: Now it seeks to ensure that the encryption software
relied on by millions of ordinary Internet users from
businesspeople engaged in sensitive professional communications to
dissidents in repressive regimes comes out of the box pre-broken.

The idea that the government should have backdoor access to

encrypted communications was proposed and hotly debated in the
late 1990s and, wisely, defeated thanks to strong opposition from
both privacy advocates and security experts. Having lost the public
debate, NSA pressured software developers to include those backdoors
secretly. Under a program known as BULLRUN, the agency has sought, in
its own words, to insert vulnerabilities into commercial encryption
systems, IT systems, networks and endpoint communications
devices used by targets, and to covertly influence the design of
commercial software potentially infiltrating companies when
necessary in order to make it more tractable to advanced
cryptanalytic capabilities being developed by NSA. Perhaps most
disturbing of all, the NSA has leveraged its role as the governments
primary source of cybersecurity expertise to influence and weaken
the public standards and specifications adopted by national and
international standard-setting bodies, introducing subtle
vulnerabilities. That weakens trust in those institutions, and makes
the already formidable task of securing the Internet against attacks
a task that depends crucially on strong encryption even more
difficult. The NSAs actions are making us all less safe, as security
and encryption expert Bruce Schneier has explained. Theyre not just spying
on the bad guys, theyre deliberately weakening Internet security for
everyone including the good guys. Its sheer folly to believe that only
the NSA can exploit the vulnerabilities they create.

NSA has decrypted and made back doors in huge

amounts of our technology, putting us at risk for
attacks
Perlroth et al, New York Times Writer and Princeton and
Stanford Law School Graduate, 2013 (September 15, Nicole, The
New York Times, N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internetencryption.html?_r=0, accessed 6-26-2015, CM)
Beginning in 2000, as encryption tools were gradually blanketing the
Web, the N.S.A. invested billions of dollars in a clandestine
campaign to preserve its ability to eavesdrop. Having lost a public
battle in the 1990s to insert its own back door in all encryption, it
set out to accomplish the same goal by stealth. The agency, according
to the documents and interviews with industry officials, deployed custombuilt, superfast computers to break codes, and began collaborating
with technology companies in the United States and abroad to build
entry points into their products. The documents do not identify which
companies have participated. The N.S.A. hacked into target computers
to snare messages before they were encrypted. In some cases,
companies say they were coerced by the government into handing
over their master encryption keys or building in a back door. And the
agency used its influence as the worlds most experienced code
maker to covertly introduce weaknesses into the encryption
standards followed by hardware and software developers around the

world. For the past decade, N.S.A. has led an aggressive,

multipronged effort to break widely used Internet encryption
technologies, said a 2010 memo describing a briefing about N.S.A.
accomplishments for employees of its British counterpart, Government
Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ. Cryptanalytic capabilities are now
coming online. Vast amounts of encrypted Internet data which have up till
now been discarded are now exploitable. When the British analysts, who
often work side by side with N.S.A. officers, were first told about the program,
another memo said, those not already briefed were gobsmacked! An
intelligence budget document makes clear that the effort is still going strong.
We are investing in groundbreaking cryptanalytic capabilities to
defeat adversarial cryptography and exploit Internet traffic, the
director of national intelligence, James R. Clapper Jr., wrote in his
budget request for the current year. In recent months, the documents
disclosed by Mr. Snowden have described the N.S.A.s reach in scooping up
vast amounts of communications around the world. The encryption
documents now show, in striking detail, how the agency works to ensure that
it is actually able to read the information it collects. The agencys success in
defeating many of the privacy protections offered by encryption does not
change the rules that prohibit the deliberate targeting of Americans e-mails
or phone calls without a warrant. But it shows that the agency, which was
sharply rebuked by a federal judge in 2011 for violating the rules and
misleading the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, cannot necessarily be
restrained by privacy technology. N.S.A. rules permit the agency to store any
encrypted communication, domestic or foreign, for as long as the agency is
trying to decrypt it or analyze its technical features. The N.S.A., which has
specialized in code-breaking since its creation in 1952, sees that task as
essential to its mission. If it cannot decipher the messages of terrorists,
foreign spies and other adversaries, the United States will be at serious risk,
agency officials say. Just in recent weeks, the Obama administration has
called on the intelligence agencies for details of communications by leaders
of Al Qaeda about a terrorist plot and of Syrian officials messages about the
chemical weapons attack outside Damascus. If such communications can be
hidden by unbreakable encryption, N.S.A. officials say, the agency cannot do
its work. But some experts say the N.S.A.s campaign to bypass and
weaken communications security may have serious unintended
consequences. They say the agency is working at cross-purposes
with its other major mission, apart from eavesdropping: ensuring the
security of American communications. Some of the agencys most
intensive efforts have focused on the encryption in universal use in
the United States, including Secure Sockets Layer, or SSL; virtual
private networks, or VPNs; and the protection used on fourthgeneration, or 4G, smartphones. Many Americans, often without
realizing it, rely on such protection every time they send an e-mail,
buy something online, consult with colleagues via their companys
computer network, or use a phone or a tablet on a 4G network. For at
least three years, one document says, GCHQ, almost certainly in
collaboration with the N.S.A., has been looking for ways into protected traffic
of popular Internet companies: Google, Yahoo, Facebook and Microsofts
Hotmail. By 2012, GCHQ had developed new access opportunities into

Googles systems, according to the document. (Google denied giving any

government access and said it had no evidence its systems had been
breached). The risk is that when you build a back door into systems,
youre not the only one to exploit it, said Matthew D. Green, a
cryptography researcher at Johns Hopkins University. Those back doors
could work against U.S. communications, too. Paul Kocher, a leading
cryptographer who helped design the SSL protocol, recalled how the N.S.A.
lost the heated national debate in the 1990s about inserting into all
encryption a government back door called the Clipper Chip. And they went
and did it anyway, without telling anyone, Mr. Kocher said. He said he
understood the agencys mission but was concerned about the danger of
allowing it unbridled access to private information. The intelligence
community has worried about going dark forever, but today they are
conducting instant, total invasion of privacy with limited effort, he said. This
is the golden age of spying.

NSA prevented online cybersecurity- failed to disclose

Heartbleed
Riley, Reporter for Bloomberg, 14 (Michael, April 11 th, Bloomberg Business,
NSA Said to Have Used Heartbleed Bug, Exposing Consumers,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-11/nsa-said-to-have-usedheartbleed-bug-exposing-consumers, 06/26/15, MM)
The U.S. National Security Agency knew for at least two years about
a flaw in the way that many websites send sensitive information,
now dubbed the Heartbleed bug, and regularly used it to gather
critical intelligence, two people familiar with the matter said. The
agencys reported decision to keep the bug secret in pursuit of
national security interests threatens to renew the rancorous debate
over the role of the governments top computer experts . The NSA, after

declining to comment on the report, subsequently denied that it was aware of Heartbleed until the
vulnerability was made public by a private security report earlier this month. Reports that NSA or any
other part of the government were aware of the so-called Heartbleed vulnerability before 2014 are wrong,
according to an e-mailed statement from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Heartbleed
appears to be one of the biggest flaws in the Internets history, affecting the basic security of as many as

Its discovery and the creation of a fix by researchers five days ago
prompted consumers to change their passwords, the Canadian
government to suspend electronic tax filing and computer
companies including Cisco Systems Inc. to Juniper Networks Inc. to
provide patches for their systems. Putting the Heartbleed bug in its
arsenal, the NSA was able to obtain passwords and other basic data
that are the building blocks of the sophisticated hacking operations
at the core of its mission, but at a cost. Millions of ordinary users
were left vulnerable to attack from other nations intelligence arms
and criminal hackers.
two-thirds of the worlds websites.

NSA failing to disclose Heartbleed led to a hackChinese hackers

Frizell, Reporter for Time, 14 (Sam, August 20th, Time, Report:
Devastating Heartbleed Flaw Was Used in Hospital Hack,

http://time.com/3148773/report-devastating-heartbleed-flaw-was-used-inhospital-hack/, 06/26/15, MM)

The infamous Heartbleed Internet security flaw that exposed half a
million secure servers to password theft was used by Chinese
hackers to steal data from American hospitals, according to a report. Citing
anonymous sources, the data security company TrustedSec told TIME Wednesday that the
Heartbleed vulnerability allowed hackers to steal secret keys used to
encrypt user names, passwords and other information from
Community Health Systems, the second-biggest for-profit U.S.
hospital chain. They then used the keys to swipe 4.5 million
patients data. The attack marks the first known breach of a company by hackers using
Heartbleed. Community Health Systems, which operates 206 hospitals in 29 states, said in an SEC filing
Monday that the attackers bypassed its security systems and stole data that included birth dates, names,
social security numbers and addresses for 4.5 million patients. The initial attack vector was through the
infamous OpenSSL heartbleed vulnerability which led to the compromise of the information, TrustedSec
said in a blog post. TrustedSec cited three trusted and anonymous sources close to the Community
Health investigation. Though the recent attack on Community Health Systems is the first thats known to
have used the Heartbleed vulnerability, it is likely just one of many instances that did, security experts

Hackers had a wide window for mischief in the period between

Heartbleeds disclosure in early April and companies installation of
patches to defense against the exploit, which in some cases took
days or weeks. You had a lag time of a week to several weeks
before patches were implemented, so if attackers were scanning
companies, there must have been countless situations where
hackers used Heartbleed to gain access, TrustedSec CEO David
Kennedy said. This is just the beginning of many that have either
not been discovered, or cases in which companies are working on
responding and disclosing now. Kennedy said the hospital incursion happened about a
said.

week after Heartbleed was first made public. Most of the well-known attacks attributed to Chinese hackers
have targeted valuable intellectual property, particularly telecommunications or defense companies, or
large industrial companies. But the recent attack against Community Health instead targeted social
security numbers and customer data, signifying a different approach by Chinese cyber criminals, if the
attacks indeed came from China.

NSA deliberately weakening cybersecurity- largest

buyer of hacks

Menn, Technology Reporter for Reuters, 13 (Joseph, May 10 th, Reuters,

Special Report: U.S. cyberwar strategy stokes fear of blowback,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/10/us-usa-cyberweaponsspecialreport-idUSBRE9490EL20130510, 06/26/15, MM)
Even as the U.S. government confronts rival powers over widespread
Internet espionage, it has become the biggest buyer in a burgeoning
gray market where hackers and security firms sell tools for breaking
into computers. The strategy is spurring concern in the technology
industry and intelligence community that Washington is in effect
encouraging hacking and failing to disclose to software companies
and customers the vulnerabilities exploited by the purchased hacks.
That's because U.S. intelligence and military agencies aren't buying the tools
primarily to fend off attacks. Rather, they are using the tools to infiltrate
computer networks overseas, leaving behind spy programs and cyberweapons that can disrupt data or damage systems. The core problem: Spy
tools and cyber-weapons rely on vulnerabilities in existing software
programs, and these hacks would be much less useful to the

government if the flaws were exposed through public warnings. So

the more the government spends on offensive techniques, the
greater its interest in making sure that security holes in widely used
software remain unrepaired. Moreover, the money going for offense lures
some talented researchers away from work on defense, while tax dollars may
end up flowing to skilled hackers simultaneously supplying criminal groups.
"The only people paying are on the offensive side," said Charlie Miller, a
security researcher at Twitter who previously worked for the National Security
Agency. A spokesman for the NSA agreed that the proliferation of hacking
tools was a major concern but declined to comment on the agency's own role
in purchasing them, citing the "sensitivity" of the topic. America's offensive
cyber-warfare strategy - including even the broad outlines and the total
spending levels - is classified information. Officials have never publicly
acknowledged engaging in offensive cyber-warfare, though the one case that
has been most widely reported - the use of a virus known as Stuxnet to
disrupt Iran's nuclear-research program - was lauded in Washington. Officials
confirmed to Reuters previously that the U.S. government drove Stuxnet's
development, and the Pentagon is expanding its offensive capability through
the nascent Cyber Command. Stuxnet, while unusually powerful, is hardly an
isolated case. Computer researchers in the public and private sectors say the
U.S. government, acting mainly through defense contractors, has become the
dominant player in fostering the shadowy but large-scale commercial market
for tools known as exploits, which burrow into hidden computer
vulnerabilities. In their most common use, exploits are critical but
interchangeable components inside bigger programs. Those
programs can steal financial account passwords, turn an iPhone into
a listening device, or, in the case of Stuxnet, sabotage a nuclear
facility. Think of a big building with a lot of hidden doors, each with
a different key. Any door will do to get in, once you find the right
key. The pursuit of those keys has intensified. The Department of
Defense and U.S. intelligence agencies, especially the NSA, are
spending so heavily for information on holes in commercial computer
systems, and on exploits taking advantage of them, that they are
turning the world of security research on its head, according to
longtime researchers and former top government officials.

Backdoors allow criminals to access private

information- Greek phone company and DoD switches
prove
Jaycox, Legislative Analyst at EFF, Schoen, Technologist at
EFF, 2013 (Mark M, Seth, May 22, Electronic Frontier Foundation, The
Government Wants A Backdoor Into Your Online Communications,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/caleatwo, accessed 6-25-2015, CM)
CALEA II will force companies with messaging servicesfrom Google to Twitter to
video game developersto insert backdoors into their platforms. But backdoors
only make us weaker and more vulnerable. It's ironic that CALEA II may be
proposed only months after Congress pushed cybersecurity legislation to protect
our networks. The notion of mandating backdoors in software is the

antithesis of online security, which is why some academics have

called it a ticking time bomb. A proposal to expand backdoors into

communications software ensures that online hackers,

communications company insiders, and nation-states have a direct
entrance to attackand steal fromcompanies and government
agencies. In one notorious example, someone exploited backdoors in a Greek
phone company's systems and recorded sensitive conversations involving
the Prime Minister. Wiretapping backdoors even affect national
security. In 2012, Wired revealed the NSA's discovery and concern that
every telephone switch for sale to the Department of Defense had
security vulnerabilities due to the legally-mandated wiretap
implementation. If politicians are serious about online security, they will not make
these security blunders even worse by bringing more sensitive communication
technologies under CALEA's scope. Just last week, an ad hoc group of twenty
renowned computer security experts issued a report explaining their consensus that
CALEA II proposals could seriously harm computer security. These experts said that a

requirement to weaken security with deliberate backdoors amounts

to developing for our adversaries capabilities that they may not
have the competence, access or resources to develop on their own.
And now the Washington Post has reported that intruders, allegedly
working on behalf of the Chinese government, broke into Google's existing
surveillance systems. (In this case, the report says that the intruders learned
who was targeted by these systems, rather than accessing the contents of the
targets' accounts or communicationsbut it's easy to see that wiretap contents
would ultimately represent an even bigger target, and a bigger prize. Even more
exciting would be the prospect of remotely activating new wiretaps against victims of
an intruder's choice.) Internet Users Have the Right to Secure Communications
Expanding CALEA is not only a tremendous risk for our online security; it's a slap in
the face of Internet users who want to protect themselves online by choosing privacyprotecting software to shield their communications. Ordinary individuals,

businesses, and journalists want and often need state-of-the art

software to protect their communications in an era of pervasive
spying by commercial rivals, criminals, and governments around the
world. The government's rhetoric takes us back to the early 1990s when US law
enforcement spoke openly of banning secure encryption software to keep it out of the
public's hands. EFF and others had to fightincluding in the Federal courtsto
establish the principle that publishing and using encryption tools is an

essential matter of individual freedom and protected by the First

Amendment. Once those crypto wars were over, the US government seemed to
accept the right of Americans to secure communications and abandon the idea of
forcing innovators to dumb down these technologies. We turned our concerns to
foreign governments, several of whom were trying to ban communications tools for
being too private. (For instance, the Associated Press reported five countries
threatened to ban BlackBerry services in 2010 because the services protected user
privacy too well.) Americans, including the US State Department, began supporting
the development and distribution of secure communications tools to foreign rights
activists who need them. Now this battle may be coming home. Even with these
tools, most Americans can protect only a tiny fraction of the trail of

data we leave behind electronically as we live our lives. But we still

have the right to choose them and try our best to keep our private
communications private.

I/L Bullrun Bad

NSA programs kill cybersecurity
Kehl, Policy Analyst and New Americas Open Technology
Institute, 14
(Danielle, July 31, Future Tense with Arizona State University, How the NSA
Hurts Our Economy, Cybersecurity, and Foreign,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/07/31/usa_freedom_act_update
_how_the_nsa_hurts_our_economy_cybersecurity_and_foreign.html, June 25,
2015, GG)
Lastly, theres growing evidence that certain NSA surveillance
techniques are actually bad for cybersecurity. As the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers recently explained: The United States
might have compromised both security and privacy in a failed
attempt to improve security. Weve learned in the past year that the
NSA has been deliberately weakening the security of the Internet,
including commercial products that we rely on every day, in order to
improve its own spying capabilities. The agency has apparently tried
everything from secretly undermining essential encryption tools and
standards to inserting backdoors into widely used computer hardware
and software products, stockpiling vulnerabilities in commercial
software, and building a vast network of spyware inserted onto
computers and routers around the world. A former U.S. ambassador to the
U.N. Human Rights Council, Eileen Donahoe, wrote a forceful article back in
March about how the NSAs actions threaten our national security.
When you weigh these costs against the questionable benefits of the
programs, the need to rein in the NSA and restore international
confidence in the U.S. becomes obvious. The USA FREEDOM Act is
historic not because it would solve all of our problems, but rather because
it would be a much-needed first step in the long road to recovery from the
effects of widespread NSA surveillance. As the Times points out, encryption
"guards global commerce and banking systems, protects sensitive
data like trade secrets and medical records, and automatically
secures the e-mails, Web searches, Internet chats and phone calls of
Americans and others around the world."

NSA decryption programs diminish internet securityleave loopholes for other hackers
Bump, political journalist for The Fix, 13
(Phillip, September 5, The Wire, How the NSA Made Sure It Can Decrypt Your
Online Communication, http://www.thewire.com/technology/2013/09/hownsa-made-sure-it-can-decrypt-your-online-communication/69094/, June 25,
2015, GG)
In one of the more remarkable and alarming revelations to come from
the documents leaked to the press by Edward Snowden, a joint report from
The New York Times, ProPublica, and The Guardian suggests that the NSA
works with internet companies to add vulnerabilities to secure
network traffic and may be able to broadly decrypt online

communications. A less technical summary: the government has

apparently introduced and/or pried open the online security systems
that ensure privacy online. For privacy advocates, this is the worst-case
scenario, which may be in part why The Times reports that the government
asked they not publish the report. (The partner organizations "removed some
specific facts.") The topline, via The Times: The agency has
circumvented or cracked much of the encryption, or digital scrambling,
that guards global commerce and banking systems, protects
sensitive data like trade secrets and medical records, and
automatically secures the e-mails, Web searches, Internet chats and
phone calls of Americans and others around the world, the
documents show. Purposely introducing flaws into encryption
technologies, if that's what has been done, does not mean that only the
NSA and GCHQ would be able to take advantage of those loopholes.
It allows the agencies to access secure socket layered communications (SSL)
and virtual private networks (VPNs) but it could conceivably allow any
other person sufficiently adept at hacking into that encryption as
well.

NSA makes internet less secure- defeats protective

encryption
Winter, journalist, 13
(Michael, September 5, USA Today, NSA uses supercomputers to crack Web
encryption, files show,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/05/nsa-snowdenencryption-cracked/2772721/, June 25, 2015, GG)
The American Civil Liberties Union, which has filed a federal suit challenging
the government's collection of telephone communications data, called the
NSA's efforts to defeat encryption "recklessly shortsighted'' and said
they make the Internet less secure for all. In a statement, the ACLU said
the actions will "further erode not only the United States' reputation
as a global champion of civil liberties and privacy but the economic
competitiveness of its largest companies.'' "The encryption
technologies that the NSA has exploited to enable its secret dragnet
surveillance are the same technologies that protect our most sensitive
information, including medical records, financial transactions and
commercial secrets," said Christopher Soghoian, principal technologist of the
ACLU's Speech, Privacy and Technology Project. "Even as the NSA
demands more powers to invade our privacy in the name of
cybersecurity, it is making the Internet less secure and exposing us
to criminal hacking, foreign espionage, and unlawful surveillance.''

Impact Grids
The grid is venerable to cyberterrorism Old infrastructure
Gertz, National Security Columnist for the Washington
Times, 14 (Bill Gertz, 4-16-2014, "Inside the Ring: U.S. power grid
defenseless from attacks," Washingtion Times,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/apr/16/inside-the-ring-us-powergrid-defenseless-from-att/?page=all //NK)
The U.S. electrical power grid is vulnerable to cyber and physical
attacks that could cause devastating disruptions throughout the
country, federal and industry officials told Congress recently. Gerry Cauley, president of the North
American Electric Reliability Corp., said that several if not all other critical U.S.
infrastructures depend on electricity, and that he is deeply
concerned about attacks, extreme weather and equipment failures causing power outages.
I am most concerned about coordinated physical and cyber attacks
intended to disable elements of the power grid or deny electricity to specific
targets, such as government or business centers, military installations, or
other infrastructures, Mr. Cauley told the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee
last Thursday. Mr. Cauley said the April 2013 attack on a California electrical
power substation by unidentified gunmen did not result in power
outages, but highlighted the vulnerability of the countrys threesector power grid. The incident at the Metcalf substation in Northern California demonstrates
that attacks are possible and have the potential to cause significant damage to assets and disrupt
customer service, he said. Cheryl A. LaFleur, acting chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission who testified at the Senate hearing, said the Metcalf attack led federal authorities to conduct

cyber
threats to electrical infrastructure are fast-changing, as she called for
a 13-city campaign to warn utilities about the need for better security. Ms. LaFleur said

better information-sharing about threats between government and industry. Sue Kelly, head of the

of more than 2,000 U.S. electric utilities,

testified about the growing danger of cyberattacks against the
power grid. The threat of cyberattack is relatively new compared to long-known physical threats,
but an attack with operational consequences could occur and cause disruptions in the flow of
power if malicious actors are able to hack into the data and control
systems used to operate our electric generation and transmission
infrastructure, Ms. Kelly said. To date, security measures have prevented a successful cyberattack
on the bulk electric system, she said. An Energy Department-sponsored study published last fall said the
U.S. power grid is vulnerable to catastrophic disruption by nation
states like China and North Korea, terrorist groups like al Qaeda, and
non-state criminals. The 269-page study Electric Sector Failure Scenarios and Impact
American Public Power Association

Analyses was published in September by the National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization
Resource, a non-government group of industry and security specialists .

A malicious software
cyberattack on the power grids Distributed Energy Resource Management System
(DERMS), which manages requests and commands for the power system, would damage
transformers that are costly and difficult to replace. Cyberattacks against
computers that distribute electrical power over wide areas could be jammed or disrupted through wireless

And cyber attackers could cause widespread power outages or

cascading power failures by gaining access to distribution systems
and equipment via remote hacking. After gaining the required access, the threat agent
signals.

manufactures an artificial cascade through sequential tripping of select critical feeders and components,
causing automated tripping of generation sources due to power and voltage fluctuations, the report said.
A blackout of varying degree and potential equipment damage ensues.

According to the

report, nation state threats to the grid include China, North Korea
and Cuba. Among the cyber terrorist threats listed: al Qaeda and the
Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani group Lashkar-e-Taibi, and the
Palestinian group Hamas. Domestic threats include lone wolf
extremists, ecoterrorists among Earth First and Greenpeace, U.S.
separatist groups, and militias and hate groups, the report said.

Nuclear War
Lawson, Associate Professor in the Department of
Communication at the University of Utah, 9 (Sean Lawson, 5-132009, "Cross-Domain Response to Cyber Attacks and the Threat of Conflict
Escalation," Sean Lawson, http://www.seanlawson.net/?p=477 //NK)
At a time when it seems impossible to avoid the seemingly growing
hysteria over the threat of cyber war,[1] network security expert
Marcus Ranum delivered a refreshing talk recently, The Problem
with Cyber War, that took a critical look at a number of the
assumptions underlying contemporary cybersecurity discourse in the
United States. He addressed one issue in partiuclar that I would like to riff on here, the issue
of conflict escalationi.e. the possibility that offensive use of cyber
attacks could escalate to the use of physical force. As I will show, his concerns
are entirely legitimate as current U.S. military cyber doctrine assumes the possibility of what I call crossdomain responses to cyberattacks. Backing Your Adversary (Mentally) into a Corner Based on the premise
that completely blinding a potential adversary is a good indicator to that adversary that an attack is
iminent, Ranum has argued that The

best thing that you could possibly do if

you want to start World War III is launch a cyber attack . [] When people
talk about cyber war like its a practical thing, what theyre really doing is messing with the OK
button for starting World War III. We need to get them to sit the f-k down and shut the f-k
up. [2] He is making a point similar to one that I have made in the past: Taking away an adversarys
ability to make rational decisions could backfire. [3] For example, Gregory Witol cautions that attacking
the decision to perform rational calculations may cause more problems than it hopes to resolve. Removing
the capacity for rational action may result in completely unforeseen consequences, including longer and
bloodier battles than may otherwise have been. [4] So, from a theoretical standpoint, I think his concerns
are well founded. But the current state of U.S. policy may be cause for even greater concern. Its not just
worrisome that a hypothetical blinding attack via cyberspace could send a signal of imminent attack and
therefore trigger an irrational response from the adversary. What is also cause for concern is that current

U.S. policy indicates that kinetic attacks (i.e. physical use of force)
are seen as potentially legitimate responses to cyber attacks . Most
worrisome is that current U.S. policy implies that a nuclear response
is possible, something that policy makers have not denied in recent
press reports. The reason, in part, is that the U.S. defense community has
increasingly come to see cyberspace as a domain of warfare
equivalent to air, land, sea, and space. The definition of cyberspace as its own domain
of warfare helps in its own right to blur the online/offline, physical-space/cyberspace boundary. But
thinking logically about the potential consequences of this framing leads to some disconcerting
conclusions. If cyberspace is a domain of warfare, then it becomes possible to define cyber attacks

But what happens if the U.S. is

attacked in any of the other domains? It retaliates. But it usually
does not respond only within the domain in which it was attacked.
Rather, responses are typically cross-domain responsesi.e. a
massive bombing on U.S. soil or vital U.S. interests abroad (e.g.
think 9/11 or Pearl Harbor) might lead to air strikes against the
(whatever those may be said to entail) as acts of war.

attacker. Even more likely given a U.S. military way of warfare that
emphasizes multidimensional, joint operations is a massive
conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) response against the attacker in all
domains (air, land, sea, space), simultaneously. The possibility of kinetic action
in response to cyber attack, or as part of offensive U.S. cyber operations, is part of the current (2006)

Of course, the possibility that a

cyber attack on the U.S. could lead to a U.S. nuclear reply
constitutes possibly the ultimate in cross-domain response. And
while this may seem far fetched, it has not been ruled out by U.S.
defense policy makers and is, in fact, implied in current U.S. defense
policy documents. From the National Military Strategy of the United
States (2004): The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities that pose
National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations [5]:

potentially devastating impacts. WMD/E includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced
high explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical weapons. They may rely more on disruptive
impact than destructive kinetic effects. For example, cyber attacks on US commercial information systems
or attacks against transportation networks may have a greater economic or psychological effect than a
relatively small release of a lethal agent. [6] The authors of a 2009 National Academies of Science report
on cyberwarfare respond to this by saying, Coupled

with the declaratory policy on

nuclear weapons described earlier, this statement implies that the
United States will regard certain kinds of cyberattacks against the
United States as being in the same category as nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons, and thus that a nuclear response to certain
kinds of cyberattacks (namely, cyberattacks with devastating
impacts) may be possible. It also sets a relevant scalea cyberattack that has an impact
larger than that associated with a relatively small release of a lethal agent is regarded with the same or
greater seriousness. [7]

Impact Econ
Foreign Cyber attacks damage the economy data
leaks cost companies billions
Riley Walters 10/27/14 Center for Foreign and National Security
Policy (Research Assistant Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and
National Security Policy. The Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign
Policy at The Heritage Foundation)
The spate of recent data breaches at big-name companies such as
JPMorgan Chase, Home Depot, and Target raises questions about the
effectiveness of the private sectors information security . According
to FBI Director James Comey, There are two kinds of big companies
in the United States. There are those whove been hackedand
those who dont know theyve been hacked.[1] A recent survey by
the Ponemon Institute showed the average cost of cyber crime for
U.S. retail stores more than doubled from 2013 to an annual average
of $8.6 million per company in 2014.[2] The annual average cost per
company of successful cyber attacks increased to $20.8 million in
financial services, $14.5 million in the technology sector, and $12.7
million in communications industries. This paper lists known cyber

attacks on private U.S. companies since the beginning of 2014. (A

companion paper discussed cyber breaches in the federal
government.)[3] By its very nature, a list of this sort is incomplete. The
scope of many attacks is not fully known. For example, in July, the U.S.
Computer Emergency Readiness Team issued an advisory that more
than 1,000 U.S. businesses have been affected by the Backoff
malware, which targets point-of-sale (POS) systems used by most retail
industries.[4] These attacks targeted administrative and customer data
and, in some cases, financial data. This list includes only cyber attacks
that have been made known to the public. Most data breaches below
are listed chronologically by month of public notice. Conclusion The
recent increases in the rate and the severity of cyber attacks on U.S.
companies indicate a clear threat to businesses and customers . As

businesses come to terms with the increasing threat of hackers,

instituting the right policies is critical to harnessing the power of the
private sector. In a cyber environment with ever-changing risks and
threats, the government needs to do more to support the private
sector in establishing sound cybersecurity while not creating
regulations that hinder businesses more than help them .

Impact Meltdowns
Cyberterrorists can target nuclear power plants
causing meltdowns as large as Fukushima Hard to
detect, convenient, and invisible
Dowds, Nuclear analyst at the CSIS, 11 (Talitha Dowds, 3-25-2011,
"A New Phase of Nuclear Terrorism Cyber Warfare," Center for Strategic and
International Studies, http://csis.org/blog/new-phase-nuclear-terrorism-cyberwarfare)
The idea that terrorists will one day strike a US nuclear power plant
resulting in a full-scale meltdown, killing tens of thousands of
people and rendering nearby cities uninhabitable for decades,
according to the article, has long been the stuff of nightmares for
Americas top homeland-security officials. However, it is interesting to note that not
all states share this fear. As Scott Sagan pointed out recently, there is a lack of consensus among non-

Many of the non-nuclear

states think that the US exaggerates the threat of nuclear terrorism,
and are therefore unwilling to spend money to protect their nuclear
assets in the manner in which the US wants. For obvious reasons,
the lack of investment into protecting against nuclear terrorism for
non-nuclear states is understandable when they dont see it as a
direct threat to their national security. However, regional attacks
whether they are carried out by terrorists or states have a
worldwide effect. Nuclear terrorism, coupled with cyber warfare
could be the next greatest threat facing states. An article in Foreign Policy states
nuclear states regarding the potential threat of nuclear terrorism.

that the crisis at the Fukushima power plant facility coupled with the Stuxnet attacks on the Iranian nuclear
facility at Natanz, paints a picture of the before and after of what cyber conflict may look like. The article

enemies will be able to target critical infrastructure, like

nuclear power plants - as was done by the U.S. and Israeli team targeting the Iranian program
highlights that

and burrowing into their operating systems which would be akin to what we are seeing in Japan. It
further points out that what makes the cyber threat so unsettling is its invisibility. Not

only are
they invisible but it is hard to detect who has launched them. This
form of warfare may be very attractive to terrorists who are unable
to physically enter a nuclear facility but can infiltrate the facilities
infrastructure to cause a meltdown.

A nuclear reactor meltdown would cause extinction

Uncontained cores and radiation
Huff, writer for Natural News, 14 (Ethan Huff, August, 8-12-2014,
"Nuclear power + grid down event = global extinction for humanity,"
NaturalNews,
http://www.naturalnews.com/046429_nuclear_power_electric_grid_global_exti
nction.html //NK)
(NaturalNews) If you think the Fukushima situation is bad, consider the
fact that the United States is vulnerable to the exact same meltdown
situation, except at 124 separate nuclear reactors throughout the
country. If anything should happen to our nation's poorly protected electric power grid, these reactors

have a high likelihood of failure, say experts, a catastrophic scenario

that would most likely lead to the destruction of all life on our
planet, including humans. Though they obviously generate power themselves, nuclear power plants
also rely on an extensive system of power backups that ensure the constant flow of cooling water to reactor cores. In the
event of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP), for instance, diesel-powered backup generators are designed to immediately
engage, ensuring that fuel rods and reactor cores don't overheat and melt, causing unmitigated destruction. But most of
these generators were only designed to operate for a maximum period of about 24 hours or less, meaning they are
exceptionally temporary in nature. In a real emergency situation, such as one that might be caused by a systematic attack
on the power grid, it could take days or even weeks to bring control systems back online. At this point, all those backup
generators would have already run out of fuel, leaving nuclear reactors everywhere prone to meltdowns. Cost to retrofit
power grid minimal, but government won't do it According to Dave Hodges from The Common Sense Show, it would only
cost taxpayers about $2 billion to update the power grid and protect it from attack or shutdown. This is roughly the same
price as a single B-1 Stealth Bomber, or the annual sum that the government pays American farmers not to grow crops. In

And yet
nothing is being done to protect the power grid against failure or,
worse yet, an attack by domestic or foreign enemies. Investment
guru Paul Singer warned about this, noting that an electromagnetic
surge is the "most significant danger" facing the world today. "Even
horrendous nuclear war, except in its most extreme form, can [be] a
relatively localized issue," said Singer, "and the threat from
asteroids can (possibly) be mitigated." Spent fuel racks contain
radiation that won't be contained during an emergency In the event
of a disaster or loss of power, a nuclear plant's emergency power
systems are designed to automatically engage, while its control rods
are dropped into the core. Water is then pumped into the reactor to
mitigate excess heat, in turn preventing a meltdown. And just to be
sure, spent fuel rods are encased in both a primary and secondary
containment structure, aiding in meltdown prevention. But if the
emergency results in longer-term power losses, and backup
generators run out of power, this constant flow of cooling water will
eventually run dry. This is what happened at Fukushima, resulting in
several reactor cores melting right through their containment
structures into the ground. There is also the issue of residual spent
fuel, which is normally contained in high-density storage racks that
are not taken into account during an emergency. "...contained in buildings that vent
other words, it is a mere drop in the bucket compared to everything else the government spends money on.

directly into the atmosphere, radiation containment is not accounted for with regard to the spent fuel racks," explained
Hodges. "In other words, there is no capture mechanism." Like many others, Hodges wants to know why the government
refuses to take this important situation more seriously. Again, it wouldn't cost that much in the greater scheme of things to
bring the power grid up to proper safety standards, protecting Americans and their infrastructure from a possible cascade
of nuclear meltdowns. So why isn't it happening?

Impact Econ
Backdoors cause loss in business confidence and econ
collapse China, keys, and insecurity proves
Timm, executive director of the Freedom of the Press
Foundation, 3/4 (Trevor Timm, 3-4-2015, "Building backdoors into
encryption isn't only bad for China, Mr President," Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/04/backdoorsencryption-china-apple-google-nsa //NK)

Want to know why forcing tech companies to build backdoors into encryption is a terrible idea? Look no

President Obamas stark criticism of Chinas plan to do

exactly that on Tuesday. If only he would tell the FBI and NSA the
same thing. In a stunningly short-sighted move, the FBI - and more recently the
NSA - have been pushing for a new US law that would force tech
companies like Apple and Google to hand over the encryption keys
or build backdoors into their products and tools so the government
would always have access to our communications. It was only a matter of time
further than

before other governments jumped on the bandwagon, and China wasted no time in demanding the same

As President Obama himself described to

Reuters, China has proposed an expansive new anti-terrorism bill
that would essentially force all foreign companies, including US
companies, to turn over to the Chinese government mechanisms
where they can snoop and keep track of all the users of those
services. Obama continued: Those kinds of restrictive practices I
think would ironically hurt the Chinese economy over the long term
because I dont think there is any US or European firm, any
international firm, that could credibly get away with that wholesale
turning over of data, personal data, over to a government. Bravo! Of
course these are the exact arguments for why it would be a disaster for US
government to force tech companies to do the same. (Somehow Obama left
from tech companies a few weeks ago.

that part out.) As Yahoos top security executive Alex Stamos told NSA director Mike Rogers in a public
confrontation last week,

building backdoors into encryption is like drilling a

hole into a windshield. Even if its technically possible to produce
the flaw - and we, for some reason, trust the US government never
to abuse it - other countries will inevitably demand access for
themselves. Companies will no longer be in a position to say no, and
even if they did, intelligence services would find the backdoor
unilaterally - or just steal the keys outright. For an example on how this works,
look no further than last weeks Snowden revelation that the UKs intelligence service and the NSA stole
the encryption keys for millions of Sim cards used by many of the worlds most popular cell phone
providers. Its happened many times before too. Security expert Bruce Schneier has documented with
numerous examples, Back-door

access built for the good guys is routinely

used by the bad guys. Stamos repeatedly (and commendably) pushed the NSA
director for an answer on what happens when China or Russia also
demand backdoors from tech companies, but Rogers didnt have an answer
prepared at all. He just kept repeating I think we can work through this. As Stamos insinuated, maybe
Rogers should ask his own staff why we actually cant work through this, because virtually every

technologist agrees backdoors just cannot be secure in practice. (If you want to
further understand the details behind the encryption vs. backdoor debate and how what the NSA director
is asking for is quite literally impossible, read this excellent piece by surveillance expert Julian Sanchez.)

Its downright bizarre that the US government has been warning of

the grave cybersecurity risks the country faces while, at the very
same time, arguing that we should pass a law that would weaken
cybersecurity and put every single citizen at more risk of having
their private information stolen by criminals, foreign governments,
and our own. Forcing backdoors will also be disastrous for the US
economy as it would be for Chinas. US tech companies - which
already have suffered billions of dollars of losses overseas because
of consumer distrust over their relationships with the NSA - would
lose all credibility with users around the world if the FBI and NSA
succeed with their plan. The White House is supposedly coming out with an official policy on
encryption sometime this month, according to the New York Times but the President can save himself a
lot of time and just apply his comments about China to the US government. If he knows backdoors in
encryption are bad for cybersecurity, privacy, and the economy, why is there even a debate?

Businesses cant expand with backdoors required

foreign countries dont trust their products
Sparapani, Former Director of Public Policy at Facebook,
2015 (Tim, May 5, Forbes, Encryption, But with Back Doors? The FBI Has
Business Running In Circles,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timsparapani/2015/05/21/encryption-but-withbackdoors-the-fbi-has-business-running-in-circles/2/, accessed 6-26-2015,
CM)
The FBIs concerns run counter to the motivations of concerned consumers
and businesses that, feeling under siege by hackers and identity
thieves, are seeking out technologies to protect their data. Others,
including journalists, human rights activists and political dissidents, seek
encryption to protect their civil liberties in response to reports of untargeted,
bulk government surveillance by the NSA and foreign spy agencies.
Businesses responded to these market demands by supplying encryption
techniques that only the customer has the key to unlock. Federal, state and
local law enforcement and national security agency calls for holes in
encryption regimes are, therefore, bad for business. These calls
increase customers doubts regarding the privacy and confidentiality
of their documents and communications held or transmitted by
businesses required to be able to reveal them on command to
government agencies. Moreover, virtually every business wants to sell
its services to customers around the world, yet mandated encryption
backdoors will facilitate de facto trade barriers. Foreign
governments are sure to use encryption, or government-mandated
weaknesses in that encryption, as a means of favoring home grown
technologies that comply with that countrys privacy or security
preferences at the expense of foreign-made technologies. In
continental Europe and throughout South America, where privacy
concerns run white hot and governments and citizens are still palpably
frustrated by revelations of US surveillance of businesses and consumers,
there are calls for encryption everywhere. European politicians, eager
to see European tech companies grow in market share and prominence, may
use any perception of US companies privacy weaknesses as a de
facto trade barrier. In short, if the FBI forces American companies to build

in encryption backdoors those companies might lose business in Europe and

South America to local companies that do not have encryption backdoors.
Viewed through one lens this pushes companies to encrypt customers
information by default and to offer encryption that only customers can
decrypt. Viewed another way, this could be naked trade protectionism
masked in concerns over privacy and consumer protection. Alternatively, if
US companies refuse some nations mandates for reciprocal
surveillance backdoors those companies might be frozen out of
specific markets. In short, the debate over encryption backdoors could
become a sharp weapon for trade protectionism. The security experts are
unanimous: technology back doors make any IT infrastructure, app
or website insecure. Dozens of the best security and cryptography
experts joined a letter with leading privacy advocates and
businesses opposing government-mandated backdoors recently.
Computer science and engineering does not allow for a door to be created
that only law enforcement and national security agencies can unlock. Each
opening creates vulnerabilities that hackers, thieves, and foreign
governments can and will exploit. Due to that technology reality, businesses
are likely to resist US government pressure to build costly backdoors into
their systems. Unlike previous iterations of the debates over encryption, the
FBI due to its own rhetoric regarding combatting cyber security and identity
theft can no longer credibly claim that businesses using encryption without
backdoors are placing civil liberties and privacy over law enforcement and
national security. This debate turns on whether business should stop an
enormous amount of identity theft and cyber crime the number one
complaint by consumers to the Federal Trade Commission for the last fifteen
years by sophisticated criminal syndicates through encryption free of
backdoors or whether law enforcement should be technologically able to
investigate a very few crimes on demand. Moreover, as more of our lives and
business are now conducted digitally think mobile payments, banking,
commerce, infrastructure management, and electronic health records, for
example threats to businesses ability to secure this data are themselves
threats to the economic national security. Mass implementation of strong
encryption may prevent attacks by terror rings seeking to fund attacks
through stealing passwords that allow them to steal customers funds.
Because growing businesses have customers worldwide, they are
even more likely to resist calls to build in encryption back doors.
Once the US mandates back doors, how can companies comply with
those mandates and yet resist similar demands from China, Russia
or any other country for wiretap- or surveillance-ready encryption?
Fearing loss of markets, businesses will not be able to articulate a principled
reason for doing so. The likely result will be not just one backdoor but rather
many. While multinational corporations might absorb those repetitive
unfunded mandates, start-ups or small businesses might be
swamped by an enormous diversion of computer coding talent and
associated costs. Businesses are not likely to back away from encryption.
The US Federal Trade Commission states that encryption is the key
to keeping your personal information secure online, especially when
using mobile devices or laptops attached to a public or unsecured Wi-Fi
network. The President has self-identified as a strong believer in strong

encryption and this spring the White House turned on encryption by default
for interaction with its websites. Post-Snowden surveillance revelations, the
Presidents specially-appointed Review Group on Intelligence and
Communications Technologies recommended that the U.S Government
promote national security by fully supporting and not undermining
encryption standards and generally available commercial encryption and
supporting efforts to encourage the greater use of encryption technology for
data in transit, at rest, in the cloud, and in storage. The California Attorney
General recommended that app developers transmit user data securely,
using encryption for permanent unique device identifiers and personal
information, such as an email address or phone number. She endorses
legislation requiring encryption to protect personal information in transit.
The FBI faces a significant challenge to deter and prosecute crime and terror
that is made more complex by ever more pervasive and more complex
encryption. To prevent businesses, however, from running in circles on the
question of backdoor-less encryption, the FBI might need to weigh whether
they want businesses to stop a great deal of identify theft and cyber attacks
as recommended by consumer protection and security experts, or whether
they want to be able to investigate a very few potential criminals or terrorists.

Impact Cyber Turns Domestic Impacts

Cyberterror is a huge risk - collapses public service
organization turns any other domestic impact.
Siegel-Itzkovich, health and science editor at The Jerusalem
Post, 4/6 (Judy Siegel-Itzkovich, 4-6-2015, "Cyber terrorism triggers severe
psychological, physical stress, Haifa researchers shows,"
http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Health/cyber-terrorism-triggers-severepsychological-physical-stress-Haifa-researchers-shows-396277 //NK)
In light of hacker group Anonymouss recurring threats against
Israel, it is important to know that cyber terrorism causes more than
inconvenience. There are, more importantly, grave physiological
effects upon a persons mind and body, said Canetti. In modern society, nearly every
system is part of a cyber network critical water and electrical facilities,
banking networks, political institutions, and no small part of national
security and military infrastructures. Nevertheless, said Canetti, who was joined in the
research by Prof. Michael Gross and Dr. Israel Waismel-Manor, the vast majority of the public are complacent and, until
they are themselves exposed to a personal cyber attack, they see cyber terrorism as nothing more than an inconvenience
that disrupts their computer services, Facebook or gmail accounts, or, in the worst case, steals a credit card number.

Most civilians do not see a cyber attack as one which can paralyze
essential services for long periods of time or put peoples lives or
health in danger. It is enough to remember the 2008 cyber attacks
in Estonia and Georgia or the Stuxnet worm that devastated Iranian
nuclear facilities in 2010, to understand that cyber terrorism can
bring chaos and widespread harm. In a simulation-based study, the research team provides the
first glimpse of how cyber terrorism affects the psychological and physiological well-being of its victims. Dozens of test
subjects were asked to sit in front of a computer and answer a series of random questions. As they filled out the
questionnaire, their computer was hacked by Anonymous without the test subjects realizing that the attack was part
of the experiment. Suddenly, the frightening mask of Anonymous appeared with a warning that their site would crash and
sensitive personal data would be publicized to the world at large. After a few more moments, a split Skype screen
captured the computer showing a hooded, masked figure typing an unseen message on one side and a live feed of the
test subject/victim on the other. Finally, in the third stage of the experiment, the test subjects received a private text
message on their personal cellphones: Youve been hacked, and Anonymous has acquired your contact list.

Immediately before and after the simulated cyber attacks,

respondents gave the researchers a saliva sample to test the level of
the hormone cortisol, a wellknown physiological indicator of stress.
The results of the experiment were striking and pointed to a
significant increase in psychological and physiological stress among
those who experienced the simulated cyber attack by Anonymous.
The same subjects also described how their sense of personal
security was undermined and how they worried about future cyber attacks significantly far more than
the control group, which did not experience the simulated attacks. It is important to see how individuals who had
previously waved off the threat of cyber terrorism were now significantly more attuned to the danger, noted Canetti.

The researchers further explained that cyber terrorism is easy for

terrorists to exploit at any time or place, since all they need is a
computer and not a sophisticated organization to plan and execute
conventional terrorist attacks. A few terrorists with computers can work hundreds of kilometers
away from their target to disable critical infrastructures and bring substantial suffering to
civilians. In other studies, currently underway, Canetti, Gross and Waismel-Manor show how victims of cyber
terrorism experience elevated levels of fear and anxiety even when they are not harmed physically themselves. It
was also not surprising to learn that victims of cyber terrorism
demand vigorous state action and retaliation to protect them from
cyber terrorism, whether by attacking terrorists with cyber weapons

or by using planes or missiles to destroy the terrorists servers,

cables, computers and other cyber facilities. The primary goal of
terrorist organizations is not to cause their victims physical harm
but to sow fear and trepidation in the heart of the civilian
population. Our study, explained the three, shows how a cyber attack by
terrorists can achieve the same goal as conventional terrorism; and
if the state does not take action against cyber terrorists, civilians
will suffer significant harm.

