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DECEMBER 1944 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF Of NAVAL OPERATIONS

COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER



VOL. I, NO.9·

You Can Outsmart Enemy Jamming and Deception Bogey? nOD Miles from Japan A Pilot's Advice to 'Fighte1' Directors "Take Over, Tlisual FDa!"

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Don't Look in the TVrong .... mLuiun

Split·Second Fixes on the DRT Pin-Point Bombing without Charts or :rabies Removing the Nlystery [rom. "AN" Nomenclature r

Jap Radio Trjckery

Indispensable RAD Guides Try These LOra11 Methods PPI View of Southern France Basic T'mining Program for Radar and eIC Personnel

Wrong Challenge

Excuse It, Please!

What Others Say of 'GIC."

RPD in the Marianas

Night Fighters Report on jap Tactics Earth Curvature Nomograph

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DECEMBER 1944.

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48 .4 Confidential magazine published: monthly by the Chief of Naval Operations for the information of commissione?". warr~nl, enlisted personnel, and persons authorizeti whose duties are connected, with the tactical Use and operation of electronic and associated equipment. The information contained in this puulicalion is

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and (IS such shall not be transmitted, or resealed, in any manner, ta any unauihorizeii persons. The publication is to be handled in accordance ll,n:th Article 76, U. S, Navy Regulations, a'nd wiZI be destroyed by b'urning when it ha seroed its purpose, either q uarterly reports nor retJOrts of Imming are required.

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Prepared by the

8uTeat! of ShipI (Code 993) and the Quality Control secuon, BurC1I11 0/

Naval Personnel,

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you can outsmart'

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enemy JammIng

and deception

Radar jamming is interference deliberately produced by the enemy in order to render our radar. ineffective. It can create confusion, neutraliz use of radar obs ure targets and prevent accurate ranging, or ruin accuracy of train. If effective, it is the easiest method our enemies have of combatting superior radar equipment.

Study and application of the methods recemmended in this article hould enable Fleet personnel to make successful jamming and other counter-measures an increasingly tough proposition for the enem '.

Radar de eption as described in this article refer to the employment of devices which cause misleading indications on OUl: scopes. For example, the Japanese have equipped sampan with refle tors so that they appear to our radars like luge craft. The sampans are em out in advance of a convo , on courses cal ulated to lead our war hips wen out of the way by the time the real targets arrive. Other types of refle tots are floated or suspended born balloons. causing fal e echoes re embling those from submarine periscopes, surface vessels, or aircraft.

The Germans and the ] aps are now using man such methods to jam

or deceive our radars, It is almost certain that the measures will be employed on an increasingly large scale in the future. We must be prepared ;I to counter them.

TYPES OF JAMMING

The two general classes of jamming ar : (1) the electronic type, in which use is made of a radio transmitter, and (2) mechanical or Window jamming. These two classe are sometime referred to as "transmis ion" and "reOe - tion" types.

Types of electroni jamming may be classified according to the nature of the emission employed by the enemy. Any kind of transmission can be used, although with arying degrees of effectiveness. We may expect a wide ariety of different patterns to appear on our radar scope screens, according to the particular type of signal the enemy is ending out. The iUu - trations following show a few typical examples,

The second class of jamming is produced by mechanical means. Strips of metal foil, cut to a critical length, are discharged into the air in great quantities by aircraft or other means. The e strips, alled "Window,"

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reflect radar energy and produce multiple onfusIng, false indications on radar scopes_

Mecham al jamming by means of Window is now being employed to a greater extent than allY kind of electronic jamming, However, this situation may change, making it important to learn c~umer-measures against both general types.

COMBATIJNG JAMMING

jamming may be combatted best by an operator who exeects it, knows how to recognize it, follows approved AJ I?rocedures, and keep trying.

BE PREPARED!

Tests indicate that an experienced operator can 'detect targets through seoeral times the transmitted power required to jam a novice after applying elementary AJ procedures. With the same power used against him, the trained man is able to work out to a much g'reater range than the untrained.

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... LoU' frequi'ncy ~mplitllde modulated CW jamming produces effect c a l l e d "tramlines." Echo apfJlJar~ on each l!'ace if Tilceiver is no/ ourrloaded. Patto! m IIIII)' move up II rid (jawn sa (1.1 10 seem 1(1 I.rell/lle.

Expect jamming. Keep in readiness and avoid panic when the signal are first en ountered, The enemy has achieved complete success if the opposing radar is shut down because the operator think hi own equipment is at fault when jamming is rec ived.

Recognize jamming_ Certain types of accidente interference cause patterns to appear on radar scopes which are very similar to those due to deliberate jamming. It is obviously important to distinguish between the two. Ask yourself the e questions:

I trouble in own eqtdpment? Interference due to internal equipment faults appears on all dire - tions of antenna train.

F1"Oni .alhe'r genr abaard.~ It is usually possible to take a bearing on this type of signal but the relative bearing will always remain the same, while true bearing will hanze with changes in own ship's course.

1. a-watch ... for "coincidences." Check to ee,

the interference curs only when the TES

other apparatus is in operation.

eKING OUT FROM UNDER.

shift 0/ both transmitter frequency lII'Jd LO. luni'n,g is good AJ if it can be done rapidly by the technician: Practicing while unjamrnetl improves speed. Make only It small cha1lge; the lap will retune his transmitter if ))011 shitl f1'equency lao much.

From oth. r fl'iendly vessels? se eye and ears. ate bearing of the strong st (major lobe) jamthis help if the disposition of forces is known. Read accidental CW interference as dots and dashes on the PPL Recognize the appearauce of "running rabbits' hom other radar-these are light tall pips which traverse the A scope screen and spirals on the PPL Have the technician

in" bonne ting headphones or speaker across the video output-the sound of interference often gives a clue as to what is causing it.

Make th.e best 'use of your equipment. Apply the technique learned from this article. Keep try-

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ing-an apparently impossible situation may suddenly impro e. It is sometimes easy, and u uall . possible with con enrration, to find and follow a target through jamming if you lie the c ntrol 011 your radar to advantage.

Here are a few pointers.

(I) Be sure to return oll CO II I. '1'016 /0 uormal when searching Lmjarnmed, sectors.

(~) Expect interaction between the controts. Adjustment of O'l1e often makes readjustment of the others necessal·Y·

is) Yow' radar probabl)! does not have all the controls listed. But you can still do a lab without the latest AJ devices.

CotlhoL

Comment

Normally keep "OFF" in presentee ()f electronic jamming though "ON" po ition can be tried to note effect.

Probabl most useful control. . djust slowly, trying both reduced and increased settings. There i an optimum setting for each target

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e~ IIwdu;/ating fniqwmcy is increased, "trY/.Illlim:s" give WlI)' to"/l(ISi!i'tiJ'tllltlt:," Pip..! unroaucc ure"k, hau« greIJter d~fi.llitiol! than res t of ,palt~T11.



P.R.F.

Control

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Range cale

• Same signal as previol,lS iltustration with rejection slot itl afld gain control set to 01J1imum. Only evidence oj jamming now is that trace is tQjckeT tllan normal. But .A] controls should not be depended on to remove Jamming - their real iob is to make echoes stand out in some di.!tinctille mamlCr from the res: of the patten •.

Antenna Train

Rejection Slots

• Medium ana high 7IIodula£ion f1'eq'lUmcics give I~pright indications witll Tegt~laT striations. Pip makes a brllak in the baseline, bnt unde.other conditions migl~t appeat atop the jam or i" both plactl$. Best tva), to locate echo with this as welt as with most other types of trarumissiofl jamming is 10 look for ir· "tglJ lart I)' in pa ttem,

flC Stuitch

'ideo Filters

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omment

pip, and this may be higher or lower than for normal search.

Try winging tuning in both direclions. Pip will decrea e in ize and may become distorted, bUL this doe not matter H readabilir i unproved. his won't work a ainst

" indow.

Use shortest scale which allow viewing targets. Short "ale and expanded sweep are parti ularly zood against \\ indow.

'Ie tronic jamming onJy. If jamming pattern is stationary, chanze P.R.F. to get it in motion.

IE jammer bearing is not quite tile same as the target, a good tri k is to train awa], from the jam and tr 0 pick up target on the edge of the major I be. n enemy equipped with both inter ept and jamming gear will start up hi jammer when w top and train on him. To pre-

ent his doing this, keep the ancenna spinning and, while still unjammed, take ranges from the PPI. Be t against low modulation Erequen ie . ill ffectual for noise and Window. If two ontrols are P" - vid d vary first one and then other ve'ry slowly to improve readability, 1£ n su cess, return ()" TT" position.

Try both ''IN"' and "Ol' ., if this t pe witch is provided. In receiver used with C/SK serie . use 10. 3 unle better on No. 2 and I o. 2 un le s better on N . I.

Chief use against elecrroni jammins but lot pass or fa t time constant t p rna help again t Window .. If several types are available, try each in. [Urn, in conjunction with L.O. detuning. These filters introduce a constant range error which should be accounted Ear on fire control equiprnents. lso they di ton pip, a do not try to center in n tch, Instead align leadina

(left) edge of pip with leading (left) edge of notch.

Control Video Gain

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'Tr different settinss while also adj usting the main gain.

Thi one is good against Window. Shorte t possible pulse may let you look through a Window cloud. Long pulse length are better against electronic jammino·.

seful against both 'Window and ele tronic jamming .•

Variable Pulse Length Selectivity

T.A.li .C.

( 'loud eliminator}

Radiation Sll'i (.(:11

Permit intermittent operation. Don't use on "momentary" e ept under orders from GI .

Report [ammiug. As complete information as possible on jamming signals should always be reported immediately to the eIC on your hip. ate presen e, bearing. and nature of the jam. and tat whether it i -possible to read through it or not.

h fact that jamming is being employed probably indicate important enem action i under way. Reporting the bearinz of jamnl.ing permit dire t action to be taken to destroy the jammer-the best AJ measure of a] 1.

Keel),' olJe'l"llling. Jamming is less effective at short 'l'anges than a long, because echo signals in rreas in trength more rapidly than jamming signals as the range do es, Thi is true, for difrerel t reasons, of both electr nic and mechanical [amming. hu even targets completel bs ured b . the jam ma appear on ur scopes while there is till time to direct action against them.

. nether reason fOT keeping the equiprnen working i that, as the disposition of forces hanges, the jammer may get off the target beating, leaving a ur radar II oj ammed except for, possi bl e side lobe

SPREAD RADAR FREQUENCIES

An electronic jarnm,er blankets only a narrotu ballet 0/ [reo uencies tuilhin one balUl. So when more than a single radar of a lytle is to be used, as in. a squadron of sltijJs-J)1'etune them 10 difjeriml f1'eq lwncies. One or more should remain iam"/1"ee. Window will cava the iuhole lran d for which it is CUi, lnu its efficien.cy is much less on other bend». Use radars on differ '11 t bands when pos ible.

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.& oise j(mmli1lg, shown here Of] IISB scope, is horde L type 01 transmission jamming to combat. Effect is that. Of greatly -inrreased gmss level, which may obsct.re pips. However, good 1I0ise jammers covering (I wide IrellUetlc)! band offer technical d esi gil d i ffi cultie s,

.. Here i Il NIl .. i bmnd-"Oerllla1l tIIixlllTe" ~" Ta~aT Mark 4 sCI'PeS. Scope at. fop is C. <:r I.: III bot/om. Tram Indicator. Con· laim both high and low modlllatiQn [requencies. Pattern jumps. Caulion : lh!v Rilld 01 j;UlI1lli1lg COli cause bearing 1l7TOrS i,r radars "sing ·lobe.switching. Readings ma)' bll of} euen thQugh fJipJ are properly matched.

JAMMER BEARING IS IMPORTANT!

[amm ,. bearing is given by the center of the' br'ightest jammed sector 'III the PPI iulien the gain control is at a low setting. Two 01' m01'C ships an coordinate PPI in'[ormation 10 obtain (I fix Ol~ [ammer. A single aircrolt can lake successive bearings 011. a land-based or shit) [ammer and find ,~ lo ation by lria.ngulalion.

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pickup. his suggests maneu erinz until the jammer is in an unfavorable p sidon. With Window, the relative Jack of motion of the material ompared to an air raft target mean that the plan sowing it is alway exposed. Also. the chances of other aircraft flying outside of the protected lane, due to fault navigation, are excellent. Particularly watch the windward side of a "Window jamWindow drift with the wind. at the wind velocity.

An aircraft arrying a jammer may pass through a fade zone while the targets he is protecting are unaffe ted. Thi causes a udden improvement in signal strength 0 er the jamming, perha~s makin

ignals readable that were obscured.

Keep ojJerating you,- radar equipineni, euen if the [amming signals are ext1'emely effective, Turning off the radar informs the enemy that his jamming is lie essful and renders the radar completely \ orthless, Even if ou can do noth ing. at least you are keeping the jammer occupied and perhap pr . venting him {Tom jamming another radar on a slightly different frequenc .

COM BATTING DECEPTION

One deceptive use of 'Window is to sow it to hide the true number of an attacking air group. In this case the enemy makes his approach Hying low to escape dete tion by long rang'e search eq uipmerits. When within radar range, he climbs to a high altitude. drops Window. aud make [or th > target. U our operators do not kn "tv how to distinguish Window, th . will report a Iarz force approaching, Plane en out to intercept the greatest number of "targets't=i.e. the Window= will find nothing. The enemy, on the other hand, will be able to accomplish his mission while we are looking tor him in t] e \1\ indow infested area ..

Learn to recognize Wiudoiu by its characteristic high rate of {lulte7' ami low rallge rate 011 the A COPC!.

An ther II e or "Window is l hid change of

curse. Th japs ha used the material in this

way. The aircraft turn while under cover of Window and approach their target from a radically different bearing. 0", they may appear to be making for one target but, when. protected by Window,

tum to strike at another, .

In still another use of Window a small fighter force may approach on on bearing and drop the material whil a bomber squadron comes in (rom a second bearing. Th fighter simulate a ma s raid by rn an of the "Window. and 0 hold ur a tendon until he bombers are upon us,

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Dou'L forget to search. continuously through J600, unless this duty has been assigned 10 other radm' and. yotl hnue been p cifically instructed. to confine yow' search 10 a designated section.

'Window, dropped from the air or fired b special projectiles, may also be used to hide the number and location 9£ surface craft, although in such usea given cloud .i onl effective at low altitude, and fall in a short time.

Check all tyj)es of unusual signals OTI radars of difJerent frequency-what may look like a 1?a,ttleship on the SG may ha1'dly appecn at all on rada« Mark 4 01' Cj K series q'ltipruenl.

PACIFIC FLEET EXPERIENCES

The following aloe actual examples of enemy use of \' indow, as taken from Fleet Action Reports:

A Ligh! Crui '1' Encounter. Window

"During an anti- hipping swee] and bombardment oE Chichi Jima. Bonin Islands, Window (at two miles range) was observed at 0428, 5 ugust chopped by a single bog y. In two minutes an area about 6 miles deep in. ranze and 20° in azimuth was infected. The pip On he "A" S 'ope was dear and distinct, giving what appeared to be an echo Irom about 30 to 40 planes, The indication on the PPI scope was quite solid at fir t and blo iklike in shape, though it on began to weaken, becoming fuzzy and commencing to fall, The plane was completely obscured b the 'Window; but one plot was obtained on it at 0430, bearing 030 ( ), 37 mile, list bond the Window area. This was the last plot obtained on the Doge. The Window was alread breaking up int treaks on the PPl scope and faded ompleteJy in about Iour minutes (rom the time it was first observed. his use of Wiudov by the enem had no effect on the perforrnance and fun tioning of Cl.C or the ship.

U personnel who observed the Window feel lire they Wall ld recognize it in the future."

