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sizing up Japan's early warning and fighter control

Japalle e early warning i con idered adequate for g·iving general warning of the approach 01 large llied air fortnarions to Japan but Japanese fighter ontrol i in a rather undeveloped tate, The limited scope of Japane e fizhter COntTOJ operations i demonstrated by the t 'pe of flgiller reaction exp rien ed OLl. llied b mber mi ion 0 er Japanese-held territorie and b}7 the poor performan .e hara teristi 5, for lurpo e or fighter

ontrol. of radar and c rrununi ati n quipmeut known t be in perational u in UP japane e Air F rce. - h japane e have und r devel P: ment a number of special devi e for l e in zround- and air- ontrolled interception and they have been conductina research and experiments in fighter control organization and procedure .. Eventually, these activitie may be expected to result in fighter centro 1 operations of a more formidable calibre.

Japanese early warning

Jnpane e )'S em f I" early warning [the approach craft 0 Japan i based on in lormati 11 1'1" III radar pi ket 1 okou ,and sound locator',

flied ITboat , visual


A complete chain of approximatel 1:00 separate rations with earl} w!l_rning radars, operating on frequencies I-['Om 60 to 200 megacycles, is now in operation on the southern coast f Japan and the out! ing i lands

to the south and uthwest, lso, early warning radar are in extensive

II e in China and utheast ia, but 11 t in "U hen enrration a in the

Japane e h me .i lands. In addition, ther is some e idence that the japanese are !Up I )ino' i o-centirneter 1 dar for urfa e warnins and p issib] ° for urfa gUll la till~ alorur the southern '0, t of Japan. It i apparent from radar intercept that Allied air formation' approach ing Japan can be plotted


r o )c (j) c U\ -I

b th e stati n at ranze a zreat a 150 mil s lr 111 the oa t. These radar, though inferior in

de ian and perrorman to earl warning radar

in lise by the American and British forces, are nevertheles quite adequate For the p:rimary function of wiving warrring against the approach of large llied air formation .1.

lt has been observed that ih radars l'requerul are operat d in pairs, apI ar ntl r to allot on to

1 It i to be noted, however, that tbe low-angle coverage from radars oparating on frequencies of 200 megacycles, or Ie s, is necessarily .rather limited and unreliable.



track whil lie th r continues LO ear 11. hi i

neces ar becau e the di pla on .lapane arl

warning Tadars is u h that searching and tracking cannot be done concurrentlv. It is also common practic to operate the early warning radar only for f ed periods during the day and night, 0)," when <U1 alert has been called. e- he total time ot opee ation i reduced in thi manner undoubtedly to con erve the life of el ential pal , particularl

LUb . the supplie Lwhi h are known to be ex-

[rem 1 limited.


Equally important ill the Japanese early warnina system are the picket boats stationed off the Japanese home islands. These picket boats ar g,1'01l ped in di isions und r L laval district and C uard clio tricts, whi h in turn are under tw Naval etense Commands with central bureau, one at Yokosuka and the [her at him no eki. A lug number 0 th boats are dispersed offshore at di ranees a great a . and metirne exceedinz 400 miles, and the tWO command areas,

o I

mentioned abo e, cover all approaches to the home

islands and key points in the outer defense perimeter.

, s of Februar 1945, number of the e pi ket boa appeared to lie a ro tb area of the. an po hoto Islands midwa berwe n the Bonms and

, ,

Jal an. The al 0 have b n izhted Iair] le in hor near Tok 0 Ba ,Kii aida, and Bango

aido, as well as b [we 11 the numerou i lands of the ansei Shoto group. Also, off hore pi et lines ha e been maintained in the north-south direction more than 400 miles east of Tokyo Ba .2

These craft depend entirely on radio for communication with early warning centers. Many of these boats are equipped with sound detectors to increase the area of coverage, particularly during condition of poor vi ibility, and there also is evidence that 'orne are equipped with. radar.

he pi ket boats form the first lin of the .J apaneseearly warning y tem and, hen the warning available from them is pooled with that supplied by land-based radars and the innumerable visual lookouts scattered throughout the mainland and outlying islands, it is clear that it would be virrually impossible for large formations of aircraft to penetrate to the inner Japanese zone without detection. Radio broadcasts heard during recent missions of the XXI Bomber Command how definitely that adequate early warning has, in fact, existed.

fighter control

A vaila ble evidence indicates that figh ter control operations, in the Japanese Air Force are in a undeveloped state. At the present time, the <ll-'au'",,,c Air Force appears to be dependent almost entirely on information from early warning radars and on visual observations from ground and air observers for daylight interception and on illumination by searchlights sited in the principal target areas for nigh t interception. j 0 special in tercep~

'on equipment equivalent to Allied GCl, fighter director, or Al equipment, or to the German WiirzbllIg or Benito equipments is known to be in operational use by the Japanese Air Force.


The limited scope of the J apane e fighter control operations is demonstrated by the type of fighter reaction th us far experienced on mi sions of the X and the XXI Bomber Commands over Japanese-held territories. The number of individual fighter attacks against B-2g's during bombing missions over the Japanese mainland has frequently been quite great, but in estimating Japanese fighrer control operations, it is significant that these tighter attacks have been concentrated almost entirely in the principal target areas. There have

2 Pae Fleet-Poa Weekly Intellige'n.Ce of 25 June '46 rethat these pickets have now pulled in to 70 mtles the .home islands and ars more thinly dispersed than fm·merly.

been vel' ' few attacks while 11 route to and from the target areas. For example the location of fighter attacks during a daylight raid by B'2g'S on a target in the J agoya area was as ol1ows:

Before reaching the coast, no attacks; from the coast to the Initial Point, 14 attacks, from the Initial Point until bombs were dropped, 50 attacks; after bombs were dropped until the coast was reached, 102 attacks; and after crossing the coast, no attack .

Of a total of 166 Japanese fighter attacks on this mission, 62 pel'cent were made aher bombs were dropped; only 8 percent 'were made before the bomb run and none were made while out to sea.

Similarly, in the course of a day mission directed against an aircraft works in Tokyo the distribution of enemy fighter attacks was as follows:

Before reaching the coast, no attacks; from the coast to the lnitial Point, 2 attacks; from the Initial Point until bombs were dropped, 474 attacks; after bombs were dropped until the coast was reached, 94attacks; and after the coast was crossed, 110 attacks.

Out of a total of 570 individual fighter attacks, only two occurred prior to making the bomb run and none were' made while OUt to sea.

The location of fighter attacks on these two raids is typical of the fighter reaction experienced on other missions over Japan. It is interesting, however, that on two daylight bomber raids over Japan when conditions of poor visibility prevailed over the Japanese mainland, no enemy fighters


were encountered anywhere, The l 'pe of fighter reaction encountered on mis ions of the XX Boml er Command against target in China and Burma has been similar insofar location of attacks i concerned. In these areas

however, the total Japane e fizhter Tea~tion has been considerably weaker "~"'~".:;.

and more or less obsolescent r pes of .fighters have been employed fre-!ffIIF quently.


Reports on night mis ions 0 er Japan in March an~ p~il 1.945 indicate that the night fighter interceptionystem depends on illummanon of target aircraft by searchlights. No route interception have been reported and there is no evidence of ectoring of night fighters by ground control.

The failure of the Japanese Air Force to make route interceptions in any organized manner, either by day or night, indicates that a system of ground control for directins such interceptions is not in operation. It is known, however, that the JAF has been examining ground-controlled interception procedure and organization in an effort to make the best use of the radar, navigation, and communication equipment at present available, also, a number of special devi e for u e in ground- and air-controlled interception are under development.


A fighter control radar system, similar to the German Egan sy - tern, is reported to be under development. The equipment, known as "F" device or "guide radar," consi t of a ground radar unit operated in conjunction with a transponder installed in the aircraft being controlled. The ground unit transmits pulses on a frequency of 106 megacycles with a pulse recurrence Irequency of 1,000 c des per second and a pulse length of 5 microseconds- The airborne rran ponder is triggered by these transmi ions and retran mits to the ground unit on a frequency of 100 megacycles. The power output of the ground transmitter is approximately 10 kilowatts. while output from the airborne transponder is goo watts. The range of the aircraft from the ground station is determined by the time delay between the transmitted and the received pulses. Azimuth is determined by a directional antenna system for the ground receiver. The specified standards of accuracy are stated to be plus OJ' minus 2.5 kilometers in range and plus or minus }.5 degree in azimuth. The specified maximum operational range is 5 ated to be 150 kilometer, although tests conducted b the Japanese early in 1944 indicated an actual operational range of about 60 kilometers.

It is reported that e periments are being conducted to determine the feasibility of employing a continuous-wave, pha e-comparison system tbat

A radar lo'be SWilt;hing Illlltmm tI'IotHllI:(i on the face of a /(lP searchlight.





would op rate in conjunction '\ ith tandard airborne communication equipment. This would have the ad antage that no additional equipment in the aircraft would be required ince one airborne communicarion, set could be u ed for both ranging and communication. nless a specially designed communication set was employed, however, it is questionable whether this system, similar to German Benito, would be practical operationally.

There is no indication to date that any guide radar quipment is in operational use.


A captured document de cribe a rendezvou P" edure used by lighter units of the Japanese Air F01'ce. The fighter accomplish the assembly by hcminz on a tracking or observation plane with the aid of airborne radio communication equipment, The following tactical uses are suggested for this assembly:

I-To effect interceptions of Allied aircraft escaping from Allied airfields during raids.

2- 0 effe tinter eptions of Allied raiders before the target area is reached.

3= To home fighter units on an e cort rm sion when the are in need of navigational aid as the result oE a Iong-range chase.

Type 2 ir Mark III radio in the tracking or observation plane is used £01' homing transmissions and also for liaison communication. A Type I Air Mark III radio direction finder and homing device in each fighter is used for picking up and DjF'ing the homing transmissions. Also installed in each fighter is a T pe 3 Air Mark I radiophone for Iiai on communication. It is stated that with this equipment rendezvous can be accomplished up to range of 60 nautical miles.

he pm edure for making rendez ous is as Iollot :

1- Th tra king or observation plane, while shadowins the enemy formation; tran rnits at regular interval on the long-wave homing frequency.

his plane tran mits call sign, altitude (in units of 100 meters), and three dashes of 3 to 5 seconds duration' and then stands by on the short-wave liaison Irequency,

2- The fighters DjF on the hominz transmissions and receive' data regarding enemy rrength, disposition, <U1.d course 011 the short-wave liaison channel.

a-It is rated in the captured document that the ideal altitude of fighter approach i that at which the spotting of enemy aircraft can be accomplished most ea ily, that is, at the am altitude as the enemy aircraft or at an altitude of 200 to 300 meter below that of the enemy aircraft.

One or two Japanese aircraft oeca ionally have been observed shadowing . S. bomber formations as they approached the Japanese coast, and on other 0 casions . S. formations leaving a target area in Japan have been follow d by shadowing aircraft 50 to 100 miles out to sea. It is possible that attempts were made to home fighter aircraft to the shadow.insr aircraft for purposes of atta k but it i not reported in an instance that lighter attack actually materializ d. t i al 0 po sible that the shadowing aircraft \ ere on the 1 kout I r tragglers and that the were in communication with ground ontrol and were reporting 11 h information a the height, s rength, and com e of the forma ion.


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The Japanese have under development an electronic identification !! stem similar to IFF. A ground transmitter with peak po\,ver of 2 kilowatts emits pulses on a frequency of 18g megacycles with a pulse recurrence frequency which is variable from 600 to 1,000 cycles per second. The airborne transponder radiates on a frequency of 198 megacycles and has a peak power between 100 and 200 watts. The specified range for the equipment is 200 kilometers bur tests conducted by the Japanese show ai actual range of about 100 kilometer. The airborne transponder is similar to that used in the guide radar and presumably would function equally well in that system.

There is no indication to date of the operational use of IFF equipment by the Japanese Air Force.


There is no substantial evidence to date of the operational u e of AI eq ui pment by the ] apanese Air FOTce. It is known, however, that several type of such equipment are under development and the frequencies on which experiments appeal' to have been made are 300, .545, Goo, 1,05°-1,080, 1,200-1>495 megacycles. It is likely that the Japanese are also experimenting with to-centimeter AI. It is known that Allied airborne ro-cenrirneter radar equipment was captured by the Japanese in 1944, and it may be presumed that they have examined this equipment with a view to producing an adaptation suitable for AI.

The Japanese have a number of types of ASV (air-to-surface vessel) radar in operation, the operating frequencies in most common use being 150 megacycles and 200 megacycles, but these equipmerits are probably too crude for AI operation.' It is reported in connection with night mission over Japan during March 1945 that enemy aircraft trailed B-2g'S from the target area out to sea and that these aircraft may have been equipped with radar since evasive action was ineffective. It is not reported in any instance that such aircraft closed on a B-29'

comm u nkations

It may be presumed that the] • air-to-arouud communication system is satisfactory, although

8 The Japanese ASV radars Iaek the fol1owing performance characteristics neceasarv for AI oparatione I, reliability in detecting single aircraft j 2, great accuracy in determination of ran~e and bearing; 3, minimum operational range of less than one mile, and 4, heigh.t finding.

analysis bf captured Japanese air-to-ground communicatiou equipment indicate that the performan e of uch equipmenc is not equal to that of star dard Allied communication equipment. ets of recent manufacture, not yet in wide operational use, appear, however, to approach more closely the performance of Allied equipment. There are indications that frequencies between 4,000 and 10,000 kilocycles are used, pl'qbably primarily fur towel" control and perhaps al a for fighter control. It may be that other channels, perhaps in the VHF band, are, or will be, allocated exclusivelj for fighter centro operations. The JAF fighter Rj procedure probably varies in detail in different areas and organization , bu t . t seems to be general practice that only the lead aircraft in a formation communicates by Rj with the Ground Control. Fighter aircraft commonly use W rr for groundto-air communication in addition to RjT. There is evidence of a distinct lack of overall, uniform procedure for air-to-ground communication throughout the Japanese Air Force.

fighter control research and training Research and study have been carried all by the Japanese Air Force in an attempt to establish uniform operational procedures for fighter conrro

Ianeuver and research have been conducted at the Branch School of the Akeno Flying School where randard operational procedure for making daylight and night interceptions with guide radar in coordination with early warning radars, searchlights, and signal and air unit' ha been worked aut in a general form.


Coordination of the radar, signal, and air unit concerned is to be ac omplished through an "Intelligence Squad" which aPl?ears to be similar in function to a U. S. Army FIghter Control Squadron. The Intelligence Squad operates in a "Fighter Unit Intelligence Center't=analagous to OUT Air Defense Control enters-which presumably would be situated near the base airfield of fighters to be controlled. At this Center, communications are to be maintained, either by wire or radio, with early warning radars, direction fina:n"" stations, weather stations, guide radars, the all' ba e, and airborne lighters. Presumably, there would also be a means of communication with adjacent in te Ilizence Centers and with the hiaher tactical c0lili: ~land. TIle commanding office~ of the "Defe.

nit" is stationed at this Center, and on the basis

of reports received from the outlying radar and DIF stations, position of aircraft may be plotted, the cour e and speed of approaching raids may be determined, and fighters may b ve toted to intercept.

At the end of February 194-1. rather extensive maneuvers to test this system of fighter control were carried out at the Branch chool of the Akeno Flying School. Earlier maneuver had been cooducted in November and December of 1943 but were said to have been unsatisfactory because of faulty air-to-ground communication and inadequate radar coverage. The equipment used in the February -maneuver consisted of ten Model I fighter planes (Oscar) u ed as an int rceptor for e, four Model 2 two-seater planes (Nicks) used as lead aircraft for the interceptor unit, nine !fodel 99 assault planes (Sonias) used as an air raid force, two "radar warning devices B" used for tracking the air raid force, signal equipment for air-toground and point-to-point commtmication, and one guide radar. The zuide udal' was intended to be employed for tracking the in -erceptor force but appears to have been non-operational during the maneuvers. FTe umably transponders for operation with the guide radar were installed in the

we-seater fighters used as lead aircraft.

The In telligence Center was at an airfield at Mito, situated 80 miles northeast of Yokohama. One radar warning device bad wire line COlUIDunication to the Intelligence Center 'while communication to the other radar warning device was by radio. The movements of the fi hters sent up to attempt interception on the raiding force were controlled from the Intelligence Genter.


Test interceptions were carried out on four uccessi e days, and [he results x ere decidedly un arisfactory. On only one of the ten flights made did the intercepting force actually encounter the raiding forc. he principal difficulty, as shown by the test records, was inability of the radar warning devi es to track the raiding Force with any degree of continuity or accuracy. On one .flight the radar warning devices did not plot on the raiding forces at all, and when their performance was at its best, they furnished only isolated plots from which it proved to be impossible to establish continuous tracks on the target aircraft. Also, the few plots that were received were extremely inaccurate. errors were from 10 to 20 degrees and

errors were frequently as hizh as 30 kilometers. In addition, there appeared to be a con-

siderable number of spurious plots which added to the difficulty in establishing tra ks 011 the tarzec aircraft. There appeared to be no organized filter system in operation at the Intellizence enter for piecing together and evaluarinz plots from the radar nations.

all equently, the information available to the commanding officer of the Defen nit on which to v ctor the intercept r force was inaccurate and scanty. The mo t he could do was to vector the fighter units out on a course that he believed to be the most probable line or approach oE the raiding terce and hope [or a ontact, There i no eviden e

hat, alrer the initial vector. correctinz ve t 'r Were given. and since chanae in course of the raidinz force could not be determined with (luy prompmess or certainty and here was alway COI1- siderable doubt as t the actual position f the raiding force and of the interc [tor units all e they had left the ba e, there would have been no point ill giving such vectors. Lack of equipment for determining heizhts is evidenced b be fa t that the raiding force wa l1.S rutted t A, within d signated limits. Inter eption were n t attempted at rang' zreater than ; 0 to 4-0 kilomet rs from tile base.


The dire tor in charge of the maneuver wa aware that the r suits of the manuvers , ere not what they should have been and attributed the failure in large part to poor radar performance. His conclusions were. in part. as follows:


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5-Mark 229, fixed land-based search radar. This set (Radar Warning Device B) has a peak power output in the order of 50 kilowatts which is considerably higher than that of other early warning sets. The transmitter and receiver are at separate locations and the operafional f:requency is in the band of 6 to 80 megacycles. Two 01' three receivers are frequently operated in conjunction with one t-':'ansmitter thereby increasing the number of targets that can be tracked at one time.

6--Mark230rutd Msxk 231, also referred to by the Japanese as Radar Warning Device B, axe mobile land-based radars and probably are similar to the Mark 229 in power output and general performance characteristics.

It is apparent, however, that Don of the known operational t pe of Japane e earl warning radar, or an combination of the e t -pes, i fully uited for operation in a y tern of 21." und-controlled interception comparable to the stems u ed b the llie or Germans,

Perhap the greatest deficiency in this respect is that they are incapable of giving inforn ation on heights. here is evidence that attempts are sometimes made to estimate heights from pick-up and fade range, but this sy tern, even if in general lise, would be inaccurate and unreliable. Furthermore, these radars lack raid handling capacity; that is, the are able to furni 11 continuous information on only one, or, at most, two aircraft tracks at one time. They also appear to be inherently incapable of determining bearing and range and of di riminating between taraet ith the aCCUTa that would be requir d for ground-controlled intercepri n.

here i no evidence that the Japan e have in operational LI e an equipment that is equivalent in performance to Allied Gel or fio'l ter director equipments or to the errnan Giant "\ urzburg.

The lap rafiar operators use, the viewing hoods project/t1g from!he ped(:.'ltJl.

These'lap mobile radar,1 have been TIII!II c.amouflaged. The trucks are reuetted; the an/enfJlIS blended with trees,

"Iti belie ed that the performance of the presently used Radar Wa~nina De ice B . . . i poor and that, unless it i further improved, the rnter pti D of enemy plan by OU1' fighter unit guided by a mall number

of chi type of set will be difficult. ., .

"The interception ta tic of the fighter urut using radar equipment must be studied thoroughly and rapidly as the performance of the radar warning device is improved."


lt rna be noted that the radar warning dice B, poor as its performan e proved to be in these man uv rs, is probably a well uited for u e in fizhte onrrol operati 11 as any other type of .Japane e earl warning radar known to he in operational use.'

.f Other standard types a1:e:

I-The Mark 1 :Modell, a fixed, land-based search radar operating at a frequ.ency of 100 megacycles. This is one of tbe roost cOlnmo~y used types and maximum operational' range on a single four-engine bomber is probably about 35 miles.

2-Mark 1 Model 2 a mobile, land-based set operating on a frequency of approximately 200 megacycles. Maximum operational range on ingle four-engine bomber is probablY about 35 miles.

a-Air Mark 6 Type 3, light weight airborne search set that has been adapted for use on he ground operating at approximately 150 megacycles.

4-Muk 1 Model 3, a portable early warning set operating at approximately 150 megacycles with higher power than Air Mark 6, Type 3.




Same bar i'l rlt« open .


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night interception

The night intercepti n tem in u e b tile

Japane e 'ir Force depend upon the use of searchlights sited ill the vicinity of the principal target area .~'l\Tben warning of an approach ing raid has been received, nigh t fighters are scram bled and take up a rand-by po ilion by orbiting about a rna ter Jight. Other Iizhts aloe LL ed to illuminate the target aircraft and when they ha e 1 een oned in the lights, the nizht fighter. mo e out from tl e stand-by position to intercept. There is evidence that me Lth se earchlight are ontrolled b radar, mostprobabl r the arne type as are used for O'UD la ing," and that other are controlled by sound locators,

earchlights are also used for pointing anti-aircraft fire and have been under control of anti-aircraft artillery units, It wa uggested by member of the In pecrorate General, in the report menU ned in footnote 5, that earchlizhc units be pla ed under fighter unit ontrol Ear be ter coordination with night fighter operations. It was

(Tap) The call ihis Il "mel/sll,'irIS device." (Ba//'am) Mmill/fl/OT for treq·uenc}' coturol,





al uggested that further training was required in

the operation of large numbers of night fighter at one time.

Great difficulty has been experienced by the Japanese in distinguishing between friendly and enemy aircraft, the only means available having been by visual or aural identification which appears to have been rather ineffective.

