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COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER

J U LV 1944_

CONTENTS

TVindow 1 Radar and ltVeather 5 Thi Is Fighter Directum 11

Fighter Direction. Aboa'rd an AG 17

ome hip board CIG 8 1 The Night F1:ghte?' 21 H arbor nderuaie» Detection 2 Combat LeSS01t8 26 Leatherneck G I 26 T'U'o Kills On Probable 2

. . Arm 'i' co umnnds lind activi ies lire requei ted «I nd requests for c pie of thi and ubs quent i sues of (', I. . to: )p ru tion Branch, ,G. 0 .. Room 2BP39, I eutngon Building, l~Tashi.nc'toll 25) D,

(Jonfidential magazine published monthly by lilt> Chief of Naval Opera tions for th information of commissioned warrant. enli t d personn I, and peron authorizedvho e dutie Ill' connected with th ta i .aluse and O[ eration of Iectroni squipm It.

'rHE INFO MATTON ONTAINED TID

PUBL ATI N I CONFIDENTIAL find a nell all not be transmitte 1 01' reveal d, in nny manner, to !loy unauthoriz d per ions.

Thi publication is to be handled in ace rdance

with Article 16 avy Begularions, and will

b de tr yed by burning when it ha erv d it purpose .. Neither quarterly rp rt nor I' port ~ buminz are requir d. ...

OPER TING l_)ERSQNNEL ~ E INVIT ~ D TO SEND AHTI ~LE DIRE 'fLY TO THE EDITOR

Thi publication can b of rnaximum servi only

if op rating p ronnel freely con rihut, items of interest, ccordingly contribution !U' invited and_ may b addr s I directly to Th hief of Naval. Op ratio'll, Editor of 'C. . .", WHshiugton 21),

D. ,with a e py to immediate mnmanding Officer,

Contributions of all tn; ar welcome including critical connnent on article which have appeared in thi publication ugg tions 1'01' tile rmprovemeu

of quipment or te hniqu nnd personal aceounts of

op ra tion .

UNITED ,STATE FLEET

Headqaarrees of tbe Commun(le.r ill .hieC nvy Deportment .. , Washington D. C.

Prop rly used Radur with i s It 0 iated electronic equipment is on mea ur of ill' UI ri li:y over the en. my. The ombat .Information nter und the Cle team at' the principal means afloat and ashore, of utilizing radar iuforma ion. In the air, radar and radio play II rita] parf In this war. In trivinz for th most effective results in electronic warfare, the operational developmen of per onnel row t be COl! inuou 1y in accord with the echnical development of th quipm nt.

1 July 1941,.

This magazine 1 i established, us an aid to ommand [0, Avia ion and other inter sted personnel to l)l' ent, monthly a dizest of th Latest fJpBl'lltional method evolved and les on' Iaarned in combat so their skill and abilit mny at all time. equa 1 til e capabil itie of th qui pro en t w hi 11 i . a va i 1- able to them.

R .. EDWARD " Ohie] of taff.

WINDOW

LLOWEUS al'(~ '1W1tJ itJl'opping W hu)ow decoys {[Jnd ja'TlIlI1u3./·s dWl'illlg t7~e m.ajorifty of their 1'ai48 on land alld sea f Qrecs. This a1'tJi.oZe presents a dige8'i of informati,on 011. tId, type of decepti()'/'l, am.a desrJ"ibes the p'u/rpo~e, appeal'UlnCC, and oharccter-istiaB 01 Windo'w jam/mi.ng.

Window is paper-backed aluminum foil of uch siz anc shape as to can e a sizable reftc(\tion of the radar b 'am. It i 1I ually lropped in great. quantities by atblcking aircraft in the vicinity :f enemy lire-controlled radars, 01' further ont t jam and confu .. e. tl 'CI ( round ont I .Interception) and long-range warning ystems.

The radar bsam which 1101'1.l1al1y trikel au aircraft, and by reflection causes a single signal or blil) on the radar screen, .is similarly affected by Window "hen i j cut to the proper length, Instead of one or >levernl bYp8 from the several planes in the air, a profuslon of 'fie i 'ion ) targets, at various range and beatings appeal'. ou the sorsan. The operuton will b ome confused if DO pl'operlJ aained all thus 10.-1' track of lh ac ual target.

TLte primary purpose of Wind i to de' ive and confuse the enemy durina low visibili y and deceive Or j am his radar sy terns. Since t h enemy can _rely, during good visibilit on optical y terns of fire control. the use of Window to s oil his radar ranze Ita not b en 'considered too effective. However, the proper use of ,Yin dow azainst fire-control systems becomes increasingly u eful rIny or ni.tht a . the aCCLU'f}C,'i' and tmckinc speed of the contrelling radars are improved, and a the radar fire-controlled. 'l tem b orne mor and more electro-meclia nica Uy automatic.

WINDOW IN THE PACIFIC

Tactical u of Wl.J1dow hy our aircraft in the Pacific Theater c uld parallel th },)l'OV n technique employed .in the Em: ope an Theater, with modiflcu tions to meet local tactical situations, ,Vhen reccunai an' and jut Iligence indicat that, enemy bases pI: ships ure u ilizing radar for gl' und cou rolled int re ption,

gun laying searchlight control, r air fit rception ( ) against our nigh

bomhinz attn cs, various tactical mploym nt of Window would be indicated. The .J apane apparen y Iiav in tall d fire-control radars on some 01' their capital shi p. and npp l' ing DD' and DE's. It mu t bl'! assumed (hat the pace of d ,. IGIJJlIenl i such that ail' intercept ana searchlight eontrol are effective, or rapidly becoming so.

''1Vin(lo10'' on HIE tube. Horizemtal polaffiBa~01l.

"WindoiO onPPI." J[, (wy concentra. ti~'ll of "Window') to north, rJ Ild, jll1lLrni'rlO also [rom. the east.

CONFIDENTIAL

SOME TACTIC L USES OF WINDOW

Window is chi 1:lyan offen iv weapon u d to upse the nerny s defensive

m a ures, It may be us d (a) IOl' de. 'oy or ption 01' (b) t jam the enemy'

I'a Iar . ta) Decoy 07' deception:

( ) A false raid may be simulat d by dropping larg quantities of Window. within range of enemy radars ; then when enemy fighter go out to meet the supposed raid the true raid COmes in Iowan the target from another bearine.

(2) Window may falsify the size and compo ilion of 'trjJres, a few planes simulating Jarge O'l'OUp cominz in from various bearlngs, thus forcing theenemy to scramble and split fighter strength, and Ie nUlg the opposition which the real raid must meet.

(3) During low vi ibili lead planes may confound GOI with Window

which 0 ers up all other bomber in the fo 'ce an] preven . nemy controllers from directing .fighter 0 plan -to-plane interceptions.

(b) J a.m.mi'fl:g Enemy ,Rrulat'8:

(1) In the enemy's defended area a lane 20 miles wide to and £1'0111 the target, may be satura ed with phantom target ) rendering the enemy s fire control and intercept radar largely or compl tely usele . Bombers may thea travel this blocked-out kywaya.nd W110ad with a minimum of opposition.

