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ate ~ COMBA‘ INFORMATION / La A Ba In| electronic and associated equipment, VOL. Il, NO. 3 MARCH 1945 1) Break the R/T Bottleneck 5 | How Good Is Jap Radar? 7| The Electronic Battle Is On 9) The Parable of Brag 10 | MEW Goes to Bat in the Pacific 14 | Authenticate! 14 | Remoting Target Date-PDQ 16 | Mert the CIC Circuit Rider 19 | Ralar Switchboard Improves PPL Remoting 2 | The “Standard” Target Is Debunked 26 | CIC Helps Gunnery Call the Shots 28 | FPR Simplifies Piloting 88 | How to Use the Summary Plot BA | NAN Signals with Invisible Light 37 | Radar Recognition Systems—IFF 45.| What to Say in Action Reports 48 | The Galloping Ghost of Nansei Shoto 48 | eas of the Month S| Action... Excerpts from Recent Reports 58 | GIG Glossary 65 | Distribution of "C.C HE Published monthly by the Chief of Neva Operations (DNC) for the information of Military personnel whose duties are connected with the lacticat and operational aspects of electronic ‘equipment Hi Include thie publication with other confidential material which ie to receive emergency destruction in the event of pos sible loss or eapture. “GIG” shall not be carried for use in ME Metcria! and photographs for publication in “CALE.” should be submitted to Chief of Naval Operations, Editor of “CA4.C." Washington 25, D.C. (Navy Department 4 and Ge770) leplione Extensions Faitorial Office: DNC Art and Layout; ONT (0P 20-64) OP A6-P. United States CONFIDENTIAL British W This document contains information alfecting the nationat defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 5p US.C., $1 and ga as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited try law a) break the R/T bottleneck S lipshod R/T procedure is among the most critical, most dangerous problems facing the U.S. Fleet today. Unless conditions are radically and immediately improved, the combat efficiency of our forces afloat, in the air, and on land will continue to be hampered to a degree which may possibly imperil our success and will ‘seriously delay our chances of conclusively defeating the enemy Action reports coming from the Pacific Fleet pile up report upon report of faults in R/T procedure of every conceivable kind. This bottleneck on combat communications must be broken. It will be broken only if all officers and men whose duties require them to use radio-telephone will faithfully obey the correct procedure. Doing so will quickly clear away the jam-up and enable communications to keep pace with the needs of all tactical situations. Correct R/T procedure is definitely not an unimportant, tedious set of requirements dreamed up to make life difficult. It is the only basis for efficient voice communications and failure to carry it out is paid for in the irreplaceable lives of Naval officers and men and in the needless destruction of ships and planes. These losses must and will be stopped. Some of the common faults noted are: breaking in on a net already in use by someone else, talking too rapidly, shouting and screaming into the microphone, blowing into the microphone to see if the transmitter is operating, keying the microphone continually throughout the transmission, poor diction and poor enunciation. It is the responsibility of the supervising officer to exercise a firm and positive control over the circuits, and to see that mistakes are called to the attention of those at fault and that active steps are taken to correct the deficiencies and prevent them from being repeated; vigilance and prompt and vigorous action on the part of the supervising officer will bring about CONFIDENTIAL S61 HOXWA ‘D1. ei C.I.C. MARCH 1945, great improvement in uit discipline Let us examine just a few of the action reports: procedure and USS CALIFORNIA (8B); “In the opinion of the Commanding Officer intra-fleet communications, especially on primary TBS, were definitely poorer than during any pre vious operation in which this ship has participated. Girenit discipline was almost non-existent. Little attempt was made by many stations to monitor this circuit prior to making transmissions, with the re sult that a large proportion of transmissions were cut out by interference and had to be repeated. USS KADASHAN BAY (CVE) (Palau): “The long and difficult campaign to make pilots radio silent showed evidence of progress on this operation and should be extended now. to ship personnel. The number of unnecessary sions from ships out-weighed those from pilots, and many of them were simple things that should be covered by doctrine or visual signals such as ‘CHARLIE,’ order of landing aboard, telling pilots to watch signal officer, asking positions and when expected over ship, etc. All of these were picked up over both the target area (Channel 1) and on the CAP circuit.” USS COLUMBIA (CL) (Leyte): “It was noted that on all voice circuits operators are inclined to talk too fast for accurate recording by the receiving operators. This was responsible for numerous requests for repetitions which would, CONFIDENTIAL not have been necessary had the transt erator spoken more slowly. Faults of this nat) can only decrease the efficiency and effectiveness of any voice circuit. We can increase the speed of any voice cirenit by speakin, more slowly, USS BIRMINGHAM (CL) (Saipan) TBS talkers should be given a course in elocu- The worst talker was the one who dragged out tion. his words, in the mistaken belief that he was insur- ing accurate reception, to such an extent that the words were almost unintelligible, and drove all listeners to distraction by the length of time taken to send his n The best talker was *g knot Burke,’ now with CTF 58 (‘Baldeagle says again’) His delivery was clear and snappy and left no doubt, as to who was in charge, He is hereby nominated as instructor of the elocution class. The correction of such faults as are indic®™ above is so simple th: recounting of ae errors suggests the remedy. Notwithstanding that fact reports of the same difficulties in operation after operation persist. After the occupation of the Marshalls, so many complaints about voice radio procedure were received that GinGPac commented: “To ships and officers in general it cannot * overemphasized that in Communications, as Gunnery, ‘The shots that count are the shots that hit’ No one would contend that in Gunnery the stress of action justifies a haste or volume greater than what is consistent with absolute precision, yet it is surprising how many people lost sight of this principle as applied to Communications. Many of us seem to feel that we can shriek almost anything across the wind or mumble itinto a transmitter, 0% x ee Oe # se eR K # that some magic will then translate it into compre- Prsible English, get ie through quickly and accurately to the addressee, and keep it from jam- ming or being jammed by othe? trafli Reports indicate that some improvement was noticed in the subsequent actions, but th complaints continued to be voiced, as evidenced by ‘comments of GinGPac after the Marianas invasion “At Saipan, the greatest difficulty in communica. ns, and one which has been present in all previous amphibious operations, was.the personnel performance on voice circuits. This basic difficulty is the result of improperly trained personnel using these circuits, officers and men alike; the persistent use of slang and improper procedure; insufficient and at times incompetent circuit control when in the hands of very junior officers: occasionally the poor examples set by some officers who indulge in Iegg harangues; improper judgment used in rout- % administrative trafic on tactical circuits; and failure to reduce all messages, other than emer- same old gency transmissions, to wr mittal. "The failure to comply with the last require- ment especially cannot help but result in ineffi Gency not only because of the natural tendency to 6 but also because of ing before their trans- a conversational manner the lack of a suit In the absence of a written record, references to messages and requests for repetition will only result, in. confusion, exasperation, and delays in the ble record of the transmissions. handling of other communications, “Every deck officer must be impressed with the importance of the proper functioning of voice > jo circuits, and must be trained in the funda- mentals of their use. Satisfactory improvement cannot be obtained in any other way. While not all communications problems are due to faulty R/T procedure, it is a fact that much un- necessary traffic, particularly a large part of the requested repeats, can be avoided by the obser of a few simple rules: 1, First, determine whether your message should If it should be sent by visual or CW, do not use the voice circuit 2. Use the proper net. Do not use the com. \d cireuit for administrative traffic or the boat control net for air raid warnings. ‘Traffic over im: proper nets accounts for much of the cong id_confusion complained about in the reports. 3 If there is any doubt as to your right to use the net, obtain permission to transmit from the proper authority. 4. Determine whether your message which If there is, be certa nce go by voice radio. tion there is anything in uust or should be encoded. n you have the correct code, If you fail to use the code, and a repeat is re- quested, don’t compromise your code by using it, in the repeat. 5. Except in extreme emergencies, reduce your message 10 writing, This does not mean you should stop to write out a message that your ship is sinking, but neither does it mean that everything, you have to say is an emergency. If you are con- scious of the question, your own comme will tell you when a true emergency exists. Writ ing your message serves several purposes: It keeps, you from grabbing the mike and making a verbose transmission when your thought can he adequately the offiniows CONFIDENTIAL S¥61 HOUVIN ‘O'1'9 C.1.C. MARCH 1945 expressed in half a dozen words; and it gives you a record of what goes out. Your face can get very red if you cannot remember your message and have no record of it when a repeat is requested. If your transmission is written, you can begin talk without wasting radio time while you are trying to phrase your message. 6. Listen before you speak. See if someone else is on the line. This is just common courtesy, but failure to observe this rule causes endless con- fusion. Both your message and the one you have terrupted n is lost. 7- Don't blow into the mike, and don't shout Use a conversational tone of voice, and keep your voice pitched in an even key. Talk with your voice Rot your emotions. Shouting causes distortion, and screaming is much worse. 8. Talk slowly. It is estimated that 50% of the Fequests for repeats are caused by too rapid speech. Remember the message is being typed or written at the other end. ‘The officer who must act on it may not hear it and may have to rely on the type. written transcript. If it is being typed at your end watch the yeoman and see that he is able to get it as you talk. IF it is not being typed, visualize your self typing it. Slow speech will enable you to speak distinctly, but do not over-enunciate, Pro. nounce words normally but distinctly. 9- After you start your transmission, go ahead. Don't stop and don’t key your mike. Hold the key down and continue evenly with your n 10. Identify yourself and the addressee by proper call sign, Do not use nicknames or unauthorized names. t be repeated and precious time CONFIDENTIAL 1. If your message is addressed to a number of addressees, and acknowledgment is not required “ all, state who must acknowledge it, Not a little of the confusion appears to be caused by a failure to understand the proper use Of the key words of voice communi ‘our,” “roger,” and “wilco.” Instances are on record time and again of talkers, who are at a loss for the correct word, elect to use them all just for good measure. “Over” means tions: “over,” ahead; transmit. ‘This is the end of my transmission and a response is necessary and required.” Its use means you have said what was on your mind and you want an answer, ‘Out” means simply “This is the end of my transmission to you and no reply is expected or required.” You have nothing further to say and heed no further information from the addressee. Roger” means literally “I have received your message.” No more and no less o ‘Wilco” means “I have received your message, understand it and will comply with it.” “Wilco” is never to be used merely to indicate receipt of the message and should be used only by the actual ad- dressee or on his order after he has understood the directive and determined that he can comply with it. 6 If you have been guilty of violating any of tle above rules or of misusing the key words, you haye been contributing to communication failure and breakdown. The result is pyramidal; each violation causes more transmissions, and the sum total can eventually cause delays which cannot be tolerated. Observe proper procedure, and save valuable time! 4 yhere was a day, not so many, mon: soons ago, when the Navy held all too few advantages over our slanteyed Ben ee ee Psene of taaerane een 1 wo root teal The Nin Boveree is cal tionally adept at grabbing someone else's ce (or anything else) and turning it to | In a nutshell, we still are a good hop-skip-and: jump ahead of Japan in the radar field, but our early overwhelming superiority has been cut For two years the Jap has been radar con ance. In early 1942 Jap radar known, of a very few early aplenty scious with a ven consisted, as far as Warning shore-based_ types. major radar development of which the Japs dc not have knowledge The Japs are now at least a year behind us Whether an ad vantage in the future is problematic ‘ee Japanese are now making operational use Land-based air and surface search radar Ship-borne air and surface search radar Air-borne surface search Radar fire control Radar search-light control Window Radar intercept receivers Centimeter radar The Japanese are known to possess. know! of (and may be expected to use in the future) IFF Electronic jammers Ground Control Intercept The extent to which Jap madar has grown. is ilastrated by the disconcerting fact. that thei dhorelbaced tadar chain embodies well oFér 430 ae is doubtful that a oe hee in Ge he sie panties nee Caiaray See tines a Uaeoey cue ae eee eens Pe eae degen percentage of de ind frequently more radar types nd patrol planes are CONFIDENTIAL 219 S61 HQUVN C.1C, MARCH 1945 equipped, and there is good evidence that Jap fighters are being fitted with Al. Allied exclusive right to the centimeter bands was broken not by the Germans, whose radar has heyer been far behind ours, but by the Japs. ‘Ten- centimeter radar for surface search and fire control is already in operational use, shipborne and shore-based. And sharply-beamed super frequency jobs of this type are next to impossible to jam. ‘The Jap made a long jump from the reasonable regions around 200 mcs, to the tricky realms of 3000 mes. But they're there—and as they pick their way through this part of the spectrum, un- questionably they'll warm to its many possibilities as we have already done. ‘The Japanese are known to be experimenting on wave lengths as short as one centimeter. Japanese air search radar has developed to the point where it is comparable to ours, at least in point of maximum range. ‘The efficiency of their surface search types, however, is still well below our levels. As for their fire control radars, there still considerable doubt as to whether most of their ships are so equipped. During recent oper tions off the Philippines, it was noted that Jap warships halted firing during rain squalls when visibility was greatly reduced, and that their fire seemed to be concentrated on ships, especially screening vessels, that were not covered by smoke. Previous reports indicate that the Japs have de veloped fire control radar, but are probably using, it only on AA guns. Recently the Japs have added Window to their bag of tricks—and they've been using it frequel occasionally with good results (for them), On tle bright side of the ledger our extensive (and con- tinuing) training in reading through Window is paying dividends, and, in addition, the Jap’s tac- tical use of Window has been poor. ‘Thus far they have been using it more as a deceptive than a pro- tective device. Our greatest. advantage in the radar field at present lies in our much more effective tactical use of the weapons [he Japanese have most of the tools but they have not yet learned how to use them. Our trajgifg. program and_ streamlined methods for evaliiating and making use of ail the information that radar can provide (CIC) repre sents our greatest margin of superiority over the enemy=particularly when the going is tough and the ‘picture’ complicated. But the Japs are quick to learn. They are suffering from radar ‘growing pains’ but they are bending every effort to ‘catch up'—and, whether we like it or not, they are reaping some of the benefits of our experience. So there can be no. resting on laurels as far as our attitude anid effort, is concerned. The attached table is a condensed statemen| the probable operational. capabilities of sol types of Japanese radar. These figures are esti mates only, based on available information which, at this time, is not too extensive, and are there- fore not to be treated as fact. TYPE FREQUENCY APPROXIMATE ACCURACY EXTENT OF USE TN BEARING IN RANGE « Landbased 6080 mes. oe Goo yards at or near Air Search 0-105 mes. most airfield 145-160 mes, ndbased Surface Search 10cm. 90-105 mes.) 5 145-160 mes. | Shipbor 200 mes, rch, room, Surfac Goo yards ot extensive ys "600 yards BB, GL, GV, DD BB, CL and A/S patrol boats 600 yards 1.6% Shipborne 200 m6. unkno a Fire Control Airborne M5 rp 10° VPB, VIB Surface Search 290-310 mes. | Airbome 1000-1200 mes. unknown: es Air Intercept CONFIDENTIAL probably VF, we The makings of an electronic slugging match are wrapped up in the ordinary-looking cases of sevéral new countermeasures equipments being procured by the Navy and installed in such aircraft : as PB4Y-2, PB4Y-1, PBM, and PV-2 and in prac- tically all types of large combatant vessels. When the slugging match begins, the principals will probably be: in one comer a Japanese radar all set to cripple an American operation; in the other corner an American electronic jamming transmitter ready to KO. the enemy radar The most effective way to get the enemy off the air, of course, would be to drop a 500-pound bomb or fire a 1G-inch shell right on the radar shack But al times when such strong-arm methods are neither possible nor desirable, an electronic jam mer can do the job with deadly subtlety. RCM may provide the only means to carty the bomb or shell near enough 10 the enemy to do any good. The Navy isn't saying much about such equip. ments, but it’s no longer any secret that offensive countermeasures with a Sunday punch are in pro- duction, being tailor-made to fit requirements dic tated by the enemy. In this article you'll meet a few of them—the TDY, DINA, Web, Rug, and Carpet, for example. Carpet is the little spoiler which teamed ment window with spot jamming in blanking out up with window and helped make life gunlaying Wurzburgs miserable for German radar crews as long Rug first went into combat at Salerno, with ap- as October 1943. At that time, to parently successful results, when it was installed protect leading planes not covered by window, — on transports and combatant vessels, Later it took by ‘one combat wing of the 8th Aix Force installed a crack at coast-watching radars in Normandy and transmitters to help jam radars which direct anti- southern France when it was installed on naval aircraft fire, searchlights and fighter-interceptor forces involved in those two invasions. & planes. After 10 missions, Carpet was credited with - As “The Eyes and Ears of Countermeasures” in e 1g approximately 21 bombers and 210 then the October “C.L.C.”" pointed out, reconnaissance E m being shot down, Since then Carpet has planes can detect an enemy radar and determine 3 been improved and given more power to supple- its frequency by use of search receivers; determine CONFIDENTIAL 7 C.1.C. MARCH 1945 the pulse repetition rate and pulse width by means ‘of pulse analyzers; and establish the location of the radar station by sof direction-finding equipment. When this information is obtained, the offensive with an electronic jammer can begin. ious types can be used—for in us wave radiation, pulsed radia. tion, or random noise radiation. Most difficult to read through is noise radiation, the type used in DINA (Direct Noise Amplifier) and certain other Navy jammers. In this type of radiation the en- ergy is distributed at random with respect to time. There is no order or recurrence period of the energy, and the distributions of energy with re spect to frequency do not repeat themselves. For example, the random motion of electrons in any conductor can be amplified sufficiently to produce a random noise output Jamming of va stance, contin THE HEAVYWEIGHT—AND OTHERS The TDY is the primary shipborne jammer, the big stick in the radar jamming program. Cov- ering a range of 60-1200 megacycles and with an average power output of 115 watts, it may be used cither as a barrage or a spot jammer. It proved its success in the Normandy invasion and has been ordered for installation in both the U.S. Navy and the British Navy. The TDY may also be used as a communi er in its frequency range. Since the output signal of the TDY provides a continuous transmission, the