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the tuctica! lise /1",1 alJerrl/iOIl oJ electronic lind associated equipment.

1 QlwNfie(l: OOIJ and CIC

J Cl C Yeslt>rday and Today

8 Preuieui af CI'll C1C$

14 - "it! "Il'I' II nnd Height Finde»

18 Workiug thr IIA Coordination )/stem

21 Marine Radar Pickets Ashore

24 Fi)'':'':£ GIG

26 Prartical [I,~I' 1)1 Lon", ill SllI'Jllce Navigali(}tI

29 RPD IIlId )'P}{-DiUeuHces in SI'

jj R(I'''''''' C ;III,r 11,<, )3;,(/

34 0., Your r\1(trk.s!

36 Fleet Training Center, Oahu

J Hoi/ (mil Fureur II 10 Toctical Rm].G1· BILI/e/in

·1 Ii peeding Lookout: RejJ()T/S

• PlLulislw'd Jlwlltlli'\) by tile Chic] of Naval 0P(:"lIlioli .(esc) for the informati01l of Militllry fu:rsOIlfle/ tuhose <i(Ltles are connected tuilh the tacticn! (ltId olJl'I'(ltioflol nsp,'ct,f of eleetrtmic equipment.

• Inclutl« this 1mbiicalilm witt. other coufulenlin! materia! whicll is to reaeiue Ilmllrg~ncy -destructia» in Ihe euen! of 1)00' sible loss or capture. "c,r,c," shall 110/ be carried /00' use ill oircratt.

• Materi«! and photographs {or publicutitm ill "C.I.C," should be submitted 10 Chief of Naval Operatious, Editor 0/ "C.f.C.", If/tl.rilitlgtOfI 25. D.C. ( (111)' Deinlr/menl Telephone Extensions, 1l333'1 uud 02779.)

Editorml Office: eNC (OP·201·F·4)

IITI and Layout: EXO [Pnblirations Diuision ,

United: States


• This document contains in [ormatitm affecting the nationn! deiense of the United Stales iuiihin the meanillg of the Espionage Act, 50 U.s.C" 3' alld 32 us amended, Its transmission or the reoelatlon of its contellls in (111' manner 10 an unautliorized persoll is t,ro/libited by law.

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" .

a dual personality story

"Combat frem Conn-How do yOll account Ior the 300 yard difference in the ranges to the guide yo u r ported j usc a min nte apart?"

"Conn from Combat-We alibrated the radar in between ranzes and I negle ted to tell you."

" ombat hom ann-Very well. Don't calibra e or fiddle with the set again on m watch,"

'at one, but two errors were made in the above example, and each shows a lack of under tanding of the duties and responsibilities of the other station, Th CIC Watch Officer did Dot realize that a chanze in the range to the guide 'will ause the OOD t add or take off turn immediatel in order to regain proper station. The OOD did not realize that it i nece ary to calibrate and tune a radar et periodically, Such errors are not at all uncommon, he are bound to an e where a mutual understanding is lacking between Officers

f the Deck and CIC Watch Officers,

This understanding. necessary for the teamwork of Deck. and CIC relationships, may be gained only through a thorough knowledge of one's OWD duties plus a knowledge of the duties of the other party, Knowledge of the latter is most often lacki,ng for a n umber of reasons. The pressure of war on an expanding avy necessitated pecializarion of work, for in the short training time availabl

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an officer could learn but one ubject with an .degree of thorouahness. For thi rea on Iftcer ha e often spent all of their naval careers in one duty station, uch a CIC. AA Gunnery, Damage Control, or Co rnunications. The strain of ombat onditions and a watch-in-three-ba is left little time for outside study.


In his position as Officer of the Deck, responsible as he is to the aptain for the proper running of the entire hip, an officer must know a certain amount about hi IC and the radar equipment in talled. The more he knows the better he rna]' carry out his duties.

After an initial surface contact report how soon can you expect a solution of course and speed? Was the watch efficient or the radar operating properly when that destroyer was first reported at 18,000 yards? At what range should that destroyer have been reported and at what range would it be possible to get a friendly indication? To what extent doe it affect other operations in eIC when you request a range and bearing on the guide once each minute? How complete is the radar coverage on yonr ship?

The answers to these questions and many more of a similar nature should be common knowledge for every Officer of the Deck. He may best become familiar with the necessary answers by becoming a qualified CIe Watch Officer.


In his position as CIC Watch Officer, re ponsible for providing the DOD with information necessary for the safe 11a vigation of the shi p as well as the over-all tactical picture, an officer must know a certain amount about the problems. dutie , and re ponsibilities of the Officer of the Deck. Again, the more he knows the better he may carry out his duties.

What will that la t-range to the guide mean to the ODD since calibrating the radar caused a 200 yard change over tile previously reported range? This contact on an approxima e collision course is still 23.000 yards distant. hould you bother to report possible danger here? Should you report the SK out of commission if it will be repaired inside of jive minutes?

The answers to these and similar questions should be common knowledge to every eIC Watch Officer. He may best become familiar v ith the necessary answer by becoming a qualified Officer of the Deck.



here are L wa to aid in passing on tie

neces aIY knowledge for a more complete understanding betw en the ODD and CIC. Each way provide more capable officers at the two watch


The most important single item is the inauguration f a policy of rotation of duty between Deck and CIC watches, Thi policy of rotation will in time permit all officers to become qualified as both DOD and CIC Watch Officer. The other

ugge tions Ji ted below will merely speed up the time in which this dual , .. atch ability will be gained.

Commader De troyers, Pacific Fleet. has recommended such a rotation of duty in all ships under his command. The policy has brought an increased efficien to tho e ships in which it has been placed in effect.

1. ince improved relations and understanding derive from knowledge, school facilities provide a fast and concentrated method of gaining the necessary information. CIC Schools and Emergenc Ship Handling courses should be attended as opel', ating conditions permit,

2. Tactical hool held in the wardroom for

all Deck Officers should be utilized as traini time on the relationship of radar and ClC to Dec Watches. Some ships have organized a training schedule of short lectures by both the Radar Material Officer and the GIC Officer introducing radar and CI subj ct to officer who have had no train LOg in thi field.

3. A CIC notebook similar to those required on. many ship for avigation and Gunnery, should be kep. Such a notebook would be composed of questions on the radar equipment of the

hip. the coverage of each type of equipment, the probable pick-up range on various targets, the method of operation of the equipment primarily as to the mechanics of obtaining a range and bearing, operation of the Temote PPI's and the conception of relative movemen which the)' portray, the various plots, a general knowledge of plotting procedures and ymbols u ed, inter- hip radio facilities, the meaning of RjT terms, tc.

Such a notebook should be req uired work for all officers standing watch in crc or on Deck. Tbe time invol ed in establishing such a course and completing the lessons is wen worth the energy expended.

4. Some hip ha e instituted the havin all oncoming OOD'-s report (Conlinued 011 Page 35)



C' C yesterday and today

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There' a word that ba become as familiar to everyone in the Fleetand his girl friend or wife-a the traditional "aye-a e." Born of the war, "roger" might beconsidered as representative of a tremendous upheaval t~t has ~en p~a~e. in the traditional concepts of navigation, !nll1nery and kindred ship activines cau ed by the introduction of the center, originally called Radar Plot, now officially Combat Information Center or CIC.

If yon've never been down to CIG, here i a tour strictly for the unitiated who want information on the what and why of the PPI-and for potential CIC personnel, ho, herein. will be introduced to their duty a we ee it,

Step into .the Combat Inf0r:nation Center, where closed doors keep the roOll_llD em~-dark:~ess. Here-sin rC-is a weird and eerie jungle of eketroruc gear, illuminated tables, shining dial and gadgets which, at first g~al1ce, makes Flash Gordon look like a piker and Buck Rogers an anachromsm. Her~ ~e o~cers and .enlisted personnel, most of the latter stripped d~wn to skivvie shirts, wearing earphones and talking strange jargon into IUlcr?phones,. telephones, an,d ~quawk boxes that seem to he constantly flashing red lights. er one lip seems to me moving-talking to someone you don't ee, but if you were "on the other end of the line," you mizht be a lookout top ide straining to see what CIC personnel do "see" so e well in the small compartment in the bowels on the ship, you might be the Captain (or the Admiral, ye ) or a gunnery officer or the Cl officer in a de troyer off your port bow, or you might be the pilot seventy miles away, ten thousand feet up. GIe is the nerve center of the modern ship' where all available

ourc . of combat intelligen e are gathered and quickly disseminated to the flag and commanding oBi< , and to other control tacions. CI ,in the Iutur > pr bably will be the focal point for all Naval operation tactics.

Every Cle setup varies with different types of ships, but it is important to remember the basic purpose of CIG in ever ship is the same. As you look at this compartment, remember-CIC is here, not as a unit unto itself, but rather as an essential part of the reason for the ship's ery existence. A carrier is in a task. force to carry airplanes; therefore, Cle's operational function emphasizes control of aircraft and AA defense. Battlewagons, cruisers and destroyers are primarily concerned with gunnery, torpedo attack or anti-submarine procedures. So are their CICs. An AGC Combat Information Center is about evenly divided between its offensive responsibilities to surface invasion forces and its defensive air warning and fighter direction duties. Other ships vary their CIC organization to meet their particular opet"ational demands.

he rna hav had b rh air and urface earch radar.-a~though it was a top day when both we~ functioning proper! . The early radar plot officer .rood over the radar set and advised the bridze whenever a targe was picked up. This led naturally to the development of timing plots-"target at two-seven-zero, forty miles, picked up at 2012, sir"-and a mark. or symbol of some kind was hastily jotted down on a rnaneuverinz board propped on the radar officer's knee.

The first use of Radar Plot was simply keeping track of planes and hlp. There were no elaborate communication facilities for advi.sing the entire ship about these movements, nor were there physical facilities for performing the functions required of the modern combat information center, There were no plotting tables-the standardized plotting table is a product of the last yearthere were no DRTs in Radar Plot, nor PPlsand it was just as well, Eor there was no space for them to begin wi tho

Using the technique of fighter direction as an example of the gradual tactical development of

As you look. at the modern CIC, the logical tactical uses of radar seem so apparent that it seems inconceivable that they weren't dreamed up the moment radar was born; yet, at the beginning of the war, there was little or no knowledge of the tactical use of radar. The processes of plotting the technique of training fire control radar into the target, the whole business of Fighter Direction were all developments brought about by wartime needs.

Your original Radar Plot officer might have been tagged a "talking-radar." If he were luck .


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radar, it was first used in a limited and somewhat ineffective way in the battle of the Coral Sea and Midway, and in the early occupation of the Solomons. In this very first phase of the war, the action showed that it was possible to have ground controllers directing friendly aircraft out to intercept enemy planes, following the tracks of each, and by means of radio communication, give COLlT e,

peed and altitude changes to our pilots to maneuer them into the best possible position for the attack. Here was a potentially trong defense that wa revolutionary in its concept and it was on the perience gained in these first battles that th

doctrine and training procedures were built.

ow' there came an a embly-line proces of training fresh-from-indoctrination plus a smattering of battle-cried officer in the art of fighter direction. At the same time. the schools for training potential radarmen were doubled and doubled in size, and a ampaign to intere t

listees and drafte in RADAR got

With the new men arne new quipment and resultant neces iry: pace to put them all I With

standardized training in effect, the trial and error methods of Radar Plot in the early stages could be supplemented with doctrine which involved the conception of task group and later task force coordinated fighter direction. Out of thi broader concept of radar plot came the Combat Information Center, with free interplay of information between ships. Traditional communication tieups went by the board in thi revolution within the hip, Fire-control officers and men, the navi-

zenith. in CI in .equipment and u e of personnel-will be found m the new CVB equipped with the new model X radar.

For detailed information relating to the functioni~g of Cl C in all types of ships with the best P,t'actlces for each, read-and study-Radar Bulleun No .. 6 (RADSIX) , the official CIC manual. But let's take an informal peek at this CIC-a model cruiser CIC-in action:


You are Mr. in the illustration. ake in the

room, c~ockwise: to your left is the DRT (Dead Reckoning Tracer), next the VF (Precision PPI repeater), the VG with a standard plotting 'table attached, the fighter director's niche with the PPI and air plotting table secured to the aft bulkhead, the SP and SK radar consoles, and finally, directly to our right, the SG console.

Eualuator: Almost in the center of the room stands the E aluator, This rightl cannot be called his area of operation for his duty station is everywhere in CIC-by the DRT, next to the fighter director, near any of the radar consoles . His duty is to analyze and evaluate all combat information, and generally speaking, he stays close to. the 21 M<? and 24 MC to pass this information w~th suggestion on tactical situations to the Captam and the. lag. On a crui er he is usually Commander 10 rank because in most cases he is the • xecutive C?fficer. TIns is a revolutionary idea born. of nece rty, for the evaluator mu t be, according to RAD IX, a "tactically experienced officer." Your averaze CIC officer may be (and this was the actual office]' complement of the USS WASP CIC at one time) a college professor, a graduate studen in forestry, a high school principal, a meat sale man, a lawyer, insurance salesman, and a recent college AB, none tactically qualified, but all well- chooled in CIC activity. It is admitted that ha ina the Executive the evaluator on ~o t battle~a~ons cruisers, and DDs is a stopgap situation: still It may become naval doctrine. The chief difficulty in the past has been that Execs and pote?-tial-execs have not had time, due to pressing wartime needs, for complete indoctrination into the intricacie of ClC. This problem is. being remedied.

GIC Officer: few feet to the left of you is the

CI officer, sometimes called the assistant evaluator. He. j ,.says RADSIX: " ... responsible for the functioning of CIC ... Ior the training and

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gator, the Captain of the ship him elf-all had to undergo a change in operating procedure. Bezinning with the invasion of the Gilberts-where ~k group and task force fighter control was born?ghter direction with crc expanded and proved itself, reaching a high pitch in the first battle of the Philippines and the famed "'turkey-shoot."

Came the Kamikaze.

~ow the t,actical doctrine had to be revamped to include picket ships. tomcats, utilizing surface sear<=? at ~es for. air attacks and the perfecting of igh; FIghter DIrection using aircraft with airb?rne. radar. Destroyer GIGs-once equipped fDT directing gun fire and navigation onl =suddenl . were loaded down with new gear to take 0 er fighter direc~ion, duties. Altitude determining radar was bemg introduced to the fleet, Better radio receivers and transmitters were being mstalled.

nd while the fighter direction doctrine was being dev~l~ped. the CIC was expanding, and the

o .trammg ne ary for tanding CIC watches

. being taught at the Navy school specializing m CIC, Hollywood Beach. Florida. Probabl the

1. Evo;dlJatOT

2. 010 offi~

3. Fighter <firs.tOT ~. DR ,,1<:I1te.'

6. t.JWC6f,>' ylott<w I bll PPI)

6. Air 8tcr.~ II .... rd 10 "PO'

7. Goot/TOJpl.i. pl<:lt officc. S. GCOI/T4P~ piotto;

O. Gcoo ..... phlc recorder

1 Q. M;B DUnn.", li .. iB<m. officfiT

11. l' P P I "per"!.>r

12. AA UU·ft'Ul'T1/ U .. is_ offiCll-r

13. Surf ace "tot offi·ce .. H. Sl.rfac8 tXOU1I,

15. Air p1<:tttm'

16. Aaaistcnt ail' plott., 11. RIJdo,,. .... pcrvi.or

18. SP oPerator

19. SK Ql>6Tator

20. sa oPe1'lItor

21. C.,.,un""r-ti"n ofjiCIJT

22. l14ilio 'eCIJrd .... /opera;!.>r

23. JL talker 2<1. J A l4ikn 20. JS wl,"" 26. JW talker

2,7. Surf_II: .. " bM",~

welding of the Cl'C team into an. efficient whole." uring GQ. his battle station is any place wi thin eIe where he normally mans the arne pow'er cir-

uits as the evaluator. In addition be checks on operating methods and procedure, keeping radar operators and lookouts informed of expected ec[or of contact, insuring that the na igator and fire control receive all po ible assistance from GIG, and in general, is a first cla s trouble shooter who sees to it that GIC is, what its name implie , a center for combat information of aU kinds.

Fighter Director: The fighter director officer, near the aft bulkhead, its before a remote PPJ using either SP or SK air search radar. mplete air picture is kept up to the minute n the plotting table next to him. An enlisted ead reckoner estimates the position of the controlled friendly aircraft in the air during fades or when

radar reports are not fa rth coming. Next to the dead reckoner is an enli ted intercept plotter wearinz earphones, who plot all contacts rep rted b one of the air search radar operators on the SP or

K.. AJI communications bets een plotters and radar p raters is over] circuits, The fighter dir tor' respon ibility idle oordination and .ontrol of au-craft a izned to his unit. e talk. and li ten to pilot over H or, on 0 xa ion, HF radio. ote the status board, where all information on friendly aircraft-the orders given to th pilots, the fuel and ammo supply, weather conditions and the like-is kept up to the minute by an enlisted status board keeper. II ually a r darman


eographic Plot Office?": landing next to .

our left, i the geographi plot officer r

Officer). With the enli led geographic plot-

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ter and recorder. this i the team pe iializing in and shore bombardment who, with th Reckoning Tracer that reproduce, with some degree of error, the ship's actual track, and with radar fixe. are able to give the ship' position at any given time. A pitometer is mounted on the bulkhead directly behind the DR . This team i in the busy comer during shore bombardments when their job is to give accurate ranges and bearings on targets, and keep the shi p from fouling up on reefs. During a sea engagement, especially under conditions of poor visibility chi

orner dire t the fir control onto urfac targets with the aid of the ain Battery liai on officer, who. with a pre ision PPI operator, operate the VF.