Reports on night operations over Tokyo in March and pril 19 5, and over Formosa at an earlier peri d, show the J apane e use of searchIight in those areas to be ompetent and effe rive. Pilots have Irequentl reported that they have b en illuminated the instant the lights came on, and that in other case one or more lights have swept the skyand, upon the target being picked up, other Iights have come on and have been trained upon the target .instantly, In the Formosa area the primary fun tion of the lights appears to be to a sist the night fighters while in tbe Tokyo area they are used for this purpose and also to as-

ist in pointing anti-aircraft fire,


During recent raids over Tokyo the searchlights have been coordinated in tracking aircraft and in passing aircraft from one light to another. It w

5 In a report by members of the Inspectorate General from Imperial General Headquarters on the B-2.9 raids over northern Kyushu on 15 June '44 and 8 July '44, it is stated that planes not spotted by searchlights could not be attacked. As the .report is fairly comprehensive in all aspects of the all' defense operations during those raids, and quite practical in appl'oach to the difficulties encountered, this statement, when taken with tb.eabsence of any reference to ground control of night fighters or the use of airborne interceptdon equipment, is evidence that no Gel or AI equipment was in operation.

G The Japanese Army and Navy have a number of types of gun-laying radar in operational use but all appear to be xatber inferior in pe:riormance. Two of tbe sets in widest use are copies of early American and British equipments capttrred at the beginning of the war in the Philippines and at Singapcre.

It is known that the Japanese have received considerable technic al iltformation from Gel'llUlnY relative to the Wfu'zbul'g, the standard gun-laying radar which was used by the German forces. It is likely that radars of tbis type are in process of production in Japan, but so far there is no evidence that such sets are in operational use. is also a possibility that the J apanese are developing centimeter gun-laying radar.

The Japanese searchlight and gun-laying radars operate on f~'equencies of 75 megacycles (Mark TA. Model and 200 megacycles (Mark TA, Models l, 2, and 4 Mark 4, Models 1, 2, and 3).

observed, however, that the searchlight control It:LLueu to become confused as the raids progre sed, UII.JU.:l.UJlV as a result of saturation,

The number of fighte_r attacks has been fairly large (more than ]00 attacks were reported to have been made during one of the night raids in March), but to date this night air opposition has not been very effective,

The japanese air crews appear to lack training in night fighter operations and attack generally are made under conditions involving no element of surprise, the principal tactical advantage that the night fighter can have. Many of me fizhters have been using landing lights to spot the bombers, and many others, with no detection aid of any kind, appear to free-lance in the target area and spot targets as best .tbey can by illumination hom fires caused by bombing, flak, explosions. and moonlight.

At the present time, the japanese Air Force is handicapped in night air defense operation by lack of well-trained night fighter crews, specially equipped night fighter aircraft, and a system of ground control based on the operation of fighter control radar. It is difficult to estimate with what rapidity these deficiencies can be made up by the Japanese, but when one considers the complexity

the equipment and organization required, the time that was taken in the European Theater by the Germans to overcome the arne difficulties, and the relatively poor past performance of the japanese in the development and production of advanced types of radar, it appears unlikely that the Japanese will accomplish a great deal in tile near future.

Japanese readiness summed up

The present Japanese early warning and fighter control system for air defense is in a tate of development roughly comparable to German development in the period from 1939 to 1941. The Germans also used picket boats to supplement the early warning radar and their first night interceplion system depended upon illumination of raiders by searchlights.

The Japanese early warning system appears to be adequate for tbe purpose of giving general warning of the approach of Allied aircraft to Japan. In view of the inferior performance of the radars, however, and of the apparent lack of a well organized filtering system, it is doubtful that accurate and prompt information on pinpoints,

rses, speeds, heights, identifications, and strengths is being supplied to japanese Air Force

Control Center. "Vithom such information. the operations of th e control center must be quite restricted, and it is not likely that the are in a position to make material change in the di position of fighter squadrons to meet the special tactical requirements of individual raids. As a corollary, it may be stated that Allied diversionary raids staged in connection with bomber atta iks against primary targets in Japan probably have li tJe effect in lessening the number of fighters available for attack again t the main force,

Operation at Japanese Fighter Control Centers appear to consist of scrambling fighters, broadcas tina warning to airborne aircraft of the presence of enemy aircraft, and ordering fighters to proceed to designated general areas in the vicinity, most often a target area, for "attack," or in other cases to take appropriate action for evasion. There is no evidence' of an operational system for vectoring fighter to intercept specific aircraft or formations or a y tern for making- route' interceptions. Height information appears to be non-exi tent, except when vi ual observations from the ground

, D

or au can be made, and an electronic system £0'[

identification is not yet in operation. ight interceptions are accomplished by coordination of nigbt fighters with searchlights and in other cases by night fighters free-lancing in the target area, often with no detection aid of any kind. So far as is known I equipment is not in operational 1I e.


It is possible that in the immediate future the japanese will perfect a system of air control interception based on homing fighters on to a shadowing aircraft by means of airborne direction finders. This system might be fairly effective £01' day operations, when potting and closing can be done visually, but seems unsuitable for night operations.

It i unlikely that the Japanese Air Force will be able to organize an effective system for zround control interception or fighter control, especially for night operations, until such time as they have in operation ground and airborne radar more uitable for the purp0se than any now: in operation. It is possible, however, that the Japanese are developing specially designed fighter control radar, perhaps an adaptation of the Giant "\ iirzburg, and al 0 AI equipment possibly adapted from Allied airborne to-centimeter equipment, but present indications are that operation of such equipment in an integrated system of fizhter 011- trol is not imminent.


o > c (j)

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V E-DAY. brOuO'. h. t Cermai SUbmari.n~. a tivity to an abrupt end. The "now It can be . told" stories of this phase of the Battle of the Atlahtic-uss GUADALCA AL' capture of a Nazi If-boat intact, exciting kills during COl voy prote - tion, and the erious ub- urface battles within

izht of OUI' tlanti eal ard-empha ize the importan ce of thi phase of Naval, arfare.

Anti- ubmarine warfare in the Pacific is different and in many"ways more complicated than its tlantic counterpart. The element of space in the Pacific makes concentrated search more difficult, he large scale operations of our own submarine force, both on attack and lifeguard missions through ut this vast area, make recognition an ultra important factor. It i evident that OUT Pacific techniques will depend heavily upon IC-coordinated information.

VHF channels and other inrer-Olf) nets offer

ndle ooperative SW pos ibiliti ( all hips



't' ~SW

,1 nOel)\C

anU r .


of our Fleet. eIC on any ship can onrribute information to the DD, DE, OT P assigned to surface attack and at th same time assist with the

orrelauon of aircraft ( P, PBY's. and H/K team) on the same attack. The cooperative task force and task group eIC a tivit , already demon-

traced in fighter dir tion and AA nerdination, is destined to pro e onclu ively to the Japane e that this anti-sub defense peU defeat f r their long ranae and oa tal type submarine activities.

Commander Destroyer. Pacific Fleet, describes 311d recommends procedure in this article which Pacifi W experience 11a developed into coordinated operations b tween IC, onar and supplementary assisting ageD ies in closing for the "kill" on a ]apallf'Se submarine. A di ell sion 0 C1C re-

pon ibilities in making air raft Weffecti e will

be pre ented in an article b Commander Free, Pacific Fleet, in a coming i ue of" .. C."

The advan xnnent 0 the main theater of peraiions into the "\ e tern Pacific Areas and to the

hores of Japan itself has alread in reased the tempo of ]apane e ubmarine warfare. Tt i to be expected that thi a tiviry will be further increased as our operations move closer to the home i lands of the empire, It i no longer nece ary for the enem-y to rely on long range submarines to strike at om shipping, hart range midzet subs, ea ier to build in larue quantities and already a ailable in large number ,ar now able to operate from strategic ba e in 'lose proximity to OUT upply lines.

From all indications, the Japs are no lonzer making a major effort to supply the by-pa eel areas in the Central. outh, and Southwest Pacific areas. As mopping-up operations continue in these areas, the supply sub will be freed for more offensive duty in the home waters. From recent action rep res it is e idem that the Japanese will continue pres ing home more submarine attacks of an aggressive nature than in the past.

A change in ta tics may be expected ill the futore in an attempt to disrupt our supply line already made ulnerahle hy the vast distance and numerous operations in olved, Under even ideal echo ranging conditions, the midget submarine

resents a poor sound tar-get. With our entry into waters less favorable for good sound conditions, it will be neces arfor the attacking hip to utilize every possible aid in order to deliver a succes ful attack.

Originally the anti-submarine warfare program in the Pacific did not present the aspects of a separate war as had been the case in the Atlantic. Its importance, however, is steadily increasing. Although all ships concerned are familiar with the problem, it is repeated at this time to emphasize the need for continued CIC training in A/S warfare and to outline the various ways in which CIC may be of as i tance at all rages of any attack. 0 be prepared t m et any condition which may arise, thos hip equipped with sonar equipment must be familiar with the various type of indio vidual and csordinaced attacks, and 11a e developed a high degree of coordination between CIC. sonar, and assisting ships or planes.


CIC can be or material assistance in combating this increase in ubmarine activity. The e 'tent 0 this assistance wilt var from one attack to another well as between phases of any ingl attack. In e normal attack, wher onar .ha contact and is

Iurnishinz all inf rmati n 1: Conn, 'IC' assist-

ance 'is limited t ubstantiarinz the anal si

already mad b Conn and suzae ting C He tions where neces ar . In thi t pe of attack, onn 1S ill a position to recei e the information before it has been plotted and of necessity must act OIl it prior to any CIC action being taken. Tbe plotting o flicer, however, honld be prepared to Iurni h the firing time in e ent of a casualty to the sonar range recorder. here should also be available some means of conducting a hand-plot if the DRT becomes inoperative.

At the firing time, CIe must pl t the explosion point and proje 't the estimated lib track in order to provide an accurate search sector to sonar, if standard search procedure ha not regained contact. crc at this lime should recommend courses to Conn in OIde_T to put the ship in an advantageous position to regain contact, taking into consideration the blind spot on either ide of the stern caused hy the baffle plates and the ship' 0, n wake.

Unfortunately, the probability of doing lethal damage to an enem contact in a single attack is very mall, and it i necessary to carry out repeated attacks to obtain a definite kill. Due to me disturbed water in the explosion area and interference from the ship's own wake, the sonar operator may easily be misled by a false contact. CIC must be prepared to evaluate any regained contact and determine if fal e, doubtful, or good. After dropping depth charges, standard proc dure should be followed in rnaneuverinz the ship into a fa arable position for r gaining contact. Thi requires that the ship be turned at least 20° in th direction the

CONFIDENTIAL 13 • Destroyers on 1H11'l"Q/ .•

A high degree of 1)rec;s.iof! IIIml. be IIcl/lI.ired by SOliar operators ami other members oj ine attack team, Effective anli-.lllbmarine nltlrttli'e is !leve'r due 10 equip. men! a/Otl<l-, bTl! is the result of close CfmpuGIi(Ju' be· tween air and surioce ,cHltl artt1 (II the trainillg /!lId persistenc« of their officer« 1171(/ crews.

submarine was last known to be moving if contact has not been regained afterrunning ou t 500 yards. IE delivering an ahead thrown attack, the ship's course should be altered at least 200 in the direction opposite to the last known submarine movement,


After running out 1000.1500 yards from the dropping point, if contact has not been regained, the attacking ship should be conned dlrectly towards the last estimated submarine position. eiG In usc then be prepared to furnish information to cany out operation "Observant," a standard search procedure for regaining contact which has given \-ery satisfactory results in actual practice. All GIG '\ atch Officers must be thoroughly familiar with thisoperation which is outlined in FTP 223A. II contact is not established after operation T'Observant' has been completed, GIG must then select an appropriate retiring search plan also [rom FTP 223A.

Numerous variations of the above procedure may be expected. In some attacks, GIG must be prepared to work with other ships or assisting . planes. To date, the two-ship coordinated attacks



• DD's and CT'Es make II lough combina'ion.-

1l<I'Ve been infrequently used in Pacific waters, sine [apanese submarines have been rarely known to operate at depths necessitating this. GIC must be' prepared, however, to handle this attack should the necessity arise,

Good communications play an integral part in any type of an attack. "\lith assisting units, this is usually accomplished with TBS, and Rag hoists when visibility permits. Within the-ship, however, the communication problem usually requires the use of 21111C, sound powered phones, voice tubes •. or a combination of these methods .. The communications must be so arranged that the war cruising watch is able to start an immediate plot upon report of coma ct. Since the original contact, if made by echo ranging, will be at relatively short range: the first attack will quite likely be completed belore the General Quarters team has manned its stations, The war cruising watch must be capable of do i.ngan adequate plotting job during this period since repeated attacks will be necessary for successful results,

CJC may become aware of the presence of a sub. marine by anyone of the following means and should control the problem until sonar contact is esta bUshed...

The ASW ship Dlay be ordered to a geogr~phi~

• 4 customer is S1J~Uef'

1osltlOn to investigate a possible submarine sighting, Upon arrival, a retiring search. plan should be initiated, again using the procedures outlined in FTP 223A

Patrol aircraft sighting a surfaced submarine will coach. the ship into the position when the cootact was made. This spot may be indicated by dye markers or sono buoys dropped into the water. Again it may be a bearing and range from the ship or from a geographical landmark. In any event, it is a GIG problem to get the ship into a position to commence the search.

A surface target suddenly disappearing from the radar scope indicates a submerging submarine, and GIG should be prepared to advise Corm of the best method of instituting a sonar search of the area. The reverse of this situation is also apparent whereby, in the midst of a sonar attack, a radar pip is discovered in approximately the same

, location that the sonar has contact. In this case GIG must suddenly shift hom a secondary role, go into high gear immediately, and take over the attack.


Those shipseqnipped with sonarequipmem ust be prepared to initiate any type of under'ater attack without delay, Two basic recom-

mendations an made herewith to assist ships in attaining that state of preparation. First and Ioremost, it should De assumed that sonar contact will be made at any instant. For this reason the DRT, when not being used. should be set up on the 500 yard to the inch scale. Tracing cloth 01' paper should be ready for plotting, and allcommunicadon equipment tested and ready for use. The GIC team must be trained to start plotting immediately on notice of a contact, noting latitude and longitude of the target, advising ships in company, and where possible, confirm or add to sonar information going to Conn, Second, a strategic chart of the operating area should occupy a prominent space in GIG. This chan should indicate positions of friendly submarines in passage, submarine sanetuaries, effective su bmarine zones, life guard stations, and all available information pertaining to both friendly and enemy submarines. This background of information should materially assist in evaluating the submarine situation.

he increasing use of S1l bmarines by the J apanese offers a keen Challenge to the well trained ClC. Ships lacking an alert! well trained GIe should not venture into the arena to try their luck, for luck sinks very fewsubmarines and is a poor substitute for training ..

o >c (j) c VI -I



J AP land-based plane could not 1 revent th seizure of an objectiv ,~ c mbined Navy. Army and Marine for es=that i the Ie son of Okinawa.

~ was anticipated, our ships and troops were

ubjected to the most concentrated and intense airattacks yet experienced in the Pacific advance. Om: Fizhter Direction and air: defen e of the ships, tro ps, and supplie at an amphibious objective ,:rethu ubjected to an acid te t. Being committed to the occupation of a territory within eas range of land-based planes of all type, it was neces-

ar~ for carriers to stay in the area and send up t~eLr planes to slug it out-with he best planes and pilots the enemy could muster. The results, notwithstanding losses which may seem heavy in comparison with those previously suffered in island hopping operations, are gratifying. The most serious loses were suffered by the ships which probably contributed the most to the protection of the troops and ships at the objective-the Destroyer s[~tioned out on picket duty to gi e early warning of approaching raids and to intercept and disrupt them if possible with planes as igned by the ask Force Cl C officer. 1 These ships accounted for many enemy planes, both by the CAP they controlled and by own ship's gunfire; they absorbed many attacks which might have seriously hampered the occupation of the isLand. Too much cannot be aid for these destroyers and the men aboard them.

This report by Admiral Turner's Force CIC Officer covers the amphibious Fighter Direction and air warning until 1 May 1945, extending over a period of about seven 'weeks.

A recapitulation of enemy planes destroyed in the immediate objective area furnishes evidence of the .lap's determination to repel the invasion and of .his inability to do so. A total of 560 raids, can, i ting of approximately 222 planes, attacked the hip and objective area. f the e raids, 331 w re at night, employing 622 planes, while 229 da raids used 1606 plan . Of this total, 43 enemy planes were destro ed b CAP, AA fire and

uicide dives. It is estimated that 1300 of the plane were destroyed in daylight, which means that over 80 per cent of all planes attempting to attack the objective were spla hed and about 60 pel' cent of them were shot down b CAP. The planes destroyed were accounted for in the following manner:

1 Thi referen e tormerly would .have been Task Force Fightcr

Director Officer, Consult Part 6, F lOB for new terminology

employed in this article.




the number one lesson of Okinawa

1. ..

By T .A.P (Target CAP):

TF 58 (CV's and CVL's) TG 52.1 (CVE's)

TAF (1'fa1'ines)

Total TCAP

By AA and suicide dives Total

- 474

- 563

- 256

79 645 143

The above figures do not include 92 enemy aircraft shot down prior to Love Day.

The relatively small number of planes de-

troyed ?y TCAP from TG 52.1 can be explained by the fact that the eVE's were stationed to the south of the objective with the assignment of keeping Sakashima neutralized and the TCAP Iumi hed by them were assigned the southern and

outhwesteru sectors for patrol. Most of the raids from Formosa and the few Irom Sakashima arrived in the late afternoon or night when the AP from the CVE's had left the area. breakdown of raids as to point of origin, time and composition shows the following:

Origin Empire Raids Planes

10 i

.5 ~ 1445

2~7 ~

Form osa-Sakashima Raids Planes

Daw'il Da Dusk



'. -

~ ...... ~ ... ~

,,!,~_.~- ~""r

: .........

Raids Planes
Total Day 229 1606
TolalNighl 331 622

Six AGe' and nineteen other shi pswere miginally scheduled £01' employment in this operation =more than double the number employed in the Iwo juna operation. Because of the hart period between operations, and the great di tan e between staging points, considerable difficulty wa encountered in effe ting a balance berwe n the experienced and ine cperieuced per onnel on the various teams. However, by means of man dispatches and considerable air transportation, with one or two exceptions, experienced team leaders were placed on each hip. One Group CIe Officer was placed on each AGC with an additional night intercept officer on P-eql1ipped AGC's. In addition, one Force eIC Officer and an assistant were ordered to the Force Flagship.

PRE-LOVE DAY AND APPROACH PHASE Two M's with Fighter Direct r teams aboard ~ccompaoied the mine weepers 00 L - 8 Da and

one additional 1\'1 with a team accompanied ubsequent minesweepers, Six DD's with Fighter Director teams aboard accompanied the Bombardment group on L -7 Day. One DD with Fighter Director team aboard accompani d the VI/estern Island Attack Force. The remaining nine D's with Fighter Director teams e corted the various tractor groups, attack groups and demonstration groups to the objective.


With the arrival of the atta It forces at the obje ive on the morning of ave Da, U DD's with Fighter Dire tor teams aboard I'ep rted to the

reen ommander for duty. be e ships were

assizn d dut in Radar Picket rations, in the

creen and as corts f r various retirement

groups. his is the fir t operation in which the ships handling Fizhter Direction assignments were not given duty as Fire Support Units.


As in the past three operations all Radar ReportS were in Polar Coordinates from a pre-detetmined reference Point (Zampa Mi aid Peninsula), and this y tern prb ed adequatefor the many use made There was no grid y tern of reporting

o >c

(j) G::

Ul -I


This chart w~ !"muhed all s1!ips at or near the obiectit/!: for aid in rapid, accurate radar reporting from COin m 0'11 refcT(t11ce Point B 0 I o . The letter,s A. b l e through Z e bra Teprt:stm.t points lI~ed by FightlJ'r DI' rectors in stali(mi'!g atld fJcctorinlj. C4.P. D1iring OTIC large raia many divisions of the CAP were simply o.-acred

to go to Point Nan atld join -1---f'------f'~----T-"t7'- -"'__---7'i::-\@-+--+--+~t-;""'_--T-__'''O'"-""--:;;>"",,-t+---].1" in the jmcos.

The numbers in the citdes show the radar picket stations. 4.11 were not filled at all times, Qrlly as de· manded by the situaUorl.

Numbers I, 2 and 5 desig" nate aUlhori%ed approaches for fr.ic'ld /y .airetaft.

used and although the Marine Air Warning Squadrons had anticipated using the JAN grid for internal radar reporting they considered the polar system superior and adopted this method for their internal reporting.


The original plan called for one division of planes to be stationed in the south-west, six divisions in the objective area, and five divisions to the north. However, due to the irregular arrival of the TCAP (Target Combat Air Patrolt=irregular both as to number and time of reponing-this scheme had to be modified to meet the conditions. The lack of unifonnity in maintaining the scheduled TCAP during the early days increased the problem of furnishing adequate protection for the

everal separate units-that is, the main Attack Force, the Demonstration Group, the Kerama Rerto area, and the Radar Pickets. exposed at great distances from the main objective. This was soon clarified, and by Love plus Two Afternoon the TCAP arrived at regular intervals in proper numbers and eight divisions were maintained on stations. On the morning of Love plus Five Day the scheduled TCAP was increased to eleven divisions and was maintained at that level or greater thereafter. Planes started operating from Tactical Air Force (shore-based Marines) on the evening


oE Love plus Six. and from Love plus Seven TCAP was furnished jointly by the CV's, the CVE's and F on regular schedules.

The tactics of the enemy in concentrating hi alta k on the outlying pickets made it nece sary to pread the TCAP. placing a greater part with the P ickets and fewer divisions in the objective area, 'with the result that a larger TCAP-ITom 56 to 76~was generally maintained. In addition, a special Radar Picket GAP of two planes each for five of the Pickets was maintained by TAF.


From Love Day through Love plus 46, the folIowinz number of TCAP sorties were furnished for da TCAP.


TF 58 (CV and CVL) TG 52.1 (CVE)

T A F (Marine)


Divisions 1403 1074 1360


Sorties 5612 4296 5440


The Special Radar Picket CAP reported directly to the pickets and no re ord was kept of the number of sorties involved. However, this is estimated lO be about 1 Goo.

