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LIlt! tactical use alld operation 01 electronic anei associeted equip 1111:.>1 t.


JULY 1945

CIG Operation ill aJl.>L C Radar Threol [rom (he 111',

GIG Organization [or igfu AA Defense TIle lap ses OUT CommUlli(Jl1tiQIIS

ClC if; the Brit ish FT eel

Mortl CIG Plan Views

/rTl!s/1011 i bilit)· on I he A ir

Air wppart COIII,HII Units

A Tale of Twa Life Rafts

RAD Publication 10 Come

Slwnit 5 ens c

One SO lor OverheOll Coverage FTC Uncouer. Moving Targets

Radio pedal is! OUicer aTld CIG Personnel


Nansei hQ~Q Gho I "masked? Charts for hips Having CIC's

A Better Method-PPT Adjllslmemt ideas of the MOtlth

Ll na lys is Of Ul1 usual Ranges Action Reports

"C.l.G." index-J(I!llIary through June Type CommondeH Please ee , Multiple Targets an DRT

Plotting' Faciiities for CIG

• l'ublishrd monthly by tile Chief 01 Navol Operations .(DNC) (or I/II! in/uTlTlalioll of Military 1)87,01171el whose duties aTC connected With the Iqaliral (lnd operationnl aspect of electronic eq u.ipm ent,

• ltlelude this lJublicatioll wilh other contiaeutla! materia! which i-$ to receive emergency destruction in the eucn; of po;· r; ble loss or capture. "C .l.C." shall tZO/ be carried lor use hz a ire rdfl,

• M(lteri,,/ and photograph, lor pub/ieal/o" ill "C.I.C." shoold bl' submitted to Chil!I of Nova! Opernlions, Editor of "Gl.C.", Washington 25, D.C. (i\·a.vy Department Telephone E: .. tensions, (i333'~ and 62779.)

Brlitm·ial Office.· DNC ,Ol)-~o·F·~)

drt ami Layout : ONI (OP·. G-P'2)

VIIi led State»



• T'hi. (1owmet.t cl)lIlaill iniormation. affecting the national dl!fel1.e of the United Slate within the meaning oj the Espionagl! A"ct, 50 U.S.C., III lind 32 as amended. Its /.ra,n$mission or tile revelation 0/ its contents in an)' mant!er to 01'1 unouthorized person is prohibited by low.





111 the ltuo [imo clw.puig"s seuem] lieu! AGO's made their debul with th« Fleet. Two 0/ these, 1·1Ie ELDORADO CM'l),illg th« flag of Admiral Tume-r, Iwd th« AUBURN carrying the flog 0/ Vice tlfimi'ml Hill have filed report» wilieh give a good pic. tur« 0/ Cle ol)sraliollS on atl amphibious headquarters 5hip, which should /UJ 01 interest to all ClC personnel and of purticu. lnr value to of/icl!f' and men sclledtLlea fOT dU! abO(lTd ships of this type. 11$ appear from the reports, the [unctions 01 CJ 011 an AGC are man)' and varied.

o o







The ELDORIJ.DO Reports:

Prior to th Iwo lima Op ration ombat Information enter had ben afforded numerous training ex rcises whi 11 started immediately aft T th cornrni ioning or Lbe hlp on the 1 ast .oast and continued until its arrival at Pearl Harbor three month later. Nearly aU of these exerci es, however, were performed within the CI itself and only on a few occasions was it possible LO conduct exercises with the ombat Information enters of other ships or actually contfol aircraft.

After arrival at Pearl Harbor in late ovember 1944 there were

training periods off Oahu during which this GIC had extensive pra rice in working with the other ships of the disposition and in contrnlling aircralt. Thi training proved rna t beneficial in that it not only trained the personnel at th CI , but also made clear for the first time' ba would he expected from CIC. Through the clo e cooperation of th For e Fi hter Director and the CIC officers the function of eIe was determined and the organization and physical equipment were changed to best produce the r ult required.

he following is a summary of several of the changes made in Cl prier LO this operation "which subsequently pro ed most beneficial:

(1) Upon arrival at Pearl Harbor the Officer personnel of I consisted of nine Fighter Director Offi er trained at NR TS, St. Simons Island, Georgia. Due to the need of ighrer Director Officer I ev here and the fa t that this vessel did not ha e any Officers specially trained in Radar avigation aboard, twO a the 'ighter Dire tor Officer of the ELD RAnO were .ansferred to otl r Fighter Dir CLOt" hips and tWO


01Ii ers trained at the Radar School at Hollywood, Florida, were transferred to this ship. The special' training these Officers had received in Radar Navigation considerably impro ed the value and amount of urface information produced by CIC. pan approaching Saipan the weather wa so bad that avigation by Radar was used exclusively and found mast satisfactory. The SP radar is a great asset to navigation due to its long range all land and surface targets.

Briefing sessions of the off duty section of ClC 'were held during morning General Quarters and on some afternoons each day while enroute to the objective. These ses ions insured that both officer and men knew th detail of the operation plan and, ere familiar with other pertinent publications. They also provided a forum for solution of problems of a general nature which came up during watches. The I personnel consists of nine Officers and forty men. The battle bill was rearranged so that there were two complete and separate teams, the port and starboard General Quarters sections consisting of four officers and twenty men each, the ninth officer acting as Visual Fighter Director Officer. In each of these sections the senior officer was responsible for and in charge of his General Quarters section and acted as Evaluator. In addition in each General Quarters section there was an intercept officer, a Surface Navigation Officer, and a Radar

antral Officer. The condition watches were arranged on a four section basis. It was possible to witch from a condition to a Oeneral Quarter. watch or back without causing officers or men to stand more than their

bare of the watch. his type organization proved highly satisfactory

for extended cruising and long periods of time at the Objective.

'Throuzh the cooperation of the Force Fighter Director nine interior illuminated Lucite status boards were obtained from the Navy Yard at Pear] Harbor. These boards utilize all bulkhead space available in CIe for displaying information and have more than any other one factor reduced the "wait" in passing information from CIC. The Lucite is not engraved in the usual manner and it wa found best to place the desired forms on the back of the Lucite with China-marking pencils, thus enabling change of the forms as conditions required. During this operation these boards were used in the following manner:

1. One large board as the Air Status Board;

2. One medium size board as an alphabetical display of tbe call names of all ships in the vicinity which might be of interest,

3. One small board to the right or the main display board for weather and Radar Picket stations;

4. One medium size board to the left of the main Display Board for Raids and Radar Control information;

5. One large board for surface recording, zigzag p1an and base course;

6. Two Iarge boards near the DRT for plotting expe ted friendly contacts, general surface information, and submarine contacts (charts are placed on the back of the board and are seen through the Lucite):

7. One radio circuit board near the radio monitors with all frequencies and the radio positions in eIC displayed thereon;

8. One board on the hip's bridge for the J8 talker there to display information received hom CIC. his board vias equipped with weak ted lights in order that it might be used at night without harming the night vision of the bridge personnel 01" being visible outside the ship. In addition to the Lucite board CI person el constructed a large Plexigla s chart board which was mounted near the DR and u ed for surface navigation.



During the lwo Jima Operation I on the • DORAD was op· el-ated on a watch-and-watch basis commencing at 0400 on Da. However, a relatively small pel-centage of the time spent at the objective was taken up with the tracking of "bogie" and "friendlies" on actual intercept Bights. The average day-to-day routine in CIC may be broken down as follows, with little real variance being noted:

1 racking of the Anti-Submarine Patrols over the various legs of their

assigned sectors to assist GA U in the task of keeping track of these flights and as part of the general CIG policy to keep track of all friendly aircraft in the area. On more than one oc asion 10 t ASP planes were "homed" by CASGD on in£onnation available from crc. Likewi e planes off-sector were guided back on in similar fashion. The tracking of the nizht ASP Rights was notably successful, with the possible exception of the se~tor to the northwest which was partially blocked by Iwo lima itself. Tracking of the more complex day sectors was somewhat less successful, but satisfactory.

2 Tracking of "strikes" northbound to Tokyo, Chichi and Iwo Jima.

B-29 and B-g4 flights to the Empire and to the Bonins wer onsistently picked up at well over 100 mile to the outh and tracked northward LO an equal distance. On their return parti ular attention was paid to possible indications of emergen y IFF as the B-29 Bights came b at scattered intervals. The B-24 strikes on Chichi became a routine evening occurrence from 2000 (K) on. ccurate tracks, with courses. speeds and "angels" were kept on the Vertical Plot with all other flights.

3 A constant watch and visual record was maintained on all airborne Combat Air Patrols working in the area, those actually assigned to the objective, and those guarding the carrier group at a greater distance.

4 11 special flights-weather press and photographic-were tracked into the objective, and away from the area to assist CASGU and any other

interested agencies in giving directions to the 'pilots.

5 Combat Air Patrols of FM-2' and FGF's (later P51's and P61'S) from

the carrier groups reported initially to "Delegate Ba e" (E LDORADO) and were assigned to various Fighter Director destroyers or to the BURN for control. The patrols varied in numbers from three divisions to six. ELDORADO control, due to the heavy. volumeof traffic passing through CIG, was limited almost entirely to the VF ( )'s.

6 Weather permitting, VF (N)' reported each night from the carriers

and were stationed in the area immediately north of Iwo Jima. FOI the mo t part, control was exercised by the ELDORADO b cau e I the SP radar. Successful navigational. fixes were obtained at regular interval from the SG radars. The variou, retirement groups were tracked away from the area at night and back in again in the early morning- by the SP and 's. Good results were also obtained in the tracking of Jaw-flying aircraft on both of the surface search sets.

7 All appropriate radio channels were continuously monitored=i.e.,

Inter- • igh ter Director Primary and Secondary, Fizhter Director Primary and Se ondary, TBS, and such other auxiliary circuits a from time to time became e sential. nformation was di seminated and received. in onsiderable volume over the IFD n t without noticeable jamming of the frequencies. Contact reports re eived over these nets were recorded on the Vertical Plot in CIG.



Due to the fact that the F r e Fighter hector \ a located in the S E DORADO .IC, Fighter Direction on this ship wa primarily concerned with identification of all aircraft in the v:icinity of 1wo Jima. he primary responsibility of the Intercept Officer during daylight hours was to keep track of all combat air patrol aircraft. Thi wa accomplished by hi maintaining Jose

u pervision of the ai tarus board and keeping' the position of the planes tracked on a remote PPI. Tbe average number of planes in the dayI igh t P ranged from sixteen to twenty-four on station for an interval of approximatel one and one-half hours. These planes were launched by nearby eVE's and reported to the LDORADO for assignment, The Intercept Officer assigned the divisions of the CAP to the Fighter Director Ship in the screen and. to outlying Radar Pickets at ration and at altitude desired by the iorc Fi hter Dire tor. Pur uant to the policy of the Force Fighter Director no daylight interceptions were planned to be controlled from this ship, but the Inter ept Office}' was prepared to ake over thi function in the event that it could not b performed by the . 'ighter Director ships because of: failure of communications or any other reason. Planes of the CAP which became lost in bad weather were "homed" by the fighter direction team of this ship.

pan completion of dut on ombat air patrol tb retiring CAP vas made available to CASCU for hart rnissi ns before returning to their base.

s CASCU is located adjacent to CIC on th ELDORA 0 and other AGe's it was possible to determine before the CAP was relieved whether planes were desired for missions or not.

Identification of all aircraft in this area was facilitated materially by close cooperation with CA G . All plane on the anti-submarine patrol were controlled by an officer of CASC who made frequent checks on their location on the Main Display Board of IC; and when any of ihes plan . tailed to show p\'oper identification siznal he i ued instructions to the plane in question. By displaying in CI expected friendly air contacts, including special flights, and by coordinating the radar reports of all Fighter Director Ship of the ta k force, CI was able to identify su - cessfully all friendly aircraft in the vicinity of Iwo .lima. Consequently th re were onl two false alert , and these w r cau ed by hips other than fighter director ships reporting a skunk or bogey over B. Likewise on the occa i n f real raids,



CI wa able to evaluate them as su hand th task for e "as alerted in suffi ient time t ralil.. proper defensive mea ures, •


For the first timeIn any amphibious operation

an was equipped Ear night fighter direction

fa)" the assault on Iwo Jima. In solving problem of operations and equipment, much was larned for future operation .

From the night of D·Da until th ship departed From the objective, a night comba air patrol r two night fighters was maintained fOT the prOteccion of the force and the objecri e. On the Ia l night, during which a raid occurred, shore based

rmy P·61 night fighters were used. An additional dusk CAP patrolled each night from 1730 until 1900. This CAP varied in number from eight to twelve. On two occasion weather for eel the pancaking 0.£ th night AP planes for everal hours.

he night fighter planes were used to investigate variou surface contacts, were placed in position to inve tigate plane which were nor identi(-ying themselve or were. showing questionabl identification, and to combat each raid upon the Objective area. a

In opposing enemy raid, there were no "kill~) althouzh numerous contacts were made on enem plane which evaded the fighter by violent course and altitude changes. On one 0 casion the night fighter was about to open fir on a "Helen" after a vi ual identification at a ranze of 1000 feet when the "Helen" eluded the pilot by a violent maneuver. ever-a! times night fighters were broken off contacts when they approached the effective range of Our anti-aircraft fire.

It is considered very probable that tbe enemy planes 'were aware of thenizht fizhters and were consequently hurried in the alta k and unwilling l' mak ready bombinz Tun. It is belie ed that the night fighters haras ed th enemy to the extent that he was unable to spend any time out-

ide f '\. range ill picking rarzets and planning attacks 011 them.

he night fighter pilots hom the SARATOGand ENTER"PRl were most cooperative and performed most capably. at a si..l!gle night fighter plane or pilot from these carriers was 10Sl at the objective due to enemy action, OUT anti ail' ra t Bye, or navigational rrors, even though control of these planes was constantly shifted fn4t their own bas to other hip at the obje tive.


The A BURN employed two watch bill , one for cruising and one fOT

objective. The seem to be somewhat different from the et·up u ed by the ELDORADO, as mentioned in the foregoing report. The ELDORADO apparently had only 20 enlisted men on watch at eneral Quarters, while the AUBURN had 1lg. This may be due to the fact that the radiomen used on nets guarded by CIC were considered a part of CIe complement on the AUBURJ while on other ships' they may be bo rowed from Air Support teams or from the ship's communications complement.


GO D. 0·3
. x:

Duty . val ...•................•..••.

Intercepter .

Surface .. " .

FFDO ...........•.............•• , ..

Evaluator _ .

Radar Control Officer " ..

Snapper .

R1\-£O " ••••...• " ••.•••••...•••..•


SK Op _ ,.

SK Vertical Plot. _ ..

Sit Recorder ....•. , , ..

Status Doard , .

Dead Reckoner ...........•........

rizontal. Air Plot, .

(GlC) , " ..•....... '.

DR Operator , :

Visual Recorder .

6JF Talker " , .

SCI (Fwd) .. , ............•.........

ummary Plot & VG ." .. , .

J Talker , .

:ReM Operator , .

Lkt. Outside ....•..................

IF» (8) Radio Monitor .

VHl' Radio Monitor ., .......•......

IFD (p) Radio Monitor .

'TBS Radio M(,mltor ., , , ..

Radio Tech , .......•.......

Lookout Standby , , .

RCM Standby '_" ..

DRT Standby , .

Tn. Plotter .

IFD Plot .

Radar Standby (CIG) ., , ,.

Radar Standby (Fwd) , .

IJS Talker , .

Supervisor of Watch .


x X X X X X X X

x X X X X X X X X X X X X

x X X X X X X


All Circuits All Circuits AlL Circuits All Circuits JJS

AI I Ra dar Circui ts VHF 2ch.. (608)

SF to Xmrr. Rm

uJ 21 J 2.1 J

VHF (4 Gil.) VHF (4 Ch.) III JS

2~ JS

22 JS

22 IS


23 J

28 JS JA,2JF



lFD (s) Freq . VHF 4 Ch. 30.2, 37.6 Freq. TBS A and B

P LO Xmtr, R1.<1

TBS A and n IFD

The objective watch bill is the same as shown above for officers, but

minor change are made for the enlisted men. . mess engel: i provided,

he ficrhter net i monitored at all times, a man .is assigned to d ad reckon SF planes at all times, only one G is manned, and one plotter is signed to plot ontacrs reported a r the IFD net. Otherwi e the bill is substantial] the ame.


A this stage of the war in the Pacific, all hands are constantly aware of the threat of Japaq.ese aircraft, and are becoming increa ing familiar with their tactics, types, operating characteristics and p tentialities, Japanese airborne radar is a major weapon coufrontinz our forces, to which ReM offers our best defense.

While the Japanese do have various airborne intercept (AI) radars they are in the experimental and developmental stages and few installations have been made. This article, therefore. will confine itself to a discussion of the more familiar and widely-used ASV-type Japanese airborne radar-the Air Mark 6 with its various models and types. That such a discussion including extent of use, tactical applications, and appropriate radar countermeasures being employed is timely is evidenced in practically every action and patrol report. It is a Tare occasion and one provoking much discussion for a report of operations in the Western Pacific to include no mention of contact with Japanese planes employing the Air Mark 6. It is one of the main Japanese threats from the air.

radar threat from the air


The Air Mark 6 radar is a conventional ASV radar similar to the earlier Allied airborne radars with which it compares quite favorably. Various antenna arrays are employed depending on the different models and type of plane in which installed, but these antennas usually amount to a pair of side Sterba arrays or wing Yagis for general search and a nose Yagi for homing purposes. There are manual and automatic switching arrangements to permit use of the different antennas in rotation or as desired. The scope presentation is the standard upright trace or vertical double A scope. The power output of the various sets averages about 5 K W which is n. particularly high when compared to our own standards.

The most-widely used model is the old Type 3 Air Mark 6 Model 4- models of which have been captured and given thorough operational testing. The intercept characteristics of this set are:

Frequency-vrag-rtio rncs, PRF-IOOQ cps, Pulse Width-5-6 microseconds The newer model of this radar also in use is the Type 4 Air Mark 6 Model 4 operating on 150-175 rnes, 250 cps PRF, and with a pulse width of 10 microseconds. Another Air Mark 6 now in limited use is the Model 3 operating 0"300-310 mcs, with a PRF of 1000 cps, and a long (not definitely known) pulse width.

A fourth ASV-type .radar was captured on Luzon and i'l most probably an nny model ( a Xi Model 1). (There i a uppo irian that thi rna}' be the ir Mark 6 Model u.) The frequency limits are 190-210 me , and it has a PRF of 1000 cp, and an unknown pul e width-vpossiblv 5 microseconds. This latter set i not yet -in wide use.


. he Air Mark 6 is a versatile enemy as proved by tests of the captured equipment and by actual operational experience in combat. It is important, therefore. that command and Cl C personnel know the capabilities and limitations of this radar and the effectiveness of our countermeasures.

Exercises were conducted in the Hawaiian area in early ifarch 1945 to make this data available. A ubmarine, a gull (radar decoy), and a destroy were used as targets to be picked up by a captured Jap Mark 6 that installed in a TBM for this experiment. An airborne jammer was em-



Flying at 5000 feet altitluLe aild approaChing the three tar- 1 gets broadside, it piched up the DD at 30 miles, the gull at 20 miles and the 88 at 12 miles. (Nete: These rGnges have been ext;eeaed in actual operations by the Japanese.)

3 Flying clocktuise areund the targets at a radius ef twelve miles, the lap Mark 6 kept a good echo en the DD and gull but maintained only intcrmittent centact with the 85 .•

5 At 2000 feet altitude, AN/A.PT-l jammer instafied in a 1M·, aircrait. cempletely iammed the lap Mark 6 frem aU relative bearings, until the TBM was between the jamming and the targets. Then, with the jammer antemna still at the TEM, targets within a 4 to 5 mile range were picked up with considerable difficulty.

2 Flyitlg at 5000 feet altitude and approaChing from ahead or astern, it picked up the DD 18 miles, the gull at 22 miles and the 58 at 9 miles. (Note: A.gain, these ranges Q?:e

usually exceeded.) .

4· Flying at 2000 jee.t altitude~ it picked up the submarine target at 9 miles approaching from astern. The submarine then submerged, leaving the gull in its place. The gull tuas Picked wI' at 22 miles 011 the lap rada.r during tile TBM's retum. The gull cOllld net be detected visually trofTI the TEM "Potl reaching its rada.,. detected location.

6 A.t 2000 feet altitude, the jamming plane remaif1ed very near the target ships a.s the T.BM appreached. The Mark 6 could pick up but one target momentarily on its approach. Tile Marl' 6 was completely jammed.



ployed on se eral of these experimental runs to determine its resistance to jamming. Results are graphically shown on page 7.

More recent tests, conducted by ComUtWingsServPac in the Hawaiian Area, furnished the following valuable information on the vulnerability of the Air Mark 6 to jamming by the TDY:

1. The radar was effectively jammed at an altitude of 5000 feet by a TDY in a BB which was 75 mile away,

2. Attem pts to home on the jamming signal were futile as the set was completely jammed on all 'bearings even with the receiver gain adjusted to the minimum position.

(In reporting these results, CinCPac quite properly cautions that improvements in .newer models of the radar and faulty jammer tuning would possibly reduce the jamming effectiveness sufficiently to permit homing on a single jamming source, and that current doctrine of many ships jamming simultaneously be continued.

