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C Q | : C. | tet oareeeik VOL. II, NO. 6 JUNE Target tnformation from CIC 5 | Gunmery Radar Tracks Over Land to | Tomcat, Problems of The “Divine Winds BAKA-Flying Warhead Night Control by GIC REM Rehearsals Clemente Battlewngon at Lingayen SM/SP Radar Target Height Chort Adjust Your PPL 38 | Current Training Films for CIC Personnel an | Interrogatory Angels 42 | The RAD Publications in Revie 48.| Mens of the M onics Refresher Training for Limite 3 foaltability 53 | Excerpls from Action Reports 61 | A Glossary of Army Equipments 65 | Last Word on “AN” Nomenclature—Airborn 63,| Technical Date on Jo 64 | That GIDX?! Mike ly by the Chief of Naval Operations (DNC) Published monthly by the Chief y ° for the information of Military personnel whose duties o i aspects of electronic connected with the tactical and operatio She au or spt "CLC shall no be ciel fr en publication in “C10.” should MMaterial ond ph , je submitted to Chief of Naval Operations, Editor of “CALC Washington 25, D.C. (Navy Department Telephone Extensions, diggs and 6 Editorial Office: DNC Art and Layout; OND OP-20-F-4) (OP 16-P 2) United States CONFIDENTIAL British ins information affecting the ational ates within the meaning of the E W This document co» defense of the United S Act, 50 USC, $1 and 32 revelation of its contents as amended. Its transmission | target Ih information from CIC ‘Target designation is a function of command. CIG, as an adjunct of command, usually provides information to gun control as a matter of routine— carly warning, OTC's raid designations, altitude estimates and forewarning of enemy attackers who have evaded intercepting fighters. But CIC team- work sometimes dead-ends there! In some ships, air operations, fighter direction, navigation, an phibious support and similar specialized opera- tions frequently tend to overshadow much infor- mation which gunnery would like to get from 3IC, that sometimes fails to reach gun control stations. This article is a digest of reports and statements, particularly from gunnery and CIC officers, dis- cussing ways in which CIC can facilitate target designation by passing information it has to com- mand and gunnery, The thoughts expressed here- in may or may not be useable by every type ship. Some methods and equipment that can be in- corporated in CIC procedures which can help with, inery’s target problems are outlined here for ight and evaluation, An example of what CIG can do is expressed in a recent action report from a ship: “Two pre-dawn AA actions fully demonstrated the value of a well trained and organized CIC team backed up by the accuracy of the SA-2 radar. In both actions the enemy was almost upon us before we could visu- ally see him, but in both cases all guns were on the correct bearing and waiting for him, Based upon continuous flow of information from CIC, it was possible to maneuver the ship so that maxi mum fire power was brought to bear on the attack- ing planes, and a minimum target afforded the enemy. CONFIDENTIAL IS S¢6l ANN? ‘11D C.1.C. JUNE 1945 ¢ TECHNIQUES THAT DEVELOP. TARGET INFORMATION DATA. Every CIC should n information to con ble useful target nd gunnery as fast and accurately as possible. The narrow beam of the Mk. 28 and other ircraft fire control radars makes it imperative that air targets be designated to the director within 3 to 4 degrees accuracy. CIG has much helpful information which gunnery can tuse to get its narrow fire control beam onto ap- proaching targets within the acknowledged 15 second designation time limit if that information reaches gun directors in time for use. Definite CIC. procedures have been developed which can make available information for gunnery that will help ¢liminate the dead-time (time from which bearing, is measured to time director is trained on that bearing) which has been responsible for errors of 5° to 15° on fast moving targets. These same techniques enhance routine CIC functions and are standard practice in many CIC 1, Proper Radar Target indication to the fire control radars to insure their getting on the desig- nated target is a function of CIC and is usually handled by a gunnery liaison officer in CIC who. uses data available in that space. CIC personnel must present their target information to the gun- nery liaison officer in a way that he can easily and correctly understand it while he concentrates on his own sound-power and target designation equip- ment responsibilities. 2, For normal cruising, air search gear operating with continuous sweep and PPI on long range, A- scope on 75-mile range, will permit operators to report good tracks on seven to ten targets with range bearing accuracy; will guarantee immediate pickup of new targets as they enter the radar horizon; and will permit the VF (precision PPI) operator to switch to any target considered most dangerous as it comes within the range limits of the VF equipment. 4 Search operators tracking with the A-scope can distinguish aircraft echoes from land echoes much easier than on the PPI. Too many times aircraft approaching from land areas are not seen, ‘or do not appear on the PPI. Fire control radars are also handicapped in picking up “‘land-blocked” targets, although they can do.a good job if their capabilities are fully utilized (see p. 6 this issue), Exact target designation of these targets by CIG CONFIDENTIAL from A-scopes of air search radars will give direc- tors.a better chance to pick up the planes in spite of the land backdrop. 4. The SG operator, working closely with the Summary Plotter, can draw attention to maneuvers of other ships that may bring them into line of fire, Close cooperation between SG and VF operators will permit tracking of multifle low flying targets that have approached too close for continued track- ing by air search radars—the VF equipment fol- lowing targets at approximately the same range, while the SG tracks of widely separated targets can be plotted on a 12” RPPI. 5. Task group maneuvering orders heard in CIC can be passed to gun control, affording them knowledge of any anticipated change in firing sec- tors relative to closing raids. With each course change the positions of various ships in the task group, as well as adjacent task groups and pickets, can be relayed to gunnery from CIC Summary Plot to insure the ship firing on safety bearings. 6. Lookout reports that feed into CIC give gun- nery liaison officers immediate knowledge of visual identifications, attacking plane maneuvers, possible decoy approaches and friendly aircraft that may be approaching the line of fire. 7- Intercept officers should not dominate search radars for sector sweeps when they are not con- trolling interceptions. Sector sweeps neglect the variety of information that other stations need from a continuous sweep. 8. SM and SP altitude evaluations should reach the directors in order that director elevation search can be limited to small ares, The wealth of information assembled in CIG by above procedures—raid development, tracking, evaluation of targets, ships maneuvering into line of fire, change of firing sectors relative to target bearing, altitude determination, recognition—are all very important considerations preliminary to target designation which can be passed on to com- ind, gunnery officers and gun directors by CIC. Instances where CIC personnel have become “gun- nery conscious,” to the extent that this infomation is continuously gathered and fed to gunnery, have demonstrated that by this coordinated effort a greater concentration of firepower can be directed more quickly onto designated priority targets. This pays dividends as enemy planes or ships press home their attacks. e PASSING INFORMATION TO GUNNERY CIC target information is generally passed on to gun control and gun stations via established sound-power circuits. Installation of VF (precision PPI) and PD (target designation panels) on some ships makes possible automatic transit of target information from air-surface radars to the direc tors. Targets picked up by the SG, SK, SC and other sources aboard are thus automatically desig, nated to gun directors, Experience with the PD has led many to say that too many buttons plus too many cranks equal too much time, Some people suggest a happy medium between an “all sound-power” and an “all auto matic” system, at least until sufficient time-motion practice makes the PD a faster procedure. All agree that the system which passes data to all sta- tions involved with greatest speed and accuracy is the system to use. Machines can’t talk, In tight spots there can be no substitute for the exchange of thought from one human brain to another—with the emphasis which inflection and direction of the human voice can give those thoughts. However, the tremendous sound-power traffic in time of @ action makes it desirable to cut down transmissions where possible by making automatically and supplem instruction. Reports via sound-power channels have been used to permit director trainers to concentrate entirely on their scopes, without necessity to take eyes off it to “follow the pointer” of an automatic designation system. One ship has crossed the 41 and 42 JS phone circuits, manned them by experi enced SK operators in CIC, and relays range and bearing reports of designated targets to the range- Keeper and trainer each time the air search radar sweeps the target. These talkers gave a 2° to 3° ead on cach bearing report to allow for time lag This system was also helpful by informing the trainer of the relative direction the target was moving, particularly when the ship is maneuvering radically. Ships using this method are usually those not having VF installed. Those ships having VF are tending to handle most target designation of radar targets by means of the gunnery liaison officer at the VE in Cl The important CIC function is to insure that the information pertinent to target designation that CIG normally has—or can easily obtain by adopting tried operating techniques—gets to pro- per stations for use. outine designations ig them h voice EQUIPMENT AIDS TO TARGET DESIGNATION Some special devices and equipments which have been used to obtain CIG information have been of help. A dev ently suggested by DesPac is of help to the gunnery liaison officer in CIC. This disk shows sector coverage of all ship's g When it is rotated to true bearing of the sh This Gun Train Indicator is made with tweo bearing circles The inner circle revolves end indices the are of train of all uns. "With the shipis head on true bearing and the movable rm on larget bearing, the number of guns which con Dear shown bythe arm. With advance information of all_ maneuvering orders passed on from CIC, command and gunnery will know which targets must be changed from one gun station to another prior to course changes. This saves precious seconds, particularly during emergency turns. Another device designed to calculate firing sec tors, more complicated in design than the above described gadget, was developed and quite success: fully operated by CIC officers on the cruiser BOSTON. A detailed explanation of the USS BOSTON Target Designator will be presented in the Ideas of the Month section of an early issue sO 1G" ‘The Mark 10 Target Designating System, used with varying degrees of success by ships of the Fleet, has been previously discussed to the extent that further presentation is unnecessary. This equipment will be outmoded by new gear designed pecifically to handle the surface and air problems individually. CONFIDENTIAL shel ANAP “01D. C.1.C. JUNE 1945 get the most value out of your VF A new equipment