Window Observed by a Task Force

" n th nizht oE 21-22 Jun 1944" while this vessel was operating in company with several other large xrmbatant ships in an approximate position bearing 175 degree , distance 35 mil es [1'01'11 tile northern tip of aipan, thi t pe of enemy radar jamming was obser ed. Four gr ups of plan s were tracked south to 50 miles over a period of two to three hours. One plane then detached itself from one of the main gTOUpS and, heading north, approa bed the disposition azain. 'i'\Then the plane

1 ed La ab III 12,000 ards, several ships op ned

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fire and the plane was observed to tum sharply right and drop ,. indow which could be seen .the SA radar only. Neither the nor fire control radar detected any interferen e· at any time. he initial appearance on the PF] wa that 01 a heavy cloud signal, centering on the spot where the 'Window was dropped, After about 12 minutes the signals grew weaker and occupied less pa e on the tim base f the . ope although still rapidly flu tuatinz, and b (J'an to scatter n the PPI ope, tending to move and attenuate in the direction of the wind which was from the east at about 10 knots. The last traces of the Window disappeared

after 19 minute, be altitude of the snooper wa

deterrnin d to be about 9,000 'eet; this would give a rate of fall of about 6 feet pet second, using an average time of fall of 15 minutes."

A nether Light Cruiser Reports

"During the night of 14 February 1944, ab t 100 miles northwest of Bougainville, this ship, operating with Task Fore 3, was attacked by

. Japanese di e bombers, and other unidentified enem planes. Th attack. started at about L830 and continued sporadically until the earl morning of the 15th. uring this attack what was believed to have been Window was picked up on tla SK and MK 4- radars, The fir t attack. came w;, from the northwest until within 15 miles, then circled the task force to the ouch and made their artack trom the east. The V/indow was first picked up on the SK radar when the planes started

irding [Q the south. The K operator wa trackinz the planes entirely b the PPl ex pt for identification, which was aken from the "A" scop . The 'i' indow was dropped at about 9 miles. co.l ered a considerable area, appearing to be about if miles deep and to ha e an arc of about 5 degrees, The igna1 had a dancing effe t similar to an air-

raft siznal but wa broad at the bas and fuzzy in outline, like a rain squall or cloud. The Window was noticed for about 30 minutes' no definite tim can be given for how long it persis ed due to th fact that the operat Twa bu tra king en n aircraft, he operator had no difficul ty tracking planes ihroush the \Nindow or around it. Since the J antenna was kept on constant search and each contact wa r ported and plotted for ea h

we p, th plotting bard offi er was able to identif Window by its lack of m tion and report it as such to the AA Directors. he MK 4 radar operators reported the signal from the Window dans'" lik an aircraft siznal but was too broad at t'*l. base and fuzzy to be identified a an aircraft signal."

• PPI and B scopes are a lot easier to

jam than the A type, and most trallSmitted jamming signals look ali/,e on their screens. 111 the illustration characterisiic pie-shaped sect01" is due to pickup on major lobe. Signal is also entering side lobes.

• G ,.auge scope looks at Window dispersal by closing aircraft. Plane (third pip 10 the rigl! t) lias dropped

the Window some ll'Iinu.tes before, causing mUltiple, ragged indications farther out on the range scale. Note the pip to the /IIT right-taTgets can

be picked up on the other siae Of a Wi'Jdow cloud.

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In the vernacular of a fighter director "bogey" means, literally, "unidentified aircraft." he connotation, however, of this word to fighter directors and to others is ometimes "enemy aircraft" or perhaps even "enemy surface essel." This con-

oration no doubt has been caused by difficulties with recognition. In a fast moving war it may be disastrous to take chances with recoznition, U a ship or aircraft cannot identify itself and appears to be in a position", here it can cause erious damage to our forces, it .i obvious that to hoot fir t and inve ligate afterwards will be a popular plan.

Many tragic occurrences have resulted from this plan, however, which could have been averted. A notable example is the B-25 pilot O!l patrol 111 Pacific waters who potted two torpedo boats below him.· Not recognizing them as . S. Navy PT's he came down on them, strafing with hiseighr 50 caliber machine zuns, They in turn opened up on him, While the first PT wa till sinkinz, a patrolling aV)' fighter happened along, made a deduction, and shot the bomber down, pilot of that bomber never lived to make explanations, nor did all the PT men,

THOROUGH KNOWLEDGE AND PROPER USE OF ALL THE' RECOGNITION EOUIPM~NT IN A THEATRE WILL PREVENT SUCH TERRIBLE MISHAPS

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Whatever identification system Ita been usedvisual recognition. IFF, or other methods-the result again and again has been. distressing. destroyer division tells a Story along that line.

During a search operation by that division, several ontacrs, visual and radar, bad been made on PBM's which were searching the area, lFF indications on these contacts were erratic, varying erween no indication to weak responses. Several • From August "Recognition Journal."

mis ellaneous contacts had been made during the da -all friendly. Just before midnight one Division Commander asked another Division Commander with l"t':gard to a bogey contact, "Do you have an indi ation that he is friendly?"

The reply-"Some think he i , but 1 have called plane on all four channels a VHF and have had no success."

At this time one of the destroyer Captains nearest the plane gave permission to open fire. One minlite later ComDesDiv 92 asked the Cowell "Why do you belie e bogey to be friendly?" The Cowell replied, "We hear someone call~ng on TJ3L 'Any station on this circuit answer!' "

Still anotl er min ute and ComDesDiv 92 transrnitted "We are trying to contacr PH If on TBL."

Division lO~ to Division 92, "We have tried all communication channels without success."

he plane was shot downl

Subsequently a contact report was recei ed to the effect that a PBM pilot had been proceeding to investigate u picious vessels. Later it , .. ras learned that that plane was missing from its base.

Coincidence perhaps, but the same old trouble -improper and ineffective recoanition. xamples like tho e above need no urther explanation.

NEEDLESS ALERTS HINDERED OCCUPATION OF·SAIPAN

During the occupation of Saipan friendly air-

raft approached on many occasions without using IFF, causing alerts which tended to interrupt un· loading. After a few days of thi no one 'paid much attention to contacts which were reponed as bogies.

Recognition may never be 100% perfect. but proper training and indoctrination of personnel will go a long way towards sol ving these problems. preventing useless alerts. and saving ships and lives .

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1200 miles from Japan

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Over 500 U. S. ships and many aircraft descended upon the Marianas on June 15th and, in the days that followed, Saipan, Guam, and 'Tinian were wrested from the japanese.

The Joint Expeditionar Force with its ships and aircraft and almost 200,000 troops was faced with inrmmerable difficulties and some definite set-backs -but by the middle of August the operations of this force were completed and the stan and stripes flew over these strategic islands 1200 mile from Japan-

The 'reports of the operation-one of the greate t joint operations in the Pacific-show that th re are still many problems to solve. The excerpt which follow describe orne of the phases of radar and communications 111 this kind of warfare.

THE TEAM GUARDSHIP SYSTEM FOR RADAR'

"The value of Radar deelops continuously with more experience in its use, In this operation various ideas, some new, were tried out and j ustified

1 Quotalion~ tmless otheruiise irldicaied are from Commander Joint E.xpeditionary Force Report.

them el es. Among these was the team guardship system for large dispositions and anchorage areas. Instead of a guardship, or group, trying to be "all

hings for all purposes," a division of responsibility , as made by several type of guards. Vessels were a igned 'or Long Range Air, Medium Range Air,

. SUI-fa e and Anti- ubmarin , and Low Flying Air-

craft guards. reening in depth (distances) wa

accomplished. It i believed that this teamwork definitely in Teased the efficiency of radar coveraze and continuation of the basic principle is recommended.'

During the cruise to the objective, numerous radar reporting drills 'were held. They proved ne es ary and gave greater uniformity and accuracy to reports. A detailed tandard form for Rada reports was promulgated.

JAP DECEPTION

"During this operation particularly interesting tactics were used by enemy planes in an attempt to evade radar tracking. Enemy planes were first clct) tecred on. a steady course designed to carry them directly over Timan and up the east coast of Saipan. pon reaching inian their echo would merge with the land echo of Tinian, emerze from this land echo and continue on the course. However, while over Tinian one or more of the e planes would lea e thei r formation, orbit over

inian and remain undetected in the mass of land echo and lose altitude rapidly. Meanwhile the re

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rnainder of the raid continued up the east oast of .pan attracting mo t of the attention in their Mr-ection. When the planes over 'Tinian were very low, too low [or search radars, they made a high speed attack on the tran pons to the west of Saipan undetected and were over the anchorage area before eheword could be passed by the few ships that might have picked, them up on surface search radars,

"The following are possible remedies to the situation:

(1) Be aware that such an attack might be launched and be prepared for it.

(2) Alert surface search watches.

(3) Careful observation by the operators on composition of raid so it will be known when the raid splits."

A Task Group Commander- aipan

NAVIGATION AT TINJAN

"During the course of the operation a general check of the reliability of radar bearings was-made. The SGa radar, especially, is 'used for na igariona] Jiirposes and it is quite important to know the .its of its reliability. All of the observations are applicable only to thi particular radar et ince beam patterns mu t vary in each equipment. A series of tests revealed the fact that there was a practically constant error of 3 degree between radar and pelorus bearings 'when a tangent or "cut" was taken on land features. The theoretical beam width of the SG is given as 6 degrees and. on etly, the results obtained seemed to agree very

y with the theoretical figure .. A three point check is still necessary when using the SG for offshore piloting preferably two radar tangents and a minimum range to hore. By means of the tests made it was possible to use "corrected" radar bearings. Heretofore the co rection (by use of the minimum range to shore) was considerable and introduced some doubt as to the extreme accuracy of the plotted ship's

." position. The "con- ted" radar beatings along with the minimum range to hore



provided a three line intersection which was e - ceedingly accurate,

U ... CALVERT (APA p)-Tinian.

FIRE CONTROL AT GUAM

"While engaged ill bombardment and fire support missions the SG- 1 and SGa radars were used extensively to obtain navigational fixes from which target range and bearing were furnished to main and secondary batteries' fire control stations. As

past experience with thi type of problem has indicated, navigational positions derived solely from radar bearing re lilted in range errors of as much as 1,000 yards. It is believed that the width of the SG beam and the inabil ity to locate on the PPI navigational points with sufficient exactness are primarily responsible for the inaccuracy of the bearing fix. Most fixes actually used during firing problems were taken from radar . ranges plotted from a series of navigational points. In general, the resulting gunnery J'anges proved accurate to 200'300 yards."

U_S.S. WICHITA-Guam

BOAT "BEACON"

"Aside from the uccessful completion of this mission, the ou tstanding developmen t in this operation, was the performance of the radar beacon, During pre-operation training with marines in joint LCPR and CR landings, the rough water caused poor radar pips (Tom LCPRs and resulted in the de ign of a radar beacon, Thi b aeOL1 consis~s o(~o. ,e ,p~ded metal sheets in the shape ?f a cross, measurfna-fie feet wide and five feet high, Without this beacon, rubber boats with personnel are not visible on the radar screen. Although originally designed for use with LCPRs the need for undetected reconnaissance, and consequent release of rubber boats 1700 yards from the bach, required further guidan e of rubber 'boats to the bea h b radar and the bea on vas mounted in a rubber boat. At thd point 0 relea e from LCPR tow, the pip from the LGPR and the ery clear pip from the radar beacon in the rubber boat

CONFIDENTIAL 13

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parateddisrincrly and enabled the hip to guide the Tubber boat O'roup to the b ach (by radl ommunicarions)."

U.S.S. STRlNGHI1Nl (APD 6)-Mariallas The t7ingham "beacon" was not a true heacou but mille?' a "corner reflector". ee "Imagination and Corner Refieciors" in the 25 Ociober " .I.C."

JAMMING WITH WINDOW

" '0 definite in lance of enemy jamming (electronic) of our radars was experienced. e eral in-

tances of radar in terference were repcrted=inrerference in hese a~es probably was caused by VH or other radio equipment harmonics, or BL equipment.

"During night air raids on Saipan, the enemy repeatedly dropped I a r g e quantities of "WINDOW which affected shipboard air search and fire control radars and night fighter air intercept radars at various times. Reason for dropping WI DOW appear to have been:

(I.) to conceal raid splits

(2) to conceal change of course (3) to cover retirements

(4) to provide cover in which to orbit while waitinz to make a coordinated attack with another raid.

(5) possibly to prevent interception by our night fighters.

The WINDOvV retained its definition on the scopes of shipboard air iearch radars throughout its fan. WI DOW gave a considerable echo n the Mark IV radar of one ship, but the enemy plane was distinguished from the WlNDO'V by the fact that the fluctuations of the pips caused b the 'VINDOW were more Tapid than those caused by the plane. WINDOW appeal's to have had more nuisance than deceptive value: it hampered tracking slightly, but did no interfere appreciably with detection."

ANOTHER EXCERPT

'In the air attack made by four (4) Japanese fighter-bombers on this Task nit on 23 June 1944, the enemy used "Window" to excellent advantage in that ships of the Unit were expecting a much more concentrated attack and as consequence

14

CONFIDENTIAL

did not concentrate lire on retiring aircraft to the ex ent possible bad the small number of pI involved been known."

U ... MA iLA BAY (CVE 6I )-Sttipetn

COMMUNICATIONS - VOICE DISCIPLINE IS M.ANDATORY

"Voice circuit discipline was som what improved on some circuits, Thi is something that must be continually watched. No one hould be allowed to use a microphone Wl10 is no proper! trained in voice procedure, It is suspected that a large part of the trouble in this respect is caused by officer talkers. Proper voice procedure is simple to learn and use, and it must be insisted on in all commands. Great improvement will 'result hom the adoption of: the a titude that voice circuits, like CW circuits, must 'transmit dispatches', 1l""t 'hold conversations,' The exact transmission m~') be decided on, and preferably" ritten down. be-

fore it i commenced. "More thoughtfulness is needed on most voice circuits. This applies not to the u e of 'please' and 'thank you,' (which are ou t of order and sho never be used) but to 'allowing the oiber fellow a chance.' Too often a transmission i broken in on before it can be receipted for, resulting in confusion when receipt is subsequently acknowledged. It hould be under toad by all hands that except in emergenc or for traffic o!: higher precedence a circui is not "Clear for n traffic until the sign-off 0 UT has been given y those already using it.

"The only noted attempt at jamming (radio) was on the Local Air Warning circuit, and jt Was brief. This circuit functioned sati factorily, although there was considerable difficulty in lining up radar guardships on several occasions. Little use was made of the Fleet Air Warning until the Lo al was secured, when it took over the ASP load.

"The local harbor circuit was over-loaded as usual, but served satisfactorily in spite of difficulies. It became th harbor Air Warning upon se uring of 3465 kc late in the consolidation phase.

"Previous discussions of circuit discipline. have concerned themselves primaril with careless ,.. ignorant errors. A new and serious problem f discipline arose in this operation with the deliber-

ate floutinz of rezulations b voice operator \ ho ad the circuits, usually at night, to broadcast ~lSic, exchange personal conversation, 'wisecrack' -even to profanity and ob enity. (Much effort

tva expended in. af'/Jrehencling orne of the of[enders.} Close upervision of operators and circuits by officers in all sh ips is required. . . . It may become necessarx to provide additional DF equipment to stop this unauthorized transmi ion.

a far, little if any in terference wi tll traffic has resulted, but this tendency must be stamped om before it g ts a foothold."

"Overload on TBS circuit was, to a great extent, due to verbose transmissions attributable to failure of originators to formulate messages prior to com-

•ncemenl of transmissions."

