[A M. No. P-94-1054.

March 11, 2003]

EDWIN A. ACEBEDO, petitioner, vs. EDDIE P. ARQUERO, respondent.
By letter-complaint dated June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Brookes Point, Palawan for immorality.
Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the MTC Brookes Point, and respondent
unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot, Brookes Point, Palawan as a result of which a girl,
Desiree May Irader Arquero, was born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to the letter-complaint was the girls Baptismal
Certificate[2] reflecting the names of respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents. Also attached to the letter-complainant was a copy of
a marriage contract[3] showing that complainant and Dedje Irader contracted marriage on July 10, 1979.
By his Answer[5] of October 6, 1994, respondent vehemently denied the charge of immorality, claiming that it is just a (sic) mere
harassment and a product of complainants hatred and extreme jealousy to (sic) his wife. [6] Attached to the answer were the September
27, 1987 affidavit of desistance[7] executed by complainant in favor of his wife with respect to an administrative complaint he had much
earlier filed against her, and complainants sworn statement[8] dated September 13, 1994 acknowledging paternity of a child born out of
wedlock, which documents, respondent claims, support his contention that the complaint filed against him is but a malicious scheme
concocted by complainant to harass him.
Additionally, respondent claimed that sometime in 1991, complainant likewise instituted a criminal complaint against him for
adultery which was, however, dismissed after preliminary investigation.
Finally, respondent claimed that complainant himself had been cohabiting with another woman.
In Investigation Report of February 12, 2001, Judge Fernandez recommends that the complaint be dismissed for failure to adduce
adequate evidence to show that respondent is guilty of the charge. The report focuses on the non-appearance of complainant and
Dedje Irader Acebedo.
By Resolution of April 25, 2001, this Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report
and recommendation.
By Memorandum of December 12, 2001, the OCA, disagreeing with the recommendation of the Investigating Judge that the case
should be dismissed, recommends that respondent be held guilty of immorality and that he be suspended from office for a period of one
(1) year without pay. Thus the OCA ratiocinates:
. . . [R]espondent admitted the fact that for eight (8) to nine (9) months, he a single man maintained relations with Dedje Irader
Acebedo, wife of herein complainant, attended with sexual union (TSN dated 23 November 2000, pp. 14-15). Based on his
testimony, we observed that respondent justified his having a relationship with Dedje I. Acebedo solely on the written document
purportedly a Kasunduan or agreement entered into by complainant and his wife, consenting to and giving freedom to either
of them to seek any partner and to live with him or her. Being a court employee respondent should have known that said
agreement was void despite it having been notarized. Even granting that Dedjie I. Acebedo was separated from her husband during
their short lived relation, to hold on to said scandalous agreement and enter an immoral relationship with a very much married woman
and a co-court-employee at that is highly improper. It is contrary to the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and
Employees which provides that public employees of which respondent is one, xxx shall at times (sic) respect the rights of others,
and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest. Moreover, respondent cannot seek refuge and sling mud at complainant for having executed an Affidavit dated September 13,
1994, acknowledging that he bore a woman other than his wife, a child. It would seem that respondent would want to apply the principle
of in pari delicto in the instant case. Respondent would have it appear that a married man with an extra-marital relation and an
illegitimate child is precluded from complaining if his wife enters into a relationship with another man.
Second, the records show that an Affidavit of Desistance was executed by herein complainant. However, a cursory reading of said
document reveals that it favors only Dedje Irader Acebedo and not herein respondent. Interestingly, the date of said affidavit is 2
September 1987. Respondent had the temerity to claim it as evidence in his favor when the instant complaint was only filed sometime
in 1994.
Third, when respondent was asked by the investigating judge if he attended the baptism of the daughter of Dedje Irader Acebedo, his
former co-employee and ex-intimate friend, he answered, I did not. Im not sure the child is mine. From his answer, we could infer that
respondent did not categorically rule out the possibility that said child might be her (sic) daughter, only that he is doubtful of her
paternity.
On the merits of the case, the entry of respondents name as father in the baptismal certificate of Desiree May I. Arquero cannot
be used to prove her filiation and, therefore, cannot be availed of to imply that respondent maintained illicit relations with Dedje Irader
Acebedo. A canonical certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church
by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein which
concern the relationship of the person baptized. It merely attests to the fact which gave rise to its issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the
fact of the administration of the sacrament on the date stated, but not the truth of the statements therein as to the parentage of the child
baptized.
Respondent justified his pursuing a relationship with complainants wife with the spouses having priorly entered into a settlement
with respect to their marriage which was embodied in a Kasunduan.

Respondents justification fails. Being an employee of the judiciary, respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan had
absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Article 1 of the Family Code provides
that marriage is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation. It is an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules established by law which cannot be made
inoperative by the stipulation of the parties.[21]
Republic Act 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
enunciates the States policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary. That is why this Court has firmly laid down exacting standards of morality and
decency expected of those in the service of the judiciary. Their conduct, not to mention behavior, is circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility, characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the publics respect and
confidence in the judicial service. It must be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the judicial branch
but also to their behavior outside the court as private individuals. There is no dichotomy of morality; court employees are also judged by
their private morals.[28]
Respondents act of having illicit relations with complainants wife is, within the purview of Section 46 (5) of Subtitle A, Title I, Book
V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, a disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Under Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, an immoral conduct is
classified as a grave offense which calls for a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first
offense, and dismissal is imposed for the second offense.
Since the present charge of immorality against respondent constitutes his first offense, his suspension for six (6) months and one
(1) day is in order.
ESPINOSA & GLINDO vs. ATTY. OMA
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa) and Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against
Atty. Julieta A. Omaa (Omaa).
Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaa with violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.
Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaas legal advice on
whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaa then prepared a document
entitled Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay (contract).
Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started
implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most of
the property they acquired during their union.
Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed
by Omaa was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaa before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
Omaa denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the
contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omaa alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office and
managed to persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the
contract. Omaa presented Marantals Sinumpaang Salaysay (affidavit) to support her allegations and to show that the complaint was
instigated by Glindo. Omaa further presented a letter of apology from her staff, Arlene Dela Pea, acknowledging that she notarized the
document without Omaas knowledge, consent, and authority.
Espinosa later submitted a Karagdagang Salaysay stating that Omaa arrived at his residence together with a girl whom he later
recognized as the person who notarized the contract. He further stated that Omaa was not in her office when the contract was
notarized.
The IBP-CBD found that Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaa had failed to exercise due
diligence in the performance of her function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law. The IBP-CBD noted the
inconsistencies in the defense ofOmaa who first claimed that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract but then later claimed
that it was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaa be suspended for one year from the practice of
law and for two years as a notary public.
Omaa filed a motion for reconsideration.
In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied Omaas motion for reconsideration.

The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether Omaa violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and
Espinosas Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.
The Ruling of this Court
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is
void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging
the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaa did in this case.
In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza, the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as
the contract in this case, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which permitted the husband to take a concubine and
allowed the wife to live with another man, without opposition from each other; ratifying a document entitled Legal Separation where the
couple agreed to be separated from each other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing each other
to remarry, and renouncing any action that they might have against each other; preparing a document authorizing a married couple who
had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of action which each may have against the other; 7 and
preparing a document declaring the conjugal partnership dissolved.
We cannot accept Omaas allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD
that Omaa herself notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only
showed Omaas negligence in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for the entries in
hisnotarial register and he could not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries 9 or any member of his
staff.
We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. Omaa knew fully well that the Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay has no legal effect and is against public policy.
Therefore, Omaa may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code
of Professional Responsibility.10
WHEREFORE,
we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaa from
the
practice
of
law
for
ONE
We REVOKE Atty. Omaas notarial commission, if still existing, and SUSPEND her as a notary public for TWO YEARS.

YEAR.

G.R. No. 173540

January 22, 2014
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner, vs. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same man, now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido
(Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in
rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate
recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed.
Thus, only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquios union, they begot four (4) children. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his
whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another
woman by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims
must be declared null and void for being bigamous an action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties
acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim, essentially averring that she is the legal surviving
spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St.
Jude Parish in Davao City. She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right
and as an heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued.
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her
life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal
wife, but was once a common law wife of Eustaquio.

In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of the
properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and attorneys fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision denying Teclas petition, as well as Peregrinas counter-claim.
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial courts alleged disregard of the evidence on the existence of her
marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision, the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing
on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void.
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to appreciate the validity of her marriage
to Eustaquio.
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn the validity of a subsequent marriage;
2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of, without proof of the execution or
existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best evidence, the original document;
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to prove the existence of a valid
marriage without the priest who issued the same being presented to the witness stand.26
Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of the marriage of
Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Teclas claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Teclas failure to present her certificate of
marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards the
Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court observed:
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it
considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her
own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court declared
that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported
themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the
same Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created,
according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the
evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Aonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G.
Jalandoni, we said, citing precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence
of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted, has been aptly
delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals. Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or
primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authencity is not
necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the
document, when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such
evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even
there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and
recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The
Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the
judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept
by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which
is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony,
and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating
priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidencetestimonial and documentarymay be admitted to prove
the fact of marriage.30
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial evidence
furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event.

The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and admissible
evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary
evidence testimonial and documentary may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the
marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who
officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the
unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The
marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No
pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 198780

October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that
immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in
jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial
and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the
existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a determination
for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of
the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio.
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated
that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the
United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never
processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The
RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void
because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only
as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent
was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their
case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios
to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR
THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both
parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and
consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being
inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be
rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment 9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way
of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of
availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire
specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely
for the legitimization of a child. 12Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is
usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage, 13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage
solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the principal test for determining the
presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a
life together at the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the
purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life
together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws. 16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for
immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also
legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling.
x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what
forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may
always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a
marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as
such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not
ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely
for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was
entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee, 21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham
marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The problem being that
in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied
annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and haveb upheld such
marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying
the OSGs motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to
freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It
held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA
found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of
American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as
husband and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code,
consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall
render a marriage void ab initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely
given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense
that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud,
force, intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. 25 Their understanding should
not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated
nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that
they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would
be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage
in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status,
and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose
to enter into such a relation. 27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties
whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent
consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being
bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in
order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married
would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship.
There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose.
Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The
possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a
marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of
marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law
are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the
marriage void. Hence, though the respondents marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is
not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the
circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn
involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted
disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute
fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured
or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham
marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would
only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for
immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot
be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a
marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot
leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no
longer needed.

G.R. No. 201061

July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respo
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of
nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he
married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies
business owned by Benjamins family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin

and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sallys father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her
father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing
Benjamins marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired
real properties.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed
criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence.
Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court
on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked
the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his
appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as
illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven
properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor of Benjamin. The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded
with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamins subsisting marriage
with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage
was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license.
Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley
because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sallys claim for spousal support because she was not married to
Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part of her
conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that
Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamins parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance
inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive
of Benjamins civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were
bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their
purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as
well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and
the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT
Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without
prejudice to Benjamins right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article 148
of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sallys share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of
Bernice and Bentley while Benjamins share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is
hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009, 7 the trial
court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals.
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err
in submitting the case for decision.
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her
motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts decision declaring the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial courts decision regarding the
property relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true
copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage
between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.

On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage
Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the
series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license
and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to
keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. 11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage
contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local
civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between
Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest" 16 and "a
simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends
and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernices birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally
were married on 8 March 1982 18 while Sally was the informant in Bentleys birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally
were married on 8 March 1982. 19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates
reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is
necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license.
It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage
license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of
Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the
general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious
are "inexistent and void from the beginning." 21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial courts ruling that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a
prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract
without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In
short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code
which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of
conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share
shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus,
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by
Benjamins father to his children as advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted that
"Benjamins late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x
x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on
record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses. 26 The properties
under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin 27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by
CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally 28 with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties
under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words
"married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. 29 Such words do not
prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of
the Family Code.30

[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO
NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was
shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing
a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The
case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could
file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the
Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit,
their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due
to their fathers death.[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to respondent
before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an
action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because
"the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was thus
treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. [3] However, upon motion of
petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.[4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. [5] A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, [6] the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article
80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58. [8] The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. [9] This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the
foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. [11]This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract
of permanent union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that
provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. [15] To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law
deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." [16] The only issue that needs to be resolved
pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period
in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether
there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime
during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor
is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other

10

during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not
comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony
and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar.[17] The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice
the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith
make an investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention,
he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same
person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal
Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife
for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year
period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the
law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his
lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage void after his
death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code [20] cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an
annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who
can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place[21] and cannot be the source of rights.
The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid.[22] That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal
effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through
actual joint contribution,[23] and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and
44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent.
The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two.
It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished
nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. [24] "A void
marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent

11

jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained
in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any
time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such
marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage
cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26]But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage [27]and such absolute
nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.[28] For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. [29] Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action
or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in
the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry.
The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil
Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC vs. DAYOT

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose
Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was
solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.[2] In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, [3] also dated 24
November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint[4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated
between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced
to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks
later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother
from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper
approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially
refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned
about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February
1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table
at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When
he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they
had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred
contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. [5] In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to
Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa
filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. [6] The Ombudsman found
Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one
year without emolument.[7]
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[8] dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:

12

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this Court
finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.Accordingly, the above-entitled
case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].[9]
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24
November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank
sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City
Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said
package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission,
[Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three
months to discover that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does
not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be taken in for a ride by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa
Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up
on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose],
again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court
does not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing
there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would
have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name
voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she
further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that
he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was
asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she
answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.
[10]

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed. It cited Article 87[11] of the New Civil Code
which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery
of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery
and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action
to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.[12]
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August
2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of
marriage under Article 86[14] of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck
down Joses appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the
marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code
provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud,
force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within
four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose
in February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of
marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.[15]
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76 [16] of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with
the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five

13

years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband
and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by
the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing
officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas
V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a
member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56 [17] of the Civil Code did not
require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The
prescription was established only in Article 7[18] of the Family Code which does not govern the parties marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the
requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant
in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him
and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision,
dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered
declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.[19]
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Nial v. Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the
basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at
least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with
those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse
to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to
notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and
Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because
of the absence of a marriage license.[21]
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution[22] dated 10
May 2007, denying Felisas motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before
this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside
for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting.Felisa filed a separate Petition for
Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court
resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.
[23]

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I

14

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO

FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO
PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE
LICEN[S]E.[24]
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Nial.[25] She differentiates the case at bar
from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her
cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy
and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their
marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall
jointly tackle the related arguments vented bypetitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists
between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage
by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26] To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by
Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which
they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republics position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the
validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to
investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not
invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the
Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also
bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its
Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988
wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ,
District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses
company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil
Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage
as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1)

Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar
of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil
Code, but not those under Article 75. [28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is
the essence of the marriage contract.[30] This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law, [31] whereby the absence of a marriage license
did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the
authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage.[32]

15

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To
wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places,
(2) consular marriages,[33] (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan
marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.[34]
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority
and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he
took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may
discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.[36]
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit declaring that they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other. [37] One of the central issues in the
Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the
minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly[38] but reasonably construed.
[39]
They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather
than the exception.[40] Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the
latter by implication.[41] For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have
attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly
written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five
years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this
material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a
mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts [42] in
an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five
months before the celebration of their marriage.[43] The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her
by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. [44] The appellate court also cited
Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.[45]
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A
question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. [46] Under Rule 45, factual findings
are ordinarily not subject to this Courts review.[47] It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception
to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory
findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or
administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such
findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.[48]
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the
requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the
validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it

16

cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither
did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at
bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [49]Restated more explicitly, persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to
be in fact married.[50] The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There
is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to
institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code [51] that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage
will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was
entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional
circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at
least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by
making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. [52] The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the
defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. [53] To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a
marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must
be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the
fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have
cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in
the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to
the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required
to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap
of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief
because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated
that equity finds no room for application where there is a law.[54] There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in
precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties
marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.[55]
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his
marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses
subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of
nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.[56] Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a
marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage
does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article
76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of a marriage. [57] It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.[58]
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CAG.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their
criminal liability, if any. No costs.
G.R. No. 169766
March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB
AHMAD A. TAMANO,Respondents.
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be
impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762
and its subsequent Resolution2 dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llaves (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void
ab initio.