Gunnery Liaison Officers. It is the Main Battery and AA gunnery liaison officers who actually man the circuits coa hing the weapons onto the targets, using all CIC information available from the DR T and radar reports. By using the VF, the MB gunnery liaison officer gets an enlarged view of the target, and with hand wheel ,can rank. in "cross-hairs" that automatically gi e him ranze

and bearing in actual figures. ~

he surface plot officer sits next to the VG with e enlisted surface plotter. With the VG, it is

ossible to keep an accurate summary plot of all ships in the formation. Secured to the VG is a plotting table, generally arrying the air picture for the benefit of the AA gunnery officer and the evaluator. The 20 1C squawkbox, known as the radar circuit is directl over the plotting table.

Radar Officer: The Radar Technician u ually assumes the TOle of Radar supervisor during GQ, standing by to check any technical difficulties and coordinating th radar operationas a whole. His station is by the radar consoles. ormally his duty is the maintenance of all radar equipment. In front of each of the radar con ole it two radar

" operators, one operating and the other tanding by, although 0 casionally, a is the ca e of the operators one checks the PPI scope, the other the .. " cope. Radar operators must shift every twenty or thirty minute to avoid eye strain.

Communications Officer: To your left, in the corner, sits the Communications officer with two radio recorders/operators, He, says RADSIX, has "general supervi ion of exterior communications in. CIC, including decoding. encoding. supervis-

ing radio recorders. stowage and main tenance 01

blications, communication plans, etc." h

r rder /operators are enlisted men wh maintain a log of designated radio cir uits and

operate th recording device when the e are available.

In the center of the room, grouped around a fire control tube, which is not shown in the illusnation, are three enlisted "talker ." heir duty is to report information to the Ie officer and evaluator that they receive over their circuits, and to give out information which is relayed to them by the CIC officer or evaluator. The JL talker gets all information from lookouts topside and coache them. on targets from radar reports in CIC. The JA talker on the Captain' circuit g ts the overall tactical situation. The J talker transmits and receives data from navigation. air plot. and other stations where radar reports are essential.

he JW talker, to your right is connected to the Captain's talker at Conn,the torpedo director office~-, the main battery director, the gunnery plotting room officer and computer range operator. Over thi circuit the recommended approach cour e , attack maneuver and ta et indication an be quickly dis eminated.


There are the battle positions in what might be termed a "model" light cruiser Cl . Just as the physical' setup of CIe varies in each type shipso does the battle bill vary, but the inherent idea of lC is the ame in each: a place for the "evaluation of all available information by trained personnel u h data (to be) quickly di seminated to the flaG' and commanding officers, to other control . stations concerned over interior communication circuits. and to other ships and aircraft via ex-ternal communication facilities." CIC is only as useful as the information it receives to evaluate and pass on. Radar alone does not ee all nOT tell all. It is essential that stations throughout the shi p- ookouts, Intelligence, Aerology, Air Operation (on carriers). Communications. Gunnery, Bridze and Flag ontinually feed information into

I in order for CI to preent a omplete, up-tathe-minute ta ti al picture at all time.




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W. 1/" I", Kamikaze p'.wh,,/,d d=nw.,d i. n,"''' in 1/" i" Pacific, the Navy had building th"ee super carriers: uss MiDWAY, USS FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, lind USS COIVI.L SEA. These 45.,000· /'on gimlt'f, equipped to carry l! llIa:dmmn 150 air.ct"ajl and SllOrl, illg /Ught deck» 932 [eet. Icmg and lLJ feet wide 'Iot to speok. of II total of some.UOO officers lind men w,;t], the sqtl.(ldTon and II flag aboard, if not the ultimate in carriers are al least a reasonable facsimile lIiereof.

Like the ships thrry will service the G.r'B CIGs aT~ b.ig, faTmidable, a-nd superscaled; Last month tile first oj thtlseGIC's IV.!nt inlo full operation as uss lIllDH! AY set oruon her sllllked:Own cruise. R e1'l!wilh "C.I.C."

Magazi'l.! presents II preview of ale M:LDWAY'SCIC s~tup, su,ggestiv.! not only of th« might.haiJ~-btien in thl! Teceflt war but: of what carrier crCswili be lik« ill peacetimcand what they may b,ecome ill any ful"!J.r« comba! operations,



of CVB



This "IIiew of CIC, looking [onoard, shotus X consoles to the rigiu, The Assistant erc Offic,e,· $~lIIlds .11/ lilt console of tile S •. ' t"/l~re I,h" No. 1 It.!lercefJ't Offille!'" has his :post. To the left ar.1l sa operators, an officer and three

enlisted ,nen manning du: DRT. ~

.An .officer from the Communica.tions D~llrtm:mt has cho7t oj t"~ Alesnlge Centcr. This "View, .lookillg. alS, shows teletype operatoTXnght foreground) and 12 radiO' mom tal's.

At first glance l\!flDWA Y's CIC does not seem to differ materially in physical setup from the

lCs pE the ESSEX class gallery deck installations e:tcept for the bank of SX consoles. Located on the gallery deck forward of the is1and on the starboard side, MIDWAY's CIC has the same bask elements: a vertical plexiglass board fronted by a VG, CIC Officer's remote PPI. and a horizontal plotting board to the Tigh_t of the watch officer's position; a VF remote and DR.T located within reach of the watch officer, and the customary bank of 'lCs, call buzzers, TBS circuits and VHF equipment on the bulkheads. As in the remodelled ESSEX class CICs, a message center with a battery of typewriters is located in an adjacent compartment with Air Plot occupying the forward end. However. the similarity is superficial, for the eVB Cl'Cs are at least several leagues ahead of the ESSEX type both in equipment and in their ability to. carry out expanded eIe functions. For

- important thing, GVB CICs are now armored ~. inches of solid steel both overhead and below, guaranteeing considerable protection for both

personnel and gear. For another-a-but here's the story.

Most notable and noticeable radar equipment advance in eVB CICs is in the SX installation which permits continuous search, the handling of four simultaneous interceptions, as well as a number of other advantages. (See page 14.) TheSX and the three consoles (an extra console is mounted in Flag Plot .in the island structure) are installed on the starboard side of CIC, with rwo Mark 2 Mod 3 horizontal intercept plotting boards within easy rea.cb- of the. SX intercept officers' positions. Built-in French phones for VHF radio communications at the base and radar and sound power selector switches on top of the consoles enable the 10 to communicate instantly with the eIC Officer, .any-one of the other radars and other key positions in Cleo Three of the seven medium frequency RRS installations in GIC are also mounted, on the bulkheads adjacent to the SX consoles.

Other search radars are an SIC3, an SR-2, an SG-4X, with an anteJ)na stabilized fOT pitch and


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roll, and an R-720 £01: zenith earch,

of th ver _< onsiderabl incre e in fire p w r with additional ~.inch turret and 40111lU Q1 unts, there et er than 26 fire antral radar, rn 'r of whicl' lnay be rca bed from r by buzzers or through remote' indicators. For the main batteries, for example, there axe four Mark 37 director usinz i\lark. l2 radar for .ranze and bearing and 'lark 22 for height finding, These radars are ala equipped with the Mark 32 IFF s stein. How valuable thi additi n will be for gnl'l11 ry v r Gunnery and IG Offic l' well know.

tber fire control radar include: for the au iliary fi e inch gl.!.ns. m unted fore and afL at th banzar d kiev -fi Mark 57 dire tor, three of which are equipped with Mark 34 M d. 3 radar ; and for the <tomm mounrs=nine ark 34 Ifod, 2, 3, and 4- radars, When and if the 40mm mount are fully equipped, there will be a otal of 21 of thi type of radar.

In t ad of th ix lO t n remer

were th hip's all tmenr for the < E

MID" AY has a total of twenty remote, I at nine different pla e throughout the ship, In C1C alone there are five, exclusi e of the four SX consoles. The GIC officer ill Condition 1 or the watch officers in. Condition 3 have a " a V -I and a The Radar Control Officer and the

la, I fighter director, or intercept officer.s-if he doe not choose to use the SX-both have VC Ear their e '11:1 ive us, ther remo e PPJ in tallation are a follows:

Tw VI>, on ea 11 in Main Ba tery PI t For-

ward and I fain Bat ery Plot It One VF in the Chart Hou e One VF in th Pilot Hall e

ODe \TF'ln Secondary Conn, which is located in the bow under the fugh deck.

Two VDs, one each in ir Defense Forward and

Air Defen e _ t.

De VF in Flag PI t ne V -2 in Flag Plot

ne 'D 11 the p I Bridg


To e tablish and maintain radar and voi 'e communi arionsin, out, and around I and the hip require, Medusian miles of able: and ie i easy (0 imagine the coils of sound pml'er wires and the number of talker it would entail under the old cir uit system. Happil r rhi problem has been

01 d by the II e of tw wit hboard panels: 1'1 for radar and the oilier for the ound power

t m. ocs ted in a mall cotnpartmen forward or


the eIC. the Remote PPI Teleph ne

Panel and the Radar Di tribution panels ena

an one oE the on ole 01' other remote P 1

operators to cut in anyone of the radars to hi indicator and to establi h sound power communication with the radar operator or other ke stations,

The system, electrically intricate, is outwardly simple. Iounted trat:egically abovetbe remote indica tOTS are sele tor switches with five po itions, one for each oE the earch radars. The mterc P! officer who wants to take a look at the 5K impl turns a handle t the prop r position. In the switchboard room the operator notes a light fla h on at the cone pending po ition and thr w hi handle to that position, cutting in the SK at the desired remote, Should the intercept officer wish to coach the operator in his search, he "dials" the appropriate circuit=e i ]S for K, 22 J for X. 231 for SG, and 2415 for SR on S MIDWA -and the operator u in the proper circuit, cau I" of the system of lights on both th

e) ctor switche and the radar and sound p witchboards, the whole operation is not on1 irtuall instantaneou but can be carried out in darkne s.

MIDWAY's eIC 1 • of course. also equipp with the usual array of tandard jacks for sound power and auxiliar ound power sy terns. The following list 0 ircuit indi ates the widened

pread of the netwo k of ound pmveT communications in eVE CI s.



termeasur ,the 6J, radar maintenance circuit, ed the 71J to the radar switchboard,

Complete equipped, ith ample 21 and 19

Mcs, me MID,,,, Y and other VB voice boxes have a notable new gadget-c-a place in which to pi ug in a hand telephone, 'When the nOL e level gets too high, it is possible to use the Mes just as one would an ordinary telephone. MIDWAY CIG personnel hope that Bridge and Flas will both note the innovation!

For ommunication between other ship and planes MIDv Y radio in lude 6 TDQ transmitters and RCK recei er , two A / T 1, two CR- 608s. to replace the fA gear and three B cir uits,

four (.)X. three (A) and two ( )R. Two gllnnery Iiai on officer. furnished b b unnery Departm nt, on fOT the five inch batterie and One for the 40nun give a total of 11 ffi er in audition One, he enlisted personnel omplement calls for three Chief Radarmen, 7 firsts, I I • econds, 15 thirds. and 54 S I/e,

Three general readiness onditions ba e been worked out for r. The p irion manned are as follow:

o o z o

< rn


1:0 m ;>;:I


CapltLin', Bartle Circuli

ircraft Con tro 1 Aircraft Infnrmatien Lookouts, Surface &: ky

Main Battery ontrol Groups Main Balter' ontrol Groups Main Battery Control

Radar Lnformauon

Radar Remote

earch Radars

Fire Con(TOI Radar.; Radar witchboard Radar ountermeasures

hip "1:1'01 &: Rangefinders

Main Battery Rangefinder roups Main Balter' Rangefinder Gro\ll's Radio ignals

Jh~av)' Machine Gun Control

Ilxillary aptain's Battle Circuit .. \ uxi liar /\ircraft Con trol Auxiliar Main Battery Control Auxiriar Radio lgnals

Radar Maintenance

Reui tId HI 't:pl. 1945

S IHDW Y ( B 41)


CO. DITIOl I 9 CLC, Officers

2 R,M,O.

I RC [ Officer I RT

11 RdM I RTIc i Rd {Ie

'j 'fER












'lJ \ 5·S]W fj,SJWF ]X

49JYI, 2. 13,16 XJA




!l RT2c

I L R<D12c 2 ane liJ RdM3c ;;4 'camen


important additions in this li i, ba i iandard for ani . are the 'lJS f r radar coun-

o handle this array of equipment require an officer and enlisted omplernent somewhat=but not really much-larger than that of the E X cia. lIDW Y's offi 1"1' complem nt call for

In oral

A I .1<11111'01 Quorlt'1'S tmn enli ted plouers mall the f' (far lelt and one /,iot/cr I/IP 'liMier horizontal plot TIll! CIC Officer and As istont. CIG DUkeI' supervise 111t~ ivlwle .11071'_


(One in Two)

S~ctiQ1! One-Dq;y SecliofiTwo-Night

6 C.I .. C. Officers 11 C.I.C. Officers

·2 R..M.O. J R.M.O. (ReM)


I RTlc I CRdm

11 RdA·flc " RdMle

6 RdM2e !i RdM2c

I RT2e 1 RT2.c

I RT1Ic I RT3e

7 RdM3e 8 RdM3,

27 Seamen 21 Seamen

56 Total

Section Olle 3 C.l.C. W.O.

I R.M.O ..



3 RdMlt 3 RdM2e :5 RdM3e

18 Seamen

36 Total

Section One j cicw.o. J R."lIf.O. lCRdM

2 RdMle

s RdM'2c

3 RdM!c

1 Rne

13 Rd.M Strikers

27 To!;U

52 Total


Section Two 11 C.I.C. '.\1'.0. I R.M.O.

J RTle

1 CRdM


2 RdMle 4- RdM2e

5 RdM3c 18. Seamen

36 Total

Sectioll Three SCJ.G. W.O.

I R.M.O. (RCM) 1 RT2e



2 R.dMlc

4 RdM2c

5 RdMlIc

18 Seamen

36 Total


,Section Two .2 crc w.o. J R.M:.O.

1 CRdM

2 RdMlt

2 RdM2c

4 RdM3c

1 RT2e

1 RTlIe

13 Rdm Siriker.;

21 Total

SectionThree 2 Clew.o .

r R.M.O.

(ReM:) 1 CRdM 1 RdMle 3 RdM2c 4 RdM3<:

I RTle 14 RdM Srikers

27 Total

Sec-tion Four 2·OICW .. O. 2 RdMle

3 RdM2e

4 RdM3c


I RT3e

14 RdM Strikcn

27 Total

1.0<:.\. PER. Crn-

TIO~ .o.It'l~~ Drv. Om.. I.E.,"~ n


Ev,,] oam. erc

TBS-l MC's

Op~.. Nay.


All Gir •. Lt. 01" Lt.Cdr.

Lbo "... I.t.. or Lt,Cdr .. Lt.Cd •.

CIC 0111. CIC Lt.C<lr. V3·F

AMt. o,rc oro Lt.


:RdMle :Rd_Mle

'!!: :Lt.

Lt. or Ens.

bdlll" Cont. MaIn Lt.

Offieer D;"play

Ev:alu. ator crc oe


RdMlc lldM1c""'RdM1"

21Js Sell.



Sta.WIl :Rd. 12

tit. or -U.o.r

E.nll. EM.

Fillne: Board 11: Li.

Di""$tOr 1 Console


D ... d R!rluIll B08~d 1 Sea. Plotte1

Prim.ary Lt. CAl'



~dB.r COMoI" RdMSc

Op" •• tor t

2218 Rd.M3c RdM3c .RdM3c



LOoA· Pile·

1"IO's" !}(lXS£L


I.E""... 11


VG--l RdM3c


V-3F 21J~

VG-1: SeI1.

sa f2


li'i~ter ConmJe Ens.

DiM<)tQ' 2: 2"Bd. IS

Seeoild· 8ry CAP

Sf;>i;Us Bd. & Bd. f3 Sea. D. R. Plot

Any SeQ.


Radar OPel:'1\o,

Consiile RdMSe 2

2U. - .R0iM3c RdM3c

" 3



RdMlc RdMlc


RdM3c RdMSc RdMllc

Statm Board ~ <1


.Radal" Operotor

Radax Opemtcr

Consol,.. Sea. 14




DR'!' om"",

n.R.T. EtmiB:n


RdhUc Sea. Sea.

ORT Plotter


DRT • RecOO"der

{)pero.tor ere .2 CRdY "





SG4 SG Sea.


lIlIis Sea.

8K4I SK R'dM2c


'2l..1a RdM2c RdM2c RdM2c

Gunnery cro Lt. (ig)


5JP Lt. (jgl



Talker ere

Marin es '1th



Talke. me

Talker CJ;C


Tatk,~r OIC


Radar MaIm .. CIG Officer






'Radar crc




:8 ea,







JX18 T1i[ke~




Air .Plot Y'ooman Air

DRT n .. pt.



JL5 Talk.... dIC SeI1. ".sF

S ....


2JG 13 TillIIer Hom



1JGSO ~8[k"," 010

5JP9 Talker ere

Eeliti.l ere


lCRdN[ • 3 RilMl a lIR<'fM2 e

ZR!lM. 1Rd!\_'f lRdM

'20 2c 2'e

Relief Opeml:ora



a,RdM8c •



5 Sea.

4 Sea. 4 Sen. ZSeli.

Radio Ree. MQJlitol"ll

M .... a1l96Rm.. o,!. Vl'tF e,.Comm.

Center 3RdM3e VlI·l!' 1 Sell.


M_II"· ·Cent.OIf.

LI:. Gi) C"""". . Lt. tilil

JS Talker Plottor

Open RdM3e VlJ·p ~JS2. ltdMSe


IJS Talkel

Aii- Der. RdMSc IJ87


Vmusl Ftlo

.\il"·D-oJ. En.ign F Qiv. VHF- EIIII.




JS Talker Plotter

u , Sea. lJS8 SeA.





JS. :ratl<"" I'[ot;t;w.