Additional tests conducted against this captured radar indicate that while it cannot home successfully on a jammer, it can home quite accurately on radar and VHF signals within the tuning limits of its receiver. The tuning limits of the associated receiver of the Air Mark 6 are 139 to 156 meso Particular attention is called to the following: that the Air Mark. 6 can intercept our VHF transmissions in the 142 mcs band at distances in excess of 100 miles (depending upon the plane's altitude) and can home quite accurately on the VHF SOUIce under 75 miles.

The foregoing test results have been borne out by operational experience. For many months, submarine patrol reports have testified to the operating capabilities of this radar, particularly its homing features. Recent action reports corroborate the fact that the Air ark 6 can be employed as an intercept receiver particularly to make u e of our VHF r, -nsrnissions. For example:

"Some enemy planes definitely have some receiving equipment "' hereby they not only home on our radar or VHF, but know when they are within sight of our radars. This is -borne out by:

(a) the violent gaining and losing of altitude of. night planes when an SMo! SP is trained on them orr when VHF channels are used;

(b) the extremely long fade areas where they appear on our radar screen for only one or two plots, long enough to get a homing course on us; (c) their reappearance at ten to fifteen miles when they cannot any longer fly under the beam; (d) 'their ability to cro s the screen, orbit. re-




en e course, and pla around at eighty to one hundred mile, then take a dire course in do j on u • wirhout arying one'd gree."

Part of the abo e rna be due to the employment of radar intercept receivers, both low frequency and micro-wave, but the usefulness of the Air Mark 6 cannot be doubted, particularly from items (a) and (d).


This question. is partiallj an" ered in the preceding pa agraph, but further details can he added and all listed for reference purpose. TIle Air Mark 6 is used in practically all types of Japanese search, reconnaissance, bombing, and torpedo aircraft, apparently both Army and avy, although an planes of each type are not equipped. Still; s-ufficient radars are in talled 1.0 -insure that each air attack can be controlled and coordinated by radar, and practi ally all ASW planes and search planes are radar equipped.

The Japanese have used the Air Mark 6: (a) 0 locate our force by radar.

(b) To coordinate and control torpedo attacks against our forces.

(c) To locate our forces by intercept of our

radars and VHF. t

(d) To home on our submarines in ASW.

(e) To guide suicide bombers and other attack groups to our forces.

The Air Mark 6 is not sufficiently accurate to be us d for blind bombing r AI purpo es.


In October: 1944, a fast carrier task force near Formosa routed a Japanese ail-borne night torpedo attack by the surprise jamming of the Air Mark 6 radars in the attacking planes. When jammed, the Japanese turned off their radars and refu ed to dose the force. his episode has been duplicated on many occasion with the same results. It is now standard practice to jam any Japanes airborne radars whene er encountered to th end that it is safe to say the Japanese have been deprived of all real benefit from this important weapon. The SPT-l radar jammer (with Alvl- 14/APT amplifier), the SPT-4 (modified) radar jammer, and the TDY jammers have been used

for this purpose. .

In addition to jamming thi radar, radar interception by the RCM equipment has been u ed profitably by our forces. This is particularly rr ~ in the case of our submarines, to which the SP (APR-]) radar intercept equipment has become

one of their mo t valued installation. It i u ed conjunction with their radars, and frequently preference to them. his same u efulnes has been experienced by the surface force. ot only are we preventing the Japanese from any value from their if Mark 6 for themselves, but we are also obtaining useful combat intelligttnce for ourselve whenever they turn on a set. Radar intercept information of the Air Mark 6 has pro ided earl -warning and at rung long before the Japane e planes ha e been detected by radar and in some cases has assisted in the .uccessful completion of an interception and' plashing" of the victim. he radar intercept equipment has proved particularly useful in detecting 10w fiying aircraft employing radar.

Improvements and new models brought out by the Japanese may force us to strennou efforts to apply effective countermeasures. '(eanwhile hi current models are alwa s a threat from the air which can ne er be ignored. Continued thought must be 2i en by the Fleet to the best methods of countering japane e airborne radar. bat such thought i being gi en to this problem is evidenced by a report from the Commanding Officer, S 'WASHI GTON (BB-56) to Cin Pac dated 16

Til 1945, which is quoted in full below:

'1. During night air attack April 14, six Mark 6 radars were intercepted: Three in ] 50 Me band and three in 205 Mc band ~205. 296, 210/1000/10- 12), indicating a probable minimum of ix udal' equipped planes in the area. Barrage jamming of 150 Mc band hawed good coverag > perhap explaining why the attack was not pressed home and also the inability of the enemy to make good use of the window-infected areas in making their approach- . a avoid interference with SK type radars, jamming of the 205 Mc band was not attempted.

"2 .. During one period of look-through the one

ignal pr ent was ob erved to be earching but within a minute wa again strong and training. Jamming was re umed, At conelu ion of jamming, all signal -except one weak searching signal at 206 M -were gone, an~ the air screen was re-

ported clear. Jamming lasted 73 minute. The enem - ised large quantities of 'window again t SK and FD radars, effective in depth to 15 miles and in bearing to 30 degrees. Signals could not be read through window, but planes could be tracked on edge and outside the infected area on G. The planes showed little ability to rude in 01' otherwise make use of the large amounts of window. Generally speaking, windo v could be distinguished from actual target, although in one in tance the secondary battery was effectivel decei ed ' .. l,Ien window dropped by plane under fire eli tracted' the

[ark <1 radars from the actual target,

"3. The enem dropped many flares and one of the bandits was seen to use navigation lights: "4. he following recommendations are made: (a) Continue barrage jamming 150 Me band whenever signal present and bogies' closing within 50 miles, but limit to below 1.57 k to avoid interference with IFF.

(b) 11 e G to fulle t extent to detect and track low-flying planes in window-infect d areas.

(c) Conduct te ts using nan-ow band spot jamming in the 205 to 210 Me band to determine extent of interference with SK type radar. If this enemy radar is to be jammed at ali, barrage jammingca:nnot be used. The SPT-I RUG jammer is recommended for this purpose. SK radars within this ranze may have to be lowered in freq ueney."

(Comment: The SPT-l, TDY, or SPT-4 (unmodifi d) radar jammers can be u ed for spot jamming in the 190-210 Mc band wi thout undue interference to friendly radars except those on or immediately adjacent (-+- 2 rncs) to the frequency being jammed. Regarding IFF when jamming is above 157 Mcs: In an air attack of. the above nature, particularly when the location of friendly units is well known, it may be advisable to jam the enemy radar regardless of IFF interference. This report also indicates the increased use of the new 190-210 Mcs Japanese airborne radar-possibly Air Mark 6 Modell, but more probably the Anny Ta Ki Model u.)





L C r-<

Simplicity is essential. for the best performance of any CIe operation. This is illustrated by the methods and organization used successfully in several shipboard CIG's for the purpose of target indication in night air attacks. These procedures are presented only for evaluation and' are not suggested doctrine. They were obtained from officers with long combat experience who have recently returned from the Fleet rather than via official channels 'from the ships. mentioned. Perhaps time and changing combat conditions -have already altered these procedures. However, some of the fundamentals outlined may be of value to other ships, with or without modification. These outlines supplement the general information article Target Iniormation [rom. GIG in the June 1945 issue of "C.LC."


An officer from the USS C B'RRA describes

the crc organization for target indication developed during the CANBERRA'S Pacific operations. The gunnery liaison officer in CIC is the kingpin of this set-up. Specifically, he has three functions to perform: To coach rhe fire control radars and directors onto the most dangerou targets at the earliest moment;' to prevent his own batteries from firing on friendly ships; and to give




the anti-aircraft battery an overall pi ture of what is happening.

For any type of attack the choice of a pro radar plan is of prime importance. For night attacks this cruiser adopted dlefollowing radar plan:

SK-A-scope and PPI both on the 75-mi1e range scale.

12" Remote PPI in CIC-short scale=-ac-mile. Forward SG-Long range scale, high gain. Used for dete ting low flying aircraft, tracking own friendly forees, and detecting surface targets. fter SG-Short range scale with low gain. Used

for determining safe firing bearings 'and tation keeping.

With radar information thus provided, the night AA target indication system centers around the air plotting table and its adjacent 12" Remote PPI.- The 5" gunnery liaison officer is stationed so he can see both of these units plus the S" director range and bearing indicators. To provide a complete panorama of the target picture for this liaison officer, the duties of each man around the air plotting table are:

SG Plotter-Connected to the forward G operator 00 the 22JS. He keeps the air plot up to date on low-fiying aircraft, and the position of other Ta k Groups within radar range. On t I" same 22JS circuit a Safety Bearing Officer wate the ]>PI on the after SG and relays safe firing

bearings to the air plot. This man plots with a ack pencil.

Radar Control Officer-Plots all planes within the short range band on the face of the 12" Remote PPI, and when it is apparent that an enemy plane is within. the safe firing bearing. he designates the SK plotter to start tracking it.

SK Plotter-Tracks all targets designated by the Radar Control Officer and any other target beyond the short scale which the SK operator may observe. He plots with a red pencil.

Inter-FDO Talker-Keeps the air plotting table up to date with any raids reported by other ships and records altitude evaluations on all raids which he obtains from those ships equipped with height finding radars.

]L Talker-Keeps lookouts informed of the overall picture and reports lookout information co CIC.

Evaluator-Informs the Captain of the overall

picture. .

In this way the 5" gunnery liaison officer has all information before him pertaining to the most threa tening targets. the bearings within which his batteries may safely fire, a repeat back from his director, and a complete picture of the tactical

·uation. He correlates and passes this informaon over the 5]P circuit through the Air Defense Officer and the Plotting Room Officer to the gun directors. This information reaches the 40mm and the zomm batteries by relay from 5]P talkers in Air Defense to the machine gnn officers.

By receiving range and true bearings over the 5JP, the director officer has only to slew his director around to the correct true bearing (by watching the Mk 0 true bearing indicator) and then let fire control operator go to work. I£ the pointer has trouble in getting on, the best estimated al titude can be sent verbally to the plotting room and the computer operator can assist the pointer by coaching him onto the approximate posi tion angle. Once the director is on a target the gunnery liaison officer needs only check the range and bearing indicators to insure that his directors are on the correct target.

Careful checks of safety bearings against the repeat back bearing from directors insure that batteries will not fire into friendly vessels. These safe firing bearings are sent intennittently over the sJP for the benefit of the machine gun batteries, By observing the po ition of the other

ask Gl'OUpS and the tracks of the various raids, nnery liaison gives the AA battery a running account of what groups are firing at what raids,

what groups may be expected to open fire-giving, in short, an overall picture of the tactical situation.

101' the benefit of tbe 20 and 40 mm guns, the 5JP talker in air defense and defense aft keeps the safe firing bearings marked on the true bearing dial of one of the target designators in his station. The machine gun control offcer simply has to observe these indicators to be aware of which of his guns can open up.


A set-up found particularly desirable by a destrayer, which has a very compact CIC, makes use of the VF for target indication. The USS HUTCHINS (DD-476) and ComDesDiv 120 report similarly. A HUTCHINS action report states: "The soundness of doctrine recommending tracking direct from SG-2 PPI scope without stopping antenna sweep was again brought out. It was found that planes inside of 10 miles could be tracked directly from the B-scope of tile VF when cut in on the SC-2. The SG proved especially effective in tracking low Hying planes (which type in all cases proved to be the most dangerous of any bogies in the area)." The VF is connected directly to the target designation system, and indication i done by merely pressing alarm buttons when the VF is on target. The GLO on the AA control circuit exchanges information directly with the director control officer and sends out designations on the most pressing attack. The excellent feature of this system is that multiple targets can be indicated in quick succession directly from PPI without chance of error. A destroyer CIC is small enough for the GLO to tum to search radars for delamination of IFF and raid composition. (A detailed l'eport on the use of VF was described

in QUINCY Endorses VF in May 1945 "C.LC.")

An action report 'from the USS ALASKA describes their use of the VG for target indication. This ship finds that "targets can be designated directly from this plot without time lag. Changes of target course are nearly always detected on on.€ revoJution of the antenna as it is not necessary to discount plots as plotting error because the pip itself is visible and the GLO can judge Ear himself. It is very easy to correlate true and relative bearing on the VG, which has been the hardest problem up to the present time. The number of the director on each target can be recorded directly on the plot, allowing 'around the clock' indication to directors in succession instead of coaching first one and then another onto targets."


(> (>

c..... c


The S PITT B RGH uses the VG to determine accurately whether or not directors are on safe firing bearings. The following method is described in their action report. "The plotter on the VG RPFr matches director train (received on Mark 2 bearing and range receivers located abo e the RPPI) with a hai rline marker on the VG "\ hich is pinned to the center of the plotting top. The VG is set on the 10 mile scale so that safety bearings up to the maximum range of the battery can be obtained."


An officer returning from the S5 MONT-

PELIER describes how that hip overcame errol'S and delays caused by talker links which interfered with efficiency of their target indication. This ship got better results with information transmitted directly from the air search radar. A gunnery liaison officer thoroughly familiar with search radar, and with a good working knowledge of the anti-aircraft batteries with all de ired set-ups, manned the 5" control circuit at the search radar.

This system allowed directors to be coached onto a target more rapidly by the direct exchange of PPI and A-scope evaluations from ClC. And, it provided the directors with the ne t thing to IFF interrogation of their own.

dative bearings were used exclusively, and steps were taken to avoid errors caused by mixing up true and .relative bearings, During an overbaul the Mk 10 Target Designation transmitter were installed at the air search radar with provision for cranking in true bearing and tran mitting relative bearing. (This modification should be made only with permission of the Bureau of Ships

in e it may reflect back on the O.S.C. circuit and introduce an error.) This was a means of confirming . erbal information. Director Train Indicators were also installed at the air search radar to permit the gunnery liaison officer to keep track of he directors. These indicators gave relative director train and made mental calculations necessary to determine just which targets director were OD. This system suggests a CIC-QUllnery pro edure whereby target indication is made right at the air search gear in order to get first hand information including identification.


h USS BOSTON set up its target indi ation proced ure in a similar manner to by-pass the air


plot" table, going directly to the air search radar

for information. he BOSTON introduces

ingenious ship-made ins trument that elirninat true-relative bearing difficulties.

In thi et-up the Air Defen e Officer is tationed at the SK radar where he has full view of its PPI and A scope. A 5JP outlet has been installed at the selector switch normally u ed by the SK. operator, adding this control circuit to the circuits

. already available at this selector. This permits the

DO to switch directly to either batter, the computer, or to director control officers on the IJP or 2JP, to each Mark 34 Main Battery director (Mark 8 radar) OU the lJB or 2JB, or to the air plotting table in crc via 22JS. A separate 22JS circuit was in talled for exclusive use of the K operator.

In order that the ADO at the SK will not become isolated from e sential information that cannat be obtained from radar, a Composite Multiple Director Train and Bearing Indicator was designed, built, and installed by ship's personnel using materials available on board. Tbis instrument concentrates jn one pla e (near the SK) information which the ADO must compare constantly-director train I (relative and true), ship's head (true), target bearing and danger bearing (true). This is information ordinarily present on eparate indicators. The difficult problem correlating relative and true bearings is eliminated by this instrument. This indicator is fully described in Ideas of the Month, page 40.

This system has provided prompt target information directly from the air search radar to directors, eliminating the time lag of plotting the target reports in eIe before the information goes to the directors. I accomplishes other essential control considerations effectively: Safe firing bearings battery set-up to utilize all guns that can bear, et cetera. Officers' Stations and Duties and radar plan used under this ystem are:

Ounnery Officer, (sIP). On the Open Bridge or in Main Battery Control. Hears all orders to the batteries from the ADO, and advi es the Captain of range and bearing of attacks coming in, prob able number and altitude of planes, directors and mounts in use, and any other available information to assist the Captain in maneuvering the ship to repel the attack and to a aid torpedoes. Puts Mk 34 directors (Mk 8 radars) on the same relative bearings as Mk 37 directors (Mk 4 radars) thr ugh his ]C talker, who relays information to him from Mk 8 radar operators. Relays any addi-

tional information from Mk 8 radar to AD9 )

5JP, for e aluation by ADO in comparison with

indications' of master PPI of the SK radar and inrmation from 1\1.k 37 directors. Orders "Cease -ing" or "Do not fire," if the Captain so desires.

Oives Captain's orders direct to ADO.

• ir Defense Officer, (sJP). Stationed at the SK master PPI in CTC, alongside and to the right of the SK operator.

(I) When attack is imminent or expected, the SK operator then takes orders directly from the ADO. The SK Master PPI is put on the so-mile

cale, and the SK antenna is pllt on continuous sw€ep at high speed. Until targets show inside of 20 miles on the PPI, the SK operator watche his A scope, on the 75-mi1e scale. The ADO watches the ·PPI, with particular attention to the clear firing sectors, for targets within 28 miles. Targets first appearing within 20 miles indicate low Bying aircraft, probably torpedo planes.

(2) If targets are seen on the A scope within the 75-roi1e :range, the ADO directs the SK operator to stop his sweep and check for IFF and compd ition. Sweep is' stopped for a minimum time to accomplish thi. The ADO may shift the Master PPI to the 75-mi1e scale at this time for several sweeps to facilitate a check of the tb~aTing and to obtain a general picture out to:75 miles.

ie primary concern, however, remains with targets within the so-mile scale (checked almost ex-

clusively on the PPI). .

(3) When targets are picked up in the clear sector, the ADO designates a target for each director, the battery set-up to Air Plot, and coaches the directors on the targets by relative bearings and ranges. Directors report when on targets with Mk . 4' radars, and Air Plot officer notifies ~A~Db . when each computer has a solution, Air Plot officer calls out ranges 'of targets every 1000 yards. Director reports when ready to fire. When the target is within 12,000 yards (or other limiting range that may be prescribed by Task Group

om mander) , is definitely closing, and is in a lear sector; the ADO zives "Commence firing."

The ADO then watche director train and gives

"Cease firing" if directors train in a danger sector.

(4) The K operator gives continuous true bearings and ranges to the Air Plotting table without stopping the sweep. Thus the maintenance of a complete plot in CIC is not hindered.

(5) The SG operator right behind the DO calls out ranges and true bearings of any air targets he. observes on hi master PPI. If K cannot pick up these targets, SG ranges and bearings are used by the DO.

Fire Control Liaison Officer, (sJP). Stationed in CIC at ir Plotting Table. Keeps ADO informed of danger bearings and ector in true bearing by actually observing the remote PPI of the SG radar. Gives information received by TBS and gi e any additional information that may be available from the plotting.

Assistant ADO, (5JP). Stationed in Air Defense. Watches the general situation and orders "Check fire" or "Cease firing" if he sees other ships endangered by our fire. He assists Machine Gun Officer as necessary and keeps topside personnel and lookouts alert. Has lookouts search on bearings of targets. Gives ADO any available additional information. from observations. The 5]P talker, with Assistant ADO, operates "cease firing" contact-makers in Air Defense when ADO 01' As. sistant ADO orders "cease firing" on the 5JP.

Assistant Mk .37 Director Officers, (S]P). Stationed in Sky Forward and Sky Aft. Receive orders direct from ADO. Check onMk 4 radar and general director control Callout ranges and bearings as received from ADO. Report when radar has the target. Report when ready to fire. Inform director officers of battery set-up, and any other pertinent information' heard on sJP.

The organization, methods and techniques described by officers of these ships represent procedures developed by individual combat experience and are not to be interpreted as doctrine. Further, they are based upon existing shipboard installations and are being modified as' new target designation equipments are delivered to the Fleet.




A U.S. air communications ofjice1'says, "Probably the g1'eatest lesson we can derive f'r01?i this enemy (Japanese) document: is the knouiledge that the enem)! is monitoring all am circuits waiting /0'1" OU'f transmissions and deriving a great deal of iniormation. from them. He clearly demonstrates the abitit), to make the maximum use of an) violations of good security practices. Much could be done toward improoi: g aircrait communication securit» a well as imjJroving 'radio di cipline by giving wide di ernination to those portions of this document which demonstrate that the enemy makes good use of our weakness. Failure to follow the 'rules laid down fa?" 'Ood communicatum procedure results in giving the enemy information [or which he is eagerly waiting."

"C.Le." herewith carries out the recommendation above and prints in full the portions of the document rejerred. to by the air communications officer. These pm'lions raise the sobering que tum, Are ou·y communications as in ecure today as they ttJe?-e a year and a half ago?

1 inCPac-CinCPOA Spe i1LI ran Iatlon No. 55 of II .Japan e document dated 10 Dec. 19.~3 (capllll'cd at aipau] on Japanese a craft cornmuntearlons in the period 8 Dec. 19~1 to 31 Oct. ,1943.







It may be seen in the accumulation of batrle sons which follow that making u e of enemy (U.S.) communication is of great value in opera· tions, In addition to perfecting our own (Japanese) communication security, we must do our utmost to develop our own operations advantazeou Iy by obtaining enemy intelligence through the use of radio.

However, it goe without saying that in doinz this, the utmo t care must be e cercised 0 a not LO be taken in b the enemy's radio dec ption.

Moreover, making use of enem communications involves the interception of enemy communications over a broad area and over a prolonged period of time, the collecting of material (data) and the drawing of conclusions from thi ; al 0 listening to rei vane enemy communications and making tacti al use of it. Of zour e th ugh there i no harp ill tin ti n between th e tWO the former i zeuerallv done b hore units which have gr ater facilities for it. The s nthesizinz of all sorts of intelligence and fO:rW31"ClinO' of it to proper parties is genf'raUy atisfaciory Eor present

Ill-poses; however, .ontinued effort towards it rfection is e sen rial.

