COMBAT INFORMATION Db). CENTER ree CONFIDENTIALC.1C. aie oe Eee VOL, I, NO. 10 OCTOBER 1945 1] CIC to Neviga 9| The In gence Offcer—His Role in CIC AEW-divhorne Early Warnin 26 | The Secret of Good Air P 34 | CIC-RADEM Coordination P 96 | C1G Time-Motion Stud 41] C1G and Shore Bombardment 44 | Jap Electronics ot Okinawa 19 | scR-720 for Zenith Cover | reapeat tmetgence Acti ss | Action Reports Published monthly by the Chief o Ope x. for the information of Military 1 whose duties are ronnected with the tactical and operational aspecis of electro Mi Include this publication with other confidential material uhich is to receive emergency destruction in the event of po sible loss or capture. “CALC.” shall not be carried for use in hs for publication in *C..C Naval Operations, Editor of “C CONFIDENTIAL te CIC to | navigator | : Piloting along dangerous or unfamiliar coastlines or into land-locked harbors is the Navigator's responsibility—and a tough one. The Navi gator is required to keep the ship's position plotted accurately along her course and to advise the captain of needed course changes and when to make them. Frequently the information necessary for the accurate fixing of the ship's position is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain with the Navi gation Department’s equipment. Almost every ship has had occasion to supplement the quartermaster’s information with dope from CIC. But a number of vessels have found that through constant practice, cooperation, and smart plotting, a smoothly-running, quiet, and efficient “CIC to Navi gator” procedure was developed which their commanding officers con. sidered so valuable as to adopt it as standard routine, regardless of visibility. NEGLECT CAN BE COSTLY Many naval officers bei g assigned duties as navigators rely on their experience and ingenuity to get them through tight spots, one of which is low visibility and adverse weather conditions. They forget that the time to test their CIC radar piloting is in clear weather and under ideal con. ditions. Piloting with the cooperation of CIG is of the utmost importance, and training in it should be carried on at every opportunity and should be as much a routine as the taking of visual bearings for piloting. CONFIDENTIAL Shb| ¥380190 ‘O11C.1.C. OCTOBER 1945 CONFIDENTIAL In entering harbors or leaving harbors, regardless of their good or bad radar characteristics, CIC should be required to maintain a flow of informa: A good solution of successful piloting by CIC is that used by one of the 2200-ton destroyers in the Pacific and it can readily be modified to fit tion to the Navigator on the bridge if for no other reason than to che rFitpe ok venel.- Fine, puotinne by CIC as included far the "Special Set the ship's position for routine training. An excellent example of this t letail”’ bill. The assignments consisted of the best radar operators on both ng has been in destroyers and DE’s during their shakedown periods face and air radar with the best plotters manning the DRT. The Navi Bermuda, B.W.L., where it was required by the shakedown command that CIC pilot ships in and out of the harbor daily. The commander of the shakedown group frequently requested a copy of the tracks made hy cessels. Throu tor with the GIG Officer in excellent weather and under excellent conditions, the command will soon realize the problems of piloting by CIC and can assist them to the point of perfection. With good assistance from CIC you may enter any harbor or steam along any coast regardless of visibility or weather conditions and know your position. This eliminates the feeling that you are blindly stea ing into danger and makes it “just another trip. h the cooperation of the Navi DANGEROUS WATERS AHEAD CIC-Assisted-Piloting is not a substitute for present methods of navi gation (piloting) but is a valuable supplement to such methods. The areas which our combatant ships are entering in the first phase of the peace bring to light many navigational hazards that are well known to the officers who served on the China station, and it would be well for vessels navigating in these waters to do so with extreme caution. In peace time our ships would obtain before leaving the Philippines for China at least one copy of a small pocket notebook, printed in China, titled “The China Coaster.” This lit- ile booklet had many rules and cautions passed down for centuries by the Chinese from navigating their junks in that area, and had considera) ‘common knowledge” data on the various tides and currents and their haviors. Tides and currents in the China Sea may or may not conform| the tide and current tables. It is well to assume that they will not. ‘The reason for this is quite obvious in that the Fast China Sea, bounded on the nd on the east by Japan, has a maximum depth of fifty ospheric conditions will south by Formosa fathoms, and being so shallow, winds, rain, and atm vary the tides and currents so that they neither appear nor are in fact any thing like the tables furnished for that area. This alone presents a great hazard to piloting. The floor of the China Sea being what it is, a fathometer is comparatively uscless for fixing position. Without being able to check what the set of the current has been since the last good fix, safe radar navi gation is well nigh impossible in making a China Coast landfall unless the shore line or land contours have sufficient individuality to be recognizable nition of landmarks, from other sections of the coast, or without visual reco; or radar beacons. The Navigator has available charts covering almost every part of the world’s coastlines. The accuracy of the detail of these charts varies with the U. 8, Navy's welcome in that area, The Atlantic and western Pacific are well charted, but there are numerous parts of the far eastern Pacific with which we are not too familiar, It is hoped and expected that some of these blanks can be filled from data obtained from the Japanese. Thus, to the usual sunken derelicts, mines, and other na ards is added the danger of not-knowing-where-you're gator’s desire for a crystal ball is understandable, CIG is no crystal ball, we admit, but GIG can do much to aid the Navigator besides an occasi and routine radar range and bearing igational wartime haz The navi- fy ator on the bridge wore a one ear-piece headset on the 22J8 radar circuit to which were also tied the circuits from each bridge pelorus. The Navi gator then had access to visual bearings, radar bearings and ranges, and was free to hear the Captain and Officer of the Deck. Along with his plot he received a flow of filtered information from CIC, which CIC had obtained from radar information closely checked by the visual bearings on the 22]S circuit. The same officer manned CIC at these times and was soon accus tomed to evaluating according to the desires of the Navigator. The com manding officer was so impressed by the results of this set-up that even under the best of visibility conditions GIC’s filtered information was util ized entirely in entering harbors, and in many cases CIC continued piloting even during the approach to the mooring buoy until such time as they Jost it due to minimum range. Asa result of this thorough training, there was no question in the commanding officer's mind but that CIC was com petent to do the job when it took over piloting in poor visibility LIMITATIONS CAN BE OVERCOME BY EXPERIENCED OPERATORS Smart “CIC-Assisted Piloting waters and for accurate positioning in waters which are poorly plotted. is essential for navigation in mined This chart shows the Loran coverage of the world. Now that the war is over the establishment CONFIDENTIAL S61 ¥3EOLD0 O19C.1.C. OCTOBER 1945 There is more to smart “CIC-Assisted-Piloting” than approximating a match between the scope and the chart, Accurate fixing of own ship's position under any and all conditions involves an appreciation of the characteristics of the radars used, and facility with not one but many Radar Plotting tech niques, It depends almost entirely on the constant and thorough training of operators and plotters during high and low visibility, and the practice of Radar Piloting methods at each opportunity. Two characteristics of the transmitted radar energy make Radar Pilot. ing more difficult than a straight match of scope to chart. ‘The first is the nearly straight line quality of the transmission, causing certain features of the land, shielded by other features, not to be reproduced. ‘This omis. sion of a part of the land picture gives trouble in piloting by making it difficult to recognize the area portrayed by the scope presentation. ‘The second modifying characteristic is radar beam width, It creates a major problem for the CIC Officer by actually distorting parts of the picture as reproduced on the scope. However, with knowledge of the eccentricities of his equipment the CIC Officer can interpolate and allow for such dis. tortions. Figures 1, 2, and g illustrate these characteristics. The coast line re 1 will appear on the PPI as in Figure 2. The low-lying land is shielded by higher land, and therefore gives no return on the scope. Beam width has caused distortion of the shore contour where the sweep of the beam is other than at right angles to the coast, and Figure 3 is a correct match between PPI presentation and chart, showing spread of the signal to sea: ward at points where the beam is nearly tangent to the coast. F 4 shows the radar search beam tangent to a cape and explains the reason for the distortion visible in Figure 3, CHECK, CHECK, AND DOUBLE CHECK Radar operators must be trained continually in piloting techniques during good visibility periods, taking advantage of all coastwise sailing in addition to entrances and departures from harbors. ‘This detailed training is best accomplished by providing a soundpowered circuit between CIC and a Quartermaster at the Bridge pelorus. The operator reads tangents ranges to nearest land, bearings and ranges on various points, swings contour templates or practices matching on VPR, and practices all the techniques of Radar Piloting. The Quartermaster on the pelorus provides the CIC Officer and Navigator with enough visual information to com pare operators’ abilities very closely. The CIC Officer is in a position to show the operator where he is consistently making the same error, where he is erratic in operation, and why the fixes obtained are good or poor. He is also in an excellent position to check the comparative accuracies of various methods of fixing, for his own information Operators should be thoroughly briefed before entering the opera tions area, so that they will know what kind of PPI pictures to expect from different points within the arc of probable approach. This briefing should consist of a thorough study of available charts and photographs of the area, and the sketching of probable scope presentations from all possible angles of approach to the target area and from various ranges. RPD photographs, if available, furnish the best possible source of scope prediction, in spite of the fact that the individual prediction photographs are made to correspond to particular antenna locations in the area. Several sets of RPD photo: graphs, showing successive PPI predictions along several lines of approach to the operations area, are of inestimable value in checking one’s own study of the charts. The briefing should also include the fire control radar op- CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL ° ° $461 ¥38010C.1.C. OCTOBER 1945 o erators because of their bearing’ accuraey To facilitate radar piloting in case the ship re turns to the same area, keep an accurate piloting showing sketches of PPI pictures, occasions pparent discrepancy between charts and the actual terrain, and camera shots of the PPI where they are of value Do not depend upon a single method of obtain. ing a fix to the exclusion of other methods which may be more suitable for the terrain at hand. Watch for new ways of doin the same thing, for ho one method is best under all conditions. METHODS Of the many the following are a. VPR (Virtual PPI Reflectoscope b, the template method ethods used to determine a fix jost common: ¢. radar range ares swung from 3 or 4 known points 4. visual bearing on a known point plus a radar range on the sa ¢ bearing ¢. radar bearings f. radar beacons and radar buoys In discussing each of these, excerpts from the action reports of ships who have put them to work advantageously will show their value under com: bat conditions. THE VPR METHOD Piloting with aid of VPR has not been ex- tensively used by larger ships because equipment has only recently been issued. As equipment is ————————— The method of plotting by the template method is accurate Although there is'tome sacrifice to speed. CONFIDENTIAL The VE is a useful piloting ic in much more detail due Teste wear Dolor Jor sealing: bearing idl Fenge Yor OFF Shore rocks, or picking out the mouth of « narrow channel The precision scope of the VE with its selected enlarged segment of the conventional PPL makes wonilable more faeurate information than formerly was obtainable and has the added advantage of allowing the antenna to rotat pansion of the PPL. installed this method of matching a contour chart to the signals of the PPI will become one of the most useful aids in identifying radar signals and in piloting ships near land masses. A section of RAD NINE, Tactical Uses of Radar Aboay Small Vessels, will deal extensively with the prt cedures and methods of VPR use. THE TEMPLATE METHOD IS GOOD FOR SOME AREAS The template method requires the use of a plexi-glass overlay about 15” x 25” im size. On, this are scribed bearing lines every 5° or 10°, covering a 220° sector and radiating from a small hole near the edge of the template To fix the ship’s position the SG operator trains his antenna in 5° or 10° steps while the iby operator reads the range to the shoreline at each interval. These ranges are plotted on the bearing lines of the overlay thereby giving a fairly accurate picture of the shoreline. The template is then placed on the DRT and fitted to the chart until the picture on the template and chart are matched. Own ship's position will be at the small hole from which the bearing lines radiate. It is obvious that this system has certain dis. advantages. By the time you have plotted a posi tion it is about one minute old and you must therefore be prepared to dead-reckon. yoursele The VG may be used successfully by overlaying transparent charts to pasition own ship. ‘The charts mey be repro: duced by hand or by photographic process. The factor determining the accuracy of this method is the matching of the chart to the VG presentation; thorough previous tudy of topographical features of the aree, and an ap prectation of the bearing and range discrimination of the radar and how they modify the PPI presentation, are Cssential to success. near a beach during an invasion the profusion of small craft sometimes makes use of the template impossible. The general aspect of a ceast-line may be a disadvantage in that a straight coastline with- elf to template radar n, The template method would be used chiefly for ‘tial landfall to identify the coastline contour nd thus fix ship’s position. The succeeding piloting fixes, as the radar picture becomes more ¢ prominent identifying contour will not lend certain of identification, might normally be by a simpler method. This would require picking up nd identifying new radar landmarks, by cutting in with definitely known landmarks, as in visual piloting. A CA in the Iwo Jima Operation reports, "The template method of obtaining a fix h: be the most accurate shoreline is available A DD reports on the same operation, ‘The SG proved to jethod when only a radar radar was used to obtain navigational fixes for the shore bombardment. The contour of that section of the island used was well suited for the Tem- plate Method of obtaining fixes. The three-arm method did not have enough accuracy for shore bombardment along this particular coast. There were small ships. very near the beach which showed up on the radar as.a part of the coastline; the general contour ding bearings every 5 ld be obtained even with one or two bad PRE equipment authorise for combatant shine and a large number of ausiiary and amphibious types. It pro ids «simply operated and aschut ploting ald by which 1B prepared chart ts continually matched tthe scope piltule. ‘The operator i thus afforded a continuous means if determining accurately the identification of landmarks. dee" Ofpcers Sto: ere nin favored at present ‘with any of these three pieces of refined equipment should not feel they are ouictased: ‘Theis are conveniences; you can sfll get out the dope, but you may have to work a litle harder. ranges. With the three-arm method one bad range would have given a bad position.” A CA at Okinawa reports, “Frequent poor d: light visibility and extensive night operati close waters required heavy dependence on CIC navigational information. ‘This was accomplished primarily by SG radar cuts, Extensive use was made of plexiglass templates both for obtaining accurate positions and for determining what stretches of a shoreline had best radar range read- ings. On several occasions the ship was brought to an assigned anchorage berth in crowded waters on the basis of CIC radar information. A DD at Okinawa reports, “Shore