Total Sorties

Day Night

Radar Picket

15,3 s 6-li 1,600


Of these 17,595 orties there were 13 pilots 'whose plane era hed and who were not recov red, none as a result of enemy action. There i no record available at this time of operational losses at fields or carriers.


Three AGC's-the ELDORADO, P AMlNT, and TETON-equipped with SP radars were in the objective area, and there were in addi ion, five GCl stations established ashore and operative by La e plus 46 Da. The ELDORADO normally retained control of one VF ( ) and assigned the others to AGC's and to shore bases. Emphasis was placed on giving control to the latter as early as their operating status permitted. Ordinarily, initial control

'las not given to Fighter Director DD's or DM's,

ut there were many occasions when control was shifted to them during an interception. Two of the total of eighteen splashes were made by DD's on such occasions. VF (N) control wa not normally given to the Picket Ships because they did not have sufficient personnel to maintain 24·hour control of a Combat Air Patrol, and most of the personnel had little or no night controlling experience.

There were eight nights during which bad weather kept the VF (N) on the deck all or most of the night. During the time VF ( ) were on station there were 331 enemy raids, involving a total of 622 planes. It is estimated that interceprion of 252 or 76 per cent of these raids was attempted. From the night prior to Love Day through the night of Love plus thirteen Day VF (N) TCAP was provided by F 58. Normally two VF (N) were on station during darkness. Based in parE on incomplete data the record oE these planes is presen ted below:

orties 173

Attempted interceptions 72

Radar Contacts by VF (N) 7lashes

1 addition TF 5

42% of sorties 67% of auempts

8 17% of contacts

F ( I) made 10 spla hes under

semi-daylight conditions. From the night of Love plus 13 through Love plus 46 T furnished the \ F (N) TeAP. There were II uall four on station and ometimes as many a eight. Estimates from incomplete records are as follows:

Sorties 474

Attempted interceptions 180 38% of sorties Radar contacts by VF ( ) 68 389'0 of attempts Splashes 10 15% of contacts Durinz thi period dusk and dawn CAP was flown by day VF with the result that VF ( ) seldom operated under semi-daylight conditions. The marked contrast between proportionate number of ontacts by F 58 and TAF VF (1 ) apparently reflects a considerable disparity in airborne radar performance. For both arrier and shorebased VF ( ), many attempted interceptions and contacts had to be broken off to protect the Night

'ighter as he chased the raid into ship and shore AA range during Control Yellow. The scope of this amphibious operation resulted in the establishment of four areas of can iderable hipping concenrrarion, with consequent increase in vulnerability to AA.


The bulk of the defense of the Okinawa amphibious operation evolved around the raid reporting and fighter direction exercised by the exposed Fighter Director ship and their supporting elements in the Radar Picket Stations. In the early stages Radar Picket Numbers


Durinz the same period, the. following Night Fighters were furni shed:

ource TFs TAE

orties 173 474



() o >c (j) c (j') -i

2 3> 4.7, 10, 12, and 1 \ ere filled, with NO.9 being filled Iater when more warning was thousht necessary against low Bying plane approaching Kerama Retto from the southwe t ( ee chart on page 18). With the completion of shore-based radar in tallations on Hedo Saki and Ie Shima a revised picket arrangement was formulated with Radar Picket umbers 5. 7, g, 15, and a new No. 16 being filled. This 'was the picket plan in effect on Love plus 46.

After the raids of the twelfth of pril in whi h the Pi ket gOt a se er p undine additional mean f pr tecting them were ought, and it wa decided to furnish as man picket as possible with a special two plane picket P. s of 1 pril, TAF was able to maintain this CAP over three stations and very shortly this was increased to five stations. These planes rep ned direct to their a - sign d Radar Pi kets and were emplo ed solel as 1 al air protection. Io eparate record of the kill effected b this special CAP is available at present, but' it :is knot n that 1)1 Ily plane were splashed. Several ships credit th Pi ket CAP with

,wing them Ir ill seriou darnaz by suiciders.


For this operation one VHF channel Was as-

izned for primary fighter direction. On this channel a man' a se en or eiaht base controlled fighter at the same time, with relie ing planes up to 12 to 16 divisions reporting in and being as-

izned to their stations and ontrolling ba es. biou 1 no one freqnenc could carr' this load during raid condition, and the result was th t

ariou air upport frequencie Were made available during these period. However, the ruany varied types or VHF equipment in the figluers. the AGe's and the De tro ers made this chanze vel' d i fficu 1 t to accorn plish in a smoo til and order 1 manner. Most of the hip had J/ARC-l'S but the e were ins ailed at the last moment orne parts were found to be mi iug and adequate p , er upp1ies were d:iffi ult to obtain. B or inti the tern and the available Iacilitie • communication were maintained, and xcept for a few instances the TCAP reached their assigned areas at the proper time. It is believed that with the in-

tallation of AN/ARC-I 's in aJJ fighters and lighter director ships communication will be much more flexible and satisfactory for future operations.

There were many in tances of a blocked circuit on this net because oE a faulty microphone or because someone unintentionally held the microphone key open for JOllO' periods of time. This wa 'particularly true of the T AF planes in the beginning, but this condition was alleviated as the operation progressed. Circuit discipline on the net was excellent with the exception of the first day 'with the TAF planes when the net was completel . blocked. This occurred '"'\ hen the planes reported in indi idually and attempted to join up by thi net. They were instructed to discontinue rhi practice. and the did.





This was the most important net in the air warning setup. It handled all raid reports (plotted, coordinated and evaluated on the ELDORADO) and assignment of aU TCAP to the variou controlling bases. 10 addition to its primary function, a olume (mnch too large, in fact) of administrati e traffic was handled durinz ver busy periods.


raffic on thi net was extremely light. It was not used underway due to conditions of Radio

Hence. uring thi period it could be used to

best advantage as intra-force IFD net. t the objective, reception was very pOOL The need for a reliable net for administrative traffic between AGC's and the AD Cat the objective area is great.


This -.; as the control net for the ASP and the control officer was stati-oned in the CIC in [he ELDORADO. This i advisable; CIC keep the officer informed on tile location of ASP planes, which enables him to keep them clear of raids. II raid reports, Bash conditions, conrrol colors sent on

S 'were immediately rebroadcast on LAW.


This net wa monitored in eIC in the EL:DORAD 111 order [Q peed up reports from the outl ing

bore-based Tadars, to determine the radar coverage of these units, and to check. the communication facilities a hore=to determine when coverage by Radar Picket ships was no longer required.


At the beginning of the operation, there was one ov rall control of air warnings and contr I color - .T' r. I (dmiTal Turner). However,

OP Kerama Rert 'a ery hartly granted the auth r it ,t e tabli h onditions and. contra) . I r for that area, and, hen the occupation oE Ie Shima began, tbe SOP in that area was granted this authority fDT the territory north of Zampa Mi aki, with the area east of Okinawa and south of Zampa being under "the ontrol of SOPA in that section. CT 51 retained the authority to e tabli 11 control in the Hagu hi ar a, and on kinawa outh oE Zampa Misaki, He al 0 retained the authority to establish 0 erall ontrol of the entire area if on-

itions warranted, but thi authority was never ercised, The clo est cooperation was maintained wi tb the AAA command a hare. Bogey

onia - were checked by the LDORADO' ith the AA command and close-in bogey contacts were relayed to the ELDORADO. At times these reports were the only source of information available, Control yellow was granted the AAA ashore if at all possible. The two controls for AAA fire as pr-omulgated by CinCPac were in effect, with a modification of control green to permit opening fire on air targets identified. as enem . All warnings and control colors were broadca t n all available radio net to ensure that all unit recei ed the warnings in the honest possible time.


Prior to leaving Pearl Harbor for the Iwo Jima operation, meetings were arranged between representatives of the ADCC and M WS to be employed at Okinawa and the Force CIC Officer. M in preparations for pa t operations, these meetings proved ery beneficial and most of the questions which arose at the objective had been anticipated and discussed. Prior to the establishment of the A ce, the individual radar stations reported directly to the ELDORADO on secondary IFD net and the shore-based Fighter Direction Units were up all this net. These stations became an integral pru·t of the air warning and Fighter Direction organization as a n as e tablished, he coordination of the e units was effected hrough the ADCC ashore. In the beginning, considerable difficulty was ncounter d in establishing adequate communications with various shore-based units. However, additional equipment Wa.5 obtained and adequate communications were established.

As in all past operations, the time required to activate the various shore-based radars and to integrate them into an adequate air warning and Fighter Direction organization wa longer than anticipated. In future operation every effort should be made to establish. these shore-ba ed unitsas going concerns at the earliest po sible moment. Condi tion in the futnre may not permit the suecessful u e of pickets to perform this fun tion.


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This report of tile USS MOOS£HEJID, a lraillillg slu'p of the Oper.aliolilli Training CommQnd, Pacific Fleet, shows the value of tile VF in close mtviglltion, lind should be of interest 10 all hips (hal havc this equipment aboaTd.

VF tor channel haui9ation

The officers aboard this ship have found, by experience gained from frequent navigation of San Diego Harbor. that the VF remote PPI used with the SG radar provide a most saaisfactory aid to channel navigation. By keeping the antenna rotating and taking accurate fixes at frequent intervals, using ranges and bearings obtained from the B scope, it is possible to fix the position of the ship in the channel and at the same time keep an ever-present picture of the surrounding area. This is not possible by using the SG-A alone as previously taught in our training pmgram.

Fixes obtained by using the VF prove to be better than those obtained using the SG radar alone. This is due to the exceptional bearing and range accuracy of the VF. The £req uency of taking fixes will depend upon the physical characteristics o~ the particular channel being navigated.

The result obtained from setting the B scope at a minimum range of 500 yards is a clear and accurate picture of the area immediately around the vessel, which was not possible prior to the use of the VF. By simple interpretation of relati e movement, the action of other vessels in the channel can be determined without the aid of plotting devices. The cursor of the PPI is lined up with the ship's head, an enlarged picture is presented, representing an area 25° on either bow and 4500 yards ahead. Before the final selection of a new course the cursor hould be rotated in the direction of the desired cour e change. Observation of the picture thus presented on the B scope, determines instantly if the new course change "will be safe with respect to other ships in the channel, Stationary objects ill the Water and land masses. The information obtained from the PPI and B scope together with the knowledge of the ship's position in the channel hom periodical fixes makes it possible to recommend a safe course to the conning officer.

It must be remembered, however, that the B scope picture is somewha t distorted and constant interpretation and evaluation is required by the CIe officer. The picture of the B scope can best be interpreted by observing the PPI carefully,

Needless to say, knowledge of the channel being navigated will make the job considerably easier. Information of buoys, net vessels and landmarks can be obtained from charts, and it is imperative that a thorough study of the channel be made before attempting to navigate it by VF radar. Decisions must be made quickly and rfcoimnendations to the conning officer must be prompt and clear. Information given too late is of no value.

Although frequent fixes give the position of the ship, ordinarily there is not sufficient rime to determine the amount of set or drift caused by wind and current; therefore the courses recommended cannot be corrected to allow for these variable factors. However, if it is possible to pick up an object either dead ahead 01' astern which should maintain a steady bearing. the approximate set or drift can be determined by observing any chang in the bearing of the object, and the recommended courses can be corrected accordingly. If the great number of ships in the channel confuses the picture to such an extent that Do recommendation of courses can be made, then ranges and bearings on buoys and landmarks, alone, can be of great assistance to the conning officer.

During channel navigation, the SG radar should be manned for the purpose of adjusting the various controls as required by the penon operating the VF. It is frequently necessary to adjust the gain control on the SG or to regulate the speed of the antenna rotation in order to obtain the best results, It is also essential for the person operating the VF to have a thorough knowledge of the operation of the equipment> relative movement and harbor piloting. Once confidence is established m this method of channel navigation, it is possible to operate in darkness and under conditions of lov

tsibility with a sen e of security heretofore unknown.

Experiments have been conducted aboard this vessel using various other types of radar navigating methods and equipment, and it has been four that the mas satisfactory results have been 0 tail ed with the use of the VF.

Zenith watch

tests are



In the July 19.;1-5 issue of "C.LC.", th e use of th e SG for zen:i tb coverage was announced, Since the publication of the article, additional reports have been received from the TOPEKA (CL) on which a zenith watch radar was installed; the results of calibration te t Tun by the TOPEKA are set forth in this report.

The minimum range is limited to about one thou and yards, while the maximum range obtained to date is nineteen thousand yards, with the altitude of target not accuratel y known. The beam seem to miss nothing in i area of coverage. Minimum position angle of contact wa 20° out to I I 000 yards and greater beyond this l·ange. Position angles were checked closely with fire control instruments, Bearing accuracy is plus or minus five degrees when using the plan po irion indicator; however, thi accuracy could be impro ed by installation of a bearing cursor.

Planes passing directly over the ship trace a circle on the plan position indicator. Planes passing one to two thousand yards away, but not over the antenna, trace a semi-circle when at minimum range.

Surface contacts do not appear on the creen unles the ship i rollins heavily and sea return is negligible.

The zenith "watch radar, because of its limited ranges, serves only as late warning of the presence of planes. At high altitudes a plane will be in the SG-1C beam only two or three minute; however an al~rt SG-IC opel-ator can direct the [ITe control radar on to the plane in a matter of econds, By observing the initial range of detection, an estimate of target altitude can be made. In ten tests to date it has not been possible to determine the point of origin of the dive 01' even that a plane is in its dive.

The SG-IC is not subject to interference fade zones. It covers the tone of silence 0"[ the SK-2. Its installation in lieu of the econd SG-l doe, .however, deprive the ship oE one surface search radar, which i a decided handicap.


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CONFIDENTIAL ___:.:__ __ ~ _L C_O_N_F_ID_E_N_T_IA_L __ 2_J_

This calibration. curve 1'I:prd' sents results obtained by the TOPEKA. [rom. her SG·JC. The plols beuaeen 2000 feet 1111a IW.,OQO feel were taken [ron» a B'25; those betweeu 20,000 ahd 2",000 feel, from all F6F. The ma~imtlm ra'lge obsented was )8,500 yards, altitude 3°,000 [eet, Scale of chart: Ont! circle equals Orlt! mile.

The tran ition from a day to a night carrier involves orzanizati mal and procedural change in GIC, The material changes are important bu relatively minor. The uccess of air operation of a GVN depends in even greater degree upon GIC efficiency than in the day CV. The responsibility of GrC and its capacity to be of real value to the hip are at their peak in the night carrier. The entire GIG organization must be impressed' ith 1:hi added 'respousibility and the opportunity to render valuable service,

Cir urn tan es were u h that this ship uld

not onduct any air operation with its new uizht air !ITOUp prim' to sortie from Pearl Harbor. Only three niaht flights were possible enroute to the rendezvcu with the task force. Had two or three nizhrs been available for practice operations in the

t least three and preferabl four rem te PPI' witl 12 inch cope are con idered ne essary in the Ie of a CV ). This hip ha three. Although constant plots are kept it is neieher desirable nM . ffectnal to control planes at night from the plots.

tationing and intercept worK is. an done from the scopes with the assi ranee oE the plots. The plots

Pearl Harbor area prior to departure, it is certain chat the early combat. operations would have bee. more efficient. As it was the trial and error method had to be applied in the combat zone with respect to ome phases of the Ie operation; some of the ele procedures were altered as a result of lesson learned through experiment and experience.



In conuertil1g from a day to a nlglrt carrier, the ENTfR-

PRISE ere obtaifled much oaluable assistance

f,om the INDEPENDENCE. This discussioll 1

of probLems encountered cmd solutions

Utor!;!ed out by che' ENTfRPRISE ele

should be of oalue to all who may be called

upon for duty on any carrier with night ffghters aboard.

formation circuit in Cl C and. during alerts, in Flag Plot. he e e tra officers rna be in training and a signed on a temporaL), duty basis for th, . duration of the Flag' tour.

This officer complement permit the organization of IC watch- teams, consisting of three officers per team when the Flag is not embarked, and rour officers per team w-hen the lag is aboard, The FDO and assistant FDD stand watch and watch in forward area. Skill and e perience may be di tributed to be t advantage when team organization is emplo ed. xperience bas pw ed conclusively that officers organized in FD teams" ork togetl c:x more effi . ently and produce better 'results, I officer tand watche fr m 0000 to 0400, 0400 to 0 00, 0 00 to 1200, 1200 to 1 00 and 1800 to 2400. Meals are thus obtainable at each change of the watch and more adequate rest is available than with the more conventional dogged watche .

Two additional enlisted men are desirable on each watch to handle' the extra sound powered ircuit in olv d-the. visual andinz ontrol circuit and the l-JG ci cuit used to blain ide number of plane launched and landed.


Positive control of ail-craft i required during night approache and landings. To obtain this COl trol th isual Fighte- Dir cto ration in Air Defense Forward i manned b an officer termed "Snapper." 1 Hi facilities include an Aldi Lamp.

1. Mar '915 "C. 1. ." Page 70.


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are particularly u eEyl [or identificari n purpo es and for determining speeds.

An additional s und powered circuit wa inStalled to connect Ie with SAPPER, ASH radar, the L 0 and Air Control Station.

The Cle arrangement should be such that two intercept officers with PPI scopes are within easy talking distance of the Fighter Director Officer in rder that the latter rna control effectivel the entire night operation.


It wa necessary to auzment the officer personnel of CIC. Officer requirements are all <Ii peak during night time because of the necessity f r con tant control of every plane in the air, the in.orica-ey of night interceptions and the extraordinary precautions which must be taken to ensure safe operations of night aircraft, In t~e daytime the C (N) is called on for as. man interception a tue cia earners sometimes mO-FC. The C I) i in p ition to handle them because of the ab ence of nsual da 01 erational problems and the comparatively high state of training of her intercept officers. This hip ha , at various tim ,been designated as task grOl!lp Cle ship in fOUl; ta k groups of Task Farce 58", Adequate CIC personuel had been provided to' handle these eventualities,

Without a Flag embarked a total of eleven officers is considered e ential: Fighter irector Officer, ssi taut Fighter Director Officer and nine watch offi ers aa lea t il of whom hould b qualified night controlle . "ith a Flag embarked it

been found hocO'hl advantageous to ba e four additional officer assigned to handle the. hip' in-

, HF rali . gyro compa , relative \ iud indicae r and ound powered ircuit '\ ith tations in GIG, A H Radar, Fl Control and Landing Signals Aft. "Snapper' .. function is to control planes hom the time eIe relinquishes control until the pilot is in vi ual Contact with the Landing Signal Officer's wands.

An SH Radar ( N/APS-4) is rigged on the port side of the ship at Frame 103, flight deck level, with the center line of the can bearing 300 degrees relative. Iter con iderable xperimentacion the can has been tilted 12 degrees abo e the horizontal for best re ults. The ope is remoted to a nearb helter where it is manned by an operator from the VT squadron experienced in handling this type of gear. The purpose of this installation is to measure the distance the plane on the down wind leg is abeam of the hip.


Planes returning hom prorra ted flighr (TN AP, He klers, Intruders, earch and Attack, R ,M mi ions, etc.) call base by VHF as con as Lhey have ontact with the YE or YMand inform ba e of the composition of the returning flight, YE

ector and estimated' position. During the report G-Balld IFF i urned on. This report, plus GBand re ponse on the K ope, will usually enable CI L 1 care the Hight and b me it promptly, Pr p r r ports may al 0 be made to Flag, Bridge, and Fl ontrol so that timely arrangements may be made EoI' landing when the entire flight has been r ndezvoused.

It frequently occurs that several 'flights must be brought in from various missions and landed simultaneously. The procedure then is to orbit the. first Bights in a designated YE sector 15-20 miles from base. Th sector must be selected carefully that there will be no difficulty in keeping til plan s clear of friendly hips. After a bu y da

hips' zunners may be quick to fire.

During the final approach, planes are vectored to the ship by an intercept officer utilizing information lrom SK radar. Pilots are gi en distance and clock code bearing infornration frequently to a 1 t them in their let down and to obtain earlier vi ual ontact with the ship. All pilots are given altimeter settings during the approach.

If Ci 0 or more carriers are conducting night landings simultaneously each hould be assigned a .eparat landing requency by th Task roup CI OAk r.




on as it is al parent to CIC that the Pilot i making a good approach he is directed to "Prep

,haTli, hiE to channel Blank and give S APPER a call." During the approach a talker in Cl.C gives I APPER distances and clock code bearings of approaching planes. When SNAPPER has good .ommunications and visual contact, he assumes

.ontrol and retains it until the landing pattern has been om ple ted and the pilot has LSD's wands in ight, In reasonably good visibility SNAPPER

will usually see a single plane at 6 to 8 miles.

In the early planning. it was' considered necesoar to Feed the planes into the landing circle from a po ition about 10 miles directly down wind. It developed. however, that this procedure was not essential and required too much time. It is now more the ru le than the exception to bring 4 VFN ill for landings directly from the four quadrants in which they have been patrolling. They are brought directly 0 er the hip and from that position put into th landing circle when the ship turn into the wind.

The Task rY',oUp eIG Officer frequently precribes the approach to be used and, at other times. delegates his authority in this regard to the ship recovering aircraft. Extremely close liaison between the TG CIC officer and ship CIC officer is essential and has been accomplished during op eration ill which this ship has participated.


"Vi th the aid of VHF radio and the emergency use of the Aldis lamp, SNAPPER brings returning planes into' isual contact with the ship, 'When the planes to be landed are under his control SNAPPER broadcasts the proposed landing course in plain language.

As soon as the ship is into the wind SNAPPER gives " ignal Charlie" to not more than four planes, whereupon they enter the landing circle. Each pilot controls his own pattern, as described below, 'Until the third turn. As the plane enters the downwind leg SNAPPER transmits "Check off List." If the pilot has completed his check off list be so indicates by blinking all external lights and gives his name 'ria VHF so that the LSO knows who is coming aboard. At the proper point SNAPPER transmits "Third turn," and the pilot goes into the final leg of his pattern.

In determining the point at which to transmit "Third turn" SNAPPER takes into account the di tance the plane on the downwind leg is abeam of the ship, as measured by ASH radar, and tl relative wind over the deck. The object is to bring

Nig/ll interception is 611 e,~· acting scieme. .If Hellcat (Jitol arid a 11ight controller team up ~I;lccessfuly. Result: a Zelle il ffamed.

and complete ommunication Failure in til all' are a rarity.