which CIC is utilizing to obtain target information is the VF (Precision PPI) mentioned earlier in this article. Used to best adj it can become the equivalent of an addi It is an extremely effective target designator for surface targets. Primarily a surface target designator, the VF is, being used with success by enterprising ships for the designation of air targets. The amount of slow cranking required to change range and bear- ing will limit the VF to about three targets. The slow antenna rotation and the greater beam width of most air search gear does hinder interpretation of the fast moving air targets. Full use of the VF Bescope cannot be made in the air problem, How- ever, possibilities of the use of its well defined PPI picture for air target designation are just being discovered. The fact that VF information can be retained without stopping the sweep of the parent radar makes it a valuable designating instrument. Some ships have demonstrated that VF equipment is far more effective in designating air targets than is generally realized. ‘These ships are using effectively in a “pinch-hitting” role until VJ and VK equipment become available to handie ait target Against low flying planes than 6°) up to 15 miles of the ship, the VF and SG input have placed a gun director on a specific target with great facility. A clear, positive picture ‘on the smaller PPI of the VF gives a better defini tion of a plane’s course making it easier for com- mand to shift gun control to the most dangerous target. Against high altitude attacks, the VF's PPI is not adapted to easy tracking because air search gear does not provide good target echo definitic However, the VF operator, by watching the main plot, can coordinate the VF picture with the most dangerous targets as they close the ship. By cen- tering the target in the VF PPI ribbon marker intensified segment) the correct range can be I search radar position angles less CONFIDENTIAL ion. This obtained within 200 yards by estin gives adequate range designation for air target acquisition by Mark 12 and Mark 28 radars. Beare ing is read directly. In the case of weak air target pips, place the cursor on the target on the PPI scope, then move the range ring out to a point just beyond the target. By subtracting 2000 yards from the range on the range counter, a fairly accurate range may be obtained. In order to accommodate the VF to the various fire control systems, standardization of the range transmission speeds of these various systems at 100 and 72,000 yards per revolution will be re- quired. On ships now having range transmission speeds of 2000 and 36,000 yards per revolution in the fire control system, changes will be required. ‘The standardization of range transmission speeds has been initiated by the Bureau of Ordnance in ‘order to give greater flexibility in interconnecting main and secondary battery systems, and change instructions are being prepared. To obtain maximum effective VF information on air targets, high speed antenna scanning is nec Speeds of 15 RPM are recommended for Experi- essary the SG series for air target information, shown that at this speed a plane will appear as a series of dots on the VF PPI. This antenna speed is easily obtained on the SG-A and §G-1 by a slight change in the steering motor cir- cuit. The $G-6 and the SR-6 will have speeds up to. 15 RPM. However, the SG-g, SG-4, SA nd SK series along with the SR, SR-1, and SR-2 are designed for maximum antenna speed of 5 RPM and such modification should not be attempted. In using the VF for target designation it must always be remembered that this equipment draws ng accuracy from the parent radar system. It is to be noted that with unstabil- ized antennas such as the SG, SG-1, and SG-3, a deck tilt error is introduced by roll and pite Ships should check alignment of SG antennas with the VF on targets while rotating the antenna. The antenna should be scanned in only one direction to li its fundamental bea nate back lash errors. | gunnery radar tracks over land Gunnery and CIC working together-and working both ways— an do a lot to crack the problem of low angle coverage and tracking over land. This pr ‘now’ we don’t have too good an answer to it, and he exploits this weakness of our air defense system lem is serious because the enemy New equipment which will assist in this problem is under development, but many months are required to produce and instal « new radar series in the Fleet. This article is concerned with getting the most ut of what we have uring recent months Jap aircraft have been °° taking more and more advantage of the limitations of our ship radars when we operate in restricted areas near land. Many suicide attacks have been made from directions where aircraft are afforded protection from easy detection by the mass of land echoes cluttering up the search radar scopes. ‘This type of attack un- doubtedly will be employed even more against future amphibious and shore bombardment oper ations, and it is imperative that ships take advan- tage of the utmost capabilities of all radar equip- ments in detecting and tracking aircraft over or near land, so that fighter planes ang guns can be placed on-larget at the earliest possible moment. This is a problem for both search and fire con- twol radars. Search radars have the advantage of 360 degree coverage in bearing as compared to the small sectors scanned by fire control radars; but, on the other hand, fire control radars generally provide much better discrimination. As a result, fire control radars should often be capable of de. tecting and tracking aircraft echoes in limited sec- tors when the aircraft echoes are completely con cealed in land clutter on the search radar scopes Special techniques may be required, but the criti- cal nature of the problem justifies—even makes mandatory—the use of any possible method which will lead to earlier detection and tracking. To do this and do it well requires many hours of practice with the fire control radars now in operation on our ships. MARK 12 WILL DO IT The beam width of the Mark 12—Mod O and 1 —is only about 10° in both the horizontal and ver- tical planes. By means of lobe-switching, however, the coverage in both bearing and elevation is in- creased to approximately 15°, as the beam is rap- idly shifted through a cycle of four positions (Up, Right, Down, and Left), each shift displacing the axis of the beam about 2.5° from the axis or “line of sight” of the antenna. These four beam posi- tions and the axis of the antenna are illustrated on page 6. On-target position is indicated to pointer and trainer by a centered spot on an F scope (target spot), matched pips superimposed on the type-A sweep trace or meter with needle pointer centered. Precise ranges are indicated on the dials of the range unit when the target pip is centered in the notch of the range scope. On-target and off-target indications also are illustrated for the-various scope presentations. The target spot presentation is controlled only by target signals in the range notch and, conse- quently, gives an indication of train or elevation only for the narrow range interval of 4oo yards represented by the notch. Pip-matching indi tions, however, hold for the full range of the sweep, 50,000 yards If planes are flying high enough over land for all the Mark 12 lobes to clear highest land eleva. tions, and the ship is far enough from land for side lobe echoes to be negligible, no difficulty should be experienced in tracking since the prob- Jem will be the same as for a high flying plane over water. Side lobes on Mk. 12 (and Mk. 4) are likely to be troublesome out to 10,000 yards, ing tracking difficult. Under ideal conditions the Mark 12 can be used to cover a sector of approxi mately 15° in both elevation and bearing without change of director train or elevation. It is prob: able, however, that enemy planes will not be so considerate as to fly at high position angles over land! To get coverage to the land surface, then, CONFIDENTIAL, $6) SNA “O19 C.1.C. JUNE 1945 Train Seope The Mark 12 glass 1” in range, be The Range Operator then cranks the on target "A" "A 1s now off in ran Range Scop Train Scope echoes in the down lobe position may have to be tolerated. Therefore, it is suggested that the an: tenna axis be elevated about 5° above the land, This will cause the up lobe to clear the land com pletely, and the right and left lobes will just graze the surface. Accurate tracking will not be pos: sible in elevation, but good tracking in range and hearing should be possible with careful operation and coordinated effort of range operator, pointer and trainer. Automatic ranging cannot be used, but normal ranging with computer aid should give fairly smooth solutions in range and bearing, CONFIDENTIAL and elevation and on Plane to Plane “B” but pointer and radar is on “B" in range and b and full radar track’ the plane clears land in ra range resolution of the Mark 12. flected signals from the target introduce an addi: tional problem, Mark 22 radar pointing should be employed when available. The various scope presentations for a low flying plane are illustrated for this case of the rightleft lobes barely grazing the land Use of train-pip-matching or target-spot presen tations by the trainer and clevation-pip-matching or target-spot by the pointer will depend upon z will be possible as soon as ge by 400 yards—the If water re the number of land pips on the scopes. It may be advisable to use pip-matching for initial acquisi tion, since training is then possible r whether or not the ta ardless of et pip is gated. A shift can be made to target-spot presentation as soon as the pip is gated in range WITH MARK 4 MODS O AND | The problem of tracking aireraft over land is similar to that involved in use of the Mark 12, since lobing of the same type is used. Range dis crimination (about 400 yards) is approximately the same as for the Mark 12, but discrimination in bearing and elevation is somewhat poorer as a result of the greater beam width (approximately 12°), and the greater lobing angle which makes the coverage in both bearing and elevation ap- proximately 20°. Cons ently, it will be neces. sary to elevate the antenna to a greater angle above land in order to eliminate land signals in all lobes except the down lobe, Side lobes will be trouble. some to about 10,000 yards with the Mod O, Otherwise, procedures for use of the Mark 4 are Eleostion Scope very similar to procedures for the Mark 12. Pip- match indications, however, are obtained on the train and elevation indicators only when a pip is in the notch and no target spot indication is available. Use of the Mark 22 radar with the Mark will simplify considerably the problem of track: ing low flying planes whether above land or not MARK 22 MOD O RADAR This equipment with a beam width of only 1.2 vertically and 4.5° horizontally scans a. vertical CONFIDENTIAL Did) sel 3NOr C.1.C, JUNE 1945 angle of about 13”, as the antenna rocks back and forth at a rate of one cycle (or two scans) per second. With its accurate coverage of a 13” ver tical angle and excellent discrimination in eleva- tion of 1.2°, it is unfortunate that provision was made for pointing indications only on a single elevation indicator. The Mark 22 was designed to overcome the limitation of Radars Mark 4 and Mark 12 in tracking low fiying aircraft over water, ‘where water reflected signals from the target cause serious elevation errors in tracking with the Mark 4 or Mark 12. This primary function of the equip- ment is accomplished with a high degree of ac- curacy down to position angles of less than one degree. Under