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CJ.C.

VOL. II, NO. 9



SEPTEM BER 1945

(h", ta lira/ me Imd OPt!1"IItiIJrl 0/ eiectHmic (lfId as ociaied cquipmCIlI.

New /nlerct:pl Techniuues

11 GC La.ntis You With CI'i/ilig Zero

16 ector Plan for AA Coordination

20 Pilot·ClC Teamwork ill A J17

23 hore Bombardment I ithout DRT

26 IIBC 01 Glids

30 etc Library atld POL

32 Efletlly Use of Anti-Radar Coaling.,

34 japawue Radar wid Tactics

37 TDZ·RVZ-New UHF Radio

39 Ai,' Plotting and the Komilaue

f2 'ew Radar for /'leavy Macl!illl! emu

'~3 tasularti tlir Plot Tnbles ill Fleet

44 The Recorder=Mechanical Melllor)'

47 [apanes« tlircn.{1 P "'formancl!

52 "CR" 1"Yacking Must B' Improve.d

53 ideas 01 the Month

55 Actiorl ROPO,'ls

60 Special Notices

• Published mQII/hly by the Clliel of tV/Ji)1l1 OperatiQn'> (JJNC) for the itl/onnatioll of Military personnel whose duties (Ire conneeteel witiJ the tactical and operationol asprcts of electronic .eqllit)ment.

• include t/liS pu.blicatioll 1I1ith other confuienti«! muteriu! which is to receive emergency destructlon in tlte event of pos)ible loss Or capw-re, "C.I.C." shal! /lot be corded [or use in aircrait.

• Material and pholographs tor PlllllicClliotl ill "C.I.C." should be submitted lIJ Chie! of Naval Operations, Editor of "C,I.C.", IVllSllillglol1 25. D.C. (NtlV)J Departllllmt Telephone Extensions : ~3334 and 62779.)

Ed itoriul Office: DNC . (OP-2o.F-4)

A rt anti Layout : 01 I (OP.,6,P'2)

United 'lilies

CONFIDENTIAL

Brittili

• This doeumen: e,mltlins information (lOuting th« nntionnl ,I/cfellsc of tlie United totes within the lIIefllling of tlu: E.<JJil)PlfI{!,1· .Act, 50 U .C., 3' am/ 32 11.1 IIlIIe/l(/ed. Il rr(l7Ismi.ssioll or tile reve/olioll of its contents ill /I"y mmme.· 10 lin Il1Iollthorized jler: 011 is pTohibiteri by 1(/111.

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20

new intercept techniques

/0

No ubjec; ill CIG operations is more WII/~'~'JSa of interception: 0 subject is mote imjJOrtanl. -ike)o owwg briej 'review of u eso theories 01 interception i Imbli. h et! t o arquaint Fleet nnd shorebnsed j)e,rsoTmei with what other Fleet and shore-based {rersonnel belieue are imptovl'rl methods of snaring enem oircrnit, "C.I.C." will uvelcam e NJnl1II en I. , em ndations, cOlllrove1'sy.

In iii earl, dim days of fighler direction when an inter ept officer ruunted himself lucky if he owned a pial board and a couple of ex radio techs EoI' apenl tors, the general in tercepl techn iq ue was to send as lUn;ny "F a' pos ible alit in the direction of a raid, pray and hope for the best.

inc th early olamon, however, fighter dire t.i n ha zrown away up. Hundred of eTC and radar offi er and thousands E nli ted op rat TS, technician J pl [tel'S now ply their trade in tile FI et and' a hare; and a book on radar and a so iated gear I k lik a po ket (?) edition of a

ear. -Roebuck aralog.

51 o

CON F1DENTtAL

Paralleling this growth has been a steady refinement of the technique of Interception. Improved equipment, experimentation 'wid']: new devices and methods, and the accumulated experience of literally hundreds of thousands: of intercepts run against the enemy or in training have produced ,<I, spate of methods, some highly stylized as in night 'Work, others, like many day intercepts, as simple and directas the fligbt of a 40 mm bullet. Like all the other means and methods of waging war, fighter direction has had to adapt itself to constantly changing enemy tactics and [0 utilize every capability of our improved equipment.

be purpose of this article is to review some of the newer methods of interception. Because the techniques are constantly changing, it is impossible LO be definitive. Noone Dot on the scene can specify the exact type of intercept to use; and, as any intercept officer knows, academic refinements frequently are jettisoned in Fleet practice, The closely controlled intercept, however academic, does underline those principlesof precision, accuracy in timing, and attention to detail which are the constant concern of the intercept officer.

·What, then, is the latest opinion on daylight intercepts? On Visual fighter direction? On night work? ,"'hat, in the opinion or pilots and intercept om.G~' I~ the. ideal clock-code approach? vVhat are the bases for current me . uS-Rend conclusions?

:f~\ '\)

THE DAYLIGHT INTERCEPT

Read On Inlercep.1

::'\ cwest and perhaps most radical departure from the old methods of orbit OT beam approach is the practice now being followed at RTS, St. Simon's: he head-on intercept with a turn into position for a 4 to 8 o'clock tallyho at within three miles. The principal reasoning behind the new method is that the high rate of dosing is reduced, a position ahead of the attacking aircraft is insurance against a. breakthrough and the interceptors are placed in the optimum attack position. The older method-an approach from forward of tile beam at between IO and .2 o'clock=so tbeargument runs-may throw the interceptor into a hopeless tail chase. Should the interception have to be made dose to base with the attacker pushing over into his dive-suicidal or otherwise=the chances of catching him are negligible.

Rapid development by the 1 apanese of speedier aircraft and their likely employment- in Kamikaze attacks made it essential that intercepting aircraft get all or the majority of the raiders=disrupting the approaches of those who do get through.

Chief arguments against the method center around the contention that in order to give the interceptor the advantage, the turn must be timed with a maximum accuracy-a feat not always possible because of radar Iirnita-

2

CONFIDENTIAL



St. Simon's Il1te.rc"p'

tions, Moreover, the positionahead of the raid, unless an altitude advantage is maintained, temporarily lays the interceptor open to attack. Opponents of the "St. Simon's method" argue that until altitude determination is more reliable the risks involved are not worth taking .. The fact that both SM and SF can give relative altitude with reasonable accuracy, of course, reduces the force of this argument.

In controlling the intercepting division, generally speaking, from one to three basic vectors are necessary. First is a snap vector, usually at buster, to start tile interceptors out. After the "On Vector" and position report hom the division leader, the intercept officer locates his VF on the remote PPI and the plotters begin to DR. Second is usually a correction vector to place the VF on a more accurate heading. Third is the "safety vector" approximately to the bogey's course.

In the event that no tallyho is_ reported an immediate turn to the

eandit'scourse is given, followed by sub~equent vectors of fro_m thirty to fifty degrees to port and starboard of Ius course, If the relative speed has been incorrectly estimated and the turn has been given too soon, this "weave" procedure slows the interceptor dOVVl1. until the raid zooms into sight. Furrlre», and most importantly, the "weavel'establish!!s a thorough, visual search of the area .. The recent Jap practice of breaking up when rallyhoed, with some raiders diving for the deck and others scattering, made this search imperative. A method of procedure against the regrettable tendency of a dear, well-defined blip of either friendly or bogey to fade Irorn the PFI scope is also thusestablished.

With an increased CAP, the practice of back-stopping or using stacked formations for additional protection can also be employed in conjunction with the St. Simon's method.

Minor but notable new uotions In intercept techniques at St. Simon's include a standardized method of keeping pilots informed, on the progress

.

CONFlDENTI:AL

3

at all inter epri 11. lit lO twen mi les on an inter ept, initiated f01" example when the boe . ha p pped up at evenly, information tran mission are generally Iimited to a imple: "Bogey ahead thirty or forty," DUrin" the next everal miles information tran missions may include enemy alticude, curse, speed an composition. Clock code i not employed in the first 20 miles, and then only when the information is useful to the pilot.

'Whether or not the "St. imou's method" will find many converts in the Fleet, its proponents point out that it effectively emphasizes the basic prin iple of the conifblled intercept. The de clopinen of jap eva ive tacti and less favorable visibility in the areas neal- the home islands of the Empire indicated that the 10 to 20 mile tallyho rnizht become more of a rar'ity than it was in the pa t.

Brigantine PF(. ) intercept

At Beavertail (jameseown, R.I.) and Brigantine (N.J .)-to mention only two continental lighter direction centers-intercept methods follow a more generally establish d pattern. Beavertail staff members still teach [orrr intercept methods: orbit, forward of the beam, four [0 eight o'clock (St. Simon's), and r i to one o'clock (semi-headon). Generall preferred for good visibility as the peediest type for a do ing raid i the II 0 one

o'clo k approach with an altitude advantage of 2000 feet, Le speedy btu the best tactical P ition when visibility i not t o, crood, the r,

CON FI 0 ENTI~A L

5

Sim n's four to eight o' 10 k appl' ach ha the advantage of bringing the pilot in at the approach he himself will likely choose after the tallyho. Actually, according to Beavertail tail membersand for that matter, St. Simon's-a combination of the two preferred methods=the four to eight and r r to one o'clock-s-is preferable with the intercept planned as semi-headon and th~ 10 standing by to control the fighters into a four to eight o'clock approach if the radar information i ufficient. In effect, tbi is the method also taught at St. Simon's. since the four to eight o'clock position is rea hed by a turn throuzh the other clock po ition . Orbits are mployed ooly when information is poor and the forward-of-the-beam approach only on crossing raids.

When there is insufficient time for a head-all, Brigantine intercept officers are advised to vector VI" for an eleven to one o'clock tallyho with a 2QOO foot altitude advantage. The too closely controlled intercept, according to Brigantine belief, leans too heavily on nicetie of cal ulation. A slight enol' or miscalculation ,yill place the fighter in an impos ible po ition and lead to a fruitless tail chase. With new, high-speed Jap fighters appearing and likely to have been employed on suicide missions, it was of paramount importance

o keep the VF between the bandit and base.

Because Beavertail i primarily a team training center and 10'5 have developed their own methods before [he arri ,. ,th taff concen rrates on team

• training and advocates no special method which can be strictly called "Beavertail."

Should a tallyho be missed both-Brigantin and Beav nail J '5, like St. Simon's tudents, are taught to turn the interceptors on the bogey' (Curse and bring them at high speed .. IE a cloud layer exists, the division Hlay sometimes be split for search above and below the cloud . Backstop' are also u eel if th y ar available.

YF(N) INTERCEPTS

B nature the niaht intercept is a high I pe-

cialized technique. .1though a day fighter rna

tallyho at ten or even fifteen miles, the nigh t fighter must be so po irioned as to be within two or three miles of his target. Moreover, he must he at a relatively exact-plus or minus 500 Ee taltitude.

There have be n two major handicaps in the development of the night intercept: The (limlty experienced by pilots who must fly their and operate their racial' e pertly at th time, and th imperfection of the airb me

gear itself. Th evolution o£ n.ight fighter dire - tion-SCI (ship controlled interception) ha been a constant effort to master the e two handicap.

Substantial. technica progre s has been made with the AP lAP -6A although as a recently returned Air Group Commander put it, "with til .; Japs getting so good at countermeasures and evasive action, "we've got to have better night fighter radar in a hun-yo The load on the night fighter i getting to be grave. He j going to need orne help pretty soon."

fany action r ports stressed the fact that Jap night fl er finally employed evasive tactics which have also materially increased the problem of the night fighter and the night controller.

Indeed, development of Jap evasive tacti s noticeably approached the German degree of skil! in night operations. Contrasted with the nightflying j ap of the Solomons in early 1943 who carne in alrno t invariably at 6000 feet, the Okinax a Jap wa de er and elusive. He arne in to th attack, roller-coaster fashion. in spiraling rbi ts, changing heading and speed constantlv, Moreover, he knew when he was being pursued.

The fir t and foremost an wer to these tactics by intercept officers has been a general tightening of control. Instead of a series of hopeful vectors, VF (N) controllers have of necessity begun to exercise increased precision, acting more fully as the fighter' eyes np to the time either the pilot. or his electronic eye cao do the spotting.

lthough the basic principles of SCI remain II e same and are well known to ere per onnel", the, may profitably b reviewed briefly to illu trate thi principle.

There axe a 'cording' to NR St. irnon's.

three Fundamental t pes 01: SCI interception: 1- Curve of Pursu it; 2-Cm-off Vector; R-Head-on. ln the Curve of Pursuit method the fighter is kept on a heading directly toward tile target. be 'IF ( ) proceed toward d.le tarzet in a gradual.

urve of teady pproach ou a eri . of vectors' whi It rna com conds apaTt. Because it i slow. the method i. general I regarded as the least likely to succeed in intercepts acr~illst newer and I edier Jap aircraft.

The Cut-Off ector method automaticall take into account the possibility of hizher peeds since it is based on the general principle of an almost equal peed of target and fight r, he in erception is planned b ele ling a point on the tarzet's projected track and vectoring the VF (N) out at a speed which will guarantee t11 imultaneou ar-

CON FIDENllAL

n

VI m v -1 m

s:

w m ;0

1;\'a1 of bogey and V1": (N) at that point. Roughly thr emile efor the fiehter r ach the h o- 's proje ted track, the fighter is turned to a a-called . aIerv ve tor whi b I lit the fio'l! ter on a track which will intercept that of the boge at an ,\1 gl of 40 degrees. When the 'fF I) has reached a pint on iha heading hom ne-lial t three qLlart r ol a mile distant fr m the target' projeer d tra .k , he i given a turn to the bog's cour e. Chi f hazard oE the Cut-Off method is the danger of bringing the V1' (r) in too far a tern. Clo se antral f F (N) pe d ad alertne s to the necessit of corr tina til e tor however, minimizes the danger of 0 er-shooting.

The third fundamental CI intercept-and the most difficult to handle-is the Head-on Interception. The approved method of e ec itlnz thi intercept is to end the fighter OUt on a vector but lightly off (i.e., roughly four miles) the reciprocal

of the target' COll.I'. t a point approximate!

five miles from the target, the VF ( ) is ordered to the afety ve tor and then to the tarzet's course. Similar to the new t. imon's daylight intercept, the night Head-on holds one similar hazard: The danzer of rni ing the turn at the crucial P 'int through lack of radar inrol"mation or communi ations failure.

With these three types of intercept regard d a basi, t. imon's-trained SCI controllers are

• taugh t to 11 tiliz L1 h variants as the ta tica 1 ituation demands.

The peed of n wer Jap plane di rated modification oE these tactics. The effective range a tern in interceptions has generally decreased-erom three to one mile a tern. Pilots training at fizhter direction centers are thus indoctrinated to high overtaking p eds and ontroller to more accurate positioning of the VF (N).

Although a small altitude differential below the target i still tandard procedure. there are instances in which an altitude advantage above the target 11'lay be nece ary and d irable, RT, St.

imon's SCI students thus sometimes position fighter abov th target when a bright undercast can be used t ilhouette the .tar et, The prin iple which dictate the normal position below the target-the normal ligbtnes f he ky in comparison with the sea, and the fa t that he darkening of the stars as the boce pa es at valuable aids in

isual potting. and tb abilit t e~ erci peed antral by reducing speed without changing throttl setting r flamiuz exhau ts-likewi e dietate the approa 11 from down moon whi h i errrpha ized at JRT, t.· imon's.

It is possible thai the need tor vi ual identificati 11. lila, he 01 viated h the luture development o]' an elecrroni guusighr f r blind firing and the development f more positive IFF. How ver, until t11 e quipm 11.t becom reality, the n ed for vi ual potting will . ntinue to demand clo attention. to light, .ondiii 11 •.

For night or low visibiut, inter epts a new technique has been devised by the Beavertail staff. Beavertail 10' employ a rncdification of the Briti Ii .ontrolled tnrn. The intercept is initiated by placing the VF ( ') 60 degree off the boze 's

curse (i.e., at ten or tWO '1 -I;.) U· m the bose

at a distance of six miles. t that point a thirty

degree turn in the direction f th bogey's rour

is given. wo miles later another thirty degree turn is ordered placing the F (I ) approximately 3Y2 mile, ten or two 0' I k from the boge , and ina "Punch" position. IE the VF ( ) Eails to make conta t aft r two mil 011 he second vect r. another thirty degree turn is order d. s thi turn is made the VF ( ) is off the beam of the boge at al out 11,4 mil ,and 11'1, the ten or two '.10 k position. If a contact is till not forthcoming, an additional :,0 dezre turn bring the VF 1) to the bogey's course about one-half mile astern.

dvanta es of the "Beavertail method", it i argu d, r valve around the fa t that a maxirnu number of effective contact po itions are obtained, the intercept i ondu Led at hieh p ed, ana a better position j achiev d in that the (N) is kept clear of the tail snmner and any possible tail • warnina device whi h have be n de elop d bi the Jap. [oreover, the tendency on the Pal:t of niaht controller. to bring tb VF (N) too far ast rn of the boge is minimized,

Other rent sllgge tions for irnprovin I

have included re 'ommel dation that night int rcepts be conduc ed at the highe t feasible speed and that the pra ti oE sp cifying fighter 'p eels be dropped sin the r Iative po ition of both fighter and bogey are readily apparent on the PPf s ope. Hi her peed can be obtained b initiall

rationing ,< (N) at altitudes well above th anticipared angels f the inter epts and losing altirude as i becomes n cessary to increase speed. New, high- pc d .lap re .onnai an planes found their advantage reduced-c-at ) ast in the inirial stages of the intercept. nether uggestion has been to all w tb pil t to choose his own r lative altitude as he nears the point of interception - il

he is the one fully informed on light and ViSibili't condition in the taraet area.

Not new but receivinz added tre ~ in training

proe:aml s are 511 h principle a keeping pilots-parucu arly night fighters-fully informed on the progress of an interception, avoiding hard turn unless they are very necessary, and keeping on the alert for en my fighter cover 0 ex night raiders. lthouzh til J . did not u e fighter cover for night raiders, there was always the possibility that they would do o. Returnin dawn and du k patrols of ,( 1) should also be joined in ctions or divisions for mutual protection whenever light condition are adequate for da tactics, according to the newest S I practice.

VISUAL FIGHTER DIRECTION

v herever IO's gather the subject of Visual

iigbter Direction i sure to bob up. No subje t in fighter direction is more controversial. Opinion -usually heated=range hom the opinion that visual interception is relati ely usele to the opposite opinion that it i essential. Recent experienee with 10w-R ing conventional Jap attacks and higb or Iml,-fLying Kamikazes, orne of whom have come iu undete ted b air earch radar, would

eem to vindi ate the vi ual enthusia l .

Late enemy ta tics- plits and breakaway after the tallyho with single wea inz in on the forceindicated that the Japs were aware of the deli.ien .ic 0 0111' ear radar and of the difficulties experienc d in .eparating the bogie from the Iarg n umbers of friendlies in the vi iniry of OUT operations. In orne. in ance vi ual Iighter dir c-

tion is thus effective and necessary. .

urrent trends, with the shift DE control from C\' to screening DD' OT BB's, have also answered the bjection of carrier people that their position ir th center of th for prevents them from makina effective use of the isual ration.

hid development in visual intercepts has b en toward simplification to save valuable time and to transfer the load [rom the pilot to the Visual Inter pt Officer (VIO). Instead of the conventional "Port ~o" or " tarboard 60" lR Simou's=train d visual FDO' cal ulat th tent of the turn them elves. ft r th initial tor-"Mohawk 7. This Mohawk Snap. Vector Pronto 150."-directiollS are simply: " tarboard

(OT Prt) Out." h n the course has been sufficiently corrected, the VIO orders: "Steady. Out."

o acknowledzment is required from the pilot.

Bu y searching for the enemy, he need not take time out to watch the compass. constant flow of informacion also goes out to the fighter. With the advantage of a hill view of the intercept picture, the VI0 can supply hi fighter with the exact number and type of cuero planes, their altitude, relative motion, position and range.

ince sighting the enem is the immediat objective and the lower the fighter the better the visibili ,current isual fizhter direction pra tice at t. imon's does not tre s either position or altitude advantage. Pacific Ieet Radar Center 10's are train d to intercept at a point about ne mile inside and on the bow of the bogey; however, as at t. Simon's, peed in interception-full military power with roo t turns hard starboard or portand quick sighting receive the most stress-

ilost vi ual interce ts are normally nducted w~th the VF at 500 feet, and an altitude ad antage of two or three hundred feet is de irable. nder low cloud cover condition when visibility is exceptionally bad; tile tallyho may be accomplished, however, from slightl below and behind th bogey. Care must be taken, as in all intercepts, to s e that the intercept does not turn into a fatal tail chase.

Pacific Fleet Radar enter's Visual course empha ize the (a t that the vi sual DO must ha e good eye sight. especially witb re pct to depth pel' eption and must be given ample opportunity for practice. with much empha i on recognition.

wo additions to the visual vocabulary ha e recently been .recommended:

"Tallyho Pouuce"-I see and will be able to bring the bandit under ffectiv attack.

"Tall ho Heads-up"-I bandit but will not

be able to make an effective attack.

Briefl stated the foregoing repr sent the latest notions in fighter direction. s our radars are perf~ ted, the intercept officers' technique will contrnue LO change and improve. Perhaps for orne years to come, fighter direction will ontinue to be the leer's long arm of defen e.

o o

CONFIDENTIAL 7

Y ou, in 'our a.il'Plane. arc di rectl over the airfield becau e'ou ar a good na igatoI and your alculations h \ that' where au hould be. Jot that au can ee the field! Your al timeter reads 5,000, and you are it ting on LOp of a fog bank whose bottom, as far as you can rell, rests squarely on the runways. You call the rontrol tower located somewhere down in the

OllP, and [hey confirm what ou have already 'W'Ol' ed:

"Fi Id cia' d in . .. eiliuz one-hundred-fift r et ... vi Ibility half a mil .... "

FI on to the ne~i"field? _ (Sure, only this is a Pacific island airbase, and there' a helluva lot of water WiWOUl bourbon between ba es.) Bale alit? ( arne thing goes about the water.) But waitl The voice From the control tower has a

uggestion:

"We are turning YOLI over La G . ," sa s the voice from the towel" and then a new voice comes over ),our earphones:

"Hello 1 av one- even-two"- (that'

"thi is Peli an. What is our altitude. and approximate p) ition, over?"