The latt r i jut now being 'organized on a separate basi. Al th ugh shore comm unica ion uni are p rforminz thi function for the m sf part, the nature of air operations in ta tical areas require the utrno t speed, and e en the rno t a curate and pertinent information i of 110. value if received too late. C nsequently, when awaiting reports from shore com units as at present, although there is no hindrance under excellent cond i nons, in general we are f.req uen el u nabl e to respond to' the enern 's movements. bus, it is wen to have a. separate enemy ommuni ation ecti n attached to each ommand which ba a direct part in th peration-at leas to every Koku entai ( arDi , Air Plot and Base Group)-and to. have it intercept principall enemy aircraft and submarine. commnnications.

Example: In the Battle of the Coral Sea the broadcast in tellJ zence reports of the fourth and eighth Com nit were generally rec ived too late [0 be of value.

FI: 11 I e hould be made of RD ' in combination with interception. By comparing th re ult ob'ned. the reliabilit of the information rna b . mcrea l.

1 c i we]] [Q make speciali ts of interception persoru el to train them for fixed dutie and to avoid hanging their as ianments.

The following are examples where ad ancage was taken of enemy ( .5.) communications.

xample: he movement of enemy planes and

air bases in the Aleutian Archipelago was in zeneral inferred by variations of signal strength. This was u ed to advantage in operations.

Example: t the time of the ail" attack. on Dutch Harbor the utter confusion of the enemy's movements was realized imme - arely by the enemy communication ection on the Flagship and important data wa obtained.

Example: In the Battle of the Coral Sea the frequencies of shorebased and carrier aircraft were well known. ince the greater part of enemy communication was in plain language.

Simply by intercepting these (U .. dispatches) we were able to a certain the nature of Ute reconnais ance communications of enem earch planes and of fizhter direction communications. Even with coded me aze the contents could be guessed from communicating periods, (priority) indicators and the substance of the code (continuous transrni ion and 0 forth), Much of this was of great value operationally.




The following are enemy reports from which we were able to derive advantage:

(a) "Enemy patrol planes discovered our tran port con or on the si. tho (Communications such a «We are about to occupy Woodlark Island," sent out in plain language, revealed the. movements of enemy task Eorces.)

(b) By intercepting the telephonic comnittnlcation of euemy fighter planes at dusk on the seventh, we were cognizant of the enemy's gradual approach.

(c) Through the interception of enemy communications on the eighth we learned that enemy aircraft transmitted a coded dispatch at 0525 in the morning, deduced that enemy searchplanes had discovered and were approaching our forces. Thu we were able to anticipate the time of their attack. This proved most val uable in air defense.

(d) We could tell that a large enemy formation had taken off from the great number of transmitter tuning-like sounds picked up.

(e) Through the interception of enemy fighter telephone communications we reported to the air unit commander (s) that enemy was well screened.

Example: In one of the olomons engagements the enemy's radio-telephone came ill very clearly •. and we ,~ere able to intercept easily. Since the greater part was in plain language, we were able to obtain a good deal of information about the enemy.

Example: In a South Pacific naval engagement threugb the interception of enemy aircraft communication we were able to surmise the number enemy carriers. the presence or absence of carriers in good condition, a so on.

Example: In the Maui operation the snd CarDiv intercepted enemy patrol plane telephonic communication. and through the strength of the signals received, estimated the movements and range of enemy planes. Tins re ulted in the alerting of AA lookouts and dispatching of fighter planes when signal strength increased considerably.

Example: In the first phase of the War a submarine engaged in patrolling Hawaiian waters intercepted the enemy transmitting a rendevous point in plain language to a group of merchant ships which were to enter Pearl Harbor. Although it stood by at the point given. the ships were never discovered; and it is believed that the submarine was deceived by a false


Example: At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor carrier bomber and fighter units picked up the Honolulu radio 011 the Type "KU" (homing radio) and used it to good advantage in their attack.

Notes: Results of experiments in radio broadcast control: (17J).

(a) Daytime (Tokyo, Se:ndai, Osaka, Nagoya broadcast with 10 KW).

Accurate homing is possible within a Go mile radius of the broadcasting station.

(b) Night time (Tokyo 1 KW and others below 500 W). Accurate homing is possible within a 40 mile radius of Tokyo.

ate: This entire article except for the two introductory paragraphs' direct translation of a part of the Japanese document.

The deoelopmenr of Fighte-r Direction and GIG the British Fleet has been on the same general course as that in the United States Fleet. imilar problems in personnel, training, and equipment and its location have been encountered, and solutions have freqttently been almost iden.tical. btu some interesting variations in organization and operational methods have been adopted by the British.

C I C in the

British fleet

In the early days of the war, we relied on the-British F1eet for operational experience in planning. The picture then reversed. but with the dosing of the European theatre operations thi is no longer true. It is interesting to observe that as their fleet undertakes operations in the Pacific. the differences between their techniq ues and ours are tending to vanish but not the difference in plan of organization. The fact that, given similar operational problems, the two fleets independently tend to arrive at similar solutions for radar operations and control argues the soundness of the chosen techniques.

The outstanding difference between the two is in organization: Our approach .ha been to centralize the function of CIG, wherea the British have leaned toward decentralization of the componen t functions. This difference is don bt less in part the outsrowth of the differing nature of the operations undertaken by the two fleets at the outset: Ours offensive, on a huge cale in the vast reaches of the Pacific, and those of the British primaril y defensive. with smaller units operating in a confined ocean area. Another factor tending to produce decentralization was the relatively la e

ignment to their GIC organization of responsiIlity for surface search and tracking, doubtless

because the German and Italian Fleets offered few

opportunities for radar tracking~ '. -


A successful radar controlled air intercept from a British ship in August 1940 won acceptance of fighter Direction in the Royal Navy. Three to five officers a month began 'getting intermittent Fighter Direction training at RAF and RNA Stations. By July .1942 the first training school for officers had begun operations at Yeovilton Air Station, and a year later a plotting school for enlisted men was added. Training was confined to air search and control problems, Early in '94'1 training on .surface search and control problems was begun when the 50-year-old School of a igation, F. M. S. DRYAD, was detailed jo take a er surface training of A.LO. At pres em, the Royal Navy has no combined fleet training center similar to the Pacific Fleet Radar Center which has been in operation since early 1943.


'With the in lallation of the <ighter Direction School at Yeo ilton, the Royal avy tepped up Fighter Direction training to 15 to 20 officer a month. To date about 420 have been qualified


L C r -<


o_ ..


This is th« i I,md of a Colossu« class carrier. T'he various components of the: "lelion In/ormation Orglln i 'til 1£011 are co-ord i na teet 1Ii' tile Navigator. The Operation Room is the closest approbch 10 a

'JC ill our sense.


AAPA'" DIH .... " lOO/ll

as intercept officers. At first the students were drawn entirely from the fleet and so had the advantage of navigational experience, Fifty per cent of the students are now coming directly :from officer training schools.

-....t...~ H. M. S. DRYAD gi e training chiefl to ! _)\ senior officers with operational experience and to entire ship teams. There is no basic training course to qualify inexperienc d officers for qc dut as at our NTS (TR), E 11, wood, but I f~'ns for this are in the making.


To overcome inadequacies arising from the late tart in providing enlisted training, the entire program was overhauled in 1 944- The new program

et up three radar-plot rates and requires all radar per onnel to take a conversion course. This proces weeds om low grade op ra tors , refre hes the skilled, and produces a high over-all standard of proficiency. It take time, however, and the outlook is that al'l fleet requirements 'will not he filled by January 1946.

TRAINING IS MOSTLY SYNTHETIC NOW --.I. e-, Lack of radar eq uipmen t for training ~. and bad flying « eather have placed chief reliance on synthetic problem. Training ha been further handicapped b the lack oE coordinated air-surface exerci es, ari ing from the fact that Yeovilton was originally concerned only in the air aspect and the Fighter Direction school had to be situated in a training area away from the sea because of operational considerations imposed by the war. A new training center at Kete will make po ible the staging of more ac ual intercep ion problems. The need a provide thorough raining on urface problems is recoznized and action is no " being taken to broaden thi training. With the ad ent of the Briti h Fleet in the Pa ific,




where there is continuou need: to employ radar information for surface search, navigation, assistance to gunnery, and so on, interest in surface radar information has grown prodigiously, and thi i radically influencing the nature of the training conducted by the Royal avy at home.



The Royal 'Navy's Cle afloat bears the title, "Action Information Organization," and is usually referred to as the AlO. But rather than a center like ours, it is composed of five separat closely coordinated organizations occupying sep

rate paces aboard ship, he spaces and short

title axe:

ircraft Direction Room Operations Room

Target Indication Room Bridge Plotting Room Radar Display Room

(AD )

(Ops) (TIR) (BPR) (RDR)

be complete array is in all ships down to destroyers. Destroyers have the same arrangemen t on a smal ler scale, except for the AircraEt Direction Room, and tep are now under wav to add thi .

Confidential Admiralty Fleet Orders, promnl!!ated 14 December 1944. define policy and procedure for the Action Information Organization. in part, a Eollo

"The primary object of A. 1. O. is to serve the Command with a picture of the tactical and straeegical situation, both surface and air, which is up to date, comprehensive and readily intelligible .. The term 'Command' in this context is taken to mean the dmiral and hi operational staff and/or the Captain and his executi e pecialist officer ...

"The econdary object of A. 1. O. is to direct th I\' ap n r in luding the air weap n, on to h targets .......

"In a tion the primary duty of the Command to control and fight the ship or squadron. It is nsidered that this can, in general. be t be done

from the compass platform or Admiral's Bridge.

"It therefore follow that the . I. O. must be capable of presenting the 'whole picture of the up-to-date situation to the Command at his Action Slalion, and in such a IOI-m as will enable him to appreciate the ituation easily and rapidly. The Bridge Plotting R om is provided expres 1 Eor this purpose and sited accordingly i.e. where po - sible immediatel beneath the Compass Platform and adja ent to the Admiral's Bridge, with a viewina' device from the former to enable the plot to be readily seen therefrom. . . .

"From the foresoinsr it follows that the general control of the A. 1. O. must be exercised by the Command. The avigating Officer will be responsible for the efficient working of the machine as a whole. On him or One of the other specialist officers compri inz the Command will also fall th duty of "Appreciator" in the 'Bridge Plotting Room .... \.

DUilES OF THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS -..t...~ The Aircraft Direction Room is reo .' )\ sponsible for.handling alldefensiv -flights,

r homing planes, and for maintaining a complete air information picture and feedinz this information to the other department . h ADR is efficiently set up and operated on all ships. parti ularly on "tbe new carriers. The ADR' have a main vertical di pla plot and one intercept position except on carrier and spe ia1 Fighter Dire - tion ships which have two or more intercept positions. Each intercept position consists of a skiatron and at least one PPJ. ew ships have used the skiatron for interception, but rely on the PPI as we do. Considerable use is still made of computers and polar plots. though thi i apparently giving way to control directly from a PPJ.

......._~ The Operation Room (with which the ! )\ BPR is combined in some classes of ships) i responsibl for 0 er-all control of operation, and maintaining and evaluating the surface situation and reportin it to all interested parties. On carriers, Ops also controls strike aircraft from air information relayed from the ADR. he most distinctive feature of the Ops Room on all ships is a general operations plot, which is a DRT with a spider's web projected on to it. Till. plot is

suaUy 6 by 4 feet, centrally located. There are '0 such plots on the larger ship the econd u ed to display local operations onl -

h arzet Indication Roo is headed by a

fficer 'who :is respo '. ible for indicating to the Director and gu.n:'piot, both b remote indicator and by phone, what targe to take under lire. The TIR controls the 293 radar which provide short ranee display of air and surface targets. The . IR also has a target indicatinz unit which can designate four tal'gets at once. There are two of these indicators on some of the larger ship. In addition. there are remote scopes fOT ideo tification of targets.

he Brid e Plotting Room ( mbined with the Operation Room in some clas es of ship) receives information continuously from ADR, Ops, and

IR, evaluates and di plays it to' Command. The Flag when aboard has direct access to this display, but the captain sees it only through a viewer cut into the deck of the bridge, Since the ADR is remote from the bridge, there is no wa for the captain to ee the air display plot.

In the Radar Display Room. information from all radar aboard is re eived and hown 011 remote displays. The RDR is responsible for feeding information on air and surface ranze and bearings. height. readings and estimations, and identifications to the other control Rooms.

~"" Performance of British radar is similar . X. to our. except for lack oE continuous antenna rotation, which is almost e sential to the proper correlation of the five components of the AlO. Fully rotatable equipment is beinz in talled in the fleet as fast as production permit. Another improvement being a retentive, remote

- cope which scans selected sectors during continuous antenna rotation. This permits estimations oE size, altitude, and identification of echoes while 3600 search is beine maintained. Other equipment scheduled £01' early addition in ADR, Op and BPR is the auto radar plot. skiatron displa i projected on to a large plotting surface

" equipped with a Dead Reckoner mechani m, It will be u d primarily for the t urfa e pi ture.


-...l..~ Aircraft direction in the Royal Navy is ! X. under administrative control of the 5th Sea Lord who, through his subordinate commands, determines policy and plans on officer personnel, radar equipment, ship installations. and fighter direction procedures and tactics. Now tha AIO has been given responsibility for surface earch and control a similar administrative organization has developed to oversee the fleet's perations Room.

c... C r-<


more plan

BB Iowa

These excellent cle perspectiue plan uiews were prepared by the Pacific Fleet Radar

CA Quincy

'ter. Oi

I.() 0
~ 0
=> L.
-, C
0 r
0 -0



eVE Block Island

ms showing C! e arrangements in other type ships are on page 25 of the May 1945 u C. I. c."

APD Barber

One of the easiest ways to aid the Japs is to violate Communications orders and doctrine and tie up our m n nets. This can forestall all efforts to "home" a lost plane, prevent warning a task force of approaching Jap planes, and, on a good day, even narl up a major operation .. Here are three reports ele ted from the man coming from the Pacific which show that

irresponsibility on the airway by our own personnel i

till jamming OUI communications far more effectively than the Japs can manage with radio countermeasures. In view of such facts, can ships and squadrons fail any longer to put an end to these offenses?


«It is strongl recommended tha in extended operation til MAN 01'uit not be used during slack periods for news broadca ts or for exchanges f plea antries between operators. On two occasions it was noted that C • 52 and CTG 51.15 u ed the circuit for such and on the evening of 29 April when the USER OR was struck by a uicide plane and her communications knocked out, he was overheard to have great difficulty in getting communication with other rations because the operator at CTF 52 was jamming the circuit with a news broadcast. the 'TF 52 operator

pparently did not hear the frantic transmission going on at Kerame Rhetto, this vital circuit was rend red virtually tl eless at a most critical time. It is felt that tran mi ions f this sort tend to aggrava[e the breakdown in circuit di cipline uch a r ently occurred in the Hollandia area pri.or to the Le te operation and in the Philippine area '\1 t after he e te opera tion."


Lt. 'orbes oE VPB-l n was providing interdic 'on of enemy airfields north of the fast carrier 'while the were refueling n ar Okinawa on- 26

larch. His PB4Y en ounter d en my air raf and tried to end a contact report to alert the carrier. Th . zot the urgent nta t reI rt five hour later. "\ hat might have happened to he. carrier force in this five hours with the enemy approaching needs no comment.



Here are the d tail. QUGtiI g 1:1' 01 the action report: • r. orbes tempted to end ~l contae report _ ba e and all forces involv ed ~ , t was nable to mi. e;.the ba e. .iother station hox ever, picked up sage

of the contact, and a III equent report of the engagement .and tela ed them to base. hey were not received, however, unril five hour after they had been sent. The plane's radio equil)~ent is believed to have been entirely satisfactory, btu the reception at ba~ was unquestionably poor.


.. <orbes likewise attempted to reach the' carrier force to warn it of the

enemy's pre ence, u ing the assigned VHF channel. The channel, bowe er, was in use for at lea t an hour bv hip of the flee.t calling for replacement

upplies such as landing hooks, etc., Thi stock report continued until making the contact rep rt was unnece ar . It is not kno n why the tactical VHF channel was u ed for this pUl'p se. dditional effort to raise the fleet on other VHF channels likewise was fruitle .

"The pilot exhausted all means at his disposal in efforts to break in on the conversations occupying the various channels and circuits."

Apparently another example of improper use of circuit on which urgent emergency transmissions may be necessar at an t time.


o registered a he prate . is

In..:-.his report on January operati, 11 , Commander CVGparticularly vigorous protest again t bad radio discipline. quoted in full below.

"Too stronz a protest cannot be made again t the almost complete break-

town of radio discipline which occurred durinz these operations. 1 ot only were too man eparate Iunction assigned the arne frequency but no attempt wa made by ships or pilots to observe even the basic fundamentals

of radio discipline. •

"Pilots zalled each other by ni kname t x hange le ex repartee and small talk. which had absolutel r no r Iation to the mission in 01 ed. Controlling destroyer con tantIy tested Tadl 'with their 'Jack' and equally constantly checked their positions b radio. Even the Ionz establi bed and accepted • party-line' practice broke down completely. Pilots and ship broke into transmissions which were not completed and prevented an

ernblance of order.

"It uias next 10 impossible to get a mes age through, and if accomplished wa nly done s b creaming as loudl a possible in. the hope of overriding whatever a inine conve sation might b on the air at the time. In many instances, re cue transmission b pilots of thi and other air groups were got through only with the zreatest of difficulty and even then onlv after undue delay.

"The only cure for this infe tious di ease appears to be a can tant reminder that there is such a thing as radio discipline-what it consists ofhow it works-and 1vhy it must be ob erved, ·The strike freq1.tency should. be monitored by (fag ships to the extent feasible and disciplina1Y action taken against offenders"

• Italics by "C. I. ."

These reports aTe reprinted. from Air Op Memo, Commander A! Force. Pacifu: Fleet, and [rtnn on Actio,) Report of U HUTCHINS.


}) })


air support control units

In amphibious landings the IC aboard the Bag. ship and aboard other ships in the force must work in very close harmony with Commander Air Support Control Units (CAsGU)l. This brief outline of the CASCU_: organization, nets employed, and the duties of the officers manning these nets should interest a11 CIC personnel participating in au invasion of enemy territory.


The control of all aircraft (except spotting planes) in the area of an amphibious operation i placed under the Commander Air Support Control Unit (CASe ) for the operation. He is aboard a Headquarters Ship or AGe with the Naval ask Force Commander and the Landing

-orce Commander and their staffs. The Commander (usually a Navy Flyer of the rank of Captain or Commander) exerci es this control through


1 ee·Pigllter Direction ill 1111 )lmphi/);ou Operation, February 1945 -c.r, C."




the Air Support Control Unit operating in the GC Joint Operations Room, so called because it is the operations room for both CASCU and LFC.


The Air Support Control Unit is composed of about 12 to 15 officers and about 40 to 50 men. The Commander of the Unit exercises control o er the various planes and air activities in the area through the officer who man the various nets. The nli ted men maintain a regular-watch with earphones and microphones cut in on all nets which need to be monitored and take down a typewritten log of aU conversation over the nets.

The Commander of the ir Support Control nit does not man any net though at his position he Call plug in his earphone or mike on any circuit and listen in or take control if he so de ires. I ormally however, he supervises the whole operalion, answers questions, dictates procedure. aI make all final decisi n a to use of planes a especially their eli position in emergency.


... I ... SAD (Support Air Direction) Net.

Tbe officer on thi net (a pilot) directs all a ircraft ell gaged ill gTound support. He talks to the planes ar their initial points. assigns them uieir m1l;~.ion threugb Olelr HlgJ;n leader and reo ceives their report on results of a mission. Planes coming "011

tation' at an Jnltial poinl report in fa CASCU on this net.

Also on this net is the Air Coordina or, a naval aviator who flies over the target area' on a regular' patrol. studying the terrain and all ground activities. When it has been determined to assign if mi sion to aircraft, the SAD officer often tells the Air Goordinator to lead the flight to the t.arget and, if necessary, to further designate it by a dummy Tun Or strafing or a smoke .bemb.


... .2 ~ SAD-E (Support Air DIrec.tion Emergency) Net.

This net is available fOJ' emeJ'gency use by the SAD officer in case oE failure oE the SAD circuit.

ilso it may be used in case (1) the SAD net is busy will] a mission and another Jlight wishes to check in "on station" OJ' make an imporlant report, and (2) jf certain planes are not equip] ed 10 communicate on the SAD frequency.

... 3... SAR (Support AIr ReqlJe~) Net.

The control officer on this net talks to the Air Liaison Parties with the troops. There will !;leIS ALI's if one dlviskm comprises the auacklng force and 26 or more if there are two or aore divisions, 'so it is apparent that this may hI: II very busy net.

,Vhen the SAR officer receives a request for a mission from an ALO. be fills out a mis ion card on which he lieu, alUOIJg orhei Lhlng!\, the description and location o[ target, nature of attack and time desired. location of. friendly from Jines, whether marked by panels, etc, The R officer passes this on to [he ACl officer.

The SAR officer mu 1 atlvise the ALO promptly as 10 the decision on all request and also give the ALP all Information that may be helpful. Also the SAR officer hould obtain much valuable iuformauon on the ground siruation from ALPs.

This net is also employed by CASCU for communlcarion with thecarriers Iu rnish ing planes and with any land bases Iurnlshing aircraft III [be objective. This is of particular Interesr to CIC Inasmuch :.t" fighter cover arrangements are made over lhi net.

