December 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Law and

Procedure
Posted on January 9, 2013 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo
Posted in
Criminal Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law
Tagged evidence,
jurisdiction, qualified rape, rape, trust receipts
Here are select December 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on criminal law and procedure:
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Rape; Pruna Guidelines. In this case, the prosecution may have been unable to
present AAAs birth certificate or other authentic document such as a baptismal
certificate during trial in accordance with the formulated set of guidelines in
People v. Pruna in appreciating age either as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance in rape cases. However, that failure to present relevant
evidence did not deter the Supreme Court from upholding that qualified rape was
indeed committed by the accused Padigos because he himself admitted, in his
counter-affidavit which formed part of the evidence for the defense and the
contents of which he later affirmed in his testimony in open court, that AAA was
below 7 years old around the time of the rape incident. In the Courts view, this
admission from accused, taken with the testimony of the victim, sufficiently
proved the victims minority. People of the Philippines v. Edgar Padigos, G.R. No.
181202, December 5, 2012.
Rape; resistance. Accused Estoya attempts to raise doubts in victim AAAs
testimony by questioning the latters failure to offer tenacious resistance during
the supposed sexual assault. The Supreme Court held that the law does not
impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. Physical resistance
need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim
and she submits herself against her will to the rapists lust because of fear for life
and personal safety. In the case at bar, AAA was only 14 years of age at the time
of the rape, and at such a tender age, she could not be expected to put up
resistance as would be expected from a mature woman. Also, Estoya had
threatened AAA that he would stab her with a knife if she resisted. People of the
Philippines v. Radby Estoya y Mateo, G.R. No. 200531, December 5, 2012.

2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Trust Receipts Law; liability of corporate agents. Section 13 of the Trust Receipts
Law explicitly provides that if the violation or offense is committed by a
corporation, as in this case, the penalty provided for under the law shall be
imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or other officials or person
responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the
criminal offense. In this case, petitioner Crisologo was acquitted of the charge for
violation of the Trust Receipts Law in relation to Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
RPC. As such, he is relieved of the corporate criminal liability as well as the
corresponding civil liability arising therefrom. However, as correctly found by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals (CA), he may still be held liable for the trust
receipts and letters of credit transactions he had entered into in behalf of
Novachem. Settled is the rule that debts incurred by directors, officers, and
employees acting as corporate agents are not their direct liability but of the
corporation they represent, except if they contractually agree/stipulate or assume
to be personally liable for the corporations debts, as in this case. The trial court
and the CA adjudged petitioner personally and solidarily liable with Novachem for
those obligations secured by the subject trust receipts, which he signed the
guarantee clauses therein in his personal capacity and even waived the benefit of
excussion. Ildefonso S. Crisologo v. People of the Philippines and China Banking
Corporation, G.R. No. 199481, December 3, 2012.
3.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Evidence; credibility of victims testimony. Accuseds appeal is hinged principally

on the credibility of the victims testimony. He insists that AAAs testimony is not
credible because she allegedly failed to give a straightforward and consistent
narration of the events surrounding the incidents at issue. He maintains that
AAAs testimony is not worthy of belief because it allegedly lacked details as to
how the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness were actually committed. The
Supreme Court (SC) ruled that when the credibility of the victim is at issue, it
gives great weight to the trial courts assessment. The trial courts finding of facts
is even conclusive and binding if it is not shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The wisdom
behind this rule is that the trial court had the full opportunity to observe directly

the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, thus, it is in a better position

than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence. In the case at
bar, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals categorically held that AAA is a
credible witness and that her testimony deserves full faith and belief. In spite of
the brevity of her testimony, the trial court considered the same as delivered in a
clear and straightforward manner that is devoid of any pretense or equivocation.
Moreover, SC has repeatedly stressed that no young girl would concoct a sordid
tale of so serious a crime as rape at the hands of her own father, undergo
medical examination, then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a
public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent desire to seek justice. People
of the Philippines v. Edgar Padigos, G.R. No. 181202, December 5, 2012.
Jurisdiction; voluntary submission. As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief
is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings
seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent
jurisdiction of ones person to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, by filing several
motions before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) seeking the dismissal of the
criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
RTC. Furthermore, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs
other than an application for bail. Dante LA. Jimenez, etc. v. Hon. Edwin
Sorongon, etc., et al, G.R. No. 178607, December 5, 2012.
Rule 45; only questions of law reviewed. Accused Josue seeks the review of his
case through a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where
only questions of law shall be addressed by the Supreme Court (SC), barring
any question that pertains to factual issues on the crimes commission. The
general rule is that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review
under Rule 45, subject only to certain exceptions as when the trial courts
judgment is not supported by sufficient evidence or is premised on a
misapprehension of facts. Upon review, the SC has determined that the present
case does not fall under any of the exceptions. In resolving the present petition,
SC then defer to the factual findings made by the trial court, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals (CA), when the case was brought before it on appeal. The SC
has, after all, consistently ruled that the task of assigning values to the
testimonies of witnesses and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court
which forms first-hand impressions as witnesses testify before it. Factual findings
of the trial court as regards its assessment of the witnesses credibility are

entitled to great weight and respect by the SC, particularly when affirmed by the
CA, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court overlooked
certain facts and circumstances which could substantially affect the outcome of
the case. Ramon Josue y Gonzales v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
199579, December 10, 2012.
November 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Law and
Procedure
Posted on December 12, 2012 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo Posted in
Criminal Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law

Tagged
arrest,
dangerous drugs, evidence, information, malversation, probable cause,
proximate cause, qualified rape, rape, robbery, Sandiganbayan, self defense,
treachery

Here are select November 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on criminal law and procedure:
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Proximate cause; definition. The Supreme Court rejected the argument of

petitioners that the Court of Appeals failed to consider in its entirety the testimony
of the doctor who performed the autopsy. What really needs to be proven in a
case when the victim dies is the proximate cause of his death. Proximate cause
has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. The autopsy report indicated that the
cause of the victims death is multiple organ failure. According to Dr. Wilson Moll
Lee, the doctor who conducted the autopsy, it can be surmised that multiple
organ failure was secondary to a long standing infection secondary to a stab
wound which the victim allegedly sustained. Thus, it can be concluded that
without the stab wounds, the victim could not have been afflicted with an infection
which later on caused multiple organ failure that caused his death. The offender
is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused,
accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim. Rodolfo Belbis Jr. y
Competente and Alberto Brucales v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181052,
November 14, 2012.

Rape; qualifying circumstances; concurrence of minority and relationship. Under

Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 or the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the concurrence of minority and relationship qualifies the
crime of rape. To warrant the imposition of the death penalty, however, both the
minority and the relationship must be alleged in the Information and proved
during the trial. In the instant case, both circumstances were properly alleged in
the Informations and proved during trial. The Informations alleged that AAA was
15 years old when the crimes were committed. Her minority was established not
only by her Certificate of Live Birth but also by her testimony that she was born
on November 6, 1985. Anent AAAs relationship with appellant, the Informations
sufficiently alleged that AAA is appellants daughter. This fact was likewise openly
admitted by the appellant and further bolstered by the said Certificate of Live
Birth indicating appellant as AAAs father. Moreover, the relationship between
appellant and AAA became the subject of admission during the pre-trial
conference. Hence, pursuant to the said article, the presence of the above
special qualifying circumstances increases the penalty to death. In view,
however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346 proscribing the imposition of death
penalty, the proper penalty imposable on appellant, in lieu of death and pursuant
to Section 2 thereof, is reclusion perpetua. People of the Philippines v. Enerio
Ending y Onyong, G.R. No. 183827, November 12, 2012.

Rape; rupture of hymen not an element. The Supreme Court gave no credence to
the claim of accused-appellant that the crime of rape was negated by the medical
findings of an intact hymen or absence of lacerations in the vagina of AAA.
Hymenal rupture, vaginal laceration or genital injury is not indispensable because
the same is not an element of the crime of rape. An intact hymen does not
negate a finding that the victim was raped. Here, the finding of reddish
discoloration of the hymen of AAA during her medical examination and the
intense pain she felt in her vagina during and after the sexual assault sufficiently
corroborated her testimony that she was raped. People of the Philippines v.
Benjamin Soria y Gomez, G.R. No. 179031, November 14, 2012.
Rape; minority of victim must be proved independently. With respect to minority,
the Information described AAA as a 7-year old daughter of appellant. While this
also became the subject of stipulation during the pre-trial conference, the same is

insufficient evidence of AAAs age. Her minority must be proved conclusively and
indubitably as the crime itself.
There must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the accused.
Documents such as her original or duly certified birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or school records would suffice as competent evidence of her age.
Here, there was nothing on record to prove the minority of AAA other than her
testimony, appellants absence of denial, and their pre-trial stipulation. The
prosecution also failed to establish that the documents referred to above were
lost, destroyed, unavailable or otherwise totally absent. Philippines v. Benjamin
Soria y Gomez, G.R. No. 179031, November 14, 2012.
Rape; elements of qualified rape. The Supreme Court held that both the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals (CA) correctly found the following elements
of qualified rape, as defined in the relevant provisions of the Revised Penal Code
to concur: (1) that the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age;
(2) that the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian or relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim; and (3) that the offender has carnal knowledge of the
victim either through force, threat or intimidation; or when she is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machinations or
grave abuse of authority. People of the Philippines v. Neil B. Colorado, G.R. No.
200792, November 14, 2012.
Rape; elements of qualified rape. The age of the victim at the time of the crimes
commission is undisputed. During the pre-trial, the parties agreed on the
existence of AAAs Certificate of Live Birth, a certified true/xerox copy of which
forms part of the records and provides that AAA was born on October 10, 1990.
AAA was then only 12 years old in December 2002, a significant fact that was
sufficiently alleged in the Information. As to the second element, there is no
dispute that Colorado is a full-blood brother of AAA, as this was also among the
parties stipulated facts during the cases pre-trial. The grounds now being raised
by Colorado to justify his exoneration delve mainly on the alleged absence of the
crimes third element. He denies AAAs claim that he had ravished her, raising the
defense of alibi and the alleged doubt and suspicion that should be ascribed to
AAAs accusations. On this matter, settled is the rule that the findings of the trial

court on the credibility of a witness deserve great weight, given the clear
advantage of a trial judge in the appreciation of testimonial evidence. The SC has
repeatedly recognized that the trial court is in the best position to assess the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, because of its unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude under gruelling examination. These are significant factors in evaluating
the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth. The rule finds
even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the CA.
Thus, except for compelling reasons, the SC is doctrinally bound by the trial
courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses. The SC then took due
consideration of the trial courts findings of fact, its assessment of AAAs
credibility, her testimony and the manner by which her statements were relayed.
Given the foregoing, the SC ruled that the CA did not err in affirming the trial
courts conviction of Colorado. People of the Philippines v. Neil B. Colorado, G.R.
No. 200792, November 14, 2012.
Rape; insanity as a defense. Under Article 800 of the Civil Code, the presumption
is that every human is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of
insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. It is in
the nature of confession and avoidance. An accused invoking insanity admits to
have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of
insanity. The testimony or proof of an accuseds insanity must, however, relate to
the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the
offense with which he is charged. In the case at bench, the defense failed to
overcome the presumption of sanity. Accused Isla exactly knew that what he was
doing was evil so much so that he had to employ cunning means, by discreetly
closing the windows and the door of the house and by resorting to threats and
violence, to ensure the consummation of his dastardly deed. The fact that he
scampered away after AAA was able to take the knife from him would only show
that he fully understood that he committed a crime for which he could be held
liable. If Isla had become insane after the commission of the crime, such fact
does not alter the situation and the Supreme Courts ruling is the same. His
defense still fails considering that he was not insane during the commission of
the acts charged. People of the Philippines v. Edwin Isla y Rossell, G.R. No.
199875, November 21, 2012.

Robbery; elements. To constitute robbery, the following elements must be

established: (1) The subject is personal property belonging to another; (2) There
is unlawful taking of that property; (3) The taking is with the intent to gain; and (4)
There is violence against or intimidation of any person or use of force upon
things. Admittedly, the subject 10th floor unit is owned by the corporation and
served as the family residence prior to the death of petitioner and respondents
parents. The 10th floor unit, including the personal properties inside, is the
subject of estate proceedings pending in another court and is, therefore, involved
in the disputed claims among the siblings (petitioner and respondents).
Respondents admitted that armed with a board resolution authorizing them to
break open the door lock system of said unit and to install a new door lock
system, they went up to the subject unit to implement said resolution. The said
corporate action was arrived at because petitioner had allegedly prevented
prospective buyers from conducting ocular inspection. Petitioner, however, claims
that on December 16, 1999 and sometime in January 2000, respondents brought
out from the unit 34 boxes containing her personal belongings worth more than
P10 million. The Supreme Court said that it cannot fathom why petitioner did not
immediately report the first incident and waited for yet another incident after more
or less one month. If the value involved is what she claims to be, it is contrary to
human nature to just keep silent and not immediately protect her right. Her
general statement that she was intimidated by Benito who was known to be
capable of inflicting bodily harm cannot excuse her inaction. Petitioner, therefore,
failed to establish that there was unlawful taking. Assuming that respondents
indeed took said boxes containing personal belongings, said properties were
taken under claim of ownership which negates the element of intent to gain. Lily
Sy v. Hon. Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, Benito Fernandez
Go, Berthold Lim, Jennifer Sy, Glenn Ben Tiak Sy and Merry Sy, G.R. No.
171579, November 14, 2012.
Robbery; elements. Taking, as an element of robbery, means depriving the
offended party of ownership of the thing taken with the character of permanency.
The taking should not be under a claim of ownership. Thus, one who takes the
property openly and avowedly under claim of title offered in good faith is not guilty
of robbery even though the claim of ownership is untenable. The intent to gain
cannot be established by direct evidence being an internal act. It must, therefore,
be deduced from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense.
In this case, it was shown that respondents believed in good faith that they and

the corporation own not only the subject unit but also the properties found inside.
If at all, they took them openly and avowedly under that claim of ownership. This
is bolstered by the fact that at the time of the alleged incident, petitioner had been
staying in another unit because the electric service in the 10th floor was
disconnected. Therefore, respondents should not be held liable for the alleged
unlawful act absent a felonious intent. Lily Sy v. Hon. Secretary of Justice Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez, Benito Fernandez Go, Berthold Lim, Jennifer Sy, Glenn
Ben Tiak Sy and Merry Sy, G.R. No. 171579, November 14, 2012.
Self-defense; requisites. By invoking self-defense, accused Joel needed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence the following requisites: (a) unlawful
aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. Here, the testimonies of Dolor and Enrique, accepted as credible by both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals, show that accused Joel, not Clarence,
was the armed aggressor. Enrique saw Joel draw a knife from his waist and
proceed to stab Clarence. Indeed, both witnesses testified that it was Clarence
who was trying to put up a futile defense against Joels continued thrusts. The
location of the wounds on the victims body corroborates such testimonies. For
his part, accused Joel did not bother to offer any corroborative evidence, such as
a medical report establishing the wounds he allegedly sustained in his struggle to
seize Clarences knife from him or someone who saw those wounds around the
time they were supposedly inflicted. Thus, the Supreme Court found Joels claim
of self-defense to be hallow. People of the Philippines v. Joel Artajo y
Alimangohan, G.R. No. 198050, November 14, 2012.
Technical malversation; elements. The crime of technical malversation as
penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code has three elements: a)
that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds
or property under his administration to some public use; and c) that the public
use for which such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose
for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance. Accused Ysidoro
claims that he could not be held liable for the offense under its third element
because the four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines he gave the Core
Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) beneficiaries were not appropriated by law
or ordinance for a specific purpose. But the evidence shows that on November 8,
2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolution 00-133 appropriating

the annual general fund for 2001. This appropriation was based on the executive
budget which allocated P100,000.00 for the Supplemental Feeding Program
(SFP) and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of
Social Services which covers the CSAP housing projects. The creation of the two
items shows the Sanggunians intention to appropriate separate funds for SFP
and the CSAP in the annual budget. Since the municipality bought the subject
goods using SFP funds, then those goods should be used for SFPs needs,
observing the rules prescribed for identifying the qualified beneficiaries of its
feeding programs. Ysidoro here disregarded the guidelines when he approved
the distribution of the goods to those providing free labor for the rebuilding of their
own homes. This is technical malversation. Arnold James M. Ysidoro v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012.
Technical malversation; mala prohibita. Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith
when he diverted the food intended for those suffering from malnutrition to the
beneficiaries of reconstruction projects affecting the homes of victims of
calamities since, first, the idea of using the Supplemental Feeding Program
(SFP) goods for the Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) beneficiaries
came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the
accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries.
Having no criminal intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime of
technical malversation. But criminal intent is not an element of technical
malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked by
law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The
offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently
immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its
commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience. It
is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect
thereof that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence,
malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant. Arnold James M. Ysidoro v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012.
Treachery. Anent the finding of treachery by the Regional Trial Court, the
Supreme Court (SC) agreed that appellants act of suddenly stabbing Wilson as
he was about to leave constituted the qualifying circumstance of treachery. As the
SC previously ruled, treachery is present when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution,

which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Here,
appellant caught Wilson by surprise when he suddenly embraced him and
proceeded immediately to plunge a knife to his chest. The swift turn of events did
not allow Wilson to defend himself, in effect, assuring appellant that he complete
the crime without risk to his own person. People of the Philippines v.Marcial M.
Malicdem, G.R. No. 184601, November 12, 2012.
Treachery. As to the issue of treachery, the Supreme Court (SC) found it difficult
in concurring with the findings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals that accused Joel resorted to treachery in killing Clarence. There is
treachery, according to Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code,
when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in attacking his victim
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Here, Dolors
testimony contains nothing that hints upon treachery being employed. She did not
see how the attack began. As she went outside and looked, accused Joel was
already attacking his father. Quite curiously, what she further saw was that his
father was trying to fight back, not just trying to parry Joels blows, indicating
that the latter had not employed means that would eliminate any risk to him
arising from the defense which Clarence might make. If he employed treachery,
Joel could very well have aimed his first blow to immediately disable Clarence.
On the other hand, Enrique, a neighbor, testified that he saw Clarence and Joel
come out of the back door of the house together. Clearly then Joel did not lie in
ambush. Since they came out together, Clarence must have perceived the attack
for he even tried to keep his grip on his assailant after it started. And the
evidence is clear that Joel did not purposely stab Clarence on the back. Enrique
testified that it was only when Clarence fell to the ground flat on his face that Joel
sat astride on him and stabbed him on the back. Those back wounds were not
treacherously delivered at the beginning with the victim having no premonition of
their coming. For the above reasons, the SC concluded that, although Joel killed
Clarence, the killing was not accompanied by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. Accused Joel is guilty only of homicide. People of the Philippines v.
Joel Artajo y Alimangohan, G.R. No. 198050, November 14, 2012.
Voluntary surrender; requisites. As to the claim of petitioners that they are
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the Supreme Court

ruled that the same does not deserve merit. For voluntary surrender to be
appreciated, the following requisites should be present: (1) the offender has not
been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority or the latters agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence
of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself
up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt
or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred
for his search and capture. Without these elements, and where the clear reasons
for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure
his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be
characterized as voluntary surrender to serve as a mitigating circumstance. In
the present case, when the petitioners reported the incident and allegedly
surrendered the bladed weapon used in the stabbing, such cannot be considered
as voluntary surrender within the contemplation of the law. Besides, there was no
spontaneity, because they only surrendered after a warrant of their arrest had
already been issued. Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. y Competente and Alberto Brucales v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181052, November 14, 2012.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Dangerous Drugs Act; buy-bust operation. Accused Robelo asserts that the
alleged buy-bust operation is tainted with infirmity due to the absence of a prior
surveillance or investigation. Moreover, per the testimony of PO2 Tubbali,
accused did not say anything when the former was introduced to him as an
interested buyer of shabu. Accused points out that it is contrary to human nature
that the seller would say nothing to the buyer who is a complete stranger to him.
The Supreme Court sustained the validity of the buy-bust operation. A buy-bust
operation has been proven to be an effective mode of apprehending drug
pushers. In this regard, police authorities are given wide latitude in employing
their own ways of trapping or apprehending drug dealers in flagrante delicto.
There is no prescribed method on how the operation is to be conducted. As ruled
in People v. Garcia, the absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy does not affect
the legality of the buy-bust operation as there is no textbook method of
conducting the same. As long as the constitutional rights of the suspected drug
dealer are not violated, the regularity of the operation will always be upheld.
Furthermore, the law does not prescribe as an element of the crime that the
vendor and the vendee be familiar with each other. As aptly held by the Court of

Appeals in this case, peddlers of illicit drugs have been known with ever
increasing casualness and recklessness to offer and sell their wares for the right
price to anybody, be they strangers or not. People of the Philippines v. Joseph
Robelo y Tungala, G.R. No. 184181, November 26, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs Act; evidence; possession. Accused Eyam was caught in
possession of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
He failed to show that he was authorized to possess the same. By his mere
possession of the drug, there is already a prima facie evidence of knowledge,
which he failed to rebut. Supreme Court sustained his conviction for the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drug, in violation of Section 11 of Article II of R.A.
9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
People of the Philippines v. George Eyam y Watang, G.R. No. 184056,
November 26, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal possession of drug paraphernalia; elements. The
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals convicted of Godofredo of illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia. The elements of illegal possession of
equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs
under Section 12, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 are: (1) possession or control by the
accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for
smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law.
The prosecution here has convincingly established that Godofredo was in
possession of drug paraphernalia such as aluminum foil, aluminium tooter and
lighter, all of which were offered in evidence. The corresponding receipt and
inventory of the seized shabu and other drug paraphernalia were likewise
presented in evidence. Moreover, Police Superintendent Leonidas Diaz Castillo
attested to the veracity of the contents of these documents. Thus, the Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts. People of the Philippines v.
Godofredo Mariano y Feliciano and Allan Doringo y Gunan, G.R. No. 191193,
November 14, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; elements. Under Section 5, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165, the elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of
drugs are: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of corpus delicti. All these elements were duly established by
the prosecution in this case. Appellants were caught in flagrante delicto selling
shabu during a buy-bust operation conducted by the buy-bust team. The poseurbuyer, PO1 Olleres, positively testified that the sale took place and that
appellants sold the shabu. Simply put, Godofredo produced two (2) plastic
sachets containing shabu and gave it to PO1 Olleres in exchange for P1,000.00.
Also, Allan had offered and given two (2) more sachets containing shabu to PO3
Razo, who in turn, handed him P600.00. PO3 Razo corroborated the account of
PO1 Olleres. The result of the laboratory examination confirmed the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride on the white crystalline substances inside the
four (4) plastic sachets confiscated from appellants. The marked money was
presented in evidence. Thus, the delivery of the illicit drug to PO1 Olleres and
PO3 Razo and the receipt by appellants of the marked money successfully
consummated the buy-bust transaction. People of the Philippines v. Godofredo
Mariano y Feliciano and Allan Doringo y Gunan, G.R. No. 191193, November 14,
2012.
3.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Arrests; warrantless arrests. The Supreme Court found appellants insistence on

the illegality of their warrantless arrest to be unmeritorious. Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court allows a warrantless arrest under any of the circumstances
cited in the provision. In the instant case, the warrantless arrest was effected
under the first mode or aptly termed as in flagrante delicto. PO1 Olleres and PO3
Razo personally witnessed and were in fact participants to the buy-bust
operation. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substances placed
inside the four (4) separate plastic sachets were found positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. Under these
circumstances, it is beyond doubt that appellants were arrested in flagrante
delicto while committing a crime, in full view of the arresting team. People of the
Philippines v. Godofredo Mariano y Feliciano and Allan Doringo y Gunan, G.R.
No. 191193, November 14, 2012.
Determination of probable cause. At the outset, a perusal of the records of
Criminal Case No. 02-199574 in People of the Philippines v. Benito Fernandez

Go, et al., pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) where the Information
for Robbery was filed, will show that on March 12, 2008, Presiding Judge
Zenaida R. Daguna issued an Order granting the Motion to Withdraw Information
filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Armando C. Velasco. The withdrawal of the
information was based on the alleged failure of petitioner to take action on the
Amended Decision issued by the Court of Appeals which, in effect, reversed and
set aside the finding of probable cause, and in order for the case not to appear
pending in the docket of the court. The propriety of the determination of probable
cause is, however, the subject of this present petition. Besides, in allowing the
withdrawal of the information, the RTC in fact did not make a determination of the
existence of probable cause. Thus, the withdrawal of the information does not bar
the Supreme Court (SC) from making a final determination of whether or not
probable cause exists to warrant the filing of an Information for Robbery against
respondents in order to write finis to the issue elevated before the SC. Lily Sy v.
Hon. Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, Benito Fernandez Go,
Berthold Lim, Jennifer Sy, Glenn Ben Tiak Sy and Merry Sy, G.R. No. 171579,
November 14, 2012.
Determination of probable cause. Judge Untalan acted well within the exercise of
his judicial discretion when he denied the Motion to Dismiss and/or Withdraw
Information filed by the prosecution. His finding that there was probable cause to
indict respondents for unfair competition, and that the findings of the DOJ would
be better appreciated in the course of a trial, was based on his own evaluation of
the evidence brought before him. It was an evaluation that was required of him as
a judge. Crespo v. Mogul instructs in a very clear manner that once a complaint
or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal, or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the
said court, as it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it.
While the resolution of the prosecutorial arm is persuasive, it is not binding on the
court. It may therefore grant or deny at its option a motion to dismiss or to
withdraw the information based on its own assessment of the records of the
preliminary investigation submitted to it, in the faithful exercise of judicial
discretion and prerogative, and not out of subservience to the Prosecutor. Shirley
F. Torres v. Imelda Perez and Rodrigo Perez / Shirley F. Torres vs. Imelda Perez
and Rodrigo Perez, G.R. Nos. 188225 & 198728, November 28, 2012.