Batt. D. R!lMBe VS"F lJ53

J.S Plotter Ai.1'lat 2 Sta:.

(D R'l') 1lec.

1JS14 2 Sea.

Rado.r Fl;!.g RdMlc

o pe:atQt (SX) Ploe

22JS RdMle

"' RdM'2c


1.0CA· PER·

"'tON I!!IOS",:;r;:-t;i'4 DI-'I[I.




JS Plotter






OR Plotter


Teclmicio.n Fwd. CR'!' Comm. X6JII RTl~ ),CMTR

Ai<lt. to Tech. Sea.. V3· F

'i"'eoJin.[clQII RT\io Com.... X6J3 RT20 RT

.RMO AU. 'Lt. (ig) Comm. Lt.



SR.2 O:pero mt

RilMI" V3-_F

24;1S RdMae R<lM3e JI.dMac

lRTlle V-3.F

1Se.... Cam m,

'llJS ;Sea. RT RT RT Striker Striker Strik".

ReM omce.

ROM L!:. Room

Aat., to RGMOffi=

RdMSc v4v


RdM Operator

·1RdM3c .. lSea.

Radar "RTS" COmm.



- '-II'


Radin Tech.

RT Sea. Striker



Asst. to Radar Tech.

!Wlai' . O(>ll78tor SeR120

Flight Oeck

~eeil!l RdM2e Circuit


AilJa.· lOSmi.



.... This view oIGIC. looking .II{I, shours the No. 1 Intercept 0lfiuT (le:fI fOTegroufla) at the. SX console. The GIC OlJkeT J.S looking over

llie shouldcr Of tile No. 2 SX console, and the Officer in Charge Of the DRT I\<; shoum 16 the 'rigid

Cammunit:aliom r;:irr:r.dt.s in lin.(/. aul .01 Air Plot aTe located abooe jlte DRT . .dir Plot occupiu the f01"U}drd part of

Ihe MC.lSilge (]fm.ler in II compartment .... immediatdy ad-face,te toClC. . P'

Administratively, MIDWAY CIC personnel are in the Air Department and are designated as V SF with the GIG Officer as Unit Officer. An additional officer will specialize in RADCM.


As with ESSEX class carriers a fully equipped message center is located on the pOirt side of cic, Under the supervision of a Communications Offi· eel' the center is furnished with a battery of type·

• writers, radiomen, and radio strikers and is able to handle all CIG traffic with ease. At the forward endof the message center is Air Plot. Equipped with one VHF and four MF radios, a teletype, typewriters, a chart table. a DRT, voycall boxes and a table for the Air Plot Officer, Air Plot is small but compact and has the obvious and highly desirable advaaeage of accessibility.

Another innovation-and an excellent one from the standpoint of both Cle and RADCM officersis the installation ata radar countermeasures room just aft of CIG. All radar countermeasures gear is to be located in this compartment with a special circuit - 81J8 - as the communications hookup between CIC and the RADCM officer. Countermeasures personnel, as in most carriers, are part of tile VaF unit and come under the supervision of the CIG Officer.

That changes in the MIDWAY setup and that of the USS FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT and USS CORAL SEA-relocations of gear, reassignment of positions in ere. the possible addition of AEW, .among other: things-will take place after shakedown is inevitable, There are always kinks to be ironed out: TIle foregoing, however. is the general picture of the CVB CIC. Within the limitations placed by space and the weight of new equipment, it is also a picture of what other carrier CICs may turn out to be.


o z o < m


'0::' m :x


the search and height finder


lleft-tll m-/)' WlIrllillg antenna with Iriple hom fl emlil)" Righi-tile Hei ht·J?_angc find· ing anlenna (en fry (I Robin 011 JltlTll.

~ cl.J 10:)



> o z



Battle-ei perien ed FDO's will admit thei env when the pi rure the ruture EO" ith the new SX. Iodel is the newes - arge-rype general search and fighter direction pdar, already installed on the mighty MID I 'Y. being installed on the "FDR" and subseql.\EIJ-tly intended Ear most CV's and AGe's in the ~ !-l~ure.

Imagine an air search set tllat makes it po-ssible to search continually and at the .same time make altitude det rrninations without stopping the sweep of the an enna. Imagine all air search set that gives almost olid tracking from eighty miles in with relativ 1 few. if any, null areas. Imagine

tanding befor a on ole with three 7" scopes, one the onvenrional air picture. the ne t one a map sector scope hawing' your target alway in true bearing and greatly enlarged, and the third scope a height indicator so you can tell the altitude of the target. with an elevation accuracy within 750 yards at 50 miles. Here you have rizht in front of you the fir t reall complete air picture ver to be shown in I. nd under the pre ent plans. you not nl hay one but four eparare radar ons les in Cl C, with one pe if all, assigned to the FDO, and the other three EaT wat h officer, e aluators, and vi iting kibitzer.

Star tin a- hom the top one of the biggest innovations in this new model is the double-antenna setup. Actually there are .two complete antenna assemblies with a 0 iated RF packages one a search di h mounted with the paraboli ar horizontal and the heizht finding or altitud dish with the parab li arc m unted vertically. For the technicians and starisrically-minded, the search di h. rna nring 5 b 14 feet, is fed b a triple hom a sernbly that give cosecant vertical beam patteUl while the height finding dish, measuring 5 by 15 feet, is fed by a Robinson horn that allows the beam' to can vertically at a rate of Goo cycles per minute. ctuall the height findinz feed has

ertical scanning much like fire control antennas, which paints in th height of plane on the RangeHeight oI e dire tl in fe t.


allowing the c axial cable from antenna down to the console, the new MIDW Y-using her as an example-calls for five separate radar on oles, four in Ie and one in Elag plot. each. can ole independent of the OdH~TS. The e can ales are large, each mea uri ng a er fa 11' and. one half feet high, near I four f et wide and two and a half feet deep.

he ubi footage would be-roughly-the space taken up b two ordinary office-size de k , one on



o o z o < r-


~ m ;;Q


TIt~ norma.1 PPI sC0f!e5how~

a sltlgle blip. The light s"(!ctron shown in this rough dia-

gram is blown. up on the

Map Sector ppr scope.



top of the other. There are three types of presentations on each console: A normal ,PPI scope. a map sector scope, and a height-range indicator.

The normal PPI scope gives the usual picture of the area for approximately 80 miles around the ship when on SX, the SX being in tile X-band range. The map sector PPI cope is a blown-up

ection of- any part of the normal PPI scope picLure. By using hand wheels, azimuth and range can be cranked into this map sector scope, and the result is much like taking a hunk of pie from a dish. then enlarging that one hunk to the size of the whole pie. The map sector always appears in true bearing.

The height-range indicator shows the same se . tionshown on the map sector PPJ scope, only the picture here is of range and altitude. Electronically written-in lines for altitude and a single line for range are controlled by hand cranks. By looking at both the map sector scope and the height indicator scope, a complete ·"three-dimensional". air picture can be seen.



L.U :D



> o z


The tactical advantages of the three scopes together in one console will make the average FDO think he has been working in complete darkness in the past. For instance, a single b ip or blob of light representing one contact on the normal PPI may appear on the map sector scope as two or more separate contacts. A single blip on the map sector scope may appear on the height indicator scope as two Of more contacts. both or all at the same range and bearing. but each Bying at different altitudes. Think how this would have eliminated that nightmare of FDO's-the low Bying plane or planes that sneaked in for torpedo runs OT diving tactics while the CAP was engaged in an





The tmlarged image as seen

,m the Map Sector PRJ scrape lIOT" reueals til a t the s Ingl e largel seen on the normal PPI is actually 11110 separateaon[actJ,

Mockl SX console showitlg the three

seoen- inch PPI scopes. ote th« speciell Fighter

Direction panel mounted on tot), '-'"ht,

The Height-Range Indicator i7.dicllte.s three, not two contacts, with two targets ai

the sam.: range anti Dem'/flg but lit diDerent altitudes.


air battle with the high-flying bombers that were there, for camouflaging the stacked formation. The almost complete absence of fades means constant tracking from nearly eighty miles out to within a few miles-of the ship where it will still be necessary to utilize a zenith search system; yet, the f-act that these tarsrets are constantly beinz tracked, not only in bearing and range but in altitude dUTing this eighty-mile run makes it possible to coach

ie fire control system on target much sooner and ith E;:!:T.more.accuracy than could be accomplished in the past.


The SX model is a repeater system a well as a primary system. With the Distribution witchboard, it is possible to "switch in" any available radar; thus, for long-range search the SK, for instance, can be used, and for surface, the SG or whatever surface search is available. Each console being' independent of each other makes it. possible to have one console on surface. one on long range, and one on SX, with one remaining. The altitude element does not go throuzh this distribution switchboard but is piped in directly to the console; therefore, the Height Finding scope is in use only when the console is on the SX as a primary system.

As the SX is primarily designed as a constant rotation unit, each of the consoles can be trained on specific raids from any direction without interfering with each other. One console. for in ranee,

uld have the map sector PPI scope on a raid ming in from the north, while the map sector on another console would be enlarging a raid

from the outh. This feature eliminate the difficnlties experienced with present radar gear where it is necessar to top the rotation in order to concentrate on one target, resulting in an average loss of from two to three minutes. During this lime the set is useless for general search, or for concentrating on any other raid. With the SX-and the present setup of four consoles in CIG-the fighter director can be stationed at one console. and under his direction could be three intercept officers each supervising his own separate console. This, in effect, would be the same as having four SM or SP equipments on the same ship. plus having the added refinements of the SX gear.


To make the Fighter Director's task even more pleasant, the number one console in CIe is fitted out with an FDQ Control Panel. This panel shows the antenna position, the elevation and bearing, in exact figures at all times; thus, the Fighter Director can read off at any time the exact position of his target. This is especially useful in assigning raids and for evaluating the air picture for the bridge. In addition, the Control Panel gives the FDQ control over the sweep of the antenna, for speeding up the revolutions per minute, slowing it down. or for sweeping in only one sector. In actual practice, the SX is not intended for sector sweep, but rather as a constant rotation unit as pointed out before.

Another feature is the deviation alarm system which starts a buzzer going and causes a light to come on when the On-Ships-Course synchro amplifier located in the Radar Distribution Switchboard is out of step with the ship's gyro-compass,


R T's will like this set. It is designed for "convenient maintenance" and a primary concern has been to make every part easily accessible. For instance. the indicator chassis itself is rotatable through 1800, and minimum clearance requirements have been set up to allow for working around the console.

Incidentally, DD's take note. The 5,500 pound weight of the antenna would simply represent a one-way ticket to Davy Jones locker. CVE's the same. So you can stop drooling-at least for the present.


Eve. n while fighter in.~ .. 'CrcePtiOD. was proving ri 1.· .. tseI£ the most effective method of combatting

Japanese ail" attacks on OUI Fleet, that small percentage of the Kamikaze which.managed to evade interception or out-maneuver our airsearch radars proved a mean problem IOT ship's AA. Despite the number of fire control radars within a disposi tion, target indica tion and nre distri bu cion sometimes became disappointlng, particularly as

the tempo of Japanese air attacks increased. Contact or approaching aircraft by firecontrol rada was more ocr less the responsibility of the shipS' individually. and it was felt that it was a lack of inter-ship coordination which enabled these leftover Kamikazes to arrive at dose range before the fire control system Gould pick them up.

Early in 1945 the USS E SEX suggested a sector plan for task group :'\ coordination. The early

,SEC'fOR 2. 5~ FG
SHTI'S g'u-ns """"'1\".
cv 0 0 e
BB 1 20 4
CL ] 12 2-
Cl.AA 0 0 0
DD 3 15 a
Total f, n SEQTOR , SEO'l'OR 1
SHIPS ·1fUJlft radar" SHIPS 11'0113 rndlITa
CV 1 12 2 OV 0 0 0
BB 1 20 4 BS 0 0 0
.CL 1 1.2 2. CL 1 if 2
CLAA 0 0 0 CLA .... 1 12 2
DD 6 25 5 DD 4 20 4
ToW 8 69 1~ Tot..l 1(1 44 8 Inner shiP" "earob. betweru. bea.rinp determined by own p01lltion and inter ... ctlona of sector bounda d as wit h 1·0 mile circle.

SQ"""n DD search ~.5· on .. anh side of own...atua ooaring.

SmPS guns tad"". 1.
CV 1 l2 2·
BB 0 " 0
CL t [2 2
CLAA 0 0 ~.
DD 5 26 s
Total ~ 49 9' 0::

UJ <:Q


UJ >

o z


US.S .. ESSEX (CP9) sample flak direclor PIOI for use 'by pro-

t)ose.d task group (laJi.direc!Or20 JI1>I1I0ry 1945, • I

1. hlftmnation it:lcluded. on sample j}]o/ is more !/U}Jl i$ reo quir-ed jor an aclual plo.l, blJt is mdmkd ,in o"der 10 indi4:ate 11/ e t h ods« f opCTa finglllJd type of seOTC II,

2, Whm search is 11nderwo:>),, shifts in other sectors aTe on call to augm~nt search or p.a:rlicular rear;J!g"s or jo· shift to gun fire.

J, Sector tiJbu/atlo.n .is gitJlmto shmu var;lItil)n [rom alR'J·llge

ligures, .Ilnd illustrates possibility. of st1'e'lgthening pm'lieulaf

sectors by of ships 10 these sectors. .

", Normal StiIJ/rch, 011. ontenllae elevated to 20·, 10 provid~ "",aclll spec« r:olJerage. Lobe switching "on",llll .ships· searcl: in seCWT indicated ~n the plot, (m~ ,~e training rates to accomplish !lire search. tryde m approx, 1 mm1t1e·. Screen. operates ~60o. Inl#' [ search, due to equal S'/Jtlcingot &CTeen vlf.$3cls. Ships :11 imler cifcle.~ operate seeto« reenforcing search.

s. I'nl'iati!m from 1l;0rlTlll/ st!on;h will be eDecledo!"l call fr Ilak r1ir(!cto'f.





use of this plan was .1·eported in the Sepiem ber issue of "C.I,.C." The article that follows was prepared at the l"equest o£"C.I.C." by Comdr. P. L. Folsom, USN, who played a majorpal·t in engineering the AA Coordination System into existence while serving as Gunnery Officer of US ESSEX. He presents briefly the objectives and methods of this AA system together with factual measurements of the s-ystem's effectiveness. These lessons learned offer handy reference for students of GIG-Gunnery of the future.

The AA Coordination System was designed to get the most from the combined AA armament of a disposition of naval vessels. This system proved its effectiveness in the Iwo Jima-Tokyo. Okinawa, and Japanese Empire operations for both day and night air defense by a task group of the Fast Carriel' Task Force. However, its use is certainly not

stricted to carrier groups. Objectives of this plan are:

To secure early Fire Control contact, radar at visual. on approaching enemy aircraft ..

To evaluate contacts, indicate targets and most effectively distribute heavy AA gunfire from the disposition as a whole, stressing early action and maximum fire power.

To disseminate information concerning the air situation in the ';licinity of the task group and to coordinate fire controlsearch with. the commencement ofaction.

To maintain search. in unengaged sectors and to prepare for handling approaching contacts while some of the batteries Were in action against contacts which had already dosed the disposition.


The AA Coordination System is inoperatioo throughou t the disposition during Condition One (Ior AA batteries), or higher Condition of Readiness, or when so ordered byOTC. The plan is carriedout in this manner. An experienced CIC· Gunnery officer takes station+in CIC of the task group flagship. He is the Task Group AA Co-

dina tor, He operates a voice-radio circuit (usuy V.I-IF) to communicate with officers stationed in CIe in the 'various ships of the disposition.

The TG Fighter Director's plot, and a small plot of his own provide him with basic information he needs to direct 'a close fire control search for bogey orr suspected contacts, to indicate targets, to distribute heavy AAfue-power, and to preserve search integrity in unengaged sectors. The Coordinator's small plot has the disposition plotted (marked with the code names of the various ships)

and divided into quadrant sectors I, III, IV, and II clockwise from the axis of the disposition. CIGs status boards and search radar information enable him to give gunnery people the word on the air situation in the vicinity of the Task Group, He identifies approaching aircraft from solution repoIts, search radar identification, IFF gear where installed in Gun Directors Mk 37, and visual identification. He transmits his evaluation of the contact to all ships and on. the basis of his information commences AA action with heavy batteries. He assists night interception with altitude evaluations received on his circuit, closely controls fire when night interceptions are in progress near the disposition (handled safely in most cases by waiting for a zero target angle) and notifies the Group FDO when AA action commences.

Each ship operates its AA batteries in accordance with current doctrine after targets have been indicated by the AA Coordinator. Each ship will initiate transmissions 011 the Gunnery Circuit when they pick. up a target, ghdng· bearing, range, altitude course and speed, with successive reports when requested by the AA Coordinator, As initial contacts close, succeeding reports are abbreviated to range and bearing, No ship is restricted in any way from opening fire as each ship has authority to open fire on any surprise contact and reserves complete control of its auto-weapons. vlJ'henever the coordinated search plan has been in effect prior to action, ships automatically return to search duty when action is completed.


The protective search by fire control tam must be conducted at such times and for periods that



'will provide best search security but will not cause excessive wear to director equipment. As pointed out in Ordnance Pamphlet 1076, "although the Mark 12 lDay prove quite valuable for suplementing the regular detection radar in battle zone , the life of the director roller paths. train motors, etc. will be greatly decreased, since the antenna cannot be trained independently of the director. The importance of such employment must be weighed wi th the possible danger of putting the director system out of commission by excessive use."

The fire control radar search of TG 58.3 consisted of the following features: When ordered, all ships 'within the inner screen circle seal'chtheir assigned sectors with one director in about one minute cycles, its antenna elevation at 30 degrees. The destroyers on the outer circle (whether in Roger or Victor formation) search 45 degrees right and left of the bearing line of their positions from the center of the task group in one minute cycles with antenna elevation 10 degrees. When a can" tact is made it is tracked and reported, the hip making the contact being relieved from search duty automatically. 'Vhen close search is ordered on an indicated bearing, sector search is abandoned. When high altitude search is ordered, inner station ships search their sectors with antenna elevation 60 to go degrees.