those conditions, full radar track- ing is provided by use of the range and train in cators of the Mark 4 or Mark 12, and the elevation indicator of the Mark 22. In the absence of inter- ference produced by water reflections at low angles, the pointer may choose either his Mark 12 or Mark 22 indicator to obtain pointing information. Additional information on the principles of oper- ation and use of this equipment are contained in the article What About Low Angles? in the August 1944 “CLC. As stated in the discussions on the use of the Mark 4 or Mark 12 to track aircraft over land, the Mark 22 may be chosen for tracking in ¢levation provided that the target echo is kept near the Bottom edge of the scope so that the train lobes of the Mark 4 or Mark 12 will barely graze the land surface. ‘The target echo on the main radar (Mark 4 or 12) must be kept in the range notch in order for the echo to show on the scope of the ‘Mark 22. If the Mark 22 signal were kept cen: tered, so that the pointing axis of the Mark 4 or Mark 12 would pass through the target, it would be extremely difficult or impossible to track in range or train with the Mark 4 or Mark 12 since the range and train scopes would be so cluttered with land echoes as to conceal the target pips. The drawing shows the scope presentation on the Mark 22 when, with the Mark 12, it is pointed about 5; above the target.. As soon as the target clears the and area, the Mark 22 signal can be centered and accurate tracking data will then be available in all dimensions. Under conditions of normal use with radars Mark 4 and Mark 12 the elevation signal provided by the Mark 22 is from the target in the range notch of the associated equipment. Ungated si nals do not appear on the scope of the Mark 22. ‘This insures that both radar equipments are track- ing the same target. CONFIDENTIAL Tracking with Mark 22 signals alone is some- times practicable. When the indication switch on the Amplifier Power Assembly is thrown to the MONITOR position, echoes received by the Mark 22 appear on the range scope of the associated Mark 4 or Mark 12. The range pips rise and fall on the range scope twice per second as the antenna of the Mark zz rocks up and down once per second through the vertical scan angle of 13°. A sector of 13° in elevation by 4.5° in bearing is thus cov ered for a given director elevation and train. By naximizing the Mark 22 range pip, presented on the range scope of the Mark 4 or Mark 12, rough tracking in bearing is possible while accurate range and elevation data are obtained. Range pips can show over the full range of the Mark 12 or Mark 4, but only the target just to the right of the notch for the Mark 4 or in the notch for the Mark 12 shows on the elevation indicator of the Mark 22. Radar Equipment Mark 22 Mod 1, now under development, and scheduled for production next fall will have two E-scope indicators which will provide both range and elevation data. One of these scopes is provided for the pointer and the other for the range operator. Both main and pre- cision sweeps are also being provided. This equi ment has excellent possibilities for tracking ait- craft over land. On an experimental installation, planes skimming the surface of the land have been detected and tracked with relative ease. In train, however, the inaccuracy involved in maximizing pips on the parent Mark 4 or Mark 12 indicator Will remain, so that accurate data in bearing must await passage of the plane from land to water MARK 8 DISCRIMINATION 1S EXCELLENT These main battery fire control radar equip- ments were not designed for tracking air targets, but they may be used for this purpose and are capable of providing very accurate data in range and bearing. The Mark 8 Mods 1 and ¢ scan a horizontal angle of 2g° at a rate of 10 scans per second. ‘The beam width is 2° horizontally and 6° vertically, and accurate plan view coverage on B- scopes is thus provided for a sector of dimension 2g° in bearing and 6° in elevation. As normally used with the main battery for surface firing, the axis of the beam is horizontal and air coverage is provided to only ° above the horizon. However, the antenna may be elevated by means of a hand crank and can thus be made to provide full 6° coverage in elevation. The great advantage of the Mark 8 in tracking low fly of 2° in bi aircraft lies in its excellent resolution ring and 100 yards in range, as well as in the broad bearing coverage shown on B- scopes. This makes it possible to pick one target of a group where resolution would not be possible with the Mark 4 or Mark 12, and continuous smooth tracking is then possible in range and bear ing. Even with the axis of the beam horizontal very low flying planes may be followed through gaps in the land signals on B-scan—Precision Sweep. If further advantage is taken of elevating the antenna 2° or 5° above the horizontal, the land signals are minimized and will show up only as stationary pips for the high points of land, thus leaving the majority of the scope face clear for detection and tracking of aircraft. No performance data have been received on tracking of aircraft over land with the Mark 8 Dut several ships have reported that spotting on land is often possible, particularly when the pro- jectiles fall on gradual slopes or behind ridges so that reflecting debris is thrown up into the beam at ranges and angles where land echoes are not prominent. It is apparent from these reports that aircraft flying as low as 100 to 200 feet over land would also be detected and could therefore be tracked through the land clutt MARK 13 Mark 8 Mod g and Mark 13 Mod 0 may be used in a similar fashion to the Mark 8 Mod 1 and Mod 2. They have better bearing resolution, about 1*, but they are limited to angular coverages of Discrimination of the Mark 8, greatly superior to that of the Mark 4 or Mark 12, makes it possible to pick a plane out of the many land signals and track it smoothly in range and bearing. @ Aircraft flying over this land could be detected and tracked over large portions of their paths. If the planes fly higher than 6 above land, other radars are cap- able of tracking them, or the Mark 8 may be elevated more to provide higher coverage This picture illustrating tracking with the Mark'8 was made for "GI.c.” by Special Devices Diviion, Buder, from an RPD photograph ‘and’ converied into. the. Scope ‘presentation. by. use. of the 'RPD simulator described in "B-Scope Simulator Looks Promising” in the May fssue. of ‘CLG:" "The small. photograph Is. the PPI photograph of this aren and illus trates the ‘congestion of echoes on that type of scope only 11.5° in bearing and 3.5° in elevation as a result of narrower scan and beam. This makes them less adaptable to extensive coverage than the Mark 8 Mod 1 or Mod 2, although they should be able to cover the smaller sector over land with greater accuracy. ‘The principles applying to use of conical scan types of radar are very similar to those used for the Mark 12, For example, Radar Equipments Mark 28 Mods 0, 2, and 3 would be used very similarly to the Mark 12. Narrower beams will make it possible to elevate the antenna a smaller amount. Angular coverage for a given position of the director, however, will be less so that only a small sector can be constantly covered. CONFIDENTIAL sve! 3NAP 91D. CALC. JUNE 1945 This ariite, taken verbatim. from dan action report, fitistrates the wse af Destroyers om Tomeat isons, thee. problems and suggested solu Toment is one of the techniques employed to combat iow. T the jap. suicide tactics. All indications are that Tomeat mis: Wont tt become and remain a standard item in the schedule Up Destrayers equipped for the duty, particularly those in which eoetiey are being tnttalled. th the fint TokyO strike, to- thins of en raft destroyed. by intercepting. planes were sented for bythe. CAP controlled from DD. pickets and During operations this ship operated as Tomcat No. 1. Our station was generally about 50 miles to the north, northeast or northwest of the center of the Task Force, the exact bearing being in the direction of the most likely enemy air attacks. Our primary mission as a Tomeat was the detec- tion and interception of low flying enemy aircraft in the vicinity, the detection and interception of enemy aircraft attempting to “sneak” approach the Task Force. At the same time it was our function to provide early warning and vital information to the Task Force regarding raids picked up beyond the range of its radars in our area. For this pur- pose a Combat Air Patrol (one division) was fur nished by the Task Force. Strikes returning through our area were re- quired to orbit Tomcat No. 1 before proceeding to base, and aircraft not complying with this pro- cedure were presumed to be enemy and investi- gated by the Tomeat CAP. In addition the: or Ditting friendly groups were looked over by our CAP to detect the possibility of enemy planes who ‘CONFIDENTIAL might have trailed these returning strikes. Fre: quently, especially in bad weather, the Tomcat CAP ‘was sent out to escort apparently lost friendly groups in, whenever the distances were not too great. ‘On this operation Tomcat No. 1 saw no case of enemy aircraft trying to “sneak approach" the Force, nor of any low flying enemy aircraft. There fore, providing early warning of all enemy aircr became this ship’s primary mission. STATION KEEPING Station keeping was checked and “corrected by having our GAP flash “emergency lights." We wer se and speed of Point Option and occasionally the Force would give us its course, speed, range and bearing from Point Option. For the first six days of this operation this ship had a general idea from the Operations Plan as to the Approximate times the Force would head into the wind for flight operations, However, after this period was terminated, this ship was only rarely Informed regarding the times of flight operations und as a result had difficulty maintaining proper station. FIGHTER DIRECTION With the exception: of station keeping, the Fighter Director had no trouble getting informa tion from the Task Force as long as the MF was im Gn 20 January it was not in use, and we were put in somewhat of a precarious position. At 1530 on the afternoon of 20 January, prior to our pass- ing through the Luzon Straits, four distinct and separate bogey tacks were picked up to the north and northwest of us at a range of approximately miles. 