To assure proper performance or radios an initial deck check with instruments is made bv teclmi .ians, Planes failing, to pas this Lest arc dudded until repaired. When pilots 11a e manned their planes and turned up engines for a laullch.' a communication check" is made by the pi lOIS. Gl C pas es the result of th deck check to all interest d station. ny plane n t having sari fad 'r .ommunications is automaticall dudded.

s soon as a Hight is airborne the Hiaht leader is so advised b Ie. Standby planes launched in lieu of duds are assigned the calls of the planes

each pilot into visual contact with the LSO in the same position and altitude each time he land. n Aldis lamp is employed for check off list and landing control in case of VI F failure.

S. APPER isa member of the C1C division.


The successful condu t of night mi ion with-. out dependable communications i irnpo ible. Planes in the air withou communication' are an annoyance to the entire force and present a po itive hazard to the proper conduct of other operations. 11 planes on this ship are now equipped with dual radios. The results have been excellent

~lighl carrier landings rtfquif'1:

IItinuous radar control until the LSO has the plane in sight.

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- repla The- Jligln lead r and interested ta-

on the ship <Ire inform d f tile e chang ere.

\ ry effort is made t keep ornmunication 'with planes on patrol at a minimum but more Icontrol necessarily is exercised than in the case of day patrol Having selected the altitude at which the patrol desired the distan e from base is determined b .reference to the SK' fade chart ( uall 20-, a miles from e.) Bearing control

'is obtained b Instructing the pi! t sa in a designated sector. These measnr 5 h ld tation keeping transrnissi 1;0 .a minimum but do

j eliminate them beear e 1:he .l. pilot is not

able to determine distance [Tom base easily.



" lap night search and attack p1ane eneoun tered b this ship in recent months ba e been elusive

.and difficult t:ar.gets. Window has been used in profu ion. I tho ugh both r om in considerable degree it rarely has been utilized a as actually to cover an enemy attack. The enemy resorts, hos - ever, to freq uent and radical changes in speed and altitude. hese tactic are used by many but not all attacking planes. In a number of instancesthe enemy has released a quantity of window and di ed radically when the VF was within "contact" range,

The intercept officer pends most of his time 011 the K remote scop. he M radar is trained on the target and the altitud determined, Con tant the ks are made with th r hip, l[ any doubt exists as to the target's altitude, "comparative angel" of bogey and friendly are obtained from the SM radar and the VFN altitude adjusted accordingly, When the friendly is close to the bogey the SM is .instru ted to "get a picture," whereupon r~he. ~p:rat?l"s s~ sect~r we~J~ing ~a'oss the two indications. As soon as the pI ture" is obtained on the M. it is put on a cond rem te cop in CIC and tbe intercept officer switches cope. lea - iug the R scope in operation so it can be referred to again if necessary. If the target changes altitude

good M operators 'an follow th direction of change and assist the intercept officer in readju ting the VF altitude.

The effectivene s of this procedure depends upon the extent to which the composition ot own force and the tactical iruation will permit ail radar facilities to be concentrated on a single raid. Be t results can be obtained only with fun concentra ion,

While the SK fade chart may be depended upon to O'iveac urate alritud 11 a tal'get in level flight i . almost usele asainst a target that i bangin altitude frequentl .

"Per onal" idenifi arion of own ship's plane may he achieved in part by setting G-Band transponders in' all planes to a frequency which will enable them to be triggered by K radar. Undue use oE G-Band respon e will clutter the radar screen but intermittent use by individual planes is almost a nece sity in nizhr operations.


Hizh spe d is essential to nizht interception work.

The current practice developed by experience, i [0 employ maximum peed at the outset slowing as neces ary during the final approach. This practice initially was developed by the USS INDEPE E' and has been followed b this ship, V1'l • are tationed higher than the expected approa h of the bogey in order to zain additional speed during the descent. At the out et an attempt was made to LI e n 0 plane sections for intercept work, but the plan ~ as abandoned or everal reasons: a-difficulty and loss of time in effecting the initial rendezvous,

b-d-ifficulty in maintaining the section intact in low visibility,

c-exce s of transmissions necessary to reform a broken. two-plane unit,

d- lutrering of the .mdar creen when units did become disorganized, and

e-dimiuu . on of plane availabiliry for other missions.

It is therefore the practice to lise single planes.







con's of the

Carriers. battle hip. and cr.uiser have now had con iderab!e operational experience with the. VG Projection PP . Thi experience, analyzed, points out the VG's many excellent abilities and also limitations, and indicates that ships are learning new ways to profit by the VG's accurate plotting, COUIse and peed determination and omprehensive geographic pi . ture.


Iodifications for the VG are now under development. These willeliminate some of the PI' - em limitations, and improve performance in gen· .al, particularly £0'1' air plotting, now handicapped y long persistency.

Among the improvements to come are: Sharp r definition of targets, sharper 'ange lines> and quicker eras-ing. Other improvements in VG performance will tern [rom impro ement in the paren[ radar , with the replacement of the SC, K air search series by the R series. The R's " ensitiviry time control" will eliminate sea return echoes that now obliterate most targets near the

hlp. VG bearing di crimination 'will be improved three to six times b the narrower beam widths of [he R-2, -3; - , and -6. VG range discrimination will impro e one to four times through difference in the SR pul elena-til l bile contra t oE target echoes 'will b b ttered considerabl by the R' higher pulse repetition rate.


In response to orr ervPac (FMO) Conference peedletrer Serial [ 0, 01734 of 1 Iarch, several hips have submitted repa"t on their use of tile VG. with comrnen on procedures and some hipboard modification which ha e proved advan. eous in 01 vinz th ir particular operational

blerns. el cted ornments are PI' ented here,


ALA KA, in its report, cover tile special merits of both the ve PPI and oE the Horizontal Plot-VC PPI combination:

"vVith the VG the plotting time lag is eliminated,

ccuracy of plotting and the number of targets that can be plotted simuJ taneou J y are greatl increased. urface tar et appear on the plot without any special coordinated effort with surface radar, thus the likelihood of shooting into friendly ship is greatl reduced. Persistence of the scope often alia, s targets to be detected on a single swe p that tile opera 0.1' OLl the receiver-indicator i apt to miss. More people are able to view the VG simultaneously than is possible with the VC.

.. he VC-Horizontal Plot provides better definition, which is especially valuable at the crucial moments of an intercept. It is feasible to shift from one radar to another without lag, Scales may be shifted quickl for close-in or more distant views as desired."


US ALA KA' repo1·t continues: "VG l"ange scale have proved excellent. The 20 milecale with input hom the SG has been used without exception Ear urtace work and for low-flying aircraft. The 0 mile cale has been used continuously with input from the SR. .

"The persi tenc of imageshould be reduced if possible. Operation is normally limited by this Iacror, Occasional use of erase features without defocusing or reducing video gain sometime helps. Persistency i more troublesome at short ranges, particularly in the area affected by sea return,

Iris 11a not pr ved troublesome in the case oE moving target and i less objectionable with aircraft than. with urface craft. The pread of images seems to be accented by this persistency,"

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"In the air problem the VG is always operated on the 80 mile scale. If this ship is assigned the long-range guard, search is conducted on the 375 mile scale of the SK A scope, with the master PPI on 80 miles .. For checking IFF inside 80 miles the A scope is switched over to 75 mile scale. WIlen unidentified targets are inside 20 miles the master PPI is switched over to 20 mile range and rapid continuous antenna rotation is used. Calls of all friendlies are kept on the plot beside the track or orbit. Continuous tracking is started only when the plane gets out of its assigned positIon. It has. ' not proved practicable or advantageous to shift to the 20 mile scale or to lise the center-expand feature."


"In the surface problem the VG is always operated on the 20 mile scale, whether tbis ship is assigned short or long-range guard. Targets at greater range are plotted on the 20 mile circle, and the range marked beside them at the correct bearing. Quick and accurate determination of target, course and speed is easy by solution oIthe maneuvering board problem directly on the plot."


"Targets can be designated directly from the plat as there is no time lag, Much more accurate range and bearing estimates can be made than with the VC, and relative bearing is just as readily available as true bearing. 'Seaman's Eye" dead reckoning in sending au t advance information so that the time lag of transmission is accounted far .is much more feasible because of the continuity of

the track with time recorded alongside. Changes of target course and speed are nearly always detected on one revolution of the antenna, as it is not necessary to discount plots as 'plotting error' because the pip ltself is visible and the gunnery liaison officer can judge for himself. By the same token window is detected in a single sweep of the antenna because of its lack of motion.

"1 n this ship there are six radar .controlled AA directors, and only where all targets can be kept plotted continuously is it possible to coach 'all onto their proper targets. It is very easy to coordinate true and relative bearing on the VG, which has been the hardest problem up to the present time. The number of the director on each target call. be recorded. qirectly on the plot .. anowiqg,~~rouqd t1]C



dock' designation to. directors in succession instead ulc.:oadlin,g on firstone and then another."


USS IDAHO utilizes geographic informatiou with "geographic overlays for the VG, drawn to scale on tracing cloth and gridded with the current gunnery grid, which furnish designation to geographic points for other radars, provide navigational fixes at exrremeranges, and indicate gunnery positions with an average accuracy within two degrees and two b undred yards at ranges around 10,000 yards. Ambiguity is eliminated and greater accuracy is achieved in utilizing total geographic information by su perimposing the overlay over the image, Contour lines, high points and gullies are shown on the overlay and indication as to how ridges will appear from different positions is of great aid where the shore line cannot be seen. The overlay is kept oriented by taping the ann. oE the drafting machine diagonally in one corner. "

USS ALABAMA uses the VG to "release the associated radar operator to search for new targets after the VG plotter has reponed contact on one target, Improved ease of reading bearings and ranges on the VG was accomplished by drawing permanent range rings and bearing lines on th screens. To allow the use of wax pencils for plotting, with accompanying quick erasure, the screens were turned over with ground glass do wn, This has given little or no parallax trouble,"

USS TENNESSEE has found "the 4. 10,20, and 80 mile range scales valuable, the first three for surface, the latter for air. The 200 mile scale does net appear to have any practical value with present radar equipment. This ship has found a definite need for a 40 mile scale to reflect the long range SF surface picture and has already convened one of the 200 mile scales to meet that need. Ships of this type can readily lise two VG equipments. But if they act as Fighter Director or Force Figh~er Director ships, a VC should be installed for exclusive lise of the Fighter Director Officer."

USS WICHITA operates with "one VG set on the 10 mile scale on the SV radar. taking advantage of its narrow beam. Small images and excellent bearing discrimination is obtained. Targets may be tracked to a minimum range of approximately 300 yards. The tactical summary plot may be maintained to a high degree of accuracy. Whil~ acting as a Fire Support Unit this setup h been at gr~~~ value, io keeping track of tJle mai

friendly support and landing craft during the night and in keeping lines of fire dear."

USS BIRM.1NG-HAM states: "In any surface plotting problem the VG plot is incomparably superior to a horizontal plot and VC PPI. Using the VG on the Ia or 20 mile. scale to repeat the SG, the plot is of sufficient size to obtain accurate ranges and bearings. Relative movement can be observed at a glance. Retentivity of images is such that targets can actually be seen to move due to their having tails, which fade so promptly that no confusion results in the track of crossing targets. Fast moving targets are portrayed as dearly as slow moving ones, the greater the relative speed the longer the tails. True courses and speeds of numerous targets can be solved immediately on the VG surface, with the use of a relative speed and distance scale made for the actual scale of the projection. Solutions of own courses and speeds for tactical maneuvers can be followed through to completion by drawing a reciprocal relative movement line Ior the target or guide, watching it 'walk down the line.'

"Much that has been stated regarding the faeility of surface VG plotting could be reiterated for air plotting, though not with the same enthusiasm. The VG air plot incorporates the obvious advantages of time lag elimination and greater number of plotted targets. For target indication it provides immediate and accurate range and bearing. However, the value of the resulting plot is exactly equal to the skill of the SK rada.r operator. 1£ he must constantly stop the S\\Teep of the antenna to identify time and again the same target, the VG projection will be a blurred mass of dark radial lines."

USS BELLEA U WOOD expresses carrier sentiment regarding VG ability for intercept work. "The VC is regarded as superior to. both VG and horizontal plotting tables for aircraft intercept work. However, with present allowance of one VC in CIe the VG is preferable to a plotting table. The size of the VG plot is adequate. Retentivity is long but adjust to this by experience. Range scales are changed seldom because the fading and refocusing operations involved require comparatively so much more time than similar procedures wirha ve."


Experiencing jamming, USS BA TA4N states: 'Even a little jamming or a little window will

cloud the VG scope because of its persistence for several minutes, More than ten, times as much jamming or window is required to saturate the'

C than is required to cause the same effect on a VG. The large scale and the resulting more accurate speed determination together with the automatic plotting makes the VG our best scope for tracking surface targets, Changes of course and 'speed become readily apparent from the persistent trace left by each rotation."


The USS FANSHAW BAY has found "the VG/VG-l equipments advantageous for target indication. A continuous, up-to-the-minute Tela~ tive plot of all surface contacts, including own disposition is available. Experience indicates. how- ' ever, that the old method of combining A-scope ranges with PPI bearings obtained directly from the radars, is most satisfactory when accurate tracking solutions are required,"

USS SUWANEE says, "The short scales are of suitable range for station keeping. When the gain on the SG radar is turned down to view the screen the plot retains the sea return, side lobes and double echoes, and therefore, does not give a dear picture. When used in interceptions with the SK radar, the target Is not well defiJ1edwhen it doubles back on itself. Weak echoes which can be seen on the VC are not always seen on the VGfVG-l, The expanded plot offered by the VG IVG-1 is highly desirable. If the difficulties already discussed could be removed, this equipment would provide a fine intercept arrangement, Fast moving targets could be quickly and easily plotted. In our CICat present time the VGfVG'l is used almost solely as a Summary Plot."


380 sets of the VGjVG-1 combination have been manufactured, of which aU but .fifty have been installed. The allowance list includes the following types: BB, eVB1 CV, CA, CL, CVL,. cvs, AGe and APA's used as relief command ships. One hundred VG-2 models are being manufactured. These are not on the allowance list and can be Installed only upon authorization of the Bureau of Ships. Twenty-six VG-2 Models have been installed at this writing.


o o >-

, (fi


VI --l


.J>. U"I


Lowering the dome und pwicetoT [rom a sea chest within the ship's hul! to an op~aling position beneath the ship is done b)1 the retracting gear. This uniJ alo trains the proi6Ctor when in the operaU'lg position and raises the dome and projector bad, into the chest when Ilot in use. Lowering and hoi ting and the training of the shaft ot! which tile projector is mounted may be accomplished either with molars or mllutloll),. Throltgh TIl{Jeotlff mechanisms both tile true alld »elatioe bearings of the projector can be read [rom dials all the remote control pallel, in conjlimclirJf! TIJ~th a ID,,·v·compass repeattn· dial.

SCmaT equipment is made up of electrical and mechanical parts connected together to perform certain functions: The driver pro· duces sound signals to be h·lPISl1l{tted.; the project01' transmits tile signals to the water (mel picks up !ou1:d $ig71IJ:1.~ from tile water; the receiver-ampli{i:trr amp/iii&" signals pic4~~ .. up by the projeclcn"; the indlca.ting equipment gives Ille range IJnd bead"g of tne twget; the dome fwevents water noise; Imd the rel<racti'lg gear hoists and lawen the projector anti trains it.

the retractable

tion by the ship. hi gear is mounted on a ea che t built into the hull of the hip and can raise the d me within the chest for P otection from underwater obstacles or heavy seas. Becau e thi equipment is more or les delicately designed. special precautions must be taken and definite pro· cedures followed to insure successful and continuous operation.'

"The primary req uisite that a streamlined retractable Sonar dome must atisfy is acoustic, with

e ondary consideration gi en to mechanical strenzth, The mechanical de ign improvements whi h are incorporated in the dome presently being deli ered make them capable of withstanding can iderably more stress than those formerly supplied. However, tile limiting requirements of acoustic performance necessi tate a type of construction resulting in a unit much less rugged than the hull of the vessel to which it is fitted. For thi reason precautions must be taken to avoid expo - ina the dome and its a ociated components to unnece ary stresses. Th e precautions can i t in

1 Standard procedure IIlr operating retractable dome and dlreeling gear .Erom (;ominCh conE. Itr., F, l-/ 68 erial 01471 Q( 2lj May 1945.

sonar dome

Sonar equipments have often been called the "ears of the fleet," for with them our antiubmarine warfare units can mea ure the depth of water beneath a hip, d teet ubmerged submarines and invisible underwater hazards, and determine their range, bearing. and motion relative to the ship. Even underwater co mmuuications can be carried on with success.

An integral pan of all sonar equipments is the dome and retracting gear. The streamlined dome, whidl covers the projector, prevents water noise from own hip as it rna es through the water, and with th~ retJ'acting gear yo-u can hoist and lower La dome and train the ound beam from the proje tor in an 11 rizon al direction wi thonr obstruc-



housing the dome during, ery T lIo1 weather and prior to prolonged high speed runs and in being certain that the dome is careful] seat d by hand in both the .retracred and be extended po ition.

" he mo t common causes of operational damage to directin -retracting mechanisms on ships underway have been:

I-Operating with dome not hand seated azainst the stop in the lowered positi n.

2-Not searinz the dome in the hoi tened po ition y hand.

- ailure to retract the dome in extrem ly rough weather.

4-RunninO" at .high peeds for pmlonged periods with the dome in the lo-wered position. s-Retracting or lowering deme when hip is undC1\v1I:y at peeds ill ex ess of 25 knots.

"In order to maintain the equipment at maximum efficien 'y and to reduce operational failures,

l' The photograph. ami -10'-)' below wn.e cantributcd. by Lhc V

the foUowing:~" ~truction should b carefully fol-

lowed: ,.

I-~ cornpli final eating of the dome in both the 1 wered and hoisted po ition b u e of the hand rank.

z=Retracc dome when sonar gear is not in use. 3-'Whenever pos ible, dome should be retracted prior to prolonged high speed runs. High speed is arbitrarily defined as speed above 25 knots,

. - Vhen' ver po ibl retracting and Iowering dome shou ld be done when ship is making less than 20 knot,

~-'When shan or intermittent high- peed runs are to be made, the dome should not be retracted as more damage results from hoisting and lowering at speeds in excess of 20 knots than from sh if[ high . peed run .

6-1£ the ra ti al ituation permits, dome hould be

rerrac ed , ben tate is more than 5." I


Loran world cooerage today

a .Before the end of I 94.S. some :10.000 aircraft and ships will be equipped with

LOTa11 receiver-indicators.

Cruising ~f

thousaflCl.s of miles 01 ocean now coveTed by the network of Loran staljo11$, these ships and aircraft can _accurately determine thei' positions. Loran coverage, today, is not "uiorld-unde" but it has expanded considerably to include many areas in the Pllci(ic and other OUa'IS which, a year ago, had no coverage of this kind.

Loran has proved especially useflll ullde, clouded skies of the Atlanlicand in the stormy reaches 01 the North Pacific. Ships and planes have ~Iad continually available, wlu:re LOTan service exists, a check on pO$itiOTl correct to within a few mUes. Closer to land, and to the Loran transmitting stations, accuracy has been Iligher-!I3!lally to a small fraction 01 a mile.

The future tOT Loran looks promising. It may well become a standard aid to naViga,·jon on Illl ocelln·going ships and transoceanic aircralt; civil and military. II lew additional LOTan stations in aptwopriate locations may som~ day complete tile coverag<! over all lanes of ocean travel.


51 :>c en c VI

In recent "Mariner Bia kcatting" operations along the hina and "Formosa coasts, the PE 1-3D' of CPB-2 have found the / APQ-s electronic bombsizh • teamed with the _ lAP 2 radar, a alnahle aid in choking off Japanese suppl lines.

The nigbt-Hying Mariner. appropriately nicknamed' izhtmares" in quadran Action Reports, left numerous-japanese merchantmen and war hips battered, smoking and sunk durinz April alone, after radar-guided attacks which occurred night after night.

On its first attempt to use the AN / APQ-6 radar bombsight in combat, the squadron reponed a hit. Used again in other " pril operations, the equipment proved the first success was no mere J ucky break.

The first use of I PQ-5 occurred on the night of April, \ hen a PB· {-3D of VP.B-2 earched the west coast of Formosa

and the China coast. To quote ,the squadron's Action Report:

"On return back to Formosa, picked up a lone ship by radar. At 6112 miles began an APQ run at 350 feet. At % mile the target was lost 'in sea return but was seen to .have one smalllight showing.

(BuAer COll1Jl1eDt: A quantity of: MX"472/AP hort Time Constant Kits are under procurement which can be used with AN / ARS-~radaI to reduce sea clutter. These kits are 'Scheduled to be available at ASA akland and

SO Philadel phia by 1 J uly 1945. If the J APQ-5 has been ynchronized

in rate of do ure and if a ollision course .ha been established, the / APQ-5 will track in and drop even though the target disappears in ea return.)

"APQ was used Ear range and radar homing for deflection, with the radar operator giving deflection corrections to the pilot up to % miles 'where the light was seen. APQ triggered the bombs, __ . On] two bombs were drop" ped, a 500 and a 250 pounder. the first set to hit 40 feet short.

" t least one hit was scored, for the ship blew up in a great blast, seen even in the pilot's compartmen ."

( uAer Comment: It i not d that only two bombs 'were ne essary here to obtain a hit, a fact hich uggest the economy in bomb e ulting from the use of blind-bombinz equipment. In most ca e four or five bombs are dropped when using "seaman's-e e" technique. lying a collision course with the /APQ-S ia auto-pilot or pilot's dire tional, indicator will gi e



better accnrac in deflection than the method employed here. However this method apparentl worked quite well at the very low altitude flown).

Another chance to u e / APQ-s occurred on

the night of 14 April, , hen one" ightmare" reported these re ults:

One Sugar -Baker Love merchantman sunk, one uzar Dog probably destroyed, one DE missed by only 20 feet and probably damaged, one gunboat bit by gunfire.

