- c. I. c.

COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER

e

AUGUST 1944

CONTENTS

PPI pictures Can Be Predicted Farewell to Communication Failures Guardians of the Sky What About Low Angles?

Black Cats and. PT's The Flying Bomb U'-Boo: Killers h01't-CUt olutions on the DRY

he ugust Cover features the new Radar Planning Device-RPD-developed by Special Devices Division, BUTeau of eronautics, which in a short time has given promise of important tactical and operational use in all combat theatres. See "PPI Pi tures Can Be Predi ted' for the detail.

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A Confidential magazine published monthly by the Chief of Naval Operations for the information of commissioned, warrant, enlisted personnel, and persons authorized, who e duties are connected ... vith the tactical use and operation of electronic equipment.

DISTRIBUTION OF "C. I. C."

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THE INF'OKlUATIO CONTAINED IN TInS PUBLlCA'l'JON IS CONFIDENTIAL and as Dcb shall not he u-ansmlrted or re caled, in nny manner. (0 any unautho1:i~ d person. The puhli ·~tiOll i to be handled ill accordance 'i\ith Artid· 76,

. S. avy RegulaliOllS~ and will be deSLroy d by hurning when it hit er ed it purpose. N('ither quartt"rl. reports nor reports of Imming are required.

This publication can be of maximum service only if operating personnel .Ereely contribute items of interest. Accordingly, ontributions are invite and may be addressed dire tly to The Chief of Naval Operations Editor of "C.1. .. ", Washington 25, ., with a copy to immediate Commanding Offi er.

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Contributions of all types are welcome Iuding critical comments on articles which appeared in this publication, suggestions for improvement of equipment or techniques, and per· anal ac ounts of operations.

Clear photograph or drawing-s to accompan the e articles are especiall desired,

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" ,I. C." is distributed by registered mail and

regi tered airmail to . S. laval, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard offi es, commands, and activities. dditional ~istribution to ther sp cine command and acti ities of the Allied Forces is determined after receipt of official requests addressed to: he

Chief of Naval perations, Editor of "C. L C.",

Washington 25, D.

. S. rmy omrnands and acnvrues are requested to send requ sts for copies of this and sub equent i sues oE "C. I. ." to:

Bran h, A. . ., R om 2B939, Pentagon Bui 'I abington 25 D. C.

How would this coastline look 011 a PPl?

PPJ pictures can be predicted

LANDFAll BY RADAR

Radar landfall when approaching an enemy coastline is greatly simplified if the navigator bas photos of that coastline as seen on it PPI, Em he can compare hese with his own PPI and quickly Ii::: l.us snip's posi?on. But such photos are-often, not to be had, and then It 1S hard, 'ometLmes impossiLle, to identify the area "seen" on the ship's PP1 with the same areas a rei resented on the navigati na 1 bart. partial olutiou to the probl m was found in a laboriou te hnique of profilinO' area and irnulatb:tg PPI images 1\ ith handmade co era 0" diagrams. 1 owev r. n ed f r a quicker, more a' urate method ha lonz been felt.

Thi need has n 'W be n mel by th "Radar Planning Devi e" developed by Special Devi es Di ision of the Bureau or Aeronautics. Its value is already being demonstrated in combat theatres.

The RPD idea was born with the question "Why not take advantage of the fact that light nys and radar waves act in many similar way?"

Both light. .ra and radar wa es ra el in straight lines and ea shad ws.

Hence, when a point sour e a light i pla ed n an a uratel rain mod') the r sulting lights and had w make a patt rn to rna on the PPI of a radar canninz ih a .tual area. pe iall phot graph may be made for use in radar landfall.

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CONFIDENTIAL )

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In the RPD method, "Evasion Indicator" pi.., may be stuck on the terrain model and ni kel b. adjusted on the Pins to indicate permanent echoes and shadow depths. Radar coverage for any site can thus be determined in advan e. 1 Pins- on models of enemy territory where radar sites are known will reveal any gaps in enemy radar coverage and show how our plane may avoid radar detection.

TACTICAL USES OF RPD

Successful PPJ simulation have been made with the RPD method for shipborne, airborne, and ground radar. The three major tactical uses of the method are: (l) To make PPI "preview" photos of coasts and land areas as navigational aids for task forces, amphibious forces, or air forces. Simulated PPI photos may be made in ad. ance fo .. any mission or the RPD may be taken along an~ photos made enroute as desired. (2) To locate gaps in enemy radar coverage to plot the safest approach for planes. (3) To locate the best sites for our ground radars. Other tactical uses will doubtless be developed.

BOW IT DEVELOPED 115

When early experiments with RPD loo~ promi ing, Special Devices Division and the Radiation Laboratory oE MIT sent an expedition to the Smoky Mountains in western orth Carolina for a thorough test of tl e new method. PPI scope pictures made there on a mobile set were practicall identical with simulated pictures made with an RPD on a terrain model of the Smokies, The val

idlty of the method was proved, '

• On request oE Com Air Pac, the RPD project engineer was sent to the Pacific Fleet Radar Center at Pearl Harbor to demonstrate PPI predictions by the point source of light method.

During April and May, tests with a model of Oahu gave excellent re ults, Many simulated PPI photos were made and compared with scope photos previously taken at mast height at variou lecadons around the island. The ompari on were convincing in every case, giving not only cornparable shapes of PE's but accurate locations in range and azimuth as well.

Tests were also made on the Oahu model for airborne simulation. These PPI photos were compared with actual on s taken from a plane _ fouud to be as accurate as those taken from rim't height.

CONFJDENTIAL 3

RPD applies a point source of light to a terrain model. The pattern of the resultiug light and shadows is ve?) similar to the 1)iclu.re on a PPI covering the same area.

CAMERA 10M BOOlA)

"HOTO EASEL

WIOE ANaLE LENS

ENLARGER

ANGLE SE'lIING Negative is rotated. on this easel to obtain the effect of beam sp·read.

aking a simulated PPI photo by the RPD method.

RPD photo after relation with the ttl ct of beam spread added.

RPD photo before rotation,

After study of the e tests and the accurate pa photos, it was decided that a regu lar RPD m~ would be established as a pe1'1TIaneht part of the Pacific Fleet Radar enter. building was equipped to handle requests from units of the fleet.

ED FOR SAIP~

TRIKE

'hese facilities were utilized immediately (or the Saipan strike. larae number of model of Saipan, and other i land were constructed in record time and simulated PPI photo were prepared to upplement navigational charts of the islands. Carrier task forces and amphibious forces took these Rl)D aids along on the operation.

The problem of siting gTound radar, 'while not an imm dia e concern for most naval acti ities, i an acute one', in the field. Many cost! mistak have been made in the in tallation at search geax du to inadequate study f the problem of ~ " . With the added Iaciliry and thoroughnes I the RPD method, areas may readily be ested in advance for their characteristics as radar site .

.J ust as we are able to predict the e£Eectia ne s of our own installations and effectively cho. sites, we can apply the ame method, to a terrain node! of enemy-held territory. Knox ing from ph to-r connai sauce the 1 ati n of enemy in allations, the model an be tested with the RPD instrument and approa hes mapped to the target (or maximum immunity to radar detection. Tills method, of course, i only as effective as the reconnaissance on enemy radar.

Measuring height:; abotie SCII level uiith .11 Ma,P C,,,nvcl' iOIl '. Height:; of beacLs on the "Evasion Indicator PIII.f reveal radm

coverage.

"Eunsion It/iIi alOr" Pins show elle1l1)! radar coverage to pitatf. A string lai4 011 the 1"OiLlll t'mces 111i: "radar evasion" approach to tile tm'get area. RY1)otlu;ticcli enemy r(l:44f. lit ... 1 and B.

CONFIDENTIAL 5

RRAIN MODEL MADE Rt\PIDLY

errain models can be constructed by rrained peTsom el rin two to three day from reliable con tom- maps. , hen only fragmentary infonnalion is available, models till can be constructed within entirely practical limits of time by an expert landfall office!" or experienced terrain modeller.

In most theatres, equipment and terrain modellers are available for construction of good models. Officers especially trained in the RPD method should be on hand to upervi e the on tru tion of models, a well as to lest and photograph the Iight SQUTee on the ompl ted maps.

The photograj hi meth d n l ani re OLd the line of ight Pf pat~ t 111 but 011 0 reproduces the effect 0 beam pread by rotation f the negative under exposure. Present method also include means of recording complete data as to range, bearing, antenna beizht: beam width, identification of areas and range marks. date and job number on the negative to avoid possible confusion and improper use of the material.

Mass producli(ltl of ten'ldn models fa)' fln facilities are becoming available in most areas.

Coaling af the "eleuation-layers" jJroduces the completed, sccurate, realistic terrain model.

6 CONFIDENTlAL

"P1'Ope?' operational 'Use of Ionospheric Data) reports tquadron Leader A. L, Hall, Royal Australian Air Force, "ensures radio contact between any two points day and n.ight throttgholll the yeal', guasuntees direction findingJ and makes Signal identification positive."