Commander- Carrier Division 24~Marim'lQs

DRilLS GET RESULTS

"Conduct more frequent drills in the type of communications actually used during an. operati n

irnu latina operating condi tions, his incl udes '

• dl;I1S on tactical circuits coordinated "with ~ding board drill. ommunication personnel do not get enough practice on C V circuits. Radi . men are not thoroughly conversant with operating pro edure because they have not actuall used enough 'If on both plain language and encrypted messages. Commanding Officers and Communicat-ion Officer, probably rniszuided by the ready availability and ease of operation of voi e chan-

als, do not insist on using CW when uch use may ~ the most expedient method of communi ation.

"Responsible offi cers lDU t be made to realize that voice communications enable command to function smoothly, to help iron out the kinks resultinz 'from current exigencies, inadequate or faulty planning, and in-

omplete or untried doctrine. All communications are an aid to command and hould erv as u 11, and oice."

A Task '·0Up Comman dei=Snipa»

"Communication fun tioned well although there wa till much unne essary tran mitring of wordy messages. careful reading of plans would have answered man questions asked over radio. furnishing 01' reports in prop r form and a understanding of the form desired would have materially reduced traffic, Word like "irnme-

diately' and 'priorit ' be .ame meaningles due t constant u e."

A Task vrou.jJ C01ntnllnd,el)"-Saipan

"Voice radio wa the onl practical means which a screen commander had of quickly assigning screening stations at Saipan where he was working with essel widely separated. a they were there aJ ng th oasts of Saipan and T'inian. Th main communication channel wa TBS but usually it could not be u ed at the time when needed most, i.e. when forming up at night, becaus or being jammed by maneuverinz ignal of hips repelling

air attacks and retiring. -

"Any li t of ve sels furni hed or assigned screening essels should be taken as a guide onlv, In using it for planning, do not count on using any vessel unless you are certain that you will have voice radio communicati n with It, An at empt was made to assign screening stations to minor craft as igned me, which did not have TBS or MN. using the Task For e ommdn CW frequency. The

ircuit was so btl y that it l as bNO hours before w could O'et into it, and then the. message had to be sent blind without getting a receipt from the ve - els intended, b cause of constant break-ins."

U.S.S. SHAW (DD 373)-SaijHI.'I1 Night Objective Group Screen]

LET OTH ERS KNOW-

Many Of the inte1'eSling arid use/'ul stories of this operation are missing. "C.I. ,." is set u,j) to lake stories 0/ the tactical use ol radio and radar in such operations and. IJtLblish them so that the entire Fleet can jJrofil by the lessons leamed.

But' • ..I.C.' cannot do that without the assistance of the operatil1g forces. The 'reports dealing with radar, radio countermeasures, com ·r111"'11;ca· lions, fire control, (ftc .. {/'1"(1 useful b u:

I II. e "story behind the r(1)01'1" 0 fie n C01'l{tL;1!S tile d olJe which will make the n ext apertuion (/ bette?' 0 n e. eui methods, new techniques become corn-

monplace to tho e who.. ioork them out) but [at months may remain unknown to thou umds of other officers (,md m.en. Put the intormaiion in "C.l. C ." /01' the benefit of officers ani! men in the other fleets task forces and aual nils.

Office of the Cbief of 1 aval Operation Editor of "CIG."

CONFI DENTIAL

15

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properly equipped, but allow for failures. When once on oxygen (above angels 12) any altitude is equally comfortable. On an intercept an altitude advantage is of prime importance. You are not good as an ~DO if you don't give your pilots this break. Pilot differ in the amount they like from 1,000 to 5,000 feet. enerally it's as much a good visibility will allow.

Orbiting: Because of torque, habit, etc., mo t pilots prefer to orbit port. Give this orbit preference if possible, but don't hesitate to give a starboard orbit if better for intercept. A figure of eight orbit is less tiring than a simple orbit. If either a port or starboard orbit is OK for youjust tell him to orbit and let him take his choice then tell you which way he's turning.

Keep the Pilots Posted: If your planes are working Gut of sight of base tell them at intervals their range and steer to base. Keep them informed, when compatible with ecurity and brevity, of what changes are developing in the tactical situation. Keep track of pilot'S gas supply by time and inquiry. Convince him that you are looking out for him. Advise him of AA fire in vicinity. Keep him out of danger zone. Advi e im o.f other air traffic in vicinity-particularly that commg up below him. Know enough abou t the general operational picture in our vicinity to give quick, intelligent an wer to questions that may arise. If he should be forced to pancake on the water or bailout, tell him immediately that you know his position and when you can sent help. IE you have time, give him necessary instructions. At night, remind him to take pyrotechnics, etc.

Target Information: This should be complete and as continuou as practicable. He wants to know boge 's angel. ize, course, speed. change rn speed which mizht indicate a change in altitude,

said better in your own words so don't be too inflexible on R.T. Get your point across, and get results quickly and effectively, regardless of how you say it. You must be brief and concise, however. Don't stumble for words-express elf-confidence, relaxation, command, assurance, poi e and directne~s ill your method of speech and words emplo ed, The crux of R.T. is its effectivenessmake any other consideration secondary. R.T. procedure "mike" technique, and voice qualities greatly affect the pilot's confidence in you.

Scrambling: All pilots in combat zones go pre· pared for any altitude. That is their responsibility. In a training activity give them advance warning if are going to send them to high altitudes so can. go prepared with a 'ygen and warm cloth-

ing. Know what pra tical times to expect on a scramble. Know just what the pilot and crews have to do. Allow for misfires in starting the engine, etc. Be sure ready planes have had complete radio checks, both primary and secondary. Give

.. ilot all the dope you can as quickly as you can. 'WlI pilots climb at a different speed, bu t they can all get there when they have to. ell the pilot what's needed, then ask him how' soon he can get there. Don't have him climb faster than necessary. It's expensive-gas, wear and tear.

Altitude: On patrol, if tactical situation allows, angels 10 to 12 is a good altitude to Hy. Oxygen is necessary over 12 and . pilots should be kept below ahis as lo.ng. as safely possible. A pilot can smoke "t angels 12 and below, but can't above. The higher the altitude the harder the plane handles,

Don't hesitate for a second to put your pilots high and all oxygen if you consider it advi able. Remember tl e pilot is there to defend the ba e-put

him where he can do it.

Oxygen: It's the pilot's responsibilit to be

These suggestions are offered by an experienced fighter pilot who is now on duty as a fi gb tel' director aboard a large carrier. Tbey are primarily intended for newly-trained intercept officers who sometimes lose the confidence of the pilots whom they are controlling becau e of a lack of familiarity with. operational procedures and the failure to conrider the pilot's viewpoint. Experienced fighter directors may pick up useful pointers, too.

The Squadron Commander: See him first. Size him up. Is he a stickler for form or is he opposed to formality? Explain that you are working for him and his men, that you are there to help them get to a bogey with every possible combat adv tage, Show him through your CIC, descri )' briefly how the equipment works, and tell him frankly what you can and can't do.

Know the Pilots: Spend as much time with them as possible. Get to be as much a part of their grollp as practi al. You are a part of their team and good teamplay means that you must kn9j their names, habits, characteristics and reacriol, . They must know you and acquire much confidence

,in you. EX.Plain to them that you are. merely there to help them get to the bogey and to get back to ba e, not to fiy their plane. Get the pilots into CIe and explain our setup with particular em-

phasis on the limitations of your information and communications. Explain their responsibilities.

Homing: You can home. You can get pilo c:... back to base. Be definite about this, but be pI pared to follow through, This is really close to a pilot's heart. He· must thoroughly know all your homing procedures. Any pilot can Immediately rate an FDO by the waJ he handles a lost plane.

R. T. PrOCedU1"e: Know your FD code cold.

The present fighter code i standard, known, and good; but occasions arise when something can be

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and b gey' ranz and relati position from him. Example: "Bog y' ranee 20 miles @ 11 o'cloc

1£ a "down sun" intercept is possible teU him that

ou're goi.ng to tr to put him "up sun." hi

shows him you knot our business and axe tryin to give him all the odds. Above all, don't kid him Or yourself. Don't give him the wrong dope to a e face. If you made a mistake 01' doped off, tell him, and then give him the true picture.

Weather: Weather arrd cl ud are major bsta-

cles to an mtercept. loud onditi ns 'will ai

on different bearinzs and at different ranze and altitudes. If your pilot know bogey's angels and boge 's range be is the best judge as to how a cloud formation or weather front should be handled, Let him go around, under, or over, ifhe deems it advisable and report his change of course to you. If bogey is just on other side, he mizht want to

orbit on this side of lauds. void sendinz a tigh

formation through clouds if posiiible. It would subject either to getting epa rated or era ked up. Keep yom pilot informed of radi al weather changes at base. Bring them ba k and pancake [hem if possible before base closes in. A k your

P for weather r ports and changes. Ask them "Report weather" rather than for a "D.R. position." By this method they'll give you the do]

that's important to them at the time. he pictur

will probabl be much more complete,

Combat Ai?' Patroi: A 2 or 3 hams AP is ver

til' orne a best. The be t way to relieve the monotony for the pilots is to give them something

to do. omparibl with security. le him run intercepts on friendly aircraft. Give the pilots short, surface-search rni sions if feasible. Let them do as ma.ny as possible of the little odd jobs th continually turn lip. 0 job is too menial. They eet a big kick alit of buzzing the water or the is1and, looking for craft or per onnel, Tbey have fine planes and they Like to fly them. Keep on-

ta t with them=don't do] e off. Le them know you're 0 the other end of the phone at all times. •

Don't Be Afraid of the Pilots: This is a common chara teristic of the (Treen FDO and (an be easil overcome by getting to know the pilots, learning his problems, knowing yOUT job and performing it properly. Consideration for the pilot is essential. bur don't forget that YO have tactical control of him. You must not be afraid of makina

o

de i ions and i suin the orders. Remember II '

depending on au to get him to die bogey in the best atta k position, and , hen I e gets through 'wit . hi job to get him ba k-and that's a biz order. Y

From ADC Board Information Release o, II,

~~ take over, visual FDO!"

The Visual Fighter Director must often feel like the relief tn:tcher who lakes over in the 9th inning when bases are loaded, 01' like the "crisis r'Unne1-" who gelS the call in the closing minutes of a football ga,rne. His burden is greatest when low flying torpetlo planes and dive bombers are closing the force) or when he m tJ.st maneu.ver his fighters close to the zone 0/ AA (i1·C.

The task of the Vi ual FDO is not always a t'jtacting as described abo e, but as a rule it doe require vigilance, ability to think. smartly unpressure, and composure. His object is the

interception of enemy aircraft which have approached within sight of the directing ship under condition which render visual control more effective than control thr ugh radar. The bandits rna be shadowers or attacking 1 lanes. Conditions undel- which Visual Direction i res- '[ted to are:

(a) "\Then saturation by land echoe impair Radar efficienc ;

(b) Vben ho tile planes are operating belox Radar cover;

() ''\Th.e.n hostile planes are dearly visible or get inside the eff tive range of Radar co er;

(d) \7hen enemy use of Radar ounter M a - .es has hindered eff rive Radar coverag ;

(e) When Radar equipment uffers material failure.

THE VISUAL METHOD'

It is all extension oE the normal directive method of fighter direction employed by a complete CIC relying on radar. The informative method of control may be used-as when the Visual FDO simply vector the Combat Air Patrol towards the bandits with a" 0 get tJ1eID.!" But the dire rive method, in which he retain antral of the CAP and aid tb fichters vim specific direc-

ions to zet to the bandits. is alwa likel to

achiev the better results.

When at sea, conditions are such that the visual method is likely to be more e£Ee tive than the Radar method, par of the CAP should be maintained within ight of the ship, and never more than 6 miles distant at a height at which they may be kept constantl in view. 5,000 feet or immedia ely b 1 w cloud ba , whiche er i lower, i usually the be t patrol height when low flying air-

raft are expe ted. Some advantage in height may be considered essential to gain initial sp ed, but

19

t~e height hould not be so great as to render VIsual fol~ow:ing difficult or give rise to the risk of evershootmg a low-Bying aircraft first seen close in.

In Assault Operation a line of patrol across the enemy's line of approach may be preferable to a figure of 8 or all. orbit of the direction ship even though the .fighter~ cannot be kept in view.

1n operations WIth large task forces, it may be n~cess~ry to .pass visual control of fighters from one directing ship to another a the Bogey pa ses from one area to the next.

When aircraft are on patrol for visual direction purposes one lookout should be detailed to keep them con taptly under observation, using binoculars as ~e ssary .. In this way the Visual FDO can at all tunes be mformed of the position of the patrol,

Since it may be necessary for the visually dir~cted fighters to lose altitude rapidly in the direc,aon o~ the unidentified aircraft, a situation arises 111. winch ?ur own, forces might conceivably open fire?ll their own aircraft. To prevent this so far as possible, a warning should be broadcast on the primary warning net that a visual interception is In pr?gress. Example: "Bobcat this is Tomboy War01ng Snapper Out".

.As soon as ~l.ni.dentified aircraft are sighted the V~sual DO wilLmform the Fighter Director. The F~g~~er Director will inform appropriate fighter divisions of the low CAP that they are to be directed ~sUally C.'Over to Snapper"). TIle Visual FDO will then gIve some initial order or information w~ch will turn the designated fighters on to approxl.m_a~ely the correct interception course.

. ~he .tnltlal order should usually be informative, lD~lcatmg. the direction of approach of the Bogeys. This may be by reference to the approximate point of .the compass or to a known and clearly identified pomt of land or to the course of the ship or Fleet.

Examples:

(a) "Bogey dosing from North-Low." (b) "Bogey over Able."

(c) "Bogeys my Port Bow."

When method (b) is used it is essential that the land referred t? should be clearly distinguishable and that the pilots should know what landmarks are to be used for this purpose and how or by what code name or letters they will be described. Method (c). sh.ould not be used in an anchorage or when ships ill the area are maneu <ering.

Method (a) -the points of the compass-is recommended for normal use.

The initial order should be followed by supple.

mentary information as to [he height, course, and number of the unidentified aircraft. .

e.g. "Bogeys Angels 1 moving left to rightSix fish."

_ As s:,on as the ~ghters are on the right side of ~e s~p and heading roughly in the right direcnon, the Visual FDO should seek to "con" the fighters Oil to an intercepting course, ordering ~a_nges of course and height as necessary, and giving supplementary information.

e.g. Port 30 = turn 30 degrees ~o pon.

Steady = steady on your present course

and height. '

UP = climb.

Starboard 60 = turn 60 degrees to starboard.Bogey crossing you right to left = Bogey crossing your bows rightleft.

Difficulty will be experienced in judging chan

of course acc~rately, but 30 degrees may be "1 garded as a sligh; turn, 60 degrees as a medium turn, and go degrees as a large turn. When a reversal of course is required the expression "Pronto," or "Port (Starboard) about." Normal vectors may be given but they will be found difficult to judge once the fighters are at a dista p from the directing ship.

When possible the Visual FDO should seek to b~n~ forth both the targets and the fighters within the field of his binoculars.

As wit~ the. Radar Method, the object should b: to aclue~e ~nterception as quickly as possible without sacrificmg the advantage of being between the enemy and the target, so as to be able to intercepra sud~en tum to attack by the enemy. In case of a single shadower, however, the risk of =. may be small and a "speed triangle" inter~ cepuon course should be used. If the shadower is using cloud cover and is only visible for short periods, this method is essential.

A small plot will be kept by one of the FD 's ssistants, information being recei ed from the CIC on the hip' Information Circuit.

One assistant hould man the lookout circuit OL). He should keep sight of the low Combat Air Patrol.

A plot of the fighters should be kept in the CIe where an Intercept Officer should be ready to take over control as soon as isual direction is no longer possible. In ships where this lS not pos ible Fighter Aircraft should not be dire ted out of sight of the hip.