TDY needs no modi fication to jam a pulsed signal or a communica: tions transmission. DINA, whose more formal name is AN/APT-1 (airborne radar transmitter), emits approximately watts of noise in any 6 mc band between 95 and 210 me. ANYSPT-1 is the shipboard version, Higher frequeney radars can be jammed with the AN/APQ.2, known to RCM personnel as Rug, a set with 20 to 10 watts of power output (decreases as frequency goes up) and a 200-550 me frequency range. Shipboard Rug (AN/SPT-4), modified to cover lower frequencies, was credited with an “assist” in preventing Japanese radar equipped torpedo planes from reaching a naval force near Formosa. Units ordered for naval air araft are being delivered. A third equipment being procured is “Web,” also called AN/APT-5 or “Carpet IV,” a wide-range noise-modulated jamn to 5 watts over a frequency range of 350-1400 me. The AN/APQ-2 and AN/APT-5 will be used to supplement each other, the former for frequen. ns jams CONFIDENTIAL with an RF output of 25+ » mc and the other above. transmitters occupy the same size case. An earlier “G known as “Carpet I” or AN/APT-2, has been used in large numbers by the Army Air Forces in Europe against Wurzburg gunlaying radar. A limited number have been procured by BuAer, but most of the Navy's needs in this frequency range will be supplied by the higher-powered AN/APQ-2 and AN/AP1 When greater ‘power is desired, two a are available—the AM-14/APT, used to increase the output of the AN/APT-1 (DINA) to 100 watts at a frequency of 85-150 mc; and the AM- 18/APT, which boosts power output to above 50 watts over a frequency range of 135-210 mc. These power output figures may. be diminished by RF line loss, Another amplifier, AM-33/APT, is ney DINA, available for use with a low-frequ AN/ARQ8, which covers 25-105 mc TWO OFFENSIVES—SPOT AND BARRAGE je missions more than one jammer must be used to provide enough power to foil the enemy effectively, The number of jammers need- ed on any mission will depend on the distance between the enemy radar and the jammer, th number of radars to be jammed, their frequenc spread, their relative locations, and the size of the aircraft or ship to be protected. These factors will also determine whether the jamming planes should attempt. “spot jamming” or “barrage jamming,’ Spot jamming is the use of one or more trans- mitters ‘tuned to one frequency channel, ‘To be most effective it is’ necessary to monitor the enemy’s transmission and tune the jammer direct- ly against that transmission, ‘This method can bet used successfully against relatively isolated rad: If the enemy has two or three radars closely linked in a network, and spot jamming is ruled out by lack of equipment or personnel, the best bet is to use barrage jamming. In this method several aircraft are used, cach carrying a jamming transmitter pre-tuned to a different frequency. Or, several jammers on one or more ships may team up. The different frequencies are adjacent to each other, so that a wide frequency band is effectively One advantage of barrage jamming, for planes, is that transmitters do not need to be tuned in flight and hence do not re- quire a trained operator but can simply be.turned on and off like a piece of IFF equipment ‘The element of surprise is highly important @ a jamming mission. ‘The jamming transmitte must not be used before entering the field of view —o eo of the intended radar victim, or the enemy will advance notice of a visitor, unless it is hoped to deceive the enemy into thinking that be- hind a few jammers is a large raid. Although the enemy radar will not be able to determine the range or size of the jamming craft or group of air- and search.radar, with little success so fi craft, it can tell the direction from which the jam- In electronic battles to come, the Navy will be ming is coming. represented by fighting equipments of many types: How effective jamming can be is shown by nu pulse analyzers and direction merous experiences dating back to the early days finders for learning about the enemy, of the war. In the battle of Britain, one great fac- tronic jammers, together with window, for knock- tor in turning back the Luftwaffe was British jam- ~ ing his radars out ming of the enemy's radio directional beams for Training of officers and enlisted personnel to blind-bombing. At El Alamein the British used a use airborne RCM equipments is underway at the communication jammer to disrupt German tank Special Projects School for Air at San Clemente communications and prevent German armored — Island, Calif., and with periodic Fleet exercises forces from regrouping during the night CNO, BuShips, and Buder are all very much Two can play at the same game, however, and interested in receiving reports on enemy tactics the enemy has also used jamming effectively. The and your use of RCM. successful escape of the warships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau up the British channel on 12 February 1942 was possible partly because of German jam- ming of British coastwatching radars. The Japa: nese have attempted jamming of communications THE PARABLE OF BRAG, WHICH PAID NO REGARD hen spake Brag unto, Freddie, “Behold, am I not a Leader of the Chariots of FAAS even the winged Chariots which do battle against the Hosts of GAF?* What need, therefore, have I of ye that abide on deck?” And Freddie+ made answer, “Thy need of me is even as mine of thee, and both are great.” And Brag shot a line, saying “Drip not, but be of good faith, O Chum. For are there not two Philistines and a Buzzbomb to my account, and was it not I which smote them down? So thou givest me the Vector, the rest is a piece of Cake, and more is not required of thee.” And leaping into his Chariot he became airborne. dnd Freddie lifted up his Mike and transmitted, saying, “Hail, O Brag, this is even Freddie that beseecheth thee. Vector therefore zero seven zero buster, angels niner. For the Host of GAF, it is ahead.” And Brag vectored zero seven zero buster, angels niner, and his flight with him. And their track was a joy to them that plotted, and they did Tallyho. And the Flight which was Brag’s joined issue with the chariots of GAF, smiting down twice twain of them, so that jettisoning their bombs they that were left did flee, skimming the face of the Waters in their Panic Then Freddie lifted up his voice over the R/T and said, “Verily, O Brag, thou hast done thy stuf. Hey Rube, therefore, thou and thy Chickens. For we that do abide on deck have need of thee.” But Brag hardened his heart, saying unto his Flight, “Pay no regard.” And they pursued the Philistines, smiting them hip and thigh. Now an Host even greater than the first drew nigh unto the Carrier, and the Chariots which did remain could in no wise cope. Wherefore Freddie pleaded with Brag, crying “Hey Rube, or we have Had It.” But Brag answered not. And they which were upon the Waters Had It And when that Brag did return, exulting and boasting for that his Score was Fife and that he was a Mighty Man of Valour, his Ship, it was not. And Brag and they that were with him did pancake perforce in the Drink. And they that were with him were picked up, even by the galleys which did escort his Ship ere that it was no more. But Brag, Jamenting, threw up his hands, and the oil which was where the Ship had been did close even above his ee Nina ie was devoured by a Whale Fleet Air Arm man Air Force + Directing Ship from the British publication “Flight Deck”, Dee. 1944 CONFIDENTIAL S| HOAWA O19. top a hill on Saipan there is a new guardian for the Saipan-based B-29's. It combats the air raids of the Japs, whose anxiety over the ‘almost daily cruises of the Superforts over the Japanese homeland is becoming increasingly apparent proaching Saipan just over the water have reached On several occasions, enemy raids ap: their objective undetected or were detected too late for effective fighter interception and some damage has resulted. ‘The Army's MEW is de. ied to put an end to this situation. Though a newcomer to the Pacific Ocean Areas, MEW is a veteran of European Campaigns, hav ing served in England in the battle against the buzz bombs, in the Normandy invasion, and in the invasion of Southern France. When General Eisenhower's troops broke out of the Normandy pocket and dashed through France, the MEW de veloped mobility and followed the lightning n border. Its effective tions prompted the decision 5 existing sets to the Pacific to combat the low altitude approach used by the Japs to escape early radar detection. terrain however present- Racific... there were no roads from the beach to its new home sweeps toward the Ge ness in these ope to send one of the These problems have now been solved, the MEW is at its battle station, and it is expected neak raids on the B-29's will become increasingly difficult MEW means microwave early warning and its official designation is AN/CPS-1. The virtues of the MEW as reflected by past. performances are many. It has great range and is very accurate in determining range and bearing. Tt can pick up acbomber 200 miles away at an altitude of 30,000 feet, but this range would probably be cut in half for a fighter plane or other small aircraft. It can sweep very low over land without losing signals in the ground return, which makes it most-valu: able in picking up low flying aircraft. The com: bination of these first two capabilities qualifies the MEW for the job it is expected to do at Saipan. Other advantages are its very high resolution and its great resistance to jamming The MEW is not an altitude determining radar “ thus cannot be used alone for Fighter Direc mn, but its range and resolution make it an effec tive adjunct. Early warning permits the FDO to vector his planes out in the direction of the raid in an excellent position for an early interception, As the raid approaches, the altitude determining radar can then be brought to bear to enable the FDO to send his planes to the proper altitude, In England, the MEW teamed with a British Type 24, which took care of altitude determination. The versatility of the MEW is reflected by the fact that its primary function at Saipan was con sidered secondary in England. ‘There it was to be used primarily to direct fighter sweeps, and. its success in this field is shown clearly by a recent report on the German offensive. The MEW serv ing the Ninth Tactical Air Command was able to, detect the movement of an enemy tank column, which is pretty good detecting in any leag Fighters were vectored onto the tanks, and the tack was stalled long enough to permit Allied armor to come up and hold off the advance that almost certainly would have resulted in the cap: ture of a headquarters town and a large part of the personnel there. Shortly thereafter the MEW was transferred to a more suitable spot directed planes in the destruction of much Ger man armor and many aireraft While no enemy tanks are expected to approach Saipan in the near future, this performance prom ises much when the Japs are engaged on their own home field, And it also indicates that the MEW may haye value in detecting and tracking surface vessels from its present location. Secondary func tions of the installation in England were consid. The MEW antenna is massive. CONFIDENTIAL HoUWAO 1: sro C.1.C. MARCH 1945 4 MEW site in Europe Preparing the Saipan site ered to be Fighter Direction and early warning. When the German Air Force showed some life ing the recent offensive, primary and second- ary functions were forgotten, and MEW compiled an impressive batting average in fighter sweeps, fighter direction and an early warning all at the same time. Under proper circumstances, it ca be used effectively to direct air support for am phibious operations and to control bombing operations. Still other possible uses for the MEW are indi- cated by the fact that experiments are being made to ascertain how helpful it may be in obtaining information for the weatherman. MEW employs a double lobe, one for low angles and éne for high. Each lobe has its own transmitter, receiver, and indicator. The tendency, ‘of the low lobe to stay on the deck gives it great value, while the upper beam coverage has left something to be desired. This will in all proba- bility be corrected in future models For ease in Fighter Direction the MEW em ploys a combination PPI and plotting table called a skiatron which is similar to the Navy VG projec- tion PPI described in the “G.1.C.” edition of January 194 Bescopes. As indicated by the difficulties encountered in. getting the MEW to the proper spot on Saipan, it, is a huge installation, weighing some 66 tons. The antenna alone weighs 5 tons and is 25 feet length. When it is necessary to make it mobile@y 10 trucks are required for MEW gear and 6 more for VHF installations. Notwithstanding its size, it has been packed for travel in 114 days and set in operation in the same period of time. Eleven days were required to convert one set from fixed to mobile. The usual fixed installation consists of @ Scope room, an operations room, a maintenance room, an operations office, and a room for power and ‘clephone gear: 150 oficers and men are@™y needed to operate the entire layout. Only 5 sets are in operation at the present time. ‘There will be more, and it is hoped the Saipan copy will be joined by other members of the fam- ily as our forces crowd ever closer to the Jap's home base. CONFIDENTIAL BeBe. eAUTHENTICATE ; In addition, the MEW can accom, | Tnodate a5 many as 18 scope, including PPTs and @ AUTHENTICATE “The enemy attempted to operate on our artillery radio frequency by using one of our sets in their posséssion. They gave a deflection change that would have endangered our troops had it been executed. When requested to give an authenticator their action was betrayed, since they seemed to be unfamiliar with the use of such a system. Aside from this, their radio pro: cedure was an exact imitation of ours, and in well spoken English.” Some marines are still fighting today who would be “pushing up daisies” had the personnel involved in the incident quoted above been less alert or less familiar with authentication. On the other hand: “It has been observed too frequently that commands are changing the effective authenticator key at the designated time “No authentication was used, although it was known that the enemy was at the time transmitting on another VHF channel.” “Authentication, in many instances, was incorrectly used, and it was only upon being challenged or a repeat being requested that a correction was made.” -gligent in AUTHENTICATE “Lack of knowledge in the use of authenticators was evident, causing recipients to question authenticator prosigs and call-ups frequently.” “The authenticator in use was the most efficient and simple produced thus far: in practice, however, it was discovered that Shore Fire Control Parties were not thoroughly familiar with it, and in many instances authen- ticated incorrectly, resulting in delay in the delivery of gunfire support in at least one instance. Action reports contain too many comments similar to the last few quoted above, but comments similar to the first quoted are all too rare. The con- clusion to be drawn from these reported incidents is almost obvious: some of us have been letting our own people down. It cannot be over emphasized that the correct use of authenticators is vital to American lives and to the success of U.S. Naval Operations. ‘All hands (not only communication personnel) who use radio, either voice or CW, must know when authentication should be used, and must be instantly prepared to use a correct authenticator when required. It is too late to read the instructions after an operation is in progress, or even, as in some cases, after somebody asks you to authenticate. ‘The “Speak-Easy” flourished for years with a strict system of authentica- tion at the door. Authentication will also enable the Navy to keep out undesirable strangers. CONFIDENTIAL SbbI HOUVIN “OID C.1.C, MARCH 1945 hen CIG spots a suspicious target, it can in- 10 other stantly distribute important range and bear- Target. Designation Tr: ing dis lougie me ED" net beads hie sclectna OF nape stow various ship control and gunnery stations. This maximum switching flexibility with fuse protec indicators located in flag plot, open bridge, pilot switchboard circuits relay the target indication in. gun directors. This PD target information sup- in CIC is the heart of the target indication system RSGeatE Ure pcties provided Wale PEL Wee Contsining actctiaccniel ty, tie VE Ceatie repeaters, and range hand cranks, the repeater affords rapid and accurate dissemination of radar data. If the ship finds itself in the midst of two simul- taneous attacks—from the air or a combined air and surface encounter, CIC in addition to the VF iniiers ark 16) locked at cach sadar (one ge and be: transmission of bearing and range of more than one target by CIC. In the near future the target ©The levers “PD" stand for the circuit designation as found nation transmitter Mark 10 will be replaced Boe tte Cena deuce genet by hand-operated cursors on the master PPI unit switchboard, See of radar, affording increased speed and miter or These switches Because the “B" scope presents an expanded ww of the target area in question, the VF (Pre cision PPI Repeater—see page 22, September 1944 ‘C.LC.”) can be utilized as a primary source of CIC—THE CENTER OF THE SYSTEM The distribution center of the PD syster CIC PD switchboard—a steel enclosure swinging front door, which may be mounted against the bulkhead. Snap switches on the panel, energize the bearing and range circuits from the VE (Precision PPI Repeater), the SG, SK, Mark is the with a remoting target data PDQ SK input = CIC target designation Jf ‘mechanism switchboard CONFIDENTIAL g- This permits simultaneous @ accuracy of transmission. Coupled to the cursors e o be converters for changing true bearing | s of the PPI presentation to relative bearing. SHIP CONTROL INFORMATION The PPI repeaters located in flag plot, open bridge, pilot house and conning tower furnish an overall picture for ship control purposes. Directly adjacent to each PPI repeater is a bear ing and a range indicator receiving information of sclected targets from the target designation switchboard, assisting considerably in the tactical control of the ship. } FIRE CONTROL DATA The primary function of the PD system insofar # as fire control is concerned is to get gun directors on the target in the shortest possible time. On all ships larger than destroyers, CIG distributes the i srce: diet to Main Batiety Bloc tr. Seconiary Plot where it is relayed to the proper gunnery stations, such as Forward Main Battery Control ‘After Main Battery Control, Air Defense For d, and so forth. The Gunnery Liaison Officer flag plot < gunnery stations in CIC supplements the target data when neces- by talking to Plot or Gun Directors. On destroyers the PD switchboard distributes data from CIG to the gun and torpedo directors. The problem of getting on the target with fire control radars is greatly simplified because synchro-trans- mission permits the use of follow-the-pointer r¢ ceivers in gun directors. “The installation of these follow-the-pointer receivers on destroyer torpedo and gun directors give full radar control of the directors from the VF repeater, the SG radar, and the Mark 4 or Mark 12 fire control radars. Because of its usefulness in ship control and fire control, the PD system is another step for- ward in the dissemination of target data. It’s, quick, it’s easy and it’s accurate. This is how the radar target information is dis tributed. Range and bearing data is transmitted from the VE, various radars, or Mark 10 Target Designation Transmitter through the target desig- nation switchboard in CIC directly to ship control stations and gunnery control stations via the gunnery switchboard open pilot conning bridge house tower T T gun directors CONFIDENTIAL Shl HOWWIN “O10. C.1.C. MARCH 1945 ‘Those terrific distances in the Pacific Ocean Area and the necessity for keeping our ships on the firing line posed a question: how could CIC. officers and men afloat be kept abreast of the rapid changes and developments in CIC practice and procedure? How could they be given the benefit of research and experiments being carried on in the rear areas as well as innovations and sugges tions arising out of actual experience of other ships? DesPac has solved the problem by institut a comprehensive and far reaching CIC train: ing program in the forward areas, carried out by a modern version of the old time Circuit Rider. ‘This is how it works. Instruction teams are assigned to tenders accessible to ships coming in for limited availability, and these teams are able to pass on the very latest information to those who most need it. In addition underway assistants are sent aboard ships in the forward area, proceeding from ship to ship and from squadron to squadron. Results indicate that this plan is meeting with success. Daily reports from ships coming back into port or putting alongside tenders for minor repairs state that changes which have been based on suggestions of forward area training men have enabled them to handle more efficiently and ac curately the increasing number of problems be- ing heaped on CIG in navigation, gunnery, shore bombardment, si tracking, and kindred matters ‘The source of supply of these training officers is the Fleet itself. A minimum of nine months’ combat experience is required, and only outstand ng officers are