bombard- ment was conducted almost entirely lying to and because of strong currents and winds usually pre- vailing it was necessary to cut in ship's positi This was found to be very plate of the most continually ple using an even 10° range ter coastline or ranges on four or more distant land- marks. This method was more accurate than visual cuts and was used day and night RADAR RANGE ARCS FROM KNOWN POINTS 1S QUICKEST ‘The method of taking radar ranges on 3 or 4 known points and swinging arcs on the DRT chart from this inform the advantage of speed over the template method. On coastlines which do not have pronounced and easily identi- CONFIDENTIAL S+6] 9380100 “O10Cu. C. OCTOBER 1945 fied imegularities, however, this system is not as practical as the template method. A DD in the Okinawa operation reports sing the VF it was found possible to take four ranges for a radar fix in about one minut this without stopping the antenna or the SG search.” A BB at Okinawa reports, “.. !During the day visual bearings and radar ranges were used to find ship’s position, For night harassing fire, radar ranges and bearings on distant points of land com mon at Okinawa were found to be quite accurate. However, both these methods were frequently checked with radar range arcs and/or visual bear ing fixes.” VISUAL BEARING PLUS RADAR RANGE REQUIRES COOPERATION A visual bearing on some prominent object (a water tank, a rock just off the shoreline, or a point of land) plus a radar range on the same be and object will, when possible, give a quick and accurate fix. Mk 8 fire control radar or the V! is extremely valuable in this work as definite points can be accurately ranged upon. RADAR BEARINGS NEED ‘CORRECTIONS ADDED Radar bearings alone are, as a rule, inaccurate for obtaining fixes. Since radar is more accurate in range than in bearing, two crossed ranges will, in most cases, give a better fix than two crossed bearings, or than a bearing crossed with a range. Where bearings must be used a more accurate ay be obtained from the fire control radar or the VF than from the surface search gear Fairly accurate tangents may be obtained in the following manner: a Always read tangents by sweeping past the land to seaward, then sweeping back and using the initial pick-up of land as the apparent tangent. b_ Determine the value of the beam width error of the radar by checking the tangents obtained by (a) with visual cuts. The difference between them will be a nearly constant figure and must be ap- plied properly to all radar tangents. RADAR BEACONS AND BUOYS ARE BECOMING PREVALENT RACON (Radar Beacon) was used under com: bat conditions for the first time at Iwo Jima. ‘The CONFIDENTIAL results were not too successful due to the difficul- ties encountered in setting up the equipment. Anything appearing above the ground had thi fault of attracting mortar fire. A GA at Okinaw: however, reports as follows: “While lying to o the coast of Okinawa, a drill was carried out be tween this vessel and a Naval Liaison Officer in the use of the Radar Beacon. In addition to the fire control use of the set-up, it is believed valu able as an aid to navigation, particularly during low visibility near large land masses with relatively smooth coastlines affording few good points for radar bearings.” The beacon offers the most accurate method of positioning own ship, because there is no doubt as to the identity of the target read. An extremely accurate range and bearing can be obtained once the geographic location of the beacon is known. Radar buoys were used at Okinawa to mark a channel and on the whole proved quite satisfac: tory. A GA comments on their use: “. . . before dawn, original entrance to the Western Oki area was made through a swept channel in a mine- field using radar buoys as an aid to navigation. The buoys were picked up at about 000 yards distance. Six were visible at one time providing a good channel. ‘The line of buoys between and —— were readily discernible at 4-500 yard and aided in navigation during flycatcher oper tions. However, no information was received the USS ——as to the establishment of the buoys and they were mistaken for small craft the first night. About the only adverse comments received on the buoys were their poor visibility from the bridge during the day and the fact that they were believed to be small boats. ‘The first fault will probably be corrected and the second can be taken care of by a minute of tracking on. a DRT as well as knowledge of buoy location Previous articles in “C.1G.” magazine on radar aids to piloting are to be found in the following August 1944 p. 1 October 1944 p. 39 March 1945 p. 28 April 1945p. May 1945 p- 40 and RADSIX p. 8 isa “must” for radar piloting Radar piloting is assisting the navigator in ships h well trained CIC's. The science can be ned and it has a tr ¢ operations in peace or w at Information Center, Air Com: nce is a wartime development which “just grew.” Since many of the duties of GIG and ACI are closely related, mutual cooperation contributes to carrier operation. Afloat, ACI officers handle all intelligence duties on carriers and sea plane tenders. On a GV there are generally six ACI officers, two attached to the ship and four to the air group aboard. The senior ship's AGI officer is responsible for all in telligence activities, and the air group intelli gence officers report to him, He is also the officer with whom CIG works in most cases. ACI PRE-STRIKE ACTIVITIES GIG is dependent on ACI for operational in formation and material such as maps, target which must be rts, recognition photos, etc died in connection with the operations plan. On some carriers the ACI officer briefs CIC a, covering the entire plan in detail, includ oe nel prior to the commencement of an opera ing everything from general data on weather and terrain to specific information on the location, strength and type of enemy air and surface forces likely to be encountered. Because ACI receives more highly classified and more diversified dispatches than either Air Plot or GIG it assumes the burden of digesting this information, correlating it with existing orders, and passing pertinent portions to units concerned. Such information is generally circulated: a—by memorandum; bein the Daily Tactical Memorandum outlining flight and arming schedule, type of enemy zones nd friendly groups to be encountered during day's operation, and other data of primary help to flying personnel; c—by Daily Strategic Summary noting results of previous day's operation by other friendly ‘oups in area, new plane types sighted, etc.; d—by word of mouth,—the least desirable method but often necessary due to time limitations. CONFIDENTIAL Sbb1 ¥380190 01D ~C.1.C. OCTOBER 1945 Officers taking refresher course at Advanced Naval In target tracking problem in CIC mock up. In addition, from data obtained from the op- erations plan and from daily dispatches, it is gen erally the duty of the ACT officer to assist in draft ing the captain's night orders detailing informa tion on shipping and air contacts which might be picked up during the night. Well prepared night orders can be of great help to CIC in evaluating contacts for flag and bridge Prior to an operation ACI should give CIC: a—a memorandum outlining AirSea Rescue pro cedure, reference points, positions and calls (many CIC’s place this information on DRT and summary plot, and post calls in positions easily visible to those monitoring circuits) b-chart of friendly search plan with calls. STRIKE DAY PROCEDURE On strike days it is the procedure of some cax riers to have one ACI officer stationed in CIC to lend assistance to CIC personnel and to be re sponsible for forwarding to the ACI office and Air Plot all pertinent information arriving in CIC. CONFIDENTIAL ligence School obtain experience in CIC operation by running multi| An ACI officer experienced in the work of CIC who knows how and where to collect this infor jation without interfering with the normal rou tine of CIC personnel can be of the’ utmost help. ACI should provide CIC with maps of the tar get area. Throughout the day the ACI officer in CIC should keep interested personnel informed of any target changes and assist in assembling tar get reports from the strike leader In airsea rescue operations the AGI officer is directly responsible for expediting rescue, keeping track of the progress of rescue expeditions at all times, and carrying through until the final report is classified as “lost” or “returned to shi Naturally air-sea rescue calls for maximum co. operation between CIC, Air Plot and ACI. Since a matter of minutes may mean the difference be- tween success and failure, the ACI officer must collect all available information on the downed pilot and report to appropriate parties, who in nd_even when full informa. io it is necewary for the nterrogate returning pilots on nission as the downed pilot in order to urther verify all information on hand. Experi enced carrier personnel will agree that having one person, such as the ACI officer te all formation on air-sea rescue lifts a great load from CIC personnel. In no operation involving CIC does there seem to be more confusion than dur ing an air-sea rescue. a pilots, reports lo: cating the downed pilot with respect to two or mote reference points and inaccurate plott On days of offensive operations following the landing of a strike or sweep, ACI prepares and dis. tributes a summary of the activities of the flight. This summary, a copy of which goes to CIC ships, ground installations, ft, losses, AA fire, target recommen. dations and supplementary remarks. On ships which do not retain an ACI officer in CIC on strike days, the ACI office should assist CIC by passing the above mentioned informa. tion to CIC preferably in writing, if time permits, otherwise via 19 MC For successful operations the flow of informa tion between ACI and CIC IC must pass to ACI certai rescue operations, tion is received via CI officer to The confusion is usually € to incorrect reports fron covers damage to enemy airc just be both ways. information picked Orders are given to “CIC” fr Naval Intelligence Schools mock the “Bridge” of Advanced up from pilots via radio. ACI should be informed of contact reports from both antisubmarine and combat air patrols, and from search planes. Tar get information from strike planes should also be passed immediately to ACI, together with any data on weather at the target. Should a change in targets be necessary ACI st be in a position to yend_new objectives and brief pilots. Though the process of realization has unfortu nately been long and painful on some units, all experienced CIC personnel must now realize that an efficient, cooperative ACI office can be of great help. On ships where these two units work Closely ACI, as outlined above, can take some of the burden from CIC. It must be remembered, however, that CIG must reciprocate in the pass ing of helpful information. A clear understand: ing of the duties, sources of information, and limitations of operations of both Air Combat In. telligence and Combat Information Center will foster closer cooperation between the two units, IT'S THE OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER ON OTHER SHIPS Whereas intelligence duties aboard carriers and sea plane tenders are handled by the ACI officer, on other combat units from battlewagons to de stroyers it’s the Operational Intelligence Officer who carries the ball, ‘The advantages of the close cooperation between this officer and CIC. person nel have become increasingly evident. Afloat, the staffs of battleship and cruiser divi- sions and destroyer squadrons have Operational ence Officers who devote their time to that duty alone. On individual ships the Operational Intelligence billet is sometimes collateral duty often for an officer standing regular watches in CIG, and as a consequence the exact manner in which intelligence duties are handled may vary In such large complex Naval operations as were featured in the concluding phases of the Pacific war, a heavy load is placed on CIG to answer legitimate inquiries from the bridge and flag. Gorrect, adequate, Operational Intelligence can help CIG to answer quickly and efficiently Operational Intelligence is actually tactical ox at intelligence—that is information concern: ing the strength, disposition and present and in tended movements of the enemy correlated with similar information on our own forces: a—actual intelligence prior to the operation and after b—operational intelligence enroute to the arrival at the objective area. CONFIDENTIAL S¥6| ¥38O1D0 “O19.C.1.C, OCTOBER 1945 CONFIDENTIAL * PRIOR TO OPERATION The Operational Officer will, as a preparation for the operation, have available from his files all bombardment charts, standard ONI publications of pertinent interest, photo interpretation reports navigational data, and all other information which may be of help in preparing detailed plans. On arrival of the operations plan he will then break down the plan and prepare chronologies of the ship’s prospective movements and activities. In addition, of primary help to CIC, he should prepare overlays of charts and routes, patrol lanes, and similar graphic data. In CIC this material should be placed for quick reference by the watch officer On many units, prior to an operation, the Oper ce Officer and all GIG officers will go over the operations plan together to assure con: ational In ellig sideration of all details. This is especially good practice when a bombardment or amphibious problem is involved. As important as any briefing done at this ting by the Operational Intelligence Officer is that CIC personnel and the ship’s aviator. At th session the air problem as a whole and as it con- cers the individual ship is covered. If the oper ation plan alls for bombardment by the ship, the plane spotting assignment is planned. If, how ever, the ship is operating with a carvier group, the primary mission of the ship’s aviator will prob. ably be rescue. Gonsequently calls and reference points should be reviewed and thoroughly under stood. UNDERWAY Once underway the work of the Operational Intelligence Officer often concerns o forces to a ‘Air Combat Intelligence Offcer takes hie place in CLC during strike day operations to coordinate activites of two unit greater extent than the enemy and his work involves “operational data” as well as strict intelligence. The volume of this data is large and of utmost value in helping the CIC watch officer to evaluate definitely and correctly face and air contacts when reporting to the bridge or flag. A portion of this operational information is from charts of friendly fir and surface patrols which have been prepared previous to the opera: tion. Daily dispatches provide the most important contemporary informa tion and the Operational Intelligence Officer should condense those of definite interest to his unit and include them in his Daily Summary, a copy of which should go to CIC Additional timely information will be contained in the Captain's night orders which the Operational Intelligence Officer assists in drafting. These night orders contain detail of primary help to CIC as they should record information regarding shipping to be encountered during the night, sub- marine lanes, mine fields and restricted areas to be passed, etc., together with data on characteristics of the area, such as location of enemy held islands in the vicinity, time and position of closest proximity to these islands, whether or not islands are equipped with radar On a bombardment problem CIC cannot have too much informa: tion from both the operations plan and from the changes and supplen tary data carried in the daily dispatches. CIC should know just what posi- tion each ship in the bombardment group should take, the relative posi- tion of all ships on the run-in, the identities and order of the ships to be followed on the bombardment run, etc Operational Intelligence should also supply full target data to CIC in cluding maps showing enemy installations, mines, supplies, communica: tions, air fields, radar installations, together with, in case of landing sup: jort, front line plot detailing disposition of own troops and their lines ym the time of initial landing. When operating in a carrier task group, the same type of operational “intelligence information is necessary for the successful operation o£ CIC The Operational Intelligence Officer should supply CIC with the task group's air plan for the day, strike targets, both scheduled and potential, information on friendly aircraft, other than own forces to be expected in the 3 Also referem ts and air-sea rescue calls for the day and types of patrols to be flown by ship's own group. This information and much other data on the current air situation is necessary. if the ship's CIC officer is to assist the task group CIG officer in the proper evaluation of air contacts. Such detail is also necessary in case the situation requires launch: ing the ship's own planes for rescue mission. In addition the ship may be called upon to take over control of the combat air patrol or other patrols. poi Some Operational Intelligence Officers stand regular watches in CIC and also have a station there at General Quarters. Such a watch bill is of advantage to CIC as the Operational Intelligence Officer obtains a first hand picture of the type of detailed information CIC must