To lay the foundation of a working team and to keep it up to date, Gunnery Conferences were held whenever port routine would permit. These had a two-fold advantage: Getting the representatives of an ships personally acquainted and mutually sympathetic to each other's problems, and definitely settling the status of proposed changes in the plan prior to their adoption. During these conferences a "simulated action" training program 'was designed. These two hour sessions of very realistic training attacks conducted by carrier aircraft operating both as single and group targets, day and night smoothed out the kinks of the coordinated procedure. Full AA coordination procedure was used and comments were submitted to the AA Coordinator after each drill period. The effect of this training was tested by comparing the early contact performance of veteran first-string fire control crews with inexperienced but handpicked and previously instructed crews. The veterans consistently turned in 96 to 100% perform" ance, whereas the green crews turned in 15 to 20% performance. This appeared to be true in action as well as in training exercises.

The voice circuit used in Task Group 58.3 was



the VHF voice Tactical-Administrative Circuit preempted or AA Coordination when the pla was ordered into effect. Use of plain languag except for ship calls and maintaining a circuit clear ex.cept when transmitting vital information made possible a time margin of 1 to 1!4 minutes for inter-ship handling of contacts. Since this circuit has outlets on bridges of all ships, commanding officers were kept fully inform d of the situation. The availability of the Administrative circuit eliminated installation of specific ieq nipment for coordination. However, ship which installed additional receiver amplifiers in AA control stations or plot found them to be of great value.


This coordinated system increased the effectiveness of AA fire against suicide attackers from appro timately 50% in 1944 to 90% against the fifty-five occurrences of special delivery suiciders destined for TG 58.3 during its Okinawa tay and was 95 % effective in the first weeks of that period when all ships that had participated in preliminary training were operating together. Inter and intra-ship CIC-gunnery teamwork performed expertly in action. The air search radars coached fire control radars onto 80% of the afore mention contacts-many times at ranges of 10 to 15 miles.

n estimated 40% of the succe sful kill were made by hits before the target was even sighted, Volume of heavy AA fire was increased by an estimated 70% over previous operations with an expenditure of 2200 rounds of 5"-38 cal. AA common against one attacker as the highest single expenditure-nearing peak performance of present equipment and personnel in combat.

Historically, the AA Coordination System came about in a "necessity is the mother of invention"

on of way. Suicide attackers who began to appear somewhat consistently during radar blackouts, provided necessity enough. From a recipe made up of action report, combat observations, available weapon, AA performance data, enemy techniques and common sense-brought to the analytical boiling point-the AA Coordination

ystem evolved and was successfully used in TG 58.3 by Vice Admiral Frederick C. Sherman, USN I in February 1945. Similar in pattern to the Task Group Fighter Direction setup which has proved so effective for so long, testimonials from ships that have operated under this plan indicate that it will receive considerable attention from the destined to shape the CTC-Gunnery doctrine the future.




pickets ashore

The marine tried it out in the Okinawa campaign-and it worked! DD's and escorts that drew picket duty or were slated for the stickyour-neck-out slot could have relaxed, some-

at, if the proposed Japanese homeland invasion lad come off per schedule. They would have had the Marine Ground Control Intercept or GCl detachments to aid or, in some cases, replace them in the operation.

The GCI detachment is, in effect, a lightweight air warning squadron employing tactical radars and radios but eliminating the Air Defense Control Center. These detachment are independent outfits, capable of handling day CAP's or Night Fighters, and of furnishing information required of any Picket Ship-"Commandoes 'with radar," so to speak, who take positions in isolated spots nearer to enemy territory than it is possible to get with the bulky, not easily camouflaged land based ADCC. If landbased GCI detachments are comparable to Picket ships, then, using a fleet comparison, the ADCC is the main task force-"behind the picket."



One officer, who is the controller, and e;i()'ht non-cams make up this "CIC" team, their CIC being a mobile unit, technically the SP-1M Operations Van, with one or more search radars piped in. The mission of this miniature or sub-control center is to contra] day or night fighters in the defense of an area assigned to it. This is done either independently or under the operational control of the higher echelon ADCC. Too, this GCl detachment, like her "si ter" Picket Ship, functions as a reporting and altitude determination radar to the main Control Center and Fleer uni ts in the area.

he Gct detachment is built around the SP-'lM radar located in the van, This set gives the most accurate altitude readings of present height-finding equipment, and is also very valuable in furnishing low coverage. Aircraft have been picked up twenty-two miles away flying at fifty feet.


Three portable ANjTPS-'lB radar sets-one a pare-have been placed in the Detachment, re-




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1ft VI'! SF-1M .. local dl1 .. MIITine'" mobil" .writ;O>l of t/w CI0. TI ... eer 0'4 .. "£ in aU! is .aod;;;"g tlu: SCR-127 IFF. Sea.ted beBid" tM £PP 0!'J01"4tv,· OP'6 tit hoo SP· LM IVJillJ.t finder ollcratoT8. To tile -,,"0"'0 .,.iolot i$ U cl'C'O! """"""8iltll UIIl Lea'" tllOr'< lIeeGS. 8(£'11 [or 811<1<:dll ("t""ce.ptio"" 1'0 til" tighe-roo, is tlwl JiJlh.tcr direc' lor offi""" on d .. tu, st .. ndi .. g lit the .. <'I>toU T'E ~COp6 (12" PPIl.

placing the R-27oD. hi new i B liaht weight

et has a seven-inch PPI ope and an "A" scope and i remoted into a tw lye-inch PPI s ope in the van. One of these portable radar sets is placed on a fifteen foot rower which gi es the set longer range at low altitudes. The other et remains on the ground and furni hes long range information at higher altitudes.

Inside the SP van is a VG projection scope and tw E copes, their original seven-inch PPI's modified into twelve-inch PPI scope to gi e the controller a clearer air picture. The two portable IB's are within remoting di ranee of the van in order that the controller can hoose whichever IB

informatio he wane on hi twelve-inch E scope.. It is al.o possible for one 1 B to be on the VE and the other on the G.

. For identification friend or foe, either the R . 127 or the new dire tional B lFF is installed to handle the "A" band IFF guard. Tbe BO i used for the UG" band.

Radio equipment for the control unit consist of the Very Hizh Frequency sets CR·S73. t;74. 575, and the 624, with three CR'399's or 299' mposing the main part of the High Freq uen v gear. An CR -608 will al 0 be used, whil rad reporting will be carried on with four C -s' .

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he G Detachment nee in operation n a

round-the-clock operational basi, capable of handling all "' ork required of a control station and radar reporting tation. The Controller j a commissioned officer qualified in both Day and light Fighter Direction and is respon ible for the complete operation of the Detachment. both in regards to equipment and personnel. Hi a i tant or Grew Chief is the enior non- om who must know and under tand the tactical situation and see that all pertinent data is proper! di pla ed for the controller-on the ti sue 0 erla of the C. The seven other non-coms who are the PPI ope operator, the Plotter-Computer who operate the 'raiD' and Mark 8 computers) dead reckon and record all orders given to Iriendly aircraft, a Communications Operator operating the telephone switchboard a Power upply (echani and the P-l M Technician .

When th I D tachment is 11 ed a an .inter-

cept station. the Controller is primaril on rned wi his CAP, controlling it from the E. F e i advised of the tactical situation as it shows up on the VG projection by the Crew hid who reports I dosing targets. On instructions from either the Gonu-oller or the Crew Chief the plotter and cornputer will track an indicated flight, coaching the

P-1M onto it and di playing all i n 'ormation on the VG ti sue 0 erlay.

During the time when the Detachment is a Radar Reporting Station, all £Iigh within the maximum P range are plotted and compu ted on the VG al ng with altitude readin s, and thi information is passed on by the Crew Chief over the command Line to the ADCC.



" ANITIJS tB "''''''JL,(i 0" a

filte" foo! 10 wrr g'''''if belt<>T .. .". 8tltt3 0" 1010 jI rli" 11 G iTcraft a-t I"" IIC)" r .... IIIGI< il'llil CQmltiemMteYIJ lob4 pal. t" ~'''' ,,,W. flU) IB ~et O'J 0", ducl<. TJle !:<Ill • !",if Q" rile ri.ghl. ;. t.1M 'Il",,..d're.tionlll BN·/PP atlh· ... lll.

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Meri"" GCI Deto.cI •• " .... U equipped with IUW IS's. The 1<1Wef' 'Part of tl< ... ,tunn<l> ill ,,,,,,lifted W viV8 b~ltcr ovltrlleud COlJ&l'OIJC. Tid" fCGtUf'6 111(JiJ deve/()JIcd MAil' Warninll t;MIII) OUI". C~rj Po{tlt, N. C.

Pro;" I~ft to ,.tg/,t j~ the AN/TPS lll. SP-l11t ( V(m. SP·l/11 Opera. tions IJc:Jt~ in: wIlt"}" i.8 locattfd Ute fltoIl1k CI ,and SCR·U; IPF' ant"""".




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Last month "C.l.C." p"inlecl the story of _4.ETf'-Airborne EaTly Warning. Photog'ra/>hs of the PB-IW (BI7J installations-the "flying ClCn-were not available at the time. Here are some views of a test model built by the Naval Avia-tion Modification Unit of ] ohnsuille, Pennsylva'nin.

flyin9 CIC


Looking aft-PB-HIJI

1. ID-188IAPA~5312" P.P.!. 4. R-4A/AKR.2

2. C-217 jAPS-20 control central .lii. SpaTelamps

J. SN-J4jAPA,·53 rync/lroni:tl!r 6. CU-2SjART-lJ

I.F.F. inl,tf'Toga 1.1011 7. AN / snc-s (2)

Looking forward -PB-ID

1. A. C.,D. C. distribulion panel 4. ANIAIC·6 ill/UP/IOIlt:

2. An A[C·6 amplifier U!lit 5. 1D-188/API1-H l2" p.r.l.

J. C-2J7jAPS·20 control central


Looking afL-PB-lll'''

1. Ai jilIC-6 interplu:me J. Plotter

2. tituation officer 4 . .'1,1 /AIC-6 interphone j. Direct reading cI"ck

J. F.n.O.2

2. m·188 APA·5J1l2" PP.I. J. Con trol officer

Looking lorward-PB-JW </. F.D.O.l

5. /D·188 APA-5) 12" P.P.I.

"This view"is lalMn with tile plot board removed. 0

PloUeT plots from directly b~hjnd tile boaTd as viewed

[rosn. the cO,ltTol o(Jicer and FDO positions. 0


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In the north. ern Pacific .aI:ld. north rn tlanti the weather. and visibilit are poor that navi auon b LOran be orne the prunar me bod ab ut lilt percent of the tim. Quite often the un and tars are not available for periods of tv 0 r three da s, and then Loran is a lifesaver to the Na igator. nder these onditions it i e ential to perfect a technique of reading, computing, and plotting LOTan 're ults, he following methods have been developed with this in mind, in order to insure accuracy. sy tematize the procedure, simplif-y the work, and provide a proper record as required b the U .. Navy Regulations, 1920, Article 1015.

Becaus of their relatively mall cale (30 miles to the inch) the VL-30

erie of iation oran hart covering the Pacifi theater are n t ali-

Iactor il accurate for urfac navisation, and furth rmore, do not utiliz to the rna imum the .inher nt accuracy of which the oran i capable. n the ther hand, the table provid dare recorded in tenth of minutes of latitude and longitude, making po ibl accurac comparable to celestial lines of position. However, the mathematics involved in the complicated double interpolations required are so formidable as to terrify the neophyte; not to mention the time required in using them.'

he form shown in photo #2 was designed to simplify the interpolatior problem. which, with a little practice, become much easier than with

practical use of loran

in surface nalligation

HO 2.14. In fact, the form is remarkabl imilar to the HO 214 columnar form; and the two supplement each other perfectly. Phot #2 shows a double page of the " avigator' Workbook,"

.nd represents about one day's work (minus course and speed changes, etc.). he form for a computation of HO 214 in East Iongirude is shown on the folding flap to the left, and the form for a Loran computation to the right, Variations of this idea can be u ed, such as the space inside the co er on either side, or a detached trip of cardboard, with the necessary data on them. ote that this form can be used regardless of the number of microseconds between column in the tables, In the computations shown, it has been used with 10, 20, and 100 microsecond differences between columns.

. When the Loran reading is taken, it is recorded dire t1 in the workbook, eliminating unnecessar cop ing from a' a izatcr's Sight Book." Tile time of ob ervation is recorded, and the Dead Reckoning Tracer marked for each station observation. The computation Is best done by the Navigator, having an assistant read the values from the tables, again imilar to the usual practice with HO 214. Chartlet ["rate"] correction is applied fir t,then sky wave correction (if appli-

lIt ... 4<J -. rio'll Q() • . M.lti tlI.2tt 1f8·S1.7 _

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1. Editor's ote: The lIydrQwaphic Office cmmol Ql5,tJe Willi the emplta/;c wording wed here, Only simple linear interpolation» e requ.ired n1~cl uuse are ac~ompli$hed in tilt: authoT's COI1Jlillg fOT"'_ FlguTe 1, at entries 12 to 18. The lLte of .such II TnJ appears dl!Sirable wll"n n completl' record 0/ the rending is desired.

cable), to gi e the corrected reading. Val ues are taken from the tables rna e cpeditou ly if they are read in the exact orde indicated in Photo # 2. from top to bottom. his eliminates repetition in 1VTi ting and fa ci li rates com putation. Sui table blank spaces are lett 'to make reading ea ier. If chamlet or s1..'1 wave corrections are not applicable, then spaces are simply left vacant. After extracting the value from he tables, the delta corre tion is applied, and the computation is fini bed.

The run of each line is recorded directl under its computation, from. speed and di tan e tal Ie if the ship is on steady course and peed, or (Tom the Dead Reckoning Tracer if maneuvering. As an abbreviation, the plus sign is used to indicate run P, and the minus sign to indicate TW1 B CK, on cour e as indicated below it.

After computation, oran lines can be plotted quickl on the u ual Position Plotting Sheet as in the method II ed with cele rial lines of position. 'While th Navigator doe the plotting. an assistant reads the computed values, giving them in the following order: Assumed latitude (or longitude) and computed longitude (or latitude) of fir t point; assumed latitude (or longitude) and computed Ion itude (or latitude) of second point. The entire Loran line is next run up (or back) by plotting the run on either of the above point preferably using the Universal Drafting Machin. The drafting machine arm is then aligned on the computed point of the original line, advanced by parallel motion to the run up


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(or back) point, and drawn in. All plotted points are then era ed, to avoid confusion with the next line of po ition, after which it is plot ed, Thus, only one line of position is plotted for each Loran observation, and each line represents the locus of po ible ship' position as of the time leered for the fix. The entire day's Dead Reckoning may be run by hand, or by tracer if maneuvering.

Photo #2 is a representative day's '\ a k and is shown plotted in Photo # 1. The figures used are not necessarily actual values and are used for illu tration only. The day's work might be described by the following narrative, At dawn there was a solid overcast and no stars. Nevertheless. the

avigator obtained a reasonably .good fix by using 4H2, 4H3, ¥Ii.b 41-16, and 4H7. A noon combination running fix was determined by forenoon sun line, LAN sun 1ine and a Loran line on 4H4 ground wave. The sun was obscured during the afternoon, but 4H4 gave a good longitude line. During the day the ship steamed beyond the tabulated range of 4H6 and 4H7. Visibility was poor at sunset. but the Navigator by special effort was able to get two northern stars, knowina that he needed a latitude line to establish a good Loran fix with 4H2, 4H3 and 4li4.

The Loran is a delicate instrument, and rough usage by any hands should not be tolerated. The careful Navigator may well look upon it as he does his sextant, since it is the source of comparable results. He should familiarize himself with its operation, and the characteristics of transmitting stations in his area of operation , Average good time for taking an observation of one Loran pair is about one minute; by using the above methods a fairly skillful Navigator can accomplish the computation as fast a an assistant an read the tables. requiring about two minutes per observation; about one minute more is required Eor plotting the resulting line. With' such facility possible. it should not be long before the N avigator welcomes foul weather. when he cannot take celestial sights and has only Loranl

It is to be noted that no use has been made of Loran charts, Using the above methods prac· tically eliminates the necessity of having charts; in fact, they will be referred to only to check the areas covered by the various transmitters. (H. 0. Publ. IL (R), "Loran Charts and Coverage Areas," provides similar information in a condensed form.) By using the tables. each pair is taken individually in turn.

In wing Loran for morning and evening fixes, it is well to keep in mind the relation of local apparent time as applied to the relative position of



the Loran transmitters and your receiver. 01;1- viously, if the transmitters are fifteen degree of longitude to the ea tward, dawn will occur there one hour before it does at your receiver. Consequently, readings on sky waves must be taken considerably before local dawn in order to get good results. Similarly, if the transmitters are 10· cared to the westward, evening readings may have to be delayed considerably after local sunset. This is particularly true when operating outside the range of ground waves when, if you fail to get a fix before daylight, the sky wave signals are lost and will not be available again until sunset. When the ship and all stations are at about the arne longitude. this consideration is eliminated.

When it is apparent that no celestial observation will be available and the ship's position must be determined by Loran; it is wise to take at least two sets of readings on all pairs if they are three or less in number. If four or more pairs ate available, this precaution is not so essential Thus, if readings are taken on sky waves before dawn, and subsequent elution indicates one is in error, the Navigator can discard it and still have a fix. It .is too late to try to verify l'l. sky wave reading, . after dawn has come and the sky waves have dis-

appeared, It is always lise, at dawn, to take a set of Loran readings before going out to shoo the morning stars. In this way a fix is assured even though all stars are suddenly and rmexpectedly obscured."