And you answer: "This i one-seven-two, Angels fl, heading one-twa-zero, somewhere over the field -1 hope."

The voi e come back: "Roger, one-s ven-rwo, 1\1 hay yOll in sight five miles ea t of the field, This is the Ground Control pproach Directordo au understand?"

You don't understand. What the hell's [his round Control Approach. It's not on your iritrument panel-as Ear as you know, The voice, a quiet, reassuring voice, continues on Channel Baker:

you)hading

"PI ase follow OUT direction and we will bring 'Oll dov n lO the end of th runwa wh 'e you can touch down isually, What i our air 'alt I pe=over?"

Y uu tell him.

"Cantin ue, on CUUI" e oue-rwo-z ro," the voice runtinucs. "You are now heading downwind. ]\fak yow- cockpit check now."

Rogel'. You check.

"You are si mile east of airport. Steer )'1ahl I we-one-zero, ( ver.'

"\Vil =steer right [IV -one-zero," you answer. "You are n our crosswind leg ix mile From

the airfield. 1'1 < I rwo-f IU1I1d r ed. over."

Nothing new about. th i . ,111Sl t he conventional landing parttrn so far. Downwind. then eros\I' ind, then:

.. he run way i _1000 Feet long, l!'i0 feet wi de, You will make a ri'!"ht hand approach to tJ1C runwa T. Steer righ t two-nine-zero, \'('1'-

You guessed it. Th final leel A Dew voice 'om over your earphones. A oice a month aan annouu e1' gi ing out with commercials. voice a relaxing as a wedish massage:

"You are on your final leg ... do not acknowledg'e further transmissions . . . two-nine-zero is your heading _ .. two-nine-zero ... five miles to end of runway ... wind on the surface northwest five ... 10 e al itude five hundred feet pel" minrn

. .. two-eight-five is your new heading ... twoeight-five .....

lot hurried, .Jut a t ady flow .0E dire rion easy to understand. Ling altitud at the normal (-i e h undred-Ieet-per-minute. d j usting your curse now. The voice continues, quietly, confidently:

GCA lands

8

CONFIDENTIAL

you with ceilin9 zero

"Four mile' La nmway ... Drifrinz slizh L1)'

abo e glide-path D wn fif feel ... for

thirty . . . twent On glide-path nmv

that's correcting nicely ... rwo-eizht-five is your heading .....

Certainly you correct nicely. You're a good pilot.

"Three mile from runway ... check landing gear down and locked ... Steer two-nine-zero ... uvo-nine-zero is our new heading ... You're twenty feet below glide-path . ... p a shade ...

ou're holding ten feet above-bring it dox n ju t little ... that' fine ... Glide-path ver good

... Still iwo-nine-zer ... Y ur hading i t\\ urune-zero ... two miles from end of runwa

Glid -path good . . . Mile and a half from runway ...

Like scooting dowr a sliding board when yOli were a kid=that's this glide-path business! Just follow direction :

" ne mile from runway ... two-eight-eight is yOUI' heading ... wo-eight-eight ... going above the glide-path rw nty ... ten .. , on glide-path onehall mile tram end of runway .....

You're squinting now. \\That rum ay? You don't ee-but wait. You do! There it IS, directly

CON FI DENTlAL

ahead, 10 ming out of an opa uen s tha -ou know tretche from here up 0 there, five housand feet up.

'Runway straight ahead. Take over visually. hi is Pelican, out."

Almost at the same instant your wheels couch and you are down on the ground once more .. Five thousand feet of soup, and you came through it to make a landing. You and y ur "co-pilot" ... the GCA controller!

How did he do it-what brouaht you down?

You did not line up crosshair on an instrument face, nor did you switch gadgets on and off; in fact, you flew yOUT plane as you would on any can entional landing, except that-shades of precommissioning days-you were given constant compass he.adings to follow, and coached on your rate of descent. Those directions came to you over your radio on a common frequency band that is

tandard in all airplanes. here wa nothing new

that you had to know, e cept, perhaps, how to have confidence in omeone' j udgment . _ . and orne "gear."

Il<" UJ <'0

2

w 1- 0.. LIJ Vl

GCA USES THIS EQUIPMENT:

hat "gear," according to the In truction book, is the ANI 1PN-IA: "A mobile ground radar system provid fig facilities for directing the movement of aircraft over a pre-determined. glide-path for a afe approach to an airdrome runway under conditions approaching zero visibility."

Thi mobile ground radar ystem known as Ground Controlled Approach equipment, or GCA, i mounted in a specially designed trailer, The trailer is set up on the airfield approximately three hundred feet from the center line of the runway (to the pilot's left on an approach) and three thousand feet from the downwind end of the runway. It is easily recognizable by the large

earch antenna reflector which is mounted on tOp of the trailer.

A you enter the trailer ou note that, similar to a Cle, the illumination is low, the only light coming from PPI scope. What appear to be one giant radar console actually houses two radar sets: one a search system for directing aircraft into the nan-ow "glide-path" area. which is scanned by the second set, a precision set that provides continuous range, azimuth and elevation information on the plane beins controlled on the Final Leg.

Fiv men make up the crew in the trail r eated before the can ole, four radarmen reading

10 CONFIDENTIAL

copes, and tb final c ntroll r usually a naval officer. In the air, you would near the voice f three of these men, the two radarmen "director" and the controller \ ho "Talks-down" the plane along the glide-path during the Final Leg. All information is carried over an ordinary two-way communication system operating on either the

F or the "VHF bands. In Eron of the controller and the directors are push-button arrangements giving them three HF and three VHF selection. Once frequencies are set up on the transmitters. all the director or qontroller has to do to witch channels is press one of the ix buttons.

THE VOICES YOU HEAR

The voice of the NO.1 director a radarrnan, is the first to be heard when you report to GCA for instructions on landing. He uses a PPI scope with a 30 mile maximum ranze. If you were a pilot familiar with GCA pro edure at advanced

, base, a Okinawa, au would call in:

"Hello Pelican, thi is av five-one-three-zeronine. Request ground approach control. over."

And it would be No. 1 director who would answer: " avy five-one-rhree-zero-nine=thi is Peli an. What is. your altitude. heading and approximate position, over?"

You would give him this information, and he would pick you out on the PPJ scope. If he were doubtful just which blip r pre ented you, he would give certain steer 0 au would be flying' in a pattern he could recogniz on his scope. Once you were id:entified he would report to you over

. the radio channel you are u ing:

"You are in sight."

No. 1 director assigns the altitude and headinz to fiy to start YOll, as a pilot, on your landing circuit. No. I director gives au the necessary information concerning altimeter setting, field elevation, runway dimen ion, wind data. NO.1 directs you to perf rID- your landin ock.pit check' o. 1 is a combination "Information-please" and supernavigator who. b areful radar checks, brings au to a point where you begin your cross-wind leg of the landing pattern. At this point, No. 1 director, on intercom, calls No.2 director who is the next man to his left and o-ives him your call, range, clock position, altitude, headinz and channel.

n a PPI scope, identical to the 30-mil maximum range scope u ed by o. 1 director, T • 2 clire tor picks you out on hi cope and dire t :

"Three-zero-nine- teer righ t one-six-zero, ov 1'." You follow dire tion .

Interior of eCA trailer. No. #1 Director's P(Jsiti(m is last "glass shmucase" !o Tear of van. The .pmll~l between .No. #1 a~~ o, #2 radar sets is commu;,it(llioTl setup io LoweY. Note "error meter" in foreground and C1Irsor crank tJJ-reclLy under lJXlln1,th p.recislon scope_

"You are on our crosswind leg' even miles fr m the airp rt, Fl at tWO th usand fL\' h undred Feet=over.'

Thu til No.2 director bring'S au to a point where you tart your up wind approach alona tbe "glide-path." Iere the final controller take over:

"Steer right two-nine-zero ... you are on your final leg ... "

ow yOLi are within the preci ion system of GC in both azimuth and elevation, a system so exactinz that the original . S. av f specifications re;uirino- that aircraft be brought in to within 1 5 f et ab ve terrain have been exceeded e er time in tes made in aine ville, eorgia, where th elevation beam was proved to be accurate within ix feet and the azimuth beam within twent Ieet.

The controller sits before an Approach ontroller Meter (see illustration). To his right is the radarrnan azimuth tracker, and at his left, the radarman elevation cracker. Each of these precision tracker. has two scopes before him. one with a ten mile range, the other with a three mile range. Actually, the three mile scope. is an en-

arged pre entation of the last three mile "Lhe

pproadl a shown on the ten mile ope.

THE FACTS OF GCA PRECISION

he preci ion tern scans 20° in azimuth,

swe ping across the end oE the runwa '. Once a plane is picked up on the 10 mile range scope, an "on course" line i established, and the azimuth tracker follows the aircraft with a hairline or "cur or." The difference in feet between the cursor, representing the actual position of the aircraft, and the established "on course" line is automatically shown 011 the azimuth error-meter in front oE the Final Controller. There i very little po ibility of the "human error" element entering the pi ture; it is onJ nece ary for the Controller to determine the compas heading that the plane should fl to correct for the rror in fe t. ontrollers usually correct in five degrees onI , out. past the 1:1\'0 mile range. to make it easier for the pilot. Once a plane is witbin two miles of the runway, the Controller will correct in exact compass headings:

"Your new CO"lHSe is two-eight-eight ... that's rwo-eight-ei ht; ... "

Mo t plan s are "on course" alma t immediately after making their turn from crosswind to the final 1eg. and there are few course chang neces ar .

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIIII1

. IIII111111 I11II

A Both the !hrce-mile ral1ge and the ten-mile range scopes are 7 inches in diameter. The "blip" on the three-mile Tallgec leuorion scope is a house one mile [ron» the GCA trailer.

The corresponding "Blip" can be Seen 071 the three-mile range mimuth scope.

, ,

/

,

@ ,\\@ om F"A

"'" ""1" lJ) 0

;;:~

o

The precision system scans 7° in elevation. 6° above the ground and 10 into the ground. Thu a permanent radar ground line is established. and an accurate glide-path may be set up anywhere from a 2° to SO angle from a definite touch down point. The glide-path. which is the angle the path of a de cending plane makes to the ground. can be

hifted for various types of plane.

Q! UJ m

'~ UJ

b:

UJ V)

u

12 CONFIDENTIAL

-> !~~

l '<, -

.. "" ........ <,

.. A hand crank controls cursor fOT tTacking to,rget in elevation.

Fool pedals COntrol (Uimuth 0"((:11110 i11 eleuatlon.

.. Twenty-degree sweep is controlled by the crank, the [oQt pedIlls controlling 1/1(1 eleuation antenna in azimuth,

Again, with the use of a cursor, the elevation tracker automatically cranks into the error meter information on the number of feet the aircraft is above or below the pre-determined "glide-path." The Controller reads these figures from the meter in giving instructions to the pilot:

"You are fifty feet above the glide-path forty. , . thirty ... twenty ... - an glide-path ..

'~4'I'#Od

010/.M,

CONFIDENTIAL 13

n the three-mile range elevation scope, the pit: LUre E the terrain i a amI I te that 11 u , t wers, radar vall and the like how up a permanen blip that take on characteri tic shapes of th e objects. For thi Tea on, it i possible for I he on tro Il er to ive useful i nforma t i all to pilots on possible hazards, such as:

"You are LlITO hundred feet above Mount uraba hi ... "

'Vith two radar men doinz the a .tual trackin

f th aircraft on the pre i ion tern and rank-

inz in the errors on elevation and azimuth into the nor-meter th Approach Controller has all information neces ar for a u ce ful "calk-down" approach; he is not hampered in thi perforrnan e h having to do the manual work of maneuvering the ttl' or to che k the patboE the incominz plane.

HOW GCA TEAMS ARE TRAINED

It is obvious that to pas control of the plane hom 1 o. 1 director to No . .2 director and finall t the. pp .oach Controller who in tructs the pilot on the last leg of the approach requires a good deal of teanrv .... ork. The question might ali e: why not have one man do the talking to the pilot? Once all have watched a ere' ... · perform, the answer is simple: to have the controller shift from the earch set to the preci ion y tern would ill the

mall spa e provided m an on ide <able lost motion-and confusion. Thi shiftlnz the aircraft from dire tors one and two to the Approach Controller makes each man a highly train d specialist, and the maneuver is performed as neatly a a

hampionship basketball team passing the ball around. To reach this high degree of efficiency La kes training, of caul' e. and following a comereuce of representatives from BuAer, BuShips, and C 0, the Naval Air Technical Training Genter was et np in ai nesvil le, Georgia, in October, 1943·

At the present rime, three compl te GCA unit

mponent 22) aTe being ent from t e chool each month. unit can i ts of three officers and fifteen enlisted men with the officer-in-charge an active aval aviator • vith a white or green in rrumerit card who has had considerable experience in flying GGA. In addition to his administrative duties, he briefs pilots who have not flown GGA before. and can take over most position in the

GC etup.

The approach controller mu t have "good microphone technique" and must have a thorouzh knowled e of the flight characteri tics of all ypes

14

CONFIDENTIAL

01 aircraft. A maintenance oflicer (E) T k ep rhe gear Iunctioning proper! at all times, which is no as' j b considering there are two omplete GC mobile units to in ure against pas ibl breakdown.

Of the fifteen enli ted men, ten are radarmen, two motor rnechani , [1\,0 radio technicians and 011e electrician. The radarmen are trained in all of the am "crew" positions, but eventually spe-

ialize in one of tbe po , those with the be t mi rophone te hnique takinz over the o. 1 and 2 dire tors' p i ion .

The GC course la ts thy e months, with the last month devoted to 'working as a .ew with a tual aircraft appr 'a be. An average of forty or more appToa hes at' LlCC full r completed each da I a that a crew claims that with so much practi-

al experience: ""'iVe can land anything from it ub to a B-2g."

. t the present time, thirteen of these GCA units are overseas and are setting up. or have set up

round Control pproa h terns in aipan,

Palau, Okinawa and pre umably "point

HOW GCA ORIGINATED

The philosophy which started GCA on its way was this: H Microwave Radar can locate a plane from the ground precisely enough to shoot i down, it is capable of the more constructive task of guiding a plane to a afe landing in conditions of blind 0: ing,

Thi basic idea wa on eived in 0 emb r,

194', b Dr. Luis lverez and was first tried at the Radiation Laboratorv of the Massachusetts Insti-

tute Technology. It was decided at this time

tha C would make a clean break from conven-

tional blind landing systems; instead of pu tting the information on a meter in front of the pilot, it would be told to him verballv, This would diminate the need of new equipment in the planes and the pilot would have most of hi thinking done for him b omeone all the ground.

The first experiments u inz aircraft were con-

du ted at East Bo too Airport and at N Qu n-

et Point using gun-laying radar for the precision ystem. It was obviou from the beginning that this gear was not sufficiently accurate at low glidepath angles, to successfully bring planes in for an approach, but 't did prove that the "talk-down" principle was good providing the controller had accurate information as to the elevation and azimuth of the aircraft at all times. The Radiation Labo atory at M.I.T. then developed special rad antenna and a presentation for high preci i

radar at low anzle, combininz th i with a e .rch S'ystem for traffic control. hi was the 'lark 1 GCA and was ready for a te t a ear later, November, .194.2.

Iark I GCA was operationali a big u cess, but technically not practical EoI' forward area use. This brought about the development of the Mark II GCA set which was exhaustively tested b the Navy operational persol nel and was accepted in Augu t, 19'!4. i. omplete uni per m nth are heing manufactured at present.

The fir t ets ~ ere set up inainesville Georgia, vVhidbey Island, Washington, ttu and in Africa. In LX, months, approximate! 10,000 successful approaches were completed to conclusively prove the dependability of the system.

PILOTS NEED TO LEARN ABOUT IT NOW

One of the difficulties being experienced, both in the forward areas and in the rates, is the lozical problem that the ' cret and confidential nature of C during the (1 -elopment period has necesarily made it "little known" to the man who mu t use it ... the pilot.

This article, for instance, is one of the first accounts to be given fleet-wide distribution.

An example of this is the pilot of the B-.29 unable to land a~ 1wo Jima because of weather conditions. He had never heard of GC ,and when it was explained t him a er the radio, he chose, instead. to attempt t land without the Ground ontrolled pproach. everal pa es over the field

onvinced him he could not find the rum ..... a -and aunt uribachi was a mental hazard looming somewhere out ill that soup. When the effective ceiling was only 100 feet and the visibility less than a mile, the GCA crew took 0 er. I though this army GCA crew had worked only with P-61' , a B-~g pilot was brought in the trailer for consultation. h tage was set for 's greatesc test: rain, strong 1'0 winds, se ere turbul n near Mount Suribachi=the weather 0 bad that the

pilot had to fl>r the rudder and the c -pil the elevators. Thi alone made it extreme! di ult in Iininz up the plane to accuratel follow the glide-path. inally the pilot called down t G ,A:

"Either get me down-or shoot me down ... there i n't any more gas."

did bring the big B-29 down, without shoetinz it down. A grateful plane crew wrote letter of thanks to all of the GCA crew, Since this incident f 4- pril 1945, B-zg' have been landing rezularl on .Iwo Jima-as high as (Went in one day. Not all B-29 pilots are being briefed in C.-\ and making t t runs,

IT HAS A ROSY FUTURE

It is difficult, at this time, to predict the tuture of CA and how far it can go. There have been several successful "Talk-down-to-touch' when pilots, under a hood, actually were brought down and landed without visual contact. This, of course, is not the claim of GC =rhat round Controlled Approach can actually bring th plane down to touch, but rather that a plane can be brought down during almost zero conditions, and the pilot take 0 er isually within a hundre 1 leer or so above the runway. No doubt when

units, now in the field, have had more experience, there will be more and more cases of "touchdowns" or near touch-downs being made.

Several commercial air-line official ha v e recently made trial runs at the Anderson, South arolina. field and have expre sed confidence in A as a pot-WaT plan for all commercial line .

• t this same fi ld, in Ander on, the pra ticability of using a "stacking" s stem for traffic control was demonstrated when thirteen approaches were made in the elapsed time of 36 minute, .lifty-n ..... o seconds, or an average of 2.81 minute per ap' proach . _ .. and preliminary tests, 1I in a modification of the present GCA equipment. have demonstrated successful carrier controlled approaches for landing at night under blacked-out conditions =-the birth of the CCA!

----------,-~-.~-------

CONFIDENTIAL

15



•••





,

sector plan for AA coordination

Prior to the Okinawa operation the USS ESSEX originated a new sector plan of AA coordination which strikingly resembles the plan of task group fighter direction, Adopted experimentally by Task Gro1tl} 58.) and later taken by all groups of Task Force 58, the success of this /llan in its first use is revealed. by action reports of the USS NEW JERSEY and othe1' participating ships. Fitting these together} here is the story which shows the effective use ·of CIC [acilities in coordinating our defense against enemy air attacks on cruising formations.

Task Group 58.3 was divided into four eccors of responsibility for AA defense. All ships in each quadrant covered the same sector, (rather than assigning each ship an individual sector based on its bearing from the center of the disposition a was done previously). By thus creating four fire groups the AA coordinator in TG 58.3 was able to place the best situated fire power on a target while the remaining sectors were left free to investigate other targets or search in their immediate areas, One or more sectors may be ordered to hold fire to safeguard friendly planes while the batteries of oUler sectors are rel a ed to fire on known bandits. The imp rtance of dividing the work load

16

CONFIDENTIAL

CON FID£NTIAL.

i particularly advantage u when numerous plan attack simultaneou ly, for no one bandit draws all the fire while others pres home their attack without adequately being taken under fire. By setting up this small number of lire groups the communication traffic of the AA Coordination System can be much more expeditiously handled than when each ship is an independerit firing unit, Every shi] in the group has all pertinent gunnery information. can fire whenever desired. and can feel free to concentrate on its own targets with no respon-

ibility to what is going on in other sectors.

The AA Coordination Sy tern wa planned With attention to detail. Thi was particularly noticeable in regard to the pecial and efficient voice procedure for use on the VHF circuit in Task Group 58.3. A well defined and efficient search plan using fire control radars was placed in effect. The directors are not designed for constant training over a sector, and rotation 0£ a director i quite a different thing from ju t rotating an antenna. ut despite this limitation on continuou search by fire control radars, their 11 e gives better coverage of the short range area out to 20 mile .. 'Within 20 miles air search radar is often unreliable and vi ual sightings cannot always be depended upon. Lookouts, directing their reports to a single station, provide clearance of all friendly aircraft; approaching the formation. As expressed by the Commanding Officer USS HORNET: "Such close liaison between ships ha the effect of 'pooling' all pertinent information as well as combining the AA batteries of all ships into one well orga ized and coordinated ta k gwnp battery," T

CO, E. TT· RPRI E adds: "Reporting hips must be po itive E enemy identification, oih rwise erron au r ports will -clog the A channel to the extent that the 'alarm effect' of a report on a real 1 andit may be nullified b the zreat number of erie 'wolf ''.

n ther rea all for the highly ffe ti coordinati 11 a hie ed in 58,3 is that the anti-aircraft control officers of the ships of that group were well informed regarding the purpose and lise of the system, having attended a conference aboard the

5S E SEX prior to the start or the operation,

FLAGSHIP OPERAnONAL TECHNIQUES

In thi pJ n. th Flagship hould ha e as much information-s-in tbe nature of a complete trackon its own radars a possible to get maximum coordination with the Director.!5.3 Task Group

oordinator rook station in IC, -58

ESSEX. U inz a small plot, he coordinated the information on tl e ask Group FDO plot with his small O'Ul1nCl pint and had the use- of his ship's -2 radar when the bozies approached to within 20 mile of ih task group. The E E' has constru ted a pial or r r th J\Ia ter PPI

cope with 15 mile ran e mark r (or th u f the operator. Ranges and bearing are read directly from the PPI cope without the u e of the CUHor. In addition. the operators are 'required to track all contacts with a grease pencil au the Master PPI Scope. Any new conta L picked up by the

-2 i rot rrogat d by tile K to determine identity. I the K does 11 t have th ntact supp rting hip (and/or the SC-2) are request d to interrogate the ntact,

o ca e of a multi-plane attack, an offic r on a Remote PPI using the 20 mile Tang scale. reads

fJ n

17

ranges and bearings on enemy contacts closing the disposition for- pm"poses of coaching FD radars onto target and also for purposes of maneuvering. The small bearing and range errors resulting from

uch proced axe are negligible in view 01 the speed and ease with which many contacts can be handled sim ul taneousl y.