have in evaluat ing for the bridge. In this connection it is interesting to note that at the U. S. Naval Training School (advanced intelligence) where refresher courses have been given experienced Operational Intelligence Officers, a course is provided giving indoctrination in CIC mock-ups. Most CIG watch officers appreciate the help Operational Intelligence Officers can give them in making material available for properly carrying out the increasingly complex duties of CIC. Given proper cooperation the " nal Intelligence Officer can be CIC's best friend. CONFIDENTIAL S461 ¥3O10 “O11{FF responce from interce range 80-200 miles range 100-200 mites steps ov! 1 180 les CONFIDENTIAL — airborne early warning t Imagine a radar antenna 5000 feet high! Imagine early warning with a system that picks up single aircraft flying at 250 feet at distances of from fifty to sixty miles and a single ship at two hundred miles—perhaps used for fighter direction! In essence this is the promise of AEW—Air borne Early Warning, On August 15 when the Army and Navy finally broke the long-awaited and long-held story of radar, one among several pending developments not mentioned was AEW. Acting on the reason: able principle that experimental developments in radar are still very definitely military secrets and must be kept under wraps, the Navy has withheld from publication one of the most promising of radar’s already spectacular wartime advances. Be cause it is new and to a large extent still in its de velopmental stages, AEW is not widely known even to CIC personnel in the Fleet, Nor, as te nicians and CIC personnel who have worked w it well know, is it by any means a perfected syste Had the war continued, however, AEW wot have become a fa niliar name to every CIC man and was expected to be of considerable use in help: ing to solve at least one of CIC’s biggest head: acheshow to combat low-flying aircraft sneaking in beneath the radar beam When peace came two top priority AEW proj. ects were under way. Ticketed Project Cadillac One and Project Cadillac Two, they were b orked out at Massachusetts Institute of Tech y Radiation Laboratory king in conjunction with Johnsville, Penn vania's Naval Aviation Modification Unit. Be cause of a slackening of war's demanding pri wling, bee! logy’s spr orities the results of these two projects may not reach the Fleet in appreciable numbers as imme diately as had been planned. However, since per fection of fighting equipment remains a No. 1 aim in peace or war the experiments are still going forward, with AEW promising much for future GIG operations and fighter direction future radar-wise enemy Briefly summed up, AEW is a system of radar warning which gives information on surface tar gets at ranges beyond our present shipborne equipment and provides warning of low-flyin; aircraft in sufficient time to take adequate readi- ness preparations and possibly to initiate intercep- tions. Cadillac 1, whose existence has been Fleet scuttlebutt for some months, employs TBM 3W’s, equipped with special airborne gear, a flying FDO, pilot, and operator. Cadillac 2, still largely experimental, uses PB-1W’s (Army B-17-G’s) and embodies the concept of a fully-equipped, fully anned, flying CIC in addition to carrying full W equipment. SW CAPABILITIES The complete story of AEW’s capabilities mast await the test of battle conditions. The tests that have been conducted, however, at the CIC Group Training Center, Brigantine, New Jersey, and in USS RANGER give a fairly complete pic ture of what may be expected from the system At Brigantine single aircraft targets of JM size at 500 feet have been fairly consistently picked up at ranges from 45 to 70 miles with the AEW-equipped TBM flying at between two and five thous: id feet. Two aircraft, comparable in size to the TBM itself, have also been spotted at from 50 to 70 miles and groups of six to 14 aircraf at from 60 to 120 miles. Surface vessels were de tected at 200 miles with the AEW plane flying at 30,000 feet under very good conditions. Good results were also obtained at both Bri antine and in USS RANGER with identification on both A and G bands observable at the same av erage ranges as the targets. Difficulty has been ex perienced with IFF equipment however because Of a non-directional antenna, and a resulting lack of bearing discrimination in the IFF response. Summed up and analyzed, the tests so far com ducted indicate that with TBM’s a reliable radar relay range of 45 miles can be expected on single low-flying aircraft under good conditions. It is expected, however, that improvements for both shipborne and airborne gear will materially ex- tend range How well AEW will work in actual fighter di rection from the plane itself remains to be seen. Tests conducted at Brigantine with TBM’s are inconclusive with intercey but “not consistent tions called “possible” Chief handicap to success ful fighter direction is the fact that the AEW plane remains in constant motion and there are conse quent difficulties in orienting fighter groups from the fighter director's post in the controlling plane. It is expected that with the development of the B-17 and with practice this handicap will be some what minimized. At any rate provisions are made in the B-17 for at least four officers—a CIC watch dgtectlam ana atom CONFIDENTIALC.1.C. OCTOBER 1945 How the AEW PPI picture compares with a map. officer, 2 FDO’s, and Radar Control Officer, who will also function as the main liaison between the plane and the ship under current plans. By careful attention to the details of installa tions difficulty which has admittedly been experi enced with the airborne equipment can be mini mized. No failures were reported in the initial tests, but Cadillac 1 planners anticipate that mainte nance will prove to be a handicap. Personnel are now being trained at MIT—to keep both ship and airborne radar gear in operating order, Experi ments designed to overcome the limited availabil ity handicap are continuing, AEW LIMITATIONS Like all radar equipment and all systems of radar detection AEW has definite limitations During the RANGER and Brigantine tests, air craft were still able to come within range unde tected. During one RANGER test a group of planes flying at above 10,000 feet was not de tected, although low flyers immediately below them were picked up and tracked. The judgment of the officers conducting the tests that the incon sistencies of reception were occasioned by the large number of targets on the scopes indicates that although AEW may aid in solving the low-flyer problem and provide vastly improved informa tion on the surface situation research must still go forward to obtain better selectivity when very large numbers of planes are in the air A further handicap in AEW operations which was revealed by the tests has been the density of sea return on aitborne scopes which has blanked CONFIDENTIAL out aircraft at ranges close to the AEW plane. The closest range to which targets can be tracked before they are lost in the sea return is governed by the roughness of the sea surface and the alti- tude of the AEW plane, as shown in the table. AEW Altitude Rough Calm Normal | 2000 feet o-rs miles | 1525 | 25-45 70;000 o-as 2530 | 50.85 limited selectivity may, however, be partially ov come. The special STC circuits in the radar re- ceivers if properly operated aid materially in re- ducing sea return, for example. Chief factor in increasing the efficiency, however, is operator skill Because of the wide area covered it is obvious also that very careful operation and attentive surveil- lance is necessary to achieve the maximum results. Proper testing and adjustment of the airborne cir~ cuits before flights is also imperative. ‘There are other limitations. Directional IFF interrogation is not possible with current equip ment. Moreover, there is at present no means of determining altitude other than a very doubtful “intelligent Since the AEW scope shows both air and surface targets on the same small scope, the picture is cluttered. Just as th fade zones in the radar coverage pattern of ship- borne equipment there are null areas present in the radar path between ship and AEW plane. Perhaps the most serious limitation is in the field of maintenance. Not every ART can get the needed maximum in performance from the A equipn nse out of the necessities of the tactical situa n- As every radar operator and CIC officer 1 Mows, one of the serious limitations of our ship. borne equipment is imposed by the curvature of | DEVELOPMENT OF AEW AEW like many other wartime developments, the earth which prevents standard radars from pickir up low flyers and ships, except under ex ceptional circumstances, at distances much greater than 25, to go miles for a single ship or 15 to miles for a low-flying bomber, With AEW, ranges not only ave extended, under favorable condi CONFIDENTIAL beyond these limits to, miles on a single torpedo bomber flying at tions, for example, 65, feet and 1 to 150 miles on a single destroyer with the AEW plane at 10,000 feet but the PPI scope may cover as much as 125,000 square miles. Thus a single AEW-equipped TBM flying at 20,000 feet can provide its parent carrier with a PPI scope view of an oc bounded by a point just south of Montreal to the an area comparable in size to an area north, Cape May, New Jersey to the south and extending inland for a distance of 200 miles. It should be noted that in this sort of PPI picture uireraft are not discernible, Generally, it is not ¥390190 “919 v6C.1.C. OCTOBER 1945 ne PPI, 100. mile range possible to see aircraft over land except where high ground can be used to “shadow beyond Other phenomenal ranges obtained in tests over New England are a convoy picked up at 160 miles by an AEW plane flying over Boston, and six SNB's flying at 250 above sea level detected by an AEW plane at 10,000 feet at go miles. Striking also are PPT pictures of ta illustrated in lower land U areas stich as are scope view of New England, New York and Long Island from 20,000 feet. The Connecticut River Valley and Lake Champlain are clearly discernible 60 miles to the westward and shadows from mountains clearly outline the Hudson River Valley. On. the same illustration shipping is noticeable at 160 and 165 miles off shore. Again, it should be pointed out, no low flyers are detectable AEW came into being early in 1944. The Navy asked MIT’s RadLab to devise whieh would provide early warning against low-flying aircraft and against shipping. The early warning goals were 50 to 60 miles for aircraft and 200 miles for shipping. Once the idea of an airborne system was decided upon there were two major problems: first, to devise a set which would be powerful enough to provide the early warning nd compact enough to be mounted in a small aircraft and second, to develop a system which would permit the transmission of the information picked up by the plane back to the ship where it could be suitably displayed. By mid-1944 the two problems were solved in the laboratory, and on 20 October the first Navy demonstration was conducted at AA Field, Bed: ford, Massachtisetts. Since then sufficient progress has been made so that the first major carrier, USS ENTERPRISE, is now fully equipped with the AEW system and at NAAS Ream Field, Cali fornia, a training program for pilots, operators and CONFIDENTIAL 4 PPI, 80 mile range Shipboard PPL, 20 mile range fiying GIG officers is in full progress. Training flights and tests of B-17’s in Cadillac 2 are also in progress at Willow Grove, Pennsylvania. THE SYSTEM The logic which dictates the AEW system is simple enough. It is simply the extension of the antenna mast from one-hundred odd feet up n 20,000 feet. In. practice because of inordinate sea return at high altitudes, most AEW planes will probably be operated at hetween 2000 and 5000 feet. In effect it enables the radar beam, so to speak, to “look over th horizon.” The beam of the airborne, high-pof ered S-band set thus is a unhindered by the ea manner both IFF le to scan relative h’s curvature. Ina simil i VHF communications are able to function far beyond the limits now im posed by the low mast and the laws of physics. Basically the AEW system is composed of two general elements: the shipborne equipment in CIG and the cd reporting system. On board ship in carrier CIC's the basic AEW unit is the Radar Receiving Equipment, ot irborne equipment PO, whose components are divided between the CIC and the PO room. Made up of a relay re ceiver, a decoder and a scan converter, these units feed radar and IFF information from the AEW aircraft to AEW indicators in CIC. In effect the PO room thus functions as a kind of middleman, picking up and shooting along the picture of the AEW-equipped plan scope and, in turn, transmitting to the plane the IFF challenge. Coordinated with information from the shipborne sets in GIC, the AEW infor mation helps fill out the picture of enemy and friendly and shipping over a wide area. Other units of the shipboard AEW system VHF communications equipment and and expanded rd seven inch delayed PPL Meroe shot AN/ARW-34 radio control transmitter—provide direct communication with the plane and permit the control of the plane's radar search equipment by the CIG officers—a vitally important part of the whole process. Difficulty is being experienced with this link in the system. However, equipment troubles will eventually be solved. Two types of airborne equipment are employed: the TBM 3W and the B-17 installations. Although the B17 equipment is still in the experimental stage, the TBM 3W’s have been fully tested. Standard model TBM-IW aircraft are externally modified by the deletion of armor and armament hd the addition of a large, bulbous radome en: sing an eight-foot radar antenna, The B-17's, the other hand, retain armor and armament founted internally are a specially-built high-pow ered microwave radar (AN/APS-20), a special high-powered IFF interrogator-respondor (AN APX-13), a relay radar transmitter (AN/ART the radar relay communication system (AN /ARC 18) and the radio control receiver (AN /ARW-35) well as standard IFF and communication equip: ment. A worm’s eye view of the basic components of the installation can be noted in Figure 1. De alphabetized and translated injo operating terms this array of equipment functions as follows SEARCH RADAR The TBM takes off from its parent carrier and takes station in a wide orbit overhead at, say, five thousand feet With the AEW plane flying about the control carrier, the plane's radar set initiates the search The heart of the AEW radar systen borne synchronizer, which furnishes goo-trigger pulses per second to excite the modulator. The pdulator generates two-microsecond, high-pow ¢: pulses which are fed to the magnetron, which is the air in turn generates one megawatt S-band rf pulses, two microseconds long, goo times a second. These pulses are fed through a feed horn against a para bolic reflecting antenna 8’ wide by 3’ high, which directs these rf pulses in the form of a narroy beam. The beam “searches” out to the horizon as the a about its vertical reflected from tar beam, are picked up by the antenna and fed through a crystal mixer to a sensitive receiver Here they are transferred into video signals and enna is rotated at 6 rpm through 360 axis. The echoes of these pulses et in the area covered by the routed to two sep: Part of the video signal from the radar receiver is sent to the indicating system of the AEW plane The radar operator sees the information picked up by the receiver presented on two PPI’s and an Ascope. The main PPI has 100 and 2 ate units. ranges. The second PPI has a 2o-mile range with a delay feature which allows enlarged presenta tion of any 20-mile band in steps of ten miles out to 200 miles, The A-scope, used primarily as a test scope, has several ranges and several points to start the sweep. ‘The radar operator's PPI scopes present true North at 12 o'clock, The pilot is provided with a PPI, plane stabilized, to show position relative to the carrier and other objects. The remainder of the video is sent to the relay mixer which is incorporated in the same box with the synchronizer, Tt has added to it here, on an appropriate time base, the synchronizing informa: SNE flying at 250 feet (see AEW 30 alle expanded PET. CONFIDENTIAL StI ¥380190 O19C.