selected. ‘These officers with a ‘ctical background already to their credit are CONFIDENTIAL, refresher schooling in CIC and fighter ion problems. If it is obvious for any rea a man is not fitted to go out as a forward area officer, he is returned to sea duty. He has lost nothing and has gained additional train- ing. Those who remain are ordered to the For- ward Areas for a period of from four to six months, at the completion of which they normally go back to sea duty, via new construction Fach forward area CIC team consists of one tender-based officer and an enlisted man. Classes for enlisted men and officers are arranged aboard the tender for drills and exercises in tracking and plotting. If this is not possible, lectures are given on the ships themselves, without disrupting the routine of the day. The enlisted man is a skilled radar operator, and he assists in training the ship’s operators. THE CIRCUIT RIDER GOES TO SEA @ The underway assistant goes to sea with a ship and holds classes and drills, making recommendations for improvements. While the method of presentation may vary, the material cach offers is about the same; it differs only in de- tail and length of time devoted to the instructiong periods and the amount of drilling carried out by the crew under supervision. The assistant’s duties include a study of the ship's CIC, including its physical, material, and personnel arrangement. By means of a handy, up- to-date check-off list, a rapid but accurate survey is, made of the equipment being used. Recommenda- tions for changes are made, bearing in mind the size of the alteration involved, the availability of, e extra equipment in the adjacent area, and the limi tations of the tender's service force. Further sug- gestions are offered based on the ship's return to a Navy Yard, as an aid to the officer-in-charge in planning his CIC alterations. Lectures are held for the General Quar- ters team, including officers and men whose stations are in CIC. The surface plotting problem is approached by demonstrating the proper use of the drafting machine, the correct symbols to be used in tracking, and thé newest methods of determining target speed, effective torpedo range, and otger time-saving devices. In asmuch as these training units go aboard many ships, they have an excellent opportunity to pick up new ideas which have worked successfully ‘one CIG and pass them to all ships they visit @ example is the currently popular three-man plot song ting team consistin @sicirer, and re After the subject of plotting comes the summary plot. During the carly stages of CIC, each ship felt its way along, building whatever style summary plot that seemed to best serve its needs. Now standardization has been achieved to some extent. Plexi-glass boards are given to the ships in port and are also sent out to the forward area group for distribution. However, there is still much that can be done to educate the ships in just what is to be expected from this plot and how it can be kept to best advantage. of a chief plower, assistant order, all enlisted men. MAINTAINING SKILL WITH THE MANEUVERING BOARD From actual experience it has been found that instruction and practice in the use of @ ~ sue maneuvering board has been neglected by both officers and enlisted men. In the com. paratively short time allotted, the forward area training officers can do little more than break the ice in this matter. It should be the responsibility of every watch officer in CIC to instruct and drill is men until they are at least able to handle the nost common problems. After all, the PPI scope is little more than a glorified maneuvering board nd the ability with which the radar operator in terprets his contacts and their movement across the screen is in direct ratio to his understanding of the basic principles of relative movement. Reason: ably accurate estimates of course and speed of the target can and should be obtained directly from the PPI scope. ‘This is not difficult if the operator Janderstands the fundamental principles of relat novement. If this concept is not clear in his mind, he sees only a light smudge moving across the scope in some undetermined direction at some un- known speed and is not able to evaluate this picture. Internal communications have been standardized to a great extent but often slight changes can be recommended in the circuits already being used to speed up the flow of information throughout the ship. The dissemination of vital data once col lected is a function of CIC of the highest impor tance and it must be carried out rapidly and with the least possible confusion. Casualty drills are suggested by these training ms on the basis of experience aboard ships ually damaged in combat, and from the report Made by the USS SELFRIDGE. More often than, not it is found that ships are not aware of the fact t nechanism in GIG is likely to be disabled n fire and no provision has been made for such. an eventuality. Ifa secondary method for handling given situation has been planned and practiced in advance, it is only a matter of a few seconds to, switch to it and go ahead with the problem at hand. It will take valuable time to invent one on the spot, and the solution may be reached too late. At present, CIC training groups are based aboard the USS CASCADE, USS PIEDMONT the USS SIERRA, and at Pearl Harbor, while un derway assistants are serving CenPac, SoWesPac. and NorPac. The USS SIERRA is the only ten. der having a model CIC aboard, but in the near future other tenders moving into the forward areas will be equipped with these model rooms. CONDITIONS DIFFER IN THE NORTH PACIFIC The Aleutian area may not be the best e in the world for operating but it provides many interesting and unique problems and CONFIDENTIAL IOUVW O19 ye! 745 C.1.C. MARCH affords considerable opportunity for training de- stroyer CIG teams. During the summer months whenever good op- erating conditions prevail, an almost continuous series of training exercises gives underway CIC Assistants an excellent chance to standardize and smooth out the procedure employed by all de stroyer CIC's in the area Many days in the Aleutians have to be spent in port, and this offers excellent opportunity for training combat teams. Not only may the entire CIC team be assembled at one time for lectures and discussions, but all types of drills may be run. By using the computer to give a set-up for continuous ranges and bearings to the enemy, the evaluator may dead-reckon his ship in any form of attack he wishes. Placing enlisted men in all positions noi mally occupied by officers during such mock-up practices gives them a much clearer picture of what is done and why. Not only do the men become more enthusiastic about their work allowed to run dummy fighter direction and surface attack problems, but also their ability to under- stand relative movement increases tremendously understanding still further, the considerable maneuver- ing board work. After they begin running their ‘own torpedo attack problems with the computer. they are able to solve maneuvering board problems correctly and quickly. As a result of all this prac tice, the men are better able to follow ship n ments on the PPI scope without losing them dur ing maneuvers. Their accuracy in maintaining the summary plot increases proportionately after being enlisted men SUMMARY PLOT PRACTICE The summary plot assumes an important role in this area since even during the day visibility is ordinarily poor, and the summary plot is relied upon for the identification of ships. Task Force commanders of all forces operating in these waters have stressed this point since most offensive opera: tions are carried out in low visibility weather Many Commanding Officers insist that a continu- ‘ous summary plot be kept on the bridge and con. stantly checked with the summary plot in CIC. ‘The destroyer CIC officers of the North Pacific are fortunate in that they are often in the same port and make a practice of get ting together to discuss their material and person: nel problems. immediately to all ships. Thus, any new ideas are distributed At the completion of CONFIDENTIAL exercises, results are readily compared, and com. petition between destroyers has become very keen! There is no doubt that, in order to be a good petty officer, a radar operator must know almost as much about CIC as the evaluator. This means that the training of such men takes months of work and patience on the part of the CIC officer Recognition of this fact brought the assignment of the best men aboard to CIC in many ships in this Probably the greatest handicap that faced the CIC's was the lack of battle-tried and experienced radar operators. Few operators could track planes, over land which present Japanese tactics makes an absolute necessity if early warning of an attack is to, be had. CIC officers are now giving the radar op. erators information gleaned from battle reports cerning the methods and doctrine that the enemy is currently employing against our forces. 1 has been found that discussions of overall Fleet tac tics and the strategy in previous engagements brings about a better understanding of problems that may be encountered. This type of instruc tion holds the interest of the men. OOD AND CIC OFFICERS Qo ROTATE JOBS All co ing officers ea feel that ro: tation of officers between deck and CIG watches is, essential in order that CIC watch officers under- stand the rieeds of the OOD and the latter under stands what can be obtained from CIC. This policy is being carried out and undoubtedly is one of the main factors in the continued improvement of th Combat and Bridge tame, e Almost without exception, the destroyers of the North Pacific welcome the idea of an experienced CIC underway assistant aboard who can give them new ideas as well as help them to standardize their organization. Valuable infor- ation is given to officers connected with CIC while enlisted personnel are trained in the use of their own equipment. More and more responsibility is being placed on CIG, and consequently those officers and men upon whom the responsibility rests need to obtain quickly any information which will be of assistance to them. DesPac’s answer is this “refresher at sea.” An article will appear in the April issue “CLC.” describing the recent introduction 6} RCM training at sea by “circuit riders: TeV BeU Me tnt d } @.. improves PPI remoting ‘The design, of the original shipboard se radar equipment (XAF/CXAM) presented the range data on an “A” scope, and had no facilities ion Indicator (PPI). The develop- nd successful operation of the Model SG for a Plan Pos dar equipment which incorporated this feature immediately demonstrated its desirability as the simplest and most effective way of presenting radar formation. At that time about the only ones interested in looking at the radar ser ens were the operators and onlookers whose duties required them to be near the radar equipment and who were fascinated by the new toy. Finally the number of interested spec- to the radar display grew to Ia ven the captains (who were very interested in © inser tive) com nent which was now becoming so effec yenced to complain of having to leave their stations to look at the screen 1 wanted a One ship worked out an ingenious arrangement whereby means of seeing it from the ‘bridge the captain could peck through a viewing hood and sce the PPI in the adjacent compartment to This was the first instance of remote presentation of PPI information. In the meantime the Radar Design Section of the Radio Division (now Electronic Division) of his conning station or on the deck below the Bureau of Ships was busy designing a remote plan position indicator repeater (now known as Radar Repeater). ‘This was an instrument that re- peated at a remote location the sume information i the Master PPI ments were then modified or designed to feed a four of these twas 01 Search radar equip- maximum of repeaters simul- tancously. It was thought that this would take care‘of any future demands. A switch was also de- CONFIDENTIAL D0. S61 HOWVIN MARCH 1945 veloped to permit switching the radar repeater to any radar designed to feed repeaters. ‘The increase in demand for these radar repeat ers for other stations beyond those originally con templated soon made it clear that more than four were necessary, so additional desi n changes were made to permit a maximum of twelve repeaters n one equipm: Inasmuch as each radar only had facilities for feeding four, a “string” type of distribution was necessary, and, for technical reasons, the number of repeaters n each string was limited to four, AND STILL THE DEMAND GREW— The supplying of additional repeaters to Navy ships only served to whet th ir appetites, and soon Tequests were coming in for repeaters to serve other locations. One captain wanted one over the bunk in his emergency cabin, another wanted one in the battle dressing station, another wanted one in the wardroom; additional requests have been received to install a repeater in almost every conceivable sta: tion aboard the ship. One fighting ship even went so far as to make an unauthorized installation in the after engine room. However, all of these requests were carefully con. sidered by the Chief of Naval Oper result that a nu ions with the nber of the more important stations aboard had radar repeaters added to their allow: types of ships calls for a maximum of nineteen repea ance. The allowance in the case of certai The use of the string system under this condi was considered impracticable Th damage control standpoint because a hit toward string system was also vulnerable from the the source end of the string would automatically cut off ll repeaters on the string beyond that point. The advent of the VF and VG series repeaters re quired more circuits to pass thn ugh each selector switch associated with each radar repeater, making nwieldy the switch Also in some cases the addi tional capacity adversely affected the definition at the radar repeaters. This was further proof of the CONFIDENTIAL old adage that a “chain is no stronger than its lighted, the radar repeater is receiving the infor weakest link” (in chis case a damaged cable any] @ mation requested; as long as the switchboard order where on the string). It was also discovered that a lamps are extinguished the various order switch re hit or damage to one string would also be reflected quests are being satisfied. The board is correctly into the other three strings so that a small piece operating when all lamps, except a few bezel-cos of shrapnel could disar radar re ered indicators, are extinguished and the board is peater system on the ship. eas. In times past the radar equipment was gener SWITCHBOARD REPLACES SPRING SYSTEM ally blamed for any disarrangement of the ship's sToerercarné ell previous objections to dhe stzing gyro system even though it was not always at fault ereriias ella eike eavece tricare inereater tn Any difficulties in the gyro system would be re allowance, a complete redesign of the radar re. | __ ected into the radar system and vice-versa; now peater distribution system was in order, with the} however, the radar distribution switchboard pro: vides a means of preventing any disarrangement result that a radar distribution switchboard was de of the radar system from being reflected back into igned. , Te cre il'not uct crs ha sae «Bre ule ete peril dial hc considerations that entered into the design, or the | _of information have been provided between the detailed operation of, the twenty-five special ampli radar distribution switchboard and all associated fiers, more than 800 individual switches, and the radar equipment to provide an alternate means of method of making more than 1200 interconnec tions utilizing more than seven miles of internagg with provision for 900 external connec At the present time the radar distribution Si JP evil wil provide wey sation with tions. selection of information from any of five radar sets, ‘The radar distribution switchboard provides a means whereby the information from each radar set is received, and fed to each repeater over a sep- arate circuit in such an nner that each repe isolated from other repeaters or the radar itself. Any disarrangement of the radar repeater circuit will jot be reflected into any other circuit. At each ‘ | idar repeater, an order switch is in } stalled. The person views ig the screen of the radar repeater throws the order switch to the position associated with the search radar whose output he wishes repeated. ‘This lights a lamp on the radar distribution switchboard and indicates to the op- erator the radar desired. He then throws the switch on the board associated with that repeater to, the position designated, thereby extinguishing the lamp on the board and lighting the light at the order switch indicating that the information is bg ing supplied. (Similar to the engine order te ph system.) As long as the order switch is Future boards will have this number increased to six input channels, The radar distribution switchboard was designed for operation on BB's, CB's, CA's, CL’s, CV's, and CVB's. At present three boards have been installed on the USS SAVANNAH (CL 42), USS OKLA. HOMA CITY (CL 91) and USS AMSTERDAM CL 101). Installation of the switchboard on the major portion of the above types is now being made as availability permits. Some ships will have their switchboards located in CIC, others will have them adjacent to CIG, and still others will have them located away from GIG. 1 their operation will be the same since they only serve as an information distribution cen: ter and do not act upon the information received from the radar equipments. The Bureau of Ships would like to hear the comments of the various ships as soon as they have given the switchboard a try. Include the comments with your Radar Performance and Operational Reporls.—Editor CONFIDENTIAL S61 HOW ‘919 C.1.C, MARCH 1945 the “standard” target is debunked © by Radiation Laboratory, M. 1. 1 How well can radar performance be measured permanent echo? While it has long the practice of field service personnel to de by the use of 3 bee pend on the strengths f echoes from so-called standard targets” as criteria of radar performance such targets are rarely “standard.” "They are poor yardsticks by which to tell whether you are getting as much as you should expect from your radar Until recently Echo Boxes and Signal Generators have not been available in the field, but, now that the are, the variability of permanent echoes should be recognized and they should be abandoned in wre dependable “yardstick” of per The purpose of this article is to expose ed for testing radar operation, and to explain why they are so misleading. favor of a me formance. the shortcomings of permanent echoes as u CONFIDENTIAL To measure overall performance, you want to know “how loud you can yell” and “how well you n of a returning echo depends upon a series of factors each of which varies in a number of ways. Schematically, we may sketch our radar radiation travels out and back, and the t the path over which the which is the cause of the echo, The echo strength depends on the radar itself and, of course, both transmitting and receiving components are im- portant. It is the radar performance which we would like to measure. This is possible only inso- far as the target and the two-way propagation pathway are unchanging, for the echo strength varies for each variation in those characteristics of the target or the propagation path which affect it Let us consider separately these causes of echo in stability ee PROPERTIES OF THE TARGET A target never is a single point. If it is a single large object, it is composed of a number of vari ously oriented surfaces and corners. Fach of th t is responsible for a little of The distances between portions of the tar the echo returning from it. the radar and the various parts of the target often ightly different; therefore, the si ignal com: ponents may be out of phase by the time the echo returns to the radar. The strength of the overall signal will depend on whether they partially can cek or reinforce each other. When the signal is composed of echoes from two or more separate targets illuminated by the same pulse (eg, a group of buildings less than 100 yards apart), the Strength of the composite signal depends on. the sizes of the targets and their positions relative to each other, To cite a simple example, with a 3 cm. radgr, the pathlengths from 2 targets need differ by less than one-half inch to cause vari in the strength of the composite echo which easily can amount to 10 or 20 db. Changes in the orien: tation of either targets or radar thus cause the sig nal to be unstable and make such a composite tar get undependable as a standard. The intensity of such an echo also is highly fre quency sensitive. If we consider two objects So yards apart, a radar system need drift only 1 me cycle in frequency to cause this maximum. va tion in echo strength. Certainly it would be for tuitons if two different systems should see the sani¢ strength of signal from a composite target. Thus, slight movement producing altered ori tation or the existence of other targets in the same range as the principal one, enormously increase or decrease the echo strength from the kinds of tar gets ordinarily considered standard THE PROPAGATION PATHWAY Aside from variable target characteristics, even reater instability of echo strength is encountered due to the nature of the propagation pathway be- tween radar and