Impact Retaliation
US is willing to respond to a cyberattack with armed
force-Pentagon concludes that it constitutes an act of
war
Gorman and Barnes 11 (Siobhan, intelligence correspondent for Wall
Street Journal, and Julian, Pentagon and national security writer, Wall Street
Journal 5-31, Pentagon: Online Cyber Attacks Can Count as Acts of War,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230456310457635562313578
2718)
The Pentagon has concluded that computer sabotage coming from
another country can constitute an act of war, a finding that for the
first time opens the door for the U.S. to respond using traditional
military force. The Pentagon's first formal cyber strategy,
unclassified portions of which are expected to become public next
month, represents an early attempt to grapple with a changing
world in which a hacker could pose as significant a threat to U.S.
nuclear reactors, subways or pipelines as a hostile country's military.
In part, the Pentagon intends its plan as a warning to potential
adversaries of the consequences of attacking the U.S. in this way. "If
you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one
of your smokestacks," said a military official. Recent attacks on the
Pentagon's own systemsas well as the sabotaging of Iran's nuclear program
via the Stuxnet computer wormhave given new urgency to U.S. efforts to
develop a more formalized approach to cyber attacks. A key moment
occurred in 2008, when at least one U.S. military computer system was
penetrated. This weekend Lockheed Martin, a major military contractor,
acknowledged that it had been the victim of an infiltration, while playing
down its impact. The report will also spark a debate over a range of sensitive
issues the Pentagon left unaddressed, including whether the U.S. can ever be
certain about an attack's origin, and how to define when computer sabotage
is serious enough to constitute an act of war. These questions have already
been a topic of dispute within the military. One idea gaining momentum
at the Pentagon is the notion of "equivalence." If a cyber attack
produces the death, damage, destruction or high-level disruption
that a traditional military attack would cause, then it would be a
candidate for a "use of force" consideration, which could merit
retaliation. The Pentagon's document runs about 30 pages in its
classified version and 12 pages in the unclassified one. It concludes
that the Laws of Armed Conflictderived from various treaties and
customs that, over the years, have come to guide the conduct of war
and proportionality of responseapply in cyberspace as in
traditional warfare, according to three defense officials who have
read the document. The document goes on to describe the Defense
Department's dependence on information technology and why it must forge
partnerships with other nations and private industry to protect infrastructure.
The strategy will also state the importance of synchronizing U.S. cyber-war
doctrine with that of its allies, and will set out principles for new security

policies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization took an initial step last year
when it decided that, in the event of a cyber attack on an ally, it would
convene a group to "consult together" on the attacks, but they wouldn't be
required to help each other respond. The group hasn't yet met to confer on a
cyber incident. Pentagon officials believe the most-sophisticated computer
attacks require the resources of a government. For instance, the weapons
used in a major technological assault, such as taking down a power grid,
would likely have been developed with state support, Pentagon officials say.
The strategy will also state the importance of synchronizing U.S. cyber-war
doctrine with that of its allies, and will set out principles for new security
policies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization took an initial step last year
when it decided that, in the event of a cyber attack on an ally, it would
convene a group to "consult together" on the attacks, but they wouldn't be
required to help each other respond. The group hasn't yet met to confer on a
cyber incident. Pentagon officials believe the most-sophisticated computer
attacks require the resources of a government. For instance, the weapons
used in a major technological assault, such as taking down a power grid,
would likely have been developed with state support, Pentagon officials say.
The move to formalize the Pentagon's thinking was borne of the
military's realization the U.S. has been slow to build up defenses
against these kinds of attacks, even as civilian and military
infrastructure has grown more dependent on the Internet. The
military established a new command last year, headed by the director of the
National Security Agency, to consolidate military network security and attack
efforts. The Pentagon itself was rattled by the 2008 attack, a breach
significant enough that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs briefed thenPresident George W. Bush. At the time, Pentagon officials said they believed
the attack originated in Russia, although didn't say whether they believed the
attacks were connected to the government. Russia has denied involvement.
The Rules of Armed Conflict that guide traditional wars are derived from a
series of international treaties, such as the Geneva Conventions, as well as
practices that the U.S. and other nations consider customary international
law. But cyber warfare isn't covered by existing treaties. So military officials
say they want to seek a consensus among allies about how to proceed. "Act
of war" is a political phrase, not a legal term, said Charles Dunlap, a retired
Air Force Major General and professor at Duke University law school. Gen.
Dunlap argues cyber attacks that have a violent effect are the legal
equivalent of armed attacks, or what the military calls a "use of
force." "A cyber attack is governed by basically the same rules as
any other kind of attack if the effects of it are essentially the same,"
Gen. Dunlap said Monday. The U.S. would need to show that the cyber
weapon used had an effect that was the equivalent of a conventional attack.
James Lewis, a computer-security specialist at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies who has advised the Obama administration, said
Pentagon officials are currently figuring out what kind of cyber attack would
constitute a use of force. Many military planners believe the trigger for
retaliation should be the amount of damageactual or attempted
caused by the attack. For instance, if computer sabotage shut down
as much commerce as would a naval blockade, it could be
considered an act of war that justifies retaliation, Mr. Lewis said.

Gauges would include "death, damage, destruction or a high level of

disruption" he said. Culpability, military planners argue in internal
Pentagon debates, depends on the degree to which the attack, or the
weapons themselves, can be linked to a foreign government. That's a tricky
prospect at the best of times. The brief 2008 war between Russia and Georgia
included a cyber attack that disrupted the websites of Georgian government
agencies and financial institutions. The damage wasn't permanent but did
disrupt communication early in the war. A subsequent NATO study said it was
too hard to apply the laws of armed conflict to that cyber attack because both
the perpetrator and impact were unclear. At the time, Georgia blamed its
neighbor, Russia, which denied any involvement. Much also remains unknown
about one of the best-known cyber weapons, the Stuxnet computer virus that
sabotaged some of Iran's nuclear centrifuges. While some experts suspect it
was an Israeli attack, because of coding characteristics, possibly with
American assistance, that hasn't been proven. Iran was the location of only
60% of the infections, according to a study by the computer security firm
Symantec. Other locations included Indonesia, India, Pakistan and the U.S.
Officials from Israel and the U.S. have declined to comment on the
allegations. Defense officials refuse to discuss potential cyber adversaries,
although military and intelligence officials say they have identified previous
attacks originating in Russia and China. A 2009 government-sponsored report
from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission said that
China's People's Liberation Army has its own computer warriors, the
equivalent of the American National Security Agency. That's why military
planners believe the best way to deter major attacks is to hold countries that
build cyber weapons responsible for their use. A parallel, outside experts say,
is the George W. Bush administration's policy of holding foreign governments
accountable for harboring terrorist organizations, a policy that led to the U.S.
military campaign to oust the Taliban from power in Afghanistan.
Note: this next card works in conjunction with the one above; not completely
necessary but its good

Comparing cyberattacks to traditional acts of war

results in armed conflict-escalation in use of force and
aggressiveness
Lawson 12 (Sean, Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication
at the University of Utah, First Monday 7-2, Putting the war in cyberwar:
Metaphor, analogy, and cybersecurity discourse in the United States,
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3848/3270#author)
But there are strong arguments in favor of the continuing adequacy
of the law of war and its restrictive definition of armed attack.
Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap, Jr. (ret), a leading expert in information
age conflict and the law of war, has stated unequivocally that the
law of war is more than adequate for determining if a cyber attack
rises to the level of armed attack. He writes, The leading view,
therefore, among legal experts focuses on the consequences and calls for an
effectsbased analysis of a particular cyber incident to determine whether or
not it equates to an armed attack and that the consequences must

extend to more than mere inconvenience; there must be at least temporary

damage of some kind [17]. As Michael Schmitt, the worlds preeminent
expert on cyber conflict and the law of war has written, to count as armed
attack, an action must have at least been intended to directly cause
physical destruction or injury [18]. As such, James Lewis has argued,
[t]he thresholds for war or attack should not be very different in
cyberspace than they are for physical space. [...] [V]iolence, or the
threat of violence, is the defining element for the use of force,
armed attack, or an act of war. [...] If there is no violence, it is not an
attack or the use of force (Lewis, 2011). There exist a number of clear
frameworks developed by international legal scholars and other critical
researchers that provide a strong and compelling set of tools for identifying
when armed attack has occurred in cyberspace (or anywhere, for that
matter) and, thus, when a state can respond in selfdefense with military
force. Schmitt (1999) has provided a clear normative framework for
determining if a cyber attack constitutes use of force or armed attack [19], as
well as if selfdefense is warranted [20]. Similarly, Myriam Dunn Cavelty has
provided a cyberescalation ladder as an aid to distinguishing between
different types of hostile cyber actions (Dunn Cavelty, 2010). These
frameworks are thoroughly effectsbased to the degree that the instrument
used is largely irrelevant to determining whether an armed attack has
occurred. The argument that an effectsbased approach to jus ad
bellum is adequate is all the more compelling when we consider
some of the possible negative consequences of expanding the
definition of war that results from the instrumentbased
approach. First and most obvious is that [a]llowing forcible reprisal
to nonmilitary coercion would broaden the grounds for use of force
to an intolerable degree [21]. Carelessly using the metaphor of war
for acts that are clearly not war and, as a result, moving to formally
alter definitions of armed attack inevitably leads to aggressive
behavior, the planning of escalating countermeasures and
eventually to real war (Dunn Cavelty, 2011). This is possible, in
part, because of the speed, difficulty of controlling, and likely
collateral damage that would result from the use of the kinds of
offensive cyber attacks imagined by many policymakers and
military leaders. When militarist cyber rhetoric results in use of
offensive cyber attack, it is likely that those attacks will escalate
into physical, kinetic uses of force (Lewis, 2009a; Clarke, 2009).

Cyber terror is an act of war traditional military

force authorized
Gorman, WSJ intelligence correspondent, Barnes, WSJ DOD
and national security correspondent, 11 (Siobhan Gorman and
Julian E. Barnes, 5-31-2011, "Cyber Combat: Act of War," WSJ,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230456310457635562313578
2718 //NK)
WASHINGTONThe Pentagon has concluded that computer sabotage
coming from another country can constitute an act of war, a finding

that for the first time opens the door for the U.S. to respond using
traditional military force. The Pentagon's first formal cyber strategy, unclassified portions of
which are expected to become public next month, represents an early attempt to grapple with a changing

threat to U.S. nuclear reactors,

subways or pipelines as a hostile country's military. In part, the Pentagon
intends its plan as a warning to potential adversaries of the consequences
of attacking the U.S. in this way. "If you shut down our power grid,
maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks," said a
world in which a hacker could pose as significant a

military official. Recent attacks on the Pentagon's own systemsas well as the sabotaging of Iran's nuclear
program via the Stuxnet computer wormhave given new urgency to U.S. efforts to develop a more
formalized approach to cyber attacks. A key moment occurred in 2008, when at least one U.S. military
computer system was penetrated. This weekend Lockheed Martin, a major military contractor,
acknowledged that it had been the victim of an infiltration, while playing down its impact. The report will
also spark a debate over a range of sensitive issues the Pentagon left unaddressed, including whether the
U.S. can ever be certain about an attack's origin, and how to define when computer sabotage is serious
enough to constitute an act of war. These questions have already been a topic of dispute within the

If a cyber
attack produces the death, damage, destruction or high-level
disruption that a traditional military attack would cause, then it
would be a candidate for a "use of force" consideration, which could
merit retaliation. The Pentagon's document runs about 30 pages in its classified version and 12
military. One idea gaining momentum at the Pentagon is the notion of "equivalence."

pages in the unclassified one. It concludes that the Laws of Armed Conflictderived from various treaties
and customs that, over the years, have come to guide the conduct of war and proportionality of response
apply in cyberspace as in traditional warfare, according to three defense officials who have read the
document. The document goes on to describe the Defense Department's dependence on information
technology and why it must forge partnerships with other nations and private industry to protect
infrastructure.

Cybersecurity attacks threaten national securityaccess gained to confidential systems

Wilshusen, Director of Informational Security Issues, 12
(Gregory, April 24, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Cybersecurity:
Threats Impacting the Nation, Wilshusen, June 28, 2015, GG)
The nation faces an evolving array of cyber-based threats arising from
a variety of sources. These threats can be intentional or unintentional.
Unintentional threats can be caused by software upgrades or defective
equipment that inadvertently disrupt systems, and intentional threats can
be both targeted and untargeted attacks from a variety of threat
sources. Sources of threats include criminal groups, hackers, terrorists,
organization insiders, and foreign nations engaged in crime, political activism,
or espionage and information warfare. These threat sources vary in terms of
the capabilities of the actors, their willingness to act, and their motives,
which can include monetary gain or political advantage, among others.
Moreover, potential threat actors have a variety of attack techniques at their
disposal, which can adversely affect computers, software, a network, an
organizations operation, an industry, or the Internet itself. The nature of
cyber attacks can vastly enhance their reach and impact due to the fact that
attackers do not need to be physically close to their victims and can more
easily remain anonymous, among other things. The magnitude of the
threat is compounded by the ever-increasing sophistication of cyber
attack techniques, such as attacks that may combine multiple techniques.
Using these techniques, threat actors may target individuals,
businesses, critical infrastructures, or government organizations. The

threat posed by cyber attacks is heightened by vulnerabilities in

federal systems and systems supporting critical infrastructure. Specifically,
significant weaknesses in information security controls continue to
threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical
information and information systems supporting the operations, assets,
and personnel of federal government agencies. For example, 18 of 24
major federal agencies have reported inadequate information security
controls for financial reporting for fiscal year 2011, and inspectors general at
22 of these agencies identified information security as a major management
challenge for their agency. Moreover, GAO, agency, and inspector general
assessments of information security controls during fiscal year 2011 revealed
that most major agencies had weaknesses in most major categories of
information system controls. In addition, GAO has identified vulnerabilities in
systems that monitor and control sensitive processes and physical functions
supporting the nations critical infrastructures. These and similar
weaknesses can be exploited by threat actors, with potentially severe
effects. The number of cybersecurity incidents reported by federal
agencies continues to rise, and recent incidents illustrate that these
pose serious risk. Over the past 6 years, the number of incidents reported
by federal agencies to the federal information security incident center has
increased by nearly 680 percent. These incidents include unauthorized
access to systems; improper use of computing resources; and the
installation of malicious software, among others. Reported attacks and
unintentional incidents involving federal, private, and infrastructure
systems demonstrate that the impact of a serious attack could be
significant, including loss of personal or sensitive information, disruption or
destruction of critical infrastructure, and damage to national and
economic security.

NIST solving cybersecurity issues- framework created

to combat threats
PWC, international professional services network, 14
(May, Price-Waterhouse Coo, Why you should adopt the NIST cybersecurity
framework, p.3, http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/increasing-iteffectiveness/publications/assets/adopt-the-nist.pdf, June 28, 2015, GG)
While the NIST Cybersecurity Framework may not constitute a foolproof
formula for cybersecurity, its benefits may be missed by those who
choose to forgo or postpone implementation of the voluntary guideline, in
part or in whole.1 Thats because the Framework comprises leading practices
from various standards bodies that have proved to be successful when
implemented, and it also may deliver regulatory and legal advantages
that extend well beyond improved cybersecurity for organizations
that adopt it early. In fact, while the Framework targets organizations that
own or operate critical infrastructure, adoption may prove advantageous for
businesses across virtually all industries. The NIST Cybersecurity
Framework, which was drafted by the Commerce Departments National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), yields no surprises for
critical infrastructure executives who have followed its development,

particularly for those whose personnel participated in workshops to help craft

the guidelines. The Framework does not introduce new standards or
concepts; rather, it leverages and integrates industry-leading
cybersecurity practices that have been developed by organizations like
NIST and the International Standardization Organization (ISO). The
Framework is the result of a February 2013 Executive Order titled Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity and 10 months of collaborative
discussions with more than 3,000 security professionals.2 It comprises a
risk-based compilation of guidelines that can help organizations
identify, implement, and improve cybersecurity practices, and creates
a common language for internal and external communication of cybersecurity
issues. The Framework is a reiterative process designed to evolve in sync
with changes in cybersecurity threats, processes, and technologies. It
will be revised periodically to incorporate lessons learned and industry
feedback. In effect, the Framework envisions effective cybersecurity as
a dynamic, continuous loop of response to both threats and solutions.

Impact US-China War

Cyber attacks cause miscalculations and causes US to
lash out at China
Gompert and Libicki 14 (David, Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence, and Martin, senior management scientist at the RAND
Corporation, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Cyber Warfare
and Sino-American Crisis Instability, vol. 56 no. 4, pg. 17-18,
https://www.iiss.org/-/media/Silos/Survival/2014/Survival--Global-Politics-andStrategy-August-September-2014/56-4-02-Gompert-and-Libicki/56-4-02Gompert-and-Libicki.pdf)
In a crisis over Taiwan, the possibility that a US defence of the island
will be deterred by severely degrading American forces, either with
cyber warfare or an all-out strike, would encourage China to attack
early on and robustly. In either case, given the deleterious effects on
its military forces and operations, the US could assume that a
Chinese cyber attack was a precursor to a conventional strike.
Moreover, intensified Chinese cyber espionage, likely in a crisis,
could be misinterpreted as a cyber attack in preparation for an
armed attack. Because the effects of cyber warfare are short-lived,
the assumption could be that an armed attack was not far behind.
The US might react by resorting immediately to armed conflict in
response to virtually any Chinese cyber operation that could be
interpreted, accurately or not, as a prelude to war. Alternatively, the
US could limit its response to major cyber attacks aimed at
degrading the Chinese kill chain. This could convince Beijing that
war was imminent, thus precipitating Chinese conventional strikes
on US forces (which, of course, may have been planned anyway).
Such a scenario is all the more likely if important decision-makers
were unaware of the Chinese cyber-warfare operations that the US
was reacting to. A mirror image of this scenario may occur if it is the
US rather than China that initiates cyber warfare, either instead of, or
in preparation for, an armed attack, or as stepped-up cyber espionage.15
Indeed, one cannot rule out the possibility that third-party cyberespionage operations may be mistaken for those of the US, carried
out in preparation for cyber war. China might interpret any such act
as a strong indicator that the Americans were preparing to attack its
kill chain. Given the drawbacks of waiting, this could trigger a
Chinese strike. Indeed, both the US and China could assume that
cyber attacks would lead, and lead quickly, to conventional warfare,
making it all the more likely.

Impact Asia Pivot

Risk of Chinese cyber terror high, US will retaliate
using trade sanctions Most significant data breach
in US history
Pengelly, writer for the Guardian, 6/7 (Martin Pengelly, 6-7-2015,
"China likely behind hack of US data, says House homeland security chair,"
Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/07/usgovernment-hacking-china-mike-mccaul //NK)

Mike McCaul, the chairman of the House of Representatives homeland security committee, on Sunday said

believed China was responsible for the recent hacking of personal

data of 4 million federal employees. The Obama administration has not apportioned
blame, though it did this week threaten possible economic sanctions against the
culprit. This was the most significant breach of federal networks in
US history, said McCaul, a Texas Republican. And thats very significant. We look at the threat
he

indicators and ask who has the motive to steal this data in a huge data-mining project that targeted

this was
an attack by China against the United States government. It
quantifies to espionage. And that raises all sorts of issues that we
need to deal with. The hack, which was revealed this week, affected the federal Office of
political appointees in the federal government and federal employees. Now, in my judgment

Personnel Management and the Interior Department. The OPM is responsible for most federal security
clearances. Adam Schiff, the ranking Democrat on the House intelligence committee, was less quick to
apportion blame during an appearance on Fox News Sunday. Its very valuable information, said the
California representative, and while were not allowed to comment on the attribution yet, weve gotten
very good at attribution. And there are only two possibilities here with an attack this sophisticated either
a state actor or a group of private hackers who often work in concert with the state. When the hack was
revealed, the New York Times and Washington Post both reported that Chinese hackers were to blame. So
did Susan Collins, a Republican from Maine who sits on the Senate intelligence committee. On Thursday,
the Chinese embassy in Washington deflected questions on the matter, saying jumping to conclusions was
not responsible and counterproductive. On Friday, White House press secretary Josh Earnest said:
When it comes to China, you all know that the president has frequently, including in every single meeting
that hes conducted with the current Chinese president, raised Chinas activities in cyberspace as a

Obama responded to increasing attacks by

launching a sanctions programme to target individuals and groups
outside the US. The move followed indictments of five Chinese military officers on charges of
significant source of concern. In April,

economic espionage. The US officials has also blamed North Korea for a high-profile attack on Sony.
McCaul, who was appearing on CBS, was asked if the hack could have been carried out by the Chinese
state or by private hackers working for it. All

the threat indicators point to the

fact that it is Ch ina, perhaps nation-state sponsored, because of
the way it was done, he said. It was not done to steal credit card information. It was done to

get personal information of political appointees in the federal government and federal employees, to
exploit them so that later, down the road, they can use it for espionage, to either recruit spies or
compromise individuals in the federal government. Asked about possible US retaliation, McCaul said: This
is an area where there are no rules of the game, in terms of espionage and in terms of stealing
information. On Fox, Schiff said: One of the things we really have to do, in addition to the defence, is
figure out when we are going to go on offence, and how were going to provide a deterrent to future
attacks.

Economic engagement with China key to Asia PivotAIIB, GDP, and US business engagement
Chakravorti, Dean of International Business & Finance at The
Fletcher School at Tufts University, 4/22 (Bhaskar Chakravorti, 4-

22-2015, "China: 1; U.S.: 0. Don't Let the Asia Pivot Turn Into the Asia Peeve,"
Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bhaskar-chakravorti/china-1us-0-dont-let-the_b_7116260.html //NK)
The AIIB is poised to have disproportionate access to fast-growing
investment and development funding opportunities in Asia. The
opportunity costs of not participating could be quite high, with both
economic and geopolitical dimensions. The evolution of Asian infrastructure will be a
critical enabler of growth in the region. Taking part in strengthening the region's fundamentals, like
infrastructure, presents opportunities; this is, after all, widely considered to be the Asian century. Consider
that three out of the four largest economies in the world in 2030 are expected to be in Asia ;

by 2050,
half of the global GDP will come from Asia; three of the top six
trading partners for the U.S. are in Asia; and a fourth Asian country,
India, has the potential to become the fastest-growing large
emerging market in the world. Helping build the region's infrastructure is also a powerful
way of building political capital. Six of the nine known nuclear powers are in Asia, and two, Pakistan and
North Korea, are highly unstable states. Further west, the stretch from South Asia to West Asia poses an
ongoing security challenge for the U.S. and NATO forces. A potential diplomatic breakthrough with Iran
could shift the geopolitical and economic dynamics not only in West Asia but across the Middle East as
well. Key U.S. allies along the Pacific rim and in the Indian Ocean would like to see the U.S. play a stronger
role in counterbalancing China's growing maritime ambitions. The ability to help craft investments in ports
and shipping along with a robust naval presence would have been important signals of commitment to

Undermining U.S. business interests in China.

According to the U.S.-China Business Council, China represents at
least a $300-billion market for American companies. According to
some estimates, U.S. firms have already invested around $70 billion
in China since the early 1980s. Nearly 50 percent of companies
surveyed by the U.S.-China Business Council report that they
anticipate double-digit revenue expansion in China, when the study
was done in 2014. For a staggering 93 percent of businesses
surveyed, China was among the top five priorities -- the top priority for 22
such a counterbalancing role.

percent. Another 70 percent report that their China operations are performing better or the same as their

American businesses place such a high priority on China

despite several challenges, including competition with Chinese
companies, IPR enforcement, and foreign investment restrictions. Two thirds of U.S. companies
global operations.

believe that the playing field is uneven and tilted in favor of state-owned Chinese companies. Some
companies, such as Facebook, do not even have a formal presence in China, and most U.S. tech firms that
do have enormous challenges. Companies like Apple and Cisco were dropped from the Chinese
government's approved technology vendors list after the Edward Snowden leaks about the NSA accessing
data from U.S. technology and communications companies. Besides, to quote a former head of the NSA,
Mike McConnell, "The Chinese have penetrated every major corporation of any consequence in the United
States and taken information." A weaker U.S. policy apparatus limits the capacity of the U.S. government
to negotiate with Chinese authorities to help American businesses do business on better terms.

Missing opportunities to partner with China: The AIIB is just the

latest signal that China is ready to collaborate with other world
powers to address broad global issues. Beijing has started playing
an active role in applying international treaties on issues such as
arms and nuclear control -- China is part of the international group
negotiating with Iran -- and climate change. China has also begun to modestly
contribute to peacekeeping and humanitarian campaigns. It has joined international anti-piracy naval
patrols off the Horn of Africa and has even begun to offer the use of its naval vessels in rescue missions
involving non-Chinese citizens.

Asia pivot key to stop Chinas militarization of the

South China Sea Bases, geopolitics, and land
reclamations
Pham, SCS researcher at the Diplomatic Academy of
Vietnam, 5/5 (Thuc D. Pham, 5-5-2015, "Why the Next US President
Should Pivot to the South China Sea," Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/why-the-next-u-s-president-should-pivot-tothe-south-china-sea/ //NK)
A handful of Democrats and Republicans have expressed an interest in running for their partys 2016

Whoever is elected as the next

president of the United States, he/she should place higher priority
on the South China Sea (SCS). Why? First, the SCS has emerged as a
central aspect of regional geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific. The issue
has been high on agenda of both track I and track II diplomacy, from
day-to-day discussions to regional strategic calculations and beyond.
It encompasses both traditional and non-traditional security issues,
and engages major players in Indo-Pacific, including the U.S., China,
India, Japan, ASEAN, and its member states. More importantly, the SCS is widely
seen as a litmus test of Beijings strategic intentions and actions, and of Washingtons resolve. Second,
U.S. policy towards the disputes in the SCS has been largely
reactive. In retrospect, Washington has modified the content of its
policy in response to tensions triggered by Chinas assertive posture
in the SCS. For example, the first U.S. policy statement on the
Spratlys and the SCS was released in 1995 in response to growing
instability deriving from Chinas move to seek control of Mischief
Reef. Meanwhile, when then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton declared at the 2010 ASEAN Regional
presidential nomination while others are considering.

Forum that the U.S. has national interest in freedom of navigation, it was a corollary of a series of
aggressive Chinese actions, including harassment of the USNS Impeccable. A U.S. State Department
document, Limits in the Seas, released in consequence of Chinas unilateral actions, particularly the HD-

Third,
regardless of Washingtons call for upholding a rules-based stability
in the region, Beijing insists on altering status quo by sheer size
and muscle. Most recently, the U.S. warned China against
militarizing the SCS through its land reclamations and
constructions on some of the features it has occupied in the Spratly
archipelago, which fuel anxiety within the region, and urged it to
avoid destabilizing activities. Beijing responded by arguing that it is building shelter, aids
981 episode, found that Beijings 9-dash line is inconsistent with international laws.

for navigation, search and rescue, etc., and it does not affect and is not targeted against any country.
However, the Fiery Cross Reef images published by CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency on its website show
different outcomes of the constructions (for instance, a 3,110-meter airstrip that can accommodate almost
any type of aircraft; and port facilities that may be capable of docking military tankers). Once the
constructions are complete,

American military bases in the region will be

under growing threat from these outposts. Clearly, the U.S. should make some
adjustments to its SCS policy, so that it becomes more proactive. Specifically, (i) Verbal assertions of

The U.S. naval and air presence in the

SCS must be maintained or increased; (ii) The U.S. should reinforce a
new web of partnerships throughout Asia that includes traditional
allies but goes beyond them. Among the new team in Southeast Asia, Washington should
freedom of navigation remain insufficient.

deepen ties and seek to expand the scope of joint activities with Vietnam in the maritime domain

Chinese SCS militarization leads to multiple scenarios

for a nuclear World War III The timeframe is literally
right now
Hua, (Shen Hua, 6-3-2015, "Will South China Sea Dispute Lead to World
War?," VOA, http://www.voanews.com/content/will-south-china-sea-disputelead-to-world-war/2806950.html //NK)
WASHINGTON Will South China Sea issues trigger a third world war?
While American scholars and New York investors are paying close
attention to the political, military and economic aspects of the South
China Sea conflict, others find the speculation unconvincing. The U.S. and China
have increasingly argued in recent days over Beijing's artificial
island building, turning underwater land into airfields, in the South
China Sea. U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter said on Saturday that
the U.S. opposes any further militarization of the disputed lands,
while one of Chinas top ranking military officials has defended
building artificial islands in contested waters, saying the land
reclamation is justified, legitimate and reasonable. Gordon Chang, author
of The Coming Collapse of China, recently claimed that the South China Sea could
become the next Great War Zone. Chang said last week at a panel
discussion held by the U.S. Air Force Association that it will not be
long before the U.S. takes initiatives to respond to Chinas
unyielding attitude and behavior in the South China Sea. He said the
time frame is now. The U.S. Navy is clearly going to test Chinas
claims of exclusion of the South China Sea, Chang said. We have
to do that, because if there has been any consistent American
foreign policy over the course of two centuries, it has been the
defense of freedom of navigation. Now China is infringing on that notion at this
time, Chang added. I think we probably will act in a very short time
frame. Chang called it a classic zero-sum game for China to challenge
the U.S. in the South China Sea. He said China sees the South China
Sea as one of its core interests with no room for negotiation, while
the U.S. has been the influential maritime power for the past two
centuries. Both could concede on the South China Sea issues, Chang said, but they will not abandon
their long-held positions. Rick Fisher, senior research fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy

attention should also be paid to the development of

nuclear weapons in China and North Korea. He said that although
North Korea stays quiet for now, it is likely to take advantage of the
South China Sea disputes in the foreseeable future. As soon as
North Korea can demonstrate that it can fire a nuclear missile, then
North Korea becomes a factor because North Korea itself can decide
to take a period of high confrontation in the South China Sea and put
greater pressure on the United States in order to obtain concessions
from South Korea or the U.S. itself. So, Fisher said, as soon as there is a
crisis, North Korea could become a very dangerous element. Fisher said
although Kim Jong Un has rifts with the Chinese government, both
share and act by the same communist ideology. Well-known American investor
Center, told VOA that

George Soros also expressed concerns about the Chinese aggression in the South China Sea in recent

He said at a recent World Bank forum that if China suffers

economically, it is likely to initiate a third world war in order to
achieve national solidarity and to get itself out of the economic
months.

difficulties. Even if China and the U.S. do not engage in a war

directly, Soros said, there is a high possibility of military conflicts
between China and one of the U.S. security partners, Japan. World
War III could follow as a result, Soros said.

Sanctions will cause World War III Pre WWI Japan proves
Saunders, executive director of the Center for the National
Interest, 14 (Paul J. Saunders, 8-21-2014, "When Sanctions Lead to War,"
International New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/22/opinion/when-sanctions-lead-to-war.html
//NK)
WASHINGTON As Ukraine battles separatists and Russia appears poised to invade, many
historians and scholars are warning of ominous similarities to the
outbreak of World War I in 1914. But they are ignoring a more
important comparison: 1941. The United States and Europe have until
now relied almost exclusively on the threat of severe economic
sanctions to prevent a Russian invasion of Ukraine. But sanctions even
crippling ones wont necessarily avert this. For 20 years, economic sanctions have become Washingtons
preferred policy to demonstrate resolve without using force. Yet the United States has not imposed harsh
sanctions on major powers; Iran has been the toughest target, and it hasnt unconditionally surrendered its
nuclear program. Washington has not tried to compel another major power with sanctions since 1940-41,

when America imposed them on Imperial Japan, culminating in an oil

embargo and the seizure of Japanese assets in July 1941. At that
time, the United States sought to deter Japan from seizing Southeast
Asia and demanded that Tokyo withdraw from Indochina and China.
Japan in turn concluded that American sanctions made the
occupation of Southeast Asia essential, as well as the devastation of
the United States Navy. Todays policy makers would do well to study
the American and Japanese choices that produced Japans attack on
Pearl Harbor in December 1941. American officials at the time widely assumed that Japan
wouldnt dare challenge the United States because, as then Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson
later put it, No rational Japanese could believe an attack on us could result in anything but disaster. And
they offered no carrots to Tokyo only a weak stick, because, like President Obama today, Franklin D.
Roosevelt never clearly threatened force. Meanwhile, Japan viewed the American position as a demand to
forgo its role as a great power something unacceptable to a proud empire. Japan preferred to fight

Japanese leaders saw little distinction between

economic sanctions and warfare and realized that sanctions would
make their country weaker over time something that encouraged them to strike
rather than cave in. Moreover,

sooner rather than later. They also believed the United States was politically weak and would give up if the
costs got too high or the war lasted too long.

Solvency Transparency Solves

Transparency about NSA BULLRUN is key to cyber
security for tech companies as well as the general
populationa deeper understanding allows for
defense against cyber attacks
Auerbach and Opsahl 13 (Dan, writer for the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, and Kurt, civil liberties and privacy lawyer, 9-9, Crucial
Unanswered Questions about the NSAs BULLRUN Program,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/crucial-unanswered-questions-aboutnsa-bullrun-program)
As we work hard to promote encryptionoh on the web through tools like our
browser extension HTTPS Everywhere, we also pay close attention to
attacks that undermine the security of that encryption. That's why
we were dismayed by last Thursday's revelations about the National
Security Agency's aggressive efforts to undermine the ability of
citizens to communicate securely. It's not surprising that the NSA
would try to break cryptographic systems in whatever way they can,
but the deeply pernicious nature of this campaignundermining
national standards and sabotaging hardware and softwareas well
as the amount of overt private sector cooperation are both shocking.
These leaks should not lead us to privacy nihilism while we cannot be
certain about the NSA's capabilities, we have good reason to believe that the
mathematical underpinnings of crypto systems in widespread use remain
strong. We are safer when communicating with encryption and
anonymity tools. This is especially true for open source tools that
are developed in public view and provide a higher level of
auditability than closed tools. Even if the NSA and other major
spying powers like the United Kingdom, China, and Russia have
advanced attacks and backdoors, strong encryption can make their
spying more difficult while protecting against less sophisticated
adversaries. And while it is important not to despair, a thorough
examination of the available information from the NSA is in order,
both so that we can bolster our defenses against these attacks on
our communications infrastructure, and so that we can have an open
democratic debate about what tactics are appropriate for the NSA to
use. Unfortunately, while last Thursday's articles and documents
about the BULLRUN program paint a picture of spy agencies working
hard on a variety of fronts in order to undermine our ability to
communicate securely, these broad brush strokes leave many key
questions unanswered. Does the NSA hold the private SSL encryption keys
of major communication service providers like Facebook, Google, and
Microsoft? We've recently been worried about the privacy of keys that are
supposed to be in the hands of service providers and no one else. A very
large fraction of the world's online communications flow through a handful of
service providers, and in turn a handful of private keys used by those
providers serve as a gateway to the communications of billions of people. It is
therefore critical to know whether or not the NSA has these private keys,

since that would mean the agency has unfettered access to a huge swath of
the world's online communications.1 The New York Times reports that the
agency has a database of encryption keys for specific commercial products.
It is not clear whether these products include online communication services,
but there are strong hints that many such services have been compromised.
According to the Times, by 2012, the GCHQ the British equivalent of the
NSA had developed new access opportunities into Google's systems. The
Guardian has also reported that Microsoft has worked with the NSA to get
pre-encryption stage access to email on outlook.com, including Hotmail.
Given the magnitude of spying that could occur with private key access to
major service providers, this is a critical question and Internet users deserve
an answer to be able to choose what communication platforms to use. What
methods does the NSA use to obtain private encryption keys? The Times
says that how keys are acquired is shrouded in secrecy, but
speculates that many are likely collected by hacking into companies'
servers. Having concrete evidence of these attacks would have
important legal and technical ramifications, and we hope that this
information comes to light, both so that companies have the
opportunity to improve the security of their servers and so the
American public can take part in a transparent debate about what
targets and methods are appropriate for the NSA to pursue. What
hardware has the NSA backdoored? The New York Times reports that, in
addition to partnering with telecommunications providers and other
companies, including Microsoft, the NSA had found ways inside some of the
encryption chips, either by working with chipmakers to insert back doors or
by surreptitiously exploiting existing security flaws. This means that there is
probably a lot of hardware floating around that the NSA knows to be insecure,
leaving many individuals and companies likely vulnerable to a host of
attackers. As we've explained before, back doors fundamentally
undermine everybody's security, not just that of bad guys. We need
to know what hardware is affected so that these vulnerabilities can
be fixed. This is especially critical now that these leaks have come
out, since malicious attackers now have been tipped off that back
doors exist, and so it is even more likely that exploitable
vulnerabilities will be discovered by parties other than the NSA, if
they have not been already. What power does the NSA have over
companies to get them to cooperate? How often do companies cooperate,
and what happens when they say no? We need to know if and how the
NSA uses the legal system to compel company cooperation with
requests for back doors. While FISA may allow the government to
seek technical assistance from telecoms, there is nothing in the law
to require the addition of backdoors to secure communications
products, either in software or in hardware. Indeed, when the
government attempted to legally require encryption backdoors with the
Clipper Chip, EFF and others fought back and defeated the proposal. If the
NSA thinks it has this authority, it has to come forward and explain
the basis. We also need to know how often this cooperation occurs
and on what scale. For example, the New York Times reports that in
one case, after the government learned that a foreign intelligence
target had ordered new computer hardware, the American

manufacturer agreed to insert a back door into the product before it

was shipped. Are these sorts of agreements common? Are the
companies pressured, enticed, or is the cooperation voluntary?
Conclusion The NSA needs to come clean about the scope of its
capabilities and relationships with companies. President Obama has
said that new public disclosures about the NSA constitute only bits
and pieces of a larger story, and that to have an open and
democratic debate we should "put the whole elephant out there."
Unfortunately, this purported concession of more transparency has
not been borne out, as we have seen continued unwillingness on the
part of the Intelligence Community or the President to reveal or
confirm enough information to have a truly informed debate. The
lack of openess around these clandestine programs has become a
liability for America. The Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper claimed last week that these leaks have harmed America's
efforts to thwart terrorists by revealing "specific techniques we are
using to try to intercept their communications." This is the tired and
empty rhetoric of fear that we've seen again and again. Nobody is
suggesting that particular investigations or individual spying efforts
must be revealed. But while any terrorist with half a brain has
already stopped using Facebook, millions of people may stop using
American-based social networks, email providers, or hardware if
they believe them to be insecure. That's why we need more details,
not fewer, to better understand the scope and contours of these
spying programs, and to have an open democratic debate about
what methods the NSA should use to accomplish its mission.

Solvency Eliminate Bullrun Solves

Ending NSA programs key to the productivity of the
tech sector-several tech executives agree
Chu 14 (Keith, spokesperson for US Senate Committee on Finance, 10-8, US
Senate Committee on Finance, Wyden, Top Tech Executives: End Mass
Surveillance to Boost Digital Economy,
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=2e57f5e4fe29-4ca3-9342-f567d19e7a05)
Senate Finance Committee Chairman Ron Wyden and executives
from Dropbox, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft today said
immediately ending dragnet surveillance will provide an economic
booster shot to the U.S. tech sector and make America more
competitive in the global digital economy. The tech leaders said
mass surveillance has cost American tech companies profits, sales
and exports to growing markets around the world. "When the
actions of a foreign government threaten red-white-and-blue jobs,
Washington gets up at arms. But, even today, almost no one in
Washington is talking about how overly broad surveillance is hurting
the US economy, Wyden said. Let me be clear: It is time to end the
digital dragnet, which harms American liberty and the American
economy without making the country safer. Google Executive
Chairman Eric Schmidt, Microsoft Executive Vice President and General
Counsel Brad Smith, Facebook General Counsel Colin Stretch, Dropbox
General Counsel Ramsey Homsany, and John Lilly of the venture capital firm
Greylock Partners spoke at the roundtable. These tech industry leaders
agreed that ending overreaching spying programs is a necessary
first step to restoring the values of Americas digital brand, and
improving consumer trust. Brad Smith, General Counsel and Executive
Vice President, Microsoft: People wont use technology they dont
trust. Globally we need better ways to protect public safety,
preserve our fundamental freedoms, and promote privacy and trust.
Todays roundtable is helping forward that important global conversation.
Colin Stretch, General Counsel, Facebook: "We continue to believe
meaningful surveillance reform is critical to restoring peoples faith
in the Internet. The government has a vital role to play in keeping
the public safe, but we believe they can do this while being more
transparent about their actions. Thats why we'll continue to work
with leaders like Senator Wyden and his colleagues in Congress to
address all of the reforms necessary to restore confidence in the
internet. Ramsey Homsany, General Counsel, Dropbox: Users around the
world trust Dropbox to be a home for their most important information.
Safeguarding that information is a top priority for us and our business. Well
keep working hard on our users behalf, but we also need Congress to pass
the USA Freedom Act so the law does its part to protect their information. It
has been estimated that the National Security Agencys mass
collection of personal communications will cost U.S cloud computing
firms up to $35 billion over just the next few years. Foreign

countries are already using the existence of intrusive spying

programs as an excuse to shut out U.S. companies. The roundtable was
held in the gymnasium of Wydens alma mater, Palo Alto High School, where
he played high school basketball.

Tech companies pushing hard for NSA reform-the NSA

programs damage their financial interests
Roberts and Kiss 13 (Dan, Washington DC bureau chief for the Guardian,
and Jemima, tech correspondent at the Guardian, The Guardian, Twitter,
Facebook and more demand sweeping changes to US surveillance,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-surveillance-techcompanies-demand-sweeping-changes-to-us-laws)
The world's leading technology companies have united to demand
sweeping changes to US surveillance laws, urging an international
ban on bulk collection of data to help preserve the public's trust in
the internet. In their most concerted response yet to disclosures by
the National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden, Apple,
Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Yahoo, LinkedIn, Twitter and AOL have
published an open letter to Barack Obama and Congress on Monday,
throwing their weight behind radical reforms already proposed by
Washington politicians. The balance in many countries has tipped too far
in favour of the state and away from the rights of the individual rights that
are enshrined in our constitution, urges the letter signed by the eight USbased internet giants. This undermines the freedoms we all cherish. Its time
for change. Several of the companies claim the revelations have
shaken public faith in the internet and blamed spy agencies for the
resulting threat to their business interests. People wont use
technology they dont trust, said Brad Smith, Microsoft's general
counsel. Governments have put this trust at risk, and governments
need to help restore it. The chief executive of Yahoo, Marissa
Mayer, said: Recent revelations about government surveillance
activities have shaken the trust of our users, and it is time for the
United States government to act to restore the confidence of
citizens around the world." Silicon Valley was initially sceptical of
some allegations about NSA practices made by Snowden but as more
documentary evidence has emerged in the Guardian and other
newspapers detailing the extent of western surveillance capabilities,
its eight leading players collectively valued at $1.4tn have been
stung into action amid fears of commercial damage. We understand
that governments have a duty to protect their citizens, they say in the letter.
But this summers revelations highlighted the urgent need to reform
government surveillance practices worldwide. A separate list of five
reform principles signed by the normally fiercely competitive
group echoes measures to rein in the NSA contained in bipartisan
legislation proposed by the Democratic chair of the Senate judiciary
committee, Patrick Leahy, and the Republican author of the Patriot
Act, Representative Jim Sensenbrenner. Crucially, Silicon Valley and
these key reformers in Congress now agree the NSA should no longer be
allowed to indiscriminately gather vast quantities of data from individuals it

does not have cause to suspect of terrorism in order to detect patterns or in

case it is needed in future. Governments should limit surveillance to
specific, known users for lawful purposes, and should not undertake
bulk data collection of internet communications, says the
companies' new list of principles. They also argue that requests for
companies to hand over individual data should be limited by new
rules that balance the need for the data in limited circumstances,
users reasonable privacy interests, and the impact on trust in the
internet. This places them in direct conflict with Dianne Feinstein, the
Democratic chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who is sponsoring a
rival bill that would enshrine the right of security agencies to collect bulk
data. Feinstein, who represents California, has been accused by critics of
being a cheerleader for Washington's intelligence committee but now faces
opposition from her state's largest industry. The companies also repeat a
previous demand that they should be allowed to disclose how often
surveillance requests are made but this is the first time they have come
together with such wide-ranging criticism of the underlying policy. The
industry's lobbying power has been growing in Washington and
could prove a tipping point in the congressional reform process,
which has been delayed by the autumn budget deadlock but is likely
to return as a central issue in the new year. The Feinstein and
Leahy/Sensenbrenner bills agree with technology companies that there
should be greater transparency of court rulings regulating surveillance and
more opportunity for privacy advocates to argue against intelligence agency
requests. The eight technology companies also hint at new fears, particularly
that competing national responses to the Snowden revelations will not only
damage their commercial interests but also lead to a balkanisation of the web
as governments try to prevent internet companies from escaping overseas.
The ability of data to flow or be accessed across borders is essential to a
robust, 21st century, global economy, the companies argue in the list of
reform principles. Governments should permit the transfer of data and
should not inhibit access by companies or individuals to lawfully available
information that is stored outside of the country. Governments should not
require service providers to locate infrastructure within a countrys borders or
operate locally. And they argue foreign governments need to come together
to agree new international standards regulating surveillance, hinting at legal
disputes and damage to international trade otherwise. In order to avoid
conflicting laws, there should be a robust, principled, and transparent
framework to govern lawful requests for data across jurisdictions, such as
improved mutual legal assistance treaty or MLAT processes, say the
companies. Where the laws of one jurisdiction conflict with the laws of
another, it is incumbent upon governments to work together to resolve the
conflict. Official responses to the Snowden revelations have been angriest in
countries subject to US surveillance such as Germany and Brazil, but more
muted in countries such as Britain and Australia, whose governments are
close partners of the NSA. Martha Lane Fox, who recently resigned as the
British government's digital champion, responded to the new letter by
expressing concern at the lack of understanding of both the scale and
complexity of the surveillance story within Britain's government. "We do have
an issue in this country among the corporate world, the political

establishment and the general population where we have a shortage of skills

and understanding for the digital age," she told the Guardian. "There is an
absence of a clear, coherent debate around this subject in this country and
it's a very big issue that will only become more frequent the more
technologically dependent we become." She pointed to comments made by
the former Conservative home office minister Lord Blencathra and the Labour
peer Lord Soley, who both expressed concern at the scope of surveillance by
the security services. "[The government] needs to listen to people, to
examine whether their policies are fit for the digital age. It's not that people
aren't used to their data being collected, but what it is being collected for,
and there needs to be a distinction between the average person and a
security threat." The eight internet companies behind the new letter
also acknowledge that business also has a responsibility to protect
privacy. For our part, we are focused on keeping users data secure,
deploying the latest encryption technology to prevent unauthorised
surveillance on our networks, and by pushing back on government
requests to ensure that they are legal and reasonable in scope,
they conclude. We urge the US to take the lead and make reforms
that ensure that government surveillance efforts are clearly
restricted by law, proportionate to the risks, transparent and subject
to independent oversight. Google, Twitter, Yahoo and last week Microsoft
have all responded to public concerns over surveillance by increasing the
security of their products, introducing perfect forward secrecy encryption to
protect information travelling on their internal systems. "The security of
users' data is critical, which is why we've invested so much in encryption and
fight for transparency around government requests for information, said
Google's chief executive, Larry Page. This is undermined by the apparent
wholesale collection of data, in secret and without independent oversight, by
many governments around the world. It's time for reform and we urge the US
government to lead the way.

