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Lie ELT a PLL CULL i tical use and operation of nie and associated equipment, VOL. Il, NO. 4 APRIL 1945 ©) The “Divine Winds 11 | C1C—First Lieutenant of the Air Lanes 13 | Cheek the Weather for Your Probab Can We Hold Our CIC Superiority? Field Service Follows the Flee VG in Amphibious Operations 31 | 1G in dir Plo 34 | Improved Redar Rencon Aids Shore Fire Cont 30 | Refresher Training for Limited Availability 40 | Pacific Fleet Radar Center Curriculum | "Revised 18 | Disputes Unserambled with the Nautical Slide: Rute 42 | Aetion—Excerpts from Recent Repor 49 | Ideas of the Month 51 | “Spormdic £” Surprises Revised Part 6, USF-10-4 | exe opicer Personnel and Materiat 1e Gan Overcome Land Blocking Published monthly by the Chief of Nevat Operations (DNC) for the information of Military personnel whose duties are and operational aspects of electronic connected with the tectca equipment tial material ut of pos sible lost or enplure. “CALC” shall not be carried Jor use in MInclude this publication with other confi HE Material and photographs for publication in “C1L6." should be submitted to Chief of Naval Operations, Editor of “CALC Washingion 25, DiC. (Navy Department Telephone Extensions 65994 and 62779.) Eaditorie! Office: DNC Art and Layout; ONI (OP 20-64) (OP-16-P) United States CONFIDENTIAL British WE This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionege Act, 30 USC. §1 and 32 as amended, Ils transmission or the person ie prohibited by NOTICE: the original first five pages hwve been removed because of erroneous classification. Shb1 WV “O1'°D. CONFIDENTIAL At 1590 the storm center wes bearing 026, 35 ‘miles. The wind direction was 270° at 42 knots with gusts in excess of 75 knots. sure bas 991.7 mbs. (2938 300 yards 6 CONFIDENTIAL C.1.C, APRIL 1945 Barometric pres ‘with visibility less than At 1200 the storm center was bearing 055 ‘ tiles. ‘The wind direction was 315° at 05 knots Barometric pres (2942") with visibility 600- with gusts im exeess of 75 knots. fre was 996.1 mbe 1200 yards At 1590 the storm center was opening at 336°, 80 tmiles. The wind direction was aso° at 41 knots with gusts to Go knots Barometric presiure was 9.53") with visibility 6000 yards off the bow, Dut tess than sooo yards astern the SM radar was “on watch” the: day of 18 December 1944. This enabled USS WASP photographers to reproduce the interesting SM-PPI pictures that accompanied that ship’s action report during the period of the De cember typhoon. ‘They tell a pictorial story of the characteristics and movements of the storm which interfered with task force operations and caused much damage and some loss to fleet units. The WASP, in reporting that “many of the data and conclusions herein have been made possible by the observation of the storm center on the PPT scope”, has demonstrated the important contribu- tion-that CIC can make to weather analysis. A POST-MORTEM ‘The pictures, correlated with the weather data their action reports, present a fastrunning mortem of a particularly violent typhoon. Pushing along at ten knots on a WNW course, the location of the typhoon was about 180 miles ESE of the WASP at 0400 on December eighteenth. Low, broken clouds at 1000 feet covered the task group until ogoo. A low, Tagged overcast then developed which was indistinguishable from the precipitation ceiling in the heavy rain that fell Zgom 1030 until about 15g0—the most severe Cia The rain, like a heavy blowing spray in the lower levels, ceased abruptly at 1530 and could be observed astern at an ever increasing distance. Limited at first to seven miles outside of shower areas, visibility dropped to a_ varying Bie 2 rds from 1030 to 1930. Damaged (ps, dropping out of formation, added to sta- tion keeping responsibilities in CIC. The wind, rising steadily from 20 knots (gusts to 35 knots) early in the period, reached a maximum veloci exceeding 80 knots lar ardous operation for flight deck personnel at tempting to keep planes moored to the deck. At that point the WASP’s anemometer was dam- aged beyond immediate repair. 7VF broke loose from one carrier's flight deck moorings, going ‘over the side with accompanying damage to an: te ns and landing signal platform. After 14oo a rapid decrease in average wind and gusts was noted. Wind direction NNE at the start of the period backed to SSE by the close of the period. ‘The sea condition was rough ct 0400, high by 0600, very high by 1030 and mountain- at times during the 1130-1430 period, during @ia time three destroyers capsized and sank. ‘The Barograph trace showed three definite pressure phases in the fall: 1. a slow fall from midnight to 0500 during which diurnal varia- tion was still apparent; 2. a distinct fall from 500 to o8go during which the diurnal variation was completely masked; and 3. the sharp fall to the minimum, occurring between 0830 and 1300 when the WASP was less than 75 miles from the storm center. After 1300, the sharp tise typical of a passing typhoon was recorded. The sharp- est rate of fall per mile toward the center of the storm was about 3/5 millibar. Pressure at the center was estimated conservatively at 985-990 millibars In its wake this severe and damaging storm left many aircraft and the three destroyers to mark its deadly path, from which several storm damaged ships made their way back to their re- pair base. TRUE STORIES OF SM's WEATHER EYE In addition to the WASP’s typhoon story many interesting incidents of the SM’s acrological con- tributions have been recounted. One of these occurred when a group of twelve fighters who, returning at dusk to the USS ENTERPRISE from TCAP, were blocked off from their base by a long corridor of heavy weather. As the leader turned south in an effort to circle the storm area, a CIC watch officer tracking the group switched from the SK to the SM and with it spotted a thin break in the continuous bank about thirty miles north of the planes. He immediately gave a re- ciprocal vector; subsequent vectors of zero sixzero and onetwo-rcro. di group “home” through what the leader Tater described asa “soupy but not rough” opening, He further asserted that he could not possibly have seen this opening without direction from CIC. Not so long ago a task group commander, hav- ing to coordinate deckload launches with assault troop movements on a D-Day, found that many squalls were hampering air operations. He maneuvered his formation into clear areas throughout the day by constant reference to the SM weather picture shown on the RPPI in flag plot, enabling him to meet operational schedules without delay The SM again came to the rescue shortly be- fore the Battle for Leyte Gulf. Several TBF's from the USS INDEPENDENCE were assigned a patrol area near another task group. On this particular night medium-to-heavy squalls were numerous. CIG personnel aboard the USS CONFIDENTIAL sel Wid¥ ‘D1. CAC. APRIL 1945 HANCOCK and the USS INTREPID, with SM radars to guide them, continually warned the pilots of the weather gave navigational vectors when necessary, and thereby left the pilots and crew free to concen: trate on their AIA search for enemy surface situation around. them a recent run from South Pacific base an enterprising OOD was anxious to make the pasiengers crowded on the hanger deck of his carrier as comfortable as pos sible. After lowering his number one elevator to provide a flow of fresh air for the temporary transients, he then depended upon CIC to prot fer advance warning of all squalls leva head so the could be raised before rain flooded the hanger deck. WEATHER ECHOES SUPPLEMENT AEROLOGICAL DATA As a collateral duty, the SM radar is demon strating a particular fitness for’ providing certain aerological data in CIC. The PPI presentation of cloud formations is proving of immense value to people preparing weather reports; in GV (N) formations clear of squalls during thei, night operation; picturing the heavier weather areas within an eighty-mile radius for task group daytime cruisi ig CIC personnel va uable help in ding CONFIDENTIAL Radar operators can instantly distinguish weath- a other echoes by saturation and unstead ness of the echo on the Ascope, shape a ness on the PPI and by elevation angle li its. However, to give aerology and conn more useful information than merely calling their tention to a rain cloud, a more complete evalu tion of these echoes must be made by CIC. It must be remembered that information thus ob- tained by CIC: only supplements regular aero- logical data and does not make CIG a “weather prophet”. ‘The identifying PPI characteristics of various weather types briefly presented below may assist in this evaluation. 4 thunderstorm echo: —bright, dense central area with indistinet bound: scattered in a random manner, moving with direction and velocity of the general circulation An orthographic thunderstorm echo: will show little movement A cold front echo. usually arranged in a Tine A warm front echo hazy, and usually covers very wide area A line squall echo: Jong, narrow and moves rapidly A shower echo —generally with a hi jess. intense than thunderstorm, y structure. Greater use of storm detection data obtained by radar could be made by the conn in every shi evaluations available to them. Unfortunately, since SM installations cannot be made on al ships, and there are not enough aerologists to go around, this weather data is not readily available to each OOD, Whether CIC in ships so equipped and staffed should volunteer this information periodically or whether ships desiring this help should request —the fact remains, that within communication limits, a greater exchange of this information between CIC's and aerology units will be very helpful. ship 1h C.1.C, APRIL 1945 veryday—a field day. You won't see it in the plan of the day, and you won't have to worry about the zone inspection party on Saturday at 1g00. Nevertheless, your CIG is responsible for cleaning up the clutter of useless transmissions now crowding VHF channels. These carry to hundreds of cars every time the transmitter key gocs down. They leave an impression much more sour than a dirty bulkhead or a rusty deck. Alll ships, particularly carriers, have been guilty of making “a good thing” of VHF for non-essen- tial traffic. With VHF channels becoming more and more crowded, particularly on strike days, a base that obstructs essential traffic with its non- essential transmissions stands out like a ship that has just zigged when it should have zagged. It is as much the responsibility of CIC to maintain a clean “ethereal space” as it is to keep its own com- partment spaces in perfect condition. Has your ship been dirtying-up the high frequency chan- nels? This is worthy of an inspection. CALL 'EM AND FIND OUT! A majority of useless transmissions originate outside of CIC by personnel in need of certain information, who do not realize the poor reputa- CONFIDENTIAL tion they cast upon their ship by orders to “call ‘em by VHF." Deck spots must be made, or the ship must prepare to turn into the wind, or per haps what starts out as a chance remark of the admiral relative to the position of his planes as sumes increasing importance as it passes dawn ¢ until finally someone anxious to make fi ter blares over the 24mc—“CIG, get the position of strike able! What is their ETA? Are they all together? How much fuel do they have? CALL ‘THEM AND FIND OUT!” DON'T OVERPLAY FOREHANDEDNESS It may be your privilege to blow your top (within the confines of CIC), but an order is an order, so the air is filled with—“gq Noisy from Noisy base, what is your ETA?” Naturally 99 Noisy won't hear because he has been delayed in receiving target assignments from Commander Support Air and has not returned to within VAF range; or he is in his dive; or transmissions at the target area block out your call; or he is still on secondary. Nevertheless, the eager-beaver on the other end of the squawk box insists that you gil Shoe pe again and again and again become the more exasperating when the strike 7) ey... : irst lieutenant of the air lanes Ck adi rative traffic. equipment. leader calls base on his return and, entirely un- aware that you have been calling him, gives this information as a matter of routine. The topside officer may kid himself into thinking he is 4.0 in efficiency and forehandedness, but the net result this persistency has been only to reflect un- Wlorably upon CIC, the ship, and the Flag. ‘The same is true on those frequent occasions when the squawk box from primary fly or pilot house urgently informs CIC that the formation is turning into the wind, and issues orders, “Call the bombers to get their ETA.” And then, 41 Noisy answers your call in disgust—“Over base, angels Sa oraitog for Chasiier All of this is embarrassing. Smoothly operat- ing carriers will insist that each strike leader call the base immediately wh within VHF range, announcing his ETA together with advance notice Bear yaon tat stents caesauens devia tions from normal landing procedure. If strike leaders fail to do this, or if schedules at the target are delayed so that returning groups are long over- due, CIC cannot refuse an order to call those Janes when so directed. However, CIC can WBrcnocrace the furl of such cals, ituminating Needless their effect on the ship's reputation. g the valve against unnecessary radio talk has become o di yet mandatory task of CIC. Supposed immunity from enemy direction finding, and a somewhat false sense of ifs security, has in too many instances encouraged use of the very high frequencies for siipplementary ‘A majority of situations portrayed in this article emphasize problems of a carrier CIC because in today's air offensive, carrier transmissions predominate. Yet the theme—keep VHF channels open for essential transmissions—is applicable to every ship having VHF ficult, calls will not bring the strike group back any earlier. If the strike leaders do their part, the base will have plenty of time to make prepara- tions for the next launch, respot and landing regardless of delayed schedules. And, the channels remain open to essential traffic. WHAT GOES UP MUST COME DOWN Forced landings present another cause for com- plaint. A pilot approaching his carrier for an emergency or a deferred forced landing often sets the stage for a maze of uscless transmissions. It is no, fault of the pilot. Over-zealous souls aboard, in a genuine effort to aid the pilot and to avoid extra respots if possible, pour suggestive orders into CIC via squawk box. ‘Thus, CIC is forced to give the pilot a small course of instruction—“try high blower—try low blower—use the hand pump —climb to safe altitude and take some sharp rolls —switch to rich—switch to lean—et cetera—et cet- era” for all within range to hear. Undoubtedly the pilot has tried these already, or he wouldn't be qualified for a combat air group. Sometimes short debates transpire via VHF as to whether or not the pilot should pancake imme- diately. Nothing worthwhile is accomplished. CONFIDENTIAL, 9 z i ae C.1.C. APRIL 1945 Other pilots in the air suffering from these uscless transmissions think—“what a lousy pilot.” Other ships, who in the meantime have tried to break in for important messages, are thinking—“what a fouled-up ship.” This type of unnecessary transmission has been