16-C-23 16-G-23 1 16-C-28 16,C-23 P 16-2-23 r

Radar Planning Device Kir;. RPD faoual • Map onversion Scale Range and Bearing Marker RPD Photo Easel

o Marine activities, the RPD will be available from Base and Field Depots through normal supply channels, in ac ordance with standard tables and allowances.

rm activities should address reque ts for the RPD to Headquarters, Army Air Forces, ssi tant Chief of Ail- StafE, Operations Commitments and Requirements, Fighter and Air Defense Branch, Washington, D. C.

farewell to

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communication

failures

The RPD kit is very conipact:

A WORD OF CAUTION

he RED is merely an aid, not a complete solution to alJ radar problems. Its use should be uper-

i ed by an officer trained in it operation, and its results hould be applied with proper regard for the limitations of the method, But properly used, the RPD should prove a aluabJe operational and tactical aid.

An article presenling the RPD from the A~-m,y Air Forces point of view ajJj)ean ,:11. the current i~s1,te -: "Radar," a .confidential magazine put lulled by the Army A~r Forces, Office of Air Communicaiion 0 ffice«.

ROW TO GET IT

An RPD kit is now in production and availabl through the channel listed below. It includes an RPD instrument. a transformer, a batter case with rheo tat for use when power is not available, a sub ass mbl with plexiglass rod for simulating antenna heights. spue bulb and fuses, a pair of l)liers, a screw driver, and I Pins.

The following devices needed for RPD planning are a vailable to avy acti vines through the Bureau of Aeronautics under the Eollowing Special Devices numbers:

F1'Om the Original Manuscript p1-epaucl by S/L A. L. Hall RAAF

a ane man would finance the 1 uilding of a xailroad system and permit the expenditure of millions on stations without IiT t ascertaining what difficulties were likely to be encountered in putting down tbe track, and by what routes the various stations would be linked. He would rightly hesitate to act before he knew a good deal concerning the nature of the country through which the line was to rUD. or would any careful pilot take off on a long oversea journey without first ascertaining the likely behavior of the medium through which he wa tfty his ship.

Yet it seem to be a rather ommon belief that one has only to et up two tran mitters and associated receiver> covering some arbirrari.ly-selected frequency range, to guarantee communication between any two points any time of the day or night. It can be definitely stated from operational experience that millions have been spent on radio equipment which has done only half the work it was designed to do. One can see and operate transmitters and re ei vel'S, but one cannot understand the nature of the connecting medium without considerable abstract study, and it is this fact which

auses orne otherwi e reliable communications officers to neglect the medium and hope for the best,

This habit of hoping for the best is not good enough, in e it has been abundantly dear for a number of years tba a high f::requen y ommunication system can be just as carefully engineered as a railroad, that the behavior of the medium through which the radio waves are to travel can be predicted more accurately than ordinary weathervand contact thus ensured between any two points day and night throughout the year.

It is hoped to dispel the habit of trusting to luck, and by citing a numbel' of applications of ionospheri data-the ke to th ituation=in the outhwe t Pacific Area rom 1940 on, to per uade respon ible ommuni ai n officer not already seized with the importance of the problem that

there is a better method: that there should, in fact be more wid pread, use of wav propagation data.

This lriking terrain model of Boston harbor hows the acc'l,l,mcy (lnd realism which trained modellers can deliver.

CONFIDENTIAL 1

RADIO NETWORKS RELIABLE AS LAND·LINES

In pea_, time delay in e tabli bing tel phonic or radio ommunication, between any two points an be tolerated to orne degree ince the 011-

equences of hort period failure do not in zeneral affect more than a handful of people. In wartime. however, delay of the order of ten minut r so may make all the difference bet ween tile su ccess or fa i lure of an important operation, defensive OT offensive.

A surveyor ustralian ommunicarions made in 1939 revealed that the ystem wa inad quate to withstand the train imposed upon it hy war. . t that time there were pTa ti all no' I point- o-point circuits in existence, and the services bad to use already overloaded carrier telephone channels. Moreover, the rrui kline telephone sy tem mbraced only til main capital cities and did not cover important area north of Geraldton in 'Western ustralia, nor the orthem Territory within which was located the important base of POrt Darwin. In addition, 'VI communication ben . veen lew uinea and the mainland of ustralia was very unsati - fa tory,

he situation was, in fact, critical, and some mean of enabling rapid communi ation to be maintained b tween all important ba e had to be establi hed in a minimum of time. r Ioreover, because £ limi ed equipment and personnel, resources had of necessity to be employed with the utmost economy of effort,

To meet the situation, it was decided a establish a comprehensive VV IT poinr-to-poiru system, and, since it had been laid dot n b the operational staff that ommunication l as essential 2Ll hours of the da • 365 days of the year, it was obvious that guesswork was not goad enough, An appeal was therefore made t variou sci ntific organizations which cooperated t the fullest degree in upplying wave propagation data based on earlier researche into the characteristics of the ionosphere, The uccess achieved in maintaining communication over point-to-point links en ouraged the. II tralian services to expand the organization responsible for supplying' prediction of wav propagation c nditi n .

ubsequent experience has shown that. provided frequency allocations are based on adequate knowledge of the ion phere communi arion is, £01' aU practical purposes, a reliable as that over land-lines. The network of poin t-to-point se i sill ustralia has grO"l\ll1 from less than ten circuits ill 1 939 to well over 500 cir uit at th [resent day, all operating with lockwork regularity,

AIR TO GROUND CONTACT ASSURED

The planning of air operations depends ill a large measure on knowl-

dg of enem activities and thus regular reconnaissance flizht are ne essary. It is important that communication be maintained between base and aircraft at all time during th flight sin e ighting r ports mu r be made without delay back to base to enable appropriate offem ive action to be taken against the enemy.

Prior t the appli ad n of iono pheric predi lion in the uthwest

Pacific Area, failures were frequent, in parti ular near the dawn period, but also quite oft nat th l' times of the da . It had been 11 tomary t employ frequencies in the region of 6Mcs., on which channels partial tLC ess had been achieved. dawn, however. these frequencies were much too high, having kip f the order 01 a thousand miles or more and at mid-da . havinz ShOTt distance ranges, due to high absorption. The selection of

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CONFIDENT] AL

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equen ies ba ed on ionospheric predictions completely eliminated ~raccally all difficulties in ommunicacinz with aircraft; so much so that pilots came to look on operators who ould not e tablish communication as being inefficient.

n strike mis ions planes may have to tra el more than a thousand miles to their target, chedule of frequencies and time of operation on each must therefore be arefully worked out in advance so chat continuous communication may be ensured. The sam are must be taken in sele ling frequencies for communication between aircraft sent to protect convoys and bo base and ship in the convoy .

mP·TO·SHORE FAILURES HAVE BEEN COSTLY

The need or fighter cover to pTOtect battleships against enemy di ebombers Inay arise. IE the commander cannot signal base in time due to delays following the employment of inc rrect frequencies, serious Iosse may result, There is evidence to indicate that inadequate knowledge of wave propagation wa an important contributing facto}' to one or two earlier heavy losses.

Warnings must also be conveyed to ships if there is a likelihood of attacks by submarines or iller vessels, -and it bas been found that unles

frequencies are carefully chosen, some area will be skipped altozether.

Broadcast warning systems mu t therefore be carefully planned and ion-

a pheri data used to assist in the selection of frequenci s ensuring reliable

pas ing of information from shore to ship at all times.

TEOROLOGY ELIMINATES FAILURES

In the Australian theatre, there exist a network of widely separated key meteorological stations. Each of these inter hauges information with all of the others so that each may prepare synoptic charts of the area, Each must then inform all airfield within its area of meteor logical conditions existing and predicted. A '''"IT network has been set up to meet this need, The frequencies u d and their time of use are all planned on the basis of ionospheric predictions; thus no failures now arise, At first ~e equipment in use could notreacb sufficiently low frequencies; later, equipment of satisfactory range was installed. completely elirninatin an difficulties in maintaining contact between stations.

omECTION FINDING SAVES PLANE

In the outhwe t Pacific rea high frequen y directi 11 finding is used as a navigational aid to aircraft. An instan e of the need for ionospheric information to obviate the failure of such a system is given by the Joss some two year ago in one theatre of war, of if:2 aircraft rerurninz from a mis ion, due to the selection of the wrong frequency, Tesulting in the air raft beina in the skip zone, and thus bein unable to obtain navigational assistance.

III the outhw t Pacific n such heas 10 ses have been exp rienced due to the fact that the Area has been divided into zones, time tables carefully drawn up and selec ed frequencies laid dow 1 for each zone, thu ensuring that no aircraft hall lJC within skip of the DI station at any tune of the day or night. No failures have arisen except where instructions ha e been disobeyed and frequ 11 i s u sed involving skip.