--Internet Freedom--

UQ Internet Freedom Low

Current NSA surveillance hinders any chance of
Internet freedom- lack of oversight makes matters
worse
Wadhwa, researcher with the Hybrid Reality Institute, 13 (Tarun, 6-132013, "NSA Surveillance May Have Dealt Major Blow To Global Internet
Freedom Efforts," Forbes,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tarunwadhwa/2013/06/13/with-nsa-surveillanceus-government-may-have-dealt-major-blow-to-global-internet-freedomefforts/)//GL
One thing has become clear though: the credibility of the idea that
the internet can be a positive, freedom-promoting global force is
facing its largest challenge to date. And it comes directly from one of its most
outspoken supporters: the US government. Simply put, our government has failed in its role as the
caretaker of the internet. Although this was never an official designation, America controls much of the
infrastructure, and many of the most popular services online are provided by a handful of American

The world is starting to sober up to the fact that much of

what theyve done online in the last decade is now cataloged in a
top-secret facility somewhere in the United States. Reasonable
minds can disagree over the necessity of these programs and how to
strike the proper balance between security and privacy. These
matters aside, what has been the most disturbing part of this entire
scandal has to do with the lack of accountability and oversight. Not only
companies.

were the American people kept in the dark they were lied to by intelligence officials, misled about
possible constitutional violations, and potentially undermined by the very courts that were supposed to
protect their rights. The government has used peculiar interpretations of laws that they are not even
willing to discuss to defend an invasive collection of personal data beyond anything even the paranoid
among us would have thought was possible. And while President Obama welcomes the debate over an
issue he has worked hard to keep secret, we are now starting to see the usual Washington tactics of
political spin, feverish scapegoating, and patriotic grandstanding in lieu of a real discussion. We should all
be extremely concerned about the colossal surveillance infrastructure that is being built in the name of our
safety. In trying to reassure the public, our leaders have told us that these programs are not meant to
target us, but instead, foreigners who may pose a threat to our security. But this is merely a decision on
how the data is being used today we are getting into very dangerous territory by hoping for the best
intentions of whoever is in power in the future. American history holds many lessons for us here:
circumstances can change, the perception of who is a threat can vary with whoever is in office, and we

In the
court of global public opinion, America may have tarnished its moral
authority to question the surveillance practices of other nations
whether it be Russia on monitoring journalists, or China on
conducting cyber espionage. Declarations by the State Department
that were once statements of principle now ring hollow and
hypocritical to some. No nation can rival the American surveillance
state, but they no longer need support to build their own massive
systems of espionage and oppression. The costs of surveillance and data storage
cannot predict what our political situation will look like decades, or even years, from now.

technologies are plummeting these will no longer be prohibitive factors. Diplomatic pressures and legal

The goal has been

to promote internet freedom around the world, but we may have
also potentially created a blueprint for how authoritarian
governments can store, track, and mine their citizens digital lives.
barriers that had also once served as major deterrents will soon fade away.

International blacklash at NSA revelations have

eroded Internet freedom globally.
Mott, Staff writer at Pando, 2014
(Nathaniel, 12/9/2014, Pando, Report: Governments have used Snowdens
whistleblowing as cover to harm Internet freedom,
https://pando.com/2014/12/09/report-governments-have-used-snowdenswhistleblowing-as-cover-to-harm-internet-freedoms/, accessed 6/25/2015,
JAK)
"Some states are using the revelations of widespread surveillance by
the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) as an excuse to augment
their own monitoring capabilities, frequently with little or no
oversight, and often aimed at the political opposition and human
rights activists," Freedom House says in the report's summary. "Growing
restrictions at the national level are also changing the nature of the
global Internet, transforming it from a worldwide network into a
fragmented mosaic, with both the rules and the accessible content varying
from one country to another." The report claims that Internet freedom
worsened in 36 of the 65 countries it examined, with those affected
ranging from Russia and the United Kingdom to Syria and the United
States, often as the result of efforts to quash dissent and penalize
both digital activities and communications. Another 12 countries saw an
overall increase in Internet freedoms; others stayed about the same. (The
least and most free countries -- Iran and Iceland, respectively -- also
remained unchanged.) Two main problems have become worse over the last
year: increased efforts to force companies to store information within a
country, allowing its government to assert more control over how that data is
used and accessed; and the arrest of citizens who share something with
which their government disagrees, which often encourages other citizens to
censor themselves in response. Both problems allow governments to
misrepresent their commitment to Internet freedoms.

The NSA threatens to destroy internet freedom

Ignoring treaties, and alienating citizens
Dourando, former member of two US delegations to the
United Nations' International Telecommunications Union, 13
(Eli Dourado, 8-1-2013, "So much for America's internet freedom agenda,"
Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/07/nsasurveillance-alienating-us-from-world //NK)
The National Security Agency's surveillance of innocent Americans
without a warrant is illegal and unconstitutional. In a narrowly defeated
amendment, congressman Justin Amash (a Michigan Republican) and a bipartisan group of over 200 members of Congress
recently voted to defund the NSA's warrantless spying on US citizens. But obscured by the debate over domestic spying is
the fact that virtually no one in the United States is questioning the NSA's total surveillance of the rest of the world.
Foreign

surveillance programs, unlike domestic ones, are clearly

legal and constitutional, but that doesn't make them good policy.
After all, most of the nearly seven billion non-Americans in the world
are just as innocent as most Americans. They resent US government
surveillance as much as, or perhaps more than, Americans do. To see
how foreign resentment over surveillance is hurting US interests,

look at the international politics of internet governance. Unsavory

regimes have long sought a preeminent role for the United Nations
on internet matters. This past December in Dubai, the United States and many of
its allies refused to sign a UN telecommunications treaty that would
have implicated the internet in part on the grounds that it would
have harmed Internet freedom. Led by Russia, some regimes want to
split the internet into 193 separate "states" (pdf), managed by
national governments, which interconnect according to the rules of a
treaty. These countries want such arrangements because they want
to more effectively surveil and censor their own citizens. The US
State Department always rightly opposed such activities, but now
that leaked documents are revealing the NSA's domestic and global
surveillance programs, the United States looks hypocritical. One can come
up with all kinds of excuses for why US surveillance is not hypocrisy. For example, one might argue that US policies are

true. And one might recognize

that in several cases, some branches of government don't know
what other branches are doing also true and therefore US policy
is not so much hypocritical as it is inadvertently contradictory. Fine.
But the fact is that the NSA is galvanizing opposition to America's
internet freedom agenda. The scandal is reinvigorating Russian proposals for the International
more benevolent than those of many other regimes, which is

Telecommunication Union, a UN agency, to take over internet technical standards and management of the domain name
system. Brazil insists that the role of governments and intergovernmental agencies in managing the internet be discussed
at ITU meetings in November and March. These are not major policy changes, but they now find a more sympathetic ear
from the developing countries that make up the majority at the ITU, which conducts business on the basis of one vote per
country. In truth, most developing countries don't care very much about the management of the internet per se. What
they really want is more access to the internet more foreign investment and more aid to set up internet exchange points.
In the past, the United States always offered more development resources as a way to smooth over its hard-line stance on

But now, developing countries don't want US

assistance because they assume the equipment comes with a
backdoor for the NSA. They are walking straight into the arms of
Russia, China, and the ITU, and when the time comes to decide how
the internet should be managed, who do you think they'll side with?
preserving existing Internet institutions.

This is not to suggest that the United States shut down all of its intelligence operations. After all, other countries spy, and
spying for better or worse is part of international politics. But the United States is one of very few countries with the
capability to monitor absolutely everything that is going on in the world. This means that the kind of indiscriminate, total
surveillance that the United States is presently engaged in is not strictly necessary, and unilateral disarmament is an

US intelligence
hegemony has its advantages, particularly if you are a US
intelligence officer. Yet as the politics of internet governance shows,
it also has significant costs. By surveilling harmless and innocent
foreigners alongside America's enemies, the United States is
alienating the world and projecting an arrogant disregard for the
perfectly ordinary aspirations of billions of people to maintain some
semblance of privacy in their personal lives. Eventually, that
alienation could destroy the free, global Internet that we all love. Is it
option. No doubt the intelligence establishment will dismiss the suggestion out of hand.

worth it?

The NSA violates basic rights and internet freedomsgrowing opposition groups agree
Hoboken, Microsoft research fellow, Rubenstein, senior fellow
at the information law institute, 14
(Joris V.J. van, Ira S., N/D 14, Maine Law Review, PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN
THE CLOUD: SOME REALISM ABOUT TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS TO

TRANSNATIONAL SURVEILLANCE IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA, Lexis, 5-25-15,

YA)
The Snowden revelations have led to a wide variety of responses by
different actors affected by government access to data and
communications processed by cloud providers. Although this Section focuses
primarily on the response of cloud providers, it is useful to first consider the wider context by examining
the responses of a few selected groups such as security engineers, and the privacy advocacy and human

Due to the repercussions for information security

products and solutions, members of the security engineering
community have been particularly vocal in their condemnation of the
methods used to gain access to Internet data by corrupting Internet
security standards. This community has also played a major role in
interpreting and analyzing the technical aspects of the programs
that were revealed by Snowden and their implications for the
privacy and security of [*507] communications, providing input for the
public debate. Edward Felten, a professor of computer science and public policy, and
former Chief Technologist for the Federal Trade Commission, noted that "[i]n security, the
worst case . . . is thinking you are secure when you're not. And that's
exactly what the NSA seems to be trying to perpetuate." n122 Bruce
Schneier, a leading computer security specialist who has written extensively about the Snowden
documents, echoed a broader sentiment in castigating the NSA for its
"betrayal" of security engineers and free and open nature of the
Internet. n123 Debates are already underway within the IETF and the
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) on how best to counter the
threats of pervasive monitoring and are likely to result in new and
improved Internet security standards and practices. Privacy
advocacy groups around the world have used the Snowden
revelations to intensify ongoing campaigns to limit government
surveillance of Internet users. First, these groups have filed a
number of court cases in the U.S. and abroad, including in the U.K.,
Germany, and the Netherlands. n125 Within the international human
rights community, there are several new initiatives to strengthen
safeguards against government surveillance. For example, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights held an official hearing on
the NSA's mass surveillance programs. n126 Additionally, in July
2013, a broad international coalition of more than four hundred
human rights related NGOs finalized and signed the International
Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications
[*508] Surveillance ("Principles"). n127 The Principles condemn mass
surveillance as a human rights violation and assert and interpret
accepted principles such as proportionality, necessity, and
transparency in the communications surveillance context. n128 Finally,
a broad range of NGOs have joined forces in the Stop Watching Us n129 coalition
rights community.

and the more recent 'Day We Fight Back.' n130 The international human rights community has also
condemned the treatment of Edward Snowden as a criminal rather than as a whistleblower and
condemned restrictions on the reporting of the leaked documents. n131 In a recent report, Frank La Rue,

on the promotion and protection of the right to

freedom of opinion and expression, analyzed the implications of
mass surveillance on the right to freedom of expression and the
need for government surveillance practices to comply with human
rights standards. n132
the U.N. Special Rapporteur

I/L BULLRUN Bad

NSA surveillance undermines internet- creates the
potential for a fragmented internet
Tsukayama, Consumer Technology Reporter, 14 (Hayley, July 3rd,
Washington Post, Researchers asked 1,400 experts to describe the biggest
threats to the Web. Heres what they said.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/07/03/researchersasked-1400-experts-to-describe-the-biggest-threats-to-the-web-heres-whatthey-said/, 06/26/15, MM)
What are the biggest threats to the Internet in the next 20 years? According
to experts canvassed by Pew, the biggest threats aren't a rise in
hacking attacks or new waves of Internet crime. They're government
and big online corporations. Control and consolidation were the top
threats for experts canvassed by Pew's Internet and American Life
Project in a study published Thursday. The think tank asked more
than 1,400 experts -- academics, theorists and those who work in
the technology industry -- to weigh in on what risks the Internet
faces through 2025. The majority pointed to government
surveillance, restrictive regulation and corporate greed as the things
most likely to kill the idea that the Web is a free-flowing network of
information. Plenty expressed concern that the Internet will fracture
due to government policies, such as those that limit access to the Web as
some governments did during the Arab Spring, aggressive intellectual
property laws or even well-meaning policies in Canada and Australia that
aggressively filter all Internet traffic to combat child pornography. These
efforts, experts said, cross the line -- or at least flirt with it. Paul Saffo,
managing director at Discern Analytics, said: "The pressures to balkanize the
global Internet will continue and create new uncertainties. Government will
become more skilled at blocking access to unwelcome sites." Experts were
also quick to point out that recent revelations in the wake of Edward
Snowden's leaks about the National Security Agency and disclosures
about the data that companies are vacuuming up threatens to erode
trust in the greater Web. "Because of governance issues (and the
international implications of the NSA reveals), data sharing will get
geographically fragmented in challenging ways. The next few years
are going to be about control," said danah boyd, a research scientist
for Microsoft.

The NSA undermines internet freedom-disrupts of

privacy, weakening of internet security, offensive
hacking, and significant damage to the global internet
community
Danielle Kehl, New Americas Open Technology Institute, 2014
[New Americas Open Technology Institute, Surveillance Costs: The NSAs
Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,

https://www.newamerica.org/downloads/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf, 6/25/15,
CY]
It has been over a year since The Guardian reported the first story on the
National Security Agencys surveillance programs based on the leaks from
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, yet the national conversation
remains largely mired in a simplistic debate over the tradeoffs between
national security and individual privacy. It is time to start weighing the overall
costs and benefits more broadly. While intelligence officials have
vigorously defended the merits of the NSA programs, they have
offered little hard evidence to prove their valueand some of the initial
analysis actually suggests that the benefits of these programs are dubious.
Three different studiesfrom the Presidents Review Group on
Intelligence and Communications Technologies, the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board, and the New America Foundations
International Security Programquestion the value of bulk collection
programs in stopping terrorist plots and enhancing national security.
Meanwhile, there has been little sustained discussion of the costs of the NSA
programs beyond their impact on privacy and liberty, and in particular, how
they affect the U.S. economy, American foreign policy, and the security of the
Internet as a whole. This paper attempts to quantify and categorize the costs
of the NSA surveillance programs since the initial leaks were reported in June
2013. Our findings indicate that the NSAs actions have already begun
to, and will continue to, cause significant damage to the interests of
the United States and the global Internet community. Specifically, we
have observed the costs of NSA surveillance in the following four areas:
Direct Economic Costs to U.S. Businesses: American companies have
reported declining sales overseas and lost business opportunities,
especially as foreign companies turn claims of products that can
protect users from NSA spying into a competitive advantage. The
cloud computing industry is particularly vulnerable and could lose
billions of dollars in the next three to five years as a result of NSA
surveillance. Potential Costs to U.S. Businesses and to the Openness of the
Internet from the Rise of Data Localization and Data Protection Proposals:
New proposals from foreign governments looking to implement data
localization requirements or much stronger data protection laws
could compound economic losses in the long term. These proposals
could also force changes to the architecture of the global network
itself, threatening free expression and privacy if they are
implemented. Costs to U.S. Foreign Policy: Loss of credibility for the
U.S. Internet Freedom agenda, as well as damage to broader
bilateral and multilateral relations, threaten U.S. foreign policy
interests. Revelations about the extent of NSA surveillance have already
colored a number of critical interactions with nations such as Germany and
Brazil in the past year. Costs to Cybersecurity: The NSA has done serious
damage to Internet security through its weakening of key encryption
standards, insertion of surveillance backdoors into widely-used
hardware and software products, stockpiling rather than responsibly
disclosing information about software security vulnerabilities, and a
variety of offensive hacking operations undermining the overall
security of the global Internet. The U.S. government has already

taken some limited steps to mitigate this damage and begin the
slow, difficult process of rebuilding trust in the United States as a
responsible steward of the Internet. But the reform efforts to date
have been relatively narrow, focusing primarily on the surveillance
programs impact on the rights of U.S. citizens.

I/L Bullrun Kills Internet Freedom Promo

BULLRUN undermines US Internet freedom agendapromotes hypocrisy
Kehl et al, Open Technology Institute Policy Analyst, 14
(Danielle, July, Open Technology Institute, Surveillance Costs: The NSAs
Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/534-surveillance-costs-the-nsasimpact-on-the-economy-internet-freedomcybersecurity/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf, page #14-15, 06/25/15, MM)
As the birthplace for so many of these technologies, including the
internet itself, we have a responsibility to see them used for good,
declared Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in January 2010.175 Her
speech at the Newseum in Washington DC effectively launched the
United States Internet Freedom agenda, articulating a leading role
for the U.S. in using the Internet to promote freedom of expression,
freedom of worship, and the freedom to connect around the world.
Clinton went on to give two other major addresses on Internet
Freedom, becoming the first global leader to emphasize Internet
Freedom as a foreign policy priority and urging countries everywhere to join us in

the bet we have made, a bet that an open internet will lead to stronger, more prosperous countries.176
As Richard Fontaine and Will Rogers describe in a seminal paper on the subject in June 2011, Internet
Freedom, broadly defined, is the notion that universal rights, including the freedoms of expression,
assembly and association, extend to the digital sphere.177 Although there were questions from the
beginning about whether the United States would hold itself to the same high standards domestically that

the American government has successfully

built up a policy and programming agenda in the past few years
based on promoting an open Internet.179 These efforts include
raising concerns over Internet repression in bilateral dialogues with
countries such as Vietnam and China,180 supporting initiatives
including the Freedom Online Coalition, and providing over $120
million in funding for groups working to advance Internet freedom
supporting counter-censorship and secure communications
technology, digital safety training, and policy and research programs
for people facing Internet repression.181 However, the legitimacy
of these efforts has been thrown into question since the NSA
disclosures began. Trust has been the principal casualty in this
unfortunate affair, wrote Ben FitzGerald and Richard Butler in
December 2013. The American public, our nations allies, leading
businesses and Internet users around the world are losing faith in
the U.S. governments role as the leading proponent of a free, open
and integrated global Internet.182
it holds others to internationally,178

BULLRUN subverts US internet governance beliefsRussia and China want more sovereignty
Kehl et al, Open Technology Institute Policy Analyst, 14
(Danielle, July, Open Technology Institute, Surveillance Costs: The NSAs
Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/534-surveillance-costs-the-nsas-

impact-on-the-economy-internet-freedomcybersecurity/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf, page #21-22, 06/25/15, MM)

Prior to the NSA revelations, the United States was already facing an
increasingly challenging political climate as it promoted the Internet
Freedom agenda in global Internet governance conversations. At the
2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT),
the U.S. and diverse group of other countries refused to sign the
updated International Telecommunications Regulations based on
concerns that the document pushed for greater governmental
control of the Internet and would ultimately harm Internet
Freedom.183 Many observers noted that the split hardened the
division between two opposing camps in the Internet governance
debate: proponents of a status quo multistakeholder Internet
governance model, like the United States, who argued that the
existing system was the best way to preserve key online freedoms,
and those seeking to disrupt or challenge that multistakeholder
model for a variety of political and economic reasons, including
governments like Russia and China pushing for greater national
sovereignty over the Internet.184 Many of the proposals for more governmental control
over the network could be understood as attempts by authoritarian countries to more effectively monitor
and censor their citizens, which allowed the U.S. to reasonably maintain some moral high ground as its
delegates walked out of the treaty conference.185 Although few stakeholders seemed particularly pleased
by the outcome of the WCIT, reports indicate that by the middle of 2013 the tone had shifted in a more
collaborative and positive direction following the meetings of the 2013 World Telecommunications/ICT
Policy Forum (WTPF) and the World Summit on Information Society + 10 (WSIS+10) review.186 However,
the Internet governance conversation took a dramatic turn after the Snowden disclosures. The annual
meeting of the Freedom Online Coalition occurred in Tunis in June 2013, just a few weeks after the initial
leaks. Unsurprisingly, surveillance dominated the conference even though the agenda covered a wide
range of topics from Internet access and affordability to cybersecurity.187 Throughout the two-day event,
representatives from civil society used the platform to confront and criticize governments about their

NSA surveillance would continue to be the focus of

international convenings on Internet Freedom and Internet
governance for months to come, making civil society representatives
and foreign governments far less willing to embrace the United
States Internet Freedom agenda or to accept its defense of the
multistakeholder model of Internet governance as a anything other
than self-serving. One can come up with all kinds of excuses for why US surveillance is not
monitoring practices.188

hypocrisy. For example, one might argue that US policies are more benevolent than those of many other
regimes And one might recognize that in several cases, some branches of government dont know what
other branches are doing and therefore US policy is not so much hypocritical as it is inadvertently
contradictory, wrote Eli Dourado, a researcher from the Mercatus Center at George Mason University in

But the fact is that the NSA is galvanizing opposition to

Americas internet freedom agenda.189 The scandal revived
proposals from both Russia and Brazil for global management of
technical standards and domain names, whether through the ITU or
other avenues. Even developing countries, many of whom have
traditionally aligned with the U.S. and prioritize access and
affordability as top issues, dont want US assistance because they
assume the equipment comes with a backdoor for the NSA. They are
August 2013.

walking straight into the arms of Russia, China, and the ITU.190 Consequently, NSA surveillance has
shifted the dynamics of the Internet governance debate in a potentially destabilizing manner. The Snowden
revelations have also been well-received by those who seek to discredit existing approaches to Internet
governance, wrote the Center for Democracy & Technologys Matthew Shears. There has been a longrunning antipathy among a number of stakeholders to the United States governments perceived control of
the Internet and the dominance of US Internet companies. There has also been a long-running antipathy,
particularly among some governments, to the distributed and open management of the Internet.191

Shears points out that evidence of the NSAs wide-ranging capabilities has fueled general concerns about
the current Internet governance system, bolstering the arguments of those calling for a new government-

At the UN Human Rights Council in September 2013,

the representative from Pakistanspeaking on behalf of Cuba,
Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Ecuador, Russia, Indonesia, Bolivia,
Iran, and Chinaexplicitly linked the revelations about surveillance
programs to the need for reforming Internet governance processes
and institutions to give governments a larger role.192 Surveillance
issues continued to dominate the conversation at the 2013 Internet
Governance Forum in Bali as well, where debates on child
protection, education and infrastructure were overshadowed by
widespread concerns from delegates who said the publics trust in
the internet was being undermined by reports of US and British
government surveillance.193
centric governance order.

NSA decryption subverts US freedom of expression

opinions- foreign countries justifying own surveillance
Kehl et al, Open Technology Institute Policy Analyst, 14
(Danielle, July, Open Technology Institute, Surveillance Costs: The NSAs
Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/534-surveillance-costs-the-nsasimpact-on-the-economy-internet-freedomcybersecurity/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf, page #23-24, 06/25/15, MM)
The effects of the NSA disclosures on the Internet Freedom agenda go beyond
the realm of Internet governance. The loss of the United States as a
model on Internet Freedom issues has made it harder for local civil
society groups around the worldincluding the groups that the
State Departments Internet Freedom programs typically support203
to advocate for Internet Freedom within their own
governments.204 The Committee to Protect Journalists, for example,
reports that in Pakistan, where freedom of expression is largely
perceived as a Western notion, the Snowden revelations have had a
damaging effect. The deeply polarized narrative has become starker
as the corridors of power push back on attempts to curb government
surveillance.205 For some of these groups, in fact, even the
appearance of collaboration with or support from the U.S.
government can diminish credibility, making it harder for them to
achieve local goals that align with U.S. foreign policy interests.206
The gap in trust is particularly significant for individuals and organizations
that receive funding from the U.S. government for free expression activities
or circumvention tools. Technology supported by or exported from the United
States is, in some cases, inherently suspect due to the revelations about the
NSAs surveillance dragnet and the agencys attempts to covertly influence
product development. Moreover, revelations of what the NSA has been doing
in the past decade are eroding the moral high ground that the United States
has often relied upon when putting public pressure on authoritarian countries
like China, Russia, and Iran to change their behavior. In 2014, Reporters
Without Borders added the United States to its Enemies of the Internet list
for the first time, explicitly linking the inclusion to NSA surveillance. The
main player in [the United States] vast surveillance operation is the highly

secretive National Security Agency (NSA) which, in the light of Snowdens

revelations, has come to symbolize the abuses by the worlds intelligence
agencies, noted the 2014 report.207 The damaged perception of the
United States208 as a leader on Internet Freedom and its diminished
ability to legitimately criticize other countries for censorship and
surveillance opens the door for foreign leaders to justifyand even
expand their own efforts.209 For example, the Egyptian
government recently announced plans to monitor social media for
potential terrorist activity, prompting backlash from a number of
advocates for free expression and privacy.210 When a spokesman
for the Egyptian Interior Ministry, Abdel Fatah Uthman, appeared on
television to explain the policy, one justification that he offered in
response to privacy concerns was that the US listens in to phone
calls, and supervises anyone who could threaten its national
security.211 This type of rhetoric makes it difficult for the U.S. to effectively
criticize such a policy. Similarly, Indias comparatively mild response to
allegations of NSA surveillance have been seen by some critics as a
reflection of Indias own aspirations in the world of surveillance, a
further indication that U.S. spying may now make it easier for
foreign governments to quietly defend their own behavior.212 It is
even more difficult for the United States to credibly indict Chinese
hackers for breaking into U.S. government and commercial targets
without fear of retribution in light of the NSA revelations.213 These
challenges reflect an overall decline in U.S. soft power on free expression
issues.

NSA disclosures have major ripple effects on global

Internet freedom-hurts the perception of the US
agenda
Kehl et al, 14 (Danielle, senior policy analyst, Open Technology Institute,
Surveillance Costs: The NSAs Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom &
Governance,pg. 9,
https://www.newamerica.org/downloads/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf)
The effects of the NSA disclosures on the Internet Freedom agenda
go beyond the realm of Internet governance. The loss of the United
States as a model on Internet Freedom issues has made it harder for
local civil society groups around the worldincluding the groups
that the State Departments Internet Freedom programs typically
support203to advocate for Internet Freedom within their own
governments.204 The Committee to Protect Journalists, for example,
reports that in Pakistan, where freedom of expression is largely
perceived as a Western notion, the Snowden revelations have had a
damaging effect. The deeply polarized narrative has become starker
as the corridors of power push back on attempts to curb government
surveillance.205 For some of these groups, in fact, even the
appearance of collaboration with or support from the U.S.
government can diminish credibility, making it harder for them to
achieve local goals that align with U.S. foreign policy interests.206

The gap in trust is particularly significant for individuals and

organizations that receive funding from the U.S. government for free
expression activities or circumvention tools. Technology supported by
or exported from the United States is, in some cases, inherently suspect due
to the revelations about the NSAs surveillance dragnet and the agencys
attempts to covertly influence product development. Moreover, revelations of
what the NSA has been doing in the past decade are eroding the moral high
ground that the United States has often relied upon when putting public
pressure on authoritarian countries like China, Russia, and Iran to change
their behavior. In 2014, Reporters Without Borders added the United States to
its Enemies of the Internet list for the first time, explicitly linking the
inclusion to NSA surveillance. The main player in [the United States] vast
surveillance operation is the highly secretive National Security Agency (NSA)
which, in the light of Snowdens revelations, has come to symbolize the
abuses by the worlds intelligence agencies, noted the 2014 report.207 The
damaged perception of the United States208 as a leader on Internet
Freedom and its diminished ability to legitimately criticize other
countries for censorship and surveillance opens the door for foreign
leaders to justifyand even expand their own efforts.209 For
example, the Egyptian government recently announced plans to
monitor social media for potential terrorist activity, prompting
backlash from a number of advocates for free expression and
privacy.210 When a spokesman for the Egyptian Interior Ministry,
Abdel Fatah Uthman, appeared on television to explain the policy,
one justification that he offered in response to privacy concerns was
that the US listens in to phone calls, and supervises anyone who
could threaten its national security.211 This type of rhetoric makes
it difficult for the U.S. to effectively criticize such a policy. Similarly,
Indias comparatively mild response to allegations of NSA
surveillance have been seen by some critics as a reflection of
Indias own aspirations in the world of surveillance, a further
indication that U.S. spying may now make it easier for foreign
governments to quietly defend their own behavior.212 It is even
more difficult for the United States to credibly indict Chinese hackers
for breaking into U.S. government and commercial targets without
fear of retribution in light of the NSA revelations.213 These
challenges reflect an overall decline in U.S. soft power on free
expression issues.

NSA revelations hurt the US legitimacy on its

Internet freedom agenda hypocrisy and fuels antiinternet freedom treaties.
Dourado, Fellow at George Mason University technology
policy program and former delegator for the US at the United
Nations' International Telecommunications Union meetings,
2013

(Eli, 9/30/2013, The Guardian, So much for Americas internet freedom

agenda, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/07/nsasurveillance-alienating-us-from-world, accessed 6/25/2015, JAK)
To see how foreign resentment over surveillance is hurting US
interests, look at the international politics of internet governance.
Unsavory regimes have long sought a preeminent role for the United Nations
on internet matters. This past December in Dubai, the United States
and many of its allies refused to sign a UN telecommunications
treaty that would have implicated the internet in part on the
grounds that it would have harmed Internet freedom. Led by Russia,
some regimes want to split the internet into 193 separate "states" (pdf),
managed by national governments, which interconnect according to the rules
of a treaty. These countries want such arrangements because they want to
more effectively surveil and censor their own citizens. The US State
Department always rightly opposed such activities, but now that
leaked documents are revealing the NSA's domestic and global
surveillance programs, the United States looks hypocritical. One can
come up with all kinds of excuses for why US surveillance is not hypocrisy. For
example, one might argue that US policies are more benevolent than those of
many other regimes, which is true. And one might recognize that in several
cases, some branches of government don't know what other branches are
doing also true and therefore US policy is not so much hypocritical as it is
inadvertently contradictory. Fine. But the fact is that the NSA is
galvanizing opposition to America's internet freedom agenda. The
scandal is reinvigorating Russian proposals for the International
Telecommunication Union, a UN agency, to take over internet technical
standards and management of the domain name system. Brazil insists that
the role of governments and intergovernmental agencies in managing the
internet be discussed at ITU meetings in November and March. These are not
major policy changes, but they now find a more sympathetic ear from the
developing countries that make up the majority at the ITU, which conducts
business on the basis of one vote per country. In truth, most developing
countries don't care very much about the management of the internet per se.
What they really want is more access to the internet more foreign
investment and more aid to set up internet exchange points. In the past,
the United States always offered more development resources as a
way to smooth over its hard-line stance on preserving existing
Internet institutions. But now, developing countries don't want US
assistance because they assume the equipment comes with a
backdoor for the NSA. They are walking straight into the arms of
Russia, China, and the ITU, and when the time comes to decide how
the internet should be managed, who do you think they'll side with?

Foreign countries backlash towards the NSA hurts US

interests- developing countries lack trust in the US
Dourado, research fellow in the technology policy program with the
Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 13 (Eli, 8-1-2013, "So much for
America's internet freedom agenda," Guardian,

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/07/nsa-surveillancealienating-us-from-world)//GLee
To see how foreign resentment over surveillance is hurting US
interests , look at the international politics of internet governance.
Unsavory regimes have long sought a preeminent role for the United
Nations on internet matters. This past December in Dubai, the United States and many of
its allies refused to sign a UN telecommunications treaty that would have implicated the internet in part on
the grounds that it would have harmed Internet freedom. Led by Russia, some regimes want to split the
internet into 193 separate "states" (pdf), managed by national governments, which interconnect according
to the rules of a treaty. These countries want such arrangements because they want to more effectively
surveil and censor their own citizens.

The US State Department always rightly

opposed such activities, but now that leaked documents are
revealing the NSA's domestic and global surveillance programs, the
United States looks hypocritical. One can come up with all kinds of excuses for why US
surveillance is not hypocrisy. For example, one might argue that US policies are more benevolent than
those of many other regimes, which is true. And one might recognize that in several cases, some branches
of government don't know what other branches are doing also true and therefore US policy is not so

But the fact is that the NSA is

galvanizing opposition to America's internet freedom agenda. The
scandal is reinvigorating Russian proposals for the International
Telecommunication Union, a UN agency, to take over internet
technical standards and management of the domain name system.
much hypocritical as it is inadvertently contradictory. Fine.

Brazil insists that the role of governments and intergovernmental agencies in managing the internet be
discussed at ITU meetings in November and March. These are not major policy changes, but they now find
a more sympathetic ear from the developing countries that make up the majority at the ITU, which

In truth, most developing

countries don't care very much about the management of the
internet per se. What they really want is more access to the internet
more foreign investment and more aid to set up internet exchange
points. In the past, the United States always offered more
development resources as a way to smooth over its hard-line stance
on preserving existing Internet institutions. But now, developing
conducts business on the basis of one vote per country.

countries don't want US assistance because they assume the

equipment comes with a backdoor for the NSA. They are walking
straight into the arms of Russia, China, and the ITU, and when the
time comes to decide how the internet should be managed, who do
you think they'll side with?

Solvency Ending Bullrun Good

Ending BULLRUN key to fostering free internetencryption key to voicing opinion for civil society
Kaye, UN Rapporteur on protection of the right to freedom of
opinion, 15 (David, May 22nd, UN Human Rights Council, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression, Pages 5-6, 06/26/15, MM)
The Internet has profound value for freedom of opinion and
expression, as it magnifies the voice and multiplies the information
within reach of everyone who has access to it. Within a brief period,
it has become the central global public forum. As such, an open and
secure Internet should be counted among the leading prerequisites
for the enjoyment of the freedom of expression today. But it is
constantly under threat, a space not unlike the physical world in which
criminal enterprise, targeted repression and mass data collection also exist. It
is thus critical that individuals find ways to secure themselves online, that
Governments provide such safety in law and policy and that corporate actors
design, develop and market secure-by-default products and services. None of
these imperatives is new. Early in the digital age, Governments recognized
the essential role played by encryption in securing the global economy, using
or encouraging its use to secure Government-issued identity numbers, credit
card and banking information, business proprietary documents and
investigations into online crime itself.1 Encryption and anonymity, separately
or together, create a zone of privacy to protect opinion and belief. For
instance, they enable private communications and can shield an
opinion from outside scrutiny, particularly important in hostile
political, social, religious and legal environments. Where States
impose unlawful censorship through filtering and other technologies,
the use of encryption and anonymity may empower individuals to
circumvent barriers and access information and ideas without the
intrusion of authorities. Journalists, researchers, lawyers and civil
society rely on encryption and anonymity to shield themselves (and
their sources, clients and partners) from surveillance and
harassment. The ability to search the web, develop ideas and
communicate securely may be the only way in which many can
explore basic aspects of identity, such as ones gender, religion,
ethnicity, national origin or sexuality. Artists rely on encryption and
anonymity to safeguard and protect their right to expression,
especially in situations where it is not only the State creating
limitations but also society that does not tolerate unconventional
opinions or expression.

See OECD, Guidelines for Cryptography Policy (1997)..

Solvency Regulations Key

NSA regulations key to internet freedom
Hattem, journalist, 14
(Julian, 10/8, The Hill, Google chief on NSA: 'We're going to end up breaking
the Internet', http://thehill.com/policy/technology/220176-google-headwithout-reform-nsa-will-break-the-internet, June 26, 2015, GG)
The integrity of the Internet could be at risk if Congress does not act
to rein in the National Security Agency, Google head Eric Schmidt
warned on Wednesday. Speaking alongside other tech executives and Sen.
Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) at a Silicon Valley event, Schmidt said the revelations
about U.S. surveillance could prompt countries to wall off their
networks. The simplest outcome: Were going to end up breaking the
Internet, Schmidt said, because whats going to happen is governments
will do bad laws of one kind or another, and eventually whats going to
happen is: Were going to have our own Internet in our own country, and
were going to do it our way. It is fundamentally about breaking the
Internet, echoed Facebook General Counsel Colin Stretch. The Internet is
a medium without borders, and the notion that you would have to
place data and data centers and the data itself [in a particular
location] ... is fundamentally at odds with the way the Internet is
architectured. In response to former NSA contractor Edward Snowdens
leaks which showed that the NSA was spying on foreigners emails, chats
and other communications through services like Google and Facebook
consumers and governments around the globe have taken steps to
enact new limits on American companies. Some countries, including
Russia, have taken steps to require that companies keep data centers within
their geographic borders a potentially prohibitive cost for start-ups and
small companies.

I/L Modeling
A strong effort from the US is key to upholding
Internet freedom-Green Dam example proves
Kalathil 10 (Shanthi, consultant on development, democratization, and the
role of technology in international affairs, Aspen Institute, Internet Freedom:
A Background Paper, pg. 74,
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/images/Internet_Free
dom_A_Background_Paper_0.pdf)
One last example from China shows how a concerted effort by the
U.S. government, civil society (both within and outside China) and
industry can be effective when addressing challenges to Internet
freedom. In 2009 the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology (MIIT) mandated that later that year all computers sold
in China would need to be pre-installed with ostensible
childprotection software, called Green Dam-Youth Escort. Studies of
Green Dam showed that the software also censored political and
religious content and logged user activity. Because the software also
had programming flaws that increased user vulnerability to attack
and violated the intellectual property rights of a U.S. companys
product, it was also easily opposed by U.S. industry. Chinese civil
society, too, opposed the software; not only was Green Dam ridiculed for
being a clumsy attempt at suppressing free speech and consumer choice, but
it was held up to be an example of crony capitalism because the software
companys founders were perceived to have relied on government ties for
their success. In the face of this united opposition, the MIIT backed
down.13 The Green Dam example demonstrates that concerted
opposition can thwart censorship and surveillance plans by
authoritarian governments. It is also something of a special case, as it is
rare for this particular blend of circumstances to occur. Nonetheless, it
provides an interesting illustration of how different stakeholders
with differing rationales for action can come together to successfully
uphold Internet freedom.

Impact Economy
Internet Freedom must be priority- fuels econ, creates
jobs
U.S. Department of State, no date
(State Department, Internet Freedom,
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/cip/netfreedom/index.htm, June 25, 2015, GG)
Internet freedom is a foreign policy priority for the United States,
and has been for many years. Our goal is to ensure that any child, born
anywhere in the world, has access to the global Internet as an open
platform on which to innovate, learn, organize, and express
themselves free from undue interference or censorship. Indeed, during
his time in Congress, Secretary Kerry worked closely with then-Secretary
Clinton to make certain that we could effectively promote long-standing
values of openness and human rights in a networked world. To do so, we are
supporting the efforts of Americans and committed partners worldwide to
bring down the walls that are denying the people of the world
connection and access to each other's ideas and services on the
Internet. We do this in part because the Internet helps fuel the global
economy, increases productivity, and creates jobs built on the
unprecedented global reach that the platform provides for our
businesses and innovators. Just as importantly, we are champions of
Internet Freedom because the Internet serves as a powerful platform to
bring information and resources to people who historically have
been isolated, or their human rights repressed, so they, too, have the
chance to become active, prosperous, and engaged participants in
the world community. The State Department has advanced U.S. initiatives
to preserve the open Internet and promoted the worldwide deployment of
broadband communications through the World Telecommunication Policy
Forum. We are an active member in the Freedom Online Coalition, a forum for
like-minded governments -- over 20 and growing -- committed to
collaborating to advance Internet freedom. This has provided us and others
an opportunity to coordinate efforts and work with civil society to support the
ability for individuals to exercise their universal human rights and
fundamental freedoms online. For example, the State Department joined with
other Freedom Online Coalition members to launch the Digital Defenders
Partnership, an unprecedented collaboration among government donors to
provide emergency support for Internet users under threat in repressive
environments. We do this work every day and it is a top priority. The
Internet is an endless resource of information. Respect for the
freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and association has the
ability to enhance lives in ways we cant even imagine, as long as we
extend the same respect for these fundamental freedoms to the
online world.

Internet is key to rapid global econ growthnot just

restricted to America
LOHR, New York Times Journalist, 2000
(steve, N/D 2000, New York Times, TECHNOLOGY & MEDIA: The Economy Transformed, Bit by
Bit;Businesses and Society Confront the Inescapable Challenges of High Technology and the Internet,
lexis, 6-25-15, YA)
In 1995, Bill Gates of Microsoft wrote an impassioned memo to his lieutenants stirring them to confront

"The Internet Tidal Wave." That wave hit corporate America

as a whole in 1999, when companies large and small recognized
that the impact of the Internet would not be confined merely to
Silicon Valley or to the proliferating dot-com start-ups. "Every
business now knows that it faces the opportunity and threat of being transformed by
the Internet, and this was the year that happened," said Daniel Yergin, a business consultant
and author. The Internet has also become a powerful symbol of
society's expectations about the future -- a future of fast-moving,
disruptive technology that is shifting the terrain not only in
business, but also in politics and culture. The truth, of course, is that it is
the challenge of

probably too early to judge whether an Internet revolution is truly under way. Historians say the
Internet should be viewed mainly as the latest advance in communications, a successor to the
telegraph and the telephone, more a technological step than a leap forward. Still, whether labeled a

the Internet's impact on the economy seems

greater and greater. When people speak of the
"Internet economy," they do not really mean that Internet businesses themselves
suddenly loom so large in the nation's $9 trillion economy. They are talking of a
technology and a pattern of business behavior that feels like the
future. The Internet is seen as a technology of borderless free
markets. It is a global network with open technology standards,
not owned or controlled by a single company or nation . And it is magic
revolution or an evolution,
destined to become

on Wall Street these days, driving the shares of many Internet companies to astronomical heights.
Because it is such a low-cost communications technology, the Internet holds the promise of drastically
reducing transactions costs. This opens the door to what Michael Porter of Harvard's business school
has called "atomistic competition," as market forces and entrepreneurial ways are driven further down
toward the individual level. Organizational bureaucracies of every kind -- corporate, government and
union -- suddenly look vulnerable to the Internet's decentralizing powers. Even the power of nation
states, already eroding, seems at risk. Mr. Yergin, the co-author with Joseph Stanislaw of "The
Commanding Heights," a history of the rise of the global marketplace, observed :

"Nothing so
symbolizes globalization as the Internet, a technology with the
power to leap across the geographic borders of nation-states and
across time zones." Prediction tends to be a humbling, hit-or-miss endeavor even for the
gifted or lucky. In the late 1960's, for example, Sir Arthur C. Clarke, the science fiction writer, predicted
that by 2000 a vast electronic "global library" would be developed -- and the Internet and the World
Wide Web could arguably qualify as one. Then again, Sir Arthur also predicted that the planets would
be colonized by next year. But technologists, economists and futurists say that some questions are
worth asking when thinking about how the Internet economy might evolve over the next few years.
What was the mixture of technology and policy decisions that created
today's Internet? What key technology and policy issues are likely to affect the Internet over the next
few years? And, finally, since the future is usually the past with a twist, what can be learned from

The Internet has been embraced by

libertarian free-marketers as the embodiment of their values, but,
to be sure, it began with government financing. Yet liberals who point to the
earlier technology-driven transitions?

Internet to support a pro-government stance -- at least in any conventional sense -- are ignoring certain
facts. The early money for the Internet -- as well as for pioneering research in computer graphics and
speech recognition software -- came from an elite, the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency.
Its money came from the military's largess, and ARPA's leaders spent it pretty much as they pleased

with little accountability. From the mid-1960's to the mid-1970's, the agency's leaders displayed an
uncanny knack for backing long-term winners in technology. For two decades, the Internet was
developed gradually in the distinctive milieu of the nation's research centers by scientists who believed
in the free sharing of information and in open technology standards. The next major policy
pronouncement about the Internet did not come until 1997, when the Clinton administration released
its "Framework for Global Electronic Commerce." Written by Ira C. Magaziner, a senior White House
adviser, the report called for a market-driven Internet. "Business models must evolve rapidly to keep
pace with the breakneck speed of change in the technology," the report said. "Government attempts to
regulate are likely to be outmoded by the time they are finally enacted." So the pattern of policy to
date: shrewd government seeding of research followed by benign neglect. But as the Internet
increasingly becomes a main thoroughfare of commerce, a host of new policy issues loom -- how to
deal with taxation, privacy, security and international trade in a global networked economy. "The
Internet has given us the greatest rate of return on a public infrastructure investment ever," said
Robert Litan, director of economic studies at the Brookings Institution. "And it has flourished because

Technologically,
the Internet is almost an economy unto itself -- a network, yes,
but also a complex and interacting set of technologies. Today's
Internet is a result of a torrid pace of improvement in recent years
in computer networks, processing power, data storage, software,
display technology and user interfaces like the Web browser. The
sheer firepower of computers, experts say, is certain to race
ahead to startling effect over the next few years. Data storage
technology, for example, is advancing at a particularly rapid rate. By
we have not yet taxed or regulated it to death -- though those are live issues."

2003, personal computers may well come with terabyte hard drives, which are roughly 100 times the
capacity on new PC's today, featuring about 10 gigabytes on average. A terabyte drive would be able
to hold every conversation that even the chattiest person has had in a lifetime. Think of a
supercomputer on every desktop, in terms of giving individuals the ability to mine personal or business
information.

Impact Culture
Restricting internet freedom collapses connection of
culture and geography The US is the main
perpetrator
Wadhwa, researcher with the Hybrid Reality Institute, 13
(Tarun Wadhwa, 6-13-2013, "NSA Surveillance May Have Dealt Major Blow To
Global Internet Freedom Efforts," Forbes,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tarunwadhwa/2013/06/13/with-nsa-surveillanceus-government-may-have-dealt-major-blow-to-global-internet-freedomefforts/ //NK)
The internet has never been a perfect tool for advancing democracy and human rights. Despite the most
optimistic techno-utopian projections, the internet has yet to set us free and rid the world of dictators.