The night' action occurred after the PB if-3D pilot took off with tl other nightmare, He reached the Takao area . bortly after un et and visuall sighted a uzar Dog (small freighter of about 150 tons). Not wishing to u e bomb on a small a target, be strafed it and left it burning.

hortly afterward he picked up another target by radar 10 miles north, found it was a gunboat of about 300 ton , and strafed it.

ontinuing his search, the pilot "sizhted fOlIT

hips by radar at 0020 and at once attacked, making the run by APQ-s due to very poor visibility." Finding the target wa a E, he decided to u e two 500-pound bombs. "The run was set for 350 feet", the ction Report states, "but the plane went over the ship at 390 fe-et. he two 50o-polmd bombs, set for 4o-feet spacing. a ccord illg1y went:

ver, the first exploding 20 feet abeam to port, resumably after passing below the ship after hitting the water to starboard. From thi fact it i estimated that the D was probably damaged but the extent i unknown, for the pilot sighted another radar target. a large one, 8 mi1e uth .... "

Then followed. an / PQ-5 run in which the

radar bomb ight was u ed for I ih ranI)' and deflection with marked succes :

"Continuing his one-plane war with [he Jap na ,the pilot decided that this target wa worthy of his three remaining bombs. Setting up his APQ'5 for another run from miles (radar from 20 rile ), he came in at precisely 350. feet through the haze. . ." he three bombs fell for a straddle in range, but at the stern in deflection. The middle bomb, a 5oo-pounder, exploded within 5 feet 0 the stern. if not directly under it.

" either pilo could see the h.ip and thi alta k, like the attack on the DE, "I a made entirely by PQ-5 <Tear, both for range and deflection, the bombs being triggered automaticall ."

The tail gunner observed the exple ion and identified the target as a Sugar Baker Love of about 6600 tons. "Checking, the pilot picked up the ship by radar" and watched the blip. After 5 minutes it disappeared from the radar screen and the pilot concluded the ship had sunk.

Direct lilts were scored on another operation the following night when the AL'l"/APQ-5 was used '01" range only and the radar for deflection. The pilot, believing in the old advice. "If at first you don't succeed, try, try again", made two runs over a Fox Tare Baker of about 7500 tons:

"A target was sighted by radar. course north, un escorted. In the haze and darkness, the pilot knew that he auld not see the target, and at 10 miles began a run by APQ-5 at 300 feet. He used this gear only for l"ange and triggering the ombs, homing by the usual ASG gear for deflection and making 0 casional changes in cour e to correct for


o (1 > c:

(j) c V1 -;

drift as directed by the radar operator.

"The bombs, spaced at 40 feet, made a perfect straddle, the middle bomb, a 250-pounder, making a direct hit amidships." The target was then seen as a Fox Tare Baker.

The pilot circled five times and, when he saw the target was not burning, decided to try again. He returned to the vicinity, picked up the ship by radar, and "made another run by APQ-5, 300 feet,

- dropping two 50o-pounders for hits amidships."

A few moments later, when the ship indication disappeared from the radar creen, the pilot concluded the -target had sunk.

The actions cited are no doubt some of the squadron's more outstanding missions, but other reports from VPB-28 indicate that crews also find their radar helpful in routine flights of their nightly blackcarting operations in the Pacifi .

Other squadrons are also finding an ANjAPQ-5 a valuable aid in attacks on shipping. The commanding officer of VMB-612, describing his squadron's experience with ANjAPQ-S, has called it "very accurate" for both bombing and rocket firing. "The azimuth has been quite satisfactory; you can get on accurately with it and hit," he said.

An effecti e method for examining can oys to be attacked with the aid of radar and. ANjAPQ-5 has been described by an Army B-24 pilot from the China theater.

When 19 miles off the convoy, the pilot turns 65 degrees to the right, flying that course until at an angle of ) 15 degrees with the convoy, and then he makes a turn of 50 degrees to the left. That leg i~ flown until an angle of 1150 is had with the convoy, when another 500 turn is made to the left.

As many of these courses are flown as desired. No 11aIm arises from the fact that the plane i not brought back to the exact tarting point when all 7 courses are flown, since the pattern can be commenced anew if necessary.

he procedure has 3 purposes:

I-It allows radar equipment to warm up to the bombing altitude temperature, as searches are made at about 5000 feet while bombing is done at 600 to 1000 feet.

2-Convoys can be viewed in the scope at all angles to determine their exact character; if viewed from one direction, two ships may look like one, and estimation of sizes and positions may be inaccurate,

3-Time is available to decide which ship in the convoy is to be bombed so that there will be no misunderstanding when the bombardier takes over from the navigator on the bombing run. The run is about 15 miles long, but the bombardier's APQ- 5 set does not begin to function until 9 or 10 miles from the target.

Still more effective use of radar bombsights for anti-shipping strikes can be expected now that the improved AN/APQ'5B is in the fleet and other electronic bombing aids, such as the AN/APA16 and ANjAPG-4, are beginning active duty. By permitting bombing in darkness and Log, by lightening the responsibility of pilots and bombardiers, by reducing the human factor of error inherent in attacks by seamen's eye, and by providing more hits with fewer bombs. radar bombing aids will' play an important role in stra.ngling Japanese sea-power.

CO:-JVERSlON TABLE FOR ALTITUDE ESTIMATES (Elevation Angle into Thousands of Feet)

Approximate .1lLitude in Feel
. Angle 3[ 5 miles at 10 miles at '5 miles ai 20 miles at 25 miles
,. 500 . 1250 :1000 !!5°O 3000
2· 1000 2300 3;;00 4500 57°0
,. lfiOO 3000 5UOO 6500 8000
4" 2000 45Q9 6500 Sr;oo 10600
_. 2500 5000 8000 10500 13000
GO 3000 6500 9500 .lJ5°O 15500
7" 3500 i5°O I LOOO '4500 18000
S· 4000 000 1~5°O 16500 20500
9· 4500 gooo 14000 ]" '00 .28000
11° 5500 11500 I iUOO 23000 28500
13° 6500 13500 20000 !7°OO S<1000
15° 000 '5000 !!4OOO 3'000
1,° go~oo 19000 28000
200 1'1500 111000 32500
25~ 13500 25500
3°· 15000 31000
4°·' 18200 38000 &J
60· 27000
- 38


turning angles into angels

Lockouts sometimes gil e their altirude evaluation on visual contacts in terms of the elevation angle obtained from Lhcir Lookout seats. 'Vhen I hese reports reach CIG or the visual FDO over the JI. circuit, wey are olien difficull to interpolate as altitude in Teet, This aWtude [able will assist the FbO, Evaluator or visual Intercept Officer on the receiving end of these. Lookout eleva Lion angle reports with their Jnterpolarlon. These altitudes are approximate, b.avjng" been rounded off to 500 foot measurements. .By observing the target's range at the time the reported angle reading is received, general altirude Information is readily available for figlner direeLion LIse or for comparison wlrh previou S evaluations on the same targel.

~ conuersfcn table

conuersion chart ~

0 20
:J: 3,5

16° 14°
90" ~OD TO 2r 1j j 15° 12° ~oo go
J 1.1 ,/
LL r-
17 17"
1/, V
u r-
u e-

IJJ '.L v
'J1 1/
III IJJJ1Jlffll'
I[hU rjJ ~

lliI1J11/J UJlL
_jJ11IJiJDJ. "
If, V
U/ ~
V v r
10 20 30
VI 30







YOU pick up a target at 3. ,000 y~rds .. Your normal range for that type target -1 L 7 ,000 yards. This unusual radar performance rna be due [0 the fact that you are operating near ew York harbor on a warm summer night.

... or near Tok 01

The re~ent report of the US BOWFIN (SS 287) furnishes evidence that mereorolozical conditions affecting the performance of radarooff the east coast of the United States and around Japan are



Date experienced:



!Cay 7 and 8, 1945

From 2330 King to 0442 King

From: 40-16.4N

2300DR 142-25.3£

39-38·SN 0500DR J42-16.oE


o wind

Air temp rature: 45° (F)

ea Inje-ction Temperature: 40° (F)

T pe Radar: ja, serial compo ite, S-Band.

Antenna height: 34 feet (above waterline)



trapping i

Normal range for type targets: 17,000 yards

• .tended range: 38,000 ards

Remark: Targets l ere a medium or small freizhter of 2000-4000 tons, and a medium tanker 0.£ ab~ot 5000 tons, the latter riding with very Iinle £ree~oard. They were southbound, hugging the coastline, and when. first picked up were thought to be part of land, Subsequent tracking at a range of from 30,000 to 25,000 yards identi-

,lied ==. and they were closed for attack. Pips of both ShIpS were very large in the initial stages, but at about 18,000 yards, the suddenly grew smaller. T1~acking and appearance from there 011 in appeared normal for targets of that size. 'Vater h~ Bat calm and slightly phosphorescent. Ghost pIp at short ranges usually experienced near land under these conditions were contacted earlier in the evening."

The U, S. 'Weather Bureau map shows zone in ~1e Pacific an~~ their meteorological counterparts III the tlantic, S BOWFIN was sailing in water near Japan (zone C) whose counterpart for meteorological conditions can be found in the tlantic (zone 0). These zone are comparable at

a 11 times of the year except zon uch as E and E'




which are comparable onl from December throuah February. Thus ships" hich have e 'perienced trapping of radio waves in these area in the Atlantic, may expect imilar increa e in ranges in the counterpart areas in the Pacific.

To date, 27 reports of greater than normal Taflges, have been received, from zone ',6 reports from zone D~, and 1 report each from zones E", F', and HI', 0 reports have been received from any other Ameri an ontinent zone in Figure 1. Thee rep or cover the p riod from 22 February 1945 through 1 ~ May.

Since there were undoubted] more ships in zone CI, whi h in ludes Boston, Nex lork, Philadelphia, Baltimore and !orfolk there were probably many more opportunitie to experience unusual ranges. he orresponden e of zones hown on the map indicates instances of crap ping hould be fairly common in zone C at certain seasons of the yea).'. RS of zone C' indicates the line about which the positions of the 27 Tepon were distributed, none being more than 100 mil away from R. Y i the corre ponding hypoth tical line for zone C_ .

It must be borne in mind that the e ompari ons are neces arily only approximate. in e the months

° Iarch ana Aprilr ere unusually warm in zone 0, there was con iderable differen e in temperature b rw en the warm air and c lder ea. Ordinarily this ituation does not reach a peak until Ma . There is no reason to S'llppO e that because a given m nth i abnormally warm in zone 0 the same thing will prevail for zone . "On the spot" wea ther conditions, as well as Iocal peculiarities "to topography and distribution of land and water rna se , play an important role.


in e warm air over cooler a PI' duce unusual ranges in zone " trapping will probably be experienced at times in zone C for the arne reason .. 1 0 there will be a TO 10'h one pondence between the sea ons of the year when increased or decreased ranges are experienced. Thus the BOWFIN's report is comparable to the BOMF-

o . ("C.l.C." magazine, July 1945, paO'e .:1:4) as regard the decided tern perature excess of air over water, the hips being in corre pending z nes in the Pacific and Atlantic. It is unfortunate that in neither report were dry and wet bulb temperatures given; we an only surmi e that th all" at bri lze level wa dry r lative to that at the urlac .


There are practical and mechanical limitations to any eq ui pment, Those of the P must' be understood before the equipment can be used efficiently.

he P radar i the late t operational equipment for providing ac urate range and bearinz information on both urface and air targets and determining altitudes. Lizhter in weight than the M, SP installation ar making available loner sought "angels information" to AGe's,

battleships, cruisers and to some specially fitted destroyer. mong its other uses, the SF is extremely helpful in night interceptions.' It can detect low II ing plane, determine the number of plane in a clo e II ing group and

ate torm areas for purp ses of navigation and control of aircraft.

There are, however, certain definite limitations in SP performan e, parti ularly in height determination. It presents operationally good accurac on targets above its critical angle if it is proper! adjusted and correctl ' operated. However, the P does not give the absolute altitude accuracy a CIC watch officer or the Gunnery Liaison officer would like to have on aircraft Hying below the critical angle, especially at ranges beyond 15 miles (see SP graph, page 44). It j important to know what the SP can do. to

recognize its known limitation, and guarantee that the e limitations will not be enlarged upon by pOOl' maintenance and operational procedures.


he critical angle of the SP is [rom 2 to 4 dezrees (page 44). Altitude determination above this critical angle is accurate (_ 500 feet) while eval uatioi below the criti al angle are not reliable at range greater than 15 miles except perhaps by chance. Reflection from the ocean's surface causes an "averaging down" of elevation angle indication. At elevation angles. below the critical angle the antenna dish tends to plit the difference between the true echo and reflections from the ocean surface. As an aircraft approaches at low angles (less than 4 degrees), Toughly 4/5 of the time the SP will measure its altitude below the actual elevation of the target, due to dli "horiz n locking." During the remainder of the time the situation is most unstable and elevation anal readings can fluctuate between -+- 2V2°. Tracking targets over land introduce another limitation in its capacity to determine accurate altitude.


To assure altitude accuracy above the critical angle the following adjustmenrs should be made: (<'I) the antenna and stable element mcunrins .urfaces should not deviate from the level by more than .01 degrees; (b) antenna must not be operated without stable element cut in as this wil in time inn duce play into the antenna gearing; (c) the console height circuit

hould be properly calibrated according to instructions on page 75 of the console instruction book; (d) the Ievation synchro' should be zeroed and check d by a plane at ten miles range and ten thousand feet altitude. The September issue of Electron magazine will present theoretical and maintenance information relative to limitations of the SP radar,

Efficient, air-sur face performance can be attained only when the set is calibrated and tuned OU air target. Accurate range on air targets are improbable if the gear is calibrated on either surface or land taraets. In the abo en e of aircraft. however, the et can be satisfa torily tuned with an Echo Box or on a fairly sharp cloud with the Cloud Suppressor witch off. (The short time constant of the Echo Box does not permit absolute accuracies for t:'P tuning.) .As a guide to periodic checks on tbe P' sensitivity, a inrrle Vl' hould be picked up atfift to ixty miles ranze.





what are the SP's limitations?


In order that operational limitation hall not add to the practical and mechanical limitations, it is essential that operators know, and follow, the prescribed operating techniques. The following outline has been prepared with the assistance of Mr. M. R, Duncan of the General Electric Company's Service Engineering Division who ha been in the Pacific area supervising installation and operation of M and SF radars. Here is what operators and CIe watch officers should watch Eor in

P operation:

1- The P beam is narrow. It call be moved in elevation as well as in azimuth. If the echo starts to fade, the winged dot (sometimes called the "gnat") on the Precision scope indicate exactly in which direction the antenna must be moved to get the target back into the center of the SF beam. When the target is in the R-scope notch the PPI operator must watch the Precision scot1e rather than the PP[.

2-The Precision scope is very sen itive. For this reason the "gnat" j extremely jumpy. It is impo sible for the operator to make a corre tion for these fast "nervous" rno ernents oE the mat. The


~ -,,~--.-.---------. -

(,.,i / .- ....

f ,'\ / ,I \

left I .!I_", \ right

\ ,. ~~, I

' ..... t-,;~ " ... ~--"



The SINGLE BEAM of the SP rotates electn'caUy, incrensillg or decreasing its strength in such a iuay that effectively there are four beams-left, "pper, right, and lower, Ilt eilch oj these quadrants voltage is applied to the indicator SCOpl! and the winged-sPQt (gnat) moves accordingly, WI,eJl the winged· spot is centered on ale scope, the target is an 1.lle a:ds 0/ the rotating beam, Whet! it moves to the left, the target is to Ole left of th« beam axis, ctc.

A SIMILAR ERROR is prw· alen! when the target (A) is pi'clled up a t a lom elevation HI.gII! {below the SP's critical angle of 2 to 4 deW'ee}, The beam (mergy ill the lower ouodf'(l1lt Illill I'eflect [ronv tile ocean -or land-hit the plan« at an (l1Igie and retun, to the indica- 10'1'. This bea 111 energy adds 0' subtroou trom the main beam causing the "gnllt" 10 appear sOIlUf.limes aboue, sometimes betoto I he plone's actue! eleuat i(m as indjcated on the scope. The res 1)1((1111 errol' ill i rulic« t 6(1 a tutnd« a/ this low IlIIgII< muy be (I.s mllrh '1,1 ~ nr II IInllMlllr/ feet (.'1' 1'l1 .4").

,1 DISCREPANCY sometimes oce"rs when the operator tractu a plane (.4) fI'ying (within two degrees) over a land 11111 s. Centering the "gnat" (il') ill the 1)recision scope, the operator is apparently "on" the target. Bltl Ihis is nol the Irtle echo ,1'0111 till! plane; it is a combined echo from the aircraft '"I(/ from th« m.oulltain. If the mountain were to di"li(1ppclIr, A' would jump 10 tile "ppe, quad.rant of tile st'ope ",,([ ilflfJen, «I A. The operator, by eleoaung to again cet! ter the "gmu/' wOllld the» actltally be "on" the aircratt.

ope!'ctor sees this signal


o o » c (j) c V\ -r+



Ot. air targets above the critical 8!Jgle (4,·. 2.66· or !"O depemflllg on the antenna '" 1Lfe) th« inil;'llwd I1lt~tude for the majority of !· wl1i be within 500 jeeJ of actual altitilde provided ~flat lhe systemCIt;, errors ore kept at a mini- 111Um b)l proper adjustment alld maintenance of equipment, 'I a plane is flying in th« shaded. area, the indicated (tiLitlule ge1ll'1"ally will be 111 error by 1000 to 3000 feet; these lurgets, houreuer, tuil! be measured mOTe occuralely lll/rl!» wit/li7! close ronge. This iow-angle error a1 !lll)' Tange will be reduced somelllhat when usillg ,he 7l1ft(.ljj'lg dfpole antenna.

PPI op'eralor should keep the hand-wheels in such a position that this green-winged spot "averages" about ihe center of the scope. vVhen attempts are made to corre t for thi j umpine , he tarzet i u ually 10 t.

g-Wben the WI! G LEVEL CONTROL i prop rly et, weak signal will sometimes show on the Pre ision scope and not on the PPI. If a target: is not apparent all. the R-scope when the wings flash, operators should investigate, for this, scope is. sensitive enough to indicate a weak target that mighc be brouzht into the R-scope with a little coaxing.

4-0ccasionally a tal'g t will fade on the SF. A good many P fades are atmo ph eric and the target will not reappear on the scope until the condition cau ing the fade has passed, rezardle of the operator's franti attempt to relocate the target 'with five to ten degree arcs in elevation and in azimuth. To regain a faded target, move the handioheels slowly, through very small arcs, remembering the app1'oximale course of the target prio1" to its fade.

S-In order that the Precision scope rna function properly only one tarzet houldl e entered in th notch. Keep the ditch at m,a irnum width unless your target is sandwiched between two other targets, in which case the ditch should be narrowed, A change in notch width alters the 'wings level control on the gnat. And, a wider ditch makes it easier to keep a fast roo ingtarget from moving out 0"£ the notch.

6-For accurate ranging the leading edge of the notch must line np '" . th the 1 ailing edge 0.£ the ignal (lef hand ed e of both). Keep the signal in the enter of the notch while tracking. moving it o er each time a: range reading is ziven.



7- he PPl Video Gain Control (not the Receiver . Gain Control) should be pre-set at about W, to ¥s of a turn from its extreme CCW position. Then, '\ bile the antenna is slowly rotated, the PPI Intensity Control should be set so the sweep is just barely vi ible on the PPL These settings should - be made by the technicians during tune-up. If set. lower than described above, weak targets will not be seen on the PPI. Changes in the PPl mtensity s.hould' be made tuith: the PPI SCOPE Video Gain Conirot (not the tsuo controls mentioned above) which can be varied to suit the operator.

S- When everal targets are strung out in range on the same bearing, the PPI operator should use the RA GE MARK on the PPI to indicate to the As ope operator "Which target to put in the no ch, TuTU the RA GE M RK on, then turn the range crank until the spot on the PPI travels along the sweep and coincides with the desired target.

9-Use the \VOBBLER sparingly. This piece of gear will not stand up to continuous operation. Tum the vVOBBLER on when obtaining an altitude measurement, then turn it off when normal search. 01' tracking is re umed. In this way the WOBBLER can be kept at peak. efficiency.

lo-Early SF installation did not in.c1'nde a correction or earth's curvature in the HEIGHT ME R. modification for earth's curvature is included in new installations, and will be available Eor present installations. The operawr~ or CIC watch officer, can obtain better altitude evaluation Ewm set not having this modification by using the " M- P Target Height Chart" reproduced in the June 1945 "C.I.C.' , page 35.

Edit r' te: Performan e te t of the SF are sill

in process. The findings will be presented in lat i ues of "C.I.C."

A H NDY bino ular "mike" mount for use in j ual Fighter Dire tion ha been de eloped by Pa ific Fleet Radar Center. It i a useful adcliti n to any hip's visual fighter direction station or other station req uiring "tal kiJlg binoculars.' Pacific Fleet Radar enter says it is a big help in peeding up visual. Inserceptions,

Thi metal gadget. which can be made easily aboard 'OUI hip, secures the tnii rophone to the bino ulars, fonning a fig e .• ee-talk" unit, This unit i handled in the usua:l manner with bin culax the on] difference being that the forefingers rest on a metal 1'0 s-piece 'U,hich controls the transm i rter bu tnon.

Plan for the binocular mike mount may be obtained upon reque t from the Pacific Fleet Radar Center, Navy ~o. 91, FPO, San Francisco.

talking binoculars


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Items printed j'1 "Ideas of the Month" are not doctrine 07 standard tJmctice, bill are suggesli071S [rom- Fleet wlits which ),on may use or reject as you see fit.

I! your ship has worked 01,11 tactics Of I echu iq PIes which have helped YOll, then the quid,est wa)' to pass the aid to others is via this aoI1lm". Airmail contribuiions 10 "C. I. C." Th~y will soon be ,in prj'lll (if deemed m{ficiellUy /Jetll and IIe/Pllil) amI on the way to the entire Fleet by airmait,

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

tube plotting on the Natoma Bay

-By Lieutenani Richard ,1;1. VI1II/"n'. USSR, StaD CIG Officer, Carrie" Division 25.

The Natoma- .Bay (CVE) displays 65 jap llags, each representing a .lap plane shot down by local CAP under control of its

C1C. everal devices have been employed in CIC which have corurlbuted to this impresstve record, the most unorthodox of which i~ the mel-hod ot plouiug.


Four radai men arc respOIl ible on a TOlalion basis [01' the operation of tile SK in the combat area. All contacts are interrogated by the operator and a umed by those in CIC to be Criendly unless the operator hit· a buzzer lhal calls the waich officer LO (he j! 1 JS circuit.