(2) The area around the enemy's fire control radar may be saturated with Window so that neither gun nor lights C,U1 be radar-aimed. During low vi ~

ility, this L"I extremal efI ctive. ...

(3) Ship in a task fore may fire ahead larg quantities of Window run into it and be SCI' ened from hal' -based enemy radars.

(4) A bomber beinz pursued by a niaht fighter can jam the enemy AI by unloading indow and effectively SCI' en a Cl' t-awa ,

(5) A very ffective u of Winaow j_ i' r th -reening of a torped -

bomber or dive-bomber a tack 011 (ttl enemy a k force. Parachute-suspended Window can b used to blanket the entire area. of he taSk force, and the planes can then attack safe from detection uy theenemy's blinded fire-control radar.

ENEMY USE OF WINDOW ..

,.,,~.1

The Germans . taliated to the ni etl Nation use of WindQW by also ~ ploying this countermeasure. The Japanese have be n mploying Window in all areas of ~he Pncific.

Becenf German u e of 'Vi ndo w has rea ched the poin t w hers almost complete infiltration of all area ha been attained. The pictures Ill' actual photograph, of radar screens taken during a rece) German bombing raid in the nitad Kingdom area. Th Japaue e have also. hown an appre iation of h potentialities of Winu w by continued mcrease of th quantity used. Th .!.xi Powers have mainl oncentrat d their effort again radar operating in the meter bands though r eently tl German hav made p ciflc attempt azainst AJli d centimeter radar. To date there is no evidence that the Japanese have employed Window directed azainst our centimeter bands. n is prQcJijcnlly impossible to jam centimeter equipment b Muse of the narrowne s of the beam and the short resolution (distance in feet the signal travels between pules). To jam centimeter, W:i:ndowwon1d have to be dropped evel'Y 3 seconds,

APPEARANCE OF WINDOW

At the star of [ammin ,Vind \V will appe.ar a a s ri s of blips which resemble h blips from aircraft. I luge quan itie ttl' dropped in ODe area, a "bla k ut" of part of the radar s('1' en win 0 cur and t.h quipment may be render d temporarily ineffective.

As time goes on and Window lisparses ncb blip will bee rue wjder and, of le amplitude, and wbil 0 cupying more of h tim ba will become less hke

un aircraft blip, ..

The difficulties in operating are similar to tho e which would CUT ii.. clutter (ground return) extended.over wide limit of range and wa of an nmplJlll'

tude gren tel' than normal. '" ,

As with normal clutter one the Wrndow JIl.:n:rrmng ha been recognized lind the best method of operating is understood, much of the reduction in efficiency can be. eliminated.

POINTERS FOR OPERATORS -;

Follewinz are om fact about Window whichwill help 01' ra OJ'S to !' COO'nize its presence and to de ermine how to read hrough it.

1) The itrips of foil are ' uned' by th length 0 ~hich the~ al' cut" Approximately half the wav length of the radars to b Jammed owes maX1J1'l~ interference. Such Window i somewhat efftive again other ire luenm.e : moderately so against. higher frequencies btl much Te s 0 again t. low r frequencies.

(2) Window cut to half wav Iength is more eiIeetive against long pul e length than against short. Rarl/.ge . cli.8o'l:innination (the I'~g ,difi':1'':Hce ,ne~e ~ sary 101' two or more targets to be identified separately) aids m distinguishing phantoms from true targets, If batches?f Wind?w are not epllJ.'fl~ed in space by more than this range difference, the Wrndow will produce a continuous a

on the scope, malting i Vel difficul to _pick 011 the real target.

(3) Wind w is Ie s effective ~gainst rada.r: wit,h narrow ante.nna-b, am width and wedt side lob than agams radar WIth wid )' 11:11 arum-beam WIdth

and stronzer side lobe. tr nz ide-lobes iv th ame tr uble with Wmc1 ,

as with permanent echoe ,) ~hen batcl:eso£ Window are not separated in space by more. than a beam width a ~ontinuou echo appeu,rs on the scop a the antenna rotate , but wh n eparation exceeds a beam width there will be breaks in the contaminated area as Ole antenna rotates, and planes lllily be

spotted in these open spaces, •

(4) When large batches ,of Window are chopped ill a .,.iven aT~a IDflJ! echoes resembling aJl'crait will appear on the cope, Here are pointers on

how they look and act : , . .

a, Window echo beats v >17 hsavil , but otherwise 1 . nih ,to a fixed

echo with practically no chanze in range or bearing,

b. Window fa U relatively sl " . ~ it e:ff ·t remains 1 ng after de-

partnr of the plan which ropped it. Win 1 om tim spread Window ,0 as to contaminate large areas rather uniformly.

c. As in Figure 1, ,Vindow !Day sho~ ~ manJ: separate, closely pa~ echoes which stay at a. fixed range, III this lllnsb'ati~n the echo of the p~ dropping Window is at the dght. On n. PPI scope ,W~dow appea~s as, a solid block of brishtness along the trail of the plane dropping It, a shown ill FIgure 2,

(5) Af6l't operator: cn,n often read, tJ;1rough ~Vindow by familial'izi._ng themselves with ill tin ui.sbing characteri tIC of W indow echoes anti mampulating the controls of their et to combat Window fiE!ct and br~g ut v l'y po. sible clifierBllce b ween Wind wand, 'U targ , ~choe. Attention to range

oparation, beam separati n flutter ~ty 0:' mob~ty of. echo manual control and scanning the infe t d ar a manipulating gam controls-these methods have pr duced succes ful reading through Window many times.

GinCPAC AND CinCPOA SAY OF WINDOW

'Use of Window against fire ?ontl'ol radar can ue eonsidere, ~s Doctrine. The use of Window again t surface Wal'lung ystem Sh01Ud be limited to those circumstances when it is desired to confuse the enemy as to the d.iJ.'~hon frem which the attack is tn,king place and as to the number of planes taltm& part ill the attack. The U' of Window against early warnma sy terns rnay add t.0 ~he confusion of enemy operators but will n t prevent the enemy from ob amma

early warning f attack. .,.

'An energetic and aazr s ive enemy attack with the RId of Wmdow cs make well~tr.ained I'a.nge-fi'rider operators extremely valuabh . (Oontinued on R.

CONFIDENTIAL

BENDING OF WAVES

Unusual range are caused by O&1UUng 01' refraction of th radio waves by the atmosphere. A most important p cial a £ refract' on i the concentration of th wav en rgy in ducts within the atmosphere. This bending and duet [ormazion ) a direct re ult of the meteorolorrical factors involved-factors of weather and atmosphere-s-and peculiar in many cases, to the locality and the season,

Th 'HF 01' radar operator \1, uaily assumes that short waves and microwaves, at frequencies above abou 30 megacycles, travel aleng the line of sight from the transmitter to the receiver and in the case of radar, to and :from the target, Experience has shown thac this a umption, nearly true in mauy in-

tance may 1 ad to serious errors or false valuation if applied to radar operation and microwave COIDrnunication.