Evidence; credibility of victims testimony. The Supreme Court (SC), like the
courts below, found that AAA was without doubt telling the truth when she
declared that her father raped her on three separate occasions. She was
consistent in her narration on how she was abused by her father in their own
house, in the copra drier, and even in a nearby pasture land. After she was forced
to lie down, appellant removed her clothes, went on top of her, inserted his penis
into her vagina and threatened her with death if she would report the incidents.
Hence, appellants attempt to discredit the testimony of AAA deserves no merit.
When credibility is in issue, the SC generally defers to the findings of the trial
court considering that it was in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment during trial.
Here, there is nothing from the records that impelled the SC to deviate from the
findings and conclusions of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
People of the Philippines v. Enerio Ending y Onyong, G.R. No. 183827,
November 12, 2012.
Evidence; credibility of victims testimony. Time and again, the Supreme Court
(SC) has stated that, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court
overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which would alter a
conviction, it generally defers to the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses especially if such findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This
must be so since the trial courts are in a better position to decide the question of
credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed first hand
their deportment and manner of testifying under gruelling examination. Given the
factual circumstances of the present case, the SC saw no need to depart from
the foregoing rules. Appellant here failed to present proof of any showing that the
trial court overlooked, misconstrued or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case.
Prosecution witnesses have in fact positively identified appellant to have stabbed
the victim. People of the Philippines v. Marcial M. Malicdem, G.R. No. 184601,
November 12, 2012.
Evidence; credibility of victims testimony. Both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals held that AAA was a credible witness. They ruled that her testimony
deserved credence and is sufficient evidence that she was raped by appellant.
The Supreme Court found no cogent reason to overturn these findings. It would
be highly inconceivable for AAA to impute to her own father the crime of raping

her unless the imputation is true. In fact, it takes a certain amount of

psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put
her own father in jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the rest of the
family including herself to a lifetime of shame unless the imputation is true. When
a rape victims testimony on the manner she was defiled is straightforward and
candid, and is corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician,
as in this case, the same is sufficient to support a conviction for rape. People of
the Philippines v. Benjamin Soria y Gomez, G.R. No. 179031, November 14,
2012.
Evidence; denial and alibi. In assailing the Decision of the lower courts finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape, accused-appellant
here proffers the defense of denial and alibi. The Supreme Court, however, did
not give credence to his defense. As often stressed, mere denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, has no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the positive testimony of a rape
victim. In this case, appellants testimony, particularly his denial, was not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Also, for his alibi to prosper,
appellant must establish that he was not at the locus delicti at the time the
offense was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Appellant failed to establish
these elements. The fact that AAA was living with her grandparents did not
preclude the possibility that appellant was present at the crime scenes during
their commission. Appellant himself admitted that the distance between his
residence and that of AAAs grandparents is only approximately 7 kilometers
and which can be traversed by riding a pedicab in less than 30 minutes. In other
words, it was not physically impossible for appellant to have been at the situs of
the crimes during the dates when the separate acts of rape were committed.
Moreover, it has been invariably ruled that alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused. Here, appellant was positively identified by AAA as
the perpetrator of the crimes without showing any dubious reason or fiendish
motive on her part to falsely charge him. People of the Philippines v. Enerio
Ending y Onyong, G.R. No. 183827, November 12, 2012.
Evidence; factual findings of trial court accorded great respect. Accused
Mangune asseverates that the lower courts should have acquitted him based on
reasonable doubt as AAAs testimony is not worthy of belief for having been

fabricated. He supports such assertion by making much of the fact that AAA did
not sustain any external physical marks, as shown by the medico-legal findings,
despite her testimony that he slapped her many times on the face. This,
Mangune insists, makes AAAs testimony incredible. The Supreme Court (SC)
cited People v. Paringit, where it declared that not all blows leave marks. Thus,
the fact that the medico-legal officer found no signs of external injuries on AAA,
especially on her face, which supposedly had been slapped several times, does
not invalidate her statement that Mangune slapped her to silence her. Mangunes
attempt to discredit AAAs testimony that he raped her on May 7, 2003 must
ultimately fail as he has shown no solid grounds to impeach it. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC), which had the opportunity to hear the testimonies live and observe
the witnesses in person, found not only AAA credible, but her testimony as well. It
even declared that AAAs testimony alone can justify the conviction of Mangune.
The foregoing were subscribed to by the Court of Appeals as well when it
affirmed the RTCs Decision in its entirety. The SC thus found no valid reason to
depart from the time-honored doctrine that where the issue is one of credibility of
witnesses, and in this case, their testimonies as well, the findings of the trial court
are not to be disturbed unless the consideration of certain facts of substance and
value, which have been plainly overlooked, might affect the result of the case.
Mangune was therefore adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape. People of the Philippines v. William Mangune y Del Rosario, G.R. No.
186463. November 14, 2012.
Evidence; factual findings of trial court accorded great respect. The Supreme
Court (SC) here found no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the
Regional Trial Court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is well-settled that
factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape victim,
are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. In its
assessment of the instant case, the SC was convinced that the testimony of XXX
positively identifying Lansangan as her perpetrator is worthy of belief. The clear,
consistent and spontaneous testimony of XXX unrelentingly established that
Lansangan inserted his penis and his index finger into her vagina while she was
in his custody. Being a child of tender years, her failure to resist or struggle while
Lansangan molested her would all the more prove how she felt intimidated by her
Tatay. Besides, in rape cases, physical resistance need not be established
when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself out

of fear. People of the Philippines v. Victor Lansangan, G.R. No. 201587,

November 14, 2012.
Information; aggravating and qualifying circumstances should be alleged. Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon. Although
the information alleged the use by the accused of a deadly weapon (bolo) in the
commission of the rape, the Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals still
correctly prescribed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua because the
information did not allege the attendance of any aggravating circumstances. With
the intervening revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure in order to now
require the information to state the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances xxx in
ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the
statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstance and for the court to pronounce judgment, the prosecution became
precluded from establishing any act or circumstance not specifically alleged in
the information if such act or circumstance would increase the penalty to the
maximum period. People of the Philippines v. Rogelic Abrencillo, G.R. No.
183100, November 28, 2012.
Presumption of Innocence; presumption of regularity of performance of duties.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals favored the members of the buybust team with the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty,
mainly because the accused did not show that they had ill motive behind his
entrapment. However, the Supreme Court ruled that presuming that the members
of the buy-bust team regularly performed their duty was patently bereft of any
factual and legal basis. It held that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty could not prevail over the stronger presumption of innocence
favoring the accused. Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of the accused
being presumed innocent would be held subordinate to a mere rule of evidence
allocating the burden of evidence. Where, like here, the proof adduced against
the accused has not even overcome the presumption of innocence, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could not be a factor to
adjudge the accused guilty of the crime charged. Moreover, the regularity of the
performance of their duty could not be properly presumed in favor of the

policemen because the records were replete with indicia of their serious lapses.
As a rule, a presumed fact like the regularity of performance by a police officer
must be inferred only from an established basic fact, not plucked out from thin air.
Where there is any hint of irregularity committed by the police officers in arresting
the accused and thereafter, there can be no presumption of regularity of
performance in their favor. People of the Philippines v. Louie Catalan y Dedala,
G.R. No. 189330, November 28, 2012.
Sandiganbayan; jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by
the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties. In turn, the issue on
whether a suit comes within the penumbra of a statutory conferment is
determined by the allegations in the complaint, regardless of whether or not the
suitor will be entitled to recover upon all or part of the claims asserted. The
Supreme Court upheld the Sandiganbayans assumption of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of Civil Case (CC) Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F. Judging from the
allegations of the defendants illegal acts thereat made, it is fairly obvious that
both CC Nos. 0033-A and CC 0033-F partake, in the context of EO Nos. 1, 2 and
14, series of 1986, the nature of ill-gotten wealth suits. Both deal with the
recovery of sequestered shares, property or business enterprises claimed, as
alleged in the corresponding basic complaints, to be ill-gotten assets of President
Marcos, his cronies and nominees and acquired by taking undue advantage of
relationships or influence and/or through or as a result of improper use,
conversion or diversion of government funds or property. Recovery of these
assets determined as shall hereinafter be discussed as prima facie ill-gotten
falls within the unquestionable jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under P.D. No.
1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and E.O. No. 14, Series of 1986, which
vests the Sandiganbayan with, among others, original jurisdiction over civil and
criminal cases instituted pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A. Eduardo M. Cojuangco Jr. v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
180705, November 27, 2012.
October 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Law and
Procedure
Posted on November 7, 2012 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo
Criminal Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law

Posted in

Here are select October 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
criminal law and procedure:
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Bigamy; elements. The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has
been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the
second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements,
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. In this case, it
appears that when respondent Lourdes contracted a second marriage with
Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still
subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a
competent authority. Thus, respondent was properly charged with the crime of
bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently
alleged. Merlinda Cipriano Montaez v. Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano, G.R. No.
181089, October 22, 2012.
Bigamy; subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of first marriage. Although the
judicial declaration of respondents first marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity was declared in 2003 and retroacted to the date of the celebration of
the marriage in 1976, insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned,
said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is incurring
criminal liability for bigamy. Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a
subsequent marriage, is a rule of procedure, which should be applied
retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said
Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The
reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on
bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that

each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment. Thus, it is
immaterial that the declaration of nullity of the previous marriage was rendered
before the information was filed or that the previous and subsequent marriages
were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code. What makes a person
criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Merlinda Cipriano Montaez
v. Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012.

Conspiracy. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to
commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after
the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to
reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently
made by evidence of a chain of circumstances. There is conspiracy among
accused-appellants and their cohorts when they kidnapped Yasumitsu. Their
community of criminal design could be inferred from their arrival at the Hashibas
home already armed with weapons, as well as from their clearly designated roles
upon entry into the house (i.e., some served as lookouts; some accompanied
Emelie to the second floor to look for jewelry, cash, and other property to take;
and some guarded and hogtied the other people in the house) and in the
abduction of Yasumitsu (i.e., Jovel S. Apole went back to Surigao City to secure
the release of the ransom money while Renato C. Apole and Rolando A. Apole
stayed in Tubajon to guard Yasumitsu). The Supreme Court thus concurred with
the Regional Trial Court that all these acts were complimentary to one another
and geared toward the attainment of a common ultimate objective to extort a
ransom of three (3) million in exchange for the Japaneses freedom. People of
the Philippines v. Jovel S. Apole, et al, G.R. No. 189820, October 10, 2012.
Conspiracy. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Actions indicating close personal association and shared sentiment among the
accused can prove its presence. Proof that the perpetrators met beforehand and
decided to commit the crime is not necessary as long as their acts manifest a
common design and oneness of purpose. Here, both the lower courts found

conspiracy in attendance. The witnesses, Magallanes and Francisco, testified

that accused Nazareno and Saliendra purposely waited for David and his
companions out on the street as they came out of the wake. They likewise
testified that Nazareno and Saliendra took concerted steps aimed at killing or
causing serious harm to David. Nazareno repeatedly struck David on the area of
his neck with a stick; Saliendra hurled a fist-sized stone to Davids head. Even
when David tried to flee, they still chased him and together with other barangay
tanods, beat him to unconsciousness. Although Magallanes testified that accused
Saliendra and Nazareno acted quite differently from each other before the
attack, their actions before and during the incident reveal a common purpose.
Although Saliendra appears to have delivered the fatal blow, Nazareno cannot
escape liability because, in a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. People of
the Philippines v. Chito Nazareno, G.R. No. 196434, October 24, 2012.
Kidnapping; elements. For the crime of kidnapping, the following elements, as
provided in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, must be proven: (a) a person
has been deprived of his liberty, (b) the offender is a private individual, and (c)
the detention is unlawful. The deprivation required by Article 267 means not only
the imprisonment of a person, but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever
form and for whatever length of time. It involves a situation where the victim
cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention or is restricted or impeded
in his liberty to move. In other words, the essence of kidnapping is the actual
deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of
the accused to effect such deprivation. People of the Philippines v. Jovel S.
Apole, et al, G.R. No. 189820, October 10, 2012.
Kidnapping; elements. In the present case, Yasumitsu was evidently deprived by
accused-appellants of his liberty for seven days. Armed with guns and a grenade,
accused-appellants and their cohorts took Yasumitsu from the latters home in
Lanuza, Surigao del Sur, to Surigao City, by car, and then all the way to Tubajon,
Surigao del Norte, by boat. Accused-appellants held Yasumitsu from January 23
to January 29, 2003. During said period, Yasumitsu was unable to communicate
with his family or to go home. The Supreme Court thus found accused-appellants
guilty of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention.
People of the Philippines v. Jovel S. Apole, et al, G.R. No. 189820, October 10,
2012.

Perpetual special disqualification; accessory penalties. The Comelec ordered the

cancellation of Jalosjos certificate of candidacy on the ground of false material
representation when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the office he
had sought to be elected to when in fact he was not by reason of a final judgment
in a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet served. The penalty
imposed on Jalosjos was the indeterminate sentence of one year, eight months
and twenty days of prisin correccional as minimum, to four years, two months
and one day of prisin mayor as maximum. The Supreme Court ruled that the
perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal
conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper
ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of deprivation of the right to vote in any
election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office. The
duration of the temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the
principal penalty. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code
perpetual special disqualification means that the offender shall not be permitted
to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification, which is
perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person
suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and
commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy
that he is eligible to so run. The accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction
becomes final. Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately
executory. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to hold or to
run for any elective public office from the time his judgment of conviction became
final. Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, et al./Agapito J.
Cardino v. Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr., et al, G.R. No. 193237/G.R. No. 193536,
October 9, 2012.
Rape. Accused Delos Reyes claims there are improbabilities in AAAs story that
render it hard to believe as they are contrary to human experience. He pointed
out AAAs failure to run away when he was taking his pants off using both his
hands and her failure to shout for help, kick the accused or bite his penis during

the assault. On this score, the Supreme Court (SC) ratiocinated that rape is not
commonly experienced by a woman. Thus, there is no common reaction to it.
Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is
exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against her will to the
rapists embrace because of fear for life and personal safety. The SC further ruled
that the fact that it could have been more convenient for Delos Reyes to rape
AAA in the house of Go instead of bringing her to the construction site and back
again does not affect her credibility. The close physical proximity of other
residents and passersby at the construction site or the neighbors of Go does not
render impossible the commission of the crime. It has been repeatedly
emphasized that rape can be committed even in places where people
congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house
where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other
members of the family are also sleeping. Lust is not a respecter of time and
place. Moreover, the failure to immediately report the dastardly acts to her family
or to the authorities at the soonest possible time or her failure to immediately
change her clothes is not enough reason to cast reasonable doubt on the guilt of
Delos Reyes. The SC has repeatedly held that delay in reporting rape incidents,
in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim.
People of the Philippines v. Val Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 177357, October 17,
2012.
Rape; qualified rape. Accused-appellant Violejas offense could not be deemed
qualified rape, despite the proviso in Article 335 (as amended by RA 7659),
imposing the death penalty on rape committed when the victim is under eighteen
(18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw spouse of the parent of the victim. This is due to the fact that the live-in or
common-law relationship between accused-appellant and VEAs mother was not
alleged in the Information despite being proven in the trial court. What was
alleged in the Information is that VEA was the stepdaughter of the accusedappellant but jurisprudence provides that a stepfather-stepdaughter relationship
as a qualifying circumstance presupposes that the victims mother and the
accused contracted marriage. However, it was shown during trial that no
marriage was ever contracted between appellant and the victims mother. Hence,
appellant Viojela was only found guiltyof simple rape.People of the Philippines v.
Alejandro Violeja y Asartin, G.R. No. 177140, October 17, 2012.

Rape; statutory rape. Sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old is referred
to as statutory rape which is penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. Although the Supreme Court (SC) was convinced that indeed rape had
been committed by appellant Violeja, it found that the prosecution failed to
present VEAs birth certificate or to otherwise unequivocally prove that VEA was
indeed below 12 years of age at the time of the incident in question. The trial
court merely relied on the testimonies of VEA and her mother who attested to the
effect that she was only 10 years old at the time of the rape. In the absence of
relevant documentary evidence or an express admission from the accused, the
bare testimony of the victims mother or a member of the family would suffice only
if the victim is alleged to be below seven years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old. In the present case, VEA was
supposedly 10 years of age on the material date stated in the Information. In view
of this paucity in the prosecutions evidence on the matter of the victims age,
jurisprudential guidelines set forth in the case of People v. Rullepa compelled the
SC to reclassify appellants offense from statutory rape to simple rape. People of
the Philippines v. Alejandro Violeja y Asartin, G.R. No. 177140, October 17,
2012.
Robbery; elements. The crime of robbery under Article 293 of the Revised Penal
Code has the following elements: (a) intent to gain, (b) unlawful taking, (c)
personal property belonging to another, and (d) violence against or intimidation of
person or force upon things. Under Article 296 of the same Code, when more
than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of robbery, it shall be
deemed to have been committed by a band. It further provides that any member
of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the band, shall be
punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band, unless it be
shown that he attempted to prevent the same. All of the foregoing elements had
been satisfactorily established herein. At least five people, including accusedappellants, carrying guns and a hand grenade, barged into the home of, and
forcibly took pieces of jewelry and other personal properties belonging to
spouses Yatsumitsu and Emelie Hashiba. Accused-appellants themselves made
their intent to gain clear when they assured their victims that they were only after
the money. The Supreme Court thus found accused-appellants guilty of the crime
of Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons by a Band. People of
the Philippines v. Jovel S. Apole, et al, G.R. No. 189820, October 10, 2012.

2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Chain of custody; standards. Accused Brainer argues that since no one testified
as to how the alleged seized and confiscated transparent plastic sachet
containing shabu reached the PNP Crime Laboratory, then there is reasonable
suspicion whether the item physically examined by the Forensic Chemical Officer
was the very same one seized and confiscated by the buy-bust team from her. In
this case, the prosecution adequately established that there was an unbroken
chain of custody over the shabu seized from Brainer. First, during the buy-bust
operation, Brainer handed over a green Safeguard soap box, inside of which was
a small transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, to PO2
Gatdula upon the latters payment of P1,000.00. Second, after Brainers arrest,
PO2 Gatdula marked the green Safeguard soap box, with the small transparent
plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance still inside said soap
box. The marked soap box was always in PO2 Gatdulas custody. Upon reaching
the police station, PO2 Gatdula removed the small transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance from the marked soap box, and marked
the sachet itself with MMB. Third, Police Inspector David, as SAID-SOTU Chief,
prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination, and said Request, together
with the small transparent plastic sachet marked MMB containing white
crystalline substance, was delivered by PO2 Mercado to the PNP Crime
Laboratory, where it was received by Police Inspector and Forensic Chemical
Officer Reyes. In her Chemistry Report No. D-1158-04, Police Inspector and
Forensic Chemical Officer Reyes confirmed that the marked item seized from
Brainer was positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. And fourth,
the small transparent plastic sachet marked with MMB and the white crystalline
substance it contains were presented and identified in open court by PO2
Gatdula. PO2 Gatdula confirmed that these were the very items confiscated from
Brainer and the marking MMB on the small transparent plastic sachet was his
own handwriting. The Supreme Court thus found nothing in the case which
jeopardized the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. People of the
Philippines v. Maricar Brainer y Mangulabnan, G.R. No. 188571, October 10,
2012.
Chain of custody; standards. Accused-appellants insisted on the police officers
non-compliance with the chain of custody rule since there was no physical

inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken in their presence or in
the presence of their counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice and an elective official. The Supreme Court ruled that
since the perfect chain is almost always impossible to obtain, noncompliance
with Sec. 21 of RA 9165, as stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations,
does not, without more, automatically render the seizure of the dangerous drug
void, and evidence is admissible as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. People
of the Philippines v. Asia Musa y Pinasilo, Ara Monongan y Papao, Faisah Abas y
Mama, and Mike Solalo y Mlok, G.R. No. 199735, October 24, 2012.
Accused; effects of escape of accused. A review of the evidence on record
shows that the chain of custody rule was sufficiently observed by the
apprehending officers. Thru the testimonies of the PO1 Memoracion and PO1
Arago, the prosecution was able to prove that the shabu seized from accused
Musa was the very same shabu presented in evidence as part of the corpus
delicti. Hence, the fact that the PO1 Memoracion and PO1 Arago did not make
an inventory of the seized items or that they did not take photographs of them is
not fatal considering that the prosecution was able to establish with moral
certainty that the identity, integrity, and evidentiary value of the shabu was not
jeopardized from the time of its seizure until the time it was presented in court.
People of the Philippines v. Asia Musa y Pinasilo, Ara Monongan y Papao,
Faisah Abas y Mama, and Mike Solalo y Mlok, G.R. No. 199735, October 24,
2012.
Drug syndicate; definition. By definition, a drug syndicate is any organized group
of two or more persons forming or joining together with the intention of
committing any offense prescribed under RA 9165. In determining whether or not
the offense was committed by any person belonging to an organized/syndicated
crime group, the Supreme Court (SC), guided by its ruling in People v. Alberca,
defined an organized/syndicated crime group as a group of two or more persons
collaborating, confederating, or mutually helping one another for the purposes of
gain in the commission of any crime. Here, the SC found that the existence of
conspiracy among accused-appellants in selling shabu was duly established, but
the prosecution failed to provide proof that they operated as an organized group
or as a drug syndicate. Consequently, the aggravating circumstance that the
offense was committed by an organized/syndicated group cannot be

