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till' tactical lise and operation of electronic 1I11(t ossociated equipment.


MAY 1945

CI ' Tukc 0/1 /{CM

6 R AI Training

7 Lookou i Loo« III On C/ C

13 IC all the • eV"HI

.8 G>'Owin" Pains in DE Combat ~o Ja/1ImeSfl ReM lind C;Cl

25 Tile Clumgillg ere

31 New Evidence of fIG Utility

QUINC.- Endorses r'F

A irmeu Rely Oil iJ ir- I.Ul Rc cue 11 ids n,Sm/Je , im ulalor Looks Promising C(I(/get

R".WIIl.· of llipl){/l"Ill1 Fir(! COntrol Radar T'rndr Willa:; and, Stlrface Trapping

CU: Training Under eOTCL(mt

70 Itill{l., tlf the Jl1 outt:

72 AClioll Rep01'I$

• Published m01u/lly by the Chic] of aual Operatiolls .(DNe) for the inflJTlflr;ltioll of Military persollnel ivhose dulles a~e cOllPlCcled wich the taciicnl and operotional lJspecls of electronic eqt,dpmenl

• Include this publicatioll witll other confidential materia! which is 10 receive emergenCJI aestrucuon in tne ~vent of PMsible loss (J1·IJOptrlre. "C_I.C." shal! no; be curried lOI' in aircrajt.

:. Materia] IlIld plwlagraph (or pubiiaulon ill "CJ.C." should b« submitted to Chief of aual Opemtion«, Editor oj "C.I.C.", Washington 25. D.C. (Nauy Department Telephone Es ten >iOIl~.' 6333+ and 62779.)

Editorin! OfjiCf!: DNC (OP'2o·F-4)

Ar! ol1d Layout; ONI (OP,,6-P'2)

Ul1iled Slole;$



• This document contains information fI~ecli71g the nr~lionol de/lltISe Of the United totes witllin the meolllng 0/ the EspIOnage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 3~ as (wtC1ulea. Its transmission or .tlte revelation of its contents in (my tn/mner to an IwalLl/lOr/zed person is /}rohiflitf'11 by law.

C/C takes on RCM

Prepared by the ReM loff, COlTltn(lfIlier in Chie], Pacific Fleet *

The ,wCure of Re.1/ bring" it logicall:v uruler tile CIG arga11i. xntion, mhere it hns now bell II pfaced by Cen/Com 2, Annex B, C TF Lnstructians, MId P'lrt Si.>: ill Clllmge '1 to USF.nul.

A bag of tricks which would impres Houdini is available l us LO confound Jap radar. hose tri ks, how ver, don't come packed in the bag read r rue an m r than Houdini's did. He had La lip nd 10l1K hour' in preparing them and be had t u good judgment in pringing them on an audience. The nece sary "prop" had La be available, each trick bad to be appropriate to the audience, and stage helpers had to know their parts perfectly. You get the idea. Radar Countermeasure and Deception (RCl\f) trick an flop as sadly a a magician's if not pi- per] planned and executed. On the other hand. killful performanc will m tify [he enern .

.. has been a I ng. hard sa-ugule to zet ReM • pment and techniques developed to the point where they an take a position of promi-

nence along with the other electronic weapons in this war. r ow that the equipment is available and docrrin are bing established it i inrere cino- L tel back tage and see ju t what lernents ar ritical in making RGJ\i 5U e sful.

The key man. of our e, is the 1 eval uaror.

His job is one of coordination, but he must knml' what he oordinates. He must be aware of the capabilities and limitations of the ReM equipment. He mu t be in close touch with the RC I station or station: on bis own ship and be amiliar with RC If terms and ignals 0 that he an rapidl ' pass and receive information c nceming other ships. Hi' is th T ponsibility f Ie ting and recommending appropriate countermes tires accion to the 0 C. He should practically memorize CelilComTwo, Annex B. and thorough] tudy


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other countermeasure publican ns as ey come out.

CIC officers will have orne busy days in mastering R M tactics, he following discussion outlines the job and should assist in getting it in hand.

me of the tricks available in OUT ReM bag


I. Interception of enemy radar signals. (See "The es and Ear E Countermeasures" in October 194.<1, "G.I:C.") "' ith thi one we can find blind P ts in the enemy' radar coverage; zet information on the composition and movement of his forces; ascertain his condition of alertne 5; gather intelligence on any new radars he bring out or modifications to old ones. All this we can do without the Japs being aware of it.

a. Jamming of enemy radars. his, of COUTSe~

is tbe aggressi e tri k. hen 'we turn on a jammer the enemy know we are up a something, but successful jamming prevents him from using his radar to find out what.

). Use 01 Windotv. (See fir t article in "C.LC." for Jnly 1944.) This is a more pa sive means of hiding ship or aircraft movements from radar observation. There are many variations of this one and most of them must be planned well in advance. In addition to regular Window and Rope" shell, rockets and bomb with Window loadinz are now being manufactured for use in ertain tactical situations.

4. Use of false targets or decoys. Tb re are many varieties of these. Some are dropped from aircraft and float down under a parachu teo Some are suspended from balloons either free or secured to a sea anchor. Reflecting surfaces are usually foil streamers or metallic corner reflectors. They are u ed to distrac the enemy's radar attention from real targets or cause him to make a false e aluation oE our action.

There are others, but the e aye the tried and proven ones, and intelligent use of an one or any combination of them is a sure way of keeping demand above supply in the Japanese aspirin market.

The CIC officer, in order to correctly determine indicated RCM action, must have at his finger tips the following information:

(a) Data on signals beinz inter epted. hi

should include bearing, frequency, pulse rate (PR ), pulse width (PvV) and condition of an-

1 Metal foil, about 400 feet long. untuned and effective from 50 to abou t 350 roes.


tenna rotation or ignaI trength. This information will be passed b the RCM inter pt personnel to IC where it should be posted on the R M data boa.rd.

(b) Up-to-date issues of Cincpoa publications Japanese Shorebased. Radar Locations and Jap~ anese Radas: and ReM Equipment. hese books will be of great as i tance in evaluating int rcept since they list cha acteri tics and locations of enemy radars known or II pee ted to be in u e.

(c) Frequencies of own hip's radar and alit of the characteristics of all friendly radars which may be encountered. GincPac Secret Serial 0036 of 3 January 1945 (or subsequent revision) contains ~ convenient listing of Allied radar :fa quenCles. ..

(d) Frequencies and capabilities of own Ship's available jammers and radiation .patte:rns of jammer antennas.

(e) Knowledge of th us and available 'luantitie of Window and variou deceptive de i e .

(f) RAD SEVE J which soon will be pub.

Iished, will serve as a convenient handbook reference on all RCM matters. In the meantime a copy oE the RC1VI Opemt01"s Mnnual. (TemjJo, rary) partially serve this purpoe.


In general, most of the intercepts passed to GIC

will .be of friendly origin. he responsibilit for

distinguishing friendly from enemy signals lie not with the' RCM operator, but 'with the C C officer and it is obligatory that he familiarize biroself with the aids listed above to enable him to spot enemy signals.

It is also advisable that the CIC officer be familiar with the methods of analyzing ignals as described in The Eyes and Ears of Countermeasures mentioned earlier in this article.

The foregoing remarks are not to imp] the RCM operator i no to use his own jnte gence in helping with the analysis of signa] . the

S t ment refer La the Jocation of the r ponsi-

for the e aluarions. For e. ample, CI' officers will find that experienced RCM per ODnel can almost read a jap radar perator's mind by the way the intercepted signal behave. His sudden chancre from mODotQUOUS routine earch procedure 0 franti can nino- of a narrow ector as he discovers the tar et is a dead gi e-awa. lis furtive searching for hart intervals during an at-

.4 bnllery of jGlIlIlling IrG7Ismitlen.

tack. indicates hi fear of being homed on and shelled out.

A submarine on one of its recent war patrols illustrates our point. A signal from a land based radar on Kokuzan Island had been intercepted and .kept under observation all one night. The report in part reads:

"03"30 (1)-23 Jan-APR (ReM) watch reported KOK Z TO having trouble with his radar. When asked, facetiously, the nature of his difficulty, the quick reply was 'Oh, hi kno k r circuit." ~With humble awe and respect tor our technician, the 000 meekly re eived the report that KOKUZAN TO had gone off the air a few moments later." 1v1a11Y other significant operating characteristics are apparent to the observant intercept operator.

There are occasions when GIC can also use interceptions of friendly radars to good advantage. Identification of the type of radar carried by a . ship or aircraft is a reliable check on i friend-

liness. Accurate indications of compliance with radar silence conditions on own ship or in own task force are passed to eIC by the RCM gwup. Faulty operation of friendly radars in the area is also readily detected.

The great tactical value of the intercept receiver rests on the fact that its intercept range is considerably greater than the detection range of the monitored radar. (See page 46 of "C.LC." for February 1945.)


The first precept in radar jamming is that regardless of the quality of tbe jamming itself, combining surprise with it increases its effectiveness many fold. For this reason rather strict regulations have been placed on the use of this weapon. The CIC officer should be familiar with these regulations as set forth in USF-IOA and CentComTI'f10, Ann x B. If authorized to jam there are a number of factors that the CI officer must consider before giving the 0 G the green light on a jamming operation. The most Important of these are:

(a) Available jammers must be able to cover the frequency or frequency band it is desired to jam. This sounds elementary, but may ave embarrassment if considered in advance.

(b) Use of a single jammer ordinarily i a dangerous practice. vVith no other ql1ipment except hi jamm d radar the enemy can home quite

1 Modulator.


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accurately on the jamming signal. Also, a single jammer should be tuned as closely as possible to the frequency of the victim radar. The effective band width. of various jamming transmitters varies with frequency and ranges from .2. me to 7.5 me. Tuning should therefore be accurate.

(c) Use of many jammers "stagger-tuned" to cover a whole frequency band i advisable. v several jammers standing b to fill in gaps or weak spots in the spectrum, this is' considered the most effective and fool-proof method. Homing on any single jammer of a group is almost impossible.

(d) Determining the range at which to start jamming is important. It is obviously bad practice to start jamming an enemy radar before he has your ship or task force within his radar detection range. Thi merely alerts him and accomplishes no useful purpose. An exception would exist where jamming is used for deception against search radars at long ranges.

(e) Most effective use of jamming is in darkness Of other conditions of reduced visibili ty when the enemy cannot fall back on visual methods of detection and ranging.

(f) There is a minimum self screenina jamming range which should be considered in jamming operations. This range depends on certain characteristics of the jammer, the craft on which it is installed; and the victim radar. A thorough discussion of this factor will be included in RAD SEVEN.


ReM antennas Teady for action.

(g) The effect of jamming on own radars in the same frequency band must be considered, for jamming signals make no distinction between friend and foe. The decision to jam in or neal' one of our own frequency bands may render inoperative many friendly sets operating in bands.

(h) If the jamming is to be a coordinated effort of several ships the CIe officer should make sure it is known which ship is to direct the operation and what part .his own ship is to play. A thorough delineation of duties au these operations is covered in CentComTWO, nnex B.

(i) Jamming the enemy's radars may prevent our intercept equipment from obtaining the usual information on them, except possibly for very brief look-through periods. .

(j) ReM operators should be given advanced warning of pending jamming operations so that they will have the equipment warmed up and tuned to correct frequencies.

After the decision has been made to jam, it is essential that all available effective jamming power be used; that ship locations in the dispositions be chosen with a view to their jamming and intercept equipment and their part in the plan; that look-through periods be coordinated and observed; and that there be no relaxation of the jamming effort until the enemy has been destroyed or leaves the area. The C C officer mu t do all in his power to see that these thing done. If they are well done tbe dividends 'V~ plentiful.


11 of 1I are familiar with the important part that ·Window ha played in thi war in connection wi th our land based bomber operations against targets heavily protected with radar-controlled AA batteries. The Japs have u ed it extensively but with poor results against our air search and fire ontrol radars. hey have also used it with vel' g ad result in e adinz our night fight 1'. Almost at the moment oE attack. a sudden eli per ion of .I\lindow combined with evasive maneuvers ha aved a considerable number of Jap bomber pilots 0 fight another day (or night).

Launching of \1 indow rockets and shells i. the only available method for ships to use this material them elves. hese application have the very seriou eli advantage that they immediately disclose the 1 cations of the Iaun hing hips, giving the enemy an opportunity to u e visual means of aiming hi attack. Since the ] ap can do a better job visually than with his radar, it does not appear advisable to use thi t 'pe of countermeasure for creening from night air atta k on ships. The essential lise of shell and rocket Win-

for ships should be for pro ection from enemy Ii control radar.

The CIC officer i very much interested in th degree of creening and its probabl duration. H should, therefore familiarize him elf with the following point in the use of Window:

(a) ,,\ indow ut for one frequen y band annat be expected to have any appreciable screen ing effect against radars in other band. This simply means that a screening operation against both 150 meso and 3000 meso radars would require quantities of .material cut for each Irequen y.

(b) Window falls at the rate of about 250 fe~t per minut . except \Vnidow cut for 300 mc. and rope fall at ab ut 600 feet per minute, and in

falling. it horizontal rno ement will approximate that of the pre ailing wind. a be mpletely protected ship m u t Slay under the " indo", as it falls. Window between a radar and a target does not prevent the radar (Tom getting good range and bearing readings of the target. but can be employed for confusion or: deception.

(c) The amounts oE Window and dropping patterns nece ary for thorough screening depend on characteristics of the victim radar uch as frequency, pulse width and beam width. It is not 'within he cope of this arti le to analyze these problems completely. The reader i referred to RAD SEVEN for further details.

(d) AIUriendly radar stations and Cl 's within range must be informed of any projected use of Window prior to use. Recently Window sown by our forces has caused considerable confu ion in that man reported "bogeys" were merely drops of friendly' indow.


It is not possible to establish definite rules for conducting radar deception operations. Ea h tactical situation presents a different set of problems. These may be handled only by resourceful and ingeniou application of available deceptive devices.

The C officer must know what decoy or

false radar taraets are on hand and what they probably will look like to enemy radars. He must realize that mo t false targets 'will u ually be analyzed by the enemy as such within a relatively short time unless enough of them are used to utterly confuse him.

Proven deceptive operations have involved jammiug, Window and decoys in various proportions. Screening the real attack with jamming or 'Window or both while a fictitious strike imilarly screened approaches from a different e tor will

RG.\/ stutus board for CIC.


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produce a splitting of defending r es if the job has been well done. A destroyer 'with Window shells or rockets and some balloon-borne streameI:S or corner reflectors-and with adequate jamming equipment=can give the appearance of a screened task force of considerable size, It is not necessary to sacrifice the decoy ship because the deception cannot or need not be maintained long enough to require it.

Deceptive operations, naturally, must be under cover of darkness, moke 01- fog if within normal visual ranges. Daytime use of radar deception must be confined to the use of decoys or Window at almost extreme radar limits to represent larger real targets for diversionary purposes. 1 t must be remembered in employing radar deceptive devices alone that they lack realism, presenting radar targets only, without the accompanying radar and VHF signals normally present in a task force; it is, therefore, de irable to supplement their use by the continued pre ence of one or more hips to lend credence to the deception.

Timing is the all-important factor in deceptive operations. The appearance of the decoy raid must precede the real raid sufficiently to allow the enemy time to divert his forces before the real attack is made. A decoy hip must not allow the enemy to detect and evaluate it before launching . its deceptive de ices, T'hi error has been co~mitred in exercises against our own radars, and It ha been found that no one is fooled if a ingle

hip suddenl blo SOIns into a task force or a single plane into apparently 20 planes. The operation plan must also consider the fact that the detection range of a radar is greater for a whole task force (or reasonable facsimile) than for a single ship.

ReM training

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Now that RCM has finally found its place in ine over-nil htpboard organization, and \ ill be controlled b CI afloat and ashore, RC I (raining i being absorbed into me esiabli lied Radar and eTC training programs.

The technical and material aspects of RCl\I[ are being added to the curriculum for all R.'1dio Specialist Officers and all Radio Technicians at ITT and advance Radio Material chools. A po l graduate course will be given at the .Spedal : ':oject

dloolaval Research Laboratory, to quahfy a mnnrnum number of officers and men for billers requiring higbJy trained. R M pCI sonnel.

IC officers and radarrnen will henceforth stud th capabililies, I Imitations, and La tical use of R !\II:1t 'T R). Hollywood, at NRT. L irnons, and at the basic rada. ?perator ehoots. Radar operator will receive thorough lra.l11mg in operating all ReM equipment.


The discus ion thu Ear has assumed ull e by the enemy of hi radar which allows us maximum opportunitie to u e our counterrnea ures,

ow suppose be become difficult an~ d~ddes to secure his radar and ju tfire-np Ius intercept zear. he German and we 11a e employed this ~ck on submarini again t airborne search radar , and there i orne evidence that the Jap - of .necessi -did it on their aircraft,

hi adds a nex dimen ion to the domain of radar and while "normall the offen i e valu of radar outweighs any advantaze which mizht be gained by not using it,"" it follows that there are circumstances where the use of radar must be curtailed. As an illustration, during the bombardment of the Volcano I lands by a CruDi , the attack was made at dawn, but during the approach on the previou night all radar ex ept S band surface-search were ecured and inter ept receivers were used as th only earl warninz devices.

Part ix, U F IoA, hanze 4 (See pril 1945 ·'C.I.C.") contains the current Fleet radar doctrine and CIC officers should familiarize themselves \'li;h ~e v~rioas conditions of radar s~le1A Any limitations In our u e of .radar are acknc:Jl - edgments of the potential pre ence of any enemy

equipped with intercept apparatus. . .

Thus the tmre tri ted u e of radar mvite appropriate oun ermea ur . It is the ask and function of RCM to limit and curtail the enem 's employment of radar and to tum an use of it to his own disadvanta e. It's up to eIC r make good wi _!h this important weapon.

I Quoted from CClIIComTTVO, Annex B.

Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Operational raining Commands

will include elementar radar countermeasure training within their preccmmissioniug and refresher CJ. training, and .e~ch will establish one facility LO give ere teams thorough tralmng in operational RCM. Elementary ReM' training, both ledmlcal and manipulative. has .also been established in the Naval

Training Schools (Etectl·Qnics). .. .

Officers and men returning for refresher rraimng III the rotarional program will find R M inclu?ed in the. curricuh~m. One example of the complete job being done In absorbing R M luro the Radar and C1 training pTogram is the Pacific Fleet Radar .enter, where the R M caool bas een abohshed as a separate unit and (he instruction incorporated in the cour es ai the chool, lh Radar Operarors chool, d

[he Radar Maintenan e hool.

ROM Forward Area Training, in \\Ihich teams of instructors go OUL to the Ships, wa described in the April "C.1. ."-Editor



• lookouts look in 011 CIC

D~termined enemy attacks by air, surface and now by swimmers are putting IC-lookou~ coordination to the test. he MANILA B Y state in an a tion report that 'attacks by single aircraft an u ually be [TLl crated b heav A fire if the e attacker can be recognized and taken under fire earl enou h in their approa h.' Furthermore, "if a ship i turning, a damazed plane in a dive has less chance to make nece ary corrections-particularl if in a teep dive-but intent of the plan mu r be recognized and pa ed to onn in time t make e asive

man u ers." re ent Weldy Lntelligeuce Bulletin tells 0 a ingle enern

motor boat that Ll ceeded in breakinz through the protective creen to rush It ad-on into the side of a U.S. transport, setting off underwater explosions near the transFort and apparently demolishing the attacking craft. Midget subs, imilar to those destroyed recently inside an advanced base harbor, pre eut a imilar problem. h e atta ks can u uall be topped bv gunfire and evasiv a tion i r ognized in time to take uch action. Another TiVeekly Intelligence Bulletin relates how the japane e are now

rtino' to th u oE wirnm r in demolition attacks upon allied forces. _ . LCtat an hor in Yoo Passage w atta ked b 30 to 0 swimmer during a rain quall. orne of these wimmer were propelling a bamboo raft

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b Ii ved 00 have be n ·al·=:;' ian b mbs, GQ wa sounded and all swimmer were killed b mall arms fire except one "who dived beneath, the stem, setting off a demolition barge.

A rapid and dependable two-way exchange of information between lookou ts and CI becomes a necessity with the enemy' increa ed attempts 0 de troy our ships by the e multi-t pe attacks. Thi demand exception all 1 e c operation berw 11 lookout and GIG personnel.


Sometimes a lookout may be tempted to relax and let radar bear the brunt of search. Then, when enemy planes or enem urface craft suddenly appear unannounced the finger point to GIG with the irnplicati n that radar and ,IC personnel are "all fouled up." Lookouts should b - told how radar is oftentimes complicated b low fl jng Jack patrol, 'window, phantom choe enemy approach tactics, nearby land areas, weather irregularities and other factors, They should fuHy realize why radar by itself is not infallible. Sharp lookouts, teamed cooperatively with Cl.C and its detection-communication facilities, can present a formidable defen e against any form of enemy attack,

Since lookouts are not u ually permit ed to visit Cle particularly during action, their under tanding of radar and GIC operation is limited. Efficient GIC-lookout coordination has 1 een developed on several ships by IG officers who carefully outlined their operations to lookout division officers and lookout personnel-showing how in typical situations lookout information and IC information can lend mutual assistance to We other. ben," orking together, the mechani s of CIC-lookout pro edure was set up.

A ve efficient I okout- IG pro edure set up in this manner, that ha operated successfully in several types of ships, place an experienced lookout in Ie to man the J circuit at orpedo DeIense and eneral Quarters. During routine watches. -however, CI personnel will man this circui t, rotating their duty between scope, plottina' and the phone. he proposed talker must be familiar with look ut procedure. Even the be t man available has 11 eded ontinual h Ip and coaching from Cl'C officer until he thoroughly understood Cl.C op ration and could be depended upon to pa all informati n both way

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wi hout b . 19 a k d tor iL. This co "hing h been best accomplished during exercis invo ing "mock atta k .. wherein We look ut talker could more easil visualize IC during battle conditions. He must develop the ability to listen to two sources of inforrnation=the ] L [11 one ear and Cl activity in the other-and observe the main plot at th same time. He must intelligently eval uaie information he r ceives tram these three

ources, knowing when to pa s on what to " h reo Ab e all he mu ound ff with pertinent inIormati n he zets 0 er th ] - so hat th Fighter Director Officer and the CIG Evaluator will consciously bear him in pite of their own concentrated activity. In short, when the chips ant down. the J L talker i the all-important connecting link by which mutual dependency 0f lookout performance and CIC operation function. An exp rienced, intelligent JL talker is es enrial r



That this connecting link may operate to be advantage, every lookout in all lookout stan must possess a clear picture of CIClookout teamwork in his own mind. The .imple explanations or Cl operati n pre ented here have been u ed b I officers in talk to 1 kout personnel. They make clear to the lookout: (a) what in£ rmation he should continually feed to ; (0) what information he an usuall obtain from erc; and (c) how IC uses the information furnished by lookouts.

00 strike days all returning groups must be carefull and ystematically in estigated as

ey approach the visual horizon to ferret out any "stranger" that may be tagging along .. This is necessary because an enemy pilot can closely follow a friendly group and the bogey echo from his plane will be so masked by the group's wide friendly echoes on the radar scope=particularly as they near the formation-that the radar operators will not detect his presence. In other words, IFF cannot be relied upon to eli tinguish friend from foe in such circumstances. Maximum alertness by lookouts is essential. eIC should inConn lookouts of the bearing and altitude of every returning group as they approach to within 30-25 miles of the formation to facilitate a close investigation of each group.

2 When operations carry Fleet units close 00

. land areas, and particularly when enemy airfields may be located on or perhaps beyond that land, lookout vigilance must be intensified. The radar scope will receive "echoes" from these land masses, sometime to the extent that the cope is "land-blocked" between the tangent bearinzs to the land area. The radar operator has great diffi-

.jlty in distinguishing an. "echo" from a plane .. ~proachinO" through the mass of land "echoes" that also show on his scope. Enemy planes can and do use this land background to approach our radars, Lookouts mu ~ be aware of the limitations of radar warning when land areas are nearby.

3 On some occasions CI': bas ~acked rai~ ,all the way into a formation without obtaining an estimate of altitude. Fighter direction and fire control are similar! y handicapped when th is

occurs. If the interception i mis ed, orne of the gunner surprise can be alleviated when lookouts obtain eIC information as to range and bearing of the bogey's approach. A concentrated high-low search of that sector may provide altitude information immediately upon visual sighting and in time to accurately coach AA fire to the target. In this regard, it is best if lookouts report their altitude estimates in feet as well as in elevation angle readings, thus making thi information more readily usable by the CI e aluator. Such

ooperative performance particularly helps overome the weakne of Iull radar control with the Mark IV when that director has difficulty with altitude determination and staying on target.

4 Lookouts, by maintaining a continuous visual

contact with the CAP orbitting overhead, can be of tremendous help to the fighter director when enemy raids must be intercepted. The C P stationed ever base rarely holds its orbit to a point directly above the ship-sliding forward, aft or abeam sometime as Ear as five to ten miles. The intercept controller in CIC. due to "sea return" on his cope, cannot pick up the track of his VF until they open to ten, sometimes fifteen miles. And, within GIC's enclosure he has 00 idea whether the planes are orbitting in the direction of the raid, or perhaps fifteen miles a1vay and at right angle to the raid. Therefore, if his initial intercept vector is to be accurat ,h must know the exact location of the combat patrol at the time the vector i given_ Lookouts, when asked the 10- eation of the CAP's orbit, can make interception more probable by reporting "five miles on starboard. beam," or "seven miles on port quarter," or "directly overhead," as the case may be so the controller can give an accurate initial. vector from that point. This same information al 0 facilitates accurate dead reckoning of the opening VF until they can be picked up by radar. If the lookouts can report the bearing of the plane's heading as they leave the formation on vector, this will serve as a double-check on the division leader's understandinz oE the vector order.


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5 he lookouts can contribute materially to

vi ual fighter direction. On several occa ian they have contributed even mare to a succes ful interception than radar. One afternoon, lookouts of the- USS E TERPRlSE teamed with the 8M radar to' keep a section of SAl J C.INT fighters on the tail of a Betty whose erratic course changes would make Z~g-Zag Plan 2.6 look like a great circle route. A simultaneous lookout and radar report of a bogey at 130-9 sent a CAP on that vector. The SM lost contact after one plot. Following a lookout report "it's a Betty Iowan the 'water about seven mile at 9 o'clock gaing aft" (ogo-7) the fighters were turned to the North. With radar still shooting blanks, another change

of course was reported by Iookouts which placed the Betty at about ago and opening fast on that heading. The VF were again given a change of vector based upan visual contact. A minute later the 8M picked up both VF and the Betty about three miles apart and opening on a 030 heading.

everal more evasi e cour e changes were perfectly tracked by the SM and the Betty was splashed twenty-fi e miles directly north of the formation. Alert lookouts with rapid and accura e reports were responsible for this successful inter epcion. If the fighters had not been vectored in response to the two early lookout reports, they would have been so far southeast by the time the radar located the bogey that interception would not have been pos ible.