Loran is capable of such marvelous- results that e ery effort should be bent to utilizing its accuracy to the maximum. It is quite obviou that it will replace the radio direction finder and radio compass station for [general] navigational purposes; in fact, many ships have already had their radio direction finders removed. It should also be obvious that it will be classed as one of the "Radio Aids to Navigation" as far as the avy Regulations are concerned and according to the Regulations the Navigator is required to use these to the maximum in bad weather. But in the final analysis, no matter how excellent the equipment. the results achieved in its use will depend on the accuracy, skill and speed with which it is used, The most perfect Loran reading ever taken is worthless until it is drawn on a navigational chart. To borrow a favorite expression of one of our most distinguished dmirals: "There is no substitute for brains."

2 Editor's Note: Lorall l'eadings lit other times may be ad· vlllltageolJS. Sky uiaoes !TIll)' be uronger in the .fII:d,dle hours 0 the night, and slightly mort lICCltT(lte. Ground 'Waves h greatest .. ,mg.t iohen. the static level is lowest. This OCCU,.s •

the middle$ 01 the dill', •


diffe~ences in use

The RPD (Radar Planning Device) and VPR (Virtual PPI Reflecto-

cope) have in recent months received rather wide pread publicity in the Pacific Ocean Areas. One result of this publicity has been a marked increase in the use of these devices and in the appreciation of their capabilities. There appears, however, to be a certain amount of confusion of the applications of the two devices and their associated techniques. Also. there is some evidence of a lack of appreciation of some of their 1imitations, Neither RPD nor VPR is claimed to be a panacea for the weaknesses of radar navigation and. piloting. The remarks noted below are presented in an attempt to help clarify this subject, state the capabilities and Iimitations of RPD and VPR, and set forth their best present tactical uses.


Using accurate terrain models, RPD methods have been applied for more than a year in making siting studies to determine the effective radar coverage from certain selected radar sites. and in making evasion studies to determine areas and courses of approach and retirement least effectively covered by known enemy radar installations. These studies have had considerable value, especially in the rapid selection of the most favorable sites for new search radars. The validity of the results so obtained is dependent upon the accuracy of the available topographical .information and the terrain model construction therefrom. the scale of the model. the precision with which the actual radar antenna position is simulated on the model, and the assumed conditions of radar propagation; i.e., whether Iine-of-sighr, normal refraction, or abnormal refraction, Army, Navy, and Marine activities, cognizant of the capabilities and limitations of the method, are making extensive use of these studies for siting search radars in U. S.·held areas and in enemy territories to be occupied in the future.

RP te hniques are also applicable to the simulation of radar scope presentations-both PPI and Becan, These simulations are approximations to actual scope pattern, the similarity between predicted and actual patterns depending upon a number of factors. Probably the most important of these is the existing condition of radar propagation, which may vary widely with changes in weather conditions and cause marked alterations in PPI or B-scope signal pattern. Other factors include those listed. in the preceding paragraph, radar beam spread and antenna height assumed in preparing the simulation. and the setting of the radar receiver gain at tbe time of making the comparison. In spite of these limitations, RPD landfall .pictures are good scope simulations and have proved to be of value to


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the Pacific Fleet far more than a ax. [umerous ction reports indicat that man 'hips have found them to be er useful aid in scope interpretation and briefing.

In the light of information presentl available.

RPD scope simulations appear to be most useful raetically as aids in scope interpretation and the identification f land masses and topographic features hom scope presentations. PPI and B·scope simulations are also useful for briefing radar operator and pilots prior to operations. When a landfall approach is to be made with the aid of VPR piloting. previous stud r of RPD scope simulations in conjunction wi h the appropriate topographic map may be a material aid to the radarjVPR operator in determining his initial chart-match and subsequent positions.


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VPR piloting is a means of radar piloting which makes possible the rapid and accurate determination of ship's position directly by the radar operator. The method is based, upon the fact that the position of a surface-search radar can be determined by comparing the map-like pTesentation on its PPI screen with a chart that shows the shoreline and inland topographic feature of the nearby land. Accurate comparison of the chart and PPI signal pattern i accomplished with the aid of the VPR, a device which caus the optical superposition of a virtual image of th chart directly on the face of the PPI tube. When the VPR chart is prepared to the same scale as the PPI presentation and has a suitable, .numbered grid (preferably the World Polyconic 1000-yard grid) superimposed on the navigable water areas, the determination of 'position is effected as follows: 'The radar (VPR) operator shifts the chart until its image is accurately "matched" (with due consideration for beam-

pread distortion in. the radar signal pattern) to the PPI presentation. The ship's position is thenindicated by the center of the PPI sweep and is read off by the operator in terms of grid coordinates.

The accuracy of positioning by this method is dependent upon the accuracy of the VPR chart. the accuracy of calibration of the radar' (including ompen ation for constant ran e error), the linearity of the PPI sw'eep, the amount of non-correctable parallax between chart image and signal pat-





tern due to curva ure of PPI tube face, the range scale used, and the proficiency of the operator' , making the neces ary adjustments to the radar, interpreting signal patterns, and effecting aCCUTate chart matches. "Vhen good master charts are available, the preparation of accurate charts f01' use with the VPR is readily accomplished. Also. the requirement of accurate PPI presentation is

ati factorily met by several surface-search radars.

Operator proficiency can be attained by adequate training. 1urthermore the VPR method of determining position is essentially equivalent to a

imnltaneons measurement of many different range and bearings, with an inherent tendency automatically to compensate for, or "average out," small errors in the chart. It has been demonstrated repeatedly that a trained VPR operator carrebtall radar fixes consistently within 100·200 yards of reliable visual axe at ranges of 6,000·8.000 yards off shore.

VPR piloting ba been u ed effectively in recent operations by amphibious control craft, underwater demolition ve els, minecraft, and shorebombardment ship. At the pre ent time it appears that the VPR method is best suited cacticaUy to use in these missions, with possible tactical applications in submarines and other, large ve els, It will unquestionably become a major navigational aid for aU ships. Operation at shore ranges up to 10,000-12,000 yard under normal conditions has pro ed to be satisfactory. EfIecti eness at longer ranges has not yet been definitely determined, but the results of preliminary tests and orne operational experience indicate that VPR methods may be applied to advantage with the so-mile radar range scale.


On s veral occasion during the pas 15 month , it has been proposed to use RPD simulations in the VPR for accurate radar piloting. Tests of this technique indicate that the method is cumberorne and yields results inferior to those obtain-

able with a chart for VPR use. Radar Center does not recommend the use of RPD pictures in the VPR deuicc for radar piloting. he standard chart for VPR use is more easily produced than a series of RPD simulations and is more easily used in the VPR. Furthermore, a single chart is applicable over a much greater area than a sing) RPD picture, which is valid only in the of the position for which it Was prepared.

Radar is not only superhuman but i also accused 0·£ being supernatural-it pick up ghosts! At lea t that i a common term for those un· identified pips which flicker an and off the screen, display courses and speed varying from stationary to erratic and in general behave more or less unrea onably. Although they ometime track as po ible targets, these pips resi t verification by other mean and are often written off as "ionized layer" or "peculiar atmospheric onditions", or something equally mysterious, In other words, they are phantoms pure and simple. At the risk of slightly tarnishing a little of radar' glamor, this article will argue that many of these pixies are nothing more romantic than birds.

Ghost echoes seem to be mast prevalent on high-powered centimeter radars, especially in coastal or island regions. On United tales naval operations, the e conditions have been most consistently met during the past tWO years b the submarine force. For orne time submarine patrol reports ha e complained about these phantom nui ances: the attempt to explain them is the primary motivation of this article. The conclu ian is reached that most of the submarine radar pixie can be attributed to birds, and thus many Q£ the urface ship ghosts ob erved under similar conditions should be due to the ame Gause.

The idea is not new that birds may be the culprits in such cases. The .J uly issue of "C.L ." recounts the experiences of the USS LEWIS' HANCO K and the US UDUBON. On separate occasions, each vessel was baffled by mysterious radar pips that seemed to be completely spurious until identified in very bright daylight as flocks of birds.

The Briti h have repeatedly ob erved, the same phenomenon with their. coa tal hain of land-based adar watch stations. A paper by the British Arm Operational Research Group of Februar 1945, elaborates on the bird hypotbe is. half dozen a e f v rifled bird contacts are cited, in-


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eluding a successful experiment on a dead gull bung from a balloon, The correspondenceoC bird velocities with those of ghost pips is noted, and the flickerinz character of these pips is ascribed to the bird' passing through the lobe of the radar antenna pattern. The objection that frequently nothing is visible at the range and bearing of the ghost contact is refuted in that report, on the grounds that the difficulty of sighting birds is not generally appreciated, especially at the extreme ranges sometimes involved (up to 60,000 yardsl) This British report concludes that birds cause most spurious contacts and are distinguished chiefly by their signal strength, which does not increase with decreasing range so rapidly as for surface contacts.


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As preparation for the study of submarine radar phantoms, data were collected and qualified ornithologists consulted on the nature and habits of birds in the China Seas and Japanese Empire Waters. A list was made of those characteristics. with possible. significance for identifying ghost pIpS.

(a) The migratory seasons for landbased birds are roughly March-May and August-October. During these periods land birds are in the majority over coastal waters.

(b) The range of the SJ on several actually verified bird contacts ran from 2300 to 5400 yards, with exceptional cases of gooo and even 12,000 yards on flocks of birds.

(c) Practically all birds refuse to fly in bad weather, particularly windy weather.

(d) Speeds of flight are supposed to run from 18 to 35 1m,0 ts, with an average of 2 1-24 kno ts, bu t there may be wide individual deviations,

(e) Land birds are believed to 8y mostly at night, although resident sea birds do some Bying by day.

(f) Their courses tend to follow coastlines and island chains like the ansei Shoto, being northerly in the spring and southerly during autumn. If there is any wind they are likely to follow it. Hocks of birds frequently display erratic zig-zag plans, while single birds almost invariably pursue

straight courses. .

(g) Birds are likely to be associated with phosphorescent areas on the ocean, for these areas abound in marine life of all kinds on which the birds feed.



To test the bird hypothesis, a list of 97 radar phantom incidents wa compiled hom submarine patrol reports from August 1944, through May 1945. These incidents occurred in the China Sea and Japanese Empire waters and were selected merel y as a sample rather than as a complete catalogue. The circum tances surrounding these unverified contacts on the SJ were then examined for correlation with the bird characteristics listed above. he results axe given for each characteristic. listed in order of fruitfulness for this investigation.

(a) Seasons. For analysis by season, the ghost contacts were split into three groups: those satis-

. fying some of the other bird characteristics discussed below and probably due to birds; those having. orne contradictory features and probably not due to birds; and those about which too little information was given for classification in either group. The table shows the distribution of conta cts by date.

Ghosts probably Month due to birds

Ghosts probablyN Unassizned due to birds

(b) Range. In all but four of the phantom con-

cts in columns 1 and 2, range was given. Initial contacts averaged around 2000-2500 7ards, with maximum ranges of holding can tact abou t 5000 yards.

(c) Weather. At least 31 of the 42 probable bird phantoms occurred in the calmest and finest weather, sea state one at most. At least 10 of these were during clear nights of bright moonlight.

(d) Speeds. In all but 7 of the contacts in column I, patrol reports mentioned the phantom's speed, running from 10 to 40 knots, with' an average of about 20-25 knots.

(e) Time of day. Most of the contacts were made at night; but this mainly reflects the submarines' tendency to operate submerged by day and urfaced at night .

(.f) Course. No definite information was obtained from submarine patrol report on phantom courses.

(g) Phosphorescence. A few scattered cases were reported of phosphorescence with ghost pips, but not enough information on phosphorescence was generally given to permit conclu ion 0 be drawn in that respect.


although they themselves often cannot be discerned even in good visibility.

iv='They al-e found generally near land areas and are most prevalent in the seasons of March-May and Augu t-October.


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It is in the first four characteristics listed above that significant correlation is obtained ben een the features of birds and radar gho ts. IE only the left-hand column of the table is admitted, birds account for over 40% of the ghost contacts encountered. If, as seems likely, the center column also represents unrecognized bird contacts, the figure is around 80%. Of course ther are other possible causes of radar phantoms: misinterpreted second-time-around echoes, bits of floating matter on which phenomenal nocturnal ranges may be obtained waves, or that old bromide. "atmospherics" of indeterminate structure. The operational evidence, however, all favors the conclusion that the great majority -(80%) of radar ghosts t;:ncountered by naval vessels arise from birds.

The outstanding traits of these bird phantoms are listed for facilitating their recoznition. i=-Their speeds are high=about the same as a very East surface vessel, but they are more often mistaken for aircraft. Their cour es may be erratic.

ii-the J (submarine radar) will generally detect them at 2,000 to 5,000 yard. Centimeter radars

surface ships can probably expect initial ranges the order of 10,000 yards.

iii-They are found only in very calm weather,


Aug 9 2 2
Sep 6 2 2
Oct 7 13 0
Nov ~ 5 2
Dec 0 0 L
Jan 0 ° 2
Feb 3 7 0
Mar 3 7 1
Apr 6 3 5
May 6 0 1
42 39 16 Although the numbers are small and subject to statistical fluctuation, it is clear that the bird ghosts in the left col umn followed more or less he expected concentrations in autumn and spring. The non-bird ghosts, on the other hand (right column), did not show much seasonal variation. Furthermore, the unassigned contacts in the Center column show pronounced bunching about the August-October and March-May periods. Therefore it seems likely that most of these contacts were also due to birds. It may be estimated th that birds may cause possibly as many as 80% the phantom pips plaguing submarines.

here have been many changes and additions to the Mru:ks and Mods o[ fir control radar equipments in the Fleet. The following thumb-nail sketches of U1C various ones used will help to acquaint 'You wlLl:! them and their comparrion gun directors, computer , rangefinders, and rangekeepers.

Fire Control Radar Equ'pments MARK I

The &rigiflol 1\1'0;/1 Battery fire control radar illl;t{llled aboard ~"ip.


An "L" bllll(l (ire control radar for main battery guns on BB's, CA's, and CL's, this set is now obsolete and is being replaced b)' Mark 8, 13, 27, or 28. Ii is also adapted to auxiliary muirl bOIL"" {i,'e control in t1lt! fiTe control towers of certain BE's and cruisers.


This is OIl "L" batld atlli·aircraft {ire COlitrO/ radar fOT 5" 111101 purpO$ batteries. It is wed uiith. the gun director MaT" H and its companion-pieces, the Mark 10 rangekeeper and rOllge/iflder Mark 42. It is also ills/allerl on the g'll7l director ,'01[0'1''' 37 taitl: the },fark 1 computer.


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MARK 8, Mod °

An " " IJand main battery fire control radar used with gun director Mark :u and tti« ratlgefinder 'M4rk 45 and also with





KIm director "'lark. ;8 wit/l the Nlark 18 rtmgefinder. The Mark 8 rangekeeper is m'ed .taith. boll! directors. The radar equi~ nun! _MaTh 8 gives accurate spotting injormation in both rlll1g llnd deflection. it characteristic feature is the polyrod antenna,


This radur irmovated II higher powered transmitter and aT! addillona! thT<le·inch indicator for use try the director COli· trol officer.

MARK 8, Mod 2

The Mod 2 changed only the tocation and number of the oiu.traling utlits:

MARK 8., Mod 3

It ftLrtlzer development of the Mod Z, thi equipment: has a ntlll./ "X" band transmitter and IlI'1II "Tockitlg horse" anttmna.

MARK 10, Mod 5

This " " band .fe-! is de$ignlld for use with gun director Mark 50 fIIlll rangefinder Mark 58.


Deoeloped. to replace the Mark. 1, this radar is used witli til gtlll director Marl; J7, the ratlge/inder 11'[ark 12 and tile compuLer Mark 1 for control of 5"dual purpose battery. n oper(des in the "L" band;

MARK 12, Mod I

This mdar removed. the range unit from the director becamt! of space limitations.

MARK 13, Mod I

Till! netaest type of maiu battery fire control radar in the "X" band to be used OIJ 'Je!1! cOI15trtlction]J.B's, CIl's, ami CL's. II will Teplace the AUlrl£ 8 Mods 1 alia. 2 umeneuer possible. lis gun directors Mark J1 and 38 are u.sed witll the 1\I[ark 8 ral1geheeptT, and the director Mar" 54 is used with UII1 range{illder MOTk 66. This mdar prOVides longer ranges, target discrimination and. improved spotting of shell splashes.

MARK 22, Mod 0

~111 "X" band microwave radar lor use toith. radar equipment Mark: 4 or Mark 12, it is installed in gun director Marh n for determini!lg elevation angles 01 air tacrgets below U·. The director is wed willI the rangefmdttT Mark 12 and CIUIlpuler Mark 1.

MARK 26, Mods 3, 4

This is an "S" band radar installed at the gun director Mark 52 a.nd computer Mark 13, It gives range data only Illla is installed on DE's and Fleet auxiliaries for control of ]n and 5~ dual PILTPOH~ butteries.

MARK 27, Mod I

A modified 5}·1 (sub1ll1lrine, it is adapted. to auxiliary mail; battery {ire control in the fire COlllrol towers of certain BB's al,d cruisers. It is used l<lith Director Mark 40 and Mark 55.

MARK 28. Mod 0, Mod 2, Mod 3

This "S" baud radar is used wit Ii the gUll director Mark rangekecper Mark 10, ond.rulIge{illder Mark 0/2. It is employe in lieu. of the maar equipment Mar" 4 or Mark 12 and pro-

vides larget spot indication and aided tracking, Mod 2 is wed ~th gun / control $)lstem Mark 63 for control of 40 mrn gum.