Information is exchanged between the Coordinator, who personally uses the transmitter together with the headset during Conditions 0 E and General Quarters, and gunnery personnel in

hips in the group over VHF. It was at first believed that no separate VHF channel for AA coordination was necessary and that such use of the Tactical (Administrative) channel would not seriously impair the flow of administrative traffic for any appreciable period of tune. However, experience has demonstrated that not only is a separate channel necessary to handle clearance reports on friendly aircraft and other coordinated information, but also it seems desirable to maintain a 24-hour gunnery watch on this circuit in CIC.

GROUP COORDINATION AT WORK

When enemy waters were entered, ships of the Task Group were kept advised of the progress of interceptions. The altitude and location of CAP we.re announced over the AA circuit, assisting ships in picking a bogey target instead of CAP when more than one target was picked up by fire control radar. This information also served to reduce the frequency of lookout reports of 'bogey, overhead, high', In instances where some bandits evaded or broke through the intercepting aircraft, ships were warned whether our fighters were following the bandits in, or if they were breaking off interception. Prompt warning was given of. the approach of all friendly aircraft as well as bogies. Individual ships were encouraged to aid in the identification of bogies and did so. It was clearly understood that the AA Coordinator would designate which sectors were to take which dosing targets Under fire. This free exchange of information has done much to eliminate uncertainty on the part of individual ships in certain situations regarding whether or not to open fire. Yet, when surprise. attacks develop the initiative of each ship to open fire at will against an identified enemy plane remains undisturbed.

Even though most of the information that goes out over the AA circuit duplicates what goes over the Fighter Director Circuit, it is felt that everything is to be gained by the repetition and nothing lost. Recent enemy tactics were to disperse

18

CONFIDENTIAL

large formation flying ju t outside intercept range (50-60 miles), following erratic course change EoI' the remainder of their approach. The fighter director channels, of necessity, 'will provide information on dispersed groups involved in interception and may not be able to furnish information on small groups closing the formation but not being intercepted. The AA channel, coordinating spas· modic tracks and visual reports from all ships, fills in with .information for gunnery concerning any dispersed groups that have evaded intercept which the other channel is too busy to adequately cover.

In the initial trial oE this setup in action all bandits approaching the disposition were correctly evaluated. No bandit contacts approached the disposition within six miles from the center. All were taken under fire at extreme gun range. Altitudes of contacts varied from 1500 to 6000 feet. On one occasion the Task Group was under attack by four separate bandit aircraft between approximately .,goo and 2130. Two wete destroyed. A heavy fire was delivered by the Task Group and warnings as to location of adjacent friendly Task Groups and pickets as well as care in regard to location of ad jacen t ships in own disposition contributed to lack of any damage by own AA fire.

Large ships in central positions in alert sectors were called to reinforce the fire of ships in action sectors. Response to this request was smooth, East, and accurate. Copious use of window as well as evasion by radical changes in altitude on the part of the bandit planes was experienced. Nevertheless early contact by fire control radar was accomplished and maintained. Reports of contact and solution were not acknowledged for or relayed, thus enhancing circuit discipline and the immediate value of the information transmitted.

BB ADJUSTS TO AA PLAN

"USS NEW JERSEY anti-aircraft and CIC organizations took immediate steps to organize crc and Secondary Battery Plotting Rooms to participate in receipt and distribution of target information under this plan. To achieve the closest possible cooperation with the task group commander and the other ships, an AA Coordination Team has been created and stationed in CIC. This team consists of two officers and one fire controlman. The members of this team are seated at a table below the Air Plot with the VHF radio and the anti-aircraft director range and bearing indo carers before them. One officer mans the VI

he e 'and olfi er mans the ship' anti-aircralt control circuit for the purpose of eli eminacing information and control orders to the direc ors and i1" D feme. The petty officer mans a special circuit, connecting with the anti-aircraft amputers, which is used to collect information to be relayed to the Task Group AA Coordinator via VHF. Each telephone circuit is virtually a oneway circuit' hich greatly expedites the handling of traffic. his method has pro eel very efficient and it j believed that the information obtained by the anti-aircraft radars, dire tor, and computers (particularly in regard to altitude of target obtained by Mark 22 Radar) has been 9f a sistance not only to the Task Group Coordinator, but also to the Task Group Fighter Director Officer in effect.ing interceptions near the Iormation. While it is realized that much remains to be done in the way of improvement, it is felt that great proOTess has already been-made since the inception of the AA Coordination Sy tern toward obtaining more effe ti e anti-air raft defense in large Iormations,

"The special and continued effort made in this ship to improve the organization of its anti-aircraft defenses, in recognition traininz of lookouts and !ttlpnery personnel, in indoctrination of glln crews and control parties in fire discipline, and in special training to obtain the rapid commencemen t of a large olume of a curatel y directed fixe to defeat suicide attacks Was repaid by the performance obtained during this op ration, Recognition was prompt and accurate under trying circumstance. On two occasions when friendly planes were taken under fire by other ships, this ship held fire and warned the task {ITOUP of the identity of the aircraft over the VHF coordination circuit. Fire discipline l·17a5 excellent, In all cases

e was opened promptly, maintained at full volume as long as possible. and then checked before endangering other ships of the formation. In spite of continued attack, enemy aircraft failed to effect more than minor damage to any hip while the S EW J ; RSEY was in ompany. It is felt that this ship contributed in full measure to the excellent anti-aircraft results obtained by this plan of task group A coordination,".

A CRUISER REPORTS

S A TORIA (CL-go) says, "It had been bur experience that a cruiser CIC with a single SK search) radar cannot efficiently accomplish of the following assignments at the same

time: (a) conduct a normal radar Guard Baker.

hecking contact as ordered by the Ta k Group eIC Officer and transmitting information obtained to him to assist in interception; (b) reduce gain to a minimum to check. all close-in contacts to obtain data for own ship's gunnery. 'VVe found T.G. 58.3 AA Coordination plan, with its mutua] interchange of target information, to be oEgreat benefit in conducting effective AA defense against enemy air attacks. Frequently this ship has been alerted as to the presence of enemy aircraft in our sector which were not detected by our own GIC or had been lost within ten to fifteen mile of the formation. This has applied to reports of visual sightings as well as radar contacts. Until fire control radars are equipped with IFF, a single ship in each sector may be designated to conduct closein ail' search and transmit resulting data over the AA Plan channel.

"Had this plan been in effect during this ship's operation with another task gTOUp which had not yet adopted the Coordina ed plan. it is believed that a HelJcat, which was hot down after pursuing a Jap dive bomber into the formation, mizht not have been fired upon. Its identification as all F6F could and would have been reported over channel Tare."

CONCLUSIONS

The Task Group AA oordinated Plan has enabled a ta k group to bring more guns to bear against suicide planes before they were in po· ition to make their dives. arge and early volume of heavy A fire appears to be the best defense against these planes, once they have eluded the C P. The: possibilities of this plan are logically summarized in the rep9rt [rom Commai del" a k Force 58: " lthouzh the re ults of long range zunn ry have not come up to expectations. it is belie ed thar from the de elopment of suitable procedures for the antral of fire against maneuverinz targets, a greatly increa ed percentage of planes shot down by fi ve-inch fire outside the ~ormation can be expected. The greatest drawback to vesting coordination of all five-inch AA fire in one ship and one man is the tendency for all hands to become too dependent on information received from the A.A. Co rdinator, However, it is believed that if the initiative of each ship to open fire at will against an enemy plane can be maintained, the AA Coordination plan has excellent po sibilities."

CONFIDENTIAL

[9

[)o'jlifll~ Barrier PON"o/s jlQUnl al Saitlllll alld Gualn

he ~~r hr a or Japanese - - the Ia. l stllge" ol the war was their eff"'Jrt to atl.a€K 3.f"lrl disrupt ('llii"7ln plribious operations .. l'tte den b-i:.:o;r..~ .... shippiuc._ around an invasion beach was <LH attracti e t.:u:g i<l1' ellcmsubmarines. During landins nperat;li'»rr: t~nspm:ts ana warships must often he "s"nirtg l1Ck$,"::rhe am15ftion,oUap.., S'Ob cornrnanrlers was to'" penetrate UI.i"I' def meso tor-pedo our ships. and exippJe our assault Iill1ring- the rriri "I p 'riucl D~101:(, -a lseachh ad and supply lines w re pc)\' rrllil . tahli h d.

The ba.rrler P'ltl"Ol was the major item in our pad[u.: an i::>J.lbllnlrlne warfare to prol<::ct OIlT ,1ll)J)}ubinlls ol!.cratioTls. . ircraft on the barri r patrol Taw a cir .le of vigilance around the approach waters I) der cr, a ud iJ possi h 1 e k ill. en emy .sub before the)' catNllber iu. to a point of attack. This "air barrier" is losely co-ordinated with SlITface sub hUHting via GIG.

TjH~ plan of defense is fundamentally simple but viewed in detail is seen to be an impressive welding of arious units. Over-all control is exer ised from cre aboard the ommancl ship, and

:?O • CONFIDeNTIAL

the Ie's of pick t hip. snpi orting suna chips, and shore- based radar units all ceruril It to the search and attack, and must clove-tail tTl i .. a .tivi .. ties. lt is essential. according! • that all e1C's be "briefed on the barrier patrol plans before :my amphibious operationand important that all CJC persool'lel under rand the purpose and teelmique 'Of .t11e barrier patrol and anri-submarit e warfare,

BARRIER !'>LAN-CATCH THEN1 ON THE SURFACE

The larget so alluring to Jap sub wa OUl lal dina lore , 11 .uallv several mile off shore, Protect.

~ /

ing this force was a creen uf· urface t.a.f~ stationed

farther out at maximum torpedo range (at least 10.000 yards). wirh aircraft of the barrier patrol scanning the region beyond this screen.

lt has been found that the air raft should

earch at a considerable di tanc (30 0 tiQ mil s) from the invasion bea .h. The eason i lhOlr at this distance the planes can probably catch U1 submarines on the surface. Since any subn ....... .&j! .....

within visual r radar range of th urfa craft

creen will be ubmerg d. there i Iittle value in aircraft flying 'within 15 r 20 mile of the beach. On the other hand the submarine would not attempt a submerged approach of more than 60 mile since thi would leave just enough battery charge for a submerg d attack. The submarine would then have to retire on the surface, making it virtually a uicide mission. Beyond 60 miles, nearly all attacking submarines are Iikel to be surfaced. A more com rvative submarine would not be likel to ubmerge until about 30 miles away from the beach so as to b able to r tire submerged, F r the reasons the PBM Patrols fiy at ranges of 60 or more miles from the in asion beach in order to cleny undetected passage oE all surfaced submarines (including suicide subs) into the shipping area. Carrier-based planes search the area do er to the beach.

The barrier patrols are carefully planned to give the best coverage on all possible approaches for submarines with the aircraft available. Plan relieve on station to insure maximum efficienc . The adjoining diagrams show the patrols which were, actually flown about Guam and Saipan, day and nizht, (The outer se tors of he clay barrier were Dot a lwayscovered.)

The ight CQV(of'uge

o ETECT-REPORT-D~STROY

The plot of the anti-submarin barri r patrols i kept on th GIC bard as the plan wing along their assigned routes, For the job in CI to be smoothly carried out, all hands must have a clear idea of the ta k which the planes face. he prim.ary objective of the aircraft is to DETECT; the second is to R PORT' the third i to DE R Y. The planes report [0 C SCU (Commander ir Support Control Units) at regular! pre cribed intervals in order to as ist in plotting and in canol. The planes guard th local air warninz chan- 1 and report all en my contacts on this channel, ereby alerting all CIC's in the area. Proper

procedure is foll wed with re p ct to IFF and anti-submarine warfare a pr mulgated in FTP- 223A. It is imperati e that the patrol plane UDderstand what hipping lanes h-iendly hip e. p t to use and any other pertinent information. I can be of valuable assistance in vectoring these patrols around friendly ships and in keeping the planes on station. In particular, the CI ' on board picket ships Clove to assist the patrol planes in keeping on cour e and in pa ins on inforrnation. hi cooperation has been r u eful in keeping a tizht screen and in easinz the burden oE the I on board he command hip.

The performan e of the anti- ubmarine barrier has een highly satisfactory, a cordinz to all CAS U officers thus far interviewed. 0 ships were sunk off Okinawa by enemy submarine action. 1'10 enemy submarines were sunk in the Okinawa vicinity. nne of which was fir t sighted by a patrol plane. Small sui ide raft were also detected by patrol planes on a number of 0 casions,

narratiue of " typical hunter-killer attack b), us CORREGlDOn (CTIE-J8)

"I c was o r o[i and the midnight SP (anti -su bmarine patrol), consisting of two TBM' and one FM2, had been in the air about 30 minutes. The search plan consi ted of one TB"Nf conducting an 80 mile bani r search on each beam and one r 2 fI ing a relative se I:i r search 30° forward of the di po ilion. h barrier ear h wa in nformiry with the search shown n pa 'e 53 f the July. 1944. i sue of the Anti- ubrnariu« Bulletin. The cruising eli position of the carrier and five DE's as screen 'Was in conformity with USF 10 B. One TBM was fully loaded and gassed and in po· sition on the catapult and anoiher was in the read position aft and to tarboard or the catapult. 11 aircraft were armed with 6 S¥2 in. solid head RP, Mark 1 rock ts, equipped with flar s and ammunition lead into the gun. The TB if' , re al 0 loaded wirh six ono-buo s and bomb .

., t 0110 IC re eived over VHF the transmission from Lt. rnith Bying the starboard ector that he 1'1a5 investigating a disappearing blip. (At interrogation later he said that his radarman picked up a strong blip at 5V2 miles and that it di appeared at 2 miles.) CIC immediately gave the bearing and position of the plane to th Bridge and enter d on th DR T overlay po iti n of plane. ship and time. Air Plot conveyed information to ready room 0 er 19 MC. The ne t tran rni ion

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o ('I

21

--- en;; Il'ucl, f(unln-Killer plalllfS Dl'. trncl:

• Sourui-contacts ,all rn/7~

22

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from Lt. Smith was '1 am dropping ramrods.' The next transmission from Lt. Smith, 'Strong indications on orange ramrod, Am positive it is skunk: (See F P 223 A and S'f" Bulletin for standard pattern fur ramrods).

Bombs away,

" he Commanding Officer then orders DE's 2 and 4- immediately to the spot, they are continuously tracked on the DRT. (the FIVI2 is vectored to the Spot when contact is by day and far from disposition to get height and thereby maintain SK fix). Every three minutes the SG operator reports position of DE's and track is maintained on DR T. At this same time rhe Air Officer orders Fligllt Quarters sounded and Air Plot is told to brief the hunter-killer mission quickly and order 'Pilots man planes!' Ready room is given true bearing and distance and hunter-killer mission is launched,

"After launching aircraft the carrier and screen regroup and take a bearing toward the contact, The track of the ship is also put on the DRT. GIC continues to vector the DE's to contact # I and, as shown by the dotted tra k, it is often necessary to give small changes in course ..

"It will be noted that the carrier does not approach the spot of the contact within five miles. As the DE's approach, the planes continue to hear sounds on the sana-buoys. Lt. Smith then reports that he now has sounds 011 purple ramrod and none on orange indicating course of skunk to be -- - - (shackle code). Hunter-killer planes have been tracked b}' eIC and arc reported as on station to the Bridge. But now Lt. Smith repol'ts no sounds are heard on .ramrods and contact lost. Then one bunter-killer plane drops a second pattern along assumed course of the sub and pilot Jones reports strong indications on purple ramrod at contact #2, Bomb away. DE's are near contact # I and are vectored to contact #2. Here i where the teamwork of aircraf-t. carrier and DE's is most closely interwoven and vital. When the DE's approach closely enough for the aircraft to vector them, tilt! pilot reports that he is now taking charge of DE's as GIC continues to track ship, DE's and aircraft.

"As the DE's approach near enough for their engines to interfere with the sene-buoy reception, the pilot orders them to stOP engines for two minutes. Sounds are still coming from the purple sana-buoy and pilot orders DE's to start engines again and gives vector.

"At this point another hunter-killer pair is launched and the original patrol TBM. Lt. Smith, is vectored back to base and Lt. Jones_ takes over. Contact is again lost at point 2 and another pattern is dropped and indications are heard on the mosrsoutberly of the sono-buoys in the pattern. Bombs away. And now the DE's report that they have the sub all. their doppler gea.r and go in for the kill at which point the aircraft torn over the action and patrol around the spot of the contact.

"If the DE's lose contact 'Observant' search is begun in accordance with patterns and time element as indicated in FTP 223 A.

"It is important chat the officer-in-charge of maintaining the DRT overlay put down the exact time of each position report obtained on the aircraft, tlae .ship and the DE's.

"During the entire engagement alter aircraft have been launched it has been found expeditious for the Air Officer to take his station in GIC where instantaneous decisions can be made and immediately tr.ansmitt~ into action by the FDO:' ..

USF-IOB says, in P4'I't Til, paragraph 6750; "The problem of shore bombardment differs ['rom normal gunnery procedure in that the target to be taken under!' fire is usually nat seen. Beeaust: of this it is necessary that the geographic position of the target and the ship be knousr: at all times:' Here is » shore bombardment procedure devel(!)ped by USS TENNESSEE during participation. in nearly every amph£bious operation in the Pacific, which successfully carries out the recommendation abooe. II diffe,'s from the procedure o1'dinarily used in that the DRT is not employed. Illthough their CIGaels o'l1lyin a standby condition after "locating" the ship f01' Main Battery Plot l]reliminary to bom;bardmeul(J\lI ark 8 rada» is thereat ter used to posi lion the ship) and the grid chart and track are maintained wholly in Main Battery PlotY-some of the techniques develolJed by the TENNESSEE can. beat use to GIG jJersonnel concerned with bombardment operations.

shore bombardment without D RT

Wi ... th t. he ill.crea,sed emplo .. ~ment. o.~ na~al gunJIre following an initial landing, In-

direct fire assumes a proportionately .. .. greater importance. The vast majority of TENNESSE' 'S targets during the. Okinawa bombardment were so located that it was impracticable to obtaincUrect bearings or ranges. 1n consequence, they used indirect fixe in nearly all instances, The ship's position was plotted with the aid of the Mark 8 Mod 2 radar, using well defined points of land on which. to take ranges and bearings. The methods of handling this type of radar fireconu'ol have functioned with great success in numerous amphibious operations, borne out by the fact that their first spot is often within 100 yards in either range or deflection when open· ing fire at ranges as great as 15,000 yards. These methods are described in detail for those who may find helpful suggestions for their own operations.

TENNESSEE DESCRIBES THE SYSTEM

Here is the TENNESSEE'sexplan.ation of their stem: "This system eliminates the use of a DR T two reasons. The size of DRT's now in service

does not permit the use of the Jarge scale charts which we have found are particularly desirable when lire win be distributed over a considerable area, III such operations the TENNESSEE feels Utal there is some loss of accuracy using the I :36.,000 scale in these instances, which warrants use of a larger scale." However, the recent CINCPAC-POA standardization of all bombardment charts (see "ABC's of Grids;" page 26) probably makes charts of th is scale the more desirable. "Second. and more important, the DRT depends upon a pitometer log input for its track. The inaccuracies of the pit log when the ship is engaged i n frequent turns or steaming very slowl yare sufficient to destroy precision, Unless a constant track from plotted ranges and bearings is maintained, there is no assurance of the accuracy of the ship's initial salvos, Even if the position were plotted before a range and bearing to target was given, there would be no guarantee of tbe accuracy of succeeding salvos, The unrefiability of the pit log input to the rangekeeper would produce false generation and make final 'on target' adjustment impossible f01: an practical purposes. By employ:

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23

ing a minute by minute plot, the pit log does not enter the picture. 11 ranges and bearings to tar<Tet are furni .hed Ir m an actual plot of ship'spo-

irion. Any current i readil y d terrnined in a comparison of the track with the haft revolutions and courses steered. his current can be applied reciprocall as target course and sp ed on the rangekeeper. wn hip' speed determined by u e of speed cales can be entered manually t ill ure accurate rangekeeper generation. The inaccura y introduced b the use of current and ship's speed from the same track i negligible.'