17

Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27,
1993 in Cotabato City3 and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2,
1993.4 In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamanos wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in
their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos legitimate children with Zorayda, 5filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon
City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint 6 alleged, inter alia,
that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married
Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore
governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal
with Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the same while his prior marriage to Complainant Zorayda was
still subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced" has no factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced
Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil
Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D.
1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with
Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one contracted under Muslim law as provided
under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus
covered by this law;7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the court for an extension of 30 days to file her
answer to be counted from January 4, 1995,8 and again, another 15 days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted.10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss 11 on February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen.
Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latters disbarment
complaint against Sen. Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues
involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.
The trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity. 13Thus, Estrellita filed in
November 1995 a certiorari petition with this Court questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred
the petition to the CA14 which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since there can be no default in cases of declaration
of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing
parties presented their evidence. When it was Estrellitas turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such purpose 15 were postponed
mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings 16 in view of the CAs temporary restraining
order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the case.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated September 30, 1996. 18 Estrellita then
elevated the appellate courts judgment to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her evidence on June 26, 1997. 20 As
Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to July 9, 1997. 21 The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again
asked for a postponement.22
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for decision, 23 reasoning that
Estrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the
outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City, 25 stating as one of the reasons that as sharia courts are not
vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a
court of general jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated August 24, 1998, 26 we
denied Estrellitas motion for reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellitas marriage
with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage
to Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.29 The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was
entered into during the subsistence of his first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very
beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of the

18

second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method of terminating the
effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She
claimed that the RTC should have required her to file her answer after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen.
Tamano is capacitated to marry her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she
highlighted Zoraydas lack of legal standing to question the validity of her marriage to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004, 32 the CA held that Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her answer
as she was given ample opportunity to be heard but simply ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her
answer despite the lapse of around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita cannot
rely on her pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an independent and original action, it does not interrupt the
proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous,
reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute
divorce. It noted that their first nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only ceremonial.
Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamanos wife and, hence, the injured party
in the senators subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution, 33 the CA denied Estrellitas Motion for Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
where it debunked the additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public prosecutors report on the
existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court 34 and Article 48 of the Family Code35 will not
invalidate the trial courts judgment as the proceedings between the parties had been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion.
Assuming that the issues have not been joined before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellitas refusal to file an answer. Lastly,
the CA disregarded Estrellitas allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of
the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the
issue of the validity of Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter
was prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against
the validity of her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias 36 laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of
an answer suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend proceedings while her motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely participated in the
RTC hearings because of the trial courts assurance that the proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever action the High Court will
take on her petition questioning the RTCs jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment
on August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998. 37 She also
questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before
further proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the latter was already divorced under the
Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased
without need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under
Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of
the deceased.38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because only the husband or the wife can file a
complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CAs reasoning and stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of
her right to be heard; and, that filing an original action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol Gen says that this is no longer essential
considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private
respondents legal standing to challenge the validity of Estrellitas purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any proper
interested party may attack directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file the action as they are
the ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts judgment, even though the latter was rendered prematurely because: a)
the judgment was rendered without waiting for the Supreme Courts final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No.
126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor did not even
conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;

19

2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellitas marriage declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her pending petition for certiorari/review on
certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the
principal suit before the RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She was never declared in default, and she even
actively participated in the trial to defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension of the period to file an answer and of the proceedings in the trial
court until her petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said
case, we affirmed the following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellitas basis for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to Dismiss, instead of filing an Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion
suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it
behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued
its Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section
4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed
from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x x 41 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court is mandated to suspend trial until it finally
resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its
proceedings should the issue of the propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate courts.
In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process in the course of the proceeding of the case because after it denied the wifes
motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste
even when, under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing
an answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for
extension of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first for the resolution of her Motion to
Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency
of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is an independent action
which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of." 42 Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case."43 In fact, the trial court
respected the CAs temporary restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present
her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any order precluding the trial court from
proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an
answer or to present her evidence when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No.
126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not be
allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded
with the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither should
the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor should it wait for its records to be remanded
back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the public prosecutor
in cases involving void marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine whether there
is collusion between the parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of
Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies
thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their
respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the
report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the
public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the required report, 45 which we find to have been
sufficiently complied with by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995, 46 wherein he

20

attested that there could be no collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of any
of the private respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of
participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not
invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether
collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by
the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the
non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the
proceedings in the trial court.48
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen.
Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. 49 The only
law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions
of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. 50 Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized
except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, 52 the
law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law
applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that
"Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which
already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective
application of its provisions unless otherwise provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at
the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate
to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly,
plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive
operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively,
and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code in respect of civil acts that took
place before the Muslim Codes enactment.54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as
one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law,
the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was
celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since
this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which subsisted at the time
Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior
spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15,
2003 claiming that under Section 2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However,
this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs,
we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation
and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3,
paragraph a]

21

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief
that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.57
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If
Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule
contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the
marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit
from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the
infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequent marriage.1wphi1 But in the case at
bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages
celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already commenced before March
15, 2003.58
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with
respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held
that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 59 Since
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise
considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit.60
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective
rights which include striking down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as
well as its subsequent Resolution issued on September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.

[G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision[1] dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment [2] dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case
No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to
a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
Also assailed in this petition is the resolution[3]of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a
period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of
letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus
they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by
the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago[4] at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City,
Bohol.

22

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on
the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information [5] filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.[6]
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage
with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as
minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio.
Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[8] the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first
secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which held that the court of a country in
which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce,
has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to
recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that
following People v. Bitdu,[10] everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a
violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered
a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually
took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios
marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 [12] of the
Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the
fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded
validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 [13] of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this
jurisdiction. Under Article 17[14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,[15] allows
mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. [16] However, the denial was by a split vote.
The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion
prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then
there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner
was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.

23

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY
CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.[17]
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good
faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He
highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing.
The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of
bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent
are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to
perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to
commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy
excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling inMarbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[18] which held that bigamy can be successfully
prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 [19] of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a
must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed
to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the
Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all the elements
of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been
judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol
Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect
the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer.
Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial
court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 [22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion
in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of
nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration
of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law,
never married.[24] The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the
decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally
speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null;
it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time
he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The
petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters
into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier
union is characterized by statutes as void.[26]

24

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge
where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the
first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance
to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity
before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every
circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we
held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of
good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on
the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171914

July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA
ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property
between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision promulgated on November 11,
2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a
condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez &
Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Paraaque, Rizal on September 10,
1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNAs
marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana
Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage,
ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to
which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated
November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber
of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican
Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY.
LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of
Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters,
for P1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas law
office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT
No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100);
GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison
(12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit
was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:

25

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA
CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the same was still
registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would
be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of
the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein
were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNAs son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz
& Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books, office furniture and equipment became
the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September
10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of
the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became coowner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of pro-indiviso share consisting of her share in the said
properties plus her share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latters last will and testament; and
thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The complaint
prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the portion of the subject properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting
of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad
administer the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorneys feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD. 3
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned facts,4 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be
changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and
Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as
soon as appropriate arrangements have been madefor transport and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE
INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE
ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA,
WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS
TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION
OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT THE NAME OF PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF
THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT
HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and

26

IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE.7
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY.
LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFFS MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER
CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNAS LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL. 8
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latters death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree
obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby
MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM
PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic)
SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces
Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence the
entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan
Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared to be
the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports
found in the condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement executed by
Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic courts approval of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof of actual contribution to the
acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the subject law books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the
condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme
Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should determine, firstly, whether the divorce
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second
marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1.
Atty.
subsisted up to the time of his death

Lunas

first

marriage

with

Eugenia

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law
in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to
follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. 15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine
laws governed thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997
terminated their marriage.

27

From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino
spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even
under the Family Code,16 even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad. 17 Indeed, the only two types of defective marital
unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages have
been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce
Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. 18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if
voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death
on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution, 19 and
regards it as a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family
life.20 The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union
especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either
spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce
decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2.
The
Agreement
was void for lack of court approval

for

Separation

and

Property

Settlement

The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had
entered into and executed in connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to
dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible error in
decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947,
the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil
Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had
not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate
property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the
net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of termination enumerated in Article 175 of the
Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of
gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as
follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during
the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner
has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been
granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval.
All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval
or the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to safeguard his interests.
Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors
and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning
the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)

28

But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating
the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as an incident ofthe action for divorce
instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds
raised in the action for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to
Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3.
Atty.
Lunas
marriage
was
void;
properties
were governed by the rules on co-ownership

with
acquired

Soledad,
during

being
their

bigamous,
marriage

What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Lunas subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous, 22 on
the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of
Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as
determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its being bigamous, the properties
acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code,
viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, ortheir marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact.1wphi1 To establish co-ownership,
therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere
allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in
Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership ofproperties acquired by the
parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition
of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterousunion
is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed
properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties
to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts
an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff
was allowed to present evidence ex parte.1wphi1 The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the
defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted
only after the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden
of proving it and a mereallegation is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase of the condominium unit in the
aggregate amount of at least P306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions ofP159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had
obtained from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totaling P146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate contributions of P306,572.00
corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00 of the units
purchase price of P1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof
of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note; 29 that she had the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases;
and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioners assertions on her actual contributions through the following findings
and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds were used to buy the law office
condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin this case proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code

29

and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together as
husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on
co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied
only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a
co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This
void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to
arise, proof of actual contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of
credit. If one of the parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both
parties were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was
an inviolable social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case
of Tenchavez vs. Escao, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an actual
contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the
acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for P55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on January 27, 1977, which was
thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the
amount of P97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty. Luna.
The third check which was for P49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna.
The fourth check, Exhibit "M", forP4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by
plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection was simply not established. x x x"
SOLEDADs claim that she made a cash contribution of P100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for SOLEDADs
claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the same was acquired
through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna, together with his partners in the
law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the
Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and
his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna"
was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts.
It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase "married to" preceding
"Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in the
purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or
paid for the law office amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought the law
office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money
for use of the law firm that he headed.30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were substantiated by the records and because
we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not
discharge her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence,31 did not serve the purpose. In contrast,
given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out
of his own personal funds and effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their
conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna
in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of
suit.

REPUBLIC vs. OBRECIDO III

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question,
presented as a pure question of law.

30

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and itsResolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The falloof the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the
divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an,
Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that
his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a
valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG,
is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. [5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents
situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.[6]
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife
obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.[7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory
relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is
ripe for judicial determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later
acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as
petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a

31

declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe
for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second
marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily,
we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family
Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply
only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is
one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen
while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings [9] on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines
(CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1.

The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them
abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who
validly divorce them abroad can.

2.

This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those
whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and
can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens,
but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this
case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the
same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

32

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far
as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent.[12]
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1.

There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2.

A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the
time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for
annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation
would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain
married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and
the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is
not evidence.[13]
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen.
Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [14] Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. [15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the
divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient
to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O.
No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we
are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 186571

August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition
for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

33

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29,
2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition
for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance
in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns
marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert
that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first
be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with
the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to
the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was
prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar
prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision, 7 the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for him or her to be able
to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; 10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly
asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien
spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the
Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He
considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be
prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file
with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, 14 both support Gerberts
position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes
is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void 15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. 17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the
Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
37 and 38.

34

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of
marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a
wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The legislative intent is for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the
alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. 24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a
mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted
by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or
her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse
is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national
law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in
this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens
with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of
right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that
the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." 28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section
requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies

35

of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the
petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes
(Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign
judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata 32 between the parties, as
provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations,
the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not
for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on
Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. 34 We consider the recording to be legally
improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a
persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded.
In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves
do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of
the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law
when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series
of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 37 both of which required a final order from a competent
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the

36

registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by
itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of
Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil
registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil
registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. 40As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one
filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a
foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself,
as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

G.R. No. 196049

June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31 January 2011 of the
RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper
venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara
were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."
Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay
and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics
Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its
active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx

37

Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been
residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its
dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may
be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition." 8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case
either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration
of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a
special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the
status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court
judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines 11on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on
the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only
the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in
having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage." 14 Fujiki had material interest
and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is
the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register
Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to
the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that
entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the
Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition
based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it
is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which
held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio
dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under
Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 0211-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC
considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the
Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x." 23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground
of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it
should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized that the
"validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party,
and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held
that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition. 28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the
petition was not authenticated as required under Section 5 29 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate
dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review. 30 The public respondents, the Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the
Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor
General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:

38

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the
marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit
from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the
infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact." 37 WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese
Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires
the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal capacity and status x x x." 38 The
Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule
108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De
Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the petition. 42 Maekara
wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any
form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She would like to
maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 0211-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can
file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy
of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. 49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2)
a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country
such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the
parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the
public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case
anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." 57 The
interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the
effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil Code
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine

39

State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom
it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as
if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the
foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen
who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the
rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of
Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to
delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled
on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, 61 as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary
trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a
divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment
is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese
Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108
creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, 66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish
the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he
has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on
the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted
and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. 69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouses right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-1110-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any case,
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the
union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent
marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither
the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to
file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

40

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because
any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. 77If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a
subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the
judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this
purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that
such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the "validity of
marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition
for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage.
A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of
1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign
judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." InRepublic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a
Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse
being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by
extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the
Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on
the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after
the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse
cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino
spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign

41

judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option
to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided
under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country,
Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of
the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in
the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy
nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right
between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for
the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a
subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be
an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1wphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and the contents and
form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

G.R. No. 183805

July 3, 2013
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 dated
February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an
Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being previously united in
lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the
second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and
void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second
marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage
between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of
the legal wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for
bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void
by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioners Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated December 1, 2004 had already been
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James

42

Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying the second marriage between James
Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that the issues raised in the civil case are
not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would
not determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble opinion that there is
merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley
G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared "the voidness, nonexistent or incipient invalidity" of the said second marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case
No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution[7] dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE
PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE
TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370
GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE
OF THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND
DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P.
CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI
AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH
FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND
FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF
FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE
INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO
OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE
OF THE SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE
CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the
criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3)

43

that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the Information was filed on June 28,
2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC
of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the
subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the
crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a
subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage
was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accuseds conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is consummated on the
celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime
had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of
petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the
first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both
the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.11
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for
bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the
parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant,
liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.13 It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from
the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners
second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S.
Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married. 1wphi1.nt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner
Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario;
and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he
had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away
on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent
filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner
Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig, 3 while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao
praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos
(P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in
default.

44

Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge
of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced
herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support
thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license
number; 5 and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who
are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage
License number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in
the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and
costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition,
contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT
THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF
THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS
GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought
to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These
need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the
same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in
1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the
marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from
the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then
became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she
was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage
license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain
from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab
initio.

45

It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab
initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family
Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before
a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not
validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without
first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable
property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute
community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on
Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships,
relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the
same married man, 17 ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.
Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home,
children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the
subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is
therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are
clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless
respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the
acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the
deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to
unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned
by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not
contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government
employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no
allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the
subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the
deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service
Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to
the second wife, holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage
has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled
to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or
as such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands share in the property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the
second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the

46

first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership
formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable solution in this case
would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and
consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage. 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance
with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate
declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is
previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void,
before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the
first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage.
However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be
valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or
documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the
determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in
accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in
the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt

G.R. No. 189121

July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners, vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for
and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November
2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated
March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pias City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are
Eliseos common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom
Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition
for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957,
Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated
to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to
Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latters marriage with one Filipito
Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties
worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the
dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the
issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. 5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules of Court, 7 the petition for settlement of decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las
Pias City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be
appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary
bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby discrediting the position taken by
the petitioners that Eliseos last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:

47

Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let
letters of administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon,
after the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision 10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and
Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village,
Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate,
the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pias City. The petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS
AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS
PIAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY
MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN
THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the
RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether
a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance
now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis
supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like
the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but
as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 15 In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. 17 Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for
the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo
resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate
may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseos Death Certificate that he is a resident
of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a
decedents residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court
of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his
death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia
before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. 20 That Eliseo went to the
extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners position that Eliseo spent the final
days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners submission that the lower courts
findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelias marriage to Eliseo as void ab
initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may
attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 22 It
must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not

48

the Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain
terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the
death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during
the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her fathers marriage to
Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by
filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, 26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such
cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or not the
decedents marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently
established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish
of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification
from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries
therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a
record of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in
the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of
Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person,
thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person
and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the
decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an
interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding
on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the
findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is
founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are

49

satisfied.29Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as
an interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November
2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.