An example of this arose when a Hudson aircraft, . o. A-16-1gB. with a crew of r:; and 5 passen.get aboard pro eeded Irom Horn Island to Brisbane on a combined reconnaissance and travel mission, arriving at Brisbane

CONFIDENTIAL

about 6 PJvL in bad weather. The aircraft called for bearings on an unsuitable frequency, and although the D IF station advised the ground statiOi"l which was maintaining difficult communication with the aircraft, to change to a lower frequency, theground station feared loss of communication and would not accept the advice given. No bearing of the plane could be given, and it finally crashed into the sea, 100 miles south of its destination, with total loss of Ii Ee .. An examination of ionospheric: graphs at the subsequent enquiry show-ed that the skip on the frequency in lise by the aircraft varied hom 300 to 600 miles during the time it was endeavoring [0 obtain bearings.

OPERATIONAL CHANNELS ScmNTfFICALl.. Y PI_.ANNED

Just prior to the Coral Sea Battle, a meeting was hastily called at Ceneral MacAtthur's Headquarters to decide ways and means of ensuring communication between ground stations, ships, aircraft and organizations vitally concerned with obtaining information which would enable them to follow' the course of the anticipated battle and take appropriate action. Because of the number and disposition or the forces concerned, both in the South and Southwest Pacific Areas, the system had or necessity to be as simple as possible. Some communications officers at the- conference therefore advocated the use of a single frequency .. It was pointed out, by reference to Ionospheric predictions, that if this 1,1an was adopted, communication failures -~vould inevitably result. The more scientific approach 'vas finally agreed upon_. and additional frequencies were selected, the hours of operation on each being specified in advance. The plan was completely successful, and as far as is known, there was not a single hitch during the battle due to a communication failure.

Since, the time Of the C01:aI S~a Battlcl'econnaissa.nce. strike. conv., and broadcast frequency alocations in the Southwest Pacific Area have been based on ionospheric data, and the success achieved has amply justified the comparatively small expenditure of effort in this direction,

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CONFIDENTIAL

LOCATING SOURCE OF SIGNALS

Ionospheric information has proved of considerable value to Signals Intelligence Units. Taking the negative aspect first, past experience Indicates that operations rooms may be unnecessarily alarmed by reports of strong signals picked up by nearby receivers, Ieading to the conclusion that an attack is imminent. A ship was, in fact. sent out on one occasion to endeavor to intercept a submarine which was finally proved to be some 10,000 miles distant at the time. Had reference been made to ionospheric data, it would have been clear that considerable skip distances were involved, and one could have predicted with certainty that the signal in question could not have come from a point closer than 2: • .000 miles from the receiver.

As a further example, in 1942 OIl@ of the Services believed a spy to be operating a transmitter in one of the mountainous regions of New South Wales, The frequency, on which strong signals were picked up, was in the neighberhoodof 11 Me/s. It was also noted that signals were exceptionally streng and steady by night. After considerable time and effort had been spent searching the area, a request was made for the snp_ply: of mobile direction findingequipment, thus bringing those familiar with the application of ionospheric data into the picture. It was then made dear that the transmitter was at least 2,000 miles away, and that errors in plotting the bearings, due to the use of rhumb lines instead of great circle bearings had caused incorrect inferences to be drawn, Further observations made by D/F stations more appropriately placed proved conclusively that the transmitter in question. although operated by the Japanese,. was Iocated in the Netherlands Indies.

Prior to the more widespread use of ionospheric data in the Sou til,

vest Pacific Area, a sudden increase in the number of signals being, received hy radio intercept units lead to the impressionvon one or two occasions, that attacks were impendirrg, and hurried preparations were made to meet them. When nothing eventuated, there was, of course, some criticism of t.hose responsible for the unnecessary alarm which had been caused. Investigation showed. however, that the sudden increase in traffic was due to improved propagation conditions on lower frequencies, due to the onset of an ionospheric storm, thus giving the impression that the enemy was more than usually active .. Ionospheric forecasts. coupled with regular monthly predictions, are now in general use, and thus cause and effect can be more readily determined, and unnecessary warnings eliminated.

There are, of course, a number of other more .irnportant positive applications of ionospheric data for Intelligence purposes; such as correct siting of intercept units, location of D/F stations, assignment of duties to units-in many cases more remote from the desired targets-co avoid the effects of "skip", determination of the approximate area covered by each unit, the assignment of frequency bands to be watched, etc., but for reasons of security. it is not desired to go further than merely indicate the nature of the problems whicb may be solved by the intelligent application of ionospheric data.

Adequatp. wave propagation data enables high frequency communicetion systems to be placed on (In engineering basis. Guesswork may be eliminated and questions 1lOsed by the ojJemlional staff confidently an· swe1-ed, either in the negative or a{firmat.ive. The need jor such data is _. tal to the, success ot many ojJcmtions and those 'who jail to make lise

the knowledge "n.ow available must becomidered guilty of negligence, should failures occur which result in heavy loss of life and eq u. ip men t.

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An enemy raid is being tracked on the display t)lot in this "action shot" of an A ir Defense Control Center at BougainviUe. Liaison officers have alerted the base. Island arld Air Command, AA Batteries, a11d ADCC's of other bases and ships. The Fighte7' Director Officer has assiened the raid to an in tercept officer (not in the jJicture) who, from an intercept table or PPI, is vectoring fighters to intercept. the raid.

guardians

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CONFIDENTIAL

of the sk!J

A n. Air Com.iJallntelligence o[fice?' b1'iets thepilols before they go QU.! on a mission. Their tense auiuuie shows that Lhey know jrom experience how vital is the information

which he is giving them on, landmarks, radar enemy o/Jj,osition to be e.1>ectecl, ther conditions enroute communications t)roc dures, and plan of attack.

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CONFIDENTIAL

what about low

angles?

The M:ark Ill! (small tllltemla to the righ t) installed alongside the MarJi 4_ =« Gu.n director is Mark 37

wah TOtmd·backecl shield.

nem air attacks at low altitudes challenge our ability to answer the question, "What About Low Angles?" The fark 22 radar can answer the que tion. In conjunction with it "big brother", the fark 4 or Mark 12, it pro ides the fire control data for shooting down low flying enemy aircraft.

The "big brothers" furnish a curate ranze and bearing. ccurate elevation above about l~o is determined also by the Mark 4 or Mark 12. But these equipm IUS are subject to serious limitations in position angle accuracy when they bear on low-flying aircraft, The diminutive Mark. 22, with j[5 antenna alongside the Mark 4 or Mark 12, will permit accurate pointing down to less than 1 degree above the horizon, and lower if skillfu 11y operated.

NARROW VERTICAL BEAM

The beam of the Mark 4 or ifark 12 is broad vertically. At low angles the energy reflected from the surface of the ocean combines with that above the surface to cause position angle errors as great as 20 or 30• The Mark 22, with its narrow vertical beam and 12° vertical can' (twice a econd) is a curate in tracking to :1:3 mils.

HOW IT OPERATE

Having selected the target on the Iark 4 or Mark i.a scopes, the trainer and radar range operator reJy on the pointer to adju this bandwheels until the director is on in ele arion. The pointer looking at his Mark 22 indicator sees only the selected target: The pointer's target, on the Mark 22 appears as a vertical trip f increa ed illumination superimposed upon the dim vertical sweep trace, At right angles to the ver-

...:

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CONFIDENTIAL

tical trace a short bright horizontal marker indiates the line-o£-sight of the dire tOL The Illus lions on the opposite page show clearly what the operator sees and does wben a target is coming in.

Antenna alignment and other adjustment notwithstanding, the pointer Can bisect a normal target signal within a ratio of 4 to 6-a pointing accuracy of :f: 2 mils. Btu on aircraft the accuracy may drop to ±3 mils.

If two aircraft targets are on the same bearing and within 400 yards of each other in ranze the signal on the ranze scope of the Mark 4- or Mark 12 become a composite of two signals and ranging precisely on one or the other is difficult. However, if the planes' angular separation in elevation from the director is over 1.2°, the Mark 22 can point accurately at one or the other. 1£ the angular eparation is less than 1.20, the director will point to a position between the two aircraft -if the merged signal is bisected.

When on target at angles below about 30, the target will produce ~ a signal on the indic~tor ~ut thi presents no problem .. The upper signal IS the true target. However, below about 6/10 of a degr e the tw siznals m.erge into

ne. Skillful operation at this point will keep the elevation error to within a quarter of a de~ presupposing' an accurately functioning ysu:~

Ordnance Pamphlet 1153. Radar Equipment Mark 22 Mod 0 should be studied by all operating and maintenance per onnel whose duties are connected with the Mark 22 and asso iated Mark. 4- or Mark 12.

TATUS OF INSTALLATION IN THE FLEET

Il fleet hips having ~ ark 37 gun directors with Mark 4 or Mark 12 radars are slated for the Mark 22. New ships will aet the Mark 22' during the building or shakedown period. Installation in Pacific Fleet and West Coast ship will be as allocated by CincPa. On the • an Coast allocation for installation i made by the Bureau of Ordnance.

,MIt of ,,""",~ ~il_

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t;? -::- - - - - - . AXIS OF MAo'N 'UHENNA OR ONE OF SIGHT

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1I0CI(

The mrlerlflll of radar Marh 21! rocks in a tlf$rlical plane,

On Mark Z2 Indicator

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The Pointer picks up the Signal-Sees. OD his Mark asIudicatnr Scope. that he is low, and elevates-(H eight of the plane flbave water is t!x(lgflerated itJ the e ;Illlstraliom).

