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c. I. c.


CIC Ope1'ation 011 (I • ighl Carrier Fighter Direction in an A mj)/ZiiJio /I Opera! iou Oiren '/J! tJetthillg uf J'inle1l1ws . , .

Hollywood trikes at j(ljW'1l f/ J-1 F-K ey 10 111S/(1I1 {(111t'O liS COif! m't~nic(IJ ion« T1'iplc T'hrea! Radur A Pilot Discouevs Radar




"X' Will MlLrh the I)ot for the Fleet' Big UIIS 37

potting-Ill Action! 10

TIll' Echo Bos, or How to Kcet) a. Radar Health,! 13

Fingerprinting Jill) Radar 46

Lessons Learned: Excerpts [rirm A ctioti Reports -1

Wamil1g on the

e of (')mll

A o1tfidential magazine 1mblished monthly (lY the Chief of Naual Opera/ions for the injormation of commissioned, lVa1'1·( enlisted personnel al1d 1Jersolls authorized, whose cluliies a1'C connected with the tactical use and opemlion oj electronic and associated equipm·crlt. The ill{ormalion; canta'ined in this jmblicalioni.s


and a uch shall not be transmitted 01' reuealed ill allY manner, 10 any unnutharizeti jJe1·SOlIS. The /ntblication i to be lu).ndl«d in accordance with Article 76 U. avy Reg,ttlations, (md will be destroyc« /Jy inrrning when it has serued its fJU1'pose. Neither quatterly 1'(1)o1'15 1107' reports of burning are required.

This asui other copies of "CLe." shall be included with other classified material which is to receive emergency destruction in. the evenl'/ at /Jossi/)1e loss or ca/)i111'e. Commanding Offi er oj uaits em plo» d . in Landi ng operations or sim ilar hazardous (htl.y are directed 10 destroy or land this jJ1lblication prior 10 these operation. «.1. ,." shnll not carried [o« use in aircrolt,



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B the Fighter Dit CtOT Offi er, U Independence

In Jul' of 19-1-4· the IN EP' NDE i .E started operating as. a n izht arrier after the . qualification of her night air group. This immediately brought to the Iorefront a series of probl m for Ie l hich her tofore had not been encountered. t the pre em writing, the bulk of these have been ironed out. but it i b Ii v d that a di ussion a them may b of alu t Em Ire night arrier and air groups.


Inasmuch as night operations do not affect the

. lise of the radars. enlisted operators and plotters carr on much a they did before, except that. it was found nee sary to have a few mol' men pel' watch, Thi wa more the re ulr, howev T, [new pi e I equipment rather than the fa t that w were perating at night. watch in thr is standard for th enli ted per onnel, with a sufficient nurnl er being on duty to hand! all ontingencies. Thi does away with the necessity Ior an interm . diate Condition watch. A General Quarters watch bill is provided, but in general, Ie efficiency is greatest with tbe murine watches, mainly becaus CfC is n t fined with personn 1 who do not bay' much to do. and who erely rv to fill space .

. h offi T' wat h bill pre ented a greater problem. inasmuch <U. not all f th fficers v ere qualiri d for night interceptions, hu ne e i aung a di- i ion between day and night. Thi wa solved satisfa torily b running a straight watch in four with "day" officers. who [Inducted the routine Ie operations. At night. in addition to the Cl : watch officer, a night qualified officer wa placed in e C in a uper isor capacity. and one quadron night ontroller was also on dut . Hen ,aL niglu [her were thre offi er to handle intercepts or control plane airb rue. and at th ame time

carr on routine J I u in For lusiv J1'

nizht carrier, howev . it i re ommended that aU

I officer be qualified as niaht controllers. This would prevent a division in the watch bill and all Ie routine and the handling of aircraft could be carried on rezardles of the time 01 day.

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Interceptions at night are rim dir tl from t.h remot PPI opes, which hay b n equipped with 12" tubes'. The SK radar i u d e clu iveJ)


on the PPI scope, with the SM furnishing altitude information, and rate of close of the night fighter when within contact range of the bogey. he advent of nigbt controllers and the ease with which inter epts may be Tun from the s ope, have reduced the use of the intercept plot tables. De of these will eventually be removed and replaced by another remote PPI, or 'VG Projection PPI. Theecond intercept table is useful for computing and is equipped with a Craig Computer. vertical plotting beard i used for keeping a complete picture of the tactical situation, showing aircraft as well a positions of task o-roups and pickets, so that the night lighters may be kept at a safe distance from them.

great aid to successful interceptions has been the setting of the G-band IFF to the SK frequency, so that it shows directly on the remote PPI scope. Since this has been done, there has never been 311 don bt as to which is the night fighter and which the bogey.

Mer a number of months of night Bying in which varying numbers of night fighters were used. it was found that the maximum number of fighters that auld be handled efficiently by one ship was two, and this number seemed to provide mfficienr protection for the cask group. The number is limited by the controllers and scope available. At the present time with greater numbers of fighters airborne it was found necessary to tum control over to other carriers of the group.


Communications have been a constant problem in night operations. night fighter without communications is not only useless, but presents the almost insoluble problem of getting him back to base, usually by resorting to an intercept.

After trying constantly to maintain good communications with only fair success, it was found necessary to install duplicate VHF radios in each night fighter. Since this has been done communications have been very good, and a large part of the worries of CIC have been eliminated. For a nigh t carrier, there should be installed. both on the carrier and in the aircraft, the best possible VHF equipment. This point cannot be stressed too much.


Getting the planes back to the ship on a dark night or in bad weather to a point within visual


range has probabl cau ed more ., weating it out" than any other single thing in CIC. The only solution has been to put a night controller on the1 scope to maintain con tam conrrol until the pilot reports, "See you." Night 8 ing planes should be brought in on a ve tor omewhat to the side of the carrier, otherwi e they rna fail to see it and fiy directly over, continuing on away from th ship. They hould al 0 be brought down while on the vector toward the ship and not afterward, otherwi e they are likely to drift away IT m base. It is very embarrassing to give a plane .. ,hattie" and find that he is n longer anywher in the vicinity.

In addition to the ; device, or and YM

equipments have been in talled to make homing easier and all pilots should be trained to use it. The need for this trainin becomes critical when communications are bad. C1C must strive ceaseIe sly to improve lost plane procedure for use at

night and to learn the best step to take in overcoming various degrees of radio and radar failur . GIC's worrie will be Lightened consid rabl if the difficulties are explained to the pilots and methods suggested whereb the GUl aid CI in getting them back to ba .

As an aid to the pilot, during inter .epti ns and even while orbitting on station, the fighter should be given frequent "stee s" to base 0 that in the event of his getting beyond radio range or in the.' e ent of complete radio failure. he will ha ome means of returning.


FaT the landing of aircraft at night, the visual fighter direction tation is manned and "Snap" gives the planes their turns around the landing circle. This has been found -"ery effective and the pilots appreciate the assistance. Snap is also useful in homing the planes when CI no longer has them on the scope, due to their entering the ea return at minimum range.

At the outset of this ship' night operations, art Q radar was installed just forward of the landing-

signal officer' platform and wa used to track lanes in the landing til" le, wi th a vie' to tting an ideal track on the short ranee scope. Thi would have proven most ffective during very low

isibility since til planes could be kept on the. track and turned at the proper points 1 hether they were' i ible or not. The Q hart range, hov ever, was too b cured b ea return ·01' omplete effectiveness.



In the three months that the S I fDEP D-

E E has been ~ ith the Fleet a a night carrier, operations have been successful and have proved beyond d ubt rh value of a nizht carrier. Se enty-f e percent of the 1 ogeys that have been in a po ition for In terception have been shot

own; the other twent -five percent e caped because of lack of radar inforrna ion or jaulty altitude determination. ince the bogey hot down ~ ere apparently search planes or "snooper " it is believed that .. plashing" them has often pre- en ted further nigh t atta k .

For the most part, the Japs inter epted have been very elusive. emplo ing rapid changes of altitude and quick cour e changes. In everal in-


ranees they ha e apparently detected the approach of the night fighter and turned awa while the fizhter was still 15 to 20 miles away. Many have dropped "window" in front of the night fighter, but were shot down, probably still wondering why the "t indot .. did not protect them.

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"With a bogey closing the for e directly. interception rnu t be iriitiated at a minimum range of 40 mile" in order to allot ufficient time for the night fighter to be put on the bogey's tail and to develop a contact before the planes get within firing Tange of the ta k group, The night fighter must use all possible speed in the earl, part of the Inierc ption up to and including the cut-off vector, in order to speed up the interception and

btain a contact in the early stages when it is most valuable.

AU operations to date have shoi n the basic training in night flying operations and in fighter direction to be sound. The Ie sons learned" hile in contact with the enemy 11Ave been largely amplilication f this training,

"Action. orne"" in lilt! II DEPENDE. CE CIG.


T?e of, a Figllt,er Dire tor. in an amphib- cially trained in Amphibious Fighter Direction

IOU peration Iogi ally fall into the thre d associated enlisted pe~ onnel. The number

main pha e E uch an perarion and D's ° u ed vade with the size of the opera-

thara.cter of the dutie differ widel in ea h phase. tion, and the number of Amphibious Task Groups

that 1 • approa 11, a aulr, and con olidation. independently approaching the objective, In the

,It migh~ be :vell at the outset to state briefly th pa t this has been from two to four. The FFDO

Fighter .DirectIOn set-up which 11a been used .with assigns the duty either to the GC or one of the

uccess in past operations, The Commander Air DD'S, depending upon availability, condition of

upport Control nits ( U). attached to the gear, location and the general tactical situation.

taff of the Commander Joint Expeditionary Fa ce , In the event of large raids or several raids at on e,

lS charged with the direction of aU aircraft at 3.1] divisions of F' may be a signed different FD

amphibious objecri e and aU plane approaching ships. Or control may 1 e pas d, after a raid de-

the area must rep rt in to him. he CU has velops, to the DD in the best po ition to handle

attached to hi staff th Force FDO (FFDO), to the interception, and in this way,onuol may be

whom i delegaed the ta k of handling all plane in several ships during a single raid.

u ed for the defense of tile obje ti e and units in The FFDO coordinate the activities of all FD

the area. Both the CASC and FFDO are em- units both, ashore and afloat during the early

barked in the mphibious orce Flagship. hases of the operation when the over-all responsi-

mphibious Fighter Direction teams re 'lity for air warning and figh er direction remains

ble to the C through the FFDO are em- afloat. His duties further in lude: (1) recom-

barked in DD' e pe iallt quipped with We radio mending the stationing of th several de troyers

and radar gear 1.1 ssar for Fighter irection. designated as FD ships from time to time; ('2)

The e team can i t of one Or more FDO' e pe- coordinating their fighter direction assignments

with firing and other mis-

a mph i b i 0 U S operation iO:st:~;~g.r~~d(3)ore~~!-

mending the number of fighter for .'\P over the objective; (4) defining the areas of responsibilitywheTc more than one CAP is to

be employed or two ships are controlling at

the same time; (5) initiating appropriate warnings of impending air attacks; (6) handling the preliminar breifing of the teams prior to the operations on important tactical and trategic matters, and (7) generally acting as liaison officer between the staff of the ] oint Expeditionary Force Commander and the various FD units. The CASeU makes arrangements 'with the OTC of the carrier gtoup for the CAP, and usually at the request of the FFDO requests additional VF for expected raids and emergencies. The FFDO must be advi ed as to the number of VF assigned to him, when they are due, the duration of the patrol, the location of the carriers, and whether or not any additional planes can be

crambled, In return, he advises the controlling FD Un i t of thi information.

hus when we speak of the duties of- an FDO in amphibious operation, we refer to the FFDO

fighter direction





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and the teams embarked on- the headquarters ship and DD's, all acting as a single coordinating unit.

1n the approach phase the duties of the FDO mayor may not actually include Fizhter Direction, depending upon the physical location of the carriers furnishing the air over. 1£ they travel in the same can oy with the transport Fighter Direction may be and often is retained by the carriers themselves. If, hov ever, the carriers are operating independently a considerable distance from the formation, then the responsibility of defending the task force from air attack falls upon the Fighter Direction Organization which has been set up to operate at the objective. During the approach, the duties of the F 0 are practically the same as those of a Fighter Director embarked in a carrier and charged with the defense of a carrier task force, "with the one exception that the number of planes available may and probably will be imaller, The size of .the CAP normally on station under way will depend on the probability of attack in the area and the number of planes available to protect all forces in the area.

Since it is imperative that the task force, its location, size, composition, course and speed, be kept secret, the F 0 during the approach is vitally int rested in so oper and hads, as is the FDO of a arrier for e. T'l ey must be dere ted and if possible intercepted and destroyed before the discov I' the force or report on it.

Durine the assault phase of an amphibious operation, the Fighter irector Officer normally faces his heavie t task, Both day and night air raids are almost a certaint I and the FDO rnu t prote t the hips at anchor, the troops and equipment a hare. earch planes at anchor and aloft in the area, and at time independent surface units opera ing eparatel but in the same general area. The latter may in lude forces retiring andapproaching J$e objective. This responsibility rests with the amphibious FDO at a time when in all probability there is no landing strip for shorebased planes, and little or no. radar gear ashor ' He may be called upon to protect a rather large area with a small CAP and with little likelihood of obtaining more planes in time to repel a large attack. Thi requires the FDO to exercise caution and judgment in the use of his planes, their ammunition and fuel. He may find it necessary to "play them close to his chest" and keep his CAP on station until a raid is definitely committed for a target which comes under his responsibility.

An illustration of the problems encountered

occurred during the early _ da of the aipan



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operation. Lat on the afternoon of D plu 3, a large raid approached th objective from the South. The CAP which apparentl numbered less than the raid was stationed at the southern tip of

inian in a position to intercept. Some 20 miles

outh of Tinian, the raid turned east to attack two groups in that area, and was intercepted by the carrier CAP. It was neces ary to maintain the GAP on station, notwithstanding they knew that the bandits were eros ing to the carrier area. Finally portions f the raid di come in toward Saipan and T'inian, an interc ption was quickly made and orne dozen enemy planes shot down with no damage to the force ashore and afloat and only damage to one defending aircraft. Had the interception been attempted farther souththe CAP would have been involved there, and no planes would have been available later for the defense of the objective.

On another a ca i n, a raid approached to within 35 miles, then turned awa for other targets; the CAP was not VI" tared to 'intercept but was kept between the raid and the force ill a good position to intercept if the raid turned in.

In this phase, the FDO is not so concerned with snoopers and shads, He may be able to vector a portion of his CAP out after them. but there may be many times when he should properly ignore them. They may often be deco s. After land based planes arriv . the F 0 may be pro perous

n ugh to go after an b (Fey within radar range, bu he must alwa maintain snff ient cover to protect the beachhead and ships supplying it.