A Gyro Compass eepeater should be readil y a - cessible to the Visual FDO. A pair of binoculars may be mounted over the repeater to indicate true bearing of contacts directly.

,,,rhen fighters are directed out of sight of the Fleet at low heights, pilots must be careful to keep sufficient height to retain VHF radio contact and, _if requesting a homing vector should climb to a ufficient heigh to stahllsh Radar contact.

1t must be stre sed that efficient visual direction can only be achieved by constant practice with aircraft. The judging of distances,· courses, and heights, is fat from easy. Every opportunity should be taken a exercise the Visual FDO and

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his assistants who must work as a team and understand thoroughly what they are doing before satisfactory resul ts can be achieved.

The Vi ual Fighter Director station should be 10 ated as hizh as possible and should afford an allaround view. Such stations are going to be installed on combatant ships, probably as follows:

On the 8M 'platform of evs and CVEs, all the Magnetic Compass platform of eVLs, and on the Searchlight platform of AGCs. Probable equipment will be a standard horizontal plotting table, outlets in the JS, JA, JL-IC circuits a remote radio control box capable of controlling VHF and ill channels as designated, and necessary wind screens. Positions will be provided for one officer and two enlisted men.

In BB, CA, CL, and DD 445 and 692 classes a Visual Fighter. Direction station will be provided in a battle lookout station, equipped with outlets for J ,JA JL-IC circuits, a remote control radio box capable of controlling VHF and HF channels, a portable plotting table, and a Gyro repeater if one is not already installed.

The complete Visual Fighte'1' Director uocabul4ry was published in the last issue of "C.l.C."· which was dated2J October, I944.

don'tlork in the wron9 direction

The wing quotation is from the report of the commander of a destroyer

squadron (' ich has seen considerable action and which was participating in the Hollandia Landing at the time that the remarks were written:

"The necessity of eliminating the 'sightseer' cannot be over-emphas#ed. In EVERY night action. everyone wants to and does) watch the 'fireworks: It should be hammered into the offuiers and men that when the enem)l drops flares in such a position as to silhouette the formation, the attack WILL NOT come from the direction of the flares but one htmdred and eighty degrees from it." 'l\Ihile it i not invariably true that an attack will come from a direction of 1800 away from the flare the general idea o~ this quotation is wholly sound. The "sightseer" instinct-that of concentrating

attention where there is most to be seen-is inherently human but tactically dangerous, and as such must be firmly combatted and repressed. When an enemy shows prominently on the radar screen or is ilhouetted by our star-shell or is surrounded by our "flak' or is lit up by the bursts of the salvoes poured into him, he is then not the one for us to worry most about.

Our danger. as 11a5 been demonstrated in many actions. is from the plane or ship or motor torpedo boat in some other sector, not detected and not under fire. It is of the utmost importance that all officers, lookouts, and radar operators should realize this and should habitually increase the vigilance of their allaround search, when exciting events in anyone direction threaten to absorb their attention.

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN .

(From CO TCIANT Newsletter, Vol. 2) No.6,

28 cpt. I944) "

IT TAKES A. TEAM

T~e VisuaJ FDO requires two assi tants, one for keepmg constant watch on the fiO'htets and one to keep th.e enemy under observation. The Visual F~O h_lms~lf is in direct voice communications with the. fighters by an extension from the CIG. He requires a pair of binoculars, but until both target and fighters are in the same field of vision he h~s to rely on his assistants to put him on to the aIrcraft. The Visual FDO and his assis .. _ must be. ex-pert in identifyi_ng both friendly ~ enemy aircraft,

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CON FrOENTIAL

DRT Longil!ule of /I. Cont.l!cl: The arm is sci to 070 (or 110) and Uu: distance in miltts as measurad on th~ scale is subtracted from 140', It. this case the d,stance is 28 miles Inut the longililde o] C01ltact is 140°-00' Ini'Hl,s 2 ' or l.,gO 32' East,

C ..,VGrd .. -Soufh

- Jt.t:r~"~"Iet:Lilill!'

,h'm 4'~t 111 O!)O~1I0 (i"U OIis can (70)

split-second fixes on the DRr

,Remember tllOse pre-war jaunts to tbe moun-tam or .to the seashore when-utterly lost-you S~opped ill at a small town fiUina station for dire ~ hans? The shin-sleeved attendant pleasantly but

Iaconically said, "Go back one block bia si

'L" ' " . " 19 SIgn

. .. one Pme ten miles.' "

ietHenam VV. W. Merrill, bead. of the Surface Department, Sy:nthetic Traininz at St S'

" 0" Imou s

plays. the p.~Tt ~f filling station attendant, and we

substitun- Lautude and Lonlritude" f "L

P· " 0 OT one

me.

The need for finding the latitude and longirude of downed planes. ound contacts, enemy forces, etc. frequently arises during operations at Sea. II the~e c~nta ts have been plotted on tile DR T their latitude and longitude can he found in a few seconds.

~ake any point, the latitude and lonlritude of which are known, as a reference point. This will usually be ~wn ~hip' position at a gi en time. .. lrrouO'h this point draw a Jortb- outh and

< ast,\.Vest reference line. hese lines hou ld ea;

tend the length of the plot, and it is recommended that the be placed 11 all plots.

~nd the latitude of an other point on the plot SImply et ell: drafting arm on 000 (or' 180) and measure the di tan in miles from that pain to the East-VIlest reference line. hi will be the nLlmb~r of mi.nutes to be added 01' Subtracted from the la tJ tude of the reference point.

~o .find the 10n~Titude, set ogo (or 270) plus (at minus) the latItude on the draftina arm and ~eastll'e the distan e in miles aJong th~ drafting

22 CONFIDENTIAL

arm from [be point in question to the NorthS~tlCh reference line. This will be the number f mlDlltes to be added or subtracted to the longitude of tile reference point,

A .similar problem arises when the latitude and Jongltu~e of a point are known and it is desired to plot It on the ~RT. To do thi , set 000 (or (80) on the draftinz ann and measure I orth or ~OUt~ from the East- W·est reference line a distance III miles equal to the difference in latitude in minut.s between the new poinr and the reference pomr, Draw an East-We t line througn thi point.

If the new pO.inl is in greater .1.\ ortli latitude 01' le~ser So.uth iatLl1J(le than the reference point, it unll ObvlOusly be N01'th of it and vice VCT$O,

low, set 0go (or 270) plu (or minus) the Iaritude of the new point on the dl'afting arm and measure alonO' the drafting arm East or West hom the orth. out~ reference line a di tance in miJes equal to the dIfference in Jongitud in minutes between the new point and th reference point. ?rawa .Torth- oU.th Iine through this point. The l~ter~ection DE tins line with the new East-\Vest lme 1 the 1 'ation of the new point.

If ,lite new point i in greater East or lesser JlVesl longttude than the reference point, it will ob,Jio OIlSty be East oj it, and vice versa.

. Similar re lilts could be obtained by onsrru t=s ~ s~aH ~rea plotting sheet on the DR T plot but 1,t 1S believed that the above method is often less tIme-con umine- and has the additional advantag that fe\ er line are drawn 01) the DR T plot.

.in-point bombin9 without charts or tables ...

that's the as ignment for the N/APG-4 automatic, Iow-alritude radar bomb-release equipment " hi h i now reaching the f et.

ince it i light in weigh t and does not req uire all operator it is suitable for in tallarion in single, place as well a lar er aircraft. omAirLant i currentl equipping pecial squadr us of TB airplane with it, and Corn.Air'Pa is conducrinz special tests of the equipment in arious types of aircraft, Prototype installations in vengers and Hell 'at fighter. are now undergoing ta tical test.

e Tests by ASDevLant indicated that per ent

of the releases would re ult in h its if a stick I t',Y0 b rnbs were dropped in each run from an a 1 ti-

ude of 40 to 4-00 feet. The tests wen conducted in PBY'5 , PB4Y-l, and TIM aircraft. Tactical eva] uation tests at N S Patuxent River in the winter of 1943 and spring of 194'-1 showed that ap~

e,roximatel 2. per ent of all 1 mbs dropped will provide dire t hits and 70 per tent a all bombs dropped will be within 35 feet of the tarzer. After the Patuxent test with BF aircraft, the Tactical Test unit there de cribed the . lAP -4 a 'the most effecti e bomb-relea e mechani m - ntrolled b radar which rhi squadron has investigated."

CONFlDENTIAL 21

of evasive action. He rna t, howe er be in level RiO'hL when the reJ ase point is reached.

3.oIt weighs only approximately 0 pounds inralled. Its two antennas are light and constitute a Eairly mall drag-6 to knots on a TBE, 8 to 10 knots on an F6F.

4· Despite trick tactics, targets annat cape the effects of bomb dropped with the aid of the

J I APG-4;. It .has b eri hot n that when til b mber i at 350 feet altitude, the maximum eva ive ta tics of a destroyer will result. in an error of only 20 feet in range.

5. '01' skip-bombing, the equipment can be adjusted to drop a bomb short of a ship at any point up to 100 feet.

Figuring out how the AN /. PG-4 actually works will be a real job for tbe ART who maintain it, btl t it is ufficieut to ay in ell is article that the ' bomb-release s stem operat on the arne principle used in radio altimeter =Irequen '" modulation.

For solving a bombing problem, four types of information are needed: azimuth, altitude, range, and range-rate. Azimuth is determined isually or, in darkne or overca t from a search radar er. Th altitude can be obtained from either the

;T/APN-l radio altimeter or a barometric pntssure altimeter, if the latter's a curac limitations are taken into account. U e of the A 1/ AP -1 permit automatic alti tude compensation and the air raft 'an fly at any .le el between 40 and 400 feel for bombing. II the barornetri pressure altimeter is used, altitude i pre. et manually and the aircraft rnu t fly at the selected le I between 50 and 350 feet.

Th e rang and ranzerate information is supplied by the bomb relea e equipment's own .circuits, There are no charts, table or graphs to be consulted and the AN / AP G ~4.even "presse the pickle" automaticall when the instant For bomb-release arrive '

omrnents from COl11.mands using the N I AP4 are invited and should be forwarded to the .ogrrizant bureaus.

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A. direc; ilil is scored 11)1' (I /ig/i I JJTa,," ticc I'(lrnl" d"oj/ped with the «irl of the iJN/APG-4" bomb-release «qw'pment. The larget shown is 01} old light.f!Oflse,

Sufficient lanai EoI' a urate bomb relea e are epr vided by sooo-ton ships and, if the are apPI' a hed broadside landing barges and surfaced s u bmar in es.

For several reason, this sharp-shooting equipment is expe ted to prove popular with pilots. Here's the outlook:

I. he bomb-release equipment is entirely automatico It needs no operator and require de pilot only to flip two switches. Before or immediately after takeoff he throw n the main power wit h, and as he start hi bombing run be operate a "safer switch" which turns on the transmitter and permits the bomb-relea e to dose at the proper time.

2. It will not c~"amp a pilot's style in "jinking"

o avoid anti-aircraft fire before an attack. It operates a p edily tha a pil t can take a wide ourse

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removl

The jig is up, boys. That ostrich-act is out of date-pull those heads out of the sand!

You have made a valiant effort to pretend that the Army-Navy nomenclatur.e system is something that you don>t have to "Worry about. But "AN" designa-

tions for Naval ship and shore models of elect-ronic equipment are here to stay and they're getting thicker by the minute. So let's lift the veil of mys-

tery and get the subject straight once and for all. '

,

The purpose of the system is to make the name tell you as much about the equipment as possible. "A rose by any other name would smell as sweet." That's all right for a rose maybe, but it just doesn't apply to electronic gear. We Want a name which tells us at a glance a lot of things, such as Where is it used, what kind of equipment it is, and what it is for. That's what the AN system does. So let' see how it works.

The first signal is the opening group of letters"AN". That mean the designating number of the equipment has been assigned jointly by the Army and avy. It doesn't necessarily mean they both will use the equipment. It does mean that we are concerned 'with a major equipment and not SOme component of an equipment. This i parallel to the use of avy model letters as opposed to Navy type numbers.

The "Al\T" is followed by a slant line and then come three letters. These letters indicate (J) where used (2) general type, (3) purpose. Having established the category of the equipment a number is added. This number indicates a specific equipment for the general purpose established by the letter. Let's see how this works on a special case. What is the AN/APS-2? Write it big and use the chart.

2+ €ONF.lDENTI~L

AN /

A

p

5

2

The second eqUipment in thi s category to which an dN desig,lalion has been a signed.

()

mystery from UAN" nomenckrrure

4

2nd 'Letter, 3rd Letter,

lSi Letter, Purpose

1 ~ln~s~ro~lI~a~ti~on~ !~-:T~Yp~e~o~f~E~q~U~~:n:le:ll~t I~;-~~~~~~~~~.- __ ! __ ~~ __

A Auxiliary assemblies 1 A X

A Airbcrnejlnstalled &: B Pigeon (not complete oper·

. operated in air<;raft) ating sets)

Air transportable (de- Communications (re. 2 B

C· signed to be air trans- C Carrier (Wire) C ceiving &: tr...l1smil-

portable .as stated. ~ ring)