45 Al these bogies closed on courses varying from 160° to 180° and speeds from 180 knots to 200 knots. ‘These raids were reported immediately to the Force via our CAP on VHE, and interception Wwas initiated on the first raid. Bogey and friendly tracks paralleled each other two miles apart for About 25 miles until the bogey had opened more than 45 miles southeast of Tomcat No. 1, but no tallyho was obtained, due to poor altitude in- formation. Four more raids showed up in the north at this time on similar courses and. speeds, so the CAP was vectored toward this second group, One tallyho was reported but the contact was lost shortly thereafter. These raids were again re. ported to the Force through the CAP. When the third wave consisting of three raids appeared to the north on same course and speed as the first two, the problem arose whether to open up on ME or not, bearing in mind that it is justifiable to break radio silence for a bogey larger than two planes or if the ship is under attack. A careful analysis of the situation led this ship to believe that these raids were somewhat larger than a two- plane section. However, in view of the fact that the force had been informed via the CAP of at least the final four raids and had not seen fit to break radio silence on MF, this ship felt justified in not doing so itself At 1754 our CAP tallyhoed three miles to the north of this ship's position, splash ing two. The third Helen passed across our bow at 1000 feet followed by our GAP, but escaped in the clouds. Further transmissions to the Force via our CAP or any other CAP was impossible due to the con- gestion on all channels, despite our frequent efforts to do so. Altogether there were 20 different raids on the afternoon of 20 January, the last appearing at 1850. It is estimated about 65, planes were in. volved. Although it was impossible to track all raids until they faded, in view of their course and speeds, this ship evaluated them for the most part as ferry flight On this particular day this ship was designated asa “radar picket” rather than a Tomeat, and we were in an excellent position to provide carly warning were it not for the conditions of radio silence. Whether this ship fulfilled its mission in this respect on that particular day is not known at the date of this writing. On 21 January at 1515 off eastern Formosa a bogey was picked up at 057-67 and was reported Helens” 45 to the Force on MF. Bogey faded for us at 1537 after intermittent plots on a course 220 headed for the Force. By this time five reports had been passed on to the Force, and interception was started at 1540. Due to intermittent plots and the great range from this ship, we did not initiate inter- ception. ‘At sunset 21 January radio silence on MF went into effect with the advice that it would be “moni- tored” to take reports from “pickets.” At 2039 We picked up a friendly group closing from ov0-ga, This ship had no knowledge of any strikes out at that time, nor did we have a CAP with which to investigate this group. One report was therefore made to the Force on MF without acknowledg. ment. The question arose as to whether we should have used MF the preceding day to report many COMMUNICATIONS Trouble arose in communicating with lost planes because of the fact that they were practically always on Channel Charlie—the VHF strike frequency Too many bases were trying to establish com- munications with a lost plane, with the result that too often nobody succeeded. On one occasion thi ship, at the direction of the Force, initiated inter, ception on a lost plane, yet that plane's parent car rier persisted in transmitting to him, thus con- gesting the channel and causing the plane to miss many of our instructions. Our interception failed and it is not known whether this plane returned to base safely or not. On another occasion a strike plane was lost near the target area without compass or YE. This ship had excellent communi cations with the pilot, but soon lost it not only because of the traffic on the channel also because his parent carrier continued to nsmit messages to him through other planes. With better radio discipline it is believed he could have been brought in safely The radio discipline of the pilots assigned to this ship for CAP was excellent. As a group they were outstanding in the habit of giving an “out” instead pf an “over” at the end of a transmission, CONFIDENTIAL srel 3NAP ‘O19 C.1.C, JUNE 1945 INTERCEPTIONS Under normal conditions this ship with one di- vision of fighters as CAP could adequately search for low flying enemy aircraft and investigate all friendly groups in the vic However, if there are many planes on returning strikes getting lost especially in bad weather, or if many bogeys ap- pear, as they did on 20 January, then one divi sion is definitely insufficient. Interceptions by the only division available cannot be effected too far other raids closing on the Task Force. It is disheartening to have to give up the chase on lost friendlies or actual bandits merely because they open more than go to 40 miles from base. While two divisions could be handled easily by one destroyer, it is felt that, especially during terceptions, one radar does not provide adequate coverage of the area because of the necessity to sector sweep frequently, and the temporary inabil- ity of this ship's SC-2 antenna to rotate at high speed. The presence of an escorting destroyer, as, was the case in the later stages of this operation, insures better radar coverage and also facilities rescue work. CONCLUSION It is believed that this operation proved the teal value of stationing destroyers out as pickets with the following duties: 1. Investigation of all friendly groups in the vicinity in search for possible enemy aircraft at tempting a “sneak” approach on the Force. 2. Early w 3- Guidi 1. Rescue missions. 5. Advising the Force as to which strike planes are on their way home. nes back to base. SUGGESTIONS 1, In order to keep proper station any ship on picket duty must be furnished with more informa- tion on what the Force is doing than gwas the ase on this operation. Such information should include a Point Option, a complete air schedule including Force GAP and night heckler missions, times of beginning and conclusion of all flight ‘operations, courses and speeds of Force betw flight operations and more frequent reports from the Force on its range and bearing from Point Option. The CAP should be used more as a check on position rather than the primary means of keep- ing station. In bad weather, from the point of view of the pilots, it is not a comfortable feeling to have to start climbing on instruments at 50 feet. Nor is it pleasant for the fighter director to order CONFIDENTIAL pilots up into the overcast and have one of them get vertigo and crash two hundred yards from the ship. 2. The Fighter Director should be apprised of all Force air operations and should be clarified on the interpretation of radio silence conditions. 3- Radio Discipline (a) Unless lost planes are assigned the use of a channel other than strike frequency, communi: cations with them will not improve. It is rec- ommended that they be assigned the channel on which the pickets control their CAP. (b) The Force Fighter Director must designate which base will maintain communications with a lost plane. (©) Pilots must be brief so that if a group of planes is lost all pilots will not have their radio volume turned down trying to pick up the YE. 4. It is recommended that when enen tivity is expected to be heavy, two di GAP be furnished each Tomcat. ‘The policy of placing two destroyers at each picket station should be continued. 6. It is recommended that all ships on picket ty with a CAP be able to transmit and receive on at least two VHF channels simultaneously. 7. It is recommended that pilots on Tomcat CAP be briefed more thoroughly on the following: (a) Purpose of a Tomeat. (One pilot stated that he saw friendlies over us and wanted to know what to do about them.) (b) Location. (Pilots, having rendezvoused at their base, have called us for a vector to Tomcat No. 1.) (c) Calls of all pickets. (So many pilots in our vicinity were calling “Strike Picket,” that we were led to believe that that was the only picket they knew much about.) (@) Number of destroyers on duty at each s tion. (Pilots have told us they were over two destroyers and wanted to know if they were on the correct station.) (c) Correct channel for receiving pickets YE. (Too many pilots at the start of the operation tried to get our YE and that of the parent carrier on the same channel.) air ac- sions of the “divine winds” shows every indication of being a carefully studied change in the Japanese general plan of air attacks—with the object of trading Jap planes for U.S. warships. Today—not tomorrow, all hands are con- fronted with the job of devising new techniques, using equipment now in hand, to prevent these enemy planes from reaching our ships. From the Battle of the Coral Sea to the “Mariana Turkey Shoot,” CIC doctrine and techniques were continuously shaped by the mold of combat experience. Hitting an all-time high last June when Japanese Carrier Forces threw everything but the Emperor's Palace at Task Force 58, CIG operation justified the faith the Navy placed in it as a defensive weapon. AIRBORNE BANZAI ! ! ! Then came mid-October. The Fleet was introduced to suicidal ven- tures of Jap pilots, paralleling the desperate infantry counterattacks with which land forces have had to contend. Jap suicide raids put fighter direction and its electronic detection facilities to the real test. Mock at- tacks, Jack patrols, backstops, fighter umbrellas, friendly return lanes, and other measures were introduced in an effort to annihilate Jap suicide raids betore they reached our formations. Most of these suicide raids are composed of three to five planes, but occasionally the Japs approach in large groups, or singly. ‘Their altitude has ranged from 50 to 35,000 feet and sometimes higher. Because our operations now penetrate deep into enemy waters, suicide-bent Japs are often able to take advantage of the situation by coming in from land masses and by following friendlies on their return.to base. These techniques make detection and identification difficult—sometimes impossible. CVE's and AGC's are particularly handicapped in this regard when operating in close support of invasion forces. Identification is sometimes hindered further by the beliet held by some that the Japs may be employing a Mark ILL IFF, although this fact has not been substantiated. ‘The Japs have planned their attacks to coincide with our launching-landing operations posing a real problem for both gunnery and the returning air groups T: Japanese Suicide Dive is still a major problem of our Fleet. It GRAND SLAM ESSENTIAL Suicide attacks are not coordinated to the extent that a greater part of the raid must penetrate our intercepting fighters and the AA screen to be successtul. The break-through of even one or two planes has proved a serious threat to our surface forces. Because interception of these raids does not disperse the attacks as it has done in the past, each enemy plane must be shot down . . . a tremendous responsibility placed on all hands, especially on the radar-fighter direction-fighter pilot team, and AA firepower. Past attacks demonstrate that no particular type of plane is favored by the Japanese Command in pushing these “happiness boys” onto the decks CONFIDENTIAL $61 SNAP “D1 3S ~1.C, JUNE 1945 Judy's, and of our ships. Zeke’s, Val’s, Oscar's, Kate’s have been used as well as Dinah's, Frances’ and Betty's. Multi-engine jobs may be sacrificed ly as the lighter planes. Nothing in the way of special gear has been attached to suicide planes, although examination of wing fragments from a plane which crashed indicated that they may have a special type of igniter near the fuel tanks. Examination of recent suicide crashes in- dicates special armor may be used in some planes. Since there is no identifying mark on these suicide planes, “‘tally-ho” information cannot be relied upon as a “tip-off” to expect the suicide visitor even when raids are intercepted at considerable rang ONE WAS STACKED Several Judy's, with an Oscar cover, recently raided a {ast carrier task group. These were picked up as one large bogey at 90 miles and intercepted at 40 miles. The SM altitude estimate of 8000 feet had placed the intercepting Hellcats above what was thought to be the entire group, but was instead the high-cover Oscar's. The Judy's came in unobserved by our interceptors, and by the time the “backstop” GAP hit them, were close enough of the formation to crash dive, demon- strating my groups may come in together, but at different altitudes. A systematic SM and SP elevation sweep, combined with an alert tally- ho, can give