Coordinating control of night .fighters and planning the defense oE the forces against night air attacks is perhaps the most importantful1ction of the FFDO during the assault phase. Every plan must include arrangements for hifting control quickly from one FD unit to another, when the tactical ituation so requires. FD destroyer units initially must be stationed on outlying picket stations so as to provide the best possible radar coverage as well as the rna t trategi pain ts hom


which to control the fighters. This activit i most important. (N)VF's may be upplied by V's in the earlier stages and by the Army or 'Marines after an.air strip is acquired or constructed ashore. Altitude determination is the biggest problem. U all goes well ashore, 527 radars may be in opel'ation 'within a few days, and in this situation, it . well for control of (N)VF's to be passed to ill !VIA W or ADC ashore. But the installation of 527's may' take some time and may be delayed by battle eventualities, and during that time, control of ( )VF's remain afloat. When GC are equipped with altitude determining radar, the control should logically be retained there until the forces ashore are equally well equipped. ntil AGC's are so equipped, the FDO may have to ",p) content with stop-gap measure such as rel upon D pickets to relay altitude when the raid comes within ranee of their fire control sets. The difficulties with this procedure are man: it permits the raid to get too clo e to the objective and thus does not give the FDO sufficient time and distance to "put his VF on" before the raid c10 e to AA range. Furthermore, raids freq uent change altitude radically after closing to within the picket line. Despite these handicaps, some

uccess has been met by u e of this procedure.

a small part of the dutie of the FDO ill onnection with ( )VF' is the protection of them from fire of friendly forces. With a large force in the area, including th creen and radar picket which may be widely di per ed, it is next to impossible to handle the ( )VF so that at aJI times he is clear of all ships, And if night raids have been experienced, the tendency is to shoot fir f and identify later. This may make it necessary for the FDO to keep al1 forces advised where the (N)VF is operating. And in all cases, all hands

should get the word over the TBS and other necessary circuits of take-offs and landings if such require the aircraft to fly low over ships. An low flying craft, not visible on the screen, danger unless appropriate warning is given.

not all hip at au objective have TBS, the ~arning may ha e to be given over several nets imultaneously, he FDO should leave no stone unturned to protect his night fighters. . he pilot has enough on his mind without having to be concerned about being shot down by ships on his

ide, At Saipan, an AmlY pilot came up on the ghter net and reported to a Ja y FDO, "That Navy ship is hot tonight; that AA is too damn close," when a DD opened up on the night fighter.

Another important a pect of the FDO's respon· sibilitie is the arduous task of following the position of all night A p, especially where VF ( ) are airborne. In the event of an attack, ASP must be cleared of the area and in general mu t be care-

ly tracked at all times so as to eliminate them identifying an contact. here cannot be too much supervision of the ASP at night.

While the FDO normally has no direct re .ponsibility to protect the forces .fr m enem surface craft, he must be informed at all time of all surface units within his area in order that he may

scertain the forces he is called upon to protect. his information should be available to him in the Cf.C of the AGe.

In the consolidation phase of the attack. COD- 0'01 of VF may pass to tbe Objective commander .or rna be retained afloat, though rhe tendency in the Central Pacific has been to retain it until over-all on trol pa e ashore. 1 hich has been after the sarris n tr p and upplie ha e b n landed and the a ault troops depart d or re-embarked, There i little difference insofar a duties of FD per onnel i concerned for if antral pa ses, the FDO afloat will probably be required to stand by to take over, to give information to and check with the force ashore. If COUtTo] is retained, the forces ashore act as standby. In either event, the character of duties changes as air raid b orne tess frequent and friendl aircraft traffic increa es to

ge proportions. Transport plan , search nes ambulance planes, P plan abound, IF failure are f-requent, and the business of




checking contact increa e proportionately: Here the duties of the FD are very irnilar if not identical with the ADCC and fA T;,;V Squadrons.

The . FDO, as distingui hed from the amphibious FD organization, during all three pha e of an operation is charged.with the duty of warning all forces ashore and afloat of impending air raids o er the appropriate warni 19 I ets. If he has not been authorized by the Flag to set conditions blue; red and white, he must work in close cooperation with the Flag dut officer in setting the e conditions. He evaluate all information received from FD Destroyers and radar gnardships as weUas from the GIC in the AGC, and from thi information he designate raids by number, and gives information over warning nets concerning location, course, speed, altitude, composition and any other pertinent information about raids. Again if he is not authorized to do so himself, he must work in close harmony with the Flag duty

officer in seuing gunner conditions. he im-

portance of this cannot be over stre ed, If . raid is to be taken under fire VF planes must Be:-' called off before the reach range; and conversely if better esults can be achieved by letting the VF's take 011 the raid, AA fire must be withheld. These decisions must be reached quickly and all forces advised promptly over the necessary nets.

Fighter Direction at the objective in an amphibious operation therefore is of such a nature that in many respects it differ widely from the concept of carrier based Fighter Direction. In the use of orbit points, reference points and in many other ways, it include aspects of land-based Fighter Direction. The duties and responsibilities are manifold and versatility is the keynote. Only thorough coordination and team work can obtai the nece ary results. This is the basis of effectivel countering new J ap tactics.





Others rna)' flot haoe found as gooel a solution as you have to some I1l1Tticular problem. And thety ma), need that sohdion-ftl,ed it badly, at sea, on. land, or in the air.

The so11 of thing we refer to is fmJt:tiMl ideas 10 we in VIC, In fighter direction, in night control> i-n gtN.ting extra vallie 01lt of search 9T fire control Tada_, in the use of eledronic mds in rnzvigation, in communications, in ,adio and ,adar countermeasures, in the use of mdar as an aid to gunmry, in air-sea rescues, in anti..rubmarine waT/are-in short, in any activity rllated to the If!Ctical and operaUOMI we of ele:ctranics.

"c. I. C." pram to devote 0 Sllction in ruc{;eed· ing issues to your use in Cionveying such items to other reade,s o/lhe magazine. The ideas should be ones which )Iou have actually wed orn:l found helpful. The point is the import4nt thing. These itenu will probably be brilf; they are better that "'0)" in lact, for then we can print more 0/ them.

This wiU be your department. StllTt firing in the items immediately, to the Chief 0/ Naval Oper, • lions, Editor of "C. I. C.", Wruhington 115. D.

by airmail.




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I HT th u and miles Irom okyo on the s~mmery • ast oa t of Florida is the aval Training School (Ta tical Radar). Located

within the Hollywood Beach Hotel at Holl wood, the eh 0] Was inaugurated 1 March 194 J. under the direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Naval Per onnel, with the ommander in hief of the

. .'1 t maintaining primary intere ~ in regard t CUT icul urn and Our material. By dire ti n its job is to "train officers ill the tactical employment of radar, and in cr , organization and op-

ration" for all surface hip ex ept carrier.

In a true sense the school strikes at Japan [u L as surely 0 the big B-2g' , for the trainees (some 170 ea It month) are the futur m r of Combat Information Center on battleships, crui ers, destroyers, and other combatant v els, It is these om er wh will determine the torpedo caul' e will end more of ojo's combatant hip to the bottom. nd it is they who will determine


The tactics course covers all basic fleet tactics. H cre the illustrates cnlumn movement em a 12 ft. polar cotable especially constructed 10 shaUl fleel matUl(£vers. Il.S a.s torpedo approach and $hore bombardment procedure.

ranae and hearing of Jand targets for OLlI hornl ardm nt for e hammering the beaches of 1 i P territor .

An indication of the training which thes hown b the fAct that on I J ober J g<H, th mmander in Chief ol III .. FL et, and the hief of aval Operations

commended the Ta tical Radar chool in part as r( llow :

"It is considered that tb Commanding fficer, aud staff of the ubject chool, in a minimum f tim , attained a high I el of a hie ement, loth quaJitatively and quantitarively in graduating officer who reflect uperior training and intere t in ornbar information center."

10 t of th 081 ers of the taff arne to the school from actual combar billets in the Pacifi , tlantic, and the • iropean theatres 0 "war. "It

was the ,. ays the hool C mmandinz 081

"who built the I cture curses modeled after the

cmands of the Commander in Chief; it was their enthusiasm which fired the first classes before t11 schooJ actually organized itself for full operation." These officers are rotated with other officers drawn directly 'from combat in accordance with the rotational training program. Today the staff presents to the student aceual battle experience gained in every single major combat up to the present day. Their intimate knowledge of naval warfare instills confidence in students towards course material and towards their own effe tivenes later as radar officers on board the ship to which the are assigned. Realism in training is believed in at Hollywood. and the curriculum provides a reali tic backdrop against whim the future CIC officer can see the necessity of teamwork to meet combat conditions.

The vast amount of information, both theoretiand practical, that the student must absorb or competent handling of CIC work could easily

require twice the time allotted. As icis, however, efficient officers must be trained in a two month period. This puts quite a burden on the officer student, and it simply means that he must put hi entire effort into an absorption of detail to . meet the necessarily high standards set.

Obviously much of the course deals with the fundamental knowledge and experience on "( hich the eIC has been and is being built. The efficient eIC officer must have a sound knowledge of radar theory and operation, of tactics and 'gunnery, of sound powered and radio communications and the functions and uses 'of the various plots.

A full month, at a minimum, is required to in till the ba ic, material in the student offi er's mind. The latter half of the course develop the application of this knowledge to problems set up in the chooI' Cl mom.

Throughout the course actual shipboard equipment is used with Little deviation from operating


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~ NTS (J'R) at the Hollywood Beach Hotel is ideally situated lOT leaching tactical radar as i! relates to the surjace problem. Set ot the edge oi tn« bench , the whole upper (lonr of the 1i00el houses the tactical rador school. TIll's view shows the various surface search, fire control, and air search radar antell1lOS. This school has 35G'S. ISC,.j, :1 SK's, 2 MK-4, I SA·!!, ami I ·L.

conditions found at sea, An artificial noise level in the CfC's is deliberately im~osed since Hollywood's experience has been that training in a realistic serting=-rather than the ideal-will produce optimum manual and mental dexterity for difficult shipboard conditions,

To get a dear picture of what is taught at the Naval Training Sci 001 (Tactical Radar), let us look into the details of the school curriculum, and see how it works.

The school is divided into six different departments; the GIG Department, Navigation, Gunnery, Communications, Radar Theory, and Fleet Tactics.

radar theory and operation

Since development of the CIG has closely paralleled the development of radar. one of the school's most important departments is Radar Theory and Operation, staffed by officers with a wide experience in installation and operation of radar on various types of combatant ships, includlnz

1 . 0

su imartnes.

In the early days of the Pacific war. surface search radar was in its infancy and air search sets had not yet reached a high degree of efficiency. We found out the hard way that these shortcomings often meant the difference between a decisive victory or a pummelling at the bands of the enemy.

Basic radar theory and good operating technique are the sine qua n n of CIG. and this radar theory course receives all possible attention. After



a great deal of effort, backed by shipboard and ing ex perience, the department's staff prents a teaching program of radar theory in layman's language and [rom the layman's point of view,

'Vith extensive visual aids and a minimum of technical terms, they give a comprehensive picture of the parts played by echo ranging, pulse width, and pulse repetition rate in the general principle of radar. After this introduction rite student is assigned to a radar set to learn operating and search technique. At the same time, the department stresses training in identification of echoes, interpretation of target signals and the effect of atmospheric conditions on radar per[ormance. In all, twenty hours of lectures and at least an equal number or hours, through day and

ight watch standing, are given each officer on air d surface sets ..

The school operates ]0 radar sets, including SG. SK, SC-4. MK.-4. SA'2, and SU types. The I 10 foot YP boat, u ed Eor surface tracking dri lis. also is eq ui pped wi I h two operation a I rada ria 111 III ers with associated search receivers and pulse analyzers. and provides valuable training in the important art of countermeasures.

Since no controlled aircraft targets are available LO the school. except for scheduled fighter direction demonstrations. the Mark 29 Trllint'ra device lor introducing synthetic pips on the scope-is used ror drill in tracking air tnrgets.

Before completing [he course. the student 1Il1Lst check out on the various radars to insure his operating proficiency. He is also checked on the operation of the VG projection PPI and the OA V jammer trainer, as well as the AN/APR-I search receiver-pulse analyzer combination and the antijamming receiver of the SC·SK series.

J' ~

~ Rear v;roJ of amphitheatre classroom. Here the radar Ilteory instructor uses ulsual aids ill th« (orlll 01 g;tWI lI/wlogratJh.s tllld moch-llp 51( set. Wit" ll [e-like visuat aids, st udent» are lhorollglt/y imloctrillafed wilh tile intricacies of eaclt radar set before lie is ClI11ed UPUIl to lise actual equipment.

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~ During the last montn of the two m01l1l1 course, the "tudtmt~ splmd one-hal] their entire time in CIG's. The photograpt« illlL5lr.q},§s students "participall'tlg in realistlc problem:s in Ii large .~hjp Iyjll! ClG. Each student rotates through each CIG PQsitioll d1triJ,g thlS'

month 0/ p'ar;ticai work. In this manner each student is made conversarll Tuilli lite uihole ClC operation. •


Equally important with early radar detection of he enemy is the tracking of enemy hip to picture thei actual and probable movement. These plots provide the material for rapid-fire solution for cour es to close with th en em or t avoid his fire. Lack of training in urfa e plotting and the inability to solve maneuvering board problems under pressure have been co tl. hips have been 10 t be au of faulty information passed to the bridze=a hip turning a port instead of to starboard and collidinz with a sister ship; another running aground aft r turning th wrong wa. to avoid a collision.

To help veliminate 'such costly mistakes the officers going through hi chool are thoroughly

trained in all phases of urface pi tting x ork, I can tant drills in the fundamental of this work so that the mechanics of reaching a problem's

elution become second nature.

In preparation for ad anced CI traimng.

daily drills are held in methods of keeping the various surfa e pl ts, teaching their uses and limitations and the s Iution E th relati rna emerits problems in olved, Much of tbi time (s:! hours) i spent working on actual plot 1I ing univ r al drafting machine and maneuvering board ..

o correlate. as lar as po sible, the instruction of all departments, emphasis is placed on relative bearings, tarzet and track angles and relative movement problems. he la ter includ stati keeping, approach and base torpedo courses a smoke laying. DRT plotting pra rice and .instru


lion pT ide training in determination of target com es and peed and the bombardment problem. rodent officer are shown .he place for and the value of short-cut solutions that can be worked directly on the DRT.

Many of the officers attending actical Radar ch 01 bring with them particular problem the have faced at ea in onvo -.; ark and ill cornbatant ship formations. Often the school presents to tbem for the first time the surface summary plot and its true value in the identification of surface craft,

We have all beard of the occasions when. under cover of darkness, an enemy submarine or other combatant ve sel, ha wormed its way undetected into a forma ion of our ship. In. e eral cas good summary surface plotting resulted in identification oE the enemy before any damage was done.

vVith ernpha is on the application of the surface summary plot WOTk to actual battle conditions, the. navigation staff employs a minimum of lectures and a maximum of practical work to show the plot'S primary and secollpary uses on ships of various types: :.~

To tie the se era! phase of the department's instruction into a cohe ive Whole, before practical work in the. GIG's begins, a cries of plotting drills has been worked out for five-rna teams. The e teams can ist of an assistant evaluator who solves the nraneuvering board problem, a urface summary plotter with an assistant, <!nd~'iO DR T plotters. Synthetic problems are constructed and set in operation by an instructor who Iurni hes succe sive ranges and bearings to target and friendly ships.

Every effort is made here to train eIC officers in all phases of the surface problem. Bombardment is no exception, Training stresses the technique " of making a landfall by radar, tile preparation and u e of contour templates and the theory of navigation by minimum ranges. This recalls the Attu and Kiskaaction under foul weather conditions with constantly poor visibility. DUTinO· the entire operation our hips depended almost entirely on

~ )11 NTS (TR) thet« are three large sllip type CIC'~, and three small Ship rrype CIC's, each completely eq14ippccJ llIiIJl the latest shipboard itlstrit1Tl'etl'l:s. Each ClC hILI its OTUn bridge. The 011.6 illustrated above is a small ship type bridge.

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~ NTS (TR) controls its realistic problems inc threeproblem rooms simillir 10 the ai'lli' illustratea. above. Here {he tactical problem is created alld sent IOnt1ord to each. GiG 10 simulate actual condltions, By all eloborute patchboard system. all GIC's and bridges can be connected together to opuflle a~ a tosk unit, or llley rna)' be di"i~led so as 10 oppwe earh other ;11 a tactical exercise. A"y series of ship combinations can be achieued thrQugh this patchboard system.

radar for supporting gunfire, piloting, and ship. to-shore movements of assault boats.