Radio waves are bent from a straight lin path as a result of refraction by the lower atmosphere. This bending Or 7'ef1-actio:n is generally recognized as a property of lizht, t is equally Ii property of radio waves. The underlying principles are exactly the same in both en es,

As can be . €len from the illustration of the ac ual pattern, the bending of the wave or rays by the atmoi ph re parmi s one to see farther than he would otherwise. In the fi ure th verti al dimen ' n have been strongly raggerated 0 that the earth curvatnre b com clearly visible. nder a verage weather conditions he h rison distance i increased by about ), percent but at an elevation near the first lobe the increase in runge is much less than this amount, This is the case of tandard refraction 01' standa'l"d propagation.

RADAR AND 'WEATHER

;;

~"IE-PHANTOM ENEMY

. WJne year azo tbi montli a Pacific force consi ting of battle hip cruisers and destroyer fired intermi - tent lv for ID01'e than at) hour aaainsf targe discoveted b t udal'. 1.11ld r til' run tan €I that created doubt as La the Pl' s uce of enemy fore

adar recep , II W-8 exceptional and af I'll' the ba - tie tarted spots were obtained which indicated that the enemy was covered with projectil -yet at· no time was enemy fire observed nor were enemy ihips

g1lterl.

But contact with nemy forces was ezpeeted.; the. crew wa keyed up and the SG, F and FD radars said that the (enemy was there, Res ult-a. battle with a phantom elJem .

The up hot of th battle was the conclnsionthat h

fOl'ce ha 1 been firing a an island some 75 miles outside th rang of the biz guns on the battl Wlto-ODS I herie condition had stepped in to modify the nmge characteristics of the radar €Its and, be-

cause of reception on second, third, 01' fourth sweeps on the scope tile l'WO'SS looked authentic as firs!'

l'\weep l'ftllges. ,

ViTeaUlel:' and atmos pheric conditions m3.y gl'eatJy modlf,V the normal range characteristic of radar and VIIF radio. erious enol'S and false evaluation of radar 1 resentation may T sult if we do not take into consideration th effect, produ e i h. thes conditions,

uch eft' ,t on radar and F may 1 a,i1e daub ill

0111' mind. a to the eff ctivsness of the equipment, W can, however, by understanding and allowing for these phenomena make useful instruments more effective; the weather will work f01' 'ins.tead 0/ a,gains.t radar and microwave equipment.

..;

CONFIDENTIAJ

IS

6 CONFIDENTIAL

7

. . . .

. , .

......

tween the rudar and the target. e can then ignore the eff ct of tandard refraction while doing his ork.

GUlDED PROPAGATION

Wan:l propagation deviating from tandard occurs 11111.11:'1' pecial weather condition. The most important !'ype is called "guided propagation", "trapping" or 'super refraction '-formerly ref ned to as annmalous propagation. The main feature of th is type of pl'opaga ion is an excessive bending of th 1'<ly lu to refraction. This bending occurs prin'jpallJ in th 1 WeI' layers of the atmo phere and mainly in the 1 we t f w hundr d feet. n certain I' giou 11 tably in warmer climate i excessiv bending i ob erved 0. high as 5000 fe t. The amoun of ben ling in rezion above this height i almo t always that of the standard atmosphere.

Two factors are operative in prodncing a rapid C'hange ot refractive index-with 11 ight: namely, variou 01 moi. ture with heigh~ ~U1d var-iatiou of ternre with heiaht. Excessive refraction OCOHl'S when I her i a ra pid decrease of moistur with height ("moistuT lap e ) au , to a Ies er dezree when th ria rapid increa f temp rature with h ight ("l mperatur inversion ') , Th IDa t pronounc d cases £ cce iva refraction oc ur ,,;h n b th th e conditions prevail at the same time,

The amoun of refraction that i the-. amount of ngular de1i()ction'of Ihe rays, is very. mall and in no ase exeeeds a fraction of a degree. How then can Lila small effect influence radar operations! The answer is that the, a not influence 0]) ration unless the angle between the raj itself and the horizontal is very mall. If radar is used for fire control earchli1!bt ' ntrol, or fighter intercept control, the targets are usually a me Iium or short rang v, and the angle

ehye 1] Lhe lin of igh and the horizontal i u uall

radar calibration practice, with coverage diagrams drawn er printed to. the % value of the earth's radius. This corrects for the e:fiect of normal bending.in he atmosphere. The radar operator merely plots the po ition of his arget on such a diagram and assumes

bat the radiation travels along a straight lin be-

t is rather inconvenient to. draw curved rays .in rada» coverage and calibration diagrams. This can be avoided by assuming that the earth's radius is % the actual radius, Then in the diagrams the rays appear as straight lines when the propagation is of the standard type. This method often is adopted in

-

CONF'IDENTUL

P. P. 1. 80(1)6 1I1w'l ill(}.

1J]JeI'- tandM'(l, Pl'op(lgaUrm UondUicms,

Lou: l----a,.rnm it III tter 40;t7, (I a I'()-IIJI d-

Ell ed DlIot.

this lobe is strongly affected IiW refraction

Rada,' lO'lie patt61'u in ttOn.stando,ni atmosphere . . . A duot has been formed Ol~ the Ilw"face and a1tf;p(s deteotea.

Radan' Zolle patte1"l~ in, Ilta.nda',·d. attn08p1tere ..• Stood!y variiJ,tic)n of temperature and Munf4ity aUJff,·,

8

LOBE DIAGRAM UNDER STANDARD CONDITIONS A LT nODE IN FEET

7000,

o

TRANSMITTER HEIGHT-IOO' . FREQUENCY-200 M.C.

larger than aDO two degr es. Refraction has practically DO fi'ect OD such an application of radar.

With early warninz radar the target may be an airplane 50 or 100 miles away and i may fly at all elevation of only a ew thou and feet. Inthis case

he angle of elevation of t11 ta,rget above the horizontal, as seen from the radar is only a fraction of a degree, This applies still mere to seaborne targets. The atmospheric effects then become operationally important. It should alwttys 06 kep in mind that only low-anzle search is aifected by meteorological conditions.

A overage diagram for tandard can iitions 1S shown ab ve with heigh trongly exaggerated. Only the lowest three lobe are hOWD and the high r lobe appear compressed as compared to the low lobe. To the right, (diagrams 2 3 4, 5) the lower part of the same diagram is drawn as jt appea;rs under various conditions of guided propagation. The bottom part of the" tandard" main lobe is shown

CONFIDENTIAL

RANGE IN NAUTICAL MILES

50

by abroken line. The hue which sepal'at the 'blind zones from the C detection zones' represen th range at which a medium bomber would jus become v-isible to this purficular radar t,

The diagrams cl acly indicate the great xtensil \ of runges in the duct, and al 0 Ih moderate chan

in rangee+sometime an extension, sometimes a reduction-above. the duct. Another feature of some of these di~~grams is the appearance of' skip-ranges. ! A. plane flying at an altitude of 500 feet, Tor instance would be detected early un er the condition . hown ill dia(J"l'ams 4 and 5. A. th plane approache t]le echo will disappear from th ope and reappeal' only

II a range Jess than. ~O mile. imilar condition will prevail for ground clutter. ill diagram 3 there would b ground clutter close in. and also from beyond 33 miles, but not from the space between. For conditions shown in diagram f5 there would be echoes from very remote ground taL'get.s but not from target

at int , l"m edi ate :raDO"e .

