CHI N A

JANUARY 1945 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

c. I. c.

COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER

VOL. 2, NO. I

JANUARY 1945

Minecra]; Have GIG's

Go

Figiuer Direction Begins (IJ I. Simons 6

1 (f1U CI J Fighter Direction and Rad(11' Training Film 16

RPD sed ill French Inua ion 2

uccessjul VG O'peraiion 26

Attack Plotter Puis the Finge1' on Subs ~ 1

Eliminate ill "Wail" 34

[amming Duel at Vi'rgilli(~ Beach 40

"Gallllp Poll' of Radar '3

StandaraiaationSturts with the E.g

'.

Ililrodllci'llg the. P-lJVl

Admiral Koga s Eire Control 5'1

lap "Know How" on Deception 50

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Lessons Learned: Conuu uuications

"C i C' ,. I I .

" . '. 1944 /)(1 e.-:.

A Coniidentiai magaxiue p'Uuli hed mOTllllly b" the Chic] of Naval Opemlion {01' the iniormation 0/ commissioned iuerrant, enlisted personnel, and persons aiuhorized, whose duiies arc connecteti ioitli the tactical lise mul. operation of electronic (wei associated equipme» t. The iniornvuiou contai ned. in this PliuliCftlion is

CONFIDENTIAL

and as such. shall not be rransmit.ted 01" revealed. ill allY /IIllllner, to (LilY unauthorized persons. Til, jJuulicalioH is 10 be lunulled in 1I(:C01'(/(I/I('e with A rticlc 76 ,S, TaV)1 Regulations, awl will lie destl'oyerl by Imming tuhen it lia served i,{ Inl rpose. l\ eith '" quarfed)l reports nor vetiorts of burn ill/5 tp'e req 11 ired.

This aud 0111(,1' copies o] "C./.G,'· hull be included wWt other classified material which is to receive e1'lIcrgellcy lie truction in the ('Velll of 1)0$ ible loss or capture. Commaading Officers oj units emfJZoyed in landing operations or similar tiazardou eluf)1 are diTec/ul [0 destroy m' land this publication P"iOT 10 these operations. "GLG,

hall not be carried for use in aircrajt.

ART AND LAYOUT BY OP-lo-P-2

minecraft have

C' C's

ShlJillll here is (me sirle 01 the ClG aboard the U IiOPKlN (DMS-13)·

The neces ity in this war for quick and accurate accumulation, display and evaluation of important information has dictated Combat Information enter for minela ers, minesweepers, and net layer of the United tat Fleet, A th war progTe d thi need be arne insi tent and th corresponding development oE the I and its use aboard Minecraft has paralleled t orne dgr e ib de elopment of CIC in desrro er ,DE' and other

ornbataru hip.

Aboard Min craft this need was not ea ily met nor was in tallation quickly accamplished, hree factors delayed the development of complete and smoothly operating CIC organizaticus: (I) lack of suffici nt pace fOT the equipment and the men to man the equipment, (2) la k of facilities for the increa e in complement ne ear)' to man the CI '. (3) the low priority

a ign d for the installati n of I quipment aboard these ships.

Those three fa tors have he n partiall er me. he ne e ar equip--

ment has been auth rized al bouzh in small units. b cau e of the ever present weight limitations on tb e ve els. Alteration to provide space

By Coumuuul r Miuecrait

nited , tates Pacific Fled

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RAOIO

PLOT t DISPlAY

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VI "- "" '" < .... Combat Injormtuion enrer 6qui1)11l~llts (lml tallations aboard I\-lill6CTllff /UIff/;" iIllJm"ftu!(l.

Min;oloyor leM)
H'9h Speed I'i.el.ye.
1200 Ton 10M)
Hi9h Spell!ld Mi,"er~yer
rzoo To. (OMI
Hjg" Speed Mf"os...,..-ceper"
1630 To. (DMS)
1"1i9h Speed MI •• ' ..... p'n
1200 Ton (OMS)
'1'1 .. , Mi,.elwlIItI~l!Ir
2211' (AM)
'FI.~I M.rU!lIY'lIIflp'l!Ir
180' IAMI
tMo":.r Mil'lfl'Wuper (VMS)
tNol C.IIUC}O Ship IAKNI 'R.d er Pl"U;'9 F •• lIil'.' Only.

lor We IC ha e been i sued .. lth ugh the CIG i till hampered b la k of ufficient spac and per onnel it i now an integral part of the hips,

VARIOUS EQUIPMENT IS PROVIDED

New DM's (converted 2200- on DD's) and the D W D 1 yes el erred 1630- on DD') have a fully equipped and organized C C.

GM' and the 01d DM and old D is vessels have a somewhat limited but can, nevertheless, perform all the primary functions of Gle.

NAVIGATIONAL DATA IS MOST IMPORTANT

Th functions of I in Minecraft are imilar to tho e of de troyer e 'cept Ear the more exactinz requirements for navigational records,

Thi Iunc 'on f the I with relation to navizarion i of first importance in Mine raft, v ry exa °t navigational r ord b ing required, b th for minelaying and mine weeping perations. In minela rinz the following information must be recorded and reported: (a) the exa t location of each mine laid, (b) the depth of water in which each mine is located, (c) the technical features of the mines laid, (d) the tactics used to la the field and (e) the time each mine wa planted,

Sin e offen ive mine fields ar u uallx laid under cover of darkne th

CI the our and azenc for the olle tion and e rdinz of thi

information.

In Min weeping the navizational record is eq ual1y important. be fol-

I wing inlorrnarion mu t b 1<.0 wn, recorded, and reported: (a) th 1 ca-

.~ Comb«! III/QYmotirlrl .611IC', ttbnn,.d I'vCillecrn/t assl 1 ttie t:ommtmdil1g officer /1)' [urni. fljllg (In eualualed picture 01

tile air, ·11(1, and 11111 umter sit uation ..

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ti nand Iimit of the min field being 'wept (b) the xact path swept .. ( ) tIt e. act area cleared or mines, (d) t 'pe and te hni al feature [the min wept. ( ) the time and to ation f am mine wept, (1) the number or mines S1:IJept, (g) the tactic u ed Ior the sweep, and (h) the tim f casual Lie 00 wee} gear and related technical information.

Fighter Direction Is a function of the Ie in certain I Iinecraft (Ci\L DM, and D tIS). This function ha not been used in Iinecraf operations to date and a yet no qualified Fighter Direction Officers have been assigned to Minecraft. Howe er, with a qualifi rd officer, pr per Fizhter Direction

an be a complished. The Iutur minela ing and rninesweeping operations

are e t 11 i e that i rna not be pra ti al to a sizn oth r t pe ships to

a t a Fizht r Director- t the C P which will be requir d during the operation. and, in that situati n, th Min aft F DO will b r qui red to perform thi function.

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TO DESTROY ENEMY SUBS

AJJ 1ineet"aXt, except tile KN, b, Me. and types, are' well

equipped and trained for anti .. ubmarine warfare .. The , therefore, is

organized to (a) assist the onn in attack on submarine, (b) record the na igational track. of UH~ ship and the submarine. (c) assist in detecting the maneuver of the submarine. (d) e timate the course and peed of the submarine, (e) as ist Conn in r Q"aining and main aining rna t, and (f) d signate proper researcl ar as and I ro edure,

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The Tl1$ is located. GOIIII611111111.1), /1l1or the Illolling lo/ll/! till tile U S DORSEY (nMS"l).

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I in these ships has be n de clop d and hold the arne important po ition as in rher type ship. As the war in th Pa iIi theater pro!!Te mine warfare is becoming increa lllgly important and Min craft vessels will pla a ery important role in assault and fleet operations. Highspeed minesweepers will be required in the van of other fleet units to pro id detection of and protection against enemy mines. Therefore, it is desirable that all units of the fleet become familiar with the capabilities and limitations of the ClC in Minecraft 'with a view to exploiting these facilities to the fullest extent.

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"C.l.C." will publish similar articles describing the functions of the Combat Lnjormation Center aboard all types of ships. Type commanders have been requested to stJ,pply this information. Other commands are invited to send ill pertinent int01'matiol1 which will be correlated in and by CominChJ eNO, and the Bureaus, and published. Mate7'ial should be mcrked, " uggested tor publication in "C.1.C."-Editor.

vVAR INSTR U CTIO S AY-

Maximum combat efficiency by individual ships and /0 k organizations can best be attained through full utilization of all available sources of combat intelligence. To develop this concept, the establishment in a ship of a center, in which iniormatioti [rom all available sOU'rces can be received, as- \ similaied, and evaluated with a minimum of delay, is e seniial. 'Througti the evaluation of all available information by trained personnel, such data can be quickly disseminated to the flag and comma11ding officers, to other cantrol stations concerned over interior communication circuits, and to other ships and aircraft via external communication facilities. The means for accomplishing the foregoing and assisting the commander in planning and ex cutin a correct course of action, is provided by tne combat information center»- (E.T.P. 143 (A))

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• Till! Undenoater part Of CIC in IMPECCABLE consists oi, left Co rigltt, the II ,1/" Chcmie«! Recorder, BDl, alul QeD.

~~ NJ{TS III;t" transmitter house, A NTTQ, anlell1w rna ts, etc. is shownitl close W01'/ling Im'l\'illlil)' to apro». ami rl1u;IICI),S. A 57:1 lin it j centered in Ilrt' lie/ri.

~~ 11('ritlit.il'lIuV.l • '(, imom, siunuing Ihe main school buildi"g NRTS (uljainillg 1/1t! apron. SL. luums lJil/ltge is ill tile di - tance 111;(/. 'I., iman (It/1Id amI the northern lip IIf Jekyll is/ami /"'VOIU/, .. 1 .5~7 uui: ;,' centerett ill the ai« {ield,

'I tercel?ting Betty, J ud ~ J oes, ana,l ze,~e' b fore th , born b, and trafe UI: ship and ba require a fa t-working mbar Irtforrnation Center, or Air Defense .ontrol Denter with a hlghly coordinated team of operators, plotters, talker, intercept officer, and fighter pilots.

Tills 1 tern to defeat th nemv' air mi i n is ailed Fight r Dire tiolla term born in Britain during the earl da I f th war-and in' 11) rates a variety of techniques, orne of which came from England. some from our

'peri nee in b th eans. Fighter DiT ti n has come a long "';'1'

in the dav of the battle oE th oral Sea and, cl v loping ra jell " it has

demanded the be t in officer, men, and equipmen ,

To fulfill the demand for well-trained officers. The omrnander-in- ,hi f

, Fleet, dire t d, on Ma 8th, 1943. that it radar training enter be e tablished to train ilghter Dire tor (and intercept) officers. Five w eks later the nited States - aval Radar raining Schoo! began the training of Naval and Marine om er a hip and hore-ba ed Fighter Dir ct r ,

[ R T is located on a small i land on the ou theast 0<1 l ((,. rgia. fifteen miles from the city of Brunswick. "St. Simons"-as the school is often referred to-1 at the - aval ir Station on t. Simons Island with other cla sroorn control enter radar stations, and a B,O,(, nearby. Pilots and planes operate from the air station on intercept missions=t hc

ole purpo e of the station bing that of supplying interceptor and "enern .. air raft for the embi 0 fighter dir ctors and the "refresher .'

taffed b officers most of whom are continuously rotating with fighter directors and int rcept officers from the combat zones, the chool conducts r ur rnajor our e f r -V ( ) and oth T offi ers de stined for their spe .ialize-d duties in carrier and battle hip CI 's, in the A "s E arnphibio L operations and with the ~ iT Defense Control Centers on the islands near Japan,

NRTS IS MODERN

The sire of NR wa chosen b cause of the already xistent airfield, and

becau more air pace was provided than at the previous location of the Fichter DiT tion ho J at Norf lk, . Virginia. Persi t nt good fI ina weather due lO the slisrht change of sea on, and available quarters for hou ing of required enlisted complement a well as tudent officer personnel have ontributed to the succe sfol op ration of the chool,

th < erial view of lhe ration haws. it is a corupletel 'modern stablishment with its O\VTI hangar, administration building, Pilot' B.O.Q. recreation halls, and larg school building adjoining the field.

The. main chool building and primal' center of NRTS ncuvuv contains an assembly hall seating 400, three large classrooms and several small ones. a reading r 0111, ven (ull, equipped CI " three of which serve in the routrol of a .tus I tnt r ept probl m and all - which ar as neal', as po sible reproductions or a tual shipbome in tallations. There are also problem rooms. Link rooms" R/T Procedure rooms, staff and general orne!', carpemc and desizn shops, and adi and radar repair h p', In ad litiou, th re t. housed in a separate structure the. 1 TTQ quiprneru which serves as the Operations raining Center for Marine Air Warning quadron ontroll r nr lIed in the' hool.

At outl lng 'ill" and at the King and Prin H tel there ar ther 1 's, radars, radios and spe ial equipm nt of up-to-date desizn for use in ih training s stem-fixed, mobile and portable equipments including radio lTU ks, P rtable radars, rernot PPl's radar trainer and nth ti DR: '5.

he taff at R ,now authorized at 11 complement of fort -nine, i made Ill" largely or officers returned from Fighter Direction assignments

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in the combat z ne . Dir

min h' r cation plan ordering e. P rienced Fighter th Pa ifi Fleet via the Pacifi Fleet Radar enter trength n the t- tel' of 01£ rs on permanent dUL as instructor.

be taff, peciall those concerned in. the air intercept

problems, works in close coop ration with operations officers and pilots of the station. In addition to the a at Officer taff, there is a Marine viation Detachment assigned to the school. he ommanding Officer of which i responsible t the Commanding fficer

of RTS. He maintains clos liaison with Cherry

Point and Commanding Gen ral Marine Corps. Thi

Detachment comprises fi e off ers, also experienced in

Fizhter Direction, who are one rned mol' peciall with h

Marine officer training.

In order to insure consistency between the U. S. Fleet and the British Fleet in matters of Fighter Direction and erc Operations. NR TS has on its staff an "exchange instructor" from Yeovilton, England. This British officer contributes the latest in British 'ighter Direction, and learns the recent American techniques and transmits these to hi own repr enratives.

VARJOUS OFFJCERS ARE STUDENTS

From July 19<13 through July J944, the tudent ffi r input with small variation comprised A-V( ) off ers direct from indo rrinarion chools, In December 1943, one Q-roup of -V(N)s entered and completed the work as qualified Interceptors. However, more recently there has been a trend toward a vari et 0 E in pu t, and it rna y be said tha t I R TS bas rece i ved, on BuPers orders, Naval officers from practically every classification, for in-

truction either as Interceptors or as erc Watch Officers, in the former eTOUp and assigned to the long COurse, have been A- (S). A-V(! ), and A-V(T) offi ers, The Marin Officer input is order d to NRTS hy the Commanding General of the Marine Corps and at 0 takes the lung cour e.

The top 1 en of this course, aval and Marine, are held over for one extra month' instruction in GCl, qualifying them as Interceptor (N).

In the short COUl" e de igned for Sh ip's Officers, IJ-V(G) and D-V(S~ lassifi ation are the rule .. with OT Lam assigning the quotas,

A last category of officers under instruction comprises Refresher students.

I\TR T 11 as been recei ing Refreshers sin ce December 1943. These have increased in number steadily until the average aboard is approximately thirty-five. CominCh' rotation plan also support thi Refresher pl'Ogram.

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L FOUR COURSES ARE AVAILABLE

The original plan fin tru .tion at NRT al led [or a tw o-rnrn rhs COLII' e leading t th qualihcati n of Iuterr-eptor econd Class. tudents em lled in thi cours were drawn direct from indo trinatioi and arrived in group' of sixty to seventy-five on the first arurday of ea h month. This cheme ha been replaced by more complex ODes as the war progress d and R Snow

onducrs four major courses.

(1) The 'Long Gaur e." his is now a three-months course, The cla

enters the firs Saturday of ea h month, resulting in three uch classe being aboard im ultaneousl . It is de izned to provide the ba i traininz. both theoretical and appli d, required in the making 0 an Inter eplor. Empha. i i n Fighter irecti, n, th uzh I Operati n in eneral are thorough!

ered with a rend L ward highlighting urface Navi arion as a respon j. bilit 0 I'C, Iter orientation the laval effie r in this our e IUO e into

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~ Navigatioll classroom, Doth aerial a 'II'I urJac#< ~ avigatio!1 are included ill th« curriculum and a check-au; O,} tile mechanics of I he D RT (IS urell as its USe In GIC operotions, is requisite.

~~ lasses in Plotting cover. bolh ail' and urtace problem, wilh G,'W and Polar Coordinate charts ill lise. Recently pliaJilm has replaced the use of IT . plJ.per 0'1 all ploW"lf. table

~~ O'lel!'l month • ((10 offi.eers

produce (111 allimllted re

couaing the basic prj"cifi of

Plot/iug.

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Plotting. N vizarion. Organization. Coruruunications, R/T Procedure, Radar heory, Aircraft Performance, Tactics, Gunnery, Combat Information Center Fighter Direction techniques. and 11-

i hetic and .tual Air Inter ept problem.

Til curricul lim 1'01' the Marine lficer in the long 'OUr e ubsti.tutes certain aspects of Land Based Fighter Dire tion for the hours of Surface Navigation, etc .. assigned to a hipborne officer. AD Board :inforl1lation is integrated and the

larine a .tivitv at 1 err Point review th prognull for its currency. Field Operation. horeBased Fighter Direction Techniques. Amphibious Operations, etc., are incorporated.

u e sful graduates of thi course onduct an average of ten actual inter ept and [ ur VI ual intercepts before qualifying, and all fl indo n-inaI ion hops as a part of their assiaumenc.

(:!) "he Gel COUl' e. Thi constitute an au t ional month added to th long our e and

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"Mike". tile !i S lnstatlution al Blood}' Mnrst, hns been e(ll'eftllly s;ted in de(tr. 11111 lerrilory to)' m/l.~imltl1l per[ormanee.

re 1'\1 d for tho e ffi en who ha e hown k ene t aptitude as Inter eptors, It is oncerued with imposing the spe ialized techuiques of night inter-

, epts on th ba ic knowledze gain d in the long

cour . G I R/ pro edur i iborouahl

credo and each student conduct a maximum Dumber of a tual interceptions. It is Teq uired that an qualified (N) on the completion of this work I ha e ondu t d fift)' s 'n theti .inter epts on rrain r and a minimum of twenty-fi e a rue Is.

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orne of them hit, 0\' r one hundred if the enrollment is not too high.

(3) The Ship's fficers our e. his is a one-

month course with the class entering the last Saturda of each month. It i de igned to acquaint

r Watch Officer of the BB s, 's, CL's, DD's,

etc., with the principles of Fj hter Direction, and den t lead 0 q ualificati n a an Inter eptoL

he first three we k: tel srope the material of the long course, and the fourth week is spent in on" rrolling air actual . However, in compliance with r c 11t directives and in. an effort to ausEy the needs [Pacific de troyers, a cond month con. j ting primaril ' of air problem. has been added 10 the one-month hip's Officers course for officers with previous I experience or a background of

wo months in [ruction at the Tactical Radar ( I) 11 01 at Hollywood Bah. FJorida. This g'r up i. qualif d Intercept r e ond Class.

(1) The Refresher Course. hi c ur e does

not convene on a stated date, bur rather incominz

'" nffi er are "accumulated" until a gTOUp of ten or

III re is ready to comm nee in tru U n. Refre her studen ar til n given a tw -weeks orientation de igned to acquaint previou A1"gllS personnel (Navy shore-based 'DO's) with ship installations

and techniq Lies, and to bring shipbome per onriel abr a t of recent technical and tactical de eJopIII 1'H , t the 1 e of thi two w eks, Refre 'hers • re attached to e tions of the enior Clas engaged in ontrol of actual air problems. Approximatel

c me month is spent in the e actuals and in the Iurther acquaintance with all CIG's. ' t the close

r rhi time, ac ording to prefer nee for duty and capability, a majority of the Refresher i drawn off and put into the one month GCT course.

t R is an officers' training school. However,

beginning with August 19.14, a lass E ighteen eulis t d men 11a been re eived the fir t f each month -f r pecialized work on th M only. These men are Oroup I !{I'aduates of Radar Operator Schools, arrive with continuLoO- orders, and are processed through ii one month.

he chool da commences at 0755, clas es continuing through 1600, with lite exception of the lun h hour, oincid ntal with these hours are tWO air problem periods. Plane pancaking at the end of the se ond period at 1000 are l'e(-u led and

rambl d for a third fi 'iDO" problem period 'which se ure at I Hgo. veather and light permitting. Rotating individual sections of the long OUTse senior class .handle this third daylight air problem Jl riod. N igb t Bying pt" blem are condu .ted f e night a ",~, ek r ihre h urs, ontr I h inz hom

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~ 01J1!:raling orcas assigned to I RTS {or air- probII:"u extend '50 miles to sea belwcen lieuri1lg 058" and 135°, and 100 miles in/aOld beuoeen IIII! bca,-ings 245" and 325". willi restrictions 011 altitudes ollly by adjOi1!Jing Army fllld Navy Commum/,\ Iw(1 CQmmenial Airways ..