A sound working knowledge of the navigational problem has paid dividends many times over. One case stands out clearly-that was the night the RADFORD took three light mine-layers into enemy waters to lay a perfect four-mile mine field under protective low visibility. She went in entirely on SG and sound information. The few visual bearings obtained checked exactly with the crc plot. The operation could not have been carried out without the SG radar and excellent CIC plotting.


In a fairly recent action in the Pacific. a lack of understanding of tactical signals resulted in an unfortunate collision between two powerful units of our fleet.

The above and numerous other experiences lead to insistence that Hollywood graduates have a thorough understanding of tactical orders and signa Is in order that they can efficienrl y stand C1C watch in a fast moving task force. This train. ing is provided by tile Tactics Department under experienced communications and radar officers.

Basic instruction in ship formations, dispositions and maneuvers is built around cruising doctrine, night search and attack, and approachnnd retirement courses. It also includes carrier operations. emergency maneuvers and picket and guard shi p d II ties.

During the twenty-five hours of classroom instruction and practical work, a clearly outlined background of actual combat experience is developed to focus emphasis on tactical problems. Throughout the course war experiences and battle reports are discussed to present a clear concept of basic principles underlying fleet tacti "'1

doctrine. ~

Action reports on air attacks, submarine war-

fare, surface engagements and amphibious opera· ns are reviewed for graphic portrayal of enemy tactics, U. S. Fleet tactics, mistakes and new developments.

More titan half the course is focused on basic tactical publications and their proper use. By constant reading, discussion. game board problems. and quizzes. students develop a familiarity with the tools the eIC officer have to use aboard ship.

As the tactics course progresses, appreciation is instilled of the part CIC plays in assisting Conn, and how necessary it is that Cl C anticipate and understand tactical signals. Tactics today are complex, especially to the officer with little or no sea experience, and while the school does not try to turn out tactical experts. students are expected "to have a sound grasp of tactical principles.

In the early formation oE the school, great difficulty was met in presenting the tactical problems to the student. 'This is understandable in light of the maze of knowledge he is required to absorb in the 'Other branches of CIC training. But firm belief in the value of a fundamental knowledge of tactical maneuvers, led the school to develop a

onecial visual aids department whose specific job s been to create a method of teaching with greater ease and to provide fuller understanding by the student.

Incidentally, the Visual Aids Department has created visual material in almost every phase of the teaching program 50 that now the most complicated theory is simplified with giant photographs, charts, and lantern slides.

But to get back to tile tactics course. The first step was to create a 12 foot polar coordinate table. This large table is located in a specially designed amphitheatre so that the students not working at the board have an opportunity of observing the problems.

For more personalized instruction, only a small number of students are assigned to each practical work period. Teams of three operate with a "tactical officer," "signal officer," and a "ship operator"-sLtip models, painted according to type, are maneuvered on the board by signal.

During these problems Iull use is made within each team of the General Signal Book. Visual Call Sign Book, General Tactical Instructions, and' USF lOA. With the instructor call ing signals. (he signal officer finds the meaning which the tactical officer interprets. The ship operator. in addition to aiding the tactical officer. maneuvers the minia[me ships and keeps his small maneuvering board plot. Student discussion of the sixty-odd signals which each team must execute is encouraged by staff officers in charge.

school. with 153 going to aux iliaries: 151 to CinePac: 70 to Newport (large ship pool); 54 to COlCPac, and 2.2 to Cotc1ant. A tOL,1 of 22 were retained For varying lengths of time on [he staff.

In addition, 225 from NTC, Miami. ifio from the destroyer pool at Norfolk, 80 Coast Guard officers and 70 officers from Cotclant have received two months' training and returned to their former stations for further orders.

As part of a large rotational and refresher policy for eIC officers, a new group reported aboard NTS (TR) on 1 November 1944. for a one-month refresher course. These officers have had exten-

. sive combat experience in some phases of CIC, and afterintensive schooling to broaden their CIC field. these officers are placed iIJ. selected CIC billets.



student resume

Since the Tactical Radar School was started in March, ]944. more than 1,100 student officers have been trained and graduated as qualified CIC watch officers. Of these about 1000 took the twomonths course. and about 150 have gone out from a one-month course, which started 1 June to train CIC officers with some previous sea experience.

The students are ordered to the school on :m assigned quota system instituted by Bu Pers, The long course draws 10 each per month from Cotclant and the Coast Guard; indoctrination schools supply 45; midshipman schools 10: shore establishments 10; NTS, orfolk, Va., 20; and NTC Miami. Florida. 110. The short course is drawn

tirely from Ootclant, 25, and CotcPac, 10. uring the first eight months, 472 officers received Buf'ers assignments to sea bil lets from this


, I u
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~ In lhe cO'llmulliClIlions procedure raom (It , TS (J'lt) .tIUJc:rIlS are tOllght SIP procedure (111(1 tile cnre of the eqllipmeut, HUe, also, proper It/?' proce(lwl"e is drilled into each studen! as toell ns the use Of Me 1~71ils. Drills coordinated tuith instructional sound l"ti:C01-diligS bring 1"Iifllism into the imtructioll conrM.


Most of us are familiar-at first hand or throuzh

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acuon reports-with. the confusion that results

from poor communications, whether due to equip. ment failures or to personnel shorrcomings. 1n many early air battles in the Pacific, fighter direction efforts were weakened or failed completely because of disregard for discipline or becau e oE ignorance of procedure and equipment. On the

other hand, alertne to go d communication

practice has foiled enem attempt to e plait me of our previous shortcominss. On one occasion an enemy pilot who had been monitoring OUT frequencies, posed as a friendly spotting plane

during a shore bombardment. sinz correct pro·

1. 0

cedure, he directed our hips to fire on an Anzio

bore target, 't lib later proved to be one of OUI own hare partie. An al rt communications officer called on the pilot to give the code word used to au henti ate me age. When the joker wa unable to d 0, hi little trick was exposed.

To avoid fatal mistakes caused by cornmunica-


non errors and to show the vital importance of efficient inter and intra-ship systems is the underlying motif of the training provided by the Communications Department.

This department draws a graphic picture of

hipboard communications and presents it as b ing the vital nerve system through. which all shi departments are fused into a successful fighting team. To focus the picture more sharply, it is

hown through action reports that many communications failures are due to human weakne signorance of pmper procedure, and failure to maintain circuit discipline.

Much emphasis is placed on ound powered and voice radio communications, Supplementary work

vers phases that the CI watch officer must know, such as radio eq uipment and designations, despatches, voice cards, and amphibious task for e .omrnunications,

he doctrine laid down in C BP-3 and' the minCh Telephone Talkers Manual is strictl followed. Primarily, however, emphasis is put 011 trier ircui dis ipline, prop r han ling f t phone eq uipment and the talker training p ~ams on board Ship.

Communication pro edure taught in lectures coordinated in daily drills, which are made as

omplete and reali ti as po sible, In a special communications room, containing thirty-five indio vid ual booths each wired with sound powered and radio telephone outlets, these drills give a true-tolife emphasis to the importance of correct procedure.

Transmi sions, couched in proper language .. are fed through loud peakers, so that all students hear the conversation and thus are able to correct mistake.

At various stages of training, more realistic drills are 0'1 en by utting in various IP and R;T circuits front the IC switchboard in the school's CTC's where advanced problems are being run, These transmissions are reviewed with constructive en ticisrns.

_ A magnetic wire 'recorder, supplementing the daily drills, plays back transmissions by the students to illustrate errors in procedure or the need for voice training.

, nnery

With the development of radar has grown the importance of the part it plays in the gunnery picture, Dot only in the actual training of the batteries on the target but in the placing of the ship in a good firing position.

The gunnery course presents a general outlineof the gunnery department on board ship and the torrdation of its activities with the functions of ClC. The ten hours of classroom work emphasize the duties of personnel, as well as gunnery and me control installations, their uses and limitations.

If the CIC is to function efficiently as a source of information for the Gunnery Department, its personnel must have a live understanding of gunnery's make-up of men and equipment and of its many problem. Students are trained to know these problems 0 that, under combat conditions, they will be able to anticipate quickly gunnery's needs for CIC information.

fighter direction

No attemp i made at Tactical Radar School qualif intercept officers, but the chool does

'to i e future CI Officer thorough training in the need for and maintenance of air plots, an important functi n of s ipboard CI 'so There is no separate figh tel' direction department. This phase of the work is carried out by a division of the CIC Department.

Para] leling the surface instruction, classroom hours on the air problem are devoted primarily to actual work on the plots. tracking aircraft and determining courses and speeds, as well as tile e aluation of radar reports. Students are trained in communication procedures squadron organizetion and performance of the combat air patrol. the basic types of raids and the mechanics' of intercepting them.

The duties of the fighter director areoutlined and, complementing the instruction of the Radar Department. the advantages and limitations of radar in air work are- explained. Action movies and other visual aids help to provide a realistic background. Reading of prescribed action reports, air doctrine and other material dealing with the air problem is required.

Bridging the gap between classroom work and training in the CIC's, members of the staff stage a fighter direction demonstration, based in good part on the actual combat experiences of the "cast." Similarly, the synthetic problems provided in the CTC's reflect the first-hand knowledge of air actions brought back by the staff officers.

C I C department

The more clearly the ClC watch afficer realizes the problems that, face the command tile gteater hi value to the ship. While the school is concerned with the actual functioning of each individual in CI ,the major goal is to clearly outline the contribution of Cle to the efficient operacion of the individual ship and of the task force.

o far we have covered the relatively large mass of information and instruction taught separately by the various departments. All of this would Jose much of its value if left uncoordinated and uncorrelated. The important work of weaving these educational threads into the clear and definite pak rem of the shipboard eIe is the function of the

I Department.


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This department directs classroom work and the team drills in the eles to round the student into an efficient CIC watch officer.

Tactical Radar students are given a thorough tryout under the closest approximation to shipboard conditions; but, the final test of an officer comes when he is under the stress of combat action-then, and only then, ' can his moral courage and his training be truly judged, "We try with OUl' best energies," Hollywood's Ccmmanding Officer says, "to pl'epaTe eaclr officer so that when that time comes he will not be found wanrinz in him-

• 0

self nor lacking in the training he received on NTS (TR)." He adds, "It

is reassuring co me co see the high type of reserve officer being trained to man important combat positions aboard ship. I firmly believe that with the excellence of the technical equipment now in lise, with the hig-h enIII usiasm of the staff officers of our various rraini ng schools, and wi th . the men and officers who comprise our Navy today, victory most assuredlywill he ours. We, of the Tactical Radar Sdl001 at Hollywood, are- doing our level best to make our 8-thousand mile strike at Japan reallycount,"



These views siunu two t)'pical turge '),pe ship CIC's installed at NT (TR). 1n photograph "A" the usual standard CIC equipment is show". III pllOtograjJ'l "ls' mOTe advanced CIG equipment is picilired, The advancement i technical equ.ipmelll in tile las ),ear can clearly be seen in thes« two CIC's. Notice' in "B" the PC (fr1'oiecI1~on PPl) sets, Notice als() tile bulkhead remote PPl as CQmpared 10 the cabinet ttype in photobTl'llPh ".1". E-ven the status boards 1'(1 this more adT~flced CIC are edge-lighted luaite,


a troublesome problem, 'Vas it better to break radio silence and disclose the position of the force, or would the bandits perhaps pass abeam without sighting the force? If they sighted our ships at closer range, would there yet be time to warn all ships presents Wieh fighters overhead, the usual practice was to open up on a high-frequency ('lr· cuit, probably being tuned in on hy half a dozen jap direction finders, and vector the fighters to a spot where they could do some good,

This was. the situation before VHF entered the communications scene, bringing a certain amount of inherent security- with its "line-of-sight" range under normal conditions 'and hence some relicf from the familiar, vexing problems. In additic .. n, VHF, which is adaptable to plane-to-plane and air-to-ground (or ship) use, has valuable functions too numerous even to list.

Even with VHF, however, security 'may often become most uncertain, VHF range may be greatly extended by "guided propagation," If the

key to Instunruneeus communications

You would be amazed if you counted up the ". umber of people in the Navy whose only duty is to pass the word along. The absolute necessity Ior this network of communications has been

_demonstrated by the loss of capital ships through communication failures and, on the contrary, by smashing defeats administered the enemy when communications operated like clockwork.

The necessity for split-second timing, reliability, correct procedure, and circuit discipline is perfectly illustrated in fighter direction. Our radars can track attacking enemy aircraft and our fighter planes have the speed to intercept them, but these two advantages might be nullified without adequate communications to enable the fighter director to get the fighters to the right spot at the right time.

Concise plain-language messages over instan"!'I~eous radiotelephone. are absolutely e sential in .1:h combat situations. nut, from the first day that radiotelephone was so used. security has been

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enemy listens in on voice transmi ions and obtains information of strategical or tactical alu, the security angle becomes very important. 1V know the enemy does thi , hen he has the chance. This i a hazard which mu t be weighed again t advantages in every combat situation.


Rei ia h lecollllnttn i a tions cannot be ex peered beyond certain di ranees. Clear, easily understood siznals for £jah er direction and aircraft control can be expected at maximum lange when the planes are flying above 10,000 feet, and tests have shown that communications up to 200 mile can be a complished when plane are at high altitudes. Beyond this range the VHF corrununications disappear and are not u ually subject to interception by the enemy. rea onabl accurate range estimate can be based on the old "line of sight" criterion. This does not take Into account non-standard, or "freak" propagation (di cussed later under PropagaIA:orl) and "masking" caused by obstructions in the path of the VHF trans mis- . sian.


The band extending from 116-156 megacycles i assigned For aircraf communications and has been channeled on a 180-kc. basis. The "frequencies the~ein have been assigned for Army or avy use. QUite a few changes have been made in this band with respect to allocation and uses, but the existing plans call for British- merican use of these frequencies for ail-craft communications, including control from ship and shore. Certain channels ,,,ill he common; others will be used for indi. vidual types of aircraft or special nets according "to the exten oE the operations. For fizhter contT?l, four channels are now provided, but these 'will eventually be replaced by 10 channel in aircraft sets. Joint or combined operations may require still other channels to or between Allied

aircraft. .

VHF will not be the only means of communicating with aircraft. Because of the "line of sizht" characteristics of VHF and its consequentlyO restricted range, it is nece sary to maintain channels in the lower freq uencies for longer-range comm unirations wi til SCOll t born bel'S, torpedo pl an es, and other types of aircraft. During the transition period from MF /HF to VHF, MF /HF radio will continue to be used in tighter aircraft and it i entirely probable that some MF /HF channels will



continue to be useful for communicating with lon~ range fighters used fOT sweeps far into ene

terntory. /


Combat operations bad shown that communication policie needed complete revision in order to provide reliable communication not on Iy between planes and between aircraft and ship and shore stations but more especially between aircraft and con rol centers (GIG and Air Operations). In order to revise these policies, the Bureau of Aeronauti undertook the task of "modernizina" air-


borne radio equipment and the Bureau of Ships

set in motion the machinery for putting the proper equipment on Navy hips and at avy ~hoTe stations and advanced base. The ATIllY, 0 Its part, delved deep into the problem of providing. VHF equipment for its planes and ground

tan n .

The BC-639 and BC-640 (wi th the nC-G38 frequency meter for setting the 639 on frequency) is an Army 50-watt VHF. Thi set is al 0 used in the Navy both" ashore and afloat. The SCR-522 (or its modified type CR-624) is also used as io v

power VHF in the Navy, as is the crystal-c trolled one channel VHF-the TDT (transmitter) -RCO (receiver) combination.

New equipment in the 'avy consists of the TDQ-RCK combination which will cover the entire band from 116 to 156 megacycles. In aircraft the AN/ AR -4, a four-channel crystal-controlled radio. is gradually being replaced by the new ARC-]. The receiver and transmitter units il the ~RC-l are contained in one case, and provide l~ different channels which can be selected by the pilot changed and tuned up in onl three second. At reasonable altitude of [Tom 8000 to tO,OOO feet, it ranges up to 180 miles.