MARK 29, Mod 2

Used with blind flring Gu.1l Fire Control ,stem Mark 57 and the computers l\:I.lJrk 16 llI~d 17, this "X" band radar controls the 10 mm and five-inch guns and oDcrs target spot indication and aided tracking:

MARK 34, Mod 2

This" X" /Ulllel radar haJojded traCking, protJid'tls target spot !"dimLiOIl and is used with the Gun Fire Control ,stem Mark 6,. The gunsighl MaTk r Mod 12 serve a its computllT.

MARK 34, Mods 3, 4

timllar LO the radar equipment i\Ictrk J4 J'lilod 2 except lor the "(mge 1m it, this set provides "ange 11.11.((1 01ltpu.ts suit(lbI~ for use with the Gun Fire CMLm/ ),stem Murh 57 and the computers [ark 16 and 17.

Gun Directors and Gun Fire ontrol ystems which are asso iated with particular types of equipment are listed below.

Gun Directors

MARK J.f (Main battery)


dua! 1'u.rJlOsli bauer)!)

MA:RK )7

(Heavy 5"incll All ',altery)


(M ain battery)

MARK 52 t

(SeCfmdory batU>y)


GUll Fire Control.System MIlRK 57

/U( 6)

Used With

Radar Mark 8 Mo(1s J, 2, J l'l.a.d/l.J" Mar" 13 Rangekeepe"lI{ark 8 Range/i1fder Mark "5

Radar Mart: 'I

Radar Mark 28 Mod.! 0 and J RllltgeheeperMark 10 Range/ind T Mark -12

Radar jll arh 'I

Radar Mark 12 Radar Mark 22 Comput er Mark 1 Rnnge:finder Mark-/2

}larla,. Murk: 8 ~\Iod.s 1,2,; Rallgekee~"lI1ark

Radar, MJJ'i 'IJ' " &rtg('rr,ul~ ,'.[al"li "


Radar Mark 10 Mod 5 Rangefinder Mark 58

RAdar MurK 26 1acjs and 4 Com/Juter Nfarh 1J

I 0 Rangefinder

Radar ,'fark 13 Rangeflllder Cark 66

Used Wlth

Radar .Marl, 29 Iod 2 Radar Mark 34 M"ds 3 and ., Computtl" ,',irOTh. J6 ami 17

Radar MaTh 28 Mod 2 Radar Mar" 3/J JI.1 od 2 GWlSight serves a Ciomplllttr

[Contin ued: from Page 2)

to relieving the watch, In eIe the relieving officer obtains a omplete picture of the present formation unexecuted orders, present and expected contacts, tactical information on course, speed. axis. zig-zag plan, and guide bearing and distance.

Upon arriving on the bridge, this officer is mar fuUy prepared to receive the informacion. from th OOD. He has a vi ual as well as a mental picture or the overall situation. This don ble check on info:rmation al a lessen the po sibility of a loss of some detail while turning over the watch.

Peacetime operation, with reduced ship complements, ill probabl require a wider cope of knowledge on the part oE every officer. Prepare for it now by an a ti e educati nal program for YOUT ship such as the one outlined abo e.

REQUESTS FOR "C. I. C." houtd lJe addressed:

NAVY-The Chief 01 oval Operntions, ;Editor oj "C. I, C.", IFullinglon 25, D. C.

ARMY-t1dj-utaf)j Genera.I's Office, OPerations Branch, Room 28939, PI!Jllagoll Building, Washington 25, D. C.

{issue prior to July 1944 <lri no tonger (Jl!ai/(l,ble)


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Fleet raining Center, Oahu is now the overall designation for the ] 9 odd schools formerly operated as Pacific leet Schools and Pacific Fleet Radar Center. The new command, described in Paclileet onfidential Letter 39CL"45, has as its purpose the coordination and administration of all the scbool to the group.

Formally commissioned on 3 August, Fleet raining Center, Oahu is substantially an administrative reorganization designed to simplify the operation of the schools themselves and to free the taffs oE the variou schools from every possible administrati ve function, permitting them to concentrate on their main objective-training.

Included in the new command are:

a-At Camp Catlin and Moanalua Ridge:

Radar Center, consisting of the following divi-


ighter Direction and CIC School Radar 0 perators School

Radar Maintenance School (Aiea) Radar Tactical School

adar Devices Division VHF Maintenance School TDD Drone School Signal Strikers School Radio Strikers School Signal Officers School

Yeoman and Stenography School Teletype School

b~Al Waianae:

Anti-aircraft raining Center

c-At Navy Yard, Pear! Harbor:

• Nancy ho I Loran School

Telephone alkers School Recognition School


The missions of Fleet Training Center, Oahu as outlined in the directive are as follows:

(I) To teach and' to train personnel in the use of equipment latest methods, procedures, and techniques, in conformance with doctrine laid down by various type commanders and other competent authorities. (This training is to be distinguished from operational training which applies to forces afloat and which is conducted by type or other co~illanders .35 directed by CincPac.)

(2) To collect, evaluate, and disseminate pertinent information to interested activities,

(3) To provide consulting and advisory service to interested activities.

(4) To ad mini ter rotational plans for CIC and technical radar officer and enlisted personnel.

(5) To conduct studies and make recommendations regarding changes in doctrine, use of existing equipment, development of new equipment, and training materials and methods.

6) To provide special services such as the producon of RPD,.VPR. and photographic materials for op rational use, upon reque t.



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hail and farewell to Tactical Radar Bulletin






Eight issues of the Bulletin were published by the Pacific Fleet Radar Center, by direction of CinCPac to accomplish speedy distribution to the Fleet &f im.po1·It'Lnt tactical info?', mation on radar and CIG. The Bulletin, ceased publication before they tuere.oble to print a, cumulative index. "C.z.G." presents it here [orthe convenience of ships having files of the publication; with a salute to the Bulletin for a job taell done.

Proper and Improper U es or Radar

Report on "Zenith earch" Undetected Enemy Plane Attacks

Upward Searching (Zenith Watcher) Radar ~ ests VF PPI Repeater and

How it \.vorks

VG Projection PPI in the . ir Problem

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Radio Discipline Reports on M N Radio The Overloaded VHF

FIGHtER DIRECTION Amphibiou Fighter Direction (Sai:pan)

Mariana ction, 19 June 1944,

ummary of N isht Fight r Direc ion in Hawaii . ight • ight r 1 J otes

2-45, pp. 13-20; (plu 3 plate )

4-44, p. 1 4-45, PP' 1-4

4-44, pp. 6-,

3-45, pp. 1·

1'45, pp. 6-9

2-.15· pp. fr7


Beacons for Life Rafts r w "Bea on" U ed in Landing Operations Ra n


3-44, pp. 12-13 3-44. p. 17

Ab ut the ark VIll Beacon upplements ire ntr ] Radar

J- 5. p. 3 ear 4-44. pp. '9 1-44, p. II

2-44· PP' 7-9

1'44, pp. 5-

2'44. pp. 5-7 2-44. p. 4;

2- 5, pp. 23-2

.-44, p. 8 2-4.4, pp. 2-3 1-44, P: 7

1-4 • P: 4

'oacbing the FD Radar Mark 22 Radar

The Fire antral Radar Program for hi ps The Low-Flying Bogey Tuning Instru lions for Mark 22

'1\ indow PI' jectile ~ e ted


Bf 1 and N/. PX-2 I'F Connections to Mark 12 Radar h eking the IFF

Dual IFF Sy tern for SM and P Radars

2'44, pp. 12'13 4'4 ' PP' IO-1l_

3-45 Supplen em 2-44. P: 12

4-44, pp. 12- 1 3 3-44, pp. 7-

4-45 upplemeru 4- 5. pp. 27-2

2- 5 pp. I1-L2


ntrols Recommended 2-45. pp. 1-4

utomatic Frequency Control

(AFC) Operation in Radar

fark 22 4~45t p. 31

B tte if Resul Du to 1\1

Generator !Cark 22 Radar

Model SR Equipment Field

hange No. 8 4-45 I p. 19-20

BU 1 and 2 Operation ote 4-t}5, P: 2.8

Planes, Tracking and re ting

of Over Land Masses.

Radar Maintenance Tips Recommended Changes to S -2 Series Radar Receiver Rugged "W" Type Electron


SG, Assi ranee Sug:ge ted fOT The OB U Series Echo Box Tracking Planes Through

Land Masses

F PPI Repeater and How it Vlforks

US Washington Develops

Some RPPI Refinements 1-45, pp. 12-13


bnormai Range on Due

to v eather

Action Reports, Excerpts FrOlU New ype FD·CIC Report

ive Improved Picture

,ewly Designed Status Board 3M and Weather Information

3-44. p. 14 4-44., pp. 10·1 I

2-45, pp. 13-20; (Plu 3 plates) 4-44, p. 111

4~4-5'~ PP' 33-34 3-44, p. 12 3-45, p. 20

4-45, pp. 29-30

1-4,5, pp. 6-g

2-44, p. 16 2-45. pp. 2)'23

3-4.4, p. 1;

(plu 1 plat) 4-44, p. 5; (plus 8 plates) 2-45, pp. 22-23

4-45. pp. 21-2~ 4"15, pp. 21-24 VPR/ MP and Radar Pilotin 4-44, p. 2

VPR/N P Equipment. f 2-45. pp. 21·22


r Iethod of lui-

Torpedo Plotting Conversion Plotter Detection and Tracking of Planes Over Land Masses

NAVIGATION Earth Curvature N ornograph

Radar Planninz Devi e with irborne Radar

ere n Overlays as Navigational Aid

ummary Plot and How

[0 Use It

urnmar Plot a id t Bombardment Mi ion Plottinz With th VG Eor Channel

DR T Plotting

For reater Efficienc ill Radar Operation

ew Method of SG Ranging Operation of the SR Radar Operation Reports on the Ra Operation board


Surface Plottinz With th racking VF ( ) on SG VF PPI Repeater and

How it Work

VG Projection PPI in the Ail' Problem

3-44 p.l1; (plus 1 plate)

2-45 p. 2 I

1-'14, p .. ! 2-45, Pl'· -10

3-45, pp. I I-I i 3-45 pp.26.27

2-45· pp. 13-20 (plus 3 plate) 3-45, pp. g'10

1-45, pp. 4-5 1-45. pp. 10-1.1 4'45 pp. 1 - 16 4-45. pp. 5-13


4-45, pp. 17-1 2-45. pp. 8-10 2-44 PP·2-3

1-45. pp. 6-g

2-45· pp. 5-7 PUBLICATIONS

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INDEX Tacti al ses of Radar, Bulletin

of Information los, 1-44 to 4-45


A Carrier Battles Jap ive Bombing Planes Detection and racking of Plane Over Land Ma es

ome Idea (01' ight

Fio-hter Direction Tracking VF (N) on the S Visual Fighter Direction

\ i ual Fighter Direction,

Organization and Technique 3-'l5 pp.21·25 ,\Then Do You Launch

Nio-ht Fighters? 2-44 pp. 3-4


IC Publications Reference urrent Instruction Book for Radar 'q uipmen ts

Publication Iews otes

4'45, p, 33 1-45. p. 16; 3-4.5, p. 2


udi and Visual omrnunications

False Echoes and Sub Radar "Gho t Stories" (More about spuriou echoes)

Taking Bearinzs on

In terference

3-44, pp. 19-23 3-44. pp. 25-26

1'45, pp, 1-3


----tl~ ...,.,.".".. ......

"'._--.--.....e.". s·~ C.I~ ._----.----$,;Jf ~ ..... G1oJlr,.I.~a~~ ----oJ", ~Cf'Ip~'~"'4"1\£-~QC. .... ---",""o.JI~~~~


/\tbOUgh radar has in a few short years become a weapon 0 e ential that an effective fleet is unthinkable without it, the importance of Iookou ts ha not diminished at all. Indeed, for hip control and defen e, lookouts have gained in importance- despite radar's miracles.

During the final pha e of the Pacific war, the value of rapid, accurate lookout reports

was demon trated time and again when enemy planes outmaneuvered our radar equipment. During numerous attacks correct identification by lookouts of friendly and enemy aircraft was rue ouly accurate method of determining whether or not to open fire. The detailed tory of the lookouts, the nature of their duties, and their importance to GIC, is given ill "Lookouts Look in on CIC" in "Cd.C." for May 1945.

But even infallibly accurate lookout reportsand visual sightings reported from gun mounts, bridge, and other topside IC stations-shave little value unless they are transmitted to the proper battle stations with speed and dependability. No sighting-and-reporting_ system is any better than the system of communications it uses. There has been a tendency on many ships to alter topside IC installations in the hope of gaining improvement. Often such alterations have defeated their own purpose by making it worse instead of improving the efficiency of the original system.

The diagram above (sent to "(Lf.C." by USS HANCOCK) shows a typical, approved CV IC system for carrying sighting l'eports w-hose reliability has been proved in combat. All ships will do well to refrain from making alterations befor obtaining the advice of proper authorities.





Using Fade Charts

CT 58.: "Operating with a detached unit of destroyers such as the Radar Picket Line, which the .BE! H M has done during the period covered by this I)CPOrt, .requires redoubled eff:ous in altitude determiuarion by fade charlo 1L wa [eund that a renewed drive was necessar to get [he radar operators to pOL fades and report them all the time. The fade chart was moved and :re-installed directty over the air plot, and all planes tracked, friendl and bogey, are now plotted on the fade chart automatically, the aim being to have iL as much a part of the air plot as the range.

&ring, .oourse. an. d speed. We found ~a[ however often the fade chart is cali brated, it is still erratic in the matter of showing altitude by range of initial con taei , and many factors had to be weighed and considered, su~ as a tmosph eric conditions, probable size 01 contact, current operating _efficiency of the C (which seems to change disconcertingly often), probable altitude based on ellisting cloud levels, and any other pertinent information available. AI, the operation progressed, altitude determination became more and more reliable. alrhough above

15.000 feet. we arc still unable to gel satisfactory results. Man more practices and fnde ch art calibrations should be arranged for destroyers assigned to this t1'pc duty.

"For some lime it has been found necessary to separate the two types of air plots, {I} contacts on own radar, and (2) contact repor-ts received over the various reponing channels and telling nets, This was especially important for altitude determinatinn, beca use of plot arlginating on another hlp and appearing 00 our air plol as if it came from OUT own radar might completely destroy a good 'fade Indication. Therefore, One roan wean; the headphones and plots own ship's radar infprmation with a 'black ~eas<:: pencil. and another man listens to the voice circuits and plots these contact reports ln blue, conversion-plotling where necessary. This system now functions smoothly and has proved of great VAlue in untangling Ihe mass of information that comes in."

Jap Control Plane

CO,'\-lDE DrV 109: "On everal OWL' .slons during moderate all' attacks, a single enem), plane orbited In the area to the we tward of the northern quarter of Okinawa. This plane used much window, On it was r porten





as a Beny. Twice when the plane performing ihls dUly was shot down the remaining enemy planes appeared to become eli organized, lhey lIew haphazardly over a large area and then retired, with few attacks being made. It appears therefore, that a control plane may have been used at times to coordinate the attack of other plnnes,"

One Ghost Dispe.lled COMGARDIV (GTG 58.1): "At 0800 on 22 May, TWINING on Radar Picket dury recovered a Japan.esc radar decoy balloon. This device con-

i ted of a rubber balloon about eight Ieet in diameter from which was suspended a light wooden frame covered with tin foil coated paper. It is believed that millie decoys were launched nom islands of the ansei

how Chain, This discovery wived tq a certain extent the numerous Ealse echo phenomena experienced during recent operation ill. the Okinawa Area.·1

The C I C Function ill a Mine Squadron


"The principal Iuncilons performed by the IC's on the 2200 Ton DM's fall into lWO general cla avigation and Detection, 'Tracking and Reponing air target. The basic organizalion and procedure were derived from DESI'AC Doctrine. although there were minor variations developed by individual teams.

I. I avigation ~ While operating as support vessels for sweep units the tracks maintained io the DM CIC's gave a dear picture of currents, holidays, marker buoy and areas swept, Thus the sweeps were given an accurate check on Lhel:r posi tion and all doubt was eliminated about what had been accomplished, In rerrospecr, "tracking the sweeps" sounds obvious and Simple. However, it is believed thar tni Dl\[ ClC Iuncnon contributed



materially to the peed and efficiency of we pre-assault sweeping, The:IIrival+on time-of the sweep urri . at U1C e act spot at which the da " sweep in g was to begin; til e cross check· ing between sweeps and DM's about swept areas, current, marker buo po. si nom, safe courses, and geographlca I pooitious: the lialson provided between the units and eTG 32.2 (Cominpa(:)~ aU were of invaluable assistance in tarrying au t the large scale sweeping plan in this operation. On several oeeaston the OM GIC's were called upon to provide exact navigational information for a sweeping operation outside radar .range of land. This was accomplished by a system of ship-to-shipto- shore radar fixe '.