-C. OCTOBER 1945 8 tion showing the angle between the beam and tue North and indication of the time of firing This combination is fed to the (T-123/ART-22), where it is wave of the trans. ation to the AEW miter used to modulate the carri mitter, which passes. inforn aboard ship. The video and synchronizing signals broadcast by the relay transmitter are picked up by a relay receiver on the surface aboard the carrier, which detects them and sends them to a decoder and a scan converter. Here the video signals and synchroniz ing signals are separated and the latter are con verted into angular motion so that they can be used to control the PI's on shipboard. The video signals are then sent to any of the ship's in dicators or to the special AEW scopes, or both The special scopes on which the video may be presented are a 7” PPI with 80 and 200-mile ranges and a 7” delayed PPI with a 20-mile range which may be started at any ten mile step ont to 180 miles, IDENTIFICATION In order that an observed target may be iden tified as soon as it appears on the scope, a special high-powered IFF interrogator has been include in the airborne equipment. This can transmit an interrogating signal on either A-band or G-band eliciting a coded response from any target properly equipped. ‘This interrogation may be carried out by either of two methods. ‘The operator in the plane may throw the ap: propriate switch on the IFF control box. This Will cause the interrogation. ‘The response, after its transformation into a video signal is routed to the plane's indicators. where it may be presented on the 5” delayed PPI or on the 3” A-scope, or both. By means of another switch the video may be routed to the relay transmitter so that it may be presented on shipboard The operator on shipboard, via radio control, may cause the interrogation, and the response is then routed to both the plane and ship indicators ‘The AEW plane carries a normal IFF transpon: dor so it may be recognized as friendly RADIO CONTROL The radio control which may used is composed. of an £m transmitter on shipboard and a receiver in the plane. When the shipboard operator closes a switch, the fm transmitter sends a modulated wave to the receiver which, by means of band-pass filters, “measures” the modulation and closes the CONFIDENTIAL corresponding relays in the receiver. “The ship- board operator has available ten channels, but cait use only three at a time. Besides IFF interrogation, sector scam the radar antenna is possible by radio nine @ This permits the shipboard operator to choose the width and position of the sector viewed on the PPI in order to obtain better persistence of i FIGHTER DIRECTION In order to communicate with fr ndly_ planes such as intercepting fighters over the horizon, it is necessary to use the AEW plane as a VHF relay point, by use of AN/ARC- VIIE signals from shipboard are received by the plane's VHF receiver and retransmitted to the in= terceptors by the VHF relay on a different wave length. Signals from the interceptors, back to shipboard, are carried through the plane relay in reverse order An important element of the challenge system: it can be seen, is the fact that challenges may also be initiated from the ship's GIG. Thus a target appearing on the shipborne scope may. be imme diately identified. Should the airborne operator fail to note a target or neglect to challenge, the shipborne operator, with a full view of the whole air and sea picture, may initiate the challeng himself The VHE relay system which permits two-w between the base carrier and planes or ships far beyond the normal range of ordinary VHF equipment is also notable. This feature of AEW is important as a means of providing command with quick information on target condition, with ETA’s of returning strikes, reports of downed pilots and similar vital, tactical data. As a protection for lost planes and as a means of rapid reporting of contact reports which normally must go out on medium frequency, the VHF relay system represents so wide an advance over contemporary methods as,to make the latter pst archaic relay equipm OPERATIONS AND OPERATORS. The operatin, AEW have at least an outward simplicity which corresponds with the: principle of the system itself—at least with the TBM. The B-17 program, of course, demands the full services of four officers, one plotter and nd is, in effect, a small airborne CIC, with plotting and status boards, an evaluator and thich of the assorted paraphernalia and citable coinpliation of the ship install au ¢ methods of two operators, | to the ship's position. AEW TBM's are operated by a three man team =the pilot, one operator, and an enlisted ART g:: latter two are seated in a specially-built com partment in the after end of the fuselage. ‘Their function is to keep the radars in operation in search, to challenge unidentified aireraft and gen. erally carry out the diréctions of the CIC officer in the parent vessel or base. The shipborne system equipment is equally simple in concept. AEW information may be re produced on any standard PPI. In addition there . are two PPI’s in the AEW indicator system: the delayed PPI and the ship-centered PPI. The ship centered PPI has as its design the re-orientation of the radar picture as it is picked up by the plane Normally the PPI picture of the view from the aircraft is centered about the aircraft itself. The ship-centering equipment per mits the picture on the main shipboard PPI to be centered about the ship. There are two obvious advantages: 1—The targets may be rapidly located with refer ence to the ship itself; CONFIDENTIAL ination may be made between ships borne targets at low altitude since the stabilized shipborne “picture eliminates the motion of the AEW plane. In addition the delayed PPI permits a detailed examination of any particular target displayed on the main PPI. Any 20 mile band of the main PPI may be expanded to the full length of the sweep on the delayed PPL AEW POTENTIALITIES ‘The shipboard AEW equipment as originally designed can be installed in ESSEX class and ger carriers, BB's and AGG's. Developments are under way, however, to provide installations for GVE’s and vessels of smaller size. Also in the experimental stage is equipment for installation of the relay receiving and indicator equi ment in tractor trucks for use in amphibious operations. AEW, with its wide coverage, holds obvious promise for landing operations and will, it is hoped, prove to be a valuable supplement to early warning against the type of attack experi- enced at Okinawa Most interesting and prom ising of AEW’s potentialities lie in the development of the flying CIC. The installation of the GIG in B-17’s envisions the use of the B-17’s, properly escorted by protecting fighters anda CAP, at far ranges from the home base. The substit tion of B-17’s for vulnerable, isolated destroyers for radar picket duty is a promising pos- sibility. It requires no great strength of imagination to imagine a protective circle of B-17's on station from 50 to 100 miles away from a naval task force or the scene of an island landi Projected features of the B-17 system are a high-pow- ered Block III relay transmit ter, the development of which is nearing completion, an air borne moving target indicator to eliminate land echoes, and 1 sixteen-foot antenna for the multi-engine installation as well as height-finding equip: ment Shb1 4390190 9.19,C.1.C. OCTOBER 1945 To a confirmed scotch-and-soda man, a bourbon and-water drinker is strictly a peasant, and to the beer imbiber, both of the hard likker boys are all wet; so drinking, so status boards. Pu in the next CIC as to what constit board—this is strictly impartial re Training Sch When considering new status boards, or re vision of old status boards, keep this thought in mind: that the status board information can be more readily understood and comprehended by than by audible means, and—this is impor tant—that the information is necessary, and must be seen by more than one individual Status boards are a vital part of CIC tant as plotting tables and radar itself; yet, strange ly enough, there is a tendency in many ships to Keep too many status boards, or rather “have” too many status boards, You could argue that it is impossible to have too many status boards, for the reason that the very existence of CIC is built on the premise that this is the dissemination point CONFIDENTIAL up your dukes and slug it out with the boy es a status the Naval sted b Jol at Hollywood, Florida. for all kinds of information. But to “have” status boards, and to “keep” status boards up to the mi ute are two distinct propositions, It should be a definite rule in every CIC that no status board should be displayed that is not going to be used Determine first exactly what information must be displayed visually. Consider this: if only one person needs the information, it is oftentimes advisable to put that information on a clipboard, especially if this information will not change or rarely changes, After determinating what infor mation should be put on status boards, there is the very real problem of making up watch lists that give you enough status board keepers to if quately keep up these boards. A status board only as good as the accuracy of its information; a status board with wrong or old information is od as no status board at all riefinitely not as a At least, in having no status board, you will not be Joperating under false information, In considering the types of status boards for your CIC, you must consider the kind of duty your ship performs, Obviously, the carrier CIC will have a different set of status boards than the cruiser and the experience of others in like duty are the best guides to the when-where-and-why-the-status-board. Many different type status boards have been de Your past experience vised to fulfill the individual needs of the various CIC's. A general listing of type status boards would include: VF, aircraft, weather, surface, ree ares, boat wave and is not an all inclusive list ognition, radar counterni fleet. This, of course but are general types that might be considered for most CIC's, from DE to BB. 1-VF Status Board (see Fig. No. 1) includes in- formation pertinent to all VE in the task force VF status board such as the tactical call of all available fighter planes, the divisions airborne, and their status time of take-off, altitude information, station or mission, radio channel, IFF code, controlling base present fuel and ammunition, and. last order Most VF status boards will also include range and bearing of nearest land, range and bearing of magnetic variation, VE on deck—condition of readiness, condition of flight enemy base or force deck (land, launch, respot), homing guards, and information on YE and/or YJ, with the compass earings inscribed. Aircraft Status Board (see Fig. No. 2) is usually attack Search aireraft data includes the subdivided into search aircraft data and information. various patrols, such as search and anti-submarine intermediate patrols, jack patrols, snasp patrols. Attack information used in control of offensive it will include the composition of the attack group. mission, and progress to and from target. g-Weather Status Board indicates the weather CONFIDENTIAL $h6| ¥3IGO1D0 '0'1'DOCTOBER 1945 hee c. cM data i conditions vital tp all ships, especially aircraft ca riers. It will include the wind velocity at various altitudes, temperature at various altitudes, geo: graphic displays of clouds at various altitudes, sun elevation and bearing, sunrise and sunset, moon rise and moonset, barometric pressure and. dew point {Surface Status Board (see Fig. No. 3) displays CONFIDENTIAL information relating to the surface tactical situa tion, Particularly, it displays all surface data which is non-plottable. Surface status boards will include the following items: force disposition base course and speed, fleet course, speed and axis, plan in use, course and speed of point op: tion with its position by latitude and longitude 9g same time, latitude and longitude of point zebr radio channels and calls, and prospective course and speed changes, Radar control stations 1m be included on this board, such as sector and range ‘overage of radar responsibility concurrently as: igned to ships in the force 5—Recognition Status Board information is often shown on the VF or Surface Status Board; it will include the IFF codes, challenges and replies, emergency si fighting lights dara. NANCY” data may be indicated here also. 6—Radar Countermeasures Status Board will dis als, and play in addition to the information obtained from the REM station all other information which is available that may be related to the ROM prob: lem. Appropriate data will include the frequen cies of own. ship's radars. conditions of radar silence, orders from OTG, the jammer frequency coverage, and intercept frequency cover Nec essary information for the identification of inter cepted signals as friendly or enemy will be listed, Such items are frequency, pulse repetition rate pulse width, the true bearing from which signal is received, Space will also be available for re cording any detailed remarks from the REM sta tion, such as signal strength increases, lobe switch: ing, A space tor action taken will also be provided. Two specialized type status boards are found in the CIC’s of Attack Auxiliary Ships 7—Boat Wave Status Board (see Fig. No. 5) is used in CIC’s furnishin status boards will show boats for the assault, These the state, location, and mission of own boats. On a Group or Division Flagship, CIC will keep a status board on all boats of the ships under that command. 8—Fleet Status Board is a variation of the basic Surface Status Board. It is used by attack auxilia ries, particularly AGC’s and relief AGC's, It will include all cruising instructions, weather reports, and expected contacis, TBS calls and command orders pertinent to the operation and maneuver ing of the auxiliary units (the train) are displayed The physical equipments used in Status Boards are as varied as the information, but edge-lighted lucite status boards are now preferred, with china This board presents an excellent display and is the easiest to operate CONFIDENTIAL Skbl Y3IEOLDO O19C.1.C. OCTOBER 1945 the secret of good air plotting CONFIDENTIAL herlock Holmes’ famous, “Elementary, my dear Watson!” can be very misleading, It always came at the end of a remarkable feat of deduction, successfully arrived at by painsf taking attention to minute details missed by th ordinary observer. We tend to look: at the result and forget how essential were those little details The story is the same with Air Plottir also deals with many sm casually re; which II details, which may be arded as insignificant, particularly in the running of canned problems— —but whe is headed it is the real thing, whi ht for you the enemy remember the Kami kaze?), those details take on an enormous, almost frightening importance ference betwee They can mean the dif life and death. ‘This theme can not be repeated and stressed and repeated too much plot neatly, neatly, neatly plot accu rately, accurately be legible, legible square up those boxes, watch the clock, watch the tlock, the clock off the board fo the minute keep off the board, be up to the minute, up That bears repeating more than any other detail Be up-to-the-minute in your plottin What is the objective FOUR, the Air Plotti at all times! plotting? RAD Lanual, states: The obj jective of air plotting is to present an accurat upto-theminute (repeat) up-to-the minute picturd of the position and track of all aircraft in the surrounding area.” That up-to-the-minute business is vitally impor tant in air plot because of are dealing with as contrasted to surface plot, for instance. In surface plot you des twenty to thirty knots, In a ¢ terrific speeds you in speeds of plot you deal in speeds of two-hundred to three-hundred knots and more—len times faster than your surface speeds! Two planes pass ng each other going in oppo: site directions can be ten miles apart in one minute! Those same two planes thirty seconds later are fifteen miles apart! a in air plot you must stress up-to-the split-minute! This article will serve as a guide to teaching radarmen strike) ‘ood air plotting. It will also be valuable as a “refresher” for seasone hands the art of : | anges, plot from the sides a . the board which means, of course, you will be THE PURPOSES OF AIR PLOTTING Quoting RADFOUR, the purposes of air plot 3: are to track interceptions of attacking enemy rcraft as an aid in fighter direction . .. to fix and @Dexaiuate unidentified air contacts. . . to track search, attack, friendly planes a rather important purpose to the pilot who is Jost out there and wants a steer home . . . and to display the air situation in such a manner that command can, at all times, be informed Your principal source of information for air plotting is from radar contacts. But you may, at times, get information to be plotted from warning net reports, from lookouts, fighter net reports telligence observation, rescue and other to assist in homing lost planes coast watchers, and occasionally from data (see article on page 9 in this issue) In your CIC you have one or more polar coordi nate charts consisting of bearing lines radiatin from the center—your ship being at the center of this chart at all times. The series of concentric circles have a uniform spacing and represent range in nautical miles. Note—range is in miles not yards! Each of the circles represents ten miles For beginners, it is best to plot from the CIC watch officer's position, that is, from a position directly in front of the chart at bearing 180. Once you become familiar with all bearings and nd from the top of jations upside plotting your symbols and abbr down or sideways, remembering that the plot must be read by someone standing at bearing 180. You will wear earphones connected to the radar operators who read off range and bearing of con- tacts from the scope, unless you are using a VG setup. Even with VG, one plotter should wear phones to get IFF and altitude information. In addition, the radar operator must give you all in: formation possible on the altitude of planes, both bogey or bandit and friendly . . . the size of the contact . . . the code showin possible splits jammin; window ... and IFF only. As an air plotter, you must not only expect but must insist on all of this radar information. In addi tion to plotting ALL information