50

CONFIDENTIAL 9

COVERAGE DIAGRAM SHOWING DEFORMAnON OF LOWEST LOBE

TRANSMITTER HEIGHT -100' FREQUENCY-ZOO M.C.





ALTITUDE IN FEET 8000

2000 ----1- __

,. ,

GROUND BASED DUCT ~--,. ... '

. -0

-

10

3000

2000 -----4- _

CROUND BASID DUCT ~ ,. ... '

-0

3000

2000-----+-. _

3000

50

2,000 -----i. __

DETtCTlON ZONE

-----~

NORMAL LIMITING COV(RAGE

RANGE IN NAUTICALMIL£S

S omeiimes the Equipment Is At Fault . . .

.A. change in echo strength from day to day is not necessarily caused by the -weather, but. might simply be caused by a, variation in performance of the set. Cases have occurred where there was extensive brapping, but due to lowered set performance there was no corresponding increase in fixed echo strength. The set then will appeal' to be in good operating condition, and the operator will be deceived about ranges of detection -for craft flying about the duct. Equipment for checking set performance is not usually available in the field. The c1).ange in .intensity of nearby fixed echoes may be, in some cases, a measure of set performance but, in the absence of more elaborate checks, this method can be misleading and should not be relied upon entirely.

Failure of detection of targets is not necessarily due to weather influences. Electrical failure of the eet or :inadequate adjustment may be the difficulty .and may be far more troublesome to identify than meteorological effects which should not be used as a "scapegoat" to be indiscriminately blamed for poor coverage.

SUMMARY--;--Basio facts conoemilng propagation at radar frequencies

1. Standard propagation results in a slight. downward bending of the rays throughout the atmosphere, leading to an increase of the horizon distance compared tothe geometrical value. It is taken into account operationally by using coverage diagramswith a 4/3 earth's radius; on a diagram modified in this way the rays appear as straight lines.

2. Guided propagation occurs almost exclusively in the lowest 2,000 feet above the ground, and usually is confined to the lowest few hundred feet (except in warm climates).

3. Super-refraction resulting in guided propagation or trapping is produced:

(a) By a pronounced decrease of moisture with height (moisture lapse), or

(b) By a pronounced increase in temperature with height (temperature inversion), and

(c) Particularly, by a combination of both of the above conditions.

4. Of the meteorological conditions conducive to guided propagation or trapping, the most outstanding are:

(a) Over sea : Flow of warm, dry air over colder water producing temperature inversions and evaporation into the lowest layers.

(b) Over land: NoctUl'nal cooling of the ground with clear skies and calm air or light winds (if moisture distribution in favorable).

(c) Over both sea and land: Low -level subsidence. 5. Conditions in a barometric high, including calm and clear skies and especially low level subsidence,

10 CONFIDENTIAL

favor trapping especially dW'in~ the night (bu.t do n~t necessarily produce it). Conditions in & baro~etnc low including strong winds intense turbulence In the lowest layers, and overca t skies are conducive standard propagation.

S. Wh~ the transmitter is within the duct, radar range is increased for surface targets (ships) and aircraft flying .in the duct. At the same time there .is an increase in fixed echo strength. and consequently III ground clutter on the scopes. This may be aeeompanied by a change in the range of detection for craft flying above the duct.

7. When the transmitter is outside the duct, the range may either be .inereased or decreased from its standard value.

8. E:ft'ects of nonstandard propagation are negligible when the angle of elevation of the target is over 10• Failure of. detection at such angles must be attributed to other causes.

This article, in part, is a digest of the information in JANP 101, June 19i4 published by the Joint Communication Board, Washington 25, D. C.

SOIDe of the original illustrations appearing in JANP 101 are reproduced on these pages.

Copies of J liNP 101 have been distributed to Army

and Navy activities. ()

(001tti1wlell from page~)

Short of complete ilestrudion of the enemy and his eg_uipm,ent, the nealt best oountermeasuse is a wellwained operator:"

OPERATING THROUGH WINDOW ~

A partial antidote for the use of Window is 'ne use of the Iower- centimeter bands which Jend themselves most readily to narrow beams, hence better target definition. Shortening the pulse length also enhances definition but brings a reduction in range. Pending the replacement of present raders w~th Improved models, the best countermeasure to Wmdow when used by the enem , is training of personnel

Operators must be taught to recognize W.indow and drilled in reading through it. Thus, the enemy may be prevented from successfully contusing our opel'~ ators and jamming our scopes. It has been found by actual experience that the effectiveness of Window decreases with use. The response from Window appearing on the radar screen, characterized by a rapid beating of a higher order than that of a plane or the beating experienced between two targets, :is readily ·recognized 'by a well-indoctrinated operator,

THIS

IS

FIGHTER DIRECTION

... Photographs on these pages were taken from the moving picture MN-1006a; This is FigJtte'J1 Direction. Prints will be available for shipment approximately 15 AlHrust. They will be forwarded to all Carriers; Pacifi~ Fleet Radar Center i Radar Training chool, St. Simons sland, Ga.; Aviation Filin Libraries OomAirPac, Navy 0.140, Navy No. 145, Navy No. 115, Navy No. U7 j NAB San Diego, AS Alameda, N AS eattle, J: AS Norfolk, N AS Quonse, AS Patuxent River NAB Floyd Bennett Field, NAS Brunswick, NAS Atlanta; NATC Corpus Christi, NATS Pensacola, NATS Jacksonville' Fleet All' Wings 4, 11 12 & lS; Marine A nation Librarie and sublibraries MARFair West Coast, MCA Cherry Point, Navy o. 61, Navy No. 156, and 4tJ't MBDAW.

... The best defense against air attack is provide by the efficient use of our figh~er aircraft,

These aircraft, 0 successfully intercept the enemy, must be directed by radio from a ceuter which has at hand the information on the attacking forces, their course and speed, altitude and size,

...... Aboard the carrier is such a center.

Its function is continuously to furnish an accurate picture of the tactical situation and to take the necessary action to protect the task force from ail' attack.

... Unidentified aircraft-bogeys-are detected by the long .range search radar. The operator reports to the Combat Information Center, giving the bearing and range of the aircraft.

CONFID.ENTIAL

. ...

u

11

... I" hen the planes are fir t detected OIl the radar cope it may be difficult to determine information other than bearinz an i range of the targe.

ubsequent reports will when plotted and evaluated in omhat Information enter, show course and spe d of the bogeys and he important mfor, Illation on alti ud .

.. ~ .

.... The force fighter director desiznates the raid by number, gives instructions for 81e intereeptioi of the raid) and informs the task force eommander of the action taken.

.... The radio interc p operator furnishes valuable information to . 1. C. uch information-c-usn. ally translations of the enemy s ship 01' aircraft 'radiotelephone ccnveraafions=-may illdicate, for example, that a C(shado:wel'~ ha seen our forces and reported QUI' position to hi ba e.

CONFIDENTIAL. 12

.... When radar and ail- search information shows enemy air activity in great force ship and aviation personnel are ordered to General Quarters. C. I. C. i then fully manned and ready to operate under ba ttl conditions.