Another example is cited by the Captain of the S5 McGOv\TAN in an action report describing how lookouts joined with 'fire control and CIC to pIa h wo bandits. "At different rimes two enemy planes were sighted visually. Fire ontrol


immediately picked up th e planes and pas ed on raJ id range and bearing reports with altitu

tirnates hom the computer to CIC. Vorking solely with this information the FDO succes fully vectored the to the intercept and sub equent splash before the bandits were able to return at low altitude through the bills of Leyte as they were accustomed to-do in order to escape destruction. In both 'instances these bandits were

pla hed several minutes after the McGOW visual sighting. I believe that this method of

isual fighter dire tion afford zreat future pr mi e when proper coordination. peed and mutual understanding exist 1 etween IC, lookouts, fire control and plot." Lookout reports, supplementing "snapper" control as well as interceptions run from an RPPI in CIC, are always helpful to fighter direction. They are particularly helpful on those ships which control the Jack patrol by visual contact and direction.

6 ime and. again CIC will ask the lookouts to

iden tify a law-flying bogey within fifteen miles, which invariably will prove to be a friendly jack or anti-sub patrol plan . Lookouts should understand that these per is tent efforts of CIC to have lookouts identify these bogeys do not. indica that ClC is a "raid happy" lot. These friendly parrols often move in and au t of radar horizon lirni ts in uch a manner that plots are too infreq uent to make a steady track of the patrol possible. hus CIC will not know the location of the patrol at all times. CIe is further handicapped by the fact that FF response is not always received frOID these horizon-hopping friendlies, Therefore every bogey target within this area must be investi-

. gated 'visually even though CIC is reasonabl certain that the target is a friendly patrol plane. If CIC does not follow thi polic the enemy "shad" will have free reign of our radar horiz n-the natural field for hi own operations.

7 he lL talker iI CI can watch the main plot

to keep lookouts fuUy informed of all raid developments. This will nullify enemy decoy planes which attempt to draw attention of lookouts and fire control from the real thing. During action of 15 December the SS MARC 'I D reported-"a plane wa een on the starboard quart r at about 5000 feet altitude, making a gliding approach on the ship from out f the sun. This plane turned right circled about 45 degrees of (

creen and then retired 1 w on the water. I probable that this plane was a decoy, pan of a

coordinated attack, because at the same time

(, ree plane were ob erved on the port quarter

at high altitude (15,000 feet)." The main plot in CfC alway ho\ 'which raid is closest and most dangerous. This information is of definite value in providing lookouts with the complete picture of the situation, particularly when several raids develop simultaneously on different bearings and at varying range. In such situations an alert JL talker can help lookout station conform to the pr dure tressed b CincPac in a recent PacFlt Conf. Ltr, which .states=" Iaintain strict sec tar and lookout discipline. 0 not permit distraction of Iookouts from their sector by own ship's firing. . sigh tseeing' and pectacular incidents. II

8 Troop s.hips, la~ding craft and so~etimes . even their creemng destroyers have trme and again directed their AA fire onto friendly planes.

This ha occurred to the extent that one Task G oup Commander states in hi action repart "the u ual incidents of firing on friendly planes occurred." Other fleet units have been guilty of this same en-or. Much of this can be avoided if lookouts can obtain advance information on approach ectors and E A of expected friendly aircraft. majorit of the smaller ships do not have a Cl C to furnish this information) but can usually obtain it from the CIC in nearby AGC's via the merchant ship and mall boat controlnets, In thi ca e communication traffic rna prohibit a play-by-play account of all friendly ap' preaches, but "J101d fire" and "batteries released" orders always go out. In the absence of more complete information, these orders are a tip-off as to' whether approaching aircraft is friendly or bogey.

ookou on craft not equipped with a CIC should know who aboard receives these transmissions and insure that upon receipt such informa- n gets to them promptly. In till way they can t gunnery in identification before damage is done.

9 ho e aircraf that seem alway to appear un-

expe redly, known a "friend! stranger ," are usually picked up by radar at a considerable range, and tracked all the way into the formation. CIG's evaluation based upon this track's course and speed, the altitude. size of echo, IFF response and other factors can suggest with fair accuracy that a friendly searchv transport, D umbo or perhaps a reconnaissance plane is nearing the formation. By passing this evaluation on to look uts most of the surprise of a B-24, a PBM or a C-54 approach is eliminated; and lookout prestige is gi en a boo t, when these friendly vi itors are picked up and visually identified a considerable distance from the formation. Similarly, "skunks" will be tracked by radar long before the lookout can make visual interception. eIC evaluation based upon course, speed, number of echoe in group, ize of echoes and any ad ance intelligence

information on friendly or enemy surface units expected in the area can be an aid to lookout recognition of these surface targets as they appear "hull down" 0'11 the horizon. Although friendly surface units will transmit a response to our own IFF interrogation, many times this respanse will not be picked up on the radar screen until such units are well within visual range. It is therefore e sential that lookout identification supplement IC cour e and speed e aluations at the earliest po sible moment.

10 . maintains a summary plot on w-?ich a.ll

ships of the Task. Group are plotted Jll then assigned station, relative to its own ship. Primarily, this plot provides a means of identifying friendly from enemy units during surface engagements. However, daily routine operations utilize this plot for tation keeping. , hen radar sh ws a ship out of position, it is possible for CIC to immediately ask the lookouts to watch that ship to determine if it is in difficulty. or if maneuvering, its apparent inten . With this timely information

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the lookout can give the OOD an earlier warning. and thus afford him more time to maneuver his own ship if evasive action is necessary. As. our fleet units operate near to and within Japanese waters the presence of fishing craft and enemy barge traffic will .increase, making this type of CIC-Lookout teamwork imperative. During periods of low visibility, and at night, this plot can serve to caution lookouts of approaching ves els and any nearby land. Recently, while a formadon was passing through Canagao Channel, the SG radar picked up two shoal buoys to starboard and one to port all within thirty-five hundred yards of the ship. In such instances it is important that the lookouts examine these radar contacts because many times there may be extended obstructions too low for radar to pick up which might cause damage to the ship. If radar alone is depended upon, ranges to these obstructions may be misleading.

Lookouts on carriers, in addition to the above situations, can greatly aid at?' operations through close teamwork with thei« GIG. Typical situations in which the carrier lookout can advantageously participate are described here:

11 ~urin~ launching and landi~g operations it

IS desirable that lookout stanons report the plane side numbers a each plane takes off, or lands. This service permits the IC talker to check off these planes on the fiy sheet, or on the flight status or strike statu boards. It gives eIe immediate knowledge of planes, pilots, crews and their call which have failed to return from a flight. At each launch C C will know at once

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which planes are duds, the call of the stand-b which replaces each dud, and what patrols may reduced in Dum ber. When this information j lacking. CIC must either make useless VHF transmissions, 01' waste valuable time checking ready rooms and the hanger deck to identify missing planes. Lookout reports can make known the status of patrols long before a revised flysheet finds its way to CIC.

12 ~ each strike grou~ re~uTDs to the £orm~-

non the lookouts. being m an excellent po 1· tion to observe check-in passes, can often give CIC a more complete picture of returning planes than is received from primary fly. If an up-to-the-minute tabulation of these reports can be kept on CIe status boards by the lookout talker, then Bag plot and pilot house will receive more accurate information on strike status. CIe may be spared some "what is your ETA" transmissions to upposedly missing planes with the usual embarra - ing answer "I'm overhead."

1 3 When CIC is caned upon to make an emer-

gency transmission to a plane already in the landing circle, a rapid check with the lookouts may serve to prevent such transmissions while tl i plane is "in the groove." A quick answer by skylookout-aft can eliminate a useless transmis ion and will spare the pilot the inconvenience of being called at a critical stage of landing aboard.

The situations described in this article are merely typical of those drawn from routine operation. They do not cover the entire field of CIC-lookout possibilities. The purpose of this recital has been to provide the lookout with a keener insight into CIC operation and perhaps suggest some phases of CIC-Iookout coordination successfully performed by some ships=untried b others. No stronger conclusion can· be written on this subject than that expressed in excerpts from PacFlt Conf. Ltr. 1566-45. To quote: "". _ . Maintain an alert lookout, particularly with a low ceiling in order to insure early opening of fixe in volume ... a large number of enemy attacks have been successful because they were surprises ... beware of a false feeling of security from a clear radar screen, especially near land masses . . . exercise frequently in fighter direction, including visual contra] ... at every opportunity include drills to train close coordination between CIC. lookouts and fire control personnel ... ti studies are helpful."

To this we say ... AMEN.

As the tn. ethods and equipment of naval warfare have changed so has the midshipmen'S curriculum at the U. . Naval Academy. All of the [ormer study courses have had their faces lifted to keep abreast the tide of modern naval

'tare,-ou,t "something new has been added," ubject that is as new to the curriculum as it is to navaiwartare. The new subject: ClG.

The new C01.I,rse will not produce a fully qualified Evaluator, Intercept Officer or GIG H'ntch Officer, but the graduate 'will join the fleet with a good fundamental understanding of all phases of GIG operation. Having manned most of the stations in GIG at drill, he should be capable of standing a watch as IG Watch Officer «[ter a Sh01't period of indoctrination.


on the Severn


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Durin the senior ear the entire pring Term in Electrical Engineering is devoted to a course in electronics covering the varian types of electronic tub es, el ectronic control systems, tel egra phs and telephones, energy couver ion systems, underwater sound. directional antennas, Loran, and radar. his course provides a ound foundation for the understanding of much of the equipment that has made C C what it i today.

In Luce Hall t1 e Divi ion f eamanship devote a major part of the nior course to naval cacti , the maneu eying board, communication. anti- nbmarine warfare, and a study of CIC Naval ta tics=which subject is assigned fifteen hours of classroom recitation, be maneuvering board problem receives special emphasis with fifteen hours of classroom work being devoted entirely to it. pan completion of this pecialized cour e the ubject receives continued attention throuzhout the year with the initial part of each of for

r citations being employed in the solution of a problem by the midshipmen. 11 of the many

pr bLeIU w111 h miaht be en ounte ed b the officer are included, Voi e radi procedure covered in three classroom periods wherein mi -

hipmen are presented oice calli, tactical organ ization data, and information to be forwarded, after which they write up the messages. In preparation, for crc drills, three recitations are devoted to the rudy of the Cl C N[a1!llal; the course including principl s and employm nt of radar, the functions, facilities, onranizarion, and

ommunications of CIC, air and urface plotting and fighter direction, upp1ementing all period of cia room work an equal amount of time i a sinned to study period for preparation.

wenty-two drills of two hours each, conducted on YP craft with SO radars, include actual use of 'voice radio communication and solution of maneuvering board problems as well as tactical e olutions and navigational piloting.

Under the Department of Ordnance and Gunnery, five recitations are assigned to the study of fire ontrol radars and two to shore bombardment. Supplementing cla room and study period time, the 1a est films on radar, fighter direction,

Ensigns-now midshipmen oJ tilegradullting c/I1S5'-Wilt join the fleli! witli a proper undersla7ldi'~[ (llid appreciation of the' lance 0/ CIC IU ou.r ships. A/ler II short indQlitrination afloat. they will be qualified for duties wl·thin tile CIC org.allizatioll, midshipmen nere are cautrolling II torpedo attach si1l1.ltlated. in Otll~ of tile Academy's erc's,

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,I Y#rg~ pOT/ion of the academic schedu.le is devoted. to Clq and telated subjects (Ind t"l? thej~ application to actual conditions ex' 'nen~d In the combat areas. Problems stich M thi« one 111 CIC ere slJ,pplemellted by mle,mve ctasstoom 1<'01'11 and related P,worlr.

and erc are shown a' movie period throughout the year. dditional time is devoted to drill in the ombat Information Center,

In view of the de irability of coordinatinz CIC with gunnery and torpedo drills, the aval Academy's Combat Information Center was installed in the Armory where it is close to the gun and torpedo batteries. Located in Dahlgren Hall the installations simulate those in 2100,2200 ton destroyers. he et-up includes rno t of the essential units used on board ship and consists of one Problem Room, one Radar Tran mitter Ro m, two Conning tations, three Combat Information

enters (two of which are contained in one room), two Torpedo Directors, and one orpedo Tube Mount, The Conning Stations and eIe's are designed to be operated in a semi-blacked out condition 10 represent night conditions.

The Problem Room and Radar ransmitter Room are adjacent. 1;'he latter room houses the transmitters for the two search radar IFF equipment and remote control units £01' the ea ch radar antennna which are installed on the 1'0 f

ve. The problem room contain three Ml . 1 r gekeepers for generating surface problems a master air plot table for supplying data for and

checking air problems, and a fa igational Problem Plotting Table which an be utilized in onnection with the urface rangekeepers for hore bombardment problems. The problem :room has adequate communications in aU circuits, in luding imulated voice circuits representing two-way communications with other ships or aircraft, which aloe available to the Officer in Charge of the problem, A record player transmits sound effects,

Each Conning Station houses a ship control unit, permitting changes to be made in the course and peed of own hip at, will, Output are transmitted t the corre ponding CIC b low (Combat 2 'which contains two CI units i Eurni hed identical outputs from onn 2) and to the generating rangekeepers. remote PPI in one Conn. and a dummy PPI in the other Conn, and the neces.sary communication and indicating fa ilieies normally available to the Couninz Officer on board ship ar€ included.


The ombat Information Centers are below the Conning Station. In advanced drills where Conn is manned, Conn 2 ties in with both Combat 2 and ombat 3 ontained in a common room, one

This co.uning station in Dahlgren Hall u a mock-up 01 the. inslaJJation i71 2100·2200 tOll destroyers. Here, .prospective OOD', vuu· alixe and eXll'ccUte varioU$ problems from the "captain's" paint of view. In Lnce 'Flail is another mock-up 61'idge complete with i attack teacher unit and DRT where mids.hipmen devote ten hours to anti·submllrine a/lachs.

The j)Tr,lJle>n 1'00111 cranks out cumplex, highly realistic air and stir face tactical mane-llVeTS for the eTC and conning st()tiom to solve. These problems are not restricted to midshipmen. Weeki,. drills are corlatlctcd in which ofJi.cers of the Department 01 Ordnance and Gunnery mon the stations arid execute various prnbCenL'. Officers from the other departments frequently participate.

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or the other CIC being u ed as a rna ter center.

( e CIGs each contain a DR T n. 6, ir Plot

Table Mk. 9. a Summary Plot, Maneu erinz Board. Air Statu and crui ing Data Boards. dditional equipment contained in Combat One consists of an SC-4 Radar, and SG~l Radar, and a TCS-g Radio set. hese permit exercising at problems employing actual surface craft and aircraft. .ombat One include an elevated platform around the working pace to permit observation of problem '.

Two Mk. 27 Torpedo Director are tied in with the CIC's above. The SG-l radar may transmit bearings electrically to one or the directors and Conn I, while the SC-4 transmits to the other director and Conn 2. When actual air- and surface targets are not used, bearings are set on the radars in accordance with generated values transmitted from the rangekeepers. Either of the director may transmit train and gyro angle order to a torpedo tube mount on the main deck of the Armory.

Telephone communication from CIC to the Mk. 37 directors at the seawall i provided or drills wh re oordination of CIC and gun control is desired. One director carries a Mk, 4 Radar, the other a fk, 12 and Mk. 22 Radar. These directors are each tied in with a Mk, 1 computer fld 5"/38 gun battery. Also at the seawall is a RacIal" Trainer Mk. I for training in use of the Mk. 4 Radar with rate control features included.

It is pos ible to very nearly simulate shipboard conditions in the training of mid hipmen. 'The schedule provides eight two-hour drills in CIC. In addition to thi , ten hours of drills are provided for training and tracking with the fire control and

radar installations at the seawall. Under the realistic conditions attained ... vith the equipment provided, the midshipmen have been very enthusiastic in their performance at the drills which are conducted throughout their senior year.


second drill, the fundamentals of air plotting, communications with aircraft, and the air problem

are covered. he third drill pro ide a fighte

direction problem in which students mall all Cl stations invol ed. The fourth drill consists of detailed instructions in the fundamentals of DR T plotting, u e of the Summary lot. u e of the maneuvering board in connection with surface problems followed by the execution of three surface problems wherein students man all CIG stations and carry out three torpedo atta k under low visibility conditions. In the fifth drill, midshipmen man all stations in onn, I, torpedo director, and torpedo tube mount and execute three torpedo attacks under low visibility conditions. The sixth drill provides a shore bombardment problem employing standard grid fire control charts. Drill seven consists of training in a combined urface and fighter direction problem. The eighth drill is a combined air- urface problem which in addition to providing training i employed as a dress rehearsal for the final drill which is competitive among the twent companies of the regiment. During all drills, midshipmen are rotated about the various station. Small groups are assigned (;0 the search radars for tracking of actual targets, and to a magnetic wire recorder for drill in voice radio and fire control telephone procedure.

The competitive drill, held ju t before grad tation, a igns nine hundred point to the winning company. In !!fading the variou companies, much weight is given to the success of torpedo attack in the surface problem and of interc ption in the air problem, but also considered are communication procedure, maneuvering board andsumroary plots, solution of enemy courses and speeds, completeness of plots including information recorded, and u e of tandard doctrine. The point value assigned for the drill is greater than that of any other held under the company competition-an indication of the importance with which CIC is VIewed at the Naval Academy.


The fir t eIC drill provides for familiarization with eIC equipment and radar operation. In the


• By Oommander DlI$troyers, Pacific Fttte! •

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\' hen Destroyer corts were first commissioned in 1943, there was no provi ion made for a Combat Information Center. It is true that these ship were equipped with the and SL radars, but it was universal opinion that these radar sets were to be used solely for navigation and station keeping, and as an earl y warning indication of targets, either friendly or enemy.

I ·F "was not installed in DE's built along the Atlantic Coast, but was added to the allowance of tho e ships ordered to the Pacific. The Dead Reckoning Tracer was mounted vertically in the

onar Hut, primariJy to ass' t the o~d Team in .. ost Contact" procedure. Originally, no attempt was made to use this equipment for plotting urface targets using radar information.

The Chart House (now GIC) was exactly what the name implied-a place to navigate, with the addition oE two radar sets. The internal communication arranzement ~ as un ati factory, due to the limited number of sound-power telephone circuits available in the Chart House. At GQ the noise and 'Confusion was almost unbelievable.

B far the most important factor in hampering the development of Ie in DE's was the lack of confidence on the part of Commanding Officers, and of other officers, in the reliability of radar information because of the following conditions:

(a) Inexperience of radar operators, most of whom .had vel~y sketchy instruction before reporting aboard for their fir t tour of sea duty.

(b) 'The asualties 0 the radar equipment i - elf, which seemed to occur at the most inopportune and critical times. This was directly attrib-



utable to a lack of experience on the pan of inadequately trained radar technicians.

(c) The lack of training and inexperience of most officers assigned a Radar Officers.

(d) The lack of plotting facilities, which frequently resulted in complete Jack of accuracy in estimated target course and speed.

(e) Inexperience on the part of all hands in th art of "Blipology.'


A reports began to come in from units operating in the Pacific, an an wer to these problem became self-evident. he proposed olution consisted of establishing a center wherein aU Information was to be gathered and evaluated before be-ing passed to Conn. Patterned after the experience of larger ships, this center was to be called CIC.

The first and zrearest lep alone this path wa th relocation of the DRT to the hart ou e, ~ here it was installed horizontally so that information from the surfa e earch radar could be pl tted thereon. This neces itated the removal of th chart desk in whole or in part from the Chart House. Some ships transferred the entire chart desk and stowage space to the Sea Cabin. 0 ther ships not desiring to convert the ea Cabin to a

hart House install d modification to permit the navigator to place a work table on top of the DR-T. However, this did not pro e satisfactory, and e entually navigation was removed entirely, either to the Sea Cabin OT to the Pilot Hous-e.

The next step was the creation of a satisfa

ir Plot Board. This was accomplished by using

plexiglass 36 inch Polar oordinate Plotting ard with a ten inch circle cut out of the center for a gyro repeater, so that relative bearings could be read hom the face of the repeater upon which

the ship's outline ·was sketched, ,

With these major alterations, the Chart House was officially designated the Combat Information Center, However, although it bad been baptized, the degree of confusion had not been lessen d to any great tent, due primarily t the lack of proper teleph u ircuits,

Ther fore, the next step was to install the 21JS circuit. with outlets at the Air Plot and Air Search Radar, and the 22J circuit with outlet at the Surface Search Radar and at the DR T for the plotting team and the recorder. As a result, the noise level in Cl C was cut almost in half,

he accuracy and efficienc ol CI began to

increase appreciabl as plotting pro edlu'ewas

tandardized and the standard set of mbols

adopted. The radar operators and technicians were rapidly gaining e perience. Plexiglass-"Tbe CI fficer' Deligbt"-was discovered as the inequa-non for the improvisation of CIG gadgets.

Cl.C was a great challenge to the ingenuit of officers and men .. Most of the changes mentioned bove were made originally, as far as DE's were concerned, with ut the assistance of tenders or

rards, he D' IC had to grow by itself.

The n xr probl m that had to be met was pro - ing eIC to Cornmandinz OBi ers. Thi wa done mainly through the expedient of making th ; xecutive Officer th Eval uator. 1 aturall the Cap-


tain was more inclined to rel upon the deci ions and recommendation f his E tee than on the same deci ion and recommendations presented by an inexperienced jlmior officer. .ommanding Officers realized what could be obtained ~rom C e they invariably became quite CI· . COnsCLOLlS, and some even shifted their GQ station to CIC.

During this period of transition, the D_E officer complemer t ansi ted of ten officer, , hich practically prohibited the assianment of neffi er. as

a CIC fficer, responsible prirnaril J ( r the tram-

ing and development of C. However, in he latter part of 1944, the officer complement was in 'eased to eleven line offi .er and one upply officer at the insistence of the Operating ommands, thus providing a ere Officer. This tep irnpro ed the efficiency of CIC markedl .


be Destroyer Escort GI as it ri today i. very similar to that installed in De tro 'er and i ready at aU time to perform an function which may be as igned to the erc of all ship. It consi ts oE a duplex arrangement of DR and Air Plot completely boxed in and provided with internal and indirect lighting. All necessary phone cir .uits are provided with rna ter switche 0 that any circuits may be cross-jacked. The late t DesPac Summary Plot Board i u uall m u~lted in a vertical p Ition near the surfa ear 'h radar. The old L is almo t unrecoanizable, 'I" ith the n w direct range readina and cursor b axing art. ellment, and its efficiency has been almo t doubled. The A radar now is equipp d with a PPI and can give a com plete air pictu~e.

Ali vital radio sets, such as TDE- L-IvIANBS-various other VHF and their remote control units. are now found in the Destro er Escort CIG. This ha relieved the bridae of the irk orne ta k of monitoring and u iug the cir uits,

Toda Destroyer Escor are rapid] being

equipped with the Mk, 26 fire ontrol radar, which, with the Mk. 52 dire tor, will eatly enhance the accura y of the main battery. I owever. this gear imposes the additional burden upon CI of supplying a continuous and rapid How of essen-

tial information to the Gunnery Off er, hi re-

quirement is now being met aboard mo t 's bd

pla ina- a Gunner Liaison Off er in .Ie, whose

ole dut i to gi e the Gunnery Off er every bit of information which can po sibl be supplied.

Th DE, with its modern IC setup, i ready. willing. and able to perform an due that the Fleet may assign it. now or in the futur .


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GC ,.


A translation of two recently captured. ja1)anese documents titled" Reference on the Penetration of a Radar 'VlJarning et and Reference on Combat and Interception sing the Radar Warning Device, have recently been received from /l TI} outhiuest Pacific Area. It is slated that the references are based on research carried out by a troop element using weapons still in the experimental stage. They have been reproduced intact by ONI under the heading COM-ONI Technical Intelligence Bulletin No. I, dated 25 March 1945. All hands are urged to give this b-ulletin very careful study in conjunction with the following analysis_

Penetration of a Radar Warning Net (dated 25 March 1944)




Chapter I of this paper discusses the general tactical types of radars, their uses, characteristics, siting, and so forth, The tactical types .(land-ba ed) are called Radar Warning Device, Guide Radar, and Radar Locator which correspond to our Early Warning, Fighter Director, and AA or SLC radar, respectively, The early warning type is further subdivided into fixed and mobile types. It is stated that there is an early warning type which i airborne and that AI radar is also used.

The fixed early warninz type is said to consist of a transmitter and number of receiving stations. Each receiving station is responsible for t> ering a sector which ordinarily is from 60° to goo. The portable early




warning radar is of the conventional type conof a transmitter, receiver, and a single an-

The fixed early warning type apparently 'is the "CHI" type radar. Information from other sources describes the "CHI" type radar as operating in the 60-80 me. band, PRY 5qo or 1000, pulse width 25 to 35 microseconds. A recent photograph of installations on Great Coco Island (Andaman) shows an in tallation of this type. There is considerable evidence to upport the belief that this type radar i used extensively in China and to a lesser extent in Japan proper. Its range is claimed to be 135 miles and this checks fairly closely with observed maximum ranges of seventy-five miles for a single bomber and 125 miles for twenty bombers. The" Mark 229 and 231 are apparently lighter versions of the "CHI" type.

The portable early warning type of radar appears to be the Mark B which is a light weight development ·of the Mark 229- Frequency is probably from 60 to 80 m _, PRF 750, pulse length 30 microseconds, and peak power 50 kw. Range scale extends to 200 km. The antenna is T and R, duplexing being employed. An Arm]' Mark B was captured at Taft. Samar in December 1944 by guerillas.

general description is given of the fire control radar (Radar Locator). It is stated that maximum range is approximately twenty-two miles. This is qualified by stating that the range differs according to the power, frequency, antenna height, and siting. Thi implies that all AA fire control 'radars do not employ the same frequency, indicating that several or more types are in use or under development. It is stated that elevation can be obtained within 0.5 to I degree and that corrected range is accurate to within 10 to 30 meters. The document further points out that the operation of this equipment may be hampered by enemy u e of Window OT electronic jamming. It is also indicated that the complete setup includes the radar, AA computer, searchlights, and AA battery.

Reference to an airborne intercept radar is made (Radar Locator) which is mainly installed in night6ghters. Maximum range of this radar is said to be 3300 yards with a minimum range of 220 yards.

Chapter II discusses in general terms the penetration of an early warning set. It stres es tlie fact that the adoption of elastic rather than stereoed tactics is highly. desirable. It is stated that enemy is constantly devising new methods to prevent penetration of their vi tal defense areas.