specification or mill-

~~~~~ 0 3 C

F Pbotographic Direction Finder

F Ground, fixed

Ground, G Tel ...... apb or Tele· G . 4 0

-0- Gun Directing

G ground use (m c lu' ...... ' type (Wire) .

two or more

installa dons)

Ground, Mobile (in- I stalled as operating

M unit in a vehicle which has no rune- M

non other than ~- Meteorological

porting the equip.

ment)

P Ground, pack or N Sound portable (horse or man)

S Shipboard

N Q

Special

5

Change in in pu t veuage, phase, or frequency

Facsimile or Television

o

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o

rn

~

c::I m ;:0

11 maior equipmerll

l1irbO'Nie (from colullin 1)

Radar Search

(from (from.

column Il) column 3)

bus the A1 /APS-~ is a radar search equipmentl' ) used in aircraft. Another equipment in tb same category would be the AN/APS-4 OJ" the A I APS·6. It is very important to note that these numbers do not represent minor design ch'anges in the same series of equipments as JOu would expect under the avy model letter sy tem. The RBO-2

is as umed to be an REO-I with minor modification I but an AN/APS-3 ,may be an entirely differ-

ent equipment from the AN/~S-2.

How do 1,17e d:istinQ'Uish slightly diffel'em equiprnents of the same ba i.e de ign? Here We pas to column 5 of the chart. IE we modify the AN / AP -2 it become the A /APS-2A. The next in the series would be the AN/APS-2B and so OD. N ow if we keep the same basic design, but merely change the input power of the y tern as, for ex-. ample. from 13 olts to 26 volt, then we pass to column 6 and add the letter X for the first Change,

2

3

1

Model 'Number

Interphone and pub- L Search Light Control lie address

M 'Maintenance and test . assemblies (including tools)

Etc.

Navigational aids eluding a l t imc beacons, compass & instrument landing)

P Radar

Radio

R Receiving

S T

T. Ground, transportable

U

Special types

Search 1Uld/or detecting

Telephone (Wire)

Transmitting

Visual and Light

W R-emote ccntrnl

6

Miscellaneous

Identification

z

y

Etc.

XA Aircraft Radio
Laboratory
XC Camp Coles
Signal Labo-
ratory
XE Camp Evans
Signal Labo-
rarery
XM Fort Mon-
mouth igoal
Laboratory
XN Navy
XO Earontown
igna]
Laboratory
XT Toms River
Signal
Laboratory T Training Set

Used by Army or * .avy and an Allied Government

CONFIDENTIAL 25

Y Eoythe second, and 0 Th

becom~s the N/AP -~~X w~s th~ . IA'pS~2B power 1 changed. en us operarm.g

There are a few more mi

letters tacked . he tai ceUaneous l,lSes for

on t e tail end a 1 .

of the cJ An .. < S town 111 column 6

laxt. expenmen tal . -b

radar in dey 1 .. all orne earcli

e pmentatthe avalR d

tory migll t be for exa 1 tl . esear] Labora·

T ' . A mp e ie ! lAP

he letter T tacked on th d. .. -2 (X 1).

device for a specifi equi~_en means a trainino·

ment. The fir t trainer d _ veloped for the A I PS-<>A wouldbemeAN/ PS-2 -'"i1. . An~ that is abou t all there :; to. It-except fOT practice.

Ty your hand out on the ~ <

chart usin-g these example . ~

What is your AN Nomenclature IQ?

( ) .

.~ A /ARC-4X (d) A /ARJ'\1. )

( ) /AR -6 (e) AN/CRT-l

(e) N/SPT-l (f) ANI PX-l

n 'wer are printed 011 page 2.7.

y DT

In I J

,KY

LS M

'lD MK ML MT M:X

o PG PH pp

P

R RD RE l"F

RG

IDEN:IFYING EQUIPMENT COMPONENTS

SO far we have talked nl £ . .

the field covered b lOY 0 - major eql1ipments-

will mention brief). ~: mO~:l Ie.teers .. Now :ve com ,Y deSlc,natlOns for major

p nears of the eq uipmem-the' 1 '

Navy type numbers C eql~ a em of

lette .s which teJJ 1~bat ~mpon;nts carry ll1di ating

number which identifies '{t: 0 • c.0u;ponent it is, a and final I y rh 1 lesi pm QCU ar component,

of which it is a part C ~~~~~~ of the equipment

ing letters and a deS~-jptio:l of ~\~:t~e~h:t~~i~~:~

Component Indicator

escriptiOL1

AB A 1

AS AT BA BB

C CG

An tenna Base

mp1ifier

An tenna System Antenna Battery, dry Battery. torage Control Box

Rad~o frequen cable transIm~sLOn line and wa ve guides with terminal .

Comparator

Compensator, regulator Computer

Crystal nits

Coupling UJJ.its

~ w OX)

~

w

U

UJ o

cj

C if C CP CR C

cj

26 CONFIDENTIAL

7

De liption Converter (ele tronic) Cover

Cord

Case

D tector. (non-electronic)

(ee V)

D namorm- nit Filters

Generator ( ee PU) oniometer

Headsets, Han d Set s Head & Chest ets Indicator

.Junction., Jack & Terrninal Boxe

R eyers , Coders R.: Inter-

rupters

Loudspeaker Microphone

Modulator

Maintenance Kit Meteorological apparaClI Mountings MisceUa11eous

Oscillator

Pigeon articles Photo!:rraphic articles Power pack

Power Units and Motors Radio Receiver Recorder

Relay Assembly

Radio Frequency nit

Radio .frequen y cables )

transmission lines and

wa e guides.

Reel ssembly

Re eiver & Transmitter Shelter

Switching 5S mbl Switchboard Synchronizer Radio Transm:i tter

elephone Apparatus Timing Device

elegraph pparatu Tool Kit

Tunina nit

Test & ..... r ~

, lV.t.easunna Apparani

Tel typewriter & Wire Facimile ppararus

:omponent Indicator U

pIng

NEW RADAR NAVIGATIONAL COURSE

A new lecture course 017 Radar as an aid to , aoigniion has been initiated at' the Pacific Fleet Radar Center Oahu T.H. to better acquoiru ship s nauigatots with the [undamental of radar pe1"/ormance and scope interpTetation. It is believed tha: a thorough understanding of these principles will enable Iwvigators to use radar more intelligentl'>' as an. aid to 'navigation.

The follou}ing sulijects are covered in the two-hour course conducted "egularly each T'uesclay at ternoo 11 at 1'3 j 5 :

Radar lhem-y propaga,lion and meteorological effects are discussed just to the exten! necessary for an understanding of radar performance. Scope interpretation, the s conti subject covered includes a short discussion of f'eflecting surfaces in general plus a series of diagrams showing PPI pictures which may be exjJectecl from beaches, hills, mountains lakes, and. similar porti01is of land mass. Finally, specific methods of using radar iniormalion t01" obtaining a navigational fix are discussed at len.gth and evaluated. Loran (Lonf!, Range avigation) is coveted. bn:efly.

DY F G o

I

G nions, connectors, plug, sockets, etc, designed for ramo frequencie .

ehicles

VS Vi ual Signalling 'quiprnent

Let's See 110W this works. What is the RT-22/ PX-I? From the ab ve table we find that "RT" denote "receiver and transmitter." Thus the component we are checking is the transrnitter-recei er lfor an airborne radar I.F.F. equipment. The an-

o tenna coupling unit for the same equipment is known as the C -13/ PX-l.

And that' the whole tory. A little practice and ~lfhat seems like a long tring ot letter. and num.1' . unfolds itself into a pretty complete story of ~at the equipment is. If all thi appeals to yon, maybe a rose by some other name would actual! smell sweeter. How about renaming the rose "AN /GVW"-a visual type remote control for <Yenera] ground use. lot of ros are used that way.

A.lJSW'W 10 Qui: 'm page 26:

Co) Airborne rtuiio transmitting and receiving e.(jujjJIIUJI1I. Dif-

fers from tile ,,IN / ,lilC-<j ilt 1)ower IIppl),.

(b Airborne radio nauigotio« IlcJu,iP'mI!!Jt.

(c) hipboard radar transmiuer.

(d) Train,' for ai1'/JOmll radio navigation eqllij)lTlenl,

(e) An air traasportable milia trnnsmiuer-:n modified oersion of th« AN/CRT-i.

m Airborne radar 1.F,F.

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~

co JTI ;:t:I

.,i.C." DISTRIBUTION 1f.4VY REQUESTS

Requests for back issues and subsequent i sues of "C.I.C." should be addressed;

The Chief of aval Operations, Editor of "C.I .. Washington 25. D. C.

ARMY REQUESTS

U. . Arm commands and activities desiring to issues of 'C.I.C." should direct their rets to:

djutant eneral's Office, Operations Branch,

Room 2B939, Pentagon Building, \"'ashingtofi, 25. D. C.

_' T HIS

PUBLICATION

I 5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 27

£ +
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a.:: LJ.J
UJ CD
CO .2
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LLI o
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:lap radio

trickery

*

*'

* * * *.* * * * * * * * * * * ~ *. ~ ~

• , I. ...... -1' -r ...

Experience has showJ.l that enemy attempts to cause ~e]ay and confusion on Allied circuits are most Iikely to occur under the following circum. stances:

r. Whe~ circuit discipline i po rand op ratinz . procedure IS careless or inaccurate. Unofficial can. versat1o~ between operators encourages and aids enemy mterference.

2. When Lnexperienced, un killed, or panicky .operators are manning circuits.

.. 3· _'When ?ur op~rator5 have unusual peculiarrues ill sending which are easily imitated.

4· 'When stations have indicated that hizh pre.'

cedenc€ traffic i awai ring transmi sion, I::>

5: When there is a large or varying number of stations on the circuit.

CONFIDENTIAL

* * * * * *

Enemy attempts to disrupt communication in the Pacific during 1944 have been numerous J but "" very successful. Enemy knowledg: 0: 1J.l~led procedure, prosigns, and operating szgnals h(LS improved, however, and our ope?', ators must be alert for what may be more skillful attempts in I945.

* *****************It

6. 'When tr.affic. i confused. Enemy operators may attempt to heighten any on fusion evident on a radio eircuit caused by garbled messages, mis- \ und rstandings, or arguments,

7· When call signs are confused .

. 8. W~en communication is difficult due to weak 51.goals: mter£erence, atinospherirs, or off-frequency operation.

9· . When stations are changing from day to night or nizht to day frequency, and the signal is weak.

10. 'When combat is imminent or' in

.. progress,

especially during critical stages.

. 11. ''''hen the amount of plain language is relz tlvely large. Procedure transmissions are pl aiL I language.

W THE JAP TRIES TO OUR RADIO

Attempts to interfere usually take one of the foTIowing form :

I. Answering call-ups and accepting traffic. Submarines are especially subject to this form of interference because of the ighting and contact reports which they sometimes originate and because their remoteness makes their transmissions difficult for Allied rations to hear. Moreo er, they' are espe· dally accessible for attack if they can be kept transmitting long enough.

In one instance in which a message was delivered to the enemy, an unknown station u ing VI-IC's call answered a submarine and told the submarine to go ahead. The VHC operator wa

alert, however. He ucceeded in copying the dis, teh and relaying it to VIXO. The Jap meanwhile ipted for it and never knew he bad failed. to

pre ent delivery. The VHC operatqr saved time and escaped possible jamming because he wisely refrained from challenging or receipting.

2. Receipting for dispatches which no Allied station has been able to copy completely and cor.eetly. An alert operator can frequently dis~nguish one station from another by its tone or keying, and, in case of doubt, will demand authentication. When asked to authenticate, however, an enemy station may avoid the challenge by calling another station and pretending to have highprecedence traffic for that station.

Early in the year an enemy station. using unauthorized procedure. posed as the holder of a pOTary call sign and receipted for a dispatch, en the transmitting station demanded authenti-

arion, the Jap came back with a QMA-K "Authenticate yourself!' The operator authenticated. The bogus station answered with C C CAR and immediately started calling another station with an OP.

The operator was alert. In tead of passing off the incident as poor procedure, he persisted until he raised the holder of the temporary call sign and found that this station did not have the dispatch.

3. Offering traffic 'which will not break. he

primary purpose of this method is to waste time and delay aenuine traffic of great urgency. t pi. cal instance i that of an enemy station which posed as a submarine with an urgent dispatch. The message wa copied by several shore radio sta-

aions, but would not break and was quickly rec~gnized as an impostor because oE peculiarities in the text.

*

-x.

*
70:-
*
-)(-
*
* •

Lifting a message, including authenticators, from one circuit and introducing it on another with a different heading, or piecing parts of several mes acres together simply to waste time and create confu ion is another wa of delaying traffic about to be transmitted if the enemy can get attencion.

If the operator an be induced to waste time copying such a dispatch and coding boards will tTy to decrypt it, the enemy has accomplished a large part of his purpose. 1£ such a dispatch produces service messages, the enemy is no doubt well arisfied with his efforts.

Deceptionists have shown themselves in some instances able to alter their note, "list," and frequency to resemble that of the station they are imitating. In one case, the only difference between the enemy signal and that of the Allied station was that the enemy signal was too strong to be plausible.

In one instance a J ap operator used a hand key when Army operators were using a hand key. When they switched to a "bug," so did the jap.

4. Calling up and pretending to have important traffic is used to create confusion. his' has sometimes succeeded temporarily in that a dozen shore stations will answer and 'tell the enemy to go ahead with his transmission. The enemy will pretend not to hear and will call repeatedly. The re ulting mix-up is quite effective, Ear enemy purposes. in delaying authentic traffic.

Sometimes an enemy station which hears an Allied tall-up of low signal strength and discovers that an 0 or OP is about to be transmitted, will cut in with a more powerful signal, pretending to have an 0 or OP also. Unless the Allied operator is alert, he may accept the enemy dispatch first be· cause it is easier to copy.

5. Fake ighting reports and distress mes ages.

In one instance, a false plain-language sighting report was used in an elIor to divert an attack group from a target previously reported by radio.

In another instance an enemy su bmarine sen t a message pretending to come from a merchant ship and reporting that a submarine bad been sizhted. This was later followed by an SOS. The merchant ship was sighted undamaged the next clay by planes. Her captain wben he arrived in port, stated that no sub had been ighted and that no distress message had been sent.

6. False orders and instructions. Thus far these have usually. been voice messages ill good English. They were reported to be common on motortorpedo boat frequencies and certain aircraft cir-

o

CONFIDENTIAL 29



30

uits arl ill the year. The enem would begin b ountermandin order or giving cancellations and conflicting order . oice messages had to be used sparingly and other methods substituted , bile this type of effort was at its height.

In one instance an enemy operator entered the circuit with "Hello Bob. this is Able. How do you receive me?" Fortunately, there was no pilot named Bob on patrol that night or he mizht have ignored the fact that unauthorized procedure wa used and answered the transmission.

ne common form of oice radio interference is to hurl obscene language at our operator in order to induce them to break radio silence and reply.

7· Jamming important transmissions. This is a last resort when more skillful attempts to obstru c communications fail. Enemy stations are apt to watch for dispatche of 'hizh pre edence or other traffic believed to be of immediate importance and attempt to garble and delay such traffic by jammmg.

Occasionally chi ucceeds, but any difference in tone between the interfering signal and the signal being copied makes it possible for a skillful operator to copy a message accurately in spite of considerable interference. Often the comparative remoteness of the enemy station defeats its efforts to jam U.S. transmis ions.

If communication cannot be carried on throuzh jamming, and another frequency is used, transmi - sian should continue on the original frequency in order to discourage the jammer and deny him the knowledge that the message is being transmitted on a different frequency. An operator should be alert for a prearranged chance of freq uency and not wait to be told by means of a QSY. Even thonzh encrypted. a QSY may be meaningful to the enemy because relativel few operating siznal are en rypted,

ometimes random noise is used for jamming

. ::.

purposes. The enem wants ar operator to blame

the re eiver he i using and shift to another 01" wa te time attempting to lind the cause of the noise in his own set. It is important to distinguish unintentional interference from that which is intentional.

WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT

Remedies for enemy attempts CO delay or 'onfuse our communications rna' b summarized a follows:

CON FI [) EN riAL

1. void indicating the number and precedence of messages awaiting tran mission whene er pOf ible.

2. Obser e L1 piciou transmis ions cl sely. Odd bits of pro edure and a tendency to overdo any method the enemy starts out to use will 50011 betray most attempts at deception. It is better. howe er, to accept a bogus dispat h occasionally than to

ndanger a ship b a lengthy argument about authentication or by refu al to accept a di patch whi h may be genuine and of great urgen .

3· Alert watch standing will help to defeat attempts at interference. ometimes se eral call-ups ~re necessa~'Y before a go-ahead is received. Delay 111 answering a call-up encourages deception. whether the delay is caused by atmospheric conditions or inattention on the pan of an operator.

Instances have been reported in which a ubmarine at.temp~ng to transmit a dispatch re eived two answers to 1(S all-ups and, when transmission was completed. two receipts. Inasmuch as one wa genuine it was 110t ne eary to challenge. Delay and possible jamming were thus avoided.

'1· By far the best defense is procedure and discipline so perfect that any attempt by the enemy to use Allied procedure will immediately arouse suspicion. Insist on circuit discipline. correct procedure and skillful operating. Practice makes perfect.