eliminated when CIC has adopted and has been able to stick to a standard forced landing voice procedure. Asan example: “Fox gz (if plane call is not known) this is—base. What is your trouble’ How long can you remain airborne?” Passing the information thus obtained to air plot, fly control, and pilot house simultaneously, CIG (1) obtains pancake instructions for the pilot, (2) keeps trans missions to a minimum, and (3) the pilot comes aboard with greater confidence in the carrier's abil ity to handle his emergency landing. This pro- along with any particular transmissions y have for the landing signal officer, will cover nearly all emergency situations. ONE-TWO-TEST—PPFFFT! Too often the finger is on CIC because an am bitious plane captain is trying to convince himself that the gear is in order by blowing his breath down the necks of hundreds of pilots in the air and CIC monitors listening on the channels he appar- ently wants to clear by lung power alone. ‘These 1—2—test—pplft’s” invariably occur when VHF traffic is heaviest. They are difficult to locate for they can originate on any flight or hanger deck of yy carrier in the area. A simple explanation to all plane captains of the consequences, plus ste’ disciplinary measures for offenders. may be CI 5 nse in this situation, Occasionally busy VHF channels are needlessly cluttered with a “landing order—vietor fox, victor baker, victor tare” transmission, and the en Fleet has to stand by while One Noisy, Four-one oisy and Eightone Noisy acknowledgments beat fo the many ears forced to listen to this normal landing order. And even more impor t. recent n reports confirm that the Jap is apparently listening to VHF for tipoffs on launching and landing operations and has directed his attacks on our formations during these operations. There are times when GIC’s highly trained per nel originates or is responsible for extraneous VHF traffic of its own. ‘Taking a look at yourself at the mike every once in a while may highlight some subconsciously-made chann BOGEY! BOGEY! BOGEY! Every now and then a base interrogates “bogey CONFIDENTIAL ‘090-9 miles” only to find it is a rain cloud, a side echo, the ASP, or pethaps a surface picket. quick evaluation of all close range radar report™ and a check with the lookouts before interrogat- ing will eliminate most of these VHF transmis- sions together with their mandatory answers from other bases and the accompanying embarrassment for the originator. For some reason these close-in bogus bogey reports usually start a small epidemic of interrogating, everyone becomes raid-happy, and channels are really jammed. MISTER FIVE BY FIVE Testing communications is a necessity—but there is a limit. When the transmitter and te ceiver are set up for each channel, a single click of the transmitter button gives assurance that the ‘equipment will send and receive. The “biowe and the “how do you hear boys become & nuisance and a menace once the habit gets them. Nothing is as exasperating as strong feedback screaming into one’s ears. Aside from discomfort to the recipient, repetition of such distorted mes- sages until they are understood crowds channels unnecessarily. Whether you choose to disengage the speaker from its jack while transmitting, clamp the earphones neater the face and cas while tly ing, introduce a circuit break to cut out the ceiver when transmitter button is down, or follow other known measures—be sure to climinate the possibility of a feedback how! from transmissions. When CIG is not monitoring channels by head set, take care that speakers are up, with proper volume, andl someone is within range to acknoliy ledge incoming calls. Important. messages 6I fail to reach their objective when this is over- looked, and in the course of repeated attempts to get through, other bases are blocked out of the use of that channel Don't hesitate to use that lite three-letter word OUT. One may feel self-consciot unappreciative, or cold while endi tions abruptly—but after all, it’s a party lin ‘The situations described here are typi ny extrancous messages thrust into the already over-burdened ears of the Fleet today. CIG is the first lieutenant of the air lanes. CIC, by clearly illustrating the end results of transmissions forced upon them to flag plot, pilot house, fly control and air plot, and by policing its own voice procedure, can close the valve against. unnecessary VHF traffic. It is worthwhile to protect the reputal Bijou ship. Keep ie deans for anh well as visual inspection With "road Beavier st for which the Interm there for sible. but areas init S Foggy wea erly wt very prob The facia Aipasard in and prod fon. ‘Com wil be m0, What would Gi Gyan say oie baie = Th a oeeiog Cap tain, we will pick up the convoy 3) calle bie $s sate them on VHF at about nil We hope that in the very near future the Captain Piltakowere acy ain statement with nothing more than his usual nod or terse, ery well Beli aay ieicelataiit tic caicy ct pease Reeds Ginly waars inne toot asce in the past been cre merawie results have bewildered the operator and caused tions that ought to be of great help to the radar and radio operator. He has, for example, pointed ‘out why the ranges and heights to which signals are effective often exhibit variations over which the operator has no control: why even though the eel pe cary fad hat desaigerace ab Be dese tras ec ties a weather m: ed the fact that if the nd persists in placing blind faith in ripment the situation may become perilous. Acrological units are now being trained to help The radio and radar operators in various opera eck the weather for your probable range Radio and Radar will do a better job for us if we consult the weather man and find out a few things about the capabilities and limitations of our equipment when it is operating through a variety of atmospheric conditions. Neither the radar nor aerology expert is on solid ground when this subject is brought up, but one thing is certain: Together they furnish valuable information on the why and when of reliable communication and effective radar coverage. This article has a sprinkling of the “why plus a moderate portion of the “when.” tional areas, Forecasts will eventually be available to radar and communications officers from which they can determine more precisely the effects of weather upon range. In the meanwhile, the op- erator must make use of whatever information is at his disposal, however limited that may be. VARIATIONS IN RANGE ARE UKE A MIRAGE Radio faves, like light waves, are subject to .” An operator of radio sets using fre quencies greater than go mc. often assumes that his transmission range is confined pt the limit of his horizon. This assump be entirely wrong. The atmosphere may, in effect provide the operator with a kind of periscope by which he can see far beyond the horizon, The lower levels of the earth's atmosphere, usually within the first few thousand feet above the sur face, may sometimes bend the high-frequency waves far around the curve of the earth, Many radar operators have observed variations in range and changes in the extent of ground or sea return that result from the changes in the lower levels of the atmosphere. At times, they have blamed this inconsistent behavior on the perform- e of the set itself. They fail to recognize the presence of a “radar mirage” because they have never heard of the phenomenon. before. CONFIDENTIAL Shel TWad¥ “D‘1'D. C.1C. APRIL 1945 There are many reports from the field that illustrate just how i portant changes in weather can be in high frequency radio and radar transmission. Failure of plane-to-ground communication hi sponsible for the loss of many aircraft. Planes in actual sight of personnel at the transmitting station have been unable to receive guiding signals and have flown on to crash landings elsewhere. If the operator had known of the weather effects he would have realized that to regain or maintain contact it is necessary merely to fly the plane at a more favor able altitude. An excerpt from the radar performance report of the USS HARRY LEE illustrates our point: “It is definitely noticeable that atmospheric conditions affect the performance of radar equipment as well as the ¥anges—one particular occasion arose in which ranges much greater than usual were obtained for both the SG and SG-1 equipments. Land was picked up as far as the end of the 375 mile scale (approximately 450 miles) on the SC-1 equipment, and on the same night a destroyer escort and transport were tracked on the SG equipment at ranges as great as 35 miles, Also on that particular night TBS reception from the two distant ships was equivalent to that obtained from ships only a few thousand yards awa If the atmosphere can have such a great effect upon radio and radar performance, it is important for operators to understand what causes the changes in that accompany certain kinds of weather. The lar operator can anticipate what sort of ranges to expect and can use this knowledge to get the greatest possible benefit from his equipment It should be noted that many of the mistakes arising from unusually Jong ranges are peculiar to certain radars that were designed before the possibility of such ranges was realized. The newer radar models, when intelligently used, greatly reduce the chance of misinterpretation. Un fortunately, however, these recent models are not yet in general use by the Fleet, and radar operators must understand the limitations of the present models ‘weather conscious” 1 CHANGE THE PULSE RATE The radar operator may pick up what appears to be a target at close range but actually may be looking at a ship or island over the horizon. This may happen under certain weather conditions when the outgoing pulse travels in a duct to the target and is reflected back to the receiver arriving after the next succeeding pulse has been transmitted. The indi cator will show this echo on the second sweep at an apparent range of some thousands of yards—as if the echo were returned from a nearby target. But by varying the pulse rate of the outgoing signals the operator can determine the validity of the r jumps in range, a radar mira nge indicated. If the pip moves or is present; the echo is being received on a sécond or third sweep and the target is actually at a range far greater than indicated. When the pulse rate can be changed, the operator should try several pulse rates if in doubt as to the actual range. If-only one pulse rate is available, he should try to check with another type of set. If a second set with another pulse rate is not available, he must turn to what informa tion the weather man can give him id must try to decide whether or CONFIDENTIAL there Range in thousands of yards >| es STANDARD. x00 ‘On windy or stormy days and fight and during weather when “nga turbulent well-mixed at mee in hh tenet SUB-STANDARD ° gy weather with she ar a0 ware: oan the wa ey peoksbly do ths to coverage: 0 RE Fao waves te been tei Bet peocucieg s Saogerous sen: 2 Be. Commsticon Sith scent frl'be more afc Mette ny SA iit: cisnce fee cose! trated in SURFACE “ ‘A warm ofthore breeze may do his to the radio or radar pater. 102 Oot at waa s coll wind oer the =——— Warmer ocean will, produce about The same result. Wein this sur face duct, through which the en figy travels cal, coverage On s0"- —g fequeatt ie increased tremendously Rircraft above the duct, on siderably reduced. Such situations fs these occur when there is Sudden, moisture’ decrease above fhe surface. This ally “ssociated helght-ot air temperature though occationally 3 fanly “ch ayp Sent dace will exit when the syature at bridge Tevel fs tem tiie ‘of the water, Sometimes 2309 theiop of the duct. will be very lore to the murlace of the ocean Ter wil not affect SG ranges the 10 SG antenna transmits and receives above the duct. But an SJ or SO, itt is low antenna, may pick up ‘08 Targets all the way to diatant por lus tions of the duct. When second. freep echoes, from targets ying Within one of these duct, is seen fn the scope, the operator may get an erroneous apparent ange, ELEVATED Duas are found the earth's surface the atmosphere. 8 Sct as. barrier, preventi munication between operators above and below the Uspping 20 area, Ranges in the duct will be much greater than the "standard Dut coverage just above the duct 200 will be decreased. Ifa warm dry Tayer exists several hundred. fect oF tyre above the cath, an ele- 0 ‘luct may. be produced, ee Height in fect amo et MELT EMT PE SS eT C.-C. APRIL 1945 the enemy listens. .. When s possibility of trapping. messages al far greater ranges than uswal, not there may be an atmospheric duet that will transmit signals to great distances. Tt should be emp pulse rates is not i Mark 3 operator ed that the use of two itself a guarantee against range. For example, both the SG and the y’ show a target at 20,000 yards and the way, therefore, assume the range to be In this case the pip is showing on the third sweep of the Mk. 5 and the second sweep of the SG because in this example the SG pulse rate is exactly half that of the Mk. 3. However, if he pulse rate of the SG tly the appar ent range of the target will change on the St scope. If the duct is high enough to tap SK sig nals, most radar mirages can be checked directly on the SK’s g75mile scale. A pip may often display its “ghost” character by severe fading and by the marked fluctuations that it undergoes on the scope. These fluctuations arise from the unusual interference between the radio waves trapped within the duct WHY VARIATIONS WITH WEATHER. What weather conditions cause these unusual transmission effects? Can the operator predict in advance when extremely long or very reduced ranges are likely to occur?_In what ways can this information be put to military The most important atmospheric factors th cause changes in the distribution of temperature and moisture throughout the atmosphere are the flow of warm, dry air from a land mass out over cooler sea; nocturnal cooling (over land); flow of cool air over warmer sea; and low-level subsi dence. Subsidence is the slow vertical sinking of air, As a result of pressure some upper level of air becomes heated and often becomes partially dried out. Subsidence results in an increase of temperature with height above the ground as well as in a layer of very dry air which spreads out CONFIDENTIAL When a duct is present, the enemy can intercept curity is important the operator should always be aware of the When trapping is present and a choice of frequencies is available, it is better to choose the lowest since high frequencies are far more susceptible to trapping than those on the lower bands. Only if the antenna lies within the duct will strong trapping ocenr ee e ontally and creates conditions favorable to the formation of a radio There are clear skies, little wind, and high Cyromensic conditions. JA wind is blowing from the land area is extensive. 