ClC ON "STANDBY"

"Physical dimensions on the ENNES EE

make it pos ible to maintain the bombardment

bart in Main Batter PI t. he plotting' r om

offi er ba immediate a ce s to information on targets, contours, line of fire, assisned p SitiODS and other elements he must consider. he Mark

{ad .2 radar has proved to be more accurate in both range and bearinz han an urface earch radar now in use. With present '1al'k 8 control establi hed in re EN E . plotting room, and with accurate transmissions of range and bearing to the rangekeepers, the most accurate infermarion is available at that station. After 10 ating the ship prelirninar to the bombardment opera· tion CIC assumes standby status a far as bornbardment procedures are concerned, concenrrating on navigation, air search and other routine procedures hat must be coordinated with thi

CON FIDENTIAL

The lust, umauts Im'd jor horr uombardmeut $olut,j(11f are p-repoo'ed 10 the same sea!e as the cht".! being used. Two range arms are used /0 plot ship's pQ~iti(}n. A small hole at the UI'O index (tile arm is gr/ld1lfl/,ed in Ilmglh ill range) is placed on (I point (strong Plu)1Zogf(lP" needles arc ideal) which lias been driven into the clmrt table at the Lip oi land to which rOllges and bearing. are taken, Bearing is read from the inked COlli' pass rose alJ th« chart, range from the en!,'1-oved scai«. Tile arm can be lifted from tile point tuhen. desired. A third range arm is designed 10 fil 011 the cenler of lite cel/uloid rose 10 give Tlmge Dnd be(lring to (~ dl!signated target: The speed scales used (mabie determination 01 speed to on (l(;curaC'l' of Qlle· half knot,

operation. Throughout the operation the 4JW circuit (hip control ranges) wa of special value. It pl' vid s a con enient circuit for rapid eli emination to all gunner rations of ranges and bearings of selected targets, and for the identification of grid locations of previously unreported targets Wide use of the chan is thus facilitated by havin thi circuit tied in with the 5-6-7- JW cir uits as firing et-ups are gi en to Air Plot, areas and targets are identified for econdary battery ontrol officers, and positions are sent to the Bridze over the tied circuit.

CHART PREPARATION

"An es ential step in this system is the preparation of a good bombardment chart. Early experience fonnd the 1: 20 000 most satisfactory and the ship has employ d thi scale iu all operations except th se for the, bombardment of Leyte and Okinawa. A large scale gives a detailed picture of topography and minimizes the ine itable error in plotting. The chart i formed by joining the several sheets with strips of cellul e tape on the reverse side, remo iug as much of the hart cl ea area as practicable. It is tben secured to linen tracing cloth which provides a durable urface from which navigati nal tracks can b era ed easil at the conclu i n of each da 's firing. Thi continual plotting and erasure is not pos ibl on present chan paper without rupturing the paper.

"Fire suppOrt area are then marked; areas responsibility are delineated' a igned firing p

SitiODS are shown; and important contour lines are inked in for easy understanding of the topographical nature of the target. All targets reported since the printing of the chart are entered. The chart i further used for identification of a target's location through ranges and bearings and Eor transmission of accurate positions to ship control stations. The area identification enables spotting officers of both main and secondary batteries to orient themselves with minimum confusion and permits accurate reports of the location 'Of new targets.

"Of paramount importance is the selection of points of land to b employed in the radar track, Obvious con ideration are prominence and loeadon enabling tracking directors to bear at all times while in the firing area. Not so obvious, but equall important, i the selection of points so

baply contoured tha tidal change exerci e little effect on radar return. The points should be so located, with relation to the landing beaches, that minimum interference from small craft can be expected.

"A compas ro e i inked around each trackins point and numbers are placed on this rose 1800 opposi te to the normal arrangement, so that the

earing of a point from the ship can be plotted immediately as the bearing of the hip from that point. be compas t e atta hed to the drafting machine has a short metal tube 7/16 inches in . diameter in its center fitted with cross hairs so that the rose can be oriented exactly around the advanced po ition.

at the objective, both Mark 34 directors and associa ted Mark 8 Iod 2 radars are trained out on tracking points. 'or several minutes, thereafter, position are plotted simnltaneou ly from each of the two units. Ranges and bearing are taken. from Mark 8 Mod 14 rangekeepers. When it is clear from the conjunction of simultaneous plots that an accurate position ha been attained, the foretop is freed from tracking to begin search of the objective for targets, The maintop maintain the fire control track.

"After a series of plots taken each minute, course and peed are readily apparent on this track and the ship's position can. be advanced for a period of one minute with great accuracy. When range and bearing to a target an: desired the ship's position is plotted and advanced one minute. The elluloid compas rose on the drafting machine is centered on the advanced position, and th "range and bearing to the designated target are given to rangekeeper # 1 where the values are entered. The foretop matches the designation transmitted {Tom range-keeper at a 'mark' on the advanced minute that the time motor is turned on. As a check, the position of the advanced minute is plotted and minor corrections are made as necessary. To check the accuracy of the plotted position the range to the nearest land in line of sight i compared from the chart and from Mark 8 radar on the forward antenna. TIle battery is ready to fire in all respects at 15 seconds after the advanced minute. In no case when the hip is steadied on a firing course should a 'delay greater than 2 minutes be necessary between the time a target is designated and the instant a battery opens using full indirect can trol."

Editor's i ole: An artlcle on shore bombardml'nt utilizing the DRT will appear in the October "C.l.C."

o (1

25

RAPAR TEAMWORK ESSENTIAL

"Excellent radar operation is es entia! in till t pe of tracking and comp ehensive study of Tadar pTe entation i indispensabl for the op· rators, As the ship approaches a firing -posi.tion

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26

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How to portray the earth' curved surface upon a flat map or chart has long been a scientific problem. For centuries men have tried to design a grid without introducing intolerable errors, and even from the earliest days of this war, grids of various types have appeared; however, the use of radar, the magnitude of island warfare, and the necessity for an increased amount of naval bornbardment have created the need for tandardization, The importance of a universal grid system to serve alJ military services alike has been realized.

This is the story of grids, how they work and their e pecial value to GIG and gunnel}' officers. Since most of the maps and charts prepared by CinGPac-GinCPOA authority for land. amphibious and air support will carry the World Polyconic Grid with target area designators,' an explanation of the polyconic system is given.

I Restricted enclosure (a) of 15 Dec. 1944 from CinCPOA top secret 0001 172 to the Hydrographer of 26 Dec. 1944.

TYPES OF GRID PROJECTIONS

Three of the type of "map projection" that have been developed are the Iercator, the 'Tran er e

Iercator, the Lambert Conic and the Polyconic.

Of these the polyconic takes its name from the fact that it is based on a large number of cones, each tangent to the earth at a parallel.

The scale on the poly conic projection is true on the central meridian and along each parallel. but the scale error on other meridians increa es with ina-easing departure in an east and west direction from the center meridian to uch an e tent that the u efulne of the polyconic projection is

onfined to area of nan-ow longitudinal extent.

A military grid is simply a network of 1000 yard lines (depending on scale of chart and area) superimposed on a map or chart sheet. In order to keep errors within practical limits, the Iimiting point has been e tablished at four degrees east

r we t of the central meridian. Distance in an

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east and west direction are not di torted on the polyconic projection and therefore the lengths of the arcs of parallels are represented in then- true lengths on the projection, Hence, the Pacific Ocean Areas are divided into vertical grid zones eight degrees wide. each spreading out four degrees east and west of the central meridian.

In order to assure greater accuracy when giving true bearings from grid readings, (he following factors must be taken into account: The grid constitutes a complete system of geometric I tl red squares. And, to the east and to the west of til cen tral meridian an angu Iar difference appear . between the converging meridians and the rigidly parallel grid line. his angular difference is called "Grid Declination." AJI bearingsmeasured from the lines or co-ordinates are grid bearings: to obtain true bearings Grid Declination must b applied. (This is always indicated on the marzin of AMS maps). Hence. grid north and true 1l00l11

are not the same. ntil "Grid Declination" is computed, general directions but Dot true bearings can be takenfrom zrid reports at first zlance, In all grid systems, the "longitudinal" co-ordinates

(eastings) aloe ah a s reported before the "latitudinal" co-ordinates (northings.)

PROBLEMS OF STANDARDIZATION

There are very definite principles involved in designing a grid to satisfy the various forces. In an assault group, \ here the ground troops are supported by navs 1 and air units, a ingle, common point-referencing system is ne e sary, and for clarity's sake there O1U t also be a common method for recognizing topographic igns. W11iJe differences in scale and density of detail may appear, all graphics must tell the same story. niversal signs are employed, but in orne harts th are necessaril more exazzerated than in ott er and variations in scale require that the amount of detail differ. Tim a 1:25,000 (one inch equals 694-4/9 yard) ground map will show nearl ever' house and hedge, while the 1: 36,000 naval bombardment chan will omit such pre cise details.

AREA DESIGNATORS AID REPORTING

Target-area designators, carried on the World Polyconic Grid, simplify the calling off of military grid positions. For example, a grid reading of 625-820 with the new avy area designation system becomes 6282 F when the 25,1 tter qllares are used jn place of the 100- ard digits. Cutting down the numerals from six to four facilitates reporting as well a plotting, minimizes the possibility E err r in transmission, and ut the length 0 E transmission. particula rl y if hack] ed,

Tn most instances operational charts will I e printed so a to include the benefits of the latest photographic intelligen e. For this rea on a clear method of edition arid issue identification has been empl yed in rmy maps to di tinguish the old from new .reports, The majority of ground maps issued for operations in POA will be Army Map ervice products, identified by the MS issu number, uch as, "Fir t Edition, AMS 3" or "Type B A is 3'" Edition number and type letters are lax ely academic, but issue number are hishl important, and erve differentiate orrent map and chart from ob 0] te ones. Thus a map marked First Edition MS 3 is to be preferred over a First Edition . is 2.

The Gin Pa - in POA authentication on an ,rmy field map is the official stamp hy which you

28

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can determine its dependability, and only those so labeled are guaranteed to be in factual agreement. This authentication is provided £01' your protection, and if any weaknesses aloe presem. they will be acknowledged on the map.

For I a charts, reference should be made to topographic and hydrographic coverage diagrams which indicate reliability of the ou!'ce material used in their compilati n by CinCPac-CinCPO . After the chart has been j u d, all corrections are handled by H.O.'s otice to Mariners,

SHEET NUMBERING SYSTEM

In order a simplify the indexing of the thou-

ands of rm: map stocked b POA agencies, a definite sheet de ignation ystem has been set up. Each map is assigned a number based on a coordina e y tem instead of ernplo ing consecutive

A c!1'/inile sheet designation system lias been se: up to simplify the ind«xing 01 maps Slacked l)y POA agencies. The whole (lua abovlI is a 1:100,000 map (md is broken down into various pan~ls 10 specify smaller sections, namely, 1 ;50,000 nud 1 ;25,000 11Iil1)The cross-hatched area represents tile 1,'25,000 sheet 211511 SR,

numbers within a series as the avy does. For example, in the adjoining diagram each onedegree square is broken dot n into three horizontal bands each 20 minutes (20 nautical miles) hi 11, and into L~I vertical tripe each 30 minutes 'ide. The pan I are numbered in ord r from we t to east (s e 2115-2215) and from south to north (2114, 2115 and 2213, 2214, 2215). For the 1:50,000 b ts, the 1: 100,000 area shown is broken down into four quadrant I, II, III. and IV, numbered clockwise beginning in the northea t crner. FOT the 1 :25,000 sheet the sam map i further at down into NE. NW, SE and S'\ quadrants, In the illustration the cross-hatched area represents the 1: 25,000 sheet 2115 liSE.

This method of sheet numbering applies t all standard MS and PO series maps. Some preliminary reprints of native maps originally designed on local sheet lines ma retain old numbers pending recompilarion, as emergency items.

'The Hydrographic Office uses chronologie )

miscellaneous number 101101l'ioO" the coa tline of any given island. '01' e ampl , the Ryuk u's are known a the 11557 eries, the Phillipine are the 11601 series. Indices of all approach and bombardment charts are available to facilitate ordering specifi nan. In later charts a differentiation has been made betwe n the approach and bombardment with Prefix A preceding the number for] :72,000 hal' and Prefix B for 1 :36,0 0_

USES OF GRIDS

Working near land 11a rea ted the ne essity for providing adequate warning for air and surface iontacts, and a mean of coordinating land operations with naval activitie off bore, rid answer this need. The also play an important Tole in evaluating aircraft warning information f01' fighter interc ption and control, for homing lost aircraft, and for locating enemy surface vessels.

U of these fun tions an of importance to CIC. During operations a around commander may wish to all for naval unfire at a pecified tarzet which appears on his map, Since his and the naval gunnery officer' chart, which goe 16 miles to sea and 10 miles inland, ar ba ed on identical cartegraphy, the bombardment can be applied by 0- ordinates, with the knowledge that it can be

ffecrively rendered.

Two Cin Pac-Cin PO charts hav been

authorized for I avy lise. The 1:36,000 naval bombardment chan is the pri nci pal firing aid for naval gunnery upport of bore operation. I i complete with a military grid and with targetarea designator. The 1: 72,000 naval appro a h charts assist na al na izarion and zunner officer in maneuverinz ships into position for precision O'unnexy support of shore operations. I t too

arrie the military grid and rea designators.

Four portfolio (NO.1, 0, 41, 49) have been tentatively drawn up by the Hydrographer for all Pacific Fleet ve sels having I 'so The e rna be obtained from the Hydrographic Office, 'Washing-

,~ ---

~

"\. \",)

\

EDITORS' NOTE. ' TillS EYCELltt'H PflOl0G~ APJI wiu, j!,E PUJltSKE, IN THE ~Fn ISSUE

OF "Ci.C:

ton, if time permits, the area Hydrographic Distributing Offi ,or a U .. Navy Chart Depot upan reque l submitted u Form HO 754. It is recomm nded that all units draw their allowances, which ar i ued in addition to the regular charts and publi .ation for u e of navigators. The Pacific Fleet ClC ehool suggests that the series of authorized charts of the Japane e Islands at scales varying from 11 to 1-! nautical miles per inch b used on the DR and 1'01' a trategic summary plot.

CIG's will also be interested in the -3 series of a jadon charts wh i h mal' also be obtained from the H drographer, Washington, 1.1 e charts have a scale of three nautical miles per inch and show both land ontours and fathom curves, The serie include the area E Chosen and -ormo a.

ince 1 A pril j g.] 5 the -1 ydrographic Office has been making automatic distribution of the Restri ted issue of all bombardment and approach charts printed after that date. This eliminates the necessity of a requisition being forwarded to the .~ a hington Office from hips at sea. These gridd d charts oyer large oastal areas of enemy-held territory at cales of I inch equal 1000 yard (1 :36,000) and 1 inch equal 2000 yards (1:72,- 000) and show land ontour and fathom curve.

CINCPAC ADOPTS AIR DEFENSE GRID

On 1 eptember, inCPa ordered th adopti n of the standard l'my ir Force Air Defense Grid (now employed bv CinCAFPa ) b naval force in th Pacific areas. "hen ever a grid i u ed, the

ir Defense Grid, which super edes the Jan rid, is to be utilized for the exchange of ail' warning information radar r porting and telling and fighter dire ti n. The following exceptions, however, are particularly important. The MS World Po] conic Grids are till to be used for gunfire and air SUPPOl-t and both th Polar Coordinate Sy - tern used by hips at sea and the Polar C ordinate System for local r porting from a fixed reference P int at the scene of an ) ration are he retained.





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"Combat from Conn"-it's the Captain on the ~ lMC-"They've been talking about pigeons over the VHF. What are pigeons?"

Simple. "Pigeons" obviously must be part of the Fighter Director Vocabulary. Now, to find that vocabulary pamphlet .. it's not on the radio bench where you remember seeing it 1ast week. ... the radarman on the se remembers the SK radarman reading it yesterday ... no, the SK operator hasn't seen it since yesterday. Frantic searching, then finally you find it. You check through it hurriedly: "Pancake=pancake ammo-pancake fuel-pancake hurt-pillow-whoa, back up. What, no pigeons?"

"Combat from Conn," the Captain. booms out again and the only answer you have for him:

..... no pigeons, sir!"

This is an incident that happens too frequently on a ship where no adequate library has been set up in CIC, and where there is no regularly assigned eIC petty officer librarian .

Consider your own library and see how it fits the dictionary definition: a library is a collection of books, pamphlets, etc., kept for reading and consultation; especially such a collection arranged to facilitate reference, as by clas ification and indexing. Consider especially "Arranged to facilitate reference"; here is where many GIC libraries fall down drastically.

A good CIC POL (Petty Officer Librarian) can, in short order, win the most-valuable-man title by simply making information readily available. Unfortunately, the complement set up for CIe does not include a POL whose duties would involve only publications; the petty officer must 'be drawn from the list of watchstanders who, during periods of inactivity, would completely familiarize himself with every pamphlet publication and book that should be in CIG and make up a filing system.

His routine runs something like this:

I-List all publications in the CIe library on a handy card index, keeping this constantly up to date.

2-Insert changes and additions into standard pbblications when these changes and additions are announced. (A good example: the word "pigeons" added to the revised Fighter Director Vocabulary.) 3-Cross-index subjects that may be found in several different sources. (Example: ",\VINDOW-USF-lO-B, Part 6, Para.666o. "Cd.C." Magazine,

July '44 pg. 1, etc.)"

4-Make routing slips and see that all concerned read the material. 5-Retum all material to the ship's custodian or lock it up in I'C when in port, compl ing· with the hip' existing se urity regulation.

. .

. . . . . ,.

• • , It ill •

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To start an adequate eIe library require a good deal of initiative, but once the basic setup is completed the "upkeep" is not too great. Listed here are books, pamphlets and bulletins that would be useful in every ClC library, One word of caution. Many of these publications can be induded in the GIC library only if the ship's allowance permits and if the ship's custodian lpthorizes such use of the publications. It will be necessary for the Oine of eIe to sign for registered publication. The assigning of a petty officer as a librarian does not hilt the responsibiliry for these publications from the OinC or the watch officer on duty. Ther fore it is sugcrested that registered publications be checked every watch.

This is by no means an all-inclusive list; different type ships will require additional publications, such as the "CIC Handbook" for De [Toyers, put out by Commander Destroyers, Pacific Fleet, which would be an essential pamphlet in a DD CIC library.

• USF-10 (Current Edition) .. Pac 71 (Current Edition) .. Pac·70 (Current Edition) Op-Orders

Task Force Instructions 1 RAD Publications

• Indicates a regiStered publication. May be obtained from:

1 Comrnlmder-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, ~adirzcs5 Division, laTry Department, Washington, D.C. 2 Office of the Chief ot Nn'{!al Opel·n'tions, Navy Depnl'tmenl, WflShington, D.C.

3 Paci{jr Fleet Radar Cellter, Fleet Post Office, SaJl Fmncisco, C(lli/(lTflifi.

01 hip'. custodian (i/ 'he hip's allotaance lis' permits).

In addition to these basic publications, periodi als, such asa al Aviation News, Recognition journal and the like, plus bulletins released from time to time, should be circulated freely. general information bulletin board should be the re ponsibility of the POL. Conceminz Op plan, it i vital that all tactical information be supplied to CI for readyreference as follow: own operation orders, plans and objective; battle plans; tactical orders and in truction for type in company; effe tive ommunicari m plans, voice calls. and authenticators; general strategical situation; general information on logistical support; own and enemy, ship and plane, recoznition characteristics; a sumed enemy objectives; en m ta tic based n intelligence reports and past performances; enemY.Tadar and radio count rmeasures; hydrographical and geographical informacion; weather information and reports; other pertinent information. This collection of combat and tactical information requires the most cla sifying and ind ing. It mu t be disseminated quick1y, oftentimes during action,

2 "C.LC." Magazine

2 "Electron' Magazine

3 FD and CIC Advanced Training Manual

.. 4 FD Vocabulary (CCBPll-~) .. 4 General Signal Book

31

enemy use of anti-radar coatings

Schnorchet's asui-radar covel'iug

u

32

CO N Fl0t:NTlAL

Th.e fi ~t develo,pment of a~lti-r~da.r c.oati?g in erman began sometune ill June 1943 at which tune Admiral Doenitz called a number of high frequenc e 'pens to a mee ing in Berlin. t this time it had . ~eco~e apparent to the ermans that llied radar was largel respon-

Ible £01' increased submarine ]0 ses. hi conference re ulted ill- widepread rese:arch on thi subject and a little later the fir t practical work began. his 'work was along the line of a high frequency selective coatins, At firs.t th.e Navy .High Command wanted a oating that would give a reduction m reflection to a value of j 0 per cent for aU wave lengtl below two met r (150 Mc.). H we er, at a second meeting at Fran .urt in. the autumn f J 9"13 the High ornrnand de ided to concentrate u the band ?f 6 m. (5000 Ic.) to 30 m. (1000 Mc.). As a r ult f III e ex! eriment l~ now appears that two t 'pe. of coatings were in operational u e at the time of ermanv' surrender.

IT WORKED FOR THE GERMANS

be lint Ll'pe, developed b the 1. G. Farben plant and known as L G.jaumann absorber, was u ed for the prote tion of Schnorchel' on -boats. Employees of this 1irm asserted that these coatinz were effecti e to the

• 0

point that .reflection were redu red to a value Ie s than 10 1 ercen of the

\ lu obtained from an un coated urfa e over the band from 6 t 20 m, This is substantiated by test urves and result E a test in which the rane of detection o~ a -b.oat with coated chnorchel was 15 to 30 percenL of the val LIe ob ained WIth an uncoated elm r hel.. centimeter airborne radar 1 as used in this experiment.

. It now appears that the 1. .-Jaumann absorber wa be ing replaced at centnneter i~rave lengths by a frequency selecri e one-layer coating developed by a Prof. Wesc11. This type coating 1S known as "Tarnarnatte" or Camoirflage m~t. Its thickness is 20 mm. and it is highly elective as to frequency and design d to operate at 9.3 m. The late t .information indicates that in spite of its selecti tty the amamat e_ had b n cho en by the High ommand to supersede the 1. G.-Jalllnann ab rber for all future application.

JAPANESE 'EXPERIMENTS

It appe~'s that the .Japanese have given much thought to the development of anti-radar coanng and paints, but their work rno t probably reached only the research stage. Information from reliable ources states that the 1 A vertical exhaust tuhe which enabled UU' -bcnes 10 end e submerged for lung periods.