appreciated. People of the Philippines v. Asia Musa y Pinasilo, Ara Monongan y

Papao, Faisah Abas y Mama, and Mike Solalo y Mlok, G.R. No. 199735, October
24, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; sale of illegal drugs; elements. In order to successfully
prosecute an offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following
elements must first be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of the corpus
delicti. The commission of illegal sale merely requires the consummation of the
selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from
the seller. As long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer,
whose offer was accepted by appellant, followed by the delivery of the dangerous
drugs to the former, the crime is already consummated. People of the Philippines
v. Reyna Bataluna Llanita and Sotero Banguis Buar, G.R. No. 189817, October 3,
2012.
Dangerous Drugs; sale of illegal drugs; elements. In this case, the prosecution
has amply proven all the elements of the drugs sale with moral certainty. The
Supreme Court found credibility in the statements of the police officers as to the
completed illegal sale of dangerous drug. Examination of the testimony of PO2
Catuday reveals that the elements of illegal sale are present to affirm the
conviction of accused Llanita and Buar. His recitation of facts was further
corroborated on material points by PO2 Plopinio in his testimony dated 13 August
2007. It is well settled rule that narration of the incident by law enforcers,
buttressed by the presumption that they have regularly performed their duties in
the absence of convincing proof to the contrary, must be given weight. People of
the Philippines v. Reyna Bataluna Llanita and Sotero Banguis Buar, G.R. No.
189817, October 3, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; sale of illegal drugs; elements. For the successful prosecution
of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti. The delivery of the contraband to the

poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money consummate the buy-bust
transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. In other words, the
commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, merely
requires the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment
the exchange of money and drugs between the buyer and the seller takes place.
People of the Philippines v. Maricar Brainer y Mangulabnan, G.R. No. 188571,
October 10, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; sale of illegal drugs; elements. A review of the records of this
case reveals that the prosecution was able to prove all the essential elements of
illegal sale of shabu. PO2 Gatdula, the poseur-buyer, was able to positively
identify Brainer as the person who sold to him the plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance, later determined to be shabu, for the sum of P1,000, during
a legitimate buy-bust operation. As the Regional Trial Court expressly observed,
Gatdulas narration of the circumstances leading to the consummation of the sale
of illegal drugs and the arrest of Brainer was given in a clear, positive, and
straightforward manner. The defense utterly failed to prove any ill motive on PO2
Gatdulas part which would have spurred the police officer to falsely impute a
serious crime against Brainer. The Supreme Court thus held that evidence
beyond reasonable doubt existed to find Brainer guilty of the illegal sale of
dangerous drug. People of the Philippines v. Maricar Brainer y Mangulabnan,
G.R. No. 188571, October 10, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; sale and possession of illegal drugs; chain of custody. In the
prosecution of illegal sale of drugs, the following elements should be proved: (1)
the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The prosecution must (1)
prove that the transaction or sale actually took place, and (2) present in court
evidence of the corpus delicti. As regards the prosecution for illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, the elements to be proven are the following: (1) the accused
is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug. These elements that should be proven
in both the sale and possession of dangerous drugs intrinsically include the
identification of what was seized by police officers to be the same item examined
and presented in court. This identification must be established with moral

certainty and is a function of the rule on the chain of custody. People of the
Philippines v. Meriam Guru y Kazan, G.R. No. 189808. October 24, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; sale and possession of illegal drugs; chain of custody. In the
case at bar, the physical inventory of the subject specimens was made only at the
police station and by an unnamed investigator. This, in itself, evokes to a
reasonable mind several questions on the safekeeping of the specimens from the
time accused-appellant Guru was arrested, up to the time she and the buy-bust
team arrived at the police station. The identity of the person who marked the
specimens and his or her competence to distinguish between the item sold by
accused-appellant and the item recovered from her are likewise relevant points of
inquiry. Finally, the conflicting evidence as regards the persons who had custody
of the specimens after the marking casts serious doubts as to whether the
identity and integrity of said items had truly been preserved. The Supreme Court
found that these are all substantial gaps in the chain of custody which inevitably
create a rational uncertainty in the appreciation of the existence of the corpus
delicti. Thus, accused-appellant was acquitted of both illegal sale and possession
of dangerous drugs on account of reasonable doubt. People of the Philippines v.
Meriam Guru y Kazan, G.R. No. 189808. October 24, 2012.
3.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Accused; effects of the escape of accused. At the outset, the cases at bar were
elevated to the Supreme Court (SC) on automatic review in view of the
Regional Trial Courts (RTC) imposition of the death penalty upon appellant in
its June 25, 1997 Decision. However, with the SCs pronouncement in the 2004
case of People v. Mateo providing for and making mandatory the intermediate
review by the Court of Appeals (CA) of cases involving the death penalty,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the proper course of action would be to
remand these cases to the appellate court for the conduct of an intermediate
review. After a judicious review of the records, however, the SC no longer saw the
necessity of transferring these cases to the CA for intermediate review and
instead, deemed it more appropriate to dismiss the instant appeal. Records
reveal that the appellant jumped bail during the proceedings before the RTC and
was, in fact, tried and convicted in absentia. There was a dearth of evidence
showing that he had since surrendered to the courts jurisdiction. Thus, he had no
right to pray for affirmative relief before the courts. People of the Philippines v. Val

de los Reyes and Donel Go/People of the Philippines v. Val de los Reyes, G.R.
Nos. 130714 & 139634/G.R. Nos. 139331 & 140845-46, October 16, 2012.
Accused; effects of the escape of accused. Once an accused escapes from
prison or confinement, jumps bail as in appellants case, or flees to a foreign
country, he loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits to
the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief
therefrom. Thus, even if the Supreme Court were to remand these cases to the
CA for intermediate review, the CA would only be constrained to dismiss
appellants appeal, as he is considered a fugitive from justice. Here, the Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal of the accused. People of the Philippines v. Val de
los Reyes and Donel Go/People of the Philippines v. Val de los Reyes, G.R. Nos.
130714 & 139634/G.R. Nos. 139331 & 140845-46, October 16, 2012.
Alibi. The Supreme Court (SC) upheld the rulings of the lower courts that
Laurinos defense of alibideserves scant consideration. Alibiis an inherently weak
defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit
approbation, the appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he
was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time when the crime was
committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime when it was committed. In this case, Laurino failed to prove
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene on May 11,
2002. Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) even
observed that Laurino claimed to be then merely two (2) to five (5) kilometers
away from the crime scene. At any rate, settled is the rule that alibi and denial
cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of an
accused by the complainant. The SC thus upheld the RTCs finding, as affirmed
by CA, that AAAs testimony, that she was ravished by her uncle on May 11,
2002, is worthy of belief as it was clear, consistent and spontaneously given.
People of the Philippines v. Noel T. Laurino, G.R. No. 199264, October 24, 2012.
Appeals; fresh period rule in criminal cases. It is now settled that the fresh period
rule is applicable in criminal cases, like the instant case, where accused
Rodriguez filed a motion for reconsideration of a judgment of conviction for unfair
competition which was denied by the trial court. The application of the statutory
privilege of appeal must not prejudice an accused who must be accorded the
same statutory privilege as litigants in civil cases who are granted a fresh 15-day

period within which to file an appeal from receipt of the denial of their motion for
new trial or reconsideration. It is indeed absurd and incongruous that an appeal
from a conviction in a criminal case is more stringent than those of civil cases. If
the Supreme Court has accorded litigants in civil casesunder the spirit and
rationale in Neypesgreater leeway in filing an appeal through the fresh period
rule, with more reason that it should equally grant the same to criminal cases
which involve the accuseds sacrosanct right to liberty, which is protected by the
Constitution, as no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that petitioner
seasonably filed his notice of appeal. Rolex Rodriquez y Olayres v. People of the
Philippines and Allied Domecq Spirits and Wines, represented by Allied Domecq
Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 192799, October 24, 2012.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners alleged that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it transferred the
criminal case filed against the respondents to the jurisdiction of the military
tribunal. It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted.
In the case at bar, the information states that respondents, conspiring together
and mutually helping with one another, taking advantage of their superior
strength, as elements of the Philippine Army, armed with their government-issued
firearms with intent to kill, by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot the
victims, hitting them on different parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting upon them
multiple gunshot wounds which caused their deaths. Murder is a crime
punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Hence, irrespective of whether the
killing was actually justified or not, jurisdiction to try the crime charged against the
respondents is vested upon the RTC by law. Fe V. Rapsing, Tita C. Villanueva
and Annie F. Aparejado, represented by Edgar Aparejado v. Hon. Judge
Maximino R. Ables, of RTC-Branch 47, Masbate City; SSGT. Edison Rural, et al.,
G.R. No. 171855, October 15, 2012.

Office of the Solicitor General; authority to represent the State in appeals of

criminal cases. After the Regional Trial Court ordered the dismissal of the libel
suits against the petitioners, respondent Cuneta-Pangilinan filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA granted the petition and
ordered that the cases against petitioners be remanded to the trial court.
Petitioners thus brought before the Supreme Court (SC) a petition for review on
certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the CA. The SC granted the petition
and held that petitioners can no longer be held liable because the petition for
certiorari of respondent was not filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), but by respondent in her personal capacity. The authority to represent
the State in appeals of criminal cases before the SC and the CA is vested solely
in the OSG. The acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him
can only be appealed by the Solicitor General acting on behalf of the State. The
private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or
dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. In the case
at bar, the petition filed by the respondent before the CA essentially questioned
the criminal aspect of the order of the RTC, not the civil aspect of the case.
Hence, the SC ordered the reinstatement of the order of the RTC which
dismissed the criminal actions against petitioners. Lito Bautista and Jimmy
Alcantara v. Sharon G. Cuneta-Pangilinan, G.R. No. 189754, October 24, 2012.
Witnesses; credibility of witnesses. Accused Brainer urges the Supreme Court
(SC) to give credence and probative value to her testimony that no entrapment
occurred on June 23, 2004 which resulted in her arrest, and that she could not
have sold shabu to PO2 Gatdula because she knew the police officer personally.
Essentially, Brainer is attacking PO2 Gatdulas credibility, asserting that the
police officer was ill motivated to extract money from her. Time and again, the SC
has ruled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is
entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless certain
facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect
the result of the case. The reason for this rule is that the trial court is in a better
position to decide thereon, having personally heard the witnesses and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. In this case, the SC
found no reason to deviate from the foregoing rule. People of the Philippines v.
Maricar Brainer y Mangulabnan, G.R. No. 188571, October 10, 2012.

September 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Law and

Procedure
Posted on October 5, 2012 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo
Posted in
Criminal Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law
Tagged alibi, arrest,
conspiracy, damages, dangerous drugs, estafa, evidence, illegal recruitment,
murder, rape, treachery
1 Comment
Here are select September 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on criminal law and procedure:
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Conspiracy; evidence. Conspiracy existed here as may be inferred from the

concerted actions of the appellants and their co-accused, namely: (1) appellants
and their co-accused brought Samuel to a waiting shed located on the left side of
the road where the yellow pick-up service vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawantawan and his group would pass; (2) appellants and their co-accused, thereafter,
assembled themselves on both sides of the road and surreptitiously waited for
the aforesaid yellow pick-up service vehicle; (3) the moment the yellow pick-up
service vehicle passed by the waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused
opened fire and rained bullets thereon resulting in the killing and wounding of the
victims; (4) immediately, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the house
of Samuels aunt to get their bags and other stuff; (5) Samuel followed appellants
and their co-accused; and (6) appellants and their co-accused fled. Conspiracy is
very much evident from the afore-enumerated actuations of the appellants and
their co-accused. They were synchronized in their approach to riddle with bullets
the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. They were motivated
by a single criminal impulse to kill the victims. Conspiracy is implied when the
accused persons had a common purpose and were united in its execution.
People of the Philippines v. Wenceslao Nelmida, et al, G.R. No. 184500,
September 11, 2012.

Conspiracy; responsibility. Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all

perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create
joint criminal responsibility. With the presence of conspiracy here, appellants and
their co-accused had assumed joint criminal responsibility the act of one is the

act of all. The ascertainment of who among them actually hit, killed and/or
caused injury to the victims already becomes immaterial. Collective responsibility
replaced individual responsibility. People of the Philippines v. Wenceslao
Nelmida, et al, G.R. No. 184500, September 11, 2012.
Estafa; elements. Estafaunder Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name,
or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud. The elements
of estafa by means of deceit are the following: (a) that there must be a false
pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false
pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied
on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to
part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended
party suffered damage. People of the Philippines v. Melissa Chua @ Clarita NG
Chua, G.R. No. 187052, September 13, 2012.
Estafa; elements. Here, the prosecution has established that appellant defrauded
the complaining witnesses by leading them to believe that she has the capacity to
send them to Taiwan for work, even if she does not have a license or authority for
the purpose. Such misrepresentation came before private complainants delivered
P80,000 as placement fee to appellant. Clearly, private complainants would not
have parted with their money were it not for such enticement by appellant. As a
consequence of appellants false pretenses, the private complainants suffered
damages as the promised employment abroad never materialized and the money
they paid was never recovered. People of the Philippines v. Melissa Chua @
Clarita NG Chua, G.R. No. 187052, September 13, 2012.
Murder; damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages
may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2)
actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages;
and (5) temperate damages. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that when
death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to be
indemnified for the death of the victim without need of any evidence or proof

thereof. Moral damages like civil indemnity, is also mandatory upon the finding of
the fact of murder. Therefore, the trial court and the appellate court properly
awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages also in
the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of each deceased victims. People of the
Philippines v. Wenceslao Nelmida, et al, G.R. No. 184500, September 11, 2012.
Murder; exemplary damages. Article 2230 of the Civil Code states that exemplary
damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Here, treachery may no longer be considered as an
aggravating circumstance since it was already taken as a qualifying circumstance
in the murder, and abuse of superior strength which would otherwise warrant the
award of exemplary damages was already absorbed in the treachery. However,
in People v. Combate, the Supreme Court (SC) still awards exemplary damages
despite the lack of any aggravating circumstance to deter similar conduct and to
serve as an example for public good. To deter future similar transgressions, the
SC finds that an award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in favor of the heirs
of each deceased victims is proper. People of the Philippines v. Wenceslao
Nelmida, et al, G.R. No. 184500, September 11, 2012.
Murder; temperate damages. Actual damages cannot be awarded for failure to
present the receipts covering the expenditures for the wake, coffin, burial and
other expenses for the death of the victims. In lieu thereof, temperate damages
may be recovered where it has been shown that the victims family suffered some
pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty as
provided for under Article 2224 of the Civil Code. In this case, it cannot be denied
that the heirs of the deceased victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact
amount was not proved with certainty. Thus, the SC similarly awards P25,000.00
as temperate damages to the heirs of each deceased victims. People of the
Philippines v. Wenceslao Nelmida, et al, G.R. No. 184500, September 11, 2012.
Rape; penalty. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty
of death shall be imposed upon the accused if the victim of rape is under 18
years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or the commonlaw spouse of the parent of the victim. To justify the imposition of the death
penalty, however, it is required that the special qualifying circumstances of
minority of the victim and her relationship to appellant be properly alleged in the

information and duly proved during the trial. All these requirements were duly
established here. In the two Informations, it was alleged that AAA was 16 years
old when the incidents happened. Her minority was buttressed not only by her
testimony during trial but likewise by her Certificate of Live Birth showing that she
was born on August 3, 1985. With respect to her relationship to appellant, it was
likewise specifically alleged in the Informations that appellant is AAAs father.
During trial, appellant categorically admitted that AAA is his daughter. Since the
death penalty for heinous crimes has been abolished by RA 9346, the appellate
court correctly modified the trial courts imposition of the death penalty by
reducing death as a penalty to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
People of the Philippines v. Antonio Venturina, G.R. No. 183097, September 12,
2012.
Rape; penetration required. The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the prosecution
failed to prove appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
consummated rape. The SC instead convicted him of attempted rape, as the
evidence on record shows the presence of all the elements of this crime. The SC
found that appellants penis did not penetrate, but merely touched (i.e., naidikit)
AAAs private part. AAA confirmed on cross-examination that the appellant did
not succeed in inserting his penis into her vagina. AAAs Sinumpaang Salaysay
also disclosed that the appellant was holding her hand when he was trying to
insert his penis in her vagina. This circumstance coupled with AAAs
declaration that she was resisting appellants attempt to insert his penis into her
vagina makes penile penetration highly difficult, if not improbable. AAAs
testimony did not establish that the appellants penis touched the labia or slid into
her private part. Without any showing of penetration, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape or acts of
lasciviousness. Thus, appellant cannot be convicted of consummated rape.
People of the Philippines v. Christopher Pareja y Velasco, G.R. No. 188979,
September 5, 2012.
Statutory rape; Pruna guidelines. Accused Lupac appeals the decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed his conviction for the crime of rape but
modified the characterization of the offense as statutory rape because of the
failure of the prosecution to properly establish that the victim is under 12 years of
age at the time of the rape. In convicting Lupac of statutory rape as defined and
penalized under Paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended by RA 8353, the Regional Trial Court concluded that although the
qualifying circumstance of relationship had not been proven, AAAs testimony
showing her age of only 11 years at the time of the rape sufficed to prove her age
as an essential element in statutory rape. The Supreme Court (SC) concurred
with the CA. Although the information alleged that AAA had been only 10 years of
age at the time of the commission of the rape, the prosecution did not reliably
establish the age of the victim in accordance with the guidelines for competently
proving such age laid down by the SC in People v. Pruna. People of the
Philippines v. Edgardo Lupac y Flores, G.R. No. 182230, September 19, 2012.
Statutory rape; Pruna guidelines. The evidence adduced by the prosecution did
not satisfy two of the Pruna guidelines, namely: [i] In the absence of a certificate
of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims mother or
relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused; and [ii] it is the
prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall
not be taken against him. People of the Philippines v. Edgardo Lupac y Flores,
G.R. No. 182230, September 19, 2012.
Treachery. Treachery, which was alleged in the Information, attended the
commission of the crime. The Supreme Court in a plethora of cases has
consistently held that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof, which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make. There are
two (2) conditions that must concur for treachery to exist, to wit: (a) the
employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was
deliberately and consciously adopted. People of the Philippines v. Wenceslao
Nelmida, et al, G.R. No. 184500, September 11, 2012.
Treachery. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. The deadly successive
shots of the appellants and their co-accused did not allow the hapless victims any
opportunity to put up a decent defense. The attack was executed by appellants

and their-co-accused in such a vicious manner as to make the defense virtually

impossible. Appellants had murder in their hearts when they waylaid their unwary
victims. Thus, appellants should be held liable for murder.People of the
Philippines v. Wenceslao Nelmida, et al, G.R. No. 184500, September 11, 2012.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Illegal recruitment; elements. In order to hold a person liable for illegal

recruitment, the following elements must concur: (1) the offender undertakes any
of the activities within the meaning of recruitment and placement under Article
13(b)20 of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of the Labor Code (now Section 6 of RA 8042) and (2) the offender has
no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers. In the case of illegal recruitment in large
scale, a third element is added: that the offender commits any of the acts of
recruitment and placement against three or more persons, individually or as a
group. All three elements are present in the case at bar. People of the Philippines
v. Melissa Chua @ Clarita NG Chua, G.R. No. 187052, September 13, 2012.
Illegal recruitment; elements. Inarguably, appellant Chua engaged in recruitment
when she represented to private complainants that she could send them to
Taiwan as factory workers upon submission of the required documents and
payment of the placement fee. The four private complainants positively identified
appellant as the person who promised them employment as factory workers in
Taiwan for a fee of P80,000. The Senior Labor Employment Officer of the POEA
presented a certification to the effect that appellant Chua is not licensed by the
POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. The prosecution witnesses
were positive and categorical in their testimonies that they personally met
appellant and that the latter promised to send them abroad for employment.
Appellant cannot escape liability by conveniently limiting her participation as a
cashier of Golden Gate. The provisions of Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and
Section 6 of RA 8042 are unequivocal that illegal recruitment may or may not be
for profit. It is immaterial, therefore, whether appellant remitted the placement
fees to the agencys treasurer or appropriated them. People of the Philippines v.
Melissa Chua @ Clarita NG Chua, G.R. No. 187052, September 13, 2012.

Illegal sale of drugs; elements. After a buy-bust operation conducted by the

police operatives, accused were charged with illegal sale and illegal possession
of shabu. In ruling against the accused, the Supreme Court (SC) cited People of
the Philippines v. Ricky Unisa y Islan, where it held that the sale of prohibited
drugs is consummated upon delivery of the drugs to the buyer: For a successful
prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the
following elements must first be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. What is material is proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of
corpus delicti. Clearly, the commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, like shabu, merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction,
which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. As long
as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer, whose offer was
accepted by appellant, followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the
former, the crime is already consummated. As borne by the records, all the
above elements constituting the sale of shabuby the appellants were clearly
testified to by PO Hamdani who averred that he received P1,000.00 worth of
shabufrom accused after the latter gave the buy-bust money to De Jesus.
Accordingly, the SC found the accused guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165. People of the Philippines v. Ronald De Jesus y Apacible and Amelito
Dela Cruz y Pua, G.R. No. 191753, September 17, 2012.
Illegal sale of drugs; elements. Accused cites several irregularities in the conduct
of the buy-bust operation and in the presentation of the corpus delicti. The
Supreme Court (SC) gave no credence to his arguments. The elements
necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identities of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
Sistemio, the poseur-buyer in this case, positively testified that the sale of shabu
actually took place when he himself parted with the marked money and received
the shabu from appellant. Yu corroborated Sistemios narration, as he also
personally witnessed the transaction given that he was posted a few meters away
from Sistemio and the accused. The SC also found that the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved by the buy-bust

team under the chain of custody rule. Under these circumstances, the
prosecution has established beyond doubt an unbroken link in the chain of
custody. Hence, it has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant here sold shabu. People of the Philippine v. Mohamad Angkob y Mlang,
G.R. No. 191062, September 19, 2012.
Illegal sale of drugs; elements. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the
accused for illegal sale of dangerous drugs after finding that the following
elements were sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment thereto. The identity of the buyer and the seller were
both established by the prosecution, appellant being the seller and PO1 Soquia
as the poseur-buyer. The object of the transaction was the five sachets of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu and the consideration was the
P500.00 marked money. Both such object and consideration have also been
sufficiently established by testimonial and documentary evidence presented by
the prosecution. As to the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor,
PO1 Soquia caught appellant in flagrante delicto selling and delivering the
prohibited substance during a buy-bust operation. He also personally handed to
appellant the marked money as payment for the same. Clearly, the abovementioned elements are present in this case. People of the Philippines v. Calexto
D. Fundales, G.R. No. 184606, September 5, 2012.
3.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Arrest; warrantless arrest. Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a
person may be arrested without a warrant if he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Accused contends that the
police officers arrested him without securing a warrant of arrest, and because his
arrest was unlawful, the sachets of shabuallegedly seized from him were
inadmissible in evidence. Accused was caught in the act of committing an
offense during a buy-bust operation. When an accused is apprehended in
flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police officers are not
only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. An arrest
made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is
considered a valid warrantless arrest. Accused argues that force and
intimidation attended his arrest when four police officers arrested him and one of

them pointed a gun at him. However, the Court of Appeals found that the defense
neither objected to the accuseds arrest nor filed any complaint against the police
officers. Considering that an arrest was lawfully made, the search incidental to
such arrest was also valid. A person lawfully arrested may be searched, without a
search warrant, for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used
or constitute proof in the commission of an offense. Accordingly, the two sachets
of shabu seized in the present case are admissible as evidence. People of the
Philippines v. Jose Almodiel alias Dodong Astrobal, G.R. No. 200951,
September 5, 2012.
Evidence; denial and alibi. Both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses
which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses that appellants committed the crime. For alibi to prosper, the
requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that
appellants were somewhere else when the crime happened. They must also
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible
for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its
commission. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is
negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. A mere denial, like
alibi, is inherently a weak defense and constitutes self-serving negative evidence,
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. People of the Philippines v.
Wenceslao Nelmida, et al, G.R. No. 184500, September 11, 2012.
Evidence; denial and alibi. In this case, both appellants claimed that they were
just in their respective houses in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, when the
ambush incident happened and they have no involvement whatsoever in the
commission thereof. The defense of alibimay not prosper if it is established
mainly by the appellant himself and his relatives, and not by credible persons.
Mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a selfserving assertion that deserves no weight in law. Between the categorical and
positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of
the accused which are uncorroborated by reliable and independent evidence, the
former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater
evidentiary weight. Withal, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to
be at the scene of the crim. Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, where both
appellants reside, is only about seven (7) kilometers away from San Manuel,

Lala, Lanao del Norte, where the ambush took place. People of the Philippines v.
Wenceslao Nelmida, et al, G.R. No. 184500, September 11, 2012.
Leave to file demurrer; period to file demurrer. One of the issues raised by Reyes
in this case is whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
counting the period to file a motion for leave to file demurrer from the receipt of
the Order admitting the prosecutions formal offer of evidence. Reyes insists that
the counting of the 5-day period to file the motion must be from the denial of her
opposition to the order admitting the prosecutions documentary evidence.
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a motion
for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds
and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the
prosecution rests its case. This period runs, according to Cabador v. People,
only after the court shall have ruled on the prosecutions formal offer for that is
when it can be deemed to have rested its case. Here, Reyes filed a timely motion
for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans ruling on the prosecutions formal
offer, which is allowed, thus preventing the prosecution from resting its case.
When the Sandiganbayan denied Reyes motion for reconsideration, she filed
with it, within the required five days of her receipt of the order of denial, her
motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence. Elsa B. Reyes v. Sandiganbayan
and People of the Philippines/Artemio C. Mendoza v. Sandiganbayan and People
of the Philippines/Elsa B. Reyes v. People of the Philippines/Caridad A. Miranda
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 148607/G.R. No. 167202/G.R. No.
167223/G.R. No. 167271, September 5, 2012.
Leave to file demurrer; discretion of court to deny filing of demurrers. Still, the
Sandiganbayans error in not allowing Reyes to ask for leave to file a demurrer to
the evidence cannot be regarded as capricious and whimsical as to constitute
grave abuse of discretion. Courts have wide latitude for denying the filing of
demurrers to evidence. An order denying a motion for leave of court to file
demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself is not subject to appeal or certiorari
action before judgment. The remedy is to assign the order of denial as an error
on appeal after judgment. Elsa B. Reyes v. Sandiganbayan and People of the
Philippines/Artemio C. Mendoza v. Sandiganbayan and People of the
Philippines/Elsa B. Reyes v. People of the Philippines/Caridad A. Miranda v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 148607/G.R. No. 167202/G.R. No.
167223/G.R. No. 167271, September 5, 2012.