given to you by the radar operator you must figure course and speed of bogies, estimate probable position of reports, bogies whenever you fail to receive and plot raid number symbols. FOUR MOST IMPORTANT SYMBOLS Let’s consider the training steps necessary to 2 an expert air plouer. Your radar oper _. ator picks up a contact on the screen and CC) reports to you over the 22]S circuit \' Friendly—two-seven-zero-ten,”” On_ your polar coordinate chart you would plot the proper symbol—a circle—at the bearing line 270 at 10 miles, which is the first concentric range circle. You would know—and everyone in CIG would know—that you have a friendly plane or planes ten miles from your ship. There are four symbols, as shown in RADFOUR, that are most commonly used. “They are the “friend: ly,” “bogey or bandit,” “merged plot” and IFF only. The “friendly” symbol which is the small circle, will be plotted most frequently, ‘The physical setup of the symbol on a standard plotting table using grease pencil is approximately Y4 of an inch across. With lead pencils, the size of the symbol can be reduced, but—and here again is an “insig; nificant” detail, but a very important one during a raid—the symbol must be plotted large enough so it can be fe adily seen by anyone standing some 1 or five feet from the plotting table The “bogey” or “bandit” symbol is a simple cross, again about 14 of an inch across. Bogey is a code word used in Fighter Direction to indicate an unidentified aireralt—repeat—an unidentified aircraft. Remember this! There is no such thing as a ‘friendly bogey.” Too often. even experienced CG personnel talk about friendly bogies.” A bogey is a bogey un til iv is identified either as a friendly or a bandit If it’s identified as a friendly, through IFF or visually or through some other source, you plot it as a friendly contact—a circle—and not as a bogey If the bogey becomes a bandit, which is ntified enemy aircraft, you All bogies, of the code word for id continue using the cross symbol. course, are treated as bandits until identified. By combining the two symbols, friendly and Merged plots are reported by the radar operator when he has bogey, you have the “merged plot friendly and enemy aircraft at the same bearing. This when friendly planes intercept an enemy nge and ppens most frequently raid and there is a sky battle in progress. You may also get merged plot reports when friendly strikes return with some aircraft showing IFF and some not showing IFF You may also get merged plot reports when your friendly strikes return and are trailed by enemy planes sneaking in to avoid detection! Don’t assume all planes in a group are friendly Get identifying because some are showing IFF CONFIDENTIALreports from visual lookouts as well as radar reports. Here is a good example of the importance of air plot in evaluating the air picture in order to disseminate information so that optimum use may be made of it. he fourth symbol most often used is the one for IFF only, which is the friendly symbol with a line drawn through it, At times, due to the Jimitations of radar, you will be unable to pick up a contact due to the fact that the aircraft may be flying through a null area or low enough to escape detection by your air search radar. It is common, under these circum. stances, to pick up IFF only. Your radar operator will generally report range and bearing, but here again you must evaluate your plot remember ing that IFF only is tsually very accurate in range, but not in bearing. For example, a contact: “IFF only two-seven-zero, ten” would tell you that a friendly aircraft is ten miles from your ship, but whether or not it’s at twoseven-zero is difficult to determine unless you watch for subsequent radar reports on friendly aircraft ten miles away. Match up IEF reports with radar reports whenever possible. LEARNING THE POLAR COORDINATE One of the most important phases of learning this business of air plot- ting is to know the polar coordinate chart thoroughly. “There must be no hesitation in plotting the proper symbol at the correct bearing and range; in fact this process should be completely automatic. Immediately upon getting a report of a contact from the radar operator, you should be able to drop your pencil down to the table, then quickly but neatly plot the proper symbol, and take your hand off the board. ‘To do this accurately requires practice. Having learned the four most frequently used symbols you are ready for these exercises in learning the polar coordinate chart. ‘The first exercise consists of having someone in CIG read off ranges and bearings of various targets in this manner: “Bogey, two-seven-zero, ten «+ friendly, one-cightzero, twenty... merged plot, two-two-five, twenty: five . . . IFF only, three-five-two-forty-two ... etc.” As you become more proficient, the time lapse between each contact should be decreased. As a further aid in learning the polar coordinate, make up cards approximately nine inches square with one bearing line drawn on each ‘There should be either thirty-six or seventy-two of these cards made up, with the correct bearing written out on the back of each card. Hold these cards up in much the same way you would aireraft identification cards and guess the bearing. In the beginning, it is sometimes difficult to get within ten degrees of the proper answer, but after practice, you should be able to hit every bearing on the nose without hesitation. TIMING PLOTS After you have mastered the first four symbols a polar coordinate reasonably well, it is time for “timing stressed that air plotting is an up-to-the-minute proposition; in fact timing is so important that getting the time down to the nearest minute is not enough. For this reason, the clock has been divided into four parts, each part comprising fifteen seconds of time. These four parts or quadrants are called Exponents 1, 2, 3 and the “no” exponent known more generally as the “even number.” On most ships you will find direct reading clocks where it is possible to read off these exponents with little or no trouble In timing plots, you use the regular Navy system’ of four digits for hour and minutes plus an exponent d have learned the ” plots. It has been he time that goes down on the CONFIDENTIAL plotting table is the time of the report and NOT the time AFTER you've finished plotting the symbol. “This is important. You may get the report a contact from the radar operator at time exponent two, but by the time A 11 have physically plotted that contact it may be time exponent three tually only a few seconds may have elapsed; yet ‘you introduce a time if iles. lag of fifteen seconds representing an error of several Whenever you have established a definite track of a flight of aircraft and begin connecting your plots, you drop the first two digits—the “hour digits”—in order to speed up your plotting and avoid a cluttered up board The first plot in a new hour, of course, is recorded with four dig After you have learned how to time plots by doing several random plot ses, you are ready to begin track development, exer TRACK DEVELOPMENT The track of an air contact is developed primarily from radar reports In wack development, the raid is usually more complex than a friendly track for the reason that you must have more information on the raid for tactical purposes. In order to bring logic into this business of air plotting by showing when, and how and why symbols and abbreviations are used, let's plot a typical raid track. Your radar operator picks up a contact, say on the SK, which he reports to you by phone: “Many bogies, three-five-zero, eighty, closing You've been keeping close tab on the time—especially on the exponent. Your first move is to-plot the bogey symbol, the cross, at the correct range and bearing, and then the time, using four digits for this first of a series of connected plots. Without any loss of motion, you draw the “raid number circle,” which a circle placed near this first plot. This circle is the largest symbol on .¢ board and is about the size of a half dollar on the standard plotting ble, It is important that this raid number symbol be plotted immediately after getting the first bogey report in order to draw attention to the bogey symbol itself which is small and could very easily be overlooked by the CIC watch officers. When possible, the direction of movement of a bogey is indicated at this initial plot by an arrow. In this instance, the bogey was reported as “closing”; therefore, the arrow points toward the center of the board. This arrow is joined to the raid number circl Finally, without loss of motion, you plot the information on the size of the bogey, placing it in a rectangular box along the bogey track. This box should be close enough to the bogey symbol so that anyone interpreting the plot will know that the information was given at the same time the symbol was plotted. Using our illustration “Many bogies,” the inf box is MB which is the abbreviation for “many bogies. ‘There are three abbreviations suggesting general size of a raid: “MB for many bogies representing over ten aircraft in the flight; “FB” for few bogies, two to ten planes; and “1B” for a single plane. To air plotting veterans, it will be noted that these abbreviations, now doctrine, differ from abbreviations used in Fighter Direction earlier in the game. In “boxing’ ation on the size of the raid, the box should be large enough to accommodate the first estimate of the specific number of = in the contact if that information is given to you in the next minute ation that goes in this two. 10007 CONFIDENTIAL S¥61 ¥3EOLDO 19.19.C.1.C. OCTOBER 1945 22,000 sk 022 03? e et Bros eee eee Ors a Tae x052 Most of you are acquainted with the fact that each radar has an antenna which is spring affair or dish usually located on the mast that “sweeps” so many revolutions per minute or minutes. The rate of revolution is controlled by the radar operator and may vary from once every twenty seconds to once every two minutes for a 360 degree sweep. A beam is sent out antenna which “strikes” the plane or planes and the returning echo makes it possible for the radar operator to see a blip or pip on the radar screen. This beam goes out in the direction the radar antenna is pointed; thus our first contact was at a bearing of 350. For purposes of illustra- tion, let's assume our radar antenna sweeps once every minute; therefore, one minute later the antenna again points toward the general direction of the contact, and this same plane or planes appear on the radar screen. The radar operator veports: “Many bogies, th e-two, seven, ten to twelve pla gels high, Again you plot the bogey symbol, a cross, at the correct range and hearing with the correct time. Assuming the first time was 1000' seventy CONFIDENTIAL this plot might be 01°. Note that in timing, use only two digits after you start developing track. You quickly analyze this new plot and note th4 the plane has traveled approximately three mill in one minute which suggests this is the same con: iat was picked up a minute ago; therefor you connect this symbol to the previous plot with a straight line. For neatness and readability it is best that space be left between the plots and the ends of the line, The radar operator has now given you a specific number of aircraft: ten to twelve planes. You have two methods, therefore, of labeling your track as to the size of the raid, the first, using MB or FB, being a rough estimate of bogey size, and the second, and more accurate wa ally put down t tact. , is to actu ¢ number of planes in the con- In this illustration, because the specific number of planes was given to you only a minute after the initial plot, it is legitimate to place this figure—10-12—in the same box with the abbrevia tion MB; however, if this estimate comes later, or if a different estimate is made later it is placed in a separate box beside the plot when this estimate is made and the letter P_ (for Plane) is placed in, the box behind the number. In this illustration it would be 10-12P, boxed. This radar report also carries the oe c “Angels High.” Angels is a code word meaniy Altitude. In comparing or contrasting surfa and air plotting, the most important factor to re member is this: In air plot you are dealing with a “three-dimensional” picture which means you must not only consider the direction and range of the contact from your ship, but also how high the plane is flying. No information plot is more important than altitude ar raid; yet these two factors are most often forgotten by sloppy air plotters. At no time should it ever be necessary for anyone to ask you: “What is the altitude of the bogey?” or “What is the size of the bogey?” Radar operators should automatically give you this information, and you should make certain that they do. In our illustration, “AH” is boxed. general terms for altitude are Angels Low” at you size of ‘The two Angels High” and and are plotted “AH” and “AL.” Doctrine does not explain when “Low” becomes “High” so it is necessary for you to adopt some rule on your ship, A fairly safe rule-of-thumb might be that you use Angels High when the pilots are using oxygen which is roughly at “? thousand feet By this time, this raid may have been desig: nated by a number. When a raid has been so desig nated it is identified on the plot by a number Jaced in the raid number circle. The antenna makes another 360 degrees sweep, Bid the radar operator reports: “Bogey, three four-eight, seventy-four, altitude 22,000." It is important to record all altitude changes, and, whenever possible, give altitude in specific ‘has “22,000” rather than “AH” or When altitude information is available nd boxed. “Angels imate, Age meanin when the altitude is only an es 22,000" although for Fighter Direction purposes it is bet- ter to write out the figure completely without the A. This reduces the danger of the FDO's slipping and using the code word “Angels” in giv ing out this bogey dope Here it might be noted that the radar operator has reported the target at three different bear ings: 350, 352, and 348. By connecting these plots, it would appear the plane is flying a rig dag course; this, of course, is a false assumption, as a Zig zag plan is not part of air plotting . . . the pilots fly straight on a compass heading! ‘The reason for this phenomenon is the width of the radar beam, making it impossible, at times, for fe radar operator to actually “split the beam’ so Jor this reason it is necessary to record course and speed on the plotting table. According to RADFOUR a minimum of three plots is necessary to determine initial course and speed, and at least two plots are needed to determine a change in course or speed. The only exception is within twenty miles when one plot is considered to indicate a change.. Changes in course and speed of less than 30° or 30 knots are, normally, not to be recorded. To determine course, a smooth imaginary | is drawn through the plots in the direction which the track is taking. In our illustration, it would appear that the raid is coming in on course 170. Ina box “C170” is recorded. By measuring with a pencil, you determine that the plane traveled six miles in two minutes which represents a speed of 180 knots. This is recorded in the same box with the course estimate—"S 180." A good rule- of-thumb for quickly calculating speed is to multi- ply by 0 the distance made good in three minutes, Thus, if a plane traveled eight miles in three min- ites, 8 x 20 equals 160 knots, or the speed of the jane. Iv is especially important to check course and speed of raids within twenty to thirty miles of One of the most effective methods of combating the Kamikaze was to keep an accu check on speed. A terrific increase in speed, for instance, indicates diving tactics. This is a good example of how an excellent air plot can be used for interpreting the enemy's tactics which gives a clue to the future couse of the raid. EPA AND FADE LINE Your principal source of information for air plotting is from radar contacts, but radar is not infallible. ‘There are times when you will not be getting radar reports due to fades, land echoes, jamming, radar interference and other mechanical difficulties. You will discover, too, that on occa sion the operator will fail to. report contacts Again this up-to-theminute business must be re peated; therefore, you, as an air plotter, must Keep that raid plot up-to-the-minute in spite of a lack of information. To do this, you plot Esti- mated Position Arcs or EPAS as they are generally called. An Estimated Position Arc is a dashed semi circle constructed between the raid and the t These EPAs are plotted every minute from the last known “fix” of the raid, To construct 3 EPA, you first figure the speed of the plane, then construct the arc using the fix as the center of the arc with the speed determining the radius. If the speed of the bogey is 180 knots, then the plane will fly approximately three miles per minute and the radius of your first arc will be three miles. At the end of the second minute, you construct another EPA, again using the fix as the center, but this time the radius is six miles, Another minute passes and you construct the third ai providing you have not received any reports The radius of this arc is nine miles. These arcs represent the possible position of the raid, You continue to construct these arcs as long as it is necessary in