~ In the Dem01utrotion CIC, new classes lire introduced. 10 Fighttrr Direction by obseroing adval,eta student. control arl intercept. Cross section Of a carrier 0'1 the bulkhead in th« rear illuminates all ship's circuits and serves as II visual aid to Communications instruction.

use of angomo trainers is an elemelltory bItt essential ~~ step Lo1J}ord quolifying (IS an Interceptor (N).

II scene in a typical NRTS GrG has .something of eeriness as the "SOrCeT(II~S Apprentictls" [obor over illuminated boards.

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(Above) The SM i.fused most in the night Q,ctuau, the inleTcet)tion being marie diHJctl~ off I/Ie L~-inch PPI in the foregroumd. This SI'I aha :w11Plies altitude data to CIC's controlling eluring the three daylight problem pcriocl.

(Below) A BB CIC in the sonool building tracks surface COtltacts dlll'ing {J. sur/ace sytJlhetic t)Tolilcm.

the M- K. combine or from the 588 (fixed G I) or from the mobile GR-527 GCI.

Ilstudents attend au evening tudy period four

venings a week from 1900-2100, in addition to the day working hour, This time is used for required and r commended reading, work in of Ia: igation pr ibl ms, check-out on the radars, and rraininz films, Returned experienced Fighter Director

rm ,Navy, and Marine ar scheduled Ear iflu -

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trared Iectu re to om bin d tafE and stu 1 ru bod during the vening tudv p riods,

In addition to the chedule described abo e. there is maintained at RT a continuou 24-hoUT

IC 'N'atch. Thi is set at either the King and Prince controlling CI or in one of the CI ' at the chool proper, and serves not only to acquaint assigned section 'with zeneral IC duties, but al 0 impo es on tuden fficer the resp n ibili of reporting any U11U ual ontacts, emerzen IFF, or p uliar surfa e tra k to Air Control, Charle -

n, . C., f r th IT a rion. In the event emerzencv IFF i picked up. airborne 1 RT planes are deiached from regular problems and ectored to inve ligate. The a rive area of search for the 2.~-hoUl· eIC Watcb COVel-S the coa t line from Savannah, Georgia, to Jack enville, Florida.

86 PERCENT OF THE STUDENTS GRADUA

Th a erage on-board dail count of tude

officers at R is 250. ttrition out of thi Dum-

ber runs about 14%.

11 new student graduating from the 1 ug rour e are qualified Interceptor Second Class. Those completing the GCI course in addition are qualified Interceptor Second Class (N). he con, tinning orders of those completing the one-man

hip's Officer COLli" e ar endor ed as .. atisfa t01 ,. or" 'ailed La compl te," without auy quali£i ation.

hi p' Offi ers remaining for two months are qualified a Pl- iously mention d. In the case of Reire hers, qualification rna"}' be made depending upon pr "i(JLlS ombat experien and performance at R.: 1] graduate of this activity are nominated to duty by NR T and are ordered b The Chief of Naval Personnel to such duty. Th billets to which they go includes practically all assignments involvin radar and its use. NRTS

ends graduates dir ctly to new constru cion, CV,

, BB, C, p. A! vP, etc. The rna

al 0 pr eed individuall: to Atlantic V or CVE teams already at ea a sinzle replacements, A prop rtion of each month' output is nominated and ordered to the Pearl Harbor Pool. for further as ignment to ships of the Pacific Fleet. A small proportion at graduates, usually Refre hers, are ordered to continental training commands Eor use in the training progl'am . heoling and a signmerit of FIying ighter hector Officers for u e in the N S, Vero Beach. Tight ighter Training ommand i also conducted at RTS. Thi i

pecializ d dut ,usual] filled by officer gradua ith previou fl) ing e perien e.

h majorit of men qualified Interceptor ec-

d all the en m in the sea around Japan. Intercept ffi er filled an important role in the a tions: t. Simon tarred them OD. the road to uccess,

nd Class (1 ) are nominat d and ord r d t m-

ail', Quon et for further a signment to q uadr n as night ontroll r , though some have been sent to Pacific Fleet Radar Center PooL. large proportion of former Argus personnel refre hed here has been ordered to AGC's, Amphibious Commands, and the Ground Control Approach program.

In the eighteen months of its existence NR S has seen over 1600 fficers go through one or anther of the four courses. . t. irnons may .i ustl laim to have ontributed to the disa tr u blow

(r.l bQue) Th« air-condltlaned R.eadiug Room accommodates ·Go jJCfS010S IIna 11 djoi 11.1 the CommLllliclJiL'O" Office f!"Om wl1ich eIM.lif/eel material ma}' be dmlli!l dll,ring tile euening study hours.

(Below) rriel!) of NRTS [rom apron. The SBllC il'l the foreground is olle of 30 5110/1 ain:raft which Serve as fighten in interrept l,mIJfNns, i1'Z,oml! IIlLt:I"CejlL g 'flY, uiitl: the exception of 1>J1t' ISH ill IlIlInlioll in fill ·SIl. "(15 1/01 )'(11 1"·",, received III .\'RT:.

CONFIDENTIAL

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THE t?'aining films and slides listed below, with the exception of the MN~36J4 which will be distributed about t February,. are now available. They may be obtained f1'om Navy Training Aids Libraries in y~ur area. Y?ur req uests should be mnde by letter indicaling the q uan ti ly desired, the n um b er and title of the filmJand also the sub-title if there are seoeral films in a series.

captain informed of all developments in tacti situations. To be distributed -probably in FeD ru.afy.

.. Combat .Information Center It

Of interest to fighter directors: and erc,. this film (now in preparation) describes. the work of eIe. the nerve center of modem warships, and its Telationship to other stations. It illustrates the methods employed by a task force of destroyers andC[uisers in combating surprise enemy air torpedo attacks and a surface contact during a night shore bombardment of a Jap air field. Without the aid of their own night fighters, the force repels the enemy attackers. The film emphasizes thetimportance .of CICand points out that it is C0n tinuo us in operation-csearching for air and surface contacts, providing navigational information, giving early warning of hostile activity, coaching gun directors, and keeping the

.. This Is Fighter Di red/on"

SOUND MOTTON "PICTURE; 50 MD'/1JTES

As an aid to understanding fighter direction, this orientation film simulates combat conditions in a task force and follows the communication procedure among the shipsanQ_ in the plotting room where the Information is recorded on the status board as reports come in. It illustrates how the plan of attack is determined from this information. methods used by the intercept officer in c tacting and directing the planes in fLight, and h enemy raids are discovered and handled. Special

Recently Distributed Films

MN'I006d FIGHTER DIRECTION SERIES

1.6

CON FIDENTIAl

lighter direction vocabulary and radar 'word codes re emphasized. For fighter direction schools and ... en in carrier-based planes.

M . .I~·IOGGg FIGHTER DIRECTION SERIES

tIC ~; - -- 'I'

. ,ommunlcahons

SOUND ~OT10N PICTURE; 28 MINUTES

This film explains the various types of communication devices and channels within the Combat Information Center, and how the communications system, the nerve center of. fighter direction, coordinates; every activity and directs scattered

personnel and moves necessary equipment to the exact spot in 'which it is needed. It describes the commnnications set-up connecting CIe with planes, flag, plot, bridge, air plot, fighter ready roem, visual station topside, gunnery control, primary .fly, other ships 'in the force, scouting planes, observation posts ashore, and the radio intercept watch. The importance of a thorough understanding and the Iollowing of correct communications procedures are necessary for maximum operational and tactical efficiency, This film is intended for pilots

d fighrc:r director officers.

UN-Joo6f FIGllTER DIRECTION SERrES'

"The: RadarmanJ'

SOUND MOTION PICTURE; 3~ M1NUTES Produced to orient the radarrnan to the part e must play in figbter direction. detection, track-

, and identification of blips. this film stresses the fact that radarmen <LEe a select group and that tbey must know the principles concerning these duties: how to determine a bearing by use of antennas, to interpret scopes, ta adjust the calibration of range., and have an understanding of the PPI, and the action of the

cathode ray tube. They must also know methods of regulating bearing, range, gain controls, echoes, of eliminating "grass" and how to use the focusing and positioning controls. . his film explains the use of PPI, identification of IFF, detection of enemy jamming and formations, and shows the various patterns on the screen and how the . darmen work through them to obtain necessary

formation to send to the plotting room. Both air search and surface radar are included in the study ..

MN·l006k FIGHTER DIRECTION SERrES

"Typical Interce.ptions-High Speed Reconnaissance"

SOUND MOTION PICTURE; 8Yz MINUTES

Interception of reconnaissance planes. shad, snooper and high-speed reconnaissance planea.as planned by fighter directors, IS demonstrated by meaq$ of straight photography and animation. The film follows through a typical arrack against a shad, the low flying snooper, and a high-speed reconnaissance plane. It describes methods of vectoring out figh ters and shows the advantages of cloud cover and sun in putting fighters in the best possible position for attack.

MN-loo61 FIGHTER DIRECTION SERIES

"Typical'.nterceptions-· . Loui Visibility Attack'" SOUND MOTION PICTURE; lIV2 MINUTES

A study of fighter director tactics is presented in th is film which sets down rules for low visibility attacks; radar-equipped planes should be sent out with only one plane for interception and brought in at the right distance behind the bogey on the same course. This is necessary to enable his radar equipment to function, Constant contact with the plot room is necessary with abbreviated communication procedure; the fighter is kept below the bogey and he is ordered to slow down as he nears the target. This eliminates: the danger of over-running. A complete ImN visibility attack is followed through and explained, including how the fighter is vectored out,

MN·IQ06h FIGHr.ER DIRECTION SERIES

tt Pr, nd pIes of Interception"

SOUND; 2.6 MINUTES

Intended Ear pilots and fighter director officers, this motion picture presents tactical factors to consider in vectoring out planes, planning raids, and directing fighters in interception. In addition, it explains the following procedures: don't let any bogey come through unopposed; vector planes OUt early in general direction of bogey, but keep them within communications range; consider fuel and always have some planes on hand for emergency; keep lighters between the bogey and the base; take

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advantage of WI clouds and surpri e;

maintain an altitude advantage with the main body of fighters above the bogey; obtain all data available about the raid; zet information from pilots when they siahr the bogey; in case of

pJit raids, vector out stand-bys.

l\IlN'1006i FIGHTER DIRECTION SERIES

"Typical Interceptions-The StrQight-in Attack"

sou D MOTlO PICTURE; 5 MlI'JUTES

A r pi al interception i demonstrated b animation in this film which analyzes tactical maneuvers for straight-in attack interception. It also explains these procedures: get fighters out in a hurry; direct them to a course paralleling that 'of the bogey; try to keep the fighters lip un; keep them informed of everything that goes on; watch the time factors and bring them in to the most favorable position for attack. Intended for pilots and fighter direc-

tor officers,

MN -L006j FIGHTER DIRECTION SERU:S UTypical Interceptions-The Crossing and Dog-Leg Attack"

SOUND MOTION PICTORE; 7 M1NUTES

Fighter direction interceptions of crossing and dog-leg attacks are analyzed in this film. It also examines procedures in downing an enemy scout: use cloud cover and sun for surprise; lead the target and use sharp, bold commands to cut down communication transmissions: anticipate position and compensate accordingly; in fades, when contact with the enemy is 10 t, keep fighters on course in direction where bogey may be, as indicated by dead reckoning; have them orbit until the b gey comes OUt of the fade in eros ing: in early dog-leg attack, vector fighters on new our e away from the base, then bring in ahead of the beam of the target for the kill; in late dog-leg attack. e tor lighters in toward the base. This film is designed for pilots and fighter d1.1' ctor a fficers,

M -2104' CA HODE RAY TUBE

"The Cathode Ray Tube in Airborne Radar" DUND >lOTION PICTURE; 24 MIN UTES

The theory of th cathode ray tube is analyzed by m.ean of animation. The film discusses nomenclature, studies the rcla-

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tion between antenna and the appearance of cope parte ns, and examine the types of installatio and their use in planes.

ERIE OF SLmE TIL t5 ON IFF MAINTENANCE

(ABK) , PERFORMANCE CHECKS AND ALIGN!'.iENTS Individual Numbers and titles are as follows:

SN-3472a S -3472b -3472C

-3472d

-34'72e

SN-3472f SN-3472g SN-3472h

Introduction

The Bench e r quipment CaJibrating the Test Equipment Performance Ch cks-Part I Performance hecks--Part 11 Performance Checks-Part III Adjusting the oltage Regulator Tuning the AGS and Quench Oscillator

Trimming the Tank Circuit Pre-Flight Checks

SN-3472i SN-3472j

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NAVY No. 230 T1-aining .Aids Lib,'ary, NOB Navy No. 230

c/o F.P.O., San Francisco, Calif.

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•

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Trai'ling ids ection

APA Pre·Commissioning chool U. S. taua! Statiofl

eante 99. Washington

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CONFIDENTIAL 19

us

TJ!e RPD. WM placed at selected points on this ten-am model of Southern FranctJ ana 1>P/ :p. red-iction. p.hOI.Orap,1S 'Were made tnT

InlHlmg cra.f/ I'IppTOaC OOI.lTSel. /

French

, ,

InOaSIOn

Because f th a isfa tory re ults obtained with the Radar Planning Devi e in the in a ion of Southern ranee Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt has recommended that the RPD process be on idered planning staffs in other theaters for future operations.

The article, "PPI Pictures Call Be Predicted," in the AUO"L1 t 1944 i ue of "C.I. ." described the RPD and its u es. in e then improvement have been made b Special Devices. some 0 re en that they wer not a ailable for the outhern operation.

Chi f u e made f the RP in uthern Franc was to aid landing craft in navigating to a igned points on the in asion bea h. It wa al 0 u ed to help determine the best positions for radar guard ships.

HOW THIS WAS DONE

bla It an i white terrain m d I wa u-

ta led for rh area e «ending fony miles inland om the coast and reach ina Ir m the Italian border to Iar eilles, It was built at a cale of

with a erti al exaggeration at twa t 0_0 . Over L appwa h p ition were photograph d overing m re than ten po sible approach.

ourses,

The RPD wa placed on thi terrain model at points approximately 3000 yard apart on the selected approach courses (5000 yard intervals would not be excessive). and PPI predi tion photograph mad £01- these points. 0 the fini h d photograph were then added the following data: I. Th point offshore (together 'i ith ranee and oordinates) for whi h the pho ograph was prepared; 2. he shoreline: 3. line indicating the approach course to he bea I; 4. A navigation grid; and 5. A scale for calibrating the range circles on the PPI scope to the scale of the predi tion photograph. A chart showing the shor line, arid. approach curse, and points photographed on each course was ziwen the na igator with each set of photograph.

Sev nteen of the eigl teen CC taking par in the invas ion v er upplied with et of photograph for use wi th their SO radar. The L Cs fun tioned a leaders for the assault wa es, relief and position check for primary reference vessels, traffic COL1U'01 boats, leaders for minesweepers, and guides for liberty ships. Accurate station was maintained by isual and radar fixes, the latter beinz obtained from the RPD predi tion photograph.

APPROACHING THE INVASION COAST

The prediction photograph were u ed uccessively during the approach. fa h photograph in nun, according to the ship's position, wa refle ted onto the face of the PPI cope. This enabl d the radar perator to compare the actual radar ignal with the prediction and thu to tabli h hi ship' a tual position. The irtual PPI Refle t p,' hid, utilizes two mirror. was used to pro] t th RPD ph t onto til PPI.

he 1 lavizational Microfilm Project r v auld erve the same purpose with micropositives oE the RPD photos.

The navigational req uirementwas to guide the landing craft from the rraru port area. approximat ly L n mil ffshore, to designated points on the a auli beach. The degree of accurac desired allowed an error of tr hundred yards t (he right r) ft f the a signed landing point and plus r minu one minute ariation Ir rn the schedul d time of ~IITi< al at the bea b.

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this is

A

RPD and mmera wen! wed on terrain model at selected poi.7Tts (I this.

The resulting phDtographs IODked lik« B -lhis. EOect of "beam s pread" htl.S been added.

shadow depths reoealed best positions for radar guard ships

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CONFIDENTIAL

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redfction photographs were prepared

HOW RADAR GUARD SHIPS WERE STATIONED

In selecting positions lor the radar guard ship, the object wa to pick locations which would afford the most complete radar coverage for the assault beadles and cover the most probable direction of enemy air attack. This coveraze was estimated by a careful study of many possible po itions, The radar hadow was imulated n the model with the vas ion Indicator pin and the

D and shadow depth measured at more than a critical points for each contemplated position of a radar guard hip. The results were recorded

C Control photog1'opl7 of the "Pf!roacll wale1'S luhich U/(lj used !o determine the scale of the prediction pholograpllS.

all. a ontour map f the area Ear ea h of the gmud ship location chosen, indicatinz the 0 erage ea h radar guard ship might anticipate.

Re u I t obtain d in thi operation and Admiral Hewitt' re ommendation .indicat that the RPD offers effective and reliable aid Ior other amphibious operations, The new RPD Instruction Book (CO AVAER 30.16oR-28) has been completed by

pecial Devices. It describes the uses of the RPD and over the latest improvements. se of the RPD a an aid [ navigation i covered in a

eparat pecial Devi es Bulletin (D -8). Both

ma be obtain d b a reque t to the Bureau of eronautics, ttention Special Devi e Divi ion.

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course photographs used by the lCCs

This grid ot the appmach uiaters 'Was added to the prediction photogmphs for their '1,.lse as VPR navigational charts. The number indicate the

equence of pholograt,hs 101' one appmuch COtt1·se.

A set of photographs was supplied each Lee tor the assigned approach course. The radar operator checked his position continuously by comparing the radarsignals orl, his PPI with these PPI prerti tions. When these photograph moe viewed in sequence, they simulate the signals appea.1·ing Oilthe PPI scope as the vessel alJ1JToached the beach,

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successful VG

The \lG erie Projection PPI op rate b means of an optical system which project the rada pattern onto a 24 inch viewing screen. The image or picture is a magenta olor on a white background, which may be "Era ed' by the controlled applicati n of heat and Light, diffu ion. r both. The time to "Erase" an be controlled, but the outstanding limitation of the G Proje tion PPI j the time required to "Erase" on "Fast Erase."

hat is, controlljng the shortest Jengtb of time that each picture remains visibl on the creen. The higb per istency characteristic of the VG win make ~t difficult to di criminate between target operating lose together, but on th oth r hand. this characteristic wiU make it possible to differentiate between stationary and moving targets by the appearance of "trails" foJ]owing the actual target ignal.

The secret of succe Iul operation of the

a observed by this school is the realization of difference between this type of PPI and other types. There is a technique which must be per-

ected for best operation of this type of unit. hi

technique involves the optimum adjustment of the V~deo Gain Control and the Cathode Ray Tube Bia control. The proper combination of the e controls can only be attained t1uol.1gh tests, sine they may vary slightly for each individua equipment.

Tests conducted by this school indicate that

ranae and bearing di crimioati n of the is

or as good as associated G-I Radar, . ing three

P boa a targets and condu ting te t t

a certain ra.ng and bearing discrimination the follm ing figures were obtained:

(, VG Di crimination in range-350 yard . 1-

200 yards.

(2) G Discrimination in bearing 51120; G· 1-4°,

(These figures were obtained using the 10 mil

range cale.) Ba d.on th tests with SG-I radar,

this school concludes:

(L) That the G RPP will n t oi e as ear a picture as other types of RPPI' .

(2) That the higher screen per ist ncy could affect the u e.

(3) hat operating personnel should be drilled thorougbl to develop proper operating te hnique most efficient operation.

he e .per ience of this chool indicates that s ft pencil on frosted 171a , or paper overla gives the most readable plot,

,

operatIon.

This is a report by the J aual Train£ng lchool (Tactical Radar), Hollywood, Florida, on experience tuith. the VG Projection PPI since its instailalion at the school on r s Septembel' I944· Due to Umitecl shorebaseti operational facilities, the conclusions drawn here as to perfm-mance, operalion, and tactical-use are based more upon analytical observation than upon operational experience_

POSSIBLE TACTICAL USES

he l1S~ of the 24 in h \ Projection PPI a a

plotting urface for the relativ movement plots ~U"'.LLL'''''· ned in Cl'C will increase the efficienc and of th e plots if the equipment i u ed with intelligence and discretion. It should be used a atl aid in plotting, and in conjunction with other RPPI's to brain a clear pic ure of ·the

urrounding area. he con rant "map in motion'

pi ture of the radar ,veep which it pre ents offers man ad antaze in the oluti n of the surface problem in Cl , The out tanding advantages that the G plot has over relative movement plot Iormerl u ed in erc are the elimination of the "dead time" factor that Iormerl existed between the radar operator and plotter, and the abilit of the V to display constantly and accurately all target detected by the radar,

(a) Use of the VG as a summary plot: The summary plot in IC is a relati e movement plot on whi h i displa ed the relative mo ement of all urface contacts within tactical range Ear the primar purpo e oE identification. In addition to thi , it rnu t also di pIa a pi lure oE one's own disposition on a scale that is expanded enough to enable the plot to be u ed for tatiou keeping as well as identification.

leG range scale should be set so that the plot will ontain all targets within effective ranze of the ship maintaining the plot.