August 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Law and

Procedure
Posted on September 7, 2012 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo Posted in
Criminal Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law
Here are select August 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
criminal law and procedure:
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Rape; elements. Accused appealed to the Supreme Court (SC) the decision of
the Court of Appeals convicting him of the crimes of statutory rape (in Criminal
Case No. 4467) and qualified rape (in Criminal Case No. 4468) committed
against his daughter AAA. The SC affirmed both convictions. Since AAA was 10
years and 9 months old when the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 4467 was
committed, then, the crime charged and proven is one of statutory rape. The two
elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age. Proof of force and
consent is immaterial if the woman is under 12 years of age, not only because
force is not an element of statutory rape, but also because the absence of free
consent is presumed. Conviction will lie provided sexual intercourse is proven. On
the other hand, AAA was 12 years and five days old when the second incident of
rape occurred. Consequently, accused-appellant cannot be convicted in Criminal
Case No. 4468 for statutory rape, which requires that the victim be below 12
years of age. However, even though accused-appellant cannot be convicted of
statutory rape in Criminal Case No. 4468, and despite the absence of evidence of
resistance on the part of AAA, his criminal liability for rape nevertheless remains.
The SC cited People v. Orillosa, which held: Actual force or intimidation need not
be employed in incestuous rape of a minor because the moral and physical
dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly
desires. When a father commits the odious crime of rape against his own
daughter, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for
violence and intimidation. People of the Philippines v. Antonio Osma, Jr. y
Agaton, G.R. No. 187734, August 29, 2012.

Rape; penalty. The statutory rape and qualified rape committed by the accusedappellant would have been punishable by death under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, if not for the enactment of RA 9346 which prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty. Pursuant to RA 9346, the penalty that should be
imposed is reclusion perpetua. In People v. Lauga, the Supreme Court held that
where the rape is committed with any of the qualifying or aggravating
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the victim is
entitled to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto and P75,000.00 as moral
damages. In addition, like in Lauga where the thirteen-year-old victim was raped
by her father, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages was awarded to the victim.
People of the Philippines v. Antonio Osma, Jr. y Agaton, G.R. No. 187734,
August 29, 2012.
Robbery with homicide; elements. Appellant was charged with and convicted by
the lower court of robbery with homicide, a special complex crime against
property. Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by
reason, or on occasion, of the robbery. In charging robbery with homicide, the
onus probandi is to establish that: (a) the taking of personal property was with the
use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property belongs to
another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi or with intent to gain;
and (d) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide (which
is used in the generic sense) was committed. Appellants contention that there is
no evidence of robbery is devoid of merit. The element of taking and the
existence of the money stolen by appellant were adequately established by the
prosecution. Henry positively testified that he left P2,000.00 in the drawer in the
ricemill in the morning of October 3, 2000 which was no longer found upon
discovery of his wifes lifeless body. Investigator Demejes testified that when he
came to the crime scene, he saw the place in disarray, i.e., drawers and coins
were scattered on the floor, another drawer was pulled out from its original
location and left on a couch, and that a blue tote bag was also seen on top of a
table and a passbook on top of the bed. Intent to rob is an internal act, but may
be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property. The
prosecution was able to establish that the motive for killing the victim was
robbery. People of the Philippines v. Raul Beriber y Fuentes, G.R. No. 195243,
August 29, 2012.

Rape; use of a deadly weapon; penalty. On July 1, 1996, appellant along with
one Tony Ginumtad were charged with the crime of rape committed against
AAA. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which is the law then in
force at the time of the commission of the crime, when the rape is committed with
the use of a deadly weapon, the crime takes a qualified form and the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Here, the use of the knife, which is a
deadly weapon, was not specifically alleged in the Information. However, it was
duly proven during the proceedings that appellant armed himself with a knife
which facilitated the commission of the crime. In People v. Begino, the Supreme
Court held that the circumstances that qualify a crime should be alleged and
proved beyond reasonable doubt as the crime itself.
These attendant
circumstances alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty. As
such, they are in the nature of qualifying circumstances. If the same are not
pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances
since the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. Consequently, the use of a
deadly weapon may be considered as an aggravating circumstance here. As
such, exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 is imposed on the
appellant in addition to civil indemnity and moral damages. Moreover, an interest
at the rate of 6% per annumshall be imposed, reckoned from the finality of
judgment until fully paid. Appellant is also not eligible for parole pursuant to R.A.
9346. People of the Philippines v. Pedro G. Banig, G.R. No. 177137, August 23,
2012.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Dangerous Drugs; illegal possession of shabu. As to the crime of illegal

possession of shabu, the prosecution clearly proved the presence of the following
essential elements of the crime: (a) the accused [was] in possession of an item or
object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession
[was] not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug. After the arrest of the accused-appellant, seventeen (17)
heat-sealed sachets of white substance were found in his possession. The
chemistry report showed that the white substance in the plastic sachets tested for
shabu. There was no showing that such possession was authorized by law. The
conviction of the accused-appellant by the lower courts is, therefore, sustained.
People of the Philippines v. John Brian Amarillo y Mapa a.k.a. Jao Mapa, G.R.
No. 194721, August 15, 2012.

Dangerous Drugs; illegal sale of shabu. After a buy-bust operation conducted by

the police operatives, accused was charged with illegal sale and illegal
possession of shabu.To prove illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must
be present: (a) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale,
and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for
the thing. And, to secure conviction, it is material to establish that the transaction
or sale actually took place, and to bring to the court the corpus delicti as
evidence. Here, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accusedappellant, not being authorized by law, sold a sachet of shabu to PO1 Mendoza
in a buy-bust operation. Further, the seized items, together with the result of the
laboratory examination and the marked money were all presented in court.
People of the Philippines v. John Brian Amarillo y Mapa a.k.a. Jao Mapa, G.R.
No. 194721, August 15, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; failure to strictly comply with requirements of section 21, R.A.
9165. The defense argues that the arresting officers did not testify that the
marking of the seized items were done in the presence of the persons mentioned
by the law and its implementing rules; and that testimonies on how the
confiscated items were turned over to the investigator for examination were
lacking. The Supreme Court (SC) cited the well-settled principle that the failure
of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical
inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines
is not fatal and does not automatically render accused-appellants arrest illegal or
the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. The SC has long settled that
an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to faithfully observe the
requirements provided under Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165, for as long as the chain of
custody remains unbroken. People of the Philippines v. John Brian Amarillo y
Mapa a.k.a. Jao Mapa, G.R. No. 194721, August 15, 2012.
Forfeiture; due process. This case seeks to annul and set aside the
Sandiganbayan Resolution which ordered the forfeiture of some of the properties
of the late NBI Director, Jolly R. Bugarin pursuant to the decision of the Supreme
Court (SC) in Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan. The heirs of
Bugarin pray that the Sandiganbayan be compelled to conduct hearings for the
purpose of properly determining the properties of Bugarin that should be forfeited
in favor of the Republic, this despite the fact that the SC in Republic has already

decreed that properties of Bugarin acquired from 1968 to 1980 which were
disproportionate to his lawful income during the said period be forfeited in favor of
the Republic. The SC held that Bugarin was accorded due process. He was given
his day in court to prove that his acquired properties were lawfully attained. The
summary of properties acquired by Bugarin during his tenure as NBI Director was
based on his very own exhibits. From this enumeration, the SC set aside those
properties that had been liquidated or those that had been obtained in 1981
onwards. Even those properties the acquisition dates of which could no longer be
determined were also excluded, all to the benefit of Bugarin. What remained was
a trimmed-down listing of properties from which the Sandiganbayan may choose
to execute the forfeiture order of the SC. The essence of due process is the right
to be heard. Bugarin or his heirs were certainly not denied that right. Due process
is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy. The Heirs of Jolly R. Bugarin
namely Ma. Aileen H. Bugarin, Ma. Linda B. Abiog and Ma. Annette B. Sumulong
v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174431, August 6, 2012.
Jurisdiction; Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan maintains that Section 4(a)(1)
(g) of RA 8249 which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, cannot apply
to the accused, Bello, because, while he held the highest rank among those who
allegedly conspired to commit the crime charged, he did not hold any of the
government positions enumerated under that section, i.e., presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations. The term
manager as defined in Blacks Law Dictionary is one who has charge of the
corporation and control of its businesses, or of its branches, establishments,
divisions, or departments, and who is vested with a certain amount of discretion
and independent judgment. Under this definition, the Supreme Court held that
respondent Bello was covered under the term manager, he having charge of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines-Retirement and Separation Benefit System
Legal Department when the questioned transactions took place. As such, he is
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. People of the Philippines v.
Meinrado Enrique A. Bello, et al., G.R. No. 166948-59, August 29, 2012.
Jurisdiction; Sandiganbayan. Respondent Bello argues that the Sandiganbayan
does not exercise jurisdiction over him because his rank at the time of the
commission of the acts complained of was merely that of Police Superintendent
in the Philippine National Police. However, the Information does not charge him

for offenses relating to the regular police work of a police officer of his rank. He is
rather charged for offenses he committed in relation to his office, namely, that of
a manager of the Legal Department of the Armed Forces of the PhilippinesRetirement and Separation Benefit System (AFP-RSBS), a government-owned
and controlled corporation. What is needed is that the public officials mentioned
by law must commit the offense described in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 while in the
performance of official duties or in relation to the office being held. Here, the
OMB charged Bello with using his office as Legal Department Head to
manipulate the documentations of AFP-RSBS land acquisitions to the prejudice
of the government. People of the Philippines v. Meinrado Enrique A. Bello, et al,
G.R. No. 166948-59, August 29, 2012.
Ombudsman; findings of fact of the Ombudsman.Petitioner was designated as a
Special Collecting Officer at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Customs
House, Collection Division, Pasay City. The Audit Observation Memorandum
dated November 26, 2002, reported that petitioner had an unremitted collection
from the sale of accountable forms with money value and stamps. Based on the
analysis of the monthly sales of accountable forms and stamps, petitioner failed
to remit a total of P53,214,258.00 from January 2000 to October 2002. The
Ombudsman rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct. Insisting on his innocence, petitioner claims that no competent
evidence was presented before the Ombudsman to show that he is guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct. The Supreme Court (SC) held that questions
of fact may not be the subject of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Court as the SC is not a trier of facts. As a rule, findings of fact of
the Ombudsman, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive and
binding upon the SC unless there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Ombudsman. There is none here. There is substantial evidence to show that
petitioner failed to remit the amount of P53,658,371.00 from the sale of
accountable forms with money value and documentary stamps from January
2000 up to October 2002. Ernesto A. Fajardo v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al,
G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012.
3.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Arrest; warrantless arrest. Ambre insists that the warrantless arrest and search
made against her were illegal because no offense was being committed at the

time and the police operatives were not authorized by a judicial order to enter the
dwelling of Sultan. She argues that the alleged hot pursuit on Sultan which
ended in the latters house, where she, Mendoza and Castro were supposedly
found having a pot session, was more imaginary than real. In arrests in flagrante
delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or
attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the
arresting officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. Here, there is no gainsaying that Ambre was caught by the
police officers in the act of using shabu and, thus, can be lawfully arrested
without a warrant. PO1 Mateo positively identified Ambre sniffing suspected
shabu from an aluminum foil being held by Castro. Prior justification for intrusion
or prior lawful intrusion is not an element of an arrest in flagrante delicto. Even
granting arguendo that the apprehending officers had no legal right to be present
in the dwelling of Sultan, it would not render unlawful the arrest of Ambre, who
was seen sniffing shabu with Castro and Mendoza in a pot session by the police
officers. PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo were not only authorized but were also dutybound to arrest Ambre together with Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of
methamphetamine hydrochloride in violation of section 15, Article II of R.A. No.
9165. Margarita Ambre Y Cayuni v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 191532,
August 15, 2012.
Arrest; warrantless arrest. Belocura is charged with illegal possession of
1,789.823 grams of marijuana in violation of RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972. Belocura argues that his arrest and the ensuing search of his vehicle
and recovery of the incriminating bricks of marijuana were in violation of his rights
under the Constitution because he was then violating only a simple traffic rule
related to the illegal use of a government plate. He claims that the arresting
policemen had no probable cause to search his vehicle for anything. The
Supreme Court was not persuaded by this argument. Belocura was caught in
flagrante delicto violating Section 31 of RA 4139 or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code. Even by his own admission, he was actually committing a crime in
the presence or within the view of the arresting policemen. The manner by which
Belocura was apprehended fell under the first category in Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. Thus, his arrest was valid, and the arresting policemen

thereby became cloaked with the authority to validly search his person and
effects for weapons or any other article he might use in the commission of the
crime or was the fruit of the crime or might be used as evidence in the trial of the
case, and to seize from him and the area within his reach or under his control
such weapon or other article. People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Belocura y
Perez, G.R. No. 173474, August 29, 2012.
Evidence; positive identification. This is an appeal of the 31 July 2009 Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03188, affirming the
conviction of Edgar Balquedra (appellant) for raping AAA. It was held that the
CA was correct in affirming the lower courts finding that AAAs testimony was
credible and sufficient to establish the rape committed by appellant. The records
will show that AAA had positively identified appellant as the perpetrator. Although
the crime was committed at night, there was a lighted kerosene lamp on the table
when he entered the shanty. AAA had sufficient light and means to identify her
assailant at the time of the incident. There was no evidence presented that this
light was put out when she went to sleep, or that it was knocked off the table, or
that it broke while the crime was being committed. Also, appellant raped AAA
facing her and covering only her mouth, thus giving her a full view of his face.
Moreover, appellant was familiar to AAA, since he was her neighbor, his
residence a mere 200 meters away from hers. He himself admitted that she had
known him since she was a child. The appeal is denied. People of the Philippines
v. Edgar Balquedra, G.R. No. 191192, August 22, 2012.
Jurisdiction; objections to validity of arrest or jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. This is an automatic appeal from the Decision dated July 28, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court finding Arturo Lara (Lara) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide. Lara argued that he was arrested without a warrant under
circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered void all
proceedings including those that led to his conviction. The Supreme Court
denied the appeal. It ruled that jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be
acquired through compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or through his
voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court.
Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is
deemed waived. An accused submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon

entering a plea and participating actively in the trial and this precludes him
invoking any irregularities that may have attended his arrest. Furthermore, the
illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a
conviction that was arrived upon a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted
without error under section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. People of the Philippines v. Arturo Lara y Orbista, G.R. No. 199877,
August 13, 2012.
June 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Law and Procedure
Posted on July 16, 2012 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo
Posted in
Criminal Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law Tagged alibi, anti-graft,
appeal, bp 22, certiorari, dangerous drugs, estafa, evidence, illegal recruitment,
malversation, murder, Ombudsman, prescription, probable cause, qualified rape,
rape, treachery

Here are select June 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
criminal law and procedure:
1. REVISED PENAL CODE
Estafa; elements. Entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential
elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code:
(a) that money, goods or other personal properties are received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return, the same; (2) that there is a
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or
denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the
offended party on the offender. In this case, all these elements have been
sufficiently established by the prosecution in this case. Andre L. DAigle v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174181, June 27, 2012.
Estafa; misappropriation;Trust Receipts Law. In order that the respondents may
be validly prosecuted for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation with Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law, the following
elements must be established: (a) they received the subject goods in trust or
under the obligation to sell the same and to remit the proceeds thereof to [the
trustor], or to return the goods if not sold; (b) they misappropriated or converted

the goods and/or the proceeds of the sale; (c) they performed such acts with
abuse of confidence to the damage and prejudice of the entrustor; and (d)
demand was made on them by [the trustor] for the remittance of the proceeds or
the return of the unsold goods. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lamberto C.
Perez, et al., G.R. No. 166884, June 13, 2012.

Estafa; misappropriation;Trust Receipts Law. In this case, no dishonesty or

abuse of confidence existed in the handling of the construction materials. The
misappropriation could have been committed should the entrustee fail to turn over
the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by the trust receipt transaction or
fail to return the goods themselves. The respondents could not have failed to
return the proceeds since their allegations that the clients of ACDC had not paid
for the projects it had undertaken with them at the time the case was filed had
never been questioned or denied by LBP. Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Lamberto C. Perez, et al., G.R. No. 166884, June 13, 2012.
Justifying circumstance; lawful exercise of right. The availability of the justifying
circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office under
Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted
in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and
(b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of
the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
The justification is based on the complete absence of intent and negligence on
the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was
committed with criminal intent or with fault or negligence. Salvador Yapyuco y
Enriquez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines/Mario D. Reyes,
Andres S. Reyes and Virgilio A. Manguerra/Gervacio B. Cunanan, Jr. and
Ernesto Puno v. Honorable Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 120744-46/G.R. No. 122677/G.R. No. 122776.June 25, 2012
Justifying circumstance; lawful exercise of right. The Supreme Court found that
the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code do
not obtain in this case. The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of
the incident is a legitimate law enforcement operation. No objection is strong
enough to defeat the claim that all of them who were either police and barangay
officers or CHDF members tasked with the maintenance of peace and order

were bound to, as they did, respond to information of a suspected rebel infiltration
in the locality. While, it may certainly be argued that rebellion is a continuing
offense, it is interesting that nothing in the evidence suggests that the accused
were acting under an official order to open fire at or kill the suspects under any
and all circumstances. Even more telling is the absence of reference to the
victims having launched such aggression as would threaten the safety of any one
of the accused, or having exhibited such defiance of authority that would have
instigated the accused, particularly those armed, to embark on a violent attack
with their firearms in self-defense. Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines/Mario D. Reyes, Andres S. Reyes
and Virgilio A. Manguerra/Gervacio B. Cunanan, Jr. and Ernesto Puno v.
Honorable Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 12074446/G.R. No. 122677/G.R. No. 122776.June 25, 2012.
Malversation of public funds. Malversation of public funds is defined and
penalized in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads: [a]ny public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to
take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall, otherwise, be
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property Under
Article 217, a presumption was installed that upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any
public funds or property with which said officer is accountable should be
prima facie evidence that he had put such missing funds or properties to
personal use. Cecilia U. Legrama v. Sandiganbayan and People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 178626, June 13, 2012.
Malversation of public funds. In this case, after the government auditors
discovered the shortage and informed petitioner of the same, petitioner failed to
properly explain or justify the shortage that was subject to her accountability.
Undoubtedly, all the elements of the crime are present in the case at bar. First, it
is undisputed that petitioner was the municipal treasurer at the time material to
this case; Second, it is the inherent function of petitioner, being the municipal
treasurer, to take custody of and exercise proper management of the local
governments funds; Third, the parties have stipulated during the pre-trial of the
case that petitioner received the subject amount as public funds and that

petitioner is accountable for the same. Fourth, petitioner failed to rebut the prima
facie presumption that she has put such missing funds to her personal use.
Verily, in the crime of malversation of public funds, all that is necessary for
conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received the public funds and
that he failed to account for the said funds upon demand without offering
sufficient explanation why there was a shortage. In fine, petitioners failure to
present competent and credible evidence that would exculpate her and rebut the
prima facie presumption of malversation clearly warranted a verdict of conviction.
Cecilia U. Legrama v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
178626, June 13, 2012.
Murder; self defense. Self-defense as a justifying circumstance under Article 11
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, implies the admission by the accused
that he committed the acts which would have been criminal in character had it not
been for the presence of circumstances whose legal consequences negate the
commission of a crime. By invoking self-defense in this case, the appellant
admitted that he shot the victim. With this admission, the burden of evidence
shifted to the appellant to prove that he acted in accordance with the law. The
appellant, in this regard, must satisfactorily prove the concurrence of the following
requisites under the second paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, to relieve him of any criminal liability: First, unlawful aggression;
Second, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third, lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending. In this
case, the Supreme Court found that the appellant failed to discharge this burden.
The existence of unlawful aggression is the basic requirement in a plea of selfdefense. In other words, no self-defense can exist without unlawful aggression
since there is no attack that the accused will have to prevent or repel. People of
the Philippines v. Eduardo Gonzales, G.R. No. 195534, June 13, 2012.
Murder; self defense. In this case, the requisite of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim is patently absent. The records fail to disclose any circumstance
showing that the appellants life was in danger when he met the victim. What the
evidence shows is that the victim was unarmed when he went to the house of the
appellant. Likewise, there was also no evidence proving the gravity of the
utterances and the actuations allegedly made by the victim that would have
indicated his wrongful intent to injure the appellant. People of the Philippines v.
Eduardo Gonzales, G.R. No. 195534, June 13, 2012.