7. A cool breeze blows over warm ocea fevel duct of this character, capable of causing e tended ranges of 3,000 m.c. radars with antenna heights of 50 feet or less, appears to be the rule rather than the exception Over open ocean in tropic areas and in the trade-wind belt TRAPPING NOT AN EXCUSE The operator should be very careful about blaming failure or unexpected changes in the be- havior of his equipment on the presence of a duct He should remember that trapping rarely affects nd, especially when A low - 2 high-frequency radio waves unless they are trans je Fale com © Fires or eit oe agree sn sights pean ee ae Or crapping, eldDMn cu: 3t were invariably equipped with, serological ingen ments and knowledge, he would have little diffi culty in detecting the presence of a “duct” and in roughly forecasting the character of ranges to be expected. Unfortunately under most operational conditions he may find it inconvenient, if not imposible, to obtain accurate measurements temperature and moisture. He must, ‘hese rely upon what evidence he can glean from visual observations, and upon whatever rules of thumb and an acrologist can give him. ‘The weather ex- perts are far from knowing all about the com tions that cause peculiar radio propagation effects, but they do know what that the ope hat the operator cane pect trapping when 1. There are skips in the ground clutter or sea return on his scope, for example, when nearby is lands do not appear on the scope. 2, There is strong fading of the pip. A rapidly fading pip may indicate a duct with echoes being returned on a second ot third sweep. ‘This rule, however, is not universally true. ‘The duct may ally true. ‘The duct ma toy oimeaetaid Kany oe ae standard conditions, bouncing in the plane or movements of the ship target may cause rapid changes in the signal 3. The temperature at bridge definitely lower than the ten f¢ moisture content of the at level is considerably tess than tt sea surface {. Smoke, haze, or dust fails to rise or spreads horizontally on on a ship is e of the sea: wosphere at bridge {just above the angles greater than one-half a degree, but a duct may be tilted and this angle of inclination must be added to the onehalf degree. It is safer, there- fore, to consider the possibility of trapping at any angle up to one degree. When unsually small ranges occur the operator should first check his rent carefully before he assumes that (pate: consitions are at fault. Some operators have been mystified by the ap- parent changes of reliable ranges for aircraft Where the ranges for surface craft show much smaller variations. Such variations are,entirely to he expected. Fastmoving planes change aspect continually and the signal may fluctuate in conse- equi eggonence, whereas the slower moving. ship gives 2 Pouch steadier signal. Aside from this, however, a set operating below normal would find aircraft ranges shortened much more than surface ship ranges. If there were a surface duct it might en able the radar to pick up ship targets so far out that the operator might be fooled into thinking that his set was working normally. The surface uct would not help his aircraft coverage which might be dangerously low. From the above it be tomes obvious that the use of reference targets such as mountains or large surface craft to test the diciency of radar eqitipment is extremely hazard ous. This danger is the reason for the installation of standard “echo boxes,” which is currently pro- ceeding. OPERATIONAL USES OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE WEATHER @ Knowledge of the weather and high-frequency transmission can be put to impor effect on tant oper affected: Search radar, beacons, and surface, ai ground, and air-to-air communication units. Ducts present a real problem for security, and knowledge of the atmosphere can help in making countermeasures more effective. If the radio officer knows something about the weather and its ‘effect upon transmission, he can help greatly in making specific operations successful. For ex: ple, if he knows that a duct is present, he will expect tite enemy radar also to be operating with greater ranges and he can advise that jamming be turned on earlier than usual. He may also make helpful suggestions as to the best direction of attack. For example, winds that pass over land and then out over sea often cause a duct to form on the leeward side of the land Therefore, if one wishes to avoid detection by his prey, he should attack with the wind rather than against it. In this respect the best naval procedure ig just the opposite of the old custom of the woodsman who stalks against the wind in order that the sensitive nostrils of his game will not be able to detect him. A possible exception to this rule lies in open ocean when a duct is formed by 2 cool wind blowing over warmer water. Here the ‘duct extends in all directions, and there is little choice in the direction of approach. “There are many other ways knowledge of the weather can be put to good use by the radio or radar operator. The important thing for him to do is to watch the weather for signs that a duct nay be present. If he is uncertain, and if he is Jucky enough to be on a ship that also has an aero- rographer’s mate aboard, he should get the necessary information from him. The “weather conscious” operator will find that his knowledge will pay real dividends, for he can then be prepared for changes in the range of his equip ment and can use these changes to his own advan tage. If a record is kept by each ship of ranges acti ally obtained under various atmospheric condi- tions, and an intelligent analysis is made of results in the light of the general rules given in this ar ticle, it should be possible to make increasingly ac curate “on the spot” predictions. It is requested that reports of unusual ranges be forwarded to Chief of Naval Operations (DNC—20-F), listing the date, time of day. position, direction and velocity of the wind, temperature of the air and height at ‘ohich taken, temperature of the sea, barometer reading, typeof radar, antenna height, normal ional use. “All types of equipment are to logist or range and extended range. CONFIDENTIAL SebI Wad “O°. 7 CLC. APRIL 1945 t 2:20 a.m. the U. S. ship put her rudder left; two minutes later she rammed the sub- marine coming up her port side. A few moments later the stern of the sub poised itself above a bubbling patch of water, then slid beneath the surface carrying five officers and forty men to a panic stricken death in the depths below: 2 “clean” job and under othe have been the subject of special commendation for the commanding officer of the U. S. Ship. There was only one hitch: the ship was escorting the sub to give it safe passage from one port to another. The officer of the deck said, “Come left to 245.” The helmsman misunderstood the order, came on Tt was ircumstances might CONFIDENTIAL collisio® around to 145 nd delivered a one-way ticket to forty-five officers and men. These things are quite simple in retrospect. The OOD “doped off.” He had two instruments at his finger tips, neither of which he used after he gave orders to the helmsman to come’ left. Had he watched the gyro repeater he would have caught the error before the ship had passed 240°; had he instructed the radar operator to give ranges on the sub until the turn was completed, the fatal col- lision could have been averted. On top of all this he did not require the helmsman to report when he was steady on the new course. It is ¢% to condemn. On the other hand, it was monot- Knowledge and common sense plus a good CIC can go. long way towards reducing the need- oss of ships and men in collisions at sea: It can be summed up: Know what the other ship is doing; know what your ship should and can do; do it. onous procedure—steaming back and forth ahead of the escorted submarine. But that is almost al ways the setting for catastrophe at sea Sometimes—at the other extreme—too much faith is placed in the instruments and we have an other setting for trouble. Up near Seattle last Sep tember, the commanding officer of an ocean-goiv tug heard, through a heavy fog, the signal of a v sel with tow. Radar identified it as beari relative, distant two miles and the track of its course during the next 14 minutes indicated that it would pass abeam about 1000 yards to starboard ter having stopped to again verify the position y sound, the commanding officer rang up 2/3 and a minute later plowed into a large log raft which was out to a 1000 yard towline from the ship to starboard. The $O-1 had not picked up the raft the skipper of the tug made an erroneous assump- tion, and the Navy had to fork over several hun: dred dollars to pay for the recovery of the logs. Off the coast of California a Navy ship ran down merchant ship. Combat had reported a target id ahead at a range of 2740 yards, but the Cap- tain didn’t get the word. Two minutes later he did get word that the ship in the fog ahead was yards away. One minute more and it closed to 1860, a minute and a half after that, to 1120. ‘The Captain did not receive any reports after fuat, despite the fact that CIG reported three more ngerthe last one being, “Under 400." Tow ever the slow and improper action of the talkers contributed materially to the collision. No infor mation on course and speed was given to CIC to assist it in tracking and evaluating the contact With that information, the officer in CIC could have anticipated the collision by at least five minutes. AN ADMIRALTY LAWYER SAYS the existence of radar does not excuse or justify non-compliance with the Rules of the Road. In fact, radar (and CIC) only impose a greater burden. The knowledge of the presence (and movements) of the other ship which other wise would not be had, due to fog or adverse weather conditions, will impose upon the vessel @ wiring that knowledge a greater burden to take proper action.” CIC WILL HELP The ¢ dyantage of having to maneuver dark- ened and in low visibility can be largely off-set by the use of radar, the capabilities of which should be utilized to the fullest extent consistent with the degree of radar security in force. Every Com: g Officer should familiarize himself with his radar equipment and CIC organization, and should make sure that it is prepared to give early and effective information and assistance in maneu to avoid collision. CIC officers, if not already qualified as deck-officers, should be given instruction in the elements of the Maneuvering Board and in the various factors involved in ship handling, to do their job more intelligently In low visibility, before starting a maneuver which may bring the ship close to other vessels, the Captain or OOD should alert the CIC and radar, indicate the maneuver that is to be exe- cuted and the ships that may be approached, and make certain that the CIC officer understands the situation and the necessity for keeping up a flow of the safety information required. ‘The actual positions of own ship and other vessels in the for- mation should naturally be plotted both before and during the maneuver to assure its safety; and if any ship at any time does not show on the screen, when she should be within fair radar range, the fact should be treated with suspicion. Needless to say, communication between CIC and the Bridge should be quick and positive. LET THE OTHER SHIP KNOW It will be a material safeguard if the vessels in a formation are informed by TBS or by any per missible method of communication as to the time, course, speed, and sector by which one of them is to join, leave, or maneuver within the format The OTC should cither do this himself or direct the maneuvering ship to do it, though in the for mer case he should not attempt to prescribe more than the sector and general method. Such a broadcast of information would not in any way pass the responsibility for avoiding collision from maneuvering vessels to those keeping station, but it would cause the latter to be alert and better able to judge the correct evasive action if danger of collision became imminent. CONFIDENTIAL 2 9° z C.1.C. APRIL 1945 Announcing one’s course, speed and intentions by TBS (or even by loud speaker) might be prac ticable and of assistance even when two vessels encounter each other in low visibility, with no formation or joining-up involved. In one of the earliest editions of Knight’s Seamanship he advo: cates trying a megaphone and a good strong voice in such situations ind it would seem even more practicable now that we have effective equipment for short-range voice communication. CAN THE OOD CONN? While the Captain will naturally be conning: during any delicate maneuver, there is always the possibility of a ship’s safety depending wholly on the Officer-of-theDeck. The present lack of ex perience among watch officers must be compe sated as far as possible by indoctrination and training. All conceivable collision situations and the action they call for should be discussed fre- quently with them by experienced officers. More important yet, every opportunity should be given them to handle the ship themselves since it is investment in safety. No matter how limited such opportunities may be, they serve at least to break down the inhibitions towards taking re- sponsibility which so often cost a vital few seconds in emergency maneuvering THERE ARE OTHER FACTORS Depending exclusively on the “Sea has caused more strandings and collisions than have inaccuracies in calculations and data. Grant- ed that every officer should cultivate and exercise this faculty, he should invariably supplement it by ranges, bearings, plotting, or other appropriate calculations, not only as safe-guards in the imme- diate situation, but to maintain proficiency in their use There are certain psychological factors which have fully as much to do with safety at sea as any of the more strictly technical ones. A large pro- portion of the disasters in tactics and maneuvers ‘comes from concentrating too much on one objec- tive or urgency, at the expense of being sufficiently alert for others. Thus, absorption with enemy craft already under fire has led to being torpedoed by others not looked for or not given attention while preoccupation with navigation, with carry ing out the particular job in hand, or with avoid. ing some particular vessel or hazard, has resulted in collision with ships to whose presence one was temporarily oblivious, There is no rule that can CONFIDENTIAL, fee this except the ancient one that eternal vigi- lance is the price of safety, no matter what the i nip ‘e should flatter himself that he is immune to the tation and ability. Where a mistake in maneuver- ng or navigating can spell calamity, an officer someone else—the Navigator, Command Duty Ofte cer, or Officer-of-the-Deck—before starting it, if time permits. This is not yielding to another's judgment; it is merely making sure that one’s fet Aisiial and mechanical’ eyipmtet aaa skill he possesses and every aid he can muste is risky and now really necessary, then there is no ex- cuse for it. There is no “Little Angel” that guards ing a war. And if he believes that to be a good ne ing man he must be dashing and take chances, let colic: Reames oo eal a riors—should a major engagement occur and every ship be desperately needed, but he and his vessel be out of it because they were back in dry-dock, patching up the hole from the collision or strang ented. Ty ie ot mo i tei Rion desolate Sempdtpon 8. pened] ao naich ape cies age radar; from the Rules of the Road point of view, as a friend Til areal i one copies wikiene ee scien dip weeaieebdtes teens em bow at a range of 12 miles. The radar continued meticulously to track the