There are two special ad antazes a ailable from the new HF aircraft equipment: one, accidents may be decreased in number because the landing signal officer on a carrie can "talk" the pilot in. as , ell as to ignal him in. landing siznal frequency has been provided for this purpose. Two, ~tmospheric .interference is eliminated. 'ormerly, ill order to in ure adeq uate reception the transmitter power had to be sufficiently high to override atmospheric noise levels. In the new VI F equipment the same distance can be 0 ered as ~Il -the MF but with le~~ lower, because hig Signal strengths ate obtainable at low levels WII . .." less' power and because there i less noi e on VHF.

In order to provide lighter equipment and power advantages for ornmercial and nonaircraft in the United States, the CAA is nowestablishina- VHF range stations at important poin throughout the country.


When, frequencie below appw}"'1mately 3° megacycles are employed. the radio wave call follow the curved surface of the earth, and the communi arion range for a given frequency of this 0 called "grouhd wave" is normally limi ed onJy by the transmitter power. Hlzher frequencies in general tend to reach shorter dl tances than

A. Commlmirnli(m P()ssi"'tI.

D. Communication doublflll or impo5sible.

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lower frequencies. For frequencies above 30 megacycl es, the limitation of ransre begi ns to become serious. The "radio shadow" cast by the ed e of the earth become harper, and communiCation is ordinarily pos ible onl if the tWO antennas are within "line of i bt." The higher the antennas, therefore. the greater is the range .

Actually the problem is somewhat more omplicated. Receiving antennas wiJthin the "line of

ight" pick up two sets of waves: one comes directl throuah the atrno phere and the other is reflected from the ground. The net re ponse a the antenna is the sum of the two sets. ne cannot assume, however, that "two , aves are better than one." IE the difference in length between the direct and the indirect paths is such that the vibrations of the two wave are opposed, they tend to cancel one another. When this a ClUS, the resultant signal intensity will be far less than either wave would have produced alone. On the other hand, there will be certain region of space when

ne two waves will reinforce one another and result in a very intense signal


bus, in the spa e surrounding the transmittin . ant nna, \ e an define regions where the signal .int mit is hizh and other where the ignal intensity is low, An iUu tration of this intensity pattern i called a "coverage diagram" because it represents the exll"eme ranges to , hi 11. a given signal intensity may be traced and therefore depicts the coverage of a receiver of specified sensi-


The pattern oE "lobes" of maximum signal intensity varies somewhat with atmospheric condirions. We can make such a picture therefore only for what we term a standard atmosphere, that is, a well-mixed atmosphere. standard atmosphere is one in which the temperatU1;e decreases nOTmally with height 'and in which the water vapor content also gradually diminishes toward the higher levels. When standard conditions prevail, the range of most VHF sets will be appro imate~y limited to the optical range. The fact that radio waves are curved slightly downward in their path through the atmosphere tend to increase the ranges slightl . The intensity of the received signal is very sensitive to antenna height for the hequencie employed.

There are numerous records available however, showing that ran tr es have occa ionally been observed well beyond the optical limit. These extreme Tanges occur a the result of unusual atmospheric conditions and may be referred to as non-standard propagation. The effects are more pron unced when a temperature inversion exists in tile first few thousand feet of the atmosphere, that is, when the temperature instead of decreasina with height firscincreases and then

tans to decrea e. ssociatcd , ith such tempera-

ture increases we usually rind a decrease oE moisture content. he tWO effects conspire to bend the radio wa e back. toward the surface of the eartl where they may bounce on and on to very great distances. Instances of reception over more than one thousand miles have been recorded.

Betwe n the top of the layer of in ersion and a Iower level J~,,?hich may be me surface of the earth), the atmosphere tends to form a Oft of "duct," which traps the radio v aves at lower levels and condu ts them to ranges far greater than normal. Within the VHF range, the trappingeffects tend to be more erious with the higher 'frequencies, but all HF ft'equencies may be subject to such peculiarities when the inversions are sufficiently intense.

Under other types of atmo pheric conditions,

for example, when advectivefog is present, or in



the process of formation (caused by advection of warmer air over a cooler surface, a common occurrence in the Aleutian Islands and off Newfoundland), we may encounter the reverse effect: an appreciable decrease of ra.nge. The actual ra~ges attained tend to ary markedly with the height .of. the two antennas. For example, if the transmitting antenna lies well above the top of the duct, the range for a receiving antenna close to the surface of the earth and well within the duct, may be reduced.

'Yhen radio equipment appears to fail. the

..,;operator should not jump to the conclusion that ~on-sl'andard ~ropaga.tion is necessarily responSible. Defects IU equipment or faulty operation may cause effects that are similar to those of nonstandard propagation. The operator will do well to remember that non-standard conditions are often unstable and that the signal intensities may Il lIc.tuate. enormously, perhaps by 20 or 30- decibels III the course of a few minutes.


(a) Turbulent well-mixed atmosphere such as produced by high winds, rain, or storms.

(b) Rising convection currents over land.

(c) Cold climates where there is little or no moistLITe in the air.

(d) In general, conditions associated with a barometric low (stormy weather).

Under anyone or a combination of these conditions, VHI! communications should be normal and range of communications should be essentially "line of sight" or slightly better. Thi~, of course, is possible only with correctly functioning transmitters and receivers, and a properly sited ground station.


(a) '''ann air blowing over a cold sea.

(b) Air aloft settling down, being warmed and lying on top of colder moist air (common in the Horse Latitudes).

(c) Cooling of the ground by radiation, on clear, calm nights.

(d) In the tropics strong trapping effects have been observed in the trade wind region. with a wlnd,velocity from two to ten knots.


(e) In general, conditions associated with a barometric high.

U nder. tl~ese condi tions "freak," long-ra commurucanon may be .expected, although generally there should be no difficulty in maintaining satisfactory air-ground communication.

A peculiar condition, usually associated with te~perature inversion, causes dead spots and un?eltevably long-range reception. TheVHF energy IS apparently trapped and may travel hundreds 01 mi.les \~ilh no noticeable attenuation; yet a plane fl~ll1~ J~~s~ above. thi~, layer ?f "trapped energy," wllhll1lJ~e of slgh~ . of the ground stat jon. may have considerable dIfficulty in receivinz the sisnals. "'lu:11 the receiving antenna in a; aiTpla;e has an altitude of l,40 or more above the horizon of the transmitter antenna, propagation tends [0 revert toward standard.

This peculiar effect indicates that it is no always possible to increase the range of VHF, or othe: high frequeo:y equipment, at some particular time by merely increasing altitude. Pilots and radiomen should take this into consideration. and lighter direction personnel should be pre~ared to acceptslldden changes in readability of Signals because of these effects. Circumstances pennitting, it might be advisable, in some cas . to have a plane decrease its altitude, even wh

on the. "h~rizon," to re-establish or improve communicauons. Such action would hinge OD whether altitude or communication was more important at the time and on an understanding of the effects of the atmosphere, at that moment, upon the V~F signals. The pilot of a plane may often recogruze the presence of an inversion at high altitll?e by the fact that the atmosphere is usually quiet Dear the level of inversion. For plane-to-plane communications, it is frequently dangerous to By too dose to the inversion level. The inversion, or duct, forms a "barrier" throuzh which transmissions may be difficult, especially when they take place at a grazing angle.

Because of the importance of propagation and the need for effective use of the available information, a sub-section has recently been formed i? the Communications Division of Naval Operanons for the purpose of disseminatin ... data for

• 0

operational use. Meanwhile, aerelozists and


aerographers are being trained in tbe use of

atmospheric sounding equipment and in the techniques of forecasting the occurrence of inversion, so that the radio operator may be forewarned and be prepared for the occurrence non-standard conditions.

ANI APS-JS serues for search, nauigation, bombing

iple . threat


"rhen it's a dark and stormy night and the target for a dawn attack is sure to. be blanketed with pea-soup

overcast, then it's time to work your radar for all it's worth.

And if the radar is AN/APS-15, it will help lead you to, the target even in unfamiliar territory; it will search out the COllVOY or city you're assigned LO attack; it will assist in the bombing from either high or low altitudes: and it will take you home again through, around and in spite of


Til e AN j AP S-l 5 radar is no magi c aUS1\Ter to all the needs of a bomber crew. understand, but it is an electronic master-of-many-trades with an excellent past behind it which bodes ill for the enemy in the future to come. The Navy's patrol bombers which have Slung hard and often with radar in the past will be even better equipped for land and sea attacks when the A '/ APS-15 is in-

lled, Since last August, all P134Y-l aircraft have een equipped with the new set, and in tallations in PB4Y-2 and FBI\,r-5 are now underway,

"And what will the AN/APS-15 do that Baker and George won't do?" some staunch defender of those "old reliables" of the airborne radar world may ask. 'Vell, here's a quick view of the new

... equipment. which has been called "the work~"' horse radar of the future,"

In searching, it can see a battleship at 60 miles, a submarine at 15 miles and even the periscope of a sub at 6 miles. It has a "magnifying? glass" (target discriminator circuit) which blows up a portion of the sweep so that individual ships in a convoy in a distant harbor can be counted, or so that a vessel using an island as a shield can be spotted.




rd View Of RetrQcted Ba[or AN/APS-iS A'llenna As· sembly in PDt}'-t.

In navigation, Lt can point out land at more than 100 miles-and that's real hel p on a stormtossed course. It call picture a string of islands so that they can be identified by comparison with maps; and it can operate against beacons to obtain precise information regarding the plane's position.

In bombing, the AN/APS-15 is valuable because of its simple type of computer which figures out range and places a release marker on the PPI scope. At high altitudes it is useful for bombing of land targets such as cities, and at low altitudes it can serve as an ideal parent radar for LAB (low altitude bombing) attachments in attacks against enemy shipping.

In design, the ANjAPS-15 might be called "an X-band ASG," since it retains the s60-degree search and PPI scope of the George but uses higher frequency to obtain greater detail in its presentations. Two new circuits-Instantaneous Automatic Gain and Short Time Constant-are being incorporated to improve target discrimination, to reduce the effect of sea return, to make the target stand out against "clutter," and to guard against enemy jamming.

That's a very quick. 11ighly simplified glimpse of the AN/APS-15. But pictures will tell me story Ear better than words, so have a look at the series of scope photographs taken during a strike at beach 261 of D-Day on the southern coast of France. They show how the course was mapped on the scope, how the range-mark circle was placed on the screen, and how the indication grew clearer as the plane neared the target.

Until recent months, the Javy supplied most of the available ANjAPS.15 equipment to the Army becau e of the critical demand for radar to help blast apart "Fortress mope." A year and a half ago German fighters, more numerous than now, were taking a costly toll of daylight at-


tackers on clear da s; the r orden bombsight could not be used effeti ely in foul' eather=and winter weather over western Europe is foul much of the time. Can equently, the AN/AP -15 was whipped into shape as £ t a' po ible and the

avy turned over most of the production to the 8th and 15th Air Forces fOT use over Germany and Italy.

a resul a my squadron' experienc with

AN / AP 5-1 5-they call it •. Mickey" -n umerous improvernerus have been in orp rated in two nev er m d 1 which are now available. be AN IPS-l r.: is a refined version of the original equipment, and the N/AP -l5]3 i quite similar but madill d for in tallari n in PB"Y-2 all' raft.


Now let' have a do er look at what the AN/APS-I5 is doing and can do for the avy. One of its most important functions will be for search, and the Japanese fleet may ha e little sn - cess with its much-loved game of hiding when the finger of the IPS-I 5 begins circling, Detection ranges at suitable altitudes have been reported generally a follows:

Target Nautical Miles










Single Aircraft (B-17)

COlmer Reflector


Land ranges may exceed 100 mile, depending upon the elevation of the target and aircraft, Ranges on submarines often exceed 25 miles wile operator skill, equipment maintenan e and target aspect are at their best. bny fleet radars, unfortunately, are not pushed to maximum levels.

The ability of the A I APS-15 to detect submarines at those ranges ma become especially valuable as the Fleet closes in on Japan, for increasing use of enemy submersibles may be expected. A group 6£ three or four long-endurance patrol aircraft, equipped witb radar, can, give effective protection ~ .landlnz operations of convoy against submarine attack'. Propedy grouped

. aircraft can also be used to provide early warning against attack qy enem'y aircraft, • e ,

...... ~ t, f ~ . f, ~ : "\ f

. '


• "MlIgrrifyi'lIg glass" provided by Targel DiscriminatoT circuit. The PPI preSl111latioH lias been expanded so that a ring from ao to 40 miie.1 covers th» scope. The expaniO'1 enables the operator to more cm·elu.l!y e.'(amine an)'

desi"ed area, Sweep starts IH 20 miles illstead 01 at o.

Use of the A IAPS-15 to detect driftinz life rafts equipped with COIner reflectors will soon become common, since more than 25,000 of tb MX-l38/A refle tors are not in the Fleet a all sea rescue aids.

special aid in search operation is the "magnifying glass" feature of the target discriminator (TD), briefly mention d earlier. The TD expands a portion oE the sweep at any ejected range. s a result, the searching crew can examine the number and formation of ships in a stilldistant harbor, can detect single hips hiding be· hind tile skir-ts of a small island, and can range

n bea ons and read beacon codes more accuratel because of the expand d presentation.

In addition, the "magnifying glass" provides two types of advantages in cloud -weather fl ing. First, it haws the differ nee between ad ud and a target many miles away, so that time and fuel need not be wasted in investigating suspected tug rs, econd, it help airm n pick their way through stormy skies by finding boles or thin

pots in frontal terms and then dodging throuzh

01' around. Th det ction of storms with

IAPS-I5 ornetimes requires the u e of the .. "scope, which normally is emplo ed to tun and monitor the radar but which also pro ide clear ide;ntification of cloud choes, e peciali when they are viewed with TD expansion.


by mid-summer of 1945. Later in 1. 45 a large number of portable -band beacons (AN/ P - 3, ·-4) will be available for marking beachheads, front-lines or other tactical points,

Drift can be determined b use of the

AN/APS-15 and a simple formula. The method is de cribed in detail in the "Air Navigation Bulletin," A AER 00- OV-22, Vol. 1, o. 2.

Closely allied to earch operations of the AN/APS-15 is its value in navigation.

If a crew could hoose, naturally it , ould always arrange take-offs and landings for dayLight hours so that visual fixes would be possible. However, wit n ideal ondition do not exist, the AN/A -15 i a valuable supplement to celestial and visual-contact navigation, A is well known, the center of the PP creen re] resent be land dire tly below the aircraf , and targets or land at various azimuths from the aircraft are represented along corresponding radii of the circular pattern with radial distance proportional to the lant range of the target. onsequently, when the radar map is used together with true maps of the terri-

I tory, navigatlon can be just about as accurate as , the operator's skill and experience permit,

More precise navigational information can be obtained by use of the flAPS-IS with X-band beacons, The Navigator. knowing the location of radar beacons wh ich can be triggered by his radar, can identify the station and lind his bearings and range by coding which is comparable to the flash coding of an ordinary lighthouse.

C,lready some 30 experimental X-band beacons "{CXEH) have been installed, and the production model (AN/CPN.6) win b widely distributed

" PPI scope preseTllalion on .iN / I'1PS'2TlldaT, which pTovid~s tlO admutl« stabilization and 110 Illbber line. The LOp of tile scope represents tile plane's heading.

• •

• PPI scope presenta.tion on AN/APS-15 radar, with azimuth stabilization, The lOp 0/ the scope is always north, and a lubber line (light .lirre) indicates the plane's heading, This pllotograph was taken at an altitude of 6000 feet when tile 50' mile rarlge was in we. Torgels shown are (l) Washington; (~) Baltimore. The Potomac river is clearly indicated.