target. One type of variation on argets is due to the rise and fall of the tide For example, due to the curvature of the earth, the radar and the target both can be above sea level yet the radar beam may just graze the water surface as shown on right. A few feet rise in tide can enor mously reduce the strength of the returni signal. When the radar beam passes above the surface Rhere is an alternate pathway in which the beam is reflected from the water as shown below on right. In this case, tidal changes do not affect the direct path way (A) but alter the pathlength of the reflected ray (B) phase; hence they reinforce or cancel depending on how great is the difference in pathlength. Tidal effects are commonly observed on coastal targets and account for several hundred fold variation in ignal strength (20 to 30 db). Probably the most variable factor influencing Thus, the rays are in phase or out of echo strength is the weather. Every operator has at some time obtained phenomenal ranges with his radar and has felt that these instances were tributable to an exceptionally “hot” system or per- haps to very unusual atmospheric conditions. In truth, these effects may be completely independent of the condition of the system and may give sub normal as well as supernormal radar range. On the average, temperature and humidity gradients in the atmosphere are such as to bend radar radia tion earthward and allow you to see slightly beyond the of However, these atmospheric conditions are extremely variable since they de pend on a changing meteorological picture. «At 1 horizon. CONFIDENTIAL $61 HOUND": 2B C.1.C. MARCH 1945 times the radar beam is strongly bent upward a thus rapidly dissipated: the maximal times the beam is ignals are then weak and radar range is short. At other ent downward; and a “duct” is formed between the sea surface and the refract layer of the atmosphere. Radiation is then propa red in what may be thought of asa two dimen. sional waveguide. In such instances, dissipation of the radar energy is delayed and echo strength is augmented; the range at which be de tected increases enormously VARIATIONS ARE AMAZING In an effort to understand the causes of these propagation anomalies, hourly measurements were made for many weeks on coastal targets north of Boston. In all tests the radar performance level was kept constant with reliable test equipment. Varia tions in echo strength were due solely to altering characteristics of the targets or of the propagation pathway. The “Signal Strength’ graph shows a representative three day portion of the data on Both wy and a go mile pathway over At one the strength of this permanent one large target. idar and target were sta ater existed between the two. is record, point in i within 24% hours echo changed by 200,000 fold (53db). Data on other targets and other sections of the record on this same target show like fluctuations, some vapid (15 or 20 minutes), others over a period of one or more days. Much the same variability shows up when the greatest obtainable radar range is measured repeat edly for a constant level of radar performance ‘The “Range” graph shows how this maximum range varied from hour to hour over the same three day interval for a 10 cm. radar, Under weather conditions especially favoring radar propagation, the farthest targets were seen at a range of 280 miles, but over many weeks this par CONFIDENTIAL ticular radar saw, on the average, only about 60 miles, d someone say “my How often have you he radar certainly is up now; look at those signals Well, suppose you were operating the radar used to get the data in Figure 8. On 17 October, you found your range only 30 miles. away out there! You changed tubes, tried a new crystal, tuned, and retuned and on the néxt afternoon (18 October you saw signals out beyond 250 miles. Wouldn't you think you had fixed your radar? the following afternoon Then if, on your best range was 45 ocr gjoct 9 ocr 8 ae SIGNAL STRENGTH (D:8 BELOW TRANSMITTED POWER) n0 Trott ie ocr ocr uy U} Z a2 a 3 209 25 me Ss 3 = ° Z ‘ | DO ihis way if mre perior in? Not at all—your system would have behaved nce level were the same at all times for that is exactly what is shown in the The set wasn’t 18 October And on the alter mosphere. By attempting to fix your radar which perhaps didn’t Range” graph hou” o but the propagation wa jate days the set wasn’t “down,” it was the need fixing, you may have reduced its performance materially; without adequate test equipment you couldn’t tell. Similarly, you could be misled by super-no1 | atmospheric conditions which gave you your usual range even though your system could see another 100 miles if it were not down 25 db, These effects lie o performance measurements are dependable only tside the radar, and overall when they bypass (through the use of appropriate pe caspase the external sources of variation nsity. THE LIMITED USEFULNESS OF PERMANENT ECHOES But, just because a radar is for checking ranges, tuned up, that does not insure its optimum overall and n unsuitable as performance ost targets are standards” for measuring performance. Very few of the ordinarily chosen targets are such that their echoes are even reasonably constant from time to es of time and from radar’ to radar. ‘The requis ch a truly “standard” target are », It must be a single, large, stationary object. This is necessary to avoid orientation effects of the target itself 2. No other target should be visible at the same ye even at considerably different azimuth (for This is it may appear on an antenna sidelobe). hecessary {0 avoid position effects with composite echoes. It should be relatively close (within 5 miles) to minin 4. Tem ze atmospheric effects. not be over water as tidal effects then are present and atmospheric conditions are more variable, The diagram on this page shows the type of tar get from which variations ip echo strength a tively small, i.e 30 per cent (1 or 2 db). The target is a stationary structure over land. \ hill is present which effectively screens it from other targets in the range of the desired one. Few such targets are to be found in the vicinity of Bos- ton where hills, buildings, and stand pipes are The moral is: Echoes from “standard” targets are rarely constant. The use of such targets for measur ing system performance is a poor way to main t pe The misleading information derived from them lulls you into a tain your radar efficiency false sense of security or worries you needlessly test equip accurately measuring system performance. Sufficient nent is now available for permanent echoes for this purpose should be abandoned as rapidly as possible in favor of a de pendable (See “The Echo Box” in the February 1945 “C.1.C.") yardstick CONFIDENTIAL 1:2) sto) C.1.C. MARCH 1945 CIC helps gunnery call the shots The value of CIC as an aid or adjunct to gun: nery is often obscured by the functions of Fighter Direction and control of aircraft. As a result many ships are not utilizing CIC information in gun con- trol as effectively as they might. Close teamwork between CIC and gunnery can be particularly fruitful in dealing with enemy aircraft that have evaded the CAP and penetrated to within AA range. As our ships will inevitably become in. creasingly exposed to attack from land-based planes, the importance of the CIC-gunnery team play will increase proportionately Both the search radar (SK or SC) and the alti tude determining radar (SM or SP) can be used to track the planes and to coach the fire con trol radars on the targets until they are lost in the “cone of silence” above the formation, at which point the third member of the double play com. bination—the lookout—must take over. In an air attack, seconds are important, and the full team must be trained until perfect coordination is ob- tained, and the target can be passed from search radar to fire control radar to lookout without loss, of time—with gun control stations getting the in- formation from all three as the attack closes. An illustration of the results that can be ¢x- pected from this combination is furnished by a recent report from a carrier of the Essex Class. The following procedure is more or less typical of the experience of other ships that have correlated CIC nd gunnery successfully. For liaison purposes, junior officers in the gun: nery department set a watch in CIG when the ship is operating in an area where the enemy might be contacted. When there are no bogeys, these officers indoctrinate themselves in CIC procedure by observation. They man the gunnery sound power circuit only when the CIC watch officers evaluate a radar contact as bogey. When a bogey is picked up, the directors and all gun stations learn of the contact immediately. As the situation CONFIDENTIAL develops continuous reports are given over the gunnery circuit. If torpedo defense or general quarters is sounded, the assistant gunnery officer takes his station in CIC, relieving the junior gun. nery officer. He watches the main plot, reports cach radar plot, and designates targets to the four, sectors directly from CIC In combat, close teamwork with GIG has demon: strated these advantages to gunnery: 3. ‘The gunnery officer and his assistant are alerted to the possibilities of attack in a routine word from the Pilot House. 2, Fire control directors are informed well ahead ee o@ or? of incoming raids, and coached on the target five to ten miles outside their range. Tracking starts when the target approaches maximum range, thus the “commence firing” order is stepped up by valu able seconds. Automatic weapons are directed by bursts before they have visual contact, thus spot ting the target more quickly 3, Accurate information pertaining to the gen: eral situation reaches all gun stations, affording personnel a complete picture as they reach GQ stations; this is psychologically very desirable, {. Continuous plots of each raid, with the raid designations, reach air defense forward, plot, and the directors simultaneously. ‘The director often encounters great difficulty in staying on the specific arget because of rapid changes in bearing. The gunnery liaison officer, followi z the continuous plot in CIG, is able to coach the director on the cor- rect target and keep it on, even through radical changes in bearing and notwithstanding the pres ence of other targets in the immediate vicinity Identification of targets, difficult for the director can be accomplished by constant coaching fro GIG, and doubt arising from echoes from picket ships, screening ships and double range echoes can be resolved by information from CIC 5. If several raids develop, especially when on different bearings and at varying ranges, gunnery's CIC liaison officer knows immediately which raid is closest, or most dangerous to the disposition and is thus able to put the guns on the raid which’ is most likely to press home an attack. Range, bear ing, course, speed, size, altitude and apparent type of attack are valuable items of information which CIC is in a position to pass along. 6. Under present procedure, the OTG through the Task Force FDO designates raids reported by all Task Groups and thereafter all reference to the particular raid is by appropriate designation, which eliminates confusion and speeds the exchange of information. “This designation is picked up by CIC on the TBS, VHF or inter FD net—channels, not usually available to gunnery—and the in. formation is readily available on the CIC plot Through CIC, gunnery can quickly shift to assigned raids if the situation so demands. All of this information is coordinated and passed to gun. ery stations much fastet via the CIG liaison officer than it would be if they depended upon varic and sundry communication monitors. 7. CIG knows the location of returning strike m other carriers, and in many instances ¥y them. With this information avail directors will not be friendlies, while a snooper or a shad hovers ne 8. CIG maintains a complete, up-to-the minute story of the tactical situation as it develops—which is evaluated by the assistant gunnery officer in CIC, and passed directly on to the various stations needing this information, Such information in- cludes: interceptions in progress; tally-ho informa: type and altitude of raid breaking through air interception; maneuvering signals; hold fire” and “batteries released” orders; IFF re ports and visual friendly identifications from picket ships or screening ships. Time saved by instant evaluation, and relay of this type of information tp. gunnery have been responsible for knocking down, ‘enemy planes as they start their run and for saving friendly planes from our ow fire. The time saved is particularly valuable in assisting gunnery't® stay on target during emergency turns. The C1C-Gunnery teamwork has worked’splen didly in actual combat. One carrier reports: “With as many separate groups of enemy aircraft in the vicinity, the SM was extremely valuable in get- ting the fire control equipment (Mark 12's) on target. The target was examined for a few seconds on the *R’ scope to determine if it were opening or closing, If closing, the position of target was designated by CIC to the control officer in the di rector by phone. The raid’s. track is available to the gunnery officer in CIC from the large vertical board. With the gunnery officer feeding this data to the director officer the fire control gear (Mark 2) was on target quickly, usually in a minute or Jess, and the SM could resume its low angle search and the SK general search.” “The system is just as effective against low flying aircraft; however, more reliance will have to be placed on the SG for initial ‘The speed with which the contact is passed from CIC to the gun directors is of the utmost importance, for the raid may be very close when detected The highway of information between gunnery and CIC should carry two-way traffic, Data from gunnery can and should be used by CIC 1. The Fighter Director can obtain a double check on range and altitude estimates from gun: nery's evaluation of fire control radar reports. 2. The CIC evaluator can and should take ad: vantage of visual reports received by the gunnery liaison officer as the raid comes into visual range. This will speed reports to captain and Flag on size, method of attack, altitude and clock bearing. 3. The Fighter Director can utilize information from gunnery to hold his planes out of AA range when ships in the disposition are firing, contact. CONFIDENTIAL $¥61 HOWIN °O'1"D. C.1.C, MARCH 1945 ‘ONE MINUTE FROM “STANDBY POSITION TO A PLOTTED Standby Mark” from the Navigator to the mada operator—and chart “BY is adjusted with the hand control ta coincide optically with the PPI picture (“A”) of the same coastline, Quichly matching the chart to the radar signals as he sees them at “C," the operator reads off the grid position of the scope center and the Navigator plots on a similarly gridded navigational chart the position of the ship correct within 200 yards. At the right és shown the PPI; the gridded contour chart; and the superposed picture as the operator sees it wh matched. correctly The scope center represents the ship's position wit respect 10 thee CONFIDENTIAL VPR simplifies piloting » >>> ‘Simultaneous Fixes” best describes the VPR piloting aid which is being installed in landing craft, minecraft, and a few other ships of the Pacific Fleet. This useful addition to the systems of piloting by radar may become universal one of these days aboard all our fighting ships but, for the present, it has been assigned a particular job off the beaches of the Japanese Empire. Developed as a control aid for getting the troops ashore on the right beach at the right time, the VPR has proved itself worthy of consideration for other piloting jobs. Piloting has long been the bugaboo of all navigation. Radar came along and helped immeasurably. Accurate ranges and bear ings can be obtained in any kind of weather—the only element lacking in some instances is the loca. tion of the radar signal on the chart. With good evaluation the operator can determine with rea sonable certainty the location of certain radar landmarks and an accurate position can be plotted, This can be done in a number of different ways, of which the most dependable are: (1) Ranges of two or more identified points or targets; (2) Bearings of two or more identified points or tar gets; (4) Range and bearing of a single point or The VPR goes one step further. A special coast-line chart is optically superposed upon the PPI to give, instantaneously, an “average range and bearing on a number of landmarks—land. @ | Ov chart showing the ert A >>> Our present systems of piloting by radar are giv curacy to blast the shore positions of the enemy—a new has been added—the Virtual PPI Reflectoscope- in another way. iS marks that may not be sufficiently well defined or located to be used, individually, as radar targets. The actual determination of position is ac- complished by shifting the chart until the PPI presentation and -chart image are accurately ‘matched.” The radar’s position is then indicated by the position of the PPI sweepcenter on the chart. By using a VPR chart upon which a suit- able grid has been superposed, the operator can note the center of the sweep in terms of the grid coordinates. When the chart is properly matched, this grid position corresponds to that of the ship. When accurately matched to the PPI, the VPR chart, by superposition, will show at once whether a given object does or does not give a signal. Even if land or lighthouse or other object does not give 1 signal, the operator may still determine range or bearing of it, if he keeps the map constantly matched. Readings are simply taken with respect to the charted positions superposed on the PPI in jeu of actual PPI signals. The accuracy of VPR fixes varies with the char- acter of the shoreline and with the distance from the shore. With a distinctive shoreline which can be matched closely, position accuracies within plus or minus 100 yards are possible within two or three miles from shore, and plus or minus 200 yards when five or six miles from shore. Another very logical use for the VPR suggests ing dis: jing us better fixes, a great factor of safety, more ind fewer headaches for the navigator. Something hhich promises to do the same job a little better >>> position of a force at sea, the radar operator can compare at a glance the positions of the various ships with the charted disposition—making easier the job of station keeping and recognition of ships. In the Invasion of Southern France, RPD photos were used with the VPR instead of contour charts of the VPR design .C.” January 1945). ‘The first VPR was developed as a control aid for amphibious landing operations. Its demonstrated precision—to within 190-200 yards of actual posi tion—and its speed of operation led to a recom mendation for its adoption for shore bombardment and by craft requiring close-control piloting, such as minelayers and minesweepers, Later on, another, similar instrument, the Navigational Microfilm, Projector, was developed but aside from a few installations, including some AGC's, the NMP will not be used in the Fleet in the immediate future. HOW IT WORKS ‘The essential components of the VPR are a small illuminated chart table, an erecting mirror and a beamssplitting glass, all in a suitable housing which is attached over the face of a PPI tube. These components are positioned within the hous- ing so that the VIRTUAL image of a chart placed on the table is superposed on the PPI, and thus by moving the chart right or left, and up or down, the shore outlines of the chart can be matched, or brought into coincidence with the respective sig- CONFIDENTIAL Sb6) HOUND" C.LC. MARCH 1945 VPR PILOTING IS ACCURATE 7 >>> . . AND FAST Recent tests in the Pacific report that consistent navigational fixes accurate to within 100 to 200 | @ Accurate fixes can be obtained rapidly without th yards can be obtained at two per minute when the VPR is used in conjunction with suitably prepared charts and a PPI Repeater which has been properly adjusted. nals on the PPI. Since the ship's position is at the center of the PPI, and since the PPI has been matched to the chart, the ship's position on. the chart is then determined in terms of the numbered coordinates of a 1000-yard rectangular grid. The characteristics of the beamsplitter are such that it transmits the YELLOW rays of the PPI and, reflects the BLUE rays from the illuminated chart. In order to eliminate parallax, (the virtual chart image must appear in the same plane as the PPI Is), the distance from the PPI to the beam: splitter must equal the distance of the chart from the erecting mirror and from this mirror to the beam-splitter. This adjustment is made by raising or lowering the chart table, or moving the beam splitter towards or away from the PPI CHARTS. VPR charts are made up to appropriate scales to match the several short range sweeps of the PPI. ‘These charts are made by tracing, with the panto. graph, the shoreline of the area desired. ‘Tracing is done.on “scratchboard” so that the finished “master chart” looks like a photo negative. 