Rape; mental retardation. On appeal, appellant argues that the prosecution failed
to establish the mental state of AAA which is crucial to the charge that he raped a
woman who is of the legal age but otherwise deprived of reason. In other words,
he asserts that the prosecution was not able to prove that AAA suffers from
mental retardation. The Supreme Court was not persuaded. In the case at bar,
the undisputed expert testimony of Dr. Imelda Escuadra, a Medical Specialist II
and officer-in-charge of the Women and Children Protection Unit at the Bicol
Medical Center who personally conducted the psychiatric tests on AAA, clearly
established that the victim is afflicted with mild mental retardation. She further
testified that AAA was also suffering from post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
and that AAA possesses an IQ of 55 with a mental age equivalent to that of a
normal 9 to 10-year-old person. People of the Philippines v. Marcial Bayrante y
Boaquina, G.R. No. 188978, June 13, 2012.
Rape; minor. Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 reads in part: [t]he penalty of
reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse. Under
Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual
abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual
abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code
and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12
years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under
Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of
the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both
crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be
prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single
criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b)
of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a
felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with
an offense penalized by a special law. People of the Philippines v. Jover Matias y
Dela Fuente, G.R. No. 186469, June 13, 2012.
Rape; minor. In this case, a punctilious scrutiny of the records shows that AAA
was born on April 23, 1991, which would make her 13 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense on June 6, 2004. Thus, appellant can be prosecuted

and convicted either under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 for sexual abuse, or
under Article 266-A of the RPC, except for rape under paragraph 1(d). In this
case, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the appellant under Section 5
(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. People of the Philippines v. Jover Matias
y Dela Fuente, G.R. No. 186469, June 13, 2012.
Treachery; elements. The Supreme Court ruled that the qualifying circumstance
of treachery was sufficiently established in this case. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods
or forms in the execution thereof that tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from any defense that the offended
party might make. The elements of treachery are as follows: (1) the employment
of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberate or
consciously adopted. This is the essence of treachery a deliberate and sudden
attack; affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or to escape. In treachery, what is decisive is that the attack was executed
in such a manner as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate. People of the
Philippines v. Ruperto Dones a.k.a. Perto, G.R. No. 188329, June 20, 2012.
Treachery; elements. These elements were correctly found to be present in the
intermediate appellate review. Although the accused was standing directly in front
of the De Gala spouses, the victim Tersiro was preoccupied with crossing the
prinsa when the accused started shooting. The Court of Appeals found that the
accused had waited for that exact moment before repeatedly pulling the trigger.
The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack, considering that it was
nighttime and the place was deserted, rendered both Melanie and Tersiro
defenseless. There was no means of escape, as they were trapped in waist-high
grass between the prinsa and the accused. It was apparent that accusedappellant sought cover in the darkness, waiting for the couple to return home.
Even after Tersiro fell, the accused continued to pepper him with bullets, thus
ensuring that the victim would not survive or retaliate. People of the Philippines v.
Ruperto Dones a.k.a. Perto, G.R. No. 188329, June 20, 2012.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

B.P. 22; prescription. Under Section 1 of Act No. 3326 which is the law
applicable to B.P. 22 cases, [v]iolations penalized by special acts shall, unless
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month,
but less than two years. Under Sction 2 of the same Act, [t]he prescription shall
be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy. Since B.P. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a
fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the
aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled
upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person. People of the
Philippines v. Ma. Theresa Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; chain of custody. In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, the chain of custody over the dangerous drug must be
shown to establish the corpus delicti. The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this
case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a
conviction under R.A. 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must
definitely be shown to have been preserved. Under Section 1(b) of Dangerous
Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, chain of custody means the duly
recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. People of the Philippines v.
Gomer S. Climaco, G.R. No. 199403, June 13, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; chain of custody. In this case, the chain of custody was not
properly established. The prosecution did not explain why the markings of the
plastic sachets containing the alleged drugs, which were submitted to be TR-B
and TR-R, became GSC-1 and GSC-2 in the Chemistry Report, Index of
Exhibits and Minutes of the Hearing. In fact, since the markings are different, the
presumption is that the substance in the plastic sachets marked as TR-B and
TR-R is different from the substance in the plastic sachets marked as GSC-1
and GSC-2. There is no moral certainty that the substance taken from appellant

is the same dangerous drug submitted to the laboratory and the trial court.
People of the Philippines v. Gomer S. Climaco, G.R. No. 199403, June 13, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; illegal possession of dangerous drugs. In order to convict
appellant for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, or the shabu in this case,
the prosecution evidence must prove beyond reasonable doubt the following
elements: (a) the appellant was in possession of an item or object that is
identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not
authorized by law; and (c) the appellant freely and consciously possessed the
drug. In this case, the fact of possession by appellant of the bag containing the
shabu was not established in the first place. In every criminal prosecution, the
State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged
and the complicity or participation of the accused. While a lone witness
testimony is sufficient to convict an accused in certain instances, the testimony
must be clear, consistent, and crediblequalities we cannot ascribe to this case.
Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must
both come from a credible witness and be credible in itself tested by human
experience, observation, common knowledge and accepted conduct that has
evolved through the years. Clearly from the foregoing, the prosecution failed to
establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was indeed in
possession of shabu, and that he freely and consciously possessed the same.
People of the Philippines v. Zafra Maraorao y Macabalang, G.R. No. 174369,
June 20, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; procedural requirements. On appeal, the accused-appellants
questioned the Court Appeals affirmation of their conviction by arguing that the
arresting officers failed to comply with the requirements for the proper custody of
seized dangerous drugs under R.A. 9165. They claim that the officers failed to
conduct the following: (1) make a physical inventory of the seized items; (2) take
photographs of the items; and (3) establish that a representative each from the
media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official had been
contacted and was present during the marking of the items. In this case, the
records are bereft of any indication that would show that the prosecution was
able to establish the arresting officers compliance with the procedural safeguards
under R.A. 9165. Neither do the records contain any physical inventory report or
photograph of the confiscated items. None of the arresting officers testified that
they had conducted a physical inventory or taken pictures of the items. Nor did

they state that there was even any attempt to contact a representative from the
media and the DOJ, and an elected public official. Nowhere can it be found that
the marking of the items was done in the presence of any of the said third-party
representatives. In all these major lapses, no one gave so much as an
explanation of why the procedure was not followed, or whether there was a
justifiable ground for failing to do so. The arresting officers and the prosecution
simply did not bother discussing these matters. R.A. 9165 has a strict mandate
for the arresting officers to comply with the afore-quoted procedural safeguards.
The Supreme Court reversed the acquittal of the accused-appellants. People of
the Philippines v. Joel Ancheta y Osan, et al, G.R. No. 197371, June 13, 2012.
Illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate; elements. To be convicted of the
crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate, the following elements
must occur: (a) the accused have no valid license or authority required by law to
enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; (b)
the accused engaged in this activity of recruitment and placement by actually
recruiting, deploying and transporting; (c) illegal recruitment was committed by
three persons conspiring and confederating with one another. People of the
Philippines v. Nurfrashir Hashim y Saraban, et al. Bernadette Panscala, etc., G.R.
No. 194255, June 13, 2012.
Illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate; elements. Accused-appellants
posits that the prosecution failed to prove that there were more than two persons
involved in the alleged crime of illegal recruitment for it to be qualified as
syndicated illegal recruitment, since the trial court held only two of the accused
liable for the crime. The Supreme Court however dismissed accused-appellants
contention. In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that accusedappellants Bernadette and Franz were not the only ones who had conspired to
bring the victims to Malaysia. It was also able to establish at the very least,
through the credible testimonies of the witnesses, that (1) Jun and Macky were
the escorts of the women to Malaysia; (2) a certain Tash was their financier; (3) a
certain Bunso negotiated with Macky for the price the former would pay for the
expenses incurred in transporting the victims to Malaysia; and (4) Mommy Cindy
owned the prostitution house where the victims worked. The concerted efforts of
all these persons resulted in the oppression of the victims. Clearly, it was
established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant, together with at
least two other persons, came to an agreement to commit the felony and decided

to commit it. The accused appellants were convicted of the crime of illegal
recruitment committed by a syndicate. People of the Philippines v. Nurfrashir
Hashim y Saraban, et al. Bernadette Panscala, etc., G.R. No. 194255, June 13,
2012.
RA 3019; prescription. Violations falling under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
prescribe in fifteen (15) years as provided under Section 11 of R.A. 3019.
Petitioner maintains that, although the charge against respondents was for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, its prosecution relates to its
efforts to recover the ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos and
of his family and cronies. Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides
that the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees is not barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel. But the
Supreme Court has already settled in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto that Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, not to
criminal cases such as the complaint against respondents in OMB-0-90-2810.
Thus, the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving
ill-gotten wealth contemplated in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
may be barred by prescription. Notably, Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides
that the offenses committed under that law prescribes in 15 years. Republic of
the Philippines v. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 139930, June 26,
2012.
R.A. 3019;section 3(e) elements. Under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, one can be
charged with corrupt practices of public officer by [c]ausing any undue injury to
any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits
or other concessions. The said crime has the following essential elements: (a)
the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. People of the

Philippines v. Aristeo E. Atienza, Rodrigo D. Manongson, Crispin M. Egarque,

and the Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 171671, June 18, 2012.
R.A. 3019;section 3(e) elements. As aptly concluded by the Sandiganbayan in
the assailed resolution, the second element of the crime as charged was not
sufficiently established by the prosecution. Manifest partiality and evident bad
faith are modes that are separate and distinct from each other so that the
existence of any of these two modes would be sufficient to satisfy the second
element. However, manifest partiality was not present in this case. The evidence
adduced did not show that accused-movants favored other persons who were
similarly situated with the private complainant.
Eyewitness Alexander Singson
categorically pointed accused Manongsong and Egarque as the persons who
destroyed/removed the second fence. Private complainant lamented that he was
not even given notice of their intent to destroy the fence. However, the same
could not be considered evident bad faith as the prosecution evidence failed to
show that the destruction was for a dishonest purpose, ill will or self-interest.
People of the Philippines v. Aristeo E. Atienza, Rodrigo D. Manongson, Crispin
M. Egarque, and the Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 171671, June 18, 2012.
3.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Certiorari; dismissal of appeal for failure to prosecute. The Supreme Court in this
case dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court considering that it (Supreme Court) found no valid, justifiable
reason for petitioners failure to file his appellants brief with the Court of Appeals
that would warrant a reversal of the Court of Appeals Resolutions dated
November 25, 2005 and May 17, 2006. To rule otherwise would make light of the
Supreme Courts extraordinary certiorari jurisdiction, which operates only upon a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the appellate tribunal. The certiorari jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is rigorously streamlined, such that Rule 65 only admits cases
based on the specific grounds provided therein. The rule applies if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. The independent action for certiorari will lie only if grave abuse of discretion
is alleged and proven to exist. Grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary or
despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the
whimsical, arbitrary, or a capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion

or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in

contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with
grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. The
Supreme Court cannot tolerate any habitual failure to follow the procedural rules,
which are indispensable for the orderly and speedy disposition of justice. In the
present case, accused Lagua was given more time, not only to file his Appellants
Brief, but also to secure new counsel to adequately prepare the appeal. The CA
issued two Show Cause Orders and two Resolutions declaring the appeal as
abandoned. Despite these issuances, his second Motion for Reconsideration was
filed 18 days after his receipt of the second and final CA Resolution. This delay is
indicative of sheer laxity and indifference on his part, for which he has lost the
statutory right of appeal. Melchor L. Laguna v. The Hon. Court of Appeals and
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173390, June 27, 2012.
Dismissal; failure to prosecute. Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, the failure on the part of the plaintiff, without any
justifiable cause, to comply with any order of the court or the Rules, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, may result in the
dismissal of the complaint either motu proprio or on motion by the defendant. The
failure of a plaintiff to prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within a
reasonable period of time will give rise to the presumption that he is no longer
interested to obtain from the court the relief prayed for in his complaint; hence,
the court is authorized to order the dismissal of the complaint on its own motion
or on motion of the defendants. The presumption is not, by any means,
conclusive because the plaintiff, on a motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal, may allege and establish a justifiable cause for such failure. The
burden to show that there are compelling reasons that would make a dismissal of
the case unjustified is on the petitioners. Eloisa Merchandising, Inc. and Trebel
International, Inc. v. Banco De Oro Universal Bank and Engracio M. Escasisnas,
Jr. in his capacity as Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
G.R. No. 192716, June 13, 2012.
Dismissal; failure to prosecute. In this case, while there was no substantial
prejudice caused to herein respondent, who has already consolidated the
ownership of petitioners properties, secured new titles in its name and
successfully implemented a writ of possession issued by another branch, there
was neither patent abuse in the trial courts dismissal of the complaint for the

third time, the earlier two dismissals having been precipitated by petitioners nonappearance at the pre-trial conference. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the trial
court did not find their offered excuses as meritorious or justifiable; the trial court
in the exercise of discretion simply reinstated the case in the interest of justice
but explicitly warned petitioners to be more circumspect in attending to the case.
However, despite the trial courts leniency and admonition, petitioners continued
to exhibit laxity and inattention in attending to their case. Assuming domestic
problems had beset petitioners counsel in the interregnum, with greater reason
should he make proper coordination with the trial court to ensure his availability
on the date to be chosen by the trial court for the long-delayed conduct of a pretrial conference. Petitioners themselves did nothing to get the case moving for
nine months and set the case anew for pre-trial even as BDO was already
seeking their judicial ejectment with the implementation of the writ of possession
issued by Branch 143. Such circumstance also belies their pretense that the
parties were then still negotiating for a settlement. Eloisa Merchandising, Inc. and
Trebel International, Inc. v. Banco De Oro Universal Bank and Engracio M.
Escasisnas, Jr. in his capacity as Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, G.R. No. 192716, June 13, 2012.
Evidence; alibi. In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, two requisites must
concur: first, the appellant was at a different place at the time the crime was
committed, and second, it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime
scene at the time of its commission. In this case, the second requisite is not met.
Victor himself testified that the distance between Brgy. Macabug and the place
where the rape occurred is just three to four kilometers and that the same can be
traversed by land transportation in just a few minutes. Hence, it was not
physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of the
commission of the crime. Also, even if Victors alibi is corroborated by Alex, said
defense is still unworthy of belief. Alex admitted that Victor was his employer and
that he was testifying for Victor as he relied on him for livelihood. Denial and alibi
are practically worthless against the positive identification made by the
prosecution witnesses, especially by the rape victim. Victors weak alibi cannot
thus overcome AAAs positive identification of him as her rapist. Victor Rondina
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179059, June 13, 2012.
Evidence; credibility of witness. It is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that when
the offended parties are young and immature girls, as in this case, courts are

inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only
their relative vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which they
would be exposed if the matter about which they testified were not true. A young
girl would not usually concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit having been
ravished and her honor tainted; allow the examination of her private parts; and
undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and
scandal of a public trial, had she not in fact been raped and been truly moved to
protect and preserve her honor, and motivated by the desire to obtain justice for
the wicked acts committed against her. People of the Philippines v. Roger Tejero,
G.R. No. 187744, June 20, 2012.
Evidence; credibility of witness. In this case, the Supreme Court gave credence
to the testimony of AAA who was just 14 years old when she was raped. AAAs
delay in reporting the rapes does not undermine her credibility. In a long line of
cases, the Supreme Court pronounced that the failure of the victim to
immediately report the rape is not necessarily an indication of a fabricated
charge. It is quite understandable how AAAs tender age, AAAs regard for Tejero
as her stepfather, Tejeros threat to kill AAA and her whole family, and Tejeros
physical proximity to AAA and her family (Tejero lives in the same house with
AAA and her family) could all have easily convinced AAA that Tejeros threat was
real and discouraged AAA from immediately reporting the rapes to anyone.
People of the Philippines v. Roger Tejero, G.R. No. 187744, June 20, 2012.
Evidence; credibility of witness. In reviewing rape cases, the Supreme Court is
guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation for rape is easy to make,
difficult to prove, and even more difficult to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime, where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of
the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and (3) the evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. When the issue is the
credibility of the victim, the trial courts assessment is accorded with great weight.
In fact, the trial courts finding of facts is even conclusive and binding, if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence. The trial court had the full opportunity to observe directly the
witnesses deportment and manner of testifying. It is in a better position than the
appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence. People of the
Philippines vs. Ricardo Bosi y Danao, G.R. No. 193665, June 25, 2012.

Evidence; credibility of witness. In the instant case, both the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals recognized the credibility and believability of AAAs
testimony. They both gave credence to the testimony of AAA who narrated her
ordeal in a straightforward, convincing, and consistent manner, interrupted only
by her convulsive sobbing. As correctly pointed out by the Regional Trial Court,
defense witness Santiagos testimony deserves scant consideration because
negative evidence cannot prevail over the positive assertions of the private
complainant. People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo Bosi y Danao, G.R. No.
193665, June 25, 2012.
Evidence; extrajudicial confession of co-accused. The extrajudicial confession or
admission of one accused is admissible only against said accused, but is
inadmissible against the other accused. But if the declarant or admitter repeats in
court his extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial and
the other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, the
admission is admissible against both accused because then, it is transposed into
a judicial admission. It is thus perplexing why, despite the extrajudicial statements
of Cunanan, Puno and Yapyuco, as well as the latters testimony implicating the
appellants in the incident, they still had chosen to waive their right to present
evidence when, in fact, they could have shown detailed proof of their participation
or non-participation in the offenses charged. Thus, the Supreme Court rejected
appellants claim that they had been denied due process in this regard, as they
opted not to testify and be cross-examined by the prosecution as to the
truthfulness in their affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the inculpatory
admissions of their co-accused. Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez vs. Hon.
Sandiganbayan and The People of the Philippines/Mario D. Reyes, Andres S.
Reyes and Virgilio A. Manguerra/Gervacio B. Cunanan, Jr. and Ernesto Puno v.
Honorable Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 12074446/G.R. No. 122677/G.R. No. 122776.June 25, 2012.
Katarungan Pambarangay Law; barangay conciliation procedure a condition
precedent. This is a complaint filed by petitioner Agbayani against respondent
Genabe for slander. The Department of Justice found that that the complaint fails
to state a cause of action on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of
the Local Government Code of 1991, on the Katarungang Pambarangay
conciliation procedure. This finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the

Supreme Court. Undeniably, both petitioner Agbayani and respondent Genabe

are residents of Las Pias City and both work at the RTC, and the incident which
is the subject matter of the case happened in their workplace. Agbayanis
complaint should have undergone the mandatory barangay conciliation for
possible amicable settlement with respondent Genabe, pursuant to Sections 408
and 409 of R.A. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991. The compulsory
process of barangay conciliation is a pre-condition for the filing of the complaint in
court. Where the complaint (a) did not state that it is one of excepted cases, or
(b) it did not allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or (c) did not have
a certification that no conciliation had been reached by the parties, the case
should be dismissed. Here, petitioner Agbayani failed to show that the instant
case is not one of the cases that is covered by the application of the rule on
mandatory barangay conciliation. Leticia B. Agbayani v. Court of Appeals,
Department of Justice and Loida Marcelina J. Genabe, G.R. No. 183623, June
25, 2012.
Ombudsman; legal interest or standing to appeal. The threshold issue in this
case is whether or not the Ombudsman has legal standing to file the instant
petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals ruling which
reversed petitioners decision. The Supreme Court ruled that the Ombudsman
has no legal standing to file the petition in this case. Citing National Appellate
Board of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) v. Mamauag, Mathay, Jr,
v. Court of Appeals, Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison, Pleyto v. Philippine
National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), the
Supreme Court ruled that the government party that can appeal is not the
disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the
penalty of dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be
one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Office of
the Ombudsman v. Romeo A. Liggayu, G.R. No. 174297, June 20, 2012.
Ombudsman; legal interest or standing to appeal. In this case, it is the PCSO,
through its then General Manager Golpeo, which filed the administrative case
against respondent for the latters alleged act of dishonesty in falsifying the OR
and sales invoice he submitted in the liquidation of his cash advance. Thus, it is
the PCSO which is deemed the prosecuting government party which can appeal
the CA decision exonerating respondent of the administrative charge. It is the
PCSO which would stand to suffer, since the CA decision also ordered

respondents reinstatement, thus, the former would be compelled to take back to

its fold a perceived dishonest employee. Notwithstanding, the PCSO did not file
any petition assailing the CA decision. Office of the Ombudsman v. Romeo A.
Liggayu, G.R. No. 174297, June 20, 2012.
Probable cause; determination. The determination of probable cause for the filing
of an information in court is an executive function which pertains at the first
instance to the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice. As a rule,
in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, courts are not empowered to
substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch; the public
prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish
probable cause in filing a criminal information and courts will not interfere with his
findings unless grave abuse of discretion can be shown. In this case, the
Supreme Court found no error in the public prosecutors determination that no
probable cause existed to justify the filing of a criminal complaint. Manila Electric
Company, represented by Manolo C. Fernando v. Vicente Atilano, et al., G.R. No.
166758, June 27, 2012.
Rule 65; remedy against determination of probable cause. Contrary to
respondents claim, Rule 65 provides the proper remedy to assail the DOJs
determination of the presence or absence of probable cause instead of a petition
for review under Rule 43. By weighing the evidence submitted by the parties in a
preliminary investigation and by making an independent assessment thereof, an
investigating prosecutor is, to that extent, performing functions of a quasi-judicial
nature in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. However, since he does not
make a determination of the rights of any party in the proceeding, or pronounce
the respondents guilt or innocence (thus limiting his action to the determination
of probable cause to file an information in court), an investigating prosecutors
function still lacks the element of adjudication essential to an appeal under Rule
43. Additionally, there is a compelling reason to conclude that the DOJs
exclusion from the enumeration of quasi-judicial agencies in Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court is deliberate. However, the petitioner must allege and show that the DOJ
acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting or denying the petition for review.
PCGG Chairman Magdangal B. Elma and Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Reiner Jacobi, Crispin T. Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 155996, June 27,
2012.

April 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Law and Procedure
Posted on May 21, 2012 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo
Posted in
Criminal Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law Tagged dangerous drugs,
estafa, evidence, murder, preliminary investigation, probable cause, rape, theft,
treachery

Here are select April 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
criminal law and procedure:
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Composite crime; defined. The felony of rape with homicide is a composite

crime. A composite crime, also known as a special complex crime, is composed
of two or more crimes that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique
offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse. It is a specific crime
with a specific penalty provided by law and differs from a compound or complex
crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that [w]hen a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
People v. Villaflores,G.R. No. 184926, April 11, 2012.
Composite crime and compound crime differentiated. There are distinctions
between a composite crime, on the one hand, and a complex or compound crime
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand. In a composite
crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in a complex or compound
crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that is,
grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit
the other. For a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of
crimes is specific; for a complex or compound crime, the penalty is that
corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum
period. A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed; a light
felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime may
be the subject of a separate information. People v. Villaflores, G.R. No. 184926,
April 11, 2012.