proper warning of multi-level attack formations. BY ANY OTHER NAME. . . Examination of Japanese suicide tactics by Naval Intelligence substantiates the view that there are no specially trained units involved in these at- tacks. This type of attack, unorthodox as it may seem, is definitely premeditated and well fits Japa~ nese military philosophy. Jap propaganda, which has “gone Hollywood” to giorify the suicidal hero, guarantees that pilots will not be lacking for these ventures. To quote: “.... by catching the God-sent opportunity the KAMIKAZE (“Divine Wind") Special Assault Unit carried out a fierce, deliberate crash-assault which even the evil gods would avoid, demonstrating truly the heart of the unit determined for sure death by sure hitting . arashing the soul which is burning like a fire with a beloved plane right into an enemy ship dying for the cause of eternal justice . . .” In English, such tripe goes by another name. To the Jap pilot it apparently has an “out of this world” appeal that moves him to just that end. CONFIDENTIAL It logically follows that these “Divine Winds” ‘can be expected to continue as Jong as the Japa- e can control a number of operational airfields. With Formosi, the China coast, remaining Nansei Islands and the Empire itself all pock-marked with strips that will take time to neutralize, it looks as if suicide attacks by planes and piloted rocket bombs are here to stay. Like rats cornered against the wall of their own little empire, the Japs can be expected to push these attacks to the utmost. Existing radar facilities, fighter direction and anti- aircraft techniques must make the suicide attack so costly and the results so meager that the Jap Command achieves nothing by these methods. MEASURES PROVED SUCCESSFUL Several fighter proved successful in stopping suicide attacks have been gleaned from action reports and talks with fighter directors returning from recent Fleet en- gagements. Strategical placement of the CAP is given much attention. In recent actions, assignment of CAP divisions to the picket stationed 50 to 60 miles in advance of the formation on strike days, and controlled by the FDO in that destroyer, has re- sulted in early warning of raids, interceptions at extended range, and thorough identification of planes returning from target areas. On days when an enemy attack is a possibility and pickets are not used, some FDO's have placed a GAP division about 20 miles in the direction of expected attacks 1, When several task groups operate together, the CAP will not mistakenly orbit another group to 15 miles away, assuming that they are over their own base, 2. Orbiting VF can be seen on the PPI at all times. Initial vectors can be given quickly and accurately without relying upon the leader's estimate of his position from base, 3. An intercept can be effected at greater range from the formation. Other fighter directors prefer to keep all of the CAP stationed over the base at all times because: 1. VF will not be lost on the screen among friendly groups, which are usually operating in the same direction from which attacks are expected. 2, Lookouts and visual FDO can supplement information on CAP at the time of the initial vector when the radar picture is not clear. In either event, enough divisions are always sta- tioned over the base at sufficient altitudes to inter- direction measures that have cept raids that might develop from any direction. Decision to station fighters in the direction of enemy fields has depended upon the number of friendlies operating through that area which might confuse the radar picture and sector assignment by the FFDO so that GAP from two or more task groups will not orbit together The altitude of cap stations | problem since suicide raiders come in at almost any angels. The old reliable “angels 12 to 14" and “angels 17" seems no longer in the Japanese Vogue. In recent actions defensive success has been achieved with divisions over base at high angels, at medium angels, and some divisions at Ag. 8 or 10, In addition a “back stop” division has been used, stationed over the base at inter mediate angels to go both up and down—mostly by sections but some- times as a division—investigating single bogey contacts. When raids develop. additional divisions are launched to sup- plement this CAP. As many as 5 or 6 CAP divisions per task group have been used while near the target are The very high cover has been neces- sitated because of several sneak raids by single planes that have slipped in at high speed between 22,000 and 28,- 000 feet, going into their dive before interceptors could climb to their alti- tude. In the past months, “snoopers" have gone on oxygen several times, One came in at angels 24, circled the formation while climbing, then opened fast at angels 34. FGF's couldn't catch him although F4U’s almost did. These high altitude boys are known to have RDF gear with which they can home raids from a range of 60 miles. They must be splashed immediately! The important factor of intercepting suicide raids (1) waste no time starting the intercept, (2) with greater number of VF than there are planes in bogey group, based on best radar evaluation. s become an acute THE BACKSTOP MAKES AN APPEARANCE Use of the “backstop” division to climb or to go down to investigate bogies that invariably make an appearance about the time bona fide fight direction business picks up, saves fuel for remain- ing id_ guarantees patrol protection at all altitudes. Although continuous orbiting be- comes a mighty dull chore for the remaining pilots when no raids develop, partial compensation can be given by exchanging stations about midway the period for freedom from the oxygen mask. The backstop, regardless of the chasing around it may do, will always h that for wi enough fuel to perform ich it was named: Backing up inter- ceptions 10 to 15 miles from the base, to pick off enemy planes which might sneak through. In the event of a missed interception, the backstop is far more effective than the old “Hey Rube!” Recent tactical employment of the “fighter um- brella” now places fighter-bomber divisions over Jap held airfields from which attacks might 0 inate. Smothering potential ra off the ground, has made the entire problem much However, it is not a cureall, since not at the Nips’ disposal can be covered. KEEP SWEEPING A better employment of radar and its guard assignments particularly with altitude determination gear, has re ceived greater emphasis since the su cide attack made its appearance. The Able, Baker, Charlie, Dog and Easy guards are not enough, however, when. several standby intercept officers suc- cumb to the desire to sector sweep one particular raid so that if control is passed to them they can take over. Con- tinuous sweep of all radars not actually employed on the intercept is the best guard against new raids sneaking in on the task group or task force. SM op- erators should make periodic high elevation sweeps to pick up high raids, to determine if two or more raids may be coming in together at differ- ent angels, and to give constant clevation-angle reading on all raids being tracked. It is of in- terest to note that ships applying the elevation- angle reading to computed charts report greater accuracy than altitude readings obtained directly from the meter on the SM console. A new idea was introduced and high cleva- tion search was increased on one of the carriers where the AN/APS-6a was installed on her star board catwalk for coverage above the ship. Early reports indicate that this unique adequately covers radar’s blind spot— shaped area directly over the ship. The operator notifies gunnery immediately when planes are picked up in this area. The lookouts, coached onto all overhead targets within the AN/APS-6a five-mile range, are able to identify them more quickly, thereby giving the automatic w chance to get on the tar s before they get installation 120° cone: apons a is in the event that they are CONFIDENTIAL $61 ANN O19. a C.1.C. JUNE 1945 DESTROYERS COME INTO THEIR OWN The destroyer picket has become a most im- portant cog in present strike opera a triple capacity of advanced radar warning, ad vanced area fighter direction, and a clearing house for all planes returning from target areas. SP radar, being installed in some destroyers, will enable them to be of even greater value in han- dling fighter direction. Recent use of the “tom ion by serving cat” orbit points for returning strikes now ferrets out the Jap who tries to s behind, our returning strike groups for a charity shot at our formations. A. pertinent suggestion from a USS COWPENS action report setting up this “return lane” so that planes would make a k in with, or close crossing track on their return to base, presenting a better radar picture, particularly of stragglers, used. Supplanting the ASP. controlled visually by destroyers, cruisers and has been successfull , Jack patrols are being battleships to play a big part in the defense inst suicide attacks. Destroyers, in particular, are doing a remarkable job in directing thes patrols, maintaining figure-cight orbits at cardinal points near the edge of the screen, with a mini mum of VHF transmissions. The Jacks have shot down several snoopers that were never picked up by radar and have helped intercept several low level attacks. A SNASP has been used in place of the Jacks in recent actions with increased ef- fectiveness. Suicide tactics make important. Every enemy plane that breaks y-ho information doubly through rately, since these suicide affairs are most often independent, not coordinated, attacks. In this way the “backstop” GAP and ship be employed to better advantage. The value of a complete tally-ho was illustrated when planes of the USS INDEPENDENCE, on a twilight attack mission over Formosa, spotted and reported 30 Betty's and Frances’ heading toward our task groups about 100 miles away. On this tally-ho information alone—size, type, angels, heading and bearing from the southern point of Formosa—the FDO vectored fighters to an intercept at 6o miles. ‘The enemy was hi sions, which broke the n interception must be reported accu- also at go miles by more divi- ck so effectively that CONFIDENTIAL the ship’s guns were able to knock down the few ‘The fact that our ships re- heavy raid must be planes that came ceived no damage from ¢ credited to alert pilots and perfect combat com A well-coordinated CIC-Jookout combination is link in the defense Visual contact with low-lying snoopers by the another stron ainst suicides. lookout has often helped an intercept when radar information was poor. On one occasion, four previously undetected Judy's were spotted in orbit five miles away from a task group by USS ENTER. PRISE lookouts. On lookout directions alone the CAP was shifted in time to attack the enemy before it started to work DIVE TACTICS VARY Suicide dive tactics experienced thus far cover almost any kind of approach known to combat aviation, and most certainly cannot be distin: guished by any one identifying maneuver. Briefly, the following tactics have been reported: (a) a vertical dive from high altitudes. hin a relative short dis- full power climb to gain a (b) a low approach tow tance of the targi few hundred feet of altitude, then the dive upon the target, (©) approach and dive in a shallow glide. (a) a vertical div ship, hedgehopping another, then crashing onto a third ship, dropping bombs on one ) a strafing run, then turning back to crash, (f) a low level approach, with pull-up to bridge or island. The only certain way to stop suicide dives is to detect and splash every enemy plane a good distance