... 4... SAO (Support Air Observation) Net.

The control offi er is in communication wi h the Alr 01 server, a Marine or Army officer, Hying usually in a VT or VOF over, and constantly observing, the battle area. He reports on friendly aud enemy forces and their movements and is most. helpful in advlsing CASCD, lind Irequently the Landing "Force COJ1)IDRnder, as to the ground situation, ALl's monitor tltis net and are often able. to gel valuable i nlormation on the overall plcrure,

In large operations it has been found desira.ble to lise two Air Observers, so there rnay be two SAO control positions at the CA CO Table.

.... 5 ~ LAW (Local Air Warning) Net.

The c~nt.1' J officer handles all planes on anti-submarine . airel. Actually he Iistens with split earphones on LWO netsthe LAW net and the LAVv seeonda y net. On the AW net

he receives the planes as they report [or anti-sub patrol ann keeps in [ouch with them as they search for enemy tills that might attack the naval force. Planes report any sub contact on this mil. Lf the LAW oflker requests the Flag Operation Officer te assign a destroyer for Hunter- Killer search with the plane reponing the contact, communications bel ween the destroyer and plane are usually transferred, to the LAW econdary net to avoid cluttering up the l,AW net and preventing normal traffic.

Of particular importance to eTC and Fighter Direction personnel is the facl that the LAW net is abo used to broadcast air raid alerts-econdirlons blue, Ted and white-and control CODdition on the beach-that is, whether AA will or will not Are at air raiders. Thi is of great concern to all intercept officer controlling night fighters .

... 6... ASR (Alr-SeaRescl.le) Net.

'This net is Jn contact wilh DUMllO Jll:l1'lc.~, subs, and surface craft assigned to the rescue or pilots forced down in. LIle water, As soon as the control officer receives word of a downed plane, he promptly dispatches rescue craft to the spot by use of previously arranged reference points and follows up on the rescu e effort •

... ·7.... GW (General Warning) Net.

On this circuit are Commanders of the.various Arrack and Naval Task Forces and groups such as CVs, CVEs, bombardment and transport groups. etc.: and it is used tQ broadcast general warnings of enemy air, surface, or submarine attacks.

11'1 many cases one net control officer monitors both the above net - Rand G\\I-witb split earphones, a traffic 011 both is, due- 10 their nature, compararlvely infrequent.

... 8 IJ- ASC (Air Support Command) Net.

his WlI' formerl)' tailed the ICSA (Lnter·Command Support Aircraft) net and provides coirm1Unication between the Commanders of various Air upport Control Units such as the Unit with ibe Task Force Commander lind chose with each Task Oroup Commander (at' Leyte there were six AGiO; and C SC s) and with a CASCU that may go a hore ;1S soon as a beachhead is establi bed. Also this net provides commuuicaLion wirh the Commander of the C' • gT0up and changes 01 schedule for planes 00 station OT on patrol, or pecial bomb loadings of plan is arranged on this circuit. JL is an important net for admini trative purposes.


F he Irequenci 1I ed [01' these various net have become Cairly standard, but may Change. They may always be found, in the operation plan covering the particulnr Invasion at hand,

91 th« nets S6t torUI above till; lAW anti CHi' nets will probably be monitored ill CIG in all ships al tile objeciiae IlIvl the 017:£.'s slane/iug oD Jome 40 or 50 miles. Tile ASR /let will 116 monitored ;n CIG aboard. all destroyers OT other .fhips employeci in rescue uiorh, The SAO tl.etll1c!)' he man· itored in 01C by vo.riOlI.l' shil's fOT information collcerning the situation on the beach, such as [rant lines anci progres of troops. The dR net may be monitored in CIC abonrd eerrier« lrut jlrobably 1I0t Oil other type. The other nels mentioned. (lye 110! li/tely to be manned or monitored in CIC.


Q'tale of two life rafts

could you erect this reflector for multi-place rafts in the dark?

If there' a pilot or aircrewman who isn't II friendl terms with radar corner refle lars, who hasn't practiced erecting one so that he could do the job in the dark with old fingers, 'then he mjght.wellread the e two little stories,

I he couldn't erect it

Fir t, can ider th as f a fizhter pilo , whom we can call Ensign Blank. l'ep rt states that Ensign Blank was f reed to make a water landing in his F6F-3 late Ol e afternoon off the oa t hom NAS Puunene, Maui, His life raft was well equipped with. rescue aids, including a Very pistol with flares, dye marker, awhistle, two waterpro I fla hlighrs, fix t aid book. bo k on urvival, mirror and Radar Comer Refle tor 'lX-13'i / ' Ensign Blank heard planes overhead. e eral times durinz th night, and fired his Vel' pistol until his ammunition ran out, Hi comment f 110w :

"I didn't break ut m radar r fI. ctor un il I had used my last Ver star. I worked with Lite. creen for about an hour but bad difficulty in erecting the reflector properly in the darkness. [ don't trunk I ever got it up properly. I think all pilots ought to have a tual drill in erecting one or the . 1 had seen ne ere ted only a few day bel r but hadn' ere ted it m If. I finally gal one trianzl of the refle tor tretched out and k pt it rotatinz over m head mtil I wa tired. I hay been told since that the radarmen in the TBl\f's



aw mall blips in th . ar a wh re Lwas, 0 perh ps the effort was not ntirelv in vain ... 1 ihir ever pilot should be check d Out on the pr .edure for erecting the radar refle tor in the dark."

En ign Blank wa 're cued the next morning after TBM's direc ed hip to the scene. But he might have been rescued the night before if he had known what to do with hi corner refle t r. The fact that the TB { radar operator saw small blips indicates that aircraft were searching for him with radar.


but they knew how


# :y

RA D publications to come

r t

Review f RAn publications ONE throuzh ·rNF, all in prepamtion except 3, 4, al1d 5, Were print d iJl~ the June 1945" .I.C." Three more RAO' } TEN through TWELVE, are also in preparation, Brief reviews below outline their contents, They will be i sued at a yet undetermined dates po sibly some months from now. The hort and long titles of ail [he RAn' are gi en for convenient reference.

RADONE-A -The Capabilities and Limitations of


RADT\"O-A -Tactical Use of Radar in Aircraft RADTHREE - he Radar Operator's Manual RADFOUR -The Air Ploning Manual

RADFIVE -The Surface Plotting Manual


RADSEVE -Radar Countermea ure Manual

RADEIGHT =Aircraft Control anual

I{ADNT. ' -The Operational Uses of Radar 1Il mall Vessels

ItADTEN -The .irborne Radar Operator's



,ADELEVEN -The Shipboard Radar Countermeas-

ure Operator's Manual

R.-mnVELV£- he Airborne Radar ountermeas-

lire perator's Manual


RADEUVEN is written fm' the operator of surface radar COU 1.1 termeasu res eq ui pmen t and bears the tame relation to RADSEVEl'I as does RADTHREE to ItADONE. It repla es the "RCM Operator's Manual (Temporary)" now in use in the Fleet, The introduction contains a brief di u, ion' of the ba kground and hi tor of 'radar countermea ures, its apabilities and limitations, tacti a1 application and operational uses 1:0 in ure the nece ary understanding of the importance of the operator's position and the relation which his work bears to that of cre. Tbe introduction includes a short discour all enemy equipment the operator wi 11 encounter and is followed by four main Parts.

Pan I deals with radar intercept and includes procedure for tanding int r pt wat he interpretation of intercepted signal, and reporting and evaluating uch intercepts. Th variou uses to which the inter ept information can be put are thoroughly di cussed. This is followed by detailed operating procedures Ior all radar intercept equipment, both "interim" and ultimate types,

In turn Parts 11, III, and IV follow the outline f Part I for radar jamming eq ui pment, shell and ro k t 'Vindow, and radar-decepti n device.

he publication is thorough 1, illustrated and the op rating in tructions are presented in the [arm which ha proved most 1" adily a imilat d b / both the experienced and uninitiated operators.


RADl'WELVE is written for the operator of airborne radar countermeasure equipment paralleling RADELlWE and bears the same relation to RAn· <;E . N as does RADTEr to RADTWO.

Tb E rmat and ontents of the publication are imilar to R DELEVEN except for actual equipment and tactical appli ations involved.


o o

<c ,



On the other hand, there's the case of a Superfortress rew wh i h had been gi en some trainiug wi th corner reflectors. ccordinz to a report from the 21 l Bomber Command 1 1 men were resell d with the aid of an 1\1, -13 / corner refle iJ r, the typ used in rnul ti-plac nit.

he report state that a :j3-2.!) was for ed to make a water landing east of the Mariana becau e of adverse headwinds and la k or fuel. The 1 I new members climbed into two multi-place life raft. and erected a corner reflector.

. Less than five hour later, ay' the A.'\F repor . a Na 'PB i picked up the radar comer refl tor on its scope from ]0 mile at an altitude of 800 to 1000 Fe t. The PB directed a eaplane tender, th BERING STRAIT, to the cene and the BElU G STRAIT it elf pi k d up til r A ('tOT at a range oE 5 miles.

ignaling mirrors and a sea marker were used by the urvivors to maintain contact with the PBM, which came to the eerie and dropped a ralt. sustenance kit, cigarettes, and a can containing; Ul e e tirna ed ti me of arri va 1 of [he resell e hip. all within )0 feet of the raft,

Five hours after being ighted by the PRM, the urvi or . were pi, k d up by the BERIN G R. IT-thanks in part to the corner refl tor.

s di tribution f orner reflectors borne. more and more wide pread, they can be expected to help in more and mOT~ re cues-iE pilots and crewmen know how to erect and use them. Th e~ are impl to erect, 011 e the procedure is under-

toed, In rruction are packed wi h each refle tor and hould be read before trouble ccurs, A nine-minute trainins film, 1 -4990' "AirborneRadar Liferaft Reflector ," 11a been distribute and hould be viewed ball 'ew. hat nin minutes might make a lot of diffeterrc some day ~



RADT:EN parallels RAOTHRE and presents for the airborne radar operator the same material as that included in RADTHREE for the surface operator. • U of the current airborne equiprnents are overed in detail in 1 udiuz operating in true ions and tactical appli ati n , all appropriately illu traced.

he subje t matter i rimilar to that presented in ItADTHREE including [he necessaTy backzround and i , therefore, not repeated here.




Type Class Si~e Uflits Tonnage Speed Cruising Ra;,f'
Cruiser LClLgth Beam Groos urf 1,b Miles@ Knots
1IIIiII&._ ..
1-5 320' x 30' 3 Ig<IO 17 8 15,000 14
....... _ _': 1-9 873' x 31' 6 2200- 17 8 15·oUO 14
......:.._ h6 335' x 30' U 2100· 17 7 15.000 '4
- ~
-~ l-t5! 3!1L' 26' 7 IOSU 20 8 7000 lol
1,'161 3~1' K 26' !I 1635 1Q 8 6~oo 10
. - .5 ..,_.
I-lil5 321' x 20' I 1635 19 8 6200 16
1cl16 335' x 27' 8 1600 23 8 .. 8000 16
tILE , ..,_.
·I-lIol - - 5 nkuown - - -- -
·r·g,51 _-_ - 2 1500 - - -.- -
-1-!l61 -- - 12 UOO - - -'_ -
M - .. I-I~I 279' x Jl4' 2 1100 14: 6 12.000 10

·I-5~ 360' ... 2,9' 7 ~oo 16 8 8000 16
·1-53 360' x 291 3 2800 16 8 80no 14
-'-400 - - 3 3000 - - -- -
Coas/ill r .
"r ? RO-.!!5 255' 24J 8 16
x 15 950 20 5000
1 .. RO-57 238' x 23' !I goo ·7 9 6000 10

·5 RO·60 '250' x 24' 5 gS8 16 S 3601) q

.& RO'loo 180' X 20' 14 500 14 2500 1"2
iiiiiiiiii::_1 ii1III uRO-soo 24'1' x 21' 2 7'!0 21 8 181000 e
.. 1;j
• skunk


New classes of lap subs.

Built In Gtrmu1l.),.



S ubmarines, midget subs and small attack craft ha been and will un. doubtedly continue as potent strike weapons-suicide and otherwiseof the Japanese Fleet. Jap barge traffic, trying frantically to keep both invaded and by-pa sed Jap garrisons supplied, is entering the SLIr ace pi ture with increased prominence.

Radar operators with the responsibility of dete ting these skunks, and Cl.C watch, officers upon whoseevaluation of such contacts our defense may depend. will find help in knowing the size, peed and operating range characteristics of Japanese craft. Naval Intelligence ba uncovered much information of value to GrG. However, uti article does not cover every type of attack craft thought to be emplo ed by the Japanese. CIG per. sonnel should not assume immunity when contacts are picked up which fail 0 faU within the size, speed and tactical employment categories pre en ted herein.


Based upon its record of past performance the Japane~e Submarine Fleet does not appear as much of a threat. evertheless, submarines remain one of Japan's more powerful. weapons. ''''hile her other major combatant unit l ere taking their beating from OUT air- urface offensive, Jap subs have been harbored dose to the homeland. New construction has been very nearly on a par with combat and operational losses, running more to the I-Type (over 1000 tons) than the RO Type (500-1000 tons). Furthermore, a n w YU Type, operated strang Iy enough by the Army. will probably release addi ional a y sub for more aggressive chores. Construction oE a new- HA class (under 500 tons) indicates activity by smaller subs. year ago 500 selected Jap sailors were taking special courses under the Germans. The gellerai characteri tics of Japanese submarines shown in the table will be of interest to ere personnel a Jap sub how offensive inclinations.


Some midget subs are to the Jap I and RO class sub wbat BA.KA is to the Betty 22. The parent sub gives her hitchhiker the necessary crui iug range, while the midget'S own torpedo load ha deadly striking power for far rea hing effect. Other midgets are carried cargo fashion on special) . fitted eaplane tenders and Jap capital ships. !fidget subs are standard in size. A captured midget sub manual indicates three types-the g.O, OTS , and H·1. The KO type is thought to be standard. 82 feet in length and with a 6 foot beam this ype can make 22 knots for a short period (about ten minutes). For normal operations speeds of '6 to 9 knots are probable. The H • I is 82 feet long. 6 feet wide with speeds up to 16 knots and an operating radius of 60 to 80 miles (submerged in the daytime. surfaced at night). The midgets can and do operate without the hitch-hiking feature havinz a cruisinz range of 120 to 180 miles on their own without battery recharge from an au ide sour e. This limit them to a 60 mile cruising radius unless a ricide venture is prescribed. Coastal indentations near areas oE obvious future operations provide concealment for midget bases. When they go pick-a-back 011 lar er subs. attacks are po sihle at any distance,


GIC is becoming more and more concerned with enemy small craft.

These small units are dangerou not alone by nature of their design. but


when xrupled with fanatic efforts of a suicide-bent pilot and crew, tl:!.ey present a onstant threat to our ships, Iarsre and mall. Shore bombardment . and fire support missions can expect increased harassing. Ta ls group cruising i not immune to the longer rang, high peed (up to 35 knots) e - 'plosive motor boats. nd a GIC watch in port «an c, peet to become involved with neak activities of small enern units at an time.

Recent information tells that the errnans

senerou Iy exposed their small surface and submersible craft to the .Japane e before bowing out .of h stilities. The fact that the Germans were 'past masters at development and employment of · neak -weapons plu the fact that our Fleet operations and bases are drawing nearer to Japane

"1 aters quite suitable for large-scale sneak craft ,opera tions, also serves to magnify probabilities of th i type of attack.

In construction these Japanese sneak craft are apparently tossed together from anything available at the time. Most model seem to f Ilow the pattern of their German counterpart. orne boats are rigged to explode upon contact, others throw out d pth harzes or mines wh re the will .do the mot damaze. Th l'e are two general types.

1 e Army type which can be identified by its · ide and stern launching rack for depth charges, Th Na 'craft carry a d molition charge in the bow. [leak attack tactics are carefully worked out, ;and per onnel attached to these units are carefully · chooled in th e tactics.

The following characteristics of some Japanese a sault craft are of gcn era lin tere t and rna he of

value when radar pi k up small, fast mo inz indi at ns,

ix Cylinde1' Moto« Boats (Army) Spced-up to 35 knot.

tize=: V2 fe t long, 5~ feet wide.

R011lTe-fuel capacit for 56 gallons. A'rminrr-two 120 kg. depth charges. Tactics-Ttl h head-on toward a hip' hull.

Depth charze an be dropped 10 e aboard, or relased autornaticall if boat is [Q .ra h tarzer, Radar Lead. Boats (Anny)

peed-ab ut 1 knots.

SiZG-l 1;'2 Eeet long.

Range-Io hours of normal speed. Radas=Ot: transmitting and two recei mg

. agi antennas mounted horizontally, Frequency 373 me, PRF-3000 gs., pulse width-2.5 microe onds, ffecrive range limits 436 yds. minimum, .1. I mile maximum.

Torpedo Launching Landing Burges (A1·m.y)

• jJeed-approximately 9 knots. ize-49 feet long 12 foot beam.

Rttnge-carries one 50 zallon Iuel tank. Tactics-probably used in night attacks. Ex-

U' mel uln rable ex ept in coordinated 'night


Maru. RE and Ma+« RO (Army). (RE-cYIJress construction; RO-veneer COil


Size~16Y2 feet long, 5~ to G foot beam.

.. peed-approximately 18 knots, loaded. Range-Io hours at averaze peed. T'actics-sxuti at our ships at top peed and cry

to tr ik hull at engine room. ornetirnes a T -

A [ast: Mo/,or Torpedo Boat


=:l .....,

. 1 1.10 ih, IIX11IO$;lli' charge in the bow


Dl!plh Charges relen eel freaT 711111 •

turn is made near the hip, and depth charzes are ropped from two racks at boat's stern.

Pontoon Torpedo Boat . Size-tG eet long .

(This information taken rom Jap diary at Anzio, Luzon, tellinc of alta k made with propelled pontoons made of yen er,

Q-Bot1ls t: avy).

ize-approximatel' 14. eet. by 7 feet.

Speed-appr. imatelv kn t .

Tactics-they sometime approach iu same manner as our own small boats. In one in ranee they approached a DD u inz oar. ~Iot were tarted when near the DD and the boat was

teered around the faruail in a manner that indicated that the b at wa dispatched Erom the DD, and ontinued full sJ) ed into th ide of an uu-

uspecting ship nearby. hese boats are u ually

hauled up on hare and concealed by camouflage.

Assaul! emolitiou Boat (t av)'). Size-15 feet long, 5 foot beam. fJeed-up to 35 knots.

Tactic -de izned to be carried at davits 011 transport or to operate from naturally carnouRaged shelt 1'5 a hare. The pilor u ually approa hes the target at slow peed. pens up to flank peed

nee he has picked out a pecifi target, arm die emolition charge at a di ranee of about lOP yards and final! jump off th tern nee the b at is aimed to ram.

and personnel behind the s-bal). Their transportation sen ice' now depend largely on mall cargo ve cis and barge traffic.

Barges known to be used are commonly of the large type called ype . Adapted from the flapramp fi bing boa, their metal hull with wo den bra e and a twin keel gives them stability when beaching. The overall length is 49 feet and the beam is about 12 f et, Power d b a 60 hp Di et or gasoline motor, the Call travel at about 8 kno . A hese barges rely upon darkness and camouflage

for protection and call cover from 50 to 60 mil from sunrise to unset. hose used in the Philippines traveled singly, or in small groups. Sometime they were escorted by motor torpedo boat. o casionally b a de troyer.

new class of small cargo vessel has been ill construction at Hong Kong for two or more years. This es el i a normal Sugar Charlie ugar (gros tonnage 800) with length of 210 feet and a 32-£00r. beam. I speed is estimated to be 10 knQLS.

Foul' classes of Jap Patrol Frigates. of which there are more than 100 aft at, vary in length from 220 to 275 eet and in widtb from 27 to 3r. feet. Gross tonnage varies from 300 to 1200 among the classes. These frio-ate are radar equipped and are capable of speeds of 14 to 19 kn ts.

These are but a I w of the surface vessel t pes. They indicate the 'wide u e Japan is mak-. inz of small cargo tran ports. Perhaps more of a navigational hazard than a ombatant threat. these p tential "skunks" will concern Ie personnet with increasing frequenc s:

Tau Mit 2 nil/fir leads ttie IIU/l(11.


Allied air p wer has pla ed Japane e Naval units responsible Ear transportatiou of supplies

'., UlIIIlc/lillg racl:« 111',' of sillll/lt! construction.


one SG

for overhead


This vertical range cO'IJcrtlge paUI!T1I of the Zenith Walch is ba.sed largely 011 flight tests mnde with a B-26 plane II.; the target. ~

• An SO with this antenna can detect air targets overhead.

To provide the flee.t wit. h equilj; ment Ior detecting enemy ai. craft overhead-especially tho e employing suicide tactics-the Radar Design Section of the Bureau of Ship has initiated a radar conversion kit bearing the title Field Cbange o. 54.

nder Field Change 54 the antenna reflector and feed (not pedestal) of one of the SG-l equipments, on vessels having two or more SG-I'S,. will be replaced by a "Zenith Watch" antenna and R. F. feed. The installation of the Zenith Watch antenna on an SG-l will convert it to an SG-l c. If the change i made to an equip-

_ menl: having Field· Change o. so.

"SG Modernization," the designation SG-Id will apply.