Critics have been right to warn us of the dangers of a single-minded

approach we should be careful not to overlook the deep historical,
economic, and cultural factors that shape the world we live in today.
At the same time, it is true that the internet has revolutionized the
way we are able to connect with each other. We are no longer limited
to our culture and geography, we can now unite around shared
interests and values. As the internet has grown in usage and importance in our daily lives, so
too has the difficulty of keeping it free from censorship and control. This struggle was important enough
to 29-year-old former Booz Allen employee Edward Snowden for him to give up his life, career, and
freedom to leak a historic amount of classified information about the shocking size and depth of the
American surveillance state. The fallout is just beginning and as of now, there are far more questions

the credibility of the idea that the

internet can be a positive, freedom-promoting global force is facing
its largest challenge to date. And it comes directly from one of its
most outspoken supporters: the US government. Simply put, our
government has failed in its role as the caretaker of the internet .
Although this was never an official designation, America controls much of the
infrastructure, and many of the most popular services online are
provided by a handful of American companies. The world is starting
to sober up to the fact that much of what theyve done online in the
last decade is now cataloged in a top-secret facility somewhere in
the United States. Reasonable minds can disagree over the necessity of these programs and
than answers. One thing has become clear though:

how to strike the proper balance between security and privacy. These matters aside, what has been the

Not
only were the American people kept in the dark they were lied to
by intelligence officials, misled about possible constitutional
violations, and potentially undermined by the very courts that were
supposed to protect their rights. The government has used peculiar interpretations of
most disturbing part of this entire scandal has to do with the lack of accountability and oversight.

laws that they are not even willing to discuss to defend an invasive collection of personal data beyond
anything even the paranoid among us would have thought was possible. And while President Obama
welcomes the debate over an issue he has worked hard to keep secret, we are now starting to see the
usual Washington tactics of political spin, feverish scapegoating, and patriotic grandstanding in lieu of a
real discussion. We should all be extremely concerned about the colossal surveillance infrastructure that is
being built in the name of our safety. In trying to reassure the public, our leaders have told us that these
programs are not meant to target us, but instead, foreigners who may pose a threat to our security. But
this is merely a decision on how the data is being used today we are getting into very dangerous territory
by hoping for the best intentions of whoever is in power in the future. American history holds many lessons
for us here: circumstances can change, the perception of who is a threat can vary with whoever is in office,
and we cannot predict what our political situation will look like decades, or even years, from now. In the
court of global public opinion, America may have tarnished its moral authority to question the surveillance

whether it be Russia on monitoring journalists, or

China on conducting cyber espionage. Declarations by the State Department that
practices of other nations

were once statements of principle now ring hollow and hypocritical to some. No nation can rival the
American surveillance state, but they no longer need support to build their own massive systems of

The costs of surveillance and data storage

technologies are plummeting these will no longer be prohibitive
factors. Diplomatic pressures and legal barriers that had also once
served as major deterrents will soon fade away. The goal has been to
promote internet freedom around the world, but we may have also
potentially created a blueprint for how authoritarian governments
can store, track, and mine their citizens digital lives.
espionage and oppression.

Impact Free Speech

NSA data collection endangers free speech
Sovereign overreach and weak legal authority
Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, 13 (Kenneth
Roth, 11-18-2013, "The NSAs Global Threat to Free Speech," Human Rights
Watch, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/18/nsa-s-global-threat-freespeech //NK)
Following months of Snowden disclosures, the extent to which the National Security
Agencys extraordinary surveillance infringes on the privacy of our
communications and other vast areas of our lives has become widely
apparent. Far less appreciated, however, is the global threat that the
NSAs spying poses to freedom of expression over the Internet . The
NSAs seemingly limitless prying into our personal electronic data is
predicated on a cramped vision of our right to privacy. As I have
described in this space these intrusions are facilitated by various
shortcomings in current US law. For instance, the law recognizes a
privacy interest in the contents of our communications, but not in
what is known as our metadata, the electronic details about whom
we communicate with, what we search for online, and where we go.
The rationale, stated in a 1979 US Supreme Court ruling, is that we have no privacy interest in the phone
numbers we dial because we share them with the phone company, even though the court could just as
easily have ruled that the phone company has a fiduciary duty to respect the privacy of its customers. In

on the weakest of legal authority, the NSA assumes that the

mere collection of our communications does not invade our privacy
until they are examined, or queried. Using facile metaphors about needing a
haystack to find a needle, the NSA asserts that it is free to assemble that haystack unimpeded. It is as if
the NSA were to mount video cameras in our bedrooms while
assuring us that we have nothing to worry about until it looks at the
film. And to the dismay of the rest of the world, US law on surveillance recognizes
no privacy rights whatsoever for non-Americans outside the United
States, even though many of their communications travel through
the United States and the US government has the capacity to collect
much of whatever does not. Considerable attention has been paid recently to the NSAs
addition,

monitoring of German Chancellor Angela Merkels mobile phone. Under existing US law, however, the NSA
can freely spy on ordinary foreigners living outside the United States as well. And it can collect not only
their metadata but also the contents of their communicationsincluding phone calls, email, and text
messages. Communications between US citizens and foreigners are also vulnerable so long as the US

This sweeping disregard for

electronic privacy has particularly troubling implications for freedom
of expression. In part that is because privacy and free expression
are intimately linked. People are more likely to speak candidly if
they can be assured of speaking privately. Whether it involves a
client confiding in a lawyer, a patient talking to a doctor, a source
speaking to a journalist, or an adherent of an unpopular cause
addressing other supporters, robust speech suffers when privacy is
imperiled. But the NSAs overreaching endangers free speech in
more direct ways as well. Consider the not-uncommon situation in
which a repressive government such as Chinas asks an Internet
company for information on a user. The most notorious request of this kind involved the
citizen in question is not deemed a target of the surveillance.

Chinese journalist Shi Tao, who just completed eight years in prison for leaking state secretssending a
human rights group information about media restrictions for the fifteenth anniversary of the 1989
Tiananmen Square uprising and the ensuing massacre. At Chinas request, Yahoo turned over Shis email
information, contributing to his conviction. One of the best defenses against such requests is for Internet
companies to store user information in servers located outside the country in question. That approach is
not foolproofgovernments have many ways to pressure Internet companies to cooperatebut it can help
to fend off such requests. US Internet companies currently opt to repatriate to servers in the United States
most information on users in foreign countries. However, after the revelations about NSA surveillance,
many countries have said they may require Internet companies to keep data about their citizens on
servers within their own borders. If that becomes standard practice, it will be easier for repressive
governments to monitor Internet communications. Weak as US privacy safeguards are, those in many
other countries are no better. For example, while outraged at the NSAs snooping, many privacy activists in
Brazil oppose their own governments proposed requirement to store data locally because they fear their
data protection laws are inadequate. Moreover, as the case of Shi Tao shows, granting national
governments easy access to user information may enable them not only to invade privacy but also to
suppress criticism and unearth dissent. Anonymity is sometimes the best protection against censorship,
but official access to user information makes anonymity difficult. Current proposals to change the way the
Internet is regulated could, if implemented, also facilitate efforts by foreign governments to gather
information on their own citizens electronic activities. The Internet is governed mainly through informal
cooperative arrangements among numerous public and private entities, but a US-based organization, the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, or ICANN, is responsible for, among other things,
coordinating the assignment of unique identifiers that allow computers around the world to find and
recognize each other. A private board of directors runs ICANN, but the US Commerce Department has a
large part in its management. It may seem anomalous that the US government would have such influence
over a global network like the Internet, and now that the United States has proven such an unreliable
guardian of our privacy, there have been renewed calls to replace the current system with a UN agency

But few believe that such a

system would protect free speech on the Internet because it would
likely defer to governments that want to prioritize national
sovereignty over the free flow of information and ideas . Greater national
such as the International Telecommunications Union.

control would make it easier for governments to wall off national Internets, as China has tried to do with its
Great Firewall and Iran has threatened to do with a national information network, enabling censorship
and undermining the powerful potential of cyberspace to connect people around the world.

The NSAs

electronic spying has also done much to discredit the US

governments reputation as an outspoken champion of Internet
freedom. Most notably under the leadership of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the US has
regularly criticized countries for detaining dissident bloggers or users of social media. But today,

although the United States continues to respect freedom of

expression on and off line, that virtue is easily overshadowed by
Washingtons indifference to Internet privacy. And even Americas
reputation for respecting free speech is undermined when the
Obama administration tries to extradite and prosecute Edward
Snowden for an alleged security breach that many see as legitimate whistleblowing. Beyond Internet

users, those who probably feel most at risk by Washingtons disregard for privacy are US Internet
companies. Companies such as Google and Facebook are undoubtedly terrified that users in other
countries will begin looking for non-American alternatives to avoid NSA snooping. The German Federation
of Journalists, for example, recently warned its members to avoid using US Internet companies for email or
searches because of NSA surveillance, and Deutsche Telekom said it is working to keep electronic
messages from entering the United States unnecessarily. Internet companies thus may become one
powerful constituency to press the US government to reform its surveillance laws. There is, of course, an
irony in the protests of companies that rake in billions by exploiting their customers online activities for
commercial purposes. But without the coercive power of the state, private companies have less capacity to
do harm, and unlike governments, they face at least theoretical competitive pressure to respect their
customers sense of proper limits. It is perhaps puzzling that Americans themselves seem largely
unperturbed by the NSA revelations. But this complacency is not shared by much of the rest of the world,
where memories are often fresher of cases in which the state abused access to private lives. That fear
abroad, conveyed by US Internet companies that have come to depend on a global customer base, is
perhaps the best we can hope for to overcome the relative indifference of the US public. With the NSAs
motto seemingly If it can be accessed, take it, one is left with the impression that the US government
never undertook a basic analysis of the costs and benefits of NSA surveillance. On the cost side must be
weighed not simply the invasion of our privacy but also the harm it does to the unimpeded flow of
information over the Internet.

Americans may undervalue privacy, but they do

tend to understand the importance of free expression.

Free-speech key to movements- allows for a broad

reach
Yang 14, (Sarah, October 2nd, UC Berkeley News Center, Cybertools offer
new channels for free speech, but grassroots organizing still critical,
http://news.berkeley.edu/2014/10/02/cybertools-and-free-speech/, 06/24/15,
MM)
What if activists from the Free Speech Movement 50 years ago had
been able to use Twitter? One could imagine the real-time alerts
drawing an even bigger crowd faster as student Jack Weinberg was
being arrested on Oct. 1, 1964, for setting up a table at Sproul Plaza
despite the ban on on-campus political activities. And people near
and far would have surely seen the videos recorded by smartphones, uploaded to
YouTube and spread via Facebook of Mario Savio standing on top of a police car, calling on students to

The communication tools of today have

changed social movements since the Free Speech Movement.
Whether it is an online petition via Change.org or survey software
that makes it easier for users to register their opinions for elected
officials, more options are available for expressing views than ever
before. Reported efforts by Chinese officials to censor news of the
current pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong by disrupting access
to Instagram and removing references to the demonstrations
illustrate the degree to which social media is seen as a threat. How
technology aids social change Social media, purely as a logistical
organizing mechanism, has transformed the ability of people to
congregate and protest because of the speed and ease with which
information is shared, said Camille Crittenden, director of the Data
and Democracy Initiative at the Center for Information Technology
Research in the Interest of Society (CITRIS). Compared with the
1960s, youre going to be able to organize more quickly, and youre
going to be able to document the event more comprehensively.
stand up for their First Amendment rights.

Impact HR
Lack of internet freedom kills human rights- leads to
acts of government violence
Radsch, Former Senior Program Manager for the Global
Freedom of Expression Campaign, 12
(Courtney, November 1, Freedom House, The Top Five Threats to Internet
Freedom Youve Never Heard Of, https://freedomhouse.org/blog/top-fivethreats-internet-freedom-you%E2%80%99ve-never-heard#.VY7-jPlViko, June
27, 2015, GG)
Next month, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) will hold a
major meeting in Dubai that could fundamentally alter the structure
and global reach of the internet. The World Conference on
International Telecommunications (WCIT) will consider whether and
how the ITU should take over regulation of the internet from
multistakeholder processes like the IGF. Only governments can be
members of the ITU, although corporations can pony up the tens of
thousands of dollars needed to buy observer status. WCIT will be more
or less closed to civil society actors, but we know that repressive
and democratic member states alike are putting forward proposals
that could stifle the internet as a force for economic development
and positive social change. One European proposal would put tariffs on
internet traffic between states, while another, supported by Middle Eastern
countries and Russia, would give the ITU authority over cybercrime, and
could have negative effects on privacy, anonymity, and human
rights. Whats at stake in December is not just the open, cooperative
process through which the internet has historically been governed, but also
the webs role as a creator of prosperity and an enabler of civic
engagement. As citizens take advantage of the internet to advocate
for political, civil, and human rights, governments and nonstate
entities have lashed out at these online activists, seeking to silence
their voices. Cyberattacks, including distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
attacks, have been used widely to take down the websites of independent
media in Russia and elsewhere, while Syrian and Tibetan activists have been
aggressively targeted with phishing and malware assaults that aim to steal
their private information and undermine their security. While it is difficult to
identify the sources of these attacks, it is all but certain that they originate
with government agents. In highly repressive states, including Bahrain,
China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Vietnam, this digital violence can
spill over into the offline world. Reports abound of citizens being
tortured or even killed in police custody because of their online
activities.

Mass surveillance threatens human rights

Harding, Foreign Correspondent for The Guardian, 15
(Luke, January 26, The Guardian, Mass surveillance is fundamental threat to
human rights, says European report, ,

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/26/mass-surveillance-threathuman-rights-council-europe, June 27, 2015, GG)

Europes top rights body has said mass surveillance practices are a
fundamental threat to human rights and violate the right to privacy
enshrined in European law. The parliamentary assembly of the Council of
Europe says in a report that it is deeply concerned by the farreaching, technologically advanced systems used by the US and UK
to collect, store and analyze the data of private citizens. It describes
the scale of spying by the US National Security Agency, revealed by Edward
Snowden, as stunning. There is compelling evidence that US
intelligence agencies and their allies are hoovering up data on a
massive scale, the report says. US-UK operations encompass
numerous persons against whom there is no ground for suspicion of
any wrongdoing, it adds. Though the recommendations are not
binding on governments, the European court of human rights looks
to the assembly for broad inspiration, and occasionally cites it in its
rulings. Several British surveillance cases are currently before the
Strasbourg court. Amnesty International, the American Civil Liberties
Union, Privacy International and Liberty all argue that GCHQs mass
collection of data infringes European law. In December the UKs
investigatory powers tribunal (IPT) dismissed their complaint.

Repressive governments violate human rights, take

away internet freedom
Weitz, Director of the Center for Political-Military Affairs at
Hudson Institute, 11
(Richard, April 19, World Politics Review, Global Insights: World Internet
Freedoms Under Threat,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8565/global-insights-worldinternet-freedoms-under-threat, June 27, 2015, GG)
According to the report, repressive governments have reacted to the
growing spread of Internet access and user-generated content by
blocking and filtering Web sites associated with political opponents;
using legal intimidation to force ISPs to remove threatening content; and
arresting users for posting comments or information that the government
considers threatening. If necessary, the authorities have employed
cyberattacks and misinformation to shape the information landscape
in ways unfavorable to human freedoms. Whereas in the past the
authorities would provide ISPs with regularly updated blacklists of banned
sites, now the use of more-sophisticated filtering technology that searches for
a rapidly updated list of banned keywords is becoming more common. The
report notes that even in basically democratic countries, state controls can
impede Internet freedoms through unwarranted legal harassment,
de facto censorship and government-supported surveillance. The
targets of their content controls are often appropriate -- such as sites that
feature child pornography, violate intellectual property or incite violence -but the measures all too easily spill over to disrupt access to legal or
legitimate political or social content as well. Many of the regulations

deviate from international human rights standards, the rule of law

and the principles of necessity and proportionality. All too often, the
criteria used to select material for censorship is arbitrary and unjustified, yet
the process offers few effective means of appeal. The available technological
tools to circumvent state controls of the Internet have displayed a limited
ability to do so, and are effective mostly in countries whose citizens enjoy a
high degree of computer literacy or whose governments use relatively
unsophisticated blocking techniques.

Chinas internet regulations violating human rightsloss of freedom of opinion

Amnesty International, International Peace Organization, 14
(November 18, Amnesty International, Internet freedom faces new attack as
China seeks to shape global web rules,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/11/internet-freedom-faces-newattack-china-seeks-shape-global-web-rules/, June 27, 2015, GG)
The Chinese governments increasing efforts to influence global
cyberspace rules is a further sign that internet freedom is under a
sustained attack, said Amnesty International, ahead of Chinas first World
Internet Conference. The event, which takes place in the eastern Zhejiang
province, between 19 -21 November, brings together senior Chinese officials
and global web leaders to discuss the future of the internet. It is seen by
many internet experts as part of Chinas attempt to have a greater say in the
rules that govern the web. Internet freedom is under attack by
governments across the world. Now China appears eager to promote
its own domestic internet rules as a model for global regulation. This
should send a chill down the spine of anyone that values online freedom,
said William Nee, China researcher at Amnesty International. Chinas
internet model is one of extreme control and suppression. The
authorities use an army of censors to target individuals and imprison
many activists solely for exercising their right to free expression
online. Since President Xi came to power, hundreds of people have been
detained solely for expressing their views online. The authorities continue
to abuse criminal law to suppress freedom of expression, including by
detaining and imprisoning activists for online posts that fall foul of the
censors. Many members of the New Citizens Movement, a loose network of
activists which aims to promote government transparency and expose
corruption, such as Liu Ping, have been arrested in part due to the
photos and opinions that they have posted online. In September, Ilham
Tohti, a prominent Uighur scholar and founder of the website Uighur Online,
was sentenced to life imprisonment for separatism in a politically motivated
trial. Articles from his website were the main evidence cited by the
authorities. The Chinese authorities continue to block access to
thousands of websites, including Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. Major
international news sites such as the BBC and New York Times are also
banned. Scores of phrases are censored on social media including
any mention of the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown or the
ongoing pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. Business leaders going
to Zhejiang should speak out for online freedom and challenge the Chinese

governments shameful record. Human rights should not be the elephant in

the room, said William Nee. The internet has proved invaluable to the
development of human rights revolutionizing access to information and
improving transparency and accountability.

World is more peaceful when states respect human

rights
Dagi, Professor at the Department of International Relations,
Middle East Technical University, 01
(Ihsan, June/July, Perceptions Journal of International Affairs: Primacy of
International Order and Security, http://sam.gov.tr/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/IhsanDagi.pdf, June 27, 2015, GG)
Furthermore, international peace and order are sustained better in an
international system that consists of countries respectful of human
rights. Therefore, it is not convincing that in the long run all cases of
humanitarian concern via foreign policy are likely to create international
instability and unlikely to result in positive domestic changes. One can also
argue that the universal acceptance of the legitimacy of intervention,
within a UN mandate for example, may deter states from engaging in
consistent massive violation of human rights and raise standards of
observation of human rights world wide. There is also a correlative
relationship between peace at home and peace in the world. Global
stability and peace cannot be separated from stability and peace
within the states that comprise the international system. In other
words, there is an undeniable connection between domestic political
structure and the attitudes of the state vis--vis the external world. The
behaviour of a state in the international arena cannot be separated
from the way in which it treats its own citizens at home. This is to say
that the kind of political regime prevalent domestically strongly influences its
policy towards the outside world. A government that does not respect its
own people's basic human rights may well also be a source of
tension and conflict in world politics. Therefore, threats to world
order do not come from the internationalisation of human rights, but in the
long term, from tyrannical sovereign states. As a result, the inclusion of
human rights issues in foreign-policy making would not necessarily increase
tension in world politics, on the contrary it may stabilise and standardise the
behaviour of states at home and abroad.

Impact Democracy promotion

Destroying internet freedom kills democracy
movements
Genachowski, Chairman of the U.S. Federal Communications
Commission, 13
(Julius, April 16, Foreign Press, The Plot to Block Internet Freedom,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/16/the-plot-to-block-internet-freedom/?
wp_login_redirect=0, June 28, 2015, GG)
But this growth trajectory is not inevitable, and threats are mounting to
the global spread of an open and truly "worldwide" web. The
expansion of the open Internet must be allowed to continue: The
mobile and social media revolutions are critical not only for
democratic institutions ability to solve the collective problems of a
shrinking world, but also to a dynamic and innovative global
economy that depends on financial transparency and the free flow of
information. The threats to the open Internet were on stark display at
last Decembers World Conference on International
Telecommunications in Dubai, where the United States fought
attempts by a number of countries including Russia, China, and
Saudi Arabia to give a U.N. organization, the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), new regulatory authority over the
Internet. Ultimately, over the objection of the United States and many
others, 89 countries voted to approve a treaty that could strengthen
the power of governments to control online content and deter
broadband deployment. In Dubai, two deeply worrisome trends came to a
head. First, we see that the Arab Spring and similar events have
awakened nondemocratic governments to the danger that the
Internet poses to their regimes. In Dubai, they pushed for a treaty that
would give the ITUs imprimatur to governments blocking or favoring of
online content under the guise of preventing spam and increasing network
security. Authoritarian countries real goal is to legitimize content
regulation, opening the door for governments to block any content
they do not like, such as political speech. Second, the basic
commercial model underlying the open Internet is also under threat.
In particular, some proposals, like the one made last year by major European
network operators, would change the ground rules for payments for
transferring Internet content. One species of these proposals is called
"sender pays" or "sending party pays." Since the beginning of the Internet,
content creators individuals, news outlets, search engines, social media
sites have been able to make their content available to Internet
users without paying a fee to Internet service providers. A senderpays rule would change that, empowering governments to require
Internet content creators to pay a fee to connect with an end user in
that country. Sender pays may look merely like a commercial issue, a
different way to divide the pie. And proponents of sender pays and similar
changes claim they would benefit Internet deployment and Internet users.
But the opposite is true: If a country imposed a payment requirement,

content creators would be less likely to serve that country. The loss
of content would make the Internet less attractive and would lessen
demand for the deployment of Internet infrastructure in that country. Repeat
the process in a few more countries, and the growth of global
connectivity as well as its attendant benefits for democracy
would slow dramatically. So too would the benefits accruing to the
global economy. Without continuing improvements in transparency and
information sharing, the innovation that springs from new commercial ideas
and creative breakthroughs is sure to be severely inhibited. To their credit,
American Internet service providers have joined with the broader U.S.
technology industry, civil society, and others in opposing these changes.
Together, we were able to win the battle in Dubai over sender pays, but we
have not yet won the war. Issues affecting global Internet openness,
broadband deployment, and free speech will return in upcoming international
forums, including an important meeting in Geneva in May, the World
Telecommunication/ICT Policy Forum. The massive investment in wired and
wireless broadband infrastructure in the United States demonstrates that
preserving an open Internet is completely compatible with broadband
deployment. According to a recent UBS report, annual wireless capital
investment in the United States increased 40 percent from 2009 to 2012,
while investment in the rest of the world has barely inched upward. And
according to the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, more
fiber-optic cable was laid in the United States in 2011 and 2012 than in any
year since 2000, and 15 percent more than in Europe. All Internet users
lose something when some countries are cut off from the World Wide
Web. Each person who is unable to connect to the Internet
diminishes our own access to information. We become less able to
understand the world and formulate policies to respond to our shrinking
planet. Conversely, we gain a richer understanding of global events as more
people connect around the world, and those societies nurturing nascent
democracy movements become more familiar with Americas traditions of
free speech and pluralism. Thats why we believe that the Internet should
remain free of gatekeepers and that no entity public or private
should be able to pick and choose the information web users can
receive. That is a principle the United States adopted in the Federal
Communications Commissions 2010 Open Internet Order. And its why we
are deeply concerned about arguments by some in the United States that
broadband providers should be able to block, edit, or favor Internet traffic
that travels over their networks, or adopt economic models similar to
international sender pays. We must preserve the Internet as the most
open and robust platform for the free exchange of information ever
devised. Keeping the Internet open is perhaps the most important
free speech issue of our time.

Internet freedom promotes alliance, democracy in

other nations
Hanson, Foreign Policy Fellow at Brookings, 12
(Fergus, October 25, Brookings Institution, Internet Freedom: The Role of the
U.S. State Department,

http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/10/25-ediplomacy-hansoninternet-freedom, June 28, 2015, GG)

Promoting and facilitating internet freedom is among the most
radical uses ediplomacy is being put to at State. Its starting point is
that Americas traditionally strong advocacy for civil liberties should
apply fully and without exception to the online world. Thus, if a
government seeks to restrict these freedoms online, the U.S. government
will oppose it both rhetorically and in practice including by directly
funding the development and rollout of tools that will subvert restrictive
internet policies. The use of technology to overcome censorship and
empower individuals in exercising their human rights online is a
forward-leaning aspect of U.S. policy that views human rights online
the same as it does in the physical world. The United States does not
condone or seek to support illegal online activity (such as transnational
crime) but leaves it to itself to be the arbiter of when and what type of
monitoring and filtering is acceptable. It is a policy that has been framed in
epic proportions. In October 2011, Secretary Clintons Senior Adviser for
Innovation Alec Ross was reported by the Washington Post as saying: If the
great struggles of the 20th century were between left and right, he said, the
conflict of the 21st century will be between open and closed. The president
and the secretary of state have made it clear where they stand on this, he
said. For openness, with an open Internet at its core. Unsurprisingly, this is
a hugely controversial foreign policy. It positions (p. 24) the United
States in direct opposition to important emerging powers like China
as well as other authoritarian states the United States more commonly
treats as partners (such as Vietnam and Bahrain). The policy also implies a
call on all democratic societies to join it in countering censorship
and monitoring. However, even some very close allies such as Australia and
the United Kingdom have, at times, pursued inimical policies and even the
United States has found it hard to live up to its own policy (see challenges
below). In many respects Congress and State were ahead of their time on this issue. The Arab uprisings,
which began at the end of 2010, revealed the extent of monitoring in places like Libya (and the complicity
of Western companies in providing surveillance equipment). It also raised awareness among many
authoritarian governments about the power of connection technologies to facilitate revolt, fuelling further
demand for monitoring and filtering technologies. As the Washington Post reported in a December 2011
article on a trade show for makers of surveillance equipment run by entrepreneur Jerry Lucas: The most
popular conference, with about 1,300 attendees, was in Dubai this year. Middle Eastern governments, for
whom the Arab Spring was a wake-up call, are the most avid buyers of surveillance software and
equipment, Lucas said. The rapid and sustained spread of the protests across the Arab world and beyond

Clintons Newseum speech

delivered nearly a year to the day before President Ben Ali of Tunisia was
ousted - was a shot across the bow, laying out the broad parameters U.S.
policy would take. It framed the issue in terms of universal human
rights, in particular freedom of expression and freedom of worship.
While some dismissed the speech as being overly optimistic, it was not
without its caveats, noting the internet is a neutral technology that does not
take sides in the struggle for freedom and progress and acknowledging it
could just as easily be used for good as ill. By couching internet freedom in
the language of rights, Clinton provided one rationale for direct U.S.
government intervention to promote internet freedom in other countries. But
the speech also offered another reason that equated restrictions on the
also appears to have fed into States thinking on internet freedom.

internet with an attack on what Clinton called "the global networked

commons." States, terrorists, and those who would act as their proxies
must know that the United States will protect our networks. Those who
disrupt the free flow of information in our society or any other pose
a threat to our economy, our government, and our civil society.
Countries or individuals that engage in cyber attacks should face
consequences and international condemnation. In an internet-connected
world, an attack on one nations networks can be an attack on all. And by
reinforcing that message, we can create norms of behavior among states and
encourage respect for the global networked commons. The speech also laid out the
approach the United States would take to implement this agenda: At a big-picture level, global political
action; and at a technical level, support for the development of technologies that enable citizens to
exercise their rights of free expression by circumventing politically motivated censorship and training.

The speech also laid out the approach the United States would take to
implement this agenda: At a big-picture level, global political action; and at a
technical level, support for the development of technologies that
enable citizens to exercise their rights of free expression by
circumventing politically motivated censorship and training. It was
envisaged activists would use these technologies across a very broad range
of issues, with Clinton stating: We want to put these tools in the hands
of people who will use them to advance democracy and human
rights, to fight climate change and epidemics, to build global support for
President Obamas goal of a world without nuclear weapons, to encourage
sustainable economic development that lifts the people at the bottom up. The
follow-up speech shied away from this more optimistic vision and focused on
what Clinton called the challenges we must confront as we seek to protect
and defend a free and open internet. These were described as achieving
both liberty and security, protecting both transparency and
confidentiality and protecting free expression while fostering
tolerance and civility. The speech focused on the tensions and
complexities of internet freedom and the fact they defy easy resolution and
tidy divisions of the world into black and white, while also addressing the
criticisms the policy had received since the Newseum speech. For example,
how to square a free and open internet with U.S. policy that regards the theft
of intellectual property, State Department cables or child pornography as
crimes? (Clinton argued freedom on the internet is an extension of
human freedom in the real world. Just as walking out the doors of the
State Department with a briefcase full of printed diplomatic cables would be
regarded as theft, so too was obtaining them electronically. In essence, what
is illegal in the offline world should be illegal online too.) The speech also
included a defense of the approach the Department has taken with the
development of circumvention technologies arguing in favor of a venture
capital-style approach, supporting a portfolio of technologies, tools, and
training, and adapting as more users shift to mobile devices, rather than a
focus on a single technology. The U.S. governments establishment of internet
freedom as a foreign policy priority has presented State with a hugely
complex policy issue. It complicates important bilateral relations, it is a
never-ending innovation battle pitting U.S.-funded circumvention
technologies against the massive resources of countries like China
dedicated to stifling freedom of speech and communication, and it is

a policy very hard to live up to. Poorly executed, it also risks endangering
activists. So how is State responding?

Impact Cyberattacks
Global open internet prevents cyberattacks, conflictprovides a reason to cooperate
DIPNOTE, Department of States Official Blog, 15
(May 18, U.S. Department of State, An Open and Secure Internet: We Must
Have Both, https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2015/05/18/open-and-secureinternet-we-must-have-both, June 28, 2015, GG)
He also made clear that the United States believes strongly in freedom of
expression, association, and choice. We understand that freedom of
expression is not a license to incite imminent violence. Its not a license to
commit fraud. Its not a license to indulge in libel, or sexually exploit children.
No. But we do know that some governments will use any excuse that
they can find to silence their critics and that those governments have
responded to the rise of the Internet by stepping up their own
efforts to control what people read, see, write, and say. Secretary
Kerry affirmed that the Internet is, among many other things, an
instrument of freedom and that banning the Internet in a misguided
attempt to impose order will never succeed in quashing the
universal desire for freedom. He said, Repression does not eliminate
the speech we hate. It just forces it into other avenues avenues that often
can become more dangerous than the speech itself that people are fighting.
The remedy for the speech that we do not like is more speech. Its the
credible voices of real people that must not only be enabled, but they need to
be amplified. The good news is that much of the world understands this.
And the advocates of Internet freedom and openness are speaking up,
Secretary Kerry said. The United States is part of the Freedom Online
Coalition, a 26-country group that we are actively seeking to expand. The
Coalition agrees that narrow and distorted visions of the Internet
cannot be allowed to prevail. We understand that. Unlike many models of
government that are basically top-down, the Internet allows all
stakeholders the private sector, civil society, academics, engineers, and
governments to all have seats at the table. And this multi-stakeholder
approach is embodied in a myriad of institutions that each day address
Internet issues and help digital technology to be able to function. Because of
the dynamic nature of this technology, new issues are constantly on the
horizon, but the United States believes that the multi-stakeholder approach
remains the fairest and most effective way to be able to resolve these issues.
Americas policy is also to promote international cyber stability. The goal is
to create a climate in which all states are able to enjoy the benefits
of cyberspace; all have incentives to cooperate and avoid conflict;
and all have good reason not to disrupt or attack one another. To
achieve this, we are seeking a broad consensus on where to draw the line
between responsible and irresponsible behavior. Secretary Kerry said, The
basic rules of international law apply in cyberspace. Acts of
aggression are not permissible. And countries that are hurt by an attack
have a right to respond in ways that are appropriate, proportional, and that
minimize harm to innocent parties. We also support a set of additional

principles that, if observed, can contribute substantially to conflict

prevention and stability in time of peace. We view these as universal
concepts that should be appealing to all responsible states, and they are
already gaining traction. The Secretary continued, First, no country
should conduct or knowingly support online activity that
intentionally damages or impedes the use of another countrys
critical infrastructure. Second, no country should seek either to
prevent emergency teams from responding to a cybersecurity
incident, or allow its own teams to cause harm. Third, no country should
conduct or support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, trade
secrets, or other confidential business information for commercial gain.
Fourth, every country should mitigate malicious cyber activity emanating
from its soil, and they should do so in a transparent, accountable and
cooperative way. And fifth, every country should do what it can to help
states that are victimized by a cyberattack. I guarantee you if those
five principles were genuinely and fully adopted and implemented by
countries, we would be living in a far safer and far more confident cyberworld.

Impact Disease
Internet restrictions encourage spread of diseaseinability to communicate about cases
McKenna, journalist who specializes in global health, 13
(Maryn, August 21, Wired, Censorship doesnt just stifle speech- it can
spread disease, http://www.wired.com/2013/08/ap_mers/all/1, June 28, 2015,
GG)
In October, Saudi Arabia will host millions of travelers on the hajj, the
annual pilgrimage to Islams holy sites. The hajj carries deep meaning for
those observant Muslims who undertake it, but it also carries risks that
make epidemiologists blanch. Pilgrims sleep in shared tents and
approach the crowded sites on foot, in debilitating heat. They come from all
over the world, and whatever pathogens they encounter on the hajj
will travel back with them to their home countries. In past seasons, the
hajj has been shown to foster disease, from stomach flus to tuberculosis
or meningitis. The Saudi Arabian government has traditionally taken this
threat quite seriously. Each year it builds a vast network of field hospitals to
give aid to pilgrims. It refuses visas to travelers who have not had required
vaccinations and makes public the outbreaks it learns about. This year,
though, the Saudis have been strangely opaque about one particular
riskand its a risk that has disease experts and public-health agencies
looking to October with a great deal of concern. They wonder if this years
hajj might actually breed the next pandemic. The reason is MERS: Middle
East respiratory syndrome, a disease that has been simmering in the
region for months. The virus is new, recorded in humans for the first time
in mid-2012. It is dire, having killed more than half of those who
contracted it. And it is mysterious, far more so than it should bebecause
Saudi Arabia, where the majority of cases have clustered, has been
tight-lipped about the diseases spread, responding slowly to requests
for information and preventing outside researchers from publishing their
findings about the syndrome. Even in the Internet age, when data sources
like Twitter posts and Google search queries are supposed to tip us off to
outbreaks as they happen, one restrictive government can still put the
whole world in danger by clamming up. Thats because the most
important factor in controlling epidemics isnt the quality of our
medicine. Its the quality of our information. To understand why MERS is
so troubling, look back to the beginning of 2003. For several months, publichealth observers heard rumors of a serious respiratory illness in southern
China. But when officials from the World Health Organization asked the
Chinese government about it, they were told that the countryside was simply
experiencing an outbreak of pneumonia.The wall of silence around what
came to be known as SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) cracked only
by chance. An anonymous man in a chat room, describing himself as a
teacher in Guangdong Province, made the acquaintance of a teacher in
California. On February 9, 2003, he asked her if she had heard of the illness
ravaging his city. She forwarded his message to an epidemiologist she knew,
and on February 10 he posted it to ProMED, a listserv that disease experts

use as an informal surveillance system. That email was the worlds only
warning for what was to come. By mid-March there were already 150 cases of
the new disease in seven countries. SARS wound up sickening more than
8,000 people and killing almost 800 in just nine months. Luckily, the disease
was quelled in China and Canada (where travelers from Hong Kong touched
off an outbreak in Toronto) before it had a chance to evolve into a more
efficiently spreading strain. Many experts believe that given time to mutate in
humans, SARS might have become a deadly pandemic. With more warning,
SARS might not even have gained a foothold outside of China. In Canada the
virus quickly infected 251 people, killing 43. By contrast, the US had time to
write new quarantine regulations, which made a difference: America had just
27 SARS cases, with no deaths and no hospital spread. To health authorities
who lived through SARS, MERS feels unnervingly familiar. The two organisms
are cousins: Both are coronaviruses, named for their crown-shaped profile
visible with an electron microscope. For this disease too, the first notice
was a posting to ProMEDthis time by a doctor working in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, describing a patient who had died several months before.
That September 2012 communiqu, which cost the doctor his job,
helped physicians in London realize that a Qatari man they were
treating was part of the same outbreak. From there, MERS
unspooled. People also fell ill in the United Arab Emirates, France, Germany,
Italy, and Tunisia. Saudi Arabia, home to the vast majority of confirmed
cases, remained far from forthcoming about what it knew.
Announcements from the Ministry of Health supplied little useful
detail and discussed illnesses and deaths that happened some
indeterminate time in the pastpossibly days, possibly even weeks. So
far the number of MERS cases is just a fraction of the toll from SARS, but
health officials fear that the real count could be higher. Especially worrisome
is the death rate among the afflicted: While SARS has been estimated to kill
roughly 10 percent of its victims, MERS so far has killed 56 percent.
Certainly censorship about the spread of disease is nothing new. The
largest well-documented pandemic, the great flu of 1918, is called
the Spanish Influenza in old accounts not because it started in Spain (it
may have begun in Kansas) but because Spain, as a neutral nation
during World War I, had no wartime curbs on news reports of deaths.
To this day, no one is sure how many people died in the 1918 flu; the best
guess hovers around 50 million worldwide. Regardless, since the virus took
11 months to circle the planet, some of those millions might have lived had
the later-infected countries been warned to prepare. After SARS, no one
thought that it would happen again. In 2005 the 194 nations that vote in
WHOs governing body promised not to conceal outbreaks. And beyond that
promise, public-health researchers have believed that Internet
chatterpatterns of online discussion about diseasewould undercut any
attempts at secrecy. But theyve been disappointed to see that their
web-scraping tools have picked up remarkably little from the Middle
East: While Saudi residents certainly use the Internet, what they can
access is stifled, and what they are willing to say appears muted.
Nearly 100 years after the great flu, it turns out that old-fashioned censorship
can still stymie the world in its ability to prepare for a pandemic. So what
now? The behind-door seething may be having an effect. A WHO team was

finally allowed into Saudi Arabia in June, and the Saudi government has
announced limits on the number of visas it will issue for this years hajj.
Meanwhile, governments and transnational health agencies have already
taken the steps that they can, warning hospitals and readying labs. With luck,
the disease will stay contained: In July, WHO declined to elevate MERS to a
public health emergency of international concern. But the organization
warned it might change its mind laterand if it does, we should fear the
worst, because our medical resources are few. At present there is no rapiddetection method, no vaccine, and no cure. While we wait to see the full
extent of MERS, the one thing the world can do is to relearn the lesson of
SARS: Just as diseases will always cross borders, governments will
always try to evade blame. That problem cant be solved with better
devices or through a more sophisticated public-health dragnet. The solution
lies in something public health has failed to accomplish despite centuries of
trying: persuading governments that transparency needs to trump
concerns about their own reputations. Information can outrun our
deadly new diseases, but only if its allowed to spread.

-- Privacy --

UQ Bull Run Targeting Now

High level of privacy infringement of untargeted
persons- encompass vast majority of information
Gellman et. al, Pulitizer Winner on Global Surveillance, 14

(Brian, July 5th, Washington Post, In NSA-intercepted data, those not targeted
far outnumber the foreigners who are,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepteddata-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-whoare/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html,
06/24/15, MM)
Ordinary Internet users, American and non-American alike, far outnumber
legally targeted foreigners in the communications intercepted by the National
Security Agency from U.S. digital networks, according to a four-month
investigation by The Washington Post. Nine of 10 account holders found
in a large cache of intercepted conversations, which former NSA
contractor Edward Snowden provided in full to The Post, were not
the intended surveillance targets but were caught in a net the
agency had cast for somebody else. Many of them were Americans.
Nearly half of the surveillance files, a strikingly high proportion,
contained names, e-mail addresses or other details that the NSA
marked as belonging to U.S. citizens or residents. NSA analysts
masked, or minimized, more than 65,000 such references to
protect Americans privacy, but The Post found nearly 900 additional
e-mail addresses, unmasked in the files, that could be strongly
linked to U.S. citizens or U.S.residents. The surveillance files highlight a
policy dilemma that has been aired only abstractly in public. There are
discoveries of considerable intelligence value in the intercepted messages
and collateral harm to privacy on a scale that the Obama administration has
not been willing to address. Among the most valuable contents which The
Post will not describe in detail, to avoid interfering with ongoing operations
are fresh revelations about a secret overseas nuclear project, double-dealing
by an ostensible ally, a military calamity that befell an unfriendly power, and
the identities of aggressive intruders into U.S. computer networks. Months of
tracking communications across more than 50 alias accounts, the files show,
led directly to the 2011 capture in Abbottabad of Muhammad Tahir Shahzad,
a Pakistan-based bomb builder, and Umar Patek, a suspect in a 2002 terrorist
bombing on the Indonesian island of Bali. At the request of CIA officials, The
Post is withholding other examples that officials said would compromise
ongoing operations. (Transcript: Q&A with Barton Gellman) Many other
files, described as useless by the analysts but nonetheless retained,
have a startlingly intimate, even voyeuristic quality. They tell stories
of love and heartbreak, illicit sexual liaisons, mental-health crises,
political and religious conversions, financial anxieties and
disappointed hopes. The daily lives of more than 10,000 account
holders who were not targeted are catalogued and recorded
nevertheless. In order to allow time for analysis and outside reporting,
neither Snowden nor The Post has disclosed until now that he obtained and

shared the content of intercepted communications. The cache Snowden

provided came from domestic NSA operations under the broad authority
granted by Congress in 2008 with amendments to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. FISA content is generally stored in closely controlled data
repositories, and for more than a year, senior government officials have
depicted it as beyond Snowdens reach. The Post reviewed roughly 160,000
intercepted e-mail and instant-message conversations, some of them
hundreds of pages long, and 7,900 documents taken from more than 11,000
online accounts. The material spans President Obamas first term, from 2009
to 2012, a period of exponential growth for the NSAs domestic collection. A
composite image of two of the more than 5,000 private photos among data
collected by the National Security Agency from online accounts and network
links in the United States. The images were included in a large cache of NSA
intercepts provided by former agency contractor Edward Snowden. Taken
together, the files offer an unprecedented vantage point on the changes
wrought by Section 702 of the FISA amendments, which enabled the NSA to
make freer use of methods that for 30 years had required probable cause and
a warrant from a judge. One program, code-named PRISM, extracts content
stored in user accounts at Yahoo, Microsoft, Facebook, Google and five other
leading Internet companies. Another, known inside the NSA as Upstream,
intercepts data on the move as it crosses the U.S. junctions of global voice
and data networks. No government oversight body, including the Justice
Department, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, intelligence
committees in Congress or the presidents Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board, has delved into a comparably large sample of what the NSA
actually collects not only from its targets but also from people who may
cross a targets path. Among the latter are medical records sent from
one family member to another, rsums from job hunters and
academic transcripts of schoolchildren. In one photo, a young girl in
religious dress beams at a camera outside a mosque. Scores of
pictures show infants and toddlers in bathtubs, on swings, sprawled
on their backs and kissed by their mothers. In some photos, men
show off their physiques. In others, women model lingerie, leaning
suggestively into a webcam or striking risque poses in shorts and
bikini tops. None of the hits that were received were relevant, two
Navy cryptologic technicians write in one of many summaries of
nonproductive surveillance. No additional information, writes a civilian
analyst. Another makes fun of a suspected kidnapper, newly arrived in Syria
before the current civil war, who begs for employment as a janitor and makes
wide-eyed observations about the state of undress displayed by women on
local beaches. By law, the NSA may target only foreign nationals located
overseas unless it obtains a warrant based on probable cause from a special
surveillance court. For collection under PRISM and Upstream rules, analysts
must state a reasonable belief that the target has information of value about
a foreign government, a terrorist organization or the spread of
nonconventional weapons.

The NSA is just like any other hacker theyre

stealing mass amounts of private, encrypted data
Buchanan, Science and technology editor for the New Yorker,
13 (Matt Buchanan, 9-6-2013, "How the N.S.A. Cracked the Web," New
Yorker, http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/how-the-n-s-a-cracked-theweb //NK)
The most damning aspect of the new disclosures is that the N.S.A.
has worked to make widely used technology less secure. The Times reports
that in 2006, the N.S.A. intentionally introduced a vulnerability into an encryption standard adopted by
both the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the International Organization for
Standardization. This is deeply problematic, Green writes, because the cryptographic industry is highly
dependent on NIST standards. The N.S.A. also uses its Commercial Solutions Center, which invites
companies, including start-ups, to show their technology to the agency under the guise of improving
security, in order to leverage sensitive, cooperative relationships with specific industry partners and

covertly make those products more susceptible to N.S.A.s

surveillance. Schneier, who has reviewed the documents, describes the process thusly: Basically ,
the NSA asks companies to subtly change their products in
undetectable ways: making the random number generator less
random, leaking the key somehow, adding a common exponent to a public-key
exchange protocol, and so on. This is why the N.S.A. specifically asked the Times and Guardian to not
publish their articles and the documents detailing the program warn explicitly and repeatedly of the need
for secrecy: Do not ask about or speculate on sources or methods. The Times notes that the N.S.A.
expects to gain full unencrypted access to an unnamed major Internet phone call and text service
sometime this year. The Guardian further specifies that it is a major internet peer-to-peer voice and text
communi cations, which sounds like it might be Skypeowned by Microsoft and previously named as an
N.S.A. partner. Drake said that he was certain that Skype has been compromised. And, in one instance,
the Times notes that after the government learned that a foreign intelligence target had ordered new
computer hardware, the American manufacturer agreed to insert a back door into the product before it was

This is worse than the legal mandate the N.S.A. and the F.B.I.
pushed for in the nineties to force technology companies to build
backdoors into their products, because, as Chris Soghoian, the principal technologist for
shipped.

the American Civil Liberties Union said, with a secret backdoor youll think its secure, rather than simply
avoiding the technology. Schneier writes,

My guess is that most encryption

products from large U.S. companies have NSA-friendly back doors,
and many foreign ones probably do as well. The pervasive effort to engineer
backdoors into commercial technology strikes upon a broader question, raised by Soghoian: Can we
rely on technology provided by corporations with extensive relations
with the U.S. government? Despite the scope of the N.S.A.s program, and its apparent
success against Internet-level encryption, strong encryption schemes do remain uncracked by the N.S.A,
and they are your best bet for privacy, said Janke. Pretty Good Privacy, a common encryption program, if
used with the latest algorithms, remains safe, he added, as does the encryption used in Z.R.T.P., which is
used by Silent Circles voice and text products to encrypt communications. Janke believes in their security
in large part because its good enough for the government to approve it for their use. Soghoian says that
the the kind of stuff we need is already available, its just not in our browsers and not with Google and
Facebook. (However, in response to the N.S.A. revelations, Google has fast-tracked its plan to encrypt
data as it zips between its own data centers to prevent it from being subject to intelligence-agency prying.)
Janke notes that on a local level, TrueCrypt, a hard-drive encryption program, along with Apples native
hard-disk encryption tool both remain unbroken. Though Drake said he would only trust 2048-bit level
encryption schemes and that he relies largely on open-source software, he would not reveal how he
protects his own communications.

I just dont want others to know how I

protect myself, he said. I literally do not trust anything
commercial. In response to the latest revelations, Representative Rush Holt of New Jersey has

introduced a bill, the Surveillance State Repeal Act, which would, among other things, bar the N.S.A. from
installing such backdoors into encryption software. While a statement from the Director of National
Intelligence, James Clapperpublished after the reports by the Times and the Guardiansaid that the fact
that the N.S.A. works to crack encrypted data was not news, Holt said, correctly, that if

in the
process they degrade the security of the encryption we all use, its a

net national disservice. The upshot is that it is now known that

the N.S.A. cannot be trusted on the issue of cyber security, said
Soghoian. He continued, My sincere hope is that the N.S.A. loses its shine.
Theyre the bad guy; theyre breaking into systems; theyre
exploiting vulnerabilities. Its conceivable that they have good intentions. And yet,
Soghoian continued, they act like any other hacker. They steal data. They
read private communications. With that methodology, how easy can it be, though, to give
the agency the benefit of the doubt? As many have, Thomas Drake compared the worldview of what he
calls the rogue agency to the total surveillance of George Orwells 1984, in which the only way to
escape was to cower in a corner. I dont want to live like that. Ive already lived that and its not pleasant.