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13000 YOS

He may Elevate too much-Here he is about 2° above the steeply gliding Torpedo Plane.

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"Oil the Target"- The Sjgnal however is nOI: bisected by the "Line of Sight" and the Operator Depresses slightly.

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.........

. . .. .. . .

Commence Firing-The Signal is. fiJi

t very low angle, an Image

ignal appears on the cope and will, below one-half degree, merge with the actual Target Signal.

rays on-If the Plane gets through to close range, the 40'S and 20'S let go,

CONFIDENTIAL

IMAGE

15

Radar and radio jacilities in the PT boats and Black Cat planes we,-e of the utmost importance in their joint operations. VHF has contributed more to these operations than all other radio equipment. together.

Operations of enemy and Allied planes and surface craft in the earlier days of the Solomons Campaign exposed the inadequacy of our identification and communications pro edures, especially at night. 'Ne were often forced to restrict air operationswhere surface units were operating and vice versa, and as a result the success of many offensive missions was definitely redu ed.

The solving of this problem i a story involvinz tactics, equipment, and painstaking promotion of better under tanding between the variou combat units. Task units of cruisers and destroyer, PT forces, night fighters Black Cats and other planes u ed to track and pot for surface force, worked together on the problem. The result of their efforts is shown in current action reports of joint offensive missions against enemy shore and surface forces-that result is increasing success. It is perhaps best exemplified ill the joint operations of PT boats and Black Cats (PEY-BAs painted bla k).

Succes of joint operations reached a new hizh durin the Bougainville ampaign in No ember 19 3 and has been going higher ever 'ince. Shortly

CONFIDBNTIAL

J6

after Bla k Cat quadron \lP-8l reached the Bougain ille area a cornerenee wa held b tween the squadron officer and PT commander. hey staged a cries of da and night exercises, during which simulated attacks were made on enemy shipping, and established the procedures for actual offensive missions. It was found that the Black. Cats would direct PTs to a target, spot P fire, illuminate the target, and, when advisable, deliver a bombing attack with strafing runs .. The PTs could align in a favorable attack position on information from the plane and deliver a simultaneous attack with almost no guess-work or preliminary calculation. Frequently th.e plane could slow down the target by bombing until the PT could close in with their greater fire power and torpedoes and effect complete d truetion. Against targets operating close to shore and taking eva i e action. the combination sh wed great prow e.

The PTs had very short range Tadar without IFF interrogator, could only detect planes dose at hand, and then could not identify them. Numerous attacks by enemy aircraft induced a natural distrust of any plane which drew near, Accordingly, the first essential for "air-surface" co-operation was identification. The Black Catwould pick up the PTs at twenty miles or more and, before homing on them, would con tact them over VHF, identify itself, give its position in range and bearing from the

PTs and advise the boats that it was to work with them for the night_ If at any time the plane went beyond VHF range, it would identify itself again upon return.

The" Black Cat and PT radars proved to be excellent complements to each other. The plane's ASE auld identify many more targets, at greater distances; however, it was seldom able to pick up small craft moving .. close to shore, whereas the PT's l'adaT could do so.

I Both planes and P s report that VHF has contributed more to joint

operations than all other radio 'lumped together and is indispen able. HF is unsatisfactory because of the high noi e level reated by the plane's radar; turning off the ASE sacrificed tarzet-detection for communications, obviously unsatisfa tory. VHF'i the compl rely satisfactory solution providingexcellent oice communication at all time J especially in e a channel has been set aside e pressly for joint operations.

The ability or the plane to transmit CW messages for great distances

. J .

. was also an asset to the combination, If aid was needed, contact with bases

was assured. This ability to remain in touch with the outside world was an innovation to the PTs and opened up wide possibilities from a tactical Viewpoint, parti ularly in large naval operations.

Following OUT successful landings at Empress ugusta Bay the enemy

• was forced to rely on large numbers of barges. moving lose to hare at night, to supply and e acuate h i eul and lower Bougan ille, Tb in eption of regular, organized PT-Black Cat o-operation at this time ",'a a stroke of luck. Experience showed that PT could not see Black ats at night, hence it was logical to assume that the enemy barges could not;

but the plane crews conld see both PTs and barges, primaril because of their wakes. Conversely, the planes could seldom determine the damage inflicted in attacks, but the PTs could do so readily by observing silhouettes and using their urface radars.

izht after nizht the Cats and PTs cracked the enemy in their a signed areas. At first the Black Cats were forbidden to bomb targets in the PT area without express permission of the boats, but experience SOOIL proved ~.he feasibility of letting the plane attack when the PTs were OtH of range, The plane, of course, notified the PT of its intention, gave location oE

CO:r:mIDENTIAL

the target, and then illuminated the target when one man was wounded facially by shrapnel. A

the PTs arri ed. If the FTs made the original doctor was aboard the PBY, but the pilot decided

contact, they notified the plane, and requested not to risk an open sea landing at night amid

any aid needed, such as bombing or strafing to heavy ground swells,

let them pull <1:1''Iay from jhe target temporarily. "Evidently out of ammunitiou,and unable to

he Iollowing excerpt from VP-81'S action get further aid from the plane whose bombs and

report on joint operations during the night of 7 flares were expended. the PTs withdrew. The

January 1944 gives a representative picture of Cat then proceeded to Choiseul and reported to the

problems faced and actions taken: FTs in that sector the action which had just taken

"When this plane arrived on station, PTs place off Bougainville. At their request, the plane

operating at; the Northern end of Choiseul Island searched N orthward ralong the SE coast of Bou-

warned us of a bogey in tile area. PTs operating gainville as far at Kieta Harbor for a large vessel

off the Southeast coast of Bougainville Island soon reported coming down from Buka Island, without

asked us to relay. a report to the Choiseul PTs success. After reporting again to the PTs still on

that planes had just bombed and strafed them, station, the Black Cat departed for its base."

'one bomb hitting close.' The PTs requested Methods were continuously improved with

flares dropped and later requested frags dropped experience. Minor navigation problems w~re

on Sipaisi Island; both requests complied with, A~olve~ by providing botl~ planes and boa~s With

results unobserved. Dropped nUJuer0US flares for identical charts and detailed maps of specific op-

PTs in both areas, but no sign of enemy. erating areas .. Widl these and VHF, planes and

"At 1400 GCT the FTs off Bougainville re- boa.ts. could dire~t each. other to targets or searc~

quested flares dropped at the mouJ.h of the Luluai poSitIOns. Even in bad weather, planes couId thus

River '. On reaching this point. Cat saw six. or drop fla~':swhere need:d. PT .ordnance gear was

seven barges in single file, on a Southerly course. I standardized andexperience soon determined the

Reported to PTs who directed plane to bomb best I.oad ~or the, Black Cats, generally, forty Hares

the barges whilethe PTs got into position to open (carried incernally and ~lTown out. the tunnel

fire, Cat dropped flares and the barges immedi- hat~h, c~mpensated. for. wind and drift so as not

ately began to scatter; released three DBs with to illuminate o.ur own PTs), four. 825 ~b. or 500

instantaneous nose fuses from altitude of 1600 feet lb. bombs carried externally on the wings, and,

spaced by intervalometer for ]00 feet at 140 knots. often" twe~ty-five or mo~e,20 lb. ami-personnel

Only the first stick of the three bombs detonated, fragm:utatton ~ombs, which may be thrown from

landing 200 feet behind the barges, Three barges the blis~r ~urlllg a run; many . targets have been

were seen leaving the column and the Cat singled straddle.d WIth these and effecll'vely. damaged,.

them out for its second attack. Irs last 325 lb. .Neither Bl~ck C?aUn?T !:s elann t.he attam-

depth bomb was released manually from l600 ment of perfectl?n ~n their JOint operatl(~ns. But

feet with the center barge as the point of aim. both are enthusiastic about the sUb.stanttal pr_og-

.. ::m.s. bomb exploded forward of the center barge' ress ma~e mus, far and are energetically strrvmg

wake, and when 'the plane banked, a 100 foot oil . or ~onunued un'pro~er,nent.. ~T officers. are fly·

slick was seen. Results other than this could not m)pn planes dunng JOLUt mISSIOns and pilots are

be seen. By this time the barges were well scat~ to ~e found aboard. the ~~s'. all trying to. learn

tered, two continuing on course, two reversing the best way ~o handle mutual problems, Results

course, and two apparently making for the shore, to date promise much for the future,

The PTs thenask.ed the plane to strafe the barges making for the beach, and the plane's gun· ners covered the decks of two of them with 3.0 and 50 caliber MG fire, Three PTs made runs on these barges, completely covering them ,'vith their fire, and receiving accurate fire in return. Heavier fire, estimated to be 37mm., was directed at the PTs either from the barges or from the shore. After each run by the PTs, the plane kept track of the barges while the boats reloaded, During the action a torpedo tube was damaged on one PT, a bole WaS put in the hull of another, and

18

CONFIDENTIAL

the fl~in9 bomb

The pilotless airborne bomb which was first used by the Germans on ] une 13, has been officially designated as the "Flying Bomb". (Newspapers have referred to it also as "Doodle Bug" and as "Buzz Bomb".)