E timated time to lift the old SG-l an tenna from its pedestal and install the Zenith Watch antenna is 6 hours; to complete the conversion with installation of an OB U-2 echo box, additional time of 4 hours is necessary. The complete conversion can be road at sea without the aid of Navy Ya \ _ facil iti . The hield around the lower




portion of the reflector minimizes radiation diected toward the horizon.

Although the term "Zenith 'Vatch" implies overhead 1 arch 01" search the antenna, within range limits and roli of ship, will detect aircraft within a 20" to goO sector. Although on the vertical radiation pattern, th.eenergy Ie el at goO (oveTlu:ad) is 1/80th of that at the 65° point (ex-

pressed as "down 19 db")," the effecti e target area of the plane increases so rapidly from 650 to goa that a sub tantially constant signal level is presented to the radar recei er, From goO to 110° the antenna energy Ie el drops rapidly enough to eliminate trouble due to back radiation. Energy level at the 00 point, or on the horizon, is between 0.02% and 0.03% of the maximum intensity point in the main lobe (35 to 38 db below), be gain of the antenna at the maximum energy point is 23 db absolute. be width of the beam in azimuth at half power points is 5~o. The 35 db horizon figure represents the solution to the main limitation of he original SO-II Zenith Watch .

Aircraft presentation, at angles of from 20" to points approaching the zenith region, is shown on the PPI scope in the usual manner. Similarly, in this sector, slant range and bearing are determined

t.s before. However, planes in the zenith region . (but not directly overhead) will appear as arcs perhaps 1200 to 1800 in length, and a plane directly overhead will appear on the PPI as a circle whose radius is equal to the altitude. The circle occurs ince tile radar at all times indicate Ian or direct range which changes lowly with time ill the zenith region, unless the tarzet is divinz, A similar effect is noticed on PPI range markers which remain in a fixed position for the duration of one or more sweep revolutions.

Aside from its usefulness in detection, it is possible to obtain the approximate height of air: craft by using either one of two methods:

(1) Determine maximum plane detection range. Read the altitude at the point of intersection of this range with the antenna coverage curve outline. Referring to the coveraze pattern shown in the illustration, if the maximum range on a particular plane is 4000 yards, the approximate altitude would then be 1000 yards.

(2) If the plane is overhead, as shown by a circle on the PPI, then the altitude will be equal to the range.

The roll and pitch of the vessel will modify the overage; therefore, both methods are approximate only and hould be used as such. The latter

1 !

method i to b preferred from the standpoint of accurac , sin e the results from u ing (1) will vary depending upon the size of the plane, whether a "tail on" or "head on" aspect 1 presented and over-all system performance,

For maximum usefulness in the detection of aircraft the SG-lc antenna has been designed to minimize pickup from surface target. [0 indication

. will be received from surface objects unle s they are extremely large and close to . the antenna. A model OBU-2 echo box is suppli d a part of Field hange 54 to furnish an artificial signal for tun-up purpo e .

be material needed co accomplish Field Change 54 is now beinz airshipped to the Pacific area for installation at an early date.


Power ratios are frequently e~re ed in dbs (decibels) to simplify expressions of power and performance of radio and radar equipment. Somewhat anaJogou is the expression kilowatts to express thousands of watts except that, with decibels, a logarithmic base is used to, on one hand, compress a multitude of figures to a comprehensible quantity; on the other hand co allow addition and subtraction as a substitute for tediou multiplication and division.

Like many other things, power ratios might be expres ed, perhaps, in a better way but the "db system" i now universal amonz enzineers. t can be understood by anyone familiar with a Eew simple niles.

1. Suppose that an SK and SK-2 are operating under the same conditions, but because of the hizher frequency of the SK-2 and due to other losses, the SK-2 shows a scope signal only half a stronz as the SIC The log, to base 10, of V2 is -.3. Multiplied by to (the decibel factor) the result i -3; or the K~2 is down :I db from the SK. As a matter of interest this would mean a 2070 decrease in ranze performance on the SK-2 when compared to the SK.

2. In the text above the absolute gain of the SG antenna is expressed as 23 db. The number whose log is 2.3 (23 has been divided by 10) is 200; and we could state that the antenna gi e 200 times the power-at the maximum energ point-of a simple dipole radiator without a reflector. This simple radiator is the standard from which the gains of a11 radar antennas are calculated.

(_ c: r -<


rechni jan

hould b come familial' wi th this

track f the rarzet. whereas, with ut me FTC, the iarzer rna . n - ver appear at all on the PP 1.

The eflicien of the modified K or S maccompli hinz the task of breaking up aturated land mas echo s ba been determined in tests, and al 0 U13 tual operation at PacFleet Radar Center. There, a change was made in an SC-2 used at the operator's school whose scope is II uallv blocked out for about 20 miles. he Radar Center reports that the modifica ion aided materially in th dete cion of planes in the area II ual ly complet J blo ked bland,

, _ __ ._.uDliU:J[lollli _

del" and make the alteration in our air sear 11 dar at the vel fir t opportunir , It an be done with pare parts already aboard Ship.

The re ult 0 the application of FTC i to break. up tbe olid pattern formed by the land echoes into an area of many small pips, which makes it possible to distinguish a moving target in the clear areas between the permanent echoes. The aircraft will of ourse merge with these land echo , but it will also emerze and b watchinz the cope loselv, you vill be abl to btain a

These tlLlO pictures shoia grapllka/l)' what

iJ accomplished by the incorporation oj the FTC in air search radal'$. The PPI IS sel on the 20

mile scale. On the left, it is utmost totally land-/oched for 16n miles.

On the right, Ihe Inllli pattern IIl1s been iJT()lIell up.




movln9 targets

Much thought has been given and much training devoted to the problem of trackinz air raft o er land with air sear 11 radar . The problem ha in the past few months become more acute as It has been necessary for ship to operate for extended periods of time off Jarge land rna ses. By practice and with the exercise of diligence, many cap-able operators have been able on the A- cope to detect air targets approaching from a land area. But the land pattern 011 the PYI i practically solid, and it i normally impo ible to ee a plane pip until it ill rg from the land echoe .

But, there is a solution for this situa 'on-perhap not the complete OT ideal olution-but one which will enable you to detect moving target

through land masse on your PPl. It is accomplished by the incorporation of the Fast lime Constant in air search radar. which i being placed in all new radar design. But ou do not have to wait for a new set to obtain the benefits of the Fast Time Constant. relativel imple alteration of Y0ul" SK or SC will do the trick, and it has been authorized by an ad interim change order," Your

1 be ad interim change wa authorized in a letrer dated In May 1945 from BuShips LO l'acFleel Rndar Center in which de, tailed instructions [or elfeCling the change are given. These inuru cdons will appear ill the first 1,11 y) i sue of .. Electron," a new Bu hips publication covering the technical a'l.pects of navy rada

radlo and sonar. be modification may nj;;o be round in Ta.(;

rica! Radnr Bulletin, I 1\111. 19,,1\.




c., C r-<




These allowances are eSlablished by CominGh Serial 01387 dated I) May ·I94-' Radio technician allowances ase omitted since they were reuiseti by B1tP(11'S cant. ltr Pers 2T4I-Ll of 27 lanum) 194-.




CIC ClC IC ".0. W.O. WoO.

"I "' ".R'~

Bnule 'hip, OSB (33'37) llauleship, 13J;l (3B up) end ier, Large (en) Cruiser, Heavy (CA) Cruiser, Light (eL)

Cruiser, Light (6000-7500 ton) Carrier, (CVn)

Carrier, (CV)

Carrier, (CV (N»

Carrier, (CVL)

Carrier, (CVE)

Carrier, (eVE !O5 class) Carrier, (CVE 105 (N» Carrier, (CVE Transport) Destroyer, (:H7 and under) De uroyer, (1).18 and up)

De urover, (Specia] Pickel hips) Destroyer Escort (DE)

Frigate (I'F)

Headquarters Ships (AGC)

Relief Headqua rters Ship (. \P A) Hcadq II nrters hip (Bi bb Class) (rU> A 1 Transport, AWlCk (Al'A)

Transport, Evacuation (.'\J'1-'I) Transport, High Spe~d (APD)

Cargo vcsser, Auack (AKA)

l\Ullc Luyci • (CM. DM)

Iine weepers, (DMS) Destroyer ender (AD)

enplane Tender (i\V,A D, AVP) Landing hip Vehicles

Patro! Vessel (less 1'1')

Repair bips, (AR)

Repair hips, Landing Cr.1Jl (.'\RL) Submarine Tender (AS)

Motor Torpedo Boat ( enders (A .1'» Landing Ships and CTafl

ubmarines (163 and above) 1\IOlOI' r orpedo 130,IL

./dh' 1/.1j,·

'/div I/div




3 !l 3 :I

:I 3 3




o tl

\J \J o

o o o


o o () o










u o



o o



3 3 G


" o



o o




u o o o II o o


o o

<I. 4- S i 3 II 3


o u


II • u









I) (J u

<I 4 ·1 4 ·1 3



Ii n



u o

u o


3 3 3

3 3 j





o II o J o U o


u o




RADAR LEN" lie 'lIe 3/e

5 5, 1) 4 4 II

7 7 7 5 3 3 II s


1 _2

1 2

• ..iii


. ,

." ..

• •

7 7' 7 1:1 8 3

II II ,j



II 2








15 I:; IU

G (;

6 3

5 :I :I










'5 10

JO 10

5 7 8

5 3


8 8 6 ~G

6 ()

6 6 6 6 (;


. .


Note; • Only LO ships designated,

... Unless specificaUy noted otherwise or unless pace Iimitarions do not permit, the policy of allowi,ng 6 enlisted personnel (rated radarmen or seamen-radar) per search ge.1.r installed. should lle, tollowed ill all lype ves els.

, "




# ,

;=- I -

A new science is being practiced by some CIC'sornithology. Modernizing the methods of John James Audubon, the USS AUDUBO (APA-I49) employed GIG, lookouts, radar, and binoculars in spotting feathered bogies. These modern methods were also used by the USS LEWl HANCQCK \ (DD-675) in identifying erratic ta,rgets~picked up

northeast of Okinawa, From the ornithological. discoveries made by these two ships arises an arrestine rquestion:

Has the galloping ghost of Nansei Shoto been unmasked? The two reports follow verbatim.

With CIC steeled to encounter blips of weird inconsistency and lookouts poised to detect the sharkfin and dolphin as well as Zeke and the ionized cloud, the AUD BOJ: stood out for Nan ei Shoto.

TO ghosts hovered by. 0 porpoises broke the

diaphanous surface. Only an occasional fiying fish protested the onward plod of a plodding convoy. Day pas-sed on to darkness, and succeeding dawns to dusk. Where was this gaUoping ghost?

. lot till the cloudless advent of a calm 24 April was CIe ruffled from the -bromide of an untroubled zig-zag, Suddenl it came, a pip, fuzzy then strong, flickering on and off the "A" scope. Some eight miles away rno ing down the starboard

'de, it showed a reciprocal cour at orne 20 nots. Before it could be identified vi ually, it was gone. Raid Baker appeared as uddenly, rno -

ing up the port side at similar speed and range. PRF made no difference. Lookouts could find nothing over the shimmering lumpy horizon to the West, and Raid Baker in turn passed on. Raid Charlie clambered next from the SC-t, closer on the port quarter. but otherwise much the same. Still, as 2iO' followed zag, and a aking un grudgingly dragged on its slow retirement from an infernal noon. the lookouts found nothing, Charlie came closer, splashing onto the PPI; then, without notice, the general alarm erased the somnolence of almost siesta. " nidentified aeroplanes bearing two-six-zero, position angle two," squeaked the.J. ummary plot showed Charlie on he same bearing. The lookouts contributed the information that one plane was afire and di ing into the ea. A puzzled evaluator stared at Charlie, crawling now at 20 knots, less thanfi e miles


c, C r -<


", ~l~ .•

~. . .

.7; VPl>.EII. wr~» I <:;- 34~

15- ~S" KTS. ,

'. ' 0;: -.'.-1<

o .'

.~ . .

away. "Contact believed no aeroplane," he told the conn.

"Affirmativ they'r bird. Dunno what kind' remarked the 21 MG. Charlie e ~,ablish.ed and • general quarters secu red, binocular showed just about what the SC-J had been in a flutter; here was a tarzet=a legion of ponderous flapping birds, pelican probably.

Charlie faded for good at 9500 yards though he'd appeared at 14,000. 1 is course had been straizht at an overall peed of 27 knots. (Zigzagging caused an irregular track on the summa) .)

1 ot that harlie i of an aid in la ing the zalloping gho . of Nansei Sh to, but he wa in hi own. right a unique visitor to aLIT CI . No ornithologist available, one can't say what he was. His 'insti n t pre umably outweighed hi judgment Ear th sea on wa pring, and his cour e lay to the northward. Had not been sighted, hIe and Baker would have been chalked IIp to the Galloping G. of Nansei _, of whose appearance amid the already well compli ated backzround of Okinawa Shima th i ship was fortunately spared.


One 01; ansei hoto' rampant radar phantom

was stripped of i gho dine b S E, I ~



II Jl/I/J(II)' (Jlot of lVrill Charlie, VSS

.IUJ) RON (,IPiJ-149), 24 .dInil 1945. Base ~ollr.~~ W(II' 3!!:lo !TI/a, and lilt, c()nvo-y IU(,I$ ma( mg Zig Z"I( :: 1 1 .7..



HA! COCK at dusk on 22 pril 1945. and in manner whi h lead' this hip to believe that mud, of ch Ryukyu Legend rna be based 00 irnilar o curren es.

hip was maintaining station a task force picket northeast of Okinawa when SG radar picked np an unidentified contact at six miles. confirmed as a low flying air target by the SC-2 and hortly thereafter picked up b the Mk. 4 fire control radar. First reported as bogey, the target showed speed between 60a.nd 100 knots, with errati movement r emblinz that of the radar phantom 'which had plagued lhi ves el intermittentl during the preceding month.

t two miles, however, lookouts and director personnel simultaneously spotted the cause of this "gho t pip". On a northwesterly om e, at angel point tw , a right formation of more than fifty birds, of an unknown pecies. To the FD opel'at r, they save "a pip like a battleship"-large, clearly defined, but with some fluctuation. TO such group of birds had previously been observed in this area, but so Imilar to the Nansei Shoto Gbo t were th radar indications produced that it is believed many previously reported phantoms may be of the same feather. On three occasions sine then, this vessel has undergone the experien e.

charts for ships haoing Cl C's

1n addition to the regular allowance of charts and publications for u e of navigators, portfolios . I; 40, 41 and 49 ha e been incl tided in a tentative allowance establi bed by the. Hydrograph r for all Pacific Fleet Vessels having I,'.

The portfolio hould be obtained from the

Hydrographic Office, Washington, if time permits, upon request submitted on Form NHO 754. be portfolio otherwise rna be btained with thi lorm from the H drographic enter in the various theaters of operation. The request should

pecify that the portfolios reque ted are for the 'Ie since all chart issued for CIC will b 0 marked. To suppl the CIG portfoli s with new charts and new editions as they become a ailable, it will be necessarv to submit requisitions on Form ~lHO 754.

'Th Pacific • leer CIC School recommend that all units draw their allowance of portfolios. In particular the school re ommend that the eries f .authorized charts covering the Japanese Island at scales that vary from II to ILl nautical miles per


inch be used on the 0 R and for keeping a traregie ummary plot.

Als recommended by the chool for use b the CIC's is the -3 series oE aviatioi charts' hi 1 ina b btained upon request from the H drographic Office, "' ashington. he e charts have a scale of three nautical mile per inch and how both land contour and depth curves. he areas covered b this eri include the Japanese home island, Chosen and Formosa,

Effecti e 1 pril 1945 the Iydrographic Office assumedresponsibility for making automati distribution of the Re tricted issue of all bombardment and approach marts printed a ter 1 April 1945. Therefore all ships will receive their copies without the necessity of a requisition. These gridded charts cover large coastal areas of enemy held territory at scales of 1 inch equals 1000 yards (1 :36,000) and 1 inch equals 2000 yards (I :72000). hev will b v b th land contours and depth urves,


"Adjust Yom PPI," page '~.1 of the June" use on SGb/ -rb. The following pro edure i the J un i sue.

Fj ld hauge jyo)

.I.C." gives a procedure to uperior to that pri)]t~d in

I. hese controls should be adjusted a foUo\~s:

(a) Set Signals-Mark witch, -g 12, LO" ign:lls", and set R~l1ge Switch. '!J 13· [0 .. '5.000 -ds." (b) Adjust Receiver ain Control R·g06-so to zero.

(c) Turn PPI Anode #2 Control R-g6 flill on.

(d) Adjll t R-97 I, the PP[ Intensity Control, until the base line is jnst bare}' visible (it ma be necessary' LO adjust PPl . nod #2. R·g6 • to dim the base line ~umcicIlUy.)

(e) Turn Range Switch, -9J3, to i!i,ooo yards and adjust R'916, u ntil the ba e line j. just

barely visible.

(f) Adjust Receiver Gain Control R·gOO·so 1.0 normal operating level, (g) Tum the Signal -M:uks Switch, 5"'912, to "Mark".

(h) Adjust R'9,64 50 that the base line becomes invisible on both '5.000 and 75,00Q yal"'\ •

(i) Adju t the PPI Range Mark iruensitv control R'959-50 0 that Range "link imell-ity is ar a satisfactory level.



Using Second Trip Echoes

-By Commanding Dfficer"USS TIlOkIPSON (DD)

The frequency with which false targets appeared on the SG Racial" screen as a result of "second trip" echoes led GIC officers to wonder if they could not be put to erne use. Bearing is easily determinable and the following system of determining ranges has been used =essEully.

The first step in calculating ranges was to set lip or determine the pulse repetition rate. This was done by setting the pulse rate at 1000 cycles per second for frequency "A", goo for "B", and 800 for "C", uslng the pulse rate switch on the transminer unit. Lacking accurate equipment £01: determining pulse rate on the ship, a 820 cycle per second harmcnic of the known repetition rate of the Mk 4. was determined with the oscilloscope. From this 1000. goo. and 800 cycle per second pul e rates were determined empiritally.

Using these pulse repetition rates as a basis, calculating the range is simple arithmetic, The range as known on the "A" scope is added to the distance a radio wave and echo will travel between P U lses: 81. 97 mil es fa r frequency •. A", 91.07 m lies for frequency "B", and 102.5 miles for frequency "C".

Observation of the ranges shows that shifting from one pulse frequency to the next should give a "jump" in range of approximately 20.000 yards. A larger jump of 40,000 yards would Indicate a third trip echo and double distance between pulses must be used.

The extreme ranges made it improbable that other than land targets will ever be picked up. The prlncipal use for these targets on this ship so far has been in rough navigational fixes.

BuShips COJllJllen t:

Where the repetition. rate is precise and known this method of range determination on multiple trip echoes is veTY accurate and was made use of in the original CX M. As range measurement is now independent of repetition rate the PRR is not stabillzed on a precise ..Et:equency; however, by dividing 8lg07 by the measured PRR in cycles, the nautical miles (2000 yards) between pulses will be obtained.



Ice Floes on Your Scope

-By Comdr. H. R. Prince, USN, Commanding Officer, USS PORTER (DD)

etG can play an. important part in giving the Officer of the Deck the first warning of unsuspected navigational hazards, especially in the frequently fog-bound water of the )lorLh Pacific, In the middle of March a squadron of destroyers, engaged in a sweep toward the Kuriles for shore bombardment, encountered a substantial amount of drift ice which Increased in density until passage was restricted and the sweep had to be abandoned. Lookouts first sighted the ice floes, which e. .. :tended only five feel above the water, during daylight. These floes

'StaTeely pierced the surface, but. by the seven-eights law oE icebergs. they extended thirty-five feet below tbe water, and thus presented an obstruction which would cause a ship no Iinle damage at high speed.

It is thought that a description of the ice as it appeared on the G and M", 12 radars might be of some aid to present and turure NorPac GIC offtcers, should they run into similar hazards

at night or in reduced Visibility. .

On the SG the floes were fir t observed at 14.000 yards in the foran of a mild sea return, When the range decreased, the pips on both the A-scope and the PPI took on the apJ;'earance of an extremely fuzzy land target, It was Impossible LO maintain an accurate track owing to the changing contours of the target, but

. the plot showed beyond doubt Chat it had negligible course and

speed. •

The pip on the Mk u: gave every indication of a funy surface contact, but it bounced somewhat, which permitted dift"erenti.a· tion. At long ranges Ie appears as a sea return as on the SG.

Editor's Note: in view of the above, a word of caution is i,_ order for ships operating in waters where ice floes may be etf' cocUnt.ered. :rhe .sensitivity Time Controt on the SO rna)' eUm· ina,t·e the return [rom a small iceberg a"t short rallges. Thissuggesls aareju! we of the STC in such areas.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Target Indication Mad~ Easy

-By LI. George L. Crain, USNR, formerly of the U S BOSTON (CA)

The problem of repelling a night air attack resolves ![sell into the [allowing:

L Target indication LO Mark 4 or Mark 12 radar with mini: mum time delay.

2. ceurate solution 0.£ the problem by the computers.

3. Opening fire with maximum concentration of AA fire as soon as opening range is reached.

". Knowing the posiuon of other ships in the Iormatlon.