Criminal liability; effect of death pending appeal. On 29 July 2009, a Notice of

Appeal was filed by Brillantes through counsel before the Supreme Court. While
this case is pending appeal, the Prisons and Security Division Officer-in-Charge
informed the Court that accused-appellant Brillantes died while committed at the
Bureau of Corrections on 3 January 2012 as evidenced by a copy of death report
signed by New Bilibid Prison Hospitals Medical. Hence, the issue here is the
effect of death pending appeal of the conviction of accused-appellant Brillantes
with regard to his criminal and pecuniary liabilities. People of the Philippines v.
Saturnino Dela Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 190610, April 25, 2012.
Criminal liability; effect of death pending appeal. The Revised Penal Code is
instructive on the matter. It provides in Article 89(1) that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment. It is plain that both the personal penalty of
imprisonment and pecuniary penalty of fine of Brillantes were extinguished upon
his death pending appeal of his conviction by the lower courts. There is no civil
liability involved in violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. No private offended party is involved as there is in fact no reference to civil
liability in the decision of the trial court. The appeal of Brillantes culminating in
the extinguishment of his criminal liability, however, does not have any effect on
his co- accused De la Cruz who did not file a notice of appeal. People of the
Philippines v. Saturnino Dela Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 190610, April 25, 2012.
Criminal liability; extinguishment by death. In a Decision dated May 9, 2006, the
Court of Appeals affirmed appellants conviction with modification, increasing the
award of indemnity from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00. It likewise awarded moral
damages in favor of AAA in the amount of P50,000.00. However, appellant died
on December 4, 2004. Nonetheless, the Public Attorneys Office still appealed
the aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision to the Supreme Court. Appellants death
during the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals extinguished not
only his criminal liability for the crime of rape committed against AAA, but also his
civil liability solely arising from or based on said crime. People of the Philippines
v. Nelson Bayot y Satina, G.R. No. 200030, April 18, 2012.
Criminal liability; extinguishment by death. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, specifically provides the effect of death of the accused on his

criminal, as well as civil, liability. It reads thus: Criminal liability is totally

extinguished: (1) By death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment. . . It is clear that the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the
civil liability ex delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. People of the
Philippines v. Nelson Bayot y Satina, G.R. No. 200030, April 18, 2012.
Murder; treachery. The stabbing of Alfredo by Samson was qualified by
treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In order for
treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or
forms of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the
latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission
without risk to himself. Here, while it is true that the attack on Alfredo was frontal,
the same was so sudden and unexpected. Alfredo was completely unaware of
the imminent peril to his life. Alfredo was walking to meet Samson, expecting
that they would only talk. Alfredo was unarmed while Samson had a knife.
Alfredo was deprived of the opportunity to defend himself and repel Samsons
attack. Clearly, treachery attended Samsons stabbing to death of Alfredo,
hence, qualifying the crime to murder. People of the Philippines v. Samson
Escleto, G.R. No. 183706, April 25, 2012.
Qualified theft; elements. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to
gain, but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon
things, shall take the personal property of another without the latters consent. If
committed with grave abuse of confidence, the crime of theft becomes qualified.
In prcis, qualified theft punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308
and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is committed when the following

elements are present: (1) taking of personal property; (2) that the said property
belongs to another; (3) that the said taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that it
be done without the owners consent; (5) that it be accomplished without the use
of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (6) that
it be done with grave abuse of confidence. Here, the first and second elements
are unquestionably present. The money involved is the personal property of Trias
employer, PNB. Trias argument that the amount does not belong to PNB even if
it is the depositary bank is erroneous since it is well established that a bank
acquires ownership of the money deposited by its clients. The third element,
intent to gain or animus lucrandi, is an internal act that is presumed from the
unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. This element is
immediately discernable from the circumstances narrated in the affidavits
submitted by PNBs employees. The fourth element of the crime clearly also
exists. PNB did not consent to the issuance of the check and its eventual
encashmentwhich both constitute the taking of personal propertyas
respondents had made sure that the bank was rendered inutile and incapable to
give its consent. The fifth element is also undisputed here; while the last element,
that the taking be done with grave abuse of confidence, is sufficiently shown by
the affidavits of PNB and Trias own admission of the position he held at the
Bank. A banks employees are entrusted with the possession of money of the
bank due to the confidence reposed in them and as such they occupy positions
of confidence. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City is ordered to file
an Information charging Amelio C. Tria and Atty. Reyes/John Doe for Qualified
Theft. Philippine National Bank v. Amelio Tria and John Doe, G.R. No. 193250,
April 25, 2012.
Qualifying circumstance; treachery. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the person
attacked. Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof,
which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. In the case at bar, the attack
on Magdalino Olos was treacherous, because he was caught off guard and was
therefore unable to defend himself, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses
and as indicated by the wounds inflicted on him. The prosecution was able to
sufficiently establish the attendance of treachery in this case. People v. Asilan,
G.R. No. 188322, April 11, 2012.

Rape; elements. The crime of rape is defined in the Revised Penal Code as
amended by the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. The essential elements that the
prosecution must prove are, first, that a man succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of a woman; and, second, that the act was accomplished through
force, threat or intimidation. In this case, AAA positively testified to the presence
of both elements. In her testimony, she recounted in detail her harrowing
experience at the hands of Ganzan how she and her friend, while on their way
home from a disco, were intercepted by the appellant; how they were made to
undress at gunpoint; how her friend was sent away so that the appellant would be
left alone with her to fulfill his lewd designs; and how he actually succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of her against her will while poking a knife against her
neck. These accusations were further buttressed by the findings of Dr. Carlos
Ray Sanchez, who concluded that there was a possibility of sexual abuse after
he found fresh lacerations in her hymen and confirmed the presence of sperm in
her vagina. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution has
fulfilled its burden of establishing appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
People v. Ganzan, G.R. No. 193509, April 11, 2012.
Syndicated estafa; elements. Gilbert Guy, et al. should be charged for syndicated
estafa in relation to Section 1 of PD No. 1689, which has the following elements:
(a) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Artilce 315 and 316 of the
Revised Penal Code is committed; (b) the estafa or swindling is committed by a
syndicate of five or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural
banks, cooperatives, samahang nayons, or farmers associations or of funds
solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. Rafael H. Galvez
and Katherine L. Guy v. Asia United Bank/Asia United Bank v. Gilbert Guy, et
al./Gilbert Guy, et al. v. Asia United Bank, G.R. No. 187919/G.R. No. 187979 &
G.R. No. 188030, April 25, 2012.
Syndicated estafa; elements. Here, five (5) accused, namely, Gilbert G. Guy, et
al, were, (a) all involved in the formation of the entities used to defraud AUB; and
(b) they were the officers and directors, both of RMSI and SPI, whose
conformities paved the way for AUB to grant the letter of credit subject of this
case, in AUBs honest belief that SPI, as Gilbert Guy, et al. represented, was a
mere division of RMSI. Furthermore, while these corporations were established

presumably in accordance with law, it cannot be denied that Gilbert G. Guy, et al,
used these corporations to carry out the illegal and unlawful act of
misrepresenting SPI as a mere division of RMSI, and, despite knowing SPIs
separate juridical personality, applied for a letter of credit secured by SPIs
promissory note, knowing fully that SPI has no credit line with AUB. The
circumstances of the creation of these entities and their dealings with the bank
reveal this criminal intent to defraud and to deceive AUB. Lastly, the fact that the
defraudation of AUB resulted to misappropriation of the money which it solicited
from the general public in the form of deposits was substantially established.
Thus, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding probable cause against private
respondents for the crime of estafa under Article 315, par 2 (a) of the Revised
Penal Code is affirmed with modification such that Gilbert G. Guy, et al, be
charged for syndicated estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1689. Rafael H. Galvez
and Katherine L. Guy v. Asia United Bank/Asia United Bank v. Gilbert Guy, et
al./Gilbert Guy, et al. v. Asia United Bank, G.R. No. 187919/G.R. No. 187979 &
G.R. No. 188030, April 25, 2012.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Dangerous Drugs; buy bust operation; coordination with PDEA. On appeal,

accused-appellant assailed his conviction by insisting that the buy bust operation
conducted by the Philippine National Police (PNP) which was instrumental to his
arrest was invalid because of alleged violation of Section 86 of R.A. 9165,
requiring that the PNP maintain close coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) on all drug related matters. The Supreme Court
ruled that accused-appellants contention is unmeritorious. It is settled that
Section 86 of R.A. 9165 does not invalidate operations on account of the law
enforcers failure to maintain close coordination with the PDEA. Section 86, as
well as the Internal Rules and Regulations implementing the same, is silent as to
the consequences of the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the
authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a buy-bust operation. This silence
[cannot] be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the
participation of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest
inadmissible. People v. Figueroa, G.R. No. 186141, April 11, 2012.

Dangerous Drugs; buy bust; required procedures. Given the nature of buy-bust
operations and the resulting preventive procedural safeguards crafted in R.A.
9165, courts must tread carefully before giving full credit to the testimonies of
those who conducted the operations. Although it has been ruled in the past that
mere procedural lapses in the conduct of a buy-bust operation are not ipso facto
fatal to the prosecutions cause, so long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items have been preserved, courts must still thoroughly evaluate
and differentiate those errors that constitute a simple procedural lapse from those
that amount to a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the safeguards
drawn by the law. Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the
performance of the official duties of law enforcers, we stress that the step-by-step
procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot
be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. Here, the conduct of
the buy-bust operations was peppered with defects, which raises doubts on the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items from
accused-appellant. First, there were material inconsistencies in the marking of
the seized items. Second, the SAID-SOTF failed to show genuine and sufficient
effort to seek the third-party representatives enumerated under Section 21(1) of
R.A. 9165. Third, the SAID-SOTF failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of
Inventory and to take photos of the seized items pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A.
9165. Accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul is therefore acquitted of the
charges in Criminal Cases No. 14935-D-TG and No. 14936-D-TG on the ground
of reasonable doubt. People of the Philippines v. Sammy Umipag y Abdul, G.R.
No. 190321, April 25, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; chain of custody and prescribed procedures. Non-compliance
with the prescribed procedural requirements does not necessarily render the
seizure and custody of the items void and invalid; the seizure may still be held
valid, provided that (a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and
(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are shown to have been
properly preserved. These conditions, however, were not met in the present case
as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification for the failure of
SPO4 Mendoza to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized
items. As held in People v. De Guzman, the failure to follow the procedure
mandated under RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations must be
adequately explained. The justifiable ground for the non-compliance must be
proven as a fact. The Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they

even exist. In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the
balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.
Petitioners Valentin Zafra y Dechosa and Eroll Marcelino y Reyes are acquitted
for the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Valentin Zafra y Dechosa and Eroll Marcelino y Reyes v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 190749, April 25, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs; elements.
Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the
following elements concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized
by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. All
these elements were established beyond reasonable doubt in the cases against
accused-appellant. The prosecution witnesses consistently and categorically
testified that pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by a judge, they found and
seized from accused-appellants house and actual possession a brick of
marijuana leaves and heat-sealed sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. People v. Velazquez, G.R. No. 177244, April 11, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; illegal sale of dangerous drugs. This appeal involves two
distinct drug-related offenses, namely: illegal sale of dangerous drugs, and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. The successful prosecution of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs requires: (a) proof that the transaction or sale took place, and
(b) the presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti, or the dangerous
drugs themselves. It is crucial that the Prosecution establishes the identity of the
seized dangerous drugs in a way that the integrity thereof has been well
preserved from the time of seizure or confiscation from the accused until the time
of presentation as evidence in court. Nothing less than a faithful compliance with
this duty is demanded of all law enforcers arresting drug pushers and drug
possessors and confiscating and seizing the dangerous drugs and substances
from them. Here, the Prosecution failed to demonstrate a faithful compliance by
the arresting lawmen of the rule on chain of custody. Further, the State did not
establish the identity of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from petitioner with
the same exacting certitude required for a finding of guilt. Although PO2 Payumo
declared that he was the one who had received the sachet of shabu (RRS-1)
from petitioner and who had confiscated the two sachets of shabu (RRS-2) from
petitioner, all of which he had then sealed, nothing more to support the fact that

the evidence thus seized had remained intact was adduced. Also, the
Prosecution did not show to whom the seized articles had been turned over
following the conduct of the laboratory examination, and how the seized articles
had been kept in a manner that preserved their integrity until their final
presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. Such lapses of the
Prosecution were fatal to its proof of guilt because they demonstrated that the
chain of custody did not stay unbroken, thereby raising doubt on the integrity and
identity of the dangerous drugs as evidence of the corpus delicti of the crimes
charged. Petitioner is acquitted of the crimes charged in Criminal Case No. 05234564 and Criminal Case No. 05-234565. Rogelio S. Reyes v. The Hon. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 180177, April 18, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; illegal sale of dangerous drugs. For the successful
prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article
II of R.A. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the
buyer and seller, object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of the corpus delicti. After a
careful examination of the records of this case, the Supreme Court was
convinced that that the prosecutions evidence established Abedins guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the
essential elements of the illegal sale of shabu. Abedin was positively identified by
the prosecution witnesses as the person who sold and possessed the shabu.
People v. Abedin, G.R. No. 179936, April 11, 2012.
3.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Evidence; circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence may prove the guilt of

appellant and justify a conviction if the following requisites concur: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In other words,
for
circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support conviction, all circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Here, the

circumstances accused-appellant (i) was the legal secretary and liaison officer
of private complainant, (ii) was tasked to process land titles of private
complainants clients, (iii) was confidently given considerable amounts of cash
without need of receipts by private complainant, (iv) submitted handwritten
padded liquidation statements because her reported expenses turned out to be
higher than what she actually spent and the official receipts she submitted to
private complainant were fake, and (v) did not specifically deny her submitting
altered or fake receipts, and (vi) suddenly disappeared leaving some of her tasks,
unfinished lead to the reasonable conclusion that appellant took amounts of
money from Rebecca. People of the Philippines v. Remedios Tanchanco y
Pineda, G.R. No. 177761, April 18, 2012.
Evidence in Rape; credibility of witness. There can be no question that the
testimony of a child who has been a victim in rape is normally given full weight
and credence. Judicial experience has enabled the courts to accept the verity
that when a minor says that she was raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed against her. The credibility of such a
rape victim is surely augmented where there is absolutely no evidence that
suggests the possibility of her being actuated by ill-motive to falsely testify
against the accused. Truly, a rape victims testimony that is unshaken by rigid
cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its
material points is entitled to full faith and credit. AAAs failure to shout for help
although she knew that her father was tending to the family store just downstairs
was not a factor to discredit her or to diminish the credibility of her evidence on
the rape. She explained her failure by stating that Taguilid had threatened to
harm her should she shout. She thereby commanded credence, considering that
she was not expected to easily overcome her fear of him due to her being then a
minor just under 13 years of age at the time of the rape. People v. Taguilid, G.R.
No. 181544, April 11, 2012.
Preliminary investigation; no vested right to file a reply. According to petitioner, he
was denied his right to due process when he was not given a copy of the: (i)
Counter-affidavit, (ii) Asst. Prosecutors 10 September 2008 Resolution, and (iii)
17 February 2009 Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman. He also claims he
was deprived of due process because he was not able to file his Reply to the
Counter-affidavit. However, a complainant in a preliminary investigation does not
have a vested right to file a Replythis right should be granted to him by law.

P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v. Orlando C. Casimiro, etc., et al, G.R. No. 190569, April
25, 2012.
Preliminary investigation; no vested right to file a reply. There is no provision in
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court that gives the Complainant or requires the
prosecutor to observe the right to file a Reply to the accuseds counter-affidavit.
To illustrate the non-mandatory nature of filing a Reply in preliminary
investigations, Section 3 (d) of Rule 112 gives the prosecutor, in certain
instances, the right to resolve the Complaint even without a counter-affidavit, viz:
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, of if subpoenaed, does not submit
counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall
resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant. On
the other hand, petitioner was entitled to receive a copy of the Counter-affidavit
filed by Aguillon. P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v. Orlando C. Casimiro, etc., et al, G.R.
No. 190569, April 25, 2012.
Preliminary investigation; non-receipt of counter-affidavit. The procedural defect
of not having received a copy of the Counter-affidavit, however, was cured when
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban had
the duty to send petitioner a copy of Aguillons Counter-affidavit. Section 3(c),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, grants a complainant this
right, and the Provincial Prosecutor has the duty to observe the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in the cases presented before it. That the
requirements of due process are deemed complied with in the present case
because of the filing of an MR by Complainant was simply a fortunate turn of
events for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v.
Orlando C. Casimiro, etc., et al, G.R. No. 190569, April 25, 2012.
Probable cause. A finding probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and there is
enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the
suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. The term does not mean
actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an

inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. Cruz v.

Hon. Gonzales, et al, G.R. No. 173844, April 11, 2012.
Probable cause. In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals in line with the principle of non-interference with the prerogative
of the Secretary of Justice to review the resolutions of the public prosecutor in the
determination of the existence of probable cause. The Secretary of Justice found
sufficient evidence to indict petitioner. It was adequately established by DBP and
found by the Secretary of Justice that the funds would not have been released
pursuant to the subsidiary loan agreement if HSLBI had no subborrowers/Investment Enterprises to speak of. As it turned out, not only were the
collaterals submitted inexistent, all the purported sub-borrowers/Investment
Enterprises were also fictitious and inexistent. In fact, the signatures of the subborrowers and the supporting documents submitted to DBP by petitioner and her
co-respondents were all forged. The findings of probable cause against
petitioner was based on the document showing that petitioners opinion was
instrumental in the deceit committed against DBP. Cruz v. Hon. Gonzales, et al,
G.R. No. 173844, April 11, 2012.
March 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Law and Procedure
Posted on April 16, 2012 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo
Posted in
Criminal Law, Philippines - Cases, Remedial Law
Tagged dangerous
drugs, estafa, evidence, murder, Ombudsman, rape, robbery
Here are select March 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
criminal law and procedure:
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Estafa; elements. The offense of estafa committed with abuse of confidence has
the following elements under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended: (a) that money, goods or other personal property is received
by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b)
that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d)there is demand by the

offended party to the offender. Esla Macandog Magtira v. People of the

Philippines, G.R. No. 170964, March 7, 2012.
Estafa; elements. The Supreme Court ruled that all the above elements [of
estafa] are present in this case, having been established by the prosecutions
evidence and by the petitioners own admissions. The first element was
established by the evidence showing that the petitioner received various sums of
money from the private complainants to be held in trust for them under the
Paluwagan operation. The petitioner admitted that she was under obligation, at a
fixed date, to account for and to deliver the Paluwagan funds to the private
complainants in the sequential order agreed upon among them. The second
element was established by the evidence that the petitioner failed to account for
and to deliver the Paluwagan funds to the private complainants on the agreed
time of delivery. The third and fourth elements of the offense were proven by
evidence showing that the petitioner failed to account for and to deliver the
Paluwagan funds to the private complainants despite several demands made
upon her by the private complainants. Each of the private complainants testified
as to how they were prejudiced when they failed to receive their allotted
Paluwagan funds. Given the totality of evidence, the Supreme Court upheld the
conviction of the petitioner of the crime charged. Esla Macandog Magtira v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170964, March 7, 2012.

Murder; treachery and evident premeditation. The essence of treachery is the

sudden attack by an aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring
the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. The evidence on
record shows treachery in the killing of Atty. Alipio, thus qualifying the crime as
murder. The assailant, identified as accused-appellant Renato Ramos, just
suddenly fired upon Atty. Alipio at a very close distance, without any provocation
from said unarmed victim, who was then just conversing with some other people.
There is also evident premeditation because the evidence shows that a couple of
days before the actual shooting of Atty. Alipio, Raymundo Zamora already saw
and heard accused-appellants Norberto (Jun) Adviento, Renato Ramos, and
Lolito Aquino, talking to Francisca Talaro and coming to an agreement to kill Atty.
Alipio. Thus, the Supreme Court finds no reason to overturn the Court of

Appeals decision of conviction. People of the Philippines v. Francisca Talaro, et

al, G.R. No. 175781, March 20, 2012.
Rape. For a charge of rape to prosper under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accompanied such act through force, threat,
or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
when she was under twelve years of age or was demented. In her September 20,
2000 testimony, the victim (AAA) narrated in detail how the appellant and Kino
threatened to kill her, and then took turns in raping her. The Supreme Court ruled
that the prosecution positively established the elements of rape required under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. First, the appellant and Kino succeeded
in having carnal knowledge with the victim. AAA was steadfast in her assertion
that both the appellant and Kino had raped her, as a result of which, she felt pain.
She also felt that something sticky came out of the appellants and Kinos
private parts. Second, the assailants employed force, threat and intimidation in
satisfying their bestial desires. According to AAA, the appellant and Kino
threatened to kill her if she refused to obey them. People of the Philippines v.
Alias Kino Lascano, et al, G.R. No. 192180, March 21, 2012.
Rape. In deciding rape cases, courts are guided by these three well-entrenched
principles:(a) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even
more difficult to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and (c) the
evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. As a result of these
guiding principles, the credibility of the victim becomes the single most important
issue.Furthermore, testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for
youth and immaturity are badges of truth. Here, the Supreme Court finds that the
testimony of AAA is straightforward and convincing with no inconsistency with
regard to the material elements of the crime of rape, and since all the elements of
qualified rape were duly alleged and proved during the trial, accused-appellants
conviction is affirmed. People of the Philippines v. Ben Rubio y Acosta, G.R. No.
195239, March 7, 2012.
Robbery; damages. The award of damages are correct and in accordance with
law for in robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages in the

amount of P50,000 each are granted automatically in the absence of any

qualifying aggravating circumstances.
An award of P25,000 for temperate
damages may be allowed under Article 2224 of the Civil Code because the
victims family undeniably incurred expenses in his burial. The Court of Appeals
decision finding appellants Eduardo Castro y Peralta and Renerio Delos Reyes y
Bonus guilty is affirmed with modification that appellants further pay the heirs of
Ricardo Pacheco Benedicto P25,000 as temperate damages. People of the
Philippines v. Eduardo Castro y Peralta, et al, G.R. No. 187073, March 14, 2012.
Self-defense. Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code states that anyone who acts
in defense of his person or rights do not incur any criminal liability, provided that
the following circumstances concur: (i) unlawful aggression, (ii) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (iii) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. SPO2 Lito T. Nacnac v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 191913, March 21, 2012.
Self-defense. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense;
and ordinarily, there is a difference between the act of drawing ones gun and the
act of pointing ones gun at a target in determining the presence of unlawful
aggression. The former cannot be said to be an unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim, while the latter is generally considered unlawful aggression. Here, a
warning shot fired by a fellow police officer (petitioner) was left unheeded as the
victim reached for his own firearm and pointed it at petitioner. Petitioner was
justified in defending himself from an inebriated and disobedient colleague. As to
the second circumstance above, the nature and number of wounds inflicted by
the accused are constantly and unremittingly considered as important indicia of
the means employed by the accused, which must be reasonably commensurate
to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted. Here, the lone
gunshot was a reasonable means chosen by petitioner in defending himself in
view of the proximity of the armed victim, his drunken state, disobedience of an
unlawful order, and failure to stand down despite a warning shot. There is also
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself or
herself in this case. Petitioner gave the victim a lawful order and fired a warning
shot before shooting the armed and drunk victim. There was no evidence on
petitioner sufficiently provoking the victim prior to the shooting. Thus, petitioner
was only defending himself on the night he shot his fellow police officer, and must

therefore be acquitted. SPO2 Lito T. Nacnac v. People of the Philippines, G.R.