This weapon, known to the Germans as V-I, appears to be one answer to Allied air supremacy in the Channel area. While the inaccuracy of the missiles as used to date is such. as to make it im-

possible to assign specific military targets as objectives, approximately 35 percent of the bombs have landed in the London area causing considerable damage 1;0 non-military installations,

The bomb, as may be seen hom the illustra~on, is of relatively simple construction and ap·

parently designed for mass production, .

From an examination of fragments and parts

of unexploded bombs recovered in England, it has been possible to determine the method of op' eration. The bomb is originally launched from an inclined ramp on the mainland, by means not yet de tennin ed, at an initial speed of approximately ...... _... 270 miles per hour and continues under the drive ;..,.. of the jet propulsion motor which operates as a

result of the increased pressure developed on the forward side of the air intake grill by the high speed of the missile.

- A clockwork mechanism which precesses the

gyro normally under control of the magnetic compass allows the bomb to be put into a turn within, three minutes after launching. The maximum duration .of the tum is one minute and corresponds to aboltt4o'" in azimuth. After being put on course by this method, the missile flies in a straight line under control of the magnetic com-

pass which precesses a gyro controlling a servo motor actuated by ail' pressure from two high pressure air bottles located in the fuselage. The gyro is further precessed by a barometric capsule

~ich can be preset for any desire. d al. tit.udeup to. .,000 feet. A small two-bladed propeller, 10 centimeters long, mounted on a shaft geared to a

~u:tL WaLl L."" ~._'111' "f"" NMIIII(f TJUi-O,U ~lftL T,Jlli!l

veeder counter, registering to 9999, constitutes an air log. By pre-setting the counter, which is turned backwards during fright, the electrical fuse can be armed, the raruorransrni tter turned o.ff, and the detonators in the tail assemblyex.ploded. The radio transmitter, which appears in approximately one out of every twenty missiles, is provided in order that shore DjF stations may obtain fixes on Ole bomb f01' the purpose of correcting errors in flight. A prisoner of. war has reported that the fix must be obtained and telephoned to the control central within ten seconds in order to insure sufficient accuracy. The detonators iothe tail assembly operate at a pre-determined time prior to me end of the flight, shutting off the fuel supply and causing the elevators to operate and put the plane in a dive. At the same time, two small spoilers of different sizes are projected from the surfaces of the elevators presumably causing the plane to spin in.

Some instances have been reported in which the plane glided in to the target after the motor .had stopped instead of diving. Later reports have indicated that some of the bombs circle before going into a dive. The exact reason for this is not known, but it is assumed that it is for the pm'pose of obtaining a fix as a check 011 the accuracy of the flight.

Countermeasures to date have consisted of:

a. Bombing launching sites.

b. Destruction of missiles by fighter planes.

c. Destruction of missiles by antiaircraft fire.

d. Use of ban age balloons.

On one instance a fighter pilot who had Ton out of ammunition succeeded in crashing a bomb by tipping it over with his wing tips.

A stj;mmary of the results of the flying bomb attacks on England (as excerpted from Prime Minister Churchill/s address of July '6th)a.pp,ears in "German Flying Bombs"in the July 12,. 1944 issu.e of The a.N.I. Weekly.

CONFIDENTIAL

19

aptain D. V. Gallttry, lr; . ,! " lind COlllllulIldel' J. C. johnson, ... oft/Ie S ,UAD/lLCA rsu:

CVE C. I. C. OjJemtions in Anti- ubrnarine WarJa?'e Vlhile the tremendous Pacific carrier strikes have held the spotlight, the Atlantic carrier forces have been building up an impressive score against the once dreaded -boat. Thanks to these small but hard-hitting ub-hunters and their DE escorts, shipping 10 ses that once reached alarm-

ing proportions no longer hamper the conduct of the urnpean war.

These versatile force op rate under all conditions of sea and kyo Flight operations on e onsidered irnpra tical are normal routine and toda include forty to sixty percent night patrols. To witnes a night recovery of a TB 1: on a pitching deck in squally weather is an education in itself and creates a healthy respect for these six thousand tonners, the crews that man them, and the BM.s.

Each task force group is usually composed of a destroyer screen of four to six DEs with one CASABLANCA or BOGUE class eVE. The closest possible coordination between the screening ve sels the carrier, and the air raft is essential to succe ful hunting a maximum, U e of all a ailable fa Iliti s mus be made to develop a contact and pre home the atta k for a kill. The eonta t may be lJY escort sound zear. aircraft patrol sighting airborne radar blip, di pal 11 information, radio DF, search radar, or vi

and rna develop at any time day or night a-om a range f a hundred miles to within the screen.

20

CONFIDENT1A 1.

Depl merit . the screen and movem nt of _the carrier val'y with every conta t a operations are 0 t onfined to a fixed pattern.

c. . C. I THE NERVE CENTER

The carrier C. L . is the nerve center of the force and must be constantly alert to evaluate and prepare to act on all types of contacts. ir defense and air interceptions are a remote possibility and al-e of minor importance and operations are of a more specialized nature than in the usual arrier type C. I. C. vVhile operations are essentially the arne in the two carrier classe in use there is some variation in physical arrangement. Figure shows layout of tbe SABLA ICA class e. 1. C., 'with modifications as found in

.S.5. G AD~ LCANAL (eVE (0). Tills shows the general ural gement of equipment in Air Plot and C. 1. C. which are adjacent and ombine operation.

he master submarine chart in Air Plot carries all available information on location of submarines, on oys, neutral M\Ts, and Anti-Submarine vVarfare task groups. he task group move-

•ments are determined in a large measure by in-

ormation on this chan. .

A detailed track chart is maintained of all force movements, contacts, aircraft patrols and

ther pertinent data. A uni er al chart table has been developed by the ship for this purpo e and is located in ir Plot. The two illustrations show the general construction of the table which was

built of material a ailable on board. In general, a latitude-longitude grid on tracing cloth is carried over all underneath lighted plexiglass sheet on

lVO rollers. By turning the rolls any latitude required can be brought over the plotting surface. An overlay of tra ing paper is used for plotting an all land in the area is sketched in.

The C. I. . equipment follow the zeneral carrier type with a summary ertical plot, two horizontal relati e plots. a DRT, and a remote PPI. be radar equipment consi ts of an SK, an SG, ABKs and a Band BL with YE and J navigational aids. he remote PPI has been converted to use he 12" scope so that grease pencil plotting can be done directly on the PPI Io rapid course determination. his conversion is shown in the illustration and was made ac ording to in-

-n ti n in Pa 'It Radar Tactical cho 1 Bulletin

Communi arion equip-men 0 er all the u ual Irequen bands including TB and 1:1 0 channels of VHF. Aircraft traffic is usually handled on VHF channels 1 and 4 with two HF channels for alternate use. The escorts maintain a listening watch on VHF which can also be used as a standby for the TBS. A D Q (I igh Frequency Direction Finder) is installed in the carrier and some escorts. constant listening watch is kept on the submarine traffic Irequencies and bearings reported on any ontacts made. An important use 01 the D Q is in locating lost planes or fixing a plane reporting a contact vhen off the radar s reen,

a a omplish this the aircraft reports on HF channel which can be F'd in a very short time. If simultaneous IFF code range can be obtained a deficit fix is established. One TBM. crew forced down at long range and recovered because of a good fix by this means will testify to the alue of this procedure,

Two PD-J Tee rders are installed one in air plot and one in communications. continuous recording of the TB5 and HF traffic is maintained and i of valuable assistance in prepanng action report .

DRT THE MOST VALUABLE PLOT

The DR remains the most valuable plot in an. SvV C. L C. Each carrier ha its own method of u e but in none of them can the importance of the DRT be over mphasized. During low visibility plots of the screening DEs are tracked for 1 e in the event of onar contact. Aircraft conta ts, DAQ bearing, downed planes, long range patrols, and escorts away hom the formation are plotted on the DRT. In fact, in every operation or contact the DR: is of prime

I 1

Till> 'IIH

FLOOR PLAN

C. I. C. ((,lid II ir Plot fire dosel). co-ordinated,

CONFlDENTI L

21

22

importance. Dead-reckoning of patrols beyond radar coverage can be accomplished more satisfactorily than on the relative plots.

tThe presnet C.l. C. complement is one FDO and three intercept officers, one officer and even men (including a CPO) for maintenance, and sixteen operator-plotters. he officer watches are six hours each and the operators four hours for each of the three sections. In addition there is mutual as istance with the Air Plot and ACI officers. Communications monitoring and maintenance are the responsibility of the communications department.

FIVE KILL IN THREE CRUISES

The USS GUADALCANAL is a comparative newcomer in Anti- ubmarine Warfare. With the pl-esent carcity of -boats and the disappearance of the wolf pa ks,finding, tracking and holding down a ub to e haustion requires the most persistent offensive tactics. Her five sure kills in three cruises are evidence that her method of operation i successful.