closing ship on the same bearing. The two ships collided—at one point on The stories of collisions are digests of records in the of the Juilge Advocate General; considerable of the text is fh Fleet Admiral Nimite's letter agb-44 of § April, s944-—Ed. Countermeasures training at sea ‘The advent of radar countermeasures as an im- portant Fleet activity has prompted DesPac to place in the field another circuit rider,’ whose job is to acquaint all destroyers and cruisers with both the offensive and defensive phases of RCM. The training program in the forward area includes (1) offensive countermeasures or actual radar jam- ‘ing; (2) intercept an.analysis of enemy radar sig: tals; (3) “radex"” or defenses against enemy radar jamming; and (4) defenses against enemy use of or other reflectors. am is at present being carried out by forward area training groups, at pres- ent based aboard Destroyer Tenders in the Cen tral Pacific and Southwest Pacific, The taining groups consist of one officer and two enlisted men each. All have had both operational experience id special technical training in RCM. we Training of ships’ radar personnel in offensive ‘operations is carried on by using jamming gear set up aboard the respective tenders. Many ships are being equipped with offensive countermeasures equipment during limited navy yard availabilities and are going 0 the forward area without ade uate preparation of officer or enlisted personnel eh operate this equipment, The RCM teams also go aboard these vessels, either for underway exer- Cises or for alongside instruction, to train person. nel in most effective use of theit equipment. On board the respective tenders, operators are taught the basic principles of jamming and are shown how to place jamming transmitters on the frequency of “victim” radars. This phase of the training has value for ships not yet RCM equipped in familiarizing personnel with the equipment advance of its installation aboard their own vessels. Since all ships—destroyers and above- equipped with intercept receivers and ‘equipment, the second part of the training prog intercept. and analysis—has broad application. the jamming gear, the interceptanalys ipment often is put aboard when there is litt jing personnel in its use. It e RCM forward area training “Window no time for trai the purpose of agrills, and aboard the tenders during work jups to supply this training, hips’ personnel are taught proper procedures for identifying, analyzing, and logging enemy radar intercepts, and how to fit the intercept analysis function into the ship's normal operating routine to enable RCM operators to give essential information rapidly ‘The “radex” or anti-jamming program. utilizes training equipment with which the ship's own radar are jammed from a distance. In this type of training, the jammers are ordinarily mounted aboard one ship of a formation during underway at anchor, RCM techi amitters and the officer-instruc victim” ship, working with radar personnel in the ship's own CIC and gun director, to point ¢ methods of overcoming jamming. for defense against “Window” or other confusion reflectors, actual “Window” is dropped from aircraft obtained for the purpose from the respective air commands in the vicinity of the tenders. Ships in harbor are advised that a “Window” drill will take place, and all then have the opportunity to practice working through this type of confusion. Where possible, underway drills of this nature are arranged. In alll phases of the RCM forward area training, lectures are given and films shown to ships’ radar personnel. Instructors describe best methods of operation and try to tie in these methods with doc trine, pointing out when and by whom jamming may be ordered, circumstances in which jamming by the enemy is most likely, quick and positive methods of distinguishing jamming and “Win dow” from other forms of radar interference, and many other items of vital importance to the RCM progra Tan aiticle on the DesPac “Cireuit Rider” appeared March 1043 “01.0. ee org RCM forward area taining groups hace been organised anil'by this date should te available to all type commands in the Pacifc area. These teams (not to be confused with the DesPac teams) consist of one officer, one technician, and two operator, fans operate the jamming or goes aboard in the CONFIDENTIAL sain cider = < S CIC superiority T ee It_has been pointed out in several. articles in “CLC.” that although we were several laps ahead of the Jap in the field of radar at the beginning of the war, our lead has been materially reduced in the last three years. Evidence does indicate, however, that in several respects we are as yet ex ceeding the best efforts of the enemy in final re sults obtained from the use of electronic gear.” This in itself might not be worthy of comment; but the reasons behind our superior results show beyond doubt that, even if the Jap finally meas- ures up to our standard of technical performance and efficiency in electronics, we still can fight to him if we continue, or better yet, our efforts in the maintenance of equipment training of personnel, and utilization of informa: tion. Such is the purport of recent information obtained from Jap prisoners and other sources which seem to justify these conclusions: 1. The enemy is short on both technicians and replacement parts for shipborne radar, One POW who was radar operator aboard a DD stated the gear was often inoperative, that the ship carried no spares, and repairs could only be made when 4 September 1914 “CIC,” page 12. October 1944 "C1.C.” pages 22 and 24 1.6." page 54 page 5. CONFIDENTIAL tte ete ees the ship was in port. the POW, the firing of two or more guns would render the radar sets inoperative. ‘This informa- tion is confirmed by another POW the DD surface engagement. He said no one aboard was capable of making repairs to the ship’s radars, and the fire control radar was not very effective 2, The enemy also appears to be lacking im ex- perienced or well trained operators. On this point, the pilot of a “Betty” stated that radars were installed in half the planes in his unit; but were useless because the radiomen were not trained on radar and no radarmen were furnished. 3. The third and most important advantage our highly developed CIC with its rapid dissemi nation of vital information over the ship's com- munication system and various radio nets, and the coordination of CIC with the other departments which need and use the information made available through CIC. The skipper of the “ASAGUMO” testifies that his ship had nothing corresponding to our GIG, and he had never heard of other shi ing it; that continuous radar watches wel Furthermore, according to the captain ‘ASAGUMO,” sunk in the Philippinl + S»ased on an Essex class GV for s Kept only “if justified by circumstances.” Fur jermore, there is much evidence that the Disp tas nothing companble to our a de fense system built around radar. Some of the evidence in this respect comes from the Superfort Bomber Command, from which it appears that radar installations are not in continuous opera- tion but are possibly alerted by visual warning net. This conclusion is based on the fact that the first RCM-equipped aircraft to approach an objec- tive rarely encounters radar intercepts, while sub- sequent arrivals do record intercepts. The Sev- enth Air Force reports that enemy radar often goes off the air when aircraft are in the vicinity and when it would be the most useful. Evidenc also tends to show the Jap either has not developed Fighter Direction, or if he has, it is not effecti ne commanding officer of a bomber squadron months—a very active six months at that—stated his squadron had never been intercepted by fighters on the ap. proach to an objective, even when the approach ‘was made at an ideal altitude for radar detection. Other skippers have given similar testimony. Let no one assume from this information that we are justified in adopting a complacent attitude and attempting to coast through the remainder of he war on our past accomplishments. Rather the contrary is true, for we may be certain the enemy is leaving no stone unturned to train operators FEE E EEE HE and technicians, and his lack of spare parts and repair facilities at sea is doubtless receiving atten- tion. It is almost certain that the creation of some- thing akin to our CIC and ADGG is under way. But our schools are constantly expanding and modernizing their training programs. If we take full advantage of their facilities and maintain con- tinuous training afloat, we should be able to main- tain or even increase our superiority in speedy and effective use of CIC data by all departments, Good team-play will keep us in the lead. But good team- play doesn’t just happen. It is the result of train- ing, practice, and intelligent application of such training. HEEEHHEE HEHEHE HEHEHE TE PPI ON JAPANESE FLAGSHIP? A Jap prisoner of war, who had served on a flag- ship, has furnished Allies with the first evidence that the Nipponese are using the PPI in combat on their S-band shipborne radar. He supported his story by drawing a picture of a cathode ray tube for his captors. ‘The flagship, he said, carried three Mark 2 Model 2 S-band systems—two for fire control, and one for search, which had a range of about $0,000 meters. ‘There was no elevation-finding radar for AA fire control, he claimed. CONFIDENTIAL Srb1 WYd¥ 'D1'D. Servicing the scope unit of an SM radar field service i@ in a quandary when a came aboard, It has often happened that no one aboard knew what the set was for, where it was to be installed, how it should be operated, or what was the proper maintenance procedure. Most ships and statia have long found it difficult, if not impossible, ¢ keep abreast of new operational and maintenance pr son electronic equipments with changes coming so rapidly This problem has been particularly acute for the forces afloat. Because the Navy's task forces are of tremendous size and rem Since’ the early days of the war, ships a tions have at times bee new electronic equipme edu at sea for long periods, it has been difficult even to make delivery of new radars, much less to provide simultaneously full instruction on their purpose, operation, and The rapid expansion of the Navy's material re quirements, resulting in a stream of new elec tronic equipments incorporating unfamiliar tech niques and principles, has produced a proportion ate demand for qualified technical personnel. But these have been hard to get; war plants have prop: erly been allocated considerable numbers, and those inducted under the Selective Service have necessarily been split_ among the variow Making final connections on a beacon monitor ‘follows the fleet @ rex services. The result is that the Fleet has Taced a poser in trying to keep up with new elec tronic developments RELIEF IS AT HAND The Chiet of Naval Operations has studied th sroblem of bringing the necessary technical aid IB the cet, since the Fleet can't be brought to port to ger the needed service. The Flectronic Field Service Group has been created as one an relief. Ic will make possible a continuous flow of field and operating forces afloat and ashore ie purpose of the Group is 10 aniet Fleet Ad trative Officers and Radio Material Officers tional instruction to the Fleet and shore establish fem whenever and wherever it is needed. The Group has been set up by the Director of the Naval Research Laboratory under the Bu of Ships SPECIALLY TRAINED NAVAL ENGINEERS. WILL DO THE JOB Be eaoning tips engincee Soneieearcunir tis: This is the IEF coordination unit being checked. requirements have been made: ‘They must have knowledge of the research and development pro: grams under way, they must have worked closely with manufacturers, and their knowledgi perience must fit them to give practical, effective aid in mastering the new equipments which the Navy puts aboard its fight nid ex: ng ships and ashore. Among them are graduate electrical engineers and graduates of such Navy schools as the Warrant Officers Radio Engineering School, the Radar School at M.LT., and the Fleet Sound Schools. Many of these men have recently returned from active duty with the Fleet and so have a firsthand knowledge of Fleet problems. Special traini has been given Group personnel in manufacturers plants and in Navy schools on ship and shore radar, radio, sonar, and navigational aid equip ments. Engineers now in the forward areas have been trained in the newest techniques of multi plex, singleside band, multi-channel, and related communication equipment. Others are highly trained and qualified on radar countermeasures Men are now being trained on AEW (Airborne Early Warning) and will accompany the equip. ment upon its introduction to the Fleet. Others are working with the bureaus, laboratories, and manufacturers on both ar submarine and pro: CONFIDENTIAL St61 Wd¥ “O10. C.I.C. APRIL 1945 submarine equipment. Some of the engineers i this bracket are now on duty in the forward areas helping to install new gear and training the crews who must operate and n it. Others are being trained on the “small object location” and ihe “wrpedaidetection equipment? for Eutsre ax. signments. This brief review indicates the lengths gone to to make the Group fully qualified for this task. SERVICE WILL BE GIVEN "@N THE SPOT” When ships go on their shakedown cruise, mem- bers of the group will be aboard to coach the crews on their electronic equipments. ‘They will have full information on new developments and will be able to demonstrate in detail the perform: ance of new and unfamiliar equipments. An ex. ample is the recent assignment of Group engineers to DesRon Ten to assist in the installation of radio, radar, sonar, navigational aids, and counter measures equipment, After the installation is com- pleted, the officers will sail with the ships of this squadron on the shakedown cruise and will put the crews through their paces in mastering opera. t nce. The engineers will go from ship to ship underway to help the whole squadron to reach peak performance. When Des Ron Ten reaches the port where the Service Force Commander is located, the engineers will report to him for another such assignment afloat or to be returned to the continental limits for assignment to another duty afloat mand mainte Another example of this “on the spot” service is the recent assignment of Group engineers to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, for duty at advance bases in installing Western Union multi plex equipment, multichannel equipment, and radio direction finder equipment, and to train base personnel to operate and maintain it, In addition, the Flectronic Field Service Group has heen designated to take over the Bureau of Ships’ anti-submarine warfare engineering program in the forward areas. Group engineers will remain at advance bases to handle all installation and maintenance proble id to give technical in struction to personnel assigned to anti-submarine or prosubmarine warfare equipments. Problems encountered by the Group engineers will be reported back to the Service Forces and the Bureau of Ships, making it possible for every fone to pitch in quickly and work out the solu tions. This “two-way” service will enable the Fleet to get better results and more hours of