Even minor violation of radio securit and .radio procedure are dangerous because they give the enemy. information he must ha: e before be can 'interfere with any hope oE success. Avoid indi~c~iminate sending of V's and other te t transrrussions.

R' . henri b· •

5· eqUlre aut enncanon w .enever there is

reason for suspicion. If, in addition to ircuit discipline and correct procedure. authentication is demanded or voluntarily offered whenever there is

lightest zround for uspicion particularl in receipting for messages enemy attempts will n ver be more uccessful than they have been thus far.

Plain language in voice or Morse code i more tLbj~ct to deceptive attempts than encrypted material. Authentication is therefore particularly important in such cases.

It must be remembered that the en.emy may hit upon a correct authenticator by ac iden once in a while and tha Ilied tations sometimes rnak mistakes. In one instance an unknown station re-

ponded with an auth nti ator so prompt] that bona fide authentication could not have taken place's Inasmuch as attempts at deception always la k plau-

HIS

PUBLICATION

IS CONFIDENTIAL

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

transmission can frequently be determined in this manner. (The next step is to destroy the enemy station-if it prove sufficiently troublesome to 'ustify the effort required.)

If enemy efforts to disrupt communication are to be a un uccessful in 1945 as the have been in 1944, every precaution must be taken. Irnpro ement in circuit discipline correct pr cedure alertness in watch standing, and accuracy in authentication must keep pace with improvement in deceptive skill 011 the part of the enemy.

Enemy obstructionists are apt to become discouraged and give up when they discover that their efforts ar un ucces Iul. It is therefore especially rmportan for every perator t do his utmo t to make certain that fu ure attempts are onsist ntly unsuccessful.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

. .

RAD 01 E (Revised)

RAD TWO (Revised) RAD THREE

RAD FOUR

Capabilities and Limitations of Radar I - January I94 .

Tactical Uses of Airborne Rada:

I5 February '9..f'j· .

Radar Operators Manual

Mailed IO 1 ouembe« I944.

The Air PloUing Manttal

Mailed 11 ouember I9..f-4·

'RAD FI E The uriace Pleuing ![{I;lIual 20 November I944·

RA D SI T The CI Mnmual

20 Decem be« 194-1·

CO N FI DENT IAL

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sibility in one or more important respects. it pays to be suspicious and to watch Eor irregularities.

G. e perating ignals and prosigns sparingly.

__ 0 edure me sage and service messages provide data of value t the enemy and facilitate interference.

.,. Keep accurate 100"s. These are u eful in studying" the methods of the enem as .~. en a in analyzing our own mistakes and determininz how to a void them in the future ..

e 8. Change method of communication. from voice to W or visual, if necessary. hut conceal by en ryption or prearrangement the method to which a hift is beinz made.

9. Lo ate the ur e of deception by means of directi n finder. The authenti ity of a doubtful

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indispensable RA D guides.

A gmup of ,)11 blicaiions=the Rad eries=preImrecl by represeuuuiues at the Fleet ~omt11(mcl are being published asid. issued by the Head q lIaTteis of the Conimander in Chief United .iates

Flee t. T hese 1mb li catio lIS will affo1'd S I (Ut dard. nomenclature arul a common source at ill/ormalion. asui directiou on the inle1"1"claled subjects 0/ GIG> plotting, aud the tocti til aspects of radar. The publications comprising the Rad series M'e . leel below together tuith. an estimated beginning .te of distribution: They will be mail d direct to all activities concerned,

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The preceding issue of "C.TC." carried a general article on Loran in which several unique uses of the equipment tuere mentioned. Because of the impo1·tallCe of these techniques in navigating foy landfall and in searching a designated area at Sea, more details are given here.

The Loran system of navigation can do more than supply a knowledg-e of position. It has two features which make it pos ible to use some new navigational procedures which are not possible by previous navigational methods and which are highly advantageous in certain situations.

One of the two features is that accurate knowledge of position is available continuously-fram minute to minute-which is something new. Previous method have determined po ition accurately e ery few hours-at the be tand used dead reckoning in between. It is hardly practicable to take celestial sights continuously, even if possible to do so.

The second feature is that position knowledge is delivered in the form of lines of position which have definite unchanging location on the earth's surface, and he receiving equipment-if set for any particular line and left untouched-shows insta'Otly by visual inspection whether the ship is on

try these loran methods

FIND THAT !iUBNIARlNE. This patrol pla,'fle, when d,i'recled to search for an enemy sub harlUSing shipping of] the COMt, uiilizes Loran to maintl1tn a geographical' perfect search. Although this. not an actual chaTt, it shows how Lon;m. may be I~ti/i~ed for searching. Ea.rt·West Loran lines might be used, bllt thry are not shown in ~his illLutl·atioll,

DARK NIGHT - HEAVY FOG.

Shown here is all excellent: example of Ille u.se 0/ LOTan for making 14ndfallwlien visibility b bad. With 01' without the assistano« of radar, the ship may steam safely into port. The diagonal lines indicate some of tile lines of position. which are auailable on a Loran chnT!'

line, or to right or left of it. Therefore the ship be steered along a Loran line of position by watching the Lorin receiver, a one ordinarily steers by compass.

approaching the coast merely na igates, well off

.shore, so as to reach that particular line of position, as read on the Loran re eiver. Having .eached that line, the Loran receiver is allowed to remain on the etting for that line, and the ship is steered so that the Loran receiver continuousl corresponds to that setting. This is very simple in practice. The two "pips" are merely kept Iined up on the scope. If the ship veers right, one pip will move one way, and if the ship eers left, the pip will move th other way. Therefore the ship is maintained on a course which is the charted Loran line of position and eventually reaches the desired destination. The accuracy of the maintenance of COlU e is that of the Loran ystem=which, when close to a coast on which stations are 1 cated, i a very few hundred yards. It is therefore' easy to "hit on the no e" any local navigational aids uch as seaward channel buoys, airfield beacons, etc.

HOMING WITH LORAN

Some useful practical applications or these features are now in u e by ships and aircraft equipped with Loran. ne is making a landfall and "homing" to a harbor. sing it, hip have been able to reach harbor channels at full speed, with certainty, even when position fixes by other methods have been impossible for as long as three day while approaching tbecoast.

Each pot on the coast, each harbor, each buoy, each airfield, has some Loran line of position running through it. The particular line corresponding to any desired de tination is determined

the oran chart. The ship or aircraft

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34 LORAN SEARCHES ARE GEOGRAPHICALLY EXACT

second new possibility which has great convenience and at the same time adds materially to navigational efficiency, is in connection 'with search and patrolof designated areas. If Loran service is available throughout the area, there wm be Loran Jines of position crossing it. Search or patrol can then be conducted by entering a Loran line which most nearly forms one boundary of the area, at a point near the corner of the area. hen the line is followed to an adjacent corner l)y "Loran steering." At this point, course is cbanged goO and followed to another Loran line which is separated from the first one by a distance equal to the area sweep spacing desired, Then the new Ilne is traversed by "Loran steering," his "lawn-mower" procedure is Ioilowed until the whole area bas been covered.

'When other navigational aids are present in the area, such as radio Signals suitable for direction finding, they may becombined with Loran in various ways. A Loran fix will of course determine end of run points if LOTan service from two pairs of stations is available :in the area, But if oran service in the particular area happens to be available from only one pair, thus giving only one set of position lines without other crossing Jines, combination with any other available navigational aid can be utilized .. Even when position fixes are possible by Loran alone, it may sometimes be more convenient to utilize a combination method. In any event, covering the area thoroughly and efficiently becomes a matter of simple coordination between helmsman and the instrument readings irrvolved. For example, the following method has been reported by the Commancli:ng Officer of Blimp Squadron Eleven:

"In conducting a box search at night or in low visibility, the following procedure of using Lor equipment bas proved to be very simple and effe - rive. Set up the Loran receiver reading conespending to the Loran line that goes through the center of the area to be searched. Select a radio station that is lying as nearly as possible all a line running through the center of the box-search area and perpendicular to the oran Iine selected. Determine in advance what the loop bearing should be at line selected. Determine in advance what rhe loop bearing should be at each corner of the area and the difference in the Loran reading from the center Loran line to the Loran line passing through each comer. With this set up, by observing the position of the slave signal with relation to the master signal, and by taking a loop bearing of the radio station selected, the navigation becomes so simplified that the search can be conducted from

the rudderman's position." f

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NEW USES OF LORAN SHOULD BE REPORTED

Commanding' officers are invited to send in more information on their use of this new and-sprophetically-re. voludonary sys~tem of navtgatio. n whict- , one day may relegate sextants to the museum an~ make "sta r shooting" a Iorgonen techni q ue,

Address such information to the Chief of Naval Operations, Editor of "C.I.C." This request does not affect any standing instructions relative to submission of operating reports to cognizant Bureaus.

Establishments giving Loran training we1'e listed. 011 page .~ of the 25 October "G.l.C." ilddencla:

Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, conducts opet"aliol'la training in Loran, and the Pacific Fleet Radar Ccnier fn'ov£des Loran maintenance training.

THIS

PUBLICATION

CON F-IDENTIAl

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IS CONFIDENTIA.L

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PPJ oiewof -Southern France'

This photograph of the PPI. of the forward ~G radar was taken aboard the U.S.S. Texas while the ship was lying to during the afternoon of D Da y A llgl'lst I 5, 1944 at the Invasion of Sou them France.

The ship was approximately due ~ast of the ... '!.",.,,.,,,,_'- to the Bay of St. Tropez, Provence. France

with the SG indicator set at the 15.000 yard sweep and the gain cut down to a somewhat minimum value. The filter on the indicator was removed and all other lighting on the equipment either covered or turned down to zero brilliance. The compartment in which the equipment is located was completely darkened.

A 4 x 5 Speed Graphic type .caraera was used with an f:3.5 stop. The type of film used was a 200 exposure Index (Tri X Pan). The camera was located approximately 30 inches from the P.P.I. screen and 12 second exposure used. The latter was limed by using the greatest rotating speed of the antenna which is quite nearly one revolution every 3 seconds. The shutter of the camera was

AP.pened " ... hile the ... ante. nna was rotat~ng and closed -at the end of four complete revolutions.

The e xplana tory sketch (A) shows an outline of

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the shore as it was seen 'on the P.P.1. picture (8) and also an actual trace (C) made of the same shore li.ne Irom a chart. Note the close similarity. The masses of Iandingcraft at the assault beaches are also noted on the sketch.

Since the visibility was so very poor on the morning of D Day, (15 August 1944) the ship's position and track both for navigation and gunnery PUTposes were obtained solely through use of the SG Radar equipment, No land marks whatsoever were visible during the .l1ringand fot the greater part of the forenoon.

CONFIDENTIAL

NA TTC, (Ad anc d A iation Radi Mate-

_ riel) ard Island, orpus Christi, Texa .

• L COl AND PRELIMIN RY TRAIN- 1NG: Radio technician trainees are selected for training on the basis of q nalifying scores on the General Classification, Arithmetical Reasoning, and Electrical Knowledge tests. In addition, they must pass the Radio Technician Selection Test (Nav Pers 16578). Since the aining courses for radio technicians are lengthy, difficult, and r quire specialized aptitude, the candidates are selected for their mechanical and scholastic ability. High

chool training with emphasis en mathematics, physics, and mechanics is highly desired. Experience in the amateur or commercial radio field is helpful. In aeneral, trainees who have mechanical and electrical ap-

titude are sought.

Preparatory training for the abo e four advanced schools includes a four-week pre-radio materiel course given at the following schools:

Theodore Herzl School, Wright Juniol' College, Michigan City aval Reserve Armory, and Hugh Manley High. all under NTSch (Radio Chicago). Pre-radio materiel training is followed by a twelve-week course in elementary electricity and radio materiel at one of the following EE and RM Schools:

Bliss Electrical School; Grove City College, 190

tate Street, Chicago; Oklahoma A & M; Texas A & M College; University of Hou ton; College of the Ozark; (NTS) Gulfport; 01' (JT ch) Del Monte.

the basic

training program for radar and C.I. C. personnel

before shakedown cru is es , as well as to .indicare where refresher training may be obtained in Mainland areas, this article will answer broadly the que tions of how radar and IC men and officers are s Ie ted and where they are given ba ic training.

INING: Intensive advanced radio materiel training is given at the above four advanced radio materiel schools on Navy gear including radio receivers and transmitters, radar, sonar, Loran. DF equipment, etc. The curriculum is twenty- igllt weeks in length and includes practical work on pertinent typ of electronic circuit. cir uit theory. r dio wave and antenna theory, trouble shooting , rice on actual navy' equipments .M .• and Loran.

With the development and widespread application of radar in the avy there arose a need for a program [0 train radar and eIC personnel at a

peed to match the almo t taggering expansion in the materi 1 field. To accomplish this, a training program was inaugurated which would divide the r spon ibility and load as efficiently as possible between the Bureau of Personnel and the Fleet Operational Training ommands, The entire prograIll profited from the experience of the Pacific ~leet Radar Center which pioneered in the field

of radar traininz and has served as a model for many .fainland training Eaciliti s. (For detailed description of "Pacific FIe t Radar Center training program see September 1944" .1..").

o give ommanding Officer a picture of the traininz their CIC and radar personnel have had

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36 BUREAU OF PE'RSONNEL SCHOOLS RADIO TECHNICIAN TRAINING:

NTS (Advanced Radio Materiel) NRL. nacostia, D. C.

1 TS (Advan ed Radio Materiel) 1'.1., an Francisco, ali£ornia.

ITS (Advanced Radio Materiel) Navy Pier hicago, Illinois.

CON F!DENTJAL

o PUT: Graduates are detailed from Advanced Radio Mat riel Scho 1 to new on truetion es el , Advanced Base nits, Spe ial Projects, and fleet ervice forces.

RADAR OPERATOR TRA.lNING:

(Rad Oprs) Point Lorna, Sail Diego, Cal. (Rad Oprs) Fort La nderdale , Florida (Rad pr) OB, orfolk irginia

SELECTION: Radar operator trainees are relec ed from Recruit Training Centers on the basis of qualifying cores on the General Classification, Clerical Ability, Reading, and Arithmetical Reasoning tests. These trainees should be at least 20 years of azeand should reflect personality characteristics of alertness, patience, and calmness under stress.

A special battery of selection tests for Radarmen is presently being constructed, and studied by the Bureau of Na al Personnel in conjunction with the Appli d Psychology Panel of DRC.

TRAI ING: Radar operator training is given at the above schools. the course covering a period of three six-day weeks. The first week is general instruction for all students, covering lectures on principles of radan telephone communications, demonstration and orientation of the student with regard to CIC. Following the first week of training, the group is divided in rela ion to existing needs and is trained in specific equipments with the attendant plotting as follows: group l-SC/SK, SG, Air Plot> Surface Plot (DRT)' group 2- SA;SL> Air Plot, Surface Plot (DRT); group 3- SF, SO, SL, Surface Plot (Maneuvering Board).

Graduates are detailed (Tom the above, schools either to pre-commissioning pools to await eIC team training or for further assignment to Fleet units by Service Forces.