SUAZO vs. SUAZO

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the July 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which reversed the January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay
City in Civil Case No. 97-1282.[2] The reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyns marriage with respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
[1]

THE FACTS
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were residents of Laguna at that time. After months of
courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and
Angelito and after finding them, brought them back to Bian, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage was arranged and
they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.
Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelitos parents after their marriage. They had by this time
stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to
work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyns
efforts.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived. They now
have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her complaint:
xxxx
8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987, their relationship had been marred with
bitter quarrels which caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part of the plaintiff because defendant
inflicted physical injuries upon her every time they had a troublesome encounter;
9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work or his indolence and his
excessive drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations making life
unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff causing their separation in fact in July 1987;
10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time of their marriage and became very
apparent as time went and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable;
xxxx
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a psychological examination with psychologist Nedy
Tayag (who was presumably hired by Jocelyn).
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt
Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the trial.
In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition, including the alleged incidents of physical beating
she received from Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained firm on these declarations but significantly declared that Angelito had
not treated her violently before they were married.
Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:
Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before you got married?
A.

He always go (sic) to our house to court me.

Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you describe his behavioural (sic) pattern
before you got married?

50

A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.

Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent nature before you got married (sic), is
there any signs (sic) of violence?
A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.
Q. Even to other people?
A. He also quarrel (sic).[3]
Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony.
When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:
Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical interpretation of his behavior?
A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during the time of the marriage the respondent
is suffering from anti-social personality Disorder this is a serious and severe apparently incurable (sic). This disorder
is chronic and long-standing before the marriage.
Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the petitioner?
A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no pattern of lying when I examined her, the
petitioner was found to be very responsive, coherent, relevant to marital relationship with respondent.
Q. And the last page of Exhibit E which is your report there is a statement rather on the last page, last
paragraph which state: It is the clinical opinion of the undersigned that marriage between the two, had already hit
bottom rock (sic) even before the actual celebration of marriage. Respondent(s) immature, irresponsible and callous
emotionality practically harbors (sic) the possibility of having blissful relationship. His general behavior fulfill(s) the
diagnostic criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social Personality Disorder. Such disorder is serious and severe
and it interferred (sic) in his capacity to provide love, caring, concern and responsibility to his family. The disorder is
chronic and long-standing in proportion and appear(s) incurable. The disorder was present at the time of the wedding
and became manifest thereafter due to stresses and pressure of married life. He apparently grew up in a
dysfunctional family. Could you explain what does chronic mean?
A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been there long before he entered marriage
apparently, it came during early developmental (sic) Basic trust was not develop (sic).
Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).
A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such because psychological disorder are not
detrimental to men but to others particularly and this (sic) because the person who have this kind of disorder do not
know that they have this kind of disorder.
Q. So in other words, permanent?
A. Permanent and incurable.
Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during the wedding or at the time of the wedding
or became manifest thereafter?
A. Yes, maam.
xxxx
Court:
Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?
A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-Social Personality Disorder (sic).
Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?
A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any employment exploitative and silent (sic)
on the part of the respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder.
Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological disorder (sic)?

51

A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not admit that they are suffering that kind of
disorder (sic).
Court:
Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)?
A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital relation to the respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)?
A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due respect more often than not he even shouted
at them for no apparent reason (sic).
Court:
Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?
A. Yes, sir.
Court:
Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?
A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. How was the petitioner tortured?
A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?
A. Yes, sir.
Court:
Q. Why did you know?
A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the respondent is not aware that this
kind of personality affect the other party (sic).
Court:
Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?
A. They do not have children because more often than not the respondent is under the influence of alcohol,
they do not have peaceful harmonious relationship during the less than one year and one thing what is significant,
respondent allowed wife to work as housemaid instead of he who should provide and the petitioner never receive and
enjoy her earning for the five months that she work and it is also the petitioner who took sustainance of the vices.
(sic)
Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to the petitioner?
A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the marital relationship but what he need is
to sustain his vices thru the petitioner (sic).
Court:
Q. What are the vices?
A. Alcohol and gambling.

52

Court:
Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital obligation?
A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-Social Personality Disorder, he is good for
nothing person.[4]
The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report pertinently states:[5]
Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for Nullity of Marriage versus
ANGELITO D. SUAZO
GENERAL DATA
[This pertains to Jocelyns]
BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY
xxxx
Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high school, a part time tricycle driver, eldest
among 4 siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to be an alcoholic, womanizer and a heavy gambler. While
mother is a sales agent. It was a common knowledge within their vicinity that she was also involved in an illicit
relationship. Familial relationship was described to be stormy, chaotic whose bickering and squabbles were part and
parcel of their day to day living.
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is adequately suppressed so much so that it
does not create inner tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives and motivation particularly in
uplifting not, only her socio-emotional image but was as her morale. She may be sensitive yet capable of containing
the effect of such sensitiveness; in order to remain in goodstead (sic) with her immediate environment.
She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a better future in spite of difficulties she
had gone through in the past. She is fully aware of external realities of life that she set simple life goals which is (sic)
commensurate with her capabilities and limitations. However, she needs to prioritize her interest in order to direct her
energy toward specific goals. Her tolerance for frustration appears to be at par with her coping mechanism that she is
able to discharge negative trends appropriately.
REMARKS :
[Already cited in full in the psychologists testimony quoted above][6]
The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of the Philippines strongly opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage. Through a Certification filed with the RTC, it argued that the psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what
she said about him was purely hearsay.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:
While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be considered as
psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would render a person to be unfit to comply
with his marital obligation, such as immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility,
otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on parents or
peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next
drinks (The Family Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)
The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points ( sic) to
one thing that the petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family life with the respondent. On the contrary, the
respondent has not shown love and respect to the petitioner manifested by the formers being irresponsible,
immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of all a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear any longer the
misbehavior and attitude of the respondent, decided, after one year and four months of messy days, to leave the
respondent.

53

In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of her married life with the respondent,
she already suffered from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon her and that she was the one who
worked as a housemaid of a relative of her husband to sustain the latters niece (sic) and because they were living
with her husbands family, she was obliged to do the household chores an indication that she is a battered wife
coupled with the fact that she served as a servant in his (sic) husbands family.
This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed to the fact that at the time of their
marriage, she and her husband are still young and was forced only to said marriage by her relatives.The petitioner
and the respondent had never developed the feeling of love and respect, instead, the respondent blamed the
petitioners family for said early marriage and not to his own liking.
Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[7] the RTC
concluded:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist testimony quoted above] would only
tend to show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from psychological incapacity which is not only grave but
also incurable.
Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268
SCRA 198, wherein the Supreme Court held that:
x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]
The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Familiar
(sic) [the psychologist who testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar] attesting that there is
psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations has been
sufficiently and clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.
A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological incapacity of the respondent is a speculation
and conjecture and without moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as the battered wife/petitioner
will still be using the surname of the respondent, although they are now separated, and a grim and sad reminder of
her husband who made here a slave and a punching bag during the short span of her marriage with him. The law on
annulment should be liberally construed in favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise said law will be an
instrument to protect persons with mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of herein respondent.[8]
THE CA RULING
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling that:
True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs Court of Appeals and
Republic vs Court of Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality of evidence approach which allows the fact of
psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence that medically or clinically identify the root causes of the illness. If
the totality of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to.Applied in Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony of the
aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the social worker were not found to be sufficient to prove psychological
incapacity, in the absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the person whose mental and psychological
capacity was in question.
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent was psychologically
incapable of entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume the essential duties of marriage due to an underlying
psychological illness. Only the wife gave first-hand testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is
inconclusive. As observed by the Court in Marcos, the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the
family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a deeper
psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the psychologist that the respondent
was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any
adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could
equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which
are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal to work could
have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage. In
any event, the respondent was not under a permanent compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to
engage in productive work and more stable relationships with another. The element of permanence or incurability that
is one of the defining characteristic of psychological incapacity is not present.

54

There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same roof, the married life of the
petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this reason be extinguished. As the
Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a reminder of the inviolability of the
marriage institution in our country and the foundation of the family that the law seeks to protect. The concept of
psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality are convenient excuses of parties to separate
and divorce.
THE PETITION
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA ruling based on the following arguments:
1.
The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally disregarded the legal basis of the RTC in
declaring the marriage null and void Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate, should be Tuason v. Court of
Appeals) holds that the finding of the Trial Court as to the existence or non-existence of petitioners psychological
incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us (the Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently
shown that the trial courts factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private respondents witnesses vis--vis
petitioners defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous;
2.
Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this omission was intentional to give
the courts a wider discretion to interpret the term without being shackled by statutory parameters. Article 36 though
was taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which gives three conditions that would make a person
unable to contract marriage from mental incapacity as follows:
1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;
(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
duties which are to be mutually given and accepted;
(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony due to causes of a psychic
nature.
The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these criteria. The RTC, being clothed with discretionary
functions, applied its finding of psychological incapacity based on existing jurisprudence and the law itself which gave lower court
magistrates enough latitude to define what constitutes psychological incapacity. On the contrary, she further claims, the OSG relied on
generalities without being specific on why it is opposed to the dissolution of a marriage that actually exists only in name.
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no
basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
The Law, Molina and Te
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely introduced an abstract concept psychological
incapacity that disables compliance with the contractual obligations of marriage without any concrete definition or, at the very least, an
illustrative example. We must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological incapacity was shaped and developed
in jurisprudence.
Santos v. Court of Appeals[9] declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must
be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.[10]

55

The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law in Republic v. Court of
Appeals[11] (Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties or one of them was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as apsychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations,
not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[12]
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic requirements of Santos.[13]
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should
be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can
be duly established.[15]
Pesca v. Pesca[16] clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already pending, under the reasoning that the
courts interpretation or construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so interpreted and
construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds

56

itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who
have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently provides:
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating
or describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial
conference the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the
petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.
All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that came to us were invariably decided based on the
principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-Te[17] (Te) which
revisited the Molina guidelines.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not give any examples of psychological
incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis; that the
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.[18] Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the
law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its application.[19]
Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is consistent with that of the Canon Law.

Going back to its basic premise, Te said:

Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether
a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment
in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings,
the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower
court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of
testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the
case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v.
Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting[20] follows Tes lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning
Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages:[21]

57

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and
to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too
expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are
provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed itnecessary to relax this stringent
requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or
clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pretrial conference.

Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,[22] merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in
these cases, which it expounded on as follows:
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decisionmaking, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
xxxx
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the
precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And
as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.[23] [Underscoring
supplied]
This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.[24]
Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on Article 36 of the Family Code, what
should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage; that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is
about to assume.[25] It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with
his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral
element in the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations
must be shown.[26] Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is
different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. [27]
If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability
requisites. This is proof of Santos continuing doctrinal validity.
The Present Case
As the CA did, we find Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological incapacity to perform essential
marital obligations. We so conclude based on our own examination of the evidence on record, which we were compelled to undertake
because of the differences in the trial court and the appellate courts appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyns presented evidence.

58

a.

The Expert Opinion Evidence

Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability
of Angelitos alleged psychological condition.
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence the psychologists testimony and the
psychological evaluation report that Jocelyn presented.Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelitos
psychological condition only in an indirect manner she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for
her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court
must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards
outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is
mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we
recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a determination
though of a partys complete personality profile, information coming from persons intimately related to him (such as the partys close
relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it
avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of
information.
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested
party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis
of Angelitos psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological condition,
this is not true for Angelitos. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of
examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological
report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.
Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologists report and testimony simply provided a general description of
Angelitos purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and
incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or theparticulars that gave rise to the
characterization she gave. These particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can they be found in her testimony.
For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelitos personality disorder is chronic or incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with
the disorder prior to his marriage with Jocelyn or even during his early developmental stage, as basic trust was not
developed. However, she did not support this declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she based her conclusion on the
presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologists own equivocation
on this point she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself may have realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this
finding is highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyns assumed knowledge of Angelitos family background and upbringing.
Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what extent was Angelitos personality
disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on Angelitos awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties
and responsibilities of marriage.
The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important concerns or requisites of psychological
incapacity, all of which are critical to the success of Jocelyns cause.
b.

Jocelyns Testimony

The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and the psychologists testimony impel us to proceed
to the evaluation of Jocelyns testimony, to find out whether she provided the court with sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelitos
psychological incapacity.

59

Unfortunately, we find Jocelyns testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelitos habitual drunkenness,
gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she received from him all of which occurred after the
marriage. Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be indicative
of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged
physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings
exactly took place whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary
gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves,
show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited
jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment. While we may concede that physical
violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, such violence, standing alone, does not constitute
psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost in the present
case under our finding that the opinion of the psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyns account of
the physical beatings she received from Angelito were true, this evidence does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related
jurisprudence, specifically the Santos requisites.
On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases we now find to be clearly and manifestly
erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyns
main anchor in her present appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary, the CA correctly applied
Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence of the present case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the appealed Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs against the petitioner.

KALAW vs. FERNANDEZ

A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established facts. It is the plaintiffs burden to convince the court of the existence of
these facts.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) May 27, 2004 Decision[2] and December 15, 2004 Resolution[3] in CA-G.R. CV
No. 64240, which reversed the trial courts declaration of nullity of the herein parties marriage. The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFOREthe appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED while the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and eventually
married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime
Teodoro (Jay).
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son in March 1983.[5]
In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and her four children with Tyrone.[6] Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with
Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.[7]
In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house
in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver.[8] The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got
sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.[9]

60

In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns permission to go to Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded only to learn later
that Tyrone brought the children to the US.[10]After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy and
Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father.[11]
Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36
of the Family Code.[12] He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the time
of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards
Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation, as shown by Malyns following acts:
1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night;
2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and
3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto.[13]
During trial,[14] Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyns alleged infidelity. According to him, on June 9, 1985, he and his brother-in-law, Ronald
Fernandez (Malyns brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned that Malyn was occupying a room with a certain Benjie Guevarra (Benjie). When
he proceeded to the said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn inside. [15] At rebuttal, Tyrone elaborated that Benjie was wearing only a towel around his
waist, while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear. After an exchange of words, he agreed not to charge Malyn with adultery when the latter agreed
to relinquish all her marital and parental rights.[16] They put their agreement in writing before Atty. Jose Palarca.
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on
Malyns psychological incapacity.
Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her
frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). [17] NPD is present when a person is obsessed to meet her wants
and needs in utter disregard of her significant others.[18] Malyns NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.[19]
Dr. Gates reported that Malyns personality disorder may have been evident even prior to her marriage because it is rooted in her family background
and upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and without a proper maternal role model.[20]
Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrones sister-in-law), and the son Miggy. She also
read the transcript of Tyrones court testimony.[21]
Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates assessment. He concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties. [22] He
explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyns ego to the point that
her needs became priority, while her kids and husbands needs became secondary. Malyn is so self-absorbed that she is incapable of prioritizing her
familys needs.
Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are not disorders by themselves. They only constitute psychological incapacity
whenever inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the detriment of ones familial duties. [23] Fr. Healy characterized Malyns
psychological incapacity as grave and incurable.[24]
He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyns expert witness.
[25]
He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyns habits because he believed it is the courts duty to do so.
[26]
Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption that the factual allegations are indeed true.
Malyns version
Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated.[27] While she admitted playing mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as Tyrone alleged. She
maintained that she did so only two to three times a week and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only. [28] And in those instances, she always had
Tyrones permission and would often bring the children and their respective yayas with her.[29] She maintained that she did not neglect her duties as
mother and wife.
Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however, explained that she did so only to escape her physically abusive husband.
[30]
On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, was upset that Malyn was preparing to go to work. He called up the security
guards and instructed them not to let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then placed cigarette ashes on Malyns head and proceeded to lock the bedroom
doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of their bedroom and into her mother-in-laws room. She blurted that Tyrone would beat her up
again so her mother-in-law gave her P300 to leave the house.[31] She never returned to their conjugal home.