It is stated that reconnaissance is conducted by headquarter planes to obtain the necessary information for successful penetration of enemy warning nets. It stresses the fact that if necessary, the attack unit itself will make the necessary reconnaissance to procure this information. These latter statements indicate that the Japanese either contemplate use of ferret plane or are using them. This is further confirmed by recently captured documents which reveal the existence of some rather elaborate airborne intercept receivers.

Considerations when attacking by penetration of the enemy radar net are stated to be as follows:

(a) Enemy air defense system, especially ground radar net.

(b) The disposition of observation orgamzations,

(c) Air patrols.

(d) Own strength, organization, objective, terrain and weather.

An elementary method of penetration is to be carried out by making the approach or penetration where the coverage of two radars overlap. It points out that in general this point will be where the coverage is poorest. During had weather it is recommended that where the geographical location of the enemy radar is known, the search device be used for homing on the radar and thence proceeding to the target. Caution is advised due to the likelihood of the radar location having been changed.

Penetration by means of diversions is discussed in detail 'With a number of specific examples shown by means of sketches, he feint or diversion force should use the - characteristics of the enemy radar .to advantage with attention being drawn to the necessity of sending out various formations separately, timing, and u e of different courses and altitudes. The strength of the diversion force is usually one-third of the main attack strength and in some cases the main attack group is used as the diversion force. Attack groups are cautioned to "avoid the use of uniform tactics" and thus "confuse the versatile enemy in his estimations and judgments." Fighters are preferred for diversions.

For effective diversion of enemy interceptors at least two or more diversions must be used. Timing is essential and the diversions ma be either on the same or separate flanks of the main attack gTOup. The distance between flanks hould be over 110 miles. Electronic jamming and Window




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c5 IIIt"C~ ~ ~in'f ",,,Of!!

2 1'Jd/'CilUr, t:I~ 1( .. ,* J Pu<cfuIN F,,,,dq

increase the effectiveness of the diversion. Reference is made to, "the jamming sets by their radiation of deceptive wa es . . . " Dispersal of th attacking force en-route is said to be advantageous. By dispersal is meant having all element of the attack force fiy directly toward the radar using a search receiver if necessary. he other elements of the attack group lose altitude, change course, and come in from another direction. sing different altitudes while in the target area is said to confuse the AA fire control radar. Examples of using radar shadows to cover change of altitude and course are given. Attention is directed to the effectiveness of making course and altitude changes while in nulls and it is said that the use of the search r cei ver make this possible.

The statement which includes the phrase "radiation of deceptive waves." undoubtedly refers to "Moonshine" or some form of pulse repeater. The Japanese certainly are in po ession of or are aware of the techniques employed in pulse repeaters. Moonshine is slightly more complex than IFF. To date. there have been no reported instances of the use of this type deception by the Japanese.

That the Japanese are well aware of the advantage to be gained by mean of diversion, deception, and radar evasive tactic is evidenced not o~ly by this document but by their tactics at Leyte, Linga: en Gulf, and el ewhere in recent months. Action reports have repeatedly stated that Japanese planes have approached and do approach within visual range before radar detection occurs. By changing altitude frequently, our fade charts are rendered usele and the only answer appears to be the use of radars which are capable



of measuring ele ation, Radar picket ships serv to alleviate the above situati n; howe er, . around coverage requires a number of pickets which in addition to being vulnerable reduce the fire power of the creen,

Electronic jamming of our earl warninz radar' bas occurred rather infrequently. 'rVhen it has occurred it was generally ineffective. 'Whedler this ineffectiv ne i due t the low P wer of the jammers or to pOOT operating techniques is not known. As evidenced b action report , the Wind01 techniques and tacti emplo ed by the J apane e ranze from poor to excellent. For example, the Japanese frequentI form a large patch of Window in which the aircraft orbit changing altitude and departing in various directions. orne at the e aircraft leave at minimum altitude and their departure is undetected.

Exercises conducted in both the Pacific and Atlantic areas have indicated that radar operators and CIC officers can be confu ed by Window dr pped according to Japanese methods. While the Window was recognized as such it did cau e confusion and hindered fighter direction to an extent which could have been disastrous in acrus combat.

Referring to the use of Window. the document states, "Also without actually attacking, Wind tv will cause ex es ive excitement within the enemy defense area thus exhausting the enemy." ction reports indicate this is more or Iess standard doctrine, the Japanese "Window Willie" being 1'1"sp n ible Eor considerable time pent at GQ.

The document states that electronic jamming is used mainly asainst earch radars and Wllldow is mainly used. against fire control radars. When jamming, several jammers should be used, converging on the radar from several directions simultaneously in order to make detection of the course and position diffi ult. U ing \I indow to jam fire control, the Window i spread over an area of about sixteen miles in all directions. In using Window against an early warning radar , indow is dropped in front of the attacking force a it heads for the objective.

The appendix to this do ument contains instructions for the handling and II e of Window.

hese instructions are more or Ie s the arne as ours. A table gives variou Jength of Wind l: whi h wouJd be effecti e up to appr imau' 700 me,

Combat and Interception Using the Radar Warning Deofce (dated 10 April 1944)

The Japanese are employing a shore-based combat information center which is imilar in function to our ir dense Control enter and which is implemented in much the arne manner a our own.

The "ADCC" team i called by the Japanese the Int lligence quad. Its (unction is to obtain information concerning the position and course ol both friendly and enemy aircraft and to direct the intercepting and defending Hying forces. The document implies that combat information is transmitted to ground forces as well a flying forces by the Intelligence Squad. he necessity for close liaison between the Intelligence Squad CO and both the warning (or radar) unit CO and the flying unit CO is stressed.

It i pointed out that the radar unit must understand the capabilities and "compute the errors" of the warning device beforehand, endeavoring to minimize errors, e pecially errors in direction. The Hying force is to cooperate in siting and calibratinz the equipment. It is rated that the signal network is of vital importance and the necessity ~ speed and ac urac in dispatching is empha-

ed. The preferred meih d of communication with the flying force is by voice radio. Wireless telegraphy can be u ed if nee ary and a contact or fighter director code is provided for use with this method of ommunicatiou.

A second, alternate method is the emplo ment of ground-to-air panels, the intercepting force in this ase cir ling the signalling static n until a vector is given.

Th Intelligence Squad secures information

from the radar unit. the flying force, and other ources and maintains a plot of all aircraft on polar chart to a maximum distance of 300 kilo, meters. Positions are plotted at one-minute interval and peed is al elated a a basis of four

or more minutes.

favorable point of intercep-

tion is determined directly from the chart and the intercepting .orce is vectored accordingly.

It is stated [hat there i often a large error in the warning device and that therefore the CO should end ou reconnais an e and patrol planes to certify the position and course of the eiTemy force. The scouting force is dispersed in altitude and area in order to insure making an interception. The scouting force reports by radio to the Intelligence Squad which in turn vectors the main force to a faverahle point of interception. It is stated that the intercepting force should be ecto red in such a way as to intersect the enemy line of advance two or three minutes prior to the estimated time of interception. When the .radar is not securing accurate data, defending fanes are to be kept near vital areas and in the expe ted direction of attack. It is admitted that serious errors are made when there are attacks from everal directions.

he document repeatedly warns against "feinting, diverging. jamming, and deceiving" by the enemy ..

These two documents demonstrate that the Japanese possess a comprehensive and thorough knowledge of the theory and practice of radar countermeasures and are using fighter direction. They taere prepared by the Hamematsa Army Flying School and the A. keno A.rmy Flying chool, 'respectively. It is to be expected that our operations will now necessarily be conducted in areas where the main oppositiqn will be land-based. Further, it must be assumed that the Japanese

ravy has the above information. The statement made in the spring of 1944 that tueapons still in the experimental stage were used [or working Ollt these tactics can only lead to the conclusion that we must be jJTe'Pared tOT an increasing and effeclive use of radar countermeasures by the Japanese and tor Gel f1'om shore-based stations.




>< ~


Three ViC1IIS of IC in. the U' YORK· TOWN, typical of the arrongemC<11I in ESSEX class carriers,


2. CIC Officer

S' Fighter Director

4. tlJ.ldby Fighter Director 5, D. R. Plotter

6. Ship's .lnfo1'matiotl Officer 'l- Rader Control Officer

8. GU1I'I1ery Liaison Officer 9, Rado1' upervisor

~O. Air Operations ODireT (Ili,. Plot Officer)

11. .Asst. Air OperotiOll Officn (Asst. Air Plot Officer)

12. Asst. Air Operations Officer

(Asst. Air Plot Officers)

13. GeograpMc Plot Officer

14. ACI OU'Lf:t!f"

15. GeograPhic Plotter

16. Surface Recorder

17. Surface Plotter

18. Intercept Plotter (at fiG)

19. Intercept Plotter er urface

Plotter (at TfC) 20. ummary Plotter e i , Summary Plotter <OQ u",mary Plotter

23. tatlls Board Keepers

24. tatlls Board Keepe''-s

25. SO aperalor

26. SG Operator :!.7' 51( Operator

SK OpeT(Itor

_ . SMISP Operator ,30. SMj P Otulrator

JlI. Radio 0 perator j Recorder 2ll. Radio OptratoT/Recorder .33. Radio Operator/Recorder 3~.]11 Talker

.!I5. ]L Talker

.36. ]X Talker

37' nc T(llher

38. !l}G Talker

39. I'eoman

40. Messenger

41. dero/0ID'

4~. Teiet)'pe Operator

.11I. Radio 0plJral.orjRef;OJ,d,tl1"


A. Radiophone Unit B. mplifier

C. Radio/,f/olle flit (wei spet!her A1llplifift!

D. Willd Direction cmd

I'elocity tndicatot

E. Pltometer

F. SpefJlter

G. Radiophone elector wildl

H. Sou,nd Powered, S(J/er/or Siaitoh

1. ol.l'lld Powered Hand et

J. Radiophone Handset Remote Bearing Indicator . Remote Range Indicator

~1. Remote Range and Bearing Indicator

This is the approved di(!gmm [or carriers of the E SEX Glass, except that only eme r'G is being jllsl{l/II:d it/stead 0/ two.



Probably no other room 011 our ships has undergone the radical and rapid change of the present CI , formerly called Radar Plot among other things. A static condition ha not been and may never be rea hed, but a new ships Iide down the way and other ships return for 0 erhauls and repair of battle damage. some degree of standardization i being obtained. The diagrams and pictures which follow are typical of CIC installations in many ships now with the fleet.

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Air Plot. CHi. ~lIlJwilJg S/' l!"lm' console, PPl, VC P1'ojl!i:;lit)lj Pf>{ lind vertical plot.

The US S SA TAAN has been conuerte:i into a night carrier, and is fairlIJ represenfatiue of the C V l group.

CIC uimucd. with FG at le/L.



Ancien; History, Radar Plot ill the U E TERPRIS£

[rom ept. I942 10 Aug. £94J:

A. F.D.D. H. TB Recorder

U. Eva. itlnting up', L b A Recorder

C. CXAi\,{ Plotter l. Flag Bridge pealln

D. SCI Plotter 2. C AM peak.e ..

e. Comm!Lnicator .~. Statu Board

F. Cl,l7Inery Eual', -I. C" peake-

G. /1)1.1/5 Board O.

>-< L



_8_'_--1!~1..- J...._*.J!:""_




Prop/e view from 10000ard port qllllrter. Note radar antennas.

The US S ELDORADO has a recent C rc illstaUatjofl for AGe's. These pictures were taken i'l Nouemberl944 before she Joined the Fleet for the fwo Jfma and subsequent operations .

. T'he vertical plot is tJ mo.!.! jl1lportant spa, ill a Headq lIorter5 GTC.

The P console in the AGG. Tile in"ialion oj th« SP {ills perhaps the , crucial need 0/ assault: sh,ps fOT (I titude determining 'TOdaT fOT Ihe control 01 night ligllten

CTC, shofl/ing intercept tables and FDO's POSiti01L



Looking toward tCTWO.l"(.I bulkhead in CIG.

Plolting tables with rlF in center.

Looking toward forward 110Tt corner ill CIC.





The U SS BJRMINGHAM received damage in coming to the assistance of the "tricken PRINCETON. During fe.pairs. she got Q new arrangemen' In C J C

/I G ,. wi I II s 10 tus board. in b (lckg'l'o turd, air p /01 Q.I th e ri gil t.

1. Eval1tator s. CIC Officer

3. Fighter Director

4. DR Plotter

5. Illtercept Plotter

6. Geogro,phic Plot Ot/icer

7. Geographic Plotter B, Geographic Recorder

9. tJ. ir Plotter

10. Assistan: Air Plotter '11. Sur/a ce Plot 0 t/icer l2_ Surface PIQUeT

13. urface tatus Board Keeper 14. 4;1' laWs Board Keeper

15, MB GU'1nery Liaison Officer 16. iVI G11f1nery Liaison Officer t 7. Radar uperuisor

18. Surface Search Operation and Standbv

19. Air Search Radar and SlamlE')' so. SP Operators

~l. Precision PPI Operator !!2. CQmmtmicatioll Of!iCt;f !la. Radio Recorder/Operator 'l1t.]S Talker

!!5. JA Talker

26. ] L Talker

!!7. ]W Talker

C. Rn.diopllone Unit and -peakeJ' i1 mfJlifier

D. Wind Directioll tmd Velocity Indicato" " Pitomcter


Radiophone eicc;tor Switch

. OILnd Powered Selector witch

1\[. Remot« Range and BeaTing IndicatQf'


The NORMAN seOTT (DO) presents all lip to date destroyer etc. The new e,e shown was installed durIng 0 recent ooerholll III a west coast nouy yard.

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The latest ploUing j(ICilities.

Looking i?lto the opera/or's C07'ller.

Ready [or statum·keeping, na~· tion, fighter direction, and nery,

new 'euidence of VG utility

H ere is another report on the operation ,Of the VG Projection PPI equipment, which has been used successfully by the USS QUIN Y for both air and surface work. The repon supplements previou "C.1.C." articles on the. oper-

ation of thi zear.' he experience of th

Q . INCY follow:

"This ship installed a k. 7 Brunnirtg-Wallace niversal Drafting Machine on each 13" eat plastic ann, with a different range scale engraved on each straight edge, to be used with the drafting machines. These scales proved very satisfactory.

sing the interval between the four range circles oJ the VG and bisecting same, each scalewa deeloped with eight large intervals. < ach large interval was subdivided into five smaller inter al .

"Two plastic arm have been developed Ear u e on the surface VG. One of the e plastic arm ha a 40 000 yard scale engraved on one traight edge with a 20,000 yard scale on the opposite straight edge. The other plastic ann for surface VG work provides an 8,.000 yaId scale and a 160,.000 yard

le on each straight edge. The plastic arm de-

e oped for air work provides an 0 mile and 20 mile scale on each straight edge. How the e scales are broken do vn in large and small yard interval' i shown a follow:

cale Large Interval mall Interval

80 mi. 10 mi. I: mi.

20 IDL 2.5 mi. 0.5 mi.

40,000 yd. 5.000 yd. I ,000 yd.

20,000 yd. 2,500 yd. bOO yd.

8,000 yd. 1,000 yd. 200 yd.

160,000 yd. ~O,OOO yd. 4,000 yd.

"The frosted glass tops provided have been used exclusively. ""ith the use of the uni ersal drafting machine and plastic arms, coupled with the presence of the enter dial it ha n t been fund necessary [0 ins ribe an bearing r ranze lines on the VG top . he ability t carry on all plotting and summal)' work on these top. with the use of Iighr pencil markings, has made work far more precise.

"The relative ease with whi h a llmmary plot of all ship and aircraft movements and naviga.tional data can be kept up to the minute, proves this VG equipment to be an invaluable de elopment.

" n re olving course and speed of surface targets, a fa t and a curate relative movement probis worked out, representing the length and of the course-speed vector merely by

Air cale

Surface Scale

Surface Scale

1 [anuary 1945 and April 194<i issues of" .L ."

arrowhead markings. In contra t to the use of the DRT for tracking it has been shown that a quicker and more accurate targe~ COUI e and peed may be obtained on the VG. Prediction of minimum pa ing range is readil zomputed on the V regardle of our e or zig-zag plan in us .

plasti 10 arithmic ale imilar to that

printed on mooring bard beet incorporating time, distance and speed, is used in conjunction with all relative movement problems, eliminating the necessity for various speed scales.

"Target angle on the VG is quickly resolved hy measuring the clockwise angle subtended on the true compass dial by the heading of the target and the reciprocal line of bearing.

"For air "Work, the VG has proved its alue a a summary plot of all Iriendly aircraft. Fighter irection work on the VG top can be done without re gues work resulting from inaccurate plotting, time delays and poor summaries.' Relative bearing information for the AA directors i also readily picked off on the relative bearing dial of the unit ..

"Improvements in the VG units that are highly desired include better defini tion and dis rimination. Rapid hift from one range scale to another now present some confusion in pattern on the scope due to the high persistency characteristic of the tube presentlyemployed ..

"With the surface search radar operating at

normal sweep rate this ship has had very good succe s in observing and detecting low flying aircraft on the surface VG top. The plane 'Chicken tracks' have been noted at ranges from 1000 yards out to 13,000 yards, when the aircraft i flying from 500 feet to 3,000 feet altitude. It is intended

a carry out further xperirnent ii thi line. As the surface VG is adjacent to th air VG i i expe ted that a new technique can be developed b LI e Fighter Director in oordinating the tW9 plots for the dete bon, tracking and interception of low flying air raft as well as the important problem of gunfire designation Ior ship's batteries by the . A liaison officer in crc. This i e pecially de-

irable in re tricted waters where the air search radars are blank d out. Here the high per istency chara teri ti of the G tube i highly de irable."

I omAirPac stares that the -v can b u ed in the inilial smgcs of interception LO determine course and peed of target, but is ineffective after intercepting arrcmft approach within five miles of target. For this reason ,0mAil:Pac ar that. the VC can not be replaced by the VG and must be used Ior intercepuens,

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The September 1944 issue of "c.r.c." contained an article on the VF Precision PPI Repeater. Briefly, the VF is a precision PPI .repeater used with various search radars. Taxgets are presen ed on two 5" cathode ray tubes, the first of which is a can entional PPI scope 'with standard ranges of 4, 2.0, 80 and 200 miles. The other is a B- cope wlu~ repeats a elected segment of the PPI creen ill greatly enlarged form; the B-s~6pe range is limited to 40,000 yards. The ra~lge 1S represented on the vertical sweep, the azimuth n the horizontal. In determining ranz and. bearing with the B.scope, a tra king p <3 t ~a pa hie .of being moved horizon tally and vertical I. y, IS supenmposed on th de ired target. Rance and bearing are then read from a counter and dial.

Two VF units were installed on the trss QIJ1 !CY

( A), one in CIC and one in main batter plot, b t? beinz linked directly to tbe PD arzet De ignation system by meal) of PD switch panel .1 The results obtained by the QUINCY are interesting, and

h.ould ,?e beneficial to ship now being equipped with tin ear:

"No significant difficulties with either console

1. e "Remoting Target Dala-pnQ." in 'far h I!M- "C, r. ."




Ql!incy endorses VF

This JTF installed. in a heav cruiser CIC is adjactmt to the DRT.

Looking doum 0'1 the rtF. Tire co,,ventional PPI appea?"S on the left with the a~imntlt crank jmi above. Bsscop« on the right with range crank. above. The range in yards appears [ustaboue the Brscope.

bas occurred in the past two month of operation. However, to reali.ze the high degree of accuracy ~at can be ~btamed from this equipment the importan e of proper adjustment and a uraee calibration cannot be over emphasized.

"For tracking purposes the VF is limited to fort~ thousand yards range which is approaching maxunum good tra kinz range for accurate resolution. Experience has shown that the results tra k on the DRT of a plotted series of VF range and bearings is more even and uniform in speed

than that obtained from direct G ranzes and

aring . his results from the high accuracy and

( gree of discrimination that is po sible -with use of the expanded range cope.

"Probably the greate t value of the F in I work lies in .the amount of information both for tracking and for navigation that may be obtained from the unit without topping the sweep of the

!faster set or disturbing the scope of remote PPls. A range and bearing on the guide or any other ship can be. obtained without topping th weep.

"Also of great value is the information obtained from the VF equipment and used in fixing the ship's position with the accura required for gunnery purposes. It i fully expected that thi equipment will supplant the widespread use of the Mk. 8 fire conn-at radar fixes) thus [Teeing chi vital equipment for other work. Once the desired navigational point has been located there is little excuse for 10 ina sight of the object, du either to other land objects or surface raft maneu ering in the vicinity.

"For spotting shell plashes, the VF used with the SG has pro' ed to be a atisfactory medium both in deflection and range. In order to record ... ch splash on the expanded sweep, it was found

ces ar to continually sweep manually past the target in bearing-approximately 10 degrees on either side. With {-gun or larger salvos the VF hould spot effectively and d ignate 5/1 gunfire up to 14,000 yard or better. A similar test on the

" main battery was successful with single sun salvos at 12,000 yards. It is predicted that multigun main batter salvo could be controll d effectively up to 20,000 yards and probably farther.

"Installation of VF equipment in onjunction , ith PD switch panel I now affords this ,sse! a practical, accurate and very direct manner of target desiznation, 0 element oE delay orin3CCUT-

• acy of manual rransrni ion of bearing and 'ranze is now apparent. The only element left t be determined at this time is the decision as to which hall take control of de ignation and .0 pro perl line up the control switch panel."

W'ith reference to the use of the VF in spotting, a recent report of Commander Destro er Divi ion contains the following oncl usi n :

"Precision in spotting depends on the bearing and range discrimination of the radar used. he zain mu t be set suffici ntly high 0 h rye the pla hes. An ordinary udal' Jed target at 50 0 Ids produces a pip on the VF oval in shane, 400 yards long and about 8 degrees wide wh n % of

an inch of gra on the SG . cope Is used. The width of the pip depends on the SG beam width, while the length depends on the SG pulse length.

pOL within 100 yard of the target rna y be er difficult to make, since the plash pip "If ill merge with. the target pip. Also it mu t be remembered that when the antenna i rota ring, th SG is not continuousl looking at the target.

''\ ith the above limitations in mind, spotting was tried with SOlDe success. sven at 10,000 yards spla he were easily een and spots a em-ate to 100 yards and about 2 degree wer not diff ul t to estimate. VF spotting is practicable and with a little practice should be a very valuable aid."

On the basi of an experiment conducted, the QUINCY concluded that, should the Mark 12 radar be di abled, information on range and bearing from the VF to thepropeJ' control stations can be used to fire the battery.

Much practice is required to obtain a good track on th VF. uggestion on the proper pro· cedure are contained in the report of oroDe Di 120 mentioned above:

. First try to anticipate the movement of the target by placing the pot where the pip will appear on the next sweep. econd, never read a ran .e and bearing unless the lower edge of the pip i just tou hinz the middle .ranze line and is pede tly bisected by the vertical line. Third, since the roll of ship or target may spoil a sweep. the VF operator must set the time of plots by calling out a range and bearing only after a good sweep. Fourth, keep in mind .,that the orientation of the B-scope with re pect to north changes as the target bearing changes. It picture may be upside down or sideways.

"Diffi ulty may be experienced in tracking more than one target at a time, peciall if the pips are widely eparated in range and bearing. VF range and bearing cranks are not as quickly operated as tho e of the G. In such ca es it may be advi able 0 track targets at approximately the same range with the VF and use the SG for the widel eparated targets. C ordination between the G opera tor and th VF pera or is necessary for his procedure."

Though the usefulness of the VF in air tracking i limited b the hort range n the B-scope, it can be employed by tracking the target on the

K or SC, then when it is picked up on the VF, the target is automatically designated to the dire to. The VF may be er useful in tarzet analysis when groups of aircraft come within range of the expanded scope.

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Can id ring the tremend us increase in carrier strike and bombing mission again t the enem in the a inc alone and the high number of planes forced down in th water, the number of re cues i remarkable,

Mu h of the succe s in locating pilots has been due to the new re cue gear, Many device, such a the am r reflector, dye marker, signal paulina, Lhe" ib on .irl." radar beacon and he onoradio buo l"La e been in rrumental in aidinz radar or radio-equipped planes in. q uickl potting life rafts and effe ting quick. res ue .

Before takina off on a miss! n, ea h flier hould de ide which device, in addition to tandard life raft equipment, rna best be carried in his plane.

his depend 00 the type of aircraft and it operating range from the base. IE carrier-ba ed, he should use a Iight-weight corner refle tor or similar aid to fit into a small life raft; if piloting a long-range plane, the fuel' rna choose 00. that is more intricately designed and heavier in weight. Regardle s of. his choice, howe Y, eff ctive results can be obtained.

valuable means of survivor-to-plane communications, signal paulina have many advantages, and H used intelligently should be responsible fOT saving lives and equipment. There ani 13 different combinations. each with a different pre-determined meaning. They are easil made b adding only a small piece of waterproof fabric to the tandard multi-place raft quipage. The life raft paulin, yellow on one ide and blue on the other can be folded to represent a variety 0 signal Bag patterns. Circling aircraft can acknowledge the igllals from survivors on the ground or in a life raft by a series of shallow zooms or rig-zags, Green fluorescein d e marker, be t seen from goo feet or above, is effective in aerial daylight searches, Waterproof flashlights, Very' pistols and whi tles are also

redited with saving the live f downed airmen in mbat area .

Ernie Pyle s stirring St01, tuith. TITfa hington eWJ Artist Foote's graphic presentation of Ensign Buchanan's rescue gives deserved credit to the pilots and to the ship which effected the rescue. The downed pilot probably would not haue been rescued had he not used his signal minor. Buchanan used dye marke« to indicate his position but apparently no radar devices were used tor this, the first known air-surface rescue in, Tokio Bay. onner and Berne" first located the life rafl seven miles north of 0- hima. The lifeguard submarine-not a surioce ship as the sketch indicates -passed in full uietu of O-Shima's airfield and proeeeded to the border of a minefield to pick up

ucharum. - -Ed.

Even if You Were Shot Down in Tok-o· Darbor9 the Navy Would Be in, to Get Yon,


IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC (Delayed}-AU but IIIx of OUr planes were back from their strike on Tokio IIIld safel

landed. .",y

The six formed a .aeparate'iligM, and We wuJdn't bell that a}l. o.f them had been'IO$t, and for that reason our o'ifi~ eers didn t feel too concerned.

~d theD came a radio messa_gefroDl the fIl ht I d ~t said that, ODe of .the six was down in the OC<lJ Wl:ath'::"i ."e other flve were hangillg around to try: to di' t surface vessel to his rescue, That's all We 'knew ;: h some When .we finally got the story, thls WII<! it; ours.

Ensigu Robert Bu.c~ of ~lemenlon, N. 1., was hit b ilf&kT aski,. they were diVl,nr on thelr target scm e 20 miles weit o "'0 u, 'B'\Icha:nan: hUllseif was not burt.

tMe kept his plane up till be got over the water but it W8.8 !ute v~ m:h<1h. ~aPBnese water. In fact, it w~ in Tokio's ma/lead~ ~l;:'~o~De of the two bays yOU sea On the

. -.