Fire c ntrol radar operators are trained at NTS, Ft. Lauderdale. Florida. This com e of training is presentl undergoing a revision, pointed t ward a general introduction to the "fire control problem. Followed by a . hort specialized course in a limited number of fire control radar sets.

Training for operators in the operation of 8M/SP radar is given to group 1 graduate of the above schools. Fifteen to twenty graduates are being trained on M gear at NRTS, S. Simons, Georgia. each month, and similar training on SP equipment is s heduled to be ziven at Pt. Lama beginning 1 Dec. 1944. For ships having SM or SP gear. t am training' for radarmen accompanied

CONFIDENT1AL

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by a eIe officer or officers is available at Beavertail, R. 1. ( M) and at CIC TC, Brigantine, N. J. (SM). SP gear for similar officer and radarmen training is a ailable at CICT ,San Iemente, California.

OU P T: G aduates of radar operator schools are detailed in at ordance witb the type of training recei ed, to IC group training facilities via Na al Traininz Station pre-commissioning p ] and thence to new construction. Graduates for operating hips are detailed via Set ice Forces. SP /S f trained graduates, from NR TS, St. Simons- and Pt.

oma are detailed to hips having such gear by the Bureau of Na al Personnel via pre-commissioning pools or Service Forces.

RADIO SPECIALIST OFFICER TRAINING; TS (Radar), M.I.T., Cambridge, Ma s.

NTS (Pre-radar), Harvard, Cambridge, Mass.

TS (Pre-radar) Princeton, Princeton, N. J.

NTS (Pre-radar) Bowdoin. Brunswick, 'Ie.

• LECTION: Radio Specialist trainees are selected on the basis of a personal interview and specialized tests including the Officer Classification, General Physics and General Mathematics Tests.

t present au] those under 35 and qualified Ear sea duty are considered as candidates. Trainee should have degrees in ele trical engineering or physics with emphasis on the application of electricity. Other engineering degrees are acceptable if they include any electrical engineering' courses. Mathematics through calculus and one year of college physics are required. Work experience or hobbies involving knowledge of radio and electricity are desirable. Candidates must be studious mature, and interested in technical training. Ability to apply themselves to intensive technical training is essential.

Radio specialist trainees from the fleet in addition to the foregoing qualifications must have the recommendation of their Commandinz Officer.

TRAINl G: Pre-radar training is given in a four-month course at Bowdoin, Princeton, and Harvard. The pre-radar curriculum covers a review of mathematics, de irricity, magnetism, direct and alternating currents, circuit elements, transients, networks, transmi sion lines, electron tubes, cathode ray oscilloscopes, radio receivers and transmitters, etc. .. pon completion of pre-radar training, officers are sent to M .. I.T. for four months of practical. intensive materiel training QD Navy ship.

38 CONFIDENTIAL

borne and airborne ear inc1udin radio. radar. onar, DF. M, etc.

o TP T: Shipborne Radio Speciali r 01£ er graduates are detailed directly to new construction and to Fleet pool b the Bureau of Javal Pel'S nnel, Aviation Radio Specialists are detailed by 0p-.32 to quadrons.

RADAR OFFICER (CIC WATCH OFFICER) TRAINING:

TS ( actical Radar), Holly-wood, Fh:lrida

SEL ~CTION: Radar (ClC) officer trainee are selected from -indoccrination, midshipmen schools, and sh re establishments on the basi of a personal interview and specialized tests, including Officer Classification test and the CI Aptitude test battery. Candidates lOU t be physically qualified for

ea duty and be preferably between the ages olll and 33. A college record of "B" or better is d~ .. able and civilian experience which has developed ability to make decisions quickly and to talk flu-

ently is helpful. Candidates from ccupational fields requiring slow methodical thinklnz are not desired. Candidates should show ability in piloting as indicated from their course in navigation, Personal haracteri tics should reflect mature judgment, ability to get along with others, self confidence, and re oureefulness. Candidates wi.th the rank of Ensign and Lieutenant (jg) are preferred.

Radar r CIC watch officer trainees from Fleet sources are accepted o-n the basis of sea experience and rec mmendation by their Coromandinr; Officer. Tbey are assigned for training by F Operational Training Commands.

TRAINING; Basic training in the operation 01 l:iilar and I. i gi en at [he above school. Th~ .r e covet's a period of eight week ~nd .the urnculum includ training in CIC organlzatlOll, radar theory, c0l111nunications. navigation, gunnery ~nd tacti '. The course are 0 arrano-ed that during the first Four we ks the srudent is tauzht the hmdamentals of theory and technique De essary to operate a CI . During the second half of the cou~'se, half of ea h day i spen in the IC's working problems. while lectures o? advanced eiC work and tactics occupy the remainder of the day. In all courses f instruction, emphasis is placed 011 "do-

ing.'

In addition to the above, TS (TR) 9ffer~ a

condensed four-week course in radar opera non and eIC £01" sea e perienced officers who are detailed from and returned to 0 Lant and The same mrri ulum is used fOI the ..-~~~ .. ith course but the material is presented in a condensed forrn. For the abc ve-average officer

with a backgTOLmd of sea duty, this condensa.tioll pro es no ob [,.1. le. Due to the hOTten~d u~e however, which limits the amount of practical lC operation that can be done, -most 0~e-~uondl_ trainees need a period of practical application ol

fundan entals learned at T (TR) before the are qualified as CfC watch officers.

TPUT; he majority of graduaLes axe detailed from 1 S ( R) ia new constrlJctio~ ~~'ecommissioning pools to CIC team traininz faClhues and thence to new construction BB, Cr\., CB CL DD, DE, M, DM ,PF, RA, APA, and APD'. A large portion of each clas is. detailed, direct to

Pac pool. ShOTt course trainees are returned their ordering comm'll1d.

INTERCEPT OFFICER TRAINING:

NRTS t. irnons Island, eorgia

SELECT! ; Inter .ept 081 er trainee are se-

leered 00 the basis oE personal interview and. the

ffi er '1a ificau n test. hey must be qualified

for sea duty and preferably between the ages of 22 and 33. Candidates should exhi?it m~ture behavior and judgment ability to think quickly a~d a urately, "If confidence ability to get alO1~g With others, resour efulne , and a preference for the training and dut . Th should present ac .eptable colleze re ords a well as acceptable ratings on office~-like qualifications b their pre ent Co Illmanding Officers. For this training, officers oE. the ranks oE Ensign and ieutenant (lg) are de~rutel preferred.

TRAlNING: Training for officers in the Fundamentals of aircraft interception by fighter direction i aiven at the above school. he COUl' e covers a ~eriod of twelve weeks and the cunicul?ID include traininz in CIe ubject such as plotring (air and surface), navigation (~il' ~d. sur~ce),

ommunications, radar theory, aircraft identi fica-

tion, tactics, gunnery, 'weather, fighter direction techniqn and fighter dire lion problem. Synthetic intercept problems precede actuals but the : zreat tres is on dire ting actual arr raft.

e In addition to the above, St. Simons offers a familiarization course to ships officers who are detailed by COTC ant. Refresher training. of an informal nature Ior offi ers from tiL H [IS also given at NRTS.

OUTP larg portion of NR S graduates

are a sizned to Carrier types, BB CA, C , CB, GC. Q, VD, AVP. and RAGC's via pre- ~~nmissioning details and CIC team training facilities

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or via CinCPac pool . Other assignments for these officers largely or purposes of further training in-

lucie: JOTC, Jack enville, Mobile Radar Intercept Training nits under Com 'airWestCoast and CornAll-ant, and ight Fighter training units under ComFairQ uonset and Naval Air Opera. tional raining Command.

Graduates of the one-month ships officer course axe returned to CO CLant for assignment. Destroyer officers for new constructio going to the Pacific Fleet are retained in the course at JRTS until qualified a Intercept Officers.

Pacific Fleet Radar Center due to the pre ent traininz load at TS (TR) Hollywood, Flor' F01' Radio Specialist Officers a two-month refre ~ __ r course which starts the 1St and 15th of every month has been initiated at M.LT. covering countermeasures. gear that has been developed since the gradu. arion. of those officers being returned for refresher training, and radar equipment pertinent to future a signment. Aviation specialist officers may also receive refresher materiel training in special airborne radar at N TTC, Ward Island, Corpus Christi, Texas,

NAVY YARD TRAINING:

Informal training is available at many avy

Yards for both radi technicians and radar operators. Such training is usually under the cognizance of the RMO and leans heavily in the direction of materiel training. For radar operators, training is usually designed to teach strikers the various controls and how to turn the gear on and off.

REFRESHER TRAINING:

recent Com inCh directive initia ed a rotation plan for IC and Radio pecialist Officers which includes refre her training at basic schools before reassignment,

As indicated above, refresher training for fighter direction officer personnel has been gOIDO- on for some time at RTS, St. Simons, Georzia. The length of refresher training at NR T is four, six Or eight weeks at the discretion of the school' Commanding Officer, depending on the experience and capability ",0 the rud nt offi er. Refresher training for eIe watch officers is being given at

40 CONFIDENTIAL

Paragraph ten (10) of Bureau of Naval Personnel restricted letter Pers-6361-TNB-l of 22 September 1944 outlines the policy for the refresher training of radio technician rates and radarman rates, starting I January 1944. It is pointed out that refresher courses are intended to provide experienced radio technicians for new construe . vessels and to give further instruction on n equipment to former' graduates of Radio Materiel

chools. Only previous graduates of NTSch (Radio !fateriel) RLJ' ashington, D. C. and NTSch (Radio Materiel) Treasure Island, San Francisco, California are eligible. The polic for giving initial formal radio materiel training for

elected fleet experienced ra es is also outlined in the reference letter .

There is at present a limited amount of refresher training for radio technicians ziven at NR and

reasure Island. Quotas for fleet personnel are limited at both schools and are granted if vacancies and facilitie permit. Special care should be taken in selecting refre her trainees to in ure that they possess the required basic tech 1 qualifications.

FLEET OPERATIONAL TRAINING COMMANDS -

nee through th Bureau of Personnel hools it become the responsibilit of the ~lee~ ~peradonal Training Commands to mold mdlvlduall . trained personnel into functional compOl~enrs which, when assembled, become the cre.w of the ship readying for shakedo,,:r:Jl and operation. T!le goal toward which the baslc. ra~ar an~ CIC tra~n. jng prooTam under BuJ_'er~ ~ aimed, 1 to Furnish competently trained individual who can. be formed into a GIC team which can tben b trained a a unit befor reporting to its ship.

Radar and CIC training under COTCLant and COTCPac .i given in the pre-commissioning details the CIC team training facilities, training vessels and durinz the shakedown cruise by underwa advisers.

Pre-commissioning details are gi en 'primary" "preliminar " CIC and radar ~~aining ~or those

additional per onnel who wil] be a signed to radar or CIC dut aboard ship but who for some reason, have not been through BoPer sch 015. Su I training also erves to keep in a practiced CODdition, graduates of Buf'ers sch ols "\\I'll? are marking time until assigned to ~ .sluR· _Under CO CLam, preliminary CI traimna l .. gl~en at AI' , Newport. for large s.rups and auxiliaries, at

~S lorfolk for DD and D personnel and at NTC Miami for Fleet Replacement personnel. Pre- ommissioning training in radar and CI under COTCPa is pre ently concerned to a large extent with U1 APA buildinz program and is beina given at SCTC. San Pedro; OTS 'Trea ure Isl~d; and PA pre·commissionin~ School, Seattle, Personnel from smalJ craft and rru icellaneous aux-

.aries. are also trained. at San Pedro as are person"'el from DD's and CL's at OTS. Treasure Island.

"Cl Team raining Centers" for CIC teams going to new con truction .vessels are .established on the East Cal at Frontier Bas , LIttle Creek, Va .. and at the Brirrantine Hotel, Brigantine. N. J-

rider COTCPa the e are located at N S an lernente Island. California. AAF Astoria Oregon and NA , 'Vhidbe . Is1a~d, 'i ashington '.

'r CICCT Vrontier Base, LIttle Creek a.,lS the assembly point for aLl'ast eo~st comb.atant type construction CIe teams. Training at Little Creek _. is given in onjunction with .n:ainin.g on the USCGG MAYFLO' R nperatmg dally out of, Little reek. Training at Brigantine U uall fol-

l ws that at Little Creek and is pe ialized toward

" probl ms. CI teams for auxiliarie are trained

• lTS Newport. and 00 an auxiliary training

b ip operating dailv out of ewport,

In addition (0 a hare CI team training, und~re

wa I C ad i or are furnished by CO CLan for

new construction during shakedown. cruises. .

Refre bel' CI team rraininz £01' ship operating in the surrounding area is available at NTC. lew Y01'k. lavy Yard (Bldg. 599); N S, Boston (Fargo Bldg.): Casco Bay T. C., Casco Bay. :vIe. ( lavy Pier); and at • r AS. Quonset (Bea ertail) , R. I.

Under GO Pac, Cf teams for the new VE

program are beinz handled at CICTTC. San ~emente Island. ,ICTTe. Whidbe I land, 'while originally intended to handle CVE and DD teams, is now training I teams E r APAs. C1Cl? . C.

S tori a is available for AV CIC team trairung and for post shakedown CVE and AP teams and for refresher training for ships in the area .. Re[-resher training or various types is also available 'it OTS, Treasure Island and teams from CVEs. CLs and DDs when in the area, are refresher trained at an Clemente.

The S8 MOOSE AD and the S PALO-

MAS operate out of San Die~o. and ~ an Francis 0 ba r re pectively, as trarrung hips f r CIC team. Other training ships which include CIC rraininz in their general pre-commissioning underway tr~ining operate out of San Franci co, San Pedro and Seattle.

CO ~CPac furnishes underway advisors 'for ships shaking down from the San Diego or San Pedro Shakedown Croups.

Both operational training comm~nds offer CIC indoctrination our es for Pro pecuve .ommand· illg Officers, and Prospe rive <xe utiv ~fficers.

nder COTC ant it is a five day COUTse gJven at Little Creek, Va., and under CO CPac the course is given at the Cl C Indoctrination chool, San Diego, alifornia.

Operational team traininz for. ~mphibi~us For es is initiated at primary mphibious Trall~ing Ba es ill tb Norfolk, Virg~oia. area and is under th cognizan e oE orrrPhib'Tra ant. Here gradua e of Group 3 co~r~e in. ra~ar opera~or school receive special trammg in Imple rnamtenance techniques and training in special radar devices used by amphibious for e .

he foregoing. in brief, is the pictl.l~e of ~e responsi bil ity sho uldered by th e shore-side tramina prog1'am_ in preparing CIC and Radar personnel Eor Fleet operation. Once haken down and reported for operation, rraininz must be .kep ~o· ing aboard in order ~at personnel may be unproved in their operation of radar and CIC.

TVa/ell lor articles 017 iYldiv~clual sch~ols ~r;,d Trai.ning Commands in iuuire IS 'lies of (;.1.C.

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CONFIDENTIAL 41

AU. s .. deSI:!".orer picked up this lone merch3. nrman by radar. intercepted it and flashed the major war vessel challenge .... but let's listen to the merchant ship's story and learn what the "other fellow" did when he, not a man-of-war, was intercepted and challenged by one of our combatant sh ips.

OST? JOV? INT JOV??

"Shortly after OJ 15> Love, on August 29th the General Alarm so unded. I was sleeping on deck and clothed, and as r came to my battle station on the bridze I saw a signal blink r light (with a red night adapter) signaling on OlU starboard bow at an undetermined range.

"The signaling was read easily liy the signalman ship's officers. a few members of the gun crew, and myself. The signal was 'OST.' This is a meaningJess signal to m . As the light was being pass d and came off the starboard beam, the signal changed to 'jOV,' which was repeated over and over as wa the first signal. few times the signal was made a que tion by signaling 'I T J V:"

Three letter' challenges are used by maim' war vessels and like single letter minor wa1' vessel challenges au meaningless to merchant ships.

"By this time the signals were coming from

light] abaft the beam, th aptain changed

course putting the signal light dead astern.

.. t about 0140, after we had been running for several minutes, a gt,ln Bash was seen, and the shot landed about I 0 ard off om starboard beam. A

42

CONFIDENTIAL

~( On the st.arboard bow o] a u. S. Merchantman steaming alone near Wake I slant/. flashed a red light, spelling out tTl,e letters "OST." Those three

leuer , clearly read but not understood by the officers and men on the merchant ship, lit tlte stage for another tragic one-sided battle between a merchant ship and a man-oj-war - each, unknown. to the other, flying the

flag o] the United States.

Examples of Jaulty recognition procedures such as these; in the merchantman's own words, are self explanatory. U. S. lives, property, and vital war materials are at stake when improper recognition procedure is -""'-----u-s-ed between U. S. Navy .. hips and OUT merchantmen, to say nothing oj the reflec-

tion on the U,tited State» Navy.))