61

Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrones wishes, because she wanted to be self-sufficient. Her resolve came from her discovery
that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the US with Jocelyn.[32]
Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was so drunk after
partying with friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but maintained being fully clothed at that
time.[33] Malyn insisted that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her spousal and parental rights under duress.[34]
After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously visiting them in school. She later obtained partial custody of the children as
an incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone against her (which action was subsequently dismissed for lack of interest).
As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested by his drug
dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence.[35] Malyn presented Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her expert witness.
Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her psychological evaluation of the spouses. The factual narrations culled from
these interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a lousy mother because of her mahjong habit, [36] while Malyn was fed up with Tyrones sexual infidelity,
drug habit, and physical abuse. [37] Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and Malyn were behaviorally immature. They encountered problems
because of their personality differences, which ultimately led to the demise of their marriage. Her diagnostic impressions are summarized below:
The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very beginning. Both of them were not truly ready for marriage even
after two years of living together and having a child. When Malyn first met Tyrone who showered her with gifts, flowers, and
affection she resisted his overtures. She made it clear that she could take him or leave him. But the minute she started to care,
she became a different person clingy and immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most
important person in his life. She became relationship-dependent. It appears that her style then was when she begins to care for a
man, she puts all her energy into him and loses focus on herself. This imbalance between thinking and feeling was overwhelming
to Tyrone who admitted that the thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that when he was in his younger years, he
was often out seeking other women. His interest in them was not necessarily for sex, just for fun dancing, drinking, or simply
flirting.
Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn adapted to her husband who was a moody man with short
temper and unresolved issues with parents and siblings. He was a distancer, concerned more about his work and friends tha[n] he
was about spending time with his family. Because of Malyns and Tyrones backgrounds (both came from families with high
conflicts) they experienced turmoil and chaos in their marriage. The conflicts they had struggled to avoid suddenly galloped out of
control Their individual personalities broke through, precipitating the demise of their marriage.[38]
Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn exhibited significant, but not severe, dependency, narcissism, and
compulsiveness.[39]
On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship problems with Tyrone, she appeared to have a good relationship with her
kids.[40] As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent him from committing himself to his duties as a husband. He is unable to remain
faithful to Malyn and is psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty.[41]
Childrens version
The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they would accompany their
mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her friends. None of them reported being neglected or feeling abandoned.
The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was only Ria who admitted actually witnessing physical abuse inflicted on her
mother.[42] The two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their mother would visit them only in school.[43]
The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver during the time that their dad was abroad. [44] While they did not live with
their mother while they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in agreement that their mother took care of them on weekends and would see to
their needs. They had a common recollection that the househelp would call their mother to come and take care of them in Valle Verde whenever any
of them was sick.[45]
Other witnesses
Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrones attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration of Tyrones confinement, the couple
appeared happy and the wife was commendable for the support she gave to her spouse. [46] He likewise testified that Tyrone tested negative for drugs
and was not a drug dependent.[47]
Malyns brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrones allegation that they found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel room. Contrary to Tyrones
version, he testified that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in the hallway. He likewise did not recall seeing Benjie or Malyn halfnaked.[48]
Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of Malyns group of friends. He stated on the stand that they would go on nightsout as a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend afterwards.[49]

62

Social worker
The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to conduct a social case study on the parties as well as the minor children. Arre
interviewed the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor children Miggy/Mickey and Jay; Tyrones live-in partner, Jocelyn; [50] and Tyrone and Malyns only
daughter, Ria. While both parents are financially stable and have positive relationships with their children, she recommended that the custody of the
minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the interviews of family members themselves, Malyn was shown to be more available to the children
and to exercise better supervision and care. The social worker commended the fact that even after Malyn left the conjugal home in 1985, she made
efforts to visit her children clandestinely in their respective schools. And while she was only granted weekend custody of the children, it appeared that
she made efforts to personally attend to their needs and to devote time with them.[51]
On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the couples de facto separation, simply left the children for several years with only a
maid and a driver to care for them while he lived with his second family abroad. [52] The social worker found that Tyrone tended to prioritize his second
family to the detriment of his children with Malyn. Given this history during the formative years of the children, the social worker did not find Tyrone a
reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be awarded.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court[53]
After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The courts Decision is encapsulated in this paragraph:
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from psychological incapacity to perform their essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties entered into a marriage without as much as understanding what it
entails. They failed to commit themselves to its essential obligations: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of their children to become responsible individuals. Parties psychological
incapacity is grave, and serious such that both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. The
incapacity has been clinically established and was found to be pervasive, grave and incurable.[54]
The trial court then declared the parties marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[55]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals[56]
Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA. The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record. Both
parties allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of psychological incapacity. The parties faults tend only to picture
their immaturity and irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial obligations. At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation.
[57]
Moreover, the psychological report submitted by petitioners expert witness, Dr. Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis of NPD came to be
drawn from the sources. It failed to satisfy the legal and jurisprudential requirements for the declaration of nullity of marriage.[58]
Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration[59] but the same was denied on December 15, 2004.[60]
Petitioners arguments
Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, which is the court that is in the best position to
appreciate the evidence. He opines that he has presented preponderant evidence to prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform
her essential marital obligations, to wit:
a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that respondents egocentric attitude, immaturity, selfobsession and self-centeredness were manifestations of respondents NPD;[61]
b) these expert witnesses proved that respondents NPD is grave and incurable and prevents her from performing her essential
martial obligations;[62] and
c) that respondents NPD existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage because it is rooted in her upbringing, family
background, and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage.[63]
Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void because of psychological incapacity, albeit on petitioners part.[64]
Respondents arguments
Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her alleged psychological incapacity.[65] She argues that the testimonies of
her children and the findings of the court social worker to the effect that she was a good, loving, and attentive mother are sufficient to rebut Tyrones
allegation that she was negligent and irresponsible.[66]
She assails Dr. Gatess report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates did not interview her, their common children, or even Jocelyn. Moreover,
her report failed to state that Malyns alleged psychological incapacity was grave and incurable.[67] Fr. Healys testimony, on the other hand, was based
only on Tyrones version of the facts.[68]

63

Malyn reiterates the appellate courts ruling that the trial court Decision is intrinsically defective for failing to support its conclusion of psychological
incapacity with factual findings.
Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had a change of heart and filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to
Withdraw Comment and Memorandum.[69] She manifested that she was no longer disputing the possibility that their marriage may really be void on
the basis of Tyrones psychological incapacity. She then asked the Court to dispose of the case with justice.[70] Her manifestation and motion were
noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution.[71]
Issue
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial courts Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. [72] The burden of
proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. [73] The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior,
suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital
state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.[74]
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two
supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on
the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of
respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts
opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In
fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly played
mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted
petitioners allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the permission
of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she played
mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that
respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to
respondents mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the years
when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged
debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for
attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends. Petitioner
presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario
only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an
extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other
men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for
concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment
of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once
did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were
sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from
their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two
sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyns
actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CAs
reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and
evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the
evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.

64

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of
themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a
marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, Respondent.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution3dated February 3, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 69103 which affirmed the Decision 4 dated October 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11 (RTC) in Civil Case No. S665 declaring the marriage of respondent Rodolfo O. De Gracia (Rodolfo)
and Natividad N. Rosalem (Natividad) void on the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines5 (Family Code).
The Facts
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the Parish of St. Vincent Ferrer in Salug, Zamboanga del Norte. 6 They
lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have two (2) children, namely, Ma. Reynilda R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and
Ma. Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma. Rizza), who were born on August 20, 1969 and January 15, 1972, respectively.7
On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage (complaint) before the RTC, docketed as
Civil Case No. S665, alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. In
compliance with the Order8 dated January 5, 1999 of the RTC, the public prosecutor conducted an investigation to determine if
collusion exists between Rodolfo and Natividad and found that there was none.9 Trial on the merits then ensued.
In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he first met Natividad when they were students at the Barangay High
School of Sindangan,10 and he was forced to marry her barely three (3) months into their courtship in light of her accidental
pregnancy.11 At the time of their marriage, he was 21 years old, while Natividad was 18 years of age. He had no stable job and merely
worked in the gambling cockpits as kristo and bangkero sa hantak. When he decided to join and train with the army, 12Natividad left
their conjugal home and sold their house without his consent. 13 Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived with a
certain Engineer Terez (Terez), and bore him a child named Julie Ann Terez. 14 After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a
second marriage on January 11, 1991 with another man named Antonio Mondarez and has lived since then with the latter in Cagayan
de Oro City.15 From the time Natividad abandoned them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizza 16 and he
exerted earnest efforts to save their marriage which, however, proved futile because of Natividads psychological incapacity that
appeared to be incurable.17
For her part, Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as appear during trial, despite service of summons. 18 Nonetheless, she informed
the court that she submitted herself for psychiatric examination to Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to Rodolfos
claims.19 Rodolfo also underwent the same examination.20
In her twopage psychiatric evaluation report,21 Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered from utter emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and
unacceptable behavior considered [as] deviant from persons who abide by established norms of conduct. 22 As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos
also observed that she lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters. Similarly, Rodolfo failed to
perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired a son with another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental
condition of both parties already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage, although it only manifested after. Based on the
foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the couples union was bereft of the mind, will and heart for the obligations of marriage. 23
On February 10, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed an
opposition24 to the complaint, contending that the acts committed by Natividad did not demonstrate psychological incapacity as
contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for legal separation under the Family Code.25
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision26 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Zalsos, holding that Natividads emotional immaturity exhibited a
behavioral pattern which in psychiatry constitutes a form of personality disorder that existed at the time of the parties marriage but
manifested only thereafter. It likewise concurred with Dr. Zalsoss observation that Natividads condition is incurable since it is deeply
rooted within the makeup of her personality. Accordingly, it concluded that Natividad could not have known, much more comprehend
the marital obligations she was assuming, or, knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.27
The Republic appealed to the CA, averring that there was no showing that Natividads personality traits constituted psychological
incapacity as envisaged under Article 36 of the Family Code, and that the testimony of the expert witness was not conclusive upon the
court.28
The CA Ruling
In a Decision29 dated June 2, 2005, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, finding that while Natividads emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility and promiscuity by themselves do not necessarily equate to psychological incapacity, their degree or severity, as duly

65

testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has sufficiently established a case of psychological disorder so profound as to render [Natividad] incapacitated
to perform her essential marital obligations.30
The Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution 31 dated February 3, 2006, hence, the instant
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTCs finding of psychological incapacity.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 32 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental
not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 33 of the Family Code, among
others,34include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.35 In Santos v. CA36 (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e.,
it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved).37 The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA,38whose salient points are footnoted hereunder.39 These
guidelines incorporate the basic requirements that the Court established in Santos.40
Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA,41 held that therein respondents emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.42 In the same light, the Court, in the case of Pesca v. Pesca43(Pesca),
ruled against a declaration of nullity, as petitioner therein utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to
make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to
warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage, significantly noting that the [e]motional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by
her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. In Pesca, the Court upheld the appellate courts finding that the petitioner therein
had not established that her husband showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable;
that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the
incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and
incurable in nature.44
The Court maintains a similar view in this case. Based on the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to
conclude that Natividads emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological
incapacity.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos which does not, however, explain in
reasonable detail how Natividads condition could be characterized as grave, deeplyrooted, and incurable within the parameters of
psychological incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to disclose the types of psychological tests which she administered on
Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of Natividads condition and to show that it existed at the time of the
parties marriage. Neither was the gravity or seriousness of Natividads behavior in relation to her failure to perform the essential marital
obligations sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsoss report. Further, the finding contained therein on the incurability of Natividads condition
remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare conclusion and even self
serving. In the same vein, Dr. Zalsoss testimony during trial, which is essentially a reiteration of her report, also fails to convince the
Court of her conclusion that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated. Verily, although expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight by the courts, the existence of psychological
incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence. 45 After poring over the records, the Court, however, does not find any such
evidence sufficient enough to uphold the court a quos nullity declaration. To the Courts mind, Natividads refusal to live with Rodolfo
and to assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically
incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform ones duties is another. To hark back to what has been earlier discussed,
psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.46 In the final analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder of this nature to
exist in the present case. Thus, for these reasons, coupled too with the recognition that marriage is an inviolable social institution and
the foundation of the family,47 the instant petition is hereby granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution dated February 3, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CAGR. CV No. 69103 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
filed under Article 36 of the Family Code isDISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

66

G.R. No. 192718

February 18, 2015
ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner, vs. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the November 20, 2009 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) and its June 1, 2010 Resolution,2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, which reversed and set aside the September
20, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City(RTC-Br.37), declaring the marriage between petitioner
Robert F. Mallilin (Robert) and private respondent Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz) null and void.
The Facts:
Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.
On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, Branch 23, Cagayan de Oro City
(RTC-Br. 23). On March 7, 1996, RTC-Br. 23 denied the petition. Robert appealed this judgment before the CA where it was docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 54261. On January 29, 1999, the CA reversed the RTC-Br. 23 decision "due to lack of participation of the State as
required under Article 48 of the Family Code." 3 The case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings and its records were
thereafter transferred from RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br. 37, as the latter was designated as Family Court pursuant to the Family Code Act of
1997.
In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering from psychological and mental
incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. Such
incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility,
deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was Robert who manifested psychological
incapacity in their marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did not appear during the trial. Assistant City Prosecutor Isabelo Sabanal
appeared for the State. When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in California, USA, and had married an
American. He also revealed that when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing and dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag.
He also claimed that from the outset, Luz had been remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the following
circumstances: (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know how to keep order; (2) it was her mother who
prepared their meal while her sister was the one who washed their clothes because she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it
was also her sister who took care of their children while she spent her time sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed
her schooling, she dated different men; (5) he received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when he was
not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house when he was away; and (6) she would
contract loans without his knowledge.
In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance Psychologist II of Northern
Mindanao Medical Center.
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan
Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal).
On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their marriage invalid ab initio on the ground of grave
lack of due discretion on the part of both parties as contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon1095. This decision was affirmed
by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).
Prior to that, on September 20, 2002,the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal with the CA. The OSG argued that Robert
failed to make a case for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Luz. It pointed out that the real cause of the marital discord was the
sexual infidelity of Luz. Such ground, the OSG contended, should not result in the nullification of the marriage under the law, but merely
constituted a ground for legal separation.
The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,4 granted the petition and reversed the RTC decision. The decision, including the decretal
portion, partially reads:
[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer scrutiny of the records reveals, as correctly noted by the Solicitor
General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. x x x.
xxxx
In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the evidence adduced by Robert fell short of establishing the fact that at the
time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived [her] of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
xxxx
We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellees undeserved marital plight. Yet, Our paramount duty as a court compels Us to apply the law
at all costs, however harsh it may be on whomsoever is called upon to bear its unbiased brunt.
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated September 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. 94-178 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.5

67

Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its June 1, 2010 Resolution, 6 stating that the arguments of
Robert were mere rehash of the same ground, arguments and discussion previously pointed out by him, and that no new substance
was brought out to warrant the reconsideration or reversal of its decision.
Hence, this petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF
THE WIFE UNDERSCORES THE EVIDENTIAL GAP TO SUSTAIN THE DECISION OFTHE RTC DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE OF PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE NATIONAL APPELLATE MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE
CATHOLIC BISHOPS CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES AS GUILTY OF GRAVE LACKOF DUE DISCRETION.
III
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO
COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of his marriage even in the absence of any medical, psychiatric or
psychological examination of the wife by a competent and qualified professional. To bolster his claim, he avers that the Metropolitan
Tribunal already declared that Luz exhibited grave lack of discretion in judgment concerning the essential rights and obligations
mutually given and accepted in marriage. The said decision was affirmed by the NAMT.
Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz with different men coupled with the fact that she failed to function as a home
maker to her family and as a housewife to him incapacitated her from accepting and complying with her essential marital obligations.
For said reason, he asserts that the case of Luz was not a mere case of sexual infidelity, but clearly an illness that was rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition which incapacitated her to carry out the responsibilities of a married woman. Robert avers that a sex
maniac is not just a mere sexual infidel but one who is suffering from a deep psychological problem.
Position of the State
The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the totality of evidence presented by Robert was not sufficient to support a finding that
Luz was psychologically incapacitated. His evidence fell short of establishing his assertion that at the time of their marriage, Luz was
suffering from a psychological defect which deprived her of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities.
With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal and the NAMT, the OSG claims that the same were only given persuasive value
and were not controlling or decisive in cases of nullity of marriage. Further, the decision was based on grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning matrimonial rights and obligations due to outside factors other than psychological incapacity as contemplated in
Article 36 of the Family Code. The OSG also raises the strong possibility of collusion between the parties as shown by the events that
took place after the issuance of the March 7, 1996 RTC Decision. The OSG wrote:
Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court issued its March 7, 1996 Decision unmistakably show the collusion between
the parties to obtain the reliefs pleaded. Among others, respondents Retraction of Testimony was executed without the presence of
counsel sometime in 1998, a few months before she married an American. This irregularity was even noticed by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:
xxxx
The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor General became indispensable, in the present recourse, when, in a whirlwind
turn of events, the Appellee made a VOLTE FACE executed a "Retraction of Testimony" and a "Waiver of Custody" waiving custody of
Franco Mark J Mallillin, still a minor, her son by the Appellant. It bears stressing that the Appellee, in the Court a quo, obdurately denied
the material allegations of the Appellants complaint and declared that it was the Appellant who was psychologically incapacitated. The
sudden turn-about of the appellee, in the present recourse, to the extent of disowning her testimony in the Court a quo and even
praying for the reversal of the Decision of the Trial Court is strongly suggestive, if not constitutive, of collusion or a modus vivendi
between the parties, outlawed by the Family Code of the Philippines and the Constitution. x x x
The Courts Ruling
The main issue is whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition is bereft of merit.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental
not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be

68

assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include
their mutual obligations to live together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.7
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only emerge after the
marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 8
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr., 9 the Court reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,10based on Article 36 of the Family Code. Thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.
xxxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x.
xxxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x x x.
xxxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. x x x.
xxxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x
x.
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that Roberts evidence failed to establish the psychological
incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage. Other than his self-serving
testimony, no other evidence was adduced to show the alleged incapacity of Luz. He presented no other witnesses to corroborate his
allegations on her behavior. Thus, his testimony was self-serving and had no serious value as evidence.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or clinically identified, and sufficiently proven
during the trial. Based on the records, Robert failed to prove that her disposition of not cleaning the room, preparing their meal, washing
the clothes, and propensity for dating and receiving different male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the
parameters of jurisprudence on psychological incapacity.
The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and
infidelity, cannot rise to the level of psychological incapacity that justifies the nullification of the parties' marriage. The Court has
repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. 11 Indeed, to
be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. Psychological
incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.12
As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a
marriage void based on psychological incapacity. Robert argues that the series of sexual indiscretion of Luz were external
manifestations of the psychological defect that she was suffering within her person, which could be considered as nymphomania or
"excessive sex hunger." Other than his allegations, however, no other convincing evidence was adduced to prove that these sexual
indiscretions were considered as nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the term of psychological
incapacity embodied in Article 36. To stress, Roberts testimony alone is insufficient to prove the existence of psychological incapacity.