NSA violates privacy regularly- accesses private

information through decryption
Markoff, Senior Writer for the New York Times, 13
(John, September 6, New York Times, N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of
Privacy on Web, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-muchinternet-encryption.html, June 23, 2015, GG)
The [national security] agency has circumvented or cracked much of
the encryption, or digital scrambling, that guards global commerce
and banking systems, protects sensitive data like trade secrets and
medical records, and automatically secures the e-mails, Web
searches, Internet chats and phone calls of Americans and others
around the world, the documents show. Many users assume or have

been assured by Internet companies that their data is safe from

prying eyes, including those of the government, and the N.S.A. wants
to keep it that way. The agency treats its recent successes in
deciphering protected information as among its most closely guarded
secrets, restricted to those cleared for a highly classified program
code-named Bullrun, according to the documents, provided by Edward
J. Snowden, the former N.S.A. contractor.

I/L Writers
Writers freedom of expression curtailed by NSA
fear of surveillance drives self-censoring
The FDR Group 13 (Chilling Effects: NSA Surveillance Drives U.S.
Writers to Self-Censor http://www.pen.org/sites/default/files/Chilling
%20Effects_PEN%20American.pdf)//MEB
Writers are self-censoring their work and their online activity due to
their fears that commenting on, researching, or writing about
certain issues will cause them harm. Writers reported self-censoring on
subjects including military affairs, the Middle East North Africa region, mass
incarceration, drug policies, pornography, the Occupy movement, the study
of certain languages, and criticism of the U.S. government. The fear of
surveillanceand doubt over the way in which the government intends to
use the data it gathershas prompted PEN writers to change their behavior
in numerous ways that curtail their freedom of expression and restrict
the free flow of information . The results of the survey regarding
forms of self-censorship were particularly strikingand troubling:
28% have curtailed or avoided social media activities, and another
12% have seriously considered doing so; 24% have deliberately avoided
certain topics in phone or email conversations, and another 9% have
seriously considered it; 16% have avoided writing or speaking about a
particular topic, and another 11% have seriously considered it; 16%
have refrained from conducting Internet searches or visiting
websites on topics that may be considered controversial or
suspicious, and another 12% have seriously considered it; 13% have
taken extra steps to disguise or cover their digital footprints, and
another 11% have seriously considered it; 3% have declined opportunities to meet (in

person, or electronically) people who might be deemed security threats by the government, and another
4% have seriously considered it. a) Self-censorship in writing and speaking: Writers reported avoiding
writing or speaking about particular subjects that they thought could make them a target of surveillance.
In my limited experience, the writers who feel most chilled, who are being most cautious, are friends and
colleagues who write about the Middle East. As a writer and journalist who deals with the Middle East and
the Iraq War in particular, I suspect I am being monitored. As a writer who has exposed sexual violence in
the military, and who speaks widely on the subject, likewise. I have felt that even to comment on the
Snowden case in an email would flag my email as worthy of being looked at. I would hesitate to express
in writing understanding for anti-American sentiments abroad, as I suspect that expressing such
understanding might make me suspect in the eyes of the American security apparatus. I am pretty free

I
have dropped stories in the past and avoided research on the
company telephone due to concerns over wiretapping or
eavesdropping. I have made a conscious, deliberate choice to
avoid certain conversation topics in electronic emails out of concern
that those communications may be surveilled.
with political opinions online, but hesitate to write about liberal organizing, especially during Occupy.

I/L 4th Amendment

NSA Surveillance compromises Internet Freedom
creates unchecked power
American Civil Liberties Union No date (are the nations leading
civil liberties advocate in the Supreme Court. With over 200 staff attorneys
and an extensive network of cooperating attorneys, we handle thousands of
cases each year on behalf of clients whose rights have been violated,
https://www.aclu.org/surveillance-under-usa-patriot-act)
The result is unchecked government power to rifle through
individuals' financial records, medical histories, Internet usage,
bookstore purchases, library usage, travel patterns, or any other
activity that leaves a record. Making matters worse: The government
no longer has to show evidence that the subjects of search orders
are an "agent of a foreign power," a requirement that previously
protected Americans against abuse of this authority. The FBI does not
even have to show a reasonable suspicion that the records are
related to criminal activity, much less the requirement for "probable
cause" that is listed in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. All the
government needs to do is make the broad assertion that the request is
related to an ongoing terrorism or foreign intelligence investigation. Judicial
oversight of these new powers is essentially non-existent. The
government must only certify to a judge - with no need for evidence or proof that such a search meets the statute's broad criteria, and the judge does not
even have the authority to reject the application. Surveillance orders can
be based in part on a person's First Amendment activities, such as the
books they read, the Web sites they visit, or a letter to the editor they have
written. A person or organization forced to turn over records is prohibited
from disclosing the search to anyone. As a result of this gag order, the
subjects of surveillance never even find out that their personal records have
been examined by the government. That undercuts an important check
and balance on this power: the ability of individuals to challenge
illegitimate searches. Violates the Fourth Amendment, which says the
government cannot conduct a search without obtaining a warrant and
showing probable cause to believe that the person has committed or will
commit a crime. Violates the First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech by prohibiting the recipients of search orders from telling others
about those orders, even where there is no real need for secrecy. Violates
the First Amendment by effectively authorizing the FBI to launch
investigations of American citizens in part for exercising their
freedom of speech. Violates the Fourth Amendmentby failing to provide
notice - even after the fact - to persons whose privacy has been
compromised. Notice is also a key element of due process, which is
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

I/L - Encryption
Strong encryption key to privacy- undermining
encryption grants unnecessary access to financial and
medical information
Greene, Open Technology Institute Surveillance Specialist, 15

(Robyn, June 15th, Open Technology Institute, Comments to the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board Concerning Activities Under Executive Order
12333, https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/3423-oti-submitscomments-to-pclob/EO%2012333%20Written%20Comments%20for
%20PCLOB.2f3cce2cdaa54b09892e3e7deeebaf9a.pdf, page #4-5, 06/24/15,
MM)
The second area we urge PCLOB to examine is NSA efforts to subvert
cybersecurity and undermine encryption. To the extent that efforts to
undermine or crack encryption aid in EO 12333 surveillance conducted in
furtherance of counterterrorism investigations or related activities, we believe
that they are within the jurisdiction of the Board. It is essential that PCLOB
examine those activities to determine the extent of their impact on
cybersecurity and privacy. Efforts to Undermine Encryption The NSA not only
attempts to crack encryption through EO 12333 programs like Bullrun.3 On at
least one occasion it also sought to undermine the National Institute of
Standards and Technologys encryption standard-setting process, 4 and press
reports revealed that it has contracted with technology companies to use
weak encryption in their products.5 More recently, the Director of the NSA,
Admiral Rogers, has joined the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
James Comey, in publicly stating that companies should weaken their
encryption by inserting vulnerabilities in order to facilitate surveillance.6
Employing strong encryption is widely accepted as the best way for
individuals to protect the contents of their communications. It is also
critical to effective cybersecurity, as is evidenced by its widespread
deployment throughout the Internet economy, including by financial
institutions, businesses, medical providers, and e-mail service
providers. NSA efforts to undermine encryption violates Americans
privacy and threaten the publics trust in the security of their online
communications. The governments calls to undermine encryption
are strongly opposed by technology companies, security experts,
and privacy advocates. In May, a coalition of nearly 150 groups,
companies, and experts wrote to the president to voice their strong
opposition and warn that such proposals, if enacted, would pose a
serious threat to privacy, human rights, economic security, and even
national security.7 David Kaye, the UN Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression and Opinion, also published a report
concluding that access to strong encryption is essential to privacy
and free expression, and that States should promote strong
encryption and anonymity. National laws should recognize that
individuals are free to protect the privacy of their digital
communications by using encryption technology and tools that allow
anonymity online, and States should avoid all measures that

weaken the security that individuals may enjoy online, such as

backdoors, weak encryption standards and key escrows.8 The report
also notes that the governments that have urged the adoption of policies to
require intentional vulnerabilities in encryption have not demonstrated that
criminal or terrorist use of encryption serves as an insuperable barrier to law
enforcement objectives, and that intentional flaws invariably undermine the
security of all users online, since a backdoor, even if intended solely for
government access, can be accessed by unauthorized entities.9

I/L Modeling
Passing BULLRUN key to promoting privacy on a
national and global level
Kaye, UN Rapporteur on protection of the right to freedom of
opinion, 15 (David, May 22nd, UN Human Rights Council, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression, Pages 19-20, 06/26/15, MM)
States should revise or establish, as appropriate, national laws and
regulations to promote and protect the rights to privacy and
freedom of opinion and expression. With respect to encryption and
anonymity, States should adopt policies of non-restriction or
comprehensive protection, only adopt restrictions on a case-specific
basis and that meet the requirements of legality, necessity,
proportionality and legitimacy in objective, require court orders for
any specific limitation, and promote security and privacy online
through public education. Discussions of encryption and anonymity have all too often

focused only on their potential use for criminal purposes in times of terrorism. But emergency situations do
not relieve States of the obligation to ensure respect for international human rights law .

Legislative
proposals for the revision or adoption of restrictions on individual
security online should be subject to public debate and adopted
according to regular, public, informed and transparent legislative
process. States must promote effective participation of a wide
variety of civil society actors and minority groups in such debate and
processes and avoid adopting such legislation under accelerated
legislative procedures. General debate should highlight the protection that encryption and
anonymity provide, especially to the groups most at risk of unlawful interferences. Any such debate must
also take into account that restrictions are subject to strict tests: if they interfere with the right to hold

Restrictions on privacy that limit

freedom of expression for purposes of the present report,
restrictions on encryption and anonymity must be provided by law
and be necessary and proportionate to achieve one of a small
number of legitimate objectives. States should promote strong
encryption and anonymity. National laws should recognize that
individuals are free to protect the privacy of their digital
communications by using encryption technology and tools that allow
anonymity online. Legislation and regulations protecting human rights defenders and journalists
opinions, restrictions must not be adopted.

should also include provisions enabling access and providing support to use the technologies to secure
their communications. States should not restrict encryption and anonymity, which facilitate and often
enable the rights to freedom of opinion and expression. Blanket prohibitions fail to be necessary and
proportionate. States should avoid all measures that weaken the security that individuals may enjoy
online, such as backdoors, weak encryption standards and key escrows. In addition, States should refrain
from making the identification of users a condition for access to digital communications and online
services and requiring SIM card registration for mobile users. Corporate actors should likewise consider
their own policies that restrict encryption and anonymity (including through the use of pseudonyms ).

Court-ordered decryption, subject to domestic and international law,

may only be permissible when it results from transparent and
publicly accessible laws applied solely on a targeted, case-by-case
basis to individuals (i.e., not to a mass of people) and subject to
judicial warrant and the protection of due process rights of
individuals.

Impact Privacy Key to Democracy

The US is turning into totalitarian government with its
invasive surveillance- inconsistency of values confirm
Moglen, professor of law and legal history at Columbia University, 14 (Eben
5-27-2014, "Privacy under attack: the NSA files revealed new threats to
democracy," Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/27/-sp-privacy-underattack-nsa-files-revealed-new-threats-democracy)//GL
In a democracy, that task is given by the people to the leaders they
elect. These leaders fell - and we fell with them - because they
refused to adhere to the morality of freedom. The civilian workers in
their agencies felt their failure first. From the middle of last decade, people began to

blow whistles all over the field. These courageous workers sacrificed their careers, frightened their
families, sometimes suffered personal destruction, to say that there was something deeply wrong. The
response was rule by fear. Two successive US administrations sought to deal with the whistleblowers
among the listeners by meting out the harshest possible treatment. Snowden said in Hong Kong that he
was sacrificing himself in order to save the world from a system like this one, which is "constrained only by
policy documents". The political ideas of Snowden are worthy of our respect and our deep consideration.

Because
of Snowden, we now know that the listeners undertook to do what
they repeatedly promised respectable expert opinion they would
never do. They always said they would not attempt to break the
crypto that secures the global financial system. That was false.
When Snowden disclosed the existence of the NSA's Bullrun
programme we learned that NSA had lied for years to the financiers
who believe themselves entitled to the truth from the government
they own. The NSA had not only subverted technical standards,
attempting to break the encryption that holds the global financial
industry together, it had also stolen the keys to as many vaults as
possible. With this disclosure the NSA forfeited respectable opinion
around the world. Their reckless endangerment of those who don't accept danger from the
But for now it is sufficient to say that he was not exaggerating the nature of the difficulty.

United States government was breathtaking. The empire of the United States was the empire of exported
liberty. What it had to offer all around the world was liberty and freedom. After colonisation, after European
theft, after forms of state-created horror, it promised a world free from state oppression. Last century we

We
bore those costs in order to smash regimes we called "totalitarian",
in which the state grew so powerful and so invasive that it no longer
recognised any border of private life. We desperately fought and
died against systems in which the state listened to every telephone
conversation and kept a list of everybody every troublemaker knew.
But in the past 10 years, after the morality of freedom was
withdrawn, the state has begun fastening the procedures of
totalitarianism on the substance of democratic society. There is no
were prepared to sacrifice many of the world's great cities and tens of millions of human lives.

historical precedent for the proposition that the procedures of totalitarianism are compatible with the
system of enlightened, individual and democratic self-governance. Such an argument would be doomed to
failure. It is enough to say in opposition that omnipresent invasive listening creates fear. And that fear is
the enemy of reasoned, ordered liberty.

It is utterly inconsistent with the

American ideal to attempt to fasten procedures of totalitarianism on
American constitutional self-governance. But there is an even deeper inconsistency
between those ideals and the subjection of every other society on earth to mass surveillance.

Impact Democracy
Privacy is key to democracy Surveillance impinges
upon this privacy
McFarland, S.J., a computer scientist with extensive liberal
arts teaching experience and a special interest in the
intersection of technology and ethics, served as the 31st
president of the College of the Holy Cross No date (Michael
McFarland, , Santa Clara University, "Why We Care about Privacy,"
www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/technology/internet/privacy/whycare-about-privacy.html)
Privacy is even more necessary as a safeguard of freedom in the
relationships between individuals and groups. As Alan Westin has
pointed out, surveillance and publicity are powerful instruments of social
control. 8 If individuals know that their actions and dispositions are
constantly being observed, commented on and criticized, they find it
much harder to do anything that deviates from accepted social
behavior. There does not even have to be an explicit threat of retaliation.
"Visibility itself provides a powerful method of enforcing norms." 9 Most
people are afraid to stand apart, to be different, if it means being
subject to piercing scrutiny. The "deliberate penetration of the individual's
protective shell, his psychological armor, would leave him naked to ridicule
and shame and would put him under the control of those who know his
secrets." 10 Under these circumstances they find it better simply to conform.
This is the situation characterized in George Orwell's 1984 where the
pervasive surveillance of "Big Brother" was enough to keep most citizens
under rigid control. 11 Therefore privacy, as protection from excessive
scrutiny, is necessary if individuals are to be free to be themselves.
Everyone needs some room to break social norms, to engage in
small "permissible deviations" that help define a person's
individuality. People need to be able to think outrageous thoughts,
make scandalous statements and pick their noses once in a while. They
need to be able to behave in ways that are not dictated to them by the
surrounding society. If every appearance, action, word and thought of
theirs is captured and posted on a social network visible to the rest
of the world, they lose that freedom to be themselves. As Brian Stelter
wrote in the New York Times on the loss of anonymity in today's online world,
"The collective intelligence of the Internet's two billion users, and
the digital fingerprints that so many users leave on Web sites,
combine to make it more and more likely that every embarrassing video,
every intimate photo, and every indelicate e-mail is attributed to its source,
whether that source wants it to be or not. This intelligence makes the public
sphere more public than ever before and sometimes forces personal lives into
public view." 12 This ability to develop one's unique individuality is
especially important in a democracy, which values and depends on
creativity, nonconformism and the free interchange of diverse ideas.
That is where a democracy gets its vitality. Thus, as Westin has

observed, "Just as a social balance favoring disclosure and

surveillance over privacy is a functional necessity for totalitarian
systems, so a balance that ensures strong citadels of individual and
group privacy and limits both disclosure and surveillance is a
prerequisite for liberal democratic societies. The democratic society
relies on publicity as a control over government, and on privacy as a
shield for group and individual life." 13

Privacy necessary in democracy- allows for more

individuality
McFarland, a computer scientist with extensive liberal arts
teaching experience and a special interest in the intersection
of technology and ethics, 12 (Michael, 6/2012, Santa Carla University,
Why We Care about Privacy,
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/technology/internet/privacy/
why-care-about-privacy.html, 6/28/15, WG*)
Therefore privacy, as protection from excessive scrutiny, is necessary if
individuals are to be free to be themselves. Everyone needs some
room to break social norms, to engage in small "permissible
deviations" that help define a person's individuality. People need to be
able to think outrageous thoughts, make scandalous statements and pick
their noses once in a while. They need to be able to behave in ways that are
not dictated to them by the surrounding society. If every appearance, action,
word and thought of theirs is captured and posted on a social network visible
to the rest of the world, they lose that freedom to be themselves. As Brian
Stelter wrote in the New York Times on the loss of anonymity in today's online
world, "The collective intelligence of the Internet's two billion users, and the
digital fingerprints that so many users leave on Web sites, combine to make it
more and more likely that every embarrassing video, every intimate photo,
and every indelicate e-mail is attributed to its source, whether that source
wants it to be or not. This intelligence makes the public sphere more public
than ever before and sometimes forces personal lives into public view." 12
This ability to develop one's unique individuality is especially
important in a democracy, which values and depends on creativity,
nonconformism and the free interchange of diverse ideas. That is
where a democracy gets its vitality. Thus, as Westin has observed, "Just as a
social balance favoring disclosure and surveillance over privacy is a
functional necessity for totalitarian systems, so a balance that
ensures strong citadels of individual and group privacy and limits
both disclosure and surveillance is a prerequisite for liberal
democratic societies. The democratic society relies on publicity as a
control over government, and on privacy as a shield for group and
individual life." 13

Privacy is key to preserving democracy

Cohen, 12 (Julie, Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center,
What Privacy is For http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2175406)//MEB
So described, privacy is anything but old-fashioned, and trading it
away creates two kinds of large systemic risk. First, privacy is an
indispensable structural feature of liberal democratic political
systems. Freedom from surveillance, whether public or private, is
foundational to the capacity for critical self-reflection and informed
citizenship. A society that permits the unchecked ascendancy of
surveillance infrastructures cannot hope to remain a liberal
democracy . Under such conditions, liberal democracy as a form of
government is replaced, gradually but surely, by a form of government that I
will call modulated democracy because it relies on a form of surveillance that
operates by modulation: a set of processes in which the quality and content
of surveillant attention is continually modified according to the subjects own
behavior, sometimes in response to inputs from the subject but according to
logics that ultimately are outside the subjects control. Second, privacy is
also foundational to the capacity for innovation, and so the
perception of privacy as anti-innovation is a non sequitur. A society
that values innovation ignores privacy at its peril, for privacy also
shelters the processes of play and experimentation from which
innovation emerges. Efforts to repackage pervasive surveillance as
innovation under the moniker Big Data are better understood as
efforts to enshrine the methods and values of the modulated society at the
heart of our system of knowledge production. In short, privacy incursions
harm individuals , but not only individuals. Privacy incursions in the
name of progress, innovation, and ordered liberty jeopardize the
continuing vitality of the political and intellectual culture that we
say we value .

Democracy Impact Tyranny

Absence of democracy leads to abusive, corrupted
and tyrannical governments
Gershman, 03 (Carl, President of The National Endowment for
Democracy, Why the Developing World Needs and Wants Democracy
http://www.ned.org/about/board/meet-our-president/archived-remarks-andpresentations/091203)//MEB
How democracy can help a country become fit is a complex and subtle
process that doesnt lend itself to news-bites. Let me suggest seven ways
that democracy contributes to this process. The first is by offering the
means by which the citizenry can hold governments accountable for
their policies and integrity. The political scientist Larry Diamond has
written that predatory, corrupt, wasteful, abusive, tyrannical,
incompetent governance is the bane of development. There is
simply no way to control or eliminate corruption if people dont have
access to the fundamental institutions of democracy: a free media
that can expose corruption, an independent judiciary that can punish
its perpetrators, and a system of free and fair elections that can
hold political leaders accountable and, where appropriate, kick the
rascals out. This doesnt mean that democracy will automatically reduce corruption or produce good
governance. Responsible governance requires political will, effective institutions, professional officials, and
an informed, alert, and aroused citizenry.

But without democracy none of these

things are possible, and the absence of political and legal restraints
leads inevitably to abusive and corrupt behavior .

The second way is by

promoting economic development and prosperity. In the past, the conventional wisdom has held that
development and prosperity encourage democracy, as better off citizens become more educated and have
the ability to participate in politics and government. More recent analysis shows that the causal effect also
works the other way around democracy fosters development. This is a principal conclusion of the Human
Development Report 2002, published by the United Nations Development Program, which notes that
democratic

governance can trigger a virtuous cycle of development as

political freedom empowers people to press for policies that expand social
and economic opportunities, and as open debates help communities shape
their priorities.

Impact Human Right

Privacy online is a human right new resolution is K2
to end NSA surveillance
Lederer, She is the recipient of numerous awards, including
the International Women's Media Foundation Lifetime
Achievement Awards and co-authored "War Torn,", 13 ( Edith
M., 12/18/13, AP, UN votes to protect privacy in digital age,
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/un-votes-protect-privacy-digital-age, 6/28/15,
WG*)
The U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution aimed
at protecting the right to privacy against unlawful surveillance in the
digital age on Wednesday in the most vocal global criticism of U.S.
eavesdropping. Germany and Brazil introduced the resolution
following a series of reports of U.S. surveillance, interception, and
data collection abroad including on Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff
and German Chancellor Angela Merkel that surprised and angered friends
and allies. The resolution "affirms that the same rights that people
have offline must also be protected online, including the right to
privacy." It calls on the 193 U.N. member states "to respect and protect
the right to privacy, including in the context of digital
communication," to take measures to end violations of those rights,
and to prevent such violations including by ensuring that national
legislation complies with international human rights law . It also calls
on all countries "to review their procedures, practices and legislation
regarding the surveillance of communications, their interception and
collection of personal data, including mass surveillance, interception and
collection, with a view to upholding the right to privacy of all their obligations
under international human rights law." The resolution calls on U.N.
members to establish or maintain independent and effective
oversight methods to ensure transparency, when appropriate, and
accountability for state surveillance of communications, their
interception and collection of personal data. General Assembly
resolutions are not legally binding but they do reflect world opinion and carry
political weight. Brazil's Rousseff canceled a state visit to Washington after
classified documents leaked by former National Security Agency analyst
Edward Snowden. The documents revealed Brazil is the top NSA target in
Latin America, with spying that has included the monitoring of Rousseff's
cellphone and hacking into the internal network of state-run oil company
Petrobras. Merkel and other European leaders also expressed anger after
reports that the NSA allegedly monitored Merkel's cell phone and swept up
millions of French telephone records. The United States did not fight the
measure after it engaged in lobbying with Britain, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand, which comprise the "Five Eyes" intelligence-sharing group, to dilute
some of the original draft resolution's language . The key compromise
dropped the contention that the domestic and international
interception and collection of communications and personal data, "in

particular massive surveillance," may constitute a human rights

violation. The resolution instead expresses deep concern at "the
negative impact" that such surveillance, "in particular when carried
out on a mass scale, may have on the exercise and enjoyment of
human rights." It directs U.N. human rights chief Navi Pillay to report to the
Human Rights Council and the General Assembly on the protection and
promotion of privacy "in the context of domestic and extraterritorial
surveillance ... including on a mass scale." Cynthia Wong, senior Internet
researcher at Human Rights Watch, and Jamil Dakwar, director of the
American Civil Liberties Union's Human Rights Program, welcomed the
resolution's unanimous adoption. "With the Internet age quickly
becoming a golden age for surveillance," Wong said, "this resolution
is a critical first step that puts mass surveillance squarely on the
international agenda." "Given the scale of snooping that technology now
enables, all states should modernize privacy protections or we risk
undermining the Internet's potential as a tool for advancing human
rights," she said. Dakwar said that while somewhat watered down , "the
measure still sends a strong message to the United States that it's
time to reverse course and end NSA dragnet surveillance."

Impact Tyranny
Too much surveillance is similar to tyranny
Porter 12 (Henry, 4/3/12, The Guardian, Privacy from state snooping
defines a true democracy,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/apr/03/privacy-statesnooping-true-democracy, 6/28/15, WG*)
As we welcome the glimmers of democracy in Burma and applaud
the heroic struggle for freedom and rights in countries such as Russia,
China and Syria, it beggars belief that Britain now contemplates a law
that will allow police and security services to access data from every
phone call, email, internet connection and text message, without a
warrant. The millions who suffer under dictatorships will be
astonished that we are about to let slip with so little protest the
freedoms for which they continue to sacrifice so much. Privacy from
state snooping is the defining quality of any true democracy. If the
bill that is reported to be in the Queen's speech next month is made law,
Britain will overnight become a substantially less free country, our
status as one of the beacons of freedom seriously diminished. This is
among the most serious threats to freedom proposed anywhere in
the democratic world. It competes with the very worst of Labour's
authoritarian laws and the last government's morbid obsession with
personal information. Those promoting the bill, which will allow GCHQ
to conduct real-time surveillance of a person's communications and
their web usage, insist that the state only wants to know who's calling who,
and that the content of messages, emails and texts will remain private. It is
an assurance that should be treated with the greatest possible
scepticism for two reasons. The law of function creep means that
oppressive measures passed to address terrorism and crime are
invariably deployed in much less threatening contexts. For example,
the spread of surveillance under the last government's Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act resulted in local councils using counter-terror
methods to mount undercover operations against fly-tippers and those
suspected of lying in school applications. Once the intelligence services
and police have these powers to insist that internet and phone
companies hand over our data without our knowledge, in a crisis it
will be a short step for the same people to argue that they need to
start reading our communications. How long before messages between
trade unionists or those legitimately engaged in protest are subject to routine
interception by the authorities, because their activities trouble the state?
Already, automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) cameras monitor
Britain's major roads, and real-time surveillance is a feature of the system. If
we let this come about without an act of parliament, the argument will go,
there surely can be no real objection to allowing the content of our
communications to be read. Is it simply the predictable cynicism of the
political trade that lets the home secretary, Theresa May, bring forward this
measure, which is every bit as intrusive as Labour's Interception
Modernisation Programme, which conceived a vast silo of communications
data? I am not sure, but what I do know is that a few years back I sat on

Liberty's conference platform listening to May attacking Labour's civil liberties

record, just I sat next to the justice secretary, Ken Clarke, at parliament's joint
committee of human rights and heard him speak about the balance between
liberty and security. Now he proposes a bill to let a minister close courts and
inquests to the public, and allow the evidence to be heard in the absence of
one party and his lawyers: secret justice, coalition-style. These things
ought to be a deal-breaker for the coalition because they go against
everything the Lib Dems said they believed before the last election,
and indeed against the coalition agreement itself, which placed an
emphasis on privacy and civil liberties. These principles are quickly
forgotten when plausible spooks come through the back door and

invoke all manner of terrors.

-- Solvency --

Solvency Congress Key

Congress has the authority over NSA surveillance- has
the ability to regulate and change FISA
Bazan and Elsea, both Congressional Research Service, 06

(Elizabeth and Jennifer, January 5th, Congressional Research Service,

Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to
Gather Foreign Intelligence Information,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf, Page #27-28, 06/25/15, MM)
The statutory language in FISA and the legislative history of the bill
that became FISA, S. 1566 (95 Cong.), reflect the Congresss stated
intention to circumscribe any claim of inherent presidential authority
to conduct electronic surveillance, as defined by the Act, to collect
foreign intelligence information, so that FISA would be the exclusive
mechanism for the conduct of such electronic surveillance. Thus, in
the conforming amendments section of the legislation, the previous
language explicitly recognizing the Presidents inherent authority
was deleted from 18 U.S.C. 2511(3), and the language of 18 U.S.C. 2511(f) was added to Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, which states, in part, that
procedures in this chapter or chapter 121 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be
the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of that Act, and the
interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted. The House
amendments to the bill provided that the procedures in the bill and in 18 U.S.C., Chapter 119 (Title III),
were to be the exclusive statutory means by which electronic surveillance as defined in the bill and the
interception of domestic wire and oral communications may be conducted, while the Senate bill did not
include the word statutory. The House Conference Report, in accepting the Senate approach, stated, in
part, that The conferees agree that the establishment by this act of exclusive means by which the
President may conduct electronic surveillance does not foreclose a different decision by the Supreme
Court. The intent of the conferees is to apply the standard set forth in Justice Jacksons concurring opinion
in the Steel Seizure case: When a President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will
of Congress, his power is at the lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional power
minus any constitutional power of Congress over the matter. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).97 In this language, the conferees acknowledge that the U.S. Supreme Court, as
the final arbiter of constitutional power, might reach a different conclusion. The Court has yet to rule on

The passage of FISA and the inclusion of such exclusivity

language reflects Congresss view of its authority to cabin the
Presidents use of any inherent constitutional authority with respect
to warrantless electronic surveillance to gather foreign intelligence.
The Senate Judiciary Committee articulated its view with respect to
congressional power to tailor the Presidents use of an inherent
constitutional power: The basis for this legislation is the
understanding concurred in by the Attorney General that even if
the President has an inherent constitutional power to authorize
warrantless surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, Congress
has the power to regulate the exercise of this authority by
legislating a reasonable warrant procedure governing foreign
intelligence surveillance.99
the matter.

Curtailing NSA surveillance requires congressional

action- limited on key reforms
Gerstein, White House Reporter on National Security, 14 (Josh,
January 13th, Politico, The limits of President Obamas power on NSA

reform, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/nsa-surveillance-limits102081.html, 06/25/15, MM)

President Barack Obama on Friday will try to put the ongoing
surveillance controversy behind him, laying out reforms to U.S.
intelligence-gathering activities aimed at reassuring Americans that
his administration will right the balance between civil liberties and
national security. But Obamas powers have significant limits. Many
of the key reforms hes expected to endorse including changes to
the National Security Agencys practice of gathering information on
telephone calls made to, from or within the U.S. will require
congressional action. Like the public and seemingly the president
himself lawmakers on both sides of the aisle are divided on what needs
fixing and how to do it. If he punts the ball 16 blocks, all hells liable to break
loose on the Hill, said former NSA Director Michael Hayden. There will be
people who will be voting against it because Obamas reform plan doesnt go
far enough and people voting against it because it doesnt defend us enough
and other people voting against it because it outsources espionage. Its
another challenge for a White House eager to clear the decks for issues that
aides want to highlight in Obamas State of the Union address later this
month, such as income inequality and immigration. The snooping saga has
been a loser for Obama in nearly every respect. Edward Snowden, the
former NSA contractor who leaked a trove of top-secret documents
detailing the surveillance, is still camping out in Russia. The
activities angered the international community. And disclosures that
widespread and intrusive surveillance continued into Obamas
presidency undercut his reputation as a reformer who would end
over-the-top anti-terrorism practices and civil liberties violations
many liberals including Obama and Vice President Joe Biden denounced
under President George W. Bush. As commander in chief, Obama could
abandon certain surveillance practices altogether. For instance, he could
simply shut down the so-called 215 program to collect telephone data in the
U.S. so it can be used to trace potential contacts of terrorism suspects. But
the president has said hes considering replacing that program with
a private-sector-based arrangement that provides the government
with similar information on a case-by-case basis. That would require
Congress to step in, officials said.

Congress Secure Data Act solves- improves cyber

security and public trust
Wyden, US Senator from Oregon, 14 (Ron, December 14th, LA
Times, With hackers running rampant, why would we poke holes in data
security? http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1215-wyden-backdoorfor-cell-phones-20141215-story.html, 06/25/15, MM)
Hardly a week goes by without a new report of some massive data
theft that has put financial information, trade secrets or government
records into the hands of computer hackers. The best defense
against these attacks is clear: strong data encryption and more
secure technology systems. The leaders of U.S. intelligence agencies hold a different view.
Most prominently, James Comey, the FBI director, is lobbying Congress to require that electronics

manufacturers create intentional security holes so-called back doors that would enable the
government to access data on every American's cellphone and computer, even if it is protected by
encryption. Unfortunately, there are no magic keys that can be used only by good guys for legitimate
reasons. There is only strong security or weak security. Americans are demanding strong security for their
personal data. Comey and others are suggesting that security features shouldn't be too strong, because
this could interfere with surveillance conducted for law enforcement or intelligence purposes. The problem
with this logic is that building a back door into every cellphone, tablet, or laptop means deliberately

Mandating back doors

also removes the incentive for companies to develop more secure
products at the time people need them most; if you're building a
wall with a hole in it, how much are you going invest in locks and
barbed wire? What these officials are proposing would be bad for
personal data security and bad for business and must be opposed by
Congress. In Silicon Valley several weeks ago I convened a roundtable of executives from America's
most innovative tech companies. They made it clear that widespread availability
of data encryption technology is what consumers are demanding.
Unfortunately, there are no magic keys that can be used only by
good guys for legitimate reasons. There is only strong security or
weak security. - It is also good public policy. For years, officials of intelligence agencies like the
creating weaknesses that hackers and foreign governments can exploit.

NSA, as well as the Department of Justice, made misleading and outright inaccurate statements to
Congress about data surveillance programs not once, but repeatedly for over a decade. These agencies
spied on huge numbers of law-abiding Americans, and their dragnet surveillance of Americans' data did
not make our country safer. Most Americans accept that there are times their government needs to rely on
clandestine methods of intelligence gathering to protect national security and ensure public safety. But
they also expect government agencies and officials to operate within the boundaries of the law, and they
now know how egregiously intelligence agencies abused their trust. This breach of trust is also hurting U.S.
technology companies' bottom line, particularly when trying to sell services and devices in foreign
markets. The president's own surveillance review group noted that concern about U.S. surveillance policies
can directly reduce the market share of U.S. companies. One industry estimate suggests that lost market
share will cost just the U.S. cloud computing sector $21 billion to $35 billion over the next three years. Tech
firms are now investing heavily in new systems, including encryption, to protect consumers from cyber
attacks and rebuild the trust of their customers. As one participant at my roundtable put it, I'd be shocked
if anyone in the industry takes the foot off the pedal in terms of building security and encryption into their
products. Built-in back doors have been tried elsewhere with disastrous results. In 2005, for example,
Greece discovered that dozens of its senior government officials' phones had been under surveillance for
nearly a year. The eavesdropper was never identified, but the vulnerability was clear: built-in wiretapping
features intended to be accessible only to government agencies following a legal process. Chinese hackers
have proved how aggressively they will exploit any security vulnerability. A report last year by a leading
cyber security company identified more than 100 intrusions in U.S. networks from a single cyber espionage
unit in Shanghai. As another tech company leader told me, Why would we leave a back door lying

The U.S. House of Representatives recognized how

dangerous this idea was and in June approved 293-123, a bipartisan
amendment that would prohibit the government from mandating
that technology companies build security weaknesses into any of
their products. I introduced legislation in the Senate to accomplish
the same goal, and will again at the start of the next session.
around? Why indeed.

Congress has the authority over NSA surveillance- has

the ability to regulate and change FISA
Bazan and Elsea, both Congressional Research Service, 06

(Elizabeth and Jennifer, January 5th, Congressional Research Service,

Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to
Gather Foreign Intelligence Information,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf, Page #27-28, 06/25/15, MM)
The statutory language in FISA and the legislative history of the bill
that became FISA, S. 1566 (95 Cong.), reflect the Congresss stated
intention to circumscribe any claim of inherent presidential authority

to conduct electronic surveillance, as defined by the Act, to collect

foreign intelligence information, so that FISA would be the exclusive
mechanism for the conduct of such electronic surveillance. Thus, in
the conforming amendments section of the legislation, the previous
language explicitly recognizing the Presidents inherent authority
was deleted from 18 U.S.C. 2511(3), and the language of 18 U.S.C. 2511(f) was added to Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, which states, in part, that
procedures in this chapter or chapter 121 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be
the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of that Act, and the
interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted. The House
amendments to the bill provided that the procedures in the bill and in 18 U.S.C., Chapter 119 (Title III),
were to be the exclusive statutory means by which electronic surveillance as defined in the bill and the
interception of domestic wire and oral communications may be conducted, while the Senate bill did not
include the word statutory. The House Conference Report, in accepting the Senate approach, stated, in
part, that The conferees agree that the establishment by this act of exclusive means by which the
President may conduct electronic surveillance does not foreclose a different decision by the Supreme
Court. The intent of the conferees is to apply the standard set forth in Justice Jacksons concurring opinion
in the Steel Seizure case: When a President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will
of Congress, his power is at the lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional power
minus any constitutional power of Congress over the matter. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).97 In this language, the conferees acknowledge that the U.S. Supreme Court, as
the final arbiter of constitutional power, might reach a different conclusion. The Court has yet to rule on

The passage of FISA and the inclusion of such exclusivity

language reflects Congresss view of its authority to cabin the
Presidents use of any inherent constitutional authority with respect
to warrantless electronic surveillance to gather foreign intelligence.
The Senate Judiciary Committee articulated its view with respect to
congressional power to tailor the Presidents use of an inherent
constitutional power: The basis for this legislation is the
understanding concurred in by the Attorney General that even if
the President has an inherent constitutional power to authorize
warrantless surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, Congress
has the power to regulate the exercise of this authority by
legislating a reasonable warrant procedure governing foreign
intelligence surveillance.99
the matter.

Congress is capable of ending NSA BULLRUN

programs-passing legislation closes backdoors
Kayyali 5-13 (Nadia, surveillance and national security activist, The Time
to Shut the NSAs Backdoors is NowNot in Two Years,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/time-shut-nsas-backdoors-now-nottwo-years)
As weve noted, our support for the current version of USA Freedom that is
moving through the Senate and the House is conditional on amendments that
improve the bill. While we hope to see such amendments, we also know that
they may not be possible, since Judiciary Committee leaders noted during the
USA Freedom markup that it is the product of painstaking and careful
negotiations, that would be killed by any changes. And yesterday, the
hearing on HR. 2048 in the House Rules Committee made it clear that USA
Freedom Act will not be amended. However, several members of the
House Judiciary Committee made some significant statements about
what reform they might support going forwardincluding statements
about reforming Section 702. So did members of the Rules Committee.

Now, we have a chance to see whether theyre willing to act on

those statements. Thats because Representatives Ted Poe, Thomas
Massie, and Zoe Lofgren have introduced the bipartisan End
Warrantless Surveillance of Americans Act (H.R. 2233). EFF joined 29
groups to send a letter in support of the legislation this week, and
we look forward to seeing which lawmakers support it as it moves
through the house. H.R. 2233 has goals similar to last years MassieLofgren amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act for FY 2015, which passed overwhelmingly with strong
bipartisan support: 293 ayes, 123 nays, and 1 present. That
legislation would have closed the so-called National Security Agency
backdoorssecurity flaws engineered into products and services
to enable or facilitate government access to, and warrantless
searches of, the contents of Americans communicationsby
prohibiting NSA and the Central Intelligence Agency from using
appropriated funds to mandate or request that companies build
backdoors into products or services. H.R. 2233 goes further, because
the prohibition on mandating or requesting backdoors would apply
to any federal agency. This change is especially important for U.S.
companies, who have suffered reputational harm overseas, and even
lost business, in the wake of revelations about the extent of NSA
spying. H.R. 2233, like the Massie-Lofgren amendment, does have an
exception for backdoors mandated by the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, a law that weve long had
concerns about. H.R. 2233 would also address the backdoor search
loophole by prohibiting any officer or employee of the United States
from searching through communications collected under Section 702
for communications of a particular U.S. person without a court order.
This provision has exceptions for certain limited circumstances. Whats new is
that H.R. 2233unlike last years Massie-Lofgren amendmentaims to
prohibit backdoor searches for particular U.S. persons of communications
collected under authorities other than Section 702including, according to
Rep. Lofgren, Executive Order 12333. While many people have never even
heard of this presidential order, as the Washington Post pointed out in
October, Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.)
has acknowledged that Congress conducts little oversight of intelligencegathering under the presidential authority of Executive Order 12333 , which
defines the basic powers and responsibilities of the intelligence agencies.
H.R. 2233 does have flaws. The above prohibition on EO 12333 searches
would be an amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2015, so it
presumably would limit only funds appropriated under that Act. And while the
bill prohibits backdoors, its not clear how that prohibition would be enforced
or where it would be published. That being said, the legislation is a good
start to shutting backdoors. As the coalition letter states: All three
of these measures would make appreciable changes that would
advance government surveillance reform and help rebuild lost trust
among Internet users and businesses, while also preserving national
security and intelligence authorities. We urge the Congress to move
speedily to enact this legislation. While the House Judiciary Committee
repeatedly noted that they thought the FISA Amendments Act should be fixed

when it is up for reauthorization, and some members of the Rules Committee

noted that they would be happy to see another appropriations amendment,
Rep. Massie made it clear why these changes cant wait: The
constitution is not negotiable, and we have a crisis right nowif we
wait two years, we are prolonging a constitutional crisis, and that is
dangerous. He also pointed out that business are suffering right
now: If we put it off, I dont think you can undo the damage that
will be done to U.S. businesses. We couldnt agree morethe time
to fix the backdoor problem is now. But while USA Freedom attempts to
rein in overbroad surveillance, and H.R. 2233 focuses on the governments
backdoors, some in Congress are trying to ensure that intelligence agencies
get to keep doing exactly what they have been doing. Legislation introduced
by Senate Majority leader Mitch McConnell and Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Chair Richard Burr would reauthorize three sections of the Patriot
Act, including Section 215, through 2020. If you want to see Congress end
mass surveillance under the Patriot Act, let your elected representatives
know at Fight215.org.

Congress should be the one to rein in the NSA

Goitein, co-director of the Liberty and National Security Program at New
York University School of Law, 14 (Elizabeth ,6-2-2014, "Senate must rein in
the NSA," Reuters, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/06/02/senatemust-rein-in-the-nsa/)//GL
The Senate committee should then address the privacy of the
communications themselves. Under a 2008 statute, the government can collect the calls
and emails of foreign overseas targets without a warrant. Though Americans
communications are often swept up incidentally, the law requires
the government to minimize their retention and use. Satellite dishes are
seen at GCHQ's outpost at Bude, close to where trans-Atlantic fibre-optic cables come ashore in Cornwall,
southwest EnglandInstead, as former NSA contractor Edward Snowden has revealed, the government runs

The
committee should end these back-door searches by specifying
that the government needs a warrant to search for Americans
information. In addition, the Senate committee should prohibit
warrantless collection if targeting an American is any part of the
governments purpose. The committee must ensure that the bill contains robust
searches of the collected communications in order to find and review Americans calls and emails.

transparency provisions. In its original form, the bill required the government and allowed telephone and
Internet companies to disclose detailed statistics about their surveillance transactions. Yet, despite
intelligence officials recent public statements lauding the value of openness, they succeeded in diluting
these provisions. There is no excuse for hiding statistics divorced from any identifying information.
Americans should know exactly how often the government collects their communications and records. The
same goal underlies all these changes: Surveillance laws must be used as Congress intended. A law
allowing the government to obtain business records relevant to a terrorism investigation should not be
used to collect every Americans telephone records. A law allowing the government to collect the
communications of foreigners overseas should not be used to search for Americans calls and e-mails.

These points should be uncontroversial especially given the lack

of evidence that either bulk collection or back-door searches have
significantly furthered counterterrorism efforts.

Legislation is key to stopping NSA backdoorsoversight shuts illegal backdoors

Kayyali, EFF writer, 15
(Nadia, 5/13/15, electronic frontier foundation, The time to shut the NSAs
backdoors is now not in two years,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/time-shut-nsas-backdoors-now-nottwo-years, 6/25/15, YA)
Washington Post pointed out in October, Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Dianne
Feinstein (D-Calif.) has acknowledged that Congress conducts little
oversight of intelligence-gathering under the presidential authority
of Executive Order 12333 , which defines the basic powers and
responsibilities of the intelligence agencies. We need Legislation to
shut backdoors and save businesses-Congress is key. That being
said, the legislation is a good start to shutting backdoors. As the coalition
letter states: While the House Judiciary Committee repeatedly noted that
they thought the FISA Amendments Act should be fixed when it is up
for reauthorization, and some members of the Rules Committee
noted that they would be happy to see another appropriations
amendment, Rep. Massie made it clear why these changes cant
wait: He also pointed out that business are suffering right now: If
we put it off, I dont think you can undo the damage that will be
done to U.S. businesses. We couldnt agree morethe time to fix the
backdoor problem is now.

The NSA only needs greater congressional oversightreduces illegal surveillance

Rosenzweig, founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a
homeland security consulting company, 13
(Paul, 10/29/15, new republic, The NSA Doesn't Need Wholesale Reform, Just
Greater Oversight, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115392/nsa-reformnot-essential-congressional-oversight, 6/25/15, YA)
First, we cant with one breath condemn government access to vast
quantities of data about individuals as a return of Big Brother, and
at the same time criticize the government for its failure to connect
the dots (as we did, for example, during the Christmas 2009 bomb plot attempted by
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab). More to the pointlarge scale data analytical
tools of the type the NSA is apparently using are of such great utility
that governments will expand their use, as will the private sector.
Old rules about collection and use limitations are no longer
technologically relevant. If we value privacy at all, these ineffective
protections must be replaced with new constructs. The goal then is
the identification of a suitable legal and policy regime to regulate
and manage the use of mass quantities of personal data. We should
therefore favor those reforms that create delegated or calibrated
transparency (enough to enable oversight without eliminating essential capabilities) and
respond to the new paradigm of data analytics and privacy (by controlling
use rather than collection): Adversarial Advocate: This proposal would create a standing team of attorneys
to respond to and present a counter argument before the FISC to requests for permission to collect

information against an individual or entity. Presumably, this team of attorneys would either be from within
the government (such as the DNIs Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer) or a cadre of non-government
attorneys with clearances. There is much to be said in favor of this proposal. With regular criminal
warrants the ex parte nature of the application for a warrant does not systematically create a lack of a
check on overreaching because of the possibility for post-enforcement review during criminal prosecution
with its adversarial process. By contrast, in intelligence investigations that post-execution checking
function of adversarial contest is often missingfew if any intelligence collection cases wind up before the
courts. As a result there is no systematic way of constraining the authority of the United States
government in this context. Providing for an adversarial advocate would give us the general benefits of
adversarial presentation and provide a useful checking function on the overarching broad effect of FISA law
on the public. To be sure, this would be a novel process. We dont typically do pre-enforcement review of
investigative techniques. And if poorly implemented, this sort of process risks slowing down critical time
sensitive investigations. Perhaps most importantly, many worry (not without justification) that the
adversarial advocate will in the end have an agenda that may distort legal developments. On balance, this
seems to be a positive idea but only if it is implemented in a limited way for novel or unique questions
of law. It should be limited to situations where the FISA court itself requests adversarial presentation. That
would limit the number or circumstances where the process was used to those few where new or seminal
interpretations of law were being made. The adversarial advocate should not appear routinely and should
not appear on his or her own motion. The court is, in my view, capable (and likely) to define when it can
benefit from adversarial argument quite well. Phone Company Data Retention: Some have suggested that,

instead of NSA collecting and retaining telephone call metadata,

Congress should amend the law and impose a data retention
requirement on phone companies and ISPs, requiring them to retain
metadata for a fixed period of time, say five years. NSA and the FBI
would, in turn, only be able to access this data set after a FISC court
had passed on the validity of the request and determined that it met
some evidentiary threshold, say, of relevance.