from our formation, or disintegrate the attackers by AA fire. "This means that radar, com- munications and fighter direction must operate at acy. With radar maintenance becom- ing more difficult, with radar's identification sys- tem partially blocked by the Japs’ approach tactics, and with future operations carrying our forces into areas where the Japs’ supply—demand of “Divine Winds” will undoubtedly be on the in- crease, this task assumes tremendous proportions. ...flying warhead CIG watch officers, FDO’s and radar operators have been given some: thing to remember. ‘The discovery on Okinawa of a number of small Japanese planes specifically dedicated to suicide missions warrants a second, and serious thought. This type of plane appears to be the latest thing in the Japanese technique of suicide air attack. The timely Okinawa discovery should serve to alert GIG personnel to the possibilities, as well as the prob: abilities, of attacks by these pl Code named “BAKA” (Japanese for “Fool”) these small planes are carried under the belly of a parent aircraft. Carrying a pilot and minimum of controls they are to be released 20 to 25 miles from their target, which they reach with increased speed by dive angle and jet propulsion. “BAKA’ carries a 2645 Ib. warhead (filling weight 1165 Ibs.) in the nose section of its fuselage. This warhead is semi-armor piercing and probably has good penetration. The Betty 22 is the only “rocket jockey” so far identified, but Sally, Peggy, Helen, Rita and Liz must be listed as probables since they can be easily adapated to parent aircraft duty with slight modification, “BAKA\ literally hooks a ride with the parent aircraft, being suspended in flight by a single bomb-type lug just forward of the C.G CONFIDENTIAL spol ANOP O19. ez 3 It takes a nose down attitude on release. Heavy can vas straps, one forward and one aft, provide bal ance and absorbs some of the weight. Ten sway brace points keep “BAKA” rigid and parallel to airflow during its transport flight. It is thought that release is made at about mph. A shallow glide for about two minutes clears the parent aircraft and gains some speed for “BAKA.” The pilot then switches to rocket propulsion, from three rocket tubes in the rear section of the fusclage gaining additional speed and regaining slight altitude, This rocket process is repeated until the target is sighted, whereupon the nose is lowered, a bead is drawh on the target by means of single ring and bead sights located forward of the pilot canopy, and the super-Kami kaze death plunge is on its way CIG personnel will be concerned: particularly with the following estimates and evaluations of “BAKA” tactics: 1, The most logical approach for the parent plane is at an altitude between its practical serv ice ceiling (for Betty-Ag. 17 to 20) and its theoreti: cal service ceiling (for Betty-Ag. 27). Ceilings of other parent aircraft would not vary appreciably from these normal ceilings. This will permit BAKA" to reach its target at maximum speed and, it will permit the parent aircraft to retreat without coming too close, to our formations 2, The above evaluation does not preclude lower level attacks with points of release nearer our formations, particularly where a land backdrop may be involved. Actual sightings have been re ported. One release was made at altitude of 4000 feet, 7 miles from our ships. Another release was made outside visual range. CONFIDENTIAL, 3. Maximum speed of the parent aircraft, while carrying “BAKA’ is reduced approximately 15 to 20 mph. 4. The approximate maximum horizontal range of “BAKA”, after release at service ceiling, is from 20 to 25 miles. ‘This distance is based upon a minimum glide angle of 16°20’. Based upon pres ent available data it is considered to be maximum practical range. At lower launching ceilings, maxi mum range will be slightly decreased. 5. The overall length of “BAKA” is about 20 feet. It has a wing span of 16 feet. When re- leased from the parent plane it will reflect a small, fast moving pip on the radar screen. It will be difficult to detect 6. The parent aircraft will undoubtedly reverse course immediately upon releasing “BAKA.” There may be a tendency on the part of radar operators to follow this opening track of the parent plane—overlooking the smaller target echo of the lying warhead” that will close the ship rapidly. AKA” n. lose it Concentrated 7. Operators may evaluate the released * echo as window on the first sweep, th altogether on succeeding sweeps. PPI scanning, with added attention to the A:scope on all raid bearings may become mandatory—par ticularly when a raid apparently turns away at 20-30 miles. 8. Speed, altitude and limited maneuverability of a parent plane pregnant with “BAKA” should provide a setup for CAP interception prior to re- lease point. Once “BAKA” is released, both CAP and ships AA firepower will be handicapped by the 630 mph. speed of a diving “BAKA. hough a potential threat if used to combat our operations in the future, “BAKA” faces several potent obstacles to its successful employment in air-suicide attacks on our ships. To be most effec tive “BAKA” will approach at high altitudes™such approach being easier to detect at-gréater tanges and is reminiscent of our earlier fighier diiéetion ficld days when raids nearly always came in at these angels. Further, the control surfaces on this plane are so small that once its aim has been com- mitted, the tremendous speed of the dive will allow very little course deviation, And, the fact remains that a complete training course for BAKA” pilots is impossible, for its most impor- tant phase upon which depends success or failure of the weapon—the dive onto a pin pointed target can be accomplished but once. Notwithstanding the abovementioned disad: the greatest obstacle to successful BAKA” operation can and must be—early detec tion, interception and destruction of the parent ireraft by our radar operator-intercept_officer- BAKA enough to our ships to be released. fighter pilot team before the is near CONFIDENTIAL Srol ANNE D'S C.1.C. JUNE 1945 @ “At 0039 a bogey appeared on the screen bearing 285°—distance 34 miles. Lt. Henry and Ensign Barnett were immediately catapulted for interception. This Jap was a wily fellow and perhaps had been chased before; in any event, he took continuous evasive action by rapid changes of altitude and headings besides frequently seeking cloud cover. After a long and tedious chase, Lt. Henry tallyhoed an Emily at 0205, bearing 180° distant 78 miles and proceeded to shoot it down: This made the eighth victim of Lt. Henry's guns. CIC was entertained by Lt. Henry with a play by play description of the kill. @® “By 0420 the six VF (N) had been armed with bombs, and the first of the hecklers launched. Comdr. Caldwell reported five minutes later that his radio receiver and gyro were out, so another VF (N) was launched as replacement. Later, Comdr. Caldwell reported everything all right and departed for his target. At 0510 and 0520 Lt. Henry and Ensign Barnett landed, completing a five hour night patrol. @ “Ensign Fisher reported that while heckling Clark Field he intercepted and shot down two Topsys. Ensign Berkheimer reported shooting down an Oscar at Lipa. All pilots reported dropping their bombs CONFIDENTIAL over the target with a minimum of interference The mission was considered to be a success. @ “At 1652 Ensign Miller and Ensign Peterson were launched for a heckling mission over Aparri. Both planes were armed with 500 Ib. bombs. While enroute these planes had to be vectored away from an approaching bogey which was being intercepted, and a few minutes later Ensign Miller reported sighting five Bettys bearing 320°—80 miles distant headed for the task force. Permission to attack was granted; both pilots jettisoned their bombs and went to work. Ensign Miller shot down two Bettys and probably shot down another while Ensign Peterson had the misfortune to have his guns jam as he was making his run. The raid was broken up, and the enemy planes scattered so that while the heckling mission was not accomplished, it was believed that an even better result was obtained. @ “Net results for the day's operations were six planes shot down and one probable; seven heckling missions flown, fourteen CAP, two rescue flights, two ASP, and two uncompleted hecklers. It was a full 24 hours, and the only regret was that again nine VT planes and pilots did not get into battle.” @ qo he adjoining reports on the exploits of a night squadron aboard the INDEPEND- NCE, our first CVL (N), illustrate the re- sults of our efforts to give adequate protection to our forces afloat from enemy air attacks at night and from detection by night snoopers and shads. The millennium has not yet been reached, but months of training and the effective use of experi- ence gained in combat have made such gratifying results as these possible and indicate the progress we have made, At the outset it is well to realize that no more is asked of any man in any branch of the service than is required of night fighter pilots based on carriers. The flight deck of a CVL is a small home atany time, but ona dark night it must seem woe: fully inadequate to a pilot in trouble. Night vision and depth perception are tricky; and the night pilot must also be his own radar and radio operator, gunner, lookout, navigator, and general man of all work. Precision in all matters is most essential. CIC AND NIGHT FIGHTERS Much more than his daylight flying brothers, the VF (N) depends on CIC and the Night Inter cept Officer for his contacts, for weather informa- tion, for homing, for vectors away from possible friendly” fire, in fact for his safety. And the pre- cision essential to the night fighter is matched by that required of CIC in properly and effectively controlling him. Where a daytime tally-ho may be made with the bogey 10 miles away and 5000 feet below, the VF (N) is doing well to get contact on his AI gear at a distance of three miles, and the altitude should be exact—plus or minus 500 feet—though contacts may be obtained in certain cases when a greater altitude discrepancy exists. TBF FIRST NIGHT FIGHTER Prior to the Fall of 1943, forces afloat relied upon smoke, radical maneuvers and AA fire for defense against night air raids. And at times AA fire was withheld. "No attempt was made to launch planes of any type to combat the raids. However, in the fall of 1943, some experimenting was done. The first effort consisted of using a TBF with radar and two VF's without radar flying wing. It was soon apparent the VF's we nd their use with the TBF was dis Two enemy bombers were destroyed in November 1943. by pilots of the TBF’s. By the end of 1943, F F4U squadrons were reaching the Fleet to be based aboard the large carriers. They went aboard but throughout the Marshalls invasion, the strikes on Truk, Saipan, and Palau, they were not used to a great extent. There was a natural hesitancy about launching planes and trying to recover them at night, and the tendency was to rely on evasive maneuvers, The squadrons were ready to go, and the intercept officers were anxious to work; but pilots and intercept officers do not decide on the advisability of launching planes. During Decem- ber 1943, January, February, and March of 1944, no carrier-based VF (N) got a kill. When they were launched, it was usually done at a time that practically precluded a shootdown. It usually hap- pened like this: A bogey appeared on the screen, closing the disposition or circling at a discreet dis. tance. Perhaps he came in and dropped something or perhaps he just snooped the formation, When the bogey