~:G!~ .. ~UC~AN is an ace, with five Jap pbme5 to

"'" eredtt, ..., ditched b' ) " "

il? his !'Ibber boat. He was l:nfs>~~:rC:~~ht~ got out

fiTh miles from. the big island that stands at the bay e~~~:

Feck:~f t~':ttf~ ~del' ir~. ~ge. He is Lieut. ~obri

t th .. " . • 8M. e 111 ... 10 an ace. and an dId hand

a . e game. He has .d~lflled seven Jap planes. .

lot':e1;,o,?k thAm" rem_atnlng foui of the ilig'ht, and statted out

SO ilg ff8lJth .... :nean !:eSC. ue ship, Th~y found on." about

III es ~ _ e ~ enfrance. '

taTll,ey talked to blm en th~ radio, tola him the circum-

he ~r;s~~~!eto~e~th~h:nd~v;'~~uto t:i~ B~t

at!!e Lt~~t~",,\:~e~ the ?tther four, to .ta~l!Oand ciItlo location &Ila a'i;aro him e went "Dack to p](~k up Bu.cllaru>.,..'s

fI But wben n<; got th~re, he couldn't filld Buchanan. Hlf

ew ~or 25 mrnutes around Tokio Bay and was abo~t to despau, when.he began get~K IOun' :flashes in lUa " es

He. flew ov4!! a~u't tb,ree m!les and there was Blcb;"'a , He had used hIlS :!Ignal nurrcr, Just lik.e it lIaysin the bQQk. n

. . .

IN the meantime, the ship'a p~ was slow. It took al-

moat two hOurB to get there. And by

escort be" " ttin· olle one the aerial tb h gan Je g ~ trouble, and one by ene Fecke nrdered th:mtim~~e our ship, which was getting farther away all

ra~o~~.fhS;~'Tea~e. Petaluma, Calif., IQst the use of his on L~,!:x lI'~~ o~ ~~YDl~il\, Wash., got dangerouo1y low baclC'LieQt. &b M~":y of~u~~:' In~as shortage allK) sent

That 'left ?uJy Lieut, Fec~e circling :above the maD in the

loost, a~d Lieul ¥nold Berner o( Springdale Ark f1yin

one. amal escort for the rescue .hip,· ,_., g

Finally the &h!P was past tbe bay entrance. The ski hogan to have.his,doubts. He had to-go within three::: ~ tath8 guDof~~~dei! Ulland. He was within five minutes' I1ying

B nee ....., and Jap planes could butcher him

In ~:nt~tiJe he looked at hill chart, 8.nd saw tbat he was

• Jt wr:1 CfJ~inl;~~r;i~:~~~~ero ~. probably mined,

He.reis a map ". ( the rese. ue described bv E ' ~--

N' , rrue, ...... wn by II.

ew~·lIl'tiat from Ernie's BtOry.

fH!l ... sltipper radioed FeCke .and said he CoUldn't go lIllY ..... ther,

Fecke .radioed back and • d "It'

Please try," sa. , 8 only ~o mlles more.

The skipper answered and SlIid, "0. k. we'll try ..

And they pulled Jt off. The t '. h' •

fho\lth. pull~ out our pilot, andYgO~e!.ter: a~~to il:e lion;

en only, dId Pecke and Berner-start home, • . en, an

~e~came back to us three hours after, aU the rest had 1euf~ey'hrpedey ;:'Bd flo,?_ m. bo0':8 on a t~ree-hour miMiOD. .ve an ..mem:an. Ufe by domg So.

THAT ni.gbt I Lnr In lD~ b~ re:din, n cop)' of "FI ,ft ... •

magazlllti. It Will) the' issue of ItO t be· Yu",

months. old. It .was the annual Na\'n~ Avia~r :' nearly ~il!;

wa!-~~!~ P~:;!~h ;entitle<l" "We on a Carri~:' ~s:uP~ge. 248,

"It's a mighty g'ood feeling to 1m th t . .

shot down in Tokio harbor. the Na";';,oul~ ~v: til YOtll war:;

It bad never happened b that' 0 ge yOIl.

it has ftappened now. . w en pieCe was written. But.

. . •.

B T~,pjece-The rescue ~ip radltXtd u •• 'Ioe nezt dall lit t uc aoa« lOa, II!~ling fUJe, and that ju,' to be 1m i a Urell ~ad abo re.cued another Naul/ pilot, II di:s ::;'~t', {:tf,1ot, and a lone bedragl1led ",ruil1Or of a JII~ Pic"'::


Their air fields strafed and shipping demoli hed, the Japs concentrated all their anti-aircraft fire at a lone P-38 flying high over Makassar to avoid the ba1·rage. The plane was hit disabled and the pilot had to make a water landing, Almost immediately the plane sank, laking the pilot down about 40 feet before he finally extricated himself from his o:>cygen mask. After coming (0 the surface, he partially inflated his life raft, turned the blue side up to prevent detection [ram. lap mrface crait, and hid under it. He remained in this position until he ighled the rescue plane and its escorting PO' 's. At/meted to him by sell marker,

is tl'ashing mirror (md the life ?'aft which had een turned ouer again so that ale yellow side .was visible, the plane effected a rescue.


-c i= Z w Cl u:

Z o U



Designated the {X-l37jA (for single-place rafts) and MX-138j A (for multi-place rafts), the

orner reflector targets give a small raft a much reElecti ity a, ay, an 84-foot a t Guard Cutter. Ordinaril , radar visibility 0 raft without refie tors i ,doubtful, or ve little more than opti-

al vi ibili ,

Having igh reflecting comers formed b three mutuallj p rpendicular, intersecting plane SUf-

>< 2-




....... 'i / , ,- ,


...... J

This IS the basic design Of comer reflectors. Dotted. l.ines :show how tllr'ee mutually perpendicular, hllersecting sqtlore plalles form "ectanglilor reflectors. oWl lines show /low triangular reflectors ere formed by cutling at.!IO)' )){Jrts Of tile rectangles.

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face, [hi device is ea y to can truer, (See above) Because the corner refiector i small and light. it i ideal for use in most aircraft and life-raft packages. "Comers" rather than flat sheets of spherical surfaces were used because a beam of energy striking a goO corner from any direction will be reflected back to its SOUTce. In addition, corner-type reflectors have a large effective echoing area in comparison with their small size. They do not require specially trained per anne! for their maintenance or operation, and being non-electronic, they equire no batteries or tubes, 'With

orner reflectors in general u e on life rafts, every radar-equipped plane i a potential ea-search craft.

Both the MX-137/A and the MX-138/A have metallic fabric reflecting surfaces, knit from round ,0035-inch Ionel wire, his fabric has the resiliency characteristics of knitted cloth, the contact resi ranee between wires is quite mall, and reflecti it decreases onl Iizhtl after exposure of e eral days to salt ail' and spra, Xn order to les en windage, the fabric j lao ely knit, yet it will reflect almost as effectively a a olid metallic

urface. .

The u pporting arm of the reflector frame of the MX-137/A are made in two telescoping sections so it will easily fit into the pilot's seat pack. It has a mounting mast and each of its eight reflector measure 24: inche on the hart edze.

be MX-138/- 1 reflector was de izned espeiall f r multi-place life raft, However. its snpportiT'JO" arm do not tele cope since space require-

1 This corner refle tor has been Slightly modified for Army II~C and is known as the l\OC-138-A/A,


Here is the MX-I3SiA COIner l·ejleClor.


modified er ion which will on go into producti n. De igned . or

. eration from a life raft both equipment have a para hute for dropping 'om an airplane, are waterproof and will float, ,They op ra~e on 500 kc., the International Distres Frequenc, and provide automati code transmission of pre-determined signals. 'his is imp_oftant be~use any oper~tor, no matter how untrained, can send distress SIgnals which, when received by rescue parties, will permit bearinzs to b~ tak~. The. CR-578 A or B may be u ed as a handpowered light Ear Ignaltng at night, or as a ontinuous light. A kite and balloon aloe Ll ed to s~pport the ~te~ma.

A m dification of the SCR-578 or B, providing tran ,n11 sion OJ~ 2 0

k . as well a 500 kc., has re ently been de eloped. . ~I new radio set, known a the A jCRT-3, automaticall hifts transmissions every 40 seconds from one frequency to the other, The use of 82 a ~c. offer a me~ns of obtaininz long-range bearing from land-ba ed. DF stations so ~at S~lPS or aircraft can be dispatched to the general location, and the. 500 kc. tran - mission can be used by the rescue craft to home to the life l'a~t. The A 1/CRT-3 will eventually replace the SCR-578 311d B now being used in the Fleet.


fan favorable comments have been written about the operational successes of the R-578 and B in air-sea rescue work. he o~e'.11 of a "Black Cat," forced down deep in enemy waters ound themselves. m real tr?u~le hen the auxiliary power unit failed them. and lack of wind made It imssible to fly the kite that carries the "Gibson Girl" antenna. The hydrogen inflated balloon solved the anr:enn~ proble~, and the crew alter-

t d at ranking the crenerato, to maintam .a contmuous flow of current

na e 0 Oib G' 1'" 1 d

[or trail mis ions. rescue pilot picked up the" 1 son II SIgna s an

homed to the downed "cat:' Re cue was oon effected' the" ibson Girl"

had done a real job. .. ,

Another similar instance COD erns a crroup of SIX PBM that were ~n, an

operational flizht to search for the mrvivors of an .rmy ~~Y-5, m~, smg on a n-an -Pacific flight. During the search, one of the _NIarme_rs developed engine trouble at night and before he c?uld return to his ba~e, was for ed down, The plane was found to be still seaw~rthy so tbe life rafts were inflated and made fast t the plane, The radioman was able to maintain communications with the ba e, but soon secured the ,w~tch to 'upervi e the working of the "~ib o~ ~iTl" ( C~-578B) tran mi Ions so that other planes auld home to It. V ithin a short time, th rescue plane, assisted b flares from the downed PBM rescued the crew,


Due to a lack of equipmen L. ana-radio buo: are now a. ailable nly for anti-submarine operations. Hower, the l/CRT-IA , (Six-band) and 1 B (12-band) have been recommended by ~inC~ac fo~ LIse III sea re~cue wor~, ( ee diagram) TIley operate omething like this: vyhen a life raft 1 ... :crhtecl by. a search plane, a "red" frequency ono-.buoy IS dropped fr~m the

ane to the raft Iocation. It can then be retrieved by the men 1Il the raft and [he res ue plane or surfa e raft can be dire ted to the exact spot

'ZINC ".F.


m nt in larger rafts aloe not as critical as in the one-man pack. (See above) Because of its can truetion, the MX-1S8/ is omewhat easier to erect in the raft than the MX-137/A.

Theoretically the optimum altitude of search. depends on the frequency of the searching radar. However, since the rolling and pitching motio of the reflector in the raft cancel the "nulls" tl:ui theoretically should be encountered in radar

earch, little effects of altitude versus range ha e been detected when flying above 800 feet, t nigher freq uencies the angular accuracy in construction of the refle tor i more important, a fact which explains the apparent ranze discrepancy between results with the ASe and ASD (See Figure B), When searching for drifting life rafts, radar operators must remember that radar range e timates at which large targets may be seen do not incli ate the radar' ability to pick up small targets. This can best be determined by overall performance checks on th e radar system using test equipment, such a : Model LZ or TS-14 for the ASG, and TS-12/AP and T '13/AP or /A 1· S for the ASD.


. he "Gibson Girls" play an important role in air-sea res ue. Emergency radio transmitters, powere 1 b a hand-driven genera or for the sending of di tre iznals b air raft peT onnel forced do

at ea, they are more Iormall known as the SC 578-A and B and the A /CRT-3. The latter is a

Radio trallsmilthlg eqltipment A /CRT'lA is a sell·contoj~ed miniature broodcastmg station for tlSe in submarine and airsea rescue operations. The bu.o)ls have a soluble wax seoling plug ami 1I0ve been designed to sink /lIter lour to eight hours.


where the raft is situated by homing on the buo . If a plane carrying this equipment is forced down at ea, one or more buo s kept for this emergency should be taken overboard with the rescue gear to provide" longer operational time. Rescue planes equipped with the AN/ARR-3 receivers com then monitor the "red" band and will be aided in reachinz the location of the raft.


, ither peech or nois e transmi sions from the

one-radio buoy to the plane's receiver can be used. For the water noise transmission, the sono buoy can be secured to and floated out 'from the raft with the hydrophone released. The hydrophone will then pick up considerable water noise


>< L


Although.still itl the tlev'!lopmlmtal loges, the "Waltt1'" life raft beacon WIll OJ/craie continuouslq for at least 20 hours at normal lemperotllres, decrea;sing to abou: J:J hours at zero temperatures. It IS shown erecLed HI a one-mall raft wilh the mast and antenna ~;,:tl'llded, ready fOT use.


and transmit it. If speech transrrn Ion iud, the hydrophone should be released but retaine in the life raft to erve as a mi rophone and the remaining portion f the buoy floated au t from the raft. In all ca es the antenna should remain vertical. These buoys have a soluble wax sealing plug and have been designed to sink after four to eight hours. Because of the e two facts, it i advi able to carry as many a pos ible to permit

ontinuous operation. Each one-radio buo is pre- et at the factory to operate on one of any 12 frequencies. The AN/CRT-IA operates on ix band: 6·7, 68.5. 69·3. 70.1, 70.9, and 71.7. The AN/CR T-IB in addition to those six will also operate on 62.g, 63·7, 64.5, 55.3, 66.1, and 66,9 frequencies.


The British life raft bacon (T-tP80) va redevel oped by the Ann Signal Corps and is now known a the A /CPT-2, or "Walter." lectrically similar to the British model, but mechanically improved, it is a beacon which continuously transmits pulses. (Shown left) By careful construetion of the transmitter circuits and by choosin batteries so that the plate voltage does not ary appreciably during the life of the beacon, Erequen y stability is accompli hed, The pulse rate i 45 k . plus or minu 10 kc.; the pulse width is two microseconds.

"Walter" is compo ed of an antenna, a transmitter unit, a six-foot mast, a switch and a battery. Wben in use, the antenna and transmi tter are held at the top of the mast; when collapsed, the beacon fits into a space of 2/1 x 4·1/2/1 X 15". The beacon will operate continuously for at least 20 hours at normal temperatures. decreasing to about 12 hours at zero temperatures. By switching th unit on for five minutes and off for ten to gi e the battery time to depolarize, the unit will operate for fOUT or five days. It should be turned on of course, whenever a plane is een or heard.

In order to use the device, the mast and an-

tennas are extended. be mast is then held in

place with the attached cords, and the unit i turned on. pon picking up the signal. the pilot should tum the rescue plane to give equal strength on both ides of the screen. it approaches the raft, the gain should be reduced and altitud decreased, udden deer ase in ignal trength wil indicate that the re ue plane i dire t1y 0 er tb beacon.

With the help of this rescue equipment, no pilot need feel that each

ight i potentially hi last one, Prior to the development of VHF emeroency IFF and the man innovation de eloped to facilitate air-sea re cue. many pilots were forced to consider them elves more or less expendable. Today this fact no longer holds true. Of all pilots who are forced "to go. in," 65% are rescued; there could be no more forceful te timony of the effectiveness of our air-sea rescue. eedless to say this is :respon ible for "retaining" a lot of go d pilots-and effective rescues don't decrea e morale!

Rescue Deoices at a Glance

Approx.Ranges Available Ranges Reponed

Length of Operation

30 to 60

days at sea

Device Designation Weight Frequency Equipment

Comer 1 lb. (Radar-ASG

Reflector IMX-137/A 'SOl. Any (Raclar-ASD

-----+---"-'-'----1 (Radar-A B

Corner (Radar-SO

ReBeCLOr IJI,IX-13/A 1\4lbs. Any

12 te 18 miles 'fro 10 miles ,5 to 7


2 rujjes

42 Ius. 8280 II: 500kc•

On 8280 I:c. lup to

radio or 1600 mi.


Above 2500 ft. over 20 mi.

About 15 miles 6 miles

30 to 4,0 mi.

mcrgency Radio Tr.aru.mi Lter

Emergency Radio Transmitter

SCR~578A-B ("Gibson Gir}'?

.12 lbs, 500 kc,

Radio or Radar

AN/CRT." (Modified "Gibson Girl'?

ASV, ASV-C andA E Radars

Radar Beacon

AN/CPT-2 alter)

II lbs,

~e.Rl~9 AN/ PN·~ AN/APX.s

IUnlimited (hand-generated)

Unlimited (han(l-senerared)

20 hrs.

(normal ternp.) 12 hrs.

(zero temp.)


62.9 to 72

A /URTIA (6-b3.J!ld) IAN/ RT 11$ (is-band)

Surface crall

(aJ1 tenna 70 to 90 flo)


at 5000 E~.

Radio-Serno Buoy

Bat ery f.

LUq: .. ~ 1,_'

2 t. (hf .: • ~ - "


.; it

_-?r ,.



o o :s:: > -<

B-scope simulator

looks promising

The B-S ope Simulator shows graphically r hat changes take pla e when a geographic pi ture on a PPI is con erted to that of a B- cope with its characteristic distortions, The Simulator does this by transforming a PPI photograph (actual 01' simulated by RPD). or a map sector, into its corre ponding B-S ope pattern. In effect, it takes a pie- haped PPI sector, and in convertinz it to a B-Scope pattern, changes a 1500 sector to a square and a smaller sector to a rectangle, thu compre ing the top area and enormously e pand-

ing the bottom. .

Ali indicated in the following report of the 5S ENTERPRISE, these B-Scope simulations are accurate enough to be valuable in a number of ways. he device is an excellent mean of training radar operator in the relation between PPIs, maps and B- cope, in briefing pilots, and, on actual flight, in identifying radar geography. The device- wa Cl-eated by the Special Device Division. Bureau of , eronautics. and is full described in peci:

Devi es Bulletin No. D 9-

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il P_P1 1lI'Igatille is placed i,! th,e I!.nlaTger and pr{)}ectea down 011 film or bromide paper lmder the top plate of ~he n· cope simulator, A/fer [ocussing for alignment, the bed. 0/ the simulator is rotmed (r011'1 left 10 right (It,,.ing exposure. Rc.mll-PPI pattem beCQme~ n-Sfiape pattern.




150· sector of RPD predicted PPI Scope.

B· cope Prediction made from negatioe of tile pP[ photo. Tile change is con· sidernble yet geographic [Joints can be easily correlated.


"Radar Planning Device (RPD) photographic predictions of PPI scope patterns have Em- the past year proven valuable navigational aid for surface ship and high altitude bomber. These s ope simulations are prepared by using a point source of light with accurate terrain models to obtain scope patterns which are then reproduced photographically.

"Night arrier Ail' GI up go requested that Pa Hie Fleet Radar Center RPD nit prepare B·

cope simulations for use with Night Carrier planes equipped with M'/AP -3 (Dog) and ANI APS-4 ( H) radar gear, t wa felt that RPD prediction "would be especiall helpful to . 'izht

arrier operations because low a1titude attacks "With rapidly chanzin scope patterns require a more thorough briefinz of pilots and 'radar operIS in the radar geograph of the target, i hara .teristi land part rn , and radar landmark

iliIap ."eadied for 'Processing into B-Scope pattern.

Map processed into B- cope pattern.

as they will appear on the scopes with 'B- can distortion. While mo t of thi radar familiarity with the target must be gained prior to the attack, it is possible to carry the RPD predictions in the air for reference in scope interpretation and orientation.

" sing basic meth d d veloped by Special Devices Division, B AER, the RPD nit at Pacific Fleet Radar Center constructed a device which accurately simulates, photographically, the distortion of B-Scope presentation. In the limited time before ight Aid Group go embarked in TERPIUSE~ one set or B-Scope simulations of 11'.'0 .IlMA was prepared, with positions taken on bearing every 300 to the island. at range of 8 and 15 miles. Althou h this island i mall and characteristically shaped. the radar presentation varies greatl on different approach bearings, and with B-Scan distortion many of the patterns how little relation to each other or to the map outline of the i land. It was requested that an RPD Offi er be made a ailable to ENT Rl RTSE by Radar nter for [em-



This is the mockup 0/ the B· cope Simalalo'" built b), Pacific Fleet Radar Center lOT USIt On th« ENTE.RPRI F. mH/ lit ARATOGA.

Three B- cope predictions for an approach COUTse to Hong Kong.


oral' additional dut to pFepare additional RPD material for other gets.

"From,') January through 26 januar '9'15. terrain model were n-

structed on board the E, TERPRISE and RPD coverage of four tarzet areas prepared; TAKAO, Formosa, CAMRANH BAY, French Indo China, HO G KONG, China, and targets in the Southern half of OKlo AWA: lansei Shore.

"While full scale night attacks did not develop on the e target during this operation the RP material wa completed on sch dul a~d wa used extensively for briefing. Limited: but successful, tests of the material were carried out by pilots and radar op rater who e shipping earch se tor rook them to the vicinity of CAMRANH BAY and HONG KO G."


"1. Since RPD provides a graphic method of demonstrating the behavior of B- can distortion, radar geography and cope interpretation techniques, it is believed that its use will be of value in the training of ight Air Group P ronnel ommencing with their fir t ontacts with air-borne radar. Early familiarity with the uses of RPD material by night pilot and radar operator. combined with briefing on specific targets and their radar characteristics and landmarks, parallel the day pilot's training in map reading and 'his later briefing in the visual characteristics of targets. Special Devices Division, B U AER, should afford every assistance to ight ir Training Units, making available trained .RPD personnel and equipment to

h NACTU for the preparation of RPD predictions in the training area • d £01" instruction in uses of material produced. ight. arriers hould have a trained RPD Officer attached to the ship. prepared to construct RPD terrain mod 1 of nev target areas and produce the required B·Scope prediction photographs while at sea as well as to brief the pilots and radar operators in their u e. This officer might replace the Photo Interpretation Officer, whose duties are ail but eliminated in night carrier operations.

2. wo major problems in connection with the preparation of RPD material while at sea are; (a) the limited notice which is given prior to attacks on specific targets; and (b) the lack of available space in which to prepare terrain models fur the RPD predictions. RPD Unit, Pacific Fleet Radar Center can make possible the solution of these problems. working in conjunction with Operational Intelligence, COMAIRPAC. by preparing in advance of operations and supplying each CV (N) with a complete library of the required models and basic RPD coverage of alllikel targe in the area concerned. From the finished terrain models the RPD Officer can prepare additional approach coverage a needed to supplement the basic RED material by photographic work only. argets should be treated in the basic RPD coverage to include airfields and harbor installations, with approaches from seaward appro imately: every 300 at distances of 30, 20'. and 8 miles for use with DOG radar gear. and 30, 15, and mile for

use 'with H radar gear."

When RPD models and photographs are no availabl, the imulator ay be u ed to produce satisfactory B· cope maps to take aloft.

I'he B·Scope Simulator (Device 16-C-23 . ) may be obtained 011 request

to the Bureau of eronautics. pedal Devi Division.



>< "2


vel one has some in entive genius in his makeup, and the advent of the Combat Information

enter was considered as an unlimited opportunity to prove this to all concerned. A modern CIe ill f-ull swing. using all of the various instruments available, could easily be mistaken for' a "Rube Goldberg." factory. a the initiated onlooker, however, it is readily apparent that there i a great deal more of method than rnadnes in thi: cene,

in e the rntrodu tion of Combat Information Centers, there has been a constant evolution toward more efficient method of handling certain problems. crc officers and men have had a free hand in devising new and better ways to sol ve the problems constantly confrontinz them. "Gadgets" of wood, "Gizmos" of metal, "Dohickeys" of paper and glass. and, abo e all. instruments made from pla tic, plexiglass and imilar material have contributed an important part in the developm nt of CI .

There is a definite place in any rganization for an aid which will increase effecti eness, However gadgets should not be used to replace or discour-



age thinking. [or should the gadgeteer be permitted to run hog wild to the extent that IC clo ely resembles an obstacle course. All C1C Officer hould understand the rea oning behind every solution regardless of his faith in his mechanically obtained answer.' ~hether or not any gadget is worth while depends on~ several factors. The folLowing e t may help determine whether or not tbe latest brainstorm hould be adopted:

(a) V\ hen and 11 w often will thi gadget be u ed?

(b) Does i save tim ? ( ) Is it accurat ?

(d) " ill its use int rfere with an other operation? (e) Is it ea y to use? (f) Is it simple to manu-


The September 1944 issue of "C.I.C," presented several pictures of CIe aids available through , 'a al Supply agencie. Several additional de ice are presented herewith for general information. Ea h bas been desizned for specific problems on specific types of ships. IE they would help yo present your l'equest to the designated source suppl '. Or-make them ourself,


Fen- use with maneuvering board ifl seleoting a torpedo /iring position. May be drawn at CiC offi·ce, ComDesPac.


ctically a Mark 5 sight moullle" on • maneuve.-ing board. olues Ihe lorl)tJ.dO 1JTobltJm fOT relative tube train, torpedo &OU1"$e, track angle, and eOective range. FOT use on Destroyer EJ" COT/of. May be drawn with sheet of instrllctiolls at CIG office,. GomDe~Pac.


Two bearing circles. lTmeT circle veoolues alia illair;ates the arc of train oj all guns and. torpedo tubes. With s/dIJ's head all true bearing, arid the movable a1'l1! on larget bearing, the number Of gUllS iohich. can bear is stunun at the right of the arm. hould. bit m(lde tiP aboard ship if desired.


sed in Radar avigation. For a

detailed explanation see the "GIC Handbook, Destroyers, Pacific Fleet (Tentative), jllly 1944." Available lit CIG office, ComDesPac.


For converting yards to degrees, yards or feet to mils, yards or feet to minutes 01 sight a7lgle. Available at CornDesPae.


The slots cut inlo the standard plexiglllS5 DRT sc.ale each I'epresent tile maximum range of a low intermediate and high speed torpedo. No ielleS along eae h ~lo t ind i ea Ie . distan ce p81' minute [rom ;l:ero ume 10 maximum '·ange. Special noten IIi 80% of ma.>:imutn indicates Doctrine Effecli'tJe Range. Can be made by .,hip's [oree if desired.


MTL c.u:« OflERLA Y

FOl' use 011. the DRT in hore Bombard~/l§!'t.

cote i mils righ' ami left 0/ center pomt.

Range orcs are one inch a/~(Jrt and represent dislallce aecordlng to. scale beitlg used an' tfle DRT. Primarily for Desl'royer Escorts, and mG)' be dl"OWII al elC office of ComJJesPac.


lilrldonl screenint: sttuious from Table 1, USF lOA ,,tolled in I~otes ~" il/cxiglru,s, witfl.e-a_r;r ,llatiOll lahel/ed. Giue« M J·J\:b maneUllerl7l_g boord 5/(l1i011S rap id 1)1 witl) 0 LI t rcflmmce tQ ,b1l5~C

publtcations. lups force call make. ,


Twelve inch parallel rulers with ~ to I and " to I scales on them. E,oT. use with r~ inch maneuvering board to eliminate necesnty for dividers. ..stom built by ship'S force or tender.