After originally maintaining air search radar silence, it was decided that the possible advantage did not balance the disadvantages. The use of the SK and escort SAs is unrestricted and appar-

ently had no effect n the conta ts by warning them of Task Group's presence.

Air patrols were maintained day and nigh when in the area of a 5uspe ted U-boat. Constant tracks were maintained on the patrols (extending to 100' miles) by SK plots until below the radar horizon when they were dead reckoned on the DR T. Plots vere periodically transferred to the vertical plot from the DR po ition on the DRT.

During night operations, C. 1. C. maintained control of the aircraft flying at sufficient height, to remain on the screen for most of their patrol. Radar contacts were investigated and additional planes vect red to the area when neces ary. Merchant vessels were challenged and identified in all contacts with them. At the time for recovery, the planes were returned to the task group usually b their own na igation on the YJ and' YE but occasionall b teers. When over the fore , the escort vertical lights (not visible from the surface) and the carrier vertical identification flashing light and the deck lights were turned on. No deck flood lighting was used. Each plane was then ordered into the landing circle and ordered to wit h to channel one. The landing signal officer then took over and "talked" them in on VHF in ad9' tion to use of the illuminated signal wands. 1" do thi a 1 est "mike" with a switch on til ignal wand was used and a the remarkably low number of era hes indicates was highly uccessful.

The following is an excerpt from the FDO's note on DR T operations which is of interest in illu trating the C. J. C. operations:

Atlantic weatne« is sometimes /lot too favorable.

craft at ) 00 miles reponed a contact and a good position was needed, the plane was ordered to climb until picked up by the air search radar.

he position obtai.ned was then ziven the avigator to plot, on his DR T; meanwhile, the scale of the one in . I. C. was changed, a clean section of tracing paper rolled out, and when ready to plot, a reference plot was obtained from the

.a igator and the distance and bearing of the

spot kept up to date from then on in C. I. C. n-

.1' conditions where extreme ranges made it dif.ult to get an a curate bearing on the plane, emergenc IFF was requested plu a brief transmi sian b the plane on the primary a/ Irequency (usually 6000-7000 kcs), The HF /DF equipment was then used to get accurate bearing and the I'F signal for a curate range, and the fix

tim obtained was plotted.

Using this procedure, it was possible to di-

rect one of the escorts to a spot to pick up the crew of a plane which had become lost and had made a water landing. This forced landing occurred during -rather bad fiyina conditions and high winds with the result that the raft with the survivors, originally 140 miles from thecanier, drifted downwind at 3 to' 4 knots, from the original sighting by a earch plane. The sequence in this case was as follows, with communications between the carrier and the lost plane at best intermittent due to the storms in the area;

(a) The plane -returning from ami-sub

earch had communication failure, was unable to receiv base either on VHF or HF and could not hear the YEo

e (b) A wind estimated about 50 knots was blowins the pilot off his course.

(c) While on the radar creen, no communication could be established to give him a homing steel', and when finaU was established, via another plane, he was off the creen 0 that no inrelligent instructions other than climb, orbit, and show emergency IFF could be given.

(d) wo upwind vectors were given during about one hour of attempting to' locate the plane. but these were of hart duration and did not ompensate fOT his down wind dr-ift while-climbing. 1 e was eventually picked up down wind by IFF at 12.8 miles and immediately given the correct steer. At this point howe er, he was I V2 hour from the carrier r ith ~ hour o· fuel. He therefore maintained altitude as long as possible during which a fair IFF position was obtained and another plane was launched to locate him when he went in the water a little later.

(e) Fortunately, the vector to the relief plane proved accurate as he located the survivors in their rubber raft before they had drifted very far from dye slick markers.

(f) By mean of HF jDF bearings on the relief pilot's transmissions plus his own na igation on distance, a second pJane was launched and sent to the spot to assist in maintaining contact. An escort meanwhile had been ordered to proceed in the direction of the original ector to pick up the survivor. The second plane made contact with the first and proceeded to orbit above an overcast from which a further reference position was obtained.

(g) Meanwhile, one pilot maintained contact with the raft by remaining low over the water, and the second provided radar fixes by flying at

1\ \

,

~ \

M"fN) u~s. ~ ~.

r:;~~:::"~::':!!~rlJ'.'

)-"'"" .. '---------f_-.D~)() /t..,A,J "... lI#~ .._!",~ -a.Js:~~~~;:.~

(J'$,J ......,._ ."..,. ~

"1M' ~.IM "u ...... ..,..,

;Id<...,. ~",,~ IS"" ~ ....... ~ ... Cliat'ls .. ~ 1:1 _,.,_... ~ lRI ~ iU_

~ .. IS", v-s~ r-'

\

Sw()sji/Ut marks the spot.

DRT OPERATION ABOARD THE USS GUADALCANAL

Recent operations against submarines have ampl demonstrated the rrernend us value of: the DR T in conducting continuou search when. in the vicinity of enemy units. A variety of situations. from tracking and vectoring planes to areas of night contacts on -boats, to res uing survivors from forced landings were constantly kept up to date on this in trument, In fact, the DR T as much a any other factor made po sible all accurate current plot of roo ernents of the Task Group and it various units and contributed greatly to the fEe ti enes of the sear h whi L e entually resulted in 2 -boar kills, after 1 and 26 hours respectively.

During flight operations at nizht, the D cale was kept at 8 miles per inch. If an air-

Remote PPI converted to ) 2" scope is $l1el1 behind the FEO 111 c. T. c.

CONf'IDENTJAL.

23

A .wlher -Boat is sunk.

CONFIDENTIAL

The master submarine chart displays vital injormation,

This !rlfch chart table has proved very usctul.

Showing cnmt,..cclioll of track churt table.

Close up of Remote PPI.

24

CONFIDENTUL

uffi ient altitude. er often hecking hi poition b going down clos to the surface.

(b) ince it wa po sible at times only a .recei e IFF signal. the HF /DF was used frequently to obtain accurst bearings on the f'lanes circling the survivors with .ranges obtained from the plane at altitude.

(i) In addition, bearings were taken by HF jDF on the escort proceeding to the Scene and these bearings plu a DR of his speed of advan .e, enabled the TG to direct the headings of the escort to compensate for drift of the raft and until the eSCOTt could pick up the circling plane on .his own radar.

(j) As a result of this coordinated action plus launching of relief planes to maintain constant visual contact with me raft, the survivor were picked up from a very rough sea within i (6) hours from the time they made their 1 ater

landing,

Throughout this situation the DRT made it possible for the CTG to keep an accurate pi ture of the bearing and distance or the planes, the raft, and the detached escort from himself, with corrections in these positions made 011 the DR."'" whenever any new information so warranted. Fu - therrnore, whenever the plane at altitude appeared to drif away from the pot where the Taft wa , he was ectored back to hi orbi station by means of the latest DRT position showing bearin and distance.

nder similar circumstances, but under conditions where a given spot was not as critical hom the navigationalstandpoint, the DR T was used to maintainz planes searching an are~ around a wake

ighting during a late afternoon flight. hese

planes conducted an expanding square search oE the area and were maintained in the limits pre-

ribed by mean of radar fixes plotted hath on the vertical summary plot and on the RT. Thu the summary plot showed the relative picture at any time for purposes of vectorina-, and the 1 R T kept a plot of the actual area covered by the searching planes,

DRT TRACK A U-BOAT

On the 0 casion of the first sighting of a U-b at by one or the pilots on night radar search, the sighting was plotted on the DRT a ",,f:

2130 one evemng. n the basis of this inforr

tion 2 other planes were sent to earch the same

.. rea, and at 0027, (three hours later), th -boat _as attacked and it submerged, but: the plot vas maintained on he DR and in addition, a sonar contact by one of the escorts which had arrived in the same general area, Another attack. on the same U-boat was made when he surfaced at 0725 the same morning, again driving him below the sur ace.

ince all of these conta ts were within a radius f about 25 mile, the imp rtan e E the DR in maintaininz an up-to-date pictur of what was tran piring both as regard aircraft and

urfa e craft cannot be over empha ized. s a

result, operations with air and surface craft were maintained in the area continuously £01' 1 hours, conta ts were made, lost, regained, and a kill even-

mall y regi tered at 15 15 the following afternoon when one of two U-boats was forced to the sur[ace and unk.

onta t, I ibly with one of the -boat met

durinz the ab ve alta k, was made b aircraft on

" -

night radar search at about 0400 the following

morning; attack was delivered and position obrained by radar fix 70 miles south outhwest of

~e scene of the first sinking, This fix was plotted as were previous ones on both the navizator's and C. . r , RTs, and additional planes laun hed and vectored to the area to ontinue the h 111_t, S dawn vas breaking, one oE the planes made contact on a surfa d U-boat about 10 mile outh of the previou a tack. The -boat fir d back at the

alta king planes, coring a hit in the port wing or one of the TBFs. Meanwhile, addi ional planes were launched and vectored to relieve those on

station over the scene of the sinking. Intermittent heavy overcast prevented quick contact with the orbiting plane but eventually th y were relieved, and the reliefs in turn aided in aiding' two e ort to th sene of th e attack to pi k up snrvi O1'S and debris reported in the water. 'While the HF jDF , as n t ernpl yed as effectivel in thi instance as .in the pre iously mentioned rescue, the ranze and bearing to the point of attack loth of the carrier and the detached escorts was maintained on tbe two DR Ts, based on the orizinal radar position and any improvements in this position established meanwhile,

gested rheref re that where any doubt a to a bearinz exi ts HF IDF be u ed to che k this by requesting brief alls on a frequency which will give a good bearing sense on the DAQ equipment.