2. GIC and AA Dc1e.use ~ The second major function during the campaign was detecting, tracking and reporting air targets. For the Fighter Director OM's (ROBERT R. MlTH, SHEA and AA:R.O WARD), this included, of course, the control of a C P and radar telling over the lFO net. Operations in the vicinity of land masses, the approach tactics of the "Divine Winds". and the inherent weaknesses of the air search radar and the Mk m IFF system put a heavy burden OD cperators and equipment. In addition to these, the following jobs were performed in eIC: tracking and identifying surface targets; conversion plot. ting of contact reports: guardirlg several and sometimes all of the folJowiug voice frequencies-VHF (FD). TBS, IFD, LAW, MN (Special sweep unit frequencies), and Minecraft Common. "The rapid distribudon of range and bearing data to all gun COntrol and lookout 'Station was one of the most important fuuctions of eIC in combating the Kamikaze. The standard set-up was the PD target designation system paralleled by 11. sound powered phone circuit for passing Information about the target to Control and ir Defense. This system was used bOtll during condition watches and at General Quarters. It was not completely adequate because of the lag and error involved in target designation. Three of the ships of the Squadron were (orrunate enough to have a VF radar repeater. This repeater with its B-.scope has provided by far the most satisfactory system of target designation. It is connected direcuy into the designation system and a quick, accurate designation is obrained merely by cranking in we range and bearing on




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the repeater and pressing the warning buttons. Control is generally on taTget in 10 to 15 seconds; lag and (!ITOr were elimjnated."

equipment, GIC's and CI '!Itch Officers exist and are a valuable aid . the sbip in dangerous wa rer and in conning the bip in formation. Cl 0 and various Fleet Task Force Commanders have issued many pages of Informarion ancl lnstru li ... ns relative LO the operating techniques, plotting methods, estimates of accuracy, erc., on the use of radar equipment and erc's. However, the basic authority which would allow a avigatox or an 000 to accept advice from a CIC 'Watdt Officer as to a safe course to be steered by the hip in time of danger or otherwise is nonexistent in lavy Regulations."


Radar Tellillg Circuit Difficulties tiss c.aLAGHAN (DD 7!J2): "Information about the Iocauon of bogies had 10 come, I.argd:y from '~d.a.r reo POTts. For this, the LAW circuit was inadequate; information over H was both meagre and late, Primary de. pendence was placed on the Radar Telling circuit, and for tbe of a fire support ship, thls lion was uneven. Reporting of raids at great disUlllCes when irnerceptiorrs

were being organized ..... 'as complete. But. on close-In raids" the FDO's inrerest was lost at the very time il became most Important to ships tEring (0 defend themselves by gunfire. Many times. after bogies Closed to ten or fifteen mlles, no reports were received for five orten minutes, Another handicap in the usc of the Radar Telling circuit was (hat new and completely strange vocabulary was periodically Introdu ed lor which, no definitions could be obtained, 'Purple Lights', 'Jelly Beans', Lights.'

Headset Monitoring Eliminates


ass ROBERT H. SMITH (DM 2)): .. he CIC external corumunicaticn dillicuhy of high noise level reported earlier has been alleviated by the extensive use of head sets Oil all po sible voice radios, excluding tactical circu i [S.

IC personnel have gained enough experience and received sufficient training to efficien tly maintain, a listening watch on a headset so (hal Lhey can be depended upon not [0 miss important messages. It is still believed however, that sound proofing the ClC is desirable."

life in CIC and secret Information concerning an operation to the world at large. Wbile such transmissions are always interesting, they are dangerous to -securiry and cause interference. he MN equipment should be modified LO prevent Inadvertent transmi ions and hips warned to watch the red pilot

light indicating the carrier i '00.' Durmg one approach phase it was ncccssa to order all destroyers to turn off the power on the M beam se some ship was transmluing continuously and repeated requc ts via Tn to Check equipment had no efEect.

"Voice Circuits in GIC-It is recommended that a separate voice radio room he constructed, completely lined with sound proof material. with operating booths for the various elrcuits. An officer CWO-evalualor would be on watch at all times [0 pas pertinent informatlon to interested officers via teleplJoneand 2JMC. Tbe operators would answer all calls to the ship, wuh the exception of the TnS, and be re· sponsible for kcel,'in.g complete logs.

II voice transmitters and receivers WOuld be wired direct to the voice radio mom with provision [or patching certain sets to CIC for specialized communications (spotting, lighter direction). The addltion of this voice radio r-oom would leave GIC free for its primary function, reduce noise level, and remove unnecessary personnel. It would also mean more eBicill1lt voice communications through improved facilities and an adequate number of. operators with a relative) quiet space in which to work."

akagusuku Wan were picked up and tracked at 8000 ards. While on picket station, without an C-ll radar, we FD ~Jark IV was used for air search, using 20° elevation and using the B on the G- for identification of contacts. The Mark IV .radar. was not very u eELIl in tracking air targets over land."

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A V G Operational Summary CT 52.1.1 and CTU 32.1.1: "In ilia f rsr operation in which the VG /VG.l wcr used by CVE"s these varied optnIons were expressed by different units based onobservarions made aboard the llagship:

1. Once again the Iimitations of lh~

C·4 ca used correspo nd ing Ii m i ta tl all S

\0 the for air intercept work.

2. hurt range air interception' were sucCC$sfulJy made on U1e VG and it is believed that K it can be excl uslvel used for this purpa e wi th a bigh degre of success.

3. Regardless of the above limitations, reports of bogies from guard Ships were plotted directly on the face of the VG with use of a scale specially pre. pared for this pUlfpose and intercep. tions made. When the bogcy finally appeared on the SCot the entire intercept picture was instantly made deal' and successful completion was po slble, 4. Reports from other activities indicare tha t the persistence of the ve tube hampered air intercept work. however, none of that was apparent during ttlis operation. ettings were used as follows: Medium video gaiLl, one quarter bias.

5. For surface work the VG was ideal, An excellent relative track was attained a tall times and true COU rses and speeds obtained from using the plotting surface as a maneuvering board were very dose to those obtained from the DRT.

6. The va for station keeping Willi excellent especially when coupled with a. 'grass cutter' on the sa. The most intricate maneuvers of the formatlon could easily be tracked.

7. The greatest drawback to tile VG is its excessive heat, becoming too hot to rest Y01.I:(" band on the metal housing if operated over long periods. The VG was used only at nighr and the " I only during fljght operadous.'

Make It Official

USS 2' CI1.LOO 11. (CA-jJ): .. It is recommended that av)' Regulations be changed and/or clarified to lake cognizance of the Iact that radar


S G and Mark 4 Pillch Hit

for Air Search

U CALLIlGFIAN (DD '192): "Tra king on both the C-3 and SG was satisfactory in general. However, during air raids. air tracking, though still po - sihle, was made dlfficul t because of interference from other e radars. During a period when our C-1I Tadar was Inoperative we were forced to depend on the G during air alerts. The results were most gratifying. Lowflying planes were picked up consistently using full gain on the SG, and tracking of air targets over land was suecessfutly accomplished. Aircraft in

Sub Topics

ass TRUTTA (S 121): "The greatest single. navigational aid in these rogbound areas was the SJ radar. ,. ithout this precision insrrument it would, have been impo 'ible to have patrolled as effectively as we did, dose in near island groups and fjorded.coast lines characterized by swift tidal currents and greatly varying depths of water. Enough praise cannot be given this equipment not only as an attack instrument but also equally as a navigational Instrument, Navigators are nowadays able to keep a sane mind, a full head of hair, and a perfect set of finger nails alollg with an accurate position at all times due to the presence of the SJ radar.

"The 0 radar was keyed approximately every minute when the visibility wa less tban eight (8) miles and roughly every two (2) minutes when the visibility was beyond eight (8) miles, ever was there any .indication that the SD was being DP'cl or homed on. Immediately upon report from the Control 'Room that there was an SD contact, we QM commenced calling • ARBABY' on VHF.ine out of ten times, a friendly plane answered up. \Vhen no answer was received, and plane bad closed to eight or nine miles, a quick dive to 40 feet was made. Eurther calling on the VHF was then resorted to and the SD scope studied. Several times we' established commnnicauon with friendly plane at 40 feet."

An AII-Pt4rpose S G Procedure us SUWANNEE (eVE 27): "During most or our last operation ComCarOiv 22 bad his fiag in the. UW N l!.E. and. tilis placed additional and iucreased responsibilities upon ClC. It is believed that. these respcnsibtlitie were met in a satisfactory manner. "Pursuant to insrructions from the Flag, a special routine for SG radar operation wasa:dopted in order to



OlJercom;II9 MAN Troubles USS INDEPENDENCE (CPL 22):

"Oilli.culties with the MA equipment aboard !.his vessel were apparent earl in the operation. Circuit analysis proved that the microphone current Limiting resistor (RlIl) overheated undel' constant operation with a resultant decrease in resistance. This condition

corrected by replacing the resistor,

ich was of the carbon type. witb one which was wire wound. The microphone circuit WIlS rewired to cut the microphone out of the circuit when the 'press [0 talk' button was not depressed. ince this modification was effected, no difficulty has been ~perieneed in low-modulation or CUlting out in the l\L.o\N equipment."

Mes.sQge Cente.r Needed

U HANCOCK (CJl 19): -cr orn-

munications in the form of the radi channels that must be manned m, 01' next to, CIa, axe stili inadequate. f\ Message Center, located ad jaceni to ere would solve many of the present problems. Bulkheads th t now have many large remote ra(LiophOlle units could be in the lVlessage enter and relieve that hulkh "ad pace so th.llL it may be used (or necessary Slaws boards:'

CIC Communication Responsibilities COMMIJ.NDER DE TJ;lOYER a.ADRON I TY: "The press- tobutton and relay in the MN IIUil· ~ ill have a tendency to stick shut and the ship broadcasts intimate detail of

provide for adequate and effective search and station keepi.tlg. Thill routine was 3S follows:

Short R.ange

2 sweeps minin:mm gain sening. 2 sweeps one-third gain s:etling. 2 sweeps two- thirds gain se L Ling. 2 sweeps full gain setting.

1 manual sweep minimum gain selling.

Long Range

2 sweeps automatic full gain. 1 swet!p manual fun gain."

S G Identifies the Close Ones eTG 58.8: "Durjng the greater parI of lilis perlod, our .BL was partially or completely inoperative, and this was an ex tremely difficult handicap to overcome in. attempung to keep an accurate pictureof the air sltuatiea duringanacks, when th.e screen was a mass of Eriendlies and bogie; in all directions. However, use of the SG for BN cballenging bogies when they dosed within 12-15 miles was developed during this period to the point where it was reliable in alm.Q:St all cases. It was necessary .for the SG operator to be kept constantly alerted to the situation so that no lime WQuld be lost in recognition of [he closing planes .. Several attacks were .made on the Picket Line by bandits who bad been Intercepted by the CAP about 15 miles out but got away. They bursr out or Ibe merged plot and. began their run -at such dose range tha; immediate recognition was essentiat. The SO and 'BN answered this need very sa tis fach:>ril y,

;'A sideHght on use of the SO for dere<:tingaircrafl was that we wood that it picked up planesnt considerably greater altitude than we bad previously realized. In one recent instance, we got a good indication frnm a plane at . 6000 feet. rangeabouL 15 m.Ues '. We therefore stopped the praerice ·of I'eporting these to Bridge, Control and Air D.efense as 'low flying ~¥,' because it was fOund lhal predousseconds were being lost sea.rdt. ing for a bogey low on the "',Her while the bogey kept closing llndetected at a moderate altitude."




A St/ggestiOll for A A Coord.fnMion USS ENGLiSH (DD 696): '"Th.e Fire Con:trol search is bighly endorsed by this ship, On. several occasions, planes were picked up on the Mk 12 before they were Seen. on the SC·!I. .It was noted numerous times that planes reponed as bogey on the flak eircuh had previeusly been established frjendly on Ihe IFD circuit. It is suggested that all ship.s check any Fire Cantrol con (acts they may pick up with CIC before reporting them LO the Flak Director. 1£ CIGcan

identify them as Iriendly, many unneces~aTyO"ansm.issions are thus avoided; if CIC cannot identify them as friendly, (hey sbouJdbe reported over the Task Group lFD. It is Important that all bQgies be reported to the Fjgbte:r DirecttJr before the Eak 01- rector, Any close bogies 'reported on t.he Flak circuit cause all ships in the sector, and some in adjacent sectors, to attempt. to get on with fire con 0"0 I gear. This causes interruption to the normal fire control search and causes .some sectors to be unprotected by Lb.i$ valuable device. The above system was used by this ship and thought excellent,"

DE's GUliS Coached 0" Target

b!l CIC

USS EISELE (DE jl/): "Fire Control on a ship with no other fire control equipment than a Mk 5{ director on the 1.1 gOD is a peculiar problem, CIC can help fill the gap by co'a.chiog the gum on the target_ To do this ellectively the :ranges and bearillgs lOme get to the guns [rom the with a minimum time lag. ~len the bogey w:as on. the SL Lbis was accomplisbed with very UtIle difficulty_ Oneo:: the contact had dosed to 5 :miles the operator wOLlld report hearings and

ranges every 10seoon&_ This information was immediatelyconve:rted 10 ative bearings and passed. to the gun . When the infcrma tioncame fromLb.e SA radar the bearings :and ranges were dead reckoned for 15 seconds and lhen passed to (be guns:"


Nalligatiomd Reference. Points USSCOLORADO (BB -15): ;'PositiOIl' ing the. shit' for indirect fire was the chief use of th e M:k 8 .since l't was seldom LbaL targets WeJ1C of such a nature that Lbey couldeasHy be picked up_ Navlgationat reference points were chosen that alford ed the besl,cbanged II:'SS in ap~Jance with a change of bearing, and whose position was aceurately known. It was found that the ideal reference polnts were small, higb islands., pinnacles 01' rocks, $Udl asfrequendy are off a point of land, Sreep tangents. or bluffs were often satisfactory provided they did IIOl change In appearance greatly with II. change in bearing. B)' cutting down the gain of . the set, it was p sible to pick lLp prominent objects - land, but this lype of reference polm did not preduceaneventrackvespeclaUy when the bearing to the. refer· ence point varied considerably duro ing it run, Mountain peaks 3.!Ireferen ce points were lIS uillynot reliable since the con Will'S ongrl d charts were Dol accurate. However, .if it wer-e necessary. the posidon ·of a peak could be Itccumtelyest''l.blisb.ed by several bearings from well ship's posi· tions far enough apart to give good cuts, To, commence tracking, an 'SG' fix was used tode.te.-rniIIe~appr-oximate bearing and :range to (he selected reference point. The directer and Mk 8 radar were ooachedon. and II truck was star red, After commencing tracking, frequentdt.ctks wiLb'SG' and optical fixes were made until a {lennile track was established. By keepiQg an'SG' navigatkrnill track in ere, in addition to the Mk 8 track, a check at any lime was possible. The grid coordinate of ,Lbe 'SG' ship's position wa.s merely .transfe:rre<l ro Ebe Mk 8 tralik where it ll'as compared. It was found heJ.p:hIl w have a soundpoweredci:rcuit manned 10 the

and stJlJ'hoard alid.-tdes fOT a vis clleck on ship's position. & a matte.r of interest, at va.rious limes wllenlhc

_____ 1

rclenm.oc poinc lay near the line of Ae, the M.I.; 8 ope.ralOrol)SBVcd the _'lOS going out ami also pidced up the spotting plane when it Hew low to investigate the iarger, It issuggesledLbat tile instaUatiun of a Mk 8 remote indieatof in CIC be aceomphshed j» make easier tile msk. of the rtik 8 on reference points ....

USS PHOENIX (CL 46): ·'The Balikpapan Area was fou.nd to be the worst that tJili ship bas ever encountered for radar :u.a.vigation.. Both. the SG and l\{k 8 :radan; were used ·.to fix the ships with fairly accurate TI~:Sul IS. The following' ge{)graphkal points fixed the ship's position with an erro r Qf not more tha n jwo or t hree hundred yards.

"BQlikpapan Point = Identifiable at .[5.000 yards 00 the SG fur the bombardment a visual bearing and a I'<fk. 5 range was used on this point. "The bridge at the mouth of the Sepinggt!lg .River-Visual. bearing and a

,[I< 8 range was used, 'rhis river mouth could D.Ot be initially picked out by ra!hr.

·e:be mouth ot the Mangga:r RiverThis river mouth could be picked out

b~ both the SG and Mk 8 radars at a maximum range of 20,000. yards. however, fur the bombardment a visual bearing on a bridgl!at the mouth of !be river and a Mk VllI range on the mouth was used."

Comments 011 the VPR

S ROPPING (dPD 51): "The SL-_\ R.adar proved very effective for naVigational pUrpoSllS- A VPR altachmeIIl with grid negatives of the operational area was used in conjunction with

.A SL-A for locating tbe invasi.on "clles and fOf patrolling screening slll~ions. A maximum e[TOr of 200

lar-ds was observed whell visual navi~dLionnl dJ~!<~ were obtainable, The VI'R was used a.pproadting the inv a · slon beaches and as a bas is for giving courses [or the boats [0 the beach with excellent results, The Underwater Demolition Team personnel aruiched to litis ship reponed that the COU[lOes given carried [hem direcL to the correct. beaches, !L is recommended that at least three negatives ·0£ each area be furnished in. future operadans. Fixes can be olJl;lined only in the center half of: the Vl'R negaLives, so that a. slight shift of lIavigationalrequirements nullifies the use of that negative. If duplicates were rurnished for each areavihey could be curwith dlflcrem areas in theoontl!l" so that a conrinuous use could be made of the VPRrnroughout the emire area covered by each negative.

"The glass minor of the VPR., with both surfaces highly polished. resulted in It double reflection of the VPR chart causiog some confusion in the aligning of land contours and [he read ill g of tb e grid ooordin ates, it is

Will! <'.111 ploycd for the first. lime during lilt: Iwo Jima assault, This device is designed LO fix 11 vessel 'sposition by apparernly superimposingLbe Image of a chan "lIpon the [ace of a Pi'l scope, as the resulrof which the ship's position, indicated at the center 01 rhe scope, is 'flXed' on the charlo The equipment was installed ill all control vessels at Pearl Harbor and contro\ officers, quartermasters and radiomen o E the shi ps received ins tructiens bo th in maintaining a fixed stauon, and in. computing speed-time data to enable the control vessel. to arriveue a Fredesignaredpclm 011 the beach wlthln a minimum of a few seconds, Both operations are essential in controlvessel operations.