CONFIDENTIAL optimum service from its electronic equipments. In effect, it puts everyone concerned at a nly ence table where all points of view can be exal ined and ideas pooled in solving the problems. Members of the Group will go out to the Fleet on temporary additional duty orders. Upon com- pletion of approximately six months duty, they will be relieved by personnel with more recent training and will go back to their command to catch up on developments which took place dur ing their duty tour. But even while they are with the Fleet, the engineers will be kept advised of de- velopments through semi-monthly field service notes so that they can pass on to Fleet personnel great deal of information on changing tech niques and procedures. In addition, the Group headquarters will keep in contact with its fie personnel and will help them in solving pr lems encountered at sea ‘The general plan is for Group personnel to go from ship to ship, whenever they are needed. They will have a double function: (a) To teach ship personnel what they need to know about the operation and. maintenance of new equipments, and by actual supervised demon- strations of techniques, to qualify the ship oper- ators to carry on reliably on their own. In this practical way, the forces afloat will be kept post on the latest electronic knowledge and on mainte nance and operational procedures. (b) From their first-hand study of the problems the Fleet faces in using and maintaining its equip- ments, these engineers can keep the service agen- cies posted on what needs to be done to ing equipments or procedures. This information wi be passed on either in official reports from the field or in person when the engineers are rotated. It is recommended that all commands using the Electronic Field Service Group expedite the for- warding of these reports so that problems can be tackled with the least possible del INVITATION TO THE FLEET ‘The service forces of the Navy are invited to make immediate use of the Electronic Field Serv- ice Group. A request by letter, by dispatch, ot by telephone to the Commanding Officer of the Electronic Field Service Group, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington 20, D. G., will receive diate consideration. If the personnel to assist the Fleet, the requesting activity will be promptly notified of the extent to which personnel are availabl fil te ree e This picture shows the overlay ‘correctly matched to the PPI echoes at Maalaea Bay, Maui, The rrley is constructed to. the tormile range scale on the VG Note the transports grouped ‘around the flagship and landing craft near the beach nC... The VG has been employed with success as a navigational aid, as shown by this report made by Rear Admiral H. W. Hill, Commander Amphibious Group Two, based on actual performance of the VG in an amphibious rehearsal. Pictures were taken aboard his flagship, the USS AUBURN In a rehearsal for an amphibious operation held at Maalaea Bay, Maui, a method of navigation utilizing the VG was developed—the report states— which has proven far superior to any other method of radar navigation thus far attempted amphibious operations A transparent hydrographic chart overlay produced to the scale of the 20 mile range on the VG was superimposed on the PPI, and the land con- tours matched after the fashion of the VPR/NMP systems. ‘The overlay is merely moved about over this flat surface until a match is obtained with e the PPI. ‘The overlay also conta ple grid coordinates over water areas for convenient reading of latitude and longitude so that fixes can be CONFIDENTIAL 9, Shbl MeV “D1 C.1.C. APRIL 1945, The first picture, taken at H-hour minus 20, shows the flagship, fire support ships and others at anchor off “much-invaded” Kahoolawe. The LCI gunboats are just beginning to emerge from the line of fire support ships. Follow them to the beach in the subsequent pictures, taken at five-minute intervals until H-hour. The last one shows the gunboats merged with the land echoes though at the time they were actually 1000 yards off shore. uansferred to the navigator's chart without mov ing the overlay from the PPI RESULTS ‘The overlay serves to locate the force with graphical points during the ap- and gives a simultaneous picture of the force relative to the flagship and surround. (See picture taken in Ma amphibious landings, the trans port ares [ areas, screen, line of departure and other areas may be marked on the overlay and thus the compared to thei The movement of the landing lowed as they circle, form, reach the line of de parture and move to the beach, (See pictures taken off Kahoolawe.) 1 position of all ships can be assigned positions at all times CONFIDENTIAL ACCURACY OF VG Rad: f maximum error of 300 ya fixes taken while at anchor under the yorable conditions were obtained with a Is; those taken under unfavorable conditions with a maximum variance from visual fixes of 1000 yards. An operator can get a fix with the accuracy indicated above in the rief period of go seconds, The followit of inaccuracy may be anticipated in the use of the overlay 1 Matehi PPI presentation, Keeping VG adjusted to scale of ov 5 Errors in making overlays (these m photographic stead of a hand made type). e@ + MAKING OVERLAYS f Chart should have good topographic lines, 1 scale between 1.5 and les per inch, and finder calibr I other lines which may obstruct proper itching. Suitable grid lines should be drawn for every minute of water areas only latitude and longitude over Reduce to scale with process camera and a negative to scale of VG (scale of this 8 inch per mile on 2 Three types of overlay prints can be tused, but the first is the most successful because of its clear uansparency: positive print on Koda lith Ortho Film, print on Defender Litho (trans photographic film), and contact print in vacuum printing frame on transparent Van Dyke paper. ; This adaptation of the VG equipment is a Iuable aid to the Amphibious Group Com. der. Intelligence officers should become fa @iar with this type of overlay, and photographic personnel should be prepared to produce it vn | es ele VG in air plot 3000 ‘This report from the CIC Team Training Genter, NAAS, San Clemente, on the use of the VG for air plotting and as an adjunct for Fighter Direction is the result of operations extending over a p00 period of two months, As pointed out in the report, the conclusions herein presented are based on nee Shorebased operations under conditions which would not necesarly obtain in shipborne activities, aoe ‘The January issue of “C.1.C,” contained an excellent report from N.T. 2300 (TR) entitled “Successful VG Operation.” This article dealt with the operation of the VG when employed with the SG surface search radar and outlined its possible uses as a surface summary and station keeping plot. CIG Team Training Genter has had VG units in operation for more than two months and has employed them extensively as Air Intercept plots for fighter direction. More than 500 intercepts have been conducted by os co @& & teams in training and staff officers. A plotting procedure has been developed for this type of tactical use. Observations and experiments have been con- ducted in order to ascertain the most satisfactory employment of the gear for maximum effectiveness. The following comments on the gear and its adaptability for air intercept work are the results of this experiment ‘The-two units (VG and VG-1) are installed side by side at the customary intercept plot position in front of the vertical Air Summary plot. A 12 inch remote PPI (VC) is installed along the port bulkhead to the left of the VG. In air operations at this center the following operational arrangement e e is in effect. The vertical plot is used as an “early warning” board and the plotters track targets reported by the operators at the outer ranges, that is, beyond 40-45 miles. Raid designation is also entered on this plot as is the usual information concerning course and speed, angels, composi- tion, IFF code, and other pertinent data, The VG units are set on the 29,000 39900 r3s000 pse000 Fs fe ae 40 = 40 ‘49gH0 S400 48900 = 44,000 1:30.00 200 809000 = r:80,00 oe 190,000 = 1:90 000 = 199900 ore eh 444 scale conversions ve Use this handy Conversion Scale when reducing photographic overlays of hydrographic charts to ae hae - VG scale. In the example, scale of the original ease Regret YanDe oll THE SUREARE OF The EO chart is 1:125,000: ‘Therefore he equivalent be {2 EQUIVALENT LENGTH INCHES ON GHART OR MODEL ersmile scale of the desired overlay may be read ° = a RF = REPRESENTATIVE FRACTION (SCALE) 2 Saas at that point on the scale where a line drawn from ° toe ste | es Btyap.do0 on the RE scale to the 2000 yard (1 mile) g 3 ae #= (36L) x (RF) pe oe a L one f a cee 3 £ = < nw @ 3 S 1: asen00 —I— : 389900 te reer 3 ae se 30. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL 3 C.1C. APRIL 1945 ighty mile range scale, and the two plotters plot thereon according to the doctrine developed here.’ The 12 inch remote PPI is set on the twenty mile scale. This setting has been found most useful for obtaining an early fix on a fighter vectored from base (usually friendly is visible on scope be- fore he is five miles out on vector when this scale is used). It also gives an excellent relative position picture of an interception within 20 miles of So with this arrangement—vertical plot em: ployed as an early warning board and information display. the VG units employed as intercept plots, and the 12” PPI set on short range to assist providing early friendly fixes—the air intercept work is conducted. RESULTS GOOD The results of employing this set-up for air intercept operations have been most heartening The average officer who has used the customary polar coordinate intercept plot for some time is frequently not impressed by first observation of the VG in operation. However, actual use of the unit for a short time with trained plotters has demonstrated its value. Practically every training activity at which this unit has been installed has offered adverse criti: cism of its effectiveness and adaptability to CIC work. It is believed that this gear is similar to much of the other equipment intended for use in CIC, that is, only with experimentation, prac tice and extensive training in operation can its benefits be fully realized. To become a proficient plotter on the VG a man needs practically as much practice and tain. ing on the gear as he does to become a satisfactory radar operator. He must become familiar with the appearance of land echoes, side and back lobes, \s differentiated from air h resolution, the pattern of movement of a target across the scope, the amount of persistence to be expected from a moving tar get, the probability and interpretation of fades and partial fades, and he must be able to employ a little intelligent imagination strengthened by a Knowledge of the probable performance of the aircraft he is plotting. In other words, more ability is required to plot intelligently on the VG than to read and interpret an A Scope or PPI. surface g and targets, ©The CIC Genter at San Clemente has developed a plotting techinie for use on the VG, which is different from that employed fn a polar coordinate chart Ie fs do smile CIC aoa baful that the use of a r2-inch PPI constantly on c scale could he justified in the operation of a CONFIDENTIAL DIFFICULTIES CAN BE OVERCOME (a) Unsatisfactory Erasing Mechan perhaps the most activity exper m. This i versal of all criticisms. ‘This nced similar difficulty when the unit was first installed, but a visiting engineer from, General Electric Company outlined a most rap and effective method of erasure that we are now using with satisfactory results, execute the following: 1, Switch Picture Erase Control from “ to “erase 2. Turn Picture Fade Out Control to “4 g- Turn Video gain to mini 4. Tun CRT To erase rapidly perate” (Cathode Ray Tube) bias to 5. Switch to longest range scale (200 mile), electronic focus control slightly 7. Switch from the SK to a radar with high pulse repetition frequency; .g., SG or SP and have that radar sweep at maximum speed. ‘This switching process may sound complicated, but it isn’t. It requires less than ten seconds, and less than ninety seconds later all indications will, he erased from the plot. This includes perm: nent land echoes and is a proven fact. The set can be refocused by reversing the above steps. e It is realized that another radar with high Pulse Repetition frequency is not always avail able for erasing purposes. If that is the case, execute the fist six steps plus the following. Have a hole drilled in the cover plate of the chassis op- posite the screw labeled “coarse C.R.T. bias ad: justment” (R6i8A). With a tum of the screy driver this adjustment may be advanced to spec the erasing process without switching radars. (b) Unsatisfactory Target Definition. Target definition on the VG is, of course, no better # the radar PPI from which it is repeating. But it can be just as good As with a radar, definition is a matter of proper focusing. In the first place the optical focus (matching of the black dots) must be practically perfect. If this is not accom plished the picture will always be blurred. Once the optical focus is achieved a satisfactory clee- tronic focus must be accomplished. This requires experience in manipulating the three controls— Video gain, C.R.T. bias and Focus. In general the following is recommended: Video positioned at-maximum, G.R.T. bias just a notch above num and adjustment of the focus by ob- (na TS aio va pe we ce a Mandard PPI, ‘The question has not been definitely settled. 6. Unfoe The VG Series PPI is @ com bination PPI and. plotting table. The sereen of the PPL is 25 inches in diameter ‘and. lies horizontally three fect above the deck. There are four electronic range ‘markers projected on the Also projected on the sereen is a compass roe showing both relative and true. bearings. rey Servation of the “giass” on the scope. This grass should appear as speckles and not as an even magenta covering of the scope. Be sure to keep the C.R.T. bias low enough for satisfactory defini tion yet high enough to pick up all targe (€) Too much Echo Persistence. Persistence of echoes has not been found to be the problem that other activities have claimed. Persistence ists, yes, but not to a damaging extent if the Init is focused properly and the plotters trained in interpreting the track. It may even be helpful in indicating the movement of a target. Land echo persistence might be quite a problem on a moving ship. With our stationary installation we have had no experience with this problem, But ith the suggested rapid erasing procedure this ificulty should be lessened. ADDITIONAL OPERATION COMMENTS: Following are several comments on VG opera- tion that are considered significant. The observa tions were made with the VG repeating from an SK radar operating at approximately seventy-five pércent efficiency. The unit was operated on the i de which has proved the most satisfactory for this area and our type of opera tions. 