"U pon stopping. the attacker began to ask q uestions, and the con ersation between us was as

follows:

'Warship: "What is your name and nationality?"

Mership: "United States."

Warship: " re you damaged?"

1e:rship: . 'Negative."

Warship: "Why didn't

Oll answer challenge?"

Mership: "We were improperly challenged .• Wal'ship: "You were challenged." .

Mership: "What does QST and J OV mean?" Warship: "They are manof-war challenges." Mership: "You still have not given the prope~ answer to our identification signal."

"W,arship: "0" (OBOE being the proper answer.) "Proceed. What is YOUT destination?"

fer hip: "We decline to answer. What is your interna tional ca Il?"

JUST LUCKY

The warship sent its call letters and so ended this incident, embarrassing to both but fortunately without a tragic ending.

CONFIDENTIAL

di di f

ra 10 rstress message wa immediately sent out."

Merchant vessels al'~ not provided the means to challenge nor are they required to initiate recognition proced'uTe.

"Erratic cour e hanges on our pan and. apparently, on the part of the attacker. made his glID flashe move from one side to the other. It thought at one time as many as three ships were firing on us as well as the fact that absolute] uothinz could be seen, made it impractical, if not impossible to Teturn fire. During this time about n ent -five rounds, as near as I could e timate, were'fired at us, hells falling from 500 to 50 yards from the ship. e eral rounds ricochetted throuzh the rigging. and at least three round pas ed thrall h the rigging, below mast height, on the

"From about 0210 until 0225 no flashe 'velseen, and I believed we were pu lling away from the attacker. After steaming at near 20 knots for a few minu res, a go righ t turn was made. At about 0230 gunfire was resumed by the attacker, who had

ut the corner and appeared slightl forward of our starboard beam.

"At about 0245, after a bout.r a or 15 rounds had been fired at us, star shells were fired 0 erhea The fir t few were a tern. but the latter half of 15 to 20 stars were abeam or dire tly overhead lighting tbe ship and surrounding area brilliantl T. Explosive rounds 'Were fired at the same time.

"After th ship was lighted up with tar shells and at about 0255 the U. S. Navy warship chal-

Jenge to Merchantmen. OBOE SY (<DE), "I •

made by the attacker. The challenge. was prope 1 and promptly answered b giving the international

11 signs and the Identification signal in effect at the time."

One hour and fo·tty minutes elapsed before mercham! ship recognition procedure was effected. Having failed to receive a. repl)1 at aLI from the major war vessel challenge, the attacker should l.e im'l1udiately challenged with "DE." When _,bt exists as to whether the vessel to be chal-

lenged is a man-oj-war or another Naval vessel, the initial challenge sho'uld be "DE."

"The signaling procedure used by the attacker made me relatively certain that be was 'fTi ndly.' "But instead of answering the recognition signal properly he ordered 'u to turn on running lights and stop. As the message was passed below to the

"ptain. someone urned on the running lights, 0 .t we did not stop. I had the signalman ask for his call. He answered with 3 rounds otaun fire --------which landed so close to the ship that shrapnel was E later found on the bridge. The unning lights were put out and every possible evasive movement taken, to no avail. About 0300 we were again given the Merchantman challenge. which was answered as before. V-Ie were ordered to top and turn on running lights. 11 this time OUT ship wa lighted very bright! ."

If the identificdtion signal made by the merchant vessel was received by the f"iendly attacking vessel) the proper reply tetter should haoe be'~n

en! back immediately. The en.emy may be [amiliar with the "DE" signal and the- master of the ar.rchant ship, it he receives no reply in response I_his identification sign.al must assume the ship i 110 tile uxui take evasive action.

"WE ARE AMERICAN"

A Merchant Vessel's encounter with a Patrol Boat in the Pacific:

At LOl5 G.G.T., in the Pacific, what appeared to be a patrol boat was sighted on the starboard quarter, and began signaling "OE." The vessel ~swere~ with the identifying signal' 2\IV-plus international ignal Ietters." The Patrol boat did not answer with the reply letter. The merchant ve sel siznaled "G2' ' and the patrol boat answered with "G2B." The - Master then directed. that the followinz signal be sent:

"Give us proper reply letter:'

The patrol boat answered." he siznal is G2 B and the reply is X."

The Master then ordered that the Eollowinz

message be sent. 1:1

'The reply is not X. You tand clear."

The patrol boat signaled back, "'What IS the reply letter? We are American."

The Master jO"nored this and ran 'full peed for two hours,

Patrol cWft do not can) complete instruction books outlining recognition procedure. Therejore they s~oul~ be given prope1' briefing and local instrucuons tn order to assure that they know and can correctly carry o·u.t recognition procedure.

A .Navy hip challenged a merchantman using the mcolT~ct sign~1 "AA:' (What Ship). In - cord an e wi th the instructions issued by the M 1 of the ~erchant hip, no reply was made. The N~v ,. ship then challenged again ~ ith, "What Ship? The Merchant ship replied "FOT What Reason?" ~~e avy Ship then signaled, "This is a. challenge, upoo receipt of , hich the faster SIgnaled, "Ple~se proceed in the proper manner." !he .. avy ship then gave the correct challenge,

o " and was .a~, ered in the prescribed manner.

The trenstmssian "AA" is the call 1'0 an unknown. ~hip and is not to be used in initialing recogmuon procedure,

THIS IS CORRECT PROCEDURE FOR RECOGNITION BETWEEN WARSHIPS OR AIRCRAFT AND MERCHANT SHIPS

The following procedure may be carried out in any part of [he world by flags or flashinz:

.1. In normal circumstances warships will, U<l. aircraft may, Challenge. The challenge wiill be Group OE.

.2. MeT~han~ ship replies by flashing, or if no ~ultable s~gnaling apparatus i available, by hoisting her Sl~al Lett~s and Identification Signal.

3. Warship or aircraft replies with, a si letter.

__:

Most readers were doubtless m:yslified?

On Page 32 the fade chart oj the U.S .. WH1TE PL4INS haws the ordinate as "altitude in teet." 'This of course should be in thousands of tea.

ttention i invited to the fa t that the Fleet Administrative Office, Navy Yard, New York, will

CONFIDENTIAL

supply blank copies of the Fade chart to an command requesting them.

...

On pages 4 and -

the Loran article (Dc. - bet "C.l. ."), the three piotures uiere printed in the v=« sequence as

diagrammed.

3-A, ,tB~--C is the right combination and sequence, as astute 'readers doubtless gathered Ir0111

the captions. ~. .

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3 4 5

On. page I9 Revised FD Vocabu.lary definition of Pantahe should read, "Land, rejuel and rearm."

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NRT_S, t, Simon's, hints plagiarism in 't hoot that Bogey Doum]" attributed to Pacific Fleet Radar Center in the eptember ItC.I.C.", claiming ilu: lyric as a t. Simon S creation. Editor ·1 'C.I.C." regrets the threatened coldness belttJ, these two famous poetic centers.

medium for combininO" the viewpoints of the two

ffi er wh e duties are so closely allied."

CajJtain Beard: "The reason that was not attempted was the existing publications available in the maintenance field. There are the airborne co· ordinating group monthly publications,: which are two in number and a digest, I think i i..fql!-arterly which is a summary of the data that- have been presented. The Bureau of Ships ha a. ompauion group of publications which are issued oh the same basis relating to shipbome zear."

C01nmandn A. ]. Hill) COTCPac: "It has been brought out that there will be film manufactured or made on various separate functions of the G.l.C. It is hoped that t hat includes the maneuvering

board of whi h there is none now.

Also on the summary plot and the~tatpedo action solver. There ha ve been one or two films manufactured concerning -adar tactics

and torpedo and. ship maneuverjog tactics. They have been recei ved with great favor. if'moTe of that type of film could be made, it would be very good. Also, if we could

ha e a booklet on such findings and a booklet on any other training aids that would come out, it would help us to understand and acquaint everybody with what is available."

Captain Beard: "It is hoped that the 'G.I.C_' magazine will carry a short de cription of the various things that will become available."

what others say of C.1. c.

During the CIC raunng Conference held; at San Francisco, the ollowing comments were made concerning "C.I. .' magazine:

Captain Donald C. Beard, Readiness Division, CominCh: "With a point of view of acquainting people throughout the avya to what is aoing on in CIC, the Vice Chief of Naval Operation was directed to expand the scope of the "C.I.C. Shorebased" into a "C.l. ." magazine. It is hoped that article which are zood for Beet con umption will be -made available to the staff publishers. It is planned that it will deal only with operational matter. The Bureau of Ships and Bureau of Aeronautics have adequate technical

publications. In other words, this A.~~Pl'7~~~.,::",

•. C.IO. magazine is designed to

. to the operating people a

medium for finding out what is going on some place else. Al 0 it has been suggested to the agencies that are working on it, to include short pictoriil summaries 0e~e various training activities

h as shown in this conference are putting an enonnous amount of effort into making this program work. Again with the He.I.C." magazine, critici ms are needed, desired, and requested. The staff of the "C.l.G." magazine is small, but I think ade-

quate.

"As a coroUary there's been much discussion and

..... times bitter comment 00 the effect on radar of • elusive thing known as weather. "C.LC." magazine is designed to make this type of thing and this type of article available to the fleet. And, I think that it will be well worth the delay in pub-

lishing of an article to send it back. to "C.I.C." magazine rather than sending a mimeographed run to some activity and, because that activity made it, giving the distribution to its limited users when the information is needed on much broader

scope." Lieutenant Commander W. R. Sherman, Quality

Control, BuPers: "1 see in this "C.I.G." magazine an excellent instrument to disseminate information on a rapidly developing art from an operational standpoint. It OCCll!S to me the same benefit would derive from a similar companion publica-

devoted to the technical development. T uggest that the two be combined in one cover. This would seem to me an excellent

excuse it, please

.eveml errors were made in the printing of the article on Fade Charts in the October issue of "CJ.C." A I the bottom of column J, page 30, the figure was drawn. iuithou! showing the 1'efleeted ray. This sketch should. have been like the accom;panying figure.

On page jl the correct: equation at the top of the page i :

1476 .1625

h=--D + __ D2

hoi 108

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

"C.l.C." magazine regards these comments as an e:llcellent, nearly complete summary of its mission. The Chief of Naval Operations has defined the scope of "C.l.C." as "The Tactical Use and Operalion of Electronic Equipment" Included within it are the C.l.C" radio, radar, sonar, and communication aspects "in operation." Also covered are the associated equipments and techniques. Fleet activities are invited to send in articles as suggested.

EDITOR OF "C1.C."

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CONFIDENTIAL 4S

Lo.rge scale production 0/ PPI simulations

cal1 be accomplished with 'his eq";pmefll. The light source is mounl"ed on an adju.stable rigging. Th.e camera is placed in front 0/ the model, traveling (1)1

a fi~ed Irtlck.

RPD in the Marianas

From the USS INDIANAPOLIS comes the following:

"Prior to entering the combat area, full use was made of the Radar Planning Device, with models of SAlPAN, TINIAN, AGUIJAN and GUAM for instructing and training the radar operators as to how the islands would appear on the PPI scopes, and for training them in picking out land marks. Photographs were used extensively in this work, being taken so they showed how the PPI ope would appear as we approached the islands. A set of the photographs of SAIP AN and TIN IAN was kept at the radar for comparison with the actual PPI scope. The results of the preliminary work were even better than had been anticipated. The radar operators said they felt that observation of the Radar Planning Device in use on the island

. models. and the utilization of the pictures, gave them a decided advantage in identificatio:p ofvarious landmarks on the PPI scope. The Radar Planning Device offers a valuable aid in rraininc radar

1:1

operators (or pieking out various landmark ."

NEW MANUAL, NEW AIDS, NEW USES

The Bureau of Aeronautics' Special Devices' Division announces a new manual for the Radar Planning Device (CONAVAER 30'160R-28). The

46 CONFIDENTIAL

R.P.D. was described in the September issue "C.I.C." Many additional uses have been fou for the R.P.D. technique. Because of these new uses and the employment of the R.p.n. in numerous operations, a new manual has become necessary.

Among the many subjects covered i~ a, new photographic technique used to predict PPI pictures. This technique has been expanded in usefulness and simplified in operation. Numerous additio use~ have b~~n found, necessitating change in t basic techmque for mas production of PPI simu-

lations. he illustration shows how the specially.

prepared R.P.D. model is mounted against the b.ulkhead. .The R.P.D. i maintained. on a special ng to hold It at the proper posirion, both in range,

bearing, and altitude. W

The Photographic Easel (Special evice 16.C 231") has been redeslrned to include additional fea~ures, simplifying the photographic process. ThJS new photographic easel and its use are described in the manual.

Requests for this new manual honld be directed to me Bureau of Aeronautics, req uesting the Revised R.P.D. Manual (CONAVAER 30-16oR-28). Acti itie now using the R.P.D. are strongly ur

to request this revised manual to replace supersede the manual now in use.

night fighters report on Japanese tactics

A c. cording to. reports by gro. und control stations in the Central Pacific, there were about 7 or 8' individual raids during early September on which the night raiders used "Window." Although it was confusing at times to the ground personnel controlling our fighters. we think they did ~ splendid job. In only one instance did. our aJrbor~e

radar operators encounter and definitely recognize "'V,\Tindow." The indications are, therefore. that "Confu or" was used some distance out and wa dispensed with by the time the raiders were

in figh tel' range. _ .

~n every occasion, with po.ssib~y two -excepuons.

~ our fighters were closing ill on the enemy raiders. they (Japs) seemed to detect ~ur pre ence, Bearing this fact in mind, we feel quue sure that

.. ' tb.e¥r-calJ"Y an airborne receiver set which co~ers H, 'Ur IFF' frequency and will give them, a warmng when our fighters are near. We would recorn:.d, who en an AI conta. ct is ~ade by our fig~ters,

the IFF be turned off during the closure in an attempt to prevent such detection ?y the enemy. Detection by an enemy bomber (night) can very easil be catastrophic as most of them carr a

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

J T\ I 5

PUBLICATION

aomm tail gun and mo t of our night closures are made from dead astern.

All the bombinz raid here included tactics quite imilar to those used by the Japs in other areas in that:

(1) They always came in duringbrlghtly moonlit periods, and then only when the weather was good.

(2) T11ey ne er brought more than one bomber o er the island at a time. The group orbited 20 to 50 miles off shore and came in individually.

Comment: The Jap use of radio to pick up our IFF, as is seemingly indicated. is an idea that h~ further ubstantiating evidence. A Seventh .An Force LIBERATOR approaching Truk on a night mission picked up on radar a plane that seeme~ to be fi ing directly at him. He> turned off his IFF and the Jap plane immediately started to wander and lost contact,

From lntelligeru:e S'ummary No. 5I~ H.eadquarters 7th Air F01"CB) APO 9 3~ Central Pacifu: Area, 2] September, I944.

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IS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 47

" C. L C."

500

15,000

SEASON'S GREETINGS FROM

25,000 211,000 25,000 25,000
" • HEIG ... T Of~(lADAR ABOVE SEA-LEVEL.
R • RANGE FROM RADAR TO POINT .....
H • HEIGHT OF SHADOW DUE TO THE
~ EARTH'S CURVATURE
20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 J-'" ,_ r.""" _ ..

2110

uo

10,000

10,000

200

200

curvature nomo9raph

- .

1100 '00

'00 1.00

ao

110

aoO .00

JDO 100

rus nomograph is an earth curvature graph corrected for refraction of the udar wav s. It is u ed by pa ing a traight-edge through the points on two vertical lines 1" presenting known quantities and reading off the solution at the interse tion of the third line with the traight-edge.

For example if the antenna is 100 feet above the water and the highest point of land we are approaching is 7900 feet, we cannormally expect to first observe land on our screen at a range of approximatel 120 mile. The straight-edge i set all. point "11" 100 and "1-1" 7900, and the expected range reads 120 on "R."

In using this nomograph, it should be borne in mind that guided propagation will modify

the rano-e characteristi .

s.eee

11,000

4,.000

lao

lao

",000

a,ooo

a,ooo

2,000

2,000

100

100

1,000

',000

... II

10 .1

From the Pacific Fleet Radar Center "Bulletin of Iniortruuion. No. 3-rf4."

100

100

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