1000: yard rectangular grids are drawn at the same time and the finished chart may be reproduced photo: graphically in the quantity needed. ‘The exact shoreline is traced with as much accuracy as the scale of the chart will permit, par ticularly where there are shore tangencies which will provide good matching points with the PPI signals. In addition to the shoreline the locations of certain prominent land formations and artificial or man-made installations (like bridges, light houses, bi ngs, etc.) are included as an aid to the radar operator. If many of these features are present, great care is exercised in selecting only those which give the best radar signals and those which are sufficiently separated to permit un. crowded positioning on the VPR chart. Where there are few of these features, particular attention is given to such minor details as contour or form lines, provided some signal variation could be ex- pected from thein NMP USES MICROFILM CHARTS While the Navigational Microfilm Projector is not being used except in isolated cases, it is inter esting to compare iv with the VPR. CONFIDENTIAL If a small projection screen is substituted for the VPR Model chart table, and a microfilm pro. jector placed below the screen’ so that chart images can be enlarged from microfilm onto the screen, we have the NMP. This model can be used with standard VPR charts, as well, if microfilm charts, are not available ‘The use of microfilm is desirable because of the additional sharpness of the projected chart and be cause preparation, distribution and storage prob lems are greatly simplified. A 25 foot microfilm strip containing approximately 200 charts occupies less space than a package of cigarettes. While specially prepared charts can be used to advantage when they are available, reproductions to the proper scale of operational charts made from Hydrographic Office charts or serial photo: graphs can be made on board and used satisfac torily in most areas.’ "SIMULTANEOUS FIXES’ ‘The steps of map-matching with the VPR or NMP are here in logical order as used in actual operations (1) Identification: Use will be made of the general form of shoreline, prominent mountains, islands, etc. The operator must be adept at rei cognition of similarity of form. (2) Approximate Match: Immediately after identification, the operator moves the chart con- trols until the shoreline on the chart bisects the shoreline si ntil general coincidence is established between islands and their signals, mountains and their signals, and depressions and their corresponding blanks. (3) Confirmation: The operator looks for con spicuous signals that have not been used for the approximate match, and notes that they coincide with map features that can logically be expected to produce signals, Similarly he notes coincidence of blanks with depressions not previously used, or with shadows to be expected from charted topo: graphic features. 4) Accurate Match: Having satisfied himself that the approximate match is correct, the oper “Facilities for preparing microfilm charts for the “NMP” being provided all AGCe which were converted from Ca. hulls Four AGCs have already been s0 equipped. | @ | @ iis possivie to use VPR charts with re ing radar by manually rotating the chart to com. pensate for changes in the ship's heading, it is not a recommended procedure, Navigational accuracy CONFIDENTIAL ¢ necessity of plotting bearing lines or range ares. The ship's position is determined directly by the VPR operator and given to CIC, the navigator or fire control personnel in terms of 100 yard grid coordina! within 100 or 200 yards of its actual position ator chooses several points which lend themselves to accurate use for a fix of position. These may be simply places where the shore is perpendicular to the radar beam, giving good tangents. Or they may be small hills, islands or rocks, towers, light: houses, etc., which give sharp signals that can be accurately bisected by their chart points. The chart is then moved so as to satisfy the condition of tangency or bisection, A. position determined from such a match as this is the product of “Simul taneous Fixes" on each of the shore tangencies and the surrounding signal points such as small islands, rocks, prominent hills, ete. In the event the accuracy of the available charts is under question, the VPR permits an ‘“‘average” matching of these signal points, In this way, if ‘one point used for matching is mischarted, it will be evident to the operator, and he can eliminate it asa reliable point. A small lamp is arranged to illuminate the surface of the table so that the @brightness level of the material on the table can be made to correspond to the brightness of the image on the tube. The amount of illuminati for both VPR and NMP, is controlled by a rheo- stat in the circuit of the lamp. TRUE BEARING |S PREFERRED When using microfilm the radar must be equipped with true North stabilization, Although, lative-bea is, of course, much better with a fixed North point as on most PI's For certain radars which have not been initially equipped with true North stabilization, modifica tions kits to accomplish this are available. For other relative-bearing radars, a recent development is the MBU—a Manual Bearing Unit—which is a small separate control unit having one dial on its panel. The operator turns the dial to the ship's heading, and the PPI presentation is automatic ally stabilized on true North while that heading, is maintained. Subsequent changes in. ship's @ourse will require constant and immediate ad justment of the MBU ‘and the course is changed Dr) iy the gridded position Navigator as the tes, fixing the position of the ship immediately PACIFIC TESTS TELL A STORY ‘Tests were recently conducted in the Pacific area to determine the practicability of the NMP used with the $O-1g radar as a navigational aid and to determine whether its accuracy was within that desired, = 100 yards of the beach point. For these tests the equipment was installed over the face of an SO-1g PPI scope on an LCC and operated by the radar operator. He matched the shoreline, mountain peaks and ridge lines to their respective radar signals on the PPI scope. When matched, the radar operator gave the navigator a fix of the boat's position (center of the PPI scope) by calling off the coordinates of the 1000 grid to the nearest 100 yards. ‘The navigator then plotted this position on his navigation chart which con tained the identical grid. After noting the rela he tion of this fix to the predetermined course, gave course and speed changes to the helmsma required. Speed changes were based on a time- distance graph prepared from data obtained in speed runs over a measured course of 1000 yards. ‘Tests were run on varying courses both in day light and under simulated night and foul weather conditions. THESE ARE THE RESULTS (2) NMP (or VPR) is a versatile navigational aid for off-shore navigation, both towards and along shore, with accuracy approximating estab- lished allowances, (2) An operator can attain teasonable profi ciency in its use after making about ten runs un. der instruction. (3) The adjustment and maintenance of the device offers no problem, providing a very small, component of spare parts is available. rf fs loge iD. Spl HOUND C. MARCH 1945 c. Ml by Pacific Fleet Radar Center variety of opinion exists in the Fleet re garding the uses for, purposes of and methods of maintaining the summary plot. These opinions arise because of the variety of experiences of Navy ship captains, dif- ferences in types of operations, and wide variation in facilities available. As to the value of the summary plot, one de stroyer captain has said, “The summary plot is more valuable than any plot kept in a CIC.” ‘The primary purpose of the summary surface plot is to identify and distinguish friendly from enemy units. In the early battles of the Pacific The VG series PPI will be of great assistance in maintaining an up-to-the minute summary plot and will eliminate the time lag. ‘See “Successful VG Operation” in January 1945 "CLC CONFIDENTIAL how to use the summary there were cases of ships in our force fi (and even sinking) other ships in our own force Such mistakes seem inexcusable, but with poor visibility and no means of telling where other friendly ships were, it is m how such a mistake could occur. ‘on record of enemy submarines surfacing within our convoys and traveling with them at night Such occurrences came about because there was no way to keep up with the present position of our This can be done with a prop: ships at all times. erly kept summary plot. Closely associated with the problems of identifi ion are the probl get designation, gun and torpedo. control. visibility these are vital consi erly kept summary plot is used by the gunnery liaison officers to select target and to coach fire control radar on targets A summary plot can be used to check on the lookout and to help him identify any ship. It can be used to determine whether a ship is on proper station. In poor visibility it can serve to caution lookouts regarding approaching vessels or nearby land. It can be used in conjunction with lookouts in determining the position of friendly ships rela tive to the line of fire. The lookout and the sum mary plot keeper m ‘The summary plot facilitates rapid and efficient conversion’ to Fleet Genter from own ship and vice versa, When any ship picks up a radar contact, it must report the contact to all ships, giving beari and range from Fleet Center. To determine b ing and range from your s from Fleet Genter to your ship. ‘The si surface plot can be utilized very readily for this purpose st work in close harmony ip. you must convert LOCATION OF PLOT In order to be maintained efficiently, a summary surface plot must be located properly, in a hori zontal mount near a remote PPI preferably. Some times no remote PPI is available. The plot then should be located near the PPI scope of the radar. Some CIC's have such limited space that a hori zontal board is impractical. In ¢ vertical board can be used. In all cases the summary plot ter should have access to a PPI if he is to do a reliable job. One of the most prominent arguments in con. nection with the summary plot concerns the loca- tion of your own ship on the board. Many ships insist on keeping the guide ship (or Fleet Center) in the center of the polar coordinate chart. Other ships maintain that your own ship should be plot the center. Pacific Fleet Radar Genter recommends that your own ship be placed in the center, in order that bearings and ranges can be determined casily from your own ship. Also, if your own ship is, placed in the'center of the summary plot the pic ture on the plot corresponds to the picture in the PPI scope. Consequently, the plotter can note readily any change in. position of any ship or the presence of an unidentified ship. It is advisable to use one color pencil to mark he assigned station of each ship. A different col red pencil can be used to track the present posi n of the ships. Tt can be seen at once, through this method, which ships are off station and how far they are off. If the disposition is too large for the plotter to trust his memory when looking from summary plot to PPI, he can make up a piece of plexiglass of a size corresponding to the PPI scope. If the position is reproduced on it to proper scale it can be placed over the PPI scope and a glance will show: where each ship is in relation to its station. With your own ship in the center, any radar and bearing or any lookout report can_be ely located on the plot. If the guide ship is in the center, the plotter must convert to the guide on each plot, making for a process both slow and inaccurate. With the method outlined herein, any ship join ing the disposition can be tracked readily on the plot, and any contact’s present position can_ be easily plotted and displayed SPECIAL BOARD AVAILABLE A iz-inch rd can be used as a summary board, but for satisfactory display is too small. Some ships use the air plot board for a summary board, but that is not advised because the ship might be assigned an interception and the summary surface information would be lost. Ifa common polar coordinate board is used, no provision is made for reading relative bearings, from the plot when a change of heading or course is made. This does not affect the Base Course, or Fleet Axis, and consequently will not change the picture on the plot A special summary board is available to the Fleet that will remedy this deficiency. It consists, of an inner movable disc with azimuth ring at tached. The inner bearing circle is used to plot true bearings of other ships from your ship (at the center). By turning the disc to the present head ing, the relative bearing of any ship can be read on the outer bearing circle. If the Fleet Axis, or base course, changes, it is necessary to replot the disposition. That can be done readily by plotting the disposition on card: board and punching holes for each ship. By ori enting cardboard to Fleet Axis and marking through the holes, the same disposition can be placed on the, board in a few seconds Editor's Note: The above article appeared in the Radar Tactical Bulletin, 27 December 1944. An article on the summary plot entitled “Eliminate the Wait” appeared in January 1945 “C.1.C. CONFIDENTIAL St6l HOAWN DD. MARCH 1945 CAC, eis ee signals The Navy's NAN signalling equipment, uses one of the components of visible light which is in visible to the human eye. A special filter may be placed over any standard illumination source such as the 12-inch signalling searchlight, and sig. nals flashed out at night visible only to an eye looking through a special NAN receiver Origina equipment night beachmarking and short range communica. tions between amphibious parties and their land: ing craft. But with the development of the new Model C receiver, greatly increased pick-up range entered the picture and offered a reliable inter task force signalling system. The result is that all Pacific Fleet and 7th Fleet combatant vessels, DE’s up, have been authorized to draw and use NAN It offers two types of ship-toship communica tions: (1) Directional, with a type “H” NAN hood mounted over the standard 12-inch signal ling searchlight; and (2) Broadcast, with the use of the NAN beacons, enabling NAN messages tc be sent at night to all ships in company. The only NAN receiver capable of long range task force signalling is the Model C. Most of the large vessels of the Amphibious Forces are already equipped for directional NAN signallin troyers. Upon delivery of the Xza beacons, OTC’s on ships larger than destroyers will be able to broadcast night visual traffic to their entire forces with security at least equal to that of TBS. This points to a considerable use of NAN by BB's, Cruisers, CV's, AGC’s and APA's. Flag officers will obtain a new voice by i NAN broadcasts with the directional signalling of their smaller ships. NAN has two disadvantages compared with daytime signalling: (1) Very exact calling sched. ules are required with NAN because the signals are visible only through a NAN The approximate bearing of calling or called ships was desi as are a few d combini with invisible light @o must be known because the NAN beam from a 12-inch searchlight is so narrow. If ships are un. aware of each other's position, even long NAN calls may not be received, But in three ways, NAN is superior: (1) For equal range, it requires much less power; (2) NAN broadcast beacons, operated by key and using “All Ships” procedure, will allow task force command. ers to clear more visual traffic than in daytime and (3) Security against enemy interception is far greater than that of visible light The narrow NAN b icap to direc tional signalling between large ships close eno for the loom of their hulls to be seen in the dark, Experience shows that widely spaced destroyers. zigzagging or patrolling, need an additional NAN masthead pointof-train light. These small round theclock NAN lights are switched on at scheduled times and allow destroyers to pick up one-another and to clear NAN traffic promptly. Once this, faint NAN glow is found on the horizon, the beam of the 12-inch searchlight is directed to it and con. tinuous signalling effected even with rolling or Destroyer type point-oftrain lights id may also be used for short ra am is no hi are keyable broadcast transmissions and for emergency identi fication in battle. Such battle identification re quires no hour-to-hour change of codes, and is superior to IFF, which cannot distinguish between two vessels close in on the same bearing, and to our present three-colored fighting lights, which identify us as quickly to the enemy as to our own forces and have frequently drawn our own fire CODE WORDS AND SCHEDUL! The six most common types of NAN signalling are: (1) Short range intership communication by ig-inch searchlight; (2) Directional communica tions along DD screens, with point-oF-train lights Broadcasts for small task units; (4) Broadcasts This article is largely a reproduction of Article 104 of PacFlt Confidential Communication Bulletin 4 RB-44 of 6 December 1944 titled “NAN Sig’ alling and Battle Identification for the Pacific Fleet The primary purpose of this reproduction is to acquaint commands not in the Pacific Fleet with the curren. use, application, and procedures involved in NAN signalling. S. Fle I vessels of the U will be furnished this equipment as production and distribution permit CONFIDENTIAL requiring NAN® o@ oo HOWVN O19 sro CONFIDENTIAL 35 C.1.C. MARCH 1945 in large task _forces— Multiplex and direc tional NAN signalling nder AGG control; (5) Intership recognition in battle; (6) Ship-to-shore communications at ad. vanced bases or during landing operations. ‘The TBS code words that have proved useful in the Pacific in initiating communications with these six types of signalling are: NANGY HANKS Meaning: “NAN message for you here. Prepare to receive Meaning: “Flash on your NAN pointoftrain light for emergency identification. (go seconds.) It is known that the Germans have for some years been considering military use of NAN. Japanese scientists are also familiar with its basic principles, However, no fleet or inter-ship use of NAN by the Japanese has yet been detected. Even if the Japanese have a NAN receiver equal in power to our own—which is highly doubtful Japanese ship would have to be well inside our SG radar screen to pick up or read NAN signals origi nating within one of our task forces. Under certain circumstances—as, for example, when steaming close in under the Japanese coast— an OTC may decide to discontinue all use of NAN. But even here there would be less danger of revealing the presence of his force through NAN than through use of any of the so-called “line of sight” radios, for it is now well known that guided propagation may carry such radio waves far beyond normal range and allow them to be intercepted by Jap direction finders. NAN EQUIPMENT AND SCHOOLING Ships arriving in Pearl Harbor should request authority from ComSerForPac to draw their NAN allowance from the CincPac Radio Pool in Building 167 of the Navy Yard. NAN gear will also be available to destroyer tenders at Manus and Ulithi. Ships should request at least three Model C receivers and the broadcast lights allotted to their types. All craft down to SC’s will be out fitted with NAN as it becomes available. A oneday NAN demonstration school is bei set up at Pearl Harbor. At least two signalmen and a signal officer from each incoming ship should get this training. An experienced signal. man can become proficient with NAN by himself but he will save time by getting a first hand ex planation of its peculiarities and signalling speeds. The type AM receiver NANGY HANKS, AND HURRY! CONFIDENTIAL and instructions to pass on to his subordinates. By demonstrating to the signalmen that NAN will Not cause tedious hours of night watch standing but will speed up traffic by eliminating relays and the presunset visual jam-ups so common in large task forces, their ready, efficient use of the new equipment will be assured. For more information on NAN, consult The General NAN Manual-Ships 1, GincPac Confi dential Communications Bulletin 4RB44, and other NAN instruction manuals and films avail able at Registered Publications Issuing Offices :xtract from CTG 32.2 (Commander ANGAUR Attack Group and’ ComGroupOne, PhibsPac Rear Admiral Blandy) 1 October 1944: At distances greater than 5000 yards there was some difficulty in receiving (Type C receiver) from Type H hood transmission. One test conducted with Mt, McKinley indicated that reception would not be satisfactory from any source where other lights (such as gunfire or exploding shells) are visible, as all lights are seen in the receiver. Comment: During conduct of tests by BuShips it was noted that when the AM Receiver is used at ranges within its capacity NAN lights appear green while other sources of light appear red, mak 0 reg © errr sel systems.. ing it possible to distinguish NAN transmissions © | @ from other light sources and gunflashes. It was also noted that tracers formed dark paths across the field of AM receivers and that these paths could sometimes only be removed by placing the instrument on charge for a short time. Distant gunflashes will spot the field of all receivers mo: mentarily, however this is not serious as the visible signal may be shifted to.a clear spot on the field. The type C-s receiver will give best all-round per formance against other light sources. Extract from USS CALVERT (APA 32), CO. report dated go October 1944: Visual: During the period of departing fror Pearl until departure from Leyte 1090 visual dis patches were handled. (a) OF the above, 96 were NAN Dispatches. (b) Also included were goo dispatches received after departing the staging area until departure from the objective. 