No. 191913, March 21, 2012.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Dangerous Drugs; illegal sale; elements. The elements necessary for the
prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are the (1) identities of the buyer and the
seller, object, and consideration, and (2) delivery of the thing sold and payment
therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is
the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. The delivery of the illicit drug
to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money
successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. The testimonial and the
documentary pieces of evidence adduced by the prosecution in support of its
case against the appellant establish the presence of these elements. First, the
identity of the seller was duly established. Second, the police officers saw the
appellant handing the sachet to the poseur-buyer in exchange of the P100.00
peso bill that the appellant earlier received from the poseur-buyer. Thus, the
Supreme Court affirms the assailed decision of conviction by the Court of
Appeals. People of the Philippines v. Jerome Paler, G.R. No. 188103, March 7,
2012.
3.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Evidence; credibility of victims testimony. Sabadlab appealed his conviction for

the crime of rape before the Supreme Court by assailing, among others, the
credibility of the victims (AAAs) testimony.The supposed inconsistencies dwelled
on minor details or collateral matters of AAAs testimony were held to be badges
of veracity and manifestations of truthfulness due to their tendency of
demonstrating that the testimony had not been rehearsed or concocted. It is also
basic that inconsistencies bearing on minor details or collateral matters should
not adversely affect the substance of the witness declaration, veracity, or weight
of testimony. The only inconsistencies that might have discredited the victims
credible testimony were those that affected or related to the elements of the
crime. The supposed inconsistencies were inconsequential to the issue of guilt.
For one, the matter of who of the three rapists had blindfolded and undressed
AAA was trifling, because her confusion did not alter the fact that she had been

really blindfolded and rendered naked. Nor did the failure to produce any torn
apparel of AAA disprove the crime charged, it being without dispute that the
tearing of the victims apparel was not necessary in the commission of the crime
charged. In fact, she did not even state that her clothes had been torn when
Sabadlab had forcibly undressed her. Verily, details and matters that did not
detract from the commission of the crime did not diminish her credibility. The task
of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and of weighing their
credibility is best left to the trial judge by virtue of the first-hand impressions he
derives while the witnesses testify before him. The demeanor on the witness
chair of persons sworn to tell the truth in judicial proceedings is a significant
element of judicial adjudication because it can draw the line between fact and
fancy. Their forthright answers or hesitant pauses, their quivering voices or angry
tones, their flustered looks or sincere gazes, their modest blushes or guilty
blanches all these can reveal if the witnesses are telling the truth or lying in
their teeth. People of the Philippines v. Erland Sabadlab y Bayquel, G.R. No.
175924, March 14, 2012.
Evidence; credibility of victims testimony. As the final appellate reviewer in this
case, the Supreme Court accorded utmost respect to the findings and
conclusions on the credibility of witnesses reached by the trial judge on account
of his unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and on account of his
personal access to the various indicia available but not reflected in the record.
AAAs recollection of the principal occurrence and her positive identification of the
rapists, particularly Sabadlab, were firm. It is reassuring, too, that her
trustworthiness in identifying Sabadlab as one of the rapists rested on her
recognition of him as the man who had frequently flirted with her at the store
where she had usually bought pan de sal for her employers table. As such, the
identification of him as one of the rapists became impervious to doubt. The
Supreme Court sustained the conviction of Sabadlab. People of the Philippines v.
Erland Sabadlab y Bayquel, G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012.
Evidence; denial and alibi.The well-established rule is that denial and alibi are
self-serving negative evidence; they cannot prevail over the spontaneous,
positive, and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who pointed to
and identified the accused-appellant as the malefactor. Indeed, alibi is easy to
concoct and difficult to disprove. Although accused-appellant presented other
witnesses to supposedly corroborate his alibi, the Supreme Court could not

ascribe much probative weight to said witnesses testimonies. None of said

witnesses actually saw the shooting, most only heard the gunshots and arrived at
the scene after the shooting took place and, thus, had no personal knowledge of
the said incident. Except for Aida, no other witness for the defense was physically
with accused-appellant at the exact time of the shooting. And even Aidas
testimony is unreliable given the observation of the Regional Trial Court that it is
in conflict with that of accused-appellant. Accused-appellant claimed that he first
went to the billiard hall owned by Ilustre where he played with a certain Zaldy and
then he transferred to Retotas billiard hall where he was playing with Danilo and
Dominador Baldaba when he heard the gunshots. Yet, Aida attested that she was
watching accused-appellant playing billiards with a certain Zaldy when she heard
the gunshots. In sum, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of accused-appellant for the murder of Danilo in Criminal Case No. Q-01105875 and attempted murder of Babelito in Criminal Case No.Q-01-105877.
People of the Philippines v. Noel Adallom y Tunge, G.R. No. 182522, March 7,
2012.
Ombudsman; power to impose administrative penalties. The Ombudsman has
the power to directly impose administrative penalties, including removal from
office. The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or
employee, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The
challenge to the Ombudsmans power to impose these penalties, on the
allegation that the Constitution only grants it recommendatory powers, had
already been rejected by the Supreme Court in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals.
The conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in Ledesma is clear: the
Ombudsman has been statutorily granted the right to impose administrative
penalties on erring public officials. Office of the Ombudsman v. Nellie R.
Apolonio, G.R. No. 165132, March 7, 2012.
Petition for review; computation of period for filing petition for review. Petitioner
assailed, among others, the resolution issued by the Court of Appeals dismissing
his petition for review for being filed out of time. In this case, the original period
for filing the petition for review with the Court of Appeals was on May 19, 2007, a
Saturday. Petitioner filed a petition for extension of time to file a petition for review
on May 21, 2007, the next working day which followed the last day for filing which
fell on a Saturday. However, petitioner prayed in his petition for extension that he

be granted 15 days from May 21, 2007 or up to June 5, 2007 within which to file
his petition. He then filed his petition for review on June 5, 2007. Petitioners filing
with the Court of Appeals a petition for extension of time to file petition for review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court praying for an extended period of 15 days
from May 21, 2007, or until June 5, 2007, within which to file his petition
(reckoning the extension from May 21, 2007 [Monday] and not from May 19, 2007
[Saturday]) is in violation A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC dated February 29, 2000 (Re:
Computation of Time When the Last Day Falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a Legal
Holiday and a Motion for Extension on Next Working Day is Granted). Alfredo
Jaca Montajes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183449, March 12, 2012.
Petition for review; computation of period for filing petition for review. A.M. No.
00-2-14-SC [of the Supreme Court] provides, among others, that if the period to
file a pleading or a motion is extended ipso jure to the next working day
immediately following where the last day of the period is a Saturday, Sunday or a
legal holiday and a motion for extension of time is filed and granted, any
extension of time to file the required pleading or motion should be counted from
the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday,
Sunday or legal holiday. Petitioner here should have reckoned the 15-day
extension from May 19, 2007 and not from May 21, 2007. The Supreme Court
ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the petition for review was
filed out of time pursuant to A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC-that the 15-day extension
period prayed by petitioner should be tacked to the original period and
commences immediately after the expiration of such period. Thus, counting 15
days from the expiration of the period which was on May 19, 2007, the petition
filed on June 5, 2007 was already two days late. Alfredo Jaca Montajes v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183449, March 12, 2012.
Petition for review; computation of period for filing petition for review.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ruled that the circumstances obtaining in this
case merit the liberal application of the rule in the interest of justice and fair play.
Notably, the petition for review was already filed on June 5, 2007, which was long
before the Court of Appeals issued its resolution dated September 21, 2007
dismissing the petition for review for being filed out of time. There was no
showing that respondent suffered any material injury or his cause was prejudiced
by reason of such delay. The late filing of the petition for review for few days did
not warrant the automatic dismissal thereof where strong considerations of

substantial justice are manifest in the petition. In this case, the Supreme Court
relaxed the stringent application of technical rules in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction. Alfredo Jaca Montajes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183449,
March 12, 2012.
February 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Law and
Procedure
Posted on March 9, 2012 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo
Posted in
Criminal Law, Philippines - Cases Tagged alibi, appeal, conspiracy, dangerous
drugs, double jeopardy, estafa, evidence, falsification, hazing, illegal recruitment,
judgment, kidnapping, malversation, murder, Ombudsman, perjury, rape, robbery,
Sandiganbayan, treachery
Here are select February 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
criminal law and procedure:
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Conspiracy. The inconsistencies pointed out are inconsequential given the

presence of conspiracy between the appellant and Olaso in killing the victim.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The presence of conspiracy
may be inferred from the circumstances where all the accused acted in concert at
the time of the commission of the offense. Conspiracy is sufficiently established
when the concerted acts show the same purpose or common design and are
united in its execution. Moreover, when there is conspiracy, it is not important
who delivered the fatal blow since the act of one is considered the act of all. The
overt acts of the appellant and Olaso showing their conspiracy to kill the victim
are: (1) the appellant and Olaso flagged down the tricycle being driven by the
victim; (2) the appellant seated himself at the back of the drivers seat while
Olaso went inside the tricycle; (3) the appellant and Olaso simultaneously
assaulted the victim the appellant embracing the victim while Olaso stabbed
him; and (4) both men immediately fled the scene after the stabbing. The above
circumstances plainly show the common design and the unity of purpose
between the appellant and Olaso in executing their plan to kill the victim. People
of the Philippines v. Rolly Angelio, G.R. No. 197540, February 27, 2012.

Estafa; elements. The offense of estafa, in general, is committed either by (a)

abuse of confidence or (b) means of deceit. The acts constituting estafa
committed with abuse of confidence are enumerated in item (1) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended; item (2) of Article 315 enumerates estafa
committed by means of deceit. Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa by
abuse of confidence; the breach of confidence takes the place of fraud or deceit,
which is a usual element in the other estafa. In this case, the charge against the
petitioner and her subsequent conviction was for estafa committed by abuse of
confidence. Thus, it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove deceit as this
was not an element of the estafa that the petitioner was charged with. Carmina
G. Brokmann v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 199150, February 6, 2012.

Estafa; elements. For the successful prosecution of the crime of estafa, the
following elements must concur: (a) that the accused defrauded another by
abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.
In this case, the prosecutions evidence duly proved that due to the appellants
false representations of overseas jobs, the complainants paid placement fees to
the appellant who failed to secure the promised overseas jobs. People of the
Philippines v. Nestor Tuguinay, G.R. No. 186132, February 27, 2012.
Falsification of commercial documents; elements. The elements of the crime of
falsification of commercial documents as found in paragraph 1, Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code, are: 1) the offender is a private individual or a public officer
or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; 2) the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171; and 3) the
falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.
Applying this to the present case, all three elements are undeniably present (i)
Chua is a private individual; (ii) he used fictitious inward foreign remittance
advice of credit to cause the funnelling or transfer of the two named bank clients
payments into his own account, squarely falling under paragraph 2 of Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code; and (iii) the falsification was committed in two
commercial documents, namely, inward foreign remittance advice of credit and
the debit tickets. Undoubtedly, Chuas subsequent conviction to a lesser crime
of falsification of commercial documents was not unfounded. Richard Chua v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183132, February 8, 2012.

Hazing; lack of malicious intent to injure. In order to be found guilty of any of the
felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the
employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that
is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises
from the mental state of the wrongdoer iniuria ex affect facientis consistat. If
there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional
felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there
must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against
the physical integrity or well-being of a person so as to incapacitate and deprive
the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se
merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony.
The commission of the act does not in itself make a man guilty unless his
intentions are. Artemio Villareal v. People of the Philippines/People of the
Philippines v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al/Fidelito Dizon v. People of
the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa v. Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al, G.R. No.
151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 & G.R. No.
178080, February 1, 2012.
Hazing; reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The absence of malicious
intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity
members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also
punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to
Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. Reckless imprudence or negligence
consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an immediate
personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable
lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this
case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. Artemio
Villareal v. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines v. The Honorable
Court of Appeals, et al/Fidelito Dizon v. People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa
v. Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al, G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No.
155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 and G.R. No. 178080, February 1, 2012.
Hazing; reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. There was patent
recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa. The multiple hematomas or bruises

found in Lenny Villas arms and thighs, resulting from repeated blows to those
areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his eventual
death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities
performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the coneophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on;
and hit with different objects on their arms, legs, and thighs. They were also
paddled at the back of their thighs or legs. There is also evidence to show that
some of the accused fraternity members were drinking during the initiation rites.
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to
recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must
be remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to
cause them injury in the process. With the foregoing facts, we rule that the
accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the
victims death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal
responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed to
the infliction of physical injuries. Artemio Villareal v. People of the
Philippines/People of the Philippines v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et
al/FidelitonDizon v. People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa v. Manuel Lorenzo
Escalona II, et al, G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R. Nos.
178057 and G.R. No. 178080, February 1, 2012.
Kidnapping; elements. For the successful prosecution of the crime of kidnapping
under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution must
prove the concurrence of the following elements, to wit: (1) the offender is a
private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner
deprives the latter of his or her liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is
illegal; and (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public
officer. In this case, the prosecution has adequately and satisfactorily proved the
existence of the foregoing elements based on the following findings: (a) that the
appellant is a private individual; (b) that the appellant took Regelyn from Pier 14
to Pier 16 without the knowledge or consent of Regelyns parents; and (c) that the
appellant admitted Regelyns minority and even referred to her as a child.
People of the Philippines v. Marites Valerio y Traje, G.R. No. 186123, February
27, 2012.
Kidnapping for ransom; application of penalty. Since the prosecution adduced
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused conspired to kidnap the victims

for ransom, and kidnapped and illegally detained them until they were released
by the accused after the latter received the P2,000,000.00 ransom, the
imposable penalty is death as provided for in the second paragraph of Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code. The aggravating circumstance of using a motorized
vehicle and motorized watercrafts, while alleged and proven, cannot affect the
imposable penalty because Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code states that in all
cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty (like reclusion
perpetua and death), it shall be applied regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
The Court of Appeals correctly reduced the appellants sentence from death
penalty to reclusion perpetua considering the passage of RA 9346, prohibiting
the imposition of the death penalty. To this, the Supreme Court added that the
appellant shall not be eligible for parole. Under Section 3 of RA 9346, [p]ersons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will
be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
as amended. People of the Philippines v. Yusop Tadah, G.R. No. 186226,
February 1, 2012.
Malversation of public funds. To sustain a criminal conviction for the crime of
malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, all the following elements must be present: (a) that the offender is a
public officer; (b) that he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of
the duties of his office; (c) that those funds or property were public funds or
property for which he was accountable; and (d) that he appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them. Celso M. Manuel, et al vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan
(4th Div.), et al/Melchor M. Mallare, et al v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
158413 and G.R. No. 161133, February 8, 2012.
Malversation; application of penalty. The penalty of imprisonment prescribed for
malversation when the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Such penalty is not
composed of three periods. Pursuant to Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code,
when the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the court
shall apply the rules contained in the articles of the Revised Penal Code
preceding Article 65, dividing into three equal portions of time included in the

penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each of the three portions.
Accordingly, reclusion perpetua being indivisible, is at once the maximum period,
while reclusion temporal in its maximum period is divided into two to determine
the medium and minimum periods of the penalty. Conformably with Article 65,
therefore, the periods of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua are the following: (a) Minimum period 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day
to 18 years, 8 months; (b) Medium period 18 years, 8 months, and 1 day to 20
years; (c) Maximum period Reclusion perpetua. Since there is no findings with
respect to modifying circumstances, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence
should be taken from the medium period of the penalty, i.e., from 18 years, 8
months, and 1 day to 20 years. Zacaria A. Candao, et al v. People of the
Philippines and Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 186659-710, February 1, 2012.
Murder; application of penalty. The crime of murder qualified by treachery is
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with
reclusion perpetua to death. For the death of Eulogio, the appellant is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua only, since there were no aggravating
or mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime. On the
other hand, for frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 125678, the correct
penalty is reclusion temporal. Under Article 61, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty for frustrated murder is one degree lower than reclusion
perpetua to death, which is reclusion temporal. Reclusion temporal has a range
of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should
be taken from the medium of reclusion temporal, since no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the crime. The minimum of
the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of prision mayor
which is one degree lower than reclusion temporal. The imposed indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, was proper. People of the Philippines v. Antonio Baldomar y Liscano,
G.R. No. 197043, February 29, 2012.
Murder; treachery. Murder is the unlawful killing by the accused of a person,
which is not parricide or infanticide, committed with any of the attendant
circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, among
which is treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the

crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution

thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the victim might make. The essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate,
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape. Here, there is no doubt that treachery was
present. Benny and Adriano were in the crime scene prior to the incident. They
hid in a dark portion of the road and assaulted Jesus with their bolos while he
was urinating with his back to them. They even held him by his shoulders to
render him defenseless and unable to resist the attack on him by his assailants.
Jesus was unaware of the imminent peril to his life and was rendered incapable
of defending himself. From the suddenness of the attack upon Jesus and the
manner it was committed, there is no doubt that treachery indeed attended his
killing. People of the Philippines v. Benny Cabtalan, G.R. No. 175980, February
15, 2012.
Perjury; venue of action. The MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against
Forum Shopping was subscribed) is the proper venue and the proper court to
take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners, and not MetC-Pasay
City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used).
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. Section 10 and
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the
court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential
ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are
deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was
committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. The first element of the crime of perjury, the
execution of the subject Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the
Information to have been committed in Makati City. The Supreme Court also
found that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also
sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second
and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be
under oath before a notary public were also sufficiently alleged in the Information
to have been made in Makati City. Union Bank of the Philippines and Desi Tomas
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012.

Rape; damages. The Supreme Court adopts the penalties imposed by the Court
of Appeals upon accused-appellant but modifies the damages awarded to AAA.
With the enactment of RA 9346, accused-appellant was properly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole for each of the four (4)
counts of qualified rape for which he is hereby convicted. In line with current
jurisprudence, however, accused-appellant is liable to pay AAA for each of the
four (4) counts of qualified rape the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, another Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as moral damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages. Exemplary damages should be awarded in order to deter
fathers with perverse tendencies and aberrant sexual behavior from preying upon
their young daughters. People of the Philippines v. Paterno Sarmiento Samandre,
G.R. No. 181497, February 22, 2012.
Rape; delay in filing charges. Appellant asserts that AAAs testimony is not
credible considering that she could have immediately shouted for help if, indeed,
appellant fled after he was hit by a piece of wood. Instead, she waited for several
days before filing the complaint. The credibility of a witness, however, is not
impaired if the delay in making a criminal accusation has been satisfactory
explained. Here, the delay is understandable. AAA was afraid of appellants
threats. Since individuals react differently to emotional stress, no standard form
of behavior can be expected of them after they have been raped. People of the
Philippines v. Diosdado Tubat y Versoza, G.R. No. 183093, February 1, 2012.
Rape; physical resistance. The Supreme Court was convinced that AAA was not
able to fight back not only because appellant was strong but because a knife was
poked on her neck. He also threatened to kill her children. These also explained
why she did not shout for help. As held in People v. Fernandez: Physical
resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are
employed, and the victim submits herself to her attackers because of fear. xxx
The use of a weapon, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or at least
intimidation, and threatening the victim with a gun is sufficient to bring her into
submission. Thus, the law does not impose upon the private complainant the
burden of proving resistance. People of the Philippines v. Diosdado Tubat y
Versoza, G.R. No. 183093, February 1, 2012.

Rape with deadly weapon.Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,
whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by
two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. The
prosecution was able to sufficiently allege in the Information, and establish during
trial, that a gun was used in the commission of rape. Since no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance was established in the commission of the crime, the
lesser penalty shall be imposed. The penalty of reclusion perpetua meted by the
courts below is affirmed. Arnel Sison y Escuadro v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 187229, February 22, 2012.
Robbery with homicide; penalty. The special complex crime of robbery with
homicide is penalized, under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code, with reclusion perpetua to death. In this case, since the aggravating
circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm had been alleged and proven
during trial, the lower court correctly sentenced the appellant to suffer the death
penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. However,
the Supreme Court did not impose the death penalty in view of RA 9346, entitled
An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. Pursuant
to RA 9346, the Supreme Court affirmed CAs reduction of the penalty from death
to reclusion perpetua for each count, with the modification that the appellant shall
not be eligible for parole. People of the Philippines v. Teofilo Rey Buyagan, G.R.
No. 187733, February 8, 2012.
Statutory rape; elements. For the charge of statutory rape to prosper, the
prosecution must prove that: (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the
woman; and, (2) that such woman is under twelve (12) years of age. In this case,
statements relating to the elements of rape, such as carnal knowledge and the
age of the victim were adequately proved by the prosecution. The Supreme
Court considers that at the time of the occurrence of the first incident of rape,
AAA was only 8 years old. People of the Philippines v. Eduardo N. Navarette Jr.,
G.R. No. 191365, February 22, 2012.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Dangerous Drugs; alibi and frame-up. Alibi and frame up are weak forms of
defense usually resorted to in drug-related cases. The Supreme Court is careful
in appreciating them and giving them probable value because this type of

defense is easy to concoct. Also, the Supreme Court does realize the disastrous
consequences on the enforcement of law and order, not to mention the well-being
of society, if the courts, solely on the basis of the police officers alleged rotten
reputation, accept in every instance this form of defense which can be so easily
fabricated. It is precisely for this reason that the legal presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed exists. Bare denial cannot prevail over the
positive identification by SPO4 Taruc of Arriola as the one who sold them the
shabu. For the defenses position to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have
performed their duties in a regular and proper manner. This, unfortunately, Arriola
failed to supply. What she made was a bare allegation of frame-up without
presenting any credible witness that would support her claim. Furthermore, she
failed to show any motive on the part of the arresting officers to implicate her in a
crime she claimed she did not commit. People of the Philippines v. Flordeliza
Arriola y De Lara, G.R. No. 187736, February 8, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale; elements. To secure a conviction for illegal
sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (a) the
identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration;
and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing. What is
material in prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu is the proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti as evidence. In this case, the requisites for illegal sale of shabu were
competently and convincingly proven by the Prosecution. PO2 Tayag, as the
poseur-buyer, attested that Bautista sold shabu to him during a legitimate buybust operation. According to Forensic Chemist Arturo, the substance subject of
the transaction, which weighed 0.05 gram, was examined and found to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. PO2 Caragdag
declared that he recovered the buy-bust money from Bautistas hand right after
the sale. Further, the Prosecution later presented as evidence both the sachet of
shabu subject of the sale and the buy-bust money used in the buy-bust operation.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the accused. People of the
Philippines v. Cesar Bautista y Santos, G.R. No. 177320, February 22, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal possession; elements. For illegal possession of a
dangerous drug, like shabu, the elements are: (a) the accused is in possession of
an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such

possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug. The elements of illegal possession of a dangerous drug
were similarly competently and convincingly established by the Prosecution.
SPO1 Ybaez stated that upon seeing the pre-arranged signal given by PO2
Tayag, he and the other members of the team proceeded to arrest Bautista; and
that he frisked Bautista and then recovered six other plastic sachets from
Bautistas pocket. Undoubtedly, the frisking was legally authorized as a search
incidental to the lawful arrest of Bautista for evidence in the commission of illegal
drug pushing. People of the Philippines v. Cesar Bautista y Santos, G.R. No.
177320, February 22, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale; elements. Jurisprudence holds that the
elements of the crime of illegal sale of drugs are the following: (1) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and payment therefor. The testimonies of Romano, corroborated by
his fellow NBI investigators Jimenez and Dizon and informant Cedeo
established the sale and delivery by accused-appellant Clarite to Romano of
what was initially believed to be 50 grams of shabu in four plastic sachets, in
exchange for what Clarite thought was P50,000.00. Romano positively identified
accused-appellant Clarite as the person who sold the plastic sachets of shabu to
him. It was likewise clear from the evidence on record that P/Insp. Clemen
examined the contents of the plastic sachets sold to Romano, and confirmed that
they contained methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), even though the total
weight was only 45.8712 grams. P/Insp. Clemen was also able to verify that both
hands of accused-appellant were positive for the presence of bright orange
ultraviolet fluorescent powder, thus, corroborating the testimonies of the NBI
investigators that he received the counterfeit money which were dusted with such
powder. This also belies the testimony of accused-appellant that he never held
the marked money. Thus, the accused-appellants conviction under RA 9165 is
affirmed. People of the Philippines v. Arnel Clarite y Salazar, G.R. No. 187157,
February 15, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs Act; sale of illegal drugs; elements.The essential elements to
be established in the prosecution of illegal sale of marijuana are as follows: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,

coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. In this
case, the evidence on record showed the presence of all the above elements.
The witnesses for the prosecution successfully proved that a buy-bust operation
took place and the block of marijuana subject of the sale was brought to, and
duly identified in court. PO3 Garcia, the poseur-buyer, positively identified the
appellants as the persons who sold to him one block of marijuana dried leaves
wrapped in a newspaper in exchange for the sum of P1,000.00. PO3 Garcias
testimony was corroborated on material points by his team leader, SPO3 De
Guzman, SPO3 Galliguez, and SPO2 Natividad. PNP Forensic Chemist Police
Supt. Theresa Ann Cid examined the items seized and found them to be positive
for marijuana. People of the Philippines v. Teofilo Honrado and Romulo Honrado,
G.R. No. 182197, February 27, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs Act; sale of illegal drugs; elements. It was held in People v.
Hernandez that the following essential elements must be established in order to
secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment thereof. People v. Naquita states that what is
material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti. The above elements have been sufficiently established
by the prosecution. PO2 Memoracion was the poseur-buyer and he identified the
accused-appellant as the seller. The object of the sale was the sachet containing
eight centigrams (0.08 grams) of shabu, which bore the marking RAM-1, and
the consideration paid by the poseur-buyer therefor consisted of the P200
marked money. PO2 Memoracion also categorically stated that the object of the
sale was in fact handed to him by the accused-appellant after he gave her the
marked money. People of the Philippines v. Rosemarie Magundayao y Alejandro
alias Rose, G.R. No. 188132, February 29, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody. The Supreme Court has, in many cases,
held that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is not,
as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. The most
important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Hence, the prosecutions failure to submit in evidence the physical
inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under Article 21 of RA