For use with DRT. Assists in plotting torpedo. Imcl. tind spread at oariovs times. Sliips fOTce make if desired.

o o ~ > -<



of shipboard fire control radar

Eire control radar has brought a revolutionary advance in gunne11 technique comparable to radar's contributions to navigation and aircraft control. This article, prepared by the Bureau of Ordnance, gives a comprehensive picture of the avy's formidable array of fire control radars today, with hints of improvements now in the making.

Fire control radar, throughout the present conflict, has been a most rapidly changing phase of electronic technique. Radar equipments have become obsolete very quickly, often before developments could be put into production and introduced into the Fleet. For this reason it has been nece _

ary to replace or modernize fire control radar equipmenrs in the -Fleet on an extremely short life ba is. In fact, in some instances equipment of a certain t pe has not been in talled universally on our combatant ships be£or it has been replaced by an improved equipment, While such a program i unquestionably expensive, it is nevertheless necessary to utilize eVeJ7 sound and worthwhile improvement in the science in order to maintain the tactical superiority of our radar over that of our enemies. Also, as the warha progressed, different tactic have been employed by the enemy whim have altered the military requirements of radar equipments.

he program discussed herein i divided into four main topics; i.e., main batteries, econdar batterie I heavy machine gun batterie and beacons. In eli cu sing th shipb ard lire control radar pTOgTam, detailed characteri . of the equipmenrs ar not .iven since this would make the report unde Lably long.

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radar for main batteries I

MARK 3 (Being ReplacedJ-

This wa the first main battery radar installed in substantial numbers in the Fleet. It was an outgrowth of the Mark 1 (FA) which was not operationally veq atisfactory, a?-d only a few of which ~ re in talled aboard ship, he Mark 3 was devel, ped in the earl tage of the radar al~t and its produ tion wa pushed to meet the. exrzenc' oE a techni al war, Because little experienc existed, either on the part of the Fleet or the radar designers. this equipment had many limitation which became apparent as soon as it .was used ?n shipboard. Its most serious shortcomings .were. Illadequate protection against shock ~d vibration, limi ted range, poor discrimination 10 b~~. rang and bearinz and limited spotting capabilitie .

be enhanced b removing the range operati n from the director to the main battery plotting l·oom. Navy Yard, Pearl Harbcrmade uch an installation 011 an experimental basis. This instal lation proved the modification to be desirable

o plan were made by the Bureau to convert all dark installation". This conversion Mark 8 M d 2, differ from Mark Mod 1 only ith re peet to the L cation and numb r f certain units. The Control Panel, Control Indicator, Range nit and Range Transmitter ha e been moved from the gun director to th plotting room and additional indicators ba e been provided in the fire control tower and at the rangekeeper in the plotting room. In addi~ion to _providing operational improvements, this modification made the equipmen more reliable be aus

of the rem aJ of man va num ube from the • direct r where bo k du to unfire is e ere.

I)K, MK. 8, and G jonv(lrd Imlcmnas on (J nll.

MARK 13 MOD 0 (Now Being Installed)-

While the Mark Mod 2 ha pro en 0 be a

very satisfactory radar and has undoubtedly been of very great value to the Fleet, it still bas orne operational and maintenance deficienc~es. Its antenna i~ excessively heavy and complicated, and its spotting capabilities are still not uch as to provide consistent re ul to the £u11 firing ranze of the guns it is controlling. Also, he equipmenL. as a whole is not easil maintained because of lilac essibility of many of the component. 'be

1. !\lOTC detailed informati.on on main batter radar is included in Bulletin of Ordnance Information 10.4·'H.


MARK B MOD 0 {Converted to Later Mods}-

As the limitations and faults of the Mark 3 were realized at an early date, the need for immediate improvement was evident and development was started on Radar quipment Mark ·8 Mod O. This was the first radar equipment to emp~oy. a

pid linear scan fan beam. It therefore contnbuted one of the major advances to radar development. Operation in the S band with B- ype pres· entation provided ubstantial operational advantages in improved discrimination; i~crea. e~ acuracy, and a marked improvement in abll:i~y to spot she]] plashes. Als it was much ro~re !~habte than the {ark 3. his improved reliability .resulted mainly from lessons in shock mountmg and zeneral design learned from it predecessor .. Its chief apparent disadvantage was the weigbt and complexity of its antenna. the "Polyrod."

MARK 8 MOD I (Being Converted to Later Mods)-

The orizinal installations of Mark 8 Mod 0 proved tba~ its range capabilities were disa~po~t-

-ing. Thi was chiefly evidenced by P?or indicatiou of shell splashes at the longer firing ranges, To improve this, a new transmitter and receiver was produced to give increased power output. and

ensitivi . This was the only noteworthy difference ben een Mark 8 M d 0 and Mark 8 Mod 1.

MARK 8 MOD 2 {Being Converted to Mod 31- a result of operational experience with the Mark ,Fleet personnel felt that its valu could

() 3: >-<

>-c 2:


l\IIat~k 13 Iod 0, 110\ in pr duction, is an X band. equipment with an eight foot antenna. The fan beam produced by this antenna i anned in harmonic motion by mechanically rocking the antenna about a vertical axis. Because of this feature, the antenna is known as a "Rocking-Horse." Two transmitters are installed and connected to ~e antenna feed through a waveguide switch. El.ther transmitter. can be. selected by the operanon of a key SWItch at the operating console. The belo~ de~ operating units of the -equipment are contained 111 a console e peciall y designed for ease of operation and servicing. 'Because of the manr features designed into this equipment to provide the Iatest developments in circuit and mechanical design, the equipment is considered to be far superior to the Mark 8. The chief advantages are:

(1) A reduction in antenna weight of near! 2000 pounds.

(2) An antenna which i electrically and mechanically much simpler.

(.3) A material increase in range.

(4) Improved spotting. The Mark 13 should allow accurate spotting to the full range of the mail] battery guns.

(5) Improved range and bearing discrimination. (6) Improved bearing accuracy.

(7) More insurance again t enemy countermeas~res resulting from X band operation and Improv.ed discrimination and two operating transmitters.

(8) More reliable operation under conditions of shock and vibration.

(9) Greatly improved serviceability.

MARK 8 MOD 3 (Now Being Installed)~ecause of the increase in below deck spa e r - quired for the Mark 13 equipment, there are am

hip that cannot accommodate it. Thi fact, c?upled ~th the. economy of electronic producnon and installation effort, makes it desirable to retain the Mark 8 equipments on many of the ves-

els now in service and on some of the cruisers now under construction. However, because some of

" ~he features of the ark 13 Mod 0 can easily be incorporated in the Iark 8 'Mod 2, this is now bing install d as -lark Mod 3. he 'Mark Mod 3 ha the same antenna and ran miller a th Mark I Jl Mod O. Thi &i e full advantaze f

(J )'. (2!. (3). (6)/ and (7) above and a partial realization of the advantage listed a () and (,11)·

,MARK 27

This is an band radar for u e in fire can tr

towers or main batter fire ontrol stations at battles?ips and cruiser £01' the control of fire against ~u.rface targets. It i-designed for use with auxiliary Gu-? Directors Mark 40 and Mark 55. It also provides the gunnery officer with an independently operated fire control radar 10 ated at hi battle station. The quipment is basi all, an SJ-.L submarine radar, modified to give accurate tram and range information for gunnery purpo es.. he equipment give the gunner ffieel' a PPI presentation which has proven aluabl for gunnery evaluation. either the dark 8 or ~k 13 main .battery radar equiprnents were pracocable. f~r ':h1S purpose because of weight and space limitarion. . few Mark 27 radars have been installed in main batt ry turrets to provide local radar can trol.

MK: • Mod. J 4Tltimna on a CL.

MK. 27 Mm/. 0 antenna and. an/erma mau.lltillg unii (lef!) Small all/enna to Tight is MaTh 22.

secondar!, batter!, radar MARK 4 AND MODS (Now Being Replaced)-

This was the first radar equipment for 5" control installed in the Fleet in any quantities. The equipment was identical to the Mark 3 with the exception of the antenna and tl e addition of an indicator for the pointer in the director. The antenna provided lobing in the vertical plane in addition to the horizontal plane. The Mark 4. therefore, had the opera ional limitation and maintenance difficulties listed above for the Mark 3· While this equipment has given an excellent account of itself in battle. it does not provide adequate blind firing against aircraft. In addition to its shortcomings in tracking accuracy and discrirnination, the Mark 4 is very inadeq uate for tracking low-flying plane because of its relatively 'wide vertical beam, While man field chanzes were made

• 0

to improve the Mark 4, its basic operational char-

acteristics were not altered.

M,ARK 12 MOD 0 [Now Being Installed)-

As the main limitations of radar equipment Mark 4 were appreciated early in its installation

'ogl-am, development was started all radar equipment Mark 12 Mod O. an improved equipment, earl in 1942. When the design of the Mark 12 was undertaken, can iderable thought was given to the employment of S band. However, becau e the range capabilitie of S band were not well established and because of difficu ties experienced by the Fleet in getting radar equipment Mark 4 on targets, it was decided that the L-band with a wider beam would be more satisfactory. However, this development has provided a considerable improvement in serviceability and reliability, a marked increase in range capabilities, some improvement in tracking aCCUTa y. and weaker ide lobe. a substantial differences in basic militar haracteristi over those of the Mark 4 were incorporated with the ex eption of automatic tracking in range. Fleet reports indicate that the improvements incorporated have made the Mark 12 much uperior to the Mark 4.

MARK 12 MOD 1 (All Conversion Kits Dis,tributed)-

After the installation of Mark 12 Mod had

been tarred, the de irability of removing the range it from the director, because of pa limitations In the director, wa apparent. Thi modification was made as Mark 12 Mod I.

MI( . .22 willi MK. 4 antenna.

MK. 1.2 (Iuterma on Director ;\l1K. )1'



MARK 22 MOD 0 (Now Being Installed)-

I aimed out abo e. the Mark. 12 has a serious deficiency in low anzle track in 0- accuracy. This defi iency produced one of the most serious

. tactical radar problems of the war because of the tactics of torpedo plane attack initiated by the Japanese. Because of the urgency of meeting this threat it was necessary to provide for Jew angle radar tracking for the secondary batteries on the mo t expedited basis. To do this, the Mark 22 Mod o wa developed and ru hed into production. To expedite the development of this radar a man exi ring components as were available were 11 ed and incorporated into a working system. The Mark 22 i an X band get employing an harmonic s an in the erti al plane. It provide elevati n information only which is pre ented on a B prime cope at the pointer' position in tbe gun director. While this equipment has ome shortcomings for shipboard operation because many aircraft components were employed, it has proven a successful interim solution to the torpedo plane problem. it is being installed with both radar equipments Mark 4 and Mark 12 on

Gun Directors Mark 37. .

MARK 28 MOD 0 AND MOD 3 (Now Being Installed)-

On Gun Directors Mark 33, it j impossible to in tall radar equipment Mark 12 because of the lack of pace. On these director, the Mark 4 equipmerits are being replaced b radar equipments Mark 2 Mod 0 and Mod 3. These equipments are identical except for a very minor difference in the mechanical structure of the transmitter case. The Mark 28 i an S band equipment with a 45 inch dish with conical scan. It provides much im-

. provement aver the Mark 4 installation on these directors. Because of weight limitations, the Mark 22 cannot be installed on the {ark 33 directOTS even though this would be desirable. There are a) 0 a number of Gun Directors Mark 37 which cannot accommodate the Mark re-Mark 22 combination because they have taper-back shields and have insufficient space for the transmitter. The 1ark 4 equipments on these directors are being replaced 'with !.!:ark 2 Mod 3 radars.

M'K. ~s· MfUI, 0 wilh Director MK. fJ) (BIJ installation].

>K L



heauy machine gun radars

ARK q (Obsolete)-

This equipment wa an S band ra.dar w_ith a 24 inch dish. It wa designed to function WIth Gun Director Mark 45. Because of excessive maint:. nance and other de ign difficulties, the un Director (ark 45 program was can .elled. here are no 'lark 9 radars :in the Fleet.

MARK II (Obsolete)-

This was an band, range-only equipment desisned for u e with GUll Director ([ark 49. Thi ~n director program was cancelled for similar reasons that the 5 director 'Was ancelled.

MARK 10 (Production Complete)-

This is an band equipment with a 45 in h

dish. It i installed all. un Director Mark 50. Thirty Mark 50 director have been built of 'vhi~1 eizht have been installed on hipboard. TIllS equipment ha some limitations, the chie.f of ru:-h is the difficulty of rnaintaininz the equrpment ttl the small space available in the dire tOT.

MARK 19-

This equipment was an i1Uprov~mel1t the ark 9 and was designed for u~e w!th. ~ director Mark 49 in.order to provide blind P0LnUl1g. H wever due to the cancellation of the director pro~ gra~, very few Mark 19's were installed in the fleet, 11 Iark 19 equipmenrs pr duced ar DOW being converted to radar used with the un Fire Control ystem Mark !'i7·

JWK. :.6 Mods. J and 4·

MARK 26 (Now Being Installed)-

This is an S band, range-only equipment [or use with un Director Mark 52 which is a. small handlebar type gun director for u e with 3" and r," zun on auxiliari s, D ',and PF's. he eqUlp-

v 0 . b. .

ment is currently in production and 1 . ernz tn-

stalled on approximately 10 a ship. ~ replacement for radar equipment Mark 26 1· contem-


ta«. !:9 Unci. !t.

o o s: > -c


MARK 29 MOD 2-

This is a onversion of radar equipment Mark 19 to ~ band for use as an interim equipment on

un Fire Control ystem Mark 57. It consi ts of Mark 19 below deck components. an SU tran mitter, and a conical scan antenna with a go" di h. It is now being installed in the leet,


. This is a conv~rsion of radar equipment Mark 19 and radar eqwpment Mark 28 to X band u inz ~ T transmitter and a parated 30" dish. hi" will also be an interim installation on un Fire Control System Mark 57. The ad 3 uses Mark 19 below deck components; the Mod 4 uses Mark 28 below deck components.


TI~s is an S band conical scan system with a 45" dish now being installed on Gun Fire Control System Mark 63. The below deck units are the same as t~ose for Mark 2 Mod 0 and Mod 3. he an~enna IS mounted on the barrels of a 40 mm. tW.lD or quad mount. Target acquisition i accornplished by. mechanically nodding the antenna in the vertical plane.

MARK 34 MOD 2-

This is an X band equipment similar to Mark 34 Mod 3 and 4· It will replace the Mark 2 Mod 2 on Gun Fire Control y tern Mark 63. The ~eplacement is being made hiefly to obtain the increased tracking ac urac afforded by X band and also to take advantage or better low anzle


performa nee.


v I1l

0- ~


2: 2



50 52


shore bombardment beacons

During the summer of ] 943, representative

the Pacific Fleet reque ted informally that the Bureau of Ordnan e provide a radar beacon to r~spond to ~re control radar equi pmen ts and proVIde a definite and accurate point of aim for shore

. bombardment. As a result of these requests, the Bur au initiated the ·ollowina beacon _program:

1. Radar Beacon Mark 1. Mod 1: This "is an L band beacon responding to radar equipment Mark 4· The beacon wa provided hurriedly usinz available equipment. It was contained in twoO boxe weighing about 100 pounds total. About 55 of these beacons were constructed and sent to the Pacific and Atlantic areas for Fleet tests. The response from the Fleet was good and a demand was ~de for similar beacons of lighter weight and covenng the frequencies of the Mark 12 and Mark

radars as well as the Mark 4.

2. Radar Beacon Mark 2 Mod 0 and Mod 1:

These two beacons were developed as a result of the demands of the Fleet. The beacons are similar except for the RF head. The Mod 0 operates with radar equipment Mark 4, and the Mod I wi radar equipment Mark 12. These beacons are considerably lighter than th Mark 1 Mod 1, veizh-

• 0

mg only about 40 pound complete with batteries.

eventy-five each of the Mark 2 Mod 0 and Mark 2 Mod 1 were produced ou an experimental ontract and furnished to the Fleet. An additional 125 are now in production.

J\ifK. 'l.8 Mod. 2.


trade winds and surface trapping

Meteorological sounding re eal the existen. ceo . .f. per .istent low-level ducts in trade wind area at heights up to about 50 feet above the surface of the sea. (A duct is a layer in the atmosphere where temperature and humidity conditions cau e radio energy to travel in a path with a downward curvature exceeding earth urvature.) These ducts appear to be strong enough to trap S-band and X-band transmissions.

When the radar antenna is within the duct, extended ranges should be obtainable on surface targets and on aircraft fiying very low. However if the radar antenna is above- the duct, the surface targets or aircraft within the duct may not be picked up until they close to ve:J.-Y short ranges.

The experiments reveal that the atmospheric duct is due to a 1'apid decrease of moisture in the air immediately above the surface. The air in: immediate contact with the water is always saturated' wind blowing ouer the water apparently sweeps this moist aiT upwards, due to turbulence, to an extent which depencls on the wind speed. TIle importance oE the resulting duct with respect to trapping of S and X band wave depends on the height of the duct. Apparently greater 'wind speeds produce higher ducts. up to the point where turbulence becomes so great that complete mixing takes place and the duct is wiped out.


he cientists belie e that the low-level ducts, the highways for these S and X band signals. are formed:

1. In oceanic regions in the trade wind belt, in which the air has not been modified through passage over extended land masses.

2. In the absence of precipitation.

3. Whenever the wind is of moderate velocity (from four to twenty knots).

If the ducts revealed by the meteorological soundings do indeed trap and X band transmissions, then important operational applications are po ible, particularl in the Pacific theaters.

1. Radar may be installed at low points on island ba to give added pro-

tection against surface targets and r low-frying air raft. Such installations hould be of additional ets to uppleroen exi ting equipments.

2. U. S. planes may evade high-sited enern radars b r making approaches ... vithin the low lying ducts provided enemy is using S and X band. These ducts have no effect on Land P.

3. It may be necessary, under certain conditions. to start jamming enemy frequencies at a considerable distance n-om the target.

4. Intercept equipment should be turned on earlier for the purpose of detecting en em y radar.

5. When a duct is present_ the en m can intercept me sage at far greateT ranses than ordinarilv, ommuni arion equipment should not use [he or X band with low antenna height when it is dangerous to have the transmission pass beyond the line-of-sizht.



orne of these applications may have to await the time when the enem.y learns about the value of locating low-angle C01!emge radar at extremely low antenna heights, but such a discovery on the enemy's part is almost certain to come euentually.

It perhaps should be em phasized that the frequent e istence of a low-level duct, with resulting extend d ranges tram radars with antenna lying within the duct doe not preclude the secnring at other ti mes of extended ranges from radars with antennas at heights greater than 50 feet. Occasionally extended range may be obtained from radar with antenna heights below 50 feet and abo e 50 feet simultaneou I)'. For complete coverage it appears to be neces ary to have radars with antennas at several heights.


An experiment in another tradewind area confirms the existence oI thi surface duct. This experiment is still going on so data reputed here are onl preliminary. 0 date results have been obtained on one-way tran missions only. The transmitting antennas are at heights of 16 feet and 46 feet; III receiving antennas at heights of 6 14, 24, 54, and 94 feet.

he duct increased the signal intensities beyond the horizon at both S and X bands, at all heights investigated, to values that are far above those to be expected under standard atmospheric condi tions,

The best antenna heights for band transmis-

ion (of the heights u ed durina this test): transmitter 46 Ie t, receiver 9'1 feet. For X band tran - mis ion th best heizhts were: tran mi ter 16 feet, receiver 6 feet.

Rain squalls, some of which were up to 6 mile

>--c ~





in diameter over the path, had no definite effect upon the strength of ignals,

Action reports from the East China Sea and Nansei Islands area (CI .I. ." March 1945) indio cate that the existence of surface ducts is much more common han hitherto upposed. Th rea on for the existence of these low lying "wa e guide " are not so evident as in the ttad wind areas, but they occur often enough to offer further convincing evidence to prove the case for the u e of microwave radars at low antenna heights a a supplement to other radars.

Until more information is available, the 'pos bility of the existence of a low-level duct should be considered in the formation of offensive aircraft tactics and in the u e 0 radar in defen e against enemy surface and air attacks. The later will require the use of mi rowave radar with antenna heights under 50 feet. Such sets, as well as other low-angle coverage radars, should be manned continuously, rather than being alerted by other-radars. "c.l.e." will continue to publish information on this SUbject.

S and X band radar are tho e affected by the weather conditions described in this article. I ere i a li t of some of the equipments used in aircraft

avy hip and at av hare rations and ad-

vanced bases.

Extra copies of Part 6, UF-roA,. are auoilable ...

U you want more copies oE "C. 1. C." for April '945. which contains the complete text of Part 6 in hange. 4 to F'IOA, just end • speed-toner or airmail request to the Chief of Naval Operations. Ecii(or of .. . 1. .", WashinglOn !!5. D. C.

Your request for additional copies will get prompt action.

Please notice: There was 110 issue of "C. I. c." dated ouember' ICJ.14· Vol. I No.8 was dalcd October 19.1." and Vol. 1 No. 9 was dated December 1$144.

1'\;."1 PN-7-lIan ponder beacon

. N/_JU> -a, 2A, 2B. 2 ,2D, 2 ,2F-airbome earch radar AN/APG-l-airborne gun Ia ring

AN IGP -!l-TlIcon homing beacon

"lark? l\fods I and 2- hipborne Main Battery fire control Mark 10 Mod 5 hipborne eeondarv Battery fire control

Mark 18 Mod O-secondar bauer)' for gun director Mk. 28 Mark ~6-Sblpbome fire control lor G.D. Mk. 52 (round back) Mark 2'i-Shipbome fire oonlTol for lire control cowers and turrets

Mark 28 Mod 0 and 3 hipborne Secondary Bauery fire control i~r G.p. Mk. 33 and Mk. 3; Mark 26 Mod 2-, hlpborne FLM. T. fire control for Gun Fire Control ystem Mlc. 63 SGR-584-Fire control. Marine ad rise battahons

F-surface detection .1

surface search

a/ C - I =surface ea rch

SG-2 =barbor hore urvelllance G-3-surface detection

G-4-slirface derecuon stabilized SW band

la-surface detection and torpedo control for subs J-l-surtace detection and torpedo control for subs

L. SLa. SL·J.,-'surface detection . SM-fighter ai~craft detection and surface search for carrlers

I-surface detection

surface and aircra (t detection SQ-I-sudace *a)1Ch., Auxiliaries O-l!-surface sear. h, oasr Guard O-B-surface search, mall Patrol, Craft O-g-surface search. mall Patrol Craft O· Ll-lenith wat h

0-l3-search, MTB

O'7MjN-search, shore station

Sr-tighler aircraft detection and surface search.

SP-1 M-fjghter direcuon

SQ-search, landing craft or battle damage sV /SV -r=aircra ft search for subs

X-lighter direction So. and sv.' band

N/AP -15-airborne earcb

A /AP -6-airborne search-intercept gun aiming radar '. 1 P "",-airborne search and interception radar AN/AI' '-3-air1)ornc earch and attack

(ark 33-shorcba ed fire control ALA-airborne earch and interception 'IAl'G-3-airborne gun la'ing radar /CPN-6-air homing beacon

AN 'PN-I (XN,,)-pre~ision for aircraft control and landing >\N/J>P ·.'-pack radar set lor ["oving UIYgel detection MarkS fed 3-hi'pbome ),f.13. lire control

~fal'k '3 Mod O-Shipborne i\<r.B. Ihe centro]

Mark l!!! Mod 0- hipborne Secondary battery Ire control

Mark 29 Mod 2-Shipborne H.M.G. fire control for un Fire Control 'stem l\la.rk 57 \\fark 34 Mod 2- hipbome £.1\1..0.. fire control for Gun Fire Control ys[em Mark 68

Mark 34 Mods 3 and 4- hipborne H.M.G. fire ontrol fo Gun Fire Control y tern Mark !,; 0-3/4:'" band surfa e search

. -5/G-XB band urface search -ll!M- band [anne Corps. search

. S-I~slll"faoe search and torpedo control fOT ub r-range only-in subs

-sla.bilited II rface arch

"' ...... The Trade Winds blow from. the bells of hig/! pre >t11'1l - ·(lrci. IIII' equatorial btU Of 10'" jll'B.f m'e-in the Northern

uilsphere [ron: the northeast and in the dulhenl Hemisphere from tile sovtheast. Tlu!y are tJrdinarily looked upon as th« most constant of wiflllj for they sometimes blow for day~ or evert weeks willi sUgh/ varia/ion in direction or strength, Hov» ever, there are limes iuhen. III(J'j l'~eakm or shift.

The trades are mill'/! In·Qllol.meed in the spring and s1l1nmer uuniths IIl11n in tlte II1/e SLWHller and alilumli. Ti11J seJ.lli- 1)(N'IIII111lt1l/ highs loefl/ltd ill the North PaC"ific: and North At·



Inntic, aroulId which the trade winds revolve, ¥I-e frequently broken liP in, the fall by typhoons ancl hurri-ealles, (md dltTing me winter by reglLiar extra-tropical .stDrms:

Over land areas of an)', these twdes are disrupted. Generally spcokillg, tht: mean PQsitioll 0/ IiltJ dilliding line between tile NottheQ,S1 (lild Southeast Trades ties in the vicinity of lite equator although at limes it 1110.)' be pusllecJ as fa r . 11$ JOo Nortt: or outh, lrougest t.·f"tIde~ OCCI~I' bettueen 25° and 10° Latitude. Normall)'; the trades in either HBmiJpherc do 1,01 extend. far/her, orth or outh than JO· ~Ii'ltde.


CIC training under COTCLant



50 CONFIDENTIAL eIC training on the Atlantic oa t ha been so ~lanned and coordinated that training at any desl~ed .leVel can be obtained, regardless of the stage of ship training.

. T~'ee general levels of training are offered within the Atlantic Fleet: (a) elemental' or in-

doctrinational eIC trai . . .

. ... .' aInmg at precommIsslOning

trammg stations at Norfolk. and Newport, (b)

C~C team training at CIe team training centers at LIttle Creek, Va., and Brigantine, N. ]., and (c) refresher training at NIT . .

ava rammg Centers

asco Bay, Boston, lew York, and Miami.

This versatile program is the outgro..wthof a directive from the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, to the Commander Fleet Operational

Training Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, to ~

rdinate all eIC training on the tl . C

J_ anuc oast.

precommissioning ele training

CIe teams slated for large hips are assembled at the Large Ship Precommissioning Training Center at Newport, R. I. Here they receive their first CIC instruction as an organized team at GIC Primary Training School. located at Coddington Point. This school has for its mission:

(a) Complete team training for CIC teams of auxiliary vessels, AP A. AKA, and other types having CIC's.