.... The force fighter director orders the appropriate numb l' of fighter ail' raft to be scrambled and combat ail' patrols take station as directed, dep~dent lll~on the tactioal situation. SODle fighters will remam over the force, ready to intercept ba:ndit8 which break through or sneak inside the

twenty-mile circle. '

.... The effie r in 11:0[1 of the vertical plot evaluate he radar plots visibl to him through the board and marks the estimated po ition of the planes :1:01' a particular time, He is shown here m~Ll'k:illg the position of f1iendlie' on their way

(Jut to intercept raid 3. .

CONFIDENTIAL 13

..... Th FDO has instructed the intercept officer to intercept raid 2. On the intercept board the position of the enemy and friendly planes is plotted continuously. The intercept officer endeavors, as the situation develops, to keep the fighters between the bcwulits and the ask force,

..... Beside the intercept board is a PPI unit on which is a radar picture of the situation. The intercept officer) as the interception pI' gr es refers to this indicator continually-sometime exclusively as the fighter overtake the oa'J't{/;its.

..... Here is what the intercept officer ees when the fighters are close to the bandits. The bandits are shown as the outermost segment, the fighters slightly inside j the task force is at the center 0:£ the indicator. Notice that the VF are directly between the raid an d base.

<4 As the Ughters approach the enemy planes the intercept officer informs the pilot of the direction relative from the interceptor's course. In this case he would say "Eleven thirty" and give the approximate di tance. The fighters have been vectored to intercept above and in fren of the incoming banili~8.

CONFIDENTIAL l1·

<411 "Tallyho') from the pilot to base. The fighters have contacted visually) the enemy aircraft. The fighters "ha,ve the ball" from here on .in until the enemy planes are shot down or dispersed.

.... "Splash." One enemy torpedo plane is downed, and the battle is on. If the enemy planes are protected by their fighter aircraft, the interceptors have (1 .. doubly ilifficult job.

.... This i how the vertical plot looks to the CIC personnel after two raids have been intercepted. The air battle is at a crescendo, and some of the enemy bombers or torpedo planes may break away and threaten another sector of the defensive ring around the task force.

..... If another raid develops as bombers break through the outer defenses, the FDa must vector some of the AP immediately to put them between the -new 1'tcid and base. Even with these measures some of tlle planes may get through to the ships.

CONFIDENTIAL 15

t ,

... The FDOinstrllcts the visual intercept oJ:licer to 'prepare for interception of the incoming torp d planes and his antiaircraft liaison officer k eps Air Defen e a-nd the gun crews informed of the posi tions of the enemy 11m - s.

... Top ide the plot and information are kept llV to date and he 'Visual intercept officer is ready to direct planes of CAP to intercept the bandits all the outskirts of the formation. These men: wouZrl be weari)ng hel/met8 at thi,~ stage of the battle.

. '

... Fighter Direction play a basic vital role in modern' naval warfare, giving the fleet gl:eatel' mobility ll.l both offensiye and defensive operutions, and enabliua naval units and tusk fore s to make maximum effective u e 0 their striking powerwith the ultimate target the home fleet of the enemy.

CONFIDENTIAL

16

CONFIDENTIAL 17

(') !"1 (')

~.

-~ ....

t

FIGHTER DIRECTION ABOARD AN AGe.!!

This view of an AGO CIC in opera-

. on indicates its complex duties in an amphibious a ault, Both the Vertical Display and.Intercept Pilot have polar coordinate with!l zrid overlay. The coastline terrain, loeation of landing craft, and dispo ition of Allied and enemy forces are clearly drawn in. The AGe I pre ants an interesting combination of shipboard and shore-be ed methods.

Here is the Vi nal Fighter Director position on an AGO. The visual FDO perates wi b binoculars and che phone, assisted by a plotter with fI small hoard and chest phone.

c'Ol'tfFIDENT[AL

18

W, looking aft. Faoilitiell fo7' conflrolling OomlJat Air P at'I'OZ8 and n'1.ll17beTOWJ raid . Verticol Display Plot and

tatu« B oord. tell the Fight- 61' Di'l'ectul' wIld the tac&ical sitluation is o;t aU times.

SOME SHIPBOARD CIC's

B B , loolr.ing 10t"W(Jf!'d. This eZtiborate set-wp shows an SO (//I'I,d K, two remote PPl'. DRT, plotting tables, sou n d power jack DOweS and intercom 'Ulfl,its radio remote clocks, and 'aU other gear' lor complete cO'1?trolling.

o A with battle stations marmed: Looming up in the left foreground, in front of the 010 watch officer, is a TDT (tm'get designation transmitter) giving romqes and oea1'itngs to remote stations, Often on 07'1.IIiser8, the TDIT is loco;ted besiile the radars but here, inte1'estingZy, 'is statiO'1?ed be ide plot,

CONFIDENTIAL 19

OL (6,500 tons) ltowng evaZ~,lator 8 position. This 010 contaens (next to far 1'igM-han& corn l' of DRT) a cllrem,i '(tel 'I'eoorde'r from which tb» range 'rate of submarinee 'may be dete1'1ni1Md, and. the sound staol« (behind the fire-consro! tube) giving 1'ange arncZ bearing of 8ubm,a?wes. Note the convenient locatior; of the battle hand Zanter"fl8 bolted to tAe overhead. The 1ru1/n.eU~Jel'ing boa:rd beside theIJRT and Plot Table is anunusutil teatwre.

DD, Zooloilng f01'Wal'd.-A 8&1'I'7)7e, (Jo1npaeL a1'l'allgemelfl,t pr~viding all faciUUes requi1'ed for emalttation and conirol.

20 CONFIDE TI L

21 ' CO mDENTIAL

.THE NIGHT FIGHTER, THE CARE AND FEEDING OF

A FOEMULA. for the ideal night fighter would include the mixture of one part dependable pilot, one part top physical condition, one part steady nerves and one part r S ain d imagination-c-plu a sprinkle of will to practice and a dash of dead-eye gunnery,

'1'11e nigbt fighter is coming into his own, The enemy has forced his hand, How our mght, fighter plays that hand will have much to do with he course of the war. He mu t successfully rneet the principal weapon left to the Inferior J up and German air forces: the threat of a decisive blow struck with cunning or urprise at night r in low. visibility. The ting still left in the enemy s night offensive tactics, parti ularly tha Jap S, is a damaging reminder of the nece sity £01' efl'ective night; fighter counter-measures.

From the above formula, it is not to be a' umed that the night fighter need be a carbon copy of uperman. A good nizht fighter is merely a top-notch day fighter-with added trainj.ng and certain minor refinements.

Dependability, of course, i a prime requi ite, The daytime 'dive and zoom" boy can sometimes give a sloppy compliance to an order, then eompensate £01' light deviations and no harm will be done. Durknes i a demanding master. Chalk up an irretrievably-lost opportunity for the night fighter who is 30 seconds late in cn.rryiug out the tighter director order or who takes a short cnt on a standard turn. It is obvious then that the night fizhter must be trained to ultra-precision. He must follow his instruments with the utmost confidence and abili ty .

TIle n cessity 01' top phy i al condition needs no elaboration. Without entering into a controversy with th vitamin enthusiasts ome of whom claim that a few nibble on a carro will produce owl yes, it must be admitted that physical fitness, which depends on proper diet is closely related to one of the main requirements of a nightfighter' efficient night vision.