• True map of Chesapqalte bay, Potomac river, Baltimore and 'Washington-the arlllU showrl- in llle scope indication .



After the AN/APS-l!) has hunted out a target and helped in navigation along the proper course, its next -job is to help send bombs stabbing into the hull's eye. Since its inception the AN/APS-l!) has been used for high-altitude bombing of land targets such as cities. For such work the radar operator doubles as the bombardier and sets altitude, ground speed and trail into a simple computer (the so-called H+B type). The computer then goes to work and places a release-marking circle on the PPI screen. Drift is solved by correcting the aircraft's course so that the targer moves along an azimuth marker. 'When the target blip reaches the release circle, the bombs are released manually.

By day or night, in clear weather or foul, the

elease circle and target indications are placed on the scope so that bombing can be independent of weather. An accuracy of 100 mils at 20,000 feet is possible under conditions oE good target definition. Special bombing techniques are being worked out by various grollPs, including the tieup of AN/APS-l5 with tbe Norden bombsight. Detailed information on bombing with the

_a4N/APS-15 is contained in a new book, "Opera, n of Airborne Radar," CO-NAVAER 00-80V-38.

Besides being used for high-altitude Lombing, We AN/APS-15 may be ised as a "parent" for low-altitude bombinz (LAB) attachments, one of which is the AN/APQ-,I}. oB, now being installed in PB4Y-1, -2, and PBM-5 aircraft. lt is a synchronous-type radar bombsight which provides

oth azimuth and range tracking with automatic omb release. Indication is presented on a B-Lype scope upon which the target blip, a horizontal electronic marker for Tange tracking, and a vertical line for azimuth tracking appear. Tracking usually starts at a distance of about 10 miles, although it may be as short as 3 miles. J\s tbe operator switches from search to track position when starting the bombing run, a traveling onemile expanded sweep appears on the B-scopc- "with the rang-e marker :It the mid-position. The bombardier solves the bombing problem by:

(a) Keeping tbe target blip stationary on the range marker line through adjustment of range tracking controls. and

(b) Centering the target blip on the scribed vertical lines with the drift controls on the attached Norden stabilizer.

he ANjAPQ-5, -5B is capable of an average radial error of 120 feet when operated at an

altitude of 1000 feet. It has already a counted for the destruction of nearly a million tons of enemy shipping. The AN/APS-15 and AN/APQ-5B together make an excellent team in sea attacks for both night operations and for daytime missions under conditions of poor visibility.

If high-alti tude bombing of shore i nsta 11 a tions and land objectives is desired, the AN/APQ-!)B may be used up to 30,000 feet by switching out the electronic computer and using charts to find dropping range. Accuracies of 40 mils at 10,000 feet on a well-defined target have been obtained by this method.

As aids in LAB work, a limited Dumber of stopframe camera installations will be available in mid-spring. They may be used to record the LAll radar screen during practice drops or actual attacks to facilitate later evaluation and improvement of technique.

• LAB Bombardier's cope on the AN/APQ-5. T'h» ulip 1\ shoum centered on mnge lin« and hair lines. Bomb« ri'''/J (l'It;""aticaIly when reiease tine mooing up from bottom touches range line. Distance [rom. target is 0.5 miles.

how the "triple-threat" does its job

In all of its tasks-precision searching. precision navigation and precision bombing-the AN/APSIS represents numerous advances since the days when earl ier airborne radars such as ASB and ASG ( N/APS-2) were designed.

One chief difference between older and newer radars is that Yagi external antennas have been replaced by rotating scanner assemblies which permit 360-degree search to be maintained constantly. In addition, blip-type indicators have been replaced by PPI screens which provide mapping. Despite tbe differences, the AN/APS-15 and ASG radars are quite similar in man respects.


() o

• Scope picttlre.s showing- eUecl' 0/ wow Shor; Time Co 1lJ"lall t ami Instanraneons Automatic Gain Controi circuit. •.

The ch i ef new can tribu don of A I APS·l S. is the high resolution of detail, achieved through lise of X-band radiation. In ad diti on. several other innovations were introduced •. including:

A one-half microsecond pulse length, to improve range detail;

Aul'oma.lic frequency control to insure optimum sensitivity at all times;

Azimuth stabilization, which maintains the PPI map with north lip. to facilitate comparison with charts, and which maintains a target at a fixed place on the indicator screen regardless of a ircraft beading, (In the older ASG or AN/APS-2 models, targets moved on the PPI during an aircraft turn and blurred to an indistinct image.) Figures on page 27 compare the AN/APS-2 and

N/ PS-15 scopes.

A "tsector scan." to permit closer examination of the chosen targe t d uring attack. I t has proved a defini te asset in confirming suspected targe ts at considera b le dista nces,

Other impmveme11ts-the Instantaneous uta" marie Gain circuit, Short Time Constant circuit, target discrimination, and provision fOT bombing have already been described.

Because the ANjAFS-15 is used for both high" altirnde bombing and searching, the antenna has been produced witbt1vo kinds of reflectors, both of the • 'equal-energy " type. The shape has been




chosen to return approximately equal signa] power from all targets, close in and far out ..

the narrow strip of the sea being instantaneous y scanned. For high-altitude area. bombing, the dish has a pronounced curvature identified as "barrel stave." For low-altitude search and bombing, the dish is essentially a paraboloid to which an. additional narrow reflector band has been added. It is imporrant that the proper dish be use for he mission at hand.



In installation of the AN/APS-15, the location

of units inside the aircraft has folfowed' the arrangements fOT the earlier AN/PS-2 radar, which have been found advantageous in actual missions. ually the positions have been chosen to facilitaze the close liaison necessary between Radar and.Command in operation of the plane. '.xcept in the PB4 Y -I, the navigator is in dose contact with the radar man, to the advantage of both, In every installation the pilot and co-pilot have access to a repeat radar scope and can participate in radar vision as often as they wish. Pilots are" increasingly forming the habit of keeping track of the radar landscape occasionally, _. a well-organized aircrew takes pride in kee~ a good radar display on all scopes. Distant radar

ightings are often initially as tenuous as sightings lade tlll"OUgll a glass" and corroboration by others, than the operator tends to establish confidence in the results.

Besides the operator, the pilot and the navigator, the bombardier is another member in the radar organization, Although the radar operator rei east's the bam bs when th€ A / PS~ I 5 is used. the bombardier is. responsible when the AN/APQ- 53 is employed. The radar organization of the aircraft is completed by one or more relief operators who must take over the radar station to minimize operator fatigue and observational efficiency. It is now generally accepted that 0p· erator efficiency under constant radar watch drops to an unacceptable level after 45 minutes and relief must be arranged.

maintenance--theprice of perfo.rmance

Along with skilled operation of the ANjAPS-15 must go efficient maintenance, which is always the price of high radar performance. Particular points to watch are receiver sensitivity, output

ower and a peculiarly technical.Jactor known to e ART as "standing wave ratio." Neglect of any of these will result in mediocre performance; which is tOO widely accepted as normal,

Tools for the AN/APS-15,. in the way of special test equipment. are now broadly circulated. 11 personnel trained earlier in the war find some of the newer equipments formidable, assistance and instruction should he arranged through the Airborne Coordinating Group at the Naval Research Laboratory . In geneml, the instruction books accompanying the AN/APS-15 and the test equipments will suffice.

A large factor in keeping maintenance morale high is the support of chits 'for maintenanee material. Spare parts do exist for these equipments, but the request for parts must be prosecuted firmly,

On the pages immediately following appears an article "A Pllot Discovers Radar," op. the AN/APS-4 airborne radar, which is.also proving versatile. The. AN/APS-4, however, dees not Inelude a bombing computer and does ndi provide all-around search, Since 'it is designed for carrierborne aircraft. its weight is kept to a minimum. The AN/APS-15. on the other hand. is designed

the "heavy-weights" of the Navy's air arm d can include mere circuits and more provisions

for meeting varied- assignments.) -

iI.V/,WS-I,!; Rlld"r COII/mi Villi /'Iml Gomp!t{er os Imlailed 011 Porisid« 0/ Comma/lit Dcck in P.B,j,Y·l.

I1.NIAP!i.15 Receiver-lndicator il.l PD<lY-I.

Alt.dliary Scope [or Use: wilh AN/APS-15, as'a/led in Pilot's Com1)arltl!1I7I1 in PB41'-l.


p o


W heh a pilot really gets acquainted with a good radar, remarkable things can. happen. This is the slory of the results achieu ed by one pilot, Lt. (jg) Warren perry of VB-?, who discovered one airborne radar, the lightweight £N /APS-4, and

used it not only [or searching out Japanese targets, navigating in strange territory. and homing to his catTier. but also to help him fly "in, over and around," tropical rain squalls which might otherwise have downed his

B2C. The story tells, fOTinstance, why Lt. SpeTry was "very thankfu.l tue had radar" on a stormy night mission in Panama and how the radar scrued wizen VB-7 was assigned to bomb a target only 180 miles south of Japan, to strike at a Formosan airfield, and to blast Japanese ships near Leyte.

Here's his story. from his first meeting with ASH (an earlier designation for the AN/APS-4) in March, 194-1, to the October day totten V n-7 swooped out or the clouds on an etlemy BE 01J the Philippines.

a pilot discooers



reported a few times. From 17.000 feet on a ~vebombing flight, land was picked up at go miles, While flying at 5000 Eeet over the mouth of a river. we were able to trace the river 45 miles back into Venezuela on the scope. While returning to base, we could see the carrier on the screen at 22 miles. On the return from the shakedown and until we left Quonset, most of our troubles were Slowly ironed out.


On August lour squadron new !'I0 miles out to our CV to start our cruise into the combat zone.

As we approached Panama we were told to prepare Ior a dawn simulated-bombing attack on the Panama Canal. Our plans necessitated climbinz over the mountains on the Isthmus so that

o .

our attack could come [rom the Pacific Side.

,Vc were launched at 0415 in the dark of night next to a tropical SlOQTI Iront, 0111' attack. rendezvous was effected and we started the I G8-mile trip to the nearest land. Ten minutes later we hit the line squalls of the storm front and they showed clearly on my ASH scope. "'e were able [Q fly through the thin spots in between storm. center sections which 'were shown on the radar. Our division was separated [rom the other ones soon after we first hit the storm area lfut broke through the light spot by use of radar.

Our course was set again Ior land and, as ,\"e approached the shore at an oblique angle. I could see the entire width oE the Isthmus, range 45 miles. altitude 800 feet. using the 50-mile scale. The rendezvous point, a large bay on the Pacific side of the Isthmus, could be seen easily on the scope as we started climbing to Clear the peaks.

As the bills showed up well on the scope, I made a bad mistake by forgettinCT the distortion of the scope and I tried to read it as a true map. ~o, seeing that the largest hill Iay slightly to starboard on the scope, I veered 20 degrees right and flew until [ was close enough to sec the valley near it visually and then headed through this winding avenue.

I know now that I should have had my aircrewman give me a bearing and distance on the cove rendezvous point as a check so that we could have taken the s h 0 r t est planned route. As it was we detoured some 25-30 miles west of the intended (TOSSing point. By checking the radar scope with my maps, 1

o o


My first introduction to ASH was sometime in larch Ift'H. Our squadron moved

to Quonset Point and received .18 ASH-equipped SB2C-3 planes.

The ASH radar 'works wen with the many jobs that we are called upon to do. The "B"-type scope presentation gives LIS targets that we c~n see and interpret with a minimum of experience. ,Vhen approaching from the sea. we picked up land at 40 miles from :,00 feet altitude and could easily pick lip the beacon at Quonset Point and another beacon ~r) miles west of the Quonset station. One uiaht the Quonset beacon appeared at 103 miles anod a few minutes later the second beacon appeared at LOn miles.

'Ve located, identified. and homed in on bays. islands. and fishinz boars. Masthead attacks were made on targets with the operator signaling the release point for bombing. We found that Ior bombing at 200 feet. the proper point For release was indicated on the scope when the target touched the sea .return.

We a lways carried the ASH lin its on the wing ,C,.{i'-~k o. f. our planes ~LLrin~ all squad.ron tactics in.ding dive bombing, glide bombing, hard pulls 011t, gunnery runs. and bounce drills. These units were of very sturdy construction, for they survived this operational handling with no trouble traceable to the handling,

(BuAer Comment: The ASH or AN/APS-4 radar is built compactly into a bombshell-like rousing which is mounted under the wing in ost installations. It can be quickly installed or taken out as operations demand. and is droppable in an emergency.)

After rendezvousing one day we proceeded to attack a spar towed by a DD. Visibility was about 8 miles, but the target was picked up at 15 to 20 miles from 10,000 feet altitude by 3 or 4 ASH units. with the leading plane homing on the target until a visual attack was possible.


Our squadron went on shakedown in June.

Heavy rains caused difficulties, since our units were on planes on the flight deck. and mnny bugs seemed to show up during our cruise to the Gulf

Paria. The A/S planes flying at 1000 feet ally expected to 'pick up the ships at 35 miles if the gear was working, although 45 miles was

traced my mistake as we crossed the middle of the mountains and tarred down the south side. We turned east, picked up the Pacific side rendezvous point again. and homed in on it. We used the AN/APN-l radio altimeter to avoid flying into unseen ridges while crossing those TUgged mountains.

(BuAer omment: Distortion of nearby targets is 'inherent in the "B't-type scope but. with expe-rience, accurate interpretation is not difficult.)

Dy checking the coastline shown on the cope with the map repeatedly we Iound and passed the rendezvou point at about the right time and started our attack approach by simulated strafing of a bomber air strip nearby. Dawn was approaching but w couldn't see ground targets even at loa-foot altitude. The next air field was pinpointed and definite] located by a hill with a particular bay just behind it as shown on the radar screen. Twelve P-.19S were"strafcd" in the simulated attack while they were at. the end of the runwa waiting for permission to take off.




Our minimum altitude approach continued as we climbed slow I over the iooo-foot backbo ridge outh of Catun Lake. OUT approach w to be down the length <;>f the lake, and its approximate bearing and di tance were again taken by radar before we popped over the ridge at Do-foot altitude and dived down the north incline to the water's surface, It was daylight now and we completed the attack at 0710 on schedule. very thankIul that , e had radar.


In Hawaii we had good results. The ASH units which had been operating £Or six. months for us still worked well. While on an engine run-in Ilight, 1r. F. J. Paul, a technician 'of the Airborne Coordinating Group, rode with me an operated the gear; II ing at 10,000 feet. we picke up the mountains of Hawaii at 83 miles. Our targets would tend to fade out and had to be brought back in focus by use of the Frequency Range Selector control. Mr. Paul informed me that the Automatic Frequency Control circuit was not holding.

The next day, 'with my regular crewman and a different ASH unit we picked up the mountai of Hawaii at 91 miles, and they appeared brighter at 75 to 80 miles. Complete island outline appeared at 70 miles.

Once we got a good return on a flight of fighter planes, about 2000 yards above us, at J 8 miles range, using 4 degrees up-tilt antenna. Later, one of our pilots at 6000 feet, identified 1 small boats and a larger vessel at .8 miles a the so-mile scale.

One night my division searched for, found. and simulated an attack on a convoy, using the ASBequipped planes oE our squadron. 'Ve knew the target was indicated on the radar but the disposition of the ships in the target area was not shown on the sco('le. The next night we went out to find and attack: a different target with ASH. 'We picked up a convoy at 22 miles and homed in on it. At 10 miles distance on the zo-mile range, the position of every ship was clearly shown on our scope. 1t would have been simple to attack any one of the targets. 1t seems that ASH is much superior to Baker gear for that type of attack.