I. G.-Jaumann absorber process had been gh' n to the Japan e b the Germans. Captured Japanese do uments al 0 ubsrantiate the fact that th .J apanese knot the ermans Were using a t pe of anti-radar coating on submarines. aptured undated d ument di us e the problem which must be met before practical u e can be mad of a paint to absorb radar radiation. The chief difficulty encountered was that of devi inz a paint which would be capable of giving protection over a wide baud of radar Frequencies. Also th y felt that the additional weight. which thi paint would add to a plane must be given can iderarion,

This do urn nt also de c ibe an ab orbinz mal rial made of a layer ol titanium. oxide and a laver of a saline Iuti n backed bra metallic plate of copper, iron 01- aluminum. The theory i that the incoming wave trike this material and a portion of the radiation is direct] refle t d from ih top layer of ab orbing mal rial" bile at th am time some of the radiation is reflected b the In taUic plate. hrougb the inrera cion at these two reflected waves theoretically a11 radiation would be cancelled out, However, it is doubtful that this material could have much practical use due to the Iact iliac the amount of energy absorbed depends upon the relationship between the thickne and quality of the absorbing material and the anzle at which the radiation strikes it. nother argument against its 11 e i its highly

elective frequ n y haracteristi .

The do ument also d cribes a , ave al orbing body which i ut in all. irregular saw too til fashion. It wa a sumed that the inc rninz wa e would be refle t d ha k and lorth between adjoining teeth and that the amount of wave ab orption depended upon the number of times the wave was reflected from the body. The limitations of this method are the same a the other type absorber and it appeal"s to be just as impractical. nether type absorber which tbe Japanese have worked on utilizes a metal plate on whi b metal rod less than one half wave length are fixed. . he e rod mav be either parallel with th plate or perpendicular to it. This ab orber' also was con idered 0 b .irnpractical b the Japane e.

When the war ended. the .Taps wer king a Ius Jage material with a

low wa e-reflectinz ratio. Wooden aircraft had b en onsidered and radar wave-absorbing paints were beinz worked n,

Although the Japanese had met with but little success at the time this captured do umenr was written, they spent much time on this subject and considered it highly important to continue re earch,

. ..

Thl$ Wtlscl<J.Radar-Pul.fe

A bsorber' •

CONFIDENTIAL 33

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Japanese radar and tactics

CONFIDENTIAL

35

The first. radar with which the J apanese had any degree of success was perfected in October 1941. This was a land-based early warning radar which was used quite extensively for air search and surface search. After the development of this equipment the Japanese began work on shipbome equipment for air search and surface search. Tests on a 150 Me, air search and a 3000 Mc. surface equipment were made in March and April of 1942. The air search equipment was fairly successful but considerable difficulty was experienced with the surface search equipment. By the end of 1943 sixty of the 3000 Mc. surface search sets were manufactured, but: only five or six operated satisfactorily.

Meanwhile the Japanese Army had developed fire control radars copied from American and British sets captured at Corregidor and Singapore. Later the Army also developed mobile equipment which was of original Japanese design. The Japanese Navy also developed a search light control

., radar copied from captured British sets for shipboard use, but as far as known this equipment was never used as such; however, it has been used quite extensively on land. It was not until late 1943 that a suitable airborne equipment was put into operational use, this being a Navy equipment. This equipment was not extensively used until the latter pan of 1944, probably due [0 production difficulties. The Army came out with a 200 Mc. set in 1944.

EARLY WARNING RADARS IN PAIRS

The Japanese early warning radar system for outlying possessions has in most instances been under Naval control. Early warning radars were located on the highest points of the island and faced seaward. Two of these sets were usually located at one site probably in order that one might be used for tracking and one for search. In man y in ranees it has been noticed that once the japa-

• nese were aware ~(the presence of invading forces or when they were under air attack. they shut down all early warning radp-. This was the usual practice before any jamming was attempted by our forces. They seemed to have a deadly fear that we were using their radar for homing.

The Army apparently used three types of early warning radar. There is II fixed type which is used for key positions, a mobile type for field use and a type lor shipping use. The typical fixed type radar site consists oE one transmitter using a nondirectional .antenna _ and. four, receivers . .1ocated convenient points around the transmitter to giv

the maximum possible co erage, The mobile radar set·up usually consists of two complete mobile sets separated by a distance of 500 meters. The two radars may be used to give more complete coverage. It has also been observed that two sets on a site may operate on different frequencies, and while it is believed. that the Japanese a ppredate the possibilities of this arrangement for reducing the effectiveness of countermeasures. it is possible that the object is to reduce mutual interference. Reports are made to a headquarters located equidistant from each radar.

Little is known of the radar for shipping use except that it was possibly being used on picket boats. (Two sets were found land-based in the Philippines). Picket boats patrolling 01I the coast and equipped with early warning radar are an important part of the Japanese early warning system. An early warning system using a continuous wave transmitter at a central point and receivers at strategic points approximately 200 miles away was also being used. This was the first type of early warning used by the Japanese.

FIRE CONTROL CHIEFLY LAND-BASED

There is very little evidence that the Japanese have ever perfected a shipborne AA fire control radar. Some sets were built for shipborne use but difficulties arose and some were later converted for land use. Information from POWs and captured documents indicate that the Japanese were 'using air search and surface search equipment for fire control in the early part of 1944. Captured documents describe a shipbome AA fire control radar but there is little evidence that it was ever put into use. Radar equipment for control of- landbased AA batteries and search lights appeared to be in widespread use. Both the Army and Navy have sets for this purpose which are quite similar in construction and operation. A typical Army radar controlled AA battery usually has one radar for a battery of six guns. A group of search lights is controlled by one radar which is mounted on a master search light. The master search light is put on the target by radar thereby illuminating it for the other lights. Changes in tactics in the use of gun laying radars have been noticed recently, and may be enemy reaction to jamming. It has been reported that fire control radars in some areas came on the air only when the first wave of bombers were about to start their bomb run. Formerly these gun laying signals were heard 40 to 60 miles

rom the target area and operators had plenty of

time to anal -zc the signals and pr pare to jam before oming x ithin radar range.

AIRBORNE RADAR HAD VARIETY OF USES

Only two Japane e airborne radars were being used extensively at the war's end. One is a 150 Me, Navy equipment and the other is a200 Ic, Army set. Although these are ASV (Air to Surface Vessel) sets they may be used with some effect for Al (Air Intercept). Both types are equipp d with antennas for search and homing and the Army equipment uses a m tor driven antenna lobe switching mechanism to give a 600 search area ahead of the plane. It apI ears that the general procedure for the use of the avy equipment is as follows: the operator switches back and Eonh on the search antennas until a target is located. Then he maneuvers the plane in the right direction and heads toward the target using the homing antenna.

The Army sets are equipped with a switch by mean of which, the pilot can hut off hi transmitter and then start it up again within a few seconds. This permits him to take a quick look at the target and then shut his equipment down again. Therefore, his chances of detection by search receivers are lessened. It is also probable that due La the shortage of radar equipment only one or two planes of an attack group were equipped with radar. These planes might either lead the group to the larget or orbit orne distan e from the target and vector the attack planes in.

The Navy equipment has been used widely, particularly against submarines, and appears to have achieved results which were encouraging to

CONFIDENTIAL

o o

them. he equipment ha also be n used a a navigational aid in identification of islands and coa t lines. Widespread use of the Ann equipment was being expected before hostilitie ceased.

SEARCH RECEIVERS IN FAVOR

It i also known that the Japanese made extensive u e of radar search receivers. early all fleet units were equipped with a receiver capable of covering from 75 Mc. to 420 1\IIc. and a receiver that will tune from 2500 Mc. to 3300 Me. In fact, it appear that they preferred to u e ear h receiver for earl warning instead of radar, During the past few- month some earl warning radars have been captured with search receiver antennas mounted on them. They also have developed three airborne search receivers. One type tunes born 42 Mc. to 400 Mc. and is used for determining frequency characteristics. The other two tune from 75 Mc. to 400 Mc. One of these is equipped with DjF antennas and a means for determining pulse rate.

STILL NO IFF

The Japanese so far a is known, did not .have all electronic IFF s}' tern in operational use. Captured documents describe tests of an electronic identification system con i tinz of a groundinterrogator perating in conjunction with an airborne tran ponder. They have ala conducted experiments with similar equipment for fighter control. This is known as "F" device or "guide radar" and con ists of a ground radar unit that operate in conjunction with a transponder installed in the aircraft being controlled. One plane of an attack group would be equipped with the "guide radar" transponder and would be put within the radar range of the target by the ground equipment. The leadiuz plane then took charge and led the other toward the target with hi radar.

-

-

&

36

CONFIDENTIAL

TDZ/RDZ - new UFH radio

__ - ",..

or

r-=-._--

-------The "{lie cabinet" call truetion of lhe 'TDZ is right dOWH the technician', II lley, S<'1'Uicillg and replacing comll1mellls is easy> euen in cramped quarters.

The n w TDZ DZ.~ ten chan. nel radio equipmerits f l' urfa e communi ati US "ere designed to meet exacting demand. A recent urvey in ih e Pacifi Ocean r a disclosed that ab tit 700 channel rna be required to provide fully adequate short-range communications for Jarge fleet and amphibious operations. Of these, 300 would be for surface cornmunications (He t and ship- hore), 400 for air and for

urface communications directly supporting air operations. 'or this s stem, equipments hould be tremely He: ible-ea il installed interchangeable nits-with in tant availabilit oE channels.

The 225-'100 Me, band ilia chosen for the new DZ/RDZ se for several reasons:

J- his frqu n range is the nl one available all wing urr nt t hnique and ompOllellt to be utilized in arriving at a ati fa tor production design.

2- ince this range is completely free From sporadic long rarrge sky wave propagation, it offers comparative ecuriry from intercepticn lit ide a limited area.

3- be band ontains sufficient channel

vide a Ilexibl o-ordinated ornmuni ation

tern adapt d t th xtrernelv fluid III ements l

large tas k forces.

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CONFIDENTIAL

37

The TDZ is a ship-and-shore transmitter. lis o1doltme mecllcmism provides ten pre-set, crystal-controlled channels anywhere in the 22)-·/00 Me. band.

The RDZ is compact, witll knobs recessed to prevent occidental tnovemerlt.

EASY TO OPERATE AND SERVICE

The RDZ is a superheterod ne- pe receiver, employing crystal frequency control and having an Aurorune mechanism pro iding ten pre-set channels within the band 225- 00 Me., anyone of which can be selected in 10 econds or less. A remote control unit permits channel selection, volume control and silencer on and off. Other

receiver adjustments are normally pre-set at the receiver itself. The cabinet has been streamlined. There are no sharp edges or corners on the receiver enclosures, and all control knobs are recessed to prevent accidental movement.

The TDZ, a crystal-controlled, general-purpose, ship-and-shore transmitter, also utilizes an Au totune mechanism to provide ten pre-set channels anywhere 'in the 225-400 Me. band, and can be shifted to anyone of these channels in approximately 30 seconds from either a local 01- remote indicator unit. Its file cabinet design is designed to permit servicing from the front, thus avoiding the

ontortions often required to reach some inaccessible part of the equipment around the sides OT back.

TENTATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF TDZ/RDZ's

The TDZ/RDZ gear is now being distributed to ttaining schools and some fleet activities. Initial deliveries in quantity will be made to the fleet for installation at the disposition of fleet commanders. Tentative allowances provide for one TDZ and two RDZ's in each ship having a CIC, with additional units for certain flagships. It is expected that when installations have progressed sufficiently, this equipment will be used first to supplement, then to supplant' present IFD and TBS nets, and eventually to replace all present VHF and FM equipments,

SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATIQN

Fur her informanon concerning the technical aspects of the TDZjRDZ and other nets in the new UHF series will he published in the BuShips "ELECTRON" Magazine which will run detaiJed articles, beginning with the August 1945 issue.

RDl [requencies ore rem 0 fd)1 controlled with this unit. T

REQUESTS FOR "C. I. C." should be addressed:

(issues prior to l"/y 1944 are 110 longer allailable)

38

CON FI DENTIAl

NAVY -The Chief of Naval Opt!f"aliom. Editor of "c.T. G.",

Washillgton 25, D. C. •

ARMY -Adfutatrl Getu!TIll's Office, OperatiOtlS Branch, Room 2B939, Pentagon Building_ Wcuhington 25. D. C.

air plotting and the Kamikaze

Good air plotting is not advertised as a cure-all for the 11010 dejunct Kamikaze, but may help considerably in eliminating the possibility 0/ your catching same in superstructure or points fortvard and aft. There are certain A.-K (Anti-Kamikaze) features about air plouing {lla.t are neglected when the following symptoms shoto ut) in the air plotter:

1

FOR GETII NG-TH E-BOGEY

What is the most serious mistake a plotter can make? Answer: Forget a bogey. What is the easiest mistake a plotter can make? Again=forget a bogey, It is easy to forget bogies when the plotter relies on radar reports only. There are at lea t five sources of contact information that can be plotted other than radar reports. ould au name them?'

One minu te after the last known radar fix LUIS been given on a bogey, an Estimated Position Arc . ( • PA) should he plotted on the board. l very minute thereafter a new EPA goes down, and EPA's are plotted until it has been definitely established that the bogey is not in the area, that it has been identified as friendly, or radar rep rts are again received.

:Waming net reports, Lookout reports, Figlttcr net reports, ast watcher reports, Intelligence dab.

One ship recently took a suicide plane that had been tracked and plotted to within thirty miles of [he force before it disappeared from the radar screen. Nine minutes later the plane was explodina on Ute deck of the ship. Could it have been avoid d? It's diffi ult to say, but it would have been possible, with accurate, up-to-the-minute srimated position arcs to give more pertinent data LO the lookouts and to gunnery.

A partial solution: Running "canned" problems involving many Eades within twenty miles of the ship. Learning to plot EPA's automatically comes only through hours of practice.

2 NEGLECTING COURSE AND SPEED

g'alll with no .radarrnan La rely on, the plotter faUs down on determining the course and speed of a bogey. It is possible Ear an excellent plotter to anticipate the movements of a bogey, and deter-

CON FI DENJ IAl

39

mille wb tiler the plan is flyil.l 1 el limbinz T divine, E erx single plot within rw nt miles of the hip rna . indicate a new cour e or speed. Exces i e speed within twenty miles can invariabl be lassified a "plane eli ing," and should be brought to the arteurion oE everyone concerned.

3 I "ANY OLD" TIMING

Although some ships have not adopted the quarter minute timing, Ior A-K plotting it is essential du to the terrific speed of these planes during the final leg. peeds up to eizht mile per minute ar omm n: thus, und r the old tern of 30

econd timinz, an error of two miles or more is

possible. 10 t important fa tOT ill the timinz

lemeni for A-K air plotting i to d t nnine a' urat] the P d of th attacking plane,

4 FACTS-IN-TH~-HEAD

0.::

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40

CONFIDENTIAL

To mbat enemy raid uccessful lv, all known

information about b gie must app ar on the plottina bard. If Information i not olunteered b . the radarman, the plotter hould, for every new

ontact, ask for size and anzel of bogey and plor this information. ALma t all re ent bulletins involving Anti-Kamikaze tactic stressed the necessity E01' knowing the exact number oE attacking planes , hen ver possible, his i especially important when interceptor plane repon" rand Slam." If the number of planes in the initial contact report i grea'ter than th tallied "Splashes," don't hide

thi fact. nl s it's plotted, our information i

worthle

5 NON-SYMBOLITIS

Planing the wrong symbol. or worse, none at all,

hould be a mistake of the no i e only, Most freq uent erious omis in: the ircle-with-arrox Raid ymboll This mbol, placed at the begin, ning of a raid tra k prirnaril for inserting the

ub e Iuenr raid number, hould be the large r rnbol n the board-a larze 'warning sign r point up the boac '1'0 . It hould be plotted immediately after the first contact.

An old chestnut but one that beal-S repeating: bczies arc plotted as bogies until they are identilied eith r a" bandit 01" friendly, When identified a mendl -by F, i ual or oth r methods-the friendl ymbol hould be plotted. malpractice i plottin e er contact a bogey with the W01'd "friendly" written out beside tho e tracks idem' fied as friendly.

6

gain, the mplete depend 11 e on radar reports has lulled certain plotter int "never-dead-reckon" state f mind. Dead Reckoning i 'insuran e again t the time when fade . land e 'hoe r jamming. radar interferen e OJ:' failure of operators to report, results in an incomplete track or controlled Iriendlv air Taft. '\ hen plotting' for an In tercept Officer controlling intercepting aircraft, dead reckoning is essential for split-second deci ions needed .0 rare tall a ucces fu I suicide attack.

NON DR-lNG

Plotter fatigue comes about not (rom too much plotting bu 11'0111 loppy plotting. The solution is for the plotter to adopt a more realistic view of the board=visualizing each symbol,friendly and bogey, DOt a a quickly plotted circle or course hut rather as a "Jive" plane, with a live pilot-a pilot either protecting you, or one=with oi funeral ceremony behind him-preparing to destroy au. lthough it i difficult to keep mentally alert all the tim, wh never a bog)' appears all the reen don't as urne it mu t b h-i end I ; instead, adopt the negative attitude that it is not fri ndlv unless pro" d a u h.

. ell nt xarnples 0 non- Ioughing off:

(a) ot a5"lI111Ln[T all planes in a r turning strike are Iriendl simpl because a tew how IFF, and

(b) .noi assuming a bogey is friendly because it apparently came over other ships that did not report "bogey approaching" over TB .

7

SLOUGHING OFF

CONFIDENTIAL

The improved Mil J9 console aids servicing (md maintenotlae.

42.

CONFIDENTIAL

or minus 2 mils) but becau e of its narrow overage requires a high degree of coordination between GIC, gunnery control, the range operator below deck and the director pointer in target acquisition. A unit designed to facilitate target acquisition is now under development.

A total of ~50 equipments .are being produced and production will be completed early in 1946. pproximately 100 are 110111 being installed.

1k 39 radar has been designed as the ultimate standard equipment for the Mark 57 system. It is an X-band conical scan radar, using an SU transmitter and having the same beam characteristics a the Mark 29 Mod 2 and the Mark 34 Mod 3 or 4. However" an E-scope. showing range versus elevation, replaces the range scope in the director indicator. Below deck range scope gives simultaneous presentation of main and precision sweeps.

Below deck components perform the same functions as those of the Mk 29 Mod 2 and the

fk 94 Mod 3 and 4, but are combined into an. operating console "with greatly impro ed features for maintenance and servicing. The console packaging results in reduced weight as compared with the other radars used with the Mk 57 system. Deliveries are expected to begin in September,

new radars for heaoy machine 9uns

. Mark 34 aJ' ins tailed in the ALAlIA.MA.

The original radar equipment [or Gun Fire Cenrrol System Mk 57 (heavy machine gun) was Radar Mk 29 Mod 2 which was produced in limited quantities largely from components of other radars already in production. The total production of approxilnately 100 such radars has been completed and the e.q\lipments .flave been installed on cruisers, battleships and carrlers. The performance of this fire contml radar has been adequate but it is no longer in production. Two new types of radar equipment are now being Installed=or are about to be-with GFC System ~latk 57. They are Mk 34 Mod 8, or 4 and Mk 39 Mod !.

Both the Mk '3i! Mod 3 and Mod 4 are X-band conical scan types with an ST transmitter and a 30" dish-reflector. The Mod 3 utilizes components of Radar Equipment Mk ]9 and Mod 0; jhe Mod 4 is identical mechanically and electrically, but all units are newly manufactured. Both employ presentations similar to Mk 29 Mod 2, that is, a type A range presentation with a step, and type F or target spot presentation for angular tracking. In addition to target pot presentation the director pointer also views simultaneously through his eye piece a range presentation covering the first 20,000 yards shown on the below deck A scope.

The beam is extremely narrow-three degrees plus-and its axis is offset only .75° irr cenieal scan, thus giving a field of view of only about 5°. This equipment therefore has excellent angular discrimination (2.l~5 0) and accuracy (plus

.., • ( • f I ,. •

• ~ II ~ ,,_ ~ ~ " t



standard air plot ta,bles· in fleet

Over twelve bU.IlCli."ed of the new. standard Iark 1 Mod ... I air plot tables (see "G.1.C.", September 1944) are now in the fleet, and one thousand more arc being manufactured as replacements for ships having obsolete, non-standard tables at the pre ent time.

The Navy Department Semi-Monthly Bulletin of 15 May 1945 (page

85) describe in detail how this new type of plotting table can be obtained.

The Mark 1 Mod. 1 wa designed after consultation with fleet representatives as to the type of air plotting table that would best fit the needs of the fleet in the forward areas. One of the latest features is the sliding-type plotters' stool that can be folded when not in use. Thi i especially convenient during GQ when crc is overcrowded.

The new Herculite "pencil-finish" plotting surface is superior to the plotting top of the first models. In recent tests made at the Bureau of Ships, lead pencils worked perfectly even with the plotting surface completely covered with water. Grease pencils work well when the urface is dry. The smooth or "Boston-type" tops on the first Mark 1 Mod. 1 tables tha were manufactured (less than a hundred in aU) are beinz replaced immediately with the new, proven "pencil-finish" Herculite top.

CONFIDENTIAL

43

the recorder . . . mechanical memory

Today' aval oice ommuni ati n are a far

cry from the days wh n J hn Paul Jon fought the Bon Homme Ri hard with leather . lung, speaking tnunpets and messengers. Voice channels from sound power to VHF have paced the development of equipment and procedures necessary to the complicated business of ship handling and the control of 1arge E0l111ation .

the tempo of aval warfare bas Increased, voice transmi ion of jactical information commands. orders, reports and routine messages have at times seemed to approach the aturati 11 I 0111 . The need came for a supplementary equipm nt to pin h-hit when inter and intra hip voice traffic be arne too h a to log. Thus the sound recorder entered u Pall a J aval career.