Congress is best fit to end Bullrun - currently working

on Reform
Official Summary of the Bill 10/4/14 (Official one page summary
presented in congress with the bill written by Ron Wyden and his advisors,
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=1e95c779-4e94-4fb4-9e27cd3a1f67932f&download=1)
The Secure Data Act will prohibit Federal agencies from requiring
that private entities design or alter their commercial information
technology products for the purpose of facilitating government
surveillance. U.S. government and independent experts have

extensively documented the multi-billion dollar threat posed by

constant cyberattacks from criminal organizations and foreign
government-sponsored hackers. The U.S. government also urges
private companies and individuals to protect sensitive personal and
business data, including through the use of data security technologies
such as encryption. The recent proposals from U.S. law enforcement

officials to undercut the development and deployment of strong data

security technologies by compelling companies to build backdoors in
the security features of their products work against the
overwhelming economic and national security interest in better data
security. Moreover, the decision of government officials to repeatedly
mislead the American public about domestic surveillance activities
has resulted in an erosion of public trust. Requiring computer

hardware and software companies to now create intentional gaps in

their data security products to facilitate further government access to

personal data will undermine the effort to restore trust in the U.S.
digital economy. Government-driven technology mandates to weaken
data security for the purpose of aiding government investigations
would compromise national security, economic security and personal
privacy. Cyber vulnerabilities weaken cybersecurity. Once a
backdoor is built in a security system, the security of the system is
inherently compromised. For example, in 2005 it was revealed that an
unknown entity had exploited a lawful intercept capability built into
Greek cellphone technology and had used it to listen to users phone
calls, including those of dozens of senior government officials. 1

Technology mandates thwart innovation. Companies have less

incentive to invest in the development and deployment of strong new
data security technologies if they are required to compromise them

from the outset. Mandating weak security would further erode trust
in American products and services. Information technology companies
are working to regain the trust of consumers upset by revelations of
government intrusions into their personal communications. A mandate

requiring companies to facilitate additional government surveillance

would undermine those efforts

Congress should end Bullrun they have dealt with it

in the past
Spencer Ackerman and Paul Lewis 6/2/13 (Spencer Ackerman is national
security editor for Guardian US. A former senior writer for Wired, he won the
2012 National Magazine Award for Digital Reporting and Paul Lewis is
Washington correspondent for the Guardian. He was previously special
projects editor, The Guardian, "Congress eyes renewed push for legislation to
rein in the NSA," www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/02/congress-nsalegislation-surveillance)
Members of Congress are considering 11 legislative measures to
constrain the activities of the National Security Agency , in a major

shift of political opinion in the eight weeks since the first revelations
from whistleblower Edward Snowden. The proposals range from

repealing the legal foundations of key US surveillance powers to

more moderate reforms of the secretive court proceedings for
domestic spying. If enacted, the laws would represent the first
rollback of the NSA's powers since 9/11. The Guardian has spoken to

six key lawmakers involved in the push to rein in the NSA, and those
involved in the process argue there is now an emerging consensus that
the bulk collection of millions of phone records needs to be overhauled
or even ended. Justin Amash, the Republican congressman whose
measure to terminate the indiscriminate collection of phone data was
narrowly defeated 10 days ago, said he was certain the next legislative
push will succeed. "The people who voted no are, I think, hopeful to get
another opportunity to vote yes on reforming this program and other
programs," he said. In the Senate, Democrat Ron Wyden said there was

similarly "strong bipartisan support for fundamental reforms", a direct

consequence of revelations about the nature and power of NSA
surveillance. "Eight weeks ago, we wouldn't have had this debate in
the Congress," he said. "Eight weeks ago there wouldn't have been this
extraordinary vote." On Thursday, Snowden was granted temporary
asylum in Russia, to the fury of Washington. The White House said it
was "extremely disappointed" in the decision, and hinted that Barack
Obama may pull out of a bilateral summit with Vladimir Putin in
September. But even as Snowden was leaving the Moscow airport
where he has been holed up for more than a month, Obama was telling
key members of Congress at a meeting at the Oval Office that he was
"open to suggestions" for reforming the NSA surveillance programs
that have embroiled his administration in controversy. Advertisement
Wyden, a long-standing critic of dragnet surveillance, is backing a
range of legislative efforts that would end bulk phone records
acquisition and revamp the foreign intelligence surveillance (Fisa)
court, which grants the NSA legal authorization for its mass collection.
Several senators are supporting a bill introduced on Thursday by
Democrat Richard Blumenthal which would introduce a public
advocate into some proceedings at the court, which currently only
hears the US government's case. In the past 30 years, it has turned
down just 11 of the nearly 34,000 warrant requests submitted by
federal authorities. Senior administration officials have indicated they
are open to Blumenthal's proposals which would not in themselves

curtail the NSA's powers. Another measure directed at the Fisa court is
being brought by House Democrat Adam Schiff, who sits on the
powerful intelligence committee. Under his plan, the court's judges,
who are currently selected by the chief justice of the supreme court,
would be appointed instead by the president, a process that would
require them to undergo a congressional confirmation process. "Then
you have these judges publicly vetted on their fourth amendment
views prior to being placed on the court," Schiff said, referring to the
constitutional freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.

Other measures seek to make government surveillance more

transparent. This week Democratic senator Al Franken introduced a
bill to force the US government to regularly report on the number of
Americans whose data is being collated by the NSA. It would also
permit internet companies to disclose the number of requests they
receive for data. "The American public deserves more transparency,

and my bill goes a long toward doing that," Franken said. A similar bill
has been introduced by his Democratic colleague Jeff Merkley, who
wants to compel the administration to disclose the key legal ruling
from the Fisa court that governs how phone records are collected.
Representative Zoe Lofgren, a California Democrat who on Friday
introduced a bill promoting greater transparency around
surveillance orders received by private companies, stressed the

cross-party nature of the measures. "If you've noticed, we've not had a
rash of bipartisan efforts in the House," she said, referring to the
gridlock that has held up other legislation

Congress should end Bullrun - they deal with NSA

reform
Jameel Jaffer 7/17/13 (Jameel Jaffer is a deputy legal director of the ACLU
and director of its Center for Democracy, which houses the organization's
work on human rights, national security, free speech, privacy, and
technology. He has litigated many cases relating to government surveillance,
including challenges to the Patriot Act's "national security letter" provision,
the Bush administration's warrantless wiretapping program, and the National
Security Agency's call-tracking program. He has also litigated cases relating
to targeted killing and torture, including a landmark case under the Freedom
of Information Act that resulted in the release of the Bush administration's
"torture memos" and hundreds of other documents relating to the Bush
administration's torture program. He is currently working on a book about
individual privacy and official secrecy. Before joining the staff of the ACLU, he
clerked for Judge Amalya L. Kearse of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd
Circuit, and Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada. He is a
graduate of Williams College, Cambridge University, and Harvard Law School,
ACLU, "ACLU on the Hill: NSA Surveillance 'Intrusive and Unconstitutional,"
https://www.aclu.org/blog/aclu-hill-nsa-surveillance-intrusive-andunconstitutional)
This morning, I am testifying before the House Judiciary Committee on why
the recently revealed NSA spying programs are unconstitutional and what
Congress can do to rein in these unlawful and intrusive programs. Read my
opening statement below. You can read the full testimony here. Introductory
Statement of Jameel Jaffer House Judiciary Committee Oversight Hearing on
the Administration's Use of FISA Authorities July 17, 2013 On behalf of the
ACLU, thank you for the invitation to testify before the Committee. Over the
last six weeks it has become clear that the NSA is engaged in farreaching, intrusive, and unconstitutional surveillance of Americans'
communications. Under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, the NSA is

tracking every single phone call made by a resident of the United

Stateswho they called, when they called them, for how long they
spoke. Until recently it was tracking ordinary Americans' Internet
activity as well. Under Section 702 of FISA, and on the pretext of
monitoring people outside the United States, the NSA is using Section
702 of FISA to build massive databases of Americans' domestic and
international communicationsnot just so-called metadata, but
content as well. These programs have been made possible by huge
advances in the technology of surveillance, but in many respects they
resemble the generalized surveillance programs that led to the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment more than two hundred years ago.
The FISA court orders resemble general warrants, albeit general
warrants for the digital age. That the NSA is engaged in this

unconstitutional surveillance is the result of defects both in the law

itself and in the current oversight system. The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act affords the government sweeping power to monitor
the communications of innocent people. Excessive secrecy has made
congressional oversight difficult and public oversight impossible.
Intelligence officials have repeatedly misled the public, Congress, and
the courts about the nature and scope of the government's
surveillance activities. Structural features of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court have prevented that court from serving as an
effective guardian of constitutional rights. And the ordinary federal
courts have improperly used the "state secrets" and "standing"
doctrines to place the NSA's activities beyond the reach of judicial
review. To say that the NSA's activities present a grave danger to
American democracy is not an overstatement. Thirty-six years ago,
after conducting a comprehensive investigation into the intelligence
abuses of the previous decades, the Church Committee warned that
inadequate regulations on government surveillance "threaten[ed] to
undermine our democratic society and fundamentally alter its nature."
This warning should have even more resonance today than it did in
1976, because in recent decades the NSA's resources have grown,
statutory and constitutional limitations have been steadily eroded, and
the technology of surveillance has become exponentially more
powerful. Because the problem Congress confronts today has many
roots, there is no single solution to it. But there are a number of
things that Congress should do right away: It should amend Sections
215 and 702 to expressly prohibit suspicionless or "dragnet"
monitoring or tracking of Americans' communications. It should
require the executive to release basic information about the
government's use of foreign-intelligence-surveillance authorities ,

including those relating to pen registers and national security letters.

The executive should be required to disclose, for each year: How

many times each of these provisions was used How many

individuals' privacy was implicated by the government's use of each
provision And, with respect to any dragnet, generalized, or bulk
surveillance program, the types of information that were collected.
Congress should also require the publication of FISA court opinions
that evaluate the meaning, scope, or constitutionality of the foreignintelligence laws. The ACLU recently filed a motion before the FISA

court arguing that the publication of these opinions is required by the

First Amendment, but Congress need not wait for the FISA court to act.
Congress has the authority and the obligation to ensure that Americans
are not governed by a system of secret law. Finally, Congressand
this Committee in particularshould hold additional hearings to
consider further amendments to FISA, including amendments to
make FISC proceedings more transparent. Congress should not be

indifferent to the government's accumulation of vast quantities of

sensitive information about American's lives. This Committee in

particular has a crucial role to play in ensuring that the government's

efforts to protect the country do not compromise the freedoms that
make the country worth protecting.

Congress is the best solution- has potential for total

oversight
Sugiyama, University of Michigan Law school J.D, Perry,
managing editor of Michigan Journal of Law, 06
(Tara, Maria, Fall 2006, Michigan Journal of Law, THE NSA DOMESTIC
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM: AN ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
DURING AN ERA OF ONE-PARTY RULE, Lexis, 6/26/15, YA)
The Constitution does not explicitly vest Congress with plenary
power to conduct investigative oversight of the executive branch. n9
The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted the Constitution as
providing Congress with inherent power to oversee executive [*151]
branch activities that may violate the will of Congress. n10
Accordingly, two primary models have emerged to guide members of
Congress through the execution of their oversight duties: the police-patrol
and the fire-alarm models of congressional oversight. n11
Under the "police-patrol" model of congressional oversight, Congress takes
a proactive role in examining actions of the executive branch to
unearth evidence of maladministration. n12 Members of Congress
may conduct this direct form of oversight by requesting documents from
the executive branch, holding hearings, and commissioning reports. n13 The
goal of this form of oversight is for members of Congress to identify,
dissuade, and remedy any executive branch violations of legislative
goals. n14

Solvency Secure Data Act

The Secure Data Act is key to prevent cybercrime and
restore legitimacy to U.S. tech companies.
McQuinn, is a research assistant for the Information
Technology and Innovation Foundation, 2014
(Alan, 12/19/2014, The Hill, The Secure Data Act could help law enforcement
protect against cybercrime, http://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/technology/227594-the-secure-data-act-could-help-law-enforcementprotect-against, accessed 6/25/2015, JAK).
The Secure Data Act is an important step in that direction because it
will stop U.S. law enforcement agencies from requiring companies to
introduce vulnerabilities in their products. If this bill is enacted, law
enforcement will be forced to use other means to solve crimes, such as by
using metadata from cellular providers, call records, text messages, and even
old-fashioned detective work. This will also allow U.S. tech companies,
with the help of law enforcement, to continue to strengthen their
systems, better detect intrusions, and identify emerging threats.
Law enforcement, such as the recently announced U.S. Department of Justice
Cybersecurity Unita unit designed solely to deter, investigate, and
prosecute cyber criminals, should work in cooperation with the private
sector to create a safer environment online. A change of course is also
necessary to restore the ability of U.S. tech companies to compete
globally, where mistrust has run rampant following the revelations
of mass government surveillance. With the 113th Congress at an end,
Wyden has promised to reintroduce the Data Secure Act again in the next
Congress. Congress should move expediently to advance Senator Wydens
bill to promote security and privacy in U.S. devices and software.
Furthermore, as Congress marks up the legislation and considers
amendments, it should restrict not just government access to devices, but
also government control of those devices. These efforts will move the
efforts of our law enforcement agencies away from creating cyber
vulnerabilities and allow electronics manufacturers to produce the
most secure devices imaginable.

The Secure Data Act solves exploits that hurt

innovation bars US agencies from mandating
backdoors.
Fingas, Staff Writer for Engadget, 2014
(Joe, 9/22/2014, Engadget, Congress wont pass a law letting the FBI access
your encrypted data, http://www.engadget.com/2014/10/22/congress-wontgive-fbi-encryption-access/, accessed 6/25/2015, JAK).
While the FBI thinks that all communication tools in the US should have
backdoors for law enforcement, a new Senate bill has proposed the exact
opposite. The Secure Data Act, introduced by Senator Ron Wyden,
would prohibit the government from forcing companies like Google

and Apple to grant access to encrypted data. A different bill to curb the
NSA and other agencies (the USA Freedom Act) was denuded by the House of
Representatives, while a recent vote allowed the Feds to carry on with
massive surveillance. However, the Secure Data Act would specifically
bar US agencies from forcing private companies to "design or alter
their commercial information technology products for the purpose of
facilitating government surveillance." Wyden's bill cites some familiar
problems with backdoors that emerged with the mass of documents revealed
by Edward Snowden. The main point is that such measures have the effect of
weakening security overall. For instance, it cites a backdoor placed by law
enforcement in Greece to monitor cellphone calls, that was later exploited by
third parties to listen in on government officials. It also contends that such
security exploits hurt innovation, since companies have no incentive
to create new security tech if they're forced to deliberately open
holes. Finally, it cited the loss of trust by the public, both stateside
and abroad, in US products and services. In light of recent revelations
like the NSA's AURORAGOLD, Apple, Google and others recently started
encrypting mobile phone data by default. That prompted a strong reaction
from FBI director James Comey, who said that law enforcement can't keep up
with the latest communication tech and apps (though he couldn't cite any
cases where encryption thwarted law enforcement). In any case, members of
Congress from both parties said they'd never pass a bill giving the FBI
unfettered access to encrypted data. Such security exploits hurt
innovation, since companies have no incentive to create new
security tech if they're forced to deliberately open holes. The bill
makes an exception for products and services already covered by the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), and builds
on a bipartisan effort to limit NSA backdoor spying. It sounds well
and good, but whether it'll survive the House and Senate is another
story -- the US Freedom Act is still cooling its heels in the Senate.

Congress is key to pass legislation that curtails

BULLRUN The Secure Data Act proves.
Castro and McQuinn, Castro is the Vice President of the ITIF and
McQuinn is research assistant at the ITIF, 2015

(Daniel and Alan, 6/5/2015, Information Technology & Innovation Freedom,

http://www2.itif.org/2015-beyond-usa-freedom-act.pdf, accessed 6/25/2015,
JAK)
Second, the U.S. government should draw a clear line in the sand and declare
that the policy of the U.S. government is to strengthen not weaken
information security. The U.S. Congress should pass legislation, such as
the Secure Data Act introduced by Sen. Wyden (D-OR), banning any
government efforts to introduce backdoors in software or weaken
encryption.43 In the short term, President Obama, or his successor,
should sign an executive order formalizing this policy as well. In
addition, when U.S. government agencies discover vulnerabilities in software
or hardware products, they should responsibly notify these companies in a
timely manner so that the companies can fix these flaws. The best way to

protect U.S. citizens from digital threats is to promote strong cybersecurity

practices in the private sector.

Solvency Break Up NSA

Breaking up the NSA is the best solution to
eliminating the malicious BULLRUN programs-it shifts
focus from the weakening of security to the
reinforcement of security
Schneier 14 (Bruce, computer security and privacy specialist, 2-20, Its
time to break up the NSA, http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/20/opinion/schneiernsa-too-big/index.html?hpt=hp_t4)
The NSA has become too big and too powerful. What was supposed
to be a single agency with a dual mission -- protecting the security
of U.S. communications and eavesdropping on the communications
of our enemies -- has become unbalanced in the post-Cold War, allterrorism-all-the-time era. Putting the U.S. Cyber Command, the
military's cyberwar wing, in the same location and under the same
commander, expanded the NSA's power. The result is an agency that
prioritizes intelligence gathering over security, and that's
increasingly putting us all at risk. It's time we thought about
breaking up the National Security Agency. Broadly speaking, three
types of NSA surveillance programs were exposed by the documents
released by Edward Snowden. And while the media tends to lump them
together, understanding their differences is critical to understanding how to
divide up the NSA's missions. The first is targeted surveillance. This is best
illustrated by the work of the NSA's Tailored Access Operations (TAO) group,
including its catalog of hardware and software "implants" designed to be
surreptitiously installed onto the enemy's computers. This sort of thing
represents the best of the NSA and is exactly what we want it to do. That the
United States has these capabilities, as scary as they might be, is cause for
gratification. The second is bulk surveillance, the NSA's collection of
everything it can obtain on every communications channel to which it can get
access. This includes things such as the NSA's bulk collection of call records,
location data, e-mail messages and text messages. This is where the NSA
overreaches: collecting data on innocent Americans either incidentally or
deliberately, and data on foreign citizens indiscriminately. It doesn't make us
any safer, and it is liable to be abused. Even the director of national
intelligence, James Clapper, acknowledged that the collection and storage of
data was kept a secret for too long. The third is the deliberate
sabotaging of security. The primary example we have of this is the
NSA's BULLRUN program, which tries to "insert vulnerabilities into
commercial encryption systems, IT systems, networks and endpoint
communication devices." This is the worst of the NSA's excesses,
because it destroys our trust in the Internet, weakens the security
all of us rely on and makes us more vulnerable to attackers
worldwide. That's the three: good, bad, very bad. Reorganizing the U.S.
intelligence apparatus so it concentrates on our enemies requires
breaking up the NSA along those functions. First, TAO and its targeted
surveillance mission should be moved under the control of U.S. Cyber
Command, and Cyber Command should be completely separated from the

NSA. Actively attacking enemy networks is an offensive military operation,

and should be part of an offensive military unit. Whatever rules of
engagement Cyber Command operates under should apply equally to active
operations such as sabotaging the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility in Iran
and hacking a Belgian telephone company. If we're going to attack the
infrastructure of a foreign nation, let it be a clear military operation. Second,
all surveillance of Americans should be moved to the FBI. The FBI is charged
with counterterrorism in the United States, and it needs to play that role. Any
operations focused against U.S. citizens need to be subject to U.S. law, and
the FBI is the best place to apply that law. That the NSA can, in the view of
many, do an end-run around congressional oversight, legal due process and
domestic laws is an affront to our Constitution and a danger to our society.
The NSA's mission should be focused outside the United States -- for real, not
just for show. And third, the remainder of the NSA needs to be rebalanced so
COMSEC (communications security) has priority over SIGINT (signals
intelligence). Instead of working to deliberately weaken security for
everyone, the NSA should work to improve security for everyone.
Computer and network security is hard, and we need the NSA's
expertise to secure our social networks, business systems,
computers, phones and critical infrastructure. Just recall the recent
incidents of hacked accounts -- from Target to Kickstarter. What once
seemed occasional now seems routine. Any NSA work to secure our
networks and infrastructure can be done openly -- no secrecy
required. This is a radical solution, but the NSA's many harms
require radical thinking. It's not far off from what the President's
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies,
charged with evaluating the NSA's current programs, recommended.
Its 24th recommendation was to put the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command under
different generals, and the 29th recommendation was to put encryption
ahead of exploitation. I have no illusions that anything like this will happen
anytime soon, but it might be the only way to tame the enormous beast that
the NSA has become.

Solvency Executive Key

Obama should rein in the NSA other branches not
qualified
10/24/13 Dan K. Thomasson (Journalist for: Daily republic, The
Washington Times. Dan K. Thomasson, a longtime Washington journalist and
former vice president of Scripps Howard Newspapers. He covered Congress,
presidential election campaigns and conventions as chief congressional
correspondent for the chain. He was promoted to managing editor, then
editor of Scripps Howard News Service and, by 1986, vice president for news.
In 1996, he was named vice president of the organization. The Daily Record,
"Commentary: Obama Needs to Rein in NSA's Power Overreach," www.thedaily-record.com/opinion/2014/01/02/commentary-obama-needs-to-rein-innsa-s-power-overreach)
Obama needs to rein in NSAs power overreach. Sometimes I think we
do the terrorists job for them. The response to 9/11, while
understandably flamboyant, set off a spasm of overreaction that
more than a decade later is still threatening all the things we hold so
dear. Chief among these, of course, is our right to privacy especially
from the prying eyes of our government without probable cause.
When that is eroded, the liberty we love is not only damaged but
also is our way of life. There is just no getting around it. The National

Security Agency an arm of the military has, as is the historic pattern

of unsupervised bureaucracy, insinuated itself into our democratic
fabric so thoroughly that nothing short of a major overhaul can put it
right. Whether President Obama is willing to reform this scary
institution wont be clear until he returns from his familys Christmas
vacation in Hawaii. Obama plans to spend that time contemplating
the results of a report by a blue ribbon commission of security
experts he appointed shortly after the enormous extent of NSAs
spying became public, causing an international sensation that
continues unabated. The report made significant recommendations
for reforming both the oversight and activities of this super secret
agency. The main ingredient missing in the current policy is diligent
oversight. It is woefully insufficient both in the Congress and in the
judicial safeguard designed to prevent the kind of abuses revealed
by Edward Snowden, the contract employee now hanging out in
Russia. Both houses of Congress have intelligence committees
charged with making certain the $50 billion being spent each year
on tracking our enemies and, it seems, also our friends is in
keeping with the nations laws and principles. But there is growing
evidence that in the wake of 9/11, congressional overseers ignored
the dangers. Then of course there is the FISA court established to

certify that warrants sought are backed up with legitimate need. But
this is a one-sided affair in which the government gets what it wants
without much challenge. Otherwise how would any federal judge

serving in that post permit such extensive fishing in the public

communication pond even if NSA contends that it merely registers who
calls whom without tapping into their conversations? By the way, thats
a claim no one can verify. No one in this volatile age believes we
should return to the days when gentlemen didnt read other
gentlemens mail. Intelligence gathering is a vital tool for preserving
our democracy, but only if those using that tool dont convince
themselves about the end justifying the means and methods. In the
current case, NSAs claims of using means that have prevented
another end like 9/11 are not only exaggerated but hard to support at
all, according to the presidential panels report. Then there is Snowden.
Is he a legitimate whistleblower or a traitor as some would paint him?
There is little doubt in my mind had he not become the bearer of bad
tidings, we might have gone blissfully along believing we were immune
from the increasing big brother aspects of our society; that we would
have felt secure from the Orwellian predictions that have come true
under totalitarianism elsewhere. There are serious questions about
whether his motives were for his own self-aggrandizement or a
legitimate concern for his country or a sinister attempt to harm it. We
may never know. What about the publications that disseminated so
dramatically the original startling information namely the Guardian of
England and the Washington Post? Did they properly use the watchdog
function newspapers traditionally follow to keep governments honest
or were they the purveyors of irresponsible sensationalism as critics
contend? The editor of the Guardian, Alan Rusbridger, I know well. He
has been a longtime defender of ethical journalistic principles. The
same holds true for the Washington Posts editors. I might criticize both
for other reasons but not in this case. Meanwhile, Barack Obama must
now make one of the thorniest decisions he is likely to face in the
rest of his term whether or not to accept the fact that an
enormously important U.S. agency has gone way too far or just
ignore the findings of his own panel, which happens more often than
not with similar presidential commissions.

Executive Order 12333 has the authority to control

NSA surveillance
Watkins, Technology Reporter for Huffington Post, 13 (Ali,
November 21st, McClatchy Washington Bureau, Most of NSAs data collection
authorized by order Ronald Reagan issued,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/21/209167/most-of-nsas-datacollection-authorized.html, 06/26/15, MM)
The National Security Agencys collection of information on
Americans cellphone and Internet usage reaches far beyond the two
programs that have received public attention in recent months, to a
presidential order that is older than the Internet itself. Approved by
President Ronald Reagan in 1981, Executive Order 12333 (referred

to as twelve-triple-three) still governs most of what the NSA does.

It is a sweeping mandate that outlines the duties and foreign
intelligence collection for the nations 17 intelligence agencies. It is
not governed by Congress, and critics say it has little privacy
protection and many loopholes. What changes have been made to it
have come through guidelines set by the attorney general or other
documents. The result is a web of intelligence law so complicated that it stymies even those tasked
with interpreting it. As one former executive official said, Its complicated stuff. Confusing though it may
be, the order remains the primary authority under which the countrys intelligence agencies conduct the
majority of their operations. Neither the office of Attorney General Eric Holder nor that of Director of
National Intelligence James Clapper would comment about 12333. Under its provisions, agencies have the
ability to function outside the confines of a warrant or court order, if approved by the attorney general.

Its Section 2.5 effectively gives the attorney general the right to
authorize intelligence agencies to operate outside the confines of
judicial or congressional oversight, so long as its in pursuit of
foreign intelligence including collecting information of Americans.

The Attorney General hereby is delegated the power to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within
the United States or against a United States person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be
required, 12333 reads. Monitoring the actual content of Americans communications still requires a
warrant under 12333, but metadata the hidden information about a communication that tells where a
person is, who hes communicating with, even the number of credit cards used in a transaction can be
swept up without congressional or court approval.

-- Answers To Answers

A2: Topicality Domestic Surveillance

Patriot Act defines surveillance is the acquisition of
electronic contents in relation to a US person
Small 08 (Matthew, His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic Surveillance,
Civil Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National Crisis,
http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf,
Page 2, MM, 06/27/15)
This papers analysis, in terms of President Bushs policies, focuses on
electronic surveillance; specifically, wiretapping phone lines and obtaining
caller information from phone companies. Section f of the USA Patriot Act
of 2001 defines electronic surveillance as: [T]he acquisition by an
electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of
any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received
by a particular, known United States person who is in the United
States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that
United States person, under circumstances in which a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required
for law enforcement purposes;

A2: Topicality Domestic Surveillance

Counter Interpretation: Surveillance is observation
and collection of data
Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Ed.
No Date (The Law Dictionary, What is SURVEILLANCE,
http://thelawdictionary.org/surveillance/, accessed 6-28-201, CM)
What is SURVEILLANCE? Observation and collection of data to provide
evidence for a purpose.

A2: Topicality We Meet

BULLRUN is any information with the goal of securing
intelligence information
Small 08 (Matthew, His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic Surveillance,
Civil Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National Crisis,
http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf,
Page 2, MM, 06/27/15)
Before one can make any sort of assessment of domestic surveillance
policies, it is first necessary to narrow the scope of the term domestic
surveillance. Domestic surveillance is a subset of intelligence
gathering. Intelligence, as it is to be understood in this context, is
information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy
makers and has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet
those needs (Lowenthal 2006, 2). In essence, domestic surveillance is a
means to an end; the end being intelligence. The intelligence
community best understands domestic surveillance as the acquisition of
nonpublic information concerning United States persons (Executive Order
12333 (3.4) (i)). With this definition domestic surveillance remains an overly
broad concept.

BULLRUN itself is considered a surveillance by

companies
Risen, US News Tech Reporter, 15 (Tom, June 2nd, US News,
Facebook Email Encryption Another Blow to Surveillance,
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/06/02/facebook-email-encryptionanother-blow-to-surveillance, 06/27/15, MM)
Facebook is taking a cue from Google and Apple and giving its users
more encryption options, despite FBI criticism that locking user data
could place lives in danger by limiting government surveillance . The
social network this week announced it would allow users to encrypt notifications sent from the site to their
email addresses, protecting potentially sensitive emails, such as a request for a new password, from
hackers, spies or anybody who does not have the users private key. Among those excluded from access to
the private key: Facebook itself, which is used by 935 million people on an average day. Users can go to
the About page on their Facebook profiles to add a public key created by the Open PGP protocol PGP is
an acronym for pretty good privacy and decrypt email messages using a corresponding private key.
People can also share public keys with others in order to have an encrypted chat on a different messaging
service.

BULLRUN is a surveillance mechanism that causes

surveillance of consumers and businesses
Center for Democracy and Technology, Internet
Freedom Organization, 14 (November 10th, Center for Democracy
and Technology, Issue Brief: A Backdoor to Encryption for Government
Surveillance, https://cdt.org/insight/issue-brief-a-backdoor-to-encryption-forgovernment-surveillance/, 06/27/15, MM)

Encrypting smartphones and other tech products will help protect against malicious hacking, identity theft,

However, a government mandate requiring

companies to build a backdoor through encryption to facilitate
phone theft, and other crimes.

surveillance would put consumers at grave risk and impose heavy

costs on US businesses. The government can obtain information for
investigations from other sources and may be able to compel an
individual to decrypt information with a search warrant.

Bullrun is Surveillance
Paganini, Chief Information of Security, 2013
[Infosec Institute, NSA surveillance is changing Users Internet Experience,
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/nsa-surveillance-changing-usersinternet-exp/, 6/26/15,CY]
Data encryption until now has represented the unique certainty for the
protection of data; the complexity of the algorithm used and a sufficient
length of the keys are necessary to protect information from espionage and
monitoring activities. The last wave of Snowdens revelations on the U.S.
surveillance program may have the effects of a disaster in the IT world. U.S.
intelligence could in fact have access to all encrypted data circulating on the
Internet and the ability to decipher any secure communication. Bullrun is
the name of latest surveillance program disclosed by Snowden, the
New York Times and The Guardian newspapers, and the journalism non-profit
ProPublica, which revealed details of the new super-secret program supported
by the NSA to have the possibility of bypassing encryption adopted worldwide
by corporations, governments, and institutions.

Bullrun is a US program for Surveillance

USNEWS, 2014
USNEWSGhost, BOUNDLESS INFORMANT, Project Bullrun, PRISM, TAR,
Snowden TED Speech, Documents,
https://usnewsghost.wordpress.com/2014/03/20/boundless-informant-projectbullrun-prism-edward-snowden-ted-targeting-rationale-with-documentssnowden-ted-speech-nsa/, 6/26/15,CY]
Bullrun, another US program for massive surveillance. Snowdens
revelations represented a heartquake for IT securityThe extension of
US surveillance activities seems to have no limits neither
borderlines, every communication and data despite protected with
sophisticated encryption mechanisms were accessible by US
Intelligence and its partners like Britains GCHQ.

Bullrun is part of the NSA surveillance program

Wageinsteil, Head security news director, 2013

[Toms Guild, Why the Latest NSA Leak Is the Scariest of All,
http://www.tomsguide.com/us/most-important-nsa-leak,news-17505.html,
6/26/15, CY]
The surveillance programs, named "Manassas," "Bullrun" and "Edgehill"
after battles in the American and English civil wars, not only built powerful
computers to crack encryption protocols. They also coerced
technology companies into handing over encryption keys, infiltrated

NSA and GCHQ personnel onto corporate staffs, broke into the
computer servers of uncooperative companies to steal information
and ensured that some companies built "backdoors" into their
technology so that the spy agencies would always have access.

Bull run is a surveillance program

Katitza Rodriguez, EFF International Rights Director, 2013
[EFF, NSA Mass Surveillance Programs,
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/05/29/unnecessary_and_disproportionate.pdf,
6/26/15, CY]
Not in and of itself a surveillance program, BULLRUN is an operation by
which the NSA undermines the security tools relied upon by users, targets
and non-targets, and US persons and non-US persons alike. The specific
activities include dramatic and unprecedented efforts to attack security tools,
including: Inserting vulnerabilities into commercial encryption systems, IT
systems, networks, and endpoint communications devices used by targets;
Actively engaging US and foreign IT industries to covertly influence and/or
overtly leverage their commercial products' designs; Shaping the
worldwide commercial cryptography marketplace to make it more
vulnerable to the NSAs surveillance capabilities; Secretly inserting
design changes in systems to make them more vulnerable to NSA
surveillance, and Influencing policies, international standards, and
specifications for commercial public key technologies.

The NSA surveillance program contains Bullrun

PERLROTH, Security reporter, 2013
[NYTNSA may have hit internet companies at a weak spot,
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/2607-perlrothnsa-may-have-hit-internetcompanies, 6/26/15, CY]
The technologies Mr. Poindexter proposed are similar to what became reality
years later in N.S.A. surveillance programs like Prism and Bullrun. The
Internet effectively mingled domestic and international communications,
erasing the bright line that had been erected to protect against domestic
surveillance. Although the Internet is designed to be a highly decentralized
system, in practice a small group of backbone providers carry almost all of
the networks data.

A2: FISA
FISA was corrupted by the executive branch
ineffective now
Sugiyama, University of Michigan Law school J.D, Perry,
managing editor of Michigan Journal of Law, 06
(Tara, Maria, Fall 2006, Michigan Journal of Law, THE NSA DOMESTIC
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM: AN ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
DURING AN ERA OF ONE-PARTY RULE, Lexis, 6/26/15, YA)
FISA was designed to limit executive power by proscribing practices
by which the administration could conduct surveillance . Specifically, the
administration can conduct electronic surveillance within the context of foreign intelligence gathering
only if the surveillance meets certain conditions. n26 The Act permits warrantless [*154]
surveillance for a period up to one year if it is for the purpose of foreign intelligence
gathering and has a minimal likelihood of acquiring information
about U.S. citizens. n27 Under FISA, the President authorizes warrantless surveillance through
the Attorney General, and the Attorney General certifies the qualifying conditions to the FISA court. n28 In
an emergency, the Act permits federal agencies to conduct surveillance for up to seventy-two hours before
they must notify the FISA court and seek a search warrant. n29 In times of war, FISA authorizes the
President to engage in warrantless wiretaps for up to fifteen days, though the extension of his authority in
that instance depends on congressional approval. n30 Alternatively, the administration can seek
authorization for wiretaps from a secret, non-adversarial court known as the FISA court. n31 The Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court now selects eleven (formerly seven) FISA court judges for terms of seven
years. n32 The FISA court conducts all proceedings ex parte where the Department of Justice (DOJ)

With both warrantless and courtapproved surveillance, the administration bears the burden of
proving that the surveillance will have little or no likelihood of
gathering information about U.S. citizens. n34 Surveillance
conducted in violation of FISA carries significant civil and criminal
liabilities. n35 Congress designed FISA to curtail executive authority
for surveillance rather than for law enforcement purposes . n36 FISA
limited warrantless surveillance to "foreign powers" and surveillance
under court order to situations where probable cause justified
surveillance of a "foreign power" or an "agent of a foreign power." n37
As a [*155] result, Congress approved surveillance under FISA only
where its purpose was intelligence gathering. That limitation fell
with the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001. In response to the
terrorist attacks, President Bush signed Public Law 107-56, the Uniting and
presents the only evidence heard in the case. n33

Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act

several significant
amendments to FISA. n39 First, the amendments approve searches where criminal prosecution
(USA PATRIOT Act) on October 26, 2001. n38 The Act includes

of individuals is the primary purpose of the search, so long as a significant intelligence purpose remains.

These amendments represent a fundamental shift in focus from

FISA as a tool for surveillance to FISA as a tool for law enforcement.
n40

The government, therefore, need no longer cloak its prosecutorial interests in the guise of foreign

increases the
number of judges on the FISA court from seven to eleven . n41 Third, the
Act expands FISA's coverage with respect to certain data gathering
devices and business records. n42 Finally, the Act also amends FISA to
include a private right of action for private citizens who are illegally
monitored. n43 Within months of the attacks, the President also
intelligence; the bar for initiating surveillance is much lower. Second, the Act

issued an executive order authorizing the NSA to conduct

warrantless surveillance of American citizens and others within the
United States. n44 Although details of the program are sparse, the initial report was
staggering - 500 U.S. citizens and between 5,000 and 7,000 noncitizens were being monitored by the NSA at any given time with no
judicial approval. n45 The obvious question for many is whether or not President Bush has the
authority to authorize [*156] domestic surveillance without a warrant, and if he does, what limits, if any,
exist on that power.

The controversies of unwarranted surveillance- FISA

and the executive branch are in bed together
Sugiyama, University of Michigan Law school J.D, Perry,
managing editor of Michigan Journal of Law, 06
(Tara, Maria, Fall 2006, Michigan Journal of Law, THE NSA DOMESTIC
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM: AN ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
DURING AN ERA OF ONE-PARTY RULE, Lexis, 6/26/15, YA)
Both FISA and the USA PATRIOT Act must be viewed against a
backdrop of judicial silence with respect to executive power to "spy"
on U.S. citizens. The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed
the question of whether, under the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
on unreasonable search and seizure, electronic surveillance of
people within the United States is constitutional for the purposes
espoused by President Bush. n46 Between the 1920s and 1967,
conversations were not considered protected under the Fourth
Amendment, and thus, wiretapping was not considered a search and
seizure. n47 In 1967, however, the Court in Berger v. New York n48
changed course and extended Fourth Amendment protections to
conversations when it overruled a New York electronic surveillance
statute it deemed a "blanket grant of permission to eavesdrop ...
without adequate supervision or protective procedures." n49 The Court in
Berger declined to rule on whether the Constitution permits a "national security" exemption, noting that
the decision to allow such an exemption should be made by "legislative bodies" because there is no
express prohibition in the Fourth Amendment. n50 The Court enhanced protections for U.S. residents in
1972 when it held that electronic surveillance in domestic security matters requires proper warrant
procedure. n51 Importantly, no judgment was made on "the scope of the President's surveillance power
with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or without this country." n52 Since then, lower courts
have split on [*157] whether the administration can conduct surveillance on communication between
citizens and their international contacts. n53

The executive branch cant be trusted with oversighttoo often do they secretly increase surveillance
Sugiyama, University of Michigan Law school J.D, Perry,
managing editor of Michigan Journal of Law, 06
(Tara, Maria, Fall 2006, Michigan Journal of Law, THE NSA DOMESTIC
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM: AN ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
DURING AN ERA OF ONE-PARTY RULE, Lexis, 6/26/15, YA)
When news of the NSA domestic surveillance program broke in the
December 16, 2005 New York Times article, n63 the Bush administration
rallied the executive branch to present a unified front in support of the
program. n64 The unitary executive theory of the presidency dates back to

1787 when the Constitution vested executive authority in a single president

rather than in a committee. n65 Under this theory, constitutional text and
original design grant the President expansive powers to execute U.S. laws.
n66 Since the Constitutional Convention, presidential assertions of the
unitary executive have waxed and waned, but in no situation has a president
significantly acquiesced to congressional interference with his ability to
execute U.S. laws. n67
President Bush endorsed the unitary executive view of the presidency long before the revelation of the NSA domestic

In response to the September 11th attacks, President

Bush relied on the unitary executive theory to challenge
congressional attempts to limit the scope of his authority. n69 Vice
President Dick Cheney also voiced support for a strong unitary
executive, lamenting that "over the years there had been an erosion
of presidential power and authority." n70 In Cheney's view, "the
president of the United States needs to have his constitutional
powers unimpaired, if you will, in terms of the conduct of national
security policy." n71 As part of its strategy of presenting a unified front among the executive branch agencies
surveillance program. n68

and departments, the administration used the tactic of framing the debate around the NSA program in terms of national
security. n72 To win public support, President Bush's Chief Political Adviser Karl Rove used simple language and preyed on
fear to garner support for the program: "Let me be as clear as I [*160] can be: President Bush believes if Al Qaeda is
calling somebody in America, it is in our national security interest to know who they're calling and why... . Some important
Democrats clearly disagree." n73 The White House calculated that few Americans would question the legality of the NSA
program if the administration made clear that the program was designed to protect them from terrorists. n74 Having
established a plan of action, in late December 2005 President Bush used the White House as a platform to begin the
executive branch's assault on rising congressional unease with the NSA program. n75 He explained in straightforward
terms that the Constitution granted him inherent authority to conduct the program. n76 Continuing to carry out the
President's message, the DOJ in a December 22, 2005 letter n77 followed suit by formally providing congressional leaders
on the intelligence committees a preview of the legal authorities it identified as supporting the program: (1) Article II,
Section 2 or the Commander in Chief Clause, n78 and (2) the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) Statute.
n79 Additionally, the DOJ stressed that the administration continued to use FISA as "a very important tool" in addressing
the terrorist threat. n80 After a short reprieve during the December holidays, in the New Year the executive branch
resumed its defense of the program as well as its resistance to congressional inquiry into the domestic surveillance
program. Both DOJ Inspector General Glenn A. Fine and [*161] Department of Defense (DOD) Acting Inspector General
Thomas F. Gimble denied the request of Democrats to investigate the activities by the NSA. n81 The NSA also articulated
its legal justification for the program, explaining that former head of the NSA General Michael V. Hayden had relied on
Reagan-era Executive Order 12333 n82 as authority to run the intelligence program until President Bush signed his own
executive order in 2002 n83 specifically permitting the agency to eavesdrop without warrants on the communications of

Despite its
concerted efforts to keep executive branch agencies in line, on January 16,
2006 the administration hit a small roadblock when the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) broke ranks with the executive branch's party
line. n85 The FBI revealed that officials of the Bureau had complained
to the NSA that the program pointlessly intruded on the privacy of
Americans. n86 One FBI official suggested that the FBI broke ranks
with the executive branch because it did not want to be the fall
agency for the program: "This wasn't our program... . It's not our
mess, and we're not going to clean it up." n87 Indeed, the FBI official's
statement may reflect a larger turf battle between the FBI and NSA
as the bureau struggles to define its jurisdictional areas postSeptember 11th. Quickly moving on from the FBI's dissension, three days later the executive branch once
individuals inside the United States whom the agency believed had links to terrorism. n84

again presented a unified front when the DOJ released a forty-two page legal analysis report in support of the NSA
domestic surveillance program. n88 Challenging the findings of a [*162] Congressional Research Service (CRS) report,
which concluded that the President's authority to carry out the NSA program may represent the "lowest ebb" n89 of
presidential powers, n90 the DOJ sought to reframe the argument. n91 The DOJ's analysis placed the President at "the
zenith" n92 of his powers when he authorized the NSA domestic surveillance program. n93 In furtherance of bolstering the
executive branch against outside pressures, Vice President Cheney also went on record to gain public support, stating that
the program is "critical to the national security of the United States." n94 To garner key support within Congress, he also
gave a closed-door briefing to a "Gang of Eight" n95 congressional leaders. n96 Even as Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) prepared to hold the first Senate hearings on the NSA program, in early February
2006, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Porter J. Goss and Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte
made one last effort to shift the focus away [*163] from the impending hearings. n97 Framing the need for the NSA

program in terms of national security, Goss denounced the leaks of the program, stating that they had caused severe
damage to CIA operations and expressed the desire for a grand jury inquiry. n98 At the Senate hearing on the NSA
program conducted on February 6, 2006, Attorney General Gonzales largely dismissed efforts by senators to urge the
executive branch to engage Congress and the judiciary in oversight of the program. n99 Instead, Gonzales maintained
that the President had legal authority to act as he had, and remained evasive when asked pointed questions about the
program. n100 Even when told by Republican senators that they had not intended to authorize the President to conduct
warrantless domestic surveillance with AUMF, Gonzales responded that, regardless of the senators' intentions, the written
letter of AUMF nonetheless supported the President's actions. n101 The White House only engaged Congress in minimal
oversight after Chairwoman of the House Intelligence Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence Heather A.
Wilson called on the intelligence committees of both Houses to conduct full investigations into the program. n102 The
following day on February 8, 2006, the White House provided a closed-door briefing for the full House Intelligence
Committee and announced that it would brief the Senate Intelligence Committee the next day. n103 In addition to
providing briefings to the intelligence committees, the administration also announced that the DOJ's Office of Professional
Responsibility had started a formal inquiry of internal dissension over the legal foundation of the program within the
department. n104 The investigation was [*164] in direct response to a letter sent by Democrats earlier inJanuary 2006.

While the executive branch seemingly increased its cooperation

with congressional inquiries into the NSA domestic surveillance
program, the administration simultaneously led a behind-the-scenes
effort to derail an investigation by the Senate Intelligence
Committee. n106 On February 16, 2006, the administration stated that it would not permit former Attorney
n105

General John D. Ashcroft and Former Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey to testify about the program's legality

The White House also started a campaign

in favor of Senator Mike DeWine's (R-OH) proposal, which would
exempt the NSA program from the FISA court and instead place the
program under the oversight of a small congressional subcommittee.
n108 On February 22, 2006, the executive branch once again
renewed its wall of resistance to congressional inquiry. n109 On the
eve before intelligence official General Hayden was scheduled to
brief the full House Intelligence Committee on the NSA program,
White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card stopped him. n110 Less than a week
before the Senate Intelligence Committee. n107

later, Attorney General Gonzales sent a letter to Senator Specter, attempting to clarify his testimony from the February
6th hearing. n111 He continued to dispute the contention that warrantless surveillance violates statutes of the United
States, and assured Senator Specter that despite the existence of "inadvertent mistakes," there was "intense oversight

In early March 2006, the Bush

administration again skirted the issue of any purported illegality on
its own part and instead refocused the issue on possible criminal
wrongdoing by those officials who had reported the classified NSA
program to the media. n113 Accordingly, the administration launched FBI probes, conducted a polygraph
both within the NSA and outside that agency... ." n112

investigation inside the CIA, and issued warnings from [*165] the DOJ, all in an effort to discourage government
employees from serving as media sources. n114

A2: Perception
House making attempts at NSA reform- revival of
Secure Data Act
Volz, journalist, 14
(Dustin, December 4, National Journal, House Lawmakers to Reintroduce Bill
to Limit NSA 'Backdoor' Spying, http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/houselawmakers-to-reintroduce-bill-to-end-nsa-backdoor-exploits-20141204, June
25, 2015, GG)
House lawmakers are attempting to revive a popular bill that would
limit the National Security Agency's ability to spy on Americans'
communications data, a day after the measure was left out from ongoing
government funding negotiations. The measure, dubbed the Secure Data
Act and spearheaded by Democratic Rep. Zoe Lofgren, would block the
NSA and other intelligence agencies from compelling tech companies
to create so-called backdoor vulnerabilities into their devices or
software. Sen. Ron Wyden, also a Democrat, introduced a similar
version of the bill earlier Thursday. A Lofgren aide said the bill is expected
to be introduced later Thursday with Republican cosponsors. A broader
form of the legislation overwhelmingly passed the House in June with
bipartisan support on a 293-123 vote, in the form of an amendment tacked
on to a defense appropriations bill. That previous bill additionally would have
prevented intelligence agencies from engaging in content surveillance of
Americans' communications data without a warrant. But the language was
left out of ongoing negotiations between both chambers over a spending
package that would fund most government agencies into next year. The
House has additionally barred amendments to that omnibus measure, a
common practice.