The twent -mile range ale will covet the

effective ranze of large type hip directly and the scale is ufficiently expanded to maintain a dispo-

itionplot for tation keeping as well as identification. arget appearing at ranges greater than twent mile an be pl tted on the outer edge of the plot on the correct bearing, while thecorrect range can be written next to the symbol in mile. On mall type ship the ten mile range scale will

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co er the effective range of the ship maintaining the plot, and a method similar to that used on large type ship plots an be u ed for indicatinz targets at ranges greater than ten miles.

The polar coordinate plotting surface should b u ed as the viewing screen for the VG wben it is being used as a summary plot. In this way the plot can be maintained in the conventional manner u ing the radar presentation as the source of in. formation from which the plot i maintained. If this y tern were u, ed, a ca ualt to the VG would not mean that the ummary plot information i lost. Furthermore, the ummar plot must contain information from source other than radar.

(b) Use of VG in the Torpedo Problem: he

torpedo dire tor will be the primary means of solving the torpedo problem using the information gained from CIC. During the approach phase before fir ill g, the director trainer will want to check the designated tarzet and the target bearing indicators. be VG can be of assistance in this. In addition, eIe should be prepared with a standby solution in ca e of a ca ualty to the director and as a check on the director solution it elf. This base torpedo cour e can be solved with the late t possible information on the VG, removing many plotting errors and dead time in transferring the plot to a maneuvering board or interrupting the DR plot. be DRT will be engaged in determining course and speed of the target.

The V present a di play of "own ship" and "target" on a relative plot that i always up-to-theminute and tree from rror in plo ting. The evaluator thus has in taruaneous display b con-

tant weeping, thus as uring better identification.

hi relative plot is a beginning in the solution for approach course or ba e torpedo course in the destroyer torpedo problem, 0 complete the 501ution, a ve tor diazram mu t be constructed usinz the curses and peeds involved. The vector diazram will be sol ed 011 the arne plo and thi " utomatically introduce the afety factor of 10 ating friendly forces within the thirt degr e afet arc for torpedo fire.

In order to gain the maximum ad anlage from the continuous presentation, the vector solution must be made di ectly on theglas viewing screen (or paper overlay), for to solve the vector diagram on a eparate maneuvering board would sacrifice the advantage of the VG's instantaneous dis play,

EXAMPLE OF APPROACH FOR TORPEDO FIRE

Figur 1 hows the so' n of the V with several minutes f the target' tra el plotted thereon.

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The target's cour e and speed .have been d termined on the DRT to be 320"-20 knots.

At twenty one minutes, plotting time, it is decided to follow an approach course at 3.~ knots to a position 5000 yards, 30" on the target's starboard bow. If the approach is to be to 030" (R), and

target is on cour 320", wn ship must

3500 (T) fro he target aft r the approach. Or

the tarzet must bear the reciprocal of that figure 1700 ( ) hom own hip. Point "C" in Figur 2 shows this desired po ition of the target as it would be spotted in on the VG, 170" (T), 5000 yard from own hip. To accomplish this maneuver, the relative movement line of the target, formerly' direction "All" on the VG., mu t be bent to become "BC."

o bend the relative movement line of the target to direction "BC" our own course mu he altered. while in rea ing peed. to 33 kno • to make the relative motion of the target with re peci to our own ship parallel to "BC" and in the dire - tion from "B" to "C." Thi elution, made directly on the VG .is shown in Figure 3. Our own ship most use course 277" for its approach to the desired position. This elution is facilitated by the calibrated ground ala. viewing creen whi h is etched with bearing line and ranze ircles.

A con tant heck upon the progress of the approach is antomati all provided; if the target does not plot exactl along "B ," the desired point on the target' bow will not be reached. In u h. a , appropriate small orrection to the curse may be ea 11y estimated by eye from th VG screen.

The solution of base torpedo course may be madem much the arne manner as shown by the above example. In this type of problem, the continuou ly current pre entation Riven on the V ~ viewing screen is in aluable, This relativ plot i alwa a picture of the ituarion na<v not at om

hort but indeterminate time ago. To make th 010 t of this advantaze, th base torpedo curse a

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

figured in CIC hould be olved dire tly on the VG alibrated creen,

EXAMPLE OF TORPEDO FIRE

igure 4 show the position of the target (at C) the screen of the VG, at the instant it is decided launch a alvo or 37·_knot torpedoes.

The cour e and peed of the target, previously determined, has been plotted and kept corrected to the latest olution (target-e). Anticipating the firing of intermediate speed torpedoes, the 37-knot speed circle has been lightly sketched in, on th.e sector of probable fire.

To determine the base torpedo course, it is necessary, at the instant of decision to fire, only to lay the arm of the parallel motion protractor through the po ition of own hip at the center and the po ition of the target at C, lock this bearing into the protra tor, and move the arm to the head of the target' cour e and peed vector. The base torpedo course is read at the intersection of- the arm. with the previously-drawn 37-knot speed cir le.

quick and safe retirement course can be ascertained immediately, first by eye and then by vector diagram with thi complete view of the disposition.

(c) Use of VG in Anti-Submasine Attack (See also" ew track Plotter Put Finger on ub ," in this issue.): The VG- can be u eel to aid Ie in carrying out coordinat d and reeping attack on

ubmerzed submarines as a secondar plot. The DRT hould remain as the primary plot.

The oordinated attack con ists of an attacking ship making a normal attack on a :ubmerged ubmarine while in company with one or more ships. ,'\Then the a tacking ship begins a run on a submarine one assi ring ship shall echo range on the submarine, sending to the attacking. hip bearing· and range, and e timation or course. peed. and

u ex b oi e radio. Afrer each alta k th tie of the two hip are exchan ed re ulting in a rapid erie of atta ks, Other bip not engaged

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shall make a box earch around the area, keeping clear of the attacking ship. The reeping attack is designed for attack on submarines estimated to be deeper than 400 feet. In this type oE attack the assisting ship will maintain sound contact with the

ubmarine and direct the attacking ship over the submarine by the combination of sound and radar information. large pattern is dropped by the attackin hip on the orders tram the a i ting ship a a low peed. The attack-ing hip d es not echo range during this type of attack. (ee F P 223.)

The smallest scale on the VG should be used (4 mile scale, or approximately 640 yards pel' inch). By plotting continuous positions of the

ubmarine on the VG while (he attacking ship is shown on the screen, a continuous relative plot is available remo ing a percentage of plotting errors and orne dead time in receiving information. This plot, however, will have value only to display the relati e position of the atta king hip and submarine at any time. curses and peeds will be difficult to olve accurately on thi plot because of own ship's movement. The curse and speed of the submarine will be solved on the DR T.

The DR T should be used as the primary plot for the assisting hip to conn the attacking ship in a creeping attack. The VG plot will he valuable for the evaluator to get informati n as to the relative po itions of the attacking hip and ubmarine without interrupting the rapid plotting on the DRT. In addition, in case of: a casualty to the DRT, th attack can be carried on from the VG

cope.

The principal limitations in the u e of the VG in an anti-submarine attaek are:

( I) The smalle t sea le «1: mile, or approximately G40 yard per inch) i too large when it is neecssar to work in ranges less than 2000 yards.

(.2) At pre ent, accurate plotting is not feasible because of the lack. of a plotting surface with adeq Uri t bearing lines and range markers.

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(d) Boat Wave 'Tracking: 13 u e of the VG the task of boat wave tracking aboard A's engaged in amphibious operations can be greatl simplifi d.

The 10 mile range seal gi e the best pres utation for boat wave tracking. This scale is ufficiently expanded to give a clear presentation of the boats as they approach the line of departure and it co ers enough area to enable a picture of the beach itself to be presented on the viewing screen.

(e) hore Bombardment: During shore bombardment the use of the VG can pro e a valuable aid to navigation. By u ing a transparent chart or grid of the area drawn to the scale of the VG as an overlay, it is possible to determine the navig-ational position of the ship on the overlay dire tly. With prearranged targets plotted Ott the overlay, the range and bearing to the target can be taken dire tlyand immediately for gunnery plot. Here it hould be noted that ranges and bearings to a t<:"lTg~t on land may be taken directly without first obtaining a navigational "fix." The most expanded cale possible should be used for this work. Either the 4 mile cale or ,10 mile scale will normally be used depending upon how close to the beach the bombarding hip is operating.

NOTES ON INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE

(a) Optical Focusing .

(I) The optical' focusing was found to be a difficult phase of the installation. Experience now indicate that qO.nsiderable practice on the part of the technician is necessary to accomplish good 're-

ults. he following points should be observed:

(A) Centering ring must be carefully oriented in its mounting. This may be accomplished by visual inspection as adjustments are. made.

(B) Angular adjustment ring should be set so that the ·C~.T neck is parallel with adjacent horizon tal urfaces.

(C) When items A and B are accomplished. final adjustments may be performed by adhering to the pro edure prescribed by instruction book. (D) CRT Bias and Video Gain Controls should not be .advanced from the zero position until pre-

Iiminary focusing i entirel ac omplished. will PI' teet again t burning center spot on en itized surface in off-center 10 a i011.

(E) Cathode Ray ube changing drill is €s ential. All technician concerned with the VG equipment maintenance hould go through the tube changing and focusing procedure during the installation period in order to cut down the time necessary later under operating conditions. For technicians with no previou experience on this equipment a minimum of one or two days time wa found neces ary to chang the CRT and re-

focu the optical system. .

elf) Extreme caution hould be exercised during installation to assure that all optical surfaces are kept free of finger marks and dust. The surfaces are not easily cleaned once they have become dirty. During the course of the work, side panels

hould be kept .secured in place a much as ibl . It would be helpful if more care is e erci

at the factory in thi respect. Units as received how considerable dust on plane mirror urfa e and finger prints on len units.

( b) lVfainlenunce

(I) Voltage Rezularion

(A) Power supply of- liS V + 10 percent is

pecified for this eq ui pment. OUT experience in: dicates tbat a greater fluctuation results in serious impairment in operational chara ·tcristi· 'We ob er e:

I'. Shift in centering.

2'. Change in weep length. 3'. Change in intensity.

(2) Servo-Amplifier Operation.

(A) Initial and operational adjustments are dif ficult to make and maintain. Considerable expe rience on the part of the technician is necessary if

on istent performance is to be maintained. (B) Lack of cone t adju tment results in; I'. Hunting.

2'. weep doe not follow rna te PPI at different speeds.

previous aTticle on the PG, "Map.in.Moliotl PPI.RepeateT:' aP.peared in the 25 October '944 iS$1Ie of "C.I.C."

GIC CIC CIC CIC GIG CIG GIG GIC GIC CIG CIG GIG GIG CIC CIC CIC CIC CIC cic ere CIG CIC

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CONFIDENTIAL

ttacJ< plotter helps put the finger on subs ...

Th.e submarines of Genru. any an~ Japan continue to threaten our extended hue of supply to Europe, the Mediterranean, India and to the Western Pacific. Although we have countered their attacks most successfully, they will continue to develop and employ new tactics to ink our ships and, at the arne time, evade our ever-watchful protective ships, planes, and harbor defenses.

Destroyer escorts and other anti-submarine craft -who at times are but part of a team of ships and es=have the job of protecting our transports cargo ships and destroying the undersea rnaof the enemy. Aboard these ships information on the movements of the enemy rnu t be fast and accurate.

A new "electronic 'DR T"-a tube on which appears the movements of own ship and enemyfurnishes a "play-by-play" picture and makes the attack more deadly. This valuable addition to the

lL.lJJ'CUU> of Anti-Submarine Warfare is called Anti-Submarine Attack Plotter.

GIVES VISUAL TRACK

OF OWN AND ENEMY SHIP

Essentially the Attack Plotter i a large catho~e ray tube on which navigational plots of both ship and target are automatically developed during a attack on a submarine.

One part of the Attack Plotter is connected with

the Dead Reckoning Analyzer and activates a bright spot on the cathode ray scope 0 that this spot moves on the scope in a manner which describe the hip' motion. The other part of the

tta k PI tter i onnected with the ship's sonar gear. TIll part moves the brizht sp t 0 as t? describe the path of the sonar beam and the POSltion of the submarine at the end of this beam. The Plotter thus makes a ailable a complete picture of the entire attack as the attack develops.

The Plotter offers on its scope a plot containing the follow in 0- elements:

1. our e of own hip,

2. Path of each sound pulse.

Position 0 underwater target when each ound i made. As successive target positions appear the cours of the targe be orne apparent.

TRACKl G ON THE ATTACK PLOTTER Mounted Ilori.zontally, the ~2·.inch scope is. view.ed through a glass cover. Tile plot loS In true bean"g W'llz Scutt: on the side of the screen toward the opt!"fCltor.

Gope pr&ent..l ,?ove,!,en~ 0/ own ship amt that, 01 target shi·p. As the (inng lime IS app.,-oached the beanng o( the Genler 01 the [orurard. throwlfT patten! ClJn be predlded.

OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS

Interpreting the scope effectively invol es compensating for the following operational limitations:

I. A cluster of echoes is shown on the scope, which requires proper interpretation. Considerably simplifying this visual cluster is a new device, the Bearing Deviation Indicator.

2. The Plotter does not in itself calculate necessary attack information regarding courses and speeds for closing on target. Courses for attack are usually re ommended by the onar officer using other attack aid in addition to the Attack Plotter. He recommends these course to the Conninz Officer who is usually on the bridge.

HEDGEHOG AND MOUSETRAP TACTICS USUALLY EMPLOYED

The Plotter aids the conning of the ship in making Hedgehog, Mousetrap type attacks, and in making depth charge attacks. In the Hedgehog attack contact-type projectiles areiired ahead about 200 ards, A pattern of 24 charges is usuall thrown. The Mousetrap attack i ornewhat

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This cathode ray tube makes the Jlttilcli. Plotter arl "electro'nic D.[t:r." It depir;t.s own ship's motion through (I hoolL'lLp with the Deild Reckoning A nalyzer. II depicls submnrine targets t1nough a haoh.up mith the s01lar gear.

imilar in that the projectile are of the conta tt pe and ar "ahead throv n." The charges. however, are s If-propelled and can i t of from eight to sixteen charges in a pattern.

Advantages of both be Hedgehog and the Mousetrap xype attacks lies essentially in 'being able to launch an alta It while till in contact, or shortly after losing contact, with a tarzet. Another ad antage i the emplo rnent or contact-type PJ~Oje tiles in these attacks which do not create waterturbul 11 e unless the target i hit. When depth

barge are thrown th resulting turbulence of the water frequently cause 10 s of onar contact and con equem e cape of the enemy craft.

THE "CREEPING" ATTACK

The Plotter is valuable ill making an effective "creeping" attack. Thi type attack is u ed usuall when a submarine i vel" deep and an atta k b a ingle ship i ineffective. In this two hip team up, one using its Plotter La con ia HF the attacking hip over the proper spot to drop depth

harae . new impro ement which introduce

the "spot" of another urfac hip on the Plotter makes the plot of such a .ocrdinated attack almost fully automatic. This additional attachment is called the Remote Transmitter £01' the ttack Plotter Mark I Iod. 2.

On making a sonar con tact and preparing for a po sible atta k a transpar nt h et f paper is usually placed OVeI; the c pe and a pencil plot is tar ted. I owever, a grea e pencil or a fountain pen with quick-drying ink may be used to plot

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directly on the scope. In either ca e a trace attar k i made and a plot is available by whic anal' contact can be more easil regained in ca it i lost during the attack.

There are control on the Plotter that enable the ship's spot, and hence the target spo~, to be shifted at will to any other part of the scope. his feature preclude the plot running off the scope.

BEARING DEVIATION INDICATOR SIMPLIFIES PLOT

on iderable practi e i required to interpret effectively the plot on the scope cover plate. The Bearing Deviation Indicator referred to earlier (and known as Dr), implifie the plot considerably. It essentially is an attachment to the onar stack which enables the sonar operator to obtain reliable center bearing of the target with little or no sweeping of the target.

a t minute maneuvers of a ubmarine tracked may be detect d qui kly 'when u ing the Plotter. Thus. the corre t train for the forward thrower can be corrected quick) ,to nullr e a ive tactics.

No matter what type attack is chosen, when the Plotter is working and manned there is no delay in bringing together on the' scope nearly all the information available from the Dead Reckonin

. nal zer, the gyro campa , and the sonar gear. Th pl t develops irnmediatel with each "ping" and echo and the accuTacy of the information may be evaluated continuall .

Additional information about the Anti- ubmatine ttack Plotter can be obtained from the 01'(1- fiance Pamphlet o. I TOt.

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1 The Attack Plotter shmu .mbmo.rine movement:

After the Sllbm.aritH~ has been picked up by sOtlar gear, the Attack Plotter will generate a plol which shams th« slIbmarine's mOllemenl _ Illustration typifies actllal conditions,

2 Tfhllt happens on tile Plotter's scope. The ship, ;!ulimarine, and paths of so.md ./JlJVC; (Ill appear as spills or tmca 0/ light.

3 Earl)' stage Of a typical Ill/lick: fl. 'hat .11Ie scope looks like during the early stagey of 011 ntiaa«, ElIottgh of II plot lias bee" developed to giue an imlicatiotl Of the target's course. The plot hefps the sOllar operator "egain a 10$1 contnct and, when tne target' courJoe is detffrmil1Ccj., it ctm /.Ie used to aid in t:01l11i1ig the ship.

4 Later st~ge of IY1)icaI ~11l/c1<: The plot 15 of the attack as tile ship apP"oaches firing rr;,nge. lllustra-

typifies ideall%lld COllditit;ms. Bright line pointing 01 OWt1 sllip's position is the prediclM line. In this illustmtion its length is set to equ(ll the forward throwing range. Its bearing may be 1m·tied to help determine the proper bearing for the fan liard thrower. The front end 0/ the /inc IlPlttoximates where the center of the forward UI?'OiVtI' paJterll may be plaeed. The actual firing is done, tunucuer, from the range recorder, since the nctua! firi"g rll1lge rmrles wil,h tire r(lnge rate.

5· Typical second approach to target: lllustration /JOrtrays continI/oliO'll of ship's tOllr$e lifter the first attack, under idealized conditlans. Because /1,1) (fist 01J. seroea Position of the wbmllr;ne remains visible the most likel" position to rega;" onar contuet CQIl be estimated from the 1J/OI 071 the screen, I,. order to avoid ranging through lila/Ie lhe proper maneuver 10 stnri th« ccond "pjJl'onch is J'eadi~~' appaHml.

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U. . NAP RADAR TRAIN! G CHOOL

N orbing becomes so irksome to a ship's captain as that word .. , ait" booming out of his 20 M.C., especially after an all night session on a windy bridge.

A "vllait Eliminator" system for eIe which expand the function of the summary pl t can. help delete the words "wait" and "stand-by" from the watch officer's vocabulary.

You've read the well-known sentence in the Watch Officers' Guide, " ... The most important faculty to be cultivated by the officer of the deck is fhat of forehandedness." This faculty is no less important in the Cl.C Watch Officer, in-anticipating the questions the bridge will ask about

urface contacts and then beating them to the punch. We believe the following check-oft list will satisfy 75% of the bridges 75% oE the time:

1. Location. Range and bearing at Tegular intervals.

2. Designation. What we are calling it,-A. E, C, etc.

3. What it appears to be. Operator's opinion plus Watch Officer's evaluation.

4. IFF Code. Whether or not it appears friendly.

5. Point and time of closest approach. Preliminary estimate after a few plots followed by more accurate figures.

6. True course and speed. Preliminary estimate after a few plots followed by 1,110re accurate figures.

7. When it starts to open. S. When it fades.

Give all this dope to' your bridge all all contacts whether or not they a k for it. A good surface ummary plot wil1 enable you not only to do thi but to answer spa question without resort to the eternal "·wait."

REQUIREMENTS OF THE PLOT

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et us look at a few of the requirements of a good surface summary. Fir t of all, it must be plainly visible to th watch officer (FDO or Evaluator at GQ) at all time a that he can watch th picture unfold before him with ut having to run over to the plot and look over sorneone's shoulder.