The sound recorder has many uses. For training, the recorder enables the Evaluator, TBS talkers, CIC officers and telephone talkers to bear them elves as others b ar them. Talkers with not the vaguest idea of how their voice ound on the air can tudy and improve upon the manner in which they deliver voice tran missions. For anal - sis of circuit discipline, the recorder can be cut in

o

CONFIDENT1AL

at will on an circuit for a "po l mortem" on me - sag , nt 1'1(, intelligibility of talkers and iandardizati I f orders and terminology. For garbled mage, 'when nditions of iler ce or verrrowded channel prohibit a "say again," several repeaLS of the recorder rna,}, make ense Out of vocal sediment. For action reports, recorders monitoring the IFD, Tactical Coordination and other lets 'will serve to Jill in th haz d tail that Ll uall evade the log during a tion periods. ter the a tion sub ide the "whodunit" an wers an be found embos d au a little disk or on a mall trand of magnetized wire.

TYPES OF RECORDERS

Sound recorders. in ofar as the Navy i concerned, are divided into three general classifications: disk, wil-e and film. Knowledge of (he .haracterisrics, limitation and allowance list for the e equipment i 0 alue to CI off ers,

Th following wire recorder are now approved for u e: he Mirrorphone whi h Te ords on masnetic tape for one minute and repeats back. the recorded message ad nau cum. Its oJy func i 11. i spe ch training F r telephone talkers and per 011.nel involved with hip-to-ship and ship-to-plane communication. These are being graduaJly reo placed by the multi-purpose spool and magazin type wire recorders. The Armour Wire /)00 Recorder (the G. E. Recorder ModeljoA i a similar rna hine) record for one hour on a ruagn tic wire F ur 01' six mils in diam ter. B' rewinding th pool recorded tran mission an be I la ed hack. and they can b retained indefinite] or the wire demagnetized for use a ain. he Brush Magazine Loaded Recorder i imilar to the f\Tmour equipment in ba ic operation and use, but incorporates several improved fea tu res includ i 11.p, componentspecified by the Bureau of Ships. "Tire type recorders are subje t a easv breakage

TYl>" Time NUl1lber
Navy T •• ngtb of Pro- .... '\llowance
R<'C or der Type Recording cured List
Wire 50 CVB-2 'B-2
.\rmour-G. E. !iO-A ne hour 3.0 -2 c -l:!
51 VL-2 CL-2
Wire --- CVE-2 A GC-.2
Hrush VRW-I :8:8-2 DD-l
One hour JliOO DE-l
Disk NRC-l Flfteen 70(l CVD-3 BB-I
ound criber NRC-2 minutes CV-3 CB-I
NR -1 C L-$ CA-J
CVE-l L-l
\ -2 Til is /'00/ tYpt! of wire recurdu WtlS dt:Veioptd V}' Armour Research Laboratory and produced for NoV)' by various contractors. II gives fair quality of speech intelligibilil), on playbacks. The fact that it is not shock mounted somewhat limits its utility afloat. Four spools of one hOUT recording duration come with each machine. A demagrleti~jn.g Ilead erases previow recordings when it is desired /0 1!.l'II tile spool over again. F(1T playbacks tile spool must be rewound. lin 01/era/lon 1I1hicb t'(nmllm'$ one-half th« lime it takes to re.cord.

Th]. di II rct;order handles 71t disks tahioh will nota fifteen mi"utes 01 recording per side. H can be used to record. playbacks from wire recordings prior 10 demagP1I!ti:ring the wire for rIH!.I'l!., providit'g a pe'rmane1lt record oJ such transmissions. A, slIght modification attached to some machj1ll1s permils in-sum/aneons plrrybackJ thus n garbled or mistmderstood message Cllr. be /leard agoin without tying up ITll{fic for a repeal. This machine I.' shock mounted. The plastic di~ks clln be obtained in ally quanlity.

This magazine type ot wiTI) rt~OrdeT, manufaotured. by Ofe Brush Company, presents some imi'rovemetlts ouer il.5 predec;essor. It is shock mounted, which improves the recording quality and reduces the possibility of the wire breaking. The wire spools" are loaded in a magazine. Rapid change to (}. new spool is a matter oJ seconds. Five magazines come with each machille. Rewindi'lg takes "ne·third tile 'recording time.

CONFIDENTIAL

"I hi allowance Jist for wire and di k I 'pe recorders has been recommended by the hip hara rerisdc Board and bas I", approved fur forces afloat, Re orders are to h obtained lill'OI COlll!-.en Pac pools.

of the wire. a discouraging occurrence that requires intricate rethreading which mean 10 of recording time.

The oumd criber Disk Recorder is built to standard Navy pecifications, It records transmi - sions of fifteen minute duration on small plastic disks and ha been used primarfly for ACI officers' Ready Room interviews with returning pilots. It bas also been used to record TBS messages in order to play back any transmissions that may be garbled.

Recording on film is something for the fu ture as 'far as a y procurement is concerned. The

avy has a Recordograph. under development which provides two hours of recording n a 35mm film. It will boa t me hanical advantages not a ailable in the pre ent wire and disk. equipment.

Comparatively light in weight and designed to plug into any phone or radio jack, the utility of available recording equipment in training, action analysis, and message repeats is dependent upon the imagination of the officers using it. As equipmen improves and i simplified. the range of its use can increa e to the extent that all principal

mmand circuits can be monitored to provide a errnanent ship record.

U'J rn "0 -; m

3:

CD m ;:Q

45

Jap

aircraft performance

A ih .. Fleet and.. rm . moved in closer to the bum or the .lap' mbattled Empire, 1] wer and mor various t pe (Jap aircraft were n ountered, orne new-the :ruit of r s ar h d ire and e perience during the war ears; some old-hastily outfitted for Kamikaze attacks-the 'ere being mar halled for the final violent and de pel'ate attempt of the JM to beat off the approaching last stase of the Pacific war.

FDa's, 10's, and Gunnery Liaison Officers, charged with a major share of responsibility for repelling air attacks. are familiar with the performance characteristic of the Zekes, Bettj: , 0 car . and Frances' which they have met in past months. hey are not all aware of the newest pe or of th late t

de elopmen in older t pe . be follow 'nO" data were prepar d with th

assistanc of leI.

In con idering aircraft performance one notable fact must be kept in mind: Much information mu t nece arily b derived not from ob erved combat operations but from Bight tests, engineering calculation, captured documents, and the word of POW. The figures, therefore, should be scanned with caution and allowances should be made for discrepancies between them an.d observed data.

Several rough generalizations may be made on the basis of available information. he emphasis in new Jap fighters, for example, wa on in" crea ed peed and high altitude performance. wo example are J OK and GEORGE, both now in service, both desi ed for t p pee in ex of 403 mph and capable of effective performance at from 25 to 32.000 feet, well abo e the former, rated altitude of 20,000 feet. ther notable performers are FRANK, a fighter with an estimated speed of '127 mph at 20.000 feet and a ervice ceiling of 38,800; RANDY, with a calculated speed of 437 mph at 32,000 feet in the high altitude fighter version, and GRACE It, latest Jap torpedo and dive bomber, with a speed of 350 mph at 19,6,6 feet. Re-engined models of both TONY and TOGO are reputedly operational in limi.ted number.

Figures for improved versions of older models illustrate the arne high speed, high altitude trend in fighter. Zeke 52, latest in the long erie, is reported to ha e a ervice ceiling of 35,100 f et and a peed of 35 mph at 22,000 feet.

Other notable trend were toward increa ed armament and bet er P .otection for pilots, the latter somewhat ironic in vi w 0 the continued uicidal missions. Zeke 52, for example, is reported to have a somm and a 13mJJ1 cannon in each wing with one or two 13mms in the fuselage. Like claimed speed data. however, any information on armament is subject to cbange without notice. Jap armament chan teristically varies 'widely.

An additional net development of the J F which po ibly was to b encountered wa the use of rockets as a means 01 gainillO" peed. At 1wo Jima, 'according to an AAF report, a boge being chased by a night-flying P6I soddenly accelerated tremendously. Two flame-colored jets. appearing along the fuselage, indicated that some type of rocket had been used. Frances also has been reported as equipped with rockets to gain speed in low altitude torpedo attacks.

The extent to which the japs may have been able to employ jet-propelled planes or variants of rockets is not completely known. In addition to the now familiar Baka, German types of the V bomb might soon have been employed. It has also been confirmed that plans for both the erman Me 262, a high peed, high altitude. jet-propelled fighter and the Me 163. a liquid. rocket-propelled fighter, had reached the Japanese.

1 Technical Air Int.elligence Center, • A, nacostia, Washington. D_ C.

CONFIDENTIAL 47

o

ZEKE 52

Single engine, carrier-based, Speed (mph) Sea Level-'2:95 2!J..OOO'-S5S.

Climb-8.6 mim_-lo,oOO'

7.S mins.-2MOO· Service ceiling-lI5.100' Range-SSO sm. at 270 mph.

IS44 sm. at 146

Notes: Still the backbone of the carrier Iorce, Zeke was also being used as anight fighter.

JACK 21

Ingle engine. land-based, SPeed (mph) Sea Level-3S9 16,600'-417.

Climb-2.3 mins.-lo.ooo·

5.1 mins.-20,ooO· Service ceiiitlg--aS,soo' Range-2()!; s.m .. at SlSmpll.

1300 sm. at 17l

Notes: TAl pilOLS who have flown Jack state it is an excellent aIrcraft and easy to fly .. A version with a turbo supercharger unit and Kasei 23 engine is believed to have been in production.

GEORGE II

Single engine, land-based. Speed (mph) Sea Level-358 19,000'-416.

Climb-6.I 1Ilins.-20.000'

2.8 mins.-lO.OOO' Service ceiling-!l9,1001 Range-S50 SIll. at 333 mph.

1730 sm. at 176

Notes: Found in quantity at Clark Field. George WllS fully operational. High perfoDIlll1lts: but more difficull to handle and land than Jack.

SAM (Provisional)

Single engine, earrier-based;

nauy fighters

SPeed (mph) Sea Level-349 19.700'-597.

. Climb~6 mins.-19.700' Setuice ceilillg-1I5.700' Rang<l'-G66 sm. at llI? mp~.

2130 sm. at 173

Notes: Expected successor to Zelle. Sam was not fully operational; and indications were tbat it would be abandoned.

REX I I (Provisional) ~ingle engine. seaplane. Speed (mph) Sea Level-320

IS,8001-373.

Climb-7.0 mins.-20.000'

14 mins.-SO.OOO' SeTVice ceiliflg-35..!l00' Range--a62 SIll. at 305 mph. l20S sm. at 177

Notes: Described as George on Hoats, Rex is an excellent performer.

.. TEN'RAI (Provisional) Twin-engine, single place. 8peed (mph) Sea Level-!l72

16,600'-418.

Climb-ll mins., 20 5eqr~2,810' Service ceiling-36.700' ROflge-unknown

187S sm. at IS7

Notes: Regarded as a type which was to be encountered in late 1945, Tenrai's trials were scheduled for com-

. pletlon in 1944 with production beginning in !:be spring of 1945.

JIM"U (Provisionel) Experimental, single engine. Speed (mph) Sea Level-lInknown

So,oOO' -415.

Climb-II mins., 30 8eo.-1I0,000' Service ceiling-unknown Range-unknown

1440 sm. at 285

Noles: A &i.ngle place, experimental plane with one radial engine, Jimpu was ell developmental possibilitj' for late 1945.

DENKO (Provisional)

Experimental, two place, single engine. Speed (mph) Sea Level-unknown

!lO,OOO' -420.

Climir-8 mins .• 50 secs.-19,686' Seruic« ceiling-39,4oo' Range-unknown

1440 sm. at 285

Noles: The first Jap aircraft to be designed as VF(N). Denko is not as strong a developmental possibility as Tenrai,

SHINDEN (Provisional) Experimental, single engine. Speed (mph) Sea Level-462

(estimated) Climb-unknown Service ceiling-1I9,400' Range-unknown

Notes: Captured German documents indicate . that this unorthodex Jap fighter (~ybe C3Wl1'd type wings or P9 ibly tailless) was scheduled for production in April of this )'ear.

IRVING II

Twin engine, land-based. SPeed (mph) Sea Level-279 19,900'-S29.

Climb-IO.9 mins.-20.oo0' 24.2 mins.-30,OOOI Service ceWng-32,.500' Range-648 sm. at 267 mph.

1982 Sill. at 177

No us: Primary duty is as VF (N). it may be OUt of production because of its ordinary performance, Its failure has apparendycawed SOIDe Zekes and 1udys to be converted to VF {N)'s.

Definition 0/ Performance teTms employed:

Maximum Speed-War Emergency Power (WEP), if available; Witary Power (MiL Pow.), if unavailable.

Range (1st figure listeG)-R.ange at combat cruising; 'i.e., at maximum continuous power and with internal fuel only.

I Range (2nd figure listed)-Maximum range; Le., of economical cruising and with external and/or removable fuel.

Aircraft 11.ames 0/ lap origin; Le., those not as yet coded by TAlC are printed. tD lower ClIfC type.

-48

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

army ffghters

NICK I

Twin engine, L wo plate. Speed (rnpli) Sea Level-302. 18.500'-855.

Climb-3.5 mlns.-9.200'

7.8 m.iru.-19,.OOO' eroic« ceiling-35,sOO' Range-83S sm. at 270 mph.

)909 sm. at 151

Notes: Nick. first operational lwin engine Jap VF, bas been. encountered by B-29's over the Empire.

FRANK I Single engine.

Speed (mph) Sea Level-!6!1 20,000'-42'7.

Climb-2.6 mins.-1D,ooo'

5.8 mins.-20,OOO' Servic« ceiling-lI8,SOO' Range-301l sm. at 388 mph.

iSI5 sm. at l7l!

Notes: Sometimes mistaken for Olcu, Zeke, and po ibly even Tojo. F1:ant was expected to be backbone of Army fighter defense ..

ONY 2 (Provisionall Single engine.

Speed (mph) Sea Level-335 28.000'-425.

Climb-6.6 l1uIIS.-20,OOO'

52 lllins.-lO,.ooo· Service ceiling-43,300' Rangll-520 sm. at !l05 mllh.

212(}-sm. at 16.0

Notes: Tony 2 was regartled as a Sl'lOOg JAF possibility for the future. Higher critical altitude than Tony I is reported.

TONY I

Single engine.

Speed (mph) ea Level-302 15,8QO'~61.

Climb-4.0 mins.-IO,OOO' 8.45 mins.-20,Ooo' Service CeUitlg-35.IOO' Range-554 sin. at 287 mph. 2010 sm. at 148

OSCAR 3

Single engine.

Speed (mph) ea Level-303 21.900'-358.

Climb-SA mins.-lO,OOO'

7.4 mins.-20,OOO· Sero,'ce ceiling-37,400' Range-Sg5 sm. at 275 mph. 1995 sm, at 145

otes: Oscar 3 is about 15 mph fasLer

na oy bombers

JUDY 12

Single inline engine. dive bomber, Speed (nlph) Sea Level-SlY

19,300'-577.

Climb-3.6 mins.-lO.OOO'

7.5 mins.-20,OOO' Seruice ceiling-36.4DO' Range~O sm. at 286 mph.

2445 sm. at 160

Notes: After a long period of cyolu· UOIt, 11-1dy L2 began appearing early in 19«" It became the Jap Navy'. principal dive bomber, but was gradually being replaced by 1udy !l1 (radial engine version).

JUDY 33

Single engine torpedo and dive bolnba_ • ed (mph) Sea Lcvd-325

18,500'-576.

Climb-3.6 m.im.-lO.OOO'

7 .. 8 mins . ....,20.0001 Service ceiling-38;BOO' Range-!l55 sm. at 281 mph.

25{)5 sm, at 157

Notes: Comparable to Judy 12 .. these new types have the same airframe. Judy has been used as suicide aircraft. The cha.nge to a .radlal engine is probably due to difficulties with lnllne engine. Judy 33 was reportedly used as It nightfighter,

GRACE II

Single engine torped and dive bomber. Speed (mph) Sea Level-3ml 19.686'-350.

Climb-7.5 mins.-13,125' Service ceiling-34.850·

than sear 2 at sea level and bas a service ceiling some 1 liOO' higher.

. TOJO 2

ingle engine.

peed (mph) Sea Le\'el-835 17,400'-883.

Climb-2.8 mins.-IO,OOQ'

6.0 mJns.-20.000· Service ceiling-36..!l50' Range-294 sm. at !IIi mph. 1206 sm. ar 188

Notes: Tojo has It lligh rate o( climb. Fronk is successor 10 Tojo in d~igo.

RANDY (Ki. 1021 (Provisional) Twin engine.

Speed (mph) Sea Level-340 32,400'-437.

C#mb-9.L mins.-19,700' IS.5 mins.-36,l00· Seruice ceiling-40,750' Range-445 sm. at 296 mph.

1lI73 sm. at 17.0

Noles; Randy, successor to and a dead ringer for Nick, comes in two versions:

High altitude VF. Gronnd Attack. Data is not complete on lhis fighter, although it was Sighted. with fair frequency. Very beavy firepower in both versions.

Ratlge-207.5 sm. at 153 mph.

1695 sm. at 153 mph.

Notes: Gl'3.Ge, with a lour blade propeller and inverted gull wings, has been sighted occasionally. The extent to which it was operational is unknown.

BETTY 24

Twin engine.

SPeed (mph) Sea, Leve1-257 13,800'-283.

Climb-7.2 mins.-IO,OOO· 17.4mins.-20,OOO' Service ceiling-30,4oo' Range-1l70 sm. at 226 mph,

307!i mi. at 1!6

Notes: Lates~ in. the series of operational Bettys, performance is about the arne as for Belty 22. It has been matiHied (0 carry Balta.

45

FRANCES II

Tl in engine.

'Peed (mph) ea Level-!l25 17,000'-367. l;ml>--6.1 mins.-10,OOO' 14.0 mins.-20,OOO' ruice ceililig-lIil,530' Rtmgf-887 rn. at 279 mph. 3'137 sm. at 165

1 aLes: U ed mainly as a torpedo bomber 01· I·CCCC. night fighrer version was In limited production.

EMILY 22

Four engine fiying boat, SPeed (mph) ea Level-262 16,800'-305.

Climb-5.2 mins.-IO,OOO'

11.1 mi:ns.-20,000' Service ceiling-34,500' Rtll1ge-1246 m, at 225 mph. 4190 Sill. al 13~

1 (;11:$; An outstanding patrol bomber of the early war, .Emil)" the successcr of Mavis. Wali beiug used prhnarily as a transport.

JILL 12

ingle engine torpedo bomber. . peed (mph) Sea Level-297 15,100'-327.

Climb-5.6 mins.-l0,OOO' 13.7 roins.-20,000' Service ceiling-35,400' Range-575~m. at 255 mpb.

2010 sm, at 147

Notes: Jill, with a four-blade prop. is a standard Jap torpedo bomber. IL WlL> expected to be replaced operationally, however, by the superior Grace II.

VAL 22

ingle engine dive bomber. peed (mph) Sea Level-230 20,300'-281.

army bombers

PEGGY I

Twin engine.

SPeed (mph) ea Level-294 18,700'-34{i.

Climb-5.9 mins.-IO,OOO' l!l.O mins.-20,ooO' Service ceiling-30.100' Rtmge-750 sm. at ~64 mph. 2040 sm. at 156

HELEN 2

. Twin engine.

peed (mph) Sea Level-274 16,900'-312.

Climb-6.6 mins.-lO,OOO' 15.2 mins.-20,OOO' Setuic« ceilitlg-30:9!10' Range-5S0 sm. at 245 mph. 2220 sm. at 145

Notes: Widely advertised by the Japs as the aircraft to win the Pacinc War,

Helen has not lived up to promises. It is among the most heavily armed or J ap alrcra ft.

SALLY 2

Twin engine.

Speed (mph) . ea Level-258 15,400'-294 ..

Climb-5.8 rnins.-lO,OO()! 12.6 mins.-20,OOO' Service ceiling-30.500· Range-S50 sm. at 235 mph.

1945 sm. at 132

otes: Verging on obsolescence. Sally was still in limited ervice, largely as a transport.

Ingle engine.

Speed (mph) Sea Level-unknown 16,500'-232.

.nauy reconnaissance

~ PAUL II
0-
0.:: ingle engine seaplane.
I..U Spud (mph) Sea Level-245
co
.2 17,900'-285.
I..U C/imb-5.2 mins.-IO,Ooo'
l-
c, 11.2 mins.-20,OOO'
LU
Vl Scruic« ceilill'g-33,350'
0 Rlmge-630 sm. at 2J 9 mpb ..
- 1690 sm. at 130
U Notes: Normally a recce plane, Paul
50 CONFIDENTIAL was sometlmes used as a dive bomber. It has not been Iound -in large numbus.

limb-4.~ m.ins.-IO,OOO'

9.5 mins.-20,ooO' eruice ceiling-33,600' Ral1gr-!!IO sm. at 223 mph. 1580 sm. at 126

Notes: Obsolete. Val is still operation. al in limited numbers.

ingle engine seaplane. SPeed (mph) Sea Level-2OI

. 7600'-222.

Climb-5.4 mlns.-lO,OOO' 12.9 mins.-2(f,000' Seroice ceiling-29.s00' nange-280 sm. at 198 mph.

1375 sm. at 119

Notes: Still the Japs' prlncipat recce seaplane, Jake is condnually associated with convoy anti-sub duLY.

NORM (Provisional) Reece, seaplane.

Speed (mph) Sea Level-unknown 19,6S6'~319.

I

Clim/)-IO mins., 110 secs.-19.686' eruice ceiling-unknown Range-unknown

246li m, at unknown mph.

Notes: ! orm was thought to be operational. but..:POW reports indicate tbar il was probably abandoned.

Notes: There are some indications (1121 Pete was 10 he replaced b Paul. Occasionally confused with our OC. it was still operauonal.