1, Targets at great range (outer go miles of the scope) present some difficulty in’ evaluation. This is especially true of crossing targets. At this range the target is so long that an accurate center determination is difficult. However, after several sweeps a satisfactory evaluation can be made. 2, It is frequently possible to follow a target ‘ough a land mass with some accuracy. IF the Outline of permanent land echoes is sketched on the plot, the protruding edge of the blip may be easily distinguished as it appears on either side of the permanent land echo and may thus be tracked through. 3. Glosing and opening data on targets may be obtained with greater accuracy and rapidity than on the usual PPI because of the broader ex panse of scope face. 4. Many more planes can be plotted effectively and accurately than with the usual operator plottersound power arrangement. Upwards of twelve targets have been simultaneously plotted and tracked with great accuracy 5. Time lag is reduced to a minimum, never longer than the time required for a single sweep. This enables a quick determination of an accurate clock code position in passing inform to the friendly during an interception. 6. Range markers are unnecessary to one: familiar with the unit and its ra It is recommended that they not be used as they ob: scure a target in the area they cover. One simple ruler-like device with the ranges etched on it is satisfactory for obtaining all range data quickly. 7. Accurate courses and speeds can be figured with great rapidity, usually within three sweeps This reduces previous time by two-thirds. Editor's Note: One limitation of the mentioned above is the fact that ceptible to “Window” and jamming than other PPI’s, It should also be noted that San Clemente used two VG’s without an intercept board. Only one VG is being furnished ships. “C.L.C.” would welcome a report from ships that have received VG's on their experiences in the use of the VG as-an air plot or otherwise in intercept work. VG not tis more sus: CONFIDENTIAL S¥6l WY 71D. CLC. APRIL 1945 CONFIDENTIAL he first fire control radar beacon had some unsatisfactory features. Called the Mark 1 Mod 1 it was heavy and lacked versatility Since it had to be man-handled ashore, its weight of 100 pounds was a serious drawback. It had short battery life which greatly limited its usefulness, and it operated only with the Mark 3 and Mark 4 fire control radars. Now, however, improved beacons are being distributed to the fleet. These are Radar Beacons Mark 2 Mod © and Mod 1. Mod © operates with F Mark 3 and 4, while Mod 1 operates with radar Mark 12, or radars Mark g and 4. An extra dipole and capsule are provided with the Mod 1 so that it can quickly be changed to operate with any of the three radars. The new beacon is quite “portable”, weighing only 40 pounds; and its bat tery life is many times that of the first beacon. The beacons are used by Shore Fire Control Parties to supply ships with a reference point ashore by which the ship is able to deliver highly accurate fire. Properly employed, the beacon gives results superior to those which ¢ Hadar Bacon Mak = (snot only aliable tn poksi-o} Battery, contol box, and anlenne sytem by using conspictious landmarks and terrain fea: tures as reference points, since identification of the reference point is positive. However, Shore Fire Control Parties will continue to use the land: marks to help the ships to get on the target, as a valuable supplement to the beacon, radioing the information to the ship. HOW THE BEACON WORKS The beacon signal is displayed on the ship's fire control radar indicators as a strong target pip, fee from confusion with land echoes. The ship's radar operators determine the beacon’s range and bearing by the usual methods of control for an isolated target. With this reference point fixed, the ship can then deliver accurate fire on targets according to relative positions designated by the Shore Fire Control Party The Mark 2 Beacon consists of a transmitte and a receiver interconnected in such a way that, when a pulse of very short duration is received from the radar equipment, the beacon transmits a similar pulse almost instantaneously 3 © improved radar beacon aids MM rccsicd on the spe + ‘The approximate range of the beacon may be sead directly from the ship's fire control radar ange unit when the beacon pip is centered in the notch of the range indicator, just as though the beacon pip were an ordinary target echo. If greater accuracy is desirable, a sinall negative cor rection of about 150 yards may be applied to the range reading to compensate for the short time delay (less than 1 U-see) in response of the beacon. It is extremely difficult or impossible to identify the beacon pip and to obtain its range and bear ing if reflected signals from land objects surround. ing the beacon are at the same frequency as the beacon signal. For this reason the beacon is tuned a few megacycles away from the radar frequency, and the fire control radar receiver is retuned to the beacon’s reply. ‘This results in the elimi tion of land echoes, and the beacon pip alone is The director trainer matches pips or centers the target spot on his train indicator in the same manner as for an isolated ship target, and thus obtains the accurate bearing of the beacon. sifore fire control CONFIDENTIAL The Mark 2 enn be carried on ma’s back. The otal weight I approximately 40 pownds. The beacon ease tx splashproof, ‘and! waterproof caps protect the tuning. mechanism inside the Two methods have been developed for use of the beacon in Shore Fire Control. If accurate charts and. grid coordinates are available, normal methods of indirect fire may be employed, pro: vided that the position of the beacon is accurately known, With the aid of the beacon more accurate fixes can be obtained than would normally be 9 ° 3 CuI. C, APRIL 1945, possible with radar control relying solely on Radars Mark 3, 4 or 12. If accurate charts are not available (geographic position of beacon not definitely established), the firing ship can use the relative position of the beacon from the ship (ob: tained by the fire control radar) to lay the guns on a target designated by spots from the position of the beacon. The two methods of control, (a with the beacon used to provide an accurate navi ational fix. ence point of aim, may be briefly su (b) with the beacon used as a refer (a) Beacon Providing Nav This method of control can be used when the beacon’s position is accurately charted. ‘The bea: con is tracked by the fire control radar, prefer ably with the director in full automatic, until a good steady solution is obtained. Ranges and bearings of the beacon may be used in CIC to fix the ship's positions and thus determine ship's tack on the chart. ‘The range and bearing of the designated target is then determined from the chart by usual methods and introduced in the computer, along with own course and speed, target course and speed equal to zero, so that a continuous target solution will be generated. This method of control is independent of the spotting limitations of Computer Mark 1. and (b) Beacon as Reference Point of Aim This method of control can usually be employed, since the beacon is primarily intended t provide close support fire for troops ashore. ‘The normal fire control set-up for direct fire may be used with tracking of the beacon in full radar control in the same manner an ordinary ship target Range and bearing data are wansmitted to the juter in Plot, and a continuous solution is thus provided with the beacon as point of aim Spots are applied at the computer in accordance with information received from the Shore Fire Control Party on the position of the target with respect to the beacon. In this way the point of fire may be shifted from the beacon to any target within the spotting limits of Computer Mark 1 The Shore Fire Control Party spots the fall of shot with respect to the target, and these spot cor rections are applied on the computer to give quick hits. This method of control is limited only by the magnitude of the deflection spots (180 mils right or left) which can be applied on the com puter. It should therefore prove adaptable to most problems for which the beacon is designed GENERAL DATA ‘The two Mods are identical except that as for n extra CONFIDENTIAL capsule (containing transmitter and receiver) and dipole are furnished with the Mod 1 for operation, with Mark 12 or 3 and 4 ge Radar Beacon Mark 2 Mod O may be tuned to any frequency in the band of Radar Equipment Mark 4 (or Mark 3). Similarly, Radar Beacon Mark 2 Mod 1 may be tuned to any frequency i the Mark 12 band or Mark g and 4 when so adapted. ‘The beacon, when tuned to the approximate fre quency of the associated radar, replies with 0.75 microsecond pulse of 15-watt peak power for every pulse it receives from the radars. ntenna is horizontally polarized gree with the polarizations of Radars Mark Mark 4, and Mark 12. ‘The reflector of the beacon, antenna provides a directional beam of go° in the horizontal plane and 60° in the vertical plane, resulting in an antenna gain of about 10 db. The complete leacon equipment is packed in @ one case, and shoulder straps are provided to make it easily carried on the back of one man. The total weight, including a 3-cell storage battery attached to the main case, is approximately 40 pounds. Replacement 3-cell storage battery units, weighing approximately 10 pounds each, are sup. plied with cach equipment and can be quickly substituted for the attached battery. Each battery will operate the beacon only three or four hour before recharging, but enough batteries will be supplied in the future to provide 15 to 20 hours operation. ‘The dipole and capsule for changing Mod © to Mod 1 weigh about four pounds. (A) It is important to note that any 6-volt stor- age battery may be used as a power supply through use of the “jeep” cable supplied with each equip QQ ment The beacon a This cable, which replaces the regular 2 foot battery cable, has.a proper fitting for connec tion to the jeep battery and beacon equipment ‘The beacon case is splashproof, and waterproof caps are provided inside the case to protect the tuning mechanism. Reliable radar ranges for use of the beacon will depend on a number of factors, such as; (1) Siting of beacon, or its location with re spect to the ship, surrounding terrain and other objects (2) Orientation of beacon antenna with re spect to ship, which must be within the go® sec tor of the beacon's horizontal beam width. (3). Amount of detuning of the radar receiver in order to eliminate land echoes. (4). Meteorological conditions. be more control with 1 dl and be Ge erizonca Radars Mark 3, Mark 4, and Mark 12, provided that there is a clear field of view between the radar ss, and the ship lies within the n width of the beacon, Under ideal conditions ranges of more than 40,000 yards have been realized. OTHER POSSIBLE USES Radar Beacons Mark 2 Mod O and Mod 1 primarily intended for use of shore fire control parties in providing accurate data for radar con. trol of ship's gunfire against shore targets in sup- port of landing operations. However, capabilities of the equipment suggest other possible uses (2) Employment in landing craft as a means of ae ee : ‘The beacon pip is Gercer is tuned directly to land echoes. herdly discernible since the reflected signals from land object nicy a4 the beacon signal fare om the same freq vectoring the craft through restricted waters to selected positions on the shore. 2) Employment in boats for against nearby shore targets. ) Use as a target for alignment (or boresight- ing) of Radars Mark 4 and Mark + (4) Use in Aircraft which fly over targets and thus provide target designation in range and yg to the firing shi ) Use in establishing the front lines of ad vancing troops. Development of is now under way for this lightweight beacon in order to provide operation with the S-band fire control radars, such as the Mark 8 and Mark 28 directing fire 1 S-band transmitter receiver The scope patiers below shows how the Beacon pip stands Ont whew lond eehocr are eliminated. ‘This can be done if the Beacon ts tuned « fei megerycles awey from the rater free Beacon spy CONFIDENTIAL S¥61 Wd ‘O19. C1. APRIL 1945 ABK was . es Mi, 8 Mod 2 is Mi 10 Mu 26 * . . =a Ma : : : . Me 29 aay ska aos > CONFIDENTIAL refresher training for limited availability Rel tuaining is the Keynote to up-to-the-minute opera tional efficiency of your ship. ‘This is particularly ue with regard to electronic equipment, on which pervonnel can so casly go stale or fall behind on modifications, new develop. iments and new operational techniques. To meet this Fleet need, a reorientation and sejuvenation ‘of Navy Yard Schools has recently been authorised. On the East Coast, their reorganization into Naval ‘Training Schools (Electronics) has already been accomplished and for West Coast Yard Schools the reorganization i proceeding at a fast pace, The primary mission of Naval Training Schools (Flee tonic) is to provide short familiarization courses inthe tiainipulation and maintenance of electronic gear, for ofcers, operators, aud technicians of ships having short Yard avail ability. ‘The courses of instruction include radio, radar, sonar, fand associated electronic equipment. They are designed to be flexible and to meet the particular needs of the individual ship's Personnel both as to subject matter and as to length of course Tn accomplishing this mision, training offered by Navy Yard Schools is not to be considered in any way a6 being iro, pertain) rae by the ciel op Nery aide fon and off, instruction in safety precautions, ct. aintenance instruction will mot attempt to provide train ing such a however, offer familiarization with new circuits, trouble shoot fen at advance radio materiel schools. It will ing, preventive maintenance and safety precautions, in addi tion to manipulation of the gear as described above, Te will be pointed at d training for specie equipment aboard ships having, availability in the particular Yard in TThe schools listed on left are now equipped to give refresher courses on the equipments indicated, to officers Ships with availability of from two days to posibly two weeks In many schools other equipments, particularly counter measures gear, are still scheduled for instalation. Courses oor fring these equipments will be started as soon as installations sre complete ‘Commanding Oficers and Prospective Commanding Oficers are advised to contact Fleet Administrative Officers, for COTCPac representatives or Ditectors of Training Naval Districts to get the answer to “When, Where and How to send personnel to Navy Yards or other radar ot ‘Commanding Oticers and Prospective Commanding Officers are encouraged to forward comments and criticisms regarding the training received at Naval Training Schools (Electronics) to the Bureau of Naval Personnel (Training) with a copy to the Chief of Naval Operations (Op-25B). It is only from such information that these schools will learn if their existence is justified, which depends entirely on their offering training Which sitifies the needs of the Fleet. Additional informative articles concerning availability of basie and refresher training for CIC offices, technical officers, radarmen, and radio technicians are listed below: GENERAL INFORMATION The Basic Training Pr connel”—"C..C2" December 1944 Naval Training Schools and Miscellaneous Training Vee ls and Activities”-BuPers Training Bulletin 