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be vertical plot is ideal when it is n t u ed for

ir. A horizontal plot is al a ati factory, pro ided the" at h Offi er can easily ee it at all times. and has the advantage that a ship's head indicator connected to the ship's gyro can be installed in the center of it.

The scale chosen for the surface summary must be such that the entire surface picture an be displayed upon it and easi1y seen. ing a standard P' lar oordinate chart, with eight two-inch range

ircle and cale of 5000 ards per circle giving

a total rang of 40,000 ards, has been found ideal for most ituations. he use of a larger ale for keeping tra k of YOUT own for 'will be eli cussed below. .T~o e ships having 8M or P radars capable of picking up surface targets at go or 40 miles can. plot them on their main or aircraft summary until they close to 20 miles.

It is recommended that plotting be done in grease pencil on a plex.iglass or lu ite urface. Beside being easily seen, thi type of pl t ha the ad ~ntag~ that old ~acks an be era ed when they bepn to Interfere with the current picture. Some

hips have arrangements for photographing the pI t whenever any of it is to be erased.

PLOTTING PROCEDURE

Mention hould be made here of the importance of a good surface summary plotter. He is the watch officer's umber One a si tanto at only must he make a neat, lear plot, but he must control the urfa e radar in uch a manner as to get all Dec ary .infor:matlon in a form and a a peed that can be intelligently plotted. Full utilization of your ummary plot depends lar ely on how well you have trained your summary plotter.

Figure at left shows a typical urface summary plot. Note its "wait eliminating" characteristics. In setting it up we have markedthe scale plainly along the 000 ogo, J 0, and 270 baring to help the watch offi er in e timating range. We have also indicated ur ba e course and speed to aid him in making such reports as "Raid Able is crossing OUT bow" or "Raid ble will pa s off our starboard quarter", etc. Finally, we have indicated the true bearing from which the relative wind is blowing so as to valuate possible rain iqualls picked up on our surface reader.

In figure a t left, Raid A has been on the creen for three minute. he watch officer has gi en the bridge the initial bearing and range and one or twO additional position report . he e were read directly from theplo and are of sufficient ac urac

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for the bridge. Figuring of coure and speeds and maneuvering problems are done in ClC.

he operator has tared that the raid appear to be one ship and judging from the range at which it was picked up, the ummaTY plotter has decided it is a large one and has so indicated on the plot. The raid has been checked for IFF and since none is showing, this is indicated on the plot and the. watch officer passes both items of information on to the bridge.

After the first few plots the summary plotter has projectedrhe raid along its direction of relative motion and estimated that its point of closest approach will be at 045 degrees-ag.ooo yards. Using a pencil or his fingers as a Tough measuring device he ha used the relati e distance travelled in three minutes to e timate that the raid will be there at 0221. This point and time are indicated on the plot and the bridge is informed.

In the meantime, the DR T has a preliminary estimate of the true course and speed of the .raid of 316 degrees and 27 knots. The DRT plotter instead of yelling this out into the room and thereby increasing the noise level, puts it over the radar reporting phone cir-

uit to the summary plotter who indicates it beside the plot. The watch officer then gives this information to the bridge.

" e ee that most of th es entia I Information de ired b the bridge ha already been gi en them and that carcely a word has been spoken within the CIe. he entire picture has unfolded before the watch officer, and he has read it off the summary plot to the bridge, evaluating and checking as he did so .. "Wait" and also noise have been eliminated.

ow let us look at figure ). Raid "AU is nearing it point of closest appr ach which has been revised to 050 degree 20,000 yards. The DRT has al 0 revised the our e and speed to 320-25 knots and thi has been checked with the maneuvering board. In a few minutes Raid A will start to open and the watch offi er will inform the bridze of this and that it how IFF C. de L The ummary plotter has made ure that ea h bit of nev information was seen by the watch officer as it appeared on hi plot.

Raid B has now appeared on the screen and imilar information about it is unfolding on the summary plot. The watch officer notes that whereas Raid A is passing u to port, Raid B i being overtaken and will pass to starboard.

At 2010, the captain nt ut one of OUr es orting de tr ver ( BS call Mike) on 056 30 to ontact Raid A. H 11a ju t a ked how far Mike i hom Raid A and the watch officer ha an wered about 13,000 ards. This i an e tima made bee dire tl from a zlance at the summary plot. It is accurate enough. and there has been no "wait." The captain is now asking for range and bearing of Raid A, Raid B, and Mike, which will all be given to him immediately without bothering the operatOr or plotters. Any more que tions, Captain?

I, au have an idea hov cl ar a picture the urfa e ummary can O'iv ·you. he more conta l ou have, the better it i a this i one plot vhich will not break down or become confused. To tat as some do that its primary purpos is one of identification i on] a Half truth. It primal' purpose is to giv Y II 'a ornplete picture of what's g 1110' all.

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There i no substirnt for our ur ace summar. 11 DR Twill gi v rou neither range and bearing nor point of do est approach at a glance: a tatus board or record d plots will give you Iittle e cept ranges and bearing, and in a confused situation, nor even that. Metal boards with magnetised metallic ships will give you position but nOL track, which is just as important.

FOR STATION KEEPING

A surface summary plot et up on a cale 0 1000 yards per circle gi ing a total range f 000 yard, is ideal for keeping track of our own disposi lion, especially during complicated maneuve s in low visibility. In order to economize on plotters and plotting tables and to have all surface information at one SOUTce, it has been found advantageous to put thi plot on the arne board with the regular

urfa e summary described above. Any confusion a to cales can be overcome b u 'ing sharply co - trastinz cot 1"5 for the two cales and a little Ind • trination of personnel.

In etting up such a plot, we first plot the proper station of each ship, with ourselves at the center, Fleet center is so indicated, as is the fleet guide. Alongside each ship is its name, TBS call, or number, depending upon how you refer to it in talkinz to the bridge.

Actual plots on the different hi! should fall very close to these stations. If an do not, inform your bridge, When steaminz alonz a given ba e course with no particular maneuvers in progress except a possible zig-zag plan, only the last plot on each ship need be shown, Old plots are erased as new ones appear. When on a straight course, plots will probably be made infrequently, although operators should be 011 the watch for ships getting off station; when Zig-zagging, it's a good idea to check nearby ships a minute or two after each

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zig-zag turn to make ure none ha e made a wrong turn.

plot uch a this become' rna t valuable during omplicated maneu ers. B fore the start of a maneuver, the new station of each hip is plotted and then each ship is tracked from its old to its new station. In this manner, we know where each ship is, what progress it is making toward its new station, when it will get there etc. Any questions from the bridge can be quickly answered, and wait i eliminated.

In figure 2, we are a CVE s reened by three DE' on rations 13295, 200 , and 306S. "' e 11a e just .hanged course and axis from, _l Iota 150, late LhaL ech is practically on tation, Pit is crossing our bow and we have just told the bridge he seems a bit too close. Yale is overtaking us slowly on the outside of the turn.

In large forces, detailed track uch as these probably b kept nl on th guide with tho ship close en ugh to conceivably collide with u . Howev r tati n and approximate position of all

hips must be known at alJ lime.

Let us look now at figure 3. At time 45, we were 011 course and ax; 330 when ech called in with a ound contact bearins 270 degrees, 1000 yard from him. The summar plotter plotted it immediatel judging the di ranee by e e: the watch offi-

er was then able to tell the bl'idge the bearing and ,'ange from us imrnediatelv. t the arne time, the summary plotter ga e the 1 earing and range from Ll to the DR plotter and after it had been plotted 011 the DR T, the DR T plotter wa able to icale it off each. minute and call it back to the sumrnar plotter, Any time the bridge wants to know the bearing and range of the sound contact from us the watch officer can zive it to them by merely glancinU" at the summary plot. On e again, wait is elirninted. (N t that we made an emergen turn 3 at ime 4-8.)

... AS MANEUVERING BOARD

If the 1 arch officer 01' ummary plotter i trained in the modern approach to the maneuvering board, keeping his 0'\111. ship always at the enter, and if he has developed enough skill to olve problems by making a dot here and there in tead of drawing a lot of useless lines, most maneuvering board problems an be worked directl on the summary plot. If the watch offi er i good, he an zive the bridge inter eption course to clear b I .- 000 yard. etc., without a "' ait,

As an example oE the use of the surface surnmar for a maneuvering board, refer to figure 4. Raid C bas been plotted for 10 minutes and all essential information passed on to the bridge. We have also figured the true course and speed of the raid

a cour e to intercept it, as we shall explain in following paragraph .

It will be Doted that in addition to the information usually presented on the urface ummary we have placed on it a dot representing our own course and speed f 020 degrees 15 knots. Tills dot we call "s." and the dot representing the course and speed of the contact, which we are

bout to find, will be called "c.' hese letters

are used rather than the letters "g" and "rn" so as to eliminate all confusion as to who i the 50- called guide.

The peeds are on a scale of one ircle to ten knots, and the dot, along with the range cale 1, 2, 3. et " ar in a contrasting oJor to the rest 0£ the plot.

After a few plots on Raid C. we find that it is moving along its relative motion track at a speed of relative motion of 22 knots. In order to 1 care "c" we me me hom" " alone a line (which need not be drawn) parallel to the raid' direction of relative motion a di tan e equal to 22 kno n our

* PASS IT ON IN 'JC.I. C." *

38

CONFIDENTIAL

speed scale. , e pia e a dot at thi point which we all "c." We find the true cour e and speed of the contact to be a ° degrees, 24 knots.

Atalla, the Captain asks us to fi ure a 'OlU eta intercept Raid C !l'lliing a speed oE 30 knots. In term of our summuTY plot, this mean that the raid must now move straight towards the center. Using the rule that the direction of relative motion of the raid i alwa s parallel to the line (which need not be drawn) "sc" we sirnpl locate a new " ," vhi h we call "sl" on the 30 knot circle in

uch a position that "slc" is parallel to a line (which need Dot be drawn) onnecting th pre en posicion of the raid with the center of the plot. 'We find the interception course to be 054, speed 30 knots.

The following types of problems are among those which can be solved using similar methods:

1. Cour e for us, or any other hip on OUI screen to take any station including interception on' raid.

2. COUT e for raid to take any tation inel uding interception on us.

3. Effect of give.n course change by us or the raid on point and time of closest approach, i. e., predicting direction of relative motion of raid after a given maneuver.

It is believed that these verma t of the

maneuvering board problems CIC will be called upon to handle, and the ability to olve them quickly and accurately will pay big dividends. As to working them on the summary plot as we have done here, all well and good if they do not interfere with thepicture on the plot. However, remember that the summary plot is primarily a display and only secondarily a maneuvering board. If the latter function interfere with the former, mo e it to another board.

CON FIDENTIAL

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I n mid-October, the INSTILL stood so

mile off the sand of Virginia Bea 11 and threw pra tical1y every jamming ignal in the book against radar searchinz eaward from the Radar Operator' School, The pLtrp e wa a double one -to test th effi ien f the various jamming rran miner aboard the I STILL and to enable the radar operators to tr th ir hand at reading through jamming.

The results are of interest to anyone connected with, radar, and the manner E caging the exercise an be profitably adopt d I others Ear traininz operat r t work in th pre en e f jamming.

TESTING THE WEAPONS

The IN TILL. ( M 252) was equipped fOT radar search and pulse analy i and with jarnmin . transmitters apable of co ering the SA, ,SK search, and the iK III. MK rv fire control, radar band. With. this gear it was possible to jam with unmodulaied C\ . and C' modulated with variou hizh and low £r qUell Y ine wa .. ves, sq uare wave, or pure noise. In addition, ° cy Ie ine uld be up rimpo ed on an on of the

m dulating -oltag s.

he Radar Operator'S hool manned K and

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40

CONFIDENTIAL

radar all 1 2.. Octo ber I 9 4, and the hip carri d out exer ises to determine trh. .efficiency of the jamming gear. The radar receiver were left in normal condition, a that japtming signals w uld not be minimized, and, the observer at the chool reported bearinz o~~I:ag : ignal trength in E- nits, and effecri enes of jamming, On 13 October the same wa done withMK I fire control radar.

her the test was completed early in the day, opportunity was taken to determine the effe rivenes of the anti-jamming antral of the JF receiver of Madej S -2 radar. h student operator and the i 11. truer r operat d the zear. nether insrru - tor operated he anti-jamming controls of the .IF r ceiver, following the instructions given in "Instructions for the perati n of 2fPPI Radar," Nav hip 900,050. hi publicati n wa available to the students, enahlinz them to identif the jamming signal and observe the anti-jamming mea ure taken and their result .

THE SHIP "SCREENS" ITS ECHO

he. [lip found and b aan jamming the ,-2 ignal ve qui klv, The fir t signal sent was u modulated C'V. B mans of code names, til hool could call for an of th jamming signals

the ship auld end, ne at a time, and where po - sible, in combination.'ach signal wa kept on as long as the instructor desired. Communi arion was, of cour e, via an assigned radio circuit.

t wa decided to k ep the antenna pointed generally at tbe ship, and to ha e th hip remain near enough. to the .hool t ive' -5 jamming

. and to b vi ible as an echo on the A and

PPI scopes. his range was found to be about 12,000 yards. Also the ship used IFF, fK III, ode 4. Thi had two advantages, It enabled the perator to Identify the ihip' echo ea h time they cleared jh jamming iznal, th 1I proving t the

students that they were eadinz thr ugh the jamming by detecting the ource, and it howed the

rodent that jamming of one radar et does not mean th. rs operating on other frequencie are also jammed. be IFF response appeared unafIected, • t all times, as was expected,

]ammiu(T ignal were called for one at a time starting with unmodulated W. In each. ase the anti-jarnrnin control were used a uga ted in Navships goo,050. Aft r each type of ignal had been u full ountered, the presence of the learl dem n traced, an 1 the target id ntid, the anti-jamming controls wer repla ed in

their normal po iti ns, so that the jamming ignaJ

was again tronge t n the scope. • am signal was studied for it chara t Tis tics, and th.e effect of varying the receiver gain control alone noted. The bearing overage of the jamming ignal wa determined carefully by finding the limit of the signal, and the center Ot the limit bearing compared with the bearing of the target ship.

This procedure was followed n each of the jamming signals and on a few of them when combined with. 800 cycles modulation. In each case, except noise, the anti-jamming controls of the J' receiver were able to reduce the jamming ignal from E-S inten ity to a alue lower than the hip's echo pip, and functioned sub tantially as described in Navship goo 05. In all ca e the echo pip from the ship had been completely blo ked out by the jamming before anti-jamming measure were taken. In a few of the simpler ca es, such as CW, and C,l\f modulated at a high frequency, variation of the gain control alone was enough to bring back the. echo pip. The addition of the 800 cycle sine wave modulation did not add appreciable difficulty to the .IF receiver operator's job.

NOISE WAS TOO TOUGH TO READ THROUGH

No adju tment of the anti-jamming controls or the zain control. or combination of all of them could be found which would enable the operator to read through noise-modulated GW jamming. The IFF signal was used repeatedly to indicate the approximat location of the ship, but the echo itself wa never found.

In all ca e th center of the limit bearing of the jam.min iznal wa fund to azree ery well with the a tual bearin of the hip. Thi demonstrared the po~ sibilitv and technique of taking a bearinz on the ource of jamming. No attempt was made to investigate the presence of jamming signal entering the system throuzh back or side lobe.

It wa . 1'1. ti ed that a portion f the trace, [rom zero range lit t about 5000 ards, wa lear of jamming ignals, and although wiped clear of grass, it howed echoes from targets within this range. TIlls wa true for all kind of jamming. The targets "' er visible on th and PPJ s ope.

CONFIDENTIAL

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SIMILAR EXERCISES STAGED AGAIN ON 4- NOVEMBER

In general the set up was the same as that for the first exercises (12 and 13 October 1944) except that this time jamming signals were never less than E-4 in intensity, and usually E-5. Also, a?- estimate of the bearing coverage of the jamming signals was obtained, as well a information on back and side lobes and a small amount of data on the best settings of the S -2 recei er anti-jamming control. As before, the hip wa kept within 12,000 yards of the school, as till i the maximum range at which the model SA-2 installed at the

chool reliably detects her presence, and the ship used Code IV IFF, MK III to identity her echo.

On both radars, it was possible, by proper use of the receiver controls, to reduce jamming signals

ufficiently for the operator to find the ship's echo on the Ascope. The signal strength of the jamming was so great, howe er, that on the model SA-2 radar when the controls were in "normal" condition, the A-scope trace was wiped clean of all signals and grass, and greatly depressed for the first 15,000 yards. From there on out, the trace gradua~ly returned to normal and grass and jamming signals gradually grew in size. As the controls were brought into use, the trace returned to normal position and the jamming signals went to

aturation, However, as before, that region from zero to 5000 yards was free of jamming signals, and echoe from nearby targets began to appear on the trace. This situation was exactly the same as wa obtained in the tests of 12 and 13 October, when weaker jamming signals were used. Further adjustment of the controls brought back the echo of the ship itself through every type- of jamming except noise-modulated CWo Model SK radar also was able to counter every t pe of jamming except this Ia tone.

BEARING COVERAGE DIFFERED FOR SK AND SA-2

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Bearing coverage of the jamming signal was found to differ on the two models. SK was overed for 510 on the main lobe, and SA-2 for 157°. Careful investigation of a few cases showed that by finding the limits of bearing of the jamming signal and determining the half-way bearing, an operator can take a bearing on the source of jamming which is accurate 'Within a few degree ; in one instance to within one degree. Both radars picked up jamminz Si!!11alS on back. and side lobes. Th'ese ignal were reduced somewhat in inten ity (about '-3).

4-2 CONFI'DENTIAL

Darn on the etting of model A-2 recei er antral i not of sufficient e tent to indicate particu lar ettings £01' specific types of jamming, but there is evidence that the GAl and VID 0 BALAJ C· can trois are very im portallt. These two control seem to have the greatest effect on jamming signals.

SCHOOL DECLARES THIS TYPE OF TRAINING INVALUABLE

In summing up the results of these exercises, the Radar Operator chool reported, 'The demonstrations held the attention of all who observed them as firmly as any instructor could desire. The practical nature of these exercises, and their importance, were apparent to students and in-

tru tors alike, serving to enlist the energetic application of the students in the effort to through. the jamming. Furthermore, the element of competition provided in the hunt for the target through the various jamming ignals appealed to the students' sporting instinct and made them bear down when they got to the scope. This kind of training is believed to be of inestimable value, and the Radar Operators School plans to make such exercises a regular feature of the trainin program, depending on how often the INSTILL i a ailable."

Some of the special advantages of this type of training remarked on by the Radar Operators hool are:

(1.) It demonstrates dearly the technique of handling anti-jamming controls.

(2.) It shows how to recognize and identify varioustypes of jamming.

(3.) It demonstrates how to take a bearing on a jamming transmitter.

(4.) It provides a real target to look for in the maze of traces that appear on the scope.

(5.) bove all, it is real, and not synthetic.

On the basis of their own excellent results, the Radar perators School highly recommends this type of training to other training activities.

CORRECTION: LORAN TRAINING

(lval Repair Base, San Diego, Cali/., was erroneousl" int;iud in the list 0/ schools oOering Loran traifling, in the Loran a.-licit: i11 "C.I.C."., Vol. I, No.8, of 25 October 19#.

ttGallup Poll" of radar

SI:llP - (N8Dle" Symbol) ~pDentJ lo\odel __ ---

( .. ) Tot~ hours ot operat.i!;l1\J

. ration lOSt. (b) ~ h.urs of ope

(c) Gen4ral performance

(i) General remarkS._

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· ... is used ~rk (FA)· OPP08i;.;:~hti!~~ar 'Log ~B page 3--6)'.

. ~- _ preamplif:Isr. odi!ioat..i<!lns eompl • . . :\:.el,""

~t.h6 nutnbers of tbe,1ll '. CompUe Wrepo-rt....! ~r~: 2!i!..

sets as' necessary. -t e:"Uintnents g!l ~ ----:-

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~~~SHIPS (2) . 1 RADAR EqUipnent.

, OP1UV (1) report covers 'Fir'e Gont.~ aat. auard Vessel)

. HUOiID . {l - when nl"'trt. is su'anittSii by 0 . OOlIDT e,G (1 - 'Vlhe(l rey-

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C1.uonC:Uogic:al excerpts from aval Research Laboratory reports on the phenomena which grew into the versatile weapon=radar.

191Z

The 6~Sl appreciation: by personnel roo.ne.cted with the 'avy of the pas lbility of receiving reflected short radio waves occurred during short wave experiments being conducted by the 1 aval Aircraft: Radio Laboratory at Anacostla, D. C. The purpose of many of the experirnen ubsequernly carried 011 was to determine the exi renee of the Keooelly-Heaviside layer. and, when thi had been proven, to determine its height 311d otherwts Sl\l~' it.