Witb these in mind the USS BOSTON (CA) developed a system which worked very successfully during the 1944 campaigns in the Pacific.s

00 most ships Ma.rk 37 directors (Mark 4: or Mark Ii radar) are given target indica don (rom a Gunnery Liaison Officer in C1C, rarioned by the air plotting table, on which [he raids are ploued along wjlh the danger bearings and other necessary Information. In u:;ing the air plot for target designation, the informaLion on air targets must COme either directly from

3 This enure problem is discussed iu an article in this issue ~

"C. I.e." entitled Cle Organization for Night Ad Deiense.

rhe SIt operator or from a 12 inchRrPI in CIG. Regardless ot which is employed there is a difference between the last position the target shown on the plotting table and its actual present

cation, To reduce the time lag to a minimum it is necessary to have available to the Gunnery Oontrol Officer in GIG (Ail' Detense Officer On tbe BOSTON) information on range, bearing and composiuon oE target, po ilion of the A directors, botb true and relative, danger beal"itlgf. ow-n ship's course, and direct communications with the directors and other, gunnery contcel

tarions, Thi information is necessary so the Gunnery Control Officer can have the proper AA BalLet')' set up to commence and cease firing at the proper moments.

The setup 011 the 130 TO follows:

Two target bearing indicators, initially a part of the target designation system and installed adjacent to the SK and SO radar ets, were never u ed. These instruments were convened to director train mdicators, and were raounred on a bracket over the 51( radar. the upper one indicating relative train of Sky Forward and the lower one of. Sky Art.

A gyro repeater was also mounted ona bracket above the SK radar, to the right of the director trail) Indlcatora. The repeater ~'I connected in the same manner as the repeater on the SG radar (and the reverse of the repeater on the SK), so thal the outer fixed. cale gives true bearings and the inner movable dial shows ship's heading and relative bearings. A ship outline is marked on the Inner movable dlal to give a beuer picture, A transparent plastic coyer i tined over the Iace of this instrument. The ADO marks of[ the true danger .secror' or bearings with a red ctuna-marking pencil on the plastlcrcover, Iil any fixed Iormauon, the true Ganger bearings remain the same if .the axis is not changed and If other ships maintain proper station. Thus,

;&tte danger or bearings once delineated on the plastic ,ver Over the Oilier true scale should remain constant during any particular action. As the inner dial indicates ship's beading and relative bearings, the clear relative bearings are always apparent £rom a -isual compaci on o[ the inner movable dial with the outer fixed true bearing scale.

The component parts oE this Instrument are as follows:

I. Transparent plexiglass cover.

Q An outer fixed scale indicating true bearing.

3. An Inner movable dial, having a ship' • outhne and iindieating ship's heading on the outer true scale. Relative bearings are engraved 011 inner dial.

4. Two pointers, on shaft through an opening in the center of the ship's outline on the inner movjlble dial, to indicate di rector train, one for Sky AIt and one for 51 c y Forward and of distinctive color for each director. These pointers extend over both the inner and outer scales, and thus indleare both relative (iuuer scale) and true (outer scale) director rralu, These poiurers, by the design and construction of the Instrument, wiU show CO!1'eCL director train, both relative and true, regardless of motion of the movable inner hip's head dial as Lb.e ship changes course,

'rhus with the luforma tion received from the radar and from this Insrrumeru the Gunnery Control Officer has. all the iuformailou betere him necessary to resist an air auack, The operating procedure i as follows:

1. The danger bearings of the Iormatiou are laid om on the plexigtass cover and these should be constant [or a given tonnauou, .out should II ship get OUl of formation the Gunnery Control Officer i immediately notified from [he ummary Plot in ClG (vja ure Gunnery Liaison Offiaer).

2. When a target appears on the Master PPI il is marked with hina crayon on the plexigtass cover, tlleo its true and relative bearing call be determined. The OJ,lOnery Control Officer then gives directly to the Assistant Director Office!" over the 5)P circuir the "relative bearing and range of the target.

S. As the of the target closes to 20 miles, the SK antenna is put irno continuou [oration (4-5.RPM) and the Master 1'1'1 to the 20 mile scale 0 that any low flying planes lnay be detected and necessary action taken.

By using this method, all requirements of successful target designation mentioned in the epening paragraph are fulfilled ill the fol!Owillg manner:

I. 'The Mal'" 4 or Mark u radars 'are put on the target as SOOLl as possible, rhus providing a long tracking period to in ure an accurate solution. This indication is done with no Intermediate steps between the Gunnery Control Officer at the source or the Informatiou and the Mark 37 director.

The BO TON'S Target Designaling- btroi~ is adjacent to the mosier PPI em the SK.


Cpgwh eel, accura telysel tile pO in ters which indicate bauerie« bearing. on the target.

2 -nltl' Gunnery GOI.\lTOI Officer isprovided information whieb he needs to have the Ai\ Battery in posiliofl LO gile a ma.~inHI1'll COil ce ntra I iOIl of fire.

3. Ry using the dlreotor train indicators 011 the instrumenrta show wben a director is approaching 11. danger bearfng, lire may be' checked in ample time and resumed witb no delay. Gr'os~rc is readily lIppa rent from the relative position director train Indicators,

+ Every bit of informaticn is in plain view. which reduces the control problem to, a mlnlmnm.

Editor's Note: TIn: Burea« of Ships tUm not f!0111is/l equip. ment from Which this target indicator can 1>1: /lllilt, Imt lUIS '10 objectian tn ils being constructed if the ship has the IIeCeS5Ul)'

The Timekeeper Eliminated Again

-Lt. Gomdr. G. c., Li:nd'atJllr, USCG, ComllM"lIi,'J;. OfJiClJt, USS BROWNST'ILLE (PF)

The 'Hiler was qutie interested In the article by the Com- 11lalldillg" Officer. nss BARNEGAT appearing- 49 In tile ~'[m:ch 19-:IC "C.LC.", on a buzzer attachment to A ship·s dpck to nlert GIG teams al the minute and half minute for plottIng pur· poses. This had long been a conslderadonol interest 011 board this ship, but in our case we were usIng a U.s. Navy Direct Reading Clock. Mllrk 1 Mod o. To ,gi,'e us the buzzer Ieauue, we decided to modify the design of ibe quarter minute indicating wheel.

The motion of rhis wheel was studied for a short whUe in order [0 determine where cam aoruarlon could be properly ap-

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UIEO, TM~ SCAl[&: I f'O~ TIlE ei: inTI!.. \ AN.GU,. - T. 0 F IGVRE'ANI'S.PttO; UUM9.E.1rS INDICATE KNOTS FOQ, 3 1'1 lit RUN


NUMBERS. • 100 '"




plied to provide signals synchronized with the minute and haH rnlnure, Wben. this was determined, two concave filings were made as indicated ill illustration. 111 view of the fact rlrattbe motor actunung tbe dock is very strong in proporuen LO Lbe work thar is demanded of 'it. the cam contacior could be made of heavy, flattened, bJ"ISS spring wire, hammered out and shaped as indicated below. The frameo[ the dock 1I1l1S drilled as indl· aced, 10 receive a. lead wire corning from the cameootacror- to another Hartened pieoeof brass spring wire Wllich flexed ·in synchronization \ .... 1(11. the cam co DtaCLOl'. bus wh(l.u the qu'lrtel' minute wheel in turning came [,0 the point where ihecam COIl· LlICtOI- could spring under tension inio the cam recess, transitory 1TI0Lion along the extension lead wlrete the contactor ann was

. permitted. and the contactor arm. heio,g Hkewise under tension, moved over tn make contact at the comuct poot as shown above, The comactors energized. a regular 115V AC L ampere. Type Z-:l Buzzer EoI' aperiod or three-quarters second at the half minute

• aud two periods of three-quarters secondeach at the minnre, A t0S'gleswitcb was connected into the line in order to de-energlze the hnzzer circuit when lt was not needed .

The above modification u.very simple and could be easily made l)y the Eactof)' 01' ~ny ship. Ioronce havlng gotten iruer ested in the scheme we finished, it iu the BROWNSVILLE'S en hi n in one. evening.

ARMY REQUESTS: Adiutan+ General's Office, Operations Brolnch, Room 2B939, .Pentag.o.n Buildin.g., Washing.ton 25,0. C.


Requeshfor "C.LC." (issues prior to July 1944 are no lon.ger a v ailable) should be addressed:

NAVY REQUESTS: The Chief of Na .... al Opera+ions,. Editor of "C.I.C.", Washington 26, O. C.


24 April 1945 I April 1945 4: March 1945
US TROMP- 24 .Hard. 1945 ~6 Mof'till 1945 USS t. M. BERMmG- 13 April 194-5
CONDITIONS (DE 685) (DD 627) (DD 362) (DD 362) (DE 530) (AM 274)
Type Radar su SG-A SG-A SG-A SL-I SL-a
EI'tended Range 78 miles 4.~ miles on 32 miles'hvo 31 miles on. 59 mild 45 mites on
(Florida Keys) su rfacetargets merchantmen medium tanker on ships small cra[t
6l mile; (Millmi
Normal Mall. Buildings)
35 miles 20 miles 17 miles 17 miles .8 miles I· .'10 miles
Range -
Antenna Height 92 feel 75 feet 86 feet R6 feet 9-1, [eel 72 feel
Ship's Posluon 24° N 39° 111' N 40" 09' 3S' i r' 35" 24' N 38° 02' N
8o°W 72° 37' W 6g0 33' W 72" 44' W oS'o 4.2' W I. 07° 30' E
Air Tempera- 7g0 E (dry) 55· F 4~" F (dry) 51° F (dry) 6~0 F 65" F (dry)
tllres 76° F (wet) 39° F (wet) .!)o· F~vel) I 64° F (wet)
ea Tempera. 80° 45° F 40.0 F 54 60°F 50· F
lure ... I
Barometer ~9.93 inches . 3°.32 inches 30.04 inches
Relative .
Humidity 58% ,
Clouds few. low Cirro Cumulus
Visibility 6 miles unlimited tmlimited
Wind 160·6 knot 26v: 15 knots , ogo-!! knot 190-6 knots ij!P~5 ~~ts 310-8 knots
. . .. ~ . , ;'-" _J - /\ E-5 signal at twice the normal maximum range i startling even to the most veteran radar operator. Yet extended radar ranges caused by atmospheric conditions, though not commonplace, are often reported. Analysis of six recent report reveal the cause of the unusual range in each case. Explanation are based only upon data that can be easily obtained aboard hip. This analy i PI' senrs GIG personnel with some rules of thumb which can be used, in the absence of elaborate meteorological eq uipment, for qualitative prediction of ranges. more detailed why and wherefore of atmospheric phenomena may be found in the "Trade 'Winds and Surface Trapping" article of May 1945 "C.I.C." and in "Check

the Weather for Your Probable Range" in the April 1945 issue.


The extended range obtained by the USS THOMPSON's SG-A a it approached 1 ew York Harbor wa probably asso iated with the large excess of the air remperarure over that of the sea. Humidity data, in the form of wet and dry bull> temperature, were not available, It appears, howe er, that this e tended range was the result of warm, dry. continental air blowing' oyer a cooler' sea (March and ea:dy .pril were. lJ\}"?sually w

in the Middle Atlantic State )." ,.J

The U S JOR BERMINGHAM can also look


to the fact that dry air, which was warmer than sea, was blowing .from. a large land area (1 orth ica) at the time their L-l pi ked up three targets at 59 miles. It is true that the air (pre urnably at bridze level) wa onl two degrees warmer than the sea. But the e tremely low relative humidity of only 58% indicates a pronounced moisture lapse within the fir t 50 feet above the surlace of the sea. Relati e humidity at the urface in chis case was about. %. It should be pointed out that the comparative relative humidi of the air at bridge height and at the sea surface does not give the complete picture inasmuch as air at th higher temperature can hold more water. he important compari on i between the so-called mixing ratios for the two levels. The mi ring ratio defines the actual moisture content of the atmosphere. The aerologist can quickly con ert relative humidity and temperature into mixing ratio (number of grams of moi cure per kilogram of dry

air.) In this case the values are 6.5 gm/kg at the bridge and 10.6 gln/kg at the surface of the sea.

In the . SS MOFFETT's fir t report-target at 65,000 yards off the Atlantic coast-the air wa but two degrees 'warmer tban t~e sea, but again the elative humidity of 76% is low. The exce of 'tended range over normal Tange is smaller than the BERMINGHAM case, probably be au e of the higher relative humidity at the bridge and a lower relative humidity at the surface.

The e three reports ubstantiate vthe rule of thumb given in the "C.I.C," articles previously referred to. tended range are probable when the temperature at bridge level i at lea t one or two degrees F. greater than that of the sea, and when the moisture on tent of the atmosphere at bridge level is considerably less than that just above the

ea surface. uch conditions are most often prevalent near large land masses, with the wind off shore. The height of the urface duct formed under such. conditions is u uall less than 400 feet.

The second MOFFETT report-target at 61,.000 yards off the Atlantic coa t-and the COATES reports both show the temperature at bridge level

to be definitely less than that of the ea. here is always a moisture lapse in such a ca e although the height of the duct is not Iikel to be mor than 50 Eeer, A low level surface duct may be assumed e en without study of relative humidity. he fact that the antenna i above the pre urned height of the duct does not prevent extended ranges, at least on

and baud radar. Thi brid e level s, ea

le el condition i experienced over much of the ocean's surface throughout the year. TIntS the pre ence of a low-I ing urfa e duct (up to a heizht of a bout 50 feet) is the rule rather than the exception.


ubsrandard ranees occur only when th air is nearly saturated, and warm relative to the water. If the air j very much warmer than the water, the temperature inversion may overcome the effe of the moisture increase, and trapping conditions rna ob ain. hus it would appear that belowDonna I range, as a resul f atmospheric conditions in the first few hundred feet above the sea's surface, should occur much less frequently than extended ranges. This point is illustrated in the report of the S8 PI 1 CLE where the air was moist (relative humidity 95%) and very much warmer than the water, yet theirL-a picked up a small urface target at 45 miles.

It should be emphasized that the above comments have been made for the type of nonstandard propagation known as "simple surface trapping" i.e. the base of the duct is at the surface of the ea. A standard gradient of temperature and moisture is assumed above the duct. Such is not always the case. In fact, "three-layer" instances have been. recorded with sub-normal conditions within the first hundred feet above the sea, s andard conditions prevailing for a few hundred feet above this inversion, and an elevated duct reo sponsible for extended ranges at a still hizher level.

* >(- * * *

"This ship is equipped for visual fighter direction and when in strike areas maintained a visual fighter direction watch during daylight hours. The following sugge tions are put forward to simplify the visual FDO's work:

(a) The JACK patrol should fly their specified orbit at all times and not just in the immediate vicinity of their directing ships. The present policy tends to leave gaps and large areas outside the screen unprotected.

(b) It is suggested that when JACKS are given orders to commence an interception they fly at highest speed possible.

(c) It is suggested that the di ranee of tbe JACK.~s orbit from the screen be reconsidered.

The pre em distance of 5 miles puts the patrol too far from the creen at the end of ea~J... leg. This makes it difficult £01' the FDO to keep track of the JACKS and leaves the creen vulnerable to attacking planes at the other extremity of the orbit. It is suggested that, while some advantage of an early interception may be sacrificed by plac-






ing the JACKS closer to the screen, the other advantages outweigh this; a distance of 2 to 3 miles is suggested. This has an additional factor of allowing the visual FDO more time to correct initial snap vectors . ."

"Stationing of CAP: 'When there are cloud

lets over the force, it is suggested that CAP be tioned at mattress below the bottom layer and at 1000 feet above each cloud layer above, rather than at arbitrary altitudes.

"Control" of Jacks: The use of picker destroyers for control of Jacks is believed undesirable because of the confusion and alerts they cause in that position by suddenly appearing as a close-in bogey on the search radar of some ship in the formation which cannot then identify them visually. Even when showing constant IFF, Jacks at that range provide IFF cover for enemy planes which may be diving for the Eormatir-- . _ that area and would otherwise be detected.

"Need of Mutual Radar Protection: It is suggested that the zone of immunity against radar detection directly over one task group may be better covered by the radars of a nearby task group than by those of the first group. TG 58,3 may be able to distinguish a single bogey mixed with friendlies over TG 58.1 that is undetected by the latter. A doctrine of mutual protection is suggested, with the SM radars of adjoining forces searching carefully the sky directly over each other, reversing the present practice of pay~g little attention to any plot within bearings .-ruting another friendly task. group."

with a statement such as 'That contact evaluated as friendly.' This is very helpful."


"The Radar Picket Line was less satisfactory from a eIC standpoint during this operation than in the past. The reason was that we had no direct communications with it and the RAPCAP was held too' low by overcast to permit constant fixes. Consequently there was never any certainty over its position; and on two occasions, when the weather was particularly bad, relieving RA CAP's could not even find it. The absence oi .... MHF communications between the Picket Line and Force and Group FDQ's was a serious handicap to its most effective use."

tiss w4sp (CV):

"Enemy Approach: It is suggested that Jap pilots may be coming out to the ship flying at 25,000 feet above a returning strike, in that way taking advantage of our IFF but remaining fairly secure from detection by esccrrt VF. This possibility is made easier by the present requirement that all strike planes drop to 3000 feet before reaching the pickets. Enemy planes in such a position, if picked up at long range. would show bogey but would turn friendly at about 40 miles when the strike planes' IFF would begin to ap:· pear on our scope.

"CAP to Cover Returning Strike Group:

Whenever the high CAP is not otherwise engaged, it is suggested that it be vectored out to search the area at 20,000 feet over a returning strike group. In connection with the above, it is suggested that some practice interceptions b tried with the 'raid' consisting of two VF B

at 25,000 feet.


USS SAN DIEGO (CL) (f1tJTious Strikes):

"Task Grqup MAN presents a considerably clearer picture for gunnery departments than use of common inter-FDQ channel such as VHF Channel 'Charlie.' When all groups use same channel and raids are approaching, the channel is so overcrowded that many reported bogies are never cleared up, raids are not designated clearly, and a certain amount of difficulr:y is experienced by ships with only SG and SC radars in determining whether various sources are reporting the same targets. (Positions of other groups or pickets are often approximate only, being out of SG range.) A task group Gunnery Liaison circuit would aid considerably. Also the practice of evaluating a contact as 'friendly', 'doubtful' or 'enemy' after there have been several conflicting reports, some friendly, some bogie in the same

, 'cinity, is extremely valuable to ships which do t ha: e the contact at all. Often the task group FDQ did follow up a series of conflicting reports


"Radio. personnel, officers and men, are still not sufficiently security-conscious. There is still far too much unnece ary sha kung of numbers (such abuses as the shack lin 60,000 gallons of fuel and 32,000 gallons of water were .met with). Training and supervi ing enlisted personnel are officer-responsibilities not always carried out. On one occasion a series of course changes was shackled and sent out over a voice channel. The series was sent in its entirety because of the brief interval between changes and in order to avoid

excessive transmitnng, Immediately after the required acknow Iedgmen ts were received, a radioman, presumably, aboard one ship of the group was clearly heard passing the breakdown of the shackled changes to the conn. Probably the .key on the microphone was stuck, but that is no excuse. Operators must make certain that keys do not stick. An attempt was made to key am the transmis ion. but without complete succes ."


"On Dog plus Seventeen Day the high Ere-· quen y radio teletype equipment furnished by Commander orward Area and used by C F 51 was transferred from the ELDORADO to the AUBURN. This equipment wa installed by technicians in the AUBURN, assisted initially by technicians from the ELDORADO. he in lallation Was made temporary with the primary pur-


po e of getting tt e P5 circuit to Guam effective as early as p ible,

"Although the equipment worked satisfactorily in the ELDORADO, several electrical defe ts develop d either in transit to or in setting up the

equipment in the B RN and were eli covered

upon installation. on iderable troubl was ex-

perienced in eliminatinz all the diffi ul ties, both mechanical and ele tri al.

"On the morninz of Dog plus Twenty Day, the third da after transfer of the equipment, te t were conducted with Radio uam. We recei ed tran mission satisfa torily but; Radio Guam, could not re eive our transrnis ions. On Dog plus Tw nty-One Da another tes was made and Radio Iwo lima also conducted tests

on the same circuit. At 2300 K on thi day Radio Guam commenced opying BURN radio teletype signals, 'readahiliry 5', and gave the order to go ahead with traffic. FTOm thi time on, the radio teletype circuit EPS to Guam, carried aconsiderable volume of traffic in the form of pres release and encrypted message. total of er sa 400 ., ord of pre l ere sent from the AUBURN of which about two thirds were ent by HF radio teletype."

uss MlJ.NIFEE (APA .lW2) (Ollinawa):

" his ship had a qualified officer supervise the voice circuits in use during the operation and found no diffi ulty .in. handling the traffic. At times some of the circuits were overloaded and it was difficult to maintain proper circuit discipline. N failures were encountered with either

the SCR 608. BS, or S.

"Visual signalling was generally atisfactory,




Nan was used underx ay enroute to the objective but not extensivel .. Thi method. of commu . cation for attack transports is not very sari EactOl) owing to the larue number of boom and rigging which block off the sender frequently, particularly when zigzagging."


us ELDOR.I100 (AGe 1-1) (17110 Jima):

"Fire Oontrol=Prios to the Iwo Jima operation various methods were tried in an effort to establish a sati factory liaison between CIG and the Mark 26 Radar in the Mark 52 Director. The Mark 10 Target Designation Indicator had never proved a practical link. with the Iark 52 under operating condition, as the er nature of its operation meant an additional time lag in reo laying information from the radar scopes to the director. It was found feasible, however, to man either the I-JP or the 1-]"'rV sound powered circuit and coach the Mark 26 on a target at a range of from 20,000 to 30,000 yards. 'Relative bearings were used. The Mark 26 1vas actually directed on a 'bogey' during the operation and successfully tracked it. Although the majority the tracking done has been for practice pnrpos only, it is felt that the two units can work in close cooperation, should the need again arise."