For the purposes of using the polar type chart in vectoring aircraft, the position of a fix should be corrected, on . uch a chart or plotting board eery ten minutes. Since it is a better di pla Ear rapidl mavin. aircraft and simplifies ve tors, it is m r uitable Eor this purpose than the rather small scale DR plot.

Ready acce sibility and practise in plotting on the DR £ I' radarmen cannot be over emphasized. Furthermore, all personnel should be so indoctrinated in its value that the moment any situation develops, no matter how apparently uivial, the po ition of the "bug" and the time will be marked immediately on the tracing paper and' as oon thereafter as po sible, the range and

aring of the fix plotted and given to the Na igal T La d lik wise. The latter i tremely important from a geographical position standpoint.

Where an accurate record of either aircraft or surface sear hes is desired in a given area, no better means of obtaining this exists than to plot the bearings and ranges from the radars directly on the DR as called by the operator. Eurihermore, the pennanent record in the Iorm of the DR tracing is oE inestimable alue in reconstructing the iruation for study and criticism.

. nether kill came about in a much different way, For orne time the task group had patrolled the area of a suspected -boat, be night patrols had picked up disappearing radar blips from time to time which were investigated on orders hom C. 1. ,but nothing definite was established, Sana buo were used frequently. The force 'was 01'd red t rever e COlU" to take one la t 10 k at that area. bout 1100 one of th arts reported a s oar outact via TBS, Two VF in the air were ordered I ... I. ,t.o the ntact po ition and a killer group requested. The contact developed to a depth charge attack just as the VF arrived, 4 miles Irom the carrier. The fighter pilots spotted the IB below the surface and reported to C. T. C. and then called the escort. The escort wa directed back over the U IB by the VF. he sub then surfaced and opened fire, The killer plane had been laun hed and was directed t the area by C. 1. C. After it had surfaced the U IB was strafed by the VF, driving the men from the zuns and finally

n situation of this SOrt, a cura 'y of radar b th on the original fix and in ecroring tional plan or escorts to the scene is of the greatest importance in saving time, It is sug-

CONFIDENTIAL

25

under combined es OTt and VF lire the crew abandoned ship and another azi flag adorned the bridge of the carrier.

During these operations C. L C. was the coordinating center and maintained control of the aircraft to the point of actual attack.

BLOCK. ISLAND HAD IMPRESSIVE RECORD

The USS BLOGK. ISLAND (Bogue la s) accumulated an impre si e ubmarine score in her numerous cruises. Her C. 1. C. method of operation was developed from long experience and the FDO's informative notes on C.!. C. for ASW are included at the end of this article,

The USS BLOCK ISLAND, while patrolling in a suspected U IB area was torpedoed and sunk, Six VF were airborne and were returning to base when two torpedoes struck the ship. C. 1. C. personnel then on watch continued their duties and general quarters was sounded. All radio receivers and the SK radar were out of commission but the - VHF transmitter still functioned. The EDO took charge of communications and broadcast to all planes on VHF that the carrier was severely damaged and probably could not recover planes. He also broadcast position of the nearest land and the vector to it for information of the pilots and he then told pilots to use their own judgment.

At this time a periscope was sighted on the port quarter and the VF were given this information and ordered to strafe. This was put out over VHF and primary frequencies. A third torpedo struck the ship ten minutes after the first and PUt out all p01Vet' and remaining C. I. C. equipment. At the time the FDO did .not know that any transmission had been acknowledged as all receivers were out of commission, On the order to abandon ship all hands made an orderly departure and arrived

a£dy at the rescue hip. The FDO made a final check of all C. 1. C. spaces and attempted to recover the C. I. C. log but the safe had been jammed.

PRACTICE NEEDED FOR "ABANDON SIDP"

In reviewing the action the FDO had the following comments and ugge tion :

L. The squadron was not thoroughly indo trinated and briefed in ad anc , by C. r. ., on what procedure should be followed in the event of an emergenc which would make it

26

CONFIDENTIAl.

CONFIDENTIAL

impossible or airborne planes to make norm - landings aboard.

2. A standby Fighter Director ship should have been designated at the beginning of the cruise, and, while communications were still intact, a summary of the situation relayed to that ship, together with any .instructions.

3. he pilots of airborne planes might have

been given a report of the ituation immediately rather than a few minutes later followed by ampliC-ying report as additional information became available. In this particuJar instance, however, the shortdelay had no bearing on the situation, as all planes were en route back to the carrier, and all pilots received the necessary information before arriving over the task group.

4· Definite provi ion. should. have been made in advance for the sal vaging of those C. 1. C. re ords and report which would be needed Later and which would otherwise have to be reconstructed in a Jes complete and accurate form.

Most of the difficulty experienced by C.1.

in this emergency could be eliminated by doiri two things=briefing the squadron on what procedure to follow (although in most instances the final decision concerning what action the planes should take would depend on the individual situ ation)-and by holding C. I. C. drills for atta ks on the carrier as well as drills for contact with, and attack on, the enemy. he BLOCK ISLAND C. 1. C. had concentrated almost exclusively on offensive rather than defensive tactics.

In connection with the briefing of the squadron, the following suggestions are made:

1 . Include the name of a tandby Fighter Director ship on the:By heet for each flight; this ship to be ontacted automatically by the senior officer in the air in the event that communications with the carrier are cut off.

2:. a far as practicable, handle the emergency

transmissions between the Fighter Director ship and planes in the air through one plane, to cut down the load on the channel being used and to avoid jamming. rmally, this would be the senior pilot in the flight or the pilot with the best communications.

3 . All transmissions from C. I. . that shou not be regarded by all airborne pilots as spe-

cific orders shou1d be preceded b "information onl "or orne such pre-arranged phrase. In connection with C. 1. C. drills, the follow-

ing suggestions are made:

(A) C. 1. C. officer, assisted by section leader-

I . Maintain order and see to it that all stations are manned.

2. Che k for afery measures u h a life belts, battle Ianterns, extinguisher, helmets ga rna ks, as situation seems to require.

3. Quick survey of the condition of equipment and personnel. Report results to FD . Report results to Bridge, using officer messenger if communications are out.

(B) ACr officeF-

l.

Assemble these records and reports previously designated to b salvazed in the e ent of such emergency and stow the e in a waterproof container designed for the pmpo e, and which ould eitl er be taken over the side in a raft or boat, or strapped to his person. If time permits, the logs and records might be distirbuted among several officers.

Other records to be destroyed or locked up . according to security needs.

In the e ent of actual "Abandon ship" or-

del' • all officer not otherwise occupied see that enlisted men get 0 er the side in an orderly manner.

In summing up, it appeaJ.·s that C. I: C. opm:ations during the emergency were effecti e, but a more efficient performance might have been turned in if a definite doctrine had been established and drilled in advance, rather than to plan the course of action and make the decisions at the time of the attack.

Due to the variable type of conta ts and

ariet of operation no specific detailed plan can be given for C. L C. operation. Briefly the watch must be ontinuously alert and the watch officer must be ready to handle every possible situation .. These ASW task groups and their C. L C. personnel can be proud of their record as tbey have been in no small way responsible for the great change in Atlantic sub operations and the afety of our convoys.

C. I. C. ON THE USS BLOCK ISLAND

During the last cruise of the BLOCK ISLAND, the personnel organization and the duties of C. r. c. were as follows:

One C.l. C. office« and fighte1' director officer~ He wa responsible for the organization and opera-

••

Drawing [rom o. N.I, 220-0 '·Cermll1l ubmarinc.l".

2.7

tion of C. I. C. and the training of all personnel. He assumed full re ponsibility in, C. I. C. at GQ or during enemy conta ts, although normally his wat h schedule was the ame as that of the other FDOs.

Three assistant fi,ghte?' director offj,cers- hese oEficers rotated a fighter director watch during all times of air operations. During times a no air operations they stood regular C. 1. C. watches.

One A CI Officer-Principal tactical adviser to C G, in charge of the preparation, a cumulation and di emination of all reports and data of a tactical significance to the task group. One of hi major duties each day was preparation of CTC's operational report, ba ed on the C.l. C. log.

Two A si tant ACI fficers-C. 1. C. watch Eficers and a ist Cl officer in handling tactical data.