A2: Oversight Now

Congress lacks NSA oversight- members kept in the
dark about intelligence programs
Grayson, Florida Congressmen, 13 (Alan, October 25th, The
Guardian, Congressional oversight of the NSA is a joke. I should know, I'm in
Congress, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/nsa-nocongress-oversight, 06/24/15, MM)
Pike's investigation initiated one of the first congressional oversight
debates for the vast and hidden collective of espionage agencies, including the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National
Security Agency (NSA). Before the Pike Commission, Congress was
kept in the dark about them a tactic designed to thwart
congressional deterrence of the sometimes illegal and often
shocking activities carried out by the "intelligence community".
Today, we are seeing a repeat of this professional voyeurism by our
nation's spies, on an unprecedented and pervasive scale. Recently, the US

House of Representatives voted on an amendment offered by Representatives Justin Amash and John
Conyers that would have curbed the NSA's omnipresent and inescapable tactics. Despite furious lobbying
by the intelligence industrial complex and its allies, and four hours of frantic and overwrought briefings by
the NSA's General Keith Alexander, 205 of 422 Representatives voted for the amendment. Though the
amendment barely failed, the vote signaled a clear message to the NSA: we do not trust you. The vote also

members of Congress do not trust that

the House Intelligence Committee is providing the necessary
oversight. On the contrary, "oversight" has become "overlook".
Despite being a member of Congress possessing security clearance,
I've learned far more about government spying on me and my fellow
citizens from reading media reports than I have from "intelligence"
briefings. If the vote on the Amash-Conyers amendment is any indication, my colleagues feel the
conveyed another, more subtle message:

same way. In fact, one long-serving conservative Republican told me that he doesn't attend such briefings
anymore, because, "they always lie". Many of us worry that Congressional Intelligence Committees are
more loyal to the "intelligence community" that they are tasked with policing, than to the Constitution. And
the House Intelligence Committee isn't doing anything to assuage our concerns. I've requested classified
information, and further meetings with NSA officials. The House Intelligence Committee has refused to
provide either. Supporters of the NSA's vast ubiquitous domestic spying operation assure the public that
members of Congress can be briefed on these activities whenever they want. Senator Saxby Chambliss
says all a member of Congress needs to do is ask for information, and he'll get it. Well I did ask, and the
House Intelligence Committee said "no", repeatedly. And virtually every other member not on the

a member of the House

Intelligence Committee was asked at a town hall meeting, by his
constituents, why my requests for more information about these
programs were being denied. This member argued that I don't have
the necessary level of clearance to obtain access for classified
information. That doesn't make any sense; every member is given
the same level of clearance. There is no legal justification for
imparting secret knowledge about the NSA's domestic surveillance
activities only to the 20 members of the House Intelligence
Committee. Moreover, how can the remaining 415 of us do our job
properly, when we're kept in the dark or worse, misinformed?
Edward Snowden's revelations demonstrate that the members of
Congress, who are asked to authorize these programs, are not privy
to the same information provided to junior analysts at the NSA, and
Intelligence Committee gets the same treatment. Recently,

even private contractors who sell services to foreign governments.

The only time that these intelligence committees disclose classified
information to us, your elected representatives, is when it serves
the purposes of the "intelligence community". As the country continues to debate
the supposed benefits of wall-to-wall spying programs on each and every American, without probable
cause, the spies, "intelligence community" and Congressional Intelligence Committees have a choice: will
they begin sharing comprehensive information about these activities, so that elected public officials have
the opportunity to make informed decisions about whether such universal snooping is necessary, or
constitutional?

A2: Freedom Act Solves

The Freedom Act is not enough- does nothing about
BULLRUN or other non-FISA surveillance
Granick, Director of Civil Liberties at the Stanford Center for
Internet and Society, 2013 (Jennifer, October 29, Stanford Law School,
A Tale of Two Surveillance Reform Bills,
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/10/tale-two-surveillance-reform-bills,
accessed 6-23-2015, CM)
Today, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Representative Jim Sensenbrenner
(R-WI) introduced a bill to reform government surveillance in light of the NSA
spying disclosures brought to us by Edward Snowden. This bill, the "USA
Freedom Act" follows on the heels of September's bipartisan offering from
Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR), Mark Udall (D-CO), Rand Paul (R-KY), and
Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), the "Intelligence Oversight and Surveillance
Reform Act". The Leahy/Sensenbrenner bill has political legs. ACLU, Center
for Democracy and Technology, and other groups "strongly support" it, and it
has bipartisan support in both chambers, including from Senators Udall and
Blumenthal. I thought it would be helpful to compare this bill to the
Wyden/Udall proposal. There's a comparison based on each bill's table of
contents, and a comparison based on some highlighted substantive
provisions, each of which should be illuminating. Assuming the text of each
bill is foolproof enough to constrain the NSA as indicated, there are many
similarities, and few differences between the proposals. Most importantly,
neither bill addresses the vast surveillance NSA conducts outside of
FISA, which nevertheless sweeps in bulk data about Americans. Nor
does any bill stop the NSA's BULLRUN program, efforts to undermine
the implementation of strong encryption on the public Internet.
These activities happen outside of FISA, seriously damage American
interests, and are almost wholly unregulated. Nor, as I've written, do
these bills go far enough to protect the average non-U.S. person
from indiscriminate surveillance. Without these protections,
Americas Internet companies and our long term political interests in
spreading democracy and the rule of law will suffer.

A2: Congress CP
Congress has not oversight of the NSAs programs
they are not properly informed
Andrea Peterson 10/19/13 (covers technology policy for The Washington
Post, with an emphasis on cybersecurity, consumer privacy, transparency,
surveillance and open government, The Washington Post, "Obama says NSA
has plent of congressional oversight. But one congressman says it's a farce,"
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/09/obama-says-nsahas-plenty-of-congressional-oversight-but-one-congressman-says-its-a-farce/)
But Rep. Justin Amash (R-Mich.), a vocal opponent of NSA spying programs,
says that congressional oversight of intelligence programs is
"broken." Amash spoke at a conference hosted by the Cato Institute on
Wednesday. While the Senate Intelligence committee sent out briefing
information about the programs to members of the upper chamber, Amash
says the House Intelligence Committee "decided it wasn't worthwhile
to share this information" with members of the House. Instead, he
says, the committee offered members an opportunity to attend some
classified briefings and review the documents in their committee chamber.
Amash describes those briefings as a farce. Many times, he says, they
focused on information that was available from reading newspapers
or public statutes. And his account of trying to get details out of those
giving the briefings sounds like an exercise in frustration: So you don't know
what questions to ask because you don't know what the baseline is.
You don't have any idea what kind of things are going on. So you have
to start just spitting off random questions: Does the government have a moon
base? Does the government have a talking bear? Does the government have
a cyborg army? If you don't know what kind of things the government might
have, you just have to guess and it becomes a totally ridiculous game of 20
questions. Amash says that if he asks a question "in slightly the wrong way
they will tell you no. They're not going to tell you 'No, this agency
doesn't do it but this other agency does it' or 'No we can't do it
under this program, but we can do it under this program.' But you
don't know what the other programs are, so what are you going to
ask about?"

Congress does not have the oversight rein in the NSA

they have little information due to lack of allowed
transparency
Zoe Carpenter 1/30/14 (Zo Carpenter is The Nation's assistant
Washington editor. She has written for Rolling Stone, Guernica and the
Poughkeepsie Journal, and has appeared on MSNBC, CNN, and other media
outlets, The Nation, "Can Congress Oversee the NSA?"
www.thenation.com/blog/178168/can-congress-oversee-nsa)
Wednesdays hearing nicely showcased the two major hurdles to congressional
oversight. The first, as Wyden argued, is senior intelligence officials. The

second is the congressional committees, which face an institutional mismatch with

the intelligence community and whose members often seem more committed to protecting, rather than
scrutinizing, the agencies they are tasked with overseeing. First, a brief history. After revelations about
abuses by the CIA and other agencies in the 1970s, Congress struck what Stephen Vladeck, a professor of
law at American University, calls a grand bargain, to accommodate the paradoxical need to submit
secret programs to democratic oversight. New legal constraints on intelligence activities would be enforced
not in public but instead behind the veil by the intelligence committees and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (also known as the FISA court). As Colorado Senator Mark Udall said at the Intelligence
Committee hearing, This committee was created to address a severe breach of trust that developed when
it was revealed that the CIA was conducting unlawful domestic searches. The Snowden leaks indicate the
bargain has broken down. In essence, the delicate balance Congress sought to strike thirty-five years ago
now appears to be tipped, rather decisively, in favor of the intelligence community, Vladeck explained in

officials have done some of that tipping themselves, by withholding

information from the public and lawmakers. On Wednesday, Wyden said the
committee had been stonewalled by intelligence officials; indeed,
none of his questions received direct answers, although Wyden did receive
an e-mail. Intelligence

promises from officials to get back to him by specific deadlines. Wyden also cited several incidents in
which officials had given inaccurate testimony in public hearings. Last March, for example, James Clapper
told Wyden that the NSA did not wittingly collect data on American citizens, a claim we now know from
the Snowden leaks to be false. In some cases,

officials may not be telling legislators

anything at all. There are certain things that the committees are simply not going to find out
about unless theyre briefed, said Representative Adam Schiff, a California Democrat on the House
Intelligence Committee. According

to law, the executive branch must keep the

intelligence committees fully and currently informed of any
intelligence activity, including significant anticipated activity . But recent
history suggests that even committee chairs have not been kept abreast. Senator Dianne Feinstein, who

the Senate Intelligence Committee and has become one of the NSAs closest
congressional allies, has admitted that her committee was not satisfactorily informed
about certain surveillance activities, in particular the tapping of German chancellor
chairs

Angela Merkels cell phone. The reauthorization of Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which the NSA says
provides legal grounds for collecting Americans phone records in bulk, presents another case in which

Congress appears to have had insufficient information to determine

whether intelligence activities were lawful. In a report released last Friday, the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board explained that the FISC did not articulate the legal basis for bulk
collection until last Augustyears after Congress extended Section 215 in 2010 and 2011. This indicates

lawmakers may not have been properly informed of how the

statute was being applied when they extended it. Ultimately, the board argued
that

that Section 215 is not written in a way that justifies bulk data collection at all, but it said that even if the
language were ambiguous, some members of Congress may have been prohibited from reading critical
documents before voting to maintain Section 215. One explanation for these gaps is the institutional
mismatch between the intelligence community and the congressional committees. The intelligence
committees are small, the staff is small, the agencies themselves ar e behemoth, said Schiff. In the

House, members are not permitted to have their own staff on the
committee, and some have described feeling inadequately prepared
to question intelligence officials. You dont have any idea what kind
of things are going on. So you have to start just spitting off random questions: Does the
government have a moon base? Does the government have a talking bear? Does the government have a
cyborg army? Representative Justin Amash said in October at a conference hosted by the Cato Institute.
The administration says Congress is duly informed, while other lawmakers have suggested its their
colleagues own fault if they arent up to speed. Clapper reaffirmed promises of greater transparency on

this culture of misinformation is

going to be easily fixed, Wyden warned. Representative Schiff told me
that he expects the mismatch in resources to continue to impact the
committees oversight ability. Id like to see our capacities augmented in the intelligence
Wednesday, but critics remain skeptical. I dont think

committee, but at a time of dwindling legislative budgets, Im not sure whether that will take place, he
said. Congress could reassert some of its own authority by including more members in the group briefed
on significant intelligence activity, for example; by shortening the authorization period for laws like the
Patriot Act to spur more frequent debate; by imposing a rule of lenity on the FISA court, so that the
administration would have to receive congressional approval in ambiguous cases, thus preventing the FISA
court from creating its own novel interpretations of law; and by making sure FISA judges hear adversarial

Whether Congress has the will to

strengthen its own hand is the big question. The fact that the
chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Mike Rogers , believes that
opinions from civil liberties and technology experts.

you cant have your privacy violated if you dont know your privacy is violated does not exactly inspire
confidence.

Congress doesnt control NSA surveillance- executive

branch oversight normal means
Watkins, Technology Reporter for Huffington Post, 13 (Ali,
November 21st, McClatchy Washington Bureau, Most of NSAs data collection
authorized by order Ronald Reagan issued,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/21/209167/most-of-nsas-datacollection-authorized.html, 06/26/15, MM)
The National Security Act of 1947 requires that Congress be kept
fully and currently informed about significant intelligence
activities. But 12333 activities receive little oversight. The problem,
legal experts and lawmakers say, is that only the executive branch
and the intelligence agencies that are part of it determines what
fully and currently informed means and what details it needs to
share with Congress. Theres no clear definition, said House Intelligence
Committee member Adam Schiff, D-Calif., who recently sparred with fellow
committee members over whether the NSA had briefed the panel on its
monitoring of German Chancellor Angela Merkels cellphone. We need to
have a bigger discussion of what our mutual understanding is of what we
want to be informed of. Schiff isnt alone in raising questions about how well
informed Congress is kept of activities undertaken under 12333 authorities.
Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., who chairs the Senate Intelligence
Committee, has called for a broad review of whats taking place under
12333, noting that the order authorizes phone and email metadata collection
beyond what the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act does. Feinstein has
consistently defended the NSAs collection of domestic cellphone metadata,
saying the program under which it is doing so is overseen by both the courts
and Congress. But even she has said the 12333 programs skirt similar
protections. The other programs do not (have the same oversight as FISA).
And thats what we need to take a look at, she said, adding that her
committee has not been able to sufficiently oversee the programs run
under the executive order. Twelve-triple-three programs are under the
executive branch entirely. Feinstein has also said the order has few, if
any, privacy protections. I dont think privacy protections are built
into it, she said. Its an executive policy. The executive controls
intelligence in the country. Intelligence officials have said that each
respective agencys 12333 collection is governed by supplemental
guidelines written by the attorney general and that those guidelines
protect Americans data. But intelligence officials have admitted that most
of those guidelines have not been revisited in decades and that they dont
offer the same protections as the metadata collection programs authorized
under the Patriot Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

A2 Bulk Data Collection Solves Terror

Bulk Data Collection plays hardly any role in terrorism
investigations Only 1.8%
Scuiletti, foreign affairs editor for PBS, 14 (Justin Scuiletti, 1-142014, "NSA surveillance doesn't stop terrorism, report claims," PBS
NewsHour, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/nsa-surveillance-doesntstop-terrorism-report-claims/ //NK)
A report from the New America Foundation says that bulk surveillance of phones and
emails by the NSA does not heavily contribute to terrorism
prevention. The report, published Monday by the nonprofit, nonpartisan public policy institute, says
claims by the government that suggested the usefulness of the data, including four
cases that were declassified in the wake of Edward Snowdens leaks,
were overblown and even misleading. For the report, the NAF
conducted an analysis of 225 individuals, recruited by (al-Qaida) or
a like-minded group or inspired by (al-Qaidas) ideology and
charged in the United States with an act of terrorism post-Sept. 11.
NSA surveillance contributions to initial investigations, the report
states, were minimal. American telephone metadata was only found
to have played a role in initiating 1.8 percent of investigations, with a
total contribution from NSA surveillance to investigations coming to 7.5 percent of cases . Traditional
investigative methods, however, including informants, community
tips and targeted intelligence provided 59.6 percent of impetus for
those investigations. The widespread use of informants suggests that if there was an NSA
role in these cases, it was limited and insufficient to generate
evidence of criminal wrongdoing without the use of traditional
investigative tools. The report also concluded that bulk collection of
American telephone metadata also had no discernible impact on
terrorism prevention and only the most marginal of impacts on
terrorist-related activities.

Surveillance does not solve terror

miscommunication and disorganization
Eddington, policy analyst in homeland security and civil
liberties, 1/27 (Patrick Eddington, 1-27-2015, "No, Mass Surveillance
Won't Stop Terrorist Attacks," Reason Foundation,
http://reason.com/archives/2015/01/27/mass-surveillance-and-terrorism //NK)

Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) said that while "Congress having oversight certainly is important ... what is more
important relative to these types of events is ensuring we don't overly hamstring the NSA's ability to
collect this kind of information in advance and keep these kinds of activities from occurring." Similarly,
Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) spoke of his "fear" that "our intelligence capabilities, those designed to
prevent such an attack from taking place on our shores, are quickly eroding," adding that the

government surveillance "designed to prevent these types of attacks

from occurring is under siege." A recent poll demonstrates that their sentiments are
widely shared in the wake of the attack. But would more mass surveillance have prevented the assault on

Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallabi.e., the "underwear bomber"nearly
the Charlie Hebdo office? Events from 9/11 to the present help provide the answer: 2009:

succeeded in downing the airline he was on over Detroit because, according to

then-National Counterterrorism Center (NCC) director Michael Leiter, the federal Intelligence Community

failed "to connect, integrate, and fully understand the

intelligence" it had collected. 2009: Army Major Nidal Hasan was able
to conduct his deadly, Anwar al-Awlaki-inspired rampage at Ft. Hood,
Texas, because the FBI bungled its Hasan investigation. 2013: The
Boston Marathon bombing happened, at least in part, because the
CIA, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FBI, NCC, and National
Security Agency (NSA) failed to properly coordinate and share
information about Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his family, associations,
and travel to and from Russia in 2012. Those failures were detailed
in a 2014 report prepared by the Inspectors General of the IC,
Department of Justice, CIA, and DHS. 2014: The Charlie Hebdo and
French grocery store attackers were not only known to French and
U.S. authorities but one had a prior terrorism conviction and another
was monitored for years by French authorities until less than a year
before the attack on the magazine. No, mass surveillance does not
prevent terrorist attacks. Its worth remembering that the mass
surveillance programs initiated by the U.S. government after the
9/11 attacksthe legal ones and the constitutionally-dubious ones
were premised on the belief that bin Ladens hijacker-terrorists were
able to pull off the attacks because of a failure to collect enough
data. Yet in their subsequent reports on the attacks, the
Congressional Joint Inquiry (2002) and the 9/11 Commission found
exactly the opposite. The data to detect (and thus foil) the plots was
in the U.S. governments hands prior to the attacks; the failures
were ones of sharing, analysis, and dissemination. That malady perfectly
describes every intelligence failure from Pearl Harbor to the present day. The Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (created by Congress in 2004) was
supposed to be the answer to the "failure-to-connect-the-dots"
problem. Ten years on, the problem remains, the IC bureaucracy is bigger than
ever, and our government is continuing to rely on mass surveillance
programs that have failed time and again to stop terrorists while
simultaneously undermining the civil liberties and personal privacy
of every American. The quest to "collect it all," to borrow a phrase from NSA Director Keith
Alexander, only leads to the accumulation of masses of useless
information, making it harder to find real threats and costing billions
to store. A recent Guardian editorial noted that such mass-surveillance myopia is spreading among
(IC)

European political leaders as well, despite the fact that "terrorists, from 9/11 to the Woolwich jihadists and
the neo-Nazi Anders Breivik, have almost always come to the authorities attention before murdering."

Mass surveillance is not only destructive of our liberties , its

continued use is a virtual guarantee of more lethal intelligence
failures. And our continued will to disbelieve those facts is a mental
dodge we engage in at our peril.

A2: Elections
People hate the NSA Multiple polls
King, class action employment attorney in San Diego, 13
(Bernie King, 7-10-2013, "NSA Surveillance Scandal: The Polls Are In, and NSA
Spying is Really, Really Unpopular," Mic Network,
http://mic.com/articles/53767/nsa-surveillance-scandal-the-polls-are-in-andnsa-spying-is-really-really-unpopular //NK)

If you have been following the recent disclosures of NSA domestic surveillance, you might have noticed a
wave of media reports a week after the first disclosures claiming something like, The Majority of
Americans Still Don't Care About the NSA Spying on Them. Further examples can be seen here, here and
here. If you were skeptical about the polling data cited in support of these headlines, you were right. The
polls cited as evidence of these claims were wildly misleading and have since been flatly contradicted by
the overwhelming majority of relevant polling data. These headlines largely relied on two polls, one by Pew
Research and the other by ABC/Washington Post. The Pew Research poll, taken between June 6 and June 9,
asked whether Americans thought it was acceptable for the NSA to track telephone call records of millions
of Americans in an effort to investigate terrorism. Fifty-six percent of people found this acceptable. In
response to a similar question, a second Pew Research poll on June 12-16 found Americans were equally
divided regarding their approval of the governments collection of telephone and Internet data as part of
anti-terrorism efforts. Unfortunately, neither survey distinguished between surveillance of terrorism
suspects and ordinary Americans. Thus, it is impossible to tell whether the respondents approved of
collecting the cell phone records for those not suspected of terrorism, or whether they merely approved of
collecting this data for terrorism suspects. Emily McClintock Elkins, director of polling for the Reason
Foundation, reached a similar conclusion in her recent critique of the NSA polling data. As the relevant
issue is whether the NSAs phone-records dragnet should extend to non-suspects, Pew Research offers
little insight as to how Americans feel about their government spying on them. The ABC/Washington Post
poll, conducted between June 12 and June 16, asked the following question: It's been reported that the
federal governments National Security Agency collects extensive records of phone calls, as well as
Internet data related to specific investigations, to try to identify possible terrorist threats. Do you support
or oppose this intelligence-gathering program? Fifty-eight percent of those polled said they supported this
program. However, just like the Pew Research poll, the question does not say whether this program collects
data on all Americans, or just those suspected of terrorism. Indeed, the mere reference to extensive
records is insufficient to alert the respondent that the NSA is collecting phone records for almost every
single American. This poll is useless in answering the critical issue, i.e. whether people support intelligence
gathering on Americans who are not terrorism suspects. When the questions expressly distinguish between
surveillance of ordinary Americans and Americans suspected of terrorism, a clear majority of Americans
are opposed to the NSAs surveillance of non-suspects. For example, a Rasmussen poll taken June 6-7
asked the following question: The federal government has been secretly collecting the phone records of
millions of Americans for national security purposes regardless of whether there is any suspicion of

Do you favor or oppose the governments secret collecting

of these phone records? Rasmussen specifically asks whether they
support surveillance of those not suspected of terrorism. Not
surprisingly, 59% of voters oppose collecting telephone records of
Americans not suspected of any wrongdoing. As further evidence of
this trend, a YouGov poll taken on June 6-7 asked whether
collecting and analyzing Americans phone records is justified as a
way to combat terrorism, or is it an unnecessary intrusion into
Americans lives? Like the Rasmussen poll, the distinction between
surveillance of terrorism suspects and intrusions upon the privacy of
ordinary Americans is clear. As expected, a solid majority (55%)
stated such surveillance was an unnecessary intrusion into American
lives. Only 22% of respondents thought it was justified. Similarly, a June 910 CBS News poll found that most Americans disapprove (58%) of
the government collecting the phone records of ordinary Americans,
but approve (75%) of its monitoring those suspected of terrorist
activity. This poll further confirms that Americans recognize an important distinction between
surveillance directed at terrorism suspects, and dragnet surveillance of ordinary citizens. Virtually
wrongdoing.

every other poll validates the critical fact evidenced by the

Rasmussen, YouGov, and CBS polls: Americans are strongly opposed to being spied on
by their own government. A Guardian/PPP poll taken June 10-11 revealed that 50% of Americans oppose
the government collecting their phone and Internet meta-data, while only 40% approve. A Gallup poll
taken on June 10-11 reported that 53% of Americans disapprove of the NSAs domestic surveillance, while
only 37% expressed their approval. In a FOX News poll conducted between June 22-24, 61% of Americans
disapproved of how the administration is handling the government's classified surveillance program that
collects the phone and Internet records of U.S. citizens. Of course, public perception of these programs is
bound to fluctuate as further information is revealed and the NSA programs are explained in greater detail.
At the moment however, we must disabuse ourselves of the false premise that Americans approve of their
government secretly collecting, storing, and spying on the phone calls and internet activity of citizens who
are not terrorism suspects. No evidence supports this claim, and in fact, the relevant polling data shows
the majority of Americans soundly reject the surveillance of non-terrorism suspects.

Americans hate the NSA

Page, Washington Bureau chief of USA TODAY, 14 (Susan Page,
1-20-2014, "Poll: Most Americans now oppose the NSA program," USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/01/20/poll-nsasurveillance/4638551/ //NK)
WASHINGTON -- Most Americans now disapprove of the NSA's sweeping
collection of phone metadata, a new USA TODAY/Pew Research Center Poll finds, and
they're inclined to think there aren't adequate limits in place to what the government can collect.

President Obama's announcement Friday of changes in the

surveillance programs has done little to allay those concerns: By
73%-21%, those who paid attention to the speech say his proposals
won't make much difference in protecting people's privacy. The poll of

1,504 adults, taken Wednesday through Sunday, shows a public that is more receptive than before to the
arguments made by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. His leak of intelligence documents since last
spring has fueled a global debate over the National Security Agency's surveillance of Americans and
spying on foreign leaders. Edward Snowden Edward Snowden in a file photo provided by The Guardian
Newspaper in London. (Photo: Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras, AP) Those surveyed now split, 45%43%, on whether Snowden's disclosures have helped or harmed the public interest. The snapshot of public
opinion comes as the White House, the intelligence agencies and Congress weigh significant changes in
the way the programs are run. In his address, Obama insisted no illegalities had been exposed but

By nearly 3-1, 70%26%, Americans say they shouldn't have to give up privacy and
freedom in order to be safe from terrorism. That may reflect the increasing
proposed steps to reassure Americans that proper safeguards were in place.

distance from the Sept. 11 attacks more than a decade ago that prompted some more of the more
aggressive surveillance procedures.

A2: XO Counterplan
The executive branch is not fit to oversee the NSA
empirics prove theyll abuse that power
Sugiyama, University of Michigan Law school J.D, Perry,
managing editor of Michigan Journal of Law, 06
(Tara, Maria, Fall 2006, Michigan Journal of Law, THE NSA DOMESTIC
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM: AN ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
DURING AN ERA OF ONE-PARTY RULE, Lexis, 6/26/15, YA)
On December 16, 2005, the New York Times sounded a fire alarm
when it revealed that, in response to the September 11, 2001
attacks, President George W. Bush had issued a secret executive
order permitting the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct warrantless
surveillance on individuals within the United States to unearth
nascent terrorist activity. The executive order purportedly
authorized the NSA to monitor the telephone and email messages of
tens of millions of unsuspecting individuals in its effort to track
down links to Al Qaeda. Almost immediately, [*150] various interest groups
n1

n2

n3

n4

began to question the constitutionality of the NSA domestic surveillance program and to challenge
whether the scope of the program violates the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).

n5

A2: Terror DA
NSA claim on 54 thwarted terror attacks false no
concrete evidence to prove.
Elliot and Meyer, Elliot is a staff writer at ProPublica and Meyer is
also a staff writer for ProPublica with past experience at The New
York Times and The Seattle Times, 13

(Justin and Theodoric, 12/7/2013, ProPublica, Claim on Attacks Thwarted by

NSA Spreads Despite Lack of Evidence,
http://www.propublica.org/article/claim-on-attacks-thwarted-by-nsa-spreadsdespite-lack-of-evidence, accessed 6.23.2015, JAK)
Fifty-four times this and the other program stopped and thwarted terrorist
attacks both here and in Europe saving real lives, Rep. Mike Rogers, a
Michigan Republican who chairs the House Intelligence Committee, said on
the House floor in July, referring to programs authorized by a pair of post-9/11
laws. This isnt a game. This is real. But there's no evidence that the
oft-cited figure is accurate. The NSA itself has been inconsistent on
how many plots it has helped prevent and what role the surveillance
programs played. The agency has often made hedged statements
that avoid any sweeping assertions about attacks thwarted. A chart
declassified by the agency in July, for example, says that intelligence from
the programs on 54 occasions has contributed to the [U.S.
governments] understanding of terrorism activities and, in many
cases, has enabled the disruption of potential terrorist events at
home and abroad a much different claim than asserting that the
programs have been responsible for thwarting 54 attacks. NSA
officials have mostly repeated versions of this wording. When NSA chief Gen.
Keith Alexander spoke at a Las Vegas security conference in July, for instance,
he referred to 54 different terrorist-related activities, 42 of which were plots
and 12 of which were cases in which individuals provided material support
to terrorism. But the NSA has not always been so careful. During Alexanders
speech in Las Vegas, a slide in an accompanying slideshow read simply 54
ATTACKS THWARTED. And in a recent letter to NSA employees, Alexander
and John Inglis, the NSAs deputy director, wrote that the agency has
contributed to keeping the U.S. and its allies safe from 54 terrorist plots.
(The letter was obtained by reporter Kevin Gosztola from a source with ties to
the intelligence community. The NSA did not respond when asked to
authenticate it.) Asked for clarification of the surveillance programs' record,
the NSA declined to comment. Earlier this month, Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt.,
pressed Alexander on the issue at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing.
Would you agree that the 54 cases that keep getting cited by the
administration were not all plots, and of the 54, only 13 had some
nexus to the U.S.? Leahy said at the hearing. Would you agree
with that, yes or no? Yes, Alexander replied, without elaborating. It's
impossible to assess the role NSA surveillance played in the 54 cases
because, while the agency has provided a full list to Congress, it remains
classified. Officials have openly discussed only a few of the cases (see
below), and the agency has identified only one involving a San

Diego man convicted of sending $8,500 to Somalia to support the

militant group Al Shabab in which NSA surveillance played a
dominant role. The surveillance programs at issue fall into two categories:
The collection of metadata on all American phone calls under the Patriot Act,
and the snooping of electronic communications targeted at foreigners under
a 2007 surveillance law. Alexander has saidthat surveillance authorized by
the latter law provided the initial tip in roughly half of the 54 cases. The
NSA has not released examples of such cases. After reading the full classified
list, Leahy concluded the NSAs surveillance has some value but still
questioned the agencys figures. We've heard over and over again the
assertion that 54 terrorist plots were thwarted by the two
programs, Leahy told Alexander at the Judiciary Committee hearing
this month. That's plainly wrong, but we still get it in letters to
members of Congress, we get it in statements. These weren't all
plots and they weren't all thwarted. The American people are getting
left with the inaccurate impression of the effectiveness of NSA
programs.

A2: Terror DA Bullrun Not Key

BULLRUN has little effect on terrorism- other means
Lillington, Tech Journalist for Irish Times, 15 (Karlin, January 22nd,
Irish Times, Digital encryption no longer some fancy exotic feature,
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/digital-encryption-no-longersome-fancy-exotic-feature-1.2074343, 06/28/15, MM)
Even as Cameron implied encryption made society more vulnerable because
terrorists use it to encode communications, a leaked 2009 report from the
US National Intelligence Council (which answers directly to the head
of intelligence in the US) undermined his security equals
surveillance bombast. The report, again from Snowden, stated
unequivocally that encryption is essential to business and consumer
security, offering the best defence for private data. Encryption is no
longer some fancy exotic feature. Its as mundane as can be, an embedded
feature in business services and applications. Most day to day business
operations, from ordinary communications using a Gmail account, to an
online purchase from a website, to the automated backing up of corporate
data, to the processing of credit card transactions, involve the routine use of
encryption. Encryption protects businesses and consumers. It can also
be used by terrorists, yes, but banning encryption for this reason
would have the same logic as dismantling the internet, or abolishing
the ability to wire money, because terrorists use those things as
well. Or, as one National Security Agency employee told me once at a
security conference lunch (before he realised I was a journalist): If
the government really wanted to prevent criminals and terrorists
from communicating secretly, it should just ban envelopes.

Turn- NSA decryption efforts actually open the US to

cyber attacks
Ball, Award-winning Data Journalist, 15 (James, January 15th, The
Guardian, Secret US cybersecurity report: encryption vital to protect private
data, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/15/-sp-secret-uscybersecurity-report-encryption-protect-data-cameron-paris-attacks,
06/28/15, MM)
An unclassified table accompanying the report states that encryption is the
[b]est defense to protect data, especially if made particularly
strong through multi-factor authentication similar to two-step
verification used by Google and others for email or biometrics.
These measures remain all but impossible to crack, even for GCHQ
and the NSA. The report warned: Almost all current and potential
adversaries nations, criminal groups, terrorists, and individual
hackers now have the capability to exploit, and in some cases
attack, unclassified access-controlled US and allied information
systems. It further noted that the scale of detected compromises indicates
organisations should assume that any controlled but unclassified networks of
intelligence, operational or commercial value directly accessible from the
internet are already potentially compromised by foreign adversaries. The

primary adversaries included Russia, whose robust operations

teams had proven access and tradecraft, it said. By 2009, China
was the most active foreign sponsor of computer network intrusion
activity discovered against US networks, but lacked the sophistication
or range of capabilities of Russia. Cyber criminals were another of the
major threats, having capabilities significantly beyond those of all
but a few nation states.

Mass surveillance doesnt solve terrorist attacks, only

endangers rights of citizens
CCDCOE, 15
(April 21, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, Mass
Surveillance Endangers Human Rights and Does Not Prevent Terrorist Attacks,
Says Council of Europe, https://ccdcoe.org/mass-surveillance-endangershuman-rights-and-does-not-prevent-terrorist-attacks-says-councileurope.html, June 28, 2015, GG)
Resolutions contain decisions by the Assembly on questions within its
authority, and expressions of views on matters for which the Assembly is
responsible. According to the resolution, the Assembly declares its deep
concern about the mass surveillance practices disclosed since June
2013 reported by journalists communicating with Edward Snowden. The
resolution states, in short, that: the surveillance practices endanger
fundamental human rights; the compromising of security by certain
intelligence agencies makes everybody vulnerable to attacks from
other state actors and criminals alike; there is extensive use of secret
laws and regulations, applied by secret courts using secret interpretations of
the applicable rules, which undermines the public trust in the judiciary; the
Assembly is worried that the mass surveillance tools, developed by the
United States and its allies, might fall in the hands of authoritarian regimes;
Russian Federation is explicitly mentioned as a case in point [INCYDER: it
should be noted that the Russian delegation has its voting rights in the
Assembly suspended due to Russias annexation of Crimea]; in several
countries, a massive Surveillance-Industrial Complex has evolved; national
parliaments should properly oversee the activities of their security services
and limit the subcontracting of their operations to private companies; there
are double standards in some nations laws, discriminating between citizens
and non-citizens in the protection of their privacy, and that even these
standards are bypassed by the Five-Eyes states by acquiring data on their
citizens from each other; mass surveillance does not appear to have
contributed to the prevention of terrorist attacks; and the Assembly
welcomes the investigation carried out by the European Parliament
and the adoption of the resolution of 12 March 2014 on US NSA
surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various [EU] Member
States and impact on EU citizens' fundamental rights.

Amount of data collected by mass surveillance

ineffective- too difficult to follow up on leads
Huffington Post, 15

(January 29, The Huffington Post, CSE's Levitation Project: Does Mass
Surveillance Prevent Terrorist Attacks?,
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/01/29/cse-levitation-masssurveillance_n_6569292.html, June 28, 2015, GG)
Mass trolling of internet data as done by Canada's electronic spy
agency in a project dubbed Levitation can impede cyber spies in the
hunt for extremists more than it helps, some security experts argue.
"We've focused too much on bulk collection just because there's a
capacity to survey broad swaths of digital communication and collect
it and store it, potentially indefinitely," says Adam Molnar, a Canadian
security expert teaching at an Australian university. But that collection may
not only be harmful to privacy and civil liberties concerns, but
ineffective as well, the Deakin University lecturer argues. "Even in
instances where we see an attack occur, these agencies are drowning in
data and they're not even able to follow up on specific leads." Molnar
cites the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing and the recent Paris
attacks as cases where information was gathered in suspects, "but it
made very little difference."

A2: Politics Plan Popular

Overwhelming congressional support for defunding
NSA backdoors
Kayyali, serves on the board of the National Lawyers Guild
S.F. Bay Area, 14 (Nadia Kayyali, 12-9-2014, "Security Backdoors are Bad
NewsBut Some Lawmakers Are Taking Action to Close Them," Electronic
Frontier Foundation, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/12/securitybackdoors-are-bad-news-some-lawmakers-are-taking-action-close-them //NK)

As many privacy advocates have pointed out recently, it looks like some people in the federal government

the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) still hasnt done
enough to address NSAs involvement in the creation of encryption
standards. Fortunately, some lawmakers are taking security seriously. You may remember that back
in June, the House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly (293-123)
to approve the Massie-Lofgren amendment to the 2015 Department
of Defense Appropriations bill, which would have defunded the NSAs
attempts to build security backdoors into products and services.
Although the amendment may have been stripped from the final
appropriations bill, alls not lost. On Thursday, Senator Ron Wyden
introduced some of the same language from the amendment as the
Secure Data Act of 2014 [pdf]. The Secure Data Act starts to address the problem of
are intent on reviving the failed Crypto Wars of the 90s. And despite recent assurances,

backdoors by prohibiting any agency from mandate[ing] that a manufacturer, developer, or seller of
covered products design or alter the security functions in its product or service to allow the surveillance of
any user of such product or service, or to allow the physical search of such product, by any agency.
Representative Lofgren has introduced a companion bill in the House, co-sponsored by 4 Republicans and 5

The legislation isnt comprehensive, of course. As some have

pointed out, it only prohibits agencies from requiring a company to
build a backdoor. The NSA can still do its best to convince companies to do so voluntarily. And
Democrats.

sometimes, the NSAs best convincing is a $10 million contract with a security firm like RSA. The
legislation also doesnt change the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA.) CALEA,
passed in 1994, is a law that forced telephone companies to redesign their network architectures to make
it easier for law enforcement to wiretap telephone calls. In 2006, the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC's
reinterpretation of CALEA to also include facilities-based broadband Internet access and VoIP service,

That being said, this legislation is

a good thing. First and foremost, its important to remind the
incoming (and overwhelmingly Republican) Congress that NSA
spying isnt a partisan issue. The bipartisan Massie-Lofgren
amendment garnered votes from Republicans, Democrats, and
Independents. And like the Massie-Lofgren amendment, Democrats
and Republicans are already supporting this legislation. While its
not likely that Congress will touch the Secure Data Act this term, by
introducing this legislation Senator Wyden and Representative
Lofgren have made it clear that they will continue to push for
privacy, civil libertiesand strong security.
although it doesn't apply to cell phone manufacturers.

Congress supports NSA backdoor reform It is the

best option
Kayyali, serves on the board of the National Lawyers Guild
S.F. Bay Area, 5/13 (Nadia Kayyali, 5-13-2015, "The Time to Shut the
NSA's Backdoors is NowNot in Two Years," Electronic Frontier Foundation,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/time-shut-nsas-backdoors-now-nottwo-years //NK)
As weve noted, our support for the current version of USA Freedom that is moving through the Senate and
the House is conditional on amendments that improve the bill. While we hope to see such amendments,
we also know that they may not be possible, since Judiciary Committee leaders noted during the USA
Freedom markup that it is the product of painstaking and careful negotiations, that would be killed by
any changes. And yesterday, the hearing on HR. 2048 in the House Rules Committee made it clear that

However, several members of the House

Judiciary Committee made some significant statements about what
reform they might support going forwardincluding statements
about reforming Section 702. So did members of the Rules
Committee. Now, we have a chance to see whether theyre willing to
act on those statements. Thats because Representatives Ted Poe, Thomas Massie, and Zoe
USA Freedom Act will not be amended.

Lofgren have introduced the bipartisan End Warrantless Surveillance of Americans Act (H.R. 2233). EFF
joined 29 groups to send a letter in support of the legislation this week, and we look forward to seeing
which lawmakers support it as it moves through the house. H.R. 2233 has goals similar to last years
Massie-Lofgren amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY 2015, which passed
overwhelmingly with strong bipartisan support: 293 ayes, 123 nays, and 1 present. That legislation would
have closed the so-called National Security Agency backdoorssecurity flaws engineered into products
and services to enable or facilitate government access to, and warrantless searches of, the contents of
Americans communicationsby prohibiting NSA and the Central Intelligence Agency from using
appropriated funds to mandate or request that companies build backdoors into products or services.

H.R. 2233 goes further, because the prohibition on mandating or

requesting backdoors would apply to any federal agency. This
change is especially important for U.S. companies, who have
suffered reputational harm overseas, and even lost business, in the
wake of revelations about the extent of NSA spying. H.R. 2233, like
the Massie-Lofgren amendment, does have an exception for
backdoors mandated by the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, a law that weve long had concerns about. H.R. 2233
would also address the backdoor search loophole by prohibiting any officer or employee of the United
States from searching through communications collected under Section 702 for communications of a
particular U.S. person without a court order. This provision has exceptions for certain limited
circumstances. Whats new is that H.R. 2233unlike last years Massie-Lofgren amendmentaims to
prohibit backdoor searches for particular U.S. persons of communications collected under authorities other
than Section 702including, according to Rep. Lofgren, Executive Order 12333. While many people have
never even heard of this presidential order, as the Washington Post pointed out in October, Senate
Intelligence Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) has acknowledged that Congress conducts
little oversight of intelligence-gathering under the presidential authority of Executive Order 12333 , which

H.R. 2233 does have

flaws. The above prohibition on EO 12333 searches would be an amendment to the Intelligence
defines the basic powers and responsibilities of the intelligence agencies.

Authorization Act of 2015, so it presumably would limit only funds appropriated under that Act. And while
the bill prohibits backdoors, its not clear how that prohibition would be enforced or where it would be

That being said, the legislation is a good start to shutting

backdoors. As the coalition letter states: All three of these measures
would make appreciable changes that would advance government
surveillance reform and help rebuild lost trust among Internet users
and businesses, while also preserving national security and
intelligence authorities. We urge the Congress to move speedily to
enact this legislation. While the House Judiciary Committee
repeatedly noted that they thought the FISA Amendments Act
published.

should be fixed when it is up for reauthorization, and some members

of the Rules Committee noted that they would be happy to see
another appropriations amendment, Rep. Massie made it clear why
these changes cant wait: The constitution is not negotiable, and we have a crisis right
nowif we wait two years, we are prolonging a constitutional crisis, and that is dangerous. He also pointed
out that business are suffering right now: If we put it off, I dont think you can undo the damage that will

We couldnt agree morethe time to fix the

backdoor problem is now.
be done to U.S. businesses.

Congress shows bipartisan support for NSA Reform

Want full ban
Timm, executive director of the Freedom of the Press
Foundation, 14 (Trevor Timm, 6-20-2014, "Congress wants NSA reform
after all. Obama and the Senate need to pass it," Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/20/congress-obamansa-reform-obama-senate //NK)
If you got angry last month when the National Security Agency, the White House and Eric Cantor's spyfriendly House of Representatives took a once-promising surveillance reform bill and turned it into a shit
sandwich, I've got some good news for you: so, apparently, did many members of Congress. Late Thursday
night, in a surprising rebuke to the NSA's lawyers and the White House after they co-opted and secretly
re-wrote the USA Freedom Act and got it passed an overwhelming majority of the House of
Representatives voted to strip the agency of its powers to search Americans' emails without a warrant, to
prohibit the NSA or CIA from pressuring tech companies to install so-called "back doors" in their
commercial hardware and software, and to bar NSA from sabotaging common encryption standards set by
the government. What a difference the last year has made, you might say. Look what a little transparency

the House's support of these new fixes, by a count of 293 to

123 and a huge bipartisan majority in the House, just put the
pressure back on for the rest of the summer of 2014: the Senate can
join the House in passing these defense budget amendments, or
more likely, will now be pressured to plug in real privacy protections
to America's new snooping legislation before it comes up for a vote.
can do! But

This all puts the White House in an even more awkward position. Does President Obama threaten a veto of
the defense bill to stop this? (The White House could always, you know, ban the bulk collection of your
data right this second.) Yes, all of these problems were exposed in some fashion by the Snowden
revelations: A year ago, it was still classified that NSA was searching for the American people's data in its
database of "foreign" data. President Obama said in response that NSA email and internet spying "doesn't
apply to people living in the United States" but the back-door loophole showed that it did. And the spy
community's campaign for weaker encryption standards was largely in the shadows as well, Snowden files
exposed it all. The public got mad, and now the House has overwhelmingly rejected those programs with
legal and technical fixes, including Rep Alan Grayson's overlooked amendment to disband NSA's covert
encryption sabotage campaign at Nist, the little-known government agency with a lot of power over
encryption standards. (By the way, Grayson's throwing the first Congressional Crypto Party next week.) Of
course, the victory is far from permanent and could be undone rather quickly. The FBI not the NSA is
usually the agency that tries to strong-arm companies into placing back doors in technology, and you can
expect intelligence agencies to try to undo the new provision against spending money on searching for US
persons in secret, with a little help from Congressional intelligence committees. Still, the real hurdle
remains in the Senate, where these strengthened provisions will still have to be adopted and passed on to
Obama's desk if they have any chance of having an affect. That is still a long shot, but the pressure's not
going away. And, hey, until Friday morning, most surveillance reform advocates were worried about the
Senate ramming through the currently neutered version of the USA Freedom Act as its fig leaf of reform,
before going back to business as usual and proposing bills that will give the NSA more power not less.