13 December im for Radar and CIC Per CIC AND RADAR ‘Radar Center ‘Trains Thousands for the Pacific War’ C1" September 94 Septem: ber 1944 Hollywood Strikes at Japan”—"CLC” February 194 REFRESHER COURSES ‘Refresher Courses are Available to Ships Calling at Many PortsBuPert Training Bulletin 15 January 1945, CONFIDENTIAL CAC, APRIL 1945 & Pacific fleet radar center curriculum In a previous issue, the activities of Pacific Fleet Radar Center in training officers and men for CIC duties in the Pacific theater were described! To keep pace with the increasing demands on CIG, the training program has been intensified der a recent revision of the curriculum of the shter Direction and CIG Advanced Training School, and additional equipment has been placed in operation. The CIC Watch Officer's course now covers a period of 4 weeks. Greater stress has been placed upon general ship organization and underway routine, particularly with respect to gunnery, communications, tactics, conning, and responsi bilities of the Officer-of-the-Deck. Practical work in the mock-ups has been doubled. The fourth week’s instruction covers task group operations with emphasis on different types of missions and the operation plans and basic do relative thereto, Fundamentals of fighter direction, R/T procedure, enemy air tactics, and the simultaneous air and surface situation are in the course. The Intercept Officer's course runs an addi tional four weeks, three of which are devoted to interception. Each student controls aircraft on 15 to 20 intercepts, and an additional ten on visual type intercepts. The week of visual interception is now a part of the four-week course. Half of the week of visual interceptions comprises recogni- tion of a specialized type, in which combat and operational features of recognition are stressed (special emphasis on low-flying aircraft). The re maining time is spent in solving simulated prob- lems of fighter direction wherein recent am- phibious and carrier task group operations are re- produced. Warning nets, inter-fighter direction Cirenits, tactical circuits, information circuits, multiple-interceptions, homing lost aircraft, rescue procedure, and the complex air situations typical of current operations coristitute the subject mat tet of this period of instruction. The new CIC building, 3-P, is now in opera tion. New destroyer, cruiser-battleship, and car rier CIC mock-ups, each with a fully equipped “bridge” for the conning officer, are used indi vidually or in combination to simulate current operations and missions. September 1944 “C10” CONFIDENTIAL revised ic) ‘The new fighter direction annex at NAS Hono- lulu is in full operation. Radar type intercepts are run from a CVE-type CIC, utilizing informa tion from SGR.527, SG-2, and SCR-584 radars. Topside (40 feet above sca level) the visual inte cepts are run simultaneously. SM TRAINER ‘An SM radar trainer has been installed by Spe- cial Devices Division, Bureau of Aeronautics, and is now being used in training Intercept Officers. i The trainer consists of a mock-up of the SM Om) + (@ console, on the indicators of which two synthetic signals are maneuvered by. means of two “equa- tionsolvers” or targetmaneuvering mechanisms. With this equipment, operators can be trained to track signals and make altitude determinations as they would with the SM radar, and training cin be given in controlling nightfighter interceptions. The target maneuvering mechanisms are “flown by means of “Ground Speed,” “Rate of Ti and “Rate of Climb" controls. Compass and al Seer ct ag ee os ordinate chart on which a spot of light is projected or yards are easily read by turning two in a manner similar to that of a DRT unit. The round dials unit can be maneuvered over 360° in azimuth, £. This navigational aid is a small eight-inch 9 to 60 or 65 miles range, and 0 t0 approximately SV AM@Mpastic square with circular inner dials on which = | time, speed, and distance have been plotted logarith: \ metically. You may set any two indices (i.e., time and speed, speed and distance, or distance and time) ner as on an SM. Their range, azimuth, and alti- pes thes seach ean iain hemsetatthe third Bebeedion die eine ope ot indice index. For example, if your ship has traveled and with the approximate accuracy of the SM. 19 minutes at a rate of 25 knots, set the dials so Dard aresioyidcvutorianaliding ack eee that the time index is at 19 minutes and the gaia atietwation GP sbaals ith range, BT speed index is at 25.’ The third index will show oscillator drift, and receiver tuning, as well as the effect of the antenna “wobbler” of the $M radar For convenience in running intercept problems, attachments supplied with the trainer permit showing the same two signals on a standard remote PPI as if presented by an SK radar. This allows a continuous “picture” to be presented on the re- mote PPI, even though the fictitious antenna of, the SM trainer is stopped at a fixed bearing to in vestigate one of the targets. DISPUTES UNSCRAMBLED... » « me or distance “Is considerably simplified by using the Nautical Slide nding the unknown quantity of speed, Rule, On it, time in hours, minutes, and seconds, WITH THE NAUTICAL SLIDE RULE Electrical outputs of these mechanisms are used to position “blips” on the trainer console, where they are ranged and investigated in the same man: the distance covered, which is in this case exactly 16,000 yards or 8 nautical miles. Although the Nautical Slide Rule is not now in cluded on the CIC Allowance List, it has bee used in many CIC rooms and has been found to be \# very handy. It has been listed as a Title “C” item and has the Standard Stock Catalogue number 18-R-114 @stribution to continental and overseas supply ‘depots is in process. CONFIDENTIAL Sr61 Tv 1D. ‘Sia iii iia CLIC. APRIL 1945 CIC AND FIGHTER DIRECTION USS LAWS (DD) (Mindanao): “The small wooden sampans or |: nding craft gave a very indistinct pip on the SG-1 radar at about 6000 yards, which was the maximum that-they could be picked up. When practice spotting was attempted on these tar gets, the splash made by the fall of shot of the five-inch battery produced a larger pip than did the target itself.” Comment of GominCh “This performance is below that of the other ships of this task unit.” - USS SANTA FE (GL) (Mindanao), “All enemy ships outside and in the mouth of BISLIG Bay were of the coastwise cargo type or smaller, apparently constructed of wood Pips obtained from these vessels when beyond 10,000 yards appeared like side lobe or cloud echoes. ‘No real difficulty was experienced in detect CONFIDENTIAL EXCERPTS FROM RECENT REPORTS ing or tacking them with the surface search and fire control radars. No attempt was made to check them with the air search radar. This would probably have been impossible due to the landlocked nature of the area in which the/-™) ships were found. Practically the same may ie said of the Mk. 4 radars. So many side lobe echoes were obtained with these radars that it was considered better to range by optics. “The ship's position with respect to land was determined by fixes with SC radars on SAN- CO Point, TIGDOS and MANCAHORUM Islands. The DRT track was oriented accu: rately enough to have permitted a shore bom bardment to be conducted with good results™ using the SG only “In all, six of these vessels were detected and tracked by radar outside the inner bay. ‘Track- ing was done by the SG-1, while the SG was used to keep track of our own forces and to aid navigation. “Maxi SG (on foremast) SG-1 (on mainmast) Mk. 4 Mk. 8 Mk. 8 Mod. 1 es obtained were as follows: = 18,400 yards —22,800 Spotting was done with the Mk. 8 Radars only. They again proved very effective even spn ships close to land. The only casualty suffered was to the after Mk. 4 radar. The concussion of firing shorted the 2 x 2 tubes and cracked several insulating wafers in the trombone section. The main frame of this unit is in Control Aft. As it has suffered this same trouble before, it is consid: ered necessary to furnish more adequate protec tion, This problem is at present under consid. eration.” Comment of Cominch: It is noted that the radar performance of in: dividual ships and on different targets is varied. This may be caused by a multitude of factors most generally not under control, but ships must continually check material and personnel | Deora to insure that both are perfect However, there is evidence of a keen percep tion of the value and limitations of the radar equipment available. New equipment to cor rect present limitations, with its attendant new problems, is now enroute to the Fleet.” : USS SOUTH DAKOT. a Strikes): Phe carrier CIC's did an excellent job dur- ing the whole of the operation. Not only was fighter direction well handled but the collect ing and the immediate disseminating of perti: nent information to all ships was very helpful. “The practice of vectoring out a VF division to trail returning strikes back to base is con- Surred in as a means of locating and destroying enemy aircraft coming in under the security of the IFF of the strike planes. If fighters are not available, the strikes themselves might orbit before coming within AA range in order to detect strangers in their formation and locate their own planes. (BB) (Numerous “Friendly planes that maintain station close to the formation protect enemy planes with their IFF, particularly when a large number of friendlies are present. It is recognized that the best means of breaking up an air attack is with one’s own fighters, and ships are glad to have them in the immediate vicinity for that reason it makes it extremely difficult, however, to de tect friend from foe, both optically and by radar; and there will be times when fire is opened on friendlies and withheld from the enemy, both of which happened on this ship during the period covered by this report.” - USS INTREPID (GY) (Luzon Strikes): “At least four of the planes penetrated the screen and made suicide dives on the carriers but a full accounting of all bogeys—and all other CIG activity!—ended abruptly when two crashed on the flight deck of the ship. “Few recommendations come to mind for preventing a repetition of this disaster, at least partially because it is believed that fighter dit rection accomplished about all that could be expected of it. Fighter direction’s main pur- pose is threefold—to break up enemy raiding formations, to destroy as many attackers as pos- sible and to alert the ships of any planes that do get through—and it did all of these; but it should never be expected to destroy all planes in a raid all of the time, However, it is obvi- ous that a consistently higher degree of success may be expected of fighter direction if it is possible in any way to improve the basic radar information in either quality or quiantity “This includes, among other things, simpli- fying the radar operator's screen as much as possible, particularly at busy, confusing times such as exist in all actual or threatened attack nd anything which could be done to reduce the number of targets on the screen would be a big step in the right direction. First of all, this ans continuing the emphasis on better join- ing up of returning strikes, as mentioned be- fore, possibly even sacrificing a few minutes off time over the target to help this and incident ally to reduce the number of returning planes low on gas, Furthermore, it seems that the Jack patrols could be done away with for they do not appear very effective in their primary mission of detecting low-flying bogeys. They are a continued source of trouble to keep lo- ns inevitable that one or cated, and also it see CONFIDENTIAL S61 Wad¥ O19. C.1.C. APRIL 1945 $ more of them always has some communication or IFF failure. “Combat air patrols over pickets should also be abolished for much the same reasons, and it has been pointed out by pilots that one of the picket CAP’s main duties—to check returning groups for shadowing bogeys—could better be performed by planes from the groups them- selves. ‘Newly-launched strike groups must also ree ognize the importance, when the force is under actual or threatened attack, of unusually prompt joining up and clearing of the imme diate area, The presence of stray friendlies within the screen is at best a nuisance and a delay to AA batteries and in the last attack even caused a ‘cease firing’ order to be passed at an extremely crit al time—in fact at least fone 5” battery had just gotten well on its target and was sure that another round or two would have finished off another suicide diver.” Editor's Note: See lead-off article in this issue entitled “Di- vine Winds,” which is based on our most recent information on the use of JACK patrols and picket CAP. It is thought the elimination of ASP has aided in simplifying the radar screen, and that visual control of JACK patrols by Destroyers and Battleships has made its use fruitful. “C.C.” would like the benefit of comments from Fighter Directors on this entire problem. - USS HANCOCK (CP) (Luzon) “During this entire operation only three ban: dits were on the radar screens, and relatively few bogeys had to be intercepted. The entire operation was so well planned and executed CONFIDENTIAL that CIG was able to give a well-evaluated pic- ture at all times. This is borne out by the fact that only three ‘Torpedo Defenses’ and only,g one ‘General Quarters’ had to be called against bogeys closing. “On a few individual planes, or groups of planes, closing this fleet, no IFF could be rec ognized on the first plot. However, almost im: mediately, at least one other ship would report seeing IFF on the particular bogey report. In cluded in these were own returning’ strike groups, PBM’s, PBY’s, PV's and TBM’s from nearby Hunter Killer groups. Strike groups, returning via the strike picket channel and beyg ing ‘deloused’ by strike picket CAP, were easily evaluated as friendly and needed no further in- terception for identification. This allowed the task groups CAP to remain on station without being needlessly vectored out. ‘The very few bogeys that did not return via this channel, were intercepted either so fast or so far away from this force that needless alerts were at a minimum, ‘All of the three bandits were picked up at night. The first one was intercepted an splashed, the second got away, and no (VF (N)) were launched against the third. ‘The first bandit was picked up at 0345 in the early morn ing of our run in on 14 December 1944. He was first seen at 248 degrees—47 miles, angels 1 course 115 degrees, speed 150 knots. Enemy airborne radar was reported at 230 degrees—go miles and lasted for less than four minut According to all evaluated reports bandit did not haye his radar in operation until: it was first reported by our countermeasures gear, then left it on only for a short while. From his course and position during this time it is be lieved bandit never had a radar contact of this force. During this time the USS INDEPEN DENCE launched two night fighters and com- eee with one of these. Their nications and none too good, so the TGC turned the inte cept over to the USS HANCOCK. In less than ten minutes this vessel's radar information was poor, so control was returned to the USS IN- DEPENDENCE. After a few minutes control ‘was again shifted to the USS HANCOCK and in a