A plotter is available at she vertical board but no plotting is done here unril the operator reports a bogey. The pIO((CI"s phones are connected to the 2 I J ' but the head-set is around hili neck ready or use.

The remote PPI occupies the normal position between the two horizontal plotting tables. In front of the PPT sitS the CIC watch officer. He is a busy individual, for be plots all contacts with each sweep 011 lll!! 12·in h tube. The old Norfolk 5y tern of plotting is employed, arrows indicating tbe direction of Fligbt. No time notation is made, but practice gives a faitly accurate impression of speed. A reI\, hours of 1V0r~ and an)' watch officer can handle the plotting job.

Arrows are used [or bogey and friendly plots in different 00101' grease pencils to differentiate between the t'Wo-a helpful procedure when several raids are on th.e screen. The ourboard horizontal plot Is available to the raff CIC Officer; here under plexiglass he keeps his hackle code, frequency tables, guard a sigruuenr record, geographical plot with picket assignment and other pertinent data. ' he inboard plot is used by the YDO who bas a DR and a bogey plotter standing by.

The FDO alternates hi' WIHch. with the Jnrercepr Officer from half an hour before sunrise to omeume after 'unset. They have a complete picture of the ail' situation at all times from the plotS on the PPJ. Both Lieutenant Ray Von Rosenberg. who developed this method, and Lieutenant Gg) Dick.ey Goodrich, preler to work on this. basis,

A geogT'Lphic plot is maintained on the ORT, Jc is entirely com preheusi ve and has been responsible [or valuable assists in ail' work. In one instance CIC was able to PUt part of the CAP around to the Iar side of a Negros mountain over an enemy airfield before seven Zekes could reach home plate-sand the Zekes never did make it.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

rapid conuersion plotting

-By Lt. PValtu S, SullivaJl, »: USNR, US OVERTON (APD):

in each of the major landing operations during the pa t

ear all radar contacts In ihe area, both. air and surface, have been reported in terms of range and bearing [rom a Radar Reference Point. POINT .\lOLLY, POI:--lT LULU, POI:-.IT HARDROCK.S, POINT BOLO conjure up memories of endless double plouing in the minds of most Pacific Fleet CIC officers. The use or the standard CI C Air P lot wi th pa rille! rulers and dividers LO replot the coruacts in terms of the Radar Reference Poilu is hopelessly clumsy. To do lr by inspection is inaccurate. A[ter experimeuring with several devices, including a revamped Hoey Po ilion Plotter, the following procedure ha been selected for use on this ship:

A chart ol the entire operating area is used with a scale of ten miles [0 (he inch. A polar grid is constructed wilh me Radar Reference Point a the center. With the scale of tel miles to the inch the grid hould resemble the air plot pol grid superimposed on the chart; however, the concentric circles ihould he extended one hundred miles beyond ihe most remere

R.adar Pickets, and the Radar Picket StaUOIl£ should be drawn in, as well as transport areas. This chart is used to Iacilltare rapid preparation of the device described below.

The device is a circular plate of min plexlglass large enough (0 cover the Air PIOl and half of the wooden frame around [be Air Plot. The underside of it is fwstcd by sandpapering, but the top is ren smooth. When the ship venters the area where radar reports are received and transmitted in terms of the Radar Reference Point, a geographical representarion of the portion of the area in which the ship is operating is .reproduced on the plexiglass.

The previously prepared chart is laid face down 011 the DRT with sufficient light under the DRT glass to make the lines ol the chan visible. The plexiglass is laid over the chart with the El'OSled side up. It is oriented on the North-South axl of the chart with the ship's current position or prospective picket siauon in the approximate center. Distinctively colored pencils are then used to trace the outline of Land, the mountain ranges, friendl y and enemy airfields, transport areas, picket stations. and (in red) that portion of the polar grid centered Oil the Radar Reference Petru which appears under the plexiglaS!. The portion of the operating area is now virtually equal to that covered by the Air Plot. A "mirror-image" ts presented until the plexiglass is turned over.

The device is laid over the Air Plot with its north side oriented 10 conform to the north side of the Air Plot and with its smooth face up. It is likewise located so that the center of the Air Plot is as nearly as possible directly under the point all the plextglass representlng the ship's current position. The device is secured in position with a few thumb tacks pressed Into the wood on the edge; of the Air 1110t,.

AU contact reports, whether from own ship's radar or nom the lFD and L W nets, can now be plotted lnsraiuaneousty by inspection. lFD and LAW reports are plotted in coordinates of the grid on -rhe bouom of the plexiglass, and own hip's reports are read off this grid Cor transmittal over these nets. Plotting in terms of own radar is done with the Air Plot Grid ..

J n recent amphibious operations a very large part of each ship's time has been spent on a station from which she rarely moved more than two miles. 10 such case the device may be Iefcsecured to the top of the Air PIc t; but there are times when a c.hange of suuion is ordered in the midst oE a raid. IE the sbip heads across the operating area at tweuty·five knees, the picture is soon contorted unless it is moved along about ever)' five minutes to coI'l.form LO lhc shill's movement. This can be done without disnrrbiug tile plotters, and all the advantages of this system are .retained, The raids can beuer be evaluated when tl1eIr relationship to the mountains. LIte airfields, and [he transport area is ob erved. There is no coulusion "hen the ship ill Rada:r.. Picket Statiou Ten hours, "Bogies over head" or "We lUI' under attack," (or his station is shown. If the ship' new station is so distant that it will be nowhere near the center of the plot in current use; a uew one must be" prepared as de,crilled above, but with the new station near [he center. T'his will not Interrupt uie plouing of a. raid if anothl!rshccL of plexiglass is a vailable. As soon as the screen is lear, 01' ahuost

clear, the new plot can be substituted for the old. A new plot can be prepared in about ten minutes,

The presence of two polar grids on top of each other may prove confusing to some officers. If, however, the Air Plol. is illuminated by a red light, me red polar grid on the plot will not he visible and can be illuminated 10caU)' with a white fla~hlight to IOClLte the bogey in terms of the Radar Reference Point.

The u e of thi system has proved the only means whereby this ship's CI.G could keep track of the torrent of reports thar come in during all attack b)' many scattered raid. If the system pro es acceptable, it i recommended that for future operations charts of the area be prepared to the scale of [en miles to the inch with a polar grid constructed around the Radar Reference Point, and the Important tactical features included as described above. In the Large parcels of material furnished for the Leyte operauon. as many as ten copies of certain eharts were furnished. }t is suggested that a few copies of such charts could be sacrificed to jnake room ·.for me grid described above.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

the target square locator for polyconic grids

-By Lt. Walle'T S. Sullivan, tr: USNR, VSS OVERTON (i.lPD):

A simple device that bas been proved successful in locating specific points all the widely used J:36,000 Polyconic grids (scale 1000 yard to the Inch) is a plexiglass plate three inches squa-re. On Lilts plate one grid section (one Inch square) bas been drawn with the small squlITcs leuered from "A" to "Y." The lines and letters are drawn witb a sharp metal point and brought out by smearing with a grease pencil and wiping clean witb. a doth.

When, for example, a gun is reponed in "1379·G," the plate is laid over the L379 square and the point located immediately. Otherwise, it is LLSUll1ly necessary to find. a. fully lettered square elsewhere on the grid and. carefully compare it to the 1379 square to locate "G."

A sketch of the Target Square Locator is shown below.

A B C 0 E
K L M N 0
U V W X y Editor's NOLe: I[ a pm-poim hole is drflled into each lettered square, it will facilltate marking the exact spot with a pencil.

o > C (j) C U1 --I

REQUESTS FOR "c. L C_" should be addressed:

(issues prior to July 1944 an! 110 longer available)

NAVY - The Chief of Nuval OtJeT4tion.s, Editor of "c. I. C.", Washi71gton 25. D. c.

ARMY -Adjutant General's Office, OperaJiOIl.s Branch, Room 1IB939. Pentagon Building, WasfJillglon 25, ·D. C.

Latest PP I Allowance List





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a....;St""dm! PPT Repeater {lV~od.el Ye. YD. VlJ) c->-Proje!'tiun 1'P1 Repeater (Model VG serl~s)

b-f'reclslou 1'£>1 Repeatex with beadng a.>.d mnl:ll tm"emis;;;ion ["atun: (Mod~ VF)

!l-IFF Indleatcr _12' 1'1'1 Repeater (Model VJ, VK)



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Station Keeping Is. ODD's Job.

No.f elC's

v;;, 1?HOfimX (CL} (Sadau and T (l.1'aluJ1} Is ian d.,,): • 'It is becoming inc:reasi!lglyevident that Officers of the Deck dO' not und ers land the prob terns 01 erc in the mauer of stanon keepit'g, On this ship it has been the pIlleuce to operate one .of ule radars &t ni;ht lV'iLh ils gain lo\~. Tbl5 is done in order that (he ODD will have a clear picture Qf the d~sposi lion 011 the RPPl on the open bridge. In spire .of Litis. OOD's have asked EIC tor ranges at 30 second :'nrer:vals. One DOD asked Cle to' give him rauges as fasras they could be given although be was out-

Ilde and not inside his required range.

ODD's seem to torgetthtu station keeping is one of the minor functio'ns of cre and when asked 1.0 perform as de;:tribC'd above, the ship is completely devoid ofaol' surface search whatsoever, An OOD' who is thoroughly [ami liar wi L11 the acceleration and de. celera ticn chaT;tcterisu<:;s of his Ship should, not require ranges more Qften Lhanevery three minutes i-o the opinion of this 'oIlirer.

"The OOD's have a l~ im:h RPl'[ siaeron keeping purpO,-e5. -and should, be able to judge the range

Iatrlvaecurately with practice. A sirnpie and easy method {or judging the range ill to mark the guide all. ehe fa,ce o[ the scope Wilh grease pencil when he is at the correct range,"

Use the 'FD Net

USS WHITE PLA.lNS (eJlE): "There 'I'3S little intercha nge of infQonatiOIl between ClC's of units ill the formatlou, lndleetlng II lack of liaison and mutual undersl.andingQf the problems at hand.

"T \9.0 rada rs are de fi nit ely better than ·one radar, Reciprocal eonfirrnauon is essential from the time th~ bogies are picked up until they come TighL on in and are getting 'warm,' Estimates, 0'1' altitudes, f Dr example. become reliable app,roximatiQns witb 81<. only wilen there is adequate exchange oE in Eollfllalion.

"Among GIG's eE rransporL CVE~s, hackgrQunds of experience ef persounel n1ay vary ['.1£1 i cally , It is highly ltnportaru to' hold a preliminary 000- terence to' establish a basls of rnu mal understandiug and to capitalize en the offerings ol the most experienced indlviduals available. in the business at lmnd."

Name the Pfc~et

us NORTH Cl1RO£INA(B.B) (OhiIlUwa): "The practice of screen commanders of giving frequent '!etta: W GIle 'Tas!;: Croup of the order of desu~~eu in the screen' has been of considerable help to etc. This informa· lion is needed especially when screening units leave ,0'1' rejein the- formarion, in whichcases heavy ships may nor be sure ot the identity 01 destroyers, er their assigned stations in rhe SCI'C,e.n without overburdeuing communication facilities .~o obtain needed Informauen. The identity of prcker.>' is equaITy important. and ::11e practtce e~ Task Group commanders .of annouucing [he identity Qf Iherr pi,ckets so lhatall





Ships in the r- <15'1:: Eerce may have l!iis inflllonatioll has been af help."

WQ~e Up .the ODD

USS DE HAJ1EN (DD) (Kyu.shu ~1rea): "CIC performance was excellent throughout the operadcn. It SCCJnli tha lLheca pa hili ties ,of eIe In keeping the Commanding Officer alld/oJ' the Officer-ol-the-Deck InIormed. are aJm.Qst unlimited, and on each, operation our technique improves. The principal ebjectiQn to GIG .is that it is developing a teno:ene}, among young Officers-of-the-Deck to reiy tQQ heavily on CIC tokeep them Informed, with the result that they are DOL developing and using the facilities provided [hem by nature. The seaman's eye is fast entering the category Qf a museem piece. The acute sense of hearing, common in Officersof-the-Deck of a few years back, bas been dulled by the constant din 01 Ole voi ce drcu in, He h es italcs to' raise his. voice to give orders for fear he may mills acourse or speed change orsome other imponan[ ioEQf(llaliQI1 coming in 00 onecf the multitudinous velce circuits. He mecharucaJly changes [he ship"s course or speed when an order CQ!lU~S over the TBS circuit or by Hag heist, and, thinks he has done all he is supposed to' do. On sevet-aloccaslorrs the Commandlng Officer bas had to take the conn frolD theOmcer-of· the-Deck [0 avert collisions er dangerous situations, simply because the Officcr·of·the-Deck either failed to look where he w-as ,going 01: didn't see an}'tillng where be was IOQking. In other words, the areekther loojng or are not developing the- ability 1:0 recognize a dangereue sitna~oJ1. Before long we m,ay6nd ourselves wilh~lIese same officer,s fl'eeted up to eornmands, Unless some means is d~vered ~Q develop their naturaT enses 0'( sight and lJear:ing-. we 'lire apl to find ourselves w!lttorned wiLh a ve"ycial\geroHs predicament,"



}1 >C

(jl C !J"I --i

Mutual Support Recommended

USS lJUSFl (DD) (Okinawa): "The B SH was proud [0 be selected for duty as a radar picket in the Okinawa area. She felt as if she bad one of the most important pos ts in the lin l line of defense, All bands steeled with previous experience in the Philippines relished their assignment regardless of the perils associated with such duty.

"Experience in this and previous actions lead to the following comments and condustons:

A. Radar pickets have been an unqualified uccess in earl). radar reporting. fighter directlon at extended dis-

ranee from objective, shooting down enemy planes, breaking IIp enemy raids with gunfire.

J:S. Japanese aircraft attack pickets for one or more oE the following reasons:

I-To eliminate interference and early warning supplied by the picket.

2-Decau e the picket offers the easiest target or at least the most a cessible largel.

S-Ollt: bit ona ·destroyer lype vessel will erve in most cases to put the ship our of action at least temporarily.

"Radar picket duty will continue [0 be hazardous. Belter protection of pickets might be gained by the employment of rwo or more desrroyers in dose circular formation for mutual support and/or assigning a separate CAP Ior the sole purpose of defending each ship (or group if more than one). It is realized that the limited number o[ ships and aircraft available would make this setup a dHlicult one LO matmala when radar coverage must be (uroishe{i on a large periphery:'




Editor's ::-lote: ALter a rather severe raid on the Pickets in April at Okinawa, a Pi~ket GAP was assigned and two DD' were placed in 'everal Stations instead of one. ee "OKTNAWA" article in this is ue.

tire. The Oscar was boxed in between HORN'ET 1!2 and other CAP, A kill was obtained by the combined efforts of these VF.

"In the two above cases an interception by visual lighter direction was not effected urnil after the diving planes had inflicted their intended damage, This is the first wod:: in visual fighter direction inaction against the enemy ever attempted by this sbip, It is believed [hat visual fighter direction will prove effective against attacks tha t develop undetected by radar and will be more effeotive in

• mall formations than in large:'


Stopping Bull Sessions

CamPhibGrp 5: "During the first week of March circuit discipline viola[ions on 34.8 became flagrant. . nknown' stations began breaking into the circuit tn we late afternoons and conrtnued to bold music and 'bull' sessions; characterized by foul language and .hecklmg, until approximately o6ooK. Security violations oceu "ring dun ng these periods were impossible to cover up by duplicating volume or nature of the traffic. T problem offered two solutions:

I-Apprehension of offenders 2-Posit,ive steps to stop the offenses The Iarter promised quicker results and \Va ably handled by the Admlnistrauve 01' who issued orders requiring Officer su pervision of all voice

Visual Fighter Direction Gets Resu:t;:

us TAU TO (DD) (Ohillalllll): "At 0110, 19 March 1945 a Judy was observed diving at an angle o·p 50° on the W'ASP. This judy dropped one, PO,S· sibly two bomb. The Judy retired on course 170. (R) to Task Group 58,1. One division of CAP under control or visual fighter director in this ship was vectored to a successful Inrcrcepuon, and a kill by tllis CAP was effected.

"At 16.60, March 18,

HORIV,ET 22 under visual lighter director control In thi ship was vectored toward an Oscar rhat bad dived on this Task Group and was artempling to re-

transmisslons, and establishing a boat patrol with 3 hoarding officer to insure compliance. vtolauons immediately decreased to zero, and occurred onl y sporadically thereafter,"

Use VfsuJJIs

D S J'ORTLAND (CA) (O/l.inawa):

"Visual channels, where applicable. are satisfactory, and this vessel cleared much traffic by flag hoist. semaphore and Bashing light by day and by NAN at night. Many other

hips appear, however, to have a high coefficient of visual reluctance and to prefer to handle all traffic, including rrivial, over the voice radio clrcults.

"NA There were too many

'1 ancy Hanks' on TB. The nalfhourly 'J aney awake' periods should normally suffice for establishment of communications. ill a minority numbel' of cases where TB call up Is necessary. it should be 'Nancy Hanks, Ollt' rather than' . . . Over:"

Message Center Advocated

U ADi'lM (DM) (Okinawa): "The number ot voice circuits now required o be guarded during a large scale peration is becoming [00 much Eor lC. There is a dangerou tendency

growing which if not checked will cause the corumunication phase to overshadow the actual combat [unctions of the Combat Information Center, LO the serieu detriment of the fighling effidency of the Ship. A study. a I read j,] S ti tured j n this di vision, should be made in all types of hips to determine whether- some son oE voice communication center adjacent to but removed [rom CIG, is not desirable. The 1'Ioise level is too great if speakers are used, and space and personnel are lacking i( earphones arc to be used exclusively.

"T nave Iistened at anchor [or hours to tile TB circuit when two thirds of the time the circuit was blocked by 'Say again your lasr jransmisstan,' or 'Repeat more slowly so that I can write.' Most of the time the original transmission came ill 'Jive by live' and was 1I0e too fast. This condition Indicates th e need for more voice cirelli [ talker training. The operators do know the procedures and the phraseology. but it is apparent that they know little or nothing about the sub-

t matter of the COil versaticns, It i elteved tha liE an tnrensive week's


instruction period were held for these opera! 1"$ during which general education, in the SUbject matter expected to be most frequently di ell ed on a circuit, were stressed ra ther than pure procedure, the results would more than pay (or lhe effort."


FD Radar Carries Double lOlld USS PORTERFIELD (DD) (Oki. nawa): "Radar Eire Control Methods:

umerous night air raids were encountered and, 'although no planes were observed to be destroyed as a result of night l\.A lire by the main battery, in every instance the attacking plane, once taken under fire in full radar control. turned away crom the Iormarlon, obviously giving up the-attack.

"Because of an early casualty to the Sugar Charlie radar. (knock(}d oli by japanese airplane) the Fox Dog radar W!\S employed both as a search and tire control radar during .reperted contacis, Con equemly, the requirements placed on this gear, because of its added responsibility, more wan doubled its we throughout the 1V11Oie operation. On several occasions we commenced lraaking a plane beyond visible range in full radar control and later took this plane under fire in optical ceutrol when it was determined Lo be enemy,"

Radar Fixes During Shore


USS i EW JERSEY (IJB) (BombaTdmerit of Oltinawa): "The after main battery director was trained on a navigational point, the northern tip of KUTAKA SHlMA, and kept there throughout the bombardment. Radar ranges and bearings from this director were fed continuously to ClC through the range-keeper in Plot Aft and the ship's positi.on was kept continually plotted [Tom thi information. Once a minute the ship's position \\'35 advanced thirty seconds from lhe last fix and a bearing and range to the desired target area laid off on th.e bomoardment Chart In ClC. This advanced range=and bearing was fed into Plo; Forward, and a 'mark' signal was given 00 the expiration of go econd. Whell a hilt of targets wa

ordci;'ed, the new bearing aud range

"'<15 (eel i 11 to Plot Forward and the solution starred on the new target area.

"The radar in Main Batter)" Director I was used to cheek the ta rget r.tIlge given I~)' eIe when the target Ja along the more line.

"The other :radars on the ship were employed in their usual manner, the [orward G keeping a check all ships in own group and the after G giving ranges and bearings for a eontinuou plot on the firing groups and the minesweepers. "


Invaluable in Aleutians

"A Ventura bomber. while on a mission over ihe Kuriles, wa hj( by a burst of and-aircraft fire which threw the p Iane 0 ver on. its back a ud destroyed the radar, compass, and other Instruments. The Loran gear was lill in operating condition, however, and by honting on an LOP [rom rate 0, the plane was able to reach its home ba e.

"Patrol rmssicns made by Navy Cata linas u se Loran extensively, Navigators sa y thar it is espedalLy useful in providing accurate wind data. III the complex weather conditions which exist in this region, winds of mallY directions and velocitie are apt to be encountered in the course of a sixhour patrol ftighL. Loran gives drilt data free from the Inaccuracies resulting from drift sightll taken on the ocean's surface.

"A vessel performlng guard-ship duty held stauon wit.h Loran through a two-week period of adverse weather.

hough the ship was outside the ground wave range of rates 1 and 2, satisfactory readings were secured 24 hOUI a day by using the day time sky waves which persist in this area during most seasons.

"Officers attached to the task force which makes frequent raids on the Kuriles state that LOHII1 pia an importa III part in the saustactory completion of these attacks. The thick weather which provides a protective cover or the ships renders ordlnary means of navigation impossible. The gear is held in uch high esteem that every effort Is being made by the command to have all officers Loran trained who stand a bridge or CIG watch."

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Japs Turn Away

U S IOWA (DB) (Okinawa): "Jamming. own and enemy; 10'" jammed on 159 mrs from 0045 to 0 I 02, 0140 to 0150 and 0220 to 0248 in accordance with Plan Baker. The first jamming period was directed against Raid I at 13 miles. This raid dropped window right after the jamming started and was opening Irern formation when hot down. The second jamming period was directed again t Raid 5 at

8 miles. Raid 5 promptly dropped window and opened from a distance of eight miles to len mil ,came in to seven miles and then turned away as the IOWA opened fire and continued to open until 10 l. The third jammuur period was directed again t Raid a ,I[ 22 miles .. Raid 8 appeared 10 ol'hi 1 briefly when jammlng began, wen closed to 6 miles belore turning away. Raid 8 then continued to open,

"IOWA jammed at 159 IDes from 0155 10 0202, and 02~O to 0226 in accordance with Plan Baker. There seemed to be )10 effect caused by the jamming on the bogey's actions. AI no Lime was jamming noticed [rom the enemy.