GLEN II (Provisional)

11 bmarine-borne , tl in float-

monoplane,

Speed (mph) Sea Level-unknown Climb-unknown

Seroice ceiling-unknown Range-5OD sm. at 92 mph ..

Noles: Used principally in the first

ear of the war, little lise has been made of Glen recently, Glen can be assembled in. 15 minutes, stowed ln less than 30.

MYRT II

Single engine, carrier-based, three 1) lace,

Speed (mph) Sea Level-lI47 16,600'-396.

Glilllb-3.8 mios.-lO,OOO' 8.4 mios-20,OOO'

NELL 23

Twin engine bomber.

SPeed (mph) Sea Lcvcl-228 19,600'-270 .

Climb-6.2 mins.-lO,OOO' 13.5 mins.-20,OOO· Seroice ceiling-34,2.liO' Range-590 sm. at 210 mph.

2050 sm. at 157

Notes: Like ally, verging on obsolescence, ell WIIS still in limited production and service. ante were equipped with Magnetic Airborne Detectors.

CUm II-unknown

Seroia« ceiling-Maximum dive speed

302 mph.. (Structural limitation) Range-MO sm. at 111 mph.

Notes: Obsolete; inline engine, low wing monoplane. Cllie£l.y a trainer

LILY 2

Twin engine.

Speed (mph) Sea Levd~268 20,000'-313.

Climb-4.G ntins.-l0,OO()l 10.0 mins.-20,000· Service ceiling-34,300' Range-liDO sm. at 246 mph.

1750 sm. at 246

Notes: Witb II hort range, small bomb capaci and unimpressive speed. Lilv has been II Jap dlsappolntmenr. PO\I.,,"s call it a "fIying collin."

PETE II Float-biplane.

peed (mph) Sea Level-199 13,000'-236.

Climb-5.0 mins.-lO,OOO' 10.4; mins.-20,OOO' Service ceiling-1I0,9oo' R.ange-180sm. at 190 mph. 1025 sm. at 111

army reconnaissance

SONIA

Single engine. Arrack and Reece. SPeed (mplt) ea Level-2.2 9000'-254.

Climb-S.5 mins.-l0,OOO' 13.4 .mins.-20,Ooo' SO!"T'fJiae ceiling-27,200' Range-490 sm. a[224 mph. 1540 sm. at 126

otes: onla, although an older ai r-

craft, was still bing produced, in two versions, viz, "L'CCCC" and "II ault.'

DINAH 3

Twin engine, Army and avy. peed (mph) ea Level-.Il66 16.700'-4-20.

Climb-S.S m itlS.-l ° ,000' 6.8 mins.-20,000' en/ice ceiling-40,600'

nauy trunsporrs

MAVIS 22

Four engine, Oying boat. Speed (mph) ea Level-198 6200'-217.

Climb-g.9 mins.-IO,OOO· 25,8 mins.-20.000' SIn-vice ceifif1g-c24,700'

Range-lOBO sm. at 190 mph.

3980 sm. aL U2

Notes: ~lavis has been largely replaced by Emily except for tran pen purpo s,

TESS II Twin engine.

army transports

TABBY 22

Speed (mph) Sea Level-2I9 6400'-220.

Climb-9.4 mins.-lO,Ooo' 29.7 m1~.-20,OOO' Seruic« ceiting-24,450' Range-75S SIll. at 192 mph, 2080 sm. at WI

Notes: Tabby is a Jap·produced DC-S with minor rnodiflcations.

TOPSY I

RUllg,:-572 In. at 31 mph, 1910 sm. at 170

otes: With increased armament, Dinah could be utilized as VF ( ); however, to date it has been used for reccc only. Acco.rding to documents Dinah 4 may be developed for high speed (400 mph at 32,000') unarmed reconnaissance, Only known opera· tional type used, in substantial quantities by both "Army and I avy.

Service ceiling-34.100' Rallge-560 sm. at 324 mph. 2640 sm. at 178

Two engine.

Speecl (mph) ea Level-233 19,000'-278.

Glimb-5.9 m11lli.-IO,OOO' 12.8 mins.-20,OOO' Service ceiiing-31,600' Range-G80 roo at 221 mph.

1909 m, at 120

Noles; Commercial version and forebear or an)., Topsy is also known as ~rC-20.

peed (mph) ell Level-220.

8000'-240.

Climb-4.0 mins.-6100' Service ceiling-28.500· Range-I785 sm. at HO mph.

Noles: Basleally Tess is a Jap.produce:J DC·2 with light modifications.

Notes: Two cameras, one mounted

. vertically shooting through belly hatch, one hand supported, shooting through ports on either side of center canopy are fairly standard equipment on which is mainly a fast photo

BAKA

Silicide .rocket-propelled aircraft bomb.

peed (mph) ea Level=unknown 5<1.0 mph level flight with rockers.

620 mph in dive ( ermlnal velociLy). 230 mph in glide without rockeLS. Climb-unknown

Service ceiling-unknown

Range-55 sm. when released at '1:l ,000' Notes: Baka, normally carried by Betty, although capable of attachment to Helen, Peggy, ally, and Rita normally finishes i IS d ive in a torpedo run,

CONFIDENTIAL 51

o o

nCR" trackin9

must be improoea,

Beware of neglecting the "CR" content of your "canned" problems. "CR" is yom' CloseRange ingredient, in canned problems-the part of the training program that deal with bogies in close ... what to do about these bogies in general, how to disseminate information quickly, and particularly how to transfer smoothly the responsibility for the e "Close-Range" p.otential Kamikazes from Fighter Direction to Anti-Aircraft weapons.

Running "canned problems" may be a daily occurrence in your CIC, but recent action reports indicate a definite deficiency in the training of eIe personnel in handling close-in targets. Check your own training methods in this art of tracking attacking aircraft! You may be u ing canned problems you made up yourself, or the training problems in Annex A of RADEOUR, the lr Plotting Manual, but in either case it's a safe bet you terminate your canned problems in this manner:

"Merged. ploj two-eight-five, sixteen . . .

end of problem."

You've-v idealiy=made an interception; therefore you end the problem while the planes are still ten to twenty miles from your hip. This defeats

a::: w ICC

2

lJ.J Ic,

w V1

52

CONFIDENTIAL

the very purpose for which the training was set up-to learn to act quickly with complete confidence under any circumstances. As a matter record=from action reports-the common "circumstance" today involves the enemy plane practically on top of you, and that plane is a far greater threat than the plane tallyhoed sixteen miles away.

WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT

The remedy is simple. In. your training problems continue to track' targets after interception. Introduce "break throughs" with "heads up" to everyone concerned. Introduce bogies suddenly appearing within the twenty mile range circle flying at such tremendous speeds that it is obvious the planes are using diving tactics. This is excellent training for quickly determining course and speed of a Kamikaze, and for anticipating exactly when and where the suicide plane is expecting to strike. Normal fades, sea return and the cone of silence should be considered in the problems with special emphasis on plotting Estimated Position

res. Multiple targets should be no excuse for losing track of any single bogey. No problems can be considered satisfactorily completed until all bogies have-been tracked into the attack over the target and have been adequately under fire by automatic weapons:

Whenever live intercepts with actual planes are being Tun, in order not to reduce the number of air intercept problems, it is suggested that intercepting planes be used to simulate an attack on the ship or base while enroute back to the base to assume a CAP status for the next problem.

It is not enough simply to run "Close-Range" problem as training for - plotters. These problem should bring out the part GIC plays not only in the shipboard organization but the responsibility of CIC to other ships as well. Intimate familiarity with intra-Ship communications must be stressed to achieve optimum smoothness in the transfer of primary responsibility from fighter direction to AA weapons as the attacking planes close our forces. Lookouts and gun director crews must be considered an integral part of every canned prob. lem. Simulated passing-of-bogey-dope-"keeping the Commanding Officer and higher commands embarked informed of the location, identity, and movement of friendly and/or enemy aircraft," quoting USF-loB-must also be included if e training is to be effective.

iered on lhe SK, and ranges may be off 2 or !I miles on targets under 15 miles.

hi£ting range scales is slow and has proved impracticable, the operators lending to concencrate on targets on one range scale to the neglect of those on the other.

One other result of the usual systems is that all plots are behind the actual target position by all. appreciable length of time. This is not so important at long ranges but it becomes so when the targer is only a few miles away and an interception is being attempted.

We solved the problem by developing a special plotting board which approximates the VG "expanded" presentation wben mounted on lbe VD-l. It gives more accurate tracks and counes on aircraft at short ranges than the usual ail' plot board, and permits rapid plotting of more air contacts.

The board consists of %" Lucile, engraved (very lightly) on the bouom side with bearing lines every ten degrees and with five-degree points indicated by a. short line at the J6 mile range circle. Range circles are one inch apart, The. size of our board is 20 inches. and its shape was determined by the location of our VD-1. .'\. larger board might be desirable.

Tile edge of the board ts lighted by two 115·volt, I5·wall lamp in metal cases. A slit J/16" by ~"gives ufficient Ughl La illuminate all plots and no light is reflected on the face 01 the l~l'I rube. Wben the llgb,ting Is turned 00: the engraving is invisible. but for bitter' visibility when in use, .do nor engrave the mlddle six illchci except [Of center markings.

The board is supported. mainly, by the face of the VD·} and adjusted LO the renter by wee sheet -metal brackets slotted to fit under the studs on the VD·l top casting.

In operation it has the effect o.E giving us a second air search radar and enables an accurate plot .of all air targefS under 20 miles without interfering with the usual medium range plotting set-up,

The VD·I is set on the 20·mile scale with range marks turned all. All planes under 20 miles are plotted on w.is board direcLly front i.be RPPI at a. scale of 1 inch equals 2 miles. The SK operator and the operator on the standard air plot tahle plol only those tlll'gets over 20 miles.

Wbell a target doses to ·20 miles ihe VD-I plouer picks up the track, checking with air plot for the IFF code. On targciLS opening from the center, the VD-l plotter obtains an IFF check from the SK operaccrand nt{leD. the target opens to 20 miles, il is picked up by the SK operator and the air plotter on the

CONFIDENTlAL

Items pri~ted in "Ideas of the Month" are nQt doctrine or sta1.lMra practice, but are .suggestions /rQm Fled units whicll )'Ol~ may !.1St: or reject as ),ou set: /it.

l/ )'Qur sllip lias luorhed out tactics or techniques which huve helped )'01.1, then the quicliesl way to pms the aid to others is via this column. Airmail contributions to "C. 1. C." They will on be in print (il deemed sulfidently new Ima helpful) and the way to the entire Fleet by airmail.

53

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

the poor man's VG

-B)' Lt. (jg) W. ~. Clark, USN, USS KENNETH WHITlNG (.tV)

The experience of our srup as Fighter Director ship and Radar Guard 8hip at Kossol Passage, Ulithi. Saipan and more recently at Kerama Rella in the Ryukyus, has proved It is necessary to keep continuous track on all targets at ranges from minimum to at least 75 miles, to obtain the IFF code on every target, and to get positive visual identffieatlon of every targe[ within vi ual range.

Our ship has one SK ail' search radar, located several decks below GIC,. communications are carried on by sound powered telephone only, and we have one VD-l RPPI in GIG. However. the VD·I cannot use the 12 inch PP[ tube without extensive modification. A VG wouJ~ be of ccnsiderahle assistance but we have none. Our problem is complicated by the fact that jt is impossible [0 keep track of both shcrrt and long range targets with one search radar. Tbis is especially true when [he shlp is anchored near a seaplane operating area or an. air field, with large numbers of planes in landing circles, and, in orbits in the

ediare vicinity. When short range targers are read from tile ium range scale, bearings may be ·off as much as 15 degrees due ro the diffitulty of keeping the PPI sweep and cursor ccn-

t)ig board. Visual Identification is obtained from lookouts on all LargelS tca.ching visual range. AU Identific:atio.ll data il; kepi in boxes alongside the track.

hi system has pre ed unusually successful in pIoLung short J·ange targets, and particularly' in tracking planes through II male of echoes and side lobes from. islands surrounding the :mchorage. A few minutes of plotting on the VD·l acquaints the plotter with the location and shape o.f all permanent echoes lind moving targets are easily picked out.

Bearing accuracy is much better than thal of pIoLS from the K l)PI and range is accurate to within 1,.1 mile. PPl'oximatei)' lint: times as many targets may be plotted in the sam length or tim~ as from the K itself.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

compass to true at a glance -B)' Gf!Ta/d Ellis Foreman, CQM (.1,.4), USN c. , . Naval T1'ainirlg an(i Distribution. CenLer, Camp Elliott, ·an Diego, Calif.

il has been noticed that the flow of informatioo from eIe to rb bridge j erlouslv impaired by a gyro casualty, e peciall under battle conditions. At limes mistakes .have been made in converting true COlUSe to compass and vice versa. \Vid1 a vari-

. . . . . . . . ... '. . . . . . . . .

arion 0 100 or 15°, su h a mistake can assume serious pro. portions.

A devi e ba ed 011 the j apier diagram on which i drawn tun-e of total error (varjation and deviation combined) will autcmatlcally give either compass or true course when the other is known.

he device is composed of a board of plexi-glas or some suitable material on ",hieb is engra"ed the conventional Napier diagram. [he surface of wbich is rough to facilitate d.l:awing of the curve of errors. The top and bottom edges of the board are perpendicutar to the dotted course lines so thaL an. arm on the principle of the Tssquare may be moved laterally across the board and maintain parallelism. This arm or straigh[,e<.tge assures orlcnuulon of the equilateral triangle whose base slides along irs p rpendl ular edge. This Iun c tion of the arm and triangle enables the operator lO, determine the true bearing of an)' Object when the compass-head is known by the simple placement of the apex of the triangle against !.he curve cor, re pcudiug to the ship's head, and then moving it, down La an' desired bearing. It can readily be seen that the entire COIDpurauon is all purely mechanical and that a oluuon is obtain d at a glance. The chance of large errors thus becomes v(!:ry ImllkeJy.

ince the curve of total error changes from day [0 day due LO the change in variation, a new cUTI'e should be drawn each lime the ~hip goes. to general quarters or when battle is Imminenr,

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

BUPERS ANNOUNCEMENT

BuPers is revising allowances to conform in general to table on Radio pecialist Offi er and eIe Personnel Allowances, established by CominCh

rial 01387 of 15 May and published on page 36 .. ,1. ." Magazine of July, subject to changes in, 411(1 in lallation of, electronic equi1Jment. omin h erial 01387 of ] 5 ay 1945 and Bu Per con-

54

CONfiDENTIAL

S5

fidential letter Pers'2141-LN of 27 januar 1945 are inter- avy epartment documents concerning detailed and voluminous studies of electronic per· sonnel requi ements and are not available [or distribution.

By direction of Chief of Naval R. 1. CRUGGS, Coptain,

CIC •

StatiotJin9 CAP

us INTREPID (CV): "The practice of sta.tio,Ding all CAP in various sectors ten [0 thirty miles from base and ar varying altitudes has at times been found by this ship to present diffi· culties in a)ntrol.This method has been particularly trouble Orne when trying [0 control divisions in widely eparated sectors, while all unnsruissions are being made b thre or Iour

controlling bases on one iutercepr Channel, or on a channel being used by Group's own trikes or for landing instruotlens LO planes in trouble.

"The advantage of having a bead start can be lost by baving planes on wrong side of base if bogey comes in om an. unsuspected bearing. The ad-

tage of knowing where friendlies are located does not work out in prac· ti(::C as various divisions dri-£t 'and cootrolls lost at times. The ituarion, can be met by sending out divisions from overhead 01" from sectors nem'by as

oon as any bogey appears and resum-

ing if bogey bows IFF late. OmiD aril Y it takes from three to me .utes before bases can tonfu::m bogey 9rts or make positive friendly identifications, by which time the CAP

dl vlsions are breaking ouc iru.o the dear on the PPI.

"There is a definite advantage in havlug C.\P away from overhead when openjng lire by ship's guns, bUL those divisions are usually ahead vectored toward .raid LO back up first divisions lu case part of raid breaks through.

here are a number of di advantages which result Erom S~alionillg C P away from ba e:

I-You arc omctimes compelled to use divisions a t poor angels in view of bogeys known altitude.

2-Bases are bei.ng con tantly alerted because p Ian es are seen on horizon ducking in and out of douds.

3-lt is difficult to join lip divisions to i ntercep t large rai ds, and Lh'is ac tu a 11 y results in conducting another interception on a channel which i5 already being used Ior an intercept.

4-There i a tendency La compromise YE ector Ieuers by constant usc of Ins truction oven chann els such as • P ur Ripper 7 in sector G north of base,'

5- on fusion always exis as to Iocalion oE P, thereby causing constant checking of status boards and this on busy IFD circuits,

6- The PI'I is already overloaded, ith

EXCERPTS

FROM

RECENT

REPORTS

targets and keeping GAP overhead eliminates this as well as keeping all strength together.

"We believe a fair compromise would be to station CAP over picket destroyers during daylight hoIUS (not radar picket Jine) twelve miles from base. These pickets are usually on three sides of base away from adjoin. ing Task Groups, They are usnall)' ncar the approach sectors and 10SI sheep circle. A known orbit point would prevent drifting and keep them clear of ship's gunfire."



High Couer

U'S ENTERPRISE fCY) (Okinawa):

"The Increase in speed and maneuverability attained by the enemy througb use of fast planes and single plane approaches can be compensated for in part by lnltial stationing of CAP at htgher altitudes and using the altitude to gain speed on vector. The unsuce ful interceptions attempted on 11 April faiI ed, it is believed, largely be· cause nearly all vectors were started with GAP below the clouds (about 3500 feet) and I)), the time the VF got into a clear area on the radar screen nOl enough Lime remained for ~omple. lion of the Interception. It is also considered that two or three divisions should be tatloned, Ear enough OUt on the bearings of possible attack that the may he controlled positively (dif. ferent ships assigned the dULy of keeping F on tatlon by radar posideuings) at, all times and identified withoUI question. A division 'over base' Is too of Len 10 miles on we wroug side of base and th Intercept officer cannot be aware of lh.isrnCL if there is cloud cover, nor c-an he do anything about it when he, di covers his predicament. Fighter direction results in this operation were discouraging [0 say the lea t, It is believed that greater success may be a tta ined in future opera lions if the Ioregolng considerations are given ~.'reater weighl,"

CONFIDENTIAL



Vector on First Plot COMCARDIV (Oki714t1)a): "CVE Car. rier Task Groups are not passing luJlident lnformn lion be tween thetr Fighter Director Officers. In this oper. arlen 2096 kes was the high frequency inter-fighter director net but often the fighter director of CTU 52.1.2 ,wuld

not reach the lighter directors of CTU 52.1.1 and CTU 52.U. It Is true thar the c\rcuit was often heavily used by the task force lighter director and by the fast carrier groups, but to prevent Tepetirlon of Intercepnons it must also be constantly employed by CVE Task Groups. If that crowds the lFD circuit too much, another frequency should be assigned.

"Control is generally retained in the llagship, being passed to another carrier jf they lint have the track. .It has worked well and there is now Iittle difference 1n the quality of control in CVE's, The need for starting the 'interception on the first pl.ot was illustrated by the fact that enemy planes In (ills area .often come in under low cloud cover and are consequently within thirty miles of tile formation when first picked up."



Follow the BtlOys

US FIN 'EGAN (DE) (Okinawa):

"During this operation, GIC has been invaluable in cracking of enemy air raids. Sometime as mallY as 40 raids a day were tracked. The excellent plotting bas permitted this ship to be fuU)' cognizam ot the air raid situation at all times. Common practice has been to· go to general quarters at any lime that a raid penetrated to within 20 miles of this ship, or at anytime when 'heavy raids plotted to pass over our position. erc was also especially helpftu at night for maintllilling sector patrol and for movements inro, om of

56

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTI.AL

and around the transport screen. The surface search radar was colllltantly used for navigation, not only at night and in periods of low Visibility, but when on stations where good visual bearings were difficult to obtain .. Radar reflector buoys were found to be very useful when they could be located. This is particularly true when two OJ: more were in a pattern so as to be

.readily identifiable. These buoys have been picked up at a maximum range o.f 7000 yards ina flat sea. They are, ho.wever, easily masked by a swell or

choppy sen, and we have frequently passed between. them without their being picked up. An experimental buoy was also I oca ted south of Kerama Rella, which gave reliable ranges of 3000 yards, despite a choppy sea. It may be of interest that during the rehearsal fa. the Iwo jima operation wb,ich was conducted in rhe vkinity of Labaina Roads, an object. believed to be a radar refleetor buoy, gavereliable ranges up to 10.000 yards, and was of indispensable value in mainraining an accurate patrol.



Train-or Else US!; HJJ.A (DM 30) (Okin4wa):

.. (a) Drill. CIC and Main Battery personnel to obtain rapidity at getting director 'On TargeL' Use Target Designator and telephones for coaching, lind remember that problem is simplilied If Director has any information as !O altl tude.

(b) Train Radar Operators LO follow targets through 'wind.ow' and over land. On one occasion Combat insisted for len minutes that an enemy plane was in window-finally the enemy started his run out of the window.

(c) Radar Operators must be alert for peculiar I.FF.

(d) Whenever possible track all planes-friendly and enemy.

(e) .Emphasize and become efficient' in lise of :Mark 22 Radar.

(f) Surface Radar Operators must be proficient in immediately recognizing planes 00. SG Radar. On one occasion dUl'ing a sustained two and one-half hour night attack, practically all enemy planes wen: first detected by SG Radal'..

(g) Air and Surface Radar must fred)' interchange inIoJ"Olatioll."



Traclzfng Ouer Land

USS ARIU.NSAS (BB)(Okinawa): "Oki. nawa, unlike rwo jima, has brought the problem of tracking overland with SK radar to the fore. This vessel prefers·l.o shift to the 20 mile scale au the 'A' scope leaving the PPI on the 75 Wile scale, when tracking clese in over land. Tllls method does not Ilis· turb the PPI presentation. For a. brief period as a radar guard ship on medium range search this vessel was ordered to foUow the reverse of the above procedure, Le., 'A' scope on 75 mile scale and PPJ on 20 mile scale. This is considered to be impracticable and dangerous in searching and maintaining an accurate plot of the air picture.