order to protect your ship. A CIC watch officer will tell you when to knock off these EPAs. ‘When and if you do get a radar report on the raid, you comnect the two “fixes” with a solid line through the EPAs. Due to the peculiarities of definite null areas at certain ranges and altitudes where it is impossible to pick up a contact. When a plane enters one of these areas, the radar ope ator will report: “Bogey fading,” or “Bogey has faded.” You will then plot a wavy line after r, there are CONFIDENTIAL ‘S61 ¥390190 “919CLC. OCTOBER 1945 the last plot given, and when the bogey reappears, another fade line is placed just before this new plot. This wavy line, on the star table, is approximately one-half to three-quarters of an inch long. While the bogey is in a fade you construct EPAs. It is important that these fade lines are parallel to @ tangent of the ra They necessarily at right angles to the raid track, espe cially if the raid is cross Placing these fade lines at the correct range makes it possible for the person computing the altitude from a fade chart to tell at a glance the range at which the raid faded and at which it reappeared. Actually, in air plotting, there is no symbol so often “misused as the fade Try, when you learn to plot, to grayp the significance of this symbol—that the ob- ject of plotting it in the right lox the proper range—and you will not experience any trouble in determining fade most important factor in altitude determination te SO (204. lard_ plotting are not tion is to get RED 164] 6 os? j A 10] 6 O DEVELOPING THE FRIENDLY TRACK nected in the same manner as bogey contacts, but there are differences in the information necessary on the two tracks. On the friendly track, no raid designations, fade lines or Fstimated Position Arcs are used. Infor mation on course and speed is seldom used and will be plotted only if directed by the CIC watch officer or someone in cha One important addition to the friendly wack is the code of IFF shown by a friendly contact. If CONFIDENTIAL the code showin is plotted. symbol is code three, this information #3—and is not boxed. The nu and the number itself should be I enough t6 be easily read Whenever possible, the name of the division 4 divisions, if known, is placed beside the track amt boxed. For instance, if the track of division Red 1 and Red 4 is being plotted, you may put “Ry & 4” beside your track ina neat box. IF there is a possibility that abbreviation might be misinter preted, print the ent divisions: “Red 1 & 4. Altitude is recorded by plotting in a box the letter A for angels and the altitude in thousands of feet names of the ADDITIONAL SYMBOLS AND. ABBREVIATIONS, One of the most important symbols in air plot ting is the symbol for Emergency IFF. If friendly plane is in trouble the pilot will turn o his emergency IFF signal which will be reported to you by the radar operator: “Emergency IF two-four-seven-twenty two. This symbol is a circle, the same as the fri symbol, only the letter Eis plotted inside the circle. ‘The emergency IFF symbol should be at least twice as large as the friendly symbol, q roughly a half-inch in diameter Yon dtp i track of a friendly showing emergency IFF exactl he regular friendly track—connect ing the plots, and trying to determine which plane is in trouble if you have a status board that might ndly as you would give you this information. The symbol for Emergency IFE Only is that for Fmergency IFF—a circle with an E—with the addi tion of a diagonal line. When the radan operator reports. “Jamm the symbol you plot is a circle with the letter J on, the outer rim of your plotting table on the ap proximate bearing reported by the operator symbol looks exactly like a This is The sun or moon kindergarten drawing of a sun or moon. an are with rays going out from the arc and is plotted on the edge of the board at the proper bearing. ‘The angle of elevation of the moon or sun should be included in this symbol. The posi tion of the sun is very important information to a Fighter Director officer. ‘The best intercept tac tie is to bring his fighter planes “out of the sun”: therefore, plot in the symbol for the sun whenever possible, RADFOUR has five rather important ab: breviations to be used when your friendly a intercept an enemy raid; they are: TH, F, R, B, and H. TH is the abbrevi- ation for Tallyho which is the code word used by friendly pilots when they sight the enemy. F means Fish or enemy torpedo planes; R for Rats, enemy fighters; B is bombers; and H is Hawks or enemy dive bombers. Your plot ing job is to plot the TH for tallyho and then, in the same box, record all information given by the pilot. If the pilot reports: ““Tallyho, ten rats, five hawks,” your box would have TH—10 R, 5 H. Naturally the pilot does not always report in code. A typical report might be: ‘“Tallyho, 1 Emily.” In this case, the information ‘1 Emily” would be printed completely. ‘This Tallyho “information box” should be as close to the merged plot as possible Finally, when a raid splits, label the various splits with letters preceded hy the number of the raid. For example, if a raid designated as raid 3 should split, one part of the split would be gA. the other 3B. If 3A should split, one branch of the split would retain the gA tag, the other would become gG. (See illustration in Part 6 of USF-10B.) SUMMARY You have all the symbols and abbreviations necessary for air plotting asshown in RADFOUR, The difficult part is to be able to plot these air plot symbols and abbreviations with speed, accuracy, neatness and legibility ‘To do this requires practice—and more practice! Sanned problems” are the solution in learning how to air plot. There are many of these training problems in Appendix A of RADFOUR. but it is advisable to make up your own canned problems to supplement these, stressing close range attacks, ‘The major difficulty in any simulated attacks of this kind is the tend. ency to become sloppy in your air plotting. Realizing that this is not the eal thing, you may adopt an attitude of “This doesn’t matter,” an attitude hat will defeat the very purpose of the training, A proven aid to plotting canned problems is tissue overlays. Each problem should be accurately plotted on a tissue overlay to be used as a check: thus, by laying this tisstie over your problem on the plotting table you can quickly see if your symbols and abbreviations are plotted correctly and if they are large enough to be readily seen from four or five feet away yet not too large to make the track confusing Concentrate on your training. Be determined to air plot as well as you know how. Itis deplorable, but true, that many experienced radarmen in the fleet today still have not learned the fundamentals of good air plot ting simply because they have never been conscientious about those very important molehills: “Square up boxes! The purposes of these boxes is to make your plot more legible, not more confusing. . . . Keep off board. Remember: You plotting for the benefit of someone else, not yourself. . . . Plot accurately This does not mean slowly . . . and, of course, be up-to-the-minute at all * CONFIDENTIAL Q 9 gC.1.C, OCTOBER 1945 CIC-RADCM coordination pags nn the early stages of the Pacific war, radar coun uures activities were confined to investi acteristics and term gations of Japanese radar chi locations, partly to aid in making undetected is, and partly to collect pproaches to enemy ar the information needed to desig tion finders, and deceptive devices. summer of 1944. preliminary work was initiated on the standardization of shipboard and airborne RADCM' equipment. ‘Then began the longest and most difficult stage in RADCM development king fleetwide installations and taining radar personnel to operate the equipment and training GIG personnel to control RADCM operations information derived tactical ners, direc In the late and utilize the important from intercept receivers for immediate There was considerable variation in the extent to which CIC officers made use of their RADCM facilities in the Okinawa operation. This illus trated the need for further training and appre tion of the tactical uses of RADEM. For example many ships felt that their RADCM obligations had been discharged when they reported the mere fact that certain Japanese shore-based radars ab ready listed in the CinGPac Publication" Japa nese Shore-Based Rad were in use and that Japanese aircraft used window when at tacking, Actually, this was a mere beginnin Aboard other ships, attempts were made to evalu ate the ability of the enemy to use his early-warn. ing radars for GCI or FDO. purposes. Others D-F'ed the shore stations and determined their locations for later destruction by bombing or bombardment All of the foregoir iar Locations tasks, together with coor dinated j represent “run of the mill RADCM functions. In other cases, shrewd com binations of RADCM and FDO tactics were em ployed to advantage, A radar officer from the USS BUNKER HILL (CV 17) made this state ment: “It was soon discovered that jamming caused enemy planes to orbit aimlessly at ranges of 15-20 miles. Adva s taken of this con: dition by vectoring fighters to such areas, and, as TRADCM is the approved joint abbreviation for Radar Countermeasures. CONFIDENTIAL a result, a number of planes were shot down, The most successful employment of such tech- a special action BB 57) niques reported to date appears it report of the USS SOUTH DAKOTA covering the Okin wa operations. "COORDINATION BETWEEN RADCM AND CIC 1—"During the period covered by this report many instances were logged in which RADCM operators were able to pick up an enemy airborne radar signal before the source of the signal was detected as an airsearch radar contact. Time dif ference between such intercept and initial air has varied in such cases from. search radar cont two to twelve mi 2"On the SOUTH DAKOTA close coordina tion has existed between RADCM and CIC on many occasions where a bearing determination has been made, based upon a comparison of enemy radar signal strength. RADCM operators h been able to alert or coach air sea Hh radars on fe the approach bearing of enemy planes not yet di tected by the latter equipment. ‘The accuracy of such bearing determination has increased with operators’ experience to a point where a bearing y of plus or minus ten degrees has fre- errors ites. quently been attained; at times, bearin have been reduced to zero. j—"Maximum pick-up range of enemy radar sig nals has been about 100 miles, although in some instances such signals have been tracked out to approximately 10 to 140 miles. {—"The following are est illus trating the coordination of RADCM and CIC ac tivities and the further potentialities thereof: few cases of inte a—"On the night of 18-19 March, enemy air and radar activity reached one of its peaks. As m: s seven distinct intercepts were detected at one time in contrast to previous experience when few more than this were made during an entire oper tion, During the course of the night in question there were five instances in which RAD‘ CIC information on intercepts and bearing de terminations of anticipated enemy raids which, were subsequently detected on the SK radar ¢ c§vidends bearings RADCM agreeing with those determined by b—“During the same night two cases of special interest developed: 1—“At one time two bogies, one to the south and one to the southwest, both at a range of about 50 miles, were being pursued by night fighters. Both intercepting planes made radar contact with their target_at about the same time and asked the controlling FDO for per mission to open fire ‘without visual identifica tion.’ Both were given a ‘waitout’ followed by a ‘negative’ from FDO. The SOUTH DAKOTA had a definite bearing on a radar in. tercept_ which agreed with the search radar bearing on the bogey to the south. Informed of this RADCM bearing solution, the FDO then granted the intercepting fighter pursuing the southern bogey permission to open. fire. Shortly thereafter this pilot splashed his tar get and identified it as a Betty 3 2—“Later that night a bogey developed at 1g0°, 1 A night fighter was vectored out to investigate, but was recalled be fore interception developed .on_ the premise that the contact was friendly. This ship had radar intercept on that bearing and upon so informing the FDO, the interception was resumed. Another Betty was splashed. ¢ about 70 miles, c—"During the night of 26 March, an active night, on the strength of an intercept and bear ing determination reported by the SOUTH DA- KOTA to the group FDO, a night fighter was sta tioned in an orbit at some distance from the task group on the reported bearing. No bogey con- tact developed on the airsearch gear but the inci dent docs suggest the possibilities of such pre asi siderably out-range air-search rad: pick-up, extensive potentialities ai ¢ early RADCM intercepts may_con- in the original indicated in the tactical employment of such information for the purpose of alerting and coaching air-search radars on to the bearing of anticipated contacts ¢ affording the group FDO an opportunity to hierpose friendly fighters on the bearing of an expected enemy raid, minutes before airsearch radars pick up the radar source as a bogey. Full realization of these potentialities will not be made ntil ships are equipped with well engineered, actory’ made, rotatable, directional receiving ntennas.”* The type of GIC-RADCM cooperation de scribed above illustrates a more subtle action than \ere radar interception to detect the presence of a radar-equipped enemy or jamming to destroy his dar capabilities. It proves that the enemy may be found and destroyed by his own use of radar This is the use of RADCM which pays dividends in enemy ships sunk and planes downed, and for the RADCM data reaching the CIC officer must be carefully evaluated and, whenever possible, translated into immediate action. ITOR'S NOTE: DEM-I D/F equipment fulfilling these requirements is now being installed in the feet CONFIDENTIAL Srbl_¥3O1ID0 DD.C.1.€. OCTOBER 1945 cIC time-motion study CONFIDENTIAL caling in bogies ational fixes, maneuver defense, aircraft control and station keeping like big busi and applied psychologists to assure that efficiency of G g- bombardinent, AA. big business. And >in thes »perations keeps pace with technical advancement and tactical doctrine, First notice of a CIC efficiency analysis reached the Fleet in mid-1944 via PacFleet dispatch announcing arrangements for a small group of Unt versity specialists to make an initial study of CIC's in operation. The ob- ject of this study was to suggest the best combination of CIC equipment and personnel to accomplish a specified job. Those in CIC who at that time vis ualized gown-draped college professors, stop watch in hand, getting into the hair of busy FDO's, GLO’s, operators, plotters and talkers during the height of action were doomed to disappointment. The Navy arranged for these studies to be made under CotCLant and CotGPac supervision on the shake- down of new and recently repaired ships as they received polishing up treat- ment prior to departure to Forward Areas. These are more or less simulated exercises to be sure, but personnel and equipment were placed in a Con- dition One atmosphere. The Experimental Psychologists and time-motion specialists who made this study were given the regular courses at St. Simons or Hollywood in the manner of all CIC officers. Upon completion of this preparatory training the group was directed to approach their study with no thought toward add- ing to “CIC gadgetry"—but rather as a simple study of: What can the man do, What can the equipment do and, What is the best arrangement of both for most efficient operation Allowance was made for different layouts and flexibility of CIC ops tion that always is to be found from ship to ship. For example, the timel motion study of AA target indication on one ship included detection by SK| SP and SG radars; target indication to both secondary battery and 40 mm. guns from: 1—Air plot using voice coaching, 2—Remote PPI in conjunction with air plot by voice coaching, g—VF, and 4—SK radar PPI using TDT Mk 10. ‘Actual time analysis of each separate CIG operation was reduced to a chart form that indicated the sequence of action, the amount of time each .quired and its correlation with other operations. Measuring devices in cluded the stop watch, camera and voice recorder. In this way the move ment and activity of each man was graphically recorded many times over to include a variety of action conditions—. e., for the Evaluator, the time sp watching the plot, evaluating data, talking on $/P, walking to VE or RPPI, observing status board, waiting, consulting FDO, listening to TBS, et cetera, The actual time measurements of each person, equipment and op: eration made possible a logical analysis of each CIC that was studied using quantitative objective data rather than personalized subjective impressions, The focal point of this quantitative analysis is the Systems Research Laboratory located at Beay mestown, Rhode Island. The lab is sponsored jointly by CominCi hips, BuOrd, BuAer and ORI. Spe- Cifically, it is set up to measure the limits of performance of a CIC as designed, to evaluate newly developed CIC equipment and to make recommendations toward improvements in CIG equipment, design and operation. To this lab oratory come at any one time not more