680 Flag hoists were handled during the opera tion, not including the frequent use of General in. formation hoists employed to indicate present speed, Comments: (1) Night orders allowed sufficient time to relay to all ships in the Column. (2) NAN Procedure has improved greatly. This method of night communication is fast developing into a con, sistent and reliable system. HE Numerous requests are reaching the Office of the Commander in Chief, US. Fleet, for copies of CCB Radar Identification Systems—IFF.” This paper (no longer available) was issued in January 1943 1c an excellent discussion of IFF at the time of its issuance, it is now out of date. 09, ‘and though it g IFF” in the forthcoming RAD ONE-A Revised (sched This article has The section on “Radar Recognition Syst ied for release in February 1945) presents the same data as CCB 99 brought up to date been extracted to make available immediately to the operating forces the latest information on the oper RAD ONE-A Revised will give additional technical data which is not © ational aspects of LFF systems. included here ole tention is also directed to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 4Cl-45, dated 1 January 1945, 0n the Mark II IFF System The friendly or enemy character of a radar contact cannot be determined from the appearance of he friendly i. That this ecognition or identification must be prov he echo alone; some auxiliary means for recognition or identificat ! problem is most urgent is brought out by the following quotation from the War Instructions, United States Navy (FTP. 143): “+516. A most important factor in war is posit i on ion, and due to misunderstanding, friends lose Through lack of thorough training, absence of coordination, a i It is essential that personnel receive proper indoctrina ¢ recognition and identification of friend or enemy heir lives or the enemy is permitted to escape tion on this subject. The terms “Recognition ition: The process of determining the friendly or enemy character of others. and “Identification” are defined by the War Instructions as follows: Rec Identification: The process of indicating your own friendly character CONFIDENTIAL Sel HOW'D C.1.C. MARCH 1945 I Several methods of determining the identity of contacts are in common we. recognizing ships and aircraft is by fam ity with. silhouettes and markings. The basic means of Recognition of radar¥ contacts sometimes can be effected by“coordlination of radar “data with reports received from observers at a distance who can see the target. A contributory aid to recognition is the maintenance of @ con- tinuous plot of both the ships in company and own planes, utilizing both radar and visual obseroa- tions. Recognition is possible by means of a process of elimination if definite knowledge is available on the location and expected course of action of all friendly units, including aircraft, in the area of op erations, But, to quote the War Instructions again, “When a friend'approaches whose movements arc unknown to the personnel charged with recognition and identification, command has jailed in an im- Portant function. Therefore, it is requisite that responsible commanders disseminate within and with- ‘out their commands adequate information of expected movements and the locations of friendly units who may possibly contact each other. However, meeting a friendly ship-at au expected time and place is no assurance that an enemy ship is not also in the vicinity: This is partieularly-true of submarines. Relying too implicitly on advance information. is unsound and not an accepldble substitute for effective recognition.” In some cases, a vessel identifies itself by a simple, coded radiotelegraphic transmission to 4 direction finder system. A submarine frequently identifies itself by keying its radér transmitter to produce coded interference on the radar indicator of another submarine. Hl 41! of these methods involve considerable coordination, anil consequent time delay. Hence, it has been found essential to provide means of direct identification at the point where the target is de- tected by radar Various systems have been developed iereby aircraft and surface vessels are provided with equipment which allows them to establish their friendly character, either direcily to the primary radar equipment or to additional apparatus associated with the radar. (Identification, Friend or DEVELOPMENT OF IFF ‘The development of IF began almost as soon as the first radar set was built. In one of the earliest experimental forms simple dipole antenna was in: stalled in an aircraft or surface vessel. The dipole was resonant to the radar frequency, and was switched so as to produce regular fluctuations in the size of the echo received at the radar. ‘This was, soon found to be inadequate due to such factors as its uncertainty, the introduction of new radar equipments using different frequencies, and the persistent demands for greater identification range. These difficulties were in part overcome by the successive introduction of IFF Mark I and Mark 11 Both of these systems employed a combined re ceiver-transmitter as an identification equipment ‘The set normally was in the receiving condition but when energized by the receipt of a radar sig. nal, it broke into oscillation and became a trans- mitter. The signal emitted from the identification equipment was radiated to the radar station to gether with the normal echo from the target, and, the echo was thereby distorted making recognition posible. The tuning of the set was mechanically CONFIDENTIAL Such systems aré known as IFF , swept through the bands of radar frequencies then in use, So that any radar would receive periodic identification signals as the receiver-transmitter set passed through the radar frequency. Radar equipments now operate on such a large numbér of widely separated frequencies that it has become impracticable to produce a single IFF set capable of tuning to all of them. To provide an @ adequate identification service operating in this manner it would, therefore, be necessary for craft and ships to carry simultaneously several dif: ferent types of IFF set. Further, it would be neces- sary to introduce additions and modifications to, this equipment each time radar equipment on a new frequency was introduced. Such increases in the amount of equipment car- ried, particularly in aircraft, could not be accepted, This difficulty has been overcome by the introduc tion of a universal frequency band for IFF, separate from that of the radar equipments designed to recognize aircraft and ships, In this manner though the need for extra equipment still exists, it is possible to save installation of several IFF sets in each aircraft by the expedient of fitting auxiliar apparatus to the radar equipment in the ship, where considerations of weight and space are in general of less critical importance. THE MARK Ill IFF SYSTEM The components which make up an IFF system are as follows: 1, Interrogator: A radio transmitter, associated with the radar equipment on which the operator is trying to recognize targets, which emits signals on some frequency in the IFF band. 2, Transpondor: A combined receiver-transmit ter which tunes over the IFF frequency band, fitted in the aircraft or ship. On receipt of a signal from an Interrogator the set returns a signal on the same frequency (or on a different frequency, depending upon the system), but in a form and of duration controlled by a coding system. 3+ Responsor: A radio receiver, associated with @ she radar equipment, which receives the signal re turned from the transpondor and produces an out. put suitable for feeding to a display system. The Responsor is usually combined into a single unit with the Interrogator. The Mark III frequency band is called the A band, which is a go-megacycle section of the P ind of frequencies. Another frequency band, called the G band, is also used in the Mark IIT sys | tem for the recognition of fighter planes. TRANSPONDOR A Mark III transpondor is tuned mechanically through the go-megacycle A band in 2.5 seconds, and approximately 1/3 second is required to reset ‘Thus the time required little less than 3 seconds, but the equipment is op: erative during only the 2.5-second interval of the forward sweep. Since the transpondor can return a reply only when it is tuned to the challenging frequency, A-band responses are returned at. § second intervals, : In the Mark III system the transpondor reply is coded by means of varying the width of the pulses transmitted on four successive frequency sweeps, A | complete cycle of the code is completed in a little | less than 12 seconds. ‘The clements that are used to make up the code are a narrow pulse, a wide | pulse, and a blank, which is a sweep during which a response is not returned. ‘The narrow pulse ap: gears approximately 0.6 mile wide on the indi tor, and the wide pulse approximately 1.5 miles in width the tuning adjustment. | @ ios onc cycte of operstion of the transpondor is a u } iets: 5s “sae. 1. (NNWW) Note that the codes are so selected that each one is distinctive. No code can be mistaken for any other, no matter at what point in the cycle the response is first observed, provided the indicator sweep is such that it is possible to distinguish between nar- row and wide pulses. Note also that there are no codes that use only wide pulses; the‘narrow pulse is fundamental in this system, and it is always in- cluded in the sequence for comparison. ‘The transpondor is capable of returning a very long pulse as a distress signal. This pulse, which appears approximately 9 miles wide on the indi- cator, is very distinctive, and should be readily recognized by the operator. When the switch on the transpondor control box is thrown to “ GENCY,” the coding mechanism is by- that the very wide pulse is transmitted on every sweep of the transpondor, regardless of the code that had been selected previously ‘The Mark III IFF system is in use at present throughout the world by all the United Nations. ‘The transpondor that is used on board ship in the Navy is called the BK. An identical transpondor for use in aircraft is termed ABK, and for use by the U. $. Army, SCR 595. Other aircraft equip- ment that incorporates a Mark II transpondor is called ABF, SCR 695, or AN/APX-1, and AN /APX-2, INTERROGATOR-RESPONSOR In the Mark III IFF system the responsor is ined to the same frequency as the interrogator. The frequency of the interrogator can be set by the technician to any point within the A band, but in general, once the frequency is set, there will be little need to change it. The interrogators of sev eral ships operating together should be spread as wide apart over the band as possible to reduce in. terference and to avoid overinterrogation of the transpondors, since these sets are limited in the maximum number of responses that they can re- turn, ‘The responsor is a conventional radar re- ceiver which should require little attention from operators aside from a periodic check to insure peak tuning, ‘The antennas in use with Mark ITI interrogations may be either omnidirectional, and therefore fixed, or directional and mounted on the same reflector as the antenna array of the radar with which they operate. Because of the low frequency used with, CONFIDENTIAL Sh6| HOW O19. C..C. MARCH 1945, this IFF system, the ant ly directional. The , interrogator - responsor_ may sometimes have its own indicator, but in almost all installations in the Navy Mark III IFF information is displayed directly on the radar scope. In general, the responsor is so connected to a type A indicator that IFF responses produce downward pulses, while the radar echoes produce upward pulses on the sereen. In older systems, both pulses were deflected from the same sweep. but in more recent designs a separate sweep is provided for the IFF display This type of display retraces the echoes na is not high perhaps three times and the IFF re- sponses once out of each four successive pulse repetition intervals. The advan tage of the separate sweeps is that neither trace interferes with the other and the picture therefore remains more clear. The shipboard interrogators for use | on the A band of the Mark IIT IFF system are desig nated BL, BM, and BN. The BLis for use on large ships, and the BM is an improved version incorpo- xating higher power and other advancements for the same purpose. ‘The BN is a small, medium power equipment designed primarily for use in small ves sels and as an auxiliary interrogator in large vessels A fourth type of shipboard interrogator is the BO. which is designed to be used in conjunction with the SM or SP radar to interrogate on the G band only. Airborne interrogators are the Army SCR 729, which formerly was called ABL by the Navy and the AN /APX-2. G BAND OPERATION ‘The normal A band IFF does not show up clearly on a PPI because there is no way of insur ing that the transpondor will be tuned to the inter rogator at the instant that the radar antenna is, pointed at the target. If an omnidirectional i rogator antenna is used, IFF responses may be re ceived on any bearing, but always at the correct range. Thus, if several targets are’ present on the screen, it will be very difficult to recognize any of them from the A band IFF responses. In the control of airplanes from ships it is very necessary to be able to recognize the friendly planes so that a successful interception can be made. To aid in this respect, a special IFF channel on a higher frequency than the A band is provided for CONFIDENTIAL fees re a eae Ty T fighter planes in addition to the normal A band. This special channel is called the G band, and it is provided in the ABF AN/APX.1 and. theg AN/APX-2 IFF equipments. These transpondors normally operate in the con ventional manner on the A band. But, whenever the pilot is directed to identify himself, he simply Pushes a buttén that causes the set to operate alter nately on the A band and G band for as long as the button is held down, and for a petiod of 10 to 20 seconds after it is released. A fixed frequency is chosen for G-band opera tion from a band 8 megacycles wide, which allows @ the response to interrogation to be instantaneous. The reply produces on the radar indicator a coi tinuous pip approximately a mile wide that shows clearly on a PPI. If a directional antenna is used with the interrogator, the range and bearing of the friendly fighter will be clearly shown on the scope DESTRUCTORS ‘The IFF system does not provide an absolute means of recognizing radar contacts, Therefore help insure that the responses are authentic, i important to deny the enemy use of any tans pondors that he may capture. As a means to this end, all transpondors are provided with small ex- plosive charges which may be detonated either by an impact switch operated by the deceleration of crash landing or by a switch to be operated by the to pilot whenever there is a possibility of the plane's @ ‘aliing in enemy territory. The case of the transpondor is designed so that there is little danger to operating personnel from the explosion. The small charge used is in. tended primarily to make the set entirely useless but not to conceal all details of the operation. In areas where there is no likelihood of capture of the transpondor, the destructors normally are not in stalled in the set. OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS OF IFF ‘The recognition of a radar contact that results from the use of IFF is in a sense a negative process. Barring compromise of the system, a properly coded respunse trom the target enables the radar operator to recognize a target as friendly, but the @ 2 of the proper IEF response is nor a clear inal cation of its hostile nature. However, any contact which does not respond correctly to an IFF chal | lenge must be treated as enemy until some other means of recognition establishes its true character An IFF system is the only means so far developed whose capabilities of recognition match the radar's | @papilitics of detection. There are several limita tions inherent in the Mark IIL IPF system that pre vent recognition of radar contacts under all condi: tions. Although a few of these eliminated in future systems, it is most improbable that any practical system will be developed d this war that will be able to overcome all of the objections to the present IFF system. In the early part of 1944, a commission was sent to the Southwest Pacific to determine the reason for the repeated reports of failure of the Mark ILI IFF system. Their findings (completely covered in “Are You Sabotaging the IFF System?” in the 4 September 1944 "C.1.C.") showed that the existing IFF system is capable of determining the identity of well over 90% of the contacts made by radar. if the system is properly employed. Aside from the operational difficulties that may arise in the functioning of IFF as a system, certain features of the Mark TIT IFF may hinder recog- nition to some extent. The responses are coded by the use of combinations of wide and narrow pulses and blanks, When a slow sweep speed is used, as, in long range searching, the distinction between the wide and narrow pulses may not be sufficiently Qe to allow rapid recognition of the code. in expanded A-scope sweep, called an R scope, will = be very useful in reducing this difficulty Since the tuning cycle of the uanspondor takes nearly three seconds, the probability is small that during several successive tuning cycles a constantly rotating antenna will point at the target at the instant when the transpondor can reply. ‘There. fore, it is impracticable to read the code from a PPI, and the antenna must be stopped on the tar get for at least 12 seconds to insure recognition of friendly contacts ‘The only type of IFF response which leéds to definite recognition without stopping the antenna is that returned on the G band. This type of reply is instantancous, and is “coded” by selecting the frequency on which the G band operates. If several planes in a group all have their trans- pondors turned on, the many responses received will make it impossible to read the code. The op- erator may be able to tell if any wide pulses are being returned, but the blanks and the order in which narrow and wide pulses occur will be ob- scured. The many responses returned under this condition need not confuse the echo presentation ‘on the screen, since the responses should show only when the operator throws the IFF switch to the “ON” position. PROPAGATION AND ITS EFFECTS ‘The energy radiated from the interrogator an tenna strikes the water, and is therefore formed into lobes and nulls by interference. In general, the IFF energy does not stay as close to the sur face as the higher-frequency radar energy does. As a result, low flying planes and surface vessels are often detected by radar well before an IFF response is visible. The low frequency used in the Mark IT system limits recognition between two destroyers to approximately 10 miles, while the radar range may be 15 miles or greater, Between. two sub- marines IFF is practically useless because the com. bination of very low antenna heights with the low frequency requires the subs to approach to a dan. gerously short range to obtain a response. The lobes and nulls of the radar and IFF pat- terns do not always overlap. Thus, an airplane can sometimes be in a maximum of the radar radiation while at the same time it is in a null of the IFF pattern. As a result, an IFF response may not be returned at some ranges even though the echo is visible, and of course the reverse can also be true. However, because the patterns of the two antenna arrays in general are different, there probably will not be many areas in the pattern where this CONFIDENTIAL Shbl HOUWNY ‘S'1'. 