::::J <.D ::::J -c





"Deceplion own and enemy: None b . own Iorces, Window was dropped by enemy planes. Tt was noticed that on two ecca ions window was dropped immediately after jamming was

rarted by T 5 -4 • gainsr bandits at hort range, who thereupon started to open. In both cases a [light fighter was in clo e proximity to [11e bandit at the time the bandit dropped window. 0.1) J' May, however, window was dropped twice Wllile the VF (N) was I'ery close to the bogey before jamming was started, but wa not dropped while jamming WlIS goiug on.

wire parachutes were sighted, and in one case a black boo was reported hanging from the chute. This chute, or more probably its box, ga\'e a radar echo,"

Jap WIndow Confuses MK 4

US NORTH CAROLINA (BD) (0 ItirIQWa): "AL 1945. 14 April, window wa dropped from bogey at 030 16 miles. Large quantities of window were used du"ring entire raid and K-2

cope was not clear of window until ugB. Durin his attack. window was observed LO be quite eftectfve against Mk 4 radar. This is the first instance during thi operation U1 which window appeared LO be uccessful against our anti-aircraft fire control. Distinguishing plane targets O!l range cope or Mk 4 was not tOO difficult, bur training by radar became impossible for short intervals of time be. cause of the large quantity oE window; two Largets were observed on Mk, e! which could not be distingui hed from aircraft by cbservation 011 range scope, Alter being cracked these were found [0 have very low (practically zero) peed. These are believed to have been radar decoys or kites dropped by enemy planes."


No Raids Escape Detection USS RICHARD W. SUESENS (DE) (Okinawa): "Combat gave sueh excellent and accurate in[ormation HUl! at no time during the operation when under attack

by enern aircraft. did an' plane eve]' attack this vessel by surprise.

"Emplo -ment and performance of radars,

a Tracking-Excellent.

b Air and surface search-On most occasions targets lost bJ air search ndar due to low altitude were picked up b)' urfaee search radar (L). On some ceca ions planes were picked lip on the urface earch .radar and tracked in time to give ample warning to ship and gun COIllI"OI.

.. ir and u rface earch radars were used in fire con 11'01 to accurately give relative bearings to the guns and to Indicate when La open fire. In this respect the ship was alwa maneuvered in time to bring the maximum number of gUllS Lo bear :1[ the time of opening lire and combat alwaj tracked any ether enemy planes In vicinity and ga\fC early warning of their presence."

These Methods Produced

Effectjue Fire

uss j\,IA1VLOVE (DE) (Oki1IalQa):

"The information furnished by CTC during all these actions was invalu-

\ able. Jt wa fo,md that the L Radar W;IS excellent for picklng up 10\\1 f1yill aircraft and ir proved superior to rh

Radar for this type of target. II was Iound the A Racial' worked. best when on the IS'mile scale, as it was then po sihle to follow aircraft over

- and ad]a ern LO land masses. In the case of the raid on the 6th oE April, IFF was noted Irom tile bogie (rom a range of ,8 to 9 miles and caused some confusion, The Mark 51 director equipped with Mark L4 sight for ton· 11"01 of the main bauery does not have sufficient range, and is u eless ror planes beyond 3600 yards. It was found that once enemy planes begin their dive, telescope control of all gil ns is preferable. In spite of constant drills. [he Iiglu AA battery opened up at 1O0 great a range during our .Ii"'l engagement on the 5Lh. The lessons learned were put LO good u e so that during the attack on tbe IHh, the eo millimeters opened up at such a range a to have from three to six rounds I (t in each gun when the atlack was over."

Radar NauigQtion and Firing at Okinawa

USS BILOXl \CL) (Okil,awliI): "T operaeion as none before demanded

CIC mo l all of its many po ibilities lUldcapabilities. Orten at night, ill' direct bombardment, approaching

emy air 'raids, and navigation in n e smoke and cl e ormadoas were heing handled simultaneously. This demanded me cooperation and coordination oE all hands involved and the rapid dissemination of information [rom IC to the various control statlcns involved,

"Because of the land locked conditions around Okinawa, the K radar was often 'clear' when unidenrlfied planes five and ten miles from. tbe

hip were being reponed by picket Ships. This land locked condition \ as I'cry anna ing, although when planes were picked np on lear bearings it was USH all y pOS15 i b Ie to crack them over land and warch them disappear Ileal' the area of enemy airfields. Side lobes from the land lind gre:lt quantilie:> ol window dropped by enemy raids also hs d to be corueuded with. By keeping the gain turned down slight! y and by careful analysts o( the tl1rget and Ics track, the performance and results of SK eareh were ... reaUy improved,

"Althrm .. h the ship's posirlon was near land and among other ships on mosr of the occasions, the fire control radars (Mk. 4) were generally uccessa in picking up and staying 011 their tirgets all the I~ay in. lIC$ides surface

and land targets to contend with, nearly every enemy raid dropped considerable window, but very seldom did these interfere with. the fire control problems.

"he Mk. 8 radars and when practicable the Iorward SG were used for setting up we indirect shore bombardment problem. From a chart drawn to the scale of 1000 yards to the inch, the Mk 8 radars were coached on prominent land marks which had been selected in advance and studied by the DR plotter and the radar operaLOr . 'Vben on their targe IS , a mark was given, radar ranges and bearings were sent iu and plotted, thus fixing the ship's po ition, This enabled the plotter to establish a range and bearing to any bombardment Largel which were lhen sent to the ploulng rooms,

"The Mk. 8 radars were most useful and accurate in keeping II continuous track of the Ship. The operators could easily identify the target on which they trained and could aid the plouer by informing him just where and how the best signal was coming in. Once on a definite land mark, the ship could maneuver quire radically and opcn to long range without affecling UlC reliability ot Mk. 8 radar fixes which always checked closely wirh visual fixes,

"The SG W\1S used for: ooachlng the

Mk. radars on their t.ugets. Its

ranges were al 0 for checking On do e and prominent Jand marks although bearing determination wa sometimes radical.

"This operation was One in which the hip did [lot know from hour [0 hour what, pan of the island it would bombard next, Beforehand, the Navigator and CIC bad commonly named all prominent points or laud, Islands, tan ents, etc .. which could beused in navlgatiug In and around the islands, The SG and l\fk. 8 radar opera to! studied the charts and learned these names so that at an' time the operators could give the navigator a fairly accurate fix. !\ [ night and while firing a cheduled bombardment. the navigator bad his choice of G fixes, or could 1I e the sallie Mk 8 radar fixes u ed for shore bombardment."


fuer!lthing but the Kitchen Stoue

ass lJJ1DLEY (DD) (Ol.inawa), report of Fig/Iter Director: "This action la ted from about 0750 until abour 0915 ar which time all enemy planes were sbot down, and both bD's ot R.I'. No. 15 were out of action.

"Action began when high C P intercepted, and shot down one Frances. At the same time two float type planes were sighted by ship's Iookouts and low AP. One Paul was shoe down by hip' five-inch battery. 0 further

reports on the other, presumably shot down in the melee. Both pontoons of lll- plaLle exploded when it hit the water: presumably it was peeiall: pre· pared as a suicide plane, Wilh POlltoons £:Iled wirb, explosi ve, and eq ui p' ped with contact detonators. This plane splashed goo yards 011 the starboard beam. while making a "e:t")' low Tun on the hip.

"About 0 00 this Ship picked 11 P a large bogey. 345 degrees. HI<) mile from Poi ur Dole. Vioeroy I I and J 3 a [ Angels 15 over Pt. Uncle were vectored OUt or an intercept all a Ingle flight. Raid plit at 30 miles from ship and CAP was split to intercept each Ilalf. Viceroy 13 l'lIllyhoed six plan ", Viceroy II tall yhoed 30 planes, Viceroy 13 quickly disposed of his six and went to the aid oE Viceroy Il. Few, if any, of these planes escaped them, Raid 2, estimated 50 planes, Bew direct! over P.L. nde where P N MINT CAP of 8 planes engaged them. Heine I was a ked LO send help


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and hili planes, orbiting PI. Tare, were directed to proceed LO PI. ncle and join the fray. No ve Lars were nece - sary. Raid 11 also appeared at this time and was 00 a course to pass to westward. Information wa passed to LOWI ill R. P. Station !6 and he was asked 10 intercept it, which be did. His 4-plane GAP tallyhoed 20 enemy planes 311d effectively dispo ed of them.

1 the helgbt of ihe combat. Raid 4. and 5 appeared. Raid 5 flew directly into the melee [0 the northeast ol us and wa engaged. ) was impossible to-vector any planes 10 meet it as none were left unengaged. At this time Viceroy 11"1 reponed he IVa OUl of ammunirion but be was Laying on to do what he could. He shortly reported forcing one Betry into the water and set the pace for all planes to standby.

everal more planes were also forced down in lhis manner b pilots unknown. Raid 4 came in at the same Lime. passed by the melee intact and when 10 miles north of the ships, fanned om, circled LL\e Iormarion and auacked (rom all sides. This raid was opposed by Ruby 15 (two·plane R, P, patrol) only. Some enem planes were ihot down and a coordinated attack wa, partly brok,en up, bu t the majority of these' planes got through to the ships and were rna lly destroyed by AA gunfire . .BOUl Ruby 15 planes bega n picki ng aft stragglers at the beginnlng of the action, then opposed Raid 4, estimated so 10 30. When enemy planes closed, these two planes came in with them. aile very outsranding [eat by one of these two planes (believed to be Ruby 15-1, bUI not verified) was that ihough out of ammunition, he twice forced a suicide pla ne OUl of his dive On the shi p, and the third Lime forced him 'UlO _ ucb " poor posirlon that the plane crashed through the !'igging but missed the snip, going into the water close aboard, his W;1S done while all guns on the ship were firing at the enemy plane, The highest award [or flying skill and cool courage is ncr too much for this pilot. Hi wingman also SL3},ed at masthead heighL in the



flak and a 'isted in driving planes away from the ship. At the lime the ship was bh below the waterline, power failed, our VHF radios were alread Inoperarive [rom antennas

arried away by a diving plane, and all eommunlcation were 10 l except on SCR '610,. battery opera led emergency set 011 84.S. M.C. However. only three bo~eys were left airborne and the' were all being harassed by the original CAT', now ou t of ammunition II ncl low 011 fuel. It ~ believed these last planes were splashed by reinforcements corning from Bolo under 00- trol of Ringlail Base, NOlle escaped to return to Japan.

.. ne Frances shot down 0 er Pt.

Uncle" hy iceroy I! was quite po ibl}' the co-ordinator as he was .20. miles ahead of the main group' of planes and atone, These seemed to' be an as ortment of all types oE planes, illeluding many torpedo planes which

"From the beginning to the end, the HADLEY "'a~ under attack by p1311($ attempting suicide dives on it, he ship was, maneuvered so thllt 'maximum battery lire was always presented. At one time tills ship bad seven eliferent air ta ... gets under lire simultaneously. Enemy planes were raken under lire many rimes without harm 1 rrendl planes wonking on the ('111'111)' aircra t."


Where to Hit the BaRa's

uss SI1N JACINTO (CVL): "Baka 80!Llb: Mother planes for Baka bomb should be ea y prey "for VF and suggests that a basic defense measure is ~o launch at a distance of 150

IVC.!'e a II splashed before ~he)' launched torpedoes, Air traffic on the ftghter net was lOO heavy to keep track 01 splashes. Before fighuIl!:" became general, the CAP harl splashed 15 planes, hip's gunfire had splashed II for HADLEY, 4 for One . mall cran, others unreported. After [he big melee began no further attempt was made be· cause all nets were already overcrowded with tactical traffic alone. No raids attacked (he hips unopposed, and except [or raid 4, stragglers from the melee were the onl. ones who were a ble to elo e the ship .

miles [rom the target and 110 nearer than 90 miles lrom land masses. enemy operating positions or enemy radar jamming positions. It is pointed out lhal maintaining these distances give the FDa a better chance for a sueCCS5fuJ intercept and that if We mrercep L m isses, there is s till lime to rna k e a second attempt. In addition (be task, group or Iorce is given ample warning and has Lime LO form the proper disposition and Iorrnation, to clear the inner screen of ftie",dl)' ail'crn[L and put ships and batteries in j"roper condluon 10 repel the incoming attack,"

COTCPac builds CI C teams

bound, Ten weeks is not a long time in which to master the intricacies of current eIG operations, to learn, as a unit, how to 'utilize the jtmgle of electronic gear, plots, and status boards and to provide the instant, u,p-to-the-minuteinformaliofJ which command. needs to fight and maneuver the ship. Yet it does get done. II is the job of CO TCPac-CommandeT 01Jerational Training Command-to see the; it does.

COTCPac is, so to speak, coach and playermanager for CIG personnel of ships readying on the west coast. IIJlith facilities extending from Bremerton in the nortli to an Diego in the south, its activities include GVE, DD, and small boat training units, rejresher courses for ships in for battle repairs or ouerhaul, (,l, GIG Indoctrination

Building a Cl C team is something like building a big-league ball club, It takes foxy, expe'rienced oldsters, promising rookies, hours at spring pmctice, and Q, series of exhibition games to iron out wrinkles and build confuience in a ball club, It takes the same combination to weld a Cl C team into a mooth, fighting unit.


Take for e ample) the Cl C team of a west coast destroyer. Tflithin ten 'weeks Of her commissioning she is usually due to shove off for a f01'wa1'd area. That means ten weeks ill outfit, take on supp_lies, shake-down, and build a te~m: If the team _ to be a winner, that team-unthin-a-team, the GIC must 'also be whipped into shape and p'ennant

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..a ~

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School tOT PCO's and PXO's, training in RCM, AEWJ and practically every other phase of CIG operalio~s. l!0lV COTCPac does the job is a story of coordination. and learn work in its OlVn right, of unremitting effo1·t to build CIC winners. Take, tor example, a DD team assembling on the coast.

The DO Team

When "Jaygee" Jone and n ign Smith finished their GIG ourse at St. Simon, their orders read:

"P:oc.eed and report . .. SS HARKER (DD)" building at Bethlehem, San Pedro. With the characteristic buoyancy of well-trained specialists, Jones and mith have no doubts about their own ability to handle their jobs. Theil" training has taught them, however, that they are not only GIG officers but player-managers of a CIG team of some three officers and perhaps 20 men. What kind of players will they find to make up their club?


.. pike" Kelly, Radarman First, in the meantime, I~as just finished ,30 days' leave ill Brooklyn, Nr slgn~~ to the DD Pool at the Precommissioning Training Center, he 1 awaiting orders for new con truction in which, as a combat veteran, his experience will be needed and felt.

Here he falls in ~ it.h "johnn " Johnson who ha ju t come up from Point Lorna where he has spen Ii e weeks at Radar Operators' chool. Chosen for ndar through classification te t which show bigh





• •

• •

marks in intelligence, adaptability, and other factor , John on is fresh from boot camp.

Johnson and Kelly. with three rated men who have s.een action in. the Marianas and Leyte Gulf. andeight others direct from Pt. Lama make up the HARKER's enlisted team.

As senior P.O. Kelly begins the process of edu eating Johnson in the needs of teamwork.

"I don't know how we're going to make out with all you boots" he tell Johnny. "Now on the old AB ER READ we really had a team=tozether 16

. 0

months we knew each other like a book and any-

one of us could do any other guy's job." But Kelly is not really worried. He knows that soon "Jay~ee" Jones and Ensign Smith and the enlisted per-

anne I will be working together as if they had

flare bomQurd.ment and interception problem in DD crc at Treosur« Island,

grown up on the arne andlot. To get them arted is COT Pac' job.


The eIe team together with the rest of the ship's company for a new DD gather atPrecommissioning Training Genter 011 Treasure Island. For three weeks their training is more or le on an individual basis within the team topping off with post-graduate training in the basic work of radar and CIG operations, organization and individual dutie > air, urfaee and summary plotting, relative mo ernent, telephone talker drill and procedure. and a pre iew oE the team training that lies ahead .

The curriculum is flexible and shaped around the needs of each team within the general framework at the training program. Here-a at all schools of Commander. Fleet Operational Training Command, Pacific-the emphasi is on the

. ~.

"doing" of specialties and the final poli hinz of individual and team kills.

All three weeks of this training the members are beginning to act a a team-and fleet experienced members like Spike begin to admit that the "boots" are shaping up and the new officers ate okeh,


After three week at Operati nal rauung

School the team mo es into the CIG raining hip for what i for many their first "sea dut ." he boots get a chance to get salty, and om 0 the older hands bezin to make cracks about "Yacht Club Boys," for the ship is the sleek pleasure yacht USB P ALOlvIAS. n aristocrat hom her bowspri.t to her flagstaff, the PALO !lAS was formerly the SS GOO WILL-with Indian teak decks, walnut paneling, and exp nsive :fittings throughout. Her sails are still furled to her graceful pars to be broken out in an erner eney.

a The P LOMAS operates in an rands a and ~an Pablo Bays where many radar targets, numer-

ous na igational aids and, even more important from the training eandpoiut, numerou navigational hazard abound.

The PALOMAS belies her Ianc dress, board

is the exact and faithful reproduction f the 2200 ton destroyer I including the G-l surface search Tildar, an SC-2 ail' search radar, and all of the associated equipment for a de trover erG.


tuall the primar mission of the training on. the PALOM i the nriuued development of the attitude of team re P Q il ility. Thi is ac omplished b imm diatel making the team Ie pon-

Ible for the afety of the ship. Ship' ompany or the. P OM . tand by to keep th rrainees from endangering the ship. Otherwise, the PALOMAS belongs to the team. One of the team's officers has the" ON " another acts as evaluator feeding in all the information from ··COMB. .. n clear days the onning officer is stationed in a canvas enclo ure to approximate low vi ibili conditions,

he trainee na igating de PALOMA in the

. . ... .' ...

. . .

bay area with its congested traffic and prevailing fa n gain con6.den e in their ability as a team.

L111 officer 0/ a DD CIC telL"_ (01I1lS tire S PALOMAS. He.

h(ls mmilo 1lIe. /I TI F (Ifill II $m(ll( chart tnbt«. OlilllTfJ}isl: be is I:lllin:ly de.pemitml IlPOI1 iii OlVn Cle team in the CIC spac« below. 11() 'l"cmaim in the canvas sheller 10 rillllllllle conditiolls a/1m» Ilisibiiily.


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This procedure throws a much heavier burden on the team than would normally be met in the first days of operation afloat and requires constant coaching and supervision by the radar and CIC instructors of the PALOMAS, but the sudden assumption of responsibility has produced marked results in intensifying the value of the PALOMAS training for the team.

In addition to exercising in the routine functions of radar piloting, the team conduct simulated low vi ibility torpedo attacks and shore bombardments, Using portable voice radio, they also direct boat targets from point to point. Although the hilly terrain of the bay area precludes any actual direction of fighters, the team carries out drills with the air search radar, taking full advantage of the continuous flights of planes taking off and landing on the air base at ALameda and at Pan American. The trainees pick up these contacts, alert lookout and gun control, and in general carry on as if the plane contacts were low level J ap plane attacks.

By the time the m thical DD team of SS HARKER steps down the gangway of USS PALOMAS, they are no longer uncoordinated jndividuals"Jay~ee Jones", PO. Kelly and eaman Jobnon-but an integrated group funcrioning as a urut,


Mter one week aboard the PALOMAS, teams head for "The Rock."

"The Rock" is the sobriquet for San lemente Island, a wasteland of burnt volcanic IOcR. about 65 miles we t of San Diego in the Pacific and about 20 miles from Santa. Catalina I land. wenry-three mile long, 7 miles wide, the island i criss-eros ed with deep canyons, and jut up in pots to some 1 940 feet above the water.

The southern two-thirds of the island is used for hare bombardments




~ Tht: ui.ruol FDO station on SCt1l Clemen Ie Island has an Utlobstructed view of (he sea area around the l".slana ,md is at an elevation of about 1000 feet. The r1i.sual FDO's of ship. goi11g into commission coriduct maol)' uisua! interceptions.

"Airstrip on "The lI..ock/' home of the GIG Team Training Center.

~ •••• _ •••••••• f ••••••• ~t-"'.' ••• >-

• • • ... .. • I ~ t • .. .. ,.. II .. • , • • •

by vessels undergoing shakedown and refresher training on the '" est Coast. At tbe northern nd is an airfield, and in the main hangar adjacent to this airfield i COTCPac's Team raininz Center.

The team' first da at San Clemente is d voted to checking out on radar equipment, polishing up radio telephone and fishrer director pr cedur , and getting et for the CIG TC' pedal training phase=Fighter Direction.

Six hours a day six days a week thereafter, the team devotes itself to actual fighter direction and intercept problems. atalinas furnished by V}12 based at Terminal Island, San Pedro, California, are the bogies and peed FM's Iurni hed b the

arne squadron act as interceptors. tiler h urs

of the working day are devoted to lectur • films and the stud of curren Fleet doctrine.

An important a peel of the team training is visual interception. The visual Interceps station at San Clemente i located atop the main hangar affording an all-around view to seaward {TOm its perch nearly 1000 feet above the surrounding Pacific, The station is equipped with sound pow· ered outlet. remote controls for b th VHF and HF voice chann I , and a portable plotting table.

aily opportunities are taken to xerci e the

isual FD and hi assistants who must learn, tOO, to work as a unit, The judging or distance, com' e and heights i Ear from easy, but con rant pracri e with aircraft produces efficient v-isual direction uf fighters on an Clemente.


in all ,OT Pac chools, very advantage is taken f rher nearbv training a ti itie to ~h'e and take en i zes for the benefit of both trainiuz endeavor. The pecial Projects 8cl1001fo1' Air

(Airborne R 1\1 hool) is Iocared at San Clemente. The CIC Team Training Center pro\'ides radar tarzers for the airborne RCT\[ activit)' and the SPSA in turn uses all the tricks in the bag to jam the radars and confuse the operators' at the CIC Team raining enter. In addition every attempt is made by the SPSA plane to make approaches on the i land through radar blind spot

.lind through their own artificial) rea ted inter-


To supplement the anti-jamming ter ises,

members of the GIC team are given instruction, in the use of shipborne radar countermeasures equipment. Durins his training at San Clemente. each team member rands watche and exercise in loz-k eping on radar intercept eq uipment.


be e tablisbrnent oE the irbome Early V arning Training Unit on 15 • p61 '945. at an Clemente introdnced a new and highly important technique in the eIC training under COTCPac.

wo surface display equipments have been installed in the mo kups and the" uppies" operate each day. The CIC team learns to co rdinate this source 0 information with its other information to produce the final evaluated picture for Conn.