69

In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of the Philippines, 13 the Court ruled that the respondents act of
living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown
that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. The petitioner must be able to establish that the respondents
unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality, which made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of the marital state.
Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center, Cagayan deOro City,
was insufficient to prove the psychological in capacity of Luz. There was nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz had either
been interviewed or was subjected to a psychological examination. The finding as to her psychological incapacity was based entirely on
hearsay and the self-serving information provided by Robert.
Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that in the
case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 14 the Court stated that interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence. Thus:
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence provides:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the NAMT cannot be given value since it was not offered during the trial, and
the Court has in no way of ascertaining the evidence considered by the same tribunal.
Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out that the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the NAMT was
not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature similar to Article 36 of the Family Code, but the
second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portions of the NAMT decision are as
follows:
The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law that based on the deposition of the petitioner the respondent
understandably ignored the proceedings completely for which she was duly cited for Contempt of Court and premised on the
substantially concordant testimonies of the Witnesses, the woman Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through her action
and reaction patterns, before and after the marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of due discretion in judgement for marriage intents and
purposes basically by reason of her immaturity of judgement as manifested by her emotional ambivalence x x x.
WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS, having invoked the Divine Name and having in mind the Law, the
Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining to the Case, hereby declares and decrees the confirmation of the nullity decision rendered by
the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manil on the Marriage Case MALLILIN JAMISOLAMIN with Prot. N.
63/2000 on the ground provided by Canon 1095 par. 2CIC on the part of the woman Respondent but NOT on the part of the man
Petitioner for lack of evidence. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)15
In Santos v. Santos,6 the Court referred to the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted
the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It went out to state that a part of the provision is similar to
the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to
be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In Najera v. Najera,17 the Court was also confronted with a similar issue of whether to consider an annulment by the NAMT as also
covering psychological incapacity, the only ground recognized in our law. In the said case, the NAMT decision was also based on the
second paragraph of Canon 1095. The Court ruled that it was not similar to, and only annulments under the third paragraph of, Canon
1095 should be considered. Elucidating, the Court wrote: Petitioners argument is without merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to consider the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunals
decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the
Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before this Court and correctly held that petitioners motion for
reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this Court only on February 11,
2004, reads as follows:

70

[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons
from the Court dated June14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia
followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husbandrespondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital
contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two
siblings have broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom [he] identified and on whom he
depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of
bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity
of his mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and
alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to
final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered the
pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the
sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of
Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies of
the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-appellants mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon,
Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994
wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial
Tribunal, petitioner-appellants sister-in-law and friends of the opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As to the
contents and veracity of the latters testimonies, this Court is without any clue. True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al.
(268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal
expounded as follows:
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the Decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different set of evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their
truthfulness. Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence presented before the court (Manzano
vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment of
the Trial Court.[31]
Santos v. Santos18 cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to
provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of
Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to
be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095
which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to
be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from
the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia
followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husbandrespondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital
contract x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered the
pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the
sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of
Canon Law. x x x.
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to
the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the
decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred

71

in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC. (Emphases in the original; Underscoring supplied)
Hence, Roberts reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To repeat, the decision of the NAMT was based on the second paragraph
of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
obligations to be mutually given and accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under Article 36 of the Family Code. A cause of
psychological nature similar to Article 36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law (Santos v. Santos
19), which for ready reference reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
xxxx
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second paragraph of Canon 1095 should also be covered would
be to expand what the lawmakers did not intend to include. What would prevent members of other religious groups from invoking their
own interpretation of psychological incapacity? Would this not lead to multiple, if not inconsistent, interpretations?
To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36 would be legislating from the bench.1wphi1 As
stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 20 interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines are
given great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or decisive.
In Republic v. Galang,21 it was written that the Constitution set out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social
institution, and the marriage was the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be
dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage
lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly
entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is
compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce sufficient and convincing evidence to prove the
alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.
As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner make a case for legal separation. Hence, this decision is without prejudice to
an action for legal separation if a party would want to pursue such proceedings. In this disposition, the Court cannot decree a legal
separation because in such proceedings, there are matters and consequences like custody and separation of properties that need to be
considered and settled.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, dated November 20,
2009, and its Resolution, dated June 1, 2010, are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice.

G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. EDNA ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA, Respondent.
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, assails the October 18, 2013 Decision 1 and the January 8, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 03768-MIN, which affirmed the October 8, 2009 Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon (RTC), in SP Proc. Case No. 3316-09, granting the petition of respondent Edna Orcelino-Villanueva (Edna) and declaring her
husband, Romeo L. Villanueva (Romeo), as presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code. 4chanrobleslaw
The
Edna

Antecedents
and

Romeo

were

married

on

December

21,

1978,

in

Iligan

City.

In 1992, Edna worked as domestic helper in Singapore while her husband worked as a mechanic in Valencia City, Bukidnon. In 1993,
Edna heard the news from her children that Romeo had left their conjugal home without reason or information as to his whereabouts.
Thereafter, Edna took a leave from work and returned to the country to look for Romeo. She inquired from her parents-in-law and
common friends in Iligan City. Still, she found no leads as to his whereabouts or existence. She also went to his birthplace in Escalante,
Negros
Oriental,
and
inquired
from
his
relatives.
On August 6, 2009, Edna filed before the RTC a petition 5 to declare Romeo presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.
During the trial, Edna was presented as the lone witness. In its October 8, 2009 Order,6 the RTC granted the petition on the basis of her
well-founded belief of Romeo's death. Hence:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Romeo L. Villanueva to be presumptively dead for all legal
intents and purposes in accordance with Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines, without prejudice to his reappearance.

72

SO ORDERED.7
On August 13, 2010, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in finding that Edna had a well-founded belief that Romeo, her absent spouse, was dead. It argued
that the conclusions reached by the RTC were in direct opposition to established jurisprudence, as ruled by the Court in Republic v.
Nolasco8 (Nolasco) andU.S. v. Biasbas9 On October 18, 2013, the CA dismissed the petition, holding that the RTC acted within its
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed decision having been expressly clothed with the power to determine the case. 10 It also cited Article
247 of the Family Code11 which provided for the final and immediate executory character of the decision of the RTC, acting as a family
court, thus, rendering the issue of whether or not Edna had sufficiently established a well-founded belief to warrant the decree of
presumptive
death
of
her
absent
spouse,
as
moot
and
academic.
On November 20, 2013, the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it on January 8, 2014.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC DECISION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CONCLUSION
REACHED BY THE RTC IS CONTRARY TO PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT THE GROUNDS RAISED BY THE PETITIONER TO ASSAIL THE RTC
DECISION ARE MERE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT.12
The OSG argues that the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when the latter affirmed the existence
of Edna's well-founded belief as to the death of her absent spouse. It claims that the evidence presented by Edna, which merely
consisted of bare and uncorroborated assertions, never amounted to a diligent and serious search required under prevailing
jurisprudence.
Respondent Edna, through her counsel, invokes the finality, inalterability and immutability of the RTC decision, which was affirmed by
the CA.13chanrobleslaw
Ruling of the Court
The

Court

grants

the

petition.

Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a judicial declaration of presumptive death may be granted, the present spouse must
prove that he/she has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead. 14In this case, Edna failed. The RTC and the CA overlooked
Edna's patent non-compliance with the said requirement. The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse
to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts
and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort
(not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack of any news that the absentee
spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. 15 The
premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of complying with the stringent requirement of
well-founded belief which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain
not only the absent spouse's whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already
dead.16chanrobleslaw
This strict standard approach ensures that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not
used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws in light of the State's policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage.
Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts but instead should see to it that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is
met.17chanrobleslaw
Accordingly, in a string of cases, this Court has denied petitions for the declaration of presumptive death on the said basis.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court ruled that the present spouse failed to prove that he had a well-founded
belief that his absent spouse was already dead before he filed his petition. His efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly consisted of the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1)

He went to his in-laws' house to look for her;

(2)

He sought the barangay captain's aid to locate her;

(3)

He went to her friends' houses to find her and inquired about her whereabouts among her friends;

73

(4)

He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in malls during his free time;

(5)

He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and

(6)

He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.

Despite these claimed "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the present spouse. The Court explained that he failed to present
the persons from whom he made inquiries and only reported his wife's absence after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in
the
RTC.
Similarly in Republic v. Granada,19 the Court ruled that the present spouse failed to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent
spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the petition. She simply did not exert diligent efforts to locate her husband either in the
country or in Taiwan, where he was known to have worked. Moreover, she did not explain her omissions. In said case, the Court
wrote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts
of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a
well-founded belief of the death of the absent spouse depends upon inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring
before and after the disappearance of an absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by the present
spouse.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife, who had been missing for more than four
years. He testified that his efforts to find her consisted of:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1)

Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;

(2)

Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and

(3)

Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless.

The Court held that the present spouse's methods of investigation were too sketchy to form a basis that his wife was already dead. It
stated that the pieces of evidence only proved that his wife had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not
that
she
was
dead.
Recently, in Republic v. Cantor20 (Cantor), the Court considered the present spouse's efforts to have fallen short of the "stringent
standard" and lacked the degree of diligence required by jurisprudence as she did not actively look for her missing husband; that she
did not report his absence to the police or seek the aid of the authorities to look for him; that she did not present as witnesses her
missing husband's relatives or their neighbors and friends, who could corroborate her efforts to locate him; that these persons, from
whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named; and that there was no other corroborative evidence to support her claim that
she conducted a diligent search. In the Court's view, the wife merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated
inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She, thus, failed to conduct a diligent search. Her claimed efforts were insufficient to
form
a
well-founded
belief
that
her
husband
was
already
dead.
In this case, Edna claimed to have
husband:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

done

the

following

to

determine

the

whereabouts

and

the

status

of

her

1.

She took a vacation/leave of absence from her work and returned to the Philippines to look for her husband.

2.

She inquired from her parents-in-law in Iligan City and from their common friends in the same city and in Valencia City.

3.

She went as far as the birthplace of her husband in Escalante, Negros Oriental, so she could inquire from her husband's
relatives.

Despite her efforts, she averred that she received negative responses from them because none of them had knowledge of the
existence
of
her
husband
who
had
been
missing
for
15
years.
Applying the standard set forth by the Court in the previously cited cases, particularly Cantor, Edna's efforts failed to satisfy the required
well-founded
belief
of
her
absent
husband's
death.
Her claim of making diligent search and inquiries remained unfounded as it merely consisted of bare assertions without any
corroborative evidence on record. She also failed to present any person from whom she inquired about the whereabouts of her
husband. She did not even present her children from whom she learned the disappearance of her husband. In fact, she was the lone
witness. Following the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof, 21 the Court cannot give credence to
her
claims
that
she
indeed
exerted
diligent
efforts
to
locate
her
husband.
Moreover, no document was submitted to corroborate the allegation that her husband had been missing for at least fifteen (15) years
already. As the OSG observed, there was not even any attempt to seek the aid of the authorities at the time her husband disappeared.
In Cantor, the present spouse claimed to have sought the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, reported his absence to the
police.22 Yet,
the
Court
denied
her
pleas.

74

Verily, it makes sense to conclude that her efforts were not diligent and serious enough to give meaning to her well-founded belief that
Romeo was already dead. Suffice it to state that her petition should have been denied at the first instance. The RTC, however, granted
it, reasoning
xxx that it was in 1993 when the petitioner while abroad heard the news from her children that her husband left their conjugal home xxx
without informing the children nor communicating with the herein petitioner as to the reasons why he left their family abode nor giving
them any information as to his whereabouts; that herein petitioner took vacation/leave of absence from her work and return to the
Philippines, in order to look for her husband and made some inquiries with her parents-in-law in Iligan City, from their common friends in
Iligan City and in Valencia City, and even went as far as the birthplace of her husband, particularly at Escalante, Negros Oriental,
inquiring from her husband's relatives, but she only got negative response from them since none of them have any knowledge as to the
present existence of her husband that since the year 1993 up to the present, a period of about fifteen [15] years have elapsed, the
person and the body of petitioner's husband could not be found, located nor traced as there is no any information as to his existence or
whereabouts.23
Worse, the CA affirmed the RTC decision when it dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the OSG. The CA should have realized the
glaring and patent disregard by the RTC of the rulings in similar situations where petitions for declaration of presumptive death have
been denied by this Court. By declaring Romeo presumptively dead, the CA clearly ignored this Court's categorical pronouncements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the October 18, 2013 Decision and the January 8, 2014 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition of respondent Edna Orcelino-Villanueva to have her husband
declared
presumptively
dead
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 184621
December 10, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.
The petition for review on certiorari1 before us assails the decision2 dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 01558-MIN which affirmed be order3 dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Koronadal City, South
Cotabato, in SP Proc. Case No. 313-25, declaring Jerry F. Cantor, respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantors husband, presumptively
dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Factual Antecedents
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in
Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the
respondents inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerrys expression of
animosity toward the respondents father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not
seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerrys disappearance, the respondent filed before the RTC a petition4for
her husbands declaration of presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had a well-founded
belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as
well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the patients
directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the
petition in court.
The Ruling of the RTC
After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondents petition and declaring Jerry presumptively dead. It concluded
that the respondent had a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead since more than four (4) years had passed without
the former receiving any news about the latter or his whereabouts. The dispositive portion of the order dated December 15, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that respondent Jerry F. Cantor is presumptively dead pursuant to
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse Jerry F.
Cantor.5
The Ruling of the CA
The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari6filed by the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). In its August 27, 2008 decision, the CA dismissed the petitioners petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion
on the RTCs part, and, accordingly, fully affirmed the latters order, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Order dated December 15, 2006
declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.7
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court. The Petition The petitioner contends that certiorari lies to
challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Rule 41 of the Family Code. It maintains that although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial proceedings, including

75

presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately final and executory (hence, not appeal able under Article 247 of the Family Code),
this rule does not mean that they are not subject to review on certiorari.
The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to justify the declaration of her husbands presumptive
death. It claims that the respondent failed to conduct the requisite diligent search for her missing husband. Likewise, the petitioner
invites this Courts attention to the attendant circumstances surrounding the case, particularly, the degree of search conducted and the
respondents resultant failure to meet the strict standard under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Issues
The petition poses to us the following issues:
(1) Whether certiorarilies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code; and
(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition.
a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy
Courts
Judgment
Proceedings
Presumptive
Death
Executory, Hence, Unappealable

in
for
Is

the
Declaration
Final

Judicial
of
and

The Family Code was explicit that the courts judgment in summary proceedings, such as the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be immediately final and executory.
Article 41,in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. [underscores ours]
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject to an appeal, the dispositions and conclusions therein
having become immutable and unalterable not only as against the parties but even as against the courts. 8 Modification of the courts
ruling, no matter how erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and executory nature of this summary proceeding thus prohibits the
resort to appeal. As explained in Republic of the Phils. v. Bermudez-Lorino,9 the right to appeal is not granted to parties because of the
express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely
because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of [Article] 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and
executory." It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTCto give due course to the Republics appeal and order the transmittal of
the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is immediately final and executory.
As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a
statutory privilege." Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial
proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The
Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no
right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics supplied]
Certiorari
Decisions,
Orders
of
Proceeding
for
Death Under the Family Code

Lies

to
Judgments
Trial
the

Challenge
or

Courts

in
Declaration

a
of

the
Final
Summary
Presumptive

A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made
from the trial court's judgment, an aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired.
As held in Delos Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,10 the fact that a decision has become final does not automatically negate the original action
of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in connection with orders or processes issued by the trial court. Certiorari may
be availed of where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and where the ordinary
remedy of appeal is not available. Such a procedure finds support in the case of Republic v. Tango,11 wherein we held that:

76

This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family
Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that
govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
"ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules."
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
"ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69,
73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable."(Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
"ART.247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory."
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment ina summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of
Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. [emphasis ours]
Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioners resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question the RTCs order
declaring Jerry presumptively dead was proper.
b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief
The
Essential
Declaration
Under Article 41 of the Family Code

Requisites
of

for

the
Death

Presumptive

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the
Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where
there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.12
The
Present
of
Proof
Requisites
Under
Family Code Are Present

Spouse
to

Has

Show
Article

the
that
41

All
of

Burden
the
the

The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code are present. Since it
is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands
to reason that the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.13
Declaration
Under
Article
Imposes a Stricter Standard

of
41

of

Presumptive
the

Family

Death
Code

Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it superseded, imposes a stricter
standard. It requires a "well-founded belief " that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death
can be granted. We have had occasion to make the same observation in Republic v. Nolasco,14 where we noted the crucial differences
between Article 41 of the Family Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a
judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter
standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or
the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead
before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any news that such absentee is still alive, failure
to communicate or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise
that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement

77

of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain not only the absent spouses whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.15
The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its
determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouseis already dead. It requires exertion of
active effort (not a mere passive one).
To illustrate this degree of "diligent and reasonable search" required by the law, an analysis of the following relevant cases is warranted:
i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.)16
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),17 the Court ruled that the present spouse failed to prove that he had a
well-founded belief that his absent spouse was already dead before he filed his petition. His efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly
consisted of the following:
(1) He went to his in-laws house to look for her;
(2) He sought the barangay captains aid to locate her;
(3) He went to her friends houses to find her and inquired about her whereabouts among his friends;
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in malls during his free time;
(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and
(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.
Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the present spouse. The Court found that he failed to present the
persons from whom he allegedly made inquiries and only reported his wifes absence after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his
petition in the RTC.
The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family
Code:
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts
of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a
well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring
before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse.18
ii. Republic v. Granada19
Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was
already dead prior to her filing of the petition. In this case, the present spouse alleged that her brother had made inquiries from their
relatives regarding the absent spouses whereabouts. The present spouse did not report to the police nor seek the aid of the mass
media. Applying the standards in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),20 the Court ruled against the present
spouse, as follows:
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to
locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquiredabout the whereabouts of Cyrus from the
latters relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent
in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular
Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end,
but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
iii.Republic v. Nolasco21
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife, who had been missing for more than four
years. He testified that his efforts to find her consisted of:
(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;
(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and
(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless. The Court ruled that the present spouses
investigations were too sketchy to form a basis that his wife was already dead and ruled that the pieces of evidence only proved that his
wife had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
iv.The present case
In the case at bar, the respondents "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted
of the following:
(1) She made inquiries about Jerrys whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and friends; and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients directory, hoping to find Jerry.

78

These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be inferred from the records that her hospital visits and her
consequent checking of the patients directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her
husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these attempts
insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerrys absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. While a finding of
well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it
proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report
his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry.
Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present spouses bare
assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouses whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the friends from whom
he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondents claim that she conducted a diligent search. Neither was
there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and
in-laws about her husbands whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search"
where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because
her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. As held in Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),22 "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the
absent spouse and the natureand extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse."
Strict
Standard
Consistent
with
to Protect and Strengthen Marriage

Approach
States

the

Is
Policy

In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their marriage, has consistently applied
the "strictstandard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code
is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the
stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),23 we emphasized
that:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of ones
spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing
spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties
wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who cannot
have their marriages xxx declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief
because of the xxx summary nature of its proceedings.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the States policy to protect and strengthen the
institution of marriage.24 Since marriage serves as the familys foundation25 and since it is the states policy to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic social institution,26 marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In interpreting and
applying Article 41, this is the underlying rationale to uphold the sanctity of marriage. Arroyo, Jr.v. Court of Appeals27 reflected this
sentiment when we stressed:
[The]protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State has the strongest
interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the
following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
Strict
Article
41
Is for the Present Spouses Benefit

Standard

Prescribed
of

the

Family

Under
Code

The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and consequently, the application of a stringent standard
for its issuance) is also for the present spouse's benefit. It is intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code which might come into play if he/she would prematurely remarry sans the court's declaration.
Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the present spouse's good faith in contracting a
second marriage is effectively established. The decision of the competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith and
his/her criminal intent in case of remarriage is effectively negated. 28 Thus, for purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to strictly comply
with the stringent standard and have the absent spouse judicially declared presumptively dead.
Final Word
As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the strict standard required in petitions for declaration of presumptive
death has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only to cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently
ruled on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this

79

situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the Family
Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the order
dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor
presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014

CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent.

The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An
affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals' resolutions dated November 28,
2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial court's judgment declaring her
presumptively
dead.
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her
husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose
of
remarriage
on
June
15,
2007.1 Ricardo
remarried
on
September
17,
2008. 2chanrobleslaw
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina rented an apartment somewhere in
San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June 18, 1980. 3 After a year, they moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged
in
the
buy
and
sell
business.4chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper.5 As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in
Hong Kong.6 Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's insistence, he allowed her to work abroad. 7 She allegedly applied in an
employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from
again.8chanrobleslaw
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina.9 He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too,
did not know their daughter's whereabouts.10 He also inquired about her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any
information.11chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that she
had
passed
away.12chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies
of
new
trial,
appeal,
petition
for
relief,
or
other
appropriate
remedies. 13chanrobleslaw
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment 14 before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true
residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City.15 According to Celerina, her true residence was in
Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City.16 This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989
until Ricardo left in May 2008.17 As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose
the
petition
declaring
her
presumptively
dead.18chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad. 20 Neither did she go to
an employment agency in February 1995.21 She also claimed that it was not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was
aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City.22 It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with
another woman.23 Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo made false
allegations
in
his
petition.24chanrobleslaw
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had never been published in a
newspaper.25 She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of
Ricardo's
petition.26chanrobleslaw
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for
being a wrong mode of remedy.27 According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil
registry, declaring
her
reappearance
in
accordance
with
Article
42
of
the
Family
Code. 28chanrobleslaw
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution dated November 28, 2008. 29The Court of Appeals denied
the
motion
for
reconsideration
in
the
resolution
dated
March
5,
2009. 30chanrobleslaw

80

Hence,

this

petition

was

filed.

The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a
wrong
remedy
for
a
fraudulently
obtained
judgment
declaring
presumptive
death.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when the spouse is
actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's
death.31 She added that it would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the first place. 32 She
insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is proper when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained
fraudulently.33chanrobleslaw
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code would not be a sufficient remedy
because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment declaring her presumptive death. 34chanrobleslaw
In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy because it cannot be availed
when there are other remedies available. Celerina could always file an affidavit of reappearance to terminate the subsequent marriage.
Ricardo iterated the Court of Appeals' ruling that the remedy afforded to Celerina under Article 42 of the Family Code is the appropriate
remedy.
The

petition

is

meritorious.

Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the
"remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner."36chanrobleslaw
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.37 This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v.
City of Legaspi:38chanrobleslaw
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to
an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or
collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a parly from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his
case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo deliberately made false allegations in the
court with respect to her residence. 40 Ricardo also falsely claimed that she was absent for 12 years. There was also no publication of
the notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general circulation. 41 Celerina claimed that because of these, she was
deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively dead. 42chanrobleslaw
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for declaration of presumptive death were false. 43 Celerina further
claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were
not
given
copies
of
Ricardo's
petition.44chanrobleslaw
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court of Appeals sufficient
ground/s
for
annulment
of
judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment 45 on November 17, 2008. This was less than two years from the July 27, 2007
decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from her discovery of the decision in October 2008. The petition was,
therefore, filed within the four-year period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by laches, which is
the
period
allowed
in
case
of
lack
of
jurisdiction.46chanrobleslaw
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her discovery of the fraud perpetrated on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions, presumptions, and conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by
the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence
of
another
marriage.47chanrobleslaw
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he
or she reappears. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to

81

the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and
without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by
mere
reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse
was
terminated
when
he
or
she
was
declared
absent
or
presumptively
dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to
several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the
civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of
reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance
must
either
be
undisputed
or
judicially
determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's
termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent marriage only
when
all
the
conditions
enumerated
in
the
Family
Code
are
present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first
marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded in
the civil registry of the subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of
reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming, such fact of reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse
is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with
the first spouse.48 The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid. 49 The burden of proof to show that the first marriage
was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second marriage. 50chanrobleslaw
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the subsequent marriage in Social Security
System v. Vda. de Bailon.51 This court noted52 that mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties to
the subsequent marriage were notified if there was "no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by [filing an]
affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]" 53 "Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the
former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must
still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law."54chanrobleslaw
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the second marriage and the liabilities of
the
spouse
who,
in
bad
faith,
claimed
that
the
other
spouse
was
absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the
following are present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1)

The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;

2)

The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;

3)

There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse; and

4)

There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.55

A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the
requirement of a well-founded belief 56 that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as. validly terminated.
Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void. 57 Only a
subsequent
marriage
contracted
in
good
faith
is
protected
by
law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action to declare his subsequent
marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still
applies.58chanrobleslaw
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her presumptively dead and when he contracted
the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is
because the circumstances lack the element of "well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is essential for the
exception
to
the
rule
against
bigamous
marriages
to
apply.59chanrobleslaw

82

The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude
the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a
subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
declaration
of
dissolution
or
termination
of
the
subsequent
marriage." 60chanrobleslaw
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the
nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent
marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the
"children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same
as in valid marriages."61 If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the
termination shall still be considered legitimate.62 Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for
bigamy.63chanrobleslaw
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent
marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or wife." 64 This means that
even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second
marriage,65 this
remedy
is
not
available
to
her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of
presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file
an
action
for
annulment
of
judgment
will,
therefore,
lie.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for
nullity/annulment
of
the
first
marriage,
and
the
merits
of
the
petition.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 179620
August 26, 2008
MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner, vs THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T.
ALMELOR, respondents.
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of their whole lives. It likewise involves a true intertwining of
personalities.1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the petition for annulment of judgment
and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Pias, Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright the Rule 47
petition for being the wrong remedy.
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila
Cathedral.3 Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on August
9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer, born on July 4, 1994. 4 Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a
pediatrician, respectively.5
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pias City to annul their marriage on the ground that
Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to
Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as medical student
clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got along well with other people. They soon became
sweethearts. Three years after, they got married.6
Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect
husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian,
unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel's unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their
frequent fights as a couple.7 Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother.
Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.8
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she noticed
Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting
his affection for a male caller.9 She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. 10 Her worse fears were
confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. 11 When she confronted Manuel,
he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support
to their children.12

83

Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida's claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she
conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and faceto-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child). 13 She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. 14Such
incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there. He, however, maintained that their
marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional rivalry. It began when he refused to heed
the memorandum15 released by Christ the King Hospital. The memorandum ordered him to desist from converting his own lying-in clinic
to a primary or secondary hospital.16 Leonida's family owns Christ the King Hospital which is situated in the same subdivision as
Manuel's clinic and residence.17 In other words, he and her family have competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating them. At most, he only imposed the
necessary discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for him to return the love and affection of the
person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This is especially apt now that his mother is in her twilight years. 18 Manuel
pointed out that Leonida found fault in this otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous and possessive nature.19
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of female friends. He wanted to avoid any further
misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up stories about his sexual preference. She also fabricated tales about
pornographic materials found in his possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.20
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually stayed at Manuel's house during
his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness to the generally harmonious relationship between his brother Manuel and
sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there was nothing similar to what
Leonida described in her testimony.21
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He denied that such
an incident occurred. On that particular date,22 he and Manuel went straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was no other person with
them at that time, except their driver.23
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his own expert witness. However, no psychiatrist
was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its effects under the law null and void from
the beginning;
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with forfeiture of defendant's share thereon in favor
of the same parties' children whose legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment
and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto; and
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Pias City and Manila City to cause the registration of the said Entry of
Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the allegations in the complaint and of the
evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero sexual marriage. This is reason
enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a special contract exclusively only between a man and a
woman x x x and thus when homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct
the situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is of course in recognition of the
biological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and forces himself to live a normal
heterosexual life, there will surely come a time when his true sexual preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him
and thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family.25
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment with
the CA.26

84

Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower court's jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve
the absolute community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in favor of his children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision
(dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in Las Pias City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No
costs.27
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of petition for annulment of judgment. Said
the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the lower Court. But the remedy
assuming there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may
be reversed or corrected only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the subject of an ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the exercise thereof. "Excess" assuming
there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the
exercise thereof.28
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF
JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS
THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS
THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS. 29
Our Ruling
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice and in the Court's exercise of
equity jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. 30 This is to
prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and mistakes. However, like most rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all,
the ultimate purpose of all rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.31
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the ordinary remedies are available or no longer
available through no fault of petitioner.32 However, in Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,33 this Court clarified the proper appreciation for
technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, they should not be
applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that while the Rules are liberally construed, the
provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an
exception to the exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations . Also, in some cases
the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules would
have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing appeals. 35 It has, in the past,
refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.36
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this Court to consider his petition before the CA
instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the lower court for annulling his marriage on
account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service
Commission,37 petitioner Delia R. Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for six (6)
months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is deemed to have already served her six-month suspension during
the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter
alia:

85

1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the instant
petition with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme Court.38(Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode of appeal. 39 The CA opined that
"under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC
is by a petition for review."40
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the Administrative Circular. The Court stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only a minor procedural lapse,
not fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals should have
overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to the parties concerned. There is, indeed,
nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it has been said, where the
rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are
justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules.41 (Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a petition for review
on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac
vice, as a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65.
This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a
judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The Court elucidated in this wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the
Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the present petition and treating petitioner's
CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what is at stake is the validity or non-validity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a
natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.45
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the merits
to attain the ends of justice.46
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal. His counsel, Atty.
Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move for
reconsideration or new trial at the first instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather than pursue an
ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence. These gravely worked to the detriment of Manuel's appeal.
True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court has recognized certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client's
liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice so require.47
The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross negligence of petitioner's former
counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made to suffer for his counsel's grave mistakes. Higher interests of
justice and equity demand that he be allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within
the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross
ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the
client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground. In the instant case, higher interests of
justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to
suffer for the lawyer's mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud,
reckless inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their clients, of
their day in court.49 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the demands of justice require it.
With more conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the
thrust of giving a party the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of one's action.50
The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings,
Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said the Court in Bengson:

86

But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great
hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In
other words, the court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of
justice require it.53
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the heavy
accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all because the supporting grounds relied upon can not
legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." It went further by citing Republic v. Molina:54
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings,
unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of some
marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity.55
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida attempted
to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among homosexual individuals. 56 She
wanted to prove that the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated
consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely there is fire. Although vehemently
denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to establish with certainty that defendant is really a homosexual.
This is the fact that can bededuced from the totality of the marriage life scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own close friends doubted his true
sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15 December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings,
plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she heard but defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for
all the truth of all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing happened after that. There may have
been more important matters to attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases against and be effected by these people
and so, putting more premiums on defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same married him. Reasons upon reasons may be
advanced to either exculpate or nail to the cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in
the end, only one thing is certain - even during his marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real preference
continued and even got thicker, reason why obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid family; and in so failing,
plaintiff and their children became his innocent and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even small details in the house (sic)
like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 7781, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these admissions of defendant taken in the light of evidence presented apparently showing
that he had extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February
2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual magazines and tapes likewise
allegedly discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his real sex identity becomes stronger. The
accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of defendant may be the name of the game in this case; but the simple reason of
professional rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not enough to justify and obscure the question why plaintiff should
accuse him of such a very untoward infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their children and family as a whole. 57
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to
Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel's sexual preference without the
corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his
marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, 58 such as
concealment of homosexuality.59Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a
homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. 60 It is the concealment of homosexuality, and
not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud
the other party in giving consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated consent
must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances 61 constituting
fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations 62 of the Committees on the Civil Code and Family Law, to
wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the grounds for legal separation. Dean
Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of "concealment," while in the article on legal separation,
there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the ground existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the
ground existed at the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they add the phrase "existing at the time
of the marriage" at the end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the suggestion.63

87

To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a
marriage.64 Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element
that respondent failed to prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual identity strike so
deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond between the spouses. 65 In Crutcher v.
Crutcher,66 the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which would make the marriage
relation so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the
whole purpose of the relation. In the natural course of things, they would cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her
health.67
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones are significantly different. Divorce is not
recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to
sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than eleven (11) years, which produced three (3)
children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent was found inVillanueva v. Court of
Appeals.68 In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as a perpetrator of
fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are
generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married
private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to
the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and
grave danger to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the
will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant
worked as a security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself
out of harm's way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with
his child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because he did not
have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his
inability to copulate with the appellee. x x x
xxxx
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling
the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed
to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld. 69
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into account petitioner's homosexuality per se and
not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basicautonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.70 The State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these
social institutions against desecration by fabricated evidence.71 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or conjugal property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties,
the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership. In a valid marriage,
both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of Manuel and Leonida. In the same breath, the trial
court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children. Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and
forfeiture of Manuel's share in the property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the community property.