began to withdraw, or if it appeared he was not going to close, a VF (N) was launched and started out after him, Usually the bogey got away. It is next to impossible for a VF (N) to start from scratch and overtake a bogey with a 2o-mile lead and an altitude advantage and still stay within radar and radio range. It has been done but not with regularity.” During this period geography and the potency of our daytime strikes stood us in good stead. We were operating against islands with considerable distance between enemy bases, and the daytime strikes at times were so devastating that the enemy was hard put to it to find the necessary planes to mount large night raids against the Fleet. Some ips were damaged, it is true, but all in all the damage was light. Experience in night operations was being gained, and the USS INDEPENDENCE was in a West Coast port being outfitted to oper- ate exclusively as a night carrier. But before she joined the Fleet, the Marianas operation had be- gun, the battle of the Philippine Sea had been fought, and a new day had arrived for the VF (N). The fierce resistance at Saipan, the delay in the invasion of Guam, and the necessity for continued strikes against nearby enemy bases all combined to make it necessary to keep large Fleet units in the vicinity subject to night attacks. And the raids came. Weather permitting, regular night combat. patrols were leaving the decks of the CV's and maintaining station over various units afloat and 1-The INDEPENDENCE boasts of a 17-minute record from initial radar contact to splash, during which time the plane was ‘catapulted, the pilot having been given initial veetor while stil fon the deck CONFIDENTIAL Sve! 3NNP ‘O10. C.1.C. JUNE 1945 over the objective area. Night business was brisk, and the fighters nibbled away at enemy raids and snoopers. Six enemy planes were definitely cred- ied to Navy carrier-based planes. In addition to the kills, many raids were broken up, many were dispersed, and more discouraged. Several lessons were learned. One important lesson was that the interception must be initiated in time to give the fighter the safety vector about 40 miles from the formation; otherwise the VF (N) gets his contact, too late and must be called off if the bandit is to be taken under fire. Another is that the AA fire must be controlled by the same authority con- trolling the VF or the closest liaison must be main- tained between the two for the decision to open fire and break off the fighter or hold fire and keep the fighter on must be made instantly on the basis ‘of information known to the intercept officer. At such a time the VF (N) is most dependent on the intercept officer; it is his responsibility to get the fighter clear if the guns are to fire. And it is the responsibility of every CIC in the force to know where the fighter is and to see he is not taken under fire. Perhaps the most important lesson learned during this period was that a (N)CAP Telieved on station was necessary and would con- tinue to be necded as it would no longer be pos- sible to blanket every enemy air field within range of our Fleet units. And it was found possible to maintain such a patrol. Some damage was suffered, mostly from predawn and dusk raids, but again the damage was light. ENTER THE NIGHT CARRIER ‘The INDEPENDENCE joined the Fleet in July and was on hand for the invasion of Palau and subsequent actions.’ Palau was relatively quiet on the night air front, but business picked up im- mediately thereafter. At about this point, the night aircraft began to acquire a number of other duties. They were used for search missions to warn of approach of surface units, and on the theory that the other side can’t score if they don’t get the ball, intruder, heckler and zipper missions =all more on the offensive than the defensive side ‘of the ledger—were introduced. On the defensive side VF (N) accounted for seven kills in October, and since that time the score has continued to mount. On a basis of the successful operations, the ENTERPRISE was designated a night carrier and joined the INDEPENDENCE at year’s end to ‘operate as a night carrier division. And for the TELE” February 1945, page 1 CONFIDENTIAL Iwo invasion and the first Tokyo strike, there was added to the division the SARATOGA. Still others may be used. In view of the rather extensive operations that may be expected of our night carriers in the future, it is not amiss to assess the capabilities and limitations of our night air defense afloat. It seems fairly well settled that a VF (N) flying alone is preferable to the use of a section or a division. On nights of extremely good visibility, a section or even a division might be profitably used against, a large raid, provided the raiders stayed together and came on in; but recent tactics of the enemy indicate he prefers to split up his raids as much as possible and attack from many directions singly or in small groups. If visibility is not very good, flying wing is dangerous and not advisable par- ticularly if the wingman must keep his station by radar. The ENTERPRISE has used a two plane element which gives the obvious advantage of double guns, radars and radios.’ Her Commanding, Officer lists the disadvantages: “Loss of time in endezvousing in poor visibility, control difficul- ties in the event of separation, reduction of plane and pilot availability for other operations and in- crease of time required for landing. There has not yet been enough experience for a sound evalu- ation.” Most pilots dislike night formation flying. ‘The practice of other ships has been mainly to use fighters singly. "There are also several limitations on the num- ber of fighters that can be airborne to protect one task group. First there is the limitation of inter- cept officers and secondly the limitation of equip- ment. The 12/ PPI is the key to night intercep- tions, and one ship can only control as many fighters as their PPI’s and intercept officers can accommodate. On routine patrol, one officer can control two fighters or perhaps even three; but when interceptions are under way, one controller can handle properly only one plane. Several night interceptors have successfully handled two raids simultaneously, but most do not care to attempt it, If two are attempted, the intercept officer must handle them so that the contact point is not reached on both at the same time. If that should happen, he would probably have to break one off. In a large formation with plenty of 12” PPI’s and night intercept officers on the various ships, a further limitation is the number of SM or SP radars in the force. Successful altitude determina- tion is essential to night work, and one such radar can stay on not more than two or three raids, and not that many if they come in from radically dif- ferent directions. Another limitation is that im- posed by communications equipments. On routine patrol, more than one VF (N) can be handled on one radio channel; but when interceptions are under way, the best procedure is to use a separate channel for each fighter. The ten channel set aboard aircraft will meet this problem, but it will still exist with respect to the mumber of planes that can be controlled by one ship until ships are similarly equipped. TOO MANY FRIENDLIES CLUTTER SCOPE Assuming that the task group to be protected has ample SM or SP radars, plenty of PPI’s, and intercept officers and sufficient communications equipment aboard both ships and planes, there are still further limitations on their defense. Suc- cessful interceptions cannot be made if the scope is too cluttered up with aircraft. Too many friend- lies in the area are worse than too few. The pre- cision with which interceptions must be made at night does not permit any guess work on the part ‘of the intercept officer about which pip is his plane. He must know, and if friendlies are all ‘over his scope, he won't know. There is therefore a limit to the number of planes that can be worked over a force. While no arbitrary figure can be set, it is safe to say that, for a normal task group dis- persed in a normal cruising disposition, the num- ber of planes is about four stationed out on dif- ferent bearings. On several occasions, more than four have been tried, and too much confusion has resulted. And to successfully handle four, there must be excellent coordination between every CIC and all FDO’s and intercept officers. The Group FDO must be definitely in charge, assign- ment of raids and fighters to various ships must be made rapidly and with good judgment, and proper radio channels must be designated. Control must be passed from ship to ship without hesita- tion and loss of time, and information must be passed over the IFD net with dispatch. The Group FDO must determine when interceptions should be broken off, or one fighter called off and another more advantageously located put on. All things considered, it is probably better to err on the con- servative side in determining the number of (N)CAP to be on station over a group. It has been mentioned that the SP or SM fur- nishes the information that makes possible night interceptions, and that interceptions should be ‘completed—that is, contact established and the ball given to the pilot—about 4o miles from the center of the force. This necessity results from several things. Let us assume contact is made at 40 miles. ‘The fighter may be two or three miles from the bandit. He must close up the distance, make any altitude adjustment, obtain his visual and fire. Bearing in mind that when the planes reach a point 15 miles from the center of the force, they will probably be blocked out on the ship's radars and will be entering AA range of the screen, this leaves the fighter a distance of 25 miles or a time of about five minutes to get his kill. He may and probably will need at least that much time. One further point to be considered here is the maxi- mum reliable altitude range of the SP and the SM. ‘That range is about 50 miles. This means the in- tercept officer gets his first reliable altitude data just as the planes are approaching each other from, opposite directions, and just as he is about to give the fighter the safety vector or cut off vector to bring him in position to get his contact. Prior to this time, the intercept officer has relied on a composite of altitude information from SK or SC fades obtained from all ships in the formation. ‘This information has come to be considered very. good, but it is not accurate enough for night work. And adjustment must be made after the bandit has closed to 45 or 50 miles. DESTROYERS GETTING SP's One recent important development will very materially improve our night defense. That is the installation of SP radars on a number of de- stroyers, which will add immeasurably to their value as picket ships and will increase the number of VF (N) that can be effectively used against raids. Intercept officers on DD's can then handle night fighters and by stationing a DD 40 or 50 miles out on the bearing from which raids are expected, the force will have much earlier reliable altitude data. Furthermore, a VF (N) can be stationed out with the DD and can be used to intercept the raid 70 miles or more from the disposition. The possi- bilities of this arrangement are most encouraging. It will provide two passes at the raid where only one was possible before. SOME CHORES FOR NIGHT FIGHTERS ‘The foregoing illustrates the limitations of night air defense afloat. What then are its capabilities? Perhaps the most valuable service a VF (N) can. CONFIDENTIAL S¥61 3NOP O10. CLC. JUNE 1945 x perform is to knock off a snooper before he spots