COM MUN ICATIONS



Party Litle Taboo

USS H.ANCOCK (CY): "Aircrafi. VHF and Fighter Director circuits dud this part o.f the operatious were erally confused and ineffioienl. Wi

an intercept being conducted on a bogey 20 miles £rom the group and the intercepting lighter about to make contacts, the FDO of another s.bip called one of its CAP divisions and asked for a radio check, thus tying up

the circuit for a valuable minute. Instances similar to this one have been occurring wid! increasing regularity, It is too late to tell the offender to. stay off the circwt as the damage has been done, If the intercepting fighter does not receive, or is delayed in receiving a new vector, the enemy plane may get through to attack the Task Group. The pilots of the planes have also been guilty .of this. Either breaking in on an important report for a radio check, or transmitting WiU10UI listening, the pilots have often inter-

pled and delayed many contact and ash reports from communication relay plW1J3s. Indiscriminate and unnecessary transmissions are prevalent every da)' in which any appreciable number oE aircraft are in the air. Willi a large number of planes airborne, the circuits are most illeflident. The solution to this problem is believed to be in the training of the pilots and GIC officers in proper communication procedure, Pilots and CIC officers should be instructed to think before t11Cy talk, say no. more than is necessary, and never break in on communication. circuits which are conducting urgent or emergency communications. These circuits must be cleared up. Tile use of Task Group frequencies for the Task Group CAP and the Task Group strike is ~ step along the road. but H is not quite enough. When a search plane has made a contact and planes fr.om all the groups are sent out to artack. the target all using the same frequency. measures mu t be taken to insure that only vital communications are maintained on this channel and that anything not pertaining to Lhat circuit be shifted to another clrcui t where p'ossible, Intercepts should not be run

a. strike channel if at all po ible. 1 lfh all the rransmisslons that occur

on such a channel, neither in.tel'cept DOl' contact report could be made with any degree o.f efficiency. The lighter director ill ha"ing enougti trouble these days without baving to worry abour whether or D.o.t the planes he is eontrolling receive the vectors and messages that he sends.



Unhealthy Habits

ass VAN f1ALKE BURGH (DD·656). (OM'lawa): "The lack of discipllne on channel four caused considerable Interference in getting urgent bogey reports to the support landing craft on the Roger Peter statlons, This usually commenced during the midwatch when many dlo.ughtless unofficial broadcasts were originated by what were apparent.ly the enlisted operators of the small ships in the anchorage areas, A frequent example of these broadcasts would commence with an injtial call for any one from a certain city or state. This usually brought a response, follo.wed by an effon LO establish a knowledge of mutual acquaint. ances and general talk about the home town or school days. The unofficial broadcasts lessened when news was broadcast during the midwarch .

"It is believed that this could be stopped completely if the necessity fo.r discipline on this circuit was explained io the personnel of the smaller ships.

"The shackle code was frequently compromised. The following are esamples of common every day occurrences:

.. (a) 'Completed drinking Baker fuel shackle X-ray George unshackle' The X-ray is obviously a nine.

"(b) 'Transfer all shackle Able unshackle shackle Mike King unshackle illuminating projectiles.' Since the laJ:gest percentage of our illuminating ammunition is 5" ISS caliber, the 5, 3, and 8 had been compromised.

.. (C) 'The stonn will pass to the east on shackle Peter unshackle June.' Since the enemy probably, also. plots the same storm, me day is known and the number compromisced.'''



Nancy Shows the Way

USS SCRIBNER (APD) (Kllme SIJima):

"The performance of Nan communications between ships, LCVP, and beachhead was o.f great assistance and naturally speeded up the operation. Marine personnel returning from the beach reported no difficulty in locating Nan-

beacons in LCVP's thus greaLly facilitating the rendezvolJ! problem. LCVP's also experienced no diflicull)' in lo.cating Nan lights from ships, when they commenced their trip back to their ships, This is the most favorable experience the SCRIBNER has .had with new equipment to date. Improvement in results from Nan equip. ment is believed to be due to. increased experience with the gear, and, seeondly a more sinccrc employment of the gear. Successful emplojment created confidence and reliance on the gear."



Double Dt4ty Transmitter

USS LITTLE (DD) (Okinawa): "Many voice transmitters are required on a destroyer and usually more than are installed. To partially alleviate this condition, the TBK transmitter was altered to transmit either C'i'\l or voice. The alteration does not ;tlfect the efficiency of !.his transmitter when used for its designed purpose. The output is about 150 watts, which is far superior to the TCS equipment. It is recommended that all destroyers perform this alteration. The details o.f the circuit, and equipment required were made the subject oE a spl:cial report to ComDesRo.n 58."



Japs Hear You 5 by 5

USS GREGORY (DD) (Okinawa): "It must be borne in mind while o.perating in close proximity to Japanese islands tbat aU our voice circuits, the frequencies of which have been unchanged Ior months, are undoubtedly being well guarded by the Japanese. It is firmly believed that our TBS, MN, l\:£A , and lighter director circuits provide tbe Japanese with excellent tactical information.

"From the time this ship departed Okinawa until its arrtval at Ulithi, a

o o

VI m "'0 -! m

K

0::1 m ;;0

57

number oE transmissions on M I etween ships in the Okinawa area could he dearly heard. WbHe off Okinawa, nne or tWO transmissions on M. between, hip in the mithi area were hear I.

''It did not take the . apanese lang 1,1) cliscover the times of departure of

.-\ P EtOIll 81..1 UOIl LO return to hase, and the evening attacks OU pickets u uall occurred shortly after the CAP departed. with the usual preliminaries over voice radio circuits of '1 must return. to base,' . Can. :remain on station only thirry minutes longer: etc."



GUNNERY



Long Range Pickups

PRlNGFIELD (eL) (OhinaUlCl): " unnery comruunicauons were satisfactcry, consisting only 01 sound powered communications within the ship,

onststenuy excellent results were obrained from the Mark 12 and Mark 22 Radars during this period. Targets were easily picked up 1n nearly all cases and were seldom lost once they were on the screen. [0 difficulty was experienced in tracking targets through window, large quantities of which were dropped in man instances. Incoming targets were usuall picked up by fire !lOU trol radars at ·ranges- between 25 and 28 miles when warnlng 'Was gi'ven h the air earch radar in sufficient Lime. :Radar fire control method varied with the dlffrent lypes of attack. In IDOSt cases pal·tial radar tontrol was employed. Full rad;t{' control was used in all instances of night firing, I)Ul " ults were not observed. 1n two daylight allacks, bowevl'T, it was necessary to use full radar control due t'O Lile ulrge l" bei]] gob 'cLlI'ed by clou cis, all d in I olh cases director optics welle found LO he dead on when the target emerged from llJ clouds."



RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

0:: u.J co

2

w Iea._

LU V1



Jap Radars Detected

COM R DTT' (Olli.1tlwa): "hOl-lly after arrival in Okinawa area and during rbe entire period in which Camerun-iv-4 remained in that vicinity, enemy l'l'ldar ignaJs were interCepled.

58 CONFIDENTIAL

As shown by \J :L, l:ll A R 1\1 Log (WI Ht A erial 001, 31 May 1945) the bearing- or 're iprocal frolll. which th se signals came was determin d in a number of ca ses. bus, the probable

" l nee of the ~ Ilowivg radars "'II hown:

AGUNI HUlA

Type HI. loue! i\A. ~fOTOB P NIN LA Mk B (Ann), Mk II.

NAIiA irport, l\flt ll.

IE SHIMA

Ivlk ll, Type HI.

"In addition, Mk B radar was -detected in the vicinity of Machinate, hurl, and i:n northern Okinawa, when these areas were still inenem.y .h ands.

"It is believed that the radar on t'lguni tracked our covering force OD irs nightly retirements. And, there is ne doubt that the Japanese used the radars as bom.ing beacons fer their air a tta ck5 a t night,

"It is suggested chat once the exlsrenee and approximate geQg.rapilica,] location of enemy radar nan mUter is known, every effort should be made to pinpoint the installation and to destroy it by Naval gunfire or aerial bombard men ,"

ance at Limes. Cenerally the K operators spotted the plane 'before it b-egan dropplng window. Occasionally the operators mi takenly called in bogies for particles of window. It was dropped in ver large quantities on occasions.

"The enemy did 1I0t obta in the maxunum effective lise of their window however, generall using it 0 that its position was determined b the operators prior to the enemy attempting to Ilrilize Ir for deception. Enemy timing was poor, auacklng planes coming in [00 loog alter the window was dropped and after it bad been identified M uch and ploued.

common practice of the enem \\,:1 to dose LO 10 miles or do er then open distance sowing window. After opening to about 20 miles the bandit would turn in. again attempting LO hi.de In irs own window.

"During the Okinawa operation, the ELDORADO was assigned overall RC/l.1 intercept guard. In addition, ali RCM. conrrol ship, all enemy ignals reponed to the R M Control Officer were evaluated by :RCJ\.f and when jamming was ordered by the OT ,the jamming signaJ was monitored by this ship.

"Between 1 April and 18 May, following shore- based enemy radar nals were intercepted by this ship:

Mk 18, 158/550/7: {k B, 100/700- 750/18-30; Mk 11, 92-95/300·350/30-40; j\>[k cm, 69-75/400·450/40-60. The lI:fk 13 was not intercepted after the L-Day pre-invasion bombardment. The Mk B was Intercepted imermiuendy wirh varying pulse widths until 12

pril after wh.kh I t was no longer in· tercepted. The Mk II was intercepted inlermittemly throughout [ne opera· tion, mo l frequently at night. J\Jlhough Lhe MIt ill was ob Cl'Ved al one lime to operate satisfactorily while cttanging frequency between 69 and 75 Me, thi.~ r~da.r wa kept IIccurately centered on oue of our TB Ereq ucn-

ics, inditaLillg tbat the enemy was more interested ill jalllIlilllg Ollr Tn tLtan gelling ullm:ferencc-free radar reception; we :'Irk CHI. vas at mo t onl a nuisance [0 TB reception.

":r::uemy airhorne l'1l.dltr has bt'eD sCllrce, due, Pel'hIlPS, to we faa war encru. planes had little diRicuh .!inding their targ; I area b simpl navi· galion. On 3 J\pril during an air raid a signal with the cb.aratle:ristics 210/ I 000/U.5 was in tcl'cepled ~ nd heliev

(0 be the A. type l'lldar descrilied

in Pa .,~ Ii 'P~ £< h vf 122332: by 1'101-

Ling all eighl raids in the vicinity at tile Lime 3l'Id compartng llllles of maximum signal. strength of the enemy rad a r, it was plls~ible LO determine th p .. oh~llle raid using ill" radar, nuring an air raid on 6 April vimilar air-I rne radar was d 'k red WI til tllo characteristics 200/1000/11>. On ! I M-ny, dming an air mid: I:lIc JIII,ancSe Mk VI wns int rtcpl d with the ehuractcristics 149/900-1000/10. A I though ther signals were reponed in th general range of Japm1<_"Sc airborne radar, the above are the onl)' ones wlrich were eval uaied b} 1.11 is s hi I) to be p<)~ i tl vel y or JapMlese orlgill.

"During the operation on several occasion IFF transponder were intercepted transmitting' coutinuouslv and in an erratic manner in a sweep from lSi LO lSi Mr.; thi!; was believed. to be [:lUle operation of tb,e transponders caused by over-sen itivity of their T"ceiver tub . ,ViLh no low frequency direction finders. this sh j P could get no bearings on the signals.

"j\) though severe I su icide boa L a ttacks were attempted on the transport area during the operation. no enemy radar was lrucrcepred during these auacks.

.. \lLhough fighLer directors believed a,at Japallesc planes were somehow ~~arned of the approach of nigtu figlH· crs, III re wa no radar intercept vidence of Japanese use of the radar (ail warning device. It is firmly believed LIl:!! anv warning device in Jap~nesc plane'S is of the radar intercept receiver l pc, tuned pos jbly to transpondor frequencies. with directional antennas In the tails oE the planes,

"The following remmmendations are SlI bill; ([ed in "iew of \"ll en l Oki:nalwl '~l'eTiences:

.. (3) The my ignal Corps sllould

rurni'h lb.e O' C prior [0 each amphibioll5 opera lion with a completE:

Lisl of all radars and their tharil-CleT' isties which .are to be landed during Lhe operation. CO!lSidcrable conrusion was Cflu'ed b the facl that Arm)' radars on Okinawa were similar to .Japanes' radars in all roarn teristics, Complete .inlormadon an this SUbject was not avaib.ble to chis ship until IWO ",<!C!..s alter L Day.

.. (b) A radar direcLlon finder for

the mnge of am 90 to 300 M

should be installed on this hip. It is illlJ..lC>iiSible to locate Japanese radars, mOSL ot wujeh arei" I.he 90 LO 300 Mc

d, wjL.b tbe trpe C GA diTectlo-n

• er nOli' instalkd in Lhis ship."



.. I he petformance of the radar

was Yen' disappoin Ling bu L m:l)' be :11- tribliled somewhat to the fact that I 1 ersonnel were accustomed to the long range pi k-up obtained With the

K, and expected similar re ults from rhc C. It was gene:rally observed rha; unless the P picked up a target itself', it was almost always coached Oil bv .reports of other ships which poessed K radar.

"Results obtained with the

quipment was better than expe teel and improved HS the I' personnel became more familiar with ilS oper· ation."



Dinah Throws a Block COMDESDlV (Okinawa): "At 0008 (1) on 15 April, at atitude 25-13.3 Nand Longitude 132-01.5 E spor januning Japanese Type 3 air Mark VI Mod 4 for a pel'iod of 20 minutes, upon orders [rom C' 58.3.2; jamming 149 Mts with 'Dina!\' using POIl antenna. A Japallese plane had closed to with.in 10 miles Of formation, his radar ha\'ing been detected b ANjSPR·l. 001- bined jammjng of task group succeeded in turning plane away £rom Lask group."



Jap T ricker!J E ualuated

U S ELDORADO (Okinawa): "Tbe enemy tried everything in the book to deai"e our radar operators, CXttJpl jamming. Violent coune cbanges. jinking in altitude, raid splitting, d.ropping window, collling in very low. and at oWeJ' times very high. were u tili zed tOO freq 11 en.Ll y by th.e enem y . However seldom did these methods' fool tbe operato .

"Wil,dow prov d to be quite a nuis-

RADAR PERFORMANCE



Orchids and Onions

G(M (Jj A 'CDI" (Oki1ID''''I); "Excessive radar ranges caused hy 'trapping' were r ported by L\lDlANA on 14 and Ii May, when the K Radar picked up land at 36 miles. itnd a single plane at 135 miles.- PITT 13 RCH picked LIp land on UII' It on 17 Mit a t 370 miles, while her 13M iFF reached .oUL 250 miles, 1\ t:nlldI debated problem in this Task nit is ihe value of the V PPI. VICR B R reported it Indispensable for both air and urface plotting, but ALAB,\M A bas had lilLie success in using it as an air pJOL. The value of the . a a surface summary plot is already well establish d. The general fedillg oncerning its II ill air WOT' ha been that although it has 50IIle value as an air 8U IDtllary plot, it. is _,nl'eciorlo the C PPI equipped with a twelve- Inch scope fot fighter direction. In view of this con troversy , the strong IJPpOl"t given tb G b)' QUINCY is quite interesting. QUIN· ,CY is satisfied wi th the C for both air and surface plolting and has used it. with success to designate targets within Jjmiting aF I:}' \)eal'ings during night torp do plane attack. The QUINCY's ahilit) to perceive • .t\ patterns on the G is noiewonh .

.. ew radars In the T'ask Group lncl ude th e Max"k 13 lire-co 11 tro I radar, reported b the ,\l.AJ3..:'\MA as upcrlor to the fark II' the SR, which bas not

er measured up to the K and for which replacement rubes arc scarcer than the scarce standard types; Llle ,GJb and the CJ . as yellll'1asse sed.. ..



Eualuatiofls

USS M.,;ltV1LIl BA r (eVE) (Okt,lawa):

"When operating wiw a large group oE planes airborne, over a wide area, the non-dll'eCtional antenna att.ached to th BM Interrogator pro ed very itleff-eclive (or recognition purposes. 1.11e directional antenna of the BO WlI men sub ti.lnted., operating off i:he 13M and excellent results were obtained on !lir IFF indicators to a Tallge of rorty miJes. It is believed !.hat a di· rectional antenna especia l1y bll ill: for the TIM Interropwr will lengthen the range considcrnhl) nne! will pel·rorm vcry ellicien t:I .



Ghost Gfues Trouble

5S B.41·AAN (CVL 29): "Durillg the period covered b)' th is action report all radar ets of the B T N I erIormed in 11 normal manner. On 25 ~!<U'ch the . P radar first picked \IP a ta.rgCL that proved to be a puzzle a lid a hazard during the entire Okinawa support period. This target could he differentiated from :II~ aircraft howing no IFF >n I by the fact l ha t it tracked with a vari;ble speed. The 'peed rllllgt'(l F(Om 20 to 70 "nuts. Having once become accustomed to seeing the now famOllli 'Gbost of Nansei hoW' the BATAA J radar operators Ioun 1 it ltule trouhle except when it appeared suddeul clos in, especialty when the Task roup was under attack.

"OJ] 18 and 1.9 May phenomenal ranges were po ible on all radar sets. The K had land 250 miles awav. The P plainly showed T 50.1 95 miles outh. The n TAA aerology office]' reported a marked inversion a L abou I 15,000 feel during this same period, This wcatber condition is considered the prob31)) cause of the IInu, ual r':luges:·



Maintenance Pa!Js Dividends

';) WALKER (DD) (Okinawa): ·'The perfon))<mce oC Ihe new! in talJed Mark [2 Rad.ar C<IlIipment exceeded ill I c,x pee t<u.ions. It req .tired constanl tllning 3-lld ad j llstcnent a.l1d the technician's \I'll tdI estal)l ished for that p\lrpo.'<C adequatel handled this requucmenl. Little trouble was e."perIcneed in picking lip [argeLS from CTC ill[Ollllation a1tbough when bogies and .fricn(lli~-s WeJ"(: close togeLher differenLiation was diBiClllr. It: is recommended th~t tFl' eqllipment be included in

n

)'1

CONFIDENTIAL 59

\1 ark llo! l~"dar j ,,~(;!lh, tious as &IOU as I'Xlssible.

"The Mark 22 R,IU:lf C(luipmcnl was disappoinring. When it worked it was Hl_ry accur-ate but it '>"as seldom oper[{'Ling pmperJy when it was needed. Much of this is believed due to the Illlfamllianty of personnel concerned with proper jnethods of maintenance and adjusull·cnt. Adjustrnea; of tbe Receiver-Transmitter unit was difficult due to its position in the weather. During the las.t weeks of the operation, irs performance has improved and per· sonnel involved are a,ble to rune it properly, The future should bring a more favorable rep on on [he Mark 22 Rad3.1-.

., D u ri ng [lie pc ri Old covered by th is

repon. [he ship's search radars were III ainta ined a t a higb level of operating efficiency. There were no major mao I.Crial or maintenance d iDicui ties encountered. This is tho light to be aue prillcipally to the fact thai the ship, tor the {ir-rt lime since il was tJ/aced in. ~Oll1missiotl, lias had a $u{ficien.t 'lumber of technically tmined penon· n el to pentli I Lh e s / an ding 0 fa technidan's condition 'f1I4tch .villl the ltchn.idans having '10 d,u!ies other than. the, mailltenollce oj rodar, sonar ond radio, eqtlipmlmt, We have been enabled to institute and maintain a progtamof preventive maintenance whic.b bas paid dividends in centlnuous cperadon with ajninimum of interruptions by materia! breakdown.

.- I'he G-a radar has been kepL in upc.r-ation2;! hocrs a day except, for shon, periods I"hen it has been secured for routlne preventive maintenance. The greatest single aid to detcetieu and cill'l}' correction of incipient lXouble;; U3,5. been we OBU·:} Echo-Box I~hich was i.lllilailed by the Navy Yaw, Mare Island in January 1945. Use of theocho-box has clearly demonstrated that me' radar's operating eflic.i.ency cannot be accunllely determined by viewing the osetllosco pes OJ: noting ma...'(imum ranges obtalned on varlous large ts, Exltnm L factors such as weather scmetimes CUt down the ranges wbidl can be Obtained even t.ltough me radar is at we peak 9f .its effi.clency."

electron.ic releases

eNO (Op-25-S.) is tile avy Departmentcoordinaring agency for the distribution of the Commander in Chief, U. S.. Pacific Fleet, electronic releases to activities not in the Pacific Ocean Area

or Southwest Pacific Area. All requests for copies of CinPac's electronic releases (included among others are the CMandO bulletins for ReM publi- . cations) should be addressed to CNO (Op-2S-S).

correction

On rhe maps illustrating "Trapping in Empire Waters" P: 40'-41, Atlgust"C.I.C.'-', two lines menuoned in (he text were inadvertently omitted. The-line RS, Zone OJ 'referred to in the text, runs

tram Cape Hatteras to Portland, Maine. The equivalent line XY, Zone C, runs from Shanghai to Vladivostok.

be careful

That attention of all training activities thar conduct or participate in Window demonstrations and exercises is drawn to the fact that Wi.ndow·, and particularly Rope, falling overland nlil,Y come in contact with high tension electric cables causing paw'er failures and possible danger to life. Ac-

60 CONFIDENTIAL

tivities using Window and Rope for training purposes should give due consideration to the direclion and force of the wind at the time of the drop to' assure that the material falls in. the water and does not drift over the land when there is dan

of coming in contact with high tension wires.