88

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDEand the petition in the trial court to
annul the marriage is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. L-10033

December 28, 1956
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LEONILA GINEZ, defendant-appellee.
This is a case for legal separation filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan wherein on motion of the defendant, the case was
dismissed. The order of dismissal was appealed to the Court of Appeals, but said Tribunal certified the case to the Court on the ground
that there is absolutely no question of fact involved, the motion being predicated on the assumption as true of the very facts testified to
by plaintiff-husband.
The facts of the case abridgedly stated are as follows: Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to
defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. Immediately after their marriage, the
couple lived with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the
dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan,
from which place she later moved to Dagupan City to study in a local college there.
As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco (plaintiff's sister-in-law) and some from
anonymous writers(which were not produced at the hearing) informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife which he did not even
care to mention. On cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that his wife also informed him by letter, which she claims to have destroyed,
that a certain "Eliong" kissed her. All these communications prompted him in October, 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain as
to the propriety of a legal separation between him and his wife on account of the latter's alleged acts of infidelity, and he was directed to
consult instead the navy legal department.
In August, 1952, plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of one Mrs. Malalang,
defendant's godmother. She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of the plaintiffhusband, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. Then they repaired to the plaintiff's house and again
passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the
information he received that she had committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which
he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her
and failing to find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his wounded feelings".
On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against
his wife, Leonila Ginez, who timely filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint and setting up affirmative
defenses. After the issues were joined and convinced that a reconciliation was not possible, the court set the case for hearing on June
9, 1953. Plaintiff's counsel announced that he was to present 6 witnesses but after plaintiff-husband finished testifying in his favor,
counsel for the defendant orally moved for the dismissal of the complaint, but the Court ordered him to file a written motion to that effect
and gave plaintiff 10 days to answer the same.
The motion to dismiss was predicted on the following grounds: (1) Assuming arguendo the truth of the allegations of the commission of
"acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery", the cause of action, if any, is barred by the statute of limitations; (2) That under the same
assumption, the act charged have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband; and (3) That the complaint failed to state a cause of action
sufficient for this court to render a valid judgment.
The motion to dismiss was answered by plaintiff and the Court, considering only the second ground of the motion to dismiss i.
e., condonation, ordered the dismissal of the action. After the motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiff was denied, the case was
taken up for review to the Court of Appeals, appellant's counsel maintaining that the lower court erred:
(a) In so prematurely dismissing the case;
(b) In finding that there were condonation on the part of plaintiff-appellant; and
(c) In entertaining condonation as a ground for dismissal inasmuch as same was not raised in the answer or in a motion to
dismiss.
As the questions raised in the brief were merely questions of law, the Court of Appeals certified the case to Superiority.
The Civil Code provides:
ART. 97. A petition for legal separation may be filed:
(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage for the part of the husband as defined on the Penal Code; or
(2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other.
ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or
consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot by either of them.
Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
ART. 102. An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff
became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.

89

As the only reason of the lower Court for dismissing the action was the alleged condonation of the charges of adultery that the plaintiffhusband had preferred in the complaint against his wife, We will disregard the other 2 grounds of the motion to dismiss, as anyway they
have not been raised in appellant's assignment of errors.
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation or, as stated in I Bouver's Law Dictionary,
p. 585, condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has
committed". It is to be noted, however, that in defendant's answer she vehemently and vigorously denies having committed any act of
infidelity against her husband, and even if We were to give full weight to the testimony of the plaintiff, who was the only one that had the
chance of testifying in Court and link such evidence with the averments of the complaint, We would have to conclude that the facts
appearing on the record are far from sufficient to establish the charge of adultery, or, as the complaint states, of "acts of rank infidelity
amounting to adultery" preferred against the defendant. Certainly, the letter that plaintiff claims to have received from his sister-in-law
Valeriana Polangco, which must have been too vague and indefinite as to defendant's infidelity to deserve its production in evidence;
nor the anonymous letters which plaintiff also failed to present; nor the alleged letter that, according to plaintiff, his wife addressed to
him admitting that she had been kissed by one Eliong, whose identity was not established and which admission defendant had no
opportunity to deny because the motion to dismiss was filed soon after plaintiff finished his testimony in Court, do not amount to
anything that can be relied upon.
But this is not a question at issue. In this appeal, We have to consider plaintiff's line of conduct under the assumption that he really
believed his wife guilty of adultery. What did he do in such state of mind. In August, 1952, he went to Pangasinan and looked for his
wife and after finding her they lived together as husband and wife for 2 nights and 1 day, after which he says that he tried to verify from
her the truth of the news he had about her infidelity, but failed to attain his purpose because his wife, instead of answering his query on
the matter, preferred to desert him, probably enraged for being subjected to such humiliation. And yet he tried to locate her, though in
vain. Now, do the husband's attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him,
amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous acts? In the order appealed from, the Court a quo had the following
to say on this point:
In the hearing of the case, the plaintiff further testified as follows:
Q. Now Mr. Bugayong, you have filed this action for legal separation from your wife. Please tell this Hon. Court why you want
to separate from your wife? A. I came to know that my wife is committing adultery, I consulted the chaplain and he told me
to consult the legal adviser. (p. 11, t.s.n.)
Q. Did you finally locate her?--A. Four days later or on the fifth day since my arrival she went to the house of our god-mother,
and as a husband I went to her to come along with me in our house but she refused. (p. 12, t.s.n.)lawphil.net
Q. What happened next? A. I persuaded her to come along with me. She consented but I did not bring her home but
brought her to the house of my cousin Pedro Bugayong. (p. 12, t.s.n.)
Q. How long did you remain in the house of your cousin Pedro Bugayong? A. One day and one night. (p. 12. t.s.n.)
Q. That night when you stayed in the house of your cousin Pedro Bugayong as husband and wife, did you slept together?
A. Yes, sir. (p. 19, t.s.n.)
Q. On the next night, when you slept in your own house, did you sleep together also as husband and wife? A. Yes, sir. (p.
19. t.s.n.)
Q. When was that? A. That was in August, 1952. (p. 19 t.s.n.)
Q. How many nights did you sleep together as husband and wife? A. Only two nights. (p. 19, t.s.n.)
The New Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Art. 97, says:
A petition for legal separation may be filed:
(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband as defined on the Penal Code.
and in its Art. 100 it says:lawphil.net
The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to
the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them.
Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, especially those portions quoted above, clearly shows that
there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery" committed
by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the
defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along
with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and
together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they
again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this
court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The
reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.
In Shackleton vs. Shackleton, 48 N. J. Eq. 364; 21 Atl. 935, it has been held that "condonation is implied from sexual
intercourse after knowledge of the other infidelity. such acts necessary implied forgiveness. It is entirely consonant with reason

90

and justice that if the wife freely consents to sexual intercourse after she has full knowledge of the husband's guilt, her consent
should operate as a pardon of his wrong."
In Tiffany's Domestic and Family Relations, section 107 says:
Condonation. Is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for divorce and bars the right to a divorce.
But it is on the condition, implied by the law when not express, that the wrongdoer shall not again commit the offense;
and also that he shall thereafter treat the other spouse with conjugal kindness. A breach of the condition will revive
the original offense as a ground for divorce. Condonation may be express or implied.
It has been held in a long line of decisions of the various supreme courts of the different states of the U. S. that 'a single
voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute
condonation, especially as against the husband'. (27 Corpus Juris Secundum, section 61 and cases cited therein).
In the lights of the facts testified to by the plaintiff-husband, of the legal provisions above quoted, and of the various decisions
above-cited, the inevitable conclusion is that the present action is untenable.
Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by the wife, We agree with the trial judge that the conduct of the plaintiffhusband above narrated despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the offended spouse, of any action for
legal separation against the offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of the Civil Code.
The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and
with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but
this presumption may be rebutted by evidence (60 L. J. Prob. 73).
If there had been cohabitation, to what extent must it be to constitute condonation?
Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the
parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation (27 C. J. S., section 6-d).
A divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the parties continue to live together after it was known (Land vs. Martin, 15
South 657; Day vs. Day, 80 Pac. 974) or there is sexual intercourse after knowledge of adultery (Rogers vs. Rogers, 67 N. J.
Eq. 534) or sleeping together for a single night (Toulson vs. Toulson, 50 Atl. 401, citing Phinizy vs. Phinizy, 114 S. E. 185, 154
Ga. 199; Collins vs. Collins, 193 So. 702), and many others. The resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of condonation
will generally be inferred, nothing appearing to the contrary, from the fact of the living together as husband and wife, especially
as against the husband (Marsh vs. Marsh, 14 N. J. Eq. 315).
There is no ruling on this matter in our jurisprudence but we have no reason to depart from the doctrines laid down in the decisions of
the various supreme courts of the United States above quoted.
There is no merit in the contention of appellant that the lower court erred in entertaining condonation as a ground for dismissal
inasmuch as same was not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss, because in the second ground of the motion to dismiss. It is
true that it was filed after the answer and after the hearing had been commenced, yet that motion serves to supplement the averments
of defendant's answer and to adjust the issues to the testimony of plaintiff himself (section 4, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court).
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. It is so
ordered.

G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972

CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias
EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review by certiorari of an order, dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387, dismissing said case for legal separation on the ground that the death
of the therein plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case, abated the cause of action as well as the
action itself. The dismissal order was issued over the objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff (and petitioner
herein) who sought to substitute the deceased and to have the case prosecuted to final judgment.
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that
they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and
wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their
marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or
about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and,
along with several other claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his
marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and
customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But before the trial could be completed
(the respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in
a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death.

91

On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" 1 on two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition
for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen
abated the action for legal separation.
On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for
Eufemio opposed the motion.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case. 2 In the body of the order, the court stated that the
motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the question of whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action has
survived, which the court resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved to reconsider but the motion was denied on 15 September 1969.
After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the order of dismissal issued by the juvenile and domestic relations
court, the petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October 1969. The same was given due course and answer thereto was filed by
respondent, who prayed for the affirmance of the said order. 3
Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio, filed counterclaims, he did not pursue them after the court
below dismissed the case. He acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that
dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and
void ab initio.
But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute for the lower court did not act on the motion for substitution)
stated the principal issue to be as follows:
When an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity of a
marriage, does the death of a party abate the proceedings?
The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a legal separation suit to one for declaration of nullity of a
marriage, which is without basis, for even petitioner asserted that "the respondent has acquiesced to the dismissal of his counterclaim"
(Petitioner's Brief, page 22). Not only this. The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same
marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication. They are not inseparable nor was the action for legal separation converted
into one for a declaration of nullity by the counterclaim, for legal separation pre-supposes a valid marriage, while the petition for nullity
has a voidable marriage as a pre-condition.
The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action?
If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? .
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute
divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the
innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum
persona.
... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs
cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section
3). The action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933, 332.") 4 .
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for divorce is a proceeding
brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a personal nature. In the
absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason
that death has settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both
over the persons of the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts
are almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the
action. 1 Corpus Juris, 208; Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth v. Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of Grandall, 196
N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17 Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41 N.W. 817;
Strickland v. Strickland, 80 Ark. 452, 97 S. W. 659; McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbie v.
Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141. 5
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance (Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corpus
Juris 208).
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal
separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. On the point, Article 106 of the Civil
Code provides: .
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; .
(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or
community, without prejudice to the provisions of article 176;
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court
in the interest of said minors, for whom said court may appoint a guardian;

92

(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession.
Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent one shall be revoked by
operation of law.
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of
property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his
disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested
exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as
assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under
Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party.
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper
notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of
thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted...
The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive for or against administrators in Section 1,
Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator;
but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon,
and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly included in the enumeration..
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that
these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come
into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent
that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same
after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article
144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by
the heirs of the appellant.
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code,
because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when
she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved
had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the
lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from
such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided in
Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No special
pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 153206

October 23, 2006

ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner, vs. LUCITA G. ONG, respondent.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 59400
which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 41, Dagupan City granting the petition for legal separation
filed by herein respondent, as well as the Resolution2 of the CA dated April 26, 2002 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin
Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority.3
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code 4before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and
grossly abusive conduct.5
Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost every day, with physical violence being
inflicted upon her; William would shout invectives at her like "putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap her, kick her, pull her
hair, bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were petty
things regarding their children or their business; William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using
the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her; on
December 9, 1995, after she protested with Williams decision to allow their eldest son Kingston to go to Bacolod, William slapped her
and said, "it is none of your business"; on December 14, 1995, she asked William to bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent quarrel

93

ensued and William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the stomach and she bent down
because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house; she then went to her sisters
house in Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she
went to her parents doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.6
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting language against her, or whipped the children
with the buckle of his belt. While he admits that he and Lucita quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house in Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, Tondo, Manila, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills condominium and only went back to their Tondo
house to work in their office below. In the afternoon of December 14, 1995, their laundrywoman told him that Lucita left the house. 7
On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal separation of plaintiff and defendant,
with all the legal effects attendant thereto, particularly the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, for
which purpose the parties are hereby ordered to submit a complete inventory of said properties so that the Court can make a
just and proper division, such division to be embodied in a supplemental decision.
SO ORDERED.8
The RTC found that:
It is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had their frequent quarrels and misunderstanding which made
both of their lives miserable and hellish. This is even admitted by the defendant when he said that there was no day that he did
not quarrel with his wife. Defendant had regarded the plaintiff negligent in the performance of her wifely duties and had blamed
her for not reporting to him about the wrongdoings of their children. (citations omitted)
These quarrels were always punctuated by acts of physical violence, threats and intimidation by the defendant against the
plaintiff and on the children. In the process, insulting words and language were heaped upon her. The plaintiff suffered and
endured the mental and physical anguish of these marital fights until December 14, 1995 when she had reached the limits of
her endurance. The more than twenty years of her marriage could not have been put to waste by the plaintiff if the same had
been lived in an atmosphere of love, harmony and peace. Worst, their children are also suffering. As very well stated in
plaintiffs memorandum, "it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts
of her home and be separated from her children, whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is already beyond her
endurance.9
William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. In its Decision dated October 8, 2001, the CA found that the
testimonies for Lucita were straightforward and credible and the ground for legal separation under Art. 55, par. 1 of the Family
Code, i.e., physical violence and grossly abusive conduct directed against Lucita, were adequately proven.10
As the CA explained:
The straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses were uncontroverted and credible. Dr. Elinzanos testimony was
able to show that the [Lucita] suffered several injuries inflicted by [William]. It is clear that on December 14, 1995, she
sustained redness in her cheek, black eye on her left eye, fist blow on the stomach, blood clot and a blackish discoloration on
both shoulders and a "bump" or "bukol" on her head. The presence of these injuries was established by the testimonies of
[Lucita] herself and her sister, Linda Lim. The Memorandum/Medical Certificate also confirmed the evidence presented and
does not deviate from the doctors main testimony --- that [Lucita] suffered physical violence on [sic] the hands of her husband,
caused by physical trauma, slapping of the cheek, boxing and fist blows. The effect of the so-called alterations in the
Memorandum/Medical Certificate questioned by [William] does not depart from the main thrust of the testimony of the said
doctor.
Also, the testimony of [Lucita] herself consistently and constantly established that [William] inflicted repeated physical violence
upon her during their marriage and that she had been subjected to grossly abusive conduct when he constantly hurled
invectives at her even in front of their customers and employees, shouting words like, " gaga", "putang ina mo," tanga," and
"you dont know anything."
These were further corroborated by several incidents narrated by Linda Lim who lived in their conjugal home from 1989 to
1991. She saw her sister after the December 14, 1995 incident when she (Lucita) was fetched by the latter on the same date.
She was a witness to the kind of relationship her sister and [William] had during the three years she lived with them. She
observed that [William] has an "explosive temper, easily gets angry and becomes very violent." She cited several instances
which proved that William Ong indeed treated her wife shabbily and despicably, in words and deeds.
xxx
That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon [Lucita] by [William] have been duly
established by [Lucita] and her witnesses. These incidents were not explained nor controverted by [William], except by making
a general denial thereof. Consequently, as between an affirmative assertion and a general denial, weight must be accorded to
the affirmative assertion.
The grossly abusive conduct is also apparent in the instances testified to by [Lucita] and her sister. The injurious invectives
hurled at [Lucita] and his treatment of her, in its entirety, in front of their employees and friends, are enough to constitute
grossly abusive conduct. The aggregate behavior of [William] warrants legal separation under grossly abusive conduct. x x x11
William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA on April 26, 2002.12