1945 C.1.C, MARCI phenomenon occurs. In any case, the plane will fly out of the null in a minute or wo. The radar operator familiar with the radiation pattern of his, radar should not be confused. When the fade charts of the radar are calibrated by flight tests, an IFF fade chart can be derived by keeping the transpondor in the plane energized, and observing both the radar echo and the IFF re sponses during the test. Such a pattern for IFF would serve not only to indicate the areas in which IFF and radar nulls overlap, but also to provide additional data for estimating the height of friendly planes. The IFF pattern will be more reliable if the G band response is observed, since the continu ous reply makes null areas easier to determine. Japanese radar pulses can trigger both the A and G bands of the Mark TIL IFF transpondors. The responses show up on the Japanese indicators more or less like normal echoes that vary with the code set on the transpondor. ‘The range from which the responses are received is always greater than from which the radar echo is returned, because the transpondor serves as an amplifier for the Jap radar pulse. For example, if the maximum ‘range at which a plane can be detected is 70 miles, the transpondor conceivably could be triggered by the enemy radar at a range of 100 miles. Since the IFF response in general is much stronger than the radar echo, the IFF response will show even though the CONFIDENTIAL echo is not visible. This is a very great advantage to the enemy since it extends the range of his radar © for detecting our planes. Therefore, IFF trans pondors should be turned off as airplanes approach enemy territory. In areas covered by both enemy and friendly radars it is necessary to strike a balance between the advantage of keeping the transpondor e gized to assist in recognition of radar contacts, and the danger of aiding the enemy by extending the effective range of some of his radars. It is important to realize that the Mark TIT IFF can serve as a recognition system for the Japanese as well as for us, without their having to capture a single trans pondor. From the Japanese point of view, targets that return an IFF response are enemy. In general, it is more important for returnin spondors energized tha ing away from their base However, on long strikes the pilots must be briefed! on the approximate positions of any friendly forces along their route, so that IFF can be on when the planes approach such forces. Unfortunately, sev eral planes.have neglected this simple precaution and have been shot down by friends. planes to have their tr COVERAGE PATTERNS © Omnidirectional antennas are always used with Coverage diagrams for shipboard 1FE equipment In A is shown the pattern of a BM, which mounted on the air search radar an Because the array i: tues a directional antenna fenna reflector ‘on top of the mainmast and has neg ligible obstruction in ite field of view, ‘he coverage is excellent at all bear: ings. The pattern shown in B is the ‘omnidirectional” coverage of @ BN ‘antenna. Note the several deep gaps in the coverage Figures C and D show the coverage patterns for two BK’: on the same ship. Where possible two transpondore fre rupplied so thet the antenna of ‘one may fill the gaps in the pattern of the other, However, note here that oth patterns are weak on "the port beam, although the coverage to star. board is excellent. One of the anter as should be m that ned to a pot would produce more Transpondor coverage patterns of airplan Note perticula mnowrited below and toward the rear i B, and the sharp null to the starboard side forward caused the poor forward coverage of the antenna the case of the PBAY Bee eee oa anstcp a) tna aie tus oc ae underneath is poo AO SS : I transpondors in order that the ship or aircraft can Rei be challenged and reply in any direction. How See fe ever, these antennas rarely have perfectly uniform coverage because they cannot be mounted in a posi ; tion free of obstruction on all bearings. Represen. tative coverage patterns are shown in the diagrams. The side lobes of the interrogator antenna may often result in IFF responses being returned from Recog } bearings at which no radar echo appears. nition of friendly ships in possible because of the confusion produced by the Par caring tscution of the tmrogators the false responses triggered by side and back lobes, the multiplicity of responses that make it impos sible to read the code, and the short IFF range possible between surface vessels. Maintenance of iary plot is probably the Sie selib le esi of intrtng shat all radar on | @acis can be recognized during a melee The range resolution with IFF is dependent on the width of response. However, since every code in use includes narrow pulses, the range difference 7D a melee is almost im an accurate surface sui required between two targets to allow the operator to read the code from one target without interfer ence from the responses of the other is approxi. mately the range to which a narrow pulse is equiv alent, ‘Thus the range resolution in the Mark TIL IFF system is between 1000 and 1500 yards. ‘Thus the range resolution of the IFF system compares, favorably with that of most search radars. Since the interrogator antenna does not elevate except for interrogators on the G band, no altitude ion is possible with IFF. The position angle resolution of G band interrogators is poor for the same reasons that the bearing resolution is poor— beam is broad, a because the a Patterns of directional Mark I11 interrogators: The antenna patterns for two BM arrays are shown in fi t and B. Notice that in both cases the main l grees. ‘The asymmetry is eaused by reflections from the ship 0 that IFF bearings will be in error by @ few . Sinueture, which also results in the excessive side lobes shown in B. Onan the patterns pr be very differen her relative beari CONFIDENTIAL 219 HOU Sto! C.1.C. MARCH 1945, e THINGS TO WATCH FOR Vibration and wearing encoum uuse may cause the tuning range of a transpondor to, change. If this change tunes the set out of the high end of the band, it may be triggered directly by some of the lower-frequency P band air search radars, Such responses would appear as upward de flections, rather than downward in the manner of normal IFF signals received by the responsor. An, adequate maintenance program should prevent this by frequent checking of the transpondor response band. ‘The sensitivity of a transpondor decreases as the vacuum tubes age. An insensitive transpondor will, not reply to a challenge until it is much closer to the interrogator than a set having full sensitivity On the other hand, too great sensitivity is also harmful because the set may be triggered by igni tion noises or other sparking, or the set may trigger itself, should certain components fail. Self-trigger ing or responding to noise, which has been termed, “squitter,” is objectionable because under this con- dition many unwanted pulses are radiated without any challenge being received. Thus, squitter causes excessive interference with the whole IFF band, and it may prevent recognition of any of the contacts detected by radar, as well as providing a continuous signal for the enemy's direction finders. On an aircraft carrier with many planes warming up on deck, much FF squittering may be en: countered because of the strong ignition noise. The squittering may interfere with the air search radars, to such an extent that detection of targets to port is impossible during the warm-up interval. In most cases this sort of interference should not appear on the indicator because the responsor output shows, only when the IFF switch is thrown on. However, in aircraft carriers where the radar frequency is not far from the TF frequency band, the transpondor pulses will cause interference because they are strong enough to go through the radar receiver in spite of the frequency difference. When the Mark TIT IFF was first installed there were some air search radars that operated at fre- quencies within the Mark IIT band. This overlap caused confusion since it was impossible to refrain from interrogating every friendly target detected. and the responses caused upward deflection rather than downward. To avoid this difficulty all “red” SC’s were set to another frequency band, and the “green” equipments were tuned to the high end of the band. ‘The Mark IIT transpondor transmits very low xed in normal CONFIDENTIAL power pulses continuously at a goo kilocycle rate even though no interrogating pulses are received. © These small pulses may cause considerable inter ference that has the appearance of strong grass each time the transpondor sweeps through the radar frequency. As a means of reducing this inter- ference between a BK and a radar on the same ship, the transpondor is made inoperative, or sup- pressed, for a time equivalent to 100 miles range every time the radar pulses. ‘he suppression is pulse repetition rate of the SA, In some cases this same sort of SC, or SK radar. interference is produced through the responsor even though the radar receiver is tuned to a fre quency considerably different from the IFF band. Thus, the BK usually will need suppression from, the air search radars, irrespective of the frequency to which the radar is tuned. ‘The policy of the Bureau of Ships relative to suppression of Mark IIL IFF transpondors is published in Section 5 of the Radar Maintenance Bulletin. In some cases harmonics of the TBS may be picked up by the responsor. ‘Thus, when the TBS is transmitting, the whole trace on the radar indi cator is deflected in accordance with the radio sig nal. This interference can be eliminated by tunin; the interrogator-responsor to a slightly different frequency. On the other hi fere with communications. \d, the transpondor may inter The transpondor puts font noise signals at frequencies up to approxi mately 20 megacycles, but most of these frequencies are detectable over a very short range only. ‘The principal interfering signals produced by the trans- pondor are on 300 kilocycles and 600 kilocycles, so that communications on these frequencies may be impeded somewhat. If serious interference is en countered on 300 KC or 600 KC, the frequency of the oscillator that generates this signal in the trans: pondor may be shifted without affecting the opera tion of the set, provided the AGS circuit is also re- tuned. When a plane is in the air, the pilot has no re liable means of determining if his transpondor is operating properly. An adequate maintenance pro gram can best remedy this difficulty by insuring that all installed transpondors are in excellent con dition. The frequency limits and sensitivity of the transpondors should be checked at frequent regular intervals and the whole installation given 2 pep ficial daily inspection in order to find and replac any broken parts ES ae CIC DATA COMES INTO ITS OWN VIA ACTION REPORTS No longer need GIG hide its light under a bushel. The time has come when valuable infor- mation, which up until January 1945 was buried in obscure corners of a thousand Action Reports, may be told by ships of the Pacific Fleet. Every bit of data concerning radar and CIC in action may mold future CIG techniques or be instrumental in initiating improvements in equipment. @ , Bey posonnel aboard ship are not expected to devote time to excessive polishing of reports; the labor of studying and organizing accounts can be done by those away from thevfiring line. Frank re- ital of all definite faults—even if uncomfortable— is encouraged, and the opinions and recommenda- tions of the originator are desired. In order to simplify your job of including just the right data concerning CIC in an action report, the following list of subject headings has been ©@ compited from a tewer from CinCPac and Cin- GPOA.* Special comment is invited, if appropri- ate, on a number of related subjects. ‘The “what, when, where, why and how” of your Combat Information Genter in both air and surface actions should be given briefly in chrono: logical order. 2. To clarify this summary, report specific facts concerning the employment and performance of radars in tracking, air and surface search, fire con- trol, shore bombardment, navigation, station keep- ing, and composition, ie., the nature and size of the targets. 3. Detailed information is needed regarding special radar operational techniques, IFF perform: ee, maintenance of radar, and the effect of 1G extn conditions on the set. raclfic Fleet Confidential letter 1CL-45, 1 Fanuary ao hee wy what to say in action reports... Nae oO ee 4. Reports on operational experience with CIC communications, both internal and external, are very helpful. Data may be given on the use of all nets of concern to CIC, such as IFD, LAW, Pri- mary and Secondary Fighter Control, and on the effectiveness, range, frequencies, procedure, and enemy or other interference. 5. Helpful enclosures may include DRT track charts showing enemy air and surface activity and the position of own forces, and scope photographs of interesting targets or unusual phenomena, if practicable. Ships participating in Fighter Direction activi ties should make a report of all interceptions, with ‘emphasis on the following facts: 1, Date and zone time of radar pickup, ships in- volved and their capacity, i.e., what ship's FDO, CAP, etc, 2, Pickup range, type, track, and performance of the radar. 3. Altitude of enemy planes, including both the radar estimate and type radar, and the actual or visual altitude. 4. Enemy approach tactics, and the type and re- sults of the fighter direction employed. 5. Recommended enclosures for this section of the report are polar coordinate plots on the most important and instructive interceptions. All the information available on Radar Counter- measures is vitally important. In your report, list (1), any intercept of enemy signals and the date, location and characteristics of the signal, radar, or both; (2), your own and the enemy's use of jam- ming and give facts as to the date, location, its fre- quency and effectiveness and (3), the devices, ap- parent tactics and effectiveness of your own or the enemy's methods of déception. If possible, include, scope photographs, CONFIDENTIAL S¥61 HOM “91D. & C.1.C. MARCH 1945 ysterious signals on elusive targets travel ing at speeds up to thirty knots have puz: aled submariners in the Western Pacific Time and again these radar contacts jumped out of a smooth sea to meander crazily sometimes on collision courses with the U. S. sub marines. Yet there was nothing th nothing that human eyes could sce. That was the origin of the “Galloping Ghost” in and around the sprawling islands south and west of Japan, Baffled and annoyed, the sub skippers changed course, increased speed, sometimes dove hurriedly to escape the persistent, bounc al on the SJ scope. Often they closed in for an attack with all hands set for another “kill,” but the “ghost seemed to wait just long enough before he would, gallop off on another course showing a 36 knot speed flag on the scope. Gould they be planes or torpedo boats, or an enemy destroyer? Could it be another phantom of the rain-cloud variety, or was it some ingenious radar device which the enemy had planted to disorganize our deadly cruises into Jap territory? Captain of the TILEFISH called it “amusing” when three lonely pips appeared up-moon, only to derisively disappear when he changed course to one side or the other of the moon slick. Skipper of SAILFISH shrugged hopelessly one night as the “Galloping Ghost,” throwing caution to the winds, bore down on the submarine at high speed. Min. utes later, the “ghost” rammed the sub—as ghosts, can do—but not before someone suggested to the Captain that he grab a megaphone and give the thing a shout with a, “What in hell is your course and speed?” All the way up and down the line from four stripers to radar strikers a score of explanations were advanced—"A buoy? . . . torpedo boat clouds . . . porpoises... Jap decoy . . . second trip echoes...” and more after that. Finally, when the official report, almost a “query,” started on its way up through the chain of command; a number of CONFIDENTIAL a Rr. we v coincidences were established which gives us some thing to write about. Of the few explanations which have been given, the most interesting is that one advanced by the Operational Research Sectioi of CINCPOA. ~Making an assumpti there, we can just about turn th jury with fair assurance that the “ghost” will take the rap this time, Even if he slips out through the bars after conviction, we know some of his habits and his methods of operation; and we can appre: hend him before he hampers too much the tactical employment of our submarines or other ships. Ryukyu Retto bound, n here and case over to the o DARK NIGHTS, CALM WEATHER In nearly every case, the weather was very calm during the nights when the “ghost” came out of hiding. Those conditions around the N. Islands are those which invite the familiar doubled to quadrupled ranges on the surface search ‘The SJ radar, on which the phantom signals wi seen, transmits and receives its signals very close to the surface of the ocean, We don't know too much: about these ducts which guide the signals undimin- ished over long distances, but recent experiments have indicated that under cer ions there are some very efficient ones existing close to the sea —lower than the antenna heights of many of the radars aboard the large ships. If the “ghost” favors these low-lying highways for his nocturnal trips, the SJ will follow his jaunts when the high-shoot ing SG’s and SK’s may miss him entirely. The SJ in addition, can’t make up its mind where to t1a mit and receive. It might be trained due north and receiving signals from the north-west or north-east on its highly “efficient” side lobes. (Side lobes have been greatly reduced on the SJ-1 by the slot ted antenna.) The “ghost,” knowing this, could Nery well sneak in from the north-east, confit that the operator wonld swear on Rad One th: he was coming from the North Pole. GHOST IN AGTION-HYPOTHETICAL Submarine picks up the “Galloping Ghost” at a range of about 10 miles closing on a collision course. The signal is the round ip (weondstrip) echo on path ABC-CRA or it may be moving in very rapidly as a result of tripe ABC-CA to be picked up 0 SJ side lobe. Either tony it can be seen that the “Ghost” is underway, disappear suddenly or “collide” with the sub. If the phanton signal, as on trip DE, is not reflected to C, it will disappear Lt will also disappear when trip ABC-OBA or ABC-CA is less than 110 miles or jump out to 55 miles. Notic many possiblities for two or three Depending upon the situation the signal me pending sspon the topog There are a few other things to consider before we attempt to materialize the phantom of Ryukyu. Almost if not all of the observations by the sub- marines indicated that they were cruising near land or in channels between the islands. Until the de fense objects, we make an assumption now that the “ghost” has never had the courage to venture ny further from the mountains and steep shores fof Nansei t he could comfortably travel within his duct-highway over the ocean MULTIPLE ECHOES MAY UNMASK THE GHOST Remember the “ghost” ship on the PPI at a range and bearing where there was no ship in the convoy or crnising disposition. The SG signal bounced off one of the ships in the formation and, in addition to returning i ately, rebounded again from another ship close by before it returned. On the PPI two ships showed up on that bearing, the real ship and another “ghost” ship steaming along at a greater range. Another case is similar. Two ships show up on a bearing where there is only one in sight—the more distant at exactly twice the range of the real ship. The radar signal makes two round trips during the same pulse, the first trip showing up as the bona-fide ship and the sec ond trip producing the “ghost” signal on scope. Now suppose, in the latter case, that the real ship closes in range by 100 yards. The ghost ship also closes; but, and here is the significant difference, it closes 200 yards in the same time giving it a closing speed of twice that of the real ship. Add all these things together in combination and assume, in most cases, that the pulse from the s marine’s SJ travels at least 110 miles (55 out back); and at once the “Galloping Ghost” becomes no ghost at all. The illustration shows several of his appearances: others can be figured out some night when you are standby operator on the mid watch, MAYBE THE GHOST IS STILL A GHOST If the “ghost” changes his tactics slightly or if our analysis is not entirely valid, we can at least check up on him toa certain extent. Here’s how to do it. 1. Vary the pulse recurrence frequency. If the phantom changes in range as the PRF is varied (on the SJ) then it is over 55 miles away. It still might be a second-trip echo from a Jap BB, but the chances are it’s our friend the ghost. 2. Change speed by about 5 knots. Then the speed and perhaps the course of the phantom will change. When stopped, the “ghost” will ring up. “stop” also. If it is a Jap BB at Go miles, chances are she'll track the same as when you first picked her up. ‘That's the story of the Phantom. It is suggested that reports of his activities in the future include Fuller details on location, course and speed of the viewing ship; sea and air temperatures: force and direction of wind; and barometrie pressure. CONFIDENTIAL Shbl HOYVIN “91D. C.1.C. MARCH 1945 & As promised in the February “C.L.C.’