(Bu er Comment: For a comparison of ASH. or AN/APS-4, with ASn, see the aval Aviation COD fiden tial Bulletin of September 1 944·)

About that time, we found that an ASH b would not be available to u in combat, so we

changed the beacon to a dual search, his seemed

mae a e our range for I picked up our ship at 50 miles on the 50-mile range while flying at 2000 feet on a 50-mile A/S. However, I could not pi k up an atoU which was about 40 miles behind m . outer leg of the 50-mile A/S, In general. our search return ranges were boosted about 15 to 20 miles alter the change.

(BuAer Comment: vailabiliry of X-Band beacons will shortly pre ent the use of the longer beacon pulse for search. Radars now in develop.

merit use this principle.) .

One morning after passing Mille Isle in the Gilberts, w were laun hed on a 200-mile search, My plane was equipped with an ASH unit while the wing man had ASE gear. At 50 miles we hit storm areas with very heavy line squalls which Tan oblique to our course. We flew through the lighter ones until we hit a particularly heavy cries of cloud bursts. Instead of angl ing through, we paralleled the line for a ShOTt time while I studied the squall map shown on my ASH screen. We .£lew until a thin spot, shown to be between two storm centers, was off our port wing at about 65 degrees to our cour e. Then a fio-degree change of course to port was initiated and we broke "~.,fouah the front in 11,4 minutes time, out into

e clear area outh of what we later found out

was the equatorial front. If we had maintained the course, it would have meant 10 or more minutes of the worst instrument flying conditions. This storm area was quite heavy for over go miles.

After continuing 30 miles in the unlimited clear area to the end of OUT sec lor, we flew the cross leg and beaded back into the storms again. We used the ASH radar continuously all the way back home to dodze the hea y torm center of the squalls. The quails were so dose together that as We emerged from one, the next one could

picked up at about 8 miles. We flew at 500 \Ve did not pick up the CV until after I saw it at 7 mile di ranee for the carrier was trav-

eling along the far edges of a line squall, and we suddenly came upon it as we passed a pocket in the line. The ASH gear doe not go beyond the neare t squall until you are almost through them and, as the CV was behind this rain front on our approach, we could not pick up the CV before it was spotted visually. Once again I was thankful my ASH gear wa working, for it saved us quite a I it of instrument flying in rain terms.


We first used the ASH in a tnal combat on a 270-mile attack search on Amami·Q·Shima, just 180 miles south oE Japan proper. 1, e flew over the cloud cover at 5000 feet. and the search leader checked his navigation by a positive and identifiable landfall on the islands near the target island. The i lands were picked up at only 30 miles that day and three coastal ships were sighted at I/) miles distance neal' the check point. As we continued, the overcast became dispersed and we made a visual approach to the actual target harbor. Radar was again used on the final approach at 10,000 feet to check the amount of hipping present in the harbor. Three medium-sized ships were found to be in the harbor channel, and a dive-bombing attack was initiated. on them. When returning to the task force, hips were picked up at 30 miles. This particular SH unit's results were considered much below the par we had learned by experience to expect. However it still served its purpose well, for the targets were picked U'p and easily identified.

Two days later we Hew through heav weather to Karertko on Formosa, where the flat area around the town was easily distinzuished from the surrounding mountains and identified by the strike leader's SH radar. We let down through

a hole in the loud near the target to sink and bum shipping in the harbor and blast nearby factories.

The next morninz the strike g r 0 U P climbed above the heavy weather on the east side of T'ia-

wan and flew up the oastline on the eat ard ide of the large port of I iirun .. "\ e used ASH radar to home in on the prominent harbor landmarks and approached Kiirun over the solid overcast at al titude, Thi wa the first time we bad ever tried high-alti Ide horizontal radar


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Tile "Rocking Horse" Antenn«

Mk 13 Mod 0 Main lVel.'P



Mark It Console (l?Id Allienna Mou,Jlting

condo Target information i presented all a B-s ope with bearing lines 1)0 mils apart. The same indicator units as used in Mod 2 in the same Iocations are used in Mod 3. Main s'Il'eep of 0 to 60,000 yards, expanded sweep of a to 20~OOO yards, and precision weep with a nominal zooo-yard interva

. are similar to the older mods. The beam width is approximately one dezree at' half that on older Mark 8 equipments. This will give better bearing accuracy, bearing discrimination. and deflection spotting accuracy. Range performance should be improved also. The photographs show th location of the units on a cruiser installation.

Radar Equipment !ark 13 Mod 0 uses the same antenna system as Radar Equipment .Mark 8 Mod 3. The beam is approximately one degree wide and 3.6 dezrees hizh measured at the half power points for one w . transmission. This beam scans a 111f2 degree sector at a rate of 10 sea p~r second. The pul e rate. i about 1800 per second with a pulse duration of approximately .25 micro-seconds.

The radar range operator's station is in Plot at the radar console. Ius operating controls, switches, meters and cope are conveniently located on the panel of the console. Auxiliary indicators are located in the director. fire control tower Or station, and at the rangekeeper. The equipment was designed with particular attention to ease of maintenance. Principal ele trical parts are readily accessible for servicing.


All indicators use a a-inch cathode ray tube 'with two weeps, main and precision and ind pendent sweep selection is possible at each indi ator. Main sweep co er a range interval from 0 to 80,000 yards. Ranges to 50,000 yards are measured by the normal precision range unit. but approximate ranges may also be obtained from 50,000 to 80,000 yards, Three bearing line at zero degrees and ±50 mils with re peer to director train, give the mean of obtaining radar baring data. Figure 1 shows the appearance of targets on main' eep.

wo precision sweeps are provided. The norma] precision sweep covers a range interval of approximately 4000 yards (adju table from 2000 to 5000 yards) out to the rang mea uring limit of 50,000 yards. he bearing lines are d tted with the dot space for 200 yard intervals. his should improve the accuracy of range spotting. The bearing line is also dotted and should eliminate spotting errors due to pips merging with n thick solid range line. The appearance of targets on the normal precisi sweep I shown at left.

The' 1al'k 13 also ha a long range precision eep which cover a rang interval of appl' irely 4000 yards out to the limit oE main tv ep. his precision sweep is controlled by a knob on a calibrated dial, The bearing line is solid to di tinzui h it from the normal precision OJ ep range line. The] ng range preci jon sweep provide for observing targets on precision weep at ranges beyond tile normal precision ',"e~p ranze thus aivinz the advantage of zood dis-

0'" 0 'D '_" ~

crimination for the full main ,eep.

Bearinz accuracy better than + 2 mils is ex-

o ,

pected, Range accuracy On the normal nnge unit

should be equivalent to the former models 01' abou t 25 yards at a 10,000-'Yard range,


The X-band main battery fire control radars should give materiall better results in dis rimination between group of targets. Two targets. at the same range separated b o.g degree (1 G mils) or more should. be distinguishable as separate targets. his value rna be impro ed omewhat by use of the gain ontrol. Reducing tb e ga~n when ob ervinz targets giving strong echoes will 9ften reduce the pip size to allow better dis-

mutation. he pre lOUS -band radar: were

double rhi value or 2 degrees (35 mil ). i facta!" is important in several probl rns. Multi, ple surfa e targets at twice the range can be distinguished as separate pips on the scope. Spotting salvos in deflection will be more a urate and impler becau e of the better di crimination. and pr:.ominent "Points on shore will appear more as they du on a navigation chart. Objects such a rocks or ships dose to the shore can be more readil picked up again t the hore background. he shad w ar a will be n1 half as large a in the S-band equipments. he overall effect will be a radar presentation which will be easier to in terpret, the effect of which is similar to a harp r [0 u picture.

Rang di crimination, r the abillt to dis-

tingui h eparate targets of a group of obje~t at the same bearina, 'NiH be somewhat better III the X-band equipment than on the -band, It

hould be possible to ranee onlndividll~l targets providing they are separated b 75 yards _lfl l"aD.g . Range potting and other proble~ m ohl~g range di crimination will be considerably im-

proved on the 1ark 13 equipment. .

In problems where both ra~ge and be~rillg di crimination are involved, a ptp hom a Ingle target will represent 75 yards in range ~nd 16 mils in bearing on the cope face. IE this area on the surface of the sea contains more than -one target, it will not be possible to distinzui h be, tween them by radar. Howev r, if n part of the pip fluctuates at a different ra e. from the other, two targets must make up the pip. Reducina the gain may, likewise, assist in separating the single pip into two.

The e eUent discrimination of the Mark 8 Mod 3 and the Mark 13 may make it possible to determine target angles of ship targets. 'Vith target angle near zero and 180°, most ty~es of large ships will produce two or three pipS at 15,000 yard r Ie . As the target angle changes to goO or 2700. the pip pattern will ;.bange in both ranze and bearinz, By observing tb~ . change in shape of the pip, operator may 11 able t

determine change j n target angle. t bOT!

ange , it may e en be po. sible to ranze and train

on a particular part of a ship. ,

As a urnmary of the discrimination of the various Marks and Mods of principal main bat" tery fire control radar th following table is.given:

Range Bearing

Radar Discrirnina- Di crimina-

tion tion

Mark 8 Mod 0,

1, 2 100 yards 35 mil

Mark 8 Mod 3 100 yard 16 mils

Mark 13 10 1 75 yards 16 mils

This article is based on one appearing in th

Bulletin oj Ordnance Information No, 4-44.


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Spotting with radar has been found to be valuable either on land or on sea. Ship reports and the results of recent tests conducted to determine the capabilities and limitations of various techniques have ShO'l\'11 that radar spotting can be used to great advantage under many circumstances. CIC can be of assistance to the gunnery section in plotting the splashes and in putting the ship in a Favorable position [or accuracy in firing.

Spotting of "land splashes" should prove practicahle in many shore bombardments. With the radar equipment Mark 8, slight depressions are Cut off from [he radar beam and 'return no echoes, but debris thrown high in the air will often rise above the higher land between the depressions and the ship, thus producing pips on the screen. These pips can then be spotted with respect to prominent reference points which produce echoes; the near sides of smooth gradual slopes would also 'be expected to return inappreciable amounts of energy to the antenna as compared to the vertical SpOLIt of dirt and debris thrown into the air by the explosion of the shell.

In some instances fire control radars were used aboard ship in conjunction with director train angle to obtain fixes from wh ich to determine range and bearing of specified targets. The Mark 8 was used for spotting to with in a fairly close limit on nat land with no land (hill) interference.

One sh i p reported that neutralizing fire could be checked within useful limits of accuracy by observing and spotting the fall of shot on the radar screen. Par example, when the coastline is irregular or the beach is obscured by dust due to heavy winds, it is possible te train by radar and cover the assigned area. Even though only 75% of the projectiles fired inland at a hillside in indirect fire might be observed, it is possible to range on the "splash" of those seen to give a rough estimate of their deflection from the 1 ine of sight, til liS providing plot a check on the application of spots covering the area.


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~ Sf/lash Pip~ of G~ A P (3 guns) at about 8000 yards target norge-Rad(lr J\I(lTI, 8 Mod. 2. Targe: is on range line and. center 1J(!OTinr, liu«. Pi]» on /ar right is T0111;lIg vessel. Splas/i pips appear 01 bOLlO)h 0/ scope. Film speed 4- [rames per second.


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~~ S1'II15/i Pips [rom a-glltl saloo 0/ SR AA Common al 11.500 yards range. Radar Mark a Mod,!!, Target pip eenter-ri Towjllg vessel, Reference vessel, and plane on lelL. readillg do

in that order. Splash pips appear in loioer cen~eT.

The following information concluded from firing tests with the Mark 8 Mod 2 for G" AP, 5" ornrnon and 5" AA Commorr projectile splashes will be of interest to the CIC and the gunnery officer.


During the tests the radar spotting was done by the ship's radar officer at the control indicator [or the forward Mark 8 in the Main plot and by a Bureau of Ordnance officer representntive at the control indicator for the after Mark 8 in Control Art. The reliable spotting range on 6" AP splashes was found to be 15,oQo to 16,000 yards, Although a six-gun salvo was detected and spotted by both radars at a range of almost 16.000 yards (MPI 725 yards over for a target range 15,100 yards), single gun salvos were not detected at about the same range. Camera rake data on the six-gun salvo placed the Fall of shot at ±914, +R88, ±Ci!)8, ±GHo, ±G!)9 and ±,512 and three distinct splash pips were observed on the control indicator scope in Control Aft. For this distriburien only three splash pips would be expected, since the +Ci!)8, +080 and +659 splashes would merge to form a single pip as did the ±914 and the +88 . It was noted that the middle pip was larger and more intense than the other two.

All splash pips that should have been detected were observed on the scopes at shorter firing ranges (runs at approximately 8.000 and 12,000 yards). Fleet reports from light cruisers generally give a maximum reliable spotting range of less than I yards for 6" A P sp lashes. Excel> tional ranges oE I or 20,000 yards mayresnlt with abnormal atmospheric conditions.

The reliable spotting range on 5" Common splashes is at least 15,000 yards and possibly as much as 18.000 yards. while the range on 5" AA Common splashes is at least 18.000 yards. For an eight gun salvo of 5" Common at 1800 yards


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range, the stop-watch duration of the splash pip was 1.9 se onds: for an eight gun salvo of 5'{ AA Common at the same range the intensity of the pips wa very noticeable and they lasted for 3 seconds.

Radar range spotting accuracy is entirely adequa te for normally expected ball istic variations, Tbe average arithmetical error in spotting were 80 yard for the orward Radar Mark 8 and 57 yards for the after Radar Mark 8 on totals of 2G and 29 spots, respectively, including all types of ammunition fired. Although spots were estimated without the use of a calibrated cale, the target pip width in range and the preci ion S~ eep interval were known and used as measuring sticks. Because of the possible variations of sweep intervals. it is obviously important to know the approximate value of the range coverage on precision sweep for each equipment.


Very few errors in potting resulted from the merging of splash pips and target pip or range line, since practically all salvos landed short or far enough over to prevent this type of error. However, it IDU rt be emphasized that the possibility of large spotting elTOTS due to this merging effect will often exist when firing to hit. he spotter should keep constantly in mind that an exceptionally small pip pattern close to the target probably does not represent all the splash pips when three or more ·guns are fired. Under these conditions it is biglily probable that some of the shells have landed on the target or been near misses and the spot should be reduced to account

for this probability. here was no definite

evidence of error resulting from shielding splash by the target or nearer plashes. 1, there was no evidence of rror caused b the operator confusing the projectile pip ju t beEo e the impact with a true splash. he few large errors could be attributed to poor estimates.

The t ts showed [hat radar deflection potting accura y is apparently better than -+-3 mils. On a total of 24 deflection spots the radar potter for the forward equipment had an average arithmetical error of 2. I mils. As a rem! t of an error in train alignment, only six deflection spots were at erupted by the potter for the after equipment. but for these six observations the average error Wa.S2 mils.


It was found that the average splash height decreases greatly with -range for tile G" AP and 5" ommon, but changes very little for the 5" AA ammon. The change in plash height with the G" AP can probably be expected owing to the projectile shape, the angle of impact. and fuze delay. It is unfortunate that the reflecti area decreases with greater range. Results Wlb). 5" AA Common and meager reports from the Fleet on spotting of 6" HC shell splashes indicate that considerably greater spotting ranges might be attained with the 6" HC.

From these facts it is evident that spotting splashes with radar is particularly effective i insuring greater accuracy and greater success i "knocking out" the enemy on land or on sea.

This article is based on one appearing m Bulletin of Ordnance Information No. 4-44.


or how to keep a radar healthy



It would be a job to find many doctors who manage to take care of their patients without the use 0'£ a stethoscope, X-Ra , or blood pressul'e But in the fleet there are m re than a few technicians who have nev r heard of the echo-box." Salle of them mana e to keep their equipment operating at top efficiency. but a lot of tbem don't. In any event, they are all overlook. ing a go d bet and making life harder r themsel e .