However, the stalwart bipartisan Senate triumvirate of Rand Paul,

Ron Wyden and Mark Udall wrote an op-ed this week in the LA Times
signaling that they will continue to push for full-scale NSA reform
not just tinkering but a wholesale ban on bulk collection and reform
to secret courts. Wyden, Udall and Senator Martin Heinrich sent a
letter to Obama on Friday, suggesting the same thing . And the president's

Privacy and Civil Liberties Board is expected to issue its long awaited report on "back door" surveillance on
Americans by July 2. Oh, and speaking of deadlines: Wyden has been asking Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper for information on how many times Americans' info has been searched through
that same "back door" the House repudiated on Thursday night. As it happens, Clapper promised a
response to Wyden by the very same day. Time's up, Jim:

Congress loves NSA reform Bipartisan support

Ackerman, national security editor for Guardian, 14 (Spencer
Ackerman, 6-20-2014, "House of Representatives moves to ban NSA's
'backdoor search' provision," Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/20/house-bans-nsa-backdoorsearch-surveillance //NK)
Surveillance reform gained new congressional momentum as the US
House of Representatives unexpectedly and overwhelmingly
endorsed stripping a major post-9/11 power from the National
Security Agency late Thursday night. By a substantial and bipartisan
margin, 293 to 121, representatives moved to ban the NSA from
searching warrantlessly through its troves of ostensibly foreign
communications content for Americans' data, the so-called
"backdoor search" provision revealed in August by the Guardian thanks to leaks from Edward
Snowden. The move barring funds for warrantless searches "using an identifier of a United States person"
came as an amendment added by Zoe Lofgren, Democrat of California, and Thomas Massie, Republican of
Kentucky,

to the annual defense appropriations bill, considered a mustpass piece of legislation to fund the US military. Also banned is the NSA's
ability, disclosed through the Snowden leaks, to secretly insert backdoor access to
user data through hardware or communications services. "I think it's
the first time the House has had the opportunity to vote on the 4th
Amendment and the NSA as a discrete item. It was an overwhelming
vote," Lofgren told the Guardian. She said the vote succeeded despite efforts of what she called "the

intel establishment." It swiftly circumvented a carefully crafted legislative package, backed by the White
House and the NSA, presenting President Obama with an uncomfortable choice about vetoing the entire
half-trillion dollar spending bill. That legislative package, known as the USA Freedom Act, had jettisoned a
measure to ban backdoor searches in order to move the bill out of committee. Losing the backdoor-search
prohibition prompted, in part, civil libertarian groups to abandon their support of the House version of the
bill. Several senators, including Democrats Ron Wyden and Mark Udall, are seeking to reinstate the ban in
the Senate version currently under judiciary committee consideration. The NSA considers its ability to
search for Americans' data through its massive collections of email, phone, text and other communications
content a critical measure to discover terrorists and a sacrosanct prerogative. Its authorities to do so stem
from a provision, called section 702, of a key 2008 surveillance law, the Fisa Amendments Act, which
Obama endorsed as a legislator and presidential candidate. During a March hearing of a government
privacy board, lawyers for the intelligence community sharply disputed that such warrantless searches are
illegal or unconstitutional, as civil libertarians consider self-evident. They contended that NSA ought to be
able to search for US data at their discretion since Section 702 authorizes the prior collection of such
communications. "That information is at the governments disposal to review in the first instance," Rajesh
De, the NSA's senior lawyer, argued to the panel. The NSA and its allies contend that searching through
the data for information identifying Americans is qualitatively distinct as a privacy issue from an explicitly
banned practice called "reverse targeting," whereby the NSA deceptively structures its broad, foreignfocused interception powers to intentionally collect communications of Americans or people in the United
States. But civil libertarians argue that the distinction is meaningless when the NSA harvests data on a
massive scale, inevitably including data from Americans. "The mere fact that the governments 'targets'
are foreigners outside the United States cannot render constitutional a program that is designed to allow
the government to mine millions of Americans international communications for foreign intelligence
information," ACLU deputy legal director Jameel Jaffer told the privacy board in March. That board, the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, is preparing to issue a report into the government's backdoor
searches. That report, due July 2, is eagerly anticipated by both the NSA and its critics, as it is likely to add
momentum to either side in the ongoing legislative debate on the scope surveillance. Additionally, US
intelligence leaders promised Wyden during a hearing earlier this month they would disclose for the first
time how many searches for US data under the 2008 law the NSA has performed. As an indication of how

critical the NSA considers its search powers to be, it fought hard behind the scenes to strip the USA
Freedom Act of its backdoor-search ban. By contrast, it accepted losing its powers to directly collect US
phone metadata in bulk, which it had argued was similarly crucial. The amendment's success came as
House Republicans were preoccupied with selecting a new majority leader to replace Virginia's Eric Cantor,
who lost his reelection primary. Cantor, a critical figure in the House leadership, was key to aiding the NSA
and its allies in weakening privacy protections in the USA Freedom Act ahead of passage last month. "Well
be reviewing that amendment, and so I cant comment on it at this time," said National Security Council

the administration has made

clear that it supports certain changes to Fisa designed to ensure our intelligence
spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden. "More generally though,

and law enforcement professionals have the authorities they need to protect the nation, while further

We believe the USA Freedom

Act passed by the House by a wide bipartisan majority accomplishes
that goal. We strongly support that bill, and have urged the Senate
to quickly consider it." Jeffrey Anchukaitis, a spokesman for the director of national
ensuring that individuals privacy is appropriately protected.

intelligence, declined to comment. Lofgren cautioned that appropriations bills containing controversial
provisions do not have smooth roads to passage. But, she said, the vote "helps the Senate understand that
the House of Representatives on an overwhelming basis, bipartisan, wants the 4th Amendment respected."
She continued: "It should change the trajectory of this."

GOP push means more of congress will support the

bill
Barron-Lopez, covers Congress for The Huffington Post,
Schulberg, reporter covering foreign policy and national
security for The Huffington Post, 5/19 (Laura Barron-Lopez and
Jessica Schulberg, 5-19-2015, "Bill To Limit NSA Surveillance Will Get Senate
Vote," Huffington Post, <span class="skimlinksunlinked">http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/19/senate-nsareform_n_7332724.html</span> //NK)
WASHINGTON -- Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said Tuesday that
he will give in to pressure and bring legislation to the floor that
would limit the National Security Agency's surveillance on
Americans, as allowed under the Patriot Act. I certainly think we
ought to allow a vote on the House-passed bill. If there are not
enough votes to pass that, then we need to look at an alternative , the
Kentucky Republican told reporters Tuesday after meeting with the GOP caucus. So well see where the
Senate is. Well find out where the votes are, he continued, not indicating when the vote would take place.
McConnell, who has floated a bill to extend the NSAs existing authority to collect bulk metadata from
Americans phone calls until 2020, has come under increasing pressure from a handful of Republicans to
allow the Senate to take up the House bill. Adding to the momentum for reform is a recent appellate court
decision that found that NSA program was not authorized under the Patriot Act. The program, which began
after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, is set to expire June 1. Under the House bill, the NSA would
retain much of its capabilities, but would no longer have access to the bulk metadata collected by phone

Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) warned on Tuesday that it would be a

big mistake if Republican leadership didnt bring forward the
House bill. The thought of starting with something entirely
different, after weve had something pass with this super-supermajority of 338 votes in the House, would, I think, be a big mistake
and a big lost opportunity, Lee told The Huffington Post. A similar bill, authored by Sen.
companies.

Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), died in the Senate late last year. But Lee said bringing up the House bill is the best
option, and that the Senate should be able to find common ground by debating, discussing and
amending it. It would require some type of showing that the data requested has a connection to an actual

The president
supports this. The Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
supports it, he continued referring to a letter from Clapper and
investigation. I think thats the kind of reform that we need, Lee said.

Attorney General Loretta Lynch that endorsed the legislation.

McConnell,
on the other hand, has argued that the House bills constriction of the NSAs spying abilities would
endanger Americans. What I think is the most important thing is to make sure we still have a program
that works and helps protect the American people from attacks, he said Tuesday, indicating his continued
preference for a clean reauthorization of the program passed after Sept. 11. The majority leaders
comments came after a lunch briefing by former Attorney General Michael Mukasey, who recently called
for an appeal of the appellate court decision that found the metadata collection program illegal, arguing
that the ruling would impede the U.S. fight against terrorism. Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob
Corker (R-Tenn.) echoed McConnells sentiments. I think we should be more robust in what were doing,
not less, he said, indicating that he prefers to see a short-term extension of the existing Patriot Act for
now. Still, Senate Republicans appear to be split, and a completely clean reauthorization of NSA powers
under the Patriot Act isnt expected to pass. While McConnell is reluctant to see the NSAs surveillance
capability watered down, it would be worse for his party if the NSAs authorities under the Patriot Act were
to expire completely while Republicans control both chambers of Congress. Lee said he would object
rather strongly to the two-month extension McConnell is now floating. Another possibility, Lee said, is a

But some senators from

both sides of the aisle have vowed to block even a temporary
extension of the Patriot Act unless significant reforms are made. Sen.
very short-term extension of maybe a couple or three weeks.

Rand Paul (R-Ky.), now well-known for his 13-hour filibuster during the confirmation hearing for CIA Director
John Brennan, threatened on Monday to filibuster an extension unless there is a robust debate and
amendment process. To Paul, even the Houses NSA reform bill doesnt go far enough to rein in the
intelligence communitys surveillance powers. And Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) is with him, vowing on
Tuesday to prevent an extension of the existing program, even with a filibuster. I would do everything it
takes -- everything, underline everything -- to prevent an extension, he told reporters. Wyden supports
the House bill, but wants to push for even stronger reforms to the NSA's power

A2: Politics Tech Companies

Multiple major tech companies are pushing for reform
Geller, the Daily Dot, 3/26(Eric, 3-26-2015, "Google, Apple, Twitter,
Facebook, and Microsoft call for surveillance reform," Daily Dot,
http://www.dailydot.com/politics/google-facebook-microsoft-join-reformgovernment-surveillance/)//GLee
The tech-industry group Reform Government Surveillance joined
other organizations in signing a letter to executive-branch officials
and congressional committee leaders that called for comprehensive
changes to the U.S. surveillance apparatus . Reform Government
Surveillance's members include AOL, Apple, Dropbox, Evernote,
Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Twitter, and Yahoo. At the end of

May, Section 215 of the Patriot Act will expire. Civil liberties groups want Congress to include measures in
their reauthorization bill that significantly limit what the section allows the government to do. The Patriot
Act, a sweeping national-security law that Congress passed after minimal debate on Oct. 26, 2001, serves
as the legal basis for nearly every control government surveillance program in existence. Section 215, also
known as the "business records" provision, grants the government access to "tangible things" for the
purposes of obtaining "foreign intelligence information." In the years since the Patriot Act was passed in
the immediate and uncertain aftermath of 9/11, Section 215 has been used to justify the bulk collection of
telephone records, including those of American citizens. "There must be a clear, strong, and effective end
to bulk collection practices under the USA PATRIOT Act, including under the Section 215 records authority
and the Section 214 authority regarding pen registers and trap & trace devices," the letter reads. "Any
collection that does occur under those authorities should have appropriate safeguards in place to protect

David Drummond, Google's chief legal officer,

explained that the search giant wasn't trying to dismantle
privacy and users rights."

surveillance altogether ; it only wanted a better balance between

privacy and security. "We have a responsibility to protect the
privacy and security of our users data," Drummond wrote on the
company's blog. "At the same time, we want to do our part to help
governments keep people safe." "We have little doubt that Congress
can protect both national security and privacy while taking a
significant, concrete step toward restoring trust in the Internet," he
added. Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), one of the most ardent civil-liberties advocates in Congress, recently
told the Daily Dot that he and his allies considered the expiration of Section 215 a key moment for their
cause.

US companies advocating NSA reform- Removed from

certain countries and hurting internet freedom
Morozov, is the author of the Net Delusion: The Dark Side of
Internet Freedom. He is a contributing editor to Foreign
Policy and runs the magazine's Net Effect blog. He is a
visiting scholar at Stanford University and a Schwartz fellow
at the New America Foundation, 15 (Evgeny, 1/03/15, The Guardian,
Whos the true enemy of internet freedom - China, Russia, or the US?,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/04/internet-freedomchina-russia-us-google-microsoft-digital-sovereignty, 6/27/15, WG*)

Recent reports that China has imposed further restrictions on Gmail, Googles
flagship email service, should not really come as much of a surprise. While
Chinese users have been unable to access Gmails site for several years now,
they were still able to use much of its functionality, thanks to third-party
services such as Outlook or Apple Mail. This loophole has now been closed
(albeit temporarily some of the new restrictions seem to have been
mysteriously lifted already), which means determined Chinese users have
had to turn to more advanced circumvention tools. Those unable or unwilling
to perform any such acrobatics can simply switch to a service run by a
domestic Chinese company which is precisely what the Chinese government
wants them to do. Such short-term and long-term disruptions of Gmail
connections are part of Chinas long-running efforts to protect its
technological sovereignty by reducing its citizens reliance on
American-run communication services. After North Korea saw its
internet access blacked out temporarily in the Interview brouhaha with
little evidence that the country actually had anything to do with the massive
hacking of Sony the concept of technological sovereignty is poised to
emerge as one of the most important and contentious doctrines of
2015. And its not just the Chinese: the Russian government is pursuing
a similar agenda. A new law that came into effect last summer obliges
all internet companies to store Russian citizens data on servers
inside the country. This has already prompted Google to close down its
engineering operations in Moscow. The Kremlins recent success in getting
Facebook to block a page calling for protests in solidarity with the charged
activist Alexey Navalny indicates that the government is rapidly reestablishing control over its citizens digital activities. But its hardly a global
defeat for Google: the company is still expanding elsewhere, building
communications infrastructure that extends far beyond simple email services.
Thus, as South American countries began exploring plans to counter
NSA surveillance with a fibre optic network of their own that would
reduce their reliance on the US, Google opened its coffers to fund a
$60m undersea cable connecting Brazil to Florida. The aim was to
ensure that Googles own services run better for users in Brazil, but
it is a potent reminder that extricating oneself from the grasp of
Americas tech empire requires a multidimensional strategy attuned
to the fact that Google today is not a mere search and email company it
also runs devices, operating systems, and even connectivity itself. Given
that Russia and China are not known for their commitment to
freedoms of expression and assembly, it is tempting to view their
quest for information sovereignty as yet another stab at censorship
and control. In fact, even when the far more benign government of Brazil
toyed with the idea of forcing American companies to store user data locally
an idea it eventually abandoned it was widely accused of draconian
overreach. However, Russia, China and Brazil are simply responding
to the extremely aggressive tactics adopted by none other than the
US. In typical fashion, though, America is completely oblivious to its
own actions, believing that there is such a thing as a neutral,
cosmopolitan internet and that any efforts to move away from it
would result in its Balkanisation. But for many countries, this is not
Balkanisation at all, merely de-Americanisation. US companies have been

playing an ambiguous role in this project. On the one hand, they build
efficient and highly functional infrastructure that locks in other
countries, creating long-term dependencies that are very messy and
costly to undo. They are the true vehicles for whatever is left of Americas
global modernisation agenda. On the other hand, the companies cannot be
seen as mere proxies for the American empire. Especially after the Edward
Snowden revelations clearly demonstrated the cosy alliances
between Americas business and state interests, these companies
need to constantly assert their independence occasionally by
taking their own government to court even if, in reality, most of their
interests perfectly align with those of Washington. This explains why Silicon
Valley has been so vocal in demanding that the Obama administration do
something about internet privacy and surveillance: if internet companies
were seen as compromised parties here, their business would
collapse. Just look at the misfortunes of Verizon in 2014: uncertain of the
extent of data-sharing between Verizon and the NSA, the German
government ditched its contract with the US company in favour of Deutsche
Telekom. A German government spokesman said at the time: The federal
government wants to win back more technological sovereignty, and therefore
prefers to work with German companies. However, to grasp the full
extent of Americas hypocrisy on the issue of information
sovereignty, one needs to look no further than the ongoing squabble
between Microsoft and the US government. It concerns some email
content relevant to an investigation stored on Microsofts servers in
Ireland. American prosecutors insist that they can obtain such
content from Microsoft simply by serving it a warrant as if it makes
no difference that the email is stored in a foreign country. In order to
obtain it, Washington would normally need to go through a complex
legal process involving bilateral treaties between the governments
involved. But now it wants to sidestep that completely and treat the
handling of such data as a purely local issue with no international
implications. The data resides in cyberspace and cyberspace knows
no borders! The governments reasoning here is that the storage issue is
irrelevant; what is relevant is where the content is accessed and it can be
accessed by Microsofts employees in the US. Microsoft and other tech
giants are now fighting the US government in courts, with little
success so far, while the Irish government and a handful of European
politicians are backing Microsoft. In short, the US government insists that
it should have access to data regardless of where it is stored as long
as it is handled by US companies. Just imagine the outcry if the Chinese
government were to demand access to any data that passes through devices
manufactured by Chinese companies Xiaomi, say, or Lenovo regardless of
whether their users are in London or New York or Tokyo. Note the crucial
difference: Russia and China want to be able to access data generated
by their citizens on their own soil, whereas the US wants to access
data generated by anybody anywhere as long as American
companies handle it. In opposing the efforts of other countries to reclaim a
modicum of technological sovereignty, Washington is likely to run into a
problem it has already encountered while promoting its nebulous internet
freedom agenda: its actions speak louder than its words. Rhetorically, it is

very hard to oppose government-run digital surveillance and online spin in

Russia, China or Iran, when the US government probably does more of it than
all of these countries combined. Whatever motivates the desire of Russia and
China to exert more control over their digital properties and only the naive
would believe that they are not motivated by concerns over domestic unrest
their actions are proportional to the aggressive efforts of Washington to
exploit the fact that so much of the worlds communications infrastructure is
run by Silicon Valley. Ones man internet freedom is another mans
internet imperialism.

Multiple tech companies want to end NSA backdoorscomputer security and policy experts support
Open Technology Institute, formulates policy and regulatory reforms to
support open architectures and open-source innovations and facilitates the
development and implementation of open technologies and communications
networks, 5/19 (5-19-2015, "Massive Coalition of Security Experts, Tech
Companies and Privacy Advocates Presses Obama to Oppose Surveillance
Backdoors," http://www.newamerica.org/oti/massive-coalition-of-securityexperts-tech-companies-and-privacy-advocates-presses-obama-to-opposesurveillance-backdoors/)//GLee
This morning, New Americas Open Technology Institute sent a joint letter
to the White House which was signed by nearly 150 privacy and
human rights organizations, technology companies and trade
associations, and individual security and policy experts. The letter
defends Americans right to use strong encryption to protect their
data and opposes the idea of mandatory backdoors to enable
government access to encrypted data. The letter, signers of which
include technology industry giants such as Apple and Google, is the
latest round in the ongoing debate over encryption first sparked by
Apples announcement last fall that new iPhones would be encrypted
by default. Responding to statements by law enforcement and intelligence officials such as FBI
Director James Comey, who have criticized companies deployment of encryption and suggested that
Congress should legislate to prevent access to encryption that the government cant break, the letter

Strong encryption is the cornerstone of the modern

information economys security. Encryption protects billions of
people every day against countless threatsbe they street criminals
trying to steal our phones and laptops, computer criminals trying to
defraud us, corporate spies trying to obtain our companies most
valuable trade secrets, repressive governments trying to stifle
dissent, or foreign intelligence agencies trying to compromise our
and our allies most sensitive national security secrets. Therefore,
says the letter to the President, We urge you to reject any proposal that U.S.
explains:

companies deliberately weaken the security of their products . We

request that the White House instead focus on developing policies
that will promote rather than undermine the wide adoption of strong
encryption technology. Such policies will in turn help to promote
and protect cybersecurity, economic growth, and human rights,

both here and abroad.

The letter, in addition to being signed by leading Internet, software,

and hardware companies such as Adobe, Cisco, Hewlett-Packard, Facebook, and Microsoft, is also signed by
a range of trade associations such as the Internet Association and the Consumer Electronics Association,
and dozens of civil society organizations devoted to civil liberties, human rights, and press freedom, such
as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Human Rights Watch and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of

It also is signed by nearly sixty individual computer security

and policy experts including Whitfield Diffie, one of the inventors of
modern public key cryptography, and former White House antiterrorism czar Richard Clarke. The Center for Democracy & Technology, one of the signing
the Press.

civil society organizations, also played a critical role in recruiting and organizing the many computer
security experts that lent their voices to the effort. The following can be attributed to Kevin Bankston,
Policy Director of New Americas Open Technology Institute and Co-Director of New Americas
Cybersecurity Initiative: Knowing that the White House is currently weighing the issue, we thought it
important to ensure that President Obama heard now a clear and unified message from the Internet
community :

encryption backdoors are bad for privacy, bad for security,

bad for human rights, and bad for business . They're just bad policy, period, which
is exactly the same answer that policymakers arrived at during the Crypto Wars of the 90s after many
years of informed debate, and the same answer the the House of Representatives arrived at just last year
when it voted to stop the NSA from mandating or even requesting that companies weaken the security of
their products for surveillances sake. Since last fall, the President has been letting his top intelligence and
law enforcement officials criticize companies for making their devices more secure, and letting them
suggest that Congress should pass anti-encryption, pro-backdoor legislation. That's despite unanimous
consensus in the technical community that backdoors are bad for security, and despite lawmakers clearly
signaling that they think it's a bad idea--most recently in a House oversight hearing where every lawmaker
in attendance was critical of the government's position, one of them going so far as to call the idea of
backdoors "technologically stupid". We decided it was time for the Internet community--industry,
advocates, and experts--to draw a line in the sand. We're calling on Obama to put an end to these
dangerous suggestions that we should deliberately weaken the cybersecurity of American products and
services. Were asking the White House to instead throw its weight behind the recommendation of the
President's own hand-picked NSA review group, several of whom signed todays letter: it should be the
policy of the US government to support rather than undermine the availability and use of strongly
encrypted products. Put simply, it's time for the White House to come out strong in support of strong
encryption, here in the U.S. and around the globe. Securing cyberspace is hard enough without shooting
ourselves in the foot with government-mandated vulnerabilities. It's time for America to help lead the
world toward a more secure future, rather than toward a digital ecosystem riddled with vulnerabilities of
our own making.

Tech companies are beginning to realize their

lobbying power in Congress-they are pushing for
major NSA reforms
Quinn 13 (Michelle, Silicon Valley analyst, Politico Pro, Tech rivals joining
forces on NSA, immigration,
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/technology-rivals-nsa-immigration97238.html)
They trash each other in the marketplace and sue each other in courts. But
lately, tech companies and their leaders have been holding hands to
fight for things they care about in Washington, from immigration
reform to National Security Agency damage control. The shift
represents a growing political savvy among the industrys biggest
players and a recognition that there are advantages to working in
concert when it comes to public policy. No single leader or group is
organizing all these oars rowing in the same direction, but they
are, said Cathy Sloan, vice president of government relations at the
Computer & Communications Industry Association. Chalk it up to
improved self-knowledge and sophistication about what makes

sense and what does not for the health of the global Internet
ecosystem, of which all these companies are interdependent parts.
The primary example is immigration reform. Tech company lobbyists and
industry trade groups have linked arms to work for passage of legislation,
holding Monday strategy calls, deploying teams to focus on lawmakers by
party and by chamber and acting as a coordinator among the disparate
groups pushing Congress to act. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg has tapped
Silicon Valleys leading executives and investors to join his reform advocacy
group, FWD.us. His group and others in the tech sector are pushing for
comprehensive immigration reform, an evolution from the industrys past
strategy of focusing narrowly on its desire for more high-skilled visas. I was
really heartened by the response, Zuckerberg said of his fellow tech CEOs
during an interview last week at the Newseum in Washington. All these folks
care about the bigger issue. It is too early to declare tech industry peace,
say insiders. Companies are not aligned on every issue, including industry
priorities like patent and tax reform. They continue to fight ferociously in the
courts over patents and take swipes at each other in public. And prominent
industry players, like Apple, are standing apart from the increased
engagement with Washington. But something has shifted, and
immigration reform isnt the only area in which the industry is
standing together. This month, LinkedIn joined Google, Microsoft,
Facebook and Yahoo in suing the federal government to demand
more transparency when it comes to the nations surveillance
programs. Prominent venture capitalist John Doerr called the
development stunning, noting that Google and Microsoft, who
hardly ever agree on anything, are leading the charge. The tech firms
have at times tried to outdo each other in describing their efforts to push for
more government transparency. But their tandem legal strategy reflects
shared anxiety that the NSA revelations could lead to lost business
particularly overseas and regulations that could restrict the
flow of data across borders. In their lawsuits, the companies echoed
each others arguments for why they should be allowed to publish
more information about national security orders. In the coming weeks,
they will have to work together more closely the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court ordered the companies to file their briefs as a single reply.
Despite the growing sense of cooperation on policy, there are frequent
reminders that rivalries run deep. Outgoing Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer,
speaking to financial analysts last week, said Google is a monopoly that
deserves the attention of competition authorities, according to reports. His
comments came days after Microsoft unveiled the latest phase of its
Scroogled advertising campaign, which seeks to undermine confidence in
Google over its use of consumer data. And the technology industrys highprofile smartphone patent wars continue. One example: Googles Motorola
Mobility unit recently filed a suit to reopen its case against Apple over mobile
phone technology. Silicon Valley has rallied around policy issues in the past.
Google and other websites mounted an unprecedented Internet campaign to
stop anti-piracy legislation in 2012. The industry fought for an extension of
the research and development tax credit and has promoted education in
science, technology, engineering and math. In May, Facebook joined
Microsoft, Yahoo and Google in the Global Network Initiative, an organization

that audits firms on their human rights policies. But the confluence of
major issues in Washington is giving tech companies more reason to
join forces. The reason it appears to be more unified now, I believe,
is that immigration reform has moved from advocacy and
speculation to possible reality, said Rob Atkinson, president of the
Information Technology & Innovation Foundation. At the same time,
he said, the disclosures about NSA surveillance have presented a
serious challenge to a large share of the tech industry. Washington
still has a profusion of technology trade groups focused on specific sectors
like software, semiconductors, app developers and Web companies which
often pursue separate agendas. The diversity of groups has helped tech
firms with different viewpoints speak out more, said Michael
Beckerman, president of the Internet Association, founded last year
by companies like Google, Yahoo and Facebook. But, he added,
there are issues where hardware, software and Internet stand
shoulder-to-shoulder working together.

A2: Politics Public Link Turn

Public wants NSA change- the issue on ending
surveillance is bipartisan
Ackerman, national security editor for the Guardian, 5/18 (Spencer 5-182015, "NSA surveillance opposed by American voters from all parties, poll
finds," Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/may/18/usvoters-broadly-opposed-nsa-surveillance )//GLee

With five days in the legislative calendar remaining before a pivotal aspect of the Patriot Act expires, a new
poll shows widespread antipathy to mass surveillance, a sense of where the debate over the National

Commissioned by the American

Civil Liberties Union and carried out by the Global Strategy Group
and G2 Public Strategies, the poll of 1,001 likely voters found broad
opposition to government surveillance across partisan, ideological,
age and gender divides. Sixty percent of likely voters believe the
Patriot Act ought to be modified, against 34% that favor its retention
in its current form. The NSA uses Section 215 of the Patriot Act as the legal basis for its daily
Security Agencys powers stands outside of Washington.

collection of all Americans phone data, as the Guardian revealed in June 2013 thanks to whistleblower
Edward Snowden, a practice that a federal appeals court deemed illegal on 7 May. Opposition to
reauthorizing the Patriot Act without modification cuts against a bill by the GOP Senate leader, Mitch
McConnell of Kentucky. The poll found 58% of Republicans favor modification, the subject of a rival
bipartisan bill that recently passed the House, with only 36% of them favoring retention .

Selfidentified very conservative voters favor modification by a 59% to

34% margin. The margins for Democrats are similar to those for
Republicans. Independent voters, however, are even less
enthusiastic about mass domestic surveillance: 71% want the Patriot
Act modified, versus 22% who favor keeping it as it is, which pollster
Greg Strimple called intense. More than three-quarters of likely voters the poll
interviewed opposed related aspects of current surveillance authorities and operations. Eighty-two percent
are concerned about government collection and retention of their personal data. Eighty-three percent
are concerned about government access to data stored by businesses without judicial orders, and 84%
want the same judicial protections on their virtual data as exist for physical records on their property. The
same percentage is concerned about government use of that data for non-counter-terrorism purposes.

Consensus on this issue is bipartisan, said Strimple. Theres

real concern about what the governments accessing about your
personal life.

A2: Politics Congress

Congress supports NSA reform the freedom act
proves
Dan Froomkin 6/2/15 (Dan Froomkin is a reporter, columnist, and editor
with a focus on coverage of U.S. politics and media. An outspoken proponent
of accountability journalism, he wrote the popular White House Watch
column at The Washington Post from 2004 to 2009. During a nearly threedecade long career in journalism, which started in local news, he has served
as the senior Washington correspondent and bureau chief for The Huffington
Post, as editor of WashingtonPost.com, and as deputy editor of
NiemanWatchdog.org. He lives in Washington, D.C., The Intercept, "USA
Freedom Act: Small Step for Post-Snowden Reform, Giant Leap for Congress,"
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/06/02/one-small-step-toward-postsnowden-surveillance-reform-one-giant-step-congress/)
The USA Freedom Act passed the House in an overwhelming,
bipartisan vote three weeks ago. After hardliner Republicans lost a prolonged game of
legislative chicken, the Senate gave its approval Tuesday afternoon as well,
by a 67 to 32 margin. The bill officially ends 14 years of
unprecedented bulk collection of domestic phone records by the
NSA, replacing it with a program that requires the government to make specific requests to the phone

companies. After Snowdens leak of NSA documents revealed it, the program was repeatedly found to
violate the law, first by legal experts and blue-ribbon panels, and just last month by a federal appellate
court. Its rejection by Congress is hardly a radical act it simply reasserts the meaning of the word
relevant (the language of the statute) as distinct from everything (how the government interpreted it).
At the same time, the Freedom Act explicitly reauthorizes or, rather, reinstates, since they technically
expired at midnight May 31 other programs involving the collection of business records that the Bush
and Obama administrations claimed were authorized by Section 215 of the Patriot Act. In fact, even the
bulk collection of phone records, which was abruptly wound down last week in anticipation of a possible
expiration, may wind up again, because the Freedom Act allows it to continue for a six-month transition
period. And while the Freedom Act contains a few other modest reform provisions such as more disclosure
and a public advocate for the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, it does absolutely nothing
to restrain the vast majority of the intrusive surveillance revealed by Snowden. It leaves untouched
formerly secret programs the NSA says are authorized under section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, and
that while ostensibly targeted at foreigners nonetheless collect vast amounts of American
communications. It wont in any way limit the agencys mass surveillance of non-American
communications. As I wrote after Sunday nights legislative action, which paved the way for Tuesdays
vote, this marks the end of a vast expansion in surveillance authorities that began almost immediately
after the 9/11 terror attacks. Indeed, the Freedom Act represents the single greatest surveillance reform
package since the 1970s. But thats a low bar. After 14 years of rubber-stamping executive-branch

Congress had an extraordinary

moment of opportunity to pass genuine reform. The Snowden revelations had
requests for pretty much anything related to terrorism,

changed the publics attitude about government surveillance. And three provisions of the Patriot Act were
set to expire. The provisions did expire after Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell repeatedly failed to
stampede the Senate into extending them as is. Loath to vindicate Snowden, McConnell and most of the
Republican majority took a position even more extreme than that of the White House and the intelligence
community, both of which had declared themselves satisfied with the modest changes in the defanged
compromise legislation. McConnell and other fearmongers issued dire warnings until the very end. The
Senate is voting to take away one more tool from those who defend this country every day, he said
Tuesday. McConnell tried to get support for some discrete and sensible improvements to the Freedom Act
on Tuesday, but failed. In one last stand before his final defeat, he refused to allow debate on several
amendments that would have given the reforms more teeth. President Obama wasted no time in
announcing his plans: Spitfire Strategies, a communications and campaign management firm, compiled

In passing the USA Freedom

Act, Congress has made a significant down payment on broader
surveillance reform. Today marks the first time since its enactment
the following responses to the passage of the bill: Google:

in 1978 that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) has

been amended in a way that reflects privacy rights enshrined in our
history, tradition, and Constitution Todays vote represents a
critical first step toward restoring trust in the Internet, but it is only a first
step. We look forward to working with Congress on further reforms in the near future. Susan Molinari,
Vice President, Americas Public Policy and Government Relations ACLU: The

passage of the
USA Freedom Act is a milestone. This is the most important surveillance reform bill since
1978, and its passage is an indication that Americans are no longer
willing to give the intelligence agencies a blank check . Its a testament to the
significance of the Snowden disclosures and also to the hard work of many principled legislators on both
sides of the aisle. Still, no one should mistake this bill for comprehensive reform. The bill leaves many of
the governments most intrusive and overbroad surveillance powers untouched, and it makes only very
modest adjustments to disclosure and transparency requirements. Jameel Jaffer, American Civil Liberties
Union deputy legal director Center for Democracy & Technology: This is a generational win for privacy and
transparency, said CDT President & CEO Nuala OConnor. Weve

successfully restricted
government surveillance, protecting the privacy of Americans and
strengthening transparency, while preserving our national security.
The era of casually dismissing mass surveillance as unimportant to
liberty is over even in Congress. OTI: It took two long years of intense debate and
negotiation, but Congress has finally put a stake in the heart of the NSAs
program to collect the phone records of millions of innocent
Americans. Although USA FREEDOM is a compromise bill that doesnt include every reform that will
ultimately be necessary to rein in mass surveillance, it is a historic victory for privacy
rights and the first step on the long road to comprehensive reform.
Without a doubt, this is the strongest new regulation of Americas intelligence agencies since the spying

of a broad bipartisan majority of Congress

responding to the average Americans clear demand: do not spy on
us, said Kevin Bankston Policy Director at New Americas Open Technology Institute.
scandals of the 70s, and it is the result

A2 Politics: Wyden Link Turn

Sen. Ron Wyden has major influence in Congressproven by his overwhelming financial support and
connections
Faler 14 (Brian, senior tax reporter for Politico, Politico 6-9, Suddenly,
everybody loves Ron Wyden, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/ronwyden-campaign-donors-107629.html)
Leadership has its privileges. Since taking over the Senate Finance
Committee earlier this year, Ron Wyden has not only quickly become
one of the chambers most influential members. Hes also raising a
lot more cash. Fundraising records show hes raised $1.7 million so
far this election cycle, which is more than twice as much as during
the previous two years and 70 percent more than he raised in the
same period during his previous term in office. His money
increasingly comes from across the country, with health care interests
that have little connection to Oregon crowding the list of his top donors.
Wydens panel has oversight over some of the hottest issues in
Congress, from health care to taxes to transportation financing.
Theres billions upon billions at stake, so everybody wants to make
sure Ron Wyden is their new best friend, said Lee Drutman, a
senior fellow at the Sunlight Foundation. Almost half of Wydens top 20
donors are in the health care industry, according to data compiled by the
Center for Responsive Politics a reflection of his panels broad authority
over Medicare, Obamacare and Medicaid, not to mention the tax provisions
that subsidize insurance coverage for millions of Americans. Blue Cross/Blue
Shield leads the list of top 20 donors, which also includes biotech giant
Amgen, American Health Care Association, Adventist Health Systems, DaVita
HealthCare Partners and Hospital Hermanos Melndez, a hospital in Puerto
Rico. A number of names have also pushed onto the list, the data show,
including Anheuser-Busch InBev, Darden Restaurants which includes Olive
Garden and Red Lobster as well as Dow Chemical and the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. Other big donors whove previously
supported the Oregon Democrat include Google, Berkshire Hathaway and
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance. Many of the donations came as
lawmakers debated postponing scheduled cuts in government payments to
doctors. For many health care companies, the worrisome question was where
senators would find the savings to prevent the bill from adding to the deficit.
In the latest round, they ultimately cut payments to skilled nursing facilities,
clinical labs and others. Many also coincided with the panels consideration
reviving a host of temporary tax breaks, including special depreciation writeoffs for restaurants, provisions making it easier for multinational companies
to move money among foreign subsidiaries and a tax credit for businesses
research programs. Wyden spokesman Keith Chu declined comment. Few
lawmakers have become more influential in the 113th Congress more
quickly. Just a couple years ago, Wyden was a backbencher, patiently
waiting to climb the ladder of seniority. He finally took over the Energy and
Natural Resources Committee last January, the first panel Wyden had run in

what by then had been a 17-year Senate career. A wave of retirements

among his colleagues then cleared the way for him to take over the
Finance panel, arguably the chambers most powerful committee,
with jurisdiction also over pensions, trade and myriad other issues.
The Finance Committee in general is a cash cow when it comes to
campaign contributions, said Viveca Novak, a spokeswoman for the
Center for Responsive Politics. And being chairman of the
committee, that certainly packs a punch because he has so much
influence over a lot of issues. Anheuser-Busch InBev is concerned about
alcohol excise taxes as well as tax reform, according to its lobbying disclosure
reports. Darden Restaurants is focused on a package of expired tax breaks
that includes more generous depreciation rules for restaurants. Dow Chemical
lobbied on international tax issues. Restaurants in general are also staunchly
opposed to the provision in Obamacare that requires employers to offer
health insurance to their workers if they work 30 hours per week or pay a
penalty. Wydens quick ascent left many on K Street scrambling to
get to know a lawmaker they had often ignored, said one lobbyist.
A lot of them didnt even know him, the lobbyist said. Now people
are trying to get to know him, to get their names in front of him.
Wydens newly found influence is only beginning to become evident
by his campaign contributions. It wasnt clear he would take over the
panel until December, and he did not formally receive the gavel until
February while the latest campaign fundraising records run only through
March. And its clear he has a long way to go to replicate the fundraising
prowess of his predecessor, Max Baucus, who left to become ambassador to
China. Baucus parlayed his chairmanship, as well as good relations with the
business community and a constellation of former aides on K Street, into a
formidable money-raising operation. But Wyden doesnt face reelection until
2016, and senators fundraising is highly cyclical, typically dipping after an
election before ramping up again as they prepare to again face voters.

Wyden has huge influence in congress the passing

of the TPA
Jeff Mapes 3/6/15 (Jeff Mapes is the senior political reporter for The
Oregonian and the author of "Mapes on Politics, The Oregonian, "In free-trade
fight, Ron Wyden emerges as key negotiating figure in Congress,"
www.oregonlive.com/mapes/index.ssf/2015/03/in_freetrade_fight_ron_wyden.html)
President Barack Obama called Wyden to press him on the trade issue
while talking with a Portland TV station to publicly praise the senator .
Business and labor leaders are clamoring to see him to press their own
divergent views on trade. One activist group is trying to drum up a primary
opponent to run against him in 2016. These days, the Oregon Democrat
is truly the man in the middle, who perhaps as much or more than
any figure in Congress could determine the fate of a huge trade pact
involving the Pacific Rim nations. "He plays the really critical role," said
Neil Sroka, a spokesman for Democracy for America, one of the myriad leftof-center groups seeking to deep-six the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership.

"He's really the linchpin." "It goes with the turf," Wyden said of the
pressure he's receiving. "The reality is, I'm trying to find a good trade policy
for the times that is going to help increase family-wage jobs." Wyden,
despite losing his chairmanship of the Senate Finance Committee after
Republicans won control of the chamber last year, finds himself in a
powerful position because of the unusual politics of international
trade. Big trade pacts, whether involving China or Canada and Mexico, need
bipartisan support to pass Congress -- and Wyden is the one Democrat in
the position and with a background of supporting trade pacts who might be
able to forge a deal with Republicans. Eventually, what is at stake is the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade deal under negotiation involving the U.S.
and 11 other Pacific Rim nations. It would be the largest free-trade pact ever
for the U.S. and has generated intense controversy, with critics charging that
it is a secretive deal benefiting corporate interests at the expense of
American workers. Obama sees the Trans-Pacific deal as a key part of his
"pivot to Asia" aimed at boosting America's role in the fastest growing part of
the world economy. Obama has frequently warned that the U.S. is in
competition with China - which is not part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership - to
write the rules for international trade. At this point, Congress isn't debating
the unfinished Trans-Pacific agreement. Instead, Wyden is negotiating over
the terms of trade promotion authority, which is legislation that would require
that Congress have a single up-or-down vote on the actual Trans-Pacific
agreement. These so-called "fast-track" bills are regarded as essential to
approving trade agreements -- and opponents know that if they can kill fast
track, they can probably kill the actual trade agreement as well. As the
ranking Democrat on the Finance Committee, Wyden and his aides
are now involved in marathon talks with the new Finance Chairman, Sen.
Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, and the chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, Rep. Paul Ryan, R-Wisc., and their staffs. The top Democrat on
the Ways and Means Committee, Rep. Sander Levin of Michigan, has declined
to participate.

Senator Ron Wyden supports NSA Reform threatens

to filibuster
Bobic 5/10/15 (Igor Bobic is an associate editor who helps oversee The
Huffington Post's coverage of politics and policy in Washington. He previously
oversaw breaking news coverage for Talking Points Memo, The Huffinton Post,
"Ron Wyden Threatens Filibuster Over NSA Bulk Data Collection,"
www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/10/ron-wyden-nsasurveillance_n_7251562.html)
WASHINGTON -- Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), one of the most persistent
critics of U.S. surveillance programs, on Sunday threatened to
filibuster a reauthorization of the Patriot Act if it fails to include
major reforms, including ending a controversial National Security Agency
program that collects data on nearly every American's phone calls. "The
question will be, as you know, the Senate Republican leadership has been
looking at a variety of ways to move forward to keep the bulk phone records
collection program going," Wyden, a member of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, said in an interview on MSNBC. "What usually happens is they

say, 'Let's just have a short-term extension of it.' I'm tired of extending a bad
law. If they come back with that effort to basically extend this for a
short term without major reforms like ending the collection of phone
records, I do intend to filibuster." The post-Sept. 11 law, which gives the
NSA much of its authority to conduct surveillance programs, expires June 1.
But because Congress is due to skip town for the last week of the month in
honor of Memorial Day, the effective deadline lawmakers face is May 22.
Wyden's insistence on blocking the reauthorization of Section 215,
upon which the government has built its rationale for bulk data
collection, could prove problematic for Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell (R-Ky.), who supports renewing the law in its entirety.

Ron Wyden supports major NSA reform he wrote an

article
Ron Wyden 6/10/15 (Ronald Lee "Ron" Wyden is the senior United States
Senator for Oregon, serving since 1996, and a member of the Democratic
Party. He previously served in the United States House of Representatives
from 1981 to 1996, Ron Wyden for Senator, "Cybersecurity - Washington Is
Chasing the Wrong Solution to a Growing Problem,"
www.wyden.senate.gov/news/blog/post/cybersecurity-washington-is-chasingthe-wrong-solution-to-a-growing-problem)
Its no surprise that a new round of high-profile hacks has Washington
scrambling once again to do something anything to look like its
working to improve our nations cybersecurity. Keeping Americas
digital information and computer systems safe is poised to be one of
the defining security challenges of the coming decades. It is clear that
private companies and federal agencies alike are falling short. When
Chinese and Russian hackers penetrate major corporations and
government files on a seemingly weekly basis, our country should
already be on red alert. But the solutions being discussed in
Congress would do little, if anything to stop these hacks, according
to most independent security experts. The so-called cybersecurity bill in
the Senate would encourage private companies to share their customers
information with the government, without giving individual Americans real
assurances their private information will be protected. In fact lawenforcement agencies could go after Americans for crimes that have nothing
to do with cybersecurity based on information companies give to the
government. At the same time that the bill creates a new way to collect
Americans information without a warrant, the bill also gives
corporations blanket immunity for providing information to the
federal government, and would prohibit that data from being used
to police those corporations. I do not agree that corporations privacy is
more important than individuals privacy. And I do not agree that the best
way to improve cybersecurity is to make it harder for individuals to sue these
corporations.

Congress is the best actor three congress people

already advocate for NSA curtailment and businesses
support
Ron Wyden, Mark Udall, and Rand Paul 6/16/14 (Three Congress people,
The LA Times, "Ron Wyden, Mark Udall and Rand Paul: How to end the NSA
dragnet," www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-wyden-nsa-surveillance20140617-story.html)
One year ago this month, Americans learned that their government was engaged in secret dragnet
surveillance, which contradicted years of assurances to the contrary from senior government officials and

Congress and the

administration know that Americans will reject half-measures that
could still allow the government to collect millions of Americans'
records without any individual suspicion or evidence of wrongdoing.
It is time to end the dragnet and to affirm that we can keep our
nation secure without trampling on and abandoning Americans'
constitutional rights. For years, in both statements to the public and open testimony before
intelligence leaders. On this anniversary, it is more important than ever to let

the House and Senate, senior government officials claimed that domestic surveillance was narrow in focus
and limited in scope. But in June 2013, Americans learned through leaked classified documents that these

the NSA has been relying on a secret

interpretation of the USA Patriot Act to vacuum up the phone
records of millions of law-abiding citizens. Under a separate program, intelligence
claims bore little resemblance to reality. In fact,

agencies are using a loophole in the law to read some Americans' emails without ever getting a warrant.
Dragnet surveillance was approved by a secret court that normally hears only the government's side of

many
members of Congress were entirely unaware it. When laws like the Patriot Act
major cases. It had been debated only in a few secret congressional committee hearings, and

were reauthorized, a vocal minority of senators and representatives including the three of us

objected, but the secrecy surrounding these programs made it

difficult to mobilize public support. And yet, it was inevitable that mass surveillance

and warrantless searches would eventually be exposed. When the plain text of the law differs so
dramatically from how it is interpreted and applied, in effect creating a body of secret law, it simply isn't
sustainable. So when the programs' existence became public last summer, huge numbers of Americans
were justifiably stunned and angry at how they had been misled and by the degree to which their privacy
rights had been routinely violated. Inflated claims about the program's value have burst under public
scrutiny, and there is now a groundswell of public support for reform. Benjamin Franklin once warned that

a society that trades essential liberties for short-term security risks

losing both. That is still true today, and even the staunchest defenders of mass
surveillance concede that reforms are inevitable. The debate over exactly what

reforms should be made is likely to continue for at least the next few years as Americans continue to learn

As an initial step, we have

worked with our colleagues in the House and Senate to build support
for a package of real and meaningful changes to the law that would
promote the restoration of Americans' constitutional rights and
freedoms, while protecting national security. This package of
reforms includes overhauling domestic surveillance laws to ban the bulk
about the scale of ongoing government surveillance activities.

collection of Americans' personal information, and closing the loophole that allows intelligence agencies to

It includes reshaping the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Court by installing an advocate who can argue for Americans'
deliberately read Americans' emails without a warrant.

constitutional rights when the court is considering major cases, and by requiring that significant
interpretations of U.S. law and the Constitution be made public. And it would strengthen and clarify the

These
reforms would erect safeguards against the further erosion of our
right to privacy, and ensure greater transparency and openness. We
are encouraged by the broad bipartisan support that this package of
reforms has received and by the endorsements from both privacy
government's authority to obtain individual records quickly in genuine emergency situations.

advocates and business leaders. Accordingly, we are disappointed by the House of

Representatives' recent vote to approve a revised version of the USA Freedom Act, with nearly all of the

the bill approved by the

House is intended to end bulk collection, we are not at all confident
that it would actually do so. The bill would require the government to use a "selection term"
essential reforms either watered down or removed. Although

to secretly collect records, but the definition of "selection term" is left vague enough that it could be used
to collect all of the phone records in a particular area code or all of the credit card records from a particular
state. Meanwhile, the bill abandons nearly all of the other reforms contained in the Senate version of the
USA Freedom Act, while renewing controversial provisions of the Patriot Act for nearly three more years.

we will vigorously
oppose this bill in its current form and continue to push for real
changes to the law. This firm commitment to both liberty and
security is what Americans including the dedicated men and
women who work at our nation's intelligence agencies deserve.
We will not settle for less.
This is clearly not the meaningful reform that Americans have demanded, so