COMMANDER Ct1~RlER DTVISW (Various Strikes):

"Several Japanese hecklers were taken under fire by the screen of this task group at extreme ranges. All firing ships reported early detection, good solutions, and no trouble from window, However, no apparent damage was inflicted to the aircraft and, on one ccasion, everal hips seemed to be firing simultaneou Iy at different points when only one aircraftwas present. It is believed that more error was cau ed by window and by the evasive action of the target than the ships were aware. This is a dangerous state of over confidence in the ability of our radars and director crews, and it is recommended that tracking drills be conducted in daylight against evasive aircraft dropping window to obtain a better estimate of the ships' tracking ability."

USS BOSTON (CA 59) rlwo [ima] :

"Ini tial ranges and bearings to each. targ t a it was designated were furnished to the main secondary battery plotting rooms by Cle. It was

found that the most accurate plot of ship's posiam. could be maintained by u ing Mark 8 radar Wnges and visual bearings on a small rock

(Kama Iwa) which was conveniently located between the BOSTO 's firing station and the island. Owing to the maU size of thi rock, it made a clear radar target and Cle was able to keep the ship' position plotted with. precision. Usinz a zridded map of Iwo lima sec up on the DRT to 100 yards/inch cale the range and bearing to the target area were picked off from the position thus plotted. Results obtained by thi ~ethod were satisfactory; over half the spots apfilied to the second salvo on each target were roo yards or less. and none were over 500 yards. The 500 yard spots were, in most ases, for the purpose of putting the next salvo on a particular installation or emplacement after the first salvo had fallen in the designated area.

"The technique used in this bombardment may have to be varied in future bombardments where different conditions of topography and visibility may make it impossible to use the dark 8 radar and/or visual bearings."

USS NORTH OllROJ.INA (BB 55) (OMnawa) :

... he Mark 8 Mod,' 2 -radars' performed' in an excellent manner. They were used continuously in ranging and tracking for determination of ship's position. Prior to the approach to the firing area, the azimuth sweep was lost on the after Mark 8 for a period of about five minutes due to maladjustment of the sweep contactor: adj11Stment brought the sweep back to normal. JUSt prior to the last salvo, the line fuse (Fr) of t:h~ forward Mark 8 was blown. The fuse was replaced and the radar returned to normal at' the end. ... o£ the time required for do ing of the time delay switch; the total time lost was approximately 1:\'10 minutes. Neither of these radar casual tie reduced the eHectivene s of the directors to perform their primary function of maintaining the track of the ship's position,

" he locating of ship's position was capably performed by Auxiliary CIG, using the Mark radars and Mark 38 directors to provide ranges and bearings totracking points. During most of the firing, the southern tip of. Kutaka Shima and o Shima were used as tracking points. All methods of fire were employed (direct, direct offset, and indirect), shifts being made from one

ethod to another without delay OT confusion."


us LUNGA POI. T (erE) (11110 lima):

"On the afternoon of the z i st at 1815. all

creen w r reported lear at 1840 a bogey appeared and was identified as a. friendly TBM, and at 18'16 the force was attacked by five enemy aircraft. This atta k followed a pattern that we have een before. hat is, bogey appeared on OUT radar, were tracked into visual Or radar range of the force, then disappeared from the screen for a onsiderable period of time, f now d by a LIdden attack. In this instance it is believed that the enemy plane brained a radar location of our for ,then di ed to wavetOp level and ta -ed

cJ ar until they were read to attack. he attack was made at dusk, one hOUT and ten minur s after ou radars had lost track of the bogey."

A ARMY REPORT (Formosa):

"Armed reconnai sance Right to akao 011 5 March; g aircraft participated. B th aircraft carried 50 units rope each. A/A wa rep ned to be accurate to inaccurate. ne plane caught in 14 search lights for three minutes. Neither rope nor evasive action se rned to be any zood, One aircraft jumped by nine night fighters, the other byone, il damage to all aircraft. Doubted if night fighter used radar. Seemed to orbit master light and made use of search lights to locate aircraft. losed in and used spot lights on aircraft to follow us. Whe.n RC if ship i available, will send it to try to determine if fighters are using radar. It may be possible that the Japanese, lacking GGl and AI equipment are using

o o

c; C r -<


a technique which has been successful in the ETO. Night fighter can see the intersection of a number of searchlight beams from a great distance and can see the plane itself from a greater distance than AI alone could detect it. The results of RCM investigation will be reported as soon as the information becomes available."


"Two 'Iriendlies' bear attention. On the evening of February 2 L 194.5 a friendly approached the task unit from the north howinz a continuous code 1 IFF. It was the opinion of our RMO that such a mechanical happening is not possible with U. S. equipment and that it was a sample of Jap duplication. On February 24, 1945, another

'friendly' passed to the east of our forma.tion on course 000 showing code 1 IFF. Attentio.n was called to the fact that the timing was bad and that the narrow pip was much wider than our operators had ever seen before. Suddenly the IFF indication disappeared completely and the then 'bogey' urned and closed our group. It is the opinion of all who watched the raid in progress in CICthat this was a definite example of the Japs using Code 1 Mark II IFF as has been mentioned many times before in Intelligence Publications. "

USS WA£P (ep).'

"Control of VF (N): It seems apparent from the skillful evasive action taken by Japanese bombers to avoid our VFN that they are now equipped with some form of tail warning equipment. Considering the possibility that the equipment may be able to pick up our IFF signal




stronger and earlier than the VFN itself it is suggested that VFN be directed to rum off their I gear when within 20 miles of a contact. If n _ essary to secure an identifying fix they can be ordered to flash it back on for a moment. Considering further the possibility that the Japanese are monitoring all of our VHF channels. it is suggested a new night fighter code be drawn up which will permit the controller to put.his VFN on target without making the fact obvious to everyone listening in on the channel. The practice of passing VFN control quickly from one CV to another keeping pace with the best available information worked very well the early morning of 21 March. There is no reason why it should not be done as readily with the Day CAP."


USS BRYANT (DD) (Iwa lima):

"On March 9, 1945, while the ship was in screening station at Iwo lima a weak. enemy signal was intercepted. Its frequency was l52, pulse repetition rate 800, and pulse width was three and one-half. At time of intercepting signal, UQ.identified aircraft was reported at sixty-six mil When bogey had closed to eleven miles we co menced jamming on orders of the OTC. Bogey opened range and did not return. 1 t is believed that the jamming was effective in this instance."


"It is recommended that a more extensive use of window be employed by all carriers. Its effectiveness has been proved and the pilot must be 'sold' on the protection from its proper use.

"This will require -'\ large allowance of window for each carrier. An increased allowance is recommended.

"The present practice of dropping window and setting up jammers when about eight miles from the target appears to be no safezuard against a partial solution to fire control problem of the radar controlled anti-aircraft batteries. It is recommended that these defensive measures be initiated at distances up to twenty miles from the target area on all approaches subsequent to the early, 'surprise' fighter sweep.

"There is a serious shortage of panoramic adapters in the fleet. USS WASH1N9-TON and USS JORTH CAROLINA were the only shi s with panoramic adapters in Task Group 5 Only one ship in the group was equipped with a

DBB (Radar DjF). Spot jamming cannot be eftivel employed without a panoramic adapter it is strongly recommended that this equip. ment be made available to the fleet without delay.

"There was considerable interference noted in the BLequipment on FRANKLIN when the APR-l with TN-2 was operating between 150·!flO mes. This was due to the local oscillator in the Tr -2/APR-l which. tracks 30 mes above the receiver frequency. A more careful planning of antennae location is indicated.

"Use of specially equipped RCM land based aircraft should be instituted as early as practicable in an operation. A long range plane such as the PB4Y2 could be used to give coverage of the "Whole target area and maintain a complete jamming blanket over the area disrupting enemy early warning and fire control radars."

Comment of ComAirPac:

Many Action Reports indicate that personnel are aware of effectiveness of window. However, ships have refused to take present suggested alIowance of window. There is an over abundance of it at Pearl and in forward areas. CornAirPac is almost ready to throw some of it away to make room for new Shipments.


uss NEW JERSEY (BB) (Okindwa):

"On the night of April 11, 1945 at 2230 a·very weak enemy radar signal was intercepted on 151 mes. At the time of interception, the signal was barely audible, and could not be observed on the SPAl or REB due to its weakness. eIC had no bogies reported at the time.

"At 2246 the signal was still weak. and intermittent, but observations showed the signal to be approximate! y 15 1/1000/6. This vessel reported the intercept to CTG 58.3. No other ships in the ta k group could concur with our intercept. CIC still had a clear screen.

"At 22,,8 the SOUTH DAKOTA reported two interceptions of enemy radar on 153 and 156 mcs. We concurred, having also two signals on 151 and 154.5 mcs, estimating the range to be ap' proximately 60 miles. There were still no reports of bogies by any ship in the formation.

"A[ 2 305 CIC picked up a bogey at 022 0 T. 50 miles, low, thus demonstrating that Radar Countermeasures can effectively be u ed as an early warning of low Hying bogies before they have come within radar range."

'I USS. ABELE (DD) (Okinawaj:

"During the period covered by this report, the

only countermeasure actrvity encountered was the use of kites on the night of 9 April 1945. A group of planes (3-4) dropped kites at about 8 miles, altitude 1000 feet, from thi vessel evidently in an effort to confuse attempts at night interception; it is not believed that the enemy knew our location since no enemy radar signals were detected and the ship was not attacked. First indications had the appearance of window, however, after several minutes on the scope they had still failed to. spread and were evaluated as kite. This was conclusively shown when the indications remained similar to a bogey pip for 30 minutes before disappearing, 'Window dropped hom 1000 feet would not have remained on the scope for this length of time.and certainly would not have retained its singular appearance. Two indications were observed. the bogey being detected breaking away from the second. Lack of movement disclosed that the indications were not planes. The area of the amp ... vas covered in the morning by the hip and two L M (R)'s in attempt to recover the kites but found nothing."


"2350 :I-Reacp.ed northern end of sweep and turned back-nothing sighted. Two J ap shore ba ed radars one 011 95 mcs and one on ] 58 mcs stayed on us all the way up the coast. Swung ship for APR minimum intensity bearings and decided both radars were in the vicinity of Takao, Released 3 radar decoy balloons about 2 miles apart on northern end of leg. Don't know whether they helped or not but the lap radars did not seem to be persistently on us as before releasing balloons. At any rate we were not molested during OUT sweep."


"C. I. C." INDEX


Excerpts [rom recent reports concerning erc, Fighter Direction, Communications, XCM and unnery procedures and tatti . They appear in each issue. (See "LES 01 S LEARI ED~ in the January and ebruary is ues)


he ull Calculator [or quick altitude Jigu\'ing. "C.I.C."-Vol. n, No.6, June 1945, p .. 41•

SM/SF' Radar Target Height Char!.

Determines height of a target (abo\'e the centerline of a radar projector) when slant range and eleva Lion angle are known. "C.I. ."-Vol. n, o, 6, JWle 1945. p. 34·

MPHIBIOUS OP RATIONS RPD Used in the French. Invasion.

How the RPD facilitated craft landings in outheru France. "C.I.C."-Vol.lI, o. 1. Jan. ~94S, p. 20.

Fighter Direction in an

A mpflibious Operation.

The du Lies and respon i bilities of the 'F 'DO and FDO in coordinating activities during a landing. "C.1.C."-Vol. n, 1 o. 2. Feb. 1945, p. 4·

FG ill Ilmphibious Operalions.

How the VG can be used as a navigauonal aid. "C.I.C."-Vol. II, NO.4. April 1945. p. 27·

ANTI·S BMARINE WARFARE IJ ttack Plouer Helps Put the

FiTlger &11 u{ls.

A description of lbe plotter which makes available a conilnuing picture of an entire sub arrack, "C.l.C."- 01. II, No. I, Jan. 1945. p. 31.


Airmen Itely on Air-Sea Rescue Aids. pedal electronic equipment and other gear for rescuing downed pilots. "c.r.c." -Vo1. II, NO.5. May 1945, p. 34,

right Control by OIG

The capabilities and llmltaucn of our night air defenses afloat and the use of nigtu- fl ing aircraft for offen tve as well as elden ive missions. "C.r. ."-Vol. II,

'0. 6, June 1945, p. 20.



Cross indexed below are subj ct which have appeared in "C.Le." from January 1945 through June 19-15·

cm-mAT Il\'F0RJ.1A JON CENTER Miucha.[t Hau« CIC's.

D iscusses eq ui pmeut used and the functions of CIC in obtainlng navigational data and destroying enemy ubs, "C.J.C." -Vol. 11, No. J, Jan. 1945. p. I.

CIC OpCTmioTis on a ight Carrier.

Suggestions [or night operations as taken from the experiences of the USS INDE· PENDENCE. '·C.T.C."- oJ. II, NO.2, Feb. 1945. p. I.

llemo/ins Tm'get Data-PDQ.

Hall' the target indicating system in erc distributes range and bearing data to ship control and .gl1.11I1e:ty circuits, "C.l.C. "Vol. n, o. 3, 'March 1945, p. 14.

t C Helps Gunnery Call the Shots.

The way to utiUze CIC in(ormation efIectively for gun control. .. .1.C."-Vol. II, NQ. 3. March 1945. p. 26.

eTe Glossary.

Varicus terms, abbreviations, radio and radar gear. and the standard nomenclature of U.S. Naval Vessels. "C.1.C."-Vol. 11. No. 3. March 1945, p, 59.

GIC-First Lieiucnasu. o/Ihe Air Lanes.

Procedures to help keep the VHl- channels open fOI" essential transmissions. .. .1.C."- 01. n, o. 4, pril 194.5, p. ! 1.

I C U ffiturr Personnel and Mrrterial.

A Jetter from the Commander in Chief, u.s. Heet to all hands. "C.I.C."-Vol. rr, NO·4. April 1945, p. 77.

Eli lIlill (I te tiM "Wail."

This "wait eliminator" ystem [or CIC

xpauds the fu ncuon ol Ule sanlmary plot and can help delete thewords "wak" and "stand-by' f:ronl the \ arch Officer'S vocabulary. "C.J.C."- 01. n. o. I. jan, 19'15. p. 34·

Batllcwag011 at: Li1lga"ell.

The U PE LVA, lA radars and

CIC in the Philippines. "C.1.C."- 01. Il, No.5, June 1945, p. 32.

Tomcat, Probl~m. 0/.

The use of ~O's on tomcat missions, their problems and uggesced solutions. "~J.C,"-Vo\' 11. No.6, June 1945, p. ro.

Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, tis. Fleet (V F-,o) Pqrt 6.

The c.:nnplete text of lhe revisiOD of Pal'l 6 (Ch:tnge 4) SF-loA. ··c.I.C."Vol. Il, No. 4, Apdl 1945, p. 55·


Devices presented (or general ill.fol"IDalion-to request or to make YOllrselL '·CJ.C,'·-VoL II, NO.5, May 19·~5. p. 4'l.

CIG Takes on ReM.

The relation hip of the ClC officer to RCM acuvities, what be should know and do. ., J.C."- oL Il, 0_ 5. lay 1945, p. I.

Lookouts Look in on ClC.

'What lookouts bould know about CIC procedures, "C.I.C."-Vol. rr. No. 5, May )945, p. 7·

G rowIng Pains in DE Gombal.

Pre Cluing the destroyer escort's modern cr set-up. "C.I. ,"-Vol. n, o. 5, May '945, p. 18.

The lJanging GIC.

A graphic descripuon of CIC's of 1945. " .LC."-Vol. n. No. 5, May 1945, p. 115·

Target Inforlllaljol~ from CIC.

What data is supplied by meLl\ods and equipment used. VoL 11, NO .. 6. June 1945, 1J. L.

CIC. "C.l.


I'HF-J!t)' to Instantaneous Comllltmical.ions.

A discu sion o[ VHF ranges, eqalpmenr, channels and its relationship to propagalion. "C.l.C."-Vol. rr, No.2, Feb. 19.15, p. 21.

Breal: tile B.jT Bottleneck;

Rules for keeping the communtcauon lines Iree Iorm unnecessary traffic and confusion. , . .I.C."- 01. II. NO.3, March '9,15. p. I.


Why this is vi tal to the sa felY of merican lives and to till: uccess of U .. Naval operaucn . "C.I.a:·~Vol. ll, NO.3, March '945, p. 13·

AN igtlals with Invisible Light.

To acquaim commands with the current use, application. aud procedures involved in /1.;'\1 signalling. "C.LC,"-Vol. U, No. 3, March 1945,1)·34·

lC-Fi,·sl·Litlt£teI'lGnt o/ille Air Lanes.

ProcedlLfCS to help keep the VHF c

nels open fon essential [ran rois i "C.l. ,"- 01. n, ~o. 4, April 1945, p. J I.

That G!DX!1 Mike.

fill microphone technique for bauer • smis ions. .. . .1. ,'·-Vol. n, No.6, June '915, p. 6J.

COUNTERMEASURES Tile El(!all'OTlic Baul« Is 011.

Introducing a few of the Navy" RCM equlpments and their II es, "C.LC:·-Vol. 11, o. 3. t.larch '9.j,5. p. 7·

Countermeasures Traini1lg at ell.

nether .. ir 1I i t Rider" placed in the field by DesPac. .. .LC."-Vo1. TI, o. 4. April 1945, p. 2 I.

Fingerprinting Jnp Radar.

How to recognize the enemy's radar with the Al'R or SPIt. " .I.C."-Vol. rIo G. 2, Feb. 1915, p. 46.

cte TIL/Wi on ReM.

The relationship ol the IC officer to RCM activities. \ bM he should know and do. ", J.C_'·-\lol. If , o. -ii, May 1945, p. I.

ReM Training.

list of the schools providing ROM courses, .. .1. ."-Vol. [I, No. 5, May 1945. p. 6.

(_0[ .R:hearsa~s ~I Satl Clemlmte .. _Taul1ng aviauon personnel III radar countermeasures. II. No.6, June 1945. p. 27.


Fighter Direction Begill al t. imom.

The curriculum and training techniques at this Nil-Val Radar Training School lor student Fighter Director (and intercept) Officers." .l.C:'-Vo1. 0, lo. I. Jan. 1945, p.6.


Figlltcr Di1'l:ction ill 411 A mpbibious OPera/ion.

The duties and responsibilities of the FFDO and FO rn coordinating acuvtties during a landing. "C.l.C."-Vol. H, , o, ~. Feb. '94-5, p. 4·

G N RY "X" Will Aftl1'k lilt: pot tor the Fleet's Dig GutiS.

A description of the two X-band main battery fire control radars=e.he ark a Mod;J and Mark 13 Mod O. "CJ.C."Vol. D, No. s, Feb. 1945. p. 37·

CIC Hell},'; Gmlllery Call th« Shots.

- ow Lo lItiliz; CI informati n more in glln collrro!. "C.l.C."-Vol. '(,rrch 19'15, p. 26.

Remoting Target Dota-PDQ.

How the target indicating syslem in CIC disctibutes range and bearing lata to hip control and gunnery circuits. " .1. .' - 01. IT, ! O. S. March 19<15. p. 14.

RCSl,lml! ... of hipboard

Fire Contro! Radar.

The- Na vy"s formidable array 'Or fire 0011· trol radars today, with hints of improvements ill the making. "C.T.C."-Vol. II. t o. 5. May 1945. p. 46.

potting-in Ac;tion!

The results oE recent tests . hew that radar pouing on land or sea call be 11 ed to advantage. "C.I.C."- 01. II. I O. 2. Feb. 1945, p. 40·

ltll1JToved Radar Beacon -Aids Shore Fire Coplrol.

Important facts about Radar Beacom Mark 2 Mod 0 and Mod 1. '·C.l.C,"Vol. n. NO.4. prll 1945. p, 34.

Lookout. Look i11 on e1C.

WhaL lookout should know about C1 op rauons, " .L. :'-Vol. 11. r o. 5, May 1945· p. 7·

Target Inforllla/jOtl from ClC.

The target Information to be supplied by CIC and the methods and equipment used. ·"C.I:C."-Vol. rr, No.6. june 1945,

p. L .

(;Ull118ry Radar Tracks Ouer Land.

Fire 4Oon[1'01 and surface radars work together. .. .1. ."-Vol. 11. No.6. June '945, p. 5·


uggestions for solving particular problems by Fleet personnel. These ideas ha ve been tried and Iound (Q work, and appear in "C.I.C .. ", Vol. n, NO.3. March 194£. P·48:

Overhead Coverage vs. Suicide aeries. Tracking Over Land.

Eliminating the Timekeeper. Maneuvering Board Solutions on DRT. "OOD to G perator."

Recording TB ransnussions.

tatlon Keeping Aids.

Vol. II- o. 4, April 1945. p. 49:

Overhead Radar Coverage.

Control of VF by Bombers a Possibility. lap Window Contuses FD Radar.

ereecing of Surface Vessel with Airborne Window.

Eliminating" tandby" and "Mark." Tuning T'ran millers During Radio ilence.

e of ubmarine Signal Company ttack eacher in crc Training.

utEace ummary cales.

01. II- o. 5. Ma 191, p. 70: napper COntrol for Night Carrier Landings .

aptain of DD t, ears Headphone During ight Engagement.

Maneuvering Board SOIUtiOIlS.

01. II- -0. 6, June '94$. p. 48:

Do You Plot on the PPl?