The clio-box is n the way of being a super test set. It will act as a performance standard for the radar y tern a a whole, it i~ a frequency meter, apr indicator, and spectrum analyzer. It' an all ar und ouble h otero Lee ee what it is and h w it works, (Incidentally, ea h et i accompanied by an excellent manual; use it.)

he echo-box is a cavit . usually circular in cro .

secti n. t one end i a pl ung r on a threaded

mount, B)' mo ing the plunger in or out the iz of the cavity chanze . When properl tuned it fun - ti ns as a very efficient (high "Q") resonant cir-

orne idea of how simple the basic principle is may be derived from the fact that empt five-


• Ringing Time 01'1 .tJ. Scope

the echo-box

• Rillgj"g Time on PPl

gallon oil tins have been succes fully used a echoboxes. They were tuned by denting the sides of the can.

But the echo-boxe which are now becoming available to a at a tivities are a lot better than oil can and much easier to use.


A portion of the transmitted energ i picked up by a dipole conne ted to the eho-box or b a "directional coupler" permanently installed in the waveguide 01' transmission line of the radar. This energy is coupled into the echo-box. Durinz the time the radar is transmitting, the oscillations in the echo-box build up. When the transmitted pulse ends. the oscillation in the box do not top a once hut continue in gradually decreasing amplitude. (ee figure 1.) This action is ometbing like a bell which, after being struck continue to vibrate for a comparati el long time after the blow i over. Indeed, thi similarity has re ulted in the echo-box being called a "ringing; cavity" or "riner box."

ow one of the most u eful application of the

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echo-box is that once the oscillation has been set , the echo-box acts as a transmitter. he oscillans in the cavity will be transmitted by the pickup dipole or coupler back to the radar system and will show up on the indicator as extended echoes. As the amplitude of the oscillation decreases, the size of the echo on the scope will become smaller until it finally disappears in the grass. This is the way it would look on an "A" scope or a PPI (See figure a),

The length of time during which the reradiated energy is received i measured in yards and is known as ehe ringing time. Just as the length of rime you can hear a bell after it is struck would be a measure of the sharpne of your hearing. so is the ringing time a measure of your radar's efficiency.


You can see how convenient and accurate this device is. Suppose you determine (by computa-

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t1 COlWement Chile" List


ti n and trial) that your G-l should have a ringing time of 7000 yards in its most efficient condition. (And don't forget to write this down where you can find it.) Each day you run a test and note that the ringing time is getting gradually

horter; that's a SUTe sign of trouble afoot. You can take corrective steps and not only prevent complete breakdown but as ur yourself that you won't be operating your set at greatly re·

duced efficiency. .

The echo-box is also equipped with a calibrated control of the plunger so that the frequency of the nan mitter call be measured quickly and accnrately . .It is equipped with a meter from wbich power output can be readily determined.

It is a handy gadget all right, but it' more important than that. Experience shows that in the absence of the echo-box you can't be sure of your set's efficiency. Set after set tested has been found to be operating at a fraction of its capabilities. One technician for example writes, "It was interesting to note that yesterday when I took the Mark 12 away from the DD bars. they said it was on the nose. A quick check with the echo-box showed a 2600 yard ring. After replacing four tubes, the ringing time went up to 4100 yards, and a target at 46,000 yard came in at near saturation."

If you remember that only a slight reduction in efficiency (3 db. down) is equivalent to cutting the transmitting power in half. you see how important it is to keep your set in trim. So use the echo-box. It's a simple device, but it will tell you in no uncertain terms when you've got a sick radar on your hands ..

Unfortunately the most experienced radar technician can't really judge his equipment's performance without an. accurate test set, and so-called "standard targets" have been proven again and again to be unreliable.

Reports from the field will help in imp1'oving the echo-box, Send them in to the Bureau of Ships, Code 930-c.


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Interpretation of this ralio gives the pulse Itmgth of an intercepted radar.

long before. that bogey rears his ugly pip, lone L before he's alerted to your presence, the APR or SPR intercept receiver gives you the word.

With detailsl Here's how-

et-so-imaginary extract from the diary of USS LA FISH: "0601 Intercepted signal on PRo!. 98 mcs. PRF. 1000. PuI e length 40. 0604 Dived."

ubPac war patrol reports ar packed with uch in tance, ases of Interceptions by the radar earch receiver providing early warning of an approaching enemy in advance of detection by the sub's own radar, and even more important, before the enemy's radar can get the slightest indication of our u b's presence.

he "why," of course, blossoms out of a pair of handy radio-radar propagation laws . . . fir t. the amount of energy bouncing back to a radar receiver is inversely proportional to the 4th power of the di tance to the target; second, the amount of energy received at a distance from a source is inversely proportional to the sqnare of the



Your radar (Jap's too) struggles through th overbearing "4th power." he search receiver, on the other hand. gobbles up incoming pulses with only the "square." or "znd power" to contend with.

ot hard to ee, then, that if a target (say, your hip, PRo} equipped) is so Ear from an enemy radar that you can jut detect it on your earch reed er, then the enemy radar itself won't get back two whiff of RF, certainly not enough to drive his receiver.

Ali right. now for the eager beaver who chirps up, "How can you tell whether the radar signal we pick up is friendly or enemy?" The an wer is that all radars have certain characteristics and. happily enough, there are plenty of differences. recognizable one, between our radar and the enem

Radar signals may be identified by all or

of the following characteri tics common [0 a spe-

cifi pe of radar: (a) Frequen ,(b) Pul repetiuon rate, (c) Pul e length.

The Fleet (meaning subs, D <', D 's, and Iarzer unit) i being

uipped as rapidl as possible with the J I APR/SPR erie of intercep

receivers and a ompan ing pulse analyzers for determining frequency. pulse rate, and pulse length of radar ignals, When l~ese three characteristics have been measured the signal may be classified friendly or enemy. , Furthermore, its probable use may be determined. A fire control radar, for instance, may be indicated by the fact that its antenna beam i being lobe-switched (although fire control radars are not alway of the lobing type). high pul e rate and short pulse length would also indicate fire control radar while a low pul rat and long pulse are usually as ociated with a ear it radar. japanese radar in general is haracterized b longer pulse lengths than OUT own radar.

1£ radar intercept equipment is not available, our own radars may detect enemy signals if they are in our frequency band. For the purpo e of analyzing such signals, a standard cathode ray oscilloscope is connected to the radar receiver output, Pulse rate may be determined with reasonable

...... "'r.,,'·.,. by synchronizing the sweep to obtain a single pul e on the scope. indicated weep-frequency i the pul e repetition frequency of the radar ignal being investigated.

Pnl e length of an enem radar rna be determined b APR r PR as follows: If the indi ated Pul e Rep tition Frequen y of the enetny radar is 2000 cycles, thi means that 500 micro econds would elapse during one sweep aero s the trace of. the cathode ray tube. The ratio between the length of this trace and the width of the pip at the half power point will give the pulse length of the intercepted radar. The half power point always

~ls :xactly .7 up th.e h~ght of the pip .. For example, tak: a trace length .. 2 inches and a P'P WIdth of approximately Va", that IS, .12511, at the

half power point. The ratio would be .125 = .062 and the puJ e length


accordingly would be .062 x 500 mi 1'0 econds or 31 micro e ond . A Tough estimate of pulse length rna also be obtained simp1 by measuring the length of the pulse on til range cale of own radar (each 500 yards is

bout 3 microsecond ).

Proper interpretation of radar ignals demands knowledge of the haracteristics of our own common types of radar. Space and security prevent listing this information here. but these can be obtained from your RMO.

Following is a table of known, commonly used Jap radar frequencies, compiled from numerous inter ept in all area of the Pacific:

PuJse Lellgtb (msec)

PRF (ap) .

Frequen y (mes)

70-80 8-108


500-1000 00-1200 5°0-1200

20-50 20-60

-30 , ir earch and Air-

borne Surface earch.

7.5-30 Air & Surface earch (possibly

used for ranging in AA fire control).

about 2 ire Control, irborne Search.

Probably Surface earch.

to "fingerprint" an, .Tap radar which ou



about 200 1000-2000


about 3000

This table will help up.



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C I C and Fighter Direction

o ~. HUTC!ilNS (DD) (Battle oJ Su.ngao Slrall);

"CIC did it. AL no time was there an y confuslon as ro targets. Se\terai times the Commanding Officer feared he was frring on Own ships, and reo ceived a vocifel'QIlS and offended nega. dve from the ~vaillator. When he asked for an idenLificaLion he received even the Desdivor Crudivnumoe:r. The Gu nnery OJlker was prevented from hifling to a Eriendly target only 200 from an enemy ship.

"The Commanding Officer was de. light~ to find I~at in spite of the eondl uon that this erc was trained primarily to furnish a Task Group Commander informalion and communlcauons, it :oimull,aneously provided full gunnery and torpedo inlormation to the ship. CIo e cooperation was received from the squadron Commander in making this possible."

U S CLil.LAGHIlN (DD) (Formosa Strike);

"CIC had a clear and complete picture of the entire action even to the ex len t of noticing the fall o.f shot of the firing ships. 6" and 8N straddles could be detected on the 'A' scope of the SC Radar at ranges as high as 21,000 y,rds and hits predicted were confirmed by visual observation from topside."

US~ McGO~AN (DD) (Battle of SlIngllo Stmlt);

"The Evaluator in. CTC was anotber officer who was directly involved in. the aLtack lind who kept hls station under



perfect control. The manner in which !ie evaluated e_l'ery contact and every Item of ~uestlon that arose gave a great feellng' of reassurance to the Captain. He was on the job constantly and several times actually an wered questions for the Captain before the latter bad even voiced them. In other words he was coonUnaLing his job with. Conn to a point approaching 100%. The fact thaL be was operating in <I small, closed, tuffy cOlll,pa"nmenl and approaching well inside the range of Japanese guns clid not seem tc faze bim. The same was true 0.£ him lhroughout the operatioh. He had his C[C team well organized .and always managed to keep the Captain well in. formed on whatever \YaS transpiring at the time."


"With the considerable geo~phic eparation of Attack forces which existed at Leyte, the complete retention of control of the Combat Air Patrol by the OTC resulted in a loss of ftexi.

bility in the fighter direction system. While the need for overall coordination by the Force Fighter Director the OTe is obvious, it is believed

the effectiveness oE the lighter co I!I' might be itnp~v~ by provision for more decenrraltzarien o:f control. In such a situation the Auack Force Com. mand~. s~ould be assigned ZOnes of respOimbiliry and, as occasion requires, given fighters to cover those zones. Having fighters under the immediate control of the Alta~k Force Command. ers i particularly impo.rLant in land locked waters such as Leyte Oulf with its attendant. poor radar coverage and increased vulnerabilny to 10lY flying aircraft approaching over land. The most lmmediate remedies appear to be the addition of low, close fighter patrols under the local control of each

ttack Force and increased use oI visual fighter direction. Such provlsion would also [adlitate the emergency employmelll of VFairaait in. eluded in tile direcr support groups under control of the Commander Sup' port Aircraft of thai Arrack For

USS UHLMANN (DD) (Formosa trike);

"All ship of Task Force 38 were equipped with radio receivers to listen in Oil inter-lighter-dirocoor conversaLion'. Thi~ is an excellent method for allowing destroyers to reap the ben

of the uperlor radar equipment ![t:'lllcd in heavy ships, If necessary, air plot could have been maintained with information obtained over this circuit alone, The tension normally felt in advanced areas was eased con. ide1'3bly by Ie ting everyone in On the 'kl?-0\~: The. fact that every daylight

zaid was s~lccessfully intercepted 1VllS an equally reassuring- factor,"

USS lIVIRl'LltND (BB) (LeyU);

"One of the mprWng Iessons of present operation was the dec· of radar in pite of lbe landpo ilion of eyte Gulf, It wa anticipated that so DllIch land would sharply curtail the effectiveness of radar. The fact that the operators were able LO separate aircraft echoes from tll e J and m ass speaks well for til el r high degree of training and indlcat what <::111 be done by skilled operators."

US CIlT'ALlER (APA) (L6Jle);

"The approach to Leyte Gul! and to the transport area was accomplished through establishment of successive radar lixes. Dead reckoning was impossible because of the varied currents in

outer gulf. se \ as made of a

plasilc template, making pas-

simultaneous 'fixes on land at bearing. The PPI pictures, prepared by the Fleet Radar Center at Pearl Harbor, were helpful in determining the exact piece of land being ranged upon. Thls was the first time this radar aid had been used by the C VALIER."


"Simulated photos of images oE thePPJ cope had been used to a limited exl:ent during the Mariaw Operation and early reports had indicated their possible value as aids to radar operation and determinacion of position. For Palau, the Fleet Radar Center prepared for Palau L5 photos from selected po idons. Each gunfire support ship, escorrlng destroyer, group commander and tra:nsdiv commander received a set. They proved accnrare and of value in the approach."


"Radal':- The employment ot the LUCE (DD 522) with an excellent radar material installation and welltrained opera.ting personnel together with its fine Fighter Director Team a Flagship gave the Flotilla Com· excellent radar intelligence greatly facilitated tactical control.

uch use of destroyers is sound because it gives the tactical commander compleie, direct, and Immediate Informstion, unfiltered and uncorrupted by sometimes dubious interpretations."

U ' MUGFORD (DD) (Le.'jte);

"The need [or a su Per-a len shortrange air search once a melee ha developed within 20 miles of a formalion is emphasized by the action participated in oy this hip. It has been noted on this hip, that even after bogies have closed LO within 25 miles and a melee i in prOJ;r ,radar operators tend to continue searching on medium scale. The Decessit}' Eor using short calc when the screen becomes thus confused is obvious. reps have been taken to improve this a peel of the air search on [his vessel. Carriers are best equipped fox long range detection but 011 several occasions within this task group, Inltial contact: have been made by cruisers, once or twice by destroyers. This ship has often been able LO track planes at a range in excess oE 100 miles. The efficiency, thoroughness and brilliance of carrier plotting and fighter direction tends to incline the rest of us to take our e}'es off the ball somewhat."

Comm unications

US STEVEN' (DD) (Mol'owi);

"Communications were satisfactory except it is believed that there is inadequate control of the voice circuits. espeCially .. by Fighter Director ships, Codes and terms, not in the communications or operations plan. were used by fighter director teams. A station which does not have a recent graduate 0 the same fighter director school, or does not happen to have his intercept officer on watch at the time, is at it 10 when these cot;lfusing words are used."

USS llORNET (or!) (Variou.! IriJ,&s);

'Pilots IllUS~ be made LO realize that un n c<:cssary cha [tel' hampers v i tal rescue eI£orcs, and that on some occasion when the usual offender grabs the 'mike' to yell for someone to take the three Tonys' off his tail (only to find

the circuli. jammed by a 'Dilbertltbe penalty i high."

U S CIiIlUNCEY CDD) (Leyte);

"Voice circuits wer sati faCtory unul the target area was reached, From this lime on all circuits were greatly overloaded and traffic of all kinds appeared on all circuits. This vessel had three voice circuits on tile bridge. the TllS, Lh 1A. and the M • the latter being the only circuit on which there was even a relative amount o~ quiet. The major source. of conlu ion noted was the facL that ships at oppo· site ends 01 the transport areas could not, in general, hear each other, conseCJ,uently llley would talk at the arne rune, wbich mused ships in the middle 10 miss both transmi ·ions. There was also enough variaticn in frequencies to neces irate much relaying between ships in the same area. Whenever ships were underway at night the u e of the Tn for tactical purposes was greatly hindered by administrative transmissions. Circuit discipline on all voice circuits was only fair at best,"

U BOlSE (CL) (Leyte);

"It is impera tlve tha t positi lie action be taken ro improve circuit discipline, parucularty on voice circuits. If more

than one station is transmitting on a given circuit at the ame time, the net res ul L is tha t flO statl on is able to deliver. traffic, and ~y re_q,uest5 for repetition are required, which slows down tmlllc still more. There 1$ much traffic being paed by TBS and other voice circuits which could go via visual.