For in spi te of the magic of radar which through Gel (Ground ontrollsd Interception) and AI (Airbotne nt rception) can put a fighter pilot in position to make a kill, it is still the human eye which in prac . cally every cas mu t take over at he final and most crucial stage. Yet there is no mysterious key to effective night vi ion. Almo t every pilot whose eyes were good enough to qualify him f01' flying has the nati ve equipment to do the required job at night. Experience has hown that skillful training and determined practice pay amazing dividends to the pilot who must work at night. l'his involves no extravagant claims, for the basic system is one the Nn,vy has utilized lor lookouts for many years-nigh adaptation,scanning, and indirect sigh t.ing ,

N atunUy, r cognition for the night :£igh tei; i a delicate and difficult proposition. It is just a impolit to boot down your :friends at night as it is during

22

CONFIDEI'UIAL

the daylight, even while gra.nting that it i much more difficult to recognize plane's features at night. Here again practice i essential (not in pot-shotti your neighbor, but in recognizing him). In a hart time the night fighter discovers. that even a tiny amount of lighting from the stars or the moon will give him a good deal to work with. The night fighter works by a system of dedueti ODS. His recognition must be so hot that even a sma 11 porti 00 oi'l1 plltlle seen in a split-second spot will be enough to tell him the type. Such impeding variables as illumination, distance, and restricted, sight area, plus a very tl'icky problem of odd di tortions, make a night fighter's job more difficult, but he is proving that it can be done.

A word on night adaptation. Some pilots object to the boresome procedure of wearing adapter goggles b fore the scramble but-until a ~1. w ype of human eye is manufactured-it is vital that the niaht fighter take off with his night vision at close to maximum efficiency. It still takes 30 minutes to reach that peak-and only one unguarded second, and a careless flashlight, to nullify the whole business.

The old saying that It pilot's learning days ate never done is doubly applicable to thsnight fighter. Long after the night lighter has said good-bye to his training days, he must continue to practice .. The reasons :fol' this extra adherence to duty are obvious. Practice provides greater confidence in in ment flying, the backbone of night fighting. Practice keeps a pilot on edg 0 meet some of flying's most PI' cision-demanding problems. Prac ice enables the night fighter to k ep st p with the latest tactics in a field acknowledged to be changing more rapidly than any other.

In the knowledge and te ling of his equipment the night fighter has a heavy responsibility. It is 11.0t only that he operates more complex equipment. Any failure to understand or give the proper check could cause a bumbled intereeptian. At the same time, any mechanical failure at night puts a pilot much farther out on the limb than the same failure during daylight ..

Night fighters are not taught to be purely defensive fliers, though the persal or harassing of an enemy bombing attack is one. of his primary duties. When accompanying a task force the job of talring care of enemy snooper falls impartantly within the night fighter's department. (It may be noted where night interception are concerned that success Ioes not entirely hinge on shooting dawn enemy bomber' to farce the enemy attack into evasive action often fouls up their navigation so badly that the raid results in a complete dud.) As the war moves along, the night fighter will play a larger part in the offensive scheme. As a swift-striking intruder he already makes life miserable-con possible fa:r the enemy's railroads and shipping.

Having eonfidence in theabilities of his AI gear, but recognizing its present limitations, ate necessary for the night fighter. He knows that his GOl unit can bring him in 0 contact, preferably behind and below the target. Often this demands a great deal of patience j to make a successful stern chase of an evasive target takes tune. No matter haw long the cha-se takes, the night fighter must adhere imp1icitly to the judgment of the flsrhter dir ctor until such time as

the chase is put into the pilot's hands PI' abandoned. The night fighter l"e~es that his AI should bring him from within three miles to l~s than half a lIDIe. He cannot a sume that die enemy will always be So' cooperative as to fly ~ smooth nonevasive course which would enable the night fighter to make the ~ll purely from information gained through his AI. He must know the SCIence of a successful night approach and he must be ever wary of radar eotmter-search

measures now being employed in eneml; bombers. . .. .

The night fighter possesses something of a Jekyll-~d-Hyde per5~.nality.

He is at once a lone wolf and the me t important cog in a closely-knit team. He m~t u e ~enuity and :imaginatian in the.final and crucial stag~ of a chase, yet in the preliminary vect~ring h~ must glV~ 100 percen . obe~ence to the fiuhter director. He is on his own ill a mysterior s element, but, if the fighter fuector is OD his toes the pilot is COIl tantly aware o~ the enemy's course speed, altitude, and relative position=end any changes ill those facto~'S. .

As the enemy's day light bombing attacks become mare castl! he IS being forced to strike under cover of darkness and bad weather. The night, fighter-:who will also get the call during daylight law visibility-must be prepared In

eyery way to deal with this challenge.. . .

The preliminary. phase of Night :~?lghter Training takes. 6 weeks. After

• opening with several hours of SNJ 1llstr1;l~el?t hops, t!le 111;ght fig~tel' then has 60 hOUl'S of F6F work designed to familiarize him with rught fiymg prob-

lems-instruments, precisions Hying safety, control, camera gllnn~ry, h?ming on 7..13 over land and water, cloud flying and FDO controlled .Bymg WIthout

a target. . . . '. . .

Paralleling tills, the. ground training phase begins by acquainting the pilot

with fighter direbtor procedure, his A radar, use of VH1! ~d oB: .He concentrates on low visibility recognition and gets further navlgati.on tra~g. A large pam of this phase of th? ground traini.ng cavel's. the Link Tramel'

,-} and includes more instmment flY1Ug, FDO vocabulary, VOIce proce~ure,~d FDO interceptions, Physical conditioning of night fi~htel's g.et~ a hlg?- 1?l'larity on the program. About one-fifth of the class tirne of. this ~rehmmary

phase is given. to valuabl? .1e~ ur~ by AOI o:ffi.cer~ an~ pilots WIth. co~bat experience. Aircraft familiarization, weather, flashing light cOI?mumcatlons,

and emergency identification complete tile syllabus for the ~st SlX weeks, .

The final 4-week phase involves another 60 hOUl'S of flying, 22 of them ~ radar classrooms and the rest in service-type night fighter plane. In this phase the empha;is is on the airborne radar sets and ~.e .vital ne(l~ssity far the

_. pilot's understanding the pel'formance: and c~pabilitles of his radar. A thorough course in the .AI ge_ar cover~ lllter~eptlOnsJ be.aeon appr?ltChes, n~d homing. Ground-cantralled interceptions with searchlights are included III this phase, as are lengthy sessions designed to p~oduce. bulls-eye night. gunnery.

Ground training for the final phase goes Into AI theory and procedure, demonstrations of the Combat Information enter, searchlight cooperaticn, night gunnery technique, more 1o,,:, vi ibility r~cognition. a~d night ~~g field control. One of the standout fea ures of this final training phase IS liberal use of the AlA Link Tnainer' which, with its electronic devices, enables the pilot to coordinate in yery realistic fashion the- varied yet vitally related problems of instruments, radio, and radar.

CON IDENTfAL

23

HARBOR UNDERWATER DETECTION

THIS NEw,little publicized field of endeavor is part of our answer to the enemy submarine threat to ships in our harbors the world over. As the name implies, Harbor Underwater Detection is (L Navy activity, whose function is to detect the approach and location of enemy vessels (both surface and submerged), give warning and provide sub equant information neces al'y to coach counterattackinz surface and aircraft in for he kill.