(b) Primary training for GIC teams of large combatant ships prior to their departure for CIe Group Training Cent r, Little Creek, Virginia. (c) Indoctrinational instruction and problem work in CIG for PXO's and PGO's of all ships. (d) Indoctrinational CIe training for all deck and gunnery officer watch standers,


ecause of the rapid constructionof auxiliaries, training of combat teams for AP ,AKA type ves-


o :s: > -<

sels occupies a major Share of the training at 1 ewport. At times as many as eight or ten auxiliary teams of 12 men each and one to three officers are training simultaneously. The enlisted men are of a high level. of intelligence, having graduated from Class A Schools such as Fort Lauderdale and Virginia Beach. They are assigned to ships prior to coining to the station and have previously obtained some of the fundamentals of radar and eIe training. In two weeks of primary work they are given basic team training in which team ~ ark is emphasized. Following the e two weeks the teams are put aboard an APA for a week of advanced training underway. This training is very advantageous in that the equipment and conditions are similar to those of the student's own ship. Both Cle watches and classroom work are conducted during this period. One officer of these team is usually a graduate of the Tactical Radar School at HoUywood, Florida. The one or two other officers


LO V 0-

>-c :2




of ~~ teams ax~ generall a igned from other division of the ship Or additional duty ill CIC and prior to coming to (hi team training cen

ha e had no training in I . These officer are trained a10110"" with t te


enlisted men of the team.



The CIC team f aU bea ombatam shi p bing built on the east coast

with the exception of aircraft arriers una '0-0 their fir t experience of team training at ewport.

During two we~k at CIPrimary Training chool, teams are gi en drills in surl:ace and air plotting, then are allowed to apply the information they have learned in simulated ship operation in the combat mockups, Each man is given an opportunity to occupy each enlisted position in the GIC's so that he will be familiar with the duties of each job and be able to take any job in emergencies. mphasis is placed on showing the entire, operational picture to the student and to emphasize his importance in the smooth functioning of the combat team. The team officers train along with the men and aid the mstructors.

Following their primary work at Newport, the teams of the combatant hips go to Little Creek CICGTC, and finally to Brigantine, New Jersey, for more advanced training in team work.


Twenty-five to thirty officer attend a three and half day indoctrination come which begins Monday of each week. This cla is comprised of officers of all ranks who will not be assigned CIC duties on their ships but whose efficiency will be augmented by a knowledge of the aid that GIC can offer their departments and di visions, A large number of the officers assigned to precommissioning details at ewport attend this course. The course emphasizes the background and the nece sity for CIG, its ph ical equipment and capabilities and the part it can play in aiding conn, gunnery, navigation. and other departments. The functions of CIC are demonstrated in lecture, movie, and practice work in pl tung rooms and mockups.


Newport has trained over ixry combat team for a total of over fifteen hundred men. In addition, over seven hundred officer have been given CIC instruction. There is little doubt that the time and effort a ed as a re ult of this primary training has been of ine timable alue to the

on which these men serve.


DD type CIC Mockup at SeaUlGII Bq.ttery coordinples ClG lind Gunnery 11I)Ci'nilig.

The mi ion of the Cl School at .I. TS rfolk is to provide ba ic C

traininz for IC team of·DD' DE's APD' , and PF's , hich will prepare them for advanced training afloat and ad anced instruction at I Team Training Centers: and to provide indoctrinational training £01· PCO's, PXO's, and all deck watch officers a pra ticable.

Insrrucrion is divided into the foUowing main classificaticns:

(a) Officer' ourse: 66 hOUT training over a period of two weeks for officers destined for zeneral duties aboard Destroyers. Between 25 and 80 officer complete thi course each week.

(b) Refre her raining: For teams having completed tra~g but

waiting for hip and for operating hip. Approximately eight hip per

week recei e this training. .

(c) Preliminary Training: About 25 hours' instruction for one week to men awaiting a signment to DD's, D ,'5, APD'::; and PF's CIG teams; approximately 25 men per week receive this instruction.

. (d) PCO and P?,-O: eIe indectrinational training to an average of three Prospective Commanding and Executi e Officers of DE and PO class ves els each we.ek. Prospective Gunnery Officers receive this training if not re eived prior to reporting to aval Training Station.

(e) float Training: Supervise and conduct third week afloat rraininz of DE type balance and fourth week. training of DD, DE. APD and PF CIe team "With balance crews.


The ratio of instructors to students is high. about one co eight in training. Instructors closely supervise the work during mockup. periods and \rive individual instruction to team members when needed. Thus a well balanced team is produced with a fair amount of facility in all phases of CIC and prepared for advanced training afloat and specialized fighter direction work at advanced schools.

Team training is stressed, the objecti e being to develop a smooth workina GIC team with a high degree of mechanical ability and on, well !IT~ul1_ded in the fundamentals of CIC operations. Lecture time i held to ~ minimum, providing only a background for problems worked. 75% of "he time is spent in practical work. All refresher training is practical work in Night Convoy Escort Trainer or the six well-equipped CIC mockups.


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CIC Team TrainIng Centers


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t ~ttle Creek team training has been the primary Job, but other phase of training have developed. All p~ses can be roughly classifi u utld~r. the ~ollo~lDg heads: (a) Basic Team Tramll.lg~pnmal'Ily for CIC teams going to new construction. (b) Refresher Team Traininz=Ior crews. of operatin~ s~ps with experience. (c) PCO-PXO IndoctnnatlO~-~or s.eruor officers. (d) Watch Officers Course=similar indoctrination for officer of the deck, etc.


,"!,~e most important work at Little Creek i the trammg of new crews in a two weeks' course. !Vfost of these crews come from the precommissionmg center at Newport, R. L The officers are usua.lly graduates of NTS ( R) Hall yv,ro ad. Florida, or of NR TS, St. Simons.

The backbo~e of the work is the training that the crew~ g~t In the CIC mockups, Six of these are steadily In use. One i laid out like a CIC in a battleship or crui er, one is similar to that in a cy . three are ~J) mockups. All are equipped WIth Anna DR T s, ?olar plots. status boards, and o,th:r gear. The sixth mockup in the series is similar b.ut has no DRT and is used by teams from smal~shlp~, New mockups with the latest electromc eqUlpmeI;lt are now being planned or under construcuon,

For the second week of training at Little Creek the teams go out daily on the USS MAY~ FLOWER, which is fitted out with four CIC's. an SG-l, and an SC'2 radar. One of the CIC's is equipped like a battleship's or cruiser's and bas

lWO VC' and a VF, in addition to polar plots ba DRT. Three CIC's are similar to that of a

stroyer. The 1" Y 'LOWER's operating area is lower Chesapeake Bay and the approaches to the Bay where there are plenty of ships and planes. Tbe crews obtain excellent exercises in tracking these targets from the radars while the ship is underway, at the same time getting practice in radar piloting by keeping the ship's position6.xed at all times. The evaluators in each combat report to an instructor on the flying bridge, who can check the course and speeds and all the other information that they report. Special exercises are held also. One day a week the radars are jammed by the INSTILL, and all are able to observe the effects of the jamming and of the corrective steps taken. Two days a week, weather permitting. Fighter Direction exercises including visual are held with planes from NAS Norfolk. A simulated shore bombardment is conducted on Cape Charles City. A subchaser is used as a target hip, and the CIG officers are required to suggest courses and speeds for the subchaser to take to maneuver on the MAYFLOWER, and again, the olutions are checked by the plotting of the team.

This training in the CIG's is supplemented by plotting drills, practice in PPI interpretation, and training for the radar operators on the radar sets, e VG's and VF's OD the MAYFLOWER and the -1 radar on the shore at Little Creek.

At the completion of this two weeks of training, the crews of new construction ships go to .IGGTC at Brigantine, . J. for intensive traininz in air problems and fighter direction.

LIWH/illg the uses of the rlF

(above right) The ele eql.lipment is modern,

WD1'king 011 the PG,

bringing out the relations that should exist between the CIC and other divisions of the ship.


Officers of the deck, control officers, and many other officers who stand watches on shipboard, need to know the functions and organization of the GIG. This course, beginning on Monday and lasting for five days, is designed to cover about the same material a is covered in the PGO-PXO course, with more emphasis on actual CIC operation co fit them for GIC watch tanding.

Another phase of COTCLant's eIe training is the supplying of instructors from the staff at Little Greek for shakedowns of new and converted ships. All battleships, cruisers, and carriers that have conducted their shakedowns in the Gulf of Paria area since February 1944 have carried one of these instrnctors with them for at least ball of their period. The function of these instructors is to assist the CIC officers to organize their men, set up their operating doctrine, instruct operators and plotters on the equipment, and in every way possible to help make the CIC become an integral part of the ship. Destroyers and de troyer escorts that shakedown in the Bermuda area receive similar aid from officer and radarman instructors stationed there. These assignments are rotated among the staff at Little Creek, to put fresh instructors on the shakedown and to keep all instructor alive to problems of an operating ship.

At Little Greek, the followin ... CIC teams have been trained: 8 battleships, 2 battle cruisers, 6 heavy cruisers, 18 light cruisers. 10 carriers, 15 AGC and RAGC, 8 destroyers ] go de troyer escorts, and 78 frizate crews.

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Refresher team training, for crews that have had considerable CICexperience, is also scheduled at Little Creek. This training uses tbe same facilities as are described above for the basic team training. Problems in the mocknps are adapted to the needs and experience of the crews. The refresher gi~es the crews a chance to catch up on new doctrine and to benefit from the experiences. of other ships. Teams reporting for one week usually work at Little Creek, where the problems can be more easily adapted to the needs of the team, and teams reporting for two weeks get the second week on the MAYFLOWER.




This course was instituted in an effort to acquaint senior officers with the capabilities and limitations of the CIG. Instruction i given by '~s of lectures, demonstrations, and movies, 'OD -co ar, CIC organization and functions, external and internal communications. the instructors


T'eams GTe polished up in Brigantine's well·equipped CIC's.

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. CI G~'~up Training enter, Brigantine N.

1 ~ acti lty f Commander leet Air, Quon P~lllt, and lS located on Brigantine Island, fi e miles north oftlantic City, N, J.' The ite wa chosen because of its unusually favorable characteristics for radar operation and its proximity to Naval Air Station, tlantic ity, where VF Squadrons are commissioned and trained.


. Brigantin~ h~ three main job. It train pil

ll~ ~ght~ dir~ctl_on and radio procedure an 1 disipline, It trains crc team, and it maintains a 24 h~~r radar watch fo: aircraft operating in the vi-

rmty. These functions combine to good effect.

In the past year, o~er n~enty fighter squadrons operated under Brigantine control, with fiizhts scheduled all day every day during flying weather.

constantly changing supply of pilots j tim available to aid in training CIC teams in the air picture and its relation to other CIe duties. B traininz together, GIC officer and pilots 1 am to work together.

Brigantine offi er is assizued to each q uadron for liaison during its period of traininz. Much ground is covered in acquainting pilots with the problems of the crc, and in learning the pilot's problems. Each squadron visits Brigantine to i . speer installations and observe actual operaeior and se era} discussions 01'1 fi hter direction are arranged as part of the regular squadron ground

chool training. Liaison of a tin more effe rive kind i upplied by the 24 hom radar wat b which Brigantine maintains. It facilitie are part 0 th

, ir-Sea rescue organization of Commander Eastern Sea 'Frontier. ~ rescue controlled b CTC is CIe s best argument to a pilot. Such rescues have been effected, and many a lost pilot has been reo turned safely to base.


In the CIC team training program, Brizanrine cooperates with Commander Operational Trainin Command, tlantic Fleet. ew team arrive via ewport or orfolk th n .ittle Creek. and receive their final training prior to shakedown.

'mphasis at Little Creek is placed on the urface

phases of I. t Brigantine, the air .picture i

.stressed and coon tina ted, on a syntheric basis, wirh the surface picture just learned. Carrier and

GC teams remain at Brigantine for three week .

Battleship, cruiser, APA, and destroyer team remain one week unless an infrequently light chedule makes a longer ta pos ible.

AU battle stations are manned during in terce )t problems and the oncept of he team j tres throughout. Emphasis i placed on deriving t e maximum information in the hortest time, on

.splaying it in a clear and descriptive manner, and on di eminating it for weapon and aircraft control. Radar operation, reporting, plotting, radio and ound power procedure, and discipline in the I are coo tantly stre ed.

An around-the- lock chedule of radar in truetion bridges the gap between primal' hool training' and team training. Each man re eives 20 minutes individual instruction on air earch ge.'U' and the same amount on surface search gear: as a check on his familiarity with firinz up and securinz the gear, afety precautions, ranze and bearing r ading, secto scan, tuning and calibration. Knowl d 'e of IFF codes is te ted by a peciall on tructed me hani: m which can produ e any c d de ired. Each man al 0 rands two fourhom night war h s durinz will h hi operating pr edure and plotting accuracy are carefull wa hed and graded. tress is laid on op ration and plotter teamwork. Instruction on the M i given to carrier teams and to team of hips anticiparing in lallation of an SP.

Inter eption problem are staged with the Eight-

er plan ontrolled by a qualified vi icing offi er,

u nervi ed b a Brigantine Staff officer. e and

rigantine officer upervise the overall team performance.

feanume. full inf rrnation is piped ynth ti.1 1 tnt CI, fr rn the P oblem Room. AntiSub Patrol is tracked and synthetic surfa e prob-

GQ in a Brigantine CIC.

Iems are read in from this room. The surface problem is solved on synthetically controlled DRT's. Synthetic BS is used both as IFD net and ship's maneuverinz circuit during all problems.

wo Mark 29 train rs, also installed in the Problem Room, are manned when foul weather preIUS ail' operations, and sometimes during actual operation to add further complication.

As far as the chedule permits, each team is assigned to a plotting room Iollowinz a GI period so that mistakes can be reviewed and drills given to point them up and reduce their repetition.

raining in Visual Fighter Dire tion o conducted from a pedal station tabli hed on the ro f. Proper are j taken to indoctrinate the pilot . in th special problems of thi t chnique.

, PBY operating from tlanti ity twO

da s a week drops V indox .. and produces electronic jamming and radio deception. his pro· gram is geared to the experience of the team.

Refresher teams follow substantially the program outlined above. The Brigantine traininz

ffi er and the senior ship's officers, however, det "wine the special requirements of ueh teams and the program i modified to an fy their needs, Brigantine' up-t -date equipment make such training e pecially desirable for ships in po-t awaitinz installation of new gear.

In its fir t year recently completed. Brizantine has trained one hundred and eighteen GIC teams.

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erc training at naual training centers

Casco Bay Training Center was established to give shore based instruction in conjunction with omDesLant underway training. t is a unit of the U. S. Naval Training Center. Portland, Maine.

Capacity is limited to three teams each day, although under some condition a fourth team can be accommodated. On the average, eighty teams consisting of approximately 160 officers and 600 men receive refresher training each month.

Most of the CIC teams which come to Casco Bay have received basic CIC schooling elsewhere .. Cl.C groups reporting for the first time usually devote the morning session to radar instruction. By means of lecture, visual aids, and operation of equipment, a comprehensive and non-technical r view of theory and operation of radar is given. Moreover radar deception, jamming. and antijamming with special emphasis on operation of 'new JF 'receiver, and an outline of new radarCIC developments are presented. Speed, skrllcreporting and ere coordination are stressed.

The remaining half day is devoted to eIe problems. CIC organization and elementary plotting usually are emphasized the first day.

A CIC team reporting for the second time will receive more complete training of a greater variety, unle s a long period has elapsed since the first visit. Detailed records are maintained to. a oid any unnecessary duplication.

. "

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The Training,Center is set up to offer a six day course to complete teams. Already thirty-five ships have taken advantage of this extended refresher, which includes all phase of eIe operation.

Individual instrucrion may be obtained, but the training program i designed for the eIe team as a whole, to improve the two basic requirements-speed and organization. Practical rather than theoretical exercises are employed, new methods and shan cuts are presented, and the necessity of passing information to interested control stations is demonstrated in all cases.

The following refresher instruction is offered: 1. Organization of eIC team: lectures, discus. sions, and pertinent films on equipment, dutie of personnel and communications and functions. 2. Air plotting, with emphasis on pro.per sym-

bols, timing, multiple tarzets and rapid plotting.



3· fighter direction, including principles, history, methods, common practices, status board and vocabulary. Practice is given in interception and dead reckoning.

~1· Surface plotting on DR T's with demon tration and drills. Speed plotting with drafting machines, rapid olutions, and cooperation of operator, plotter and recorder are stressed. .

5· Surface plotting method for casualty drills and for ships without DR '5, including navigational, Halifax, Gladstone, Alwyn plots.

6. Maneuvering board problems of relative movement, COUTse, speed, time and distance, drill in summary plotting and u e of plastic maneu ering boards.

7· arious types of maneuvering board problems on the DRT, with relative movement and short cut speed solutions .

8. eIC Mockup Trainer: Experienced teams which have completed the preliminary plotting are given such exercises as; Radar navigatio shore bombardment, torpedo rLlns, convoy screening, "' coordinated and creeping attacks, sonobuoy exercises, direction of fighter planes and PT boats, im estigation of contacts, and other combined surface and air attacks.

At present, ASW-CIC coordination is achieved by using Cl'C teams to plot SW runs on a DR T connected with an Attack eacher. Communications exist between the DRT room, Sonar and Conn. Ordinary runs and coordinated and creeping attacks are plotted by the Cl.C team and information transmitted to the AS",-\, team operating the attack teacher.

CfC training is to be augmented substantially by new equipment now being installed. Every type of Cl.C problem can then be generated under realistic conditions. Information pertaining to air and surface targets will be supplied from radars operated by the ship's own radar operators, under supervision of instructors. ASW problems will be plotted from reports coming from Sonar regarding ranges and bearing generated by the Attack Teacher and interpreted by the ship's own sonarmen. Close cooperation between eIC and radar . and CIC and ASW 'will be brou ht about in t solution of every type of CIe problem which the 'ship might encounter during operations at sea.

• Casco Bay bears down Orl plotting skill.

Studying relative movement •

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Ship arrIVIng at harle town and outh Bo ton Na -Yard find a we' coordinated and easil utilized refresl er traininz program coaducted s the Naval raining enter. heduling of all refre her classes is made through one agency: Fleet Administrative Offices, NyBos, cheduling Officer.

No cu~ and clri~d curriculum is offered. Every pha e of CIe training is so organized that "It can be presented immediately upon n:.!luest.

Classes meet for two-hour periods, which are scheduled Monday throuzh aturday from 0800 to 1700. Whatever a ship' time in POTt may be and whatever her daiJ chedule, it is easy to arrange for CI training.

Green ere, are given ba ic plotting procedures, and then work problem i?-Air Plotting, Fighter Direction Plotting, Can ersion Plotting, Grid Pia - ting, and Maneu ering. They are taught "rule of thumb" and "shor L1C· pro edures which ha e been proved in actual operations.

Much stress is plac-ed upon Summary Plotting and the wide vari t of usefulness. of the Air Plot. In order co provide each group with .. enlisted men who are capable of solving practical, routine maneuvering board problems, all enlisted men are taught a simplified crc approach to relative movement problems,

Advanced groups and General Quarters team are put through the paces of an a mal type operation, with complete. detailed reprodu tions of the tactical mployment of CIon this type of ship. T pica I operations of this

kind are: ight orpedo Attack, Shore Bombardment employing .1

rids. Creeping track, Fighter Direction, • scort Patrols, Minelaying and 1ine weeping.

In addition to the completely equipped IC', three Conning Stations are equipped for lise by a conning officer. This officer may simulate the

activities or an OOD, a ship's Captain, OT an OTC. Thus instruction )

given in the very important relation between CI officer and command.

The immediate proximity of the rrSch (Electroni ), located n th same deck, makes possible the transmission of radar information from th ir receivers to the RPPI's in the CIG's, and from their op rators to th plotters in CIC.

he LO hool is also next door to and on the same deck as IC

(Boston). his permits a do e tie-in of instruction,

CI • (Boston) is looking ahead to more effective refresher CIe training, for-new radar and plotting equipment are soon to be installed, Since {l<TOS( 21, 1944, 191 ships have received 16,438 man hours of instruction.


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The GIC school at aval Training enter, Navy Yard, ew York, Build- N T C NEW YO R K

599, wa e tablished t make available to aU ships of the USCG and

avy a "refre her tyl e" sh r course during their availabilit in the

New York area.

All scheduling i handled through the Fleet dministrative Office at the j ew York Navy Yard, and two types of COurses are available. The "Primary' , or three-day course is for·hips long away from formal schoolinz or for those never chooled in CI . It onsists of one da in the class, room with lecture and drills in the four types of plo ; namel DR', Relative urface, ir, and Fighter Dire ti n 0 ad Reckoning Plotting. The ne: t tw da are spent in the c mbats making use of the four t pe ol

plots in simulated battle problem. he "Refresher" r one-da cour e i

for ships with recent schooling and !IT es them practice-in oordinated eIC work during simula ed combat problem .


Facilities for training consist of a classroom suitable for lectures and plotting drill two DO ID CIC mockup' with their associated onning rations, and a problem control room for generating problems. AnI'" c1a room, under construction, v ill provide eight ARM DR's for surface plotting drills as well a appr priate air and relati e urface plottiug boards.

The rno kup are fitted" iih the equipment e sential to CIC's proper functioning a found on the late t las e of Destroyers and D strayer Escorts. One of the mock. ups is being enlarged to simulate a CIC with appropriate surface and air search radar indicators and remote PPI units.


Various types f ships have been trained and the school ha the policy of adapting its training to meet each individual hip's needs. orne of tile types trained are P', AK's. APD , D " DO's, L's, and ships even as small as PGM's. In the case oE a ship without a DRT, concentration is placed on the relative surface plot and the team is taught to develop a true plot by mean of dead re koning it own hip. When the team is placed in a combat, It i . iven types of. problems IDa t pertinent to its needs. For instance, in the ca e of AP's and AX' , they are drilled thoroughly in keeping station, and in alculating the best evasive courses and speeds. The school is able to handle any type of team within its physical limitations.



:;'tuering the gates of the S TC Iiami,

Florida, each week are 290 officers to whom, for the most part, the letters CIC mean very little. Of this group, approximately 30 have just returned from combat areas as commanding officers and executive officers of SC's and P 's and these are earmarked for the rigorous six week Advanced course. The balance, comprised of recent graduates of Midshipman schools and Advanced Indoctrination schools, wi th a sprinkling here and there of former Armed Guard officers, are enrolled in the nine week Basic course. 0 the Naval Training Center is assigned the function of training these men for duty afloat as line officers aboard any and all types of combatant and auxiliary vessels.

There has been an ever growing realization at the Naval Training Center of the necessity for at least a fundamental training in the organization and functioning of CIG, and as a consequence ClC now occupies one week of instruction in both the Basic and Advanced courses. Faced .... vith this severe limitation of time the CIC staff realized that it cannot hope to turn out trained CIC officers, and therefore its course of instruction for the Basic groups is. fashioned for the purpose of gi ing sufficient training so tbat its graduate are prepared to stand an efficient CIC watch. ince the graduates of the Advanced group are destined for billets as commanding officers and executive officers of DE's and APD's, and other combatant ships, their course of instruction is primarily aimed at training in the function of an Evaluator.


In the basic course the curriculum consists of lectures all Personnel, Communications (internal

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and ~temal), radar doctrine, DRT plotting, Ait:

Plotting, -Summary Plotting, Gunnery Liai T?rpe~o 'Control, Shore Bombardment, Fighter

irecnon, Radar Theory, Radar Operation, Radar Countermeasures, and IFF. 'l\1ith emphasis on "lear-?-ing by doing," the course is made extremely practical, Of the 40 hours of Ie instruction, 17 ar~ pent by the student officer participating in a drill of one SOrt or another. The highlight of the course i, the 9 hours spent in team drills. In these team drills the group are divided into regular ClC teams, manning the 10 eIC mock ups, which ~ll accommodate 100 student officers at anyone nme,

Each evening until 2100, under the tutelage of an enlisted radarrnan, an average of twenty student officers voluntarily operate air and urface search radars. This program will be expanded in the very near future with the completion of a CIC-Radar demonstration amphitheater,


T~e curriculum for the advanced group is substantially the same as that of the basic, the chief difference being that the lectures are a little more streamlined.

he final week of both the ad anced and ba courses consists of a six-day and three-day cruise respectively aboard a DE. During this crui e the lessons learned on the beach are put to practical application afloat. Nightly, student officers stand CIC watches, where they search, track, and report, informing the bridge and OTC of maneuvers of the other school ships, which are alternately engaged in night screening, horizon sweeps, torpedo attacks, and night illumination. The cruise is ulrninated by a hore bombardment of Woman

Key, in which all the school ships parucipate.

ring these shore bombardments, CI is

manned by student officers who are charged with the re pon ibility of continuously tran mitring the range and bearing of the target to Gun ontro1. During a recent bombardment, conducted by Student officers of an advanced group from a DE GIC, no pot from the place exceeded lilty yards.

Recently added to the school' CIe curriculum has been a course of instruction a PT officers who are in Miami for shakedown. This consists of instruction in the vectoring of P's to torpedo attack position against enemy forces, based upon radar information and the application of lighter direction principles, After a short lecture period

WhQlcsale drill on the D.RT.

and ob ervation of it uccess in the CIC mock ups, the PT officers go afloat and, fol,lo'\>'Jing vectors as received over the B from the can olling DE C C, oon learn to appreciate the practical val ue of CIG.

Frequently, advantage of the school's facilities is taken by commanding officer and executive offi· cers of PD and DE units, who are a embling and gi ing preliminary training to their nucleus crews. The crews receive training in radar maintenance and radar plotting from the enlisted staff of the Enlisted Radar School. fter this preliminary training the m n work with their officers in the CIC mockups, during the few hours the mockups are a ail able.

COTCLant SA.YS: "Any description of the ele training program. under COTCLant is incomplete without some comment on the policy established by GOTCLant in his restricted letter serial 1159 of 13 February. 1945, for vitalising all training programs within COTCLant through the medium of comment and constructive criticisms by both those giving and those receiving training under his command. The keynote in this invitation for such an exchange of ideas is that 'COiCLant consider it imperative to assure that training organizations, training method and pro ednres not be permitted to stagnate. The program must always progress toward betterment of detail and over-all efficiency. The source of information that best engenders such development is comments and constructive criticism by personnel of units receiving the training and by personnel of the respective training acti ities who have an opportunity to observe the quality of training received at some other activity.' "

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Snapper Control for Ni9ht Carrier landin9~

=Erom. Report of USS ENTERPRl E on First Tokio Slrike The use of ASH radar by " napper" control (visual control

officer in air defense forward who controls aircraft from "Prep Charlie" at night to th.e time of landing aboard) has proven extremely helpful in posuloniag planes properly in tile Iandlug circle abeam of the ship and in determining the proper position to start the third tum from the downwind leg to the ship in making an approach for landing aboard. The following account of the installation and use of this gear is submitted for considerauon of similar in tallations in other carrier :

1. oon after a SNA1'P£R con trol 113d been set up on this Ship, it became apparent that to 6x a plane's third tum position on Lhe downwind leg the varlables of wind across the deck and Tange of plane from ship's beam must be known to SNAl'l'ER. "rind over the deck was information readily available, but experience proved tha r it was not practicable to attempt to vlsually determine distance to a pinpOint Of light whic.h is all a 'plane shews at rught on the downwind leg. Therefore an AN/liP -4 fa dar has been installed on the Ship to supply accurate aircraft 'range data for s, AI"l'l'.It. Operations to date have been very suceessful,

s. In locating the radar, as follows, careful consideration was given 10 maximum scan with minimum ea return interference avaiiability of power and communication facilities, and quiet and safelY for operators.