DR T Plotting from Relative Bearings. Loran Homing' or Rendezvous Pro-


Relocating DR _ .Bug for Resumption of Plot Interrupted by a Change of cale.

IC Voice Circuit Transmitter W'3l'oing Lighl.

A Procedure in Close Formation. Use of Templates on Bridge PPI.


Ratlnr Recognition. Sys!ems-iFF.

The development, component parts. operation and Ilmltatioru of IFF. ..Cl.C ." -Vol. n, NO·3. March 1945. p. 37.


J(lpanese "Know Row" on Deception.

The Japs are aware lhal they must deS l,OY tb e effec li veu ess 0 f ou r radars, as evidenced uy this captured document. "C.I.C."-\Io1. 1[. o, I, Jan. 1945. P: 56.

[IIPIl1l8SC RGM and GGI.

Discussion of Jap equtpmem and tattics translated from captured documents. "C.J.C."-Vol. Il, o. 5, May ]945, p. 20.


Admiral Kogl2's Fire Control.

Translated excerpts EroJU a captured jap document which shows that we must expeer to e!1OOU n ter an increaaingly danger. ous weapon in Jap radar. "GJ.C."-VoJ. J!, NO.1. Jan. 1945, P,M·

How Good Is Jap Radar1

A sbort dlscu ion of the types and operational characteristi of Japan e radar. ·'C.I.C."-Vol. n, o. 3. ~iarch 1945. p. 5.

Call We Hold Our CIC uperiorilyl

Sumary of Jap radars and -radar systems.

"C.LC."-Vol. n. o, 4. April 1945. p. 22.

Tile "Divine Wine/s."

Known ucts about Jap suicide pilots and methods to combat them. "G.1.C."_ Vol. u, I O. 6. June '945. p. 13·

flAM-Flying Wllrilead.

The latest Lhing in Lhe .Iap3Ilesele!ih· njque of suicide air attack. "CJ .. "-Vol. a, 0.6, June 194-, p. 17.


(_ c: r -c


Last Word 071 "A/N" Nomenalature-« .. i,·bonlc.

bit about the new publication,' 0- menclamre Lin fOT the Bureau of Aeronautics Aircraft Electronic Equipment" dated 1 April. "Cl.C:'-Vol. 11, No .. 6, June 1945, p. 63·

il Glossary of Arm)' Equipnumts.

Removes the mystery oE nomenclarure of some of the Al:my's electronic gear used by the avy. "C.1.C."-Vol. II, No .. 6, June '94.5, p. 6t.

NAVIGATIO RPD Used ill French. Invasion.

How the RPD facilitated craft landings in Southern France. "C.I.C."-Vol.lI, No. " Jan. 1945, P: 20.

Warning-Oil Use of Loran.

Loran should be used as a. navigational aid, not as a rul.vigalor. "C.1.C."- 01. 11, o. 2, Feb. 1945. p. 52.

I'PR impli[ies Piloting.

A valuable aid in obtaining accurate fixes. "C.I.C."-VoL 1[. No. 11. March 1945, 1';·28.

VC"jn AmphibiQU5 Operatio,lS:

. I:'!6w the VO can be used as a navigational aid. "C.I.C."-Vol. II, NO.4, April

'945,1" 27·

IGB- FIGHTER CO. TROL CTC Ope1'atiorn on a Night Carrier,

uggesttons for nigbl operations as taken from the experiences of the US I DEJ'ENDE CEo -c.r.c.v-vei. II, No. 2, Feb. 19'15, p. I.

Night Control b<y CIC.

'he capabilities -and limitations of our ulgh; air defenses afloat and the use of night flying aircraft for offensive 3$ well as defensive missions. "C.r.C,"-Vol. 11.

o. 6, June 1945. p. 20.

PLOTTThlG Eliminate the "Wait."

A "wail eliminator" system for CIC expands the function of the summary plot and can help delete lhe words "wai t" and "standby" from the Walch Officer's vocabulary. "C.l.C."-VoL IT, No. " Jan. 1945, P·34·

How to Use the SummaI')' Plot.

Detailed study of this aid, and methods b I whi h it can help you in di tinguishing friendly from enemy units. "C.l.C."- 01. rr, o. 3, March 1945, p. 32.



I' ln Air Pial.

The results of the VG for air plotting and as an adjunct for Fighter Direction, based on recent shore based operations. "C.I.C."-Vol. II, 0, 4, April 194.5, p. 31•

PUBLICAT[Q[ SAD FILMS New CIC. Figl!ler Direction and Rudelr T1'a~ni>Jg Films.

ynopsis of new films, with a listing of Aviation Film Libraries. Training Aids Sections, and locations outside the nited tales from which you may request films.

"CJ.C."- 01. 11, 1 O. 1, Jan. 1945, p. 16.

"C.I.C." Index,

A cross index of the ubjects which have appeared in "C.I.C." from March 1944 through Dec.' 944. "C.l.C. "_ Vol. rr, No. I, Jan. 194&, p. 50.

The RAD Pl~blicatiotl$ in Reuieu:

Summaries of the RAD Publications that have been, or soon are to be. distributed, "C.I.C."- 01. II, No.6, June 1945. p. ,p.

Cu .. rent Training Filllls lor ClC Personnel.

List of available films, arranged according to subject matter. "C.J.C:'-Vol. II, No.6, June 1945, p. a8.

RADAR "GlIllup PoU" of Radar=: 945.

Brief history of radar and the use made of performance and operation reports. "C.I.C."-Vol. n, No.1, Jan. 1945, p .. 43-

landardiwtion Starts with the SR.

Capabilities of the new SR long-range aircraft search radar. "C.I.C."-Vol. Ll, o. 1 .• .Jan. 1945, p. 49.

tntroducing the SP-IM.

Mobile radar for accurate lighter direclion control ashore. "C.LC."-Vol. n, No. " Jan. 1945, p. 51.

1Jeaking of ilJltemlllS.

A pictorial presentation of the various radar antennas used on the USS YORK· TOWN. "C.I.C."-Vol. u, o. 2, Feb. '945· P: g.

Triple Threat Rlldar.

The soory of the A /IU' '15 for search, navigation and bombing. "C.I.C.h-Vot IT, No.2, Feb. 1945. p. ~5'

A Pilot Discovers Radar.

personal account by Lt. G.g.) WaITen perry of B-7 relling his experiences with the AN/APS-4. -c.i.c.v-vet. II, '0. 2, Feb. 1!l45, p. 32.

MEW Goes 10 Bat in the Pacific.

The Anny's microwave early warn' (T radar used in Europe and now at, Sai "C.1.C."-Vol. n, No. 3, March 1945, p. 10.

M Radar TunIS

Interesting incidents of the SM's allilily to pick up weather data and filets of the December typhoon. "C.I.C."-Vol. El, No. 4. April 194,1;' P: 6.

The Echo Box ... or How to Keep II Radar Healthy.

A bandy in trumern, [01' testing: tbe efficiency of your radar. "C.J.C."-Vol. l l, o. 2, Feb. 1945, p. 411·


Slories of "radar collisions" digested from records in the Office of the Judge Advocate General, "C.I,C:"-Vol. 11, 0. 40 Apdl 1945. P: 18.

Flell). Service Follows tne :Fleet.

What the Electronic Field Service' Group does. "C.l.C."-Vol. II, NO.4, April 1945. p.2!!.

RAn R PERFORMA CE The "Standard" TClrget is Deblm/led.

Why permanent echoes are a poor way to measure system performance and 10 maintain your radar at peak effiai "C.I.C."-Vol. II, NO.3, Much 1945, p.

Adjust Your FPI.

Detection of small Objects at longer ranges is more probable if you adjust yo\ll' PPI according to these rules. "C.1.C,"_ Vol. n, o. 6, June '945, P: 36.

Battlewagon at Lingayen.

The ass PENSYLVANlA radars and CIC in the Philippines. "C.1.C:'-Vo1. Tl , No.6, June J 94,5, p. 32•

The Galloping G1105! of Nansei shoto.

One explanation of those myneriou targets encountered by su E>marines in the West rn Pacific. "C.l.C_"- 01. n, NO.3, March 1945. p. '16.

RADAR REPE TERS SltCCe55fttl JIG Operation.

A report b)' NT (Tactical Radarj, Hollywood. Florida, On eJ,.perieuC£'! with the VG Projection PPI, its possible [3Ctical uses and notes on Installation and maintenance. "C. I.C. "-Vol. U, o. I, Jan. 1945, p, 26.

Remoting Target Datl)-PDQ,

How the target indica Lion system in di tributes range and bearing data to control and glllmery circuits. "c.r. Vol. II. o. 3, t\fa.rch 1945, p. 14.

Rlldm' Switchboard Tmproves 1\ Remoting.

Is switchboard replaces [he string systern and facilitates the distribution of Master PPl data LO repealers in various pUts of the ship, "Cl.C."-VoL II. NO.3, March 1945, p. '9·

I'G in A mpliibiol4-S Operations.

How the ve can be 1I ed as a navigauonal aid. "C.T.C."-Vol. 11, NO.4, April '!H5. p. 27·

I'G itt LUr Plot,

he results of the VG for air plotting and as an adiunct for ·igllter Dlrectlon, based on recent boreba ed operations. "C.1.C."-Vol. II, o, 4. April 1945, p. 111·

New Evidence 01 J7G Utility.

The USS Q 1 CY reponts the successful me of the VG Projeeticn ['PI equipment [or both air and surface work. "C.I.C:'Vol. n, NO.5, May 1945, p. 31.

QUINCY Endorses VE,

Beneficial results obtained by the USS QUICY_ "C.I.C."-Vol. 11, ) 0. 5. May '945. p. 32.


SPECIAL D 'VIOES RPD Used in French Invasion.

How the RI;D facilitated craft landings in Southern France. "O.r.C."-Vol. II, No. An. 1945, p. 20.

~. SimjJli[ies Pi/oti11g.

A valuable aid in obtaining accurate fixes. "C.I, ."-Vol. n, I O. 3. March '945, p.28.

8~ (;01JII imulalor Looks Promising_

he ENTERPRI Erecommends

this device Eor training. for briefing pilots, and fOT lise on actual flights. "C.1.C."Vol. IT, NO.5. rt:lay 19'15. p. 40.


Fighter Directiorf .8egi7lS at 51. Simons.

The curriculum and training techniques given at uris Naval Radar Training School

to urdent Fighler Director (and Imerceptj oflicen;. "C.I.C."-Vol. u, o. I, Jan. 1945. p.6.

Jatll1l';lIg Duel (II Virginia Beach.

The results of the efficiency test to which the various jllluming transmitters aboard the U I S ILL were put, and the a bilily shown by the radar operators III Virginia Beach as they tried to lead lh.: scope through jamming. ·'C.I.C."-Vol. n, o. I, Jan. 19-t5. p. 40.

Hollywood trikes IlL Japan.

Methods aud curriculum used at 1 HoU wood. Florida, in Lrainiug officers In the tactical employment of radar, and in CIC organization and operation for all surface ships, e.'l:.cepl carriers, "o'1.C."Vol. 11. o. 2, Feb. '9d,5, p. 10.

M.eet the CIC Circuit Rider.

The training methods used by DesPac ill keeping officers and men afloat abreast of the rimes. "CJ.C."-Vol ll, NO.3. March 1945, p. 16.

Countermeasures T1'Ilining at Sea.

Another "Circuit Rider" placed in the. field by Desr'ac. "C,LC:'-Vol. II, o. 4, April 1945, p. 21.

Refreslier Truj"inEf for

Limited Availability.

Information concerning ITailling schools II nd the eleorroruc courses offered. "C.I.C." -VoL II, o. '.j" pril '945. p, 39.

Pnci fie Flee! Rad ar Genter Curriculum Revised.

ew COUI es pro ide up-to-the-minute

i lformaLion. "C,LC·'-Vol. II, O. 4,

ApLiI 1945, p. 40.

RCM Tvaining:

A list oE the schools providing RCM courses. "C.1.C."-Vol. IJ, NO.5, May '945, p. 6.

type commanders please see ....


Cl C 1111 I fte euern;

The Naval Academy ai Imapolis provides C1 training COl' midshipmen, "C.L ,'·-Vol. Il: , o. 5, May 194-5, p. t3.

CiG T-raining Under COTCLant.

A summary ot tile Vers-atile courses given at various training centers within the Atlanuc Fleet. "C.I.C."-Vol. Il, NO.5, May '945, p, 56.

RCM Rehearsals lit '011 Clemente.

raining aviation personnel in radio and radar countermeasures, "C.1.C."Vol. Il, I o. 6, June 1945. p. 27.

'lectTOuic Refresher Trai71i11g For Limiud Availability.

A tabulation of various radar, Loran and electronics schools, and the equipruents installed at them for training purposes. "G.l.C,"-VoL II, No.6, June 1945. P·52•


The" l-Im£iaTd" Target Is Deblmhed.

Wh)' permanent e hoes are a poor way to measure system performance and to maintain your radar at peak efficiency, "C,I.C."-Vol. ll, NO.3, {arch 1945, p, 22.

M Rador Turns Aer%gist.

I nrerestlng Inciden ts oflbe SM's ability [0 pick up weather data. and [acts of the December typboon. "C.I.C."_;.Vol. II, -0. 'I·, • pril '945, p, 6.

Chect: the Weathe7' for Your Probable Range.

he effects of the atmosphere upon communication and radar systems operaring regions above 30 mCS. "C.I.C."-Vol. n, NO·4. April 1945. p. 13·

Trad« Wind.!' (llld Sur/ace Trapping.

How low level ducts affect S or X-band radars. "CJ.C."-Vol. IT, NO.5, May 1945. p. 53·

"C.I.C." is distributed within the U. S. Nav), primarily in accordance with. the Standard Navy Distnibutien LisLS. In addition" Special Lists include certain commands lind actlviues who req uire excepticnal qua 0 tlues or the publication.

'aell ship or unit accordlng to type receives a. specified number of copies of " .I.C."-nB's 5; C 's 5 (plus group and quadron ); CN 3; DU's 2; DE' I; etc. 1 is Impra li able LO ~end varying amounts 10 hips 0.1' units of one lype, unless by the ype Commander or other appro-

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Type Commanders arc requested to notify C;\I'O if a change in number of copies is desired or if an exceptional quantiry is considered necessary for ccrta in units.

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changes in distribution requested by in-


o o

(_ C r-<


• multiple targets on D R T

T'hls article which origj'lall,}, appea1'ed in Paclileet: Radar etmII!tr'S Tactical Radar Dulle tin demonstrates that seuerat largetr can be tracked simultaneously on the DR1' if (I /G51 ~"$tem ls employed and all hands perform lilt/iT dl~tics accurately and expeditiously.

A. D olJicer of Radar Center recently witnessed !.he ploulng f"'\ of ten tiLl'get!; per minute by .3 ptouing team of WlSCO 1 on duty in the Pacific. Ten sepaune fixes were plotted each minute on live friendJr targets du ring a one 110ul" and 3 half rtigbl exercise, Courses and speed were obialned , composuion or each group determined and a comlnuous track was kept.

Heretofore, the limitation of DR ploniu that has received the most attention is me inability of me DRT plotters [0 (ruck more than LWO or three targets. The methods used by this plotting team are similar to those recommended by COlnDes· fa . Importaut Ieaiures are:

1. The entire plottiug team, including the plouing ollicel', wear sound power phones.

. a, One "Slandby~II'1ark" is gi\'cn on the saimue every minute by the recorder, who i responsible for watching the dock and recording ranges and bearings all 3 permanent recording pad. A five-second interval is 11 ed between" land by" and "Mark."

J. Two men are ued on the 'radar . The :1' istant operator sets the bearing. he operator handles the range crank and reads bearing LO nearest degree and range to the nearest, hundred ards,

Upon receiving the .. tandb ," the assi stant (lperalOr stops the antenna on the primary un'gel which ha been designated by the pleulng officer working ,)11 the DRT. On "Mark" the radar operator sets range and calls (JU! t;mge and be.3l'i:ng. After reading lhe prhnary W I'gl:l the operator mils j naIl remalnlng targets in clockwise order. :"10 more" Mark " are given until the next minute when the same procedure i repeated.

AU contacts in the minute are plotted from the posnion of

the bug at the "Mark" for that mtnuie, his introduces a

• plotting facilities for CI C

C1 officers will I e Interested in the content o[ a BuShips circular letter reprinted under" 45'5 Is-Plotting FactlitiesDescription, Allowance and vallabi.lity oE" in the 15 Ma)' 1945 Navy Deparuuem Bulletin, dlstributed to all ships and shore stations.

PI' enting a full description of new pLOLlil'g facilh.les designed for cre (and radar plot where CI is not authorized) and visual fighter direciien statlous, [he following equ ipm 'ul brought (.0 auendon:

Horlzeural Plotting Table !l6h ]',lk I, Mod 1 ummary Plotting Board ynchro 24" Mit 2 Mod $ ummary Plouing Board X 24" Mk 3 I[od 2


small initial error, but the error is constant for each minute, Therefore, aCCUI"llC)' of courses and speeds is 1l0~ alIeaed. 'I he radar operator is censtantly aware or the Ioearion of the primary' targel. He] never told uie raid clc'SignatlOI\,

The pleuing team COU"islS oL:

R'I officer who supervises the plculng, places correct symbois on LIte plot, connect. plots, determines peeds with a speed scale, marks 011'11 ship's track, labels raids as they are desiguated, add b()xed in[or01lllidn such as compositiuu, cou rses, and sl)cetli;. and labels each plOL with the correct time. Wh.enever possible the officer helps the a rista ru 'plotter mark ranges.

The assistant plotter (Rdll-lllC) who ets bearings on rne parallel motion prolr~ lor and marks ranges. Instead 1.11 placing symbofs all the plot he puts a pencil pOillL mark at the correct range. The symbols are added by the plotting officer. Tile ru.sistam _plOll('1 uses the "yioch method" and dot'S not touch the bUlLedl)' lock all the P.IIIP, He stands at the side of the table on which the l'MP base is anchored, He determines target courses and help' th plotting officer whenever time permits,

An additional Ieature was added all the \'\fISCO:NSIN [or the benefit of other CIC personnel to prevent them from crowding over the DR 10 obtain i uformatiou. 'his Ieature is It iemporary recorder' bla kboard on which i kept po ted the last bearing and mnge of ca h raid with the raid desiguation, This is displayed within C<I )' view oE all CL personnel.

The tempo)llJ")' recorder writes :111 ranges and bearings U$ operaror calls ihern OUL do kwise, The correct mid designad can be checked by referrlng' to the adjacent DR .

IUs peed system of pi lLing docs not display inforrnat ion as neatly or as accurate] a a slower method. It is occasionally necessary La skip a minute's plotting La determine composition of the various target raids.

However, iL serves 10 give a :Olllplele gcogyaphic picture 01 be target groups in [he area. It presents illfon~ation sufficiemly accurate to coac,b both main and econdary baLl;ery on any target with case under fu U radar con trol.

Verucal n03l'd 60" 'Ill 4 Mod 4 Edge Lighted Statu' Board 36" Mk 5 lad J

Dead Reekoning k 6 Mod 4 (5l~" x 39" x t!l~~)

Dead Reckoning Tracer fk '} Mod I (~4" x 2.6" x 9")

24~ x 2 "HcrcuJile lass Plotting urface

This information includes proper terminology to use in making official reference 10 each in trumeut togetber with size. type, electrica) specification and ()Lher features of caw ltum, It Iises allowances of each in trument [or each type hip. IL scrlbes methods Cor obtaining Installation of each instrru

and lists avy Yards \ here stock of each (mil is available.

standby .... mark!

You are about to receive the !ir,st issue of au important DC'" Confidcnual magaaine=Bu hips ELECTRON.

The Flee~ needs this magazine and will surely welcome it.

'LE TRO\ ' mission is to pre cut the lilt t techni ,II informariou on the instaltat ion and maintenance of ship and bore electronic equipments, paralleling ·'C.I.C:s" co,",'erngc of the tactical and operational uses.



Though the articl will be prepared primarily LO assist Radio Technicians, many other readers hould find them helpful HII\1 inlormative. • LE TRO:-' will welcome

cont rthu tions [rom Radio Te hni ian 011 p'rolllems thev have

mel and olved. Sources of material willie repons ami alii lcs (rom lite field. I? I U~ all ieles prepared hy BII hips,

Dlst ribut.ion (about the same number of cople no" .I.e.") will couunenre with the Jul} i W', 10 all ornmands, ship. school,

and shore activities concerned with the technlcal aspects of electroni .... I. ." suggests rharrecipients take sLeps to assure l)rOW~J' cireutaucn o( thelr copies-and extends (0 ELECTRO:\ a '"non Voyngel"

, .. that would lIe of iblerl~~1 for ~"Idl'lhl ofthe Month" f

~J #;k ii, ~ :s~' ",rp?

Many "lJipM: arc now reporlulg dilico\'~rie~

which speed plottlng, remo e kinks Irom COUl' munieariens, gf~l better eoneentratlon of AA fire, mHke Luran pay extra tli" emls, lay lUort:" effective hRrriert! in the I.atlt of Kamikazr~ , amI "" on.

BOW ABOUT ,·OUR :5HIP? What solutions have you

found 10 prohlemg which ' !lliII he

I ,olheringnllu~r8'!

"C.I.C.·' in\'ilc~ you ,to beeomc a contrihuling menrbee of the "{d.-as of Ihe [\1" .. lh'· (lub-loday!

this publication ;s CONFIDENTIAL