<In Clemente is an isolated spot. The bright lights of .. hore side" which might eli tract from intensive rraininz efforts are missing. This serves as a valuable aid in molding ream spirit. forrhe isolation draws til team. together. be whole program during the ta at San Clemente i an, emphasi on "teamwork." Nearl an evening during III I ng twilighL periods. the CI team in ~ tual Iact become a "ball dub:' Groll games, 'with the team a ting og' LIl " alwa 1 are emphasized L keep group morale and phy ical ondition at LOp peak.


In a movie travelogue the narrator at this point would perhap intone: "So we sail awa in the

un et 1 aving behind us r1: e quaint i land of San Clem at .... " The t am a a matter of fact does actuall ail awa , n l as touri aboard a luxury line!' bur a a. team whi h i n w manning


o o > c


c VI -1

ttl of a de tro er of the arne clas as their

own hip,

The destro er au whi 11 th y take passao-e i C T Pac's destro 'er training hip. More than one hundred trainee are aboard, nearly all member of the destroyer crew of 'which Our CIe is a part. Engineers and gunners take their traiuins together with the Ol C team.

Rated as a most effective training period, the one week cr lise enabl officers and men for the fir t time to work together underway in a ship that handl and operate much a their own ship will.


San lernente and San. Francisco. Cl'C is required to put gun control on the right targets. Errors made and the reasons 1 ehind them are analyzed for the eIC team' benefit.

Air and Surface Target Indication: The numerous surface and air targets of the busy coastal area provide many opportunities Ear CIe to coach fire control radars au to targets. Incidentally, the operator of this gllllllery equipment are the same with whom the CIe team ~ ill man the new destroyer.

\> a ch Standing: The routine Cl.C watch standing of the training ship now falls on the shoulder of the new CIe team. he CIC officer gets a chance to organize, change and improve his condition watch organization before be boards his own ship.

Radar Ja igation: The team undergoes real

Shore Bombardment': imulated bombardment on shore targets are made during the run between.

• . ,


::> c.D ::> -c


Prospective Commandi"g Offi' cers and Executive OfficeTs tak« a grl,le/ling course ;71 all ClC oiJt!raliOllS-Qml like it.


tests of its ability to carry on radar navigation for its own ship. Coa tal fixes a~ord an. e. ~ellent opportunity to put into practlce the initial lesson learned on the PALOMAS.

RCM; The radar intercept equipment aboard the DD training ship is manned for interception and analysis of all coastal radars, T~e team .uses the radar jamming equipment to imulate .lamming these coastal radars.


o )c (j) c




'While the team has been undergoing thi intensive training. the star performers of GIe have also been getting pecial grooming. The Captain of the ship, who will use the CIC as l~is :rig~t ha~d and most know its abilities and Iimitadons 111 order to exploit it to the fullest, and th~ Executive Officer, who will act as evaluator during GQ. have been taking the PCO-PXO course at the GIe Indoctrination chool at eOT Pac Beadquatters

in San Diego, .

To the uninitiated it is something of a urpnse to enter the CIe mockups at this school. Captains and Commanders bend over plotting tables, wear sound powered phones, act as talkers, rada~ op~r. ators, plotters and assume other tasks ordinarily handled by seamen.




The mission of the Cl'C Indoctrination chool is to show commanding and execu ti e officer how a well organized and efficient Ie can make the fighting of a ship easier and better. The ar O'iven a well rounded indo trination our e in radar, fighter direction and other te hnique of GIG, They learn not only what a eIe can do but also what it cannot do. By their experience at ea h of the positions of the team, they learn what the Commanding Officer must contribute to Cl.C for its efficient functioning.

This one week's course packs in lectures, picked training film, "P" works every afternoon in the mockup. and winds up with ada' afloat train'ng aboard the IG training hlp the fa E-

EAD. I The eIG Indo trina ion Scho I' weekl cap a ity

is rw nt -four tudents; hut, at the height of the P A building program, as man as fort -eight student were trained in a week. The ehool's eurriculum i de igned Ior skippers and executive officers, but other selected officer are given the course within the capacity of the school.

In addition to' the course for the PCO's and PX 's the school conducts a three-day course to familiarize aval unfire iai on fficer with the role CI play during shore bombardment. Also dL1TIDo' morninz period three da a week, the mockup are regularly in 11 e for drilling the eIe teams of hip which are either shaking down or receiving refresher training under he Commander, San Diego Shakedown Group.

Tbe week is a busy one and even recently reo turned f ur- triper going to division or squadron command have exclaimed .f r ou're throwing the work at us." These senior offi as, however, depart "when the week is 0 er 'with elf-confidence which pring from close familiarit with the problem . nfronung eI ,

A Learning to we the N]I.[P-JI'PR [or radar 11(J.'IIigalion.

Summary plol ~



<rom its one week underway period on the DD training ship the DD erc team returns to the peTC to rejoin the balance of the ship's company. Other groups, which really are teams too,-gun crews, signal andradio gangs, lookouts. black gang, damage control parties-are assembled and the whole detail, together with the "star performer" commission their ship and make it ready for sea.


,Vhen the n w ship gets underway for an Diego and fi e weeks of intensive polishing Llp preparatory to it departure for the Forward Areas, the various teams are working as a part of one big team and as a unit. The Cl C and Gun Control teams have already worked together aboard the 1 D training ship; now all departments lUU t operate together to make an efficient fighting ship.

The shakedown starts in San Diego with an arrival inspection by the Staff of the an Diego

hakedown Group. TIlls is a major check-up on ship, and with regard to CIC, it cover Cf C arrangement, interior and exterior communications, administrative and battle organization and the general adequacy and functioning of the CIG.

The San Diego Shakedown Group has twelve

·ghly-trained groups of underway assistants, each group containing officer and enlisted instructors for CIC, gunnery, torpedo control, communications, engineering, and damage control. As the ship progTesses through the numerous shakedown exercises, these underway instructors a sist the ship to get off with a right start. The CIC underway instructor offers suggestions to improve the per· formance and efficiency of the tehm. Inasmuch as these instructors go aboard many ships, they have an excellent opportunity to pick up new ideas which have worked successfully in other CfCs, and to pass the e ideas on.

During hakedown, a destroyer CIe team gets a thorough workout. Not only does it carry out the exercis pecifically cheduled for its training, but it assumes its normal everyday functions of tracking targets, air and surface target indication, radar na \tigation and station keeping. Particular em phasis is placed on training the CIC team in liaison with Gunnery control of AA fire. One of the big problems of the shakedown cruise in CIe is the Condition ~Vatch. Here only part of the whole team is at work, ye it must function, in a limited

iJi..3Y. in the same fashion as the whole team. be Waked wn period unCOVCl-S team weaknes es and the underway instructors concentrate on orrecring

these weakne es in order to attain the tandards necessary for combat readines .

Another mis ion of the underv a y in tructor i to encourage and aid the ship in setting up its own CIC training program. They bring strikers up to rated skill, utilize "dull" periods for drill, and pro ide the impetus for continued alertness on the team's part. They also susze t ca ualty drills Ear u e b the ship to meet any emeraencv.


The final examination for the DD CfC team

(and the ship as a whole) comes at the end of the shakedown period during the "Battle Problem." The Battle Problem is conducted a determine whether the ship is ready 01' combat duty-and not as an excuse to "show somebody up," It gives a real opportunity to bring out weaknesses for correction through training during the hip's transit to the Forward Areas. The CIG team in particular receives a evere testing.

Battle problem scenarios have been carefully ~ orked out by combat e perienced officer for each type of ship. Scenarios include simulated, shore bombardments, surface and air engas·ements, and typical casualties. Voice communications are fed directly into the ship's radio by the officers conducting the problem and every effort at realism is made. PPI scope pictures for each minute, for example, are displayed to give the Evaluator and Conn the same chance to evaluate the situation direct from the PPI which they would normally have in action.

An important feature of the Battle Problem is the conference in the Wardroom afterwards, where the observers give their reports first hand and permit the sbip officers to enter into free discussion point by point.

Seldom does a hip leave the battle problem and shakedown cocksure and complacent. A realization that continuou training is nece ary to bring weak performance up to standard and bring standard performance up to excellent has been driven home.

one kipper recently said at the battle problem critique. "This is the most thorough working over I' e received in twenty-seven years in the J a vy. "


For eleven weeks, the DD CIC team has been given a first brush-up on their basic skills in radar and plotting, then a long period of working as a team. At the end of this period the DD CIC team ha taken j ts place with. the other team to form the fighting ship.

o :> c G> c trI -i


has trained fifty-one new con rru - team and although the rate of How

ha mewhat sub ide 1 i still pouring them out.

eam Ior ships of the COjVIME eE!IE T BA (C -105) ass are now being trained at a rate of about a new one every three or four, eeks, CVE team training is generally oneentrated in the San

iego rea because the lighter direction opportunities and facilities are greater there than anywhere el e on the W t Coast.


On a Friday evening a boat comes alongside the

D l\'IOOSEHEAD, TCPac's ClC training

hip in the an Diego Area, and some eighteen to

II. mfJmber of lhe CIG team of (I ner/,l eVE is operati'llg fill) SQ radnr nboard the U S COMME CEMENT BAY (GVE-J05), as 0 port of his afloat training.


twenty-six enli ted men clamber aboard, sea bas

and all ith a little wear and a few seamanlike

ur es, bags are stowed, bunks made up. hammock wLlng, and another C E CIC team starts training.

Bright and early the following morning the OOSE-HEAD gets underway and stands out of San Diego Harbor past Point Lorna. Then, as many a eVE radarrnan can testify, begins the helli'11 battle of "bogey" and bucket, "skunk" and 1 kness, "radar" and "rail." Normally after one

gruelling day of trying to learn how to stand up aboard hip and plot at the ame time, the n w motion takes on a ertain familiarity and trainin commences in earnest. he u ual dar consists of two one-hour lecture and drills in the classroom both morning and afternoon and a watch in three in CIC between times. The team receives primarj in truction in SC and C eries radar operarior IFF, surface, air and ummary plotting and telephone talkinz procedure. h ck outs are al a given in the peration of the DRT, VC, VF and R M equipment.

During the CI watche the team receives i first acq u.aintanceship with the problem of keepinz station, following zig-zag plans, maneuvering by TBS signal, plus the one hundred one other things expected of a eIC team. By constant snpervision and Insrruction by the training staff of the MOOSEHEAD, the team members learn how to ' handle their work on board hip in a wa no shore

a ti ity an hope a appro . mate by s nthetic training de j e .


t the conclusion of it ba ic tranung on the MOO EHEAD, the team is landed on San Clemente Island, where it i joined by the Officers of the t am, fresh from t. imons. 01 an Clemente, rh train ing of the C team i ery similar to the training aiven the DD team. The training in fighter direction duties, however, is longer an more int nsi e-a minimum of three weeks, and

hedulins will permit, often [our weeks.

COTGPuc has trained fifty-one flew construction eVE GIG teQms Q7ul i.I still turning them out.

The CVE officers ale given their first taste of _'esponsibility and are made to feel that the suc~ess at their team depends largely on how much tune ana effort they are willinz to put out.


From an Clemente the team goes north to Bremerton. Washington, where it embarks on the USS COMMENCE 1ENT B Y ( E-1OS), COTCPac's CVE training ship. Aboard the ship for two weeks, the CVE CIC team has the opportunity to join the balance of its own ship's company and a work. in a IC comparable to the one

n their own hip.

In its 01 eration in Puget Sound. the COl - M.E CE ,IE IT B. Y ives the CIC team problem in radar navigation, surface tracking, aircraft tracking 0 er land. air target indication, all of which are a neat counterbalance to the previous training on an lemente. Again emphasis is placed all. the £u~c~ions. of the ~unnery~iaison Officer in transrmtnng information affecting the can trol of AA lire.

drills and other skills given to all surface ships come under the cognizance of Commander, San Diego hakedown Group and the pecialized work of air operation is under the upervision of the Commander. Fleet Air, 'Vest Co t.

training for large auxiliaries

The training of CI teams for large auxiliaries, a major task between June and December, 1944, is 110W nearly completed as the building program draws to a close. eIC teams for large auxiliaries receive three week's basic training where their ship's company is forming (either S.C.T.C., San Pedro, or P.C.T.C., an Franci co). hi i EolIot ed haw ek' afloat training in an auxiliary training hip and then by a tw -t eeks' hakedown period in San Diego.

smell craft-training

II small craft training is concentrated in the San Pedro rea. Preliminary and basic CIC training is given the teams by the Small Craft Training Center, which concentrates on the problems peculiar 0 mall hips. strong effort i made 1;0 inculcate the idea of team endeavor and coordination within the limitations of the GIC equipment and per nnel of mall craf .



The C E team,1ik.e the DD team, receives its e1al poli hina duri_ng the shakedown train ina period in the San Die 0 Area. Gunnery, general

o o >c (j) c



hakedown training 'of mali craft is accompli hed at San Pedro b the Shakedown GTOup of the mall raft Training Center. Although these ve sels are not expected to accompli h in their CIG's the many functions of the CIC's of larger

hips, their radar plottincr teams are required to have the "know how" of CIC and to be prepared for the tasks small craft are called upon to perform.

refresher training

. new facet to Cl C training on che West oa t is the refresher training given to ships returning to the mainland for 0 erhaul and repair. Incident to the tapering off of the precommissioning training required for the new construction program, there has been a necessary expansion in the amount of refresher training.

Refresher CIe training has distinct features and problems of its own. Strictly speaking it tan be divided into two categories: training Tecei ed off the ship at either some hare or afloat training activity while the ship is undergoing repair and overhaul, and training received on board the ship during the ten-day refresher training period under Commander, San Diego Shakedown Group just prior [0 return to the Forward Area.

Because of the large turnover of personnel of ships in for overhaul, the training received off the hip, closely parallels that given during -presom-

Tile CHESTER (Cd-;!7) GIC tackles the bailie problem at tile conclusion of her ten-day refresller training period.

missioning training periods. The new members of the team who join the ship at this time must be given replacement training. Older members of the team must also be gi en instruction in new equipment. At present, this is largely due to the in-

tallation of SP radars, VF. VG and RGM equipment.

The practical means for giving refresher training to ship's GIG personnel while the ship is in the




yard is through the mean of a Naval Training enter in the avy Yard. Although GOTCPac does not have a complete and uniform sy tern 0 aval Training Center at West Coast Ja y Yards, most avy Yards are able to meet the demand.

In the Seattle area, eOTCPac has two refresher CIC training activities: the CIC Team Training Center at NAS, "Vbidbey Island, and the newly approved crc School at the eVE Precommi ioning chool, Puget ound 1a Yard, Bremerton .


The CIC Team raining Center, Whidbey

Island, Washington, is located on the beach at the eastern end of the Strait of Juan de Fuca. To the southwest are the Olympic Iountains, co the east the Cascades. Although the location somewhat handicaps fighter direction, air tracking, especially ehe difficult kind against land echoes, can be practiced with many targets from the aval Air Station, Whidbey Island. hips standing om and in to sea in the Puget ound area provide ample targets for practice in surface tracking and plotting.

Since its completion in June 1944, this training center has been used largely for the precommissioning training of CIe personnel of the Kais APA"s. Some refresher training was also provided various type ships and air groups in the icinity recei ed training by participation in limited lighter direction and air- ea re cue exercises. ow. however, the activity is entirely devoted to refresher training of ships in the Puget Sound 1 'avy Yard. Four teams can be trained three days each per week.

Besides the Cl'C team training, a CIC Indoctrination course is given to junior deck officers who , v i11 stand CIC 'watches on board hip. The COllTSe deal primarily with condition watch operations, doctrine and basic ele techniques. T'rainin ... capacity is one class of watch officers per week.


Toe ornmander in Chid. nited States Fleet, has recently approved a new eIC school at the CVE Precommissioning School, Puget Sound Na y Yard, Bremerton, Washington, This school is being rapidly setup and when completed will be able to assume the greater pan of the refresher Cl'C training load in the Bremerton Navy Yard.

In the San Francisco Area, refresher training in C1C is undertaken largely by the Precommissi ing Training Center, on Treasure Island. This

Cl TTG. lV.lf. c. Whir/he)' /s/(/tl(/" WrLShingloll, i Ilnw II etillTimarily (01' "e/resllel' training. of ClG reams 01 ships undergoing ouerhaul:

trainina is prirnaril ' replacement training of mall groups in basic CI techniques. Similar training i given to hips at Hunters Point by the C]C de-

eaI·ttnent ;f th new I aval Training enter.

In the San Pedro Area, all refre her training in I i ondu ted a the Small Craft Training Center, wh i h is equipped to give team in tru lion a well a individual instruction in all pha e 01 C1' I erajion .

Operati nal Training in special new le tronic equipment is accomplished ror the whole "' e t Coast by quotas at the Following:

Cl C Team Training Center. - Sp, VF, V ,R M an Clement


1] P. LOi\4A (lX.·~)I) - "F, \ G


ProVI ion has been made by ommander in Chief. nired tates Pacific Fleet, for all ship reo

turning to rhemainlaud Ior extensive overhaul to receive ten days refresher training under Commander. San Diego Shakedown roup, prior to return to the Forward Area. The refresher training peri d in Cl C is roughly the arne as the shaked wn peri d or new ships ex ept that in III st cases the latter em to be b tter If than the lder ships back from the ombat z ne. The battletorn V terans ha e to get them elve together after leave period and get into til vinz of teamwork azarn,


",,,reek after week, day alter da '. eOTCPa thus build' CIe teams. helping to weld each one into a unit. adapting its program to the need and demand' of DD's. C E's, small craft, au Iliaries, and all t pe of hip in for overhaul. rom Bremert n to San Diego T Pac per onnel and facilities n entrate on one aim-i-to build teams that are winners.



o > c (j) c Vl -I

\ '

------~-------!,.------ 090 I

two carriers collide





Recipe lor ollision: Take one VL with a three can escort ( 11 COlU- e 060. Place one approaching .\' with her two cans in same water all recipro · a 1 ourse 240. Be me visibilit . is kept low. dd a doped-off OAl er-of-the-Deck or 'J h fficer, Resulr=oue di a tr II collision

thai erve th ]apane au to perfe tion!

Re entl " the e ingredient wen: brouzht t <Tether .ill t FE the Hawaiian I land 0"1' up, the carriers being a .vL and a. CV, Fortuuat 1 ,in rhi ca , n ither the CI officer nor the ODD were quite properl doped-off!

Down in CI . on the "L. the V projection wa on surface search, llsiJ1.g' a four mile range 1:0 keep a summary plot on the three escort de-

troYC1' , he creen was dear except fOT these three can. 't 2226 there

appeared (')1] the 1 erimeter oE the 24-inch plotting urface or the VG, three well defined purpl pots, Ith ugh it w. 11 t kn WI1 at th time, one I

the three pot w a big carrier. few plot hawed that th three ship

were closinz on a head on collision course.

C1 prom] tlv notified the ffi er-of-the-Deck. "hen no immediate action wa taken (he I. off er again notified the OD, iving not only the ourse 0 th three approaching hips. but definirel taring that this was a colli ion course, Rather than take action him elf. the OOD notified the Captain who took one look at the VG jllld promptly ordered an emergency turn nine. At 2255, the V with her two cans were cleared by approximacel one mile as the VL's VG track began to open. It is not known what t'pe of track was shown in the >V's IC.

E er D should have his ear tuned to that "Conn from mbat"

phrase whi h i the beginning of a me ag' th l u ually will b f con ider-

abl help in the all-important ta k of arel- IlI'lU10'th hip. E\' 1'y Al er-

of-the-De k h uld realize the imp f .Ie inlormati m and take

action ac ordingl ,




C I'L" pint shOD" hQtJI lh« (.T ,,1It1 (1I1() ~(III$ Ult>)"~ i!1t;1sillg 1m' fI rolllsion IllIti/ the light tafl'i"I' (llIlIrdq ct,"'r~lI. TI", thre« ~ir· cled dQts be/aU' 111m I ttl' are ttl rortiug /lr'.lln)}'6IS willi the C r'L,

-{:;-U. S. Gwvernrn.!tot P6nting Office' Iq+'.j


no request IS needed

Gel trainers

wrong address

change I to RADTHREE




Radio 'pecialist Olfi.cer and GIC Per ounel A lloiuances tor all classes of /til)S alJj)eareil 011 page 36, '945 "C.l.C."

Bu.P'(!rs,:s in the process of revising aliotuances to conjarm with CominG h' s recommeruiatious. No requests for revisions in allotuance /0 this exl mt ueed /)(: submitted by forces aflolil.

1\[1l1/)' aclivill 'S are in need. of (I trainiue Ikvicl' which eoes uruler the title of SPecial Device IS-J-I (TY/Je 2gGCI Trainer). If you fume one not being used .. 01' knoiu uihere aile is located, please unite to GND. P-33-H tou Deport ment; fiJ1flShillgi01i 2!1' D.C,

III [une 1945 "GIG." 0.11 jJage ",8, il is stulet! t ltn! 12" J)lexiglas couers 101' PPJ scopes can hi' obtai net! "1)011 reouest from Pacifu: Fleet Radai C enter. Reg nests hould be addre Jed to Raden

(J fJ()m lor)" B /(1 .r, 9" Nttu» ]I (I1'(I, Pea rl H arbor,

C luuig« 1 to The Radar 0 lJcutlorY s !HUH ua! ita .• IJe('H ciisLTilJltlet/ to nil octiuitic ott tlte origiua! list for tltr MUIIIIIl! (R4DTHRE), Jf Iry (his ltue, ,'UII hove not received th e etuuig«. address

you'- req uest (0 Headquarters, Commander ill Chief, .S. FI'I'I. /J('tifyilll{ I/Ie IIl1ml)('1 Of 0l}ip,~ desired.