the formation and reports on it. There won't be any raids if the enemy doesn’t know where we ar In this department, VF (N) have been very succ ful. Many enemy planes on routine search have been destroyed, and there is no way to determine how many times raids have been avoided by the elimination of snoopersand search planes; but there is reason to believe the number would be high. They have also been valuable in knocking out planes attempting to reinforce besieged areas and transport planes trying to reach or escape from these same areas. Transport planes are regarded as “duck soup.” VF (N) can deal very effectively with small raids, and the enemy has obliged us repeatedly by sending in raids in groups of two, four, or six planes with which we can deal prop: erly. With two or four fighters on station, small raids approaching from various directions can be coped with. ‘The two kinds of attack most difficult for the night air defense are first a large raid that comes in straight and fast, and a dispersed raid that ap- proaches the force from all points of the compass, In case of the first, the available VF (N) can be put ‘on the bandits one by one, and in this manner they may be disorganized and dispersed, and some may turn back. This is not as effective now as formerly because of the Kamikazi boys. But at night time, a good chase or two won't help the enemy's navigation any. He may get off course and be unable to locate his targets. However, in case of such a raid some task force FDO's have ad- vocated clearing the fighters and relying on AA fire. The second type pre: difficult problem for the VF (N), the i cers and CIC. Some bandits may be knocked down but some will probably get through. Here again fon several occasions it has been deemed best to have the fighters stand clear and to rely on AA, In all such cases, the fighters can be put on whi the raids withdraw, and there is an excellet chance of getting some shoot-downs. This, of course, does not prevent damage; but it does mean there are some planes that will not be back to, morrow night. Night fighters have been used with good results against pre-dawn torpedo attacks; and they have been used as dusk Jack patrol, though this practice has been seriously questioned by the Commanding Officer of a Unit of Task Force g8. He states the requirement of taking the planes aboard at a dangerous time outweighs the advantage of the protection furnished. CONFIDENTIAL NEED FOR MORE NIGHT INTERCEPT OFFICERS The creation of the night carrier division has brought about an increased demand for night in- tercept officers. So also have the SP equipped de- stroyers and the decision to put at least one night intercept officer on BB's, Cruisers, and AGC's. ‘The need for this arises out of the fact that fighters will be furnished by the night carriers to other units which have not in the past had such protec: tion or the facilities for handling it. ‘This in- creased demand is being met from various sources, and officers who have had one tour of combat duty in day intercept work are being given an oppor- tunity to qualify for night work. ‘They are being trained at NRTS, St. Simons. Many officers are also available at Naval Stations engaged primarily in taining night pilots, as at ComFairQuonset, the Marine Night Fighter Training Base at Vero Beach, and at NACTU, Barber's Point, Oahu. The intercept officers at these stations gain much valuable experience. TYPICAL NIGHT INTERCEPTION Certain established principles and procedures govern the handling of VF (N). A special vocabu- ary has been developed to keep essential trans- mission at a minimum.’ The fighter is given a vector “for customer” to let him know this is the real thing. He is given an indicated air speed and altitude to fly. He is given the location of the target, altitude of target when obtained, and indi- cated air speed and course of target. The fighter is usually sent out on a vector that will leave a distance of about three to five miles between his track and the track of the bandit, this distance de- pending on light conditions. At the appropriate time—depending on speed of both aircraft—the fighter is given a safety vector to turn him around and put him on a course 40° off the bandit’s course, If things go well, the fighter will get his contact in this turn. If so, he takes over. If he does not, then he is straightened out directly behind the bandit, ‘on the same course and slightly below him. If the plots merge and no contact is obtained, the friendly will be vectored off the course to separate the pips and identify the aircraft; and when identi- fication is obtained, a new vector given designed to cut off the bandit. This is only an example of ‘one type of interception. There are too many for an article to include them all, but this illustrates the difference between day and night interceptions. TCGHP-11-2, Part 3, Fighter Director Vocabulary (Night) Another difference lies in the fact that many offi- cers prefer to control the night fighter at all times, so that they know always exactly where the plane is. Pilots generally prefer to orbit and at times are permitted to do so. The SK or SC is employed for initial contact, for preliminary altitude estimates and by most officers for the actual intercept, with the SP or SM used only for altitude information. Other officers prefer to switch to the SP or SM for the-intercept because these radars do not have the bearing in- accuracy of the SK or SC. At all events, both are needed for successful night work. Exact informa- tion is essential; and if the controlling ship does not have it, control should be passed promptly to ip that does. Indicated air speeds for raids are obtained by use of the Craig or Vard Computer, but here again practice varies: Some use the in- formation while others prefer to rely on th “feel” obtained from watching th scope. OFFENSIVE MISSIONS The new role that has gradually developed for night flying aircraft is very well stated by Ad- miral Bogan in an action report: “Events of recent months tend to establish two things as regards employment of night fighters: (2) Their potentialities as an offensive weapon are just beginning to be realized and made use of. (2) Their use as a defensive weapon has been and is being over-emphasized, which has and is re- sulting in their misuse in that capacity. “The first point is illustrated by the success of night fighters as hecklers, intruders, and to a lesser extent bombers during the whole Philippine cam- paign, principally in Luzon and Formosa. Prob- ably one of their biggest contributions has been one which cannot be measured, namely the loss of sleep suffered by the defenders. A tired enen not an effective enemy. “Probably the basic reason for the second point is the illusion entertained by many that because there are night fighters in the air, the force is well protected; and the companion fallacy that the more night fighters there are airborne, the greater the protection. CONFIDENTIAL 9 S a CLIC, JUNE 1945 “That this conception 1s a mistake 1s easily seen when limitations of present radar equipment are seriously considered. At the present time there is no shipboard equipment available which will allow the effective control of any large number of night fighters. Even in the case of con- trolling single planes the SM is often inadequate because it cannot give the fine altitude readings sometimes necessary nor can it give them at the long range which often results because of a long chase. Finally, it is seriously doubted that any determined night attack of any size could be broken up by night fighters, principally because of the limitations given above. “This is not to say that the defensive aspect of night fighters should be disregarded. Rather it is to say that their defensive limitations should be recognized when assigning them their role in force protection.” Search missions may be either offensive or defensive in nature. Search ‘and attack planes may be combined. It is contemplated they will be used in two plane elements. They may consist of a fighter and a bomber or a fighter and a torpedo plane. Intruder and heckler missions are of the same general nature, and it is difficult to draw a line between the two. Essentially they are designed to patrol enemy air fields and deny the enemy their use, to knock down any planes attempting to land or take off, to keep the station alerted! all night, and to bomb or strafe any targets of opportunity. ZIPPERS The term “zipper patrol” is very descriptive. It was originally coined to describe a strike by night planes to follow the last day time strike—they were to go in and “zip” up the target after the enemy had settled down for fa rest after what he thought was the last raid of the day. The zipper was to put the bombing on a 24-hour basis. Since that time the term seems to apply to any fairly large night raids, whether composed of fighters, bombers, or both, and without regard to the nature of the objectiv. In all of these missions, VF (N) have been used with success. Perhaps the most successful was a zipper patrol in the China Sea. Thirty Betty's were coming in to land ona field at dusk with intent to refuel and take off for a night raid. Word was relayed to the zippers, who went in and accounted for 28 of the 30. The duties of CIC in connection with these offensive sorties vary with the circumstances. They must, of course, help lost planes, and the CIC on parent ship takes over control of returning flights as early as possible to keep them clear of own forces operating separately. CIC can, of course, vector the planes to target, but this is not usually necessary. Furthermore, CIC can always put them on any bandits in the vicinity. CONFIDENTIAL o®@ RCM rehearsals at San Clemente YA view of the roof showing mounts of reconnaissance receiver Antennas in the background. In the foreground is the vertical ‘antenna for plane to. ground communications: Two shipboard fintennas with corner reflectors, ASA antennas, “ASVC, ASB, SG-1, 84-2 and the antenna for « modified ASVC which is modi fied to operate on 109 mes. “These modern, obsolete, and modi- fied radars provide victims for air operations at many diversified frequencies 4 Fleet Training Base, San Clemente Island, at which the SPSA Ground School ts located. ‘The primary purpose of the Special Projects School for Air (SPSA), San Clemente Island, San Diego, California, is to supply the fleet with avi- ation personnel trained in radio and radar counter: meastires. Technical officers chosen for this training are products of previous instruction encompassing a presradar school, Naval Training School (Radar), MIT, operational training at OTU, Jacksonville, and radar operational training at ARTU, Fleet Air Wing 14. ART’s usually arrive directly from Naval Air Technical Training Center, Corpus Christi. Oc- casionally, fleet experienced ART’s are trained be- fore their return to the fleet. ARM's are all drawn from the multi-engine OTU at Jacksonville. GROUND AND AIR INSTRUCTION From ten to fifteen officers enter the school monthly. The course of instruction is divided into two phases: five weeks of ground instruction in operation, maintenance, and tactical employment of current airborne RCM equipments, and three weeks operation of RCM equipment in the air, together with advanced study and planning of tactical employment of RCM equipment. Approximately fifteen ARTs enter the school every two weeks on alternate Mondays for eight weeks of instruction. Six weeks at the ground school are devoted to extensive training in main- tenance and operation of airborne RCM equip- CONFIDENTIAL S¢61 aNAP ‘O1O. 8