than one-half of the Shipboard Re: search Group with their time-motion data, They join with a Technic s, CIG has employed time-motion study ve Systems Research Laboratory fs designed to. mock-up and. to lest under simulated combat gnditions, all” types of CIC's. (SP, SK-2, SC-2, SX, SG and u IEF receivers are directly ble or are remoted [rom bey egg fas, “Phe Too) & built to'xippors fire con trol directors. New! and existing tle equipmcate ae brought fo this setup. for “imtaediate valuation under combo cont tions. Compafate» measure aterelive C10 ljoutt cam be made. The Cle Laboratory arce (25 B40) has sevable partion Iapendel Screamo able floor pancls which make tt frsibte 1 reproduce any ste or hapa G16 on tor onder. he mobile floor panels (ise) cover table wells ‘which ‘house ‘ade tate ‘lecrcal, sound power, Mterphone and radio. duit Fhe permit ques, relcaton of any EC equipment repardias abit or welt pose—to find ways of improving layout and opera tion, and to suggest changes in layout for further experimental evaluation within the laboratory. The Shipboard Research and the Technical Groups operate on a rotating plan whereby half of each group is engaged in gathering data in the field while the remainder collaborate as an Evalut ation Group at the laboratory THE LABORATORY IS FLEXIBLE ‘The Systems Research Laboratory has facilities for mocking up and simulating realistically the op: eration of any CIG, as well as the many ship con trol and fire control stations associated with CIC. full complement of various equipments, flexible ical connections and movable bulkheads petmit setting up exactly the same GIG layout as was studied afloat. Assigned squadrons from nearby Quonset provide air targets, while mechan ical simulators provide air and surface targets for the various radar indicators. Battle problems are realistic. Laboratory personnel are trained as a typical CIC team, The laboratory analysis separates each prob: desist fer levee ol wads, First, sno Wb mental desi mn for best use. This concerns stich phases as size of scales, location of handles and the placement of scopes. Second, the operating factors or the method of doing the operation function or process involved. associating equipments-t Bef ce re dae Third, the This step means ther to best carry out ether. Fourth, CONFIDENTIA St61 Y380190 O19C.1C. OCTOBER 1945 Spotting wasted m CONFIDENTIAL step directs the coordination of all equipment personel of receiving raw information in CIG and ‘Command: The overa to cut to a minimum all delays and sources of inaccuracies between receiving and disseminating information THE The lab has been called “Systems” Research be cause emphasis is not on individual pieces of evaluation of each “system asawhole. This final tion. For example, a piece of r equipment nated from the standpoint of and operations concerned with the its physical characteristic—its_ frequency width, pulse lobe pattern. and Systems Research supplements this in- om. formation by giving answers to questions such as of this four-level analysis is pulse repetition rate and to gunnery; and to nav purpo: When operated by typical personnel, how many target fixes can the radar handle per minute? What is the normal deg of error in these fixes?” “How much time lag is there between the appearance of the pip on the scope and the dis. semination of range and be: "SYSTEMS" IDEA by the op. What are’the details—such as location erator?” and size of controls, and types of cursors—which ach fix?” The data provided by the measurements e equipment as opera in beings as an integral part of an or under combat con $¥61 ¥390190 O19. CONFIDENTIAL 39C.1C. OCTOBER 1945 mera and stofreatch auginen ditions aboard ship binds these answers to ticality. The method employed by the Evalua- tion Group in the lab spreads the study from one equipment to the next, one person to the next, all the way along the informational Jane from radar to Command, radar to jery, radar to Navi gator and so on. Component parts of CIC activities are then iso- lated for analysis and measurement. The opera tion of plotting, for instance, both on polar co- ordinate and geographical plots, is studied in order to determine the plotting load—the number of target fixes, courses and speeds a single plotter or team of plotters can handle. In addition a pro: cedure called “micromotion study” is applied in order to determine the quickest and most accurate plotting methods. Motion pictures are made which permit a detailed breakdown of the elements of motion and the time involved in current ploi techniques. These techniques are then revised to cut to a minimum unnecessary motion and de lays. This works toward the much needed reduc- tion of time lag between radar and plot. Simi methods can be used to determine the best tech niques for operating radar and other equipments A CRUISER STUDY While the actual findings of the many time motion studies which have been made are far too numerous to recount, the potentialities of a Sys tems Research study is demonstrated by the gested CIC arrangement for a new class of cruisers. ght CONFIDENTIAL This study showed how to minimize necessary king, eliminate crowding at each piece of equipment, and to insure maximum acc Ly to each station at GQ. In addition, equipm was arranged to provide more efficient handling by condition watch personnel, standby facilities in case of failure, and adequate space for main- tenance. Typical of suggested modifications for these cruisers was: Relocation of plotting equip ment to eliminat combining VG and DRT while reloca and associated g and Range Repeaters, and moving the SK closer to Air Plot—moves which halved both the viewing and the walking paths of the original layout LABORATORY FACILITIES ALSO. USED FOR NEW DEVELOPMENTS The third phase of a Systems Research which in reality supplements research and evaluation is the developmental phase. Results of the shipboard study and laboratory evaluation phases are given direct consideration during experimental develop- ment of equipment alterations that will tangibly affect the efficiency of CIC operators. The Sys: tems Research: Laboratory facilities are often used by Radiation Laboratory engineers for testing specific CIG equipments in order to incorporat new electronic changes with Systems Resea tested improvements in equipment layout and of eration, For example, the VG has been subjected to many tests based upon findings of aggregate shipboard and laboratory time-motion studies. Modifications suggested for the VG include a high heat unit (150° G) introduced to reduce reten tivity of the image; voltage “souped up” from 9 KV to 15 KV to provide better contrast, and the recommended relocation of certain operator con- trols for greater ease of operation. Other equi ments, as well as ship GIG layouts, undergo ex- periments of the Developmental Group. with equal results. ‘The application of industrial engineering tech niques to CIC operations was showing the antici ed results at the time the Jap capitulated. Suggested modifications emanating from these original time-motion studies were helping CIC teams pass information about the ship with the finesse mindful of the Bears’ backfield handling the ball in the “I” Formation. Whatever the future of the physical set-up of Systems Research, certainly the mechanics of this type of analysis will be advantageously applied by Naval offieg in shaping the CIC. of the future ¢ q } loestablisn a fie Ntpes a il” is an appropriate expresion when GIG rolls out range and bearing da to correlate the ship's navigational fixes with target locations for shore bombardment so- lutions. “But this “first throw accuracy” is done with carefully developed techniques and pro- Cedutes (RADSIX)—in no way to be associated with the phenomena of bouncing cubes. In fact. obtaining accurate pinpoint fixes suitable for shore bombardment during low visibility or for lirect firing presents some rather complex g-- in CIC > accomplish this function CIC usually re lies upon the DRT and surface search radar. “The potential inaccuracies introduced into the DRT’s track by the pit log when the ship is maneuver ing or steaming slowly, by the dead time involved in taking a range and bearing, passing the data over sound power to Gunnery Plot to incorporate these values into the rangekeeper or computer, and by erratic time intervals which often occur in obtaining reports at the DRT must be ed. And, the ) climin: choice of the proper cessing it within Gunnery Plot method of obtaining radar fixes may also mean If the DRT is equipped with external hand The “bearing tangent method” is best when the target is parallel to line of sight. A single sharp target can be used to establish @ fix. The “runge tangent method’ is best when the target is perpendicular to line CIC and shore bombardment sight. ‘Two well separated poinis of land ave req the difference between a fair or an exceilent bi bardment. Some carefully developed techniques and procedures that have been developed by CIC personnel to overcome these potential inaccura cies are outlined here, DRT NOT ENERGIZED To eliminate time lag and pit log inaccura Gies the DRT “bug” is often not energized. Actual navigational fixes should be available consistently without excessive time intervals between fixes. In using a “successive fix. method” of maintaining ship's position, it is desirable to have a fix each minute. IF excessive time intervals do develop, it is highly desirable the DRT “bug” be positioned as each fix is obtained so that the bug” may indicate ship’s position during the period within which no other data is available. sand bearings 10 the target are de relation to the g allowances for the aforementioned dead time involved in passing this information to and pro: Nc CONFIDENTIAL42 cranks to facilitate posit ever a fix is obt bu; ing the “bug” when ined, it is desirable to use the in this fashion even when fixes are aybil able each minute, There are three advantages: 1—By watching the movement of the “bug,” it is simple to pick a point slightly ahead of the pres ent position of the “bug” to pass down the range and bearing thus obtained to Plot Standby approaches the measur ing point, and to give “Mark” as the “bu reaches the point. This method avoids unneces. sary delays in dead time allowance. When the bug” is not used, it is necessary to dead reckon to a future point along ship's track for a prede termined time interval, and this time interval (in order to allow for all contingencies) is often ex. cessive for the individual case as the “bug’ 2—As successive fixes are obtained, a graphic pic ture is available of the actual ship's movement against the dead reckoned position. Thus, set and drift of the current are determined. With two or three fixes, it becomes simple to determine whether set and drift are relatively constant; and, where they prove to be, it is easy to measure these values so as to incorporate corrections for laying 5 more accurately. This is done by using the reciprocal of the set as target course and drift as target speed in the rangekeeper or computer Even when, under normal operation, fixes are available each minute, occasionally there will be relatively long intervals during whieh accurate in formation is not available. With the “bug” always positioned on the latest fix, these emergen: cies need not affect the smooth flow of target data from CIC to Gunnery Plot ‘One of the most used CIC procedures to pro- vide shore bombardment information involved the use of the DRT together with available radar charts which show what portion of land contour is most likely to produce reliable information Altho these methods will rapidly become obso CONFIDENTIAL lete as VPR gains wider distribution in the Fleet, a discussion of these procedures which involve the choice of the proper method of obi fixes is still of interest to many. Fu this choice should take into consid the “range ta ining radq damental] ion wheth bearing tangents” will The choice: between these two methods should be governed by the type of problem involved; more specifically, much thought must be given to the type or shape of land contour under consideration. For example, a sharp cliff perpendicular to line of sight will afford better fixes by the “range tangent method.” A sharp cliff more or less parallel to line of sight might provide better fixes by the bearing tangent method. An alter desir give the most accurate fix. ive method may of necessity become ple whereby one bearing and one range to a given point will supply the necessary informa- tion to establish a fix. In this procedure it is s- sential to know what portion of the land con: tour is producing the echo. This is done with the aid of devices such as VPR, bombardment over lays, and associated radar navigation charts. At the present time, some ships of the Fleet do not have these aids. Inaccuracies caused by personnel errors and the errors inherently found in a radar add to the difficulties inherent in this metho though these may be definitely improved on proper training plus a thorough knowledge the limitations of the equipment concered. ERRORS INVOLVED The position error dete tangents will rem 2 given range scale be about (+) termined by bearing tan ned by range 1 approximately constant for For the SG this error will 90 yards, The position error de. ents will vary with c. In the case of an isolated target, the total ing error of the SG will approximate (-+) 2 Bearing Equipment ‘and bearing resolution figures of the radar.’ This chart. presenie the tabulated value for several equipments employed. to obtain fader navigational fixes, half the beam width, depending somewhat upon the range involved and which portion of the radiation beam produces the first echo as the an- tenna is trained across the target. At longer ranges nothing but the stronger portion of the beam will produce an echo. As the range decreases, larger portions of the beam will produce the echo. RANGE TANGENTS It is readily apparent that in some cases. the “range tangent method” of obtaining fixes will be the most accurate, The range error remains about constant; whereas, the position error de termined by “bearing tangents” will change with range and in most cases will be greater than the g@pec crror. Therefore, assuming the worst con qe of an ertor of onchalf the bean width, Je SG would have an error of plus or minus 3 degrees. Errors expressed in terms of yards would depend upon the distance from ship to land and would be of the order of For 8000 yards Error — Angle x dis Sin 3° 8000 1052 8000 416 yards For 20,000 yards— Error = Angle distance Sin 3° < 20,000 052 20,000 = 1040 yards At close ranges; ie, 5000 yards, the the outer portion of the radiation bea produces a strong eclo Accuracy jie will opeer on the beatin Range Accuracy Bearing Resolution Range Resolution 200 yds. goo yds, z00 yds, 200 yds, 40 yds. 250 yds. 100 yds, x00 yds. These calculations assume constant angular error however as discussed above, the angular error will decrease with increased range. From a prac tical standpoint alert operations are usually able to improve on these calculated errors. OTHER EQUIPMENTS USED The installation of the VF will greatly improve accuracy in obtaining fixes by the range target method. This is true since the VF has greatly im- proved range accuracy ( 2400 yards range, 100 yds. from 500 to yards from 2500 to 40000 yards) as compared to the master radar, with a correspondingly small increase in bearing accur acy. Many of the large ships have found a definite advantage in using one of their fire control radar sets to obtain fixes since they generally give eater accuracy and better definition than the search radar, (See “Shore Bombardment without DRT,” September “C.LC.”, page 23.) Too much emphasis cannot be placed on a care ful analysis of the immediate problem at hand. The best method for obtaining fixes for one land target may not hold true for another. Action re: ports have indicated trouble in differentiating be tween true and false targets where false targets were produced during low tide from shoals and reefs several hundred yards from the land. indicator approximately $° ahead of the actual bearing because CONFIDENTIAL a1.C. OCTOBER 1945 44 ade extensive use of airborne radar and landbased air warning radar dar ing the Okinawa campaign, and it is also highly probable that airborne radar search receivers were used. *There is no definite evidence that the Japanese used any new radar equipment but there was a marked increase in the use of the Jap Navy's aitborne Mark VI Model 4 and the Army's TA KI Mark I radar. Other radar sets used were the Navy landbased Mark I Model 1 Mark I Model g and the Army landbased CHI (Mark 229 and Mark 231). These so well protected and camouflaged that althou intensive efforts were made to knock them out two equipments r he Japanese mained in operation until their Mark 231, a mobile I Model 3, a portable set sites were captured. The radar, and the Mark NFIDENTI were difficult to pin point because they cou moved to a new location within a few hours. The landbased radars were used to track ships as they left the area at night and also to track bombarding ships as they moved along the coast. It is believed that the course of the retiring ships was plotted and that planes were vectored toward them. It is also highly probable that the Mark 1 Model 3 and the CHI radars were used as beacons