94

Hence the present petition where William claims that:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE
PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION WAS INSTITUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF
REMOVING FROM PETITIONER THE CONTROL AND OWNERSHIP OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES AND TO
TRANSFER THE SAME TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAMILY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE REPUDIATING
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CLAIM OF REPEATED PHYSICAL VIOLENCE AND GROSSLY ABUSIVE CONDUCT ON THE
PART OF PETITIONER.13
William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and ownership of properties belonging
to the conjugal partnership; these properties, which include real properties in Hong Kong, Metro Manila, Baguio and Dagupan, were
acquired during the marriage through his (Williams) sole efforts; the only parties who will benefit from a decree of legal separation are
Lucitas parents and siblings while such decree would condemn him as a violent and cruel person, a wife-beater and child abuser, and
will taint his reputation, especially among the Filipino-Chinese community; substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked
which warrant an exception to the general rule that factual findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal; the findings of the
trial court that he committed acts of repeated physical violence against Lucita and their children were not sufficiently established; what
took place were disagreements regarding the manner of raising and disciplining the children particularly Charleston, Lucitas favorite
son; marriage being a social contract cannot be impaired by mere verbal disagreements and the complaining party must adduce clear
and convincing evidence to justify legal separation; the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita and her witnesses, her sister
Linda Lim, and their parents doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzanzo, whose testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud; in the 20 years of
their marriage, Lucita has not complained of any cruel behavior on the part of William in relation to their marital and family life; William
expressed his willingness to receive respondent unconditionally however, it is Lucita who abandoned the conjugal dwelling on
December 14, 1995 and instituted the complaint below in order to appropriate for herself and her relatives the conjugal properties; the
Constitution provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution and shall be protected by the State, thus the rule is the preservation
of the marital union and not its infringement; only for grounds enumerated in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds should be
clearly and convincingly proven, can the courts decree a legal separation among the spouses.14
Respondent Lucita in her Comment, meanwhile, asserts that: the issues raised in the present petition are factual; the findings of both
lower courts rest on strong and clear evidence borne by the records; this Court is not a trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC
when confirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal; the contention of William that Lucita filed the
case for legal separation in order to remove from William the control and ownership of their conjugal properties and to transfer the
same to Lucitas family is absurd; Lucita will not just throw her marriage of 20 years and forego the companionship of William and her
children just to serve the interest of her family; Lucita left the conjugal home because of the repeated physical violence and grossly
abusive conduct of petitioner.15
Petitioner filed a Reply, reasserting his claims in his petition,16 as well as a Memorandum where he averred for the first time that since
respondent is guilty of abandonment, the petition for legal separation should be denied following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family
Code.17 Petitioner argues that since respondent herself has given ground for legal separation by abandoning the family simply because
of a quarrel and refusing to return thereto unless the conjugal properties were placed in the administration of petitioners in-laws, no
decree of legal separation should be issued in her favor.18
Respondent likewise filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions.19
We resolve to deny the petition.
It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The rule finds more
stringent application where the CA upholds the findings of fact of the trial court. In such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt
the facts as determined by the lower courts.20
The only instances when this Court reviews findings of fact are:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.21
As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptional circumstances, the general rule applies.
Indeed, this Court cannot review factual findings on appeal, especially when they are borne out by the records or are based on
substantial evidence.22 In this case, the findings of the RTC were affirmed by the CA and are adequately supported by the records.

95

As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife, which made
his life miserable, and he blames her for being negligent of her wifely duties and for not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their
children.23
Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous accounts of the instances when William displayed violent temper against Lucita
and their children; such as: when William threw a steel chair at Lucita; 24 threw chairs at their children;25 slapped Lucita and utter
insulting words at her;26 use the buckle of the belt in whipping the children; 27 pinned Lucita against the wall with his strong arms almost
strangling her, and smashed the flower vase and brick rocks and moldings leaving the bedroom in disarray; 28 shouted at Lucita and
threw a directory at her, in front of Linda and the employees of their business, because he could not find a draft letter on his table; 29 got
mad at Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin prompting William to smash the plate with steak and hit Charleston, then slapped
Lucita and shouted at her "putang ina mo, gago, wala kang pakialam, tarantado" when she sided with Charleston;30 and the December
9 and December 14, 1995 incidents which forced Lucita to leave the conjugal dwelling.31
Lucita also explained that the injuries she received on December 14, 1995, were not the first. As she related before the trial court:
q. You stated on cross examination that the injuries you sustained on December 14, 1995 were the most serious?
a. Unlike before I considered December 14, 1995 the very serious because before it is only on the arm and black eye, but on
this December 14, I suffered bruises in all parts of my body, sir.32
To these, all William and his witnesses, could offer are denials and attempts to downplay the said incidents.33
As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general denial for William, the Court gives more weight to those of the
former. The Court also gives a great amount of consideration to the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses
as trial court judges enjoy the unique opportunity of observing the deportment of witnesses on the stand, a vantage point denied
appellate tribunals.34 Indeed, it is settled that the assessment of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect
and weight having had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.35
In this case, the RTC noted that:
Williams denial and that of his witnesses of the imputation of physical violence committed by him could not be given much
credence by the Court. Since the office secretary Ofelia Rosal and the family laundrywoman Rosalino Morco are dependent
upon defendant for their livelihood, their testimonies may be tainted with bias and they could not be considered as impartial
and credible witnesses. So with Kingston Ong who lives with defendant and depends upon him for support.36
Parenthetically, William claims that that the witnesses of Lucita are not credible because of their relationship with her. We do not agree.
Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label a witnesss testimony as biased and unworthy of credence 37 and a
witness relationship to one of the parties does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony.38 Considering the detailed
and straightforward testimonies given by Linda Lim and Dr. Vicente Elinzano, bolstered by the credence accorded them by the trial
court, the Court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with bias.
William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order for her side of the family to gain control
of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her
siblings could control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe. What benefit would Lucita
personally gain by pushing for her parents and siblings financial interests at the expense of her marriage? What is more probable is
that there truly exists a ground for legal separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts. As aptly stated
by the RTC,
...it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts of her home and be
separated from her children whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is already beyond her endurance.39
The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also
does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucitas
decision to seek relief from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be
granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given
ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than
one year.40 As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated by the said provision.
As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. 41 The
Constitution itself however does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the province
of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it and put into operation
the constitutional provisions that protect the same. 42 With the enactment of the Family Code, this has been accomplished as it defines
marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as
prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. 43 As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a
ground for legal separation, the Court has no reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA, and grant her the relief she is
entitled to under the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

96

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I.

DOE, respondents.

BILDNER

and

SYLVIA K.

ILUSORIO,

JOHN

DOE

and

JANE

[G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000]

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights
including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention,[1] or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld
from the one entitled thereto.[2] Slx
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated
time and place, with the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge
awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf."[3]
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned
without sufficient cause.[4] It is issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising legal custody over
another person.[5]
The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio[6] is to reverse the decision[7] of the Court of Appeals and its resolution[8] dismissing the application
for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the wife.
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio [9] is to annul that portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K.
Ilusorio visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the Court of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.
The undisputed facts are as follows: Scslx
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty (30) years. In
1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City
when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in
Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age
50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo
City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead
of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence, Potencianos health
deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a petition [10] for guardianship over the person and
property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead
lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. Slxsc
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents[11] refused petitioners demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from
returning to Antipolo City.
After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, judgment is hereby rendered:
"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioners manifestation, respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio
Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap, the administrator of Cleveland Condominium or anywhere in its place, his guards and
Potenciano Ilusorios staff especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to allow visitation rights to Potenciano Ilusorios wife,
Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children, notwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof, under penalty of contempt in case
of violation of refusal thereof; xxx
"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued be recalled and the herein petition for habeas
corpus be DENIED DUE COURSE, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the
subject of the petition.
"SO ORDERED."[12]
Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein jointly decided.
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, [13] or by which the rightful custody
of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of
his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary,

97

and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.[14] It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.[15] Jksm
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.[16]
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. [17] The illegal
restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.[18]
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would
justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not
necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of
the individual to discern his actions.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his liberty.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not request the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium
not to allow his wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to seeing them.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the Court of Appeals observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered
all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence
and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices
which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his house
or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the
Court of Appeals.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his
free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional
right. Es m
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even
prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subjects sanity.
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in
case of violation or refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit
a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty
attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of
a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left
to the man and womans free choice.
WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No costs.
In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights
to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.

G.R. No. 182894

April 22, 2014

FE
FLORO
VALINO, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D. ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA
ADRIANO BAYONA, and LEAH ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Challenged in this petition is the October 2, 2006 Decision 1 and the May 9, 2008 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 61613, which reversed the October 1, 1998 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City (RTC) which ruled
that petitioner Fe Floro Valino (Valino) was entitled to the remains of the decedent.
The Facts:
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law Office, married respondent Rosario Adriano
(Rosario) on November 15, 1955. The couple had two (2) sons, Florante and Ruben Adriano; three (3) daughters, Rosario, Victoria and
Maria Teresa; and one (1) adopted daughter, Leah Antonette.

98

The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano
courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to
provide financial support to Rosario and their children (respondents).
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United States spending Christmas with her children.
As none of the family members was around, Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano.
When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a
few days but her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at
the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried and that his burial at the
Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for
actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the
family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more than twenty (20) years before he courted
her. Valino claimed that throughout the time they were together, he had introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife.
Although they were living together, Valino admitted that he never forgot his obligation to support the respondents. She contended that,
unlike Rosario, she took good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses when he got seriously ill. She also claimed
that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and dying, Rosario still left for the United States. According to Valino, it was Atty.
Adrianos last wish that his remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit brought by respondents. Thus, she prayed that she be
awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Decision of the RTC
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the counterclaim of Valino after it found them to have not
been sufficiently proven.
The RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long time, she knew very well that it was his wish to be buried at
the Manila Memorial Park. Taking into consideration the fact that Rosario left for the United States at the time that he was fighting his
illness, the trial court concluded that Rosario did not show love and care for him. Considering also that it was Valino who performed all
the duties and responsibilities of a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably presumed that he wished to be buried in the Valino
family mausoleum.4
In disposing of the case, the RTC noted that the exhumation and the transfer of the body of Atty. Adriano to the Adriano family plot at
the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City, would not serve any useful purpose and so he should be spared and
respected.5 Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the
expense of respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer, transport and inter the remains of the decedent
in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City.
In reaching said determination, the CA explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the custody of the remains of her
deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of
the appellate court that the law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to make arrangements for the funeral of
her husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time
of the latters death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact.
Like the RTC, however, the CA did not award damages in favor of respondents due to the good intentions shown by Valino in giving the
deceased a decent burial when the wife and the family were in the United States. All other claims for damages were similarly dismissed.
The Sole Issue
The lone legal issue in this petition is who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
The Courts Ruling
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 6 of the Family Code, specifies the persons who have the right and
duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order established for
support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case
of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right. [Emphases supplied]
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order
herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
[Emphasis supplied]

99

Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in
Articles 294 and 305. [Emphases supplied]
In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of
the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the surviving spouse if he or she possesses
sufficient means to pay the necessary expenses;
x x x x. [Emphases supplied]
From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the
members of the family to the exclusion of ones common law partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 7 a petition for habeas corpus was
filed by the brothers and sisters of the late Vitaliana Vargas against her lover, Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter forcibly took
her and confined her in his residence. It appearing that she already died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio,
Sr. sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction and claimed the right to bury the deceased, as the common-law husband.
In its decision, the Court resolved that the trial court continued to have jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana
Vargas. As to the claim of Tomas Eugenio, Sr. that he should be considered a "spouse" having the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements for his common-law wife, the Court ruled:
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many
years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife
in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a
community of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership
requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying
Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving
Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted, however, that with respect to 'spouse,' the same
must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of
exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The
Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and
another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions
of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry
her in her lifetime.8 [Emphases supplied]
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving
legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no
controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make
arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other
right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a
free and voluntary intent to that end.9 While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was
still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a
family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas to Valino
for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend the service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as they
came to know about Atty. Adrianos death in the morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the
respondents immediately contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valinos
own testimony that it was Atty. Adrianos wish to be buried in their family plot is being relied upon heavily. It should be noted, however,
that other than Valinos claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to
corroborate such claim. Considering that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in the Adriano family plot in
Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish of Atty. Adriano was unclear and undefinite. Considering this ambiguity
as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have
been created in Valinos favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.
Moreover, it cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was unavailable to bury her husband when she died, she had already
renounced her right to do so. Verily, in the same vein that the right and duty to make funeral arrangements will not be considered as
having been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury the remains of her deceased
husband should not be readily presumed to have been exercised, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a
free and voluntary intent of the deceased to that end. Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the law favors
the legitimate family. Here, Rosarios keenness to exercise the rights and obligations accorded to the legal wife was even bolstered by
the fact that she was joined by the children in this case.

100

Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in the Valino family plot at the Manila Memorial Park,
the result remains the same. Article 307 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his
religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the
person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after consulting the other members of the family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of the funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of
the deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article
305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code. Even if Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the place of burial among those on
which the wishes of the deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino), an eminent authority on civil law,
commented that it is generally recognized that any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased should be established by some form of
testamentary disposition.10 As Article 307 itself provides, the wishes of the deceased must be expressly provided. It cannot be inferred
lightly, such as from the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent his last remaining days with Valino. It bears stressing once more that
other than Valinos claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Valino family plot, no other evidence was presented to corroborate
it.
At any rate, it should be remembered that the wishes of the decedent with respect to his funeral are not absolute. As Dr. Tolentino
further wrote:
The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not be contrary to law. They must not violate the legal and
reglamentary provisions concerning funerals and the disposition of the remains, whether as regards the time and manner of disposition,
or the place of burial, or the ceremony to be observed.11 [Emphases supplied]
In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited by Article 305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of
the Family Code, and subject the same to those charged with the right and duty to make the proper arrangements to bury the remains
of their loved-one. As aptly explained by the appellate court in its disquisition:
The testimony of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino that it was the oral wish of Atty. Adriano Adriano that he be interred at the Floro
familys mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park, must bend to the provisions of the law. Even assuming arguendo that it was the
express wish of the deceased to be interred at the Manila Memorial Park, still, the law grants the duty and the right to decide what to do
with the remains to the wife, in this case, plaintiff-appellant Rosario D. Adriano, as the surviving spouse, and not to defendant-appellee
Fe Floro Valino, who is not even in the list of those legally preferred, despite the fact that her intentions may have been very
commendable. The law does not even consider the emotional fact that husband and wife had, in this case at bench, been separated-infact and had been living apart for more than 30 years.12
As for Valinos contention that there is no point in exhuming and transferring the remains of Atty. Adriano, it should be said that the
burial of his remains in a place other than the Adriano family plot in Novaliches runs counter to the wishes of his family. It does not only
violate their right provided by law, but it also disrespects the family because the remains of the patriarch are buried in the family plot of
his live-in partner.
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain
right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who
have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also
authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even transfer
it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt
that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.13
All this notwithstanding, the Court finds laudable the acts of Valino in taking care of Atty. Adriano during his final moments and giving
him a proper burial. For her sacrifices, it would indeed be unkind to assess actual or moral damages against her. As aptly explained by
the CA:
The trial court found that there was good faith on the part of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino, who, having lived with Atty. Adriano
after he was separated in fact from his wife, lovingly and caringly took care of the well-being of Atty. Adriano Adriano while he was alive
and even took care of his remains when he had died.
On the issue of damages, plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to actual damages. Defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino had all the good
intentions in giving the remains of Atty. Adriano a decent burial when the wife and family were all in the United States and could not
attend to his burial. Actual damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To be
recoverable, they must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. In this case at
bench, there was no iota of evidence presented to justify award of actual damages.
Plaintiffs-appellants are not also entitled to moral and exemplary damages.1wphi1 Moral damages may be recovered only if the
plaintiff is able to satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis for the damages and its causal connection with the acts
complained of because moral damages although incapable of pecuniary estimation are designed not to impose a penalty but to
compensate for injury sustained and actual damages suffered. No injury was caused to plaintiffs-appellants, nor was any intended by
anyone in this case. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be awarded if claimant is able to establish his right to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Unfortunately, neither of the requirements to sustain an award for either of these
damages would appear to have been adequately established by plaintiffs-appellants.
As regards the award of attorney's fees, it is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather
than the rule, and counsel's fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees
under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion

101

without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In this case, we have searched but found nothing in
plaintiffs-appellants' suit that justifies the award of attorney's fees.14
Finally, it should be said that controversies as to who should make arrangements for the funeral of a deceased have often aggravated
the bereavement of the family and disturbed the proper solemnity which should prevail at every funeral. It is for the purpose of
preventing such controversies that the Code Commission saw it best to include the provisions on "Funerals."15

102