The firsL proof of the existence of the layer was establlshed, and experiments were continued until '930 with various Improvements in technique and apparatus. Development in the short wave field had tremendously improved transmitters and receivers and had developed practical forms of beams for ooncentratlng tfie energ}'.I"'ilbin limits, in one direct Ion.

While observing the action of uper freqUIIDCY dire tion finding equipment, iL was noted that excellent minima on 1I~.8 m . were obtained except at short intervals when the ignaJ would come in SLtollgly. Large atrcratr, uch as the Ford all, metal. trimetnr, appeared LO cause a more pro· uounced signal, while smaller aircraft caused a smaller deflection. Further, as the airplane fle\~ <lIang any given course, the Signal would vary at some periodic rate. It was determiner! from experiments With airplanes fl iog at various specified relationships to the transmiuer and receiver, that the presence of R .movlng bod navl11g a substantial ref ccung surface in the energy field of a transmittel' weuld eau e a portion 0 the transmitted energy 0 be re-radiated from it. urface, his

(Continued on Page 6)

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CON FI DENTIAL

Ienti n of reports i , to ome the igllal f r a tirade n bureaucrac .' 'IVa te of paper, and 10 0 valuable time. "What zood are the , anyhow?Fill them in and set them off the ship." But these reports are not u elessroutine, If the worst sceptics could see the valuable uses to which their reports are put, tbey would justl feel pride in their contribution. Even hastily prepared reports, if pertinent, ma be ueful,t hile th e which are pTepared with care and diligence, '\ ith the "betweenthe-line" explained, are of tremendous, often in tirnable, value to the avy.

Take the Radar Performance and Operational Reports-reports which could be justifiably referred to as the radar life-line. They may not sparkle with the wit of a Will Rogers or the intrigue of Agatha Chris tie , but they form strong links between design, maintenan e, and 01 eration of deadly and versatile weapon and furnish up-to-dar and accurate information whi h when e aluated becomes a "Gallup Poll" of radar in action.

1940 "BED-SPR!NG"

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Back in 194.0, radar made its operational debu as a mysterious and ecret gadget on the battleship C IFORNIA, on the crui er CH STER, CHI-

A 0, PENSACOLA, ORTHAMPTON, and on the old YORKTOWN. The "bed-spring" atop the mast was not omethinz to write home about, literally or figurati ely. E en the secret channel between those ship and tile avy Department carried little correspondence during those month in I 9'10 a bout the" thing" -tha t is few reports that in the light of retro peet added much to the development of the equipment.

C mmanding om ers, my tilled and dubious, w . re asked for their opinion on this new and untried detecting de i e and hardly knew what to a. Operator and maintenance men, wi 11 I

previous training or experience with the eq u i p. ment, were beset by innumerable difficultie that have now been eliminated.

In the first reports, however. the "life-line" began_ D finite plan were made to dose the gap b tween desizn and operation. Operati n became the riterion of in tallation, maintenan e and de-

ign' and the reports from th ·leet helped pr duce the "dire tive ,. whi 11 k P the stem ali e and health .

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QUICK ACT!ON

One ship, for xample, reports a failure of a conden er in an G; the same unit fail in -;mother ship. Both radars are inoperative because of inadequate replacements, Even before a third report arrive, the Bureau starts a three-way action. Design is notified to build a better conden er,

Iaintenan e goe ahead to get spare out to all G's, and the hip themselv are notifi d t use, top-ga.p repla emen which are available aboard.

There is no better way to illustrate thi erie of actual e ents than graphically.

In dealing with so many ship and various equipments, through long supply lines, orne delays will crop up in spite of the best system. The "firing pin" of the system, however, is reports.

o reports-no action.

REPORTS MODERNIZE THE SG

Probably the most ourstandinz example of the long term value of reports is that of the SG Modernization. This, the biggest of e en hundred modifications to shipboard' radar equipments, is

sensitivi y at hort range pro iding lean ignals do e-m at the same time as g d iznals from distant targets.

Operators complained of the difficultie of ranging and baring on a particular target, and retaining an entire picture during continuous sweep.

o a PPI range marker hooked to the range counter was incorporated mechanically and electricall into the indicator. Interlock dropped out during ction, requiring a pecial horting witch which i a l)art of the new SG. Perfo rman e Reports indicae d a need for better siznals at medium and Ion ranges. greatly impro ed receive): is the re ult. here are many others-the important factor being' the many reports from the 'Fleet which elaborated on the fault and commented on the advantages of the SG, thereby indirectl giving to the avy a new and superior equipm nt,

WHAT HAPPENS !N WASHINGTON?

Three thousand, five hundred, and forty-four radar performance and operational reports were received in one month recently from the ships of

I. Fjeld Servic" Engineer'. Report. 2. Ship. begin to report ca.ualtles.

S. USS BALCII reports a faulty eondenser_

4. usS NEW MEXICO regorta .. bad unll:.

S. Rayth~n i. lnvestigating.

6. Shh.. have reported L4 defective unfta (P. & O. Reports).

7. D~gn sectIon of Bureau ot Shros [ .. design. the condenser.

S. BuSltipg notifies !Ill .hips by lIir"mil. ton,,", sJ)are hom other "Il.d8,' • t-t-t-t-:tl-1f1-.fj--l,.t..j--l--l--l--l--l-+-i~~:

"'Iuipmente ..

!to ManufalltUl'Cr lnstitut.!a rel'Juce<nent • i-r-r-Hf-I-I+Hf-\d-l---l---l-l-l-l-l[

PTOgrlUD (Na'ly Field Change No. '+-+++H-+l-+-Y---f\-+---1-+--+--+-+--I

16). 0"

10. St'>J)~Gnp measure. beeome ,dIed; ve i-r-r-H-f-I-I-H..l.....j-;;<rl-l-l-l-l-l

11. P. & O. reports (latch Il. defective High-Voltage filter condenser In the SG before it cripples the SG'~ of the Fleet_

12. Replacements have arrived on meat ~hip s.

13. No more unit>; tall.

Rt:JJOrl Contribute 10 'IJi!Cd RccOt,C"ry of the G Radar

traceable to a series o,E reports from your ship and other ships 0 er a period of several years. hese chang , orne of them major one, were de cribed briefly in the 15 September 1944 i ue of "C.l.C."

Report indicated the difficultie with sea r - om and eli criminati n of echo at hort range . 1 lew desirm wa initiated and in additi 11 t a I ew PPI, ele trical circuits were built in to redu e the

This - () condenser Tl1(J$ crippling (J lJ!,ooo f'(Idar.

the 1 avy. Thi is in striking contra t to the one hundred received one month after Pearl Harbor. In three ears, tens of thou ands of report ha e been fil d-cro -indexed b equipment and ships -pre enring a "Gallup Poll" of radar peration and performance. The reports are u ed 0 much and s often b the Iaintenan e nd De 19n sections of the Bureau of Ship and b man other

CONFIDENTIAL

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resulted in a combination of two wave fronts which would be received at the receiver ... one a direct wave, .one a re-radiated wave.

The Director, aval Research Laboratory. submitted to the Bureau of .Engineering a report which summarized the development oE the work in this field since the first di oovery of the re-radladon of hort waves by objects in the energy field of the tra!-UrWLler. The effe t of a plane "xing at variou altitudes was recorded on moving picture film and tbese verified the theory that the observed phenom ella were caused by interference between radiaLion follo\vlng a direct path and rha t reflected from the plane.

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JUN.!£" 41 19)6

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After many months of. experimentation a more adequate receiver and transmitter were developed.

everal test flights and demonstrations were held before high-ranking Naval officel'S and on 3 June a plane was followed out to 25 miJes-the full length of, the scale, the reflection being still unmistakably identifiable as it went into the next pul e. The problem was now given priority over all other projects and assigned to a secret status.

. AU6U'Ir t "1&

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A new secret problem to investigate radio ranging for lire control was begun. This involved building and testing a new indicator circuit and a receiver. Work was also started on a 700 me, pulse transmiuer. The next month on =3 September a plane flew 011 scheduled flight at high altitudes to remain above the horizon for great distances and was followed out to 96 miles on the 200 me, equipment. Elevation was measured for the iii t time, but at a range of :!3'h miles an elevation error of 5- was en countered, A strong echo which had long been ob erved. on bearing 8230 lit 40 miles was identified by the plane as ugar Loaf Iountain, which is over the horizon,

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Successful tests were begun on lile 200 me equipment on board the SlEW YORK during fleet maneuvers.

• •••••••• -. ••••••••••• 1111 ....... 1111 ••••

46 CONFIDENTIAL

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sections, (including the Editor ol ··C.LC.") that the older heets ha e the same, orn appearance as the paa of the Ia t ' q uire,

11 11 n the raid at Pearl Harbor catapulted what wa left of our Pacific forces into the pre en war with Japan. th ree people were handling the radar reports in the Bureau. Twenty-five people do that job 110'" -an in rea e, oincidentally, in pr portion to the in ease in hip or the United State Fleet since December 1 9 1. Those three people, Lt. C. "V. Bailey, MT. Harold Werness, and a typist, e tahlished the present "informative" ystem in January 194-2. And today the expanded section. under Lt. Harry Rodin and 'IT. Werness, re ords ever con eivable apability and limitation of radar equipment. placing these facts at the fingertips of those who. provide instructions, furnish maintenance equipment and govern the design and installation of radar gear.

variety of other no less important benefits is gained from this active poll of radar operation. Iniormation on enemy jamming and radar countermeasure gives a pretty complete picture of the enemy's fight again t our radar. Anti-Jamming devices are designed and new techniques are evolved. "C.I.C." acts as one "go-between" to get much of that information to all the operating force.

The blower installed for your c mfort may be a direct result of some report or group of reports. Ventilation is. important to both equipment and personnel. The Bureau may 0"0 so far as La change the blueprints on a new ship nearly completed to conform to suggestions and recommendations regarding ventilation. During overhaul, spaces are modified and devices installed to more adequately ventilate a radar room. Wh? Report are again the answer.

During the infancy of the SG, di turbing echoes were received from bearings on which then were no ships (or seagulls). Tbe reports said so, anyhow, and the Bureau quickly Im e tigated. The re ult i on your mast-the wa hboard affair that throws the SG beam kyward to eliminate double reflection.

One hundred changes have been made to the ark 3 and Mark 4 since the da s we called them .. ·C' .. and "FD'." Many f the e parall 1 a para, graph in a report or stem from a ShOTt statement in a "P. & 0." report. Field banges have been made to that standby of standbys, the SG, chang-in a re istor the size of a pen il eraser Il th late t modification #50' weighing 200 pound.

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"BETWEEN THE LINES"

Monthly Performance and Operational Repor~ must contain certain information to achieve their purpo e. When the arrive at th ~ureau. an analysis of this information is made lIum~dlate1y ~y the Radar Maintenance Section comparmg.all failures comments, and performance figlITeS with the previous record.

Thi process includes checking of all component and tube failures, the cause and all pertinent facts surroundinz each failure. The failures are recorded on c~mponent and tube cards listing circuit symbol. hip's name, date of reports, type and

erial number of equipment. unit in olved, lenzth of operation, serial number (if the casualt is a tube) and remarks as to whether the paft shorted. opened, blew up, leaked, etc. Tbe card records

summarized on a monthly basis. These umare sent to the Radar Material OIU ers at Yards, to supply officers for radio, to various

sections of the Bureau, to the manufacturer 0£ the equipment, and are reprinted in section.l2: (trouble shooting section) of the Radar Maintenance Bulletin.

Recurrent failure of an item indicates that the item is either improperly designed or defective in ufacture: or that the circuit in which the item is u ed is improperly designed or subject to vibration, voltage flu tuation, high temperature. etc.

Failures are called to the attention of the manufacturer for corrective measures. If a particular item is at fault, an improved item will be provided the R. M. O. as a ·ield Change Kit. Action will be taken by the distribution ections and supply officers for radio also to keep on hand a stock of the items that fail recurrently. The reports are also analyzed for special information on such sub" jects as ibration interference, ve"?-tilation, voltage fluctuation, shock of gunfire, moisture, tc, The data are compiled in looseleaf binders by subjects Eor quick reference to solve many shipboard radar problems. If £01" example it is necessary to analyze a problem of vibration aboard hip, a study of- the "vibration" book tells the story.

The books are tudied by the engineer of the Bureau of Ships, Manufacturers' Engineers. and personnel of the different laboratories, uch as Naval Research Laboratory, Radiation aboratory, and Bell Telephone Laboratory. They are also used by other sections and activities 'within and

the bureau,

Radar Range Performan e data is used to determine the capabilities of each type of radar; to

compare similar types of radar on its use and performance; to study .tge effectiveness of equipment modifications in all operating areas and to tudy the advantages of antenna height and ather

actors influencing performance. The range data j evaluated and distributed to inform all major activities on the performance of Radar under actual operating conditions.

It is through the excellent ooperation of all activities that the Bureau ha been informed about Radar weaknesse and has been able to. provide the Fleet with corrective measures and better equipment. The Bureau of Ships requests all hands to u e the Shipboard Radar Maintenance Bulleti?and to make certain that the monthly T port 15

ubmitted including pertinent information on performance, equipment failures, and suggestirms.

YESTERDA.Y'S ... complete and carefully p-reparedreports make todtJy~5 radars more effective and improve thos.e of. telmurrow. This is one of "yesterday's" TCPOTtS from USS CAUFORNlil-ferty-five mo'ttJu aiter the first CXilNl W(IJ installed-: giving valuable performance .and operational d~ta. on her Sell';" sea'rcli and, fire control radars. Ire reports SK stg-nals ~ aircrait (11 362 mile -l!4-ho~lr eYllising rllnge of /I 15 knot hlP!

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CONFIDENTIAL -47

U.S.S. CALIFORNIA, OCTOBER 2, 1940

22,000 Yards 1

"Minimum range of 500 yards denotes hortesc range at which reflected ignal stand out dearly from keying pulse. Surface targets at ranges greater than 22.000 ards have been picked up, but by the Lime positive identification could be made- the range had do ed to approximately 21(POO yards."

One or everall

" 0 dale operations show that an experienced eXAM operalor can generally determine whether he is observing ODe or more ships or planes in a group."

aile oiu« Radar

"Only once has a transient signal which moved uniform I around the trace been ob erved, and it was later found OUt that l\li wa caused b another CXAM equipment delit erately Ll ing to gel om' attention."

A FEW CASUALTIES

"One of the carbon brushes on [he line voltage adjuster transformer (ymbol -90,*) 1'.'30 round broken off flu b with the bea holder. Cause of breakage unknown. No brusbes are supplied as spares, but a replacement brush was taken from the spare transfcrmer carded in the Power Supply Unit Spares.

"One shield Interlock (symbol 5'904) on rear of Power Supply nit has failed to operate everal limes when rear shield was replaced, The studs of the male pan of the interlock bend out of line and realignment is often uecessar before the inrerlock will operate properly:'

THE FIRST REPORT RECOMMENDED:

"I. 'Reduce dimensions and weight of ant nna array and • First 'Radar afloat (Experimemal Model XAF) was installed for experimental reasons in battleship NEW YORK. CALIFORNlA' CXAM radar, the first "service" .installaticn afloat, had also the distinction of being the Navy's fust shorebased radar. Removed from the crippled GIlLIFOR1VI.A a few days aflerlhe Careful raidon Pearl Harbor, it was put in operation Oil Oahu asa long range air search, later transferred to USS HOR1,lET and went down with that hip. This IlISt radar 'was as sturdy a radar as any we have u ed in the Fleet. 'his particular set worked sarisfacrori I y for eighreen mon rhs wi th onl y two breakdowns, each of about fifteen minutes' duration!

'~M'I On the eapla.ne tender CURTI op rated ?7 hOUT' 2-1 hour a day without a Iallure--Enrroa.

COll tro I equipmem ill; much a po lble by increasing frequency or other 1nCl\.IlS witbolll any sacrifice of performance.

"2. Reduce back radlatlon as much as possible.

"3. Decrease width of beam in horizontal plane.

"4. Con ider an arrangement whereby the scanning screen i located in a borizonrat or inclined position and the pointing and training controls revolve horizontally Instead of vertically. Provide a comforuable seal for an operator who may be required to control Lbe equipment for hours at a time.

"5' Redesign pedestal mounting to provide ready access to collector ring assembly. Stanchions instead of a cast pedestal would be a beuer arrangement.

"6. Provide means for determining position angles oE aircraft with the same accuracy as that with which bearings

be determined.

"7. Provide suitable hand power method foJ' traintug poinung' amy in ea ~ of failure of th raton control units.

·'S. Provide air vent In training motor gear box so that box can be lilled with oil as necessar without the expenditure of lOO much time,"

MICROPHONES vs, TELEPHONES

"The Q'UM control room should be provided wlth a microphone mounted $0 as [0 be in front of the eXAM operator

while he is observing the screen. his microphone is to be use

in Hell oE the sound powered telephones and is part of an interphone ystelll enabling one man [0 operate the eXAM, report bearings lind ranges and receive orders without the necessity of wearing baule phones or using a talker."

SEARCHING TECHNIQUES

"Long range searching for surface ships or aircraft with

J[ethod Al1i.\lll: C M arraj' points (ele\-'3tcs) to 00 and trains

~onti':luoll.ly through 36<1°, or designated sector, SLOpping only to Idenufy ignals detected. Method Baker: Comparativety rapid searching .for aircraft at hIgh altitudes where the range may he comparatively short (probably less than llo,oooyarm). eXAM polnt up at 10°, ~oo,or 30. a'S desired, Have orders gi-ven to eXAM by cue conrro! station only. For example: searching for

ul"face shIps normally would be controlled from the bridge whereas earching for aircraft might be controlled by the ky Battery Officer. The CXAM operator hould be given in truelions sucb as: 'CXAM, take order from Bridge-search by method affirm.' Or 'cx..'\\\f, Lake orders from sky control-search by met.bod baker: ..

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ON

IN

"C.I.C."

,

SR TRAINING AND INSTALLATIONS HAVE BEGUN

Thirty complete R's and 50 indicator consoles have been nipped to training schools for instruction purposes. Installations are beinz made as rapidl as po sible in cargo ships, destroyers, transPOTt ships carriers and attack cargo craft.

Modification of this basic R type, which will eventually ucceed the SA, K, and C series for combat u e, have been drawn up; the SR-2 will possibly be in production by Spring; and the R-l, SR·3, and SR-ll are now in the developmental stages and may be available late in 1945·

The R range scope has facili ties for presenting targets at distances up to 400 miles hould guided propagation extend the radar's range to such a distance. There are four range scales: 4. 20, 80, and 400 miles. The cope has a long-per istence creen so that the operator may take a "second look" at the pi ture. On the 4 and fa-mile cales, the actual range in ards appears on the range counter .i list below the scope. The counter is geared to an electrical component which moves the range step back and forth thus assuring grea tel' accuracy. Range indication for 80 and 4oo-mile scales are given by scaled figures on the surface of the scope for relativel reliable estimates.

Plan Po ition Indicator uni in the SR offer the same presentation as any other PPI and have the same de 'ee of persistence. It has, also, an

standardization starts with the SR

& full of promi e as the new year itself, the SR, a new long-range aircraft search radar, represents Navy's first major step to standardize compoof radar equipment.

The object of this program. is to can truct radar sets so that as many individual units as possible will be interchangeable. This unit construction has many advantage even. i applied to only one model of radar and its value increase as more types utilize the standard units. Improved units y be developed and introduced into service by placement in the console. Spare units will provide a means of quick repair in event of a casualty.

When the SR design was set up in 1943 it was planned to make the Monitor Scope. Console Recei er, IFF Coordinator, PPI, Range cope, and Bearing Control units "standard." Operational demands and de ign lessons have introduced desirable changes so that the SR becomes the step to standardization which is realized in the SR-l, SR-2, SR~3, SR-4, and SG-3· This series (except SR) utilize new frequencies and have the following units completely mechanically and electrically interchangeable: Console Video. IFF Coordinator, PPI, Range Scope, and Monitor Scope. All of the electrical circuits follow a similar pattern even in

e units which are not interchangeable; that is, e receivers are pTa tically id ntical except for the R.F.

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CONFI DENTIAL

49

Ull tside bearing cursor similar 10 that on th new which m ble the operator to brain larg t bearings wi thout stopping the rotation 0 the anrenna. The range scales are -1,,20, 80, and 200 miles, This The 11 Timestarter. unit is identical to the VE

radar repeater.

Il'F coordinatior is included in the SR and wh n the swi tch turned on, a second trace al)pear n th rang

ope under the radar trace; at the same time the IFF transmitter is triggered. Response from :riendl craf is indicated on th bottom tra ' with the pip deflected downward.

he console receiver plays an important role ill defeating the enemy's attempts at jamming. A new un it incorporated into the receive!" may be used by' the operator if he is cognizant of the t p (

jamming being employed. orrect manipulation

of control will, in rno t ase 1 ar the indicator.