That the activity is succe ful i eviden from the fact that not one effective penetration 0.£ any harbor znarded by Iii ed States harbor detection equipment has been made since the J ap midget subs slipped into Pearl, Harbor December 7,1941.

Let it be clearly understood that Harbor Detection devices are not in themselves capable of offenslve action, but instead perform much ,the same function against surface and :ubmersible craft that Radar does against aircraft.

THE ONO-RADIO BUOY

A listening device anchored in the harbor approach from which position it transmits underwater ounds to a shore radio receiver. It incorporates a nondirectional supersensitive underwater microphone a high-frequency radio transmitter and antenna, and a large dry-cell battery.

Dependable underwater listening range :for the Sono buoy is 1,000 yards; while the unit transmits a radio signal receivable to between 12 and 15 miles. The Sene-radio buoy is usually the first of the detection devices to 'be installed; since-it is lighter, and lends itself to rapid handling.

"Harbo» Underuiate» Detectio1-,., urfiw8 and Subm,o/r.ine Wa~ning Notes, is a bimonthly cO'nifidential bulleti,,~ pubUsl~ed by The OMet o] avril Oper·ations for personnel whose duties are conneoted 1/nth Vnderwater Detection.

Request« for copies of issue No. 1-4,4 may be addre sed to The Ohief of NavalOpe1'atiom OPNAV 30-3E Washington 125, D. O.

CONFIDENTIAL

24

25

,

THE CABLE-CONNECTED HYDROPHONE

A. Listening device laid on the ocean floor in a harbor approach consi tina of a Dumber of hydrophene cor:nected to a here II teninzstation by m an of a mul 1- conductor cable. nee laid, the cable-connec ed hydrophone. require little attention and ar -v ry dependable.

THE MAGNETIC INDICATOR LOOP

Mo J) itiv £ the devices in e it i Iaid on the ocean floor in th outer harbor approach . Tt i very sensitive when prop l-'ly Iaid and or era ed, The disrortion of the earth magnetic field by a metal objec over the loop cau as magnetic unbalance between the

wo areas enelo ed by the loop cable generating

inute voltages which are indicated by a ensitive galvanometer in he shore station. One of hese devices record d the entrance of Japanese midget submarine into ydn y Harbor.

:Magn tic loop are installed in many imp rtant, harboi th wonld ov r.

THE HERALD ...

. , . or Harbor Echo Banging aHd Li tening Devic is laid on h cean 11001' usually in the ' hun ing at' It of a harbor entrance where it can bo h detect and track an enemy hip. Most precise or the devices) it enables the operator to coacl the counterattack to the exact Ioeation of the enemy vessel.

The Herald operates at supersonic frequencies and will give range and bearing on any targe within its maximum rsnze. On of these devices detected the approach of enemy sneak eruft into Alexandria Harbor enabling harbor facili ties to break up the attack.

OONFIDENTIAL

COMBAT LESSONS

izht-furhte» controlling mu b constsutly pra ,tic d. The controllers of V1J1F ( ) -31 were ful'tuil.p.te in croj,ng strnight to then- squadron from C011- trollers chool, The squadron spellt, 3 weeks at El

'entra alif, where the pilets flew every nightallowing con iderabla team training for controllers and pilo . Th 1'12 the basic job of making (t t;C(Jl1'Y/r play out of an :int rc ption 'iVa accomplishe 1.

Later on a Pakoi Bay V lin LaVe1la (a.iter '. btgllO'" at Espiritu auto and .ombat 0 ration on Liapari I land) -the crew reall began to get expert at readinsr altitudes plotting; and computing. Th l' ading of altitudes was sadly neglected in raining schools, whereas it is one of the most important and difficult jobs a crew is called upon to perform.

t lias been. said that height! cannot be read aceurately with he autenna, turning ix to seven times per mlnute=c good 'Leight'r ad 'f ('un do 'it, h01lJe'IJe'I',

A practi .ed 'ew can obtain suffici 11 plots Ie-

termine the trround true ail', and indicat d ai L' pf' 'd in 3 -mlrude» 1l1lowin{T 2 minut un 40 eeonds tor pl ttins :md20 seconds for computing. This, as in th cas of h ight reading, is a matter of practice .

.At Pakoi Bay jobs were rotated daily so that each man had 1 hour's 'Work at hejght readins azimuth reading, plotting, and computing, and controlle '8 met weekly to discuss unusual situations arising in action.

The 531'8 controllers 1.,1 ed the current system of snap vector cut- 1:I vector af ty vector, and finally tarket. course. (ee I T chnique in J one issu of . I. C,) This worked mill n bomb r flying a traizht t ady course to tarzet or rendezvous pojrit ; how Y r, Lh technique was modifis some'what to count r the actio u ed by J apane e float plane in search of ships) consi ting of sharp turns alternating right and left,

Evasive tactics observed consisted of sharp turns, squares and violently jinxing course with varying altitudes. Sometimes planes dove for the water and streaked for- home, The Betty has great speedon 10 ing altitude gradually from 15 000 feet was clocked a 2'701m ts, This magnifies the importanc of putting your fighter in close behind the bandit and make t· I'll chases futile,

Japan e tactics It Stirling I land (531's fifth locajon) employed 'Window" and th splitting up of raids into several flights, Two plsnes about 20 miles apart would drop "Window' in a large circle and then continue to 6y lazy eights imparting to the Window an illusion of motion on the PPI Scope, The . elution to this problem wa to end out fighters after one and not more than two of these bogeys.

Experienc ha proved tha int reep ions are best controlled from th PPI. It i e entia} that th track of both fighter and bogey be k pt, and it does no harm to write with g1' ase pencil on the face of

26 CONFIDENTIAL

"THE FIGHTER CONTROI.LER IS RESPONSIBI.E FOR TH!? SAFETY AND CONDUCT OF THE PI1.0T .• ,II

E AFFORDS .... '\AN IDEAL G.C.!. SIT

(itl

'l'IHf,nl(.8 to 'apt, Joh~1 If'. W'll.~lJlI, ?WIO 0'11 /lu,ty at WG-l, 11 A.S, Oherrv Point, . 0., ae GOI insh'llCtoT, 'who dill the o1'i(lillal 1l1cetc1l.C8 frOm which "Leall~erll('Qk f1 J" wail d7'«'Hm.

the tube h vectors given the fighter, The controller must keep the fighter informed almost constantly of his relative position to the bogey and the bogey' altitude, course and peed and he should keep his eye on the tube at all times during an interception.

In 2 months, 531 s controllers directed score of AI conta 1 got six kills plus one probable, and mad matters so ho for the Japs that they gave up night raid on Pakoi Bay and Stirlin ,

; E I=IGHTER C.O

A s NTROlL

--- TEADY FLowER SI·t~LL Ke:

OF INFORMA EP UP

"" TION .. ,"

TWO KILLS, ONE PROBABLE







Report of A W -1 Oper(aion8 DU1'ing Ene11111 Night Raid 14, ApTiZ 1944.