for guiding enemy planes to the target area. Gom- parison of plots and intercepts show that when- ever the Mark I Model 3 at Naha was on the air the attacking planes flew a straight course for Naha. Either the Air Mark 6 Model 4 receiver, which tunes from 131 to 171 Me, or a search re- ceiver can be used as a homing device in a pla Te was alo found that whenever the Mark I ol 3 was not in operation, the Jap planes flew zig. zag courses but when the radar came back on, the planes found their course and came in as before nother interesting fact was that the Mark I flodel 3 antenna was held stationary at the time the planes were coming in. The CHI equipment may also have been used in the same manner however, an airborne search receiver would have been required as there is no known airborne radar operating on the CHI frequency. During bombardment, only x few landbased ind. these often shifted their frequency and pulse widths. It is possible they were trying either to escape our jam- T Mark 229, the inter ference from TBS transmissions. Conversely, there were reports that the GHI Mark 229 caused some, but not serious, interference on the TBS. The Air Mark 6 Model 4 and the TA KI Mark 1 were probably also used for plane navigation and to locate our shipping for bombing attacks Although the existence of the TA KI Mark I had been known for some time, this eampaign marked its first extensive use. This equipment does not appear to have mnch advantage over the Navy set except that it has an automatic lobing sys tem which makes the search procedure simpler t seems highly probable that the Japanese were jing some type of intercept receiver to evade our ight fighters. There Wer instances. of enemy planes taking evasive action when our in: terceptors were in position to make a, splash although visual sighting was impossible. This would suggest that the enemy planes were using tail warning radar but in the majority of instances there were no enemy radar intercepts. The Jap flyers were either using a search receiver with a D/F antenna to warn them-of the approaching plane by detecting its radar or possibly the Air Mark 6 Model 4 to detect the inter ceptor’s IFF, Some success was had when the in. tercepting aircraft was ordered to switch off his IFF and not to reply to VHF transmissions. This procedure was not, however, 100 per cent effec tive, Several reports were made by picket ships that when the dusk CAP was ordered to return to base, enemy planes made appearance within a few minutes after the order was given It is believed that they were either monitoring our VHF or more probably using a radar-equipped plane which detected the withdrawal of the CAP and then led other planes to the pickets. De ~~ fact that the use of airborne radar by the radars were on at the same time ming or as with the their kpanese increased since the Iwo Jima campaign they were, at war's end, still far from equipping all their planes with radar. Apparently their latest procedure was to have one radar-equipped plane of an attacking group lead the others, There was also evidence of the use of intercept receivers and fade charts in attempts to ca undetected many ‘There are reports of bogies coming in undetected and some that were sub- ject to frequent fading. A report from a GVE states that several unidentified aircraft came in when the occasion although an unidentified plane was de tected at twenty-four miles GIG was able to get only three plots on him as he closed the forma tion. Other ships of the formation did not pick up the bogey until he had closed to thirteen miles. It is known that the Japanese had under develop ment an airborne intercept receiver which warns the pilot when he is within a radar beam. Also 1 considerable number of documents captured which describe and the results of tests dar screens were clear and that on one ave been the use of fade charts gainst Japanese radars by planes using these fade charts. Although there were some reports of jamming there is still no concrete evidence that the Japa nese deliberately used electronic jamming our raday It is known that they have been work- ing on electronic jammers for some time, but it is believed that because of the critical shortage of electronic equipment very few have been pro: duced. Not discounting the fact that in some few instances the Japanese may have deliberately tried to jam, itis the belief that most jamming has been interference from our own equipment and from harmonics of Japanese equipment Japanese techniques in the use of window at Okinawa showed much improvement and at times effect indiscriminate dropping of window as in, previous invasions, they dropped it in greater volume were very e. Instead of nd in such 0 that many operators were completely confused. Window was more effective on the Mark 12 sand Mark 22 than ever before and in some instances was completely effective in covering the targs When the war ended the far behind us in rad: were steadily Japanese were still development, but they ning ground. CONFIDENTIALC.1.C. OCTOBER 1945 SCR-720 for zenith coverage 4n SCR-730 shipboard installation designed to. permit todding CONFIDENTIAL NI) ozey, overhead high” became a startlingl oftentimes disastrous revelation when Lookout suddenly discovered a Kami kaze Kid cruising about that vulnerable dead zone which the SC, SK and SR. series radars fail to cover. However, the critical prob lem of zenith search, while in the st satisfactorily solved by ge of being scientistengineers was eased considerably by on the spot Naval ingenuity when overhead detection was needed. USS TICONDEROGA led the way earlier this year by tipping an AN/APS-Ga on end in their star board catwalk to comb radar’s blind area directly above their ship. More recently the GV’s TICON DEROGA, HANCOCK and BON HOMME RICHARD. (o- her with USS APPALACHIAN (AGC), USS NORTH GaKoziNa (BB) and uss neisrot. (DD) participated in experimental installations of the Black Widow's more versatile SCR-720 (airborne) radar to ob- tain better overh ner. Several advan answer to the zenith problem, as an interim measure it offered fairly accur ¢ data on air tay ge. It coverage provided a combi 9 most urgently ad detection in a similar man: gained by the SCR d though not the its predecessor to tion overhead search and partial inner search. 9. JOB ANALYSIS A satisfactory zenith watch radar should detect the presence of a plane overhead, determine if the plane is friendly, provide altitude, bearing and range and indicate when the plane is in a dive. The SCR-720 was destined to pinch hit for the AN/APS.6a, and gave promise of meeting these requirements. Although the Japs called the game before the 720 came to bat, an evaluation of the early tests on the HANCOCK, TICONDEROGA, BRISTOL, signed particularly for zenith search could be in- and APPALACHIAN will be of particular interest to stalled. In comparison with results attained by Fleet units which experienced surprise visitors the SG-1¢ (designation of SG with Mod 54) Com overhead while the Jap was still active mander Amphibious Group Three reports “two FGF's flying at 30,000 feet were detected by both screen data than is possible with the other model. ‘The scanner speed is fast enough to follow planes over the ship. And, a dive looks just like a dive on the Bscope—the target echo moves rapidly down: ward while the C-scope indicates nearly constant position angle. All in all, the 720 adapted to this Collateral duty will give adequate warning of a plane overhead, its range and altitude, and some tip-off as to its apparent mission, With an APX-2 interrogator synchronized with the 720's range mark on a separate IFF display scope (APA-1), a fairly complete overhead picture would have been available until shipboard equipment de SCR720's APTITUDE radars at a maximum slant range of 5 miles. Scope presentation of the SG gave both true and relative + These tests showed that the SGR-720 detects bearing, the 720 relative bearing only. ‘The planes at distances beyond the range of the AN/ adapted airborne equipment provides position jore accu ion angle APSia. Its target presentation gives rate azimuth determ angle information and its B and C scopes give an tageous presentation. Qicsceofrn 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 q |" one | two wo | one | two | one | two | one | pane | planes | plane | planes plones| plane | planes | plane | planes | plane Maximum slant range nautical miles at target | 3-0 (2.6 | 3.7 | 3-5 [48 | 53 | 62 Computed position angle itd ct inereases Best 0 ft. Operators were able 10 follow targets in a dive without any dfieu Jest runs with @ DD installation shows that slant range increases as ‘and 20 Maximum slant range nantical miles) that target Ms Results of « fou lest on the USS HANCOCK Circling the ship become immediately apparent on the SCR be resotoed when fying Ys mi plane (Fé more apart A —_——_ CONFIDENTIAL Sh6| 4380190 “9.19C.1.€. OCTOBER 1945 Vs airborne gear “stretches out” aboard ship. The 7230's Modulator Unit installed on a CV REQUESTS FOR “C. I. C. disses rior to July 1944 are no longer avilable) CONFIDENTIAL NAVY—The Chief of Naval Operations, Balt Washington 25, D. C. cifdresed SCR-720's LIMITATIONS This adaptation did not provide “sees all—telly all” security, for it was not without limitations Planes flying in heavy cloud strata were not de tected due to cloud echo. Bearing and elevation data was badly smeared at elevation angles greater than 70° due to an overlapping of radiation pat tern. Planes within 14 mile of the ship disappea in clutter at the bottom edge of the scope. Azimuth accuracy is about (=) 15 degrees. Position angles could be indicated on G scope to not better than () 10 degrees and unless the antenna is stabil ized the degree of inclination from ship's roll will add ta this error. If searching practice is to nod the antenna between its maximum limits the tr gets will appear and disappear at the nodding rate. Based upon these early experiments the follow ing recommendations are made for operation of quipment. The 100 RPM scan is used and tacking planes outside of two miles range while the 360 RPM scan should be used for close-in targets and planes overhead. The azimuth blanking and unblanking switch installed fon this equipment by PacFleet Radar Center is satisfactory and necessary for interpretation of tar get bearings in the scope. ARMY— Adjutant General's Office, Operations Branch, Room 28999, Pentagon Building, Washington D.C ‘ea & con persion yi jorting T: “eyes” comes to conve ion plotting—the “eyes,” that is, and a Tint application of good common sense. No other form of plotting, or the report ing of plots, has been so much maligned as conver sion plotting. There have been instances in the flect when the same bogey has been reported by a dozen ships—and the plot in the flag has shown twelve different locations for the same raid. ‘This sort of radar reporting over TBS is inexcusable when the remedy is so simple. You have a bogey contact. You want to report this bogey contact to the task group. It is not always necessary to convert, of course, but suppos- ing you must convert due to the fact that you are far enough from the task force that the angle of jarallax between your radars and those in the task roup would make considerable changes in bear- ig and range of the contact relative to the group ce. This is true especially on destroyers or de- stroyer escorts serving as Tomcats. Number one rule, and actually, almost the only rule is to use your eyes! Look at your bogey contact. Look at the task force disposition. Immediately ask _ yourself “What is the general bearing of the contact from the task group, and what is the range?” Think: is the bogey, generally speaking, north, south, east or west of the task group? By looking at the plot and visualizing your board as a “picture” of the area taken from a very high altitude, you can quickly determine the direction of the bogey from the task group you must report to. If the contact is south and a little west of the group, then, by knowing your polar coordinate chart thoroughly, you realize that the bogey's bearing must be re ported, roughly, between 180 and 270, and simply by using the “eye” method, you often can come within ten degrees of the correct bearing, ‘This system eliminates the possibility of your reporting the bearing for ¢ “0-8-0” which, we'll ing. Strangely thod is the very eS thing that makes CIC officers report a contact such as 2-7-0, as “bogey 0-9-0'"—the reason for this being that they attempt to apply “learned” rules to con- version plotting, with their minds working in this manner: is us—B is the fleet center—X is the contact. Now using the line AX. And on and on! Of course there are rules for conversion plotting, and they can be found on page 21 of RADFOUR, the Air Plotting Manual. But only apply the rules after you have used the eye-method first, and then use the parallelogram, as described in RAD. FOUR, only as a method of obtaining a more ac- curate range and bearing. ‘As for range, decide if the bogey—using your eye to make this decision—is closer or farther away from the task force than it is to you. Visualize, if you will, your ship in the accustomed place in the center of your plotting board, the task group thirty miles directly north of you on bearing ooo, and a bogey contact directly south of you at 180, ten miles away. Using the eye-method, you can read- ily see the situation: you are between the bogey and the task group; therefore when you report the bogey it is obvious that the bogey must be farther from the group than it is to you. Mental calcula- tions would give you the answer—that the range of the bogey, from the task group, is forty miles; yet, presenting this same problem to a class of embryo CIG watch officers before the eye-method, or “common sense” method of conversion plotting was introduced, over half of a class of thirty gave the answer: “Bogey twenty miles from task group” —this in spite of the fact that by looking at the known thirty miles from the task group—were closer to the task group than the bogey was to the task group. At times you may be converting from some point “option” to your ship, or the center of the board. Again there are rules in RADFOUR, but again the number one rule is to use your eyes and good common sense board, it was apparent that you CONFIDENTIAL S¥b1 ¥380190 "91DC.1.C, OCTOBER 1945 pantograph — a method of chart tracing he pantograph, a drafting instrument for T= copying, or enlarging charts, makes chart tracking quicker and more accurate. CIC officers with VG radar repeaters or DRTs who need smaller—or larger—charts will find it a reliable instrument. ‘The Navy Mark 1, Mod O pantograph pictured in the accompanying illustrations, consists of five 26 inch bars (so designed that they may also be assembled as 2o inch bars) with fine machine bear ings that permit a high degree of accuracy in copy ing and permit the construction of charts at almost any given size. [Figure 1] The method of employing the pantograph is as follows FIRST: ment Ratio. Determine the Reduction or Enlarge- (The Reduction Ratio is the Ratio between the chart to be copied and the one to be prepared.) The formula: Scale of chart desired Scale of chart 0 = Reduction Ratio For example, the reduction ratio for reducing a chart from 1/40,000 to 1/200,000 is 0.20 and is figured as follows: 200,000 40,000 200,000 5 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL S61 ¥IBOLIO “O19C.1L.C. OCTOBER 1945 SECOND: Determine the Divider Setting or Beam Compass Setting. [Figure 2] (The divider or beam compass setting is the re duction ratio times the base length of the panto- graph.) ‘The beam compass is set to the proper di and is used for setting up the pantograph to achieve the proper scale of chart tracing. ance The formula Pantograph base length (20” or 26”) x Reduc~ tion Ratio — Divider Setting. For example, if the pantograph is used with a 26 inch base length and reduction ratio of 0.20, the divider setting is obtained as follows: 26 X 0.20 = 5.2 inches THIRD: Set the Divider or Beam Compass Set ting on the Pantograph. Using the present beam compass, the bars of the pantograph are adjusted so that distances AB, GD, and BE are each equal. Distances are meas ured with the compass from one pivot center mark to another as illustrated in Figure 3. CONFIDENTIAL FOURTH: Mount the Pantograph, the uf and tracing material. ‘The area required for the use of the panto- is generally larger than the surfaces of most A sheet of veneer may be employed and will generally provide a satisfactory working sur- face. The pantograph is fastened by thumb tacks through the holes of the metal plate located at point “A.” Point “A”, the center of the tracing material, and the center of the chart area to be traced should be positioned in line as in figures 7 to 10, inclusive. Before tracing is begun, the tracing point should be swung over the chart sur- face to insure that the tracing material is of ade- quate size and is properly located. ‘The pantograph exhibits a tendency to swing in a circle, resisting the motion of straight lines. ‘The tracing point should be held firmly as in Figure 4. By placing a ruler along straight lines, the tracer may be smoothly guided, increasing ac- curacy and insuring straight lines as in CONFIDENTIAL S¥61 ¥380190 *D.DRT overlays aid small ships

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