"The probable cause oE some of these circuit congestion is that officers are prone to act as radio operators. on occasion, and apparently have nOL bothered to read Communlcatlon Instrucnens or R/T procedure. Inexperienced rndio operators are guilt)' of the same lack of circuit " nse".

"The answer to tills problem has been dis ussed many times, but SOOlC



." m 0:0 ;;0

c: > ;:a




of the pertinent points and reoommendaticns arc as follows:

. (a) One statiot; should exerci e po i· [; comro~ of clrcn it when necessary, 9l1lmg stanons permission LO transmit JJl order of priority oE traffic.

(b) Individual ship stations must lecLUre. and drill 011 the subject until all hands understand "oi~e procedure. The procedure set forth III Communication Instruction, Section (D) is both adequate and speedy when correctly used. Nothing need be added for

larificarlcn. Usually a departure from tandard procedure causes confusion.

( ) The most common faults noted are as follows:

(.1) Failure or a sta Lion to receipt OT acknowledge for a transmisslon, even though [he station had reo ce~v~ transmission. 'This means the or~~t0r must make an extra transrnlSScIOD to request receipt.

(2) Talking too L1lSt. This probably a~U?ts for 500/'0 of requests (or repeunons,

}l~ Poor diction and enunciation a!l . ill some cases exa&"ge:rnred enuncianon. orne Indlvlduals imply cannot make themselves understood and should nOL be allowed to use voice radio.

(4) Talking 100 loudly which

causes disrordon, '

(5) Failure to "listen in" before transmitting to make sure no one else is using the channel.

. (6) Transmi.rte-r olI frequency, lIn:pl"Oper1y adjusted, lack df method to prevent feedback, etc.

(7) Receiver .hnproperly adjusted .. (8) fi~ophone in noisy compartmenr caUSI!,g undesirable high back. ground noise, which sometimes wiu override actual speech."

U55 FAN Btl W BAY (eYE) (MoTotai):

"Greater emphasis should be placed ~n ecuricy, especially on SCR-SoS (!nt~.fighte~ director circuu) and 811D_;1Iar equrpments in 110"10 mc band which cannot be considered a ecure a. VHF. On several oecaslons informalion a to IiglHer director tactics, fade


charts and other highly classified mat. tel' was freely rransmlued in plain language. Greater care should also be taken to u e the correct code in giving range;; and bearings which might compromise the posltion ot the formation and ill encoding radio freq uencies, ~requentjy during the subject operanon such matter was passed in plain language."

US BlLOXl (CL) (VariollS Strikes):

"Radio reception conditions were the worst encounlered by this vessel at any ume. l'oo'r signals, particularly between 1600 and :WO() Zebra, were noted on PM Prim .• IIY and Jump Fox s. chedules .. Frequently sudden rain squall SLane would block out all circ.uifS for short periods. These condiuons were. magnified by the great amount oI unportanc operational D.·al· fie au~ed LO the Task roup, l'oor reception called lor great ingenuity ana ceaseless effort on the part oE the coning board in clearing garbled messages,

··~nti.J.iDg effor~ on the pan of the coding board, ship's radio electrician r~dio supervisors anti operators com~ inned LO keep incoming radio traffic up to dale whiJe working under extremely trying conditions."

uss NATOMA Bn ( PEl (Leyle);

_.. he use of nter- ommand Support ircraft, nel (which has a150 been used as a. Standby lFD net) during this operauon marked a decided improvemein in maintaining direct voice contact with the Commander upport Aircraft. 1t was also helpful in keeping !:his ship informed of current developm~nts. It was over this drcu~t that this unj., first learned of the presence of the Japanese .Ieet in the Yicinit), of the Escort Carrier Units."

USS KALlNl BAY (CTfE) (Leyle suriace engagement):

"A plane on anti-submarine patrol from USS KI K I .BAY reported to the OTC a [ask force composed 01 four enemy battleships, six cruisers, aud n~=tIS des~l'OyCrs bearing 2700 (1'), distance 20 111IJ~ (rom this formalion at 0654' be pilot of the plane defini tel y iden tilled the La k force as enemy. This Informatlnn was conveyed. to this ship over the In LeI" fighter Director er (117.6) mcs, Inrmediately after this report excited Japanese voices were heard over the lFD Net. Irequenc lest was made and it was found that the Japanese

were directly on 87.6 mcs, On orders from the OTC Ceneral Quarters was rounded at 0658 lind speed in ere

to flank."


"NA;N was, used by the ship lor the l1~t tlme. With vllrying success. The ~Lggest difficulty is in training the '!ght ~ccurntely. To do this while zlg7.aggmgoll a dark. night requires close . c peration on the part or the

IC In k eplOg the signal b.ridtle informed of the new relative bearinz of the receiving Ship. One method which prov~d helpful (on a clear nighl) was to ~I~k It l?w star direclly over the recel.vlD[f sh. p and use it as a point of aim,


"NAN equipment-It has been found ~a( messages. can be mere qukkl:y delivered by usmg a Dash for receipt of each word than by using the steady

light method. The numerous king po III and booms. especia.lIy While ztgzagging, cause misundersta.nding be. tween the operators."

ass STEVENSON (DD) (Palau):

"The N Nnight signalling equipll1~nL ~~as us.ee1 for the first Lime by thls hlp durmg the Subject eperadcn, It was found to be excellent equipment and extremely useful: it fulfills R. nee~ of long standing for a night

ignalling' apparatus."



Jap Tactics

Counter-Measures (R C M)

USS INTRE.PID (CP) (parious Strikes):

"A full technicalexplanarion o[ ~ situation is neither available nor pertinent to this report, but at least rwo of the suggestious or possible aids [0 the solution of the maintenance problem are worth repeating here. One is [0 provide ships with a more generous supply of .replacemen; pares than heretofore. both in kind and number.

econd and even .more important, is die realizauon lhal in the modern carrier gl:Oups, consisting usually of at least tWO CVs plus one OT two CVLs and nu merous screening ships with excellent radar equipment, there is much more than ample radar protec.tio n at all times. III vi ew 0 C this it

E· obvious that, in early phases of Lions or at any other rimes when or active combat are not expected, there should be set up within each group a schedule of rotating radar duty with permission to secure at least the air -search sets on 'off days. This would not only directly add that amount oE lime to the life of the gear but would ind1:reclly extend il st ill Iurther by providing much needed periods' for regular checkups and neeessary maintenance and at the same time the result would be to have the _menr in peak operating condition ... it was really needed."

USS N4TOMti BAy.(CVE) (Leyte); "SK. Radar (Air Search)- This equipfunctioned excellently throughe entire opera tio n. It centinu-

picked up planes at from 1 LO to 140 .mi1esfrom the ship, showing E·" 'pips' and indicating IFF signals plain. Iy. On the 25th of October a raid of approximately 40 planes was tracked ln toward lhis unit from log miles,"

US BORNET (CV) (Various Strike5):

"The Japs are undoubtedly getting to know better the limits o[ our radar. Those who come back tell the tactics tIle} u ed and others follow sult. The Japs are using higber performance planes (often fighters). eo-ming ip low and climbing fast when closiog force, Coming in low and climbing tend to confuse the 'ighter Director and the high performance plane makes the mo t of that confuslon.~


IFF and Recognition



"This incident again emphasiaes the obvious nee . ity for maximum alertness when there is reason to believe enemy demonstrated [hat IFF in air search radars cannot be relied upon to di tinguish friend from foe when planes are close to the formation. Thi is due largely (0 limitations of lh~ equipment: (a) planes lo,;jthin five miles are obscured. by the light spot or 'SUIl' in the center of the SK screen -individuru p-lanes within this range are often difficult or impossIble to distinguish, and (b) in the'nmge Interval from five to twenty miles, if the bogey .is within approximately five degrees in bearing and one mile in range of one or more friendly planes, the friendly plane's IFF will generally mask the 'oogey'-consequendy, ... vithin this range, an 'friendly' plPS have La be constan tly watched to Instan tl y detect any 'bogey' that may break illYn)' from them."

U 5 MARCUS 1. LilND (CYE) (Leyte):

": at one case of IFF failure, either personnel or material was experienced during the period of this operation. This i attributed [0 increased emphasi on maintenance and personnel operation. All IFF equipment wa checked for proper operation immediately after and JUSt prior to every Blg:hl:. IEF was an. item covered at the briefing before aU !lig.hlles. When starting engines 00 the flight deCK pilots were reminded, both by blackboard and Fly Control over the bull horn, to rum on IFF. All squadron officers and all ship officers that would possibly have any connection with IFF were required to read and study the article, "Are you Sabol4.ging the IFF

y tem", appearing in the September 15t" issue of the GIC pamphlet prt;· p~ted and pu.blis~~l by the Cruef of Naval Operations.


Remarksc=This was the first patrol of this commanding officer ill a submarine equipped with the APA &: APR radar detector. This instrument W35 invaluable in detecting aircraf~ and itmigill well he aid thal \\IlthOUl it, many enemy aircraft contacts would have been made at ranges too close for comjort. I consider this instrument one of the most valuable pieces or equipment aboard, and hope that it can be developed and relined to tnclude additional leatures, That the SD radar is obsolescent is rapidly being indicated. Its use is almost certain t.o invite enemy aircraft into the vicinity. Irs detection ranges are not in proportion to the ranges at wruch it can be DF'd, and it is. tberefore, a military defiCiency rather [han all aid. 1 would nor hesitate to depend entirely upon

the radar detector and lookouts during da.yUght and upon the former and SJ radar dUTJn~ darkness; I would, in fact, prefer Lt. SD radar silence was the policy during the entire return trip from area to refit base. Al1~I:' craft '0 n tacts ei tb er were .si gnted 0 r were detected on the detector in suf· fieient lime to dive.

USS SEGUNDO (S5) (Repor' of Enemy Aircraft Radar Signal on 150 mcs):

"Night flying radar planes are II nuisance ... this particular time we stayed on the surface purposely to find out what APR gain setting would give a saturated signal VS .. range of plane indication. We found that wben a gain setting of 7.5 produced a saturated signal, the plane was close enou gh for his exhaust .flare to 'be in sight. When it appeared likely that these planes were spotting in our position and (bat traffic was being routed around us, we dove when his signal was being received at hal£ strength with full gain setting, hoping that he had not located tI ."



"Another euree ol Interference

ploved [0 be the slmnltanecus use of all the SC and SKradan in the task unit when a bogey was reported. This mused a continuous stream of railings on the A-scope, which are hard on the operators' eyes on the middle il!:e :setting, and on long range, obs es ~he laTgelll. Rotating radar guard It)' 18 recommended as a solution to his interference."





low d-t: l' orne 'ear lome at lea "L. n is that the Loran re eiver may blow a tube, btl t a button, r omething, at any time. If that happen and a fix has riot been taken ju t befor =where are you?

The second Tea on is that go d navigating al it.

it require practice to attain and to r lain. 00 )

or later everyone will hit area , ... here L Tall er ice does not exist.

Treat Loran as a navigational aid=riot a n navigator. It will ea e the burden and improve results at the same time, but no matter h w accurate! it beha es, or how easily it follows a desired track, don't let it become the only Lhing aboard that knows where the ship is.

Don't let your extant get rust -or our k

• • _ J

ol u 109 It either.


In practically e er Loran chain in tallation.

I h ere are lal'ge area served hy on I

providing on] one line of position. To .a fix in such areas. under conditions teo or fifteen minutes, or more, may be taken Ear the proc s . a ertain method rna be utilized, as de cribed in the Eoliov ing .

Take Loran reading at such time as will give a value of reading which is that of one of ,the Loran lines printed on the Loran chart. Also read lime, hip's course and ground speed.

Maiutain course and ground speed until tile Loran receiver reading is that of the adjacent Loran line on Loran chart. Read the time.

Make two pencil marks on a parallel rule, sep· arated by a distance equal to the estimated ground 'overed between readings, drawn to the s ale of Loran char.

parallel rule on Loran chart (on hip' course) and "fish" around with that half, of rule having the pencil marks, until there is found by trial be one place on the chart where the marks

n parallel rule will fit between the two chart lines for the reading used, Intersections oE the rule with the -1;1'10 Loran lines are the ship's posi-

lions at the two tim of reading. .

.he method i the arne as is u ed in coast pi IOli-:l"in connection with soundings, but is somewhat easier because two definite lines on the Loran chan arc: a ailable to test, instead of random chart markings for oundings. It will also be more accurate. 111 fact, the accuracy limitation will be iOf the course and ground speed reckoning.

• •


"a. In OUI ring (on AN/AP -4 aircraft Loran equipments) count sweep speeds in sequence, 7, 6, 5 after aligning blip on s\: eep 4 rather than 'in equence 5, 6 7. It i much easier to add mentall • if thi sequence is followed and if sweep 6 i counted in hundreds thus:

., (7) 3500, (6) 3600-3700-375°, (5) 3785.

line a position may be obtained in les than one minute and without the .necessit of writing any figures other than time on the line of position plot. (Editor's ate: In using this method,

penal care must be taken to avoid errors when the r ading i nearly an exact multiple of 50 or 50 microsecond .. The switching arrangement on DAS· serie Shipboard does not lend itself to this III thod.)

"b. Preset Loran for crossing plotted line of position, in addition to presetting £01' maintaining track on a line of position. This is a very convenient method for use of aircraft in obtaining ground peed (when the track and lines of position al-e in proper relationship) without the necessity of interpolating to plot lines or even make a plot other than a time indication on the track.

I< Loran has been used very effectively by this quadran in the Pacific and the projected operation of additional nations will greatly enhance it value."




,\ II iSSuc, are II vaflable wi ih l he {ol· IUlI'iJlg exceptions:

larch. April, and May i ',ues (Volume I. ~. and 8) ~I"(, no longe,' avail- 1I11c! issue (Vl.)illlnc l. No. ,1) is a\:tilu Ille in limited quani


of Loran





learly everyone in the a aJ ervic having a direct concern with navigational problems of any kind has heard about Loran. Loran er ice now exi ts in nnmerou areas, and utilization of it is increasing rapidly with more rapid installation of recei in equipment.

considerable amount of operational us' ha alread been had~enough to give an ob ervati )1 a one characreristi which require a word of warning.

It is a fact that navigation by means of Loran in an area where good Loran signals exist, is so simple and accurate, and so easily applied that oth r methods heretofore used appear laborious, Consequently, there is a tendency to depend wholl upon Loran and to slight the labors of dead reckoning and celestial observations. ome ase have been observed oE failure to take accurate time and point of departure on overwater flights! (Incidentally, thi is a violation of regulations.)

There are at lea t two Tea ons wh ordinal navigati nal practice should he retain d and ('01.

}{ ulrr i\ I~I OIl tile !:'!,ur e being "lade good. /!till the pencil marks IIrc matrtuu! mith Luran "line of 1'(J,·ili;jfl."



Requests for ba k i,~u " and subsequem isme<> of .. . J. ." should be add resscd:

The Chid of Naval Operations, Editor 0.1 "C, I, .". \ ashingron !!r;. D. .


Arm command and acuvitles desiring to rcceivel ues of "C.LC:' . bould rli rect their requ es ts to:

Adjutanr eneral' Office, Operations Branch, Room l!B939, Pentagon Building, \\'a,hinglon 2[" D.



.,., m CD 7'3 C




"With the utmost contempt for his personal safety,

the Editor of ·C. I. C.' has gathered, from the.'

wildest regions of the globe, these amazing

reports on the newest happenings in the Great W:tr

of Electro.n.ics! f' You cannot, you must not, miss

them! You absolutely and utterly must not

permit any officer or man in your command to be

denied the opportunity to imbibe of this knowledge

IF he needs it in the performance ofms duties-

Go away, boy, you bother me- Step right inf

HUrryr Hurryr The show is beginningr"