In oth T re peets th n le receiver perform' in a mann r iimilar La COIT landing unit.

HOW SR COMPARES WITH SA AND SC

s ompared 'with the A and C series, the

new :R radar equipment offer the Iollowins pecial features:

1. 40 0 greater range and twice the power.

2. 'Th creeu is on a vertical plan- rather than tilted to a 15° angle Ir m the horiz ntal as in the

.-2.

:1. Dubie rrac ad antaze for I' ordination.

4. uti-jamming control built right into the con-

Ie receiver.

5. he monitor cop in the transceiver may b interchanged 'with th am unit of other radar equipment. It i ann cred La the receiver and echoes show on it on either of tWO ales: 20 OT 80 miles. It aids in checking the efficiency oE the

),stem and tests the various circuits.

6. The motor re olve with the pedestal and antenna, while in other equipment, it is tationary. hi design permits turdier onstruction,

7. n echo box is "in lud d For Luning and Iinins up for peak efficien .

11 R-I, R-~, R-3. I -.,(, and G-3 will aivc

th addi ional spe ial feature:

I. Expanded" "s ope.

2. Removable range tep,

3. Step on 80 mile scale.

4. Range ring on PPI.

5. hip's Head ru ark r on all PP , .

(1. Improved hand rank hearing cur or 'wit

m hanical tak - ff,

7. Standard nchro oncrol ircuit,

8. Impro ed shock moun ring. 9. en iti ity Time Control.

10. In tantaneous .V..

1 I. Fa time Constant and Video Filter. 1 .2. ew freq uen ies.

Some of the mod Is will employ Jitter Pul ing, Random Pulsing. 1 oise Pulsing, and Frequen Scanning as anti-jam and anti-detection features.

From all these ad antag it' apparent that th nex R radar will be a valual le a set i1 pI'tee tin 0' and insuring til ontinu cl IIC ess of our fizhtinz fleet.

The t;(}lnpact console i planned for quiet: n1plal;81118nl of 1I11il.l.

Tile Il'Iwsreitrer's u"it 111'(1 also e.asily Teplace

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CON FIDENTIAl

THE 0 IPLETE P- . MicT()IoaVe at it tate t l In

fQregrounil is 1118 operations 'railer Joid, 'he auxiliar,.

unit between it aUll tile equipment frailer. at

8"-010n ill the .mait lraile-r ."I.ic.h. conlaiTUI til tlehlm.;di'i,.in,; unit. COff~bined If/eighl 0/ flll jour ITailer units i approlJ;illta:tely t.venly-one f·ons,

ntroducin9

the SP-IM

Designed for .e."<.tremely accmatefig. hter direc-. tion con trol ashore, the SP -J M is a microwave mobile radar set with a "punch."

For rnobilit the nr re equipment nece ary for a figbter direction radar station is mounted in two trailer which contain the radar, communication , id ntification, plotting tables, and power uppl. For reliabilit , an auxiliary power supply unit is included in a mall four-wheel trailer. For reducing the deteriorative effects of operating in moist tropical climates, an innovation, a dehumidifying unit is included in a small two-wheel trailer.

he radar rran mittel' operates at the upper

limit of tb HF band with a peak power output

f 6 a kilowatts. Id ntificati n equipment i proided and consi t oE Navy type B and B IFF u ipments, In addition, pia i ion ar made in the projection PPI, to utilize indi arion from an

external H.F.-R.D.F. set, using' the aircraft's H.F. radio f01' identification purposes.

he two power units are identical, can i ting F a Willy jeep engine driving an C alternator and ex iter to pro lde a 15 kw ource of 115 olt

C p wer at 6 G' le and 80 I er ent power factor. E ither pm er unit rna b u ed and ontrolled 'from radar equipment, althouzh uffi ient cabling is provided to locate the mall pot er trailer 100 feet from the radar trailer.

The P-1M and its counterpart for fleet installation, the P, are in full production. Marine training a tiviti and Air Warning quadran. Navv training a tivitie and Fighter ire tion a tivitie oversea and Pa if Ir Warninz units of the Army ir Fore are heduled t re eive th SPI M. Full production will re ult in di tribution of eleven unit per month.

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CONFIDENTIAL

SI

THE SP-ll\l GOE TO WORK. Intercept Officer here is looking QI track of largd on the JI(; repealer. Complete and eflkient operation as a [r.g'ller tliree'ion unit requires 7 men. TIle 7-,,,on cr 0 can elel1ate Grlil inllkdl the antenna which is carried in'ide of 'lie antenna trailer and place Ihe entire equipment in an operating condition in abol.u one hour after arriving on dellired site.

reiC requirel/: Fighter Direcliorr. officer, contnumiAlaliQ11.8 operator, plotter and computer operator, range an4 identification, operator a:imud .. and elevation. operator, lec.hnician, aTld Illilit:r 'plotter or talker,

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RANGE ACCURACY ± 200 YARD.

Range in.forma.ion is presented all un "A:' scope lcith a 100 mile range lfI(Ieep. An expanded ..... " lIeelion or "R" scope give. a preeision: 5 mile .weep. A "PPI" scope loilh 4, 20. 50. and 100 milerangel! il! proojded orr the con~ole. .4 P(; Projection "PPI" ,.epeaLer unit ill arranged for use «II a plotting table wi,h 4, 20, 80, and 200 mile ,.anges provided. Thi~ repeater ploUing table il! capable of presentins radar in,fOrmctiO'n /rom any O'·n~ 0'1 four .March radar., in Ilddil'on eo U&e SP-1M gear.

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EQtllPl\lENT TRAILER.. The 8-fo01 parabO'lic antenn6 q al(710ed huid.e el,.!., .,an lOhell unit U being moved. An elee· 'mall:r operated elevat'or railJu into 700f fOP POllit:;on the anlenuo which prooidel a radar beam So in azimuth and 4· in elevation at the IuIlf power poinU. Bearing accuracy of ± %' tmtJ elellarion accuracy of ± 700 ft. il! obtained in the corucol acan lehieh q p,.ollwed by l"otating an oU-cenler circular ,"cn>e guide feeding tb« paraboloid.

52

CONFIDENTIAL

Trailer hOllSe;3 main pOUler .. nit, '1'0_ miner anlenna, and 1.00 ntodularor., each with different pube leng,Il e. In addition, feM equipm.en& ilf provided 10 enable com>plete field mai.ntenance and includes tu.be hIller, IIYnChrOlll.Ope. lIo/lohmmeter, eCM bO'% •• ignal generator, O',8cillolcO'pe, an4 'rigger 'O(.lrce, model LAD le.1 8et and' a wave guide probe loilh amplifier. TRAILER INTEBIOB.

COMMUNlCAl'IONS CORNER. Telephone and radio are hOfued in on.e corner of lhe operatiom trailer. Communieation» gear prollided includes (I Naoy t:rpeTCS radio, an SCR-624A. radio, a BD-72 .'flitch bO'ord, and necessary in.terconurwnication eql&.jpment including microphoRt!Il, receiver8, and cmltJ'ol switc"_ CORITol equipmerdc ... prOllitletl to r'(l",ot~,. handle on.eor lIDO. SCR·57S/574J'HF radio BetB. Nol !leen in dlill pic:llJ.re i~ flu! Illaru!! board which i3 on I.he bulkhead 10 the right l)1 the cO'mrnunic:ationa prmel.

CONFIDENTIAL

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53

Admiral Koga's fire control

The introductory pa'Yll,gmph of an article ill the October "C.I . stated, "Anyone inclined to laugh off Japanese Radar is a b:keb)1

candidaie for trouble ... " Th.e statement bears repeating.

Imperial ray rn 11 ar ill dead earn Sl about th radar in their ship ancl air ralt, 'This i lear! indicated in a car ured Japan se d .umeru dat d D 'ember 1945, Pre ent R dar Fire Control . \oai nst urface .raft. The Iollowiuz translated 'xcerpts show that we LUU t expect to encoun er

au increasingly dangerou weapon in japane e radar. 1 t i wise to assume that the Japanese w iJJ succeed in their determination to rnak [he petlorman e r their radar approa h the effectivene s

of ours, he translation follows:

A YEAR AGO UNDER SHIMADA AND KOGA

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" "he radars installed on the hips of our Heet toda are the Type Two Mark n Model I 31 d the Type Two Mark II Model :2. he former is used principally for early warning against planes and the latter: was planned Ior lise a au earl' warning device against surface craft.

"However it was inunediate1y apparent that it

would b diffi ult LO u e the (or fire . ntrol

inc Ibis would require ranze and hearing

a .cura .' bond th scop of a et designed primali I . a' a warning' de ice. Nevertheless th exizencies 01: war demanded that th is set be used [or other pbrposes than those of a mere warning' device, ince the set was to he used for fire coorrol, til improvement of range and b aring accura y wa giv n top priority and the present

upplemeruary equipment "a pla ed in trial production. 'With th addition of this equipment the expected results wer obtained, hut though it en itivity was enough fOT a r designed primaril ' a a warning devi e. it was till not a urate

non 11 1'01' effective fir ntrol making fullest u e

of measurement data. It i hoped that great irnprovemenrs in performance may be expected with the earl production of radar designed solel Ior fire antral.

"But in he present rage f the war we mu t g t the rn out of our present quipruenr, at d n t vainl di CllSS the p sibilitie E r ihe future. Variou rneth cis f dealinz with tlri problem ar nOI under stud}'.

<..5

"The wave leneth \1 ed b the pre nt Taoat' • particularl th 1:k II, M del 2, are ver hart; handling and tuninz' are extremelv difficult and it ill 01 es gl'eat modulation or re eiver sen itivity . Consequently the bearing error du LO re .eiver

sen ItlVJ is very irregular.

"This equiprnenr was not intended for fire con tro I use, and it is clear tha r irn perfection in design and production were j nesca pa h] e from th standpoint of it lise a uch.\Ve have conf ill III ability of Ill' men to make the full t po ibl us 01: it,"

The "supplementary equiprnent" T (erred to is alled the "phas ontrol meth d." h d uruent tares that ., be method which has been adopted matches the ranze indications with the pip of the rransrnitred wave, at the extreme I and this is taken as the zero po ition. Then phasing of the tran mitred wave. the echo, and the ranz indication i hift d. Til posicion of the indication is adjusted and the desired range OlD be obtained by matchinz it with the pip of the

b • a t the extrem left."

"CONCLUSIONS"

"The value of 'radar in firinz action is tremendous. 'Ve must quickly marshall its full capabilities since it is, the \7ery essence or the pTe ent war of s ien rear advantage an be zained bv proAT- in radar, Those re Ion ibJ Ior me ting' the pre em war si tuati n in it tactical phases must examine the essential elements and ndea or. to obtain maximum effi ienc in both men and equipment in the Imperial avy.

glan e at the pre em condition of the fleet reveals that the ships of those with an active intere t (in radar) are well equipped in all e senrial d tail and the accura of some of the quip. ment has exceeded all ex]) Clarions. 011 the other hand there are many who lack conIid n e in i II e and J:e I that radar j a, hite lephant 01 th if hands. vVe mu t triv all the more fOT ih perfection of radar by re earch and trairrinz."

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how"

Not only are the laps tully conscious 0/ the need to improve their radar) but they hruno that they must destroy the effectiveness of ours. Evidence that they have plenty of ideas on how to go about that job is revealed in another captured Japanese document covering Lectures on Aerial Navigation given to the Yokosuka Naval Ai,' Group in Decembel' I943.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

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"U e of Radar: a. Methods to avoid aircraft search radar (YOKOSUKA Research Experiment No.2)

.. (1) When a Bight comes near a radar, no matter how the group is arranged, avoiding radar detection is not possible. he same is also true for a single plane.

"(2) An airplane at an extremely low altitude (under 100 meters) is not likely to be detected b radar prior to visual sighting.

.. (3) 0 make the most of their capabilities

bombers, etc., must approach at high altitudes and therefore have 110 effective means 0 avoiding detection. Consequently, the best they can do is to avoid visual observation by flying at the highest possible altitude. It is most effective for torpedo plane units and tracking planes to contact the enemy at extremely low altitudes (30 to 50 meter). ( he experimental results of radar performing against plane at extremely low altitude will be distributed within a few days as a research report.)

"b. eceptive jamming methods against search radar (YOKOS KA Air Group Research Experiment No. IS):

" (1) Half wave length special wave reflector paper (paper to which aluminum or tin foil has been applied):

"If you continuously scatter a uitable amount over a wide area, correlating i with the advan e of the leading unit, it is effective in radar jarnmmg.

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CONFIDENTIAL

.. (2) Reflection of 10 pieces of reflector paper is roughly equivalent to reflection of one land attack. plane; for a formation, increase the number of

heets proportionately to the number of planes.

When there are unde 60 sheets of reflector paper it frequently is not difficult to discriminate be tween the paper and the reflections of a plane. That is to say, although, it is possible to get a reflection equivalent to a 6 plane formation with 60 sheet, in a der to make di crimination difficul t, you s,bould use 70 to 80 sheets, and for a 9 plane formation you should u e more than go sheets.

" (3) When the length of the reflector paper is not half wave length, result are poor. Increase the amount as follows:

"J.4 wa e length-sao times "%, wave lengdl- 3 times "full wave length-l ~ times.

"(4) The sensitivity to 1 flying boat is equivalent to that for 3 to 4 land attack planes, and sensitivity to 1 land attack plane is equivalent to that for 3 to small model planes. (This should vary depending on radar wave length and plane type.)

"c. Jamming of AA fire control radar (YOKDSUKA Air Group Secret No. 41-356):

" (r) When a large amount of half wave length special wave reflectors are cattered over the course and in the vicinity of the radar, it is extremely effe tive in jamming fire control radar and rendering it impotent.

"(a) Amount of reflector paper necessary:

• •

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

"For 1 large flying boat or 5 Land attack planes -300 sheets.

"For a formation of 6 to 9 land attack. pla:nes-? --00 sheets (Translator'S note: first figure illegibI ). "(b) Dropping intervals of reflector paper.

e ~'Drop continuously at 1000 meter intervals; resuIts are greater the smaller the interval.

" (2) The following lIying formations, ill effectively deceive fire ontrol radar even 'when r fl - tor paper is not u ed:

.. (a) Formations whi h will jam elevation computation :

"Make elevation vary from 500 to 1000 meters tor's note: spacing between aircraft), and variou planes (units) appear to be at roughly equal distances from the radar (difference in range less than 800 meter ).

"(b) Formation whi h win onfu e bearing computations.

"Make horizontal distance (Translator' note:

spacing ?) from 500 to 1000 meter for ea h plane (unit), and each plane (unit) seem to be at an equal di ranee from the radar (ran e differ n . within 00 meters).

"(c) Formation which 'will confuse elevation as well as bearinz computations combine paragraphs 1 and 2 (above).

" ( • xpl ana tor 1 te.) When r efle to)' paper was II ed in the e ])erirnems as well a in the experi-

men E 21 N vember, e were able t mpl tel

the computation of bearinc el vati n nd The radar aimed midwa herween til planes and rlre relle tor paper.

.. In jamming by means of flight formations, the computation of bearing and elevation was rendered impo ible, and the radar aimed midway between 2 units (2 planes) .

"When we combined the use of Right Iormations and reflector paper in jamming experiments. the results were extremely good. But when the location of the enemy radar was uncertain, good results were obtained only with reflectors. Although ngland eems to have u eel reflector paper of from Vii to 1/3 the wave length, in the recent Hamburz attack, zood results cannot be expected unless the number of sheets is increa eel ten-fold. "d. Jammino. Night Fighter' Radar: Being developed following completion of equipment,

"e. be u e of present ndar (Type 3, Air Mark 6, Model a) in night attack: Being prepared f r di tribution as a researcl rep rt,

"The fodel 4 Radar with which T'I 1 land attack. plane and ypc 97 carrier attack. planes are equipped was utilized in the Hosho (Trans. la or's n te: V) night attack. te ts in N vemb r and obtained the following re ults:

" (1) Facilitated an undetected torpedo attack during mconligh t.

'(2) Facilitated an illuminated torpedo attack during a dark night.

"(3) reatly nhan ed the sue ess of an unilluruinated, undet cted bombing at extreme! low altitude during a dark night.

" (4) It had in uffi ien power lor unillurninated torpedo attack during dark nights."

CONFIDENTIAL

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RECl:. T

ACTlO:-I R' PORTS From: USS HOE

( n 'War Patrol in u h hina eas)

. . all serials were opied and no, difficulty was encountered in sending. The enemy employs onstant jamming in the outh China , as and uccessfull d la d recep ion of ne important me saze to us for 12 hour ."

*

B rKERillLL

(On perations at G uam)

omplaint wa frequ ntl made during- the operation of unne essary U e of VHF. ne air group repeatedly za e a running aceo mt of their attacks 0 er the air. In s veral ase Air roup reported only three transmissions during tbe flight: (I) report to Commander upport

ircraf of arri al a initial point or 011 ration,

(2) A request for a targ 1- statement of targets

already assigned. and (.3) report au completion of assignmen t. ften no further tran mi sions wer necessary. Excessive u e of VI-fF in fligb t must be topped by responsible flight leader ."

From:

Fr m:

S PORTL

(On Operations at Palau)

the practice of aIling a station and

aying 'message EoI' you, ov r,' getting an acknowledgement. and then sendinz the me sage, should b disc mag d. hi sh uld, be unnece ar D circuits for whi h a ontinuou wat h i pre rib d. It wastes time and clogs the circuit ....

"The necessity of using low power for short range communi ation su h as spotting should be emphasized, One ship, whose spotting frequency wa 100 kilocycles above that of thi essel carne-

58

CON F!DENTIAL

in s nzth Jive on our pottin lrequenc until the), reduced pow 1" at ur req ue t."

From:

.ommand r a k roup 53,5

(on seizure and a cupation of Guam)

. , the II which' net '. r put

in this operation 1 as th m r. satisfactory yet found. .he Force Fox circuit was used as such 1 hrough II the emir period enabling to. ask For 'e nnnander t band] expeditious] op rational traffic to Ius force wi thou t resortina to HO OL L Fox with its attendant delays ....

"Thi 'ommaod, in ill c ur of arr ing out its fighter upport missions, had many occasions to del iver traffi to individual ships effe ting qUI .k dcliv T via the Force Fox, . . .

"There were enough oice .hannels pro id

sa that the often overworked B was not jamm with all arts of transmissions as bas 1 een experineed in 0 man pt· viou operations. . . . Th usual complaint can be made that too mu h extraneou matter was ph ed on this channel,

" ommuni ations n th a al Gu.n . ir nets

were usually exc U nt, Difficulties were encountered establi hing contact with shore parti at tim b au f the Jaw po-we red net in LIse, plus the interferen e cau. ed b the terrain and atmospheric condi tions. . .

" curity rolation could b noted dailv,

though usuall they were of a minor nature. Th

, hackle' code can be considered compromised daily a person would err in its u e, the .ommen

error being a proper hackl d transrni ion on

minute followed by the ame numbers in the pIal. the next. . . . Impromptu call would be OIllpromised by the actual name of the hip being u ed inadvertent] ."

From: ommander Card r II' ".tOLlP 13 (On Operations at uam)

ir Group 13 has worked rnces antl on radio discipline while in the air. To assist in maintaining tile eli cipline all possible matters pertainine t ftigb which could be handled aboard

sh i P before takeoff wer so handled. n n earl

e e1"" iligbt, .howevel-' reports were brought back that air operations weree erely handicapped by broadca ts from other group di u sinz metho of flight, methods of attack and other points wl could be t be dis ussed aboard hip prior to the

radio communication 111 the air . e more effe tiv each opera ion."

From:

Ta k lit ornmand r

(On Operations at Angaur)

_ radio operators gen rall are be aIDing le pI' fi ient 011 'VV circuits. Man' heading were garbled and the ode groups in the text were in many cases undecipherable. rna t reCelVll'l.g

tali n had troul le with the traffic n the circuits it could be concluded that at least some of the blame should be attached to the tran nutting operat r at tile originators' station. his command missed at J ast one action message of an. extrernely important' op rational nature whi h wa not re ei ed until five h ur later when it was

eared ....

"Radiomen are not thoroughly conversant with operating procedure main! because the have not actuall worked enough CW n both plain language and encrypted traffic. Commanding Officer and Communication Officers misguided by the ready a ailabili of voice channel , do n t insi t on using ,VV when su hue rna even b

ore practicable."

L ED TQWN

(On cupation of Peleliu)

ommunications during the Peleliu operation seem d to have been definitely better than in either of til two previon 'as au1t operaIn which thi .ornrnand had participated.

circuits were not overcrowded as a general rule but were more reliably and adequate] manned. This was due, i i believed, to more experienced personnel in the participating transports, to continual! improving equipment, and to a frequen plan which provided suff ient parall I it, uit for reliable cmmunications."