—in the ‘Open Up? ’—here is the depart ment in which you can present to others ideas announcement, which you have tried and found to work. Publi cation of items does not make them doctrine and does not mean that they are approved as standard practice. It merely means that we are passing on to the Fleet a suggestion based on someone's experience Particularly good suggestions will also be in cluded from other publications Overhead Coverage us. Suicide Tactics —By Commanding Officer USS TICONDEROGA ov) Recent enemy suicide tactics have stimulated this ship into an investigation of the possibilities of an overhead search radar, covering the area over the Force not covered by present shipboard radars with their limited search area overhead. The equipment being used is the AN /APS-6A, which has been mounted in the starboard catwalk at the edge of the flight deck, frame 35. The scan: ner is mounted looking straight up. It has been in operation for five days, during three of which strikes were conducted against Luzon. No attacks were made on this group during this time. How ever, observations of simulated attacks by own CONFIDENTIAL planes prior to the si CAP lead to the following conclusions: (a) The presence of planes can be detected in a cone of 120 degrees overhead to a limit of five miles, line of sight. (b) It is possible to interpret the scope so that the following can be ascertained: (1) Whether the plane is fore or abaft the beam, (2) The relative sector it is in (3) The position in the sector in bearing within 25 degrees of accuracy (4) The approximate altitude of the plane and its horizontal distance from the ship. (5) The fact that a plane is diving or in level (©) Cumulus type clouds do not blanket targets although rain squalls do. (@) Guns can be alerted as to the presence of ) planes overhead and can be warned of their posi- tion, and in particular whether the planes are diving or not. ‘urther development is possible. An attempt is being made to hook up the APX-2 in conjunction with the radar so that planes can be interrogated It is thought that identification responses on thd) five mile scale can be improved since the duration of the IFF response on the scope is too, persistent to permit separate identification of blips or A remedy to the limitation now being tried is to shorten the video output of the IFF receiver to about five micro-seconds by use of the R.C. peaker and cathode follower. The effect of this is to limit the IFF response to a small area around the blip of the plane which is responding to the terrogation of the APX-2 at the radar. A further refinement of adding a second cathode ray tube to enable clevation and azimuth to be read directly has been tried in the shop and gives enough prom: ise to warrant further development. It is realized that the AN/APS-6A equipment was not intended to be used in the vertical posi tion. It has operated for twenty hours without breakdown to date. The set is kept warmed up, and is operated only when enemy planes are sus- pected ovethead or have evaded the GAP and have come in to the blind area overhead. ‘The operator is on the JP circuit for liaison with gunnery and C Pending development of equipment which is more effective against current enemy tactics, ever) effort will be made to develop the foregoi experiment to the limit of its possibilities. kes and movements of the gy C.1.C. and Fighter Direction ‘ ° WSS TICONDEROGA (CY) It is a clear principle that it is advanta @<08'0 position att or a part of the GAP away from base in the direction from which a raid may be expected. It is recommended that more attention be paid to this principle. In J. the past operations there have been many planes around each Task Group going or re turning from strikes or on Jack, ASP or NASP. It is quite difficult to pick out the CAP on the screen after it starts on vector from some elusive position overhead, and the higher the CAP is the longer it takes and the { farther it goes before it shows on the PPI. ) Often the CAP does not know its position J over base because of intervening clouds Sometimes the GAP will even wander over { an adjacent Task Group and orbit. All, or J’: 0f these factors make control of the CAP Bice: ciijoris. Je addition to the above reasons for stationing the CAP away from base in the direction of the expected raid there is another consideration. That is that the CAP is 20 to 25 miles in the best direc tion which makes possible a quicker intercep: tion at a greater distance from base. In the operations in the vicinity of Luzon the raids were expected and, for 75% of the time, came from one sector 210° to 330 oi USS BELLEAU WOOD (CVL): “On 17 October while attacking the Manila area the TG FDO instituted a new system for LEXINGTON FDO, who ordered him down to 3000 feet and then to 1500 feet, where he informed Dear the bogey was two miles ahead. As dawn was breaking Dear had some visibil ity above him. He could not see the bogey above so concluded the enemy was below and eased his plane down towards the water until he was about 50 feet above the waves. The FDO told him the bogey was about mile ahead and that Dear was about to over run him. Almost simultaneously Dear caught sight of the enemy directly beneath him. The aircraft was difficult to make out because its blue-grey color blended with the color of the a. He identified it asa Jill or Kate. He tipped his plane over and made his run from 8 o'clock. He fired about ten rounds from each of his four inboard guns. The enemy gave out a puff of smoke and crashed into the water. There was no return fire at any time. The accomplishment of both pilot and FDO jin knocking down this bogey is consid CONFIDENTIAL ered noteworthy. When shot down the aircraft was 4o miles from the Task Force an had been flying low over the water the whole time.” ° USS BENNION (DD) (Surigao Strait): “Initial SG radar contact was picked up at 42,000 yards, and a summary plot of the carried through up through our attack r FD radar had good firm contact on the leading BB at 20,000; and when he was illuminated by shell and torpedo explosions, the FD was ‘right on’ the target. The SG radar was used in connection with picking up the IFF transmissions of our own ships. "Phe pestorstance of bl pidare ea ela lent. No radar jamming was noted. “CIG operated as though it was a practicer= in fact better than on any practice conducted by the ship up until now, “We had con enemy from th ion of the time we picked him up 21 miles to the south, until our attack was de- livered. Incident to the retirement it was necessary to turn down the ‘gain’ on the SG, radar to permit safe maneuvering ahead. Al a result our plot of the enemy was discon- tinued at this point. ‘The installation of the automatic gain control feature on the SG is projected at the earliest possible time.” ° USS NEW JERSEY (BB); “Enemy air attacks reached their climax on October 14th when the ship was under threat of attack from 1515 Item until about 0051. Enemy raids were easily picked up by th rch radar and tracked in, As soon as raids got in close, however, they split up and plete inforn circled to such an extent that it was impos sible to assign or keep track of raid numbe Wien this happens, CIC ‘concenteated ia picking up all bogeys within 20 miles.” 2 Communications @ 555 canenna (cay: ‘When the torpedo hit, a large ball of fa shot up about mast high. ‘There \ rific jolt with whip sensation fore and aft communications continued to function close to normal efficiency. A very small num: ber of TBS transmissions was lost due to noise, shock and excitement. For about 20 minutes messages came in too fast, considering the cir- cumstances, to log times of entry. The Fox Schedule operator missed two characters Editor's Note: The above illustrates that communications can be maintained even fgp 218? he ship is damaged Ba COMMANDING OFFICER VB-14 (Philippines): “The radio discipline on the latter stages of this operation was almost incredibly bad, with everyone on the circuit offending. On several ‘occasions. communications on the primary ( broke down completely and necessary messages never got through. ack of even the rudiments of common s ‘or courtesy. On many occasions extended con. yersations were held with no more identifica tion of the sender or receiver than ‘Mike’ or ‘Bill’. About 95% of the traffic was either of a useless nature or concerning some matter that should have been discussed on the ship before launching. Even the ships themselves initiated a great deal of useless and confusing traffic. Such messages as those to flight leaders about composition of flight, time of departure, radio tests, landing order, reports in detail on mission, weather while en route, routine re- ports of condition of returning planes, etc all examples of the type commonly heard @ «3: required by the various ships. Te is be lieved that all but a very small fraction could The cause was be eliminated. On every hop the first twenty minutes of radio transmission is a steady stream of comments such as ‘Where are you going?’, “Join me at ooo feet over base,’ ‘Where are you going now?’ and so on. After that the flight departs and all the way to the target people shout about low oil pressure, hot engines, etc., and discuss returning to the ship with anyone that will answer. Then someone starts calling ‘bogey’ without identi- self.” ° FAST CARRIER TASK FORCE. “During the afternoon of 5 November, communications on MAN became so bad as to be useless. The other Task Gronps had bogeys north of them, and the range of MAN was inadequate to determine the action taken by 38.3 (North). 38.1 (Genter) was unable to relay to 38.2 (South) an evaluation of the situation. The resultant confusion might have been alleviated if the 2096 kes circuit had been used for mutual assistance and clarifica- tion, Each Task Group must have a separate frequency on MAN for an inter-fighter direc tion circuit and the use of a common long range circuit for communications betw Task Groups.” Editor's Note: Four carriers have com- mented on another aspect of the MAN gear, that is, the fact that at times transmissions can be heard 1000 miles or more away. All four concur in the belief of MAN should be used for inter-group Fighter Direction and TBS No. 2 for intra-group Fighter Direction, Sd Gunnery CRUISER REPORT “This ship has found that direct plotting in a twelve inch adapted remote PPI helps immeasurably in the air problem for close- in planes. When planes have closed in to 20 miles of the ship, the remote PPI in GIG is thrown to the 20 miles scale and the air plot officer keeps track of the raids by plotting on the face of the remote PPI. In this manner he can tell which is the most dangerous tar- get and keep the AA Battery informed so it will be on same. It has helped liaison be- tween CIC and the AA Battery considerably.” CONFIDENTIAL S¥bl HOUVIN 19 C.1.C, MARCH 1945 USS SALT LAKE CITY (CA) (IWO JIMA BOMBARDMENT) he function of CIG was to provide to 8” and 5” range-keepers, separately and simul tancously as necessary, present range and bearing to one or more targets, and to furnish approximate times of expected ship maneuy- ers which would effect fire control, while maintaining a navigational plot and tracking any other units, own and enemy, surface and air. This was done without incident, despite failure of DRT for 6 minutes due to power failure. “A chart of scale 1” — 1 mile was used on the Mark VI Mod. 3 DRT table, with pro- posed track laid down in ink and all naviga- tional points, target areas, and gun positions indicated by numbers or letters. A smaller scale DRT chart (1” = 1000, yards) was used on the chart table together with a large, de. tailed target area grid chart. Unengaged fire control radars and SG-a forward were used to cut in positions, “Auxiliary CIG duplicated the plot of CIC, ready to act as relief in case of casualty to CIC, as well as keeping a continuous SG sweep for use at remote PPI’s as desired. Other duplicate plots were maintained on Combat 3 DRT and Chart House table, all taking their information from same sources.” od Jap Tactics ISS. ESSEX (CV): “Suicide Attacks. ‘The current increased volume of suicide dives by Jap planes on ships of our Task Groups makes it more im perative than ever that.all possible precau- tions be taken to prevent the undetected approach of the enemy. Too frequently recent engagements the enemy has been able to launch attacks by single planes which have slipped in undetected. Now that our current operations take us into areas in which our carrier planes can no longer be expected to climinate all enemy planes within striking distance of our Task Groups, the risk of having enemy planes tail- ing our returning strikes, following up our CAPs returning from interceptions or ap proaching our dispositions while strikes or CAPs are returning to base, has materially increased. ‘That enemy planes can, at times, slip in undetected is due, it is believed, not CONFIDENTIAL to fault in radar operation but to inherent limitations of radar equipment, Radar's limitations must be understood by all con cerned in order to diminish the chance of tected approach by the enemy Radar Limitations. It is recognized that earch radar has the following limitation “(a) A bogey, and a friendly plane at substantially the same range and bearing, but at different altitudes, will produce a single indication which, upon being interrogated, will appear as though it were a single friend- ly plane, (b) A bogey, at the same range and on a bearing within ten to twelve degrees of that of a friendly will, when interrogated, show a weak friendly signal apparently coming from the bogey. The smaller the distance in azi- muth between the friendly and the bogey, the stronger the friendly signal will be. (Th friendly signal, which appears to come from the bogey, is actually the triggered IFF re- sponse from the nearby friendly.) n “(c) Time and other limitations meces- sarily preclude interrogation on a radar scope of each of fifteen separate simultaneous indi- cations, many of which are fading and reap pearing as well as merging ot separating® because of differences in direction and speed of movement. About twenty seconds is re- quired for even the most expert radar oper- ators to interrogate, determine the code and report the character of each radar indi The average operator would require approx: imately thirty seconds to do so. Air Search Radar cannot effectively interrogate each of many indications in a limited area and still maintain effective 360° search coverage. Hence, the effectiveness of air search radar diminishes as the number of separate signals to be interrogated increases and soon reaches the point of saturation. (During recent op- erations as many as forty to fifty simultaneo) indications have been observed on the P| repeater, well above this saturation point.) indication from a single plane @ 1 @eovers an area on the surface of an air search radar scope equal to one and one-half miles in depth and from four to twenty miles in length, the size of the indication increas. ing as range incr Therefore, a large number of friendly planes not in formation so fills the air search radar screen with sepa tate indications as to make the location of bogies in the same general area impossible. (c) Air search radars cannot detect the presence or the character of planes diately overhead. RECOMMENDATIONS The most efficient results from air search radar are obtained when the number of separate simultaneous indications on the adar screen is reduced to the least possible umber. Reduction in the number of radar indications can be materially aided by re quiting friendly planes returning from inter. ceptions or strikes to close the disposition in the smallest practicable number of forma tions. To accomplish the desired reduction @ the total number of indications closing the position the following is recommended: Return and Recovery of Strikes. “(a) Station a destroyer, as an orbit point, twenty-five to thirty miles from the center of one of the Task Groups on a bearing of sixty fo ninety degrees from the bearing from Task Force to target. Station another di troyer midway between the screen and the bit point. When strikes are made at ex- treme ranges, the bearing to the target and to the orbit point may be allowed to coincide, thus furnishing added protection for pilots forced down for lack of fuel, or in need of help in returning to base “(b) Require all planes returning from strikes (except emergency forced landings) to proceed from the target rendezvous point to he orbit destroyer, all strike groups as nearly a single formation as practicable, and to rendezvous again over the orbit destroyer at prescribed altitudes, before closing their re. spective bases. From orbit point to base the altitude prescribed for orbit shall be adhered @ the most direct route shall be used and nes shall return to base in as small a num- ber of formations as is feasible. (©) Station CAP as neéded over the orbit destroyer, possibly under its Fighter Director Control, to detect and prevent the approach of enemy planes tailing the returning strikes at higher altitudes, This destroyer could be used as an anchor point for a CAP division nearer the direction of probable attack (a) Require the orbit destroyer as well as the destroyer between the screen and orbit point to maintain sharp visual look-out to detect enemy planes tailing the strike at low altitudes. Rendezvous of CAP. (a) Require all GAP, regardless of iden- tity, which intercept a given raid (unless otherwise ordered by Fighter Director Off cer) to rendezvous at the altitude and YE sec- tor prescribed by the controlling Fighter Director before closing the disposition. It is recognized that, at times, it will be impos- sible or impracticable for all such planes to rendezvous. Nevertheless considerable ad- vantage will result from. (a) limiting the area in which CAP will return and (b) reducing the total number of indications to be inter- rogated. “(b) Require returning CAP, whether rendezvoused or not, upon sighting base, to make a 720 degree standard rate turn, unless otherwise directed by controlling Fighter Di- rector. This will tend to prevent bogies from tailing CAP enroute to base by facilita ing both visual contact by CAP and detection by radar. . General. (a) Brief all pilots thoroughly concerning the necessity and the reasons for reducing the number of radar indications closing the di position to the smallest practicable minimum So that their full cooperation may be ob- tained “(b) Require all planes, particularly when closing our disposition to maintain constant adio guard on their assigned channels so Fighter Direction may, in emergencies, assume control of all friendly planes.” Ba USS PETROF BAY (CVE): “This ship was attacked bv one, possibly two, ‘suicide’ dive bombers. One was defin- itely shot down, the other was seen to ‘loop’ ‘pata. Srl HOV “O19 C.1.C. MARCH 1945 into a cloud and then dive vertically for the ship possibly out of control. Other attacks were ‘turned’ by volume of fire. Men on this ship have been indoctrinated on this subject along the following lines: (a) Itis a stupid way to attack because it has less chance of getting liome than other types of bombing, (2) The reason that it has less ch that the plane should be shot down b 2000 and 5000 feet where the plane is qu large in the sights and the density of shot re- }\ quired to bring it down decreases with near- (3) Keep firing at it until it breaks up, blows up, or crashes. The best chance of stopping it is when it looks like a freight car in your sights. (4) It actually does less damage as a rule than the regularly dropped bomb that reaches the vitals Of the ship. It is more spectacular but has less penetrative qualities. (5) It is like the ‘bayonet charge’ of infan- try and like enemy infantry it is most surely stopped at close quarters, so keep shooting.” ° USS LONGSHAW (DD). It is believed that window dropped at low altitudes (200-1000 Ft) is ineffectual since the bundles do not have sufficient time to sepa- rate and produce the desired effect. In neither of the above cases did any enemy plane attempt to close the formation through the ‘window,’ leading me to believe that the window was dropped merely to confuse our radar screens and not integral part of an attack. Other reports of window were made by various ships in the formation, but we had no indications to verify these reports.” CONFIDENTIAL Miscellany KADASHAN BAY (CVE) (Palau). The morale of the ship was very high out the operation. It is believed that this was due in no small part to the fact that the crew was kept fully informed as to the progress of the entire operation by daily news summaries which were broadcast by the ship's r combat information officer over the RBO circuit.” Bd Tactics COMMANDING OFFICER VE(N) 101 As for our own interception tactics, we had to adjust them to the situation. A stern approach is preferable under most conditions but the stage of the moon is a very impol tant controlling factor. We found that it as important to keep the bogey between ourselves and the moon as the interception progressed. It was satisfactory for the ap: proach to be made by radar and by visual Contact from directly astern, but if tly coe a Le position were of possible assistance, wwe preferred an ap- proach out to the side so as to get the bogey directly up- moon from us. This position gave the fighter the advan e tage in making vis ual contact before G7 heing spotted by the bomber crew. ‘After a visual is obtained a standard approach, starting from directly below and_ dropping back to the'tail position, is made. We found that a completely open hood, regardless of the wind and noise, was an assct in establishing and maintaining visual contacts because the plexiglass on the hood will reduce vision about 30%. A clear view was important since the Japs had excellent flame dampeners, and it was not to be expected that exhaust flares would be of any. assistance to us. Ona few occasions after visual contact had bf made, we did see sparks from the Jap gines as the pilot changed throttle settings.” CLC. DISTRIBUTION e BACK ISSUE AVAILABILITY All isues are available with the exceptions April, and May 1s (Volume I. Nos. 1, 2, and ) are no longer available June fawe (Volume 1, No. 4) is available in # NAVY REQUESTS Reque # ARMY REQUESTS U.S. Army commands and activitie.desit dinect their reque Adjutant General's Ofce, Operations Branch, Re Washi 1 2Bggo, Pentagon Building This pictube is @ giffie to gie this party the power to 303 himself os others see him. Subject party is on *Army- Navy "Dog in The Manger" whose fond dreams of popu- larity are strictly @ one-way proposition. His habits are pretty sad. When “C.LC.” aboard, he does not, alas, route the copies around speed. arrives ily ond efficiently. Sometimes he buries them in the safe and groots coldly all requests for copies. When ho does cont apathetically, get down to the muting, he puis perhaps 54, of the authorized readers on the list. (He is not with ‘ut accomplices; some readers hang on 40 copies indefi nifely instead of passing them on.) Ships, squadrons. and stations suffering from p Of the routing system ere urged to look for AN, They are not beyond reclaiming. Judiciously encouraged, they have been known to show remarksbla improvement, pENTIAL