(a) The canner is mounted on Lhe port side. outboard of the splinter shield between the 20 mID. mounts at frame 109\4, It is raised 10' above tbe horizontal [0 clear sea return and is aligned so thar thecenter scribe mark bears 2150 relative. (b) The $cope and ccntrole are located directly inboard in the light locker space just outboard of the air radio shop, which has a power supply as well as repair facilities.

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{ ) A sound power phone circuit has been established between

(.) • N l'I'EIl, radar (tIDled .. tation R") at the ~.


(ll) AT'.PER in Air Defense Forward,

(3) Landing Signal Officer

(4) rc.

(5) V8:F-RDF truck.

3· The first ccnsidcration .for successful operations WM to gel range datil 011 approaching aircraft to SNAf'P£R in time for it to be useful ill determining the point of third turn which is ordinarily about on Ute beam. Assuming- mat aircraft on the downwind leg are proceeding on a reciprocal of ship' heading. the slam range shown by the Tadar when the plane is forward of me beam is converted trigonOmetrically to give a predi Led range on the beam. It has been found that accurate predi tions can be made when aircraft are bearing 3250 relative and [he information then reaches SNAPI'm in good time. sample approach would be handled as follows:

(a) Problem: .Aircraft bearing !I~5 0 relative, radar fall.gc:

(slmll) -.2800· yards.

(b) Solution: Secant !S5G = 1.74; if slant range (hypotenuse) = 2Boo yards, range on me beam (adjacent side) ;_ 1600 yards,

(c) ction: "SNAIi'PER from tauon ASH plane approaching

will be 1600 yards on the beam."

4· The operational radar officers of ) -go have under-

taken the responsibility of manning the SN"APP£n radar during all night landings as an extra duty. Enlisted radar operators are being trained, and it is believed that sufficient doctrine has been established in scope interpretation find in exchange of information with SNAPPER, so that the enlisted operators will soon beable to take over on a permanently assigned. basis.

5- The SNAPF~ radar has the additional advantages of b -

a porential sobstitutefor visual control in conditions of 10, visibility or if aiJ'craft :return (0 the ship without lights. So long as it is executed to pOIt, the entire approach pattern. well beyond the third turn can be observed and controlled from the radar scope. Pilots are briefed on how best to avail lhelllelves of this aid when conditions of vis~bility are limited.

Editor's Note: uss ENTERPRISE operat~tJ. as part of Night Carrier Division during the period covered by this report. 11 CIC officer ums .!!ationed in the {orelop to direct returning aircraft 10 the .!hip and jnto the landing circle b)' "Snapper' control.

This control was found necessary as retarning planes lJ}ere frequently lost inside the screen. Under CIC control the returning planes ar~ brought i" on II vector to base. When thtry reach the screen "Snapper" is notified of bearing of approach and identity. "Snapper" lhen takes over control after picking them 'Up visually and coaches them to base, gilling them the landing course (shiP's heading).

Captain of DD Wears Headphone Durin9 Ni9ht En9agement

-.By Co~'manding OffiCllT, us McGOWAN

During the entry Into [.EYrE CllU' on the night or 19-20 October and dUTing the torpedo attack in the earJy morning hours oE ~5 October, the Captain Wore a regulation, ound po vered telephooebeadsel on the IJW barrle circuit and a telephone Lalker's helmet.

The Yig was uncomfortable but not overburdening, Tt, deadened outside noises such as gunfire. (good), verbal in[ornlatiOIl (bad),

voice circuu transmissions (not bad), normal nois of a Livit}' nd (he bridge (not good); but overtones could be quite distly beard-hardly a single MN transmission was mi ed and none when attention was directed towards iN loudspeaker. The rig with its wire lead is confining: .the Captain had no difficulty in from side to side o.t the bridge as far aft as torpedo directors and Inside to peer into RII; a little rorethoU~ht was necessary in obtaining a long enough lead to reach to either torpedo director and a Jillle presence of mind in piekiog up the lead and helping it along from time to time.

o difficulties were e .. xperieuced .in using peloruses, binoculars, or e en voice tabes. Difficulty was experienced in trying to listen to MN transmissions using the handset. However one can still talk over the handsel and listen over the loud peaker. In spite of all the , ir around 00 deck, not a ingle 50111 was thrown. down or strangled by them; the Captain never even 'rereceived a jerk on his,

During the torpedo action there. were no repeats called for or needed over the. IJ" circuit. At me same time there Were several repeats requested and given ov~r the JA circuit by and to nominally experienced, talkers.

It was a pleasant and reasonably secure feeling when entering U\'IT£ CULF with mines reported in the main channel to hear the Evaluator's own voice telling in his own words and inflections exactly how he knew we were south .of the main channel and just how far. Likewise it was reassuring during the torpedo attack to hear Combat coaching Torpedo Control on to the Ull'gel lind advising.him on his set-up and to hear 6.rsr band the intelligent replies that Torpedo Control gave. It was reassuring to have direct word from Combat on voice transmissIons received and to be able to give OW11 transmissions direct

.;;:.r transmitting when it was higbly impracticable for the Cap~ even to think about transmitting himselE.





{logo 'tIS;, 11.1t11; 10 KN"TS

oj) OUI! 3011.' 'S "II C-Ol>O S-IS

00 nRAw "'It-RAID AIIU:~ c-see s.~"

0.11.. I! .. ro 4&Lf. fOR I! I'I'N. ,.~.s" POINT M, .

-,Tue" PO$lTION 7000 'I'D'" i'· OFf .... U' A"'L'S POQT &OW II Po."T M, O'R~W' 'I'" PA!RJ\l.LE.-L To i1tH& A!ND ~ ":'-I!'It. OIRt,.C'TtON

PGIrd '" I. "" .. r.llt. t'" LIN .. ""T S so " .... T ~9t.t.D ""'CLt.


nu O'f(..m!O'VIO~Il. "15"f~"Ct'l",(,,,,H)ON M,M,-TOTAI. TIl'll." n ""N.

. To um up, Lhe captain has tried out and heartily approves and recommends to other Commanding Officer of destroyers the f ersonal lise during nighlsu1;face aonons of a complete telephone headset on the 1]\ or J circuic (3 pel' personal preference and ship's banle organitalion) in direct communication. with the Evaluator, the Gon Control Officer, and the Torpedo Control ,Officer, He does not recommend it fOT use at every General Ql1arLers bur does recommend LI.S stowage wlthin easy reach at aU times.

,~rearillg phone will be hardest of all just before the.y are put on and until they are. given an honest trial. Right now, the Captain oE M OWAN is thoroughly sold on them for night surface actions.

\1 C. I. c." Correspondent

COI11»umder 11.. F. Flemillg. USN, Commanding Of!iCIlT, i RT , St. Simo1ls, has designated II member of his staff with collateral duty as correspondent: for "G.I.C" and suggest.\· th!,s would be desirable tor all major cOrlti"ental CI G cnd Figll/er Direction actioities .

Editor's Note: Needless to .sa.)'. ··C.!.C." Ileal'liIy e/ldorse~ this suggestion and hopes the lead will be [allowed,

Maneuuerin9 Board Solutions

By Lt. W. P. Kinne, U NR,

CIC Team Training Center, Boston, J\f1lS5Qchu.setLs

A sample night torpedo problem is presented below Oe.ft) with the various steps necess:ny to a corrccr solution:

In tile event of casualt¥ to the DRT, it may be necessary to solve the egm triangle on the air plot. Here is how it ma.y be done (below right):

-ORAW -8 -C-045 S"5

~R:;' ,~:A~:;;~;,~: .... M,

() ....... ul!. , .. 1 .... 0 .. I!tl. .. IlIST. (M,M.I ON grn LINt. TO f'IND POI~ m ():~Q.AU) A&L~ 15 ON c.·~.sO oS-.S

([)- St\OW PO,"'TIOH OJ. GUIDE. etf-On "'ANWVt.It (".1 AND ",FlU '''.1 .

lOllA'" 11,>\ LI,.t. l'U.'OtS ttl. HOlI.1Il DRAW e:a- t;.U'Dt.$ C."045 & .. 15' oct"w Q:1n TO "'1"'1. .""0

• ,. SAI""\It DlIlt.C.TIQN •

(lrPOIHT .." 15 ""fl.!'.£' &.If'll!;, Qb\ C;\JiT~ 1.0 KNOT SPU.D C IIlCLt.

Ii"- OIIR C,"" U~ TO rut ~TATID" • 3U'

Editors Note: This is standard plouing procedure: but is pr~emeO .here as a refre bel'.

CD KtU' O ..... N StllP AT C.~NTE.R
TO 6fT THt Ul1t 9PI SCOPf P!CTURf.
® qm IS 'MA.NtUVU!lNG MlI~ Y!.C1011
I~ OPPOsITf 100 1I.r..L. DIST. IS SAMe
511 IP5- U5t OUIZ Rt.L_ MOTION
AND VIC~ VI:.RS ....
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(!)TIMt. fOlll1AHlUVfR :~x'3
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10 KN ors ~o9l1 , . •
300GI.5 - .. CONFID!:NTIAL



uss fi.UNILA BAY (CVE) (Ll!')'te):

"The tasks of a GIC on a Elagahip are complex and varied, so much 50 as often to be too much for the limited personnel and facilities to accomplish with complete efficiency. To partially alleviate this situation it is suggested that responsibility for intercepting bogies be more freely delegated to other ships. This responsibility was almost never delegated in Ttl 77.4.2 duri:Qg these operations and at. no time was MANILA .BAY assigned an intercept. Once the decision is made 10 intercept a bogey, (he actual intercept procedure can probably be carried out more effectively by a separate ClC organization not at the same time burdened with the multitudinous responsibilities o( a Elagship. further advantage would result if control could be given to the parent carrier of the CAP, thereby obtaining the maximum value of previous teamwork training. It would st-em advisable to assign a dailyfigble.r director duty to one or two carriers (or destroyers), the ships with such duty to be prepared 10 conduct intercepts when directed to do so by the controlling fighter director. Tbe flagship would of course remain in overall fighter direction control."

CO['rfD{,:SRON (Ormoe Bay, LeYIC):

"Both the SC and fire control radars lvere seriOusly handicapped by thesurrounding land, preventing early warning of approaching enemy planes, with consequent insufficiency of time to get th e fire con 0'01 radars on the target.

evertheless due to the ability of all destroyers to plek up targets visually and then train on quickly with directors, few if any targets Were unfired 00. In many cases, particularly in the 2200 tanners, air targets were picked op by



fire control .adaIS. Success was due primarily to alert lookouts, and "in an area which is landlocked, or partially landlocked, the primary means o.f dete,ctingenerny planes is still the visual lockouts and, gun crews. This should be thoroughly impressed on all hands."


"Enfoute to the objective Visual Fighter Direction exercises were conducted with very little success. During the two days in the Mindanao sea it was expected that visual direction would 'come into irs own: but, eorurerily, il proved mest disappoint. ing. Although in the Mindanao Sea. most of the information on bogies was visual, it came from the bridges and lookouts of various ships, mostly from screening DD's, and was acted upon to best advantage by the controlling FDO's in ClC."

USS WAllER (DD) (Ley1e):

"The need Eor an additional surface search radar especially in division and squadron nagliltips was keenly felt. Our SG was assigned the following missions: (I) navigation for the division, (=) designation and tracking of surface targets (of which six appeared), (3) designation and tracking ot low !lying bogies (two appeared), (4) setting up computer for shore bombardment' (four set ups), (5) in addition

_ the two RPI's were constan tly in useOlC's with summary plot information =Conn's with piloting in confined waters and designation of targets to the unengaged 40 mID. battery, It' obvious that tile load on the SG a Combat's tracking parties was tremendous. Tbe tnterrupucns caused by vitally needed navigational fixes taxed all facilities to the limit. It is most strongly recommended that an SF or similar type radar be installed in this type vessel:'

raids. Man targets were tracked successfully through che land massesparticularly Jap strikes OIl Panaon, originating to the west, closing to Panaon, then openlng again. Also raids

, m southern Luzon were tracked dilly over Samar to !be objective area. he arne exceptional ranges and

were made of aircraft apparerul gaining alumdes over their northern egros base and _proceeding on a southeasterl. cour e to the east coast of findinao. These pickups were made at 1LO [0 120 miles and tracked aut to 140 miles, never closing within 70 miles of the WA ATCH:'

n the evening o[ 3 December 1944 was especially good.

"The communication setup on the previous opera tion was faulty in that the 011 tlets of the various circuits "were not eentrnlizcd. Preceding uhi operarion changes were made to correct this. The kir Operation circuit was also installed in Air Plot. decided improvement in CIC operations was noticeable. Little confusion was evident even when under attack. The ClC had the appea.rance of "it forest o~ wire but they turned the trick. It i evident, though, that communication faeil ities ace not Hexible enough [0 change circuits without 11 10L of haphazard arrangements:'

tacks Irom the bridge. here are man advantages in the ttack Group orumander being in Cl. He can obtain 11 more complete picture in

ornbat and would be in 11 position to quickly check LI,e Evaluator's plot and recommended. course changes, In g~. cml il is believed thai 11 nothing 'unusual or unexpected' happens the atu1d: can best be conducted from Combat, lJlll should the attacking .group be taken nuder heavy fire, a melee de-

clop or an)' other 'unexpected' development lake place, the ttack Group Commander can better grasp the situation jf on the bridge. It is therefore considered that me unit commander should be on tile bridge during LIle attack and CIC must keep him consiandy informed, recommend to him the courses to be steered. evaluadoa of targets, when within effective range, and furnish all other data required. b ClC handbook to ship and torpedo control:'

tiss NATOM.A BAY (CVE) (MilldoTO):

"Three times single enemy planes approached the formaticn at sea-level. undetected by radar. These planes were sighted visually by lookouts .in the destroyer screen and the information was passed to the Eighter Director over IFD radio net. The CAP stationed over the base at 5,000 feet was then directed by clock-cede> frorn the fleet center and Instructed to dive at the spot reported by [he destroyer lookouts. All three enemy planes were shot down, indicating tile value of this method over the Visual Figh[er Direc· tion method W111ch had been previouSly used without success."

'1 There is another report opposing use of the clock-code due [0 unreported changes of course.


"During the period in which the ,.vASATCH was situated in the Northem Transport area, the SK-2 PPI scope was completely blocked to approximately 80 miles in all directions and to lI5 miles in a southerly and northeasterly direction by Leyte, amar, Dinagat and other adjacent land masses. BUl again due to Japanese tacdcs it was possible to get an initial contact from 105 to 40 miles from the WASATCH. By far [he majority of contacts were made in a. westerly (Ii. rection at 11 distance of between 80 and 90 miles. It was then possible [0 track the target up until the liIDe it entered the land masses. If COL\~tions were such that time could be devoted to tracking through the land .m

it was done. However, in every case was possible to give an ETA of the

U KADA. ElAN BAY (eVE) (Mindoro):

"Thi operation showed [be necessit}' of wide awake lookouts and pilots when working in a land-locked area. 1 n several instances 3. much as inIormation was received concerning bogies Irorn them as from the radar, It was brought vividly LO our auenI ion lh it tin form adon from a II sources m ust he used for LI1e defense against encmv planes. 0 ne case in particular is recalled when ONl:1l>lANEY BAY'S lookouts reponed bogies overhead. 0 radar. in the task unit had this bogey on its screen. I _ T 1\1A BY's Inlrn:cpt Ollicer did a plendid job using

infonnatioll in the various mterceplions. His handling of the combar air patrol In defending the Eonn.Hion

COflWESRO (1ITigno);

"The p Iormance of ClC's of hips of DesRon 54 1\'.15 ver goo to excellent. The need for more training in low visibilit), torpedo attacks with high relative speeds is indicated.

IC learns should be trained under more reallsnc conditions than those sim II la ted in the present standard torpedo train ing practices. It is recoinmended that an advanced practice be held u ing target speeds of about lIO knots and attack speeds oE 25 to 30 knots. The target should consist of LWo or more vessels, preferahl of difIerent t pes and the attacking groups hould be three destroyers,

"TIIC:: Squadron Commander and CornDesDi 108 conducted their at-

S AM 6L B. ROBERT (DE) (. (1)11111'):

.• IC was superb. Combat kept a constant flow of clear, concise .. correct, and vital information to Conn. The value of Ie in battle cannot be too highly emphasized. ost, by far, of the credi t for a successful torpedo attack goes to I, and it" is fell that Lhe installation E a very efficient DC setup. plus the interest hewn in it by the ComDesPac representative, and the excellent organization and, drilling ol. personnel accomplished by the Chief Evaluator. and Assistant Evaluator were of inestimable value."


"Radar navigation -was uccessful in taking the formation through anagao

hannel without t-rouble. 'Three shoal buo s, two to port and one 10 starboard, were picked up by G radar at about, 3500 y.anls. This vessel navigales in such -restricted waters by taking G ranges only to points prom:l.nenron the PPI and crossing the resultant area. It is believed that the overlay method i not necessary and Is too cumbersome In this terrain where goo I sized hills come down abruptly lO the sea and , here fa vora ble angles for crossing arc are almost always a rulable.

"CIC located fishiJl!{ craft with which the area abounds, and had



litlle difficult in picking up enelUY barge traffic. One disadvantage, :11 least in this type or CI , is lack of room to navigate and yet do effecti e surface plotting. The chan was mounted on the DRT which was setto scale. hut i l is quite o.fien a scale almost useless for good surface tracking. More operational charts on a

calc of 1000 yards per inch are recommended."

U HUTCHl S (DD) (Leyte):

"Raid warning and fighter direction was centralized in an AGC. Other command ships in the Gulf furnished radar information, supplemented occasionally by .repcrts from smaller ships. HUTCHlNS was able to 'beat' the net with reports only five Limes in three day _ The ship's SC-l! with smal] antenna was obviously very inferior to the large antenna, installations. All contact were reponed in reference to 'Point Molly,' a mountain peak on Leyte Island.

"The efficiency o· bogey reporting and fighter direction by the OlC of the WASATCH was nothing short of marvelous. In three days only one sneak raid got through without the ships being warned. It was nece sary for thi ship to sound the General Quarters alarm only three time, a " ASAT H gave sufficient warning to get me crew to stations for raids by normal 'drill signal: Conversion (to Point Molly) reports were so fa t and accurate that frequently the SC radar was coached accurately onto a target by these reports alone. From the sketch it will be seen til at the radar

hips were in a very poor situation in regard to land echoes. Tile C.O. was non-plu ed to learn that the 'wonder' radar of the command ship was only an C-3 employing a very large dish-

haped antenna. It is understood that tbe lap somewhat assisted in overcoming our serious radar position by Flying across the sea approaches to Leyte at a high altitude."

>< 2.


U TWIGG (DD) (Lingllyel1):

"It i fell by the Commanding Offi· cer that the CIC bas turned in an outstanding job in each of the operations in which this vessel has taken part. 'With a minimum number of telephone transmissions and a minimum of con-



fusion the bridge, all gun control, and all lookout tauous exchange information with me result that all stations have the visual condition as well as the radar situation not only in the ship bu t ill th e -dispos i lion as a whole."

U S ssou T McKINLEY (AGO) (Lillgayen):

"The Cl team has turned in an excellent performance in three assault areas-Palau, Leyte, and Lingayen GuU_ In the land-locked an Pedro Bay in upper Leyte Gulf this team frequently. tracked eneDlY planes from 80 miles over land and vectored friencUy planes out 30 miles to suecessful interceptions, The fade-charts developed from frequent calibrations have proved to be dependable.

"Prior to me Luzon operation the CIC team had practically no oppor· tunity to do actual Fighter Direction. On the way to and at Lingayen Gulf, Visual Fighter Dire tion proved its value.

"At 17261 8 lanl;lRl'Y the SK2 picked up g graups of bogies at 45 miles ranging in bearing from 1700T to HoOT. The groups appeared to rendezvous dosed LO 30 miles then disappeared from the screen. At 15 miles the 3 groups reappeared> 2 on the port quarter of the Iormation, one on the starboard quarter. The starboard group of 2 planes clo ed to 10 miles and then turned away. Just before this group turned the 2 groups of 4 planes each on the port quarterstarled to dive toward the formation. Our Vijlual Fighter Director had placed his 2 fighters at angles 1.5, 5 miles broad on the port quarter. Our fighterij shot down 11 Japs seven miles from the formation, another was shot down by AA. and crashed near our formation, an ther made an auack, and the other g turned away.

"These same enemy approach tactics were observed 4 times in two days. In land-locked areas such as Llngayen Gulf, Luzon, and San Pedro Bay, Leyte, where radar information is poor the need for trained Visual Fighter Direction perscnnel was clearly demonstrated."

U "'lAlLA BAY (eVE) (Lingayen):

"I is believed that the handling of fighwr direction by CTU 77+2 during this operation, both as regards the

broad policy of delegating intercepts La other carriers and as regards ; actual details of intercepts. was wo

of 11igb praise. Two comments may be offered. First, there still seems (0 be a tendency on the pan of ille intercept officer to ignore the nCCC5Si I.)' of lowering the CAP's altitude when a bogey j picked up ~5-ao miles away and i obviously low. AltiLUd advantage is essential; but nor so essential a the tallyho i£5clf, and 6000 feel is

till too high LO - spot a low'H <ing plane. econdly, it may not be out f place to recall one of the basic principles of fighter direcrionr Let no attack come in unopposed. In the late afternoon attacks of ;; January there was understandably a considerable amount of confusion and communication, difficulty. However, so Iar as MA ILA BAY could observe, the planes which attacked this and other hip were not oppo ed by an friendly

fighters although it seemed that ime and availability of Al' would have permitted an attempted Inreroepuen.

"For a ship whose radars have been destroyed but which oontinues to operate in a combat area, perhaps the most Importnnt single radio circuit is the 1FD net, over wnicb reports of bogi and the progress of intercepts is I ce.ived. here ill no lack of appreciauoe [or the dear, ample reports which were received over this circuit during the recent operauon. It may be mentioned, however, that the divergcnce in bearing and range reported for a single bogey at, the same Lime by two or more ships is almost invariably much greater than the distance between the ships, and that when a number of ships are reporting the same bogey it i extremely difficult for another ship without radar to plot an accurate track, One Ship should. 'hold' tile bogey altd the others Tefrairl from TepoTtil~g unless they haue something definitely helPful to add. It might also be remarked, aom the standpoint of a ship whlch i deprived of its K radar, that there is no positive follow· up on man)' bogeys reported over the net. This sort of 'unfinished business' produces a very uncornmrtable shuanon in the dependent ship."


"There is considerable doubt as the ability of tile K and C raddetect planes above 25.000 (eet

rude, It i recommended that lest be

made to del zrruine the effecLi vends oE e radars to detect planes at high titudes.


"In the interest of increasing the effe riveness of om hat Air Patrols in the future the Iollowing- is recommended:

(a) \> hen practicable establish ap· proa h routes that pass ["lOL closer than 40 miles from land rna es,

(b) '''''hen two dispo Iuons are in dose proximity designate one force fig.hter director with the responsibility for allccatlng incoming l'aids to bases controlling the Combat Air Patrol. Also assign separate VHF channels for control of the Combat Air Patrols assigned the U 0 groups.

(c) Limit control of tile Combat Air Pall"ol di ision vectored against au:y sing1e raid lO one base thus elhninating the confusion to me fighter director occasioned by not knowing which group of friendly fighters, indicated on therndar screen, is his:

(d) Use low altitude ('sl\apper') pa-

.• 0).'; only when necessitated by the reducnoa ill radar visibility C3USOO by adjacent land masses thereby keeping radar screens as clear as possl ble.

(e) Provide at lea r on 11'£ or SF

radar in each Ta k Unit for determining altirude of incoming raids.

([) impUfy and reduce the number of terms at present in Use for lighLer direction. Fighter direction code is becoming increasingly more complicated. and less universal, due to Introduction of additional terms with obscure meaning by various task groups and units.

(g) Repeatedly Impre s upon fighter pilots the importan e of tallyho and. amptifying reports. Particularly where altitude of small raids is unknown these reports become immeasurably Important, and where the size 0.£ the bogey is unknown uch reports can .increase til e effec ti veness 0 f rll e II va Bab le Combat Air Patrol by determining rhe number of divisions to be vectored on a specific intercept,"

U MeGO W 11J (DD) (Leyte):

• 'I should like to. comment, in ad~Li. non, on the splashlug oE two bandits by the AP by m-rans of visual fighter

direcuon which, I belleve, ' as due lO rapid communication and excellent coordination primarily between ere and

ontrol, At different times two enemy planes were sigh ted isu ally, control immediately trained on the planes and phoned rapid ranges and bearings to CIC which were put on -the air plot. Thus, courses and speeds of the enemy planes were ~uickly determined, altitude estimates were passed to Combat by phone from Control and the omputer. The .inforrnatlon thus quickly obtained enabled the FIDO LO vector the AP to intercept before me bogies were able to retire at low altitude through the hills on Leyte as they were accustomed to do in. order to escape destruction. In the only two cases of such visual sighring, the bogies were splashed by theCA1' within several minutes after first being Sighted. 1 believe that this method of visual fighter direction affords great future promise when proper coordination.

peed, and mutual understanding e. - isr between the "fIDO, I, ntrol, k Lookouts, and-Plot."


USS ALC]'O E (AKA) (Liflgllycn):

"With one exception the voice radio circuits available to this ship were usually so jammed with our own traffic that it wa almost impossible to transmil a message and receive an answer

within a reasonabl time. The reason for Uris was because there wa no one station contl"olling the circuit, R consequence everyone tried LO transmit at once and no one had much success, On the few occasions when someone of the 11ighercommand did take charge conditions II!. once became immeasurably better. It is believed that every voice circuit hould be scrictly controlled in the interests of better communication .