From:

LEO r

(On Opel', tion at Saipan)

" the SCR 6 10 radi taken 0 the beach

by the beacbmaster when set-up proved capable of receiving but not of transmitting. Not until D .£U 2 Day was this known t the ship at" hich _e a new radi wa ent in and communication establ ished."

From:

From: Commander Transport Division 32

(On Op rati n at Palau)

a thorough study of the purposes of Ircuits hould be made by all corn-

muu i arion pers nnel that each circuit will

erve its own particular purpose and there will be 110 overloading E any on ircuit."

From: Commander Carrier Air roup 13 (On Operation at Palau and Yap)

. . homing devices operated atisfactorily . . . The primary VHF transmitter used by

ommander upport Aircraft in upport air dire tion at Peleliu and Angaur was very poor. It is considered an absolute necessity that Commander Support Aircraft ha e the TUO t powerful

transmitter in the area concerned. ..

From: Commanding- G neral, Headquarter 1'1 et farine Force, Pacific

(On Operations iTt 1 Iarianas)

. . deception was attempted by the enemy on our circuits but was never successful because our operator recognized strange or incorrect procedure and demanded authentication, which wa never forthcoming, he enemy employed both co unuous jamming and code to interfere with our re eption, but l as generally unsuccessful . . , ,

.. he ability of our operators to copy through enemy jamming is attributable, in a large part, to previous training in which jamming tactics were emphasized. evertheless, enemy techniques are improvin and .mu t be met with int nsive traininz of our ine perien ed operata s in the future."

From: APP L CHL N

(On mphibious Operations at Guam)

man incomina me sages addressed to Lhe hip for a cion wer obviously intended for the

ask Force Commander. In most cases the proper a tion addres e could be readily determined, bu in om in tan es the 'intenti n of the ender regarding the addre see was not clear. When communicating with Force, Group, or Unit Commanders the ommander's call should be used and n t th call of ih hip in which he happens to

be. his applies to visual and radio traffic."

CONFIDENTIAL

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59

C.I. C. INDEX

Cross indexed below are subjects whi h have appeared in "c.I.e." since Marcil 1944. Of the first four issues-which were Ysbore-baaed'; predecessors to today's "c.r.c."-very few back copies are avaflabl None is available of the first two issues, March. and April 1944.

ACTION" REPORTS-EXGERPTS Fire Controt Radar Noll!S.

Ex.cerpts from ship repons on fire 0011- rrnl radar Wilh comments by the Bureau of Ordnance. "CLC."-Vol. I, NO.7, Sept. 1944, p. ,30.

Lessons Leanled.

Excerpts on Communications from aclion reports sent from various operations, including the MariaOa!!, 'Tinian, Guam. Saipan. and Normandy. "C.J.C."-V,ol. 1. No.8. Ol;l. 1944, p. 41•

1200 Mifes ,(ro.n Japan.

Exeerpts Trom actioll reports on comIDUiliCitiollll, radar, G.J.G .• and related matters. "C.LC."~VOJ.I, NO.9. De,c.

194.4, p. 12.

AIR-GROUND COOI'ERA:TION Llir-Grotlrld C'O'Operati'On

A di~t of Air-Grollnd cooperation on (he battlefield. The original article by Lt. Col. B. M. Tarver, A. C., was published in "Ma1itary Review." "C.I.G."Vol. 1. No. 4, June 1914, p . .ll.

AIR WARNING AdvllTwed Bose Air Defense Doctrine.

A reprint of CinCPac's "Advanced Base Air Defense Doctrine", giving definitions and duties oE pel:'SonneL"C.I.C."-Vol, I, No. I, March 1944, P·35·

Air Defeme Contro! Cenrers.

A reprint of CinCPac·CinGPoa's letter on "Air Warning and Fighter Direction Conttoi,Shorebased." "C.LC."-VoL I, No. 4, June 1944. p. 27·

I.h'gil$ Radio .Eql~ipmenl.

Radio equipment in the 14 component of Argus units. "C.I.C."-Vol. I, NO.3, May 1944, P.S6.

Argus Units in ActiQ)! ..

Experiences in the Pacific from Giladalcanal eo Tarawa as relayed by Argu~ I, II, 4, 5, 6" Rand g, IO,'~' and [6. "C.I.C."-Vol .. "No.1, March 1944. p. 11.

....:

Figlite>" Direction and RadaT Control at Advanced Naval Bases,

Portraying {he evolution of radar control in the Pacific aDd the problems of the Marine Air Warning Squadron and the' Argus Uni.t. "c.LC."-VOJ.I, No. " Marcil. 1944" p. 6.

60

CONFIDENTIAL

Gilbert. IsIa"lds-Argus "0, I~ and 16.

Argusemployment at Tarnwa and Apamama, "CJ.C."-Vo1. " No.~, April 1944.

P·4·

Groll"d Observers.

"Front Line Aircraft speuers." "C.I.C." -Vo.l. I, NO.3. May 1944, p. 17.

ilfllTille Air Warning Squadrons.

The history and organization of MAWS including an account of probably the fmt interception in the Paci.ficoomrolled by a U. S. shore-basedcentroller. "C.I~C."Vol .. I, No. 3, May 1944, p. I.

Marir'~ Corps Defense .BaUali'On.

Air and surface warning and radar fire control in the defense bauatlon, "C.l.C." -Vol. 1, NO.3, May 1944, p. 19.

Operation« and COIl!rol C1!111er.

Descrlpuon of the AN/TTQ-I Air De~ense Control Center and its function in me Air Defense System. ··C.I.G."-Vol. I, No. 'I, June !944, p. 21.

Pacific Leapfrog.

ARGUS, Air warning. and [adarat Kwajalein, MajllrO, and Erriwetok. "G.J,C." -Vol. ,. NO·3, May 1944, p. 3. -.--~

Radar W1l1 llir Wa1'l1illg in the PadJk.

Typical scenes showing shore- based :r;:Idarn, a temporary camp site, an operations board. and a radar power plant. "G.I.C."-VoL I, No. I, Mareh 1944, p. 4.

Response from IJrgJtsB.

ExperiencC$ obtained frOm Samoa to Nanumea Island of the Ellice Group with (he 7th Defense Battalion. '·CJ.C."-Vol:. " NO·3, May 19'14, p .. 7.

Staging mId F,:eld OperGliol1!i of Argus Ul1iU.

Advanced . Base componenrs, staging, op' orations and dal to day schedulesol activity Eor training of Argus Units. "C.I.C." -Vol. I, No. I, March. J9H, p. 9. ~~-

U. S. Flee! Ralla,. GOlltTol and Fighter Direction Doctrine.

Supporting docrrlnes and instructions from USF loA. the U. S. Fleet COrfCl'lt Tactical Orders and Doctrines. 19\14. "C.1.C."-Vol. 1., NO.2, April '944, p. 38.

COMBAT iNFORMATION GENTER .BuSh ips. A'lnOUIZCeJ NI!iJJ P,lo iii ng arid Nllviga.tio.nul Aids.

Describing the Mark I, Mod. I plotting table, and. the Mark 6, Mod. 4 class Z Arum DRT. "C.1.C."-Vol. I., No. '7. Sept .•. '944, p. Sl.

GTC (Fleet) Terms arid Meaning.

A reprlnt of CinGPac's letters defining terms as applied to ship-based radar and lighter direction, in connection with m.e "Advanced Base Air Defense Doctrine;" "C.l.C."-V'Ol. J, No. I, March '9'14, p. 84-

Combat Proble-ms Train Escort GIC Teams.

Recommendations and instructions cerning manenverlng contests for tra

CIC personnel as suggested by the CANNON. "C.I.C."-VoJ. I, No, 8, Oct. '944. p. 43·

Fighter Direction tlboard <l1I IlCC.

View or a Glcimlalla~ion aboard an AGe in operation. .,C .. tC."-Vo1. ), No. S' July, 944, p. 17·

Raid Board,

Preliroina:ry instruction displa-y board

at RTS, St. Simon's .. "C.I.C."-Vol. I"

NO.3, May '94-1. p. 27·

Reporting 011 Sound Power and In/ercom.

To remedy variances the Interior Conl1:01 Eoard, with Sec Nav approval, ptc" scribes standard procedure on reporting bearing, target angle, position angle, an range. ·'C.l.C."-Vol. I,. NO.7, Sept. 194

P·4·7·

Short-Cut S'Oluliont on!lIe DRT.

Detailed descripdenof bow to Use the DRT in ere effectively. Article is complete wi th diagrammatic examples. "C.l.C." ~Vo.l. !, No. ,fl" Au.g.L9+1, p. 31.

Some Shipboard CtC'.I.

Illustrations ·of typical CIC installarions aboard CV"s, nn's, and CA's. "C.1.C."_ Vol. t, NO.5. July 1944, p. lB.

StJ/il-Second FiXes OIl Ifu, DRT.

A simple procedure for speedier results on the DRT. "CJ.C."-VoL I, No. 9, Dec. 19411, p. 22.

The Care alld Ci'l!unillg oj Pla!lic Plots, Practical hints concerning the care 01 lucite and plexiglass plotting surf "C.1.C."~Vol.- ),'No. 8, Oct. 1944, p. 4' •

a -Boat Rillen.

CIC operauous \I'jth GVE. ill Ami-Subarine War/are. A resume of the role of CV . 's plying the Atlantic, "Bunting and Killing." Re13~es taciics employed by CVE·based planes ill accoundng (or enem)' subrnarinecrnlt. CIC procedure with emphasis 011 the DRTeqllipanem, Rnd the respousihllities of the various ship's otfleers i~ given. "C.I.C."-"ol. 1, NO.9. Dee. 19114. p. 45.,

U. S. Flelll RadaT Contra/ rlml Fighter Dircctitm Doctrine.

Supporting dootrines and instrucrions from U F loA, the IJ.. Flee{ Current Tactical Order!' find Docrrlnes, 1944. "C.I.C."-Vol. " No.2, Aplil 1941, p. 38.

IV/Wi Olliers S(,>, Of "C.I.G.".

Comments made during the recent "C.I.C.·· con ference. "C.I.C. "-Vo!' " No'.

hen Walch' is Reliew!tI!u GIG.

t\ "eheck-olf usr: o[queslions, the answcrs to which will prepare the GIC watch office,' [or any unexpected developmenL. "G.LC."-VoJ. 1. No.8, Oct. 19<14, p. I~.

COMMONICA 110"-lS 1n1n1lIlicatiOlI.'i.: Chllmc!cri$tics of Radio m municat ions ill Ihe A. rgu,s Unit.

Sketching 111e role of the fol1owingra-

dio gear as used by Argus;

nC-6,!') (VI-H) Transmhrcr (Si:gnal Corps)

nC-G§9 (VHF) Receiver (Si~n~1 Corps) SCR 52~A (VHF) T'ransmitter (Signal Corps)

TnW (HF) Transmitter (N3VY) RUM (.HF) Receiver ( !Ivy)

A TGS.. (YvlF-RF) Transmitter .. and Re· ... cetver (Navy)

- SGR 5a6 (Wnlkie-Talkiel (HF) (Sign~l Gorp!»

en 399 Mobile Radio Stations (HF) (Signa.! Corps)

n.nG Receiver (Navy)

"C.I.C."-Vol. I, o. I. Marcb !944,_P. :23:

[1'" 1"('"1",./1 10 CQlIlrJI" Him/iQII Fa ilures,

,\ discl!ssion on the principal causes ot 0011111111 nlca Lion troubles with suggesrlons on rnaintainlng maximum efIl:ciency. ··C.1.C."-VloL '. No. G. Aug. 1944. p. 7.

j"j! Radio Tricker)'.

HoII' the japs try to render 0111' COInmunil')atiollsincffective find what to do about it. "C,r.C."-Vol. I., NO.9,. Dec. '9-14, p. 28.

Jt/i.srms Lam-ned.

.xeerpts on corumunicatlens from action rel,"'0l'ts sent ('rom various operations, in-

eluding the ;'I'[:I1-i;'l(la5, Tinian, Guam. Sai· pan, and Normandy, "C.I.C,"_ Vol. " No. S, Oct. 1944. p. 4"

Il:llie$are so Stupid.

Cartoons tllustratiug the lmporta nee 01 milia discipline to prevenl jamming the frequency. "C.I.G .... -t1ol. " No.8, Oct . '9H, p. J'.

urtaoe Senrch if Vi.tal to 1111.1e Dejense,

Surface Search Units play an important part In base and island defense s,ystems. Diagmmmed ilia lypica1 base telephone system, linking all defense activities [0. gether, '·C.I.C."-Vol. 1, NO.7, Sept. 1944, p. ~6.

Till! Story of "(1HF RadiotelepllOlle.

{1!. Importance. charaereriseies, and limitations in the system o[ fighter direction Hod aircmfrconrrol.vincluding' an account or VHF operartons in rhe invasion of Italy. "C.J.C,":"'Vul. " NO.2, .April 1944, p .. 8..

CO UNTERM.'l'".ASURE:S

Bye .• nnd. Eur« of CounlermeasuT'fs,

Revealing the tactinal uses "3.11.d effec, i vencss of enemy radar eq uipment and our types 01 eounrermeasures in defeating Iheir purposes. ·'C.LC."-VoL I, No_ 8, OCI, '9'14. p. 27.

JflP 1~fldio TriG/II:ry.

How {he ]nps try LO renderOl!r COIllrnunlcauons Ineffective and what [0 do aboiu it. "C.I.C."-Vol. I, No. 9, Dec. 1944, p. ~8.

rli'iudow.

A digest of informationon this type of deception, describing the purpose. appearance, and characteristics oEWindow jamming. "C.I.C,"- VoL,. No. 8, July !9+j',p.. I.

Yoa Can On/.ww'l'/ Enemy [amming afld DccepI'il!i1l.

Use oE Anti-Jamming cemrols and. otiler methods In reading through electronic and mechanical jamming. "C.I.C."-Vol. " NO·9, Dec. !944, p. 1.

ERRATA [':.V(;!I.'JC it, Please!

Correction of errcrs in previous ISSUes.

"C.I,C."-V(ll. I, NO·9, Dec. '944, p. 44 ..

FICHTER DIRECTION

II Pilot": 11 (i.'IIice 1'0 Fighter Directors, Suggestlons [or obtalning smoother team work Ivitll pi IOlS. "'C.I.C,"- Vol.. 1, No. g. Dec, 194.4, p, 16.

Army Rador tlil1s tho US H/JNCOCK.

Report of figh ter direction exercises in the Gul£ of" Faria ncar Trinidad. result of army units reaming up with pracdcing carrier [orocs. '·C.l.C."-\lol. " NO.1, Sepe '944, p. 16.

DD'$ and 1I1'11IY Planes Team Sllcce5sfuU),.

Destroyers team up with the ar:my P-gS's in SOUUll,rest Pacific amphibious operations a 1 Lae, Fins(;htll'en, New Britain and Biak. "C.l.C."-VoJ. " No, 7. Sepb 1944. p. 17·

DC$I UJ)'C1 fighler Direct ion fllllllllcs "11- ried Ass ignm C.!t1.

Relating the part played by DD"s Ii.glller direction equipment and its value drlring l'ilJ'iOllS assignments in Pacific landlngs, "C.LC."-Vol. I, No. B" Oct. '944, p. !!i'

Fi~hler Direction aU" R(1drlr Control ~l Advamleti Naval Bases.

Portraying the evolution of radar 0011- trol in the Pacific and the problems of the' Madne Ail' Warning Squadron and the Argus Unit. ··C.I.C."-Vol. 1. No. I, March '9't'l- p. 6.

qwmliarls of the SI,,),,

Fu II page illustration sllowing an alr oomba l intelligence alllcer briefing pilots before they go Oll,t on a mission. "C.l.C." -Vol. t, No.6, August )94Jh p. 12.

Leatherneck GCI Sketches.

Cartoons !rtusttating daily "problems" in. a lighter directcr's life. "C.LC."-Vol. I,

NO.5, July 1944.,1" 2.6. .

R<ro.i5Cd Fighter Director Pocabulary.

An up-to-date listing of fighterdirec{ion vocabulary for day conrrol of fighter aircrafteitbl'r under shore orshipoon. rrol, RT IFF code, RT code used with night fighters under shore 0.1" ship comrel, aud R T code for 1I15U <I I control of '5gh!ern, '·C.I:G."-Vol. I', No.8, Oct. 1944, p •• 8.

SaPac Fighter Direction QellU"_ Fuuctlons of the Sourh Pacific :E. D.O.. center. "C.I.C."-Vol. I, No. 3. ~Ia)' I 94'l, p. 38.

"T,,"e Ouer, V~<ll(l'1 FDO!"

What [his job is and what he lias to work with. '·C.I.C."-Vol. I, NO.9. Dec. 1944, p. 19.

This Is FighltJ1· Direction.

Scenes (mill a film on Fighter Direclion. "C.I.C."~Vol. '. No. 5, JuLy 19H. p. '.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

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61

U. S. F/tu:t ]'l(jilIiT Gontrol mid Fig/I!er Direation Doctrine.

upporting do trines and in tructions

lrorn . loA. the . FIe t Current

actical Orders and Doctrines. 1914. .. . T.C."-Vol. '. No.2. "prj] '9'14, p. S8.

GON~RXL Wad, Cals and PT's.

olomon -based P'T''s and P·81·S Black GalS [cam lip ill the olcmcns against t.he J~ps aud carve a l)CW chapter in Pacific warfare, A rticle describes radar's

role in Llle combination.

"C.L 16.

Don't Loob i" the Wrong Direction.

. ,,'liming from dmirnl imitz against ralHn!\, [or enemy deception. "C.I.C."Vol. I, NO.9, Dec. '944. p. 21.

Protection from Aerial Bllrsl B(JIIlb s,

Suggestlens for prote Ling per onnel and equipment from Japanese aerial bombs, incJ udlng a description of two o[ the more common types ol aerial bomb". ·'C.l. :'-Vol. I. No.2, April 1944, P' 36.

Imitation a Responsibili!)' o] Unit COIll- 1na"ders.

Reccmmeedaclens forestllbiishing conditions in "an effort to improve living conditions .... 1. ,"-Vol. '. o. 3, May '941. P·37·

Tile Flyillg Bomb.

A short descripuonol the original German "Buzz 130mb" and, countermeasures tbat have been evolved to combat it. ."-Vol. I, o. 6. Aug. 19.14. p. 19"

IFF

Are You Sabotaging the IFF y.!tem'

A detailed discussion of IFF and how its success or failure is affected by area command r, O's oE a ship. quadran or base, pilots, radar matntenance men, and flight operations officers. "C.I.C."-Vol." NO.7, Sept. 1944. p. I.

>C>!

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IFF un CR !J27A.

Instru lion. and explanation o[ mao terial necessary for the installation or R "50 IFF equipment on the SCR-527A. "C.I.C."-Vol. 1. o. I, MaTch 1944, p. 30.

JAPANESE CO TERMEASURES

A. Japanese Radar COlllltermeosure .

Enemy c:m.ploymenl oE a radar countermeasure in the Pacific area, 11.amed, by a Marine unit. " iuno." "C.I.C:·-Vol. 1. l\lo. 2, -"prJI '9'14. p. 3'l.

62

CONFIDENTIAL

Jt\PAN-' .' 1 D R BU1IIIils Use Radar.

Information concerning JaV nse ot radar as received from prisone 01 war, ca.pLured Japanese documents, and reports from our own Iorce wi(ll illustrations or .Iapnirbor)le radar fOf surface search. "Cl.C."-Vol. I. No.8, Oct. 19.[4, p. 22.

Eyes and Eats of COIl.lItenneO ures.

Reveal! ng the tactical uses and effecrlveness or enemy radar equipment and our types o[ countermeasures in defeating their purposes. "Cl.C."-Vol. I, I O. 8, Oct. J 91-1" p. 27·

Japanese Rodm·.

Report on lyp ,characlerislics and performance or Jap radar equlpment=airborne and shipbome-ns discovered by intcrcepi, phorograptnc reconnaissance. and. (rom captured equipment. "C.t.C." -Vol. I. o. 7. cpt. 1944., p. 12. ---

Tile ,"\ilennel! of jajlanese Radar.

Recent information concerning enemy radar installations and usage as discovered oy .. noopers' near Truk, .... I.C."-VoJ. '. No.8. Oct. 1944, p. 24·

I l'A !ESE TACTIC 1;fllm~y Air Tactics.

The Importance of knowing about enemy tali . with it report on Japanese Z 1"C;1 tacri a related hy or a.ir pilots. _. .r.C."-Vol. 1, NO.1, (:l(ch '9.14. p. 33.

• Vighl Fighler Direction.