Initial bogey picked up at 0013, 3 nautical mile , bear' IT 235°. At the rune one night fighter, P-IO (Lt. ~T. i. Bonner) of Vl'YlF ( ) 532 was on pa trol a 1 000 feet. He was imm dint ly ordered to Ancels 20 on a vector of 240° and put in orbi to wait for boa y when 40 miles from ba ·e.

After initial bogey plot was picked up, 7 additional bogies appeared b tween 220D and 320D a, ranges or 60 to 100 nautical mile. Four additional night fighters were scrambled by L . F. lll. Hnoblauch, C C Controller. P-l Lt. F. C. Lang' P-2,

apt. W. Bollman' P-7 Lt. E. A. ovik j -21 Lt.

Donal I patz. P-21 on repor iug airborne was witched to chann 1 No.3 to call Vip r Base (AruUl 22 at Eniwetok) for control.

P-I0 made contact on ur i-nitial bogey at 00311 and tallyho at 0036 rnnae 30. After tallyho -10 called controller to confirm whether contact was real bopey and w.as o)'~ereclto fire. _ (N O'l'E.-In the past, numerous DJPht interceptions have been made all friendly -bogies.) P-I0 s next transmission reque ted a s .eer, advising tha windshield was cover d with oil. Lieutenant Bonner was very calm UJl advi ed " gave him a burst and he o·Ftve me a bur t. P-10 bailed ut at 4 000 feet, ranO'~ 21 bearing 205° and was pick d up by DD aft ~ bei~O' located by arch plan s using our information. Thi bogey continued to cia dropping gizmoes until range 15. then turned away on vector of 240 and plots faded at 3 miles indicatinz he was below 5 000 feet. Cr~ilit is given as "PI'obable)) account enem; plane's action .. Co;ntl'oller-- aptain Reinert M. Torgerson.

By this time P. P. L scope had at least 50 aizmoes

on it covering 1800. e

P-2 and P-i8 were controlled by Capt. Reinert M.

Toraer on on VHF and P-7 by L . F. G. McOlintocS

...:

28 CONFIDENTIAL

on H. F .. Many false con acts on gizmoes were made making AIA interception quite difficult. In instance P-1 was on tail of hoo'ey droppin gizmo whi h undoubtedly prevented tallyho being made.

t 0111 P-7 controlled by Lt. McClintock accompli h d preliminai-i sand ho down a Betty in.Bame . Range 12 bearing 270° al titud 22 000. Performance wa rep ate 1 b)~ P-2 controll d by Capt. Torger 011 at 0122. Kills confirmed by ground ob rver. These were second and third enemy planes c10 i:ng on base ..

By 'his time approximately iDO gizrnoes wer plainly visible on P. . I. scope making G I and AI interceptions extremely difficult. Gizmoes covered 3600 out to 40 miles.

At 0135 two plan s were 10 ing ani AA was r -

lea ed. .Tarring from 9 -mm, battery elo by

hal' e i 527 cables and lid other minor damage kno 'king it ofl' the air. It required several hour t put it in working order. At the time this OCCUITf P-18 was being vectored and was closing interception.

Duling action bombs were dropped in lagoou and 0111'66r but none on Engebi or Eniwetok,

earchlight interc ption were nob practicable on accoun of 6/10 cover.

During actio 26 report d ubrnarin iontact at 20,000 yards and 155-mm. were- re eased to fire by I but contact did no com within range.

At one 'point when G I intercep ions were beinz at erupted and unidentified transmission was heard over VHF radio as follow 'Elizh one flight one

get out get ou . t i thought enemy monitors OUT

VHF radio, .

Condition Red called at 0030; all plotS'idell~ified a friendly or gizmoes by 0300 and all clear sounded, (NOTE.-IFF in one nizhf fight r ~~!l. faulty.) hortly after 0200 a call as-kina :for a steer wa l' c ived from P~21 (Lt. Donal Spatz. who had b en

controlled by Viper Base). He gave Happy the Homer (SCR-575) a long COUIT' but was weak. Happy aid. not obtain a good fix but e: timated 340° a his bearing. A. message from iper Base informed 11 h wa range 30, du we t of Eniwetok (about 2000 from _ W' ba e). We could no c nfirm this in:formation from our radars and by thistime had lost radio contact with P-21. Viper Base rela ed vectors of 010 360 and 090 to P-21 th rough P-18. P-21 by this time was at Angels 4 and advised he could not climb a ga was too low. Finally at 0400 P-18 received a weak call 'Mayday , :from P-21 and PC-IS was pancaked at OUO,beiug very low on gas. Another plane was sent up and continued to call P-21 withou result.

Aench is ill progress for P-21 based on the follox ins U sumpjions,

(1) Happy s bearing was approximately correct. (2) P-21 wa over 150 mil from ba e when we 10 t radio contact. (Our VHF antennas are 90 fset.) (3) -21 followed Vip l' Ba e' vectors relayed through P-18.

. Oonc~io'lUJ: G~zmoes ill qUil,ntity are fairly efiectrve, 'Iwo experienced controllers can work from one P. P. . tube and handle three or four nizht fi~hteI's. H;R reader must be highly qualified bas aizmoe maka for confusion. (Lt. Willianl W. Thame "SCR-527 Radar Officer, took over and was of tremendou help to c n ·ollers.) ome zizmoes rise ? w~ pi~ed up a number with 110 indica ion of plane ill vicinity, It would be po ible Ior enemy to jam OUT radio, Night bombing raid on A olls can be made ineffective,

(Signed) W1I!. D. FELDlllI) Jr.

RETORT PROVOCATIVE

uring an interception problem a Port Hueneme (ARGU raDet) the intercept officer lost all trace of boge. He asked friendly to scan in an directions in hope of locating the mysteriously vanished tarsrst plane. Friendly reported nothing in sisht and then himself called bogey asking "Whe~e I are you bogey~1l

Bog y 1" plied uccin tly Ea. Ha! • ind me!" The jointly in iignant intercept oBi 1" nd friendly finally su:oked bogey out of his hiding place behind a mountain on anta Cruz Island.

11 WS-l Ola in.feria1" .mapped while a, l08t B-24 wa~ bing hom ea. Note T7IF 10n(ispea1Ger above beam at left.

SB7' O'/H!:raticm8 a1la vower "IIans- 1'ooetted. One a:ntemuJ, b yona /a/' ena wen sit d at the wat r's due.

210 t'(~vet'ted to the poi9lt of cOllcealm nt except 101' tl~e stately n?l1:enna.

299 1'adia8 WI Hl1Ietlnen.ts, 'with 001'80it'8 linea up on la'mling st"'ip behind.

AWS-l'B "home," ·1oitlt?ne81l1la.ll at/aT' en,a. ot street •

CONFIDENTIAL

29

I You mean bat you', e contacted UJC nemy? '

ot a ye ir but I HA E contact d ' a reliable ource of po: t-war eeurity l "

I How's hat "

I I've registered a "Val' Bond Allotment, an inves ment ha will -pay me

back 4 for every 3 I kick in ! II .

"Where's that Disbur ing' Officer '? It sounds like a good idea. I

IT'S A PIP OF AN IDEA! WHY DON'T YOU REGISTER A

NAVY

WAR

80

A

OT

E