short time ‘contact’ was reported by the (VE(N)), at twelve o'clock, two miles. The night fighter closed in to three fourths of a mile then had to go right down on the water to make visual contact. He then tally-hoed and splashed ‘one Emily, bearing 180 degrees—55 miles from the Task Force at 0422. General evaluation | was that we were not spotted during this run in. During this operation the radars performed Dats. “Low ying planes were picked up by ar information were the SM consistently at ranges of twenty-five to | thirty-five miles. Surface units were picked up and tracked at ranges up to forty-seven miles The SK and SG radars continued to operate most satisfactorily, and the SC-3 radar per formed better than it ever has before.” ° | @s sancus sscanp (cre) (Pritippines) “Closer cooperation between CIG and look ‘outs was achieved by stationing at Gunnery Gontrol during daylight hours the ship's Rec- | ognition Officer, a GIC Intercept Officer, and a JA talker-plotter—these in addition to the JL \gggikcr-plotter. As a result of the constant ex- Be i intectnttion thesehy dae postu CIC was in one instance able to coach the CAP toa tally-ho when many friendlies and bogeys @c s0 close to the formation that it was im- possible to track the bogey by radar. The JL. talker-plotter at Gunnery Control again proved his value by providing GC with warning of ap- proaching bogeys and enabling the GC Officer and lookouts to locate bogeys visually much : COMMUNICATIONS COMMANDER AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET: “Communications n Combat Informa: tion Center have become so complex that a message center should be installed or communi cations simplified to where they will be work able. It is suggested that a study be made of this problem by communication and. fighter direction personnel. - COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON (MANILA BAY) ‘Radio communications are extremely portant in CIC and to copy TBS, MN, or MAN by hand has proven inadequate. Installation of typewriters and assignment of yeomen to a headphone copying watch is considered neces- sary. All radio circuits in CIC should be equipped with phone jacks and speakers to use interchangeably as the circumstances warrant. This has been found necessary in order to guard all circuits withont raising the noise level in CIC.” - COMMANDER TRANSPORT DIVISION (LINGAYEN GULF): Circuit discipline and voice procedure is constantly improving but much is yet to be de sired. The voice circuits are not being actively controlled or monitored and seldom is the net control actually known to the stations on the circuit. When a serious breach of discipline is noted, no one obviously feels responsible and the offending station is not corrected. Several serious breaches of communications security were also noted on voice circuits during current operations. It is therefore recommended that in the basic plan provisions for rigid control and monitoring of all voice circuits be made by specifically designating a station (preferably a senior member) as net control, Net control should be delegated with full responsibility for discipline and security considerations on desig: CONFIDENTIAL Sr61 Wd 91D. CALC. APRIL 1945 nated channel. It is further recommended that serious consideration be given to the questior of increasingly common violations of communi- cations security particularly while cruising in enemy waters, There is need for a new code for tactical maneuvering voice signals which would allow rapid coding and decoding and still provide a reasonable measure of security by daily change of code or key list.” - COMMANDING OFFICER, BATTLESHIP DIVISION (Leyte): The old story concerning voice circuits is still true, There is much need of improvement in upkeep of material, procedure, speed of transmission and choice of subject matter. Dur- ing the SAIPAN Operation a special voice moni tor on the fleet flagship with the call ‘BAD. NEWS’ did much to keep better discipline on voice circuits. If any ships improperly used a voice circuit, he immediately told them so. It is suggested that this practice be continued as ‘only responsible seniors will be able to do any good along these lines - CTF 5 “Communications in general were goods voice procedure and radio discipline have shown some improvement. Pilots and others are be: ginning to realize the importance of clear chan- nels for operational traffic. Fighter Director Off cers and Flight Leaders must realize their re: sponsibility in regard to circuit discipline. Comment of CominCh: “As should the officers in command from the Task Force Commander down—proper training, and indoctrination is all that will help. More circuits to do wrong on leads to further con fusion.” . COMMANDER TASK GROUP (MAPIA AND ASIA ISLANDS): “Voice radio is undoubtedly a potent factor in speeding up communications and is there- fore vital to amphibious operations. It is not however, infallible, and on occasions when it fails, visual signalling by lamp is sure and effec- tive. The importance of visual signalling should never be lost sight of by either of the services, and its efficiency should be maintained ata high level in spite of its restricted use these CONFIDENTIAL, days. On this operation there were two occa sions when it proved of great value: (a) The Army asked me for an immediad™ bombing of Bras Island; I had four bombers and no elfective radio to them; the message was passed to them by visual and the bombing was carried out (b) The party on Pegun Island had estab- ished itself on the north end of the island a before leaving in the evening, it was essen= tial for me to know if they had set up the radio and established communication with the outside world. Time was short and I had no effective radio communication with them, USS WILLMARTH got visual communication with them and obtained the required information in time These are only two small examples, buy they serve to show how good inter-service vistas communications can have quick and important results.” - USS CLARENCE K. BRONSON (DD) (VARIOUS STRIKES): “The TBS circuit continues to be saturated. Discipline on this circuit appears to be det orating instead of improving, with the high echelons of command and larger ships the prin: cipal offenders. On at least one occasion when the Task Force was maneuvering into position on the service groups the TBS came perilously close to breaking down altogether. A great many transmissions are altogether unnecessa Others can be shortened. Many retransmission ™ can be eliminated if ships keep a closer watch fon the TBS and copy transmissions that at the time do not seem to apply to them. It often ‘occurs that later these transmissions do become applicable. “The use of the tactical circuit (TBS Primary) for unnecessary and routine adi istrative traffic continued during this operation. It is recommended that visual signals and/or a lower frequency with greater range be used for such traffic especially during fueling - USS LEXINGTON (CV) (VARIOUS STRIKES) “Radio discipline during this operation showed a noticeable improvement, but the Yay ume of traffic which is placed on VHF channel °C’ frequently renders that channel useless. On ge eee sree Pets the force I too frequently jammed the circuit com- pletely by leaving their transmitter button down, Until the Fleet receives radio equip- ment with more than four VHF channels, it is recommended that some of the load on chan- nel ‘GC’ might well be shifted to channel “B.’ The latter is virtually unused at present, being merely a standby for CAP communications. If the Jacks patrol alone were switched from ‘C’ to ‘B,' the situation would be greatly improved.” - COMMANDER TRANSPORT SQUADRON (LINGAYEN): @ xv cquipmene performed very satisfac: torily. Not only is its continued use justified, but all ships not yet equipped should be so out fitted. The Australian ships in this group were not equipped with NAN equipment and could not be supplied at the staging area. This de- ficiency was a handicap to necessary communi- cation during darkness. Considerable mainte- ance is required in the continued use of NAN mon, but it is entirely worthwhile, - USS HARRIS (APA) (LINGAYE! “TBS waffic and discipline was satisfactory til the departure of certain unloaded trans- @:: from Lingayen Gulf. At this time there ‘were so many commands giving orders pertain- ing to getting underway and forming up that reception was extremely difficult, ‘The situa- ion was not born of a misuse of the circuit— it was simply a condition that the TBS was not designed to meet. The advantages of a single general frequency are well recognized. These are occasionally lessened by the need for a cit- cuit of more limited use. It is suggested that a combination could be effected by use of other aystals by separate units for limited periods, especially if flagships were provided with a sec- ‘ond TBS so there could he communication be- tween commanders on the common. Once the ships were clear of the congested area, they could revert to the common frequency. The é“ involved in changing frequency is not a idable obstacle. - GUNNERY USS YORKTOWN (GV) (VARIOUS STRIKES) “The practice of having the Gunnery De- partment keep a watch on duty in Combat In- formation Center 24 hours a day when in com- bat zones worked very well; and mended that it be continued. When bogeys were detected the information was sent to gun- nery more quickly than ever before, and it felt that they had all information possible o every enemy aircraft that approached this ship. - USS MONTPELIER (CL) (Leyte Gulf): “After the attack, a surprise barrage setup was designed especially for adverse conditions found in Leyte Gulf. It is proposed to use this setup in future actions of this type. In this setup either Sky Director or Air Defense con- trol officer upon seeing a plane to break out of clouds and commence run on this ship orders arprise barrage setup’ and Plot immediately sets target angle zero, speed goo and range 3000 yards. ‘The battery is then ready to open fire as soon as the director is on target. Control officer or rangefinder operator sends down a more accurate range as soon as possible. With- out prearrangement or planning, this method was approximately arrived at in the heat of the action on the 27th. Two planes attacking simultaneously from about 3500 yards in a shallow glide were fired upon by 5” with almost no solution or setup other than target angle zero, speed 180 and range estimated. One hit the water in flames about goo yards off the port beams, believed hit by 4omm fire; the second plane lost a wing at about 150 yards off the port beam and hit the water. “Against suicide dive attacks a high volume of well-controlled gomm fire is the ship's LIFE INSURANCE. “Intensive training and indoctrination of machine gun and director personnel is a requi- site. The following training devices proved to be exceptionally useful (a) The Mk.1 Trainer (Bishop’s. Hat)—to impress gunners and director operators with the need for smoothness in tracking and to de- velop ability to do it. (b) The Mk. 3 Trainer—to develop team- work in operation between gunner or director pointer and the sightsetter, and to practice the CONFIDENTIAL, Svb1 Wd¥ “O"1' C.1.C, APRIL 1945 procedure of picking up targets quick oping a good track, followed by firing and spot- ting and shifting to new targets. “There is no substitute for well-drilled, well: disciplined, and alert lookouts.’ Comment of Commander Cruiser Division: ‘Ships of this Task Group found themselves in a difficult and trying situation during the suicide attacks covered by this excellent report That the MONTPELIER came through prac tically unscathed despite the four individual and almost simultaneous attempts to crash her is evi dence of the competent manner in which her commanding officer met this situation and of the efficient performance of his personnel, of whom he may be justly proud. The ideas per taining to gunnery set forth in this report are food for thought as a help in defeating Japa- nese suicide tactics and will be given further study by ships of this division.” - USS TENNESSEE (BB): “On Fox Day the ship carried on experimen- tal operations with the Radar Beacon which the Shore Fire Control Party had set up on the beach. ‘This is the first time this ship has worked with a beacon of this nature. The posi- tion of the Shore Fire Control Party as estab lished by ranges and bearings to the beacon from the ship checked exactly with their report- ed position. The Radar Beacon should be a definite advantage in future operations partic larly when designating targets from it. In many cases target designations made by the Shore Fire Control Party are faulty, and this new sys- tem would eliminate such errors. The beacon may also be used as a tracking point after the Shore Fire Control Party is once set up, but in the majority of cases the contours of the island provide a sufficient number of tracking points. ‘The Radar Beacons would be more satisfactory to this ship if they were set up on a frequency for the Mk. 8 radar rather than the Mk. 3 and as the former is used about 100% during shore bombardment.” Comment of CominCh. “At the request of the CinCPOA, the T/O and E of Joint Assault Signal Companies has been amended to provide four (4) Radar Bea: cons pet company, together with the necessary personnel to carry and operate the beacons. CONFIDENTIAL These beacons are of value only if their geo- graphical location is accurately known to the firing ships, since what is wanted are beaco to permit the ships to accurately determine their position.” eS RADAR AND RADIO COUNTERMEASURES (RCM) (CTF 38): “Intercept receivers were installed in one VT of each Task Group prior to the beginning of the operation. Their use was of little value as in most cases the plane so equipped is one of the first casualties. Also. during strikes the operator is preoccupied with more importanj duties, to him at least; and very little radar i formation is obtained. Comment of CominCh: “Jamming equipment is useless unless you know what you are going to jam. Steps must be taken to permit intercept operators to de- vote their full attention to the duty of searching for enemy transmissions; otherwise there is no use of carrying the equipment in the airplane - COMMANDER TASK GROUP (IWO JIMA BOMBARDMENT): “The flagship experienced two instances of enemy attempts at radio jamming. Upc proaching Chichi Jima key clicks were heart= on the primary spotting frequency, 5195 Kes. However, this did not appear to be deliberate jamming. Twenty minutes after shifting to secondary, a slightly off frequency locked key was heard. This, together with occasional ‘V's’ appeared to be deliberate jamming. A shift back to primary eliminated the interference. The second instance of enemy countermeasures was during transmission of a long message to NPN 7 on 4295 kes. Fnemy employed a signal slightly off frequency and repeated the groups transmitted by the ship. Since NPN 7 was receiving ship's signal without difficulty, trans mission was continued by the CHESTER. ‘The Japanese operator stopped sending groups after a while, but upon completion of transmission receipted for the message without authentic ing, but this attempt at deception was ine tive.” ape, Overhead Radar Coverage