"Since the installation o·f VPR, in both amphibious force and combatant vessels has been authorized, the fcllewing observations may prove of asslstance to other commands In the fnrure:

VPR charts and speed-time charts were draItedem:oute to the staging point and were reproduced on hoard USS AU.BURNand distributed to an control craft prior to departure for the objective. ,\11 AGC's "me being equipped with for 'reproducing these charts. The dawn. approach to Lwe Jima was made IIsing VI'R enrirely for navigating the contro! vessels to the Line 0.£ Departure. Current data. was obtained by plotting the VPR. trlI~k when the ship was. dead in !.he warer, Best results were obrained from observations of fifteen or more minutes, The first assault wave was tracked ttl the beach by radar ami VPR willL reasonable success, Radar of subscqucnr waves was not possi bJ e d tre LO con ges ricn in. the a rea off the beach a .. evidenced in the PPl scope."

believed that this dfecLcould be 'COT.rected if one side ·ofLb.e mirrorlike glass weregiven a higMy polished surface.

"The VPR negative;; were furnished in two sizes: J-180,000: 1-480;000. These sca,lesgav.e a coverage of 7LA miles and 20 miles radius respecdvely when used with the 5" SLeA scope and proved q uire satis fac LOry . 'The useo! the 1-180,000 ratIo necessitareda, modification in the SlVeep unit of the S.L-A Pldar f.I:.ceiver, bUL lWseaused no difficulty."

COMPHLBSPA.C (CTE 51 al'ld Join! Expe:ditioll(lI~'F()rce): "After D. " Day, during rescue and salvagaoperarlens, VPR was used to determine the ship's position and £aciU ta te return 1;0 the assigned control station, This proved especially vllluable du.reing hOUlS of" daJ"kness when 'o'isuai fixes were unobLainable. F.roru tllis experience it is reoommended I.hal. all areas, in.cluding oont:rolc:raEI. positions on and seaward of !.be Line of Departure, be included in the reproduced large-scale eoordina te dJ arn ( I.: 36 .000).

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USS AUBURN (ACe lO):·'The l'ad~.r Ilal'igaliona.i device kno,m as \'PR



"Tracking me first wave 10 the beach ... as done without. the use of radar reflectors on the LVf's. For more accurate tracking, ilis suggested thai tests be made using radar reflectors mounted on the LVT commanders' LVr's. Of the radars used on vessels of the control group, (SF, SL, 0) the SF JaW is least adaptable to VPR lise for two reasons. SF gear would not lay in mae duxing continued operaLion, and the center dots on the PPL scope of SF gear can be reduced to not smaller than two hundred yards in diameter (and in some cases the dot is as large as one thousand yards in diameter). This makes Interpolauon of VPR fixes extremely diflicult.

"The present VPR equipment installed in control craft is inaccurate .in the Inllowing respects:

a. It was found impossible to remove enough of the parallax error to permir accurate matching and fix reading.

b. By having no device. for securing and aligning the VPR chan, the operator ts required to align the chart in north-south and east-west axes b)' . hand.

"The first extensive use 0 VPR navigation in an amphibious operation in the Pacific (Iwo Jima) indicated that VPR assists the control vessels materiaUy in assuming their proper posilions on time. It ShOILld be pointed out. however, tbat VPR was not designed to .replace other navigational means, but rather to supplement them. The concept of VPR navigation arose from tbe need for a means by which hips could make a blind navigation approacb to a beach under conditions of poor visibility. VPR does aecomplish this within the practical bounds of accuracy, That accuracy depends on:

1. The adaptability of the radar gear

LO PR modifications;

2. he preci ion of the VPR unit h-

self; and

JI. The skill and experience of the radar operator in obtaining fixes,"


CI! LlJ <:D



> o z


Jam Session

OM.B/lTDIT' Nil E; "During this operation radar COuntermeasures were controlJed by Commander Battleship Division ine under the supervision of the Bombardment Group Com-




mander, OU'ring the approach [or the bomhardment [he lint enemy radar ignal (154/500/6) was intercepted at

21001 by one of the picket planes.

t 2115 the radar stoppe(1 sweeping and steadied on the plane, obviously traCkjog it. At this time the closest laud was Shioya Saki bearing !l00~ (T), distance 3~ miles. The picket planes were about 15 miles abead of us Oying at 500 feet alti tude.

.. t 2116 the picket planes were told to jam the. enemy radar, which was identified as shore based air search, (~rk 13), probably located at Konoike Airfield. Withill the next few minutes severalships in the group began pick. ing up the same signal. now sweeping. "Between 2130 and 2215 VaI'IOllS ships Intercepted signals of 85, 95. 108 and 17!1 megacycles. one, however, appeared to I)C steadied on the group or our planes.

WiUljn a kw minutes the WI CO _ SIN reported excellent 150 to J 57 megacycles. Wilhin a h! minutes the bogies turned away and were lost in me land return,

"At 2805 the FRAl X KNOX reported an ill tercep t of 170 megacycles, (possibly Air Mk 6), trained on the group.

he was ordered to pot jam that frequency; WISCONSIN then jammed 154 megacycles.

"AL 2359 all jamming was ordered ceased. No Intercepts were reported by- an·y- ship for over 15 min utes.

"At 0015 18 July the ns OUR! ill' tercepted a sweeping signal of 156 megacycles and was ordered to SpOI jam if it steadied 011 us and to so .infonn the group. By Ibis time our retirement had b~n. No further in. tereepts were reported.

The group was prepared to Iaunch de. coys" (A), if detected on approach

D when the signal strength reached but pracdee showed that this often the plane to get within 3 to

4 miles. We finall), sertled on the following procedure: \Vben the radar was identified as airborne and reached a signal strength of S, the S.D was keyed three times (5 econds in each mlnute], t this time we believed that the plane was somewhere within the ranges of 3 to 10 miles. I.f no contact was made, the SD was secured until the signal. strength reached 6 at which time the SD was keyed until the contact was developed or the APR. signal greatly dlrninished. When. the contact was developed either by SD or SJ. we slowed to reduce the wake and maneuvered to place the contact astern, We had very good success in llsing this procedure. The J wall ke ed only during tracking and when we had Jap ]0 CM radar on ihe 5J screen."

, hich became at rimes almost imposlble to interpret. The diffieWLies iu transposing accurate bote)' information from task group to task group make it often necessary for one grotq) LO go after a bogey another group is already chasing. But vithin we task group itself the iruauon is more easily controlled. So, since the safer factor afforded by having more than one formation of fighters out to Ierercept ally one raid is undoubtedly a valuable precaution, it is extremel important ihat the 'safety back' fighters be held back as a safeguard, and not allowed to get tangled up with other friendlles out after the raid. This requires very strJct control and a proper understanding b)' intercept officers of what they are to do when told to back up someone else."

Night WorN

VSS ESSEX (CV 9): "Action reperts from air group 86 are now available, and explain why the USS ESSEX nighL fighters received such a pat on the back. Between 4- April and 13 May they shot down 15 airooYlle Jap planes. Two of the boys .made themselves aces during the period. Here's the box score:

. ns, omers, at On the 0 CAR' tail for almost three minutes before he made it flame and explode, A 330" vector ran them into 8 VALS, flying close to the water. Umphres picked out the Tail-End Charlie and. knocked it dOIVII with a deflection shot' from above. Barnes plashed the second with II stern burst. and then went

after the third Jap, which was now heading straight for a DD nearby . "Harne splashed the would-be Kamikaze plane just 200 n. short of its intended target.

"The VF (N) were then: vectored out 15 miles and bumped into 3 OSCARS


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01 m ;::0

"At 2216 lIfiS OURI reported OJ. radar of 104 megacycles trained 0[1 the group. h and the OR~{AN OTT were ordered LO jam that frequency. "At 2222 the FRANK. KNOX reported a radar of 155 megacycles alsorrained onus. She was immediately ordered to spot jam. At 22~5 the FRANK KNOX reported erious interference LO her VI-IF channels and was told to cease jamming.

"A t 2235 three to four bogies were picked up bearing 210" (T) distance 58 miles, closing.

"From ~2!19 to 2242 three ships reported a radar of 154 megacycles steadied 0"- the group. At 2245 bar. rage jamming was ordered. with center frequency )54 megacycles, the 1I-US 0 RI jammin.g her intercepted signal. The .FRANK KNOX was tcld to withhold jamming if it caused in. terference to her VHF channels,

while still a considerable distance away, (B) if under bore fire or plane attack while on bombardment COU1'Se, (C), w.hile ru.ming to 'retirement course. (A) and (B) were not found necess ary: (C) was caTl'ied out with results unknown."

Ens. Barnes " April '45 0430 TCAP SONIA
Ens. So men 6 April '45 l730 DAD CAP CAR
Lt. Umphres 6 April '45 17110 DADCAP VL
Ens. Barnes 6 April '45 1730 DAD CAP VAL
Ens.Barnes 6 April '45 17llO DADCAP VAL
Lt. Umphres 6 pri1 ·45 1730 DAD CAP OSCAR.
Lt. Umphres 6 pril '45 1730 DADCAP- OSCAR
Ens. Barnes 6 April '49 1730 DADCAP OSCAR
Ens. Barnes 6 April '45 1730 DADCAP OSCAR
Ens. Robertson 7 April '45 0400 CAP UNIDENTlFtED
Ens. Colvin 7 April '45 0430 CAP OSCAR
Ens. Colvin 17 April '45 0220 GAP BETTY (see below)
Lt. Umphres 13 Ma), '45 OU5 NCAP JAKE
Ens, Barnes 13 r-.fay '45 0345 NCAP JAKE
Lt. mphres 13 May '45 0506 C P TO Y (seebdow) "One Hop Bags Eight: On 6 prll, Lt. mphres, and Ens. Somers and Barnes look off on a dusk CAP over Okinawa, take-oil time 1645 (LZ'I). While on their way to the rendezvous area, they saw an OSCAR being chased by an F6F and an F4U, both of which over-ran it. The three night figbters then. made runs on the Jap, which was flying at 2000 ft. The lint two (VF (N) gOL visible hits" and the third"

about 3000 Ieet below them. The Japs were Hying a loose formation, abreast.

mphres made a high ide .run on the middle plane. and flamed. it with a 10nS' burst into the engine. The pilot bailed ou t. mphres then -made a pass on a second one at close range, and believes the Jap's oxygen bottles must have been hit, 3S the OSCAR dlstintegrared Immediately. The thlrd lap then made a head-on pass at both


Submarine Eoades Jap Radar

Equipped Planes

ass BAl'A (SS 318): "In dealing with Jap radar equipped planes the follow. ing. procedure was used: The SP ·1 scope was marked off vertically into five equal divisions, 5 being full saruration signal. A close watch was kept on the APR.·l and SPA-I. When 0011· tact was made, we endeavored to determine the type 'radar from all avail. able information keeping the informed of the type radar and strength. It was planned to key the


"Where Are M!:I Friendlie.s?"

~s I.N.DEPENDENCE (CJ'L 22): "Another aid in the 'Where are my friendlies?' problem is the stationing of the CAP out some distance from base, so tha t they may be kept in ighl on the PPI. This procedure is obviously neee Sall' when the weather is such that the CAP at altitude cannot keep ba e in sigh L, and abo is worthwhile when the CAP can be stationed in the direction of expected attack. However, if this practice is overdone" [he disadvantages outweigh the advantages, since there will then be an exec tve number of friendly plots in. the same general area, til us confusi ng the picture. In addition, even with the use of the YE, a grea.t maay transmiSSions are often needed to keep C P on stalion, due LO hij:'h winds. fades, and carelessness of .pilol:S in holding a good, tight orbit. For these reason it i felt that, weather permitting, only ,>DC group of VF should be stationed :I''''a), from the force, with the others stationed overhead in as few different !;TOups as we aituation allows.

" uccessful Interceptions were often hampered by the presence 01 several dlvisions of fighters all chaBing the

ane bogey. ot only did the ,fF _ste time tallyhoing each other, but {he)' presented a piclureon the PPI


mpbrc:; and omen, and as he did so. Ens. Barnes jockeyed himself behind the Jap for II steal shot. everal long bursts fin a II , forced the Jap \.0 bail out of his burning plane at 150 ft. altitude. He landed safely in aver empty OCean. TIle final vector found the three VF (N) chasing anorher OS· CAR below the clouds at 3000 ft. This Jap made head- Oil runs against . mphres and omers, lir:ing 20 mjm as be did, but crash d into the water."


Window Breakers

ass .ASTORIA. (CL 90): "Although the enemy did not sow window to the Mark 12 frequency, every method. of combat:illg such usage was developed. This ship's Mark 12 operators were drilled to check all suspicious contacts with the Mark 22. When tracking :1 target with both radars and other questionable pips appeared 011 the Mark 12 range scope, the operator switched the range scope LO the Mark 22_ U tbedoubtful pip is a real target it wHi also appear on the Mark 22.

Thill check can be made in a VCI'}" short time and eliminates confusion without the steady trackillg of the desired target."

at: .lJ 10



> o z


High Altitude Tracking T ests ComCarDiv ONE: "During the Okinawa operation numerous h:igh.ftying snoopers were encoumered, "the inability of p]"~t radar sets to pick up and consistently track with any amount of accuracy these snoopers flying between 25 and 35 thou and feel was exceedingly serious. On one occasion the presence of a high fiyer was determined only by !.he window dropped, which remained in the vi· tlnity for 45 minutes'. This was the first time litis Group had encountered window during daylight.

As a result 01 thiS shortcoming TG 58.3 experimented on traoking one dlvision of CAP at Angels lout l030 miles, ascending at this point to Angels 25. The following comments were received from ships in com pan)' on this experiment.

ALABAMA-"Infonnat.ion normal Lip to Angels 25 wlth usual Eades:'



PRlNGI'lELD-" sual fades up to Angels 1.5, good .results to ~gels 20, unreliable aBove that,"

WILK.ES·JlARRE-"Performance better than usual at medium Angels. Infonnation above Angels 20 unreliable." 1\[ONTERJ!.l'-"rnfunnation poor on S,p up W Angels 15. Between Angels Hi and 21 information good," RANDOLPH-"Average to good results at all altitudes on K and SC radars,"

BATAAN-"Thfonnat.ion and altitude determination erratic up to Angels 15, Above 15 consistent through 25."

operator's technique and adju. uueni technique of maintenance force

ne cary to obtain beuer altitude 1 Iormacion.'

Cutting Grass Helps ElJaluate 5 G's Air Targers

PORTERFIELD (DD'.682): "Ill tracking air targets on the G it was found LO be difficult to estimate compo ition of larget when several planes were in dose Iormatiou. By using }6" of 'grass' planes were readily discernible at ranges from 20,000 to 85,000 yards, and reason ... bl accurate courses were determined hy track on the master PPI."

Plotting Helps the Operator

'S SH4 'CRl-/..A (CrI38): .. C radar was altered SO that operator ploued with grease pencil on I'PI scope. This was accomplished by removing the gla . cover of P P 1 unit and fi Lling a clear plexiglass cover !4 inch above the Cathode Ray rube (CRT). Plexiglass cover was etched with anmuth lines and range circles, The result afforded quick and reasonably accurate plotting 011 the scope by operator, These plots in turn were called in

the vertical plot. This method w [<lund vcry satisfactory .since the oper· ator was able to hold a more comprehensive picture of the air situation b plotting on PPT. It follows !:hat ident lfication of targets was wade easier particularly when fades occurred. Eur ther development is planned by using amber CRT Covel' with India ink Iines since clear plexiglass causes undue eye s trai n for operators. A quick lie riog mechanical centering deville is esseruial for the PPJ unit if this tech nique i to function satisfactorily."

Ghosts, Geese, and Aerolog;sts

U YORKTOWN (CfI" 10): "All ~J

radars in the Group were affected b 'ghosts' at nigfu, and YORKTO ,. was no exception .. Some were undoulnedly due LO unusual electronic conditions. However, an several occasions when these 'ghosts' appeared, looko~HS reported flocks of geese fiying nea.f thrformatlon; and they may have been the target. Radar balloons, evidenrlv released over Okinawa for wind formation. were also picked. up b

M radar. One detected at 40,000 and ll'O'lvelliog at 90 knots sent th (0 General QU3rtCl'S on one occasion."

he second run was started with the division at Angels 2!i, range 30 miles, They proceeded out to 80 miles a~ Angels 25 and returnedat Angels 80.

WASHINGTON reported, "On runin had track from 45 to 40 miles. A[ no other time could the division be picked up."

E SEX-"Had fair Information (con. sidering condition of radars) from 50 miles in to 18 miles:'

PRING1"ll:LD--" pouy track on outbound leg. Had one plot on inbound leg at 75 miles."

·WILKES.IMRRE-"Two plots only at distance 26 and 22 miles,"

MONI"EREY-''Tracked to 47 miles, lost there on both 1) and SK. and never definitel' tabli ned contact again."

RA mOLPH-" 0 track OUI. between 40 and 80 miles. 000 track in from 62 miles LO l2 mile with only 2 fades of 6-8 miles each."

J'ASADENA-"Only one contact at 75 miles, "

Sugar Peter


"Tracking of air targets by SP was satlsfactory although SF was not frequenrly used for this purpose, Results of altitude determinations with SF were variable. Further improvement of

* u. S. & ,P,IO\Ilng Office: 1945

The Dirct.wr t>r Naval (".ommunil::l[ion~ appreelates the Joya I work of the thousands of om·

CCCi and enlisted men in cornmurricaunns and elet:lwllics who maintained through lr) ing (."andi· tions the high standard of I he Naval Communlcauon Service. Communicarions aile! electronics

will 113 e an irnportanr part in the po~t war Naval Reserve, ami plan' now in preparatlon will he announced when completed. It is hoped (hal the communications and the electronics personnel who <10 not continue in an act.ive status IU1,II who

played such a vital role ill winning the war will work to Insure the peace as members or the Naval Reserve.

Joseph R. Redman Rear Admiral, SN

Director of Naval Commullications

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E. I. KINe

Fieet 4dllliraJ. Us

Chief of Na"",J O"eCiltion6