WiUl 1J1e necesshy for husbanding his air power lh Jap i tUTning more and more [0 low visibility attack. Explains the techniques of combatiug such attacks, "'c.r. ."-Vol. I. NO.2, April 1944, p. I.

Night Fighters Report 011- ,up Tactics.

Action reports on attempted Jap inter-

ceptions. "CJ. ,"-Vol. 1, O. 9, Dec.

1944, p. 4'7·

Noles on Ai'r Tactics Ilseti by the Japanese.

Bomber and torpedo plane tactics or the ]::rpancsc ill the Paoli ... .t.C."-VoL I. No.2, Apl"il 1944, p. 35.

Prophecy.

Japanese Bettys versus the nlghrfighters oE VM17 532( ). ·'C.1.C."-Vol. I, No. 4, jOl'le 1944, p. 7·

J01, T ARMY AND A V\,

DD's IJIld Arm.y Planes Team Success· fully.

Dest1"oyen; Leam up wjth Lhe army P-38'S ill ouUlwest Pa ilk amphibious opera-

tions at Lae, . insch a ven , :-lew Britain and f1i;'lk. "C.1.C."-Vo1. ,. o. p. 17·

Removi'lg the /J[Yl/er}, from "il " NometlclClture.

Presenting a chan £01' quick translation O[ Anny·N",vy radar3nd radio designslions. "C.I.C."-Vol. I. NO.9, Dec. 19,14, p. ~.

AVl TI N LOTan, the liIcctroujc fl{ligfljor.

A complete slory f)f Long Range Navigation-a 11C\V radio instrumeru-cincluding its history. possibilities, [ pes. opera· lion, and where training of personnel is gi CII. .. .1' • ."- 01. I, 10, ,0 L 191'~. p. I.

i t'7IJ Precision PPT Repealer.

An excellent aid (or navigation or for auxiliary fire control as well as search and track. Outstanding is peater's ability 10 enlarge any se tors desired on a new "n- cope." "CJ.C."-Vol. " No. '1, Sept. 1944'.J1. _2~.

T1'Y These Vmm Methods,

Helpful sugg lions on landfall and area searching. .. .I.C."-Vol. I, NO.9, Dec. 1!lII, p. 32.

NIGHT F1GJITl C Combat Lessons.

Relates system of LC3m training for GCI conrrollers and pilots regarding llcighL reading, plotting, computing, azimuth reading, and night lIghter tactics . " .LC."-Vol. I, No. ". July '944, p. 26.

The art of conducting aircraft inte cepuons at night and during 1'OOUCOO vi!; hUity. "C.I.C."-Vol. I, o. ,~, June 1944,

E.:.2.:

igh: Fighter Direction.

Wilh the necesslr for husbanding his air power tile Jap is turning more and more to low vhibility attacks. Explains the techniques of combating such attacks. ... r.C,"-Vol. I, prj I 1 911>1, p. I.

right Fighter Squadron.

The first Marine ['right Fighter Squad. ron in action. in the South Pacific, relating the tactical employment of PV's ill countering the Jap over the uadaleanal, Ru ells, and lunda areas. "C.r. ."Vol. I, No.', laTch 19114. p. I.

Night FightC'rs Report 011 lap T'actics, Action reporl$ On attempted Jap in ceptions. "C.I. ."-Vol. I. NO.9, - J94~· p. <17·

/\'jghl lntcrccptions in the olomons.

Experiences of Commander W. J. Wid· elm's igb[ Fighter quadrcu. "CJ.C," -VoL I, [ O. 4. June 19-14, p.

Nine Mimdes to iTT/ana.

A "perfecr" night interception. ··C.f.C." -Vol, t, 10. 110 May t.g14, p .. 26.

Revised Fighter Director Vocabulary,

An up-to-date listing of fighter direction vocabulary [or d;l)' control of lighter aircraft either under shore or ship control, RjT IFF code, RJT code used with night tighten; under here or hip control, and RJT code for visual control of fighters. .. J. . 0 t. 19# p. 18.

The Night Fighter, the Cart: twd Feeding of.

A digest on the physical and menial requirements of me successful night , reladng special pha es of the air ground training involved. "C.I.C."o. 5, Jllly 1944, p. s r.

Two gills, 011e Probable.

Action report and conclusion as reo I orted by IT quadron One during enem night raid, 14 April 1944. "C1 .. "Vol. I, No. ;), Jul)' 1944, p. 28.

hat to do to Improve Night Vision. How to make best use of eyes at night.

I' t (he Various factors UlaL aJfect night vision, .0. 'I, JUlle 1~1,4, P·25·

PUBLICATIONS AND FILMS (Hrli.~pcfJslJbie R D Guides.

Publication notes of these standard guid . on radar, plotting, and Cl . *~G.1.C ... - 01. J. NO.9, D . 1944. p. !p.

I'll b lla« lions • R.1!:{:I0'/"ts ami Training Films.

A compilation of reports and publica,iOIlS 1" levant [0 ail' warning, issued b various army and nav activities. "C.r. ." - 01. I. No.1, l\<1.aIdJ 1944, p. 37'---

Repon« amI Publications.

Repol'ts and pu blicanons of interest to radar and Iighrer director personnel, pril L944, P: 51.

Report!> lind Publications,

Supplementary list of relerence materia) on aviation, communication, fighter direction, and weather. .. .1 •. "-Vol. I. :-:/0, 4. June '94-1., p. 34.

Reporu aud Publicntlous,

supplemenlary lin of recenl I'eports publicalions. "C.l.C."-Vol. I, o. S, Ma}' 194'1', p. 38.

R.\DAR

VCf.cdillg (md Trllcldllg l1il'CTaf' OVIIT Land. Formations,

uggestions lor Increasing the ability of the radar operator to identify aircraft o"e[ land formarlon • ~, pril '9H, p. 25·

fode Charts Wit/milt NfIJlhemntics.

Explain rue "why" of facie charts and hOI., the can supply valuable information with the radar gear in operation. "C.T.C." _ 01. I, '0. 8, Oct. 194"1, p. 30.

"P;lJO logy " . haracterisu echoes a' seen

and evaluation of radar by the Tadar opera WI", pril 1944, p. 19·

The Effective Maintenance of Radar.

A letter from the Chief of the Bureau et hlps to Lhe CO's of all vessels in commission on the importance of proper maintenance of radar equipment. "C.1.C."' -Vol. I, o. I, March J.944. p. 36.---

Tile Hear! of Microwave Radars.

'\vb a t the crys tal recri fi er In ea ns for optimum radar operation with a reprint of a Western Electric Bulletin on the proper handling of these unit. .. .1.C." _ Vol. 1, No. 'lo ept. '944. p. 48.

RADAR DOl\1l3ING Bombing Pammushiro Through the Overcast.

Ta tical u e of the ,\' 0 and APS-·3 geu for blind bombing attacks as reo ported by quadron VB-l§!l of Fair;Vlng Four. "C.l.C."-Vol. I, NO.7. Sept. 1!l±!! P·7·

Pin-Point Bombing Without Charts OT Tables.

What the new Nj PG-/I radar bomb release equipmenr will do. "C.J.C."-VoJ. I, o. 9, 1)ec, 1944, p. ~3.

RADAR-FIRE COl'T'ROL Fire Control Radar totes.

Excerpts from hip reports on fire control radar with comments bv the Bureau of Ordnance. "C.l. ."- Vol. I, 10. 7. "epl. 1944. p. 30.

J\'{lIri7le Corps Dejens« Battalion.

.\0: and surface warning and radar fire corurcl ill the defense bauallcn. ·'C,I.C." -Vol. I. NO·3, lay 1944, p. 19.

1. CUI Precision PPI Repeater.

All excellent aid [or navig-d.tion or [OT' auxiliary fire control as well as regular search and track. Outstanding is the reo pruner's 3 bility LQ enlarge allY partillll.lar seeton; desired 011 a new "8- cope," "C.l.C:·-Vol. I, • o. 7, ept. '94<1-, p. 22.

The J\1a'T/{ 8 i5 Dearlly.

A deadly complement to thetleets' big guns, the Mark 8 i discussed a to its use and limitation in spotting. "C.l.C,"_ Vol. 1, No. ,Oct. '944, p. 36.

The Marh 8 and ShortJ Bom/)(Irdmenls .

A report 011 the versatililY ot the Mark 8 ill fleet operations against enemy land obje lives by presenting recognizable radar patrerns. "illustrates the "B scope" in action. "C.I.C."-Vol. 1, No. A. Oct. 1944. P·39·

What A bQt~t LoD,! A "gles.

Explains the low angle. coverage and operational Iimitaticns of the fark 4. 12, and J!~ fire control radars. "Cl.C."-Vol. " No.6, Aug. '944, p. 14.

RADAR PATTERN

/iartll urvatuTe omograph,

A practical aid [Or esnmaung when vour radar will pick 01) land. "C.I.C."Vol. I, NO.9', Dec. 1944. p. ,~8.

" PilJOiogy."

Characteristics and evaluation of radar echo as seen by the rada r operator. "Cl.C."-VoL I, No.2, April 1944, p. ,g.

PPI Pictures Call Be Predicted.

Explains Lhe pro nciples o~ [be new "Radar Planning Device," covering Its development and tactical uses. n .1.C.n-Vol. I, TO. 6, Aug. 1944 p. 1.

PPI Presentations.

descrlpucn of III 1'1211·1'0 Irion Indicator MId what advantages and limitations may be expected. "C.I.C."-Vol. I. No. I, March 1944. p.2g.

PPI Victu of Southern France.

the assault beach. Dec. '944, p. 35·

The Mark 8 ami bor« Bombardments.

report on the versatil i ty of the ark 8 ill Ileet operation again [ enemy land objectives by pr enring recognizable radar patterns. Illustrates the "B scope" in action. "C.r.C."-\/ol. 1. 10. 8, Oct. 1.944, ]1. !l.9.

RAD R R~PEATERS

"Map-in-Motion" PPI Repeater,

The versa Lile P PI repeater is discussed l'egardillg il$ optical system, construction, pre;entation, and a\lllUability. "C.I.C."\'01. I, No. R. Oct. 1944, p. 34.

CON FI DENTIAl

63

New Precision PPJ Repeater.

An excellent aid for navigation OT fOT auxiliary lire corurol as well as regular search and track. Outstanding is the repeater's ability to enlarge any particular sectors desired on a UCIY ·'B·Scope." "C.I.C."-Vol. I, NO.7, Sept. 1944, p. 22.

RADAR -SHIPBORNE Meet the Modernized SG.

The old reliable SG gets its "face liEted" with new and useful modifications which will give better definition, better range and bearing indication, and other improvements. "CJ.C."-Vol. I, o. 7, Sept. J944, p. 20.

SG Troltble Shooting.

DesLanc's trouble shooring chan:

"C.I.C."-Vol. I, No.2, AprIl 1944, p. 31.

SU Radar is Put Through its Paces.

Results of recent tests made near Bermuda to determine the performance and target discrimination of the SU radar. Oomplere illustrations show zacdcs employed. "C.I.C."-Vol." 0.8, Oct. 1944. p- 44·.

>-~

-c ::J Z «

....,

RAO R-SROREB SED ~lIitttd" attd the 527.

A liandy gizmo easily constructed which facilitates reading !.he HfR cope of the

CR-527. Related to tlds is the Height· Range charts for the SCR-527 which is another aid fbr accuracy in altitude determination. "CJ.C."-Vol. I. o. 7. Sept. 1944. p. 24·

~zimutll Dial for 270 Makes Fast Reading.

A unique arrangement of azimuth dial over the se,epe of CR-270. "C.l.C."Vol. I, No.2, April 1944, _po 32.

Calibratiofl Flights tor SCR'52'7'~'

Checking altitode accuracy of the" 527 and suggestions for improving operating techniques. "C.1.C."-Vol. I, 0 . .2, April 1944, p. ~5·

Chart of hare Based Radar Equipmefll.

Gives lype number, packaging, cype presentation, eie., on the following radar equlpments:

Ircralt ea rch G J

urface earch eaeoasi .Eire Control A_ A. Fire Control earchliglH Centro!

"C.l.C."-Vol. I. NO.2, April 1944, p. 33,

IFF Ofl CR 527;1,

Instru lions and explanation of material necessary (or the in tallation o[ R -150 IFF equipment on the CR-527A. "C.l.C."-V01. I. o. 1, March 1944. p. 30•

64

CONFIDENTIAL

Protecting Land-Bt1sed Radars.

How to dig in and camouflage radar sites. "C.l.C."-Vol. " '0. I, farch 1944.

~

SB Radar.

"Stop-gap" lightweight air 'earth equipment Eor use by Air '\Taming Squadrons and Argus Units. ··C.I.C:·~Vol. I, No. I. March 1944, p. 27·

SCR-527 otes.

Observations on a 5::!? at 'Roi Island br Argus 21, and other comments on operation and mainlenn:nce. "C.LC,''-Vol. I. NO.3. May 1944;. p. 29·

Siting of [t.fobile GCl.

Beach-siting and overwaier calibration of the SCR-52? In the olomons. "Cl,C." -Vol. 1, ! O. 1. March 1944.1'· 17·

nap Siting Dnd Calibration.

imple rules for "look and guess" siting of GCT and Long Range Air Search radar equipment together with general procedure ['Or calibration. "G.l.C."-VeL I, NO·4. J line 1944"' p. 17·

Sur/ace Seorc/, is Vital to Base Deiense.

Surface Search Units play an Important part 10 base and island defense systems. Diagram!Ded is a typical base telephone system, linking all defense activities together, "C.l.C."-Vol. I. NO.7, Sept. 1944, p. :!6.

Stlr/aCIf Search Radar Equipnle'l1l-S0.,N, SO-7M, SG·2S.

Illustrations and descriplionoE new mobile surfaee search radar equipment. "CJ.C,"-Vol. I, No. I, March 1m, p. 25·

W Lightweight Aircraft D(tector.

Description and illu trarlons of the model SW ( /TP'2) radar. "C.l.C." -Vol. I. No.2, April 19#. p, ~9·

Use/Ill Chart for iling SCR-270 and CR-271.

setul chart in Siling long-range air search radars find for making snap esrlmates of set performance, "C.l.C."-Vol. I. NO.4, June 1944, p. 20.

W/lat /I!~ Q'7M Can Do.

PerIormance data on the truck-mounted sllrfaceearm radar with PPI presentaLion, 'Tests conducted by Pacf lee; Radar enter. "CJ.C."-Vo1. I, NO.7. Sept. 194cl. p. ~9·

RECOGNITION AND IDEI TIFTCATION

Bogey.

The sad results of improper recognition procedures. "C.l.C:'-Vol. I. o. 9, Dec. 1944. p. 10.

Wrong Challenge.

wbat'bappene when warships improper. ly challenge merchant men. "C.I.C."Vol. I, o. 9. Dec. 1944. p. 42•

SEC RITY

PUTPO e atld Use I'IJ Code Names.

A reprint of CominCh letter to all ships and stations on the purpose and use o( code names. "C.T,C.n-Vol. 1, NO.4. Jtme '94<1·, p. 33·

SPECIAL DEVICES Imagination and COnlCf" Re/fectors.

Description or the effectiveness of refle tors and the variety of U5CS to they may be put. "C.l.C."-Vol. I, Oct. 1944, p. 46.

PPJ Piatures Can be Predicted.

Explains the principles of the new "Radar Planning Device," covering its development and tacrieal uses, "C.r.C."-Vol. I, 0 .. 6. Aug. 1944. p, I.

RPD in the Mariallos.

Report on use of the device at Saipan. and announcement of a new manual. "C.LC."-VoI. 1, o. g. Dec. '944, p. 46.

TRAINING

tJ.rmy Radar Aids the USS HANCOCK.

Repon of fighter direction exerci in

the Gulf of Pania near Trinidad, result of aTtny 'uults learning up with prattle carrier force. "C.I.C:'-Vol. I, No. Sept. 1944, p. 16.

As.lembl), and Trailling of Argus Units 011 th« West Coast.

Relating the role of Port Hueneme. an Clemente Island, and other mainland air stations as they fitted into Argus Trainillg .. "C.I.C."-Vol. I, '0. 1, March 1944,

P·7·

BO.f;';: Traini"g Program for Radar muI P",·s01llwl.

g-raln. p. 36.

C01ll/)l1/ Prob! '/1!,1 Train Escort. GlG Team,".

RQ ommendarion and instructions cone Filing rna neuvcring coruests for training .Ie personnel as suggested by the S CAl'/NO:'-l, "C.l. :'-Vo!. I. No.8. Ou. '!!!;t. p . .J!j.

til

The Night Fighl~r the Ca1"(' and Feedillg of.

dig .[ on the physical and mental ]'«11 I i rernents of [he successfu I night figblcr, relating special phases of the air and ground training involved. "C;l .. "\'01. I, No, (,. Jul)' 1941b p. ~ l.

Lntun, the Electronic (!lJig%r,

,\ complete stor of Long Range Navigalion-a new radio lnsrrurucm-sinctudlng Its history, po sibilities, lypes, operation. :111(1 where training or personnel is given.

.C:·--Vol. I, No. . Oct. I I.

Training Films.

oomprehensi e list of U. . Navy training fi.lm, on radar and fighter dire - Lion ... .T.C."-Vol. I, 0.2, ApriJ J9-I-I, p. fI·J·

Training of ir l'Faming 'quadron •.

Organization and training of Madoc Air Warning quadrons lit Cben)' Point. "CJ.C:·-Vol. J, No. 3, fay 194~, P~

Treining ()f A'rgl~1 Fighwr Dirertll' Of(iCtlr.j at SI. i ilIOn's.

I. imon's is the sole ualutng center 10[" new FDO's. The cu rr iculurn pursued is iketched. "C.l.C/'-Vol. I, '0. I, Ivrarch '!HJ, p. 6.

NOER \ A'l'ER I)ETECT10N

Harbor rulenoater Dcll:cli{)1l.

Methods of detecting approa hand 10- ca lion of enem y vessels and in [ormation necessary for successful, cou mer-attack i og. "C:.r.C:·-Vol. 1. In. 5. July !944. p. 2'[.

ETHER lVII/til· lind Wclltllcr.

Bending and Duct Formation and its relation to the meteorological factor involved. "C.T. ."-Vol. I. NO·5, Jill '9+4,

r.:...?..:

Iladar Storm Detectlm),

\ Bl'W field of del ection clcsely a"~ociuted with the tactical ut.ilization or radar .1Ilt! o[ interest to ,,11 fighter direcror and radar pCI '(;I 11IIe I , ,~~ well as aerologisrs. .. .I.C:·-Vol. I, 1':0. ~, AprilL9.1..j. I~!!:

Ire'll/Ita.

, eather Information 101" til FDO and how it COin be obtained at advanced has '. . .• 1. .:·-Vol. I, No. ~. June "9.]4. p. 15-

C.LC. DISTRIBUTION

BA K

E V ILABILIT

Prepuration. of Air II'IImillg • quadrons for OVeT5e(lS Dut .

Final L['llinillg and preparation 0 J"1 1VS for overseas duty. "C.I.C."-Vol. I, No. 3, Ma.y 194>i, p,q.

liiII...'rlT G.<1111"'· T)"I).i115 Thousands [or the

_lie WU"·. -

A comprehcustve '11I'1'c), or the Pacf'lee; Radar Center, describing various types oC 11':1.[ n i ng and courses riven. t ypical dass s hcdulc is lisie L "C.l.C."-Vol, I, NO·7· epl. 19+1· p. 3-1~

A II issues are available wub the following exceptions:

March, April, and )lila)' issues ( olurne I, lOS. I. 2. and 11) ate no longer available; june issue (Volume I, NO.1) is available in lirnl ted q uaauues.

}.TAVY REQUE T

Request)! for back issues and su bseq uent issues or ··c.l.e." should be addressed; he Chief of Naval Operations, Editor of " . r. •. ", \ ashington 25, D.

ARMY REO EST

Arm commands and acuvlrles desiring to receive issues ()f "C.T. ." should direct tbeir requests to:

Adjutant General's Office, Operations L\ranch. Room 211939. Pentagon Building, \'\'ltllbington 25. 1). C.

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1/(111", Sl/IjlJrt> Dctrotion u! ,4(h""'cerl \:ml(ll lJ'ISfI·.

"~6 and 137 surface detection compo.1l~-tJleiY organizaticn and training pI'lor to ultimate assignmcn: Lu advanced b,I<e>. "C.1. ."-1'01. I, No. ~, "'1)1'.iJ '91.10

1~ ... :1:

fluid IImlt·d.

Prcl! 1I1111RI')' in I ru uen display board at i'<R S. SL. Simon's. "C.I.C:·_ 01. I, i>.IO. :1, ~Iay 1911. p. 27.

ON IN

"C.I.C."

CON FIDENTIAl

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65