Two Radar Maintenance Officers-C. I. . watch.

ff er and respon ible for proper maintenance and upkeep of all hip-borne radar and hominCT equipment and all air-borne radar and radio equipment. These were excused from C. I. C. watch when pressure of maintenance work necessitated.

One Anl¥- ubmarine Warfare Officer-« C.l. C. watch officer and adviser to CTC on S'\IV tactics.

One Ai1' Plot Officer-Permanent air department dot l' officer and responsible for settinz up flight plans and navigation therefore in accordance with CrG's desires. However all . I. C. officers could and did check aerial navigation.

Twenty-Two Enlisted Men- ixteen radarmen, divid d into four watch section; t1 0 information board keepers who stood twelve on and rwel e off; and three radiomen who rotated on monitoring and recording VHF. Lack of available men pre enred the primary frequency being recorded except automatically on PD-l. y oman striker operated both recorders and as isted in keeping tactical board up to date.

During air operations, the FDO on watch is, generall speaking, re pan ible for radar plot "While the C. 1. C ... vatch officer is respon ible Io air plot.

The operations of C. I. C. in preparing for and carrying out flight operations in the daytime i usually as follows: Night operations are taken up separately.

28

CONFlDENTIAL

I. GTG advi es the air plot officer, as far in advan e a possible, of the desired.flight schedule' including type of search, number and type of plane to be used typ of armament to be carried, and PO data.

2. This information is immediately passed to the read room, hangar deck, flight deck 0 that preparations may be made.

3· pproxirnatel an hour and a half before schedu led take-off, the C. I. C. watch officer Or FDO on watch prepare the flight beet which includes the following information (a) flight number, (b) type of earch plan to be used (from CTG) (c) variation (hom chart house), (d) PO, time, course, speed (from CTG} and position (from DR ) at time of take-off, ( ) plan available including standb (from hangar deck), (f)

pilot as igned, according to sector and plane, plus standbys (from ready room), (g) any special instructions for the mission (from CT ), (h)

P ssible izhtins (from ship and sub plot), (i) weather data (from aerology), (j) ZD and time

of sun and moon rise and set (from chart hQU €), (k) nearest land and bearing and distance w i.

from PO po irion (from DR plot), (l) recognition and approach data (from signal off er), (m) aircraft frequencies and calls, (n) y. code in use.

4· Sear h plan corrections are determined by the air pi t officer and given to the ready room. Pilots na igation i hecked b him or C. 1. C. watch officer.

5· The na igation on a relative movement basis is passed to radar plot and the search plan is accurately set up on b th the o. 1 horizontal and the erti al plot. (This enables dead reckonings of the planes throughout their ear hes, thereby presenting at all tim a fairly accurate picture or where the various sear hes should be, The K radar is frequently n t operated for

curi ty reasons and often the length of the searches

is greater than the effective radar tracking range.)

6. 1 e statu board is brought up to date ill accordance with the latest fly she t information.

7. Prior to take-off, VHF communication with the planes is checked by the FDO.

8. After launching. communications are agarn hecked and after each plane or group oE

"~es. has ch.ecked and joined u,P .satisfa~torily, ~ IS gLVen a ETR (proceed on mission assigned).

The C. 1. C. watch officer is respon ible Eor ha ing all BTK' noted appropriately on the DR T. ( his permits a reasonaby ace mate plotting of all contacts or sightings on the DRT of anything . een, The pilot reports positions in term of range and bearing from las BTK po irion of the arrier.)

• 1.0, The C. I. C. watch officer is Tespon ible for the correct plotting on the DR T of all contacts, HF IDFs and ightings as they are mad .

1 J .• The C. 1. C. watch officer is responsible

lor maintaining the "contact and sighting book" up to date at all times. This book contains a oneline urnmary of all ontacts and sightings, gi - ing the date, time, range and bearing from base,

DR position and brief evaluation.

12. In the event of an enemy contact by a plan or earch group, the pilot immediat Iy rep rts it by - HF, giving range and bearing a accurately as possible. IFF is switched to 'code r o.

e to identify him as contact plane or group.

13· The following actions are taken by C.LC. immediately on re eiving u h a report:

(a) K radar immediately turned on (if not already in operation) and search made for contact group in area determined by DR plot.

(b) Nearest armed airborne plane immediately arc vectored to zeneral area of contact. A more accurate vector is given when contact planes have been picked up on the SK or their position otherwise determined.

( ) Bridge, read room, and fligh deck are notified to make immediate preparations for launching a "killer group." Planes are launched a soon as preparations and aptain permit.

(d) Horizontal and vertical plots aloe both rna rked with DR positions of contact and later corrected to show radar fix on contact when obtained.

(e) Killer group i given mo t accurate po - sible ector to point of contact; this is done both by blackboard and VHF.

_ (f) Horizontal plotter discontinues dead

reck ning and plots only radar positions of contact group and planes being ectored to contact.

(g) Vertical plotter continues DR plot of planes remaining on regular searches but ketches in ectors as given.

(h) C. L . watch officer ees that ontact is plotted on DR T and entered in contact book.

(i) C. 1. C. watch officer keep readyroom and bridze informed of all developments, Request is usually made that one or more e corts be ent to scene anel information as to course and di ranee is supplied.

The following additional fun tions of C. I. C, are under the re p 11 ibility of the C. 1. . watch officer.

1. Iaintenance of all equipmen in C.I.C. and responsibility of notifying proper per on in case repair or adjustments are n ce al'y; seeing to it that at least one receiver, speaker, and transmitter in C. I. C. are tuned in at all times on both primary and secondary frequencies.

2. Keeping convoy and neutral ve sel plot up to date at all times and setting up new heet at 1200 daily. (ACI officer is re ponsible for plotting daily positions of subs, although C. I. C. watch officers may assist in this.)

3. Determination by geographi plot, the course and speed of radar surface contacts, passing this information with any possible evaluation to the bridge as q uickl y as pos ible. Also, seeing that one petty officer simultaneously solves course and

peed problem b relative mo emen and that another enters information properly on DR and in contact book.

4. Keeping of accurate TB log b monito with plit headphones on both TBS and on RBK receiver, and rapid translation of same 50 that decoded messages are quickly available to the bridge, if required.

5. Evaluation and entering of all pertinent H ; IDF and MF (DF intercepted transmi ions on DR T and in sigh ting book.

6. Keeping task group fuel reports up to dale also all information of tactical importance oncerning any unit in the task group.

7. Turn oil YE ten minutes before any search group was due back over base. To assist in this, a red ring was drawn ten minutes out on the vertical plo . When dead reckoning of plotter brought

CONFIDENTIAL

29

a plane within thi ring he notified CIC wac h officer. 1'E code was also maintained on vertical plot to assist in locating position of planes.

8. Frequent checking of station keeping of escorts during the night and notifying tactical watch officer if any escorts are out of position. However, the primary function of G was surface search rather than station keeping.

9· Keeping of complete and accurate log of all happenings during watch that are of tactical importance to Task Group.

10. Seeing that enlisted men man their correct stations in an efficient manner.

Night flight operation were primarily the concern of the FDO on watch. In addition to hi normal daytime functions, he 'was responsible for the following:

I. Keeping all earch planes or groups in

30

CONFIDENTIAL

ONFIDENT[AL

po ~ tion so that there were no loophole in th ' areas being covered. •

2. Changing or expanding the search as conditions or the CTG dictated. his necessitated both. joining up groups and working ant new navigation and passing same to the pilot 0 er VHF.

3· Rigid control of altitude of each plane or grou p a as to pre ent po sibility of colli ion. All planes approaching the carrier at the same time had to be placed at levels at least five hundred feet apart. The same was true of any two planes ap· preaching each other.

4; Maintaining an accurate up-to-the-minute picture of the position of all surface vessel in the area so that any plane picking up a radar conta t could be told. immediately, or preferably in advance, whether it was worthy of further inves igation.

5. Passing on barometer readings and emergency wind (magnetic- direction of urface wind) to pilot at least every two hours and always thirty minutes before their final estimated time of ar , rival (ETA). •

6. Stationing planes at different altitudes and positions in relation to the carrier 0 as to expedite recoveries with minimum risk. Plane with least gas was placed at angels .5 and the others stacked five hundred feet apart; the lowest plane landed first while each of those still airl orne were simultaneously brought down fi e hundred feet.

7. Keeping carrier and escorts informed as to position and ondition of night search planes and notifying them as necessary when truck lights should be turned on or some other form of identification gi en.

,

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e •

C.I.C

tactical •

use ond °perat·

IOn Of

rOd' radar

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. UIPrnent

The usefulness of this vi!al iniormation dependS. ttpon how [as: it completes thi circuit.

Expedite it all you can!

RADAR PERATOR' I-I OBO K

The Radar Operator' Iandbook is not available Ior distribution at thi time, Sufficient netic will b given as to when this publication can be obtained. ince wide di tribution is contemplated, copies will be forwarded to all hips of the Beet and schools concerned without request.

By direction of Chief of Naval Personnel.

•

Th

iniormatioti

contained tn this p /;

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u.. icatio. . 17.. ts

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and a /

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in any' ransrnitt d ,-

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