"Another faulL noted which always seems to be pre eut was the rransrnission at LOO greal a peed of long messages "'hidl had LO be written down, This resulted in countless requests for repetition which further slowed up traffic. Long messages of this kind should be transmitted slow enough so they can be properly recorded the first time,"

GOMD)?SRO {Ormoc Boy, Leyte}:

"The General Air Warning fr quency was nOL used during the operation although ships were required to listen an it. Thc IFD frequen produced all the information on bogies required by GIC to maintain raid plots. UnlesS' pertinent inform a tion is passed on General Air Warning in the future .it is suggested iliac ships with limited radio facilities be required to listen to the IFD circuit instead of the General Air Warning circuit.

"Frequently Executive Method ruessages were received on two circuits, 13 and }'fA. • and the same ships


required to acknowledge on both Irequenci . This produced some con£LIS ion and placed an unnecessary load on the circuits. 'Vhen two frequencies have to be used due to equipment limi La tio I1S on certain ships in Lh e convo):, which was the case, the same units should nOl be asked [0 acknowledge on both channels.

"Some stadons experienced trouble on the HF Fleet common, due to improper tuning: of receivers and use of lOO much power on the TBL and Irnilar transmitters. Operators and technicians still do not understand that with powerful voice transmitters, such as the TBL, more reliable communications result when the lowest possible power is used and the vanrenna decoupled from the final amplifier so that output is about 40% of normal. This also tends ~o reduce feedback. Frequently receivers were set on the frequency, the gain controls et, and no further tuning adjustments made. This resulted in stations three miles apart being unable to hear each. other either because of blocking or because one was slightly off frequency. Such circuits ahculd be continually monitored by .3 radioman who knows how to 1.1.!Ie the tuning controls provided."

USS MANILA. BI1Y (eVE) (Leyte):

IC which is not occupied in directing the CAP or performing flag duties is fundamentally a c0re-mur:ica. tions and evaluation center. With respect to oommuaicadoes the chief problem is how to effe.ctively monitor, with the limited personnel available, [he necessary radio circuits (three VHF channels including the radar infotmation circuit, llle TBS, and the local IFD circuit, not to mention the HF LAW and A P circuit, the B'F IFD circuit, the ICSA circuit, etc). In the case of the high frequency circuits. monitoring by trained enlisted personnel is probably adequate. But to attain any degree of efficiency in CIC operation, it would seem necessary for officers to monitor most of the VHF radios, including the RIO, !FO, CAP, ASP channels. It is suggested that during the time that the ship is occupied in active suppon and combat operations, officers from Communications and Other departments might be assigned 'communication' watches in erc in the same way that they are assigned watches ill the coding room. For this purpose ))0 extensive (raining would

>-c 2:




be required. A general familiarity wirh the shuation ufficieru to allow the officer to recognize m sages of interest to our own ship would be adequate. In this wa a 'selective' log could be maintained, which is rarely possible or advisable in the case of monitoring by enlisted personnel. It is recommended in any event that during periods ot combat opera lions when many radio circuits mUSL be manned a communication officer be tatioued in CIC to coordinate ihe handling of communications. (This SUbject is fur· ther discussed from the Communication Department's point oE view in Section C following.)

"During the occupation of Leyte, P.L, IS Escort Carriers operated almost always within VHF range of each other, Use of V9F was to be expected for communications other than interfighter director and ship-plane communications in order to maintain 1,'adio silence on long range medium and high frequencies.

"The use of H:F circuits continued, however, after the necessity for radio silence had ceased. This was due to the foUowing advantages:

(a) Speed with which messages can be delivered over voice cireuits.

(b) Additional VHF transmitting and receiving units in the allowance of CV"s.

"All VHF equipment on board this ship is now controlled in the Combat Information Center. over which the Communication Department has no control. This was originally the logical location of such equipment Inasmuch as its primary use was for aircraft-Ship communication. However, the increasing use of these circuits for administrative and operational traffic has resulted in ClC becoming a communication center to a certain extent and messages of permanent or semipermanent value are not properly serviced. A great many outgoing messages are delivered to GIC'directly for transmission and most of these are transmitred witbout D/ references. This makes diflic·ulc any reference to these messages in s u bseq u en t tralli c and in. creases we problems of filing, Tbis situation can be improved by requiring that outgoing messages be handled by the Communlcadon Office in the same manner as visual messages. his of COUl'Se is oqly half of [he problem since the ship control only out-going traffic. Due perhaps to the face that extensive ulrilizancn of VHF circuits for voice dispatch traffic is still new, fel"

, '

commands have as yet started to use proper communication procedure (Dfi: group, info and action addees etc.). It is believed that improvement in this direction is necessary.

"On II c Kaiser Class carrier the physical S~LUp further complicates the problem. Two alternative solutions are suggested:

(a) Install a VHF transceiver in Radio Central to be used solely lor inter-hip administrative and operational traffic. This would relieve the present burden on VHF circuits used by GIC for aircraft control and which are already overcrowded.

(b) Modify the Air Plot spaces to provide an enclosed space at the outboard bulkhead where VJi.f' circuits could be monitored by communicatfon personnel. This has the advantage of close proximity [0 the bulk of VHF equipment and the personnel using it. If this were done messages would be automaucally serviced in the same manner as those received in Radio Central. eliminating the hit Qr miss method by which they are often handled now.

"Whatever solution is fOund, it is apparent lilat increases of personnel complement for communication dur has net kept pace with the demand placed upon the communication departments of carriers actively supporting amphibious operations. lt is recommended that communication personnel be increased for these purposes."

USS PARGO (SS) (South China Sea Pa tro I):

Recepuon was unusually good except lbat at limes the signals from VIXO were choppy. All transmissions. were of seven minutes or' less duration from initial call-up to final authentication of the receipt. pon one transmissron

I'M was the first [0 answer the callup; the message was given to NPM for transmission to VlXO. Exactly fourteen minutes after tbe initial callup. VI, 0 put the message out on schedule. S u ch elIi ciem 11 an dling oE communlcations by the shore stations is highly satisfying to a vessel on war patrol close to enemy stations."

COMDESRO 5I (Mindoro):

"Voi e Radio Circuit discipline IV good. Voice transmissions were kept to a minimum consistent with the

tical suuarion. Tile ligluer direc-

-. ships kept the forrnation well ap·

'Pl'ised of the existing siruarion, both as to frien(lly and enemy aircraft. TBS discipline was the best that has yeL been observed OIl a lal'ge scale operation, due to strict contro'l by the OTC and assignment of special frequencies to individual group [or iacucal and administrative traffic,"


"Continued II e or the same voice calls for Ships. over long periods, appears q uestlonable practice. Jt is also considered doubtful procedure to continuol.lsly use the voice terms 'Chll,Tlie: 'Prep Charlie; and 'Orbit Base Angles' etc, 10 operations such as this one, with the enemy conrinuously in contact, such terms provide him with val-


uable information upon which to time his attacks. To tell the enemy that you are preparing lO land aircraft is inViting arrack at a most vulnerable moment."


.. Among breaches noted on voice circuits, particularly Tn • were: unnecessary repetition of call-up when stations were obviously in good communication; ineffective repetition in the apparent hope rhat the other station might hear when the stations were obviously not in communication with eacb.other: use of plain language numerals wben shackle code should obviously have been used; use of actual ships' names in transmission: compromise ofshaGkle code and radio call by repeating the code or call Immediately after its plain language meaning. Officers rather than

diomen seemed to be the offenders OD breaches of security."

AL T LAKE ctrr (CA) (Truo [ima Bo mbl1rdT1l(:l1 r):

"TB communicarion was up to the usual dependable standard of excellence. No [rouble was experienced, Several rrausmissious had to be repeated, and inquiries had to be made as La wberher or not [his ship or that ship received the last transmission because 0 fail ure of addr ees to comply with paragraph 6441 of Com' munications Instructions. This paragraph dearly requires that addressees answer up in alphabetical sequence,"

uss LANGLEY (CTIL) (Leytc):

"Because of the importance of YE homing and the neceSSity wat all pilots in the task group have tfie same sector letters as the rransmiuing car-

riel'. it is suggested that tbe flag ship send a reminder the night before a change in sector letters is to lake place."

ass ENTERPRISE (Crr) (Formosa Strike):

"VHF discipline is not being maintained by all Air Groups. A senior officer with all necessary authority should be delegated to monitor tbe VHF circuits."


"It is most apparent that many transmissions are spur of the moment thoughts broadcasr withom any real necessity. Repetitious transmissions Iil1 the air for minutes on end to ensure that all hands 'get the word: If alert communication watches are being maintained pel·tinenr information can be obtained without four or five reo

lavs, Observation nf surrounding units will give a quick check on the receipt or tactical orders. As we proceed deeper and deeper into terrirory which the enemy bas held Ior long pertods of Lime it becomes a necessity to cut down on all forms of radio transmls. slons, The shackle code of a low grade security at best is continually compremised I y unthinking and appar-ently impromptu messages."

COMAJ.RPA. C (Various trikes):

"Too few cbannels are available [0 handle all aircraft transmissions. 'Lack of radio discipline' is a result rather than tile cause of the treuble. Each TG should have a VH'F channel for strikes and one for Fighter Direction, The strike channel should not be used

for Ineer-saip communications 01' FDO operations when strikes are in the air. The ship's strike frequency operator should be an officer qualified to make operational decisions,"


"It is fell that the keying of the secondary Tn circuit is a valuable addition as a means of clearing administrative traffic; be primary TBS functioned in a dependable manner; however. excessive and unnecessary tra ns missions con rlnu e to appear 0 n lhis eire u i e, It is s ugge.stcd tha t a systenlatized voice l?rocedu:re be pre· scribed for lise during fueling. thereby eliminating a greater part of the otherwise continual conversation during fueling operations,

"Considerable difficulty was eaeeuntered in obtaining snfflcieur number of crystals peculiar to the task grou p to equip all planes. lnce there Is a


strong posslbilir thaL carriers 'Will be shifted from one task group to another on short notice, it i recommended that each carrier maintain an adequa e stock including spares 01' crystals for all frequencies a Igned to various task groups. urplus stoekscould be turned over to the Task Group Commander to be maintained in a pool.

"It is believed that when Task Groups maintain approximate station and are within the lirnitsof Inter Y.D. communication equipment, the Task Force Jighter director should coordinate and assign all raid designations. With due regard to the number of Task Groups operating in force, attendant overloading of present communication channels, and communication difficulties due to equipment range limitation, the Force fighl~' director can at best only attempt ooordination of proper inlormation the Task Groups. These considerauons presently preclude close control of each TG's fighters by the force .FDO. That control should remain firmly in the hands of the Group FDO to achieve 'close eflicieut control of catil Task Group's air defense,

"Channel 'Charley' was definitely overcrowded. Its tactical uses included the following: trike frequency for all Task Groups, life-guard circuit, ASP circuit, VI{F circuit for earch plane comrn un lea tlons , and intermittent use for Inter FDO circuit plus common Task Group channel 'Dog' except as a nighL lighter circuit, and Channel 'Baker: was reserved for an secondary CAP frequency. It is strong· Iy Tccomm.ended that consideration be given towards lessening this burden on Chaunel 'Charley: Two other circuits are available and should be put to use during strike days."

>-< :z


TASK FORCE THIRTY EIGHT P01NT 0 E (Munila Harbor); "The usc of medium frequencies as upplemcntary channels in fighter direction and warning has gready increased the speed and accuracy of raid Information. The use of these circuua is recognized as doing away with radio security over an extremely large radius. When they are used, MAN as task group circuit (each task group on a different frequency) can. be used as a warning and fire control information net with good r'e ults, An exercise of 1l1istype lias been held in this task group."





"The addition of medium frequency circuits as inter group warning nets has been a cause [or eonfu ion. It should undoubtedly be a function of the task group fighter director to put out warnings to all ships and other task groups as LO approach and direction of raids, as well as what measures be is taking to deal wirh them, However, putting the Information out on lOUT different circuits bas resulted in misleading reports about the same boge. Ith the exception of the intra group fighter director channel the lime lag on these various circuits almost docs away with their value, 31 though it is believed 35 an Inter task group fighter director and warning circuit one such channel is necessary. This one channel should be controlled if possible from the IC in which the task group lighter director is located,"

U McGOWA (DD 678) (Mindoro):

RT procedure was fair [0 poor.

Sample type of fighter n t talk that caused confusion-UHey Bill, this is Joe, 1 think I see a bogey at 9 o'clock. let's go look at It." In eases like crus I the fighter director had no idea who Joe was, where the bogey was in relation to the formation nor was jle Informed of a departure ~om his original vector. Thjs meant breaking into the crowded fighter net and asking about the bogey, the division that saw it, the new heading and the new angels. It is believed that this was one of the main reasons wby interceptions were missed, as topside officetS Could see ~oth bogey and friendlies and reported that the friendlies in many cases did not take the vectors or angels as ordered. AI! far as patrolling was concerned. all planes followed Instructions. These criticisms do not apply to all P-3'f! divisions. Lt, may be that the newer P-S8 outfits have nOL been acquainted with the problems and method used by Navy Fighter: Directors."

U TERLET (S8 392);

"The liIegllarding itself was a pleasure because of the instant and efficient communlcatlcns using VHF; 110t only with OUI lighter cover bill with strike leaders and incidental cruiser search planes. At first communications were hampered by a lack of: knowledge Of air "slang" 0\' code words. The first

pilot r cue. however, SOOn corrected this. As soon as LL (jg) DANA£r ' BlLO I had put on dry clothes an bad some ~ffec, be volunteered to guard the VHF on the bridge. He translated the circuit language and in addi don knew practically all of the air group calls so that we were able to utilize retnrning groups to searCh for reported rafts along their return route. Incidental cruiser scours also cooperated with great willingness.

.. A working knowledge of the slang used in air operations is considered very u dill. A short glossary may be found in tbe ·'C.l.C:' (Combat Information Center) issue of 25 October 1944. hould the voice call of various air groups be made available thls would also be of great help."


USS CABOT (8VL) (Okinawa lima and olhM' strikes):

"The well planned airborne attack mentioned wa of particular interest as it showed to some extent the enemy's knowlOOge ot the capabilities D£ our radars. During the morning

29 October our task group was oper atlng 60 eo 75 miles north of Catanduanes Island launching strikes and sweeps against Manila and adjacent areas. We had been well snooped and ~t was likely the enemy was aware of our presence in that area. About IllS a bogey was picked up eros ing to the sou th at 110 miles. Five minutes later another bogey was picked up at 60 miles, closing, directly Erom the south, Interception was started and two HANCOCK. . splashed one Val and two Zekes at 30 miles. Shortly aEter this it was noted that the first bogey had closed to 60 miles and now 'lip' peared to be 10 to 15 planes. IntercepLion was made, again by HANCOCK VF, but a few' broke through and made a lively time of it. The large raid was at high altitude. estimated angles "18-20. The smull group. which was obviously bait to draw OUI" fighters off. was estimated angels 6·8. The most interesting fact about the entire raid was the track of the large group which followed exactly che peninsula formed by the eastern tip of LuZOn and Catanduanes Island. 'ither they expeered me land LO interfere with ou radars or their navigation was

good enough to allow them to come by a more direct route, Later develop .

meets make it appear that it: was the former.

"At 1550 01 the saroe day, a small bogey was picked up dosing from the south at 78 miles. peed was calculated at 100 knots, sa it was taken for granted the bogey was in a Steep climb. One Zeke and one Val were tallyhoed at 40 miles angels 18. Shortly thereafter, at 1627", another bogey

oup was picked up at 80 miles folving the same land rOUte employed

the morning raid. This group also slowed to under 100 knots when it had closed. to 60 miles. .By best: estimate the group had started their climb as soon as they crossed me coast line of Catanduanes Island. :By the time they bad closed to 50 miles their altitude was about angels 16-18 and they continued Climbing on a closing course until tallyhoed at 40 miles. The first estimate on siz'c of this group Was 4 to 5 planes. bUL the closer !.hey came the bigger it looked and a mal estimate of 10 to 15 planes was made shortly before they were intercepted.

"Born the morning and afternoon raids had tried to defend themselves by .Bying over land and both had sent in a piece of bait to drat off our lighters. The fu"St attack tried sending the bait in low and the raid high, the second tried sending both in on a climb. The land was neither dose enough not high enough LO hide the mid from our radars so this part o.f their effort was wasted, The altitude might, have fooled us but didn't. The real error that was made, 'however, was in supplying the hair on the same

.ring as the body of the raid and (. placing our fighters in perfect position to intercept."



"As to the anacss themselves and ClC's Iunctlon in helping to repel them. the antiaircraft battery was divided to give greaulr coverage and to permit the effeCtive use of the 6" battery against aircraft, The 5" mounts were on the fO'r\\la:rd AA director with the AA Liaison fficer in ClC coaching the director on the target. The 6" turrets and 40 MM were on the after AA director with the Main Battery Liaison Offill:er in CIC ooaching the direc or on the target. The Mark 37 director wtrh Mark 4- radars' consistenLly reported 'on target' al ranges between 50,000 and 70,000 yards when coached. on with this setup. This sys· Lem worked beal}tifullyand is strongly recommended provided of course that no surface action is probable. be best estimate oE raid altitude as determined by the carder's M radar was obtained by GIC via HF and given to the Mark [ computers, AA directors and control officers. This infoTIllatioo is vital in night radar control firing. Tile position of the various ships in this taSk group as well as the position of adjacenc task groups and picleets were plotted on the air-plot to insure the ship firing on safety bearings. The information as to own ships in line of lire was given to the control officers at all times."

USS MO TPELIER (CL) (Mindoro):

"Mark 12 Mod 0 radar in Mark 37 directors proved extremely clfectiv_e during the e1Itim period. feat numbers 0 f reported bog; es were tra eked

in full radar control. Planes at alutude of 1500 feet or above were normally picke,d up at over 40,000 yardS after one or tWO ranges and bearings from the air search radars. Target designation was made by sound powered telephones. Low fliers could be expected [0 be picked up at 20,000 )'31'& with the Mark l!2 giving accurate position angles at about l.2,oqo yards. The accuracy of the new Mark L2- Mark ~2 radars is best illustrated by the fact that time aEter time the director pointers and trainers iollIld themselves right on target when the plane came out otthe clouds and into view after tracking in tull radar control. he principal difficultiesencoun· tered by the AA fire control radars were in picking up planes flying over land, staying on targets when in the midst of flying fragments of bursting pro] ec tiles, getting on targets th a [ were in or beyond dense heets of rain. and distinguishing friend from foe in a melee."

U8S FLETCHER (DD) (O"moc Bay):

"Although CIC functioned without any major failures, this operation brough; OUl clearly the necessity of a gunnery Iiai on officer in ClG. Tbe

imultaneous problems of air and surface target designation, high speed maneuvers. bridge, director, and BS com))1unlcaliOlls were too much FOt the evaluator and ClC officer to handle clIi.cientl without assistance. The result was that the director was not kept full Informed of the rapidly changing situation as has been CUSCOnllUY under less complicamd conditions."



U KADA HAN RAJ! (CVE) (Luzon):

"As each operation commences there is a flurry of inoperative or weak IFF on our own planes. This carrier division is no exception. The per[onnance imprEn'¢S wiLh each successlve day and eventually the problem is solved. It is recolllIIJended that each plane On each carrier be flown and checked the first day at sea.

"The U 5 AGINAW BAY bas used a system of checking.IFF on deck prior to launch which bas improved the fUllctioning to a marked degree. The system 'used includes a Test Transmitter CPR-6o AAC, energized bydIj' cells within the transmitter case, and phones which are plugged inro the I:F'E unit in the plane. The res; transmitter is placed outboard of the wing; when energized, the phones will emu a high queak if the IFF is working. The test

receive!' CPR-60-AAB was tried. but exc sive engine noise on deck made the ignal inaudible.

"Twent.y-Eo u r irHercep[ions were made on Army and Navy bombers and transpor ts with Ineperau ve IFF or IFF turned off. 'This caused unnecessary employment of cover that might have been badly needed elsewhere and unnecessary calls to general quarters."

u.~ POIlTUND (CA) (Lingayen):

Many unnecessary alerts are still' being caused by own planes no; shewing IFF, In operations where personnel muse be kept in high readiness conditions for extended periods. when maximum advantage must be taken of opportuni ties fOT: lower conditions, such un~ecessary alerts are not merely of nuisance value, It would seem that di ciplinary and technical means are available to reduce such occurrences [0 a negligible frequency."


>-c ::[



"A highlight. of the operation occurred on the last sweep of 14 December when eight TICO DEROGA fighters intercepted and attacked 27 enemy fighters. Osears and Zekes, near _ i~n. Eighteen of the enemy planes,

Which were quite possibly Bying in



from Formosa. were sh I dawn withOUt Joss to ourselves.

"On the night of l4- '5 December the first VJo to reach Aparci saw several light~ on the strip, The pilot blinked his running lights 'and the Japs obligingly turned on more lights -at which. lhe VFN prOlilpLly strafed the field and produced the desired

Ifeet. complete blackout. On both nigh LS there were several ligh ts in lingn 'en, Laoag and Aparri I owns. bUL DO activit)' wa noted on any of !he orrhem Luzon fields while our VF r were in the are a , The towns were not strafed due to We possibility of injuring friendly personnel:'

ReM •

U S UNGLEl' (CrrL) {Luxor: Strikes):

"The radar intercept receiver was operated while in the vicinity of enemy bases. but no autheuuc intercepts were made on any Japal1ese radar. 'Window' was carried and used br our VT on the one strike wey made during this period, This deception material has been used construulyon all VT ncil;.es for the past few months and is considered very effective by pilots and aircrewmen, everal instances .have been related in which heavy AA bursts have been seen definitely to recede from the planes when 'window' was dropped."

USS SALT LAKE CITY (CA) (fwd lima lJombardmtml):

"The use of window by frieudly planes during coordinated. air strikes bas OD several occasions proved discencerdng to thls vessel. Window reduces the efficiency of our own radar as well as that of the enemy. and when nor expected will cau e unnecessary focusing of attention on the area involved.. It is recommended that when possible, the surface forces be advised, either in advance or at the time by lIppropriat.e r'<ldiosignal of the use of window and other jammlngor deceptive devices by our own planes."

COiI1M£1NDEl? AIR CROUP THREE (USS YOR/(TOWN) (Various trikes):

"There is no doubt that the Japs have radar controlled AA. They have been able (0 get on exactly in altitude with heavy AA on the first bUT6t, when

plane were i.ther above or below Ioud layer, Window ha been

by this sq uadron on all strikes. bu ,

ITect j II matter of cenjecture, 'The lengllI chosen was IlS\I.l" in antlcipario n 0 f 200 IllCS rue con trol radar, It \~'as dropped upon coming within pos. SIble range of AA and released at, 5 sec?nd intervals until out of AA range. It iii felt tha; despite definite informa, uon as [Q true effect, the UBe of window is a good morale feature in particular Cor the crew member who throws it out. thereby keeping him bu 'y. {ore definite informarion as LO the freq uencies of fire ccnrrolled radar in sp cific enemy areas would, obviously be quite useful, The ASB'7 radar proved 10 be an invaluable navigational aid. in the most unsa t:isfactory weather which was normally eaceuntered during ihe period. ot this report. For reas ns unknown to us, the VJ 011 the U OND 'ROGA was con isteml picked up III Iurthest di tances."


"A conunueu watch was 'kept on the radar intercept receiver, The guard assigned \\'3SWe baud from So to goo JuegacycJes rOJ the greater pan of t period, but was changed to 980 to 9 meg-dcycles for the Iauer part. Only one verified intercept of enemy radar was made. his {\ as an airborne radar and operated in tile usual frequency band IH IS2 megacycles. Intercepts of Japan e radar in the 150 to 160 magacyde band have been noticeably la,cking in the past two months. This situation suggests the po~ibility (oat most of the radar-eqllipped Japanese ~lanes in this area have been destroyed 10 the attacks by U .. carrier planes during the P t few months,

"Radar balloon decoys were- Iaunched tw~ce during this period, two decoys bemg dropped both limes. A method of laun hing this [)'Pe of decoy bas been developed by the radar maintenance personnel on the LANGLEY which greatly facilitates the operation. A light cardboard rube, open at both ends, about 18 inches in length and one inch in diameter is made for each decoy, The Cree end of the line (the end whieb is auached to the balloon) is drawn through this Lube and all of the treamers, rolled up but not tied, arc pu hed into the rube in succession with the five feet of line betw streamer called 1000se1y between tl:;, Both ends Qf the tube are then seal" off with tape to retain the streamers

the LUbe until read [or u e. When the deco it is necessary only to tie the free end of the line LO :-II! ill Fla tetl hallocn lind remove the lape I"om the ends of the lube, Wh.en the balloon is relea ed it pulls the streamers out of the cube ooe at a lime, each one unrolling to its fuU length :1Ii it is pulled clear, When all the srrearners have cleared, the tube is released and th ea an hor compleres the operation."

17T OF TASK FORCE )8 (Formoso Slrikc):

"If a night air auack is probable the employment of VF (N) as hecklers over the enemy bases at dusk offers an efficient and early means of preventing the alta k. ,,() should also be launched as a nighl P. The funclion of ihe latter i to shoot down the snoopers and search planes who

usually precede large scale enemy night arta It •

"The usc of VF (N) however is not always practicable. If we are retiring the distance to enemy bases l.l.lay be ton grea t [or the effective employment of .hecklers, When a dusk CAP is launched it must be recovered about three hours Iater. If an enemy attack Ita developed b that time. the recover of the 'I) may jeopardize the safte f the task group. Inasmuch a the VF ( ) can 001 ShOOl down isolated targets they can not be u ed effectively to stop the attack once it has commenced on a large scale. The decision to use a night CAP must be made U pon considering their effectiveness in preventing the attack rather than SLOpping it.

" he use of smoke, eorubined with judtciou maneuvering of the task grou p appeared to offer an effective means of confusing the night torpedo attackers. pan i c 1I l a rl Y when the

dropped flares. Enemy torpedo planes would find it difficult LO distinguish targets or evaluare uheir course and speed when smoke is ued,

"Use of 5" AA batteries with flashless powder and Mk, 32 fuses are considered more effective against night attacking planes than automatic weapons. The use of the latter tends [0 disolose the location of the ship ."

uss WA P (CV) (Sotlthem Luzon):

"It is the opinion of the Fighter Director Officer lind CIC watch. officers that the use of picket destroyers as pylons and radar guard ships during strike dars was highly sa tisfac.tory.

"It is recommended, however. that Picket No, 2 be stationed at least 15 miles .fa nIJ er ouih in order that radar screens on T .G. 38.1 be fmmer clarified:'

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •••••••••••

Extra copies of Part 6, USF-IOA. are auailablie . , .

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Please naLice: There Wil no;' ue uf "C. 1. C." dated /ltlemller !944' Vol, 1 "0.8 was dated October 19N, IIl1it Fol. I No, q was dated Deutnbu I9.f-/·


.. c. L C." is trJilll to help JOU get

in touch with the Adminl-in a WI, that he .. 1 remember. Please let lIS know if you desire more copies. Requests for II C. I. C." (issues prior to July 1944 are no longer available) should be addressed:

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