9165, will not render Mendozas arrest illegal or the items seized from her
inadmissible. Here, it was shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drugs had been preserved. The plastic sachet containing shabu was
marked, kept, and delivered to the forensic chemist by the same officer who
received it from Mendoza. Ching, the poseur-buyer, marked the plastic sachet he
bought from Mendoza with SOG-1 after the buy-bust team arrested her.
Thereafter, the marked plastic sachet, together with the laboratory request, was
delivered by Ching himself to Macapagal for examination.
Macapagals
Chemistry Report showed that she received a plastic sachet marked SOG-1 for
examination at around 3:20 p.m. After she completed her examination at 5:20
p.m., she placed the same marked plastic sachet in a small brown envelope,
which she in turn dated, signed, and sealed with a staple wire. It is therefore
clear, that the prosecution was able to account for each link in the chain of
custody over the shabu, from the moment it was seized from Mendoza, up to the
time it was presented during the trial as proof of the corpus delicti. People of the
Philippines v. Emily Mendoza y Sartin, G.R. No. 189327, February 29, 2012.
Illegal recruitment; elements. The appellant is guilty of large scale illegal
recruitment. The essential elements of large scale illegal recruitment are: a) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers; b) the offender undertakes any
of the activities within the meaning of recruitment and placement under Article
13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of RA 8042); and c) the offender
committed the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group,
are present in this case. The prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the appellant enlisted the three (3) complainants for overseas
employment without any license to do so. People of the Philippines v. Mariavic
Espenilla y Mercado, G.R. No. 193667, February 29, 2012.
3.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Double jeopardy; gross negligence of special prosecutor. Gross negligence exists

where there is want or absence of, or failure to exercise slight care or diligence,
or the entire absence of care.
It involves a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Petitioner State failed to
clearly establish the gross negligence on the part of the special prosecutor (or to

show or even allege that there was collusion in the principal case between the
special prosecutor and the respondents) that resulted in depriving the petitioner
of its due process rights; and, consequently prevent the application of the rule on
double jeopardy. If at all, what the records emphasized, as previously discussed,
is the weakness of the prosecutions evidence as a whole rather than the gross
negligence of the special prosecutor. The petitioners position is therefore
rejected. People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division),
Imelda R. Marcos, Jose Conrado Benitez and Gilbert C. Dulay, G.R. No. 15330405, February 7, 2012.
Evidence; circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The
circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair
conclusion: the accused committed the crime to the exclusion of all others. In this
case, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction made by the RTC based on its
findings that the accused was responsible for the murder of the Alolod couple
based on circumstantial evidence. People of the Philippines v. Maritess Alolod,
Efren Deocampo, Elmer Deocampo and Edwin Deocampo, G.R. No. 185212,
February 15, 2012.
Evidence; credibility of witness. The Supreme Court is guided by the following
jurisprudence when confronted with the issue of credibility of witnesses on
appeal: First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTCs evaluation of the
testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing
the demeanor of a witness on the stand. Second, absent any substantial reason
which would justify the reversal of the RTCs assessments and conclusions, the
reviewing court is generally bound by the lower courts findings, particularly when
no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are
shown to have been overlooked or disregarded. Third, the rule is even more
stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC. In this case, both the RTC
and the CA found AAA and her testimony credible. The Supreme Courts own
independent examination of the records leads us to arrive at the same
conclusion. AAAs testimony relating to the identity of the appellant as the
perpetrator was firm and categorical. Her testimony on the details of the rape
which established all its elements namely, the carnal knowledge, the force and

intimidation employed by the appellant, and AAAs young age was clear and
unequivocal. AAAs credibility is further strengthened by her clear lack of illmotive to falsify. People of the Philippines v. Julieto Sanchez, G.R. No. 197815,
February 8, 2012.
Evidence; dying declaration.
A dying declaration, although generally
inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be
admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration
must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death;
(b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a
consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a
witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide,
murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. In this case, the Supreme
Court ruled that all the above requisites were met. Bolanon communicated his
ante-mortem statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who had
stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his
impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to
Estao, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed
in the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred
under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that
the declarants belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the
declarants own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature
of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his
physician. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the
declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this
criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim. People of the
Philippines v. Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello, G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012.
Judgment; appeal of judgment of acquittal. Only judgments of conviction can be
reviewed in an ordinary appeal or a Rule 45 petition. As explained by the
Supreme Court in People v. Nazareno, the constitutional right of the accused
against double jeopardy proscribes appeals of judgments of acquittal through the
remedies of ordinary appeal and a Rule 45 petition. However, the rule against
double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65 petition, predicated on
two (2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of acquittal rendered with
grave abuse of discretion by the court; and where the prosecution had been
deprived of due process. The rule against double jeopardy does not apply in

these instances because a Rule 65 petition does not involve a review of facts and
law on the merits in the manner done in an appeal. In certiorari proceedings,
judicial review does not examine and assess the evidence of the parties nor
weigh the probative value of the evidence. It does not include an inquiry on the
correctness of the evaluation of the evidence. A review under Rule 65 only asks
the question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not the
question of whether the decision is legally correct. In other words, the focus of the
review is to determine whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional
grounds. Arnold James M. Ysidoro v. Hon. Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, et al,
G.R. No. 171513, February 6, 2012.
Judgment; appeal of judgment of acquittal. Applying these legal concepts to this
case, the Supreme Court found that, while the People was procedurally correct in
filing its petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the petition does not raise any
jurisdictional error committed by the Sandiganbayan. On the contrary, what is
clear is the obvious attempt by the People to have the evidence in the case
reviewed by the Court under the guise of a Rule 65 petition. This much can be
deduced by examining the petition itself which does not allege any bias, partiality
or bad faith committed by the Sandiganbayan in its proceedings. The petition
does not also raise any denial of the Peoples due process in the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan. It was also observed by the Supreme Court that the
grounds relied in the petition relate to factual errors of judgment which are more
appropriate in an ordinary appeal rather than in a Rule 65 petition. The grounds
cited in the petition call for the Courts own appreciation of the factual findings of
the Sandiganbayan on the sufficiency of the Peoples evidence in proving the
element of bad faith, and the sufficiency of the evidence denying productivity
bonus to Doller. Arnold James M. Ysidoro v. Hon. Teresita J. Leonardo-de
Castro, et al, G.R. No. 171513, February 6, 2012.
Ombudsman; findings of fact. Elementary is the rule that the findings of fact of
the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence and are
accorded due respect and weight, especially when they are affirmed by the CA. It
is only when there is grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman that a review
of factual findings may aptly be made. In reviewing administrative decisions, it is
beyond the province of the Supreme Court to weigh the conflicting evidence,
determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that
of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. It is not

the function of the Supreme Court to analyze and weigh the parties evidence all
over again except when there is serious ground to believe that a possible
miscarriage of justice would thereby result. Valiente C. Villegas v. Hon. Victor C.
Fernandez, et al, G.R. No. 184851, February 15, 2012.
Sandiganbayan; exercise of discretion in the interest of justice. The
Sandiganbayan, in the exercise of its sound discretion, may require or allow the
prosecution to present additional evidence (at its own initiative or upon a motion)
after a demurrer to evidence is filed. This exercise, however, must be for good
reasons and in the paramount interest of justice. The court may require the
presentation of further evidence if its action on the demurrer to evidence would
patently result in the denial of due process; it may also allow the presentation of
additional evidence if it is newly discovered, if it was omitted through
inadvertence or mistake, or if it is intended to correct the evidence previously
offered. In this case, Sandiganbayan is not guilty of grave abuse of discretion
when it exercised restraint and did not require the presentation of additional
evidence, given the clear weakness of the case at that point. Under the obtaining
circumstances, the petitioner failed to show what and how additional available
evidence could have helped and the paramount interest of justice sought to be
achieved. It does not appear that pieces of evidence had been omitted through
inadvertence or mistake, or that these pieces of evidence are intended to correct
evidence previously offered. More importantly, it does not appear that these
contemplated additional pieces of evidence (which the special prosecutor
allegedly should have presented) were ever present and available. People of the
Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), Imelda R. Marcos, Jose
Conrado Benitez and Gilbert C. Dulay, G.R. No. 153304-05, February 7, 2012.
January 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Law and
Procedure
Posted on February 10, 2012 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo Posted in
Criminal Law Tagged bp 22, conspiracy, dangerous drugs, estafa, evidence,
fencing, information, judgment, jurisdiction, murder, Ombudsman, probable
cause, self defense, theft
Here are selected January 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on criminal law and procedure:

1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Estafa; probable cause. East Asia acted as dealer of commercial papers and
custodian of the same on Zamoras behalf. This is clear from the terms of its sale
invoice and custodian receipt. East Asia acquired the commercial papers in trust
and was obliged to deliver them and their proceeds to Zamora, failing which, its
responsible officers could be prosecuted for estafa. However, there was no
probable cause to charge the respondents with estafa. Zamora failed to identify
the particular officers of East Asia who were responsible for the misappropriation
or conversion of her funds. She simply assumed that since she had been
communicating with them in connection with her investments, they all had a part
in misappropriating her money or converting them to their use. Many of them
were evidently mere employees doing work for East Asia. She did not submit
proof of their specific criminal role in the transactions she assailed. It is settled
that only corporate officers who actually had part in the crime may be held liable
for it. Virginia A. Zamora v. Jose Armado L. Eduque, et al, G.R. No. 174005,
January 25, 2012.
Estafa through falsification; presumption of authorship. Metrobank urges the
application of the presumption of authorship against Tobias based on his having
offered the duplicate copy of the spurious title to secure the loan, and posits that
there is no requirement that the presumption shall apply only when there is
absence of a valid explanation from the person found to have possessed, used
and benefited from the forged document. Metrobanks theory was not sustained
here. First, a presumption affects the burden of proof that is normally lodged in
the State. The effect is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the
prima facie case that shall prevail in the absence of proof to the contrary. As
such, a presumption of law is material during the actual trial of the criminal case
where in the establishment thereof the party against whom the inference is made
should adduce evidence to rebut the presumption and demolish the prima facie
case. This is not so in a preliminary investigation, where the investigating
prosecutor only determines the existence of a prima facie case that warrants the
prosecution of a criminal case in court. Second, the presumption of authorship,
being disputable, may be accepted and acted upon where no evidence upholds
the contention for which it stands. It is not correct to say, consequently, that the
investigating prosecutor will try to determine the existence of the presumption
during preliminary investigation, and then to disregard the evidence offered by

the respondent. Moreover, the presumption that whoever possesses or uses a

spurious document is its forger applies only in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank), represented by
Rosella A. Santiago v. Antonio O. Tobias III, G.R. No. 177780, January 25, 2012.

Murder; conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit the
felony. Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct
because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts. Here, conspiracy
between the accused can be inferred from the mode and manner in which they
perpetrated the killings. PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal responsibility for
the fatal shooting by Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused were
convincingly shown to have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of
assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was
manifest not only from their going together to the betting station on board a single
motorcycle, but also from their joint attack that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing
successive shots at Moises and immediately followed by Edwins shooting of
Ferdinand and Joselito one after the other. It was also significant that they fled
together on board the same motorcycle as soon as they had achieved their
common purpose. To be a conspirator, one need not have to participate in every
detail of the execution; neither did he have to know the exact part performed by
his co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts. Accordingly, the existence
of the conspiracy between PO2 Valdez and Edwin was properly inferred and
proved through their acts that were indicative of their common purpose and
community of interest. People of the Philippines v. PO2 Eduardo Valdez and
Edwin Valdez, G.R. No. 175602, January 18, 2012.
Murder; conspiracy and abuse of superior strength. Conspiracy exists when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is either express or implied. Thus, the State
does not always have to prove the actual agreement to commit the crime in order
to establish conspiracy, for it is enough to show that the accused acted in concert
to achieve a common purpose. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and
manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint
purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest. Where the acts of the

accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common

design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is
evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals. Abuse of superior
strength is an aggravating circumstance that qualifies the killing of a person to
murder. It is present if the accused purposely uses excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked, or if there is
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and aggressor, and the latter
takes advantage of superior strength. Superiority in strength may refer to the
number of aggressors and weapons used. People of the Philippines v. Melanio
Del Castillo y Vargas, et al, G.R. No. 169084, January 18, 2012.
Murder; conspiracy and abuse of superior strength. The existence of conspiracy
and abuse of superior strength were appreciated in this case. The accused,
armed with bolos, surrounded and attacked the victims, and pursued whoever of
the latter attempted to escape from their assault. Thereafter, the accused, except
Hermogenes, fled their homes and together hastily proceeded to Antipolo, Rizal.
Their individual and collective acts prior to, during and following the attack on the
victims reflected a common objective of killing the latter. Thereby, all the accused,
without exception, were co-conspirators. A gross disparity of forces existed
between the accused and the victims. Not only did the six accused outnumber
the three victims but the former were armed with bolos while the latter were
unarmed. The accused clearly used their superiority in number and arms to
ensure the killing of the victims. Abuse of superior strength is attendant if the
accused took advantage of their superiority in number and their being armed with
bolos. Accordingly, the crimes committed were three counts of murder. People of
the Philippines v. Melanio Del Castillo y Vargas, et al, G.R. No. 169084, January
18, 2012.
Murder; elements. To be convicted of murder, the following must concur: (1) a
person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any
of the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (4) the killing does not constitute parricide or infanticide. People of the
Philippines v. Eduardo Dollendo, et al, Nestor Medice, appellant, G.R. No.
181701, January 18, 2012.
Quasi delict; vicarious liability. Orix cannot point fingers at the alleged real owner
to exculpate itself from vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the Fuso by reason
of a contract of sale, it is nevertheless primarily liable for the damages or injury
the truck registered under it have caused. Besides, the registered owners have a
right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that they may be
required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff, which Orix
rightfully acknowledged by filing a third-party complaint against the owner of the
Fuso, Manuel. Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation (Formerly
Consolidated Orix Leasing and Finance) v. Minors: Dennis, Mylene, Melanie and
Marikris, All surnamed Mangalinao y Dizon, et al, Sonny Li and Antonio Delos
Santos v. Minors: Dennis, Mylene, Melanie and Marikris, All Surnamed
Mangalinao Y Dizon, et al, G.R. Nos. 174089, January 25, 2012.
Self-defense; burden of proof. In the instant case, in invoking self-defense,
Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is
basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his
infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would
avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of
the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying
circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally
liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. In
this case, Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals
that, one,Olais did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two,
Fontanillas act of hitting the victims head with a stone, causing the mortal injury,
was not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable response to the victims
fistic attack and kicks. People of the Philippines v. Alfonso Fontanilla y Obaldo,
G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012.
Self-defense; elements. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, the accused
had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the
indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to
the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the

justifying circumstance of self-defense. People of the Philippines v. Alfonso

Fontanilla y Obaldo, G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012.
Self-defense; unlawful aggression. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no
justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful
aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim
put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the
peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must
establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a)
there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault
must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be
unlawful. People of the Philippines v. Alfonso Fontanilla y Obaldo, G.R. No.
177743, January 25, 2012.
Theft; elements. The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that there be taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done
with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. Theft becomes qualified when the
theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence. Here, the prosecution was
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of P797,187.85 taken
does not belong to petitioner but to VCCI and that petitioner took it without VCCIs
consent and with grave abuse of confidence by taking advantage of her position
as accountant and bookkeeper. The prosecutions evidence proved that petitioner
was entrusted with checks payable to VCCI or Viva by virtue of her position as
accountant and bookkeeper. She deposited the said checks to the joint account
maintained by VCCI and Jefferson Tan, then withdrew a total of P797,187.85
from said joint account using the pre-signed checks, with her as the payee. In
other words, the bank account was merely the instrument through which
petitioner stole from her employer VCCI. The conviction of petitioner Anita L.
Miranda for the crime of qualified theft is affirmed. Anita L. Miranda v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 176298, January 25, 2012.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

BP 22; gravamen of offense. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is

the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to
pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions,
the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The
law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order. Edgardo Medalla v. Resurreccion D. Laxa, G.R. No. 193362,
January 18, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; burden of proof. In the prosecution of possession of illegal
drugs, the prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the
existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his control and dominion
and the character of the drugs. With the prosecutions failure to prove that the
nipa hut was under petitioners control and dominion, there casts a reasonable
doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the
laws own starting perspective on the status of the accused in all criminal
prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that
quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and
satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Ruben Castillo @ Boy
Castillo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; buy-bust; prior surveillance. Prior surveillance not a necessity
for the validity of the buy-bust operation. In People v. Padua, the Supreme Court
ruled that a prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an
entrapment or buy-bust operation, the conduct of which has no rigid or textbook
method. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. For as long as the rights of the
accused have not been violated in the process, the courts will not pass on the
wisdom thereof. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and
dispense with the need for prior surveillance. People of the Philippines v. Marcos
Sabadlab y Narciso @ Bong Pango, G.R. No. 186392, January 18, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; chain of custody. A review of the records establishes that the
procedure laid down by RA 9165 and its IRR was not followed in this case.

Several lapses on the part of the buy-bust team are readily apparent. To start
with, no photograph of the seized shabu was taken. Secondly, the buy-bust team
did not immediately mark the seized shabu at the scene of the crime and in the
presence of Relato and witnesses. Thirdly, although there was testimony about
the marking of the seized items being made at the police station, the records do
not show that the marking was done in the presence of Relato or his chosen
representative. And, fourthly, no representative of the media and the Department
of Justice, or any elected official attended the taking of the physical inventory and
to sign the inventory. The marking immediately after seizure is the starting point
in the custodial link, because succeeding handlers of the prohibited drugs or
related items will use the markings as reference. It further serves to segregate
the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar and related evidence
from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the
end of the criminal proceedings, obviating switching, planting, or contamination
of evidence. It is crucial in ensuring the integrity of the chain of custody. People of
the Philippines v. Darwin Relato y Ajero, G.R. No. 173794, January 18, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; chain of custody. Chain of Custody is defined in Section 1(b)
of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002: Chain of Custody
means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such
record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date
and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping
and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. The procedural lapses
committed by the buy-bust team underscored the uncertainty about the identity
and integrity of the shabu admitted in evidence against the accused. They
highlighted the failure of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody, by
which the incriminating evidence would have been authenticated. An unavoidable
consequence of the non-establishment of the chain of custody was the serious
doubt on whether the shabu presented as evidence was really the shabu
supposedly seized from Relato. People of the Philippines v. Darwin Relato y
Ajero, G.R. No. 173794, January 18, 2012.

Dangerous Drugs Act; conspiracy to commit possession of dangerous drugs. The

crime of conspiracy to commit possession of dangerous drugs does not exist.
Simply put, the circumstance of conspiracy is not appreciated in the crime of
possession of dangerous drugs under Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165. The fact that
the information for violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 that was filed against
the petitioner and Saunar alleged that they conspired and helped each other is
immaterial since conspiracy is not appreciated in the crime of possession of
dangerous drugs. Reynaldo Posiquit v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
193943, January 16, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; illegal possession of drugs; elements. In every prosecution for
the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the
person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the
accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug. Ruben Castillo @
Boy Castillo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012.
Dangerous Drugs; intent to possess. In a prosecution for possession of illegal
substances, proof of animus possidendi on the part of the accused is
indispensable. But animus possidendi is a state of mind, and is thus to be
determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior and
contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.
It may and must be inferred usually from the attendant events in each particular
case. Upon the States presenting to the trial court of the facts and circumstances
from which to infer the existence of animus possidendi, it becomes incumbent
upon the Defense to rebut the inference with evidence that the accused did not
exercise power and control of the illicit thing in question, and did not intend to do
so. For that purpose, a mere unfounded assertion of the accused that he did not
know that he had possession of the illegal drug is insufficient, and animus
possidendi is then presumed to exist on his part because he was thereby shown
to have performed an act that the law prohibited and punished. People of the
Philippines v. Geron Delos Santos y Maristela, G.R. No. 170839, January 18,
2012.
Dangerous Drugs; intent to possess. It cannot be disputed that Delos Santos
had animus possidendi. His conduct prior to and following his apprehension
evinced his guilty knowledge of the contents of the gift-wrapped box as shabu.

His uncorroborated story of having been summoned to help in the cleaning of

Unit 706 was a sham excuse that he peddled to explain his presence in the
Somerset Condominium. His explanation was useless, however, because he was
no longer employed as a janitor of the Somerset Condominium at the time of his
arrest after being already terminated from employment. Correlatively, his
willingness to run for Wilson the errand of delivering the gift-wrapped box to the
unnamed person near the Jollibee Vito Cruz extension branch proved that he
was serving as a courier of shabu. Besides, his guilty knowledge was confirmed
by his unreasonable refusal to exit from Unit 706 despite the demand of the NBI
agents to do so, and by his stealthy transfer to the adjoining Unit 705. Had he
been truly innocent, he would have voluntarily cooperated with the NBI agents
instead of attempting to escape from them. People of the Philippines v. Geron
Delos Santos y Maristela, G.R. No. 170839, January 18, 2012.
Fencing; elements.The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been
committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that robbery or
theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing was derived
from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for
another. Here, someone carnapped Mantequillas Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998.
Two years later in December 2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for P850,000.00.
Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought from Tolentino was not properly
documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration
and official receipt. But this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle
having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino
was unable to make good on his promise to produce new documents
undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit
source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no
effort to check the papers covering her purchase. Hence, the decision of the
Court of Appeals finding Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law is
affirmed. Mel Dimat v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181184, January 25,
2012.
Ombudsman; power to impose penalties. The power of the Ombudsman to
determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but
actually mandatory. The Ombudsmans power to impose the penalty of removal,

suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or

employee found to be at fault in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary
authority is well founded in the Constitution and RA 6770, otherwise known as
The Ombudsman Act of 1989. Gemma P. Cabalit v. COA-Region VII/Filadelfo S.
Apit v. COA, Legal and Adjudication, Region VII/Leonardo G. Olaivar, et al, v.
Hon. Primo C. Miro, et al, G.R. Nos. 180326/180341/180342, January 17, 2012.
Sandiganbayan; jurisdiction. Petitioners maintain that the jurisdictional facts
necessary to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter in CC No. 0033-A have
yet to be established. Petitioners claim that the Republic failed to prove the illgotten nature of the sequestered coconut farmers UCPB shares. Accordingly,
the controversy is removed from the subject matter jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and necessarily any decision rendered on the merits, such as
PSJ-A and PSJ-F, is void. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the subdivided amended complaints. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by law. The question on whether a given suit comes within the
pale of a statutory conferment is determined by the allegations in the complaint
regardless of whether or not the plaintiff will be entitled at the end to recover upon
all or some of the claims asserted therein. Judging from the allegations of the
defendants illegal acts thereat made, it is fairly obvious that both CC Nos. 0033A and CC 0033-F partake, in the context of EOs 1, 2 and 14, series of 1986, the
nature of ill-gotten wealth suits. Both deal with the recovery of sequestered
shares, property or business enterprises claimed, as alleged in the
corresponding basic complaints, to be ill-gotten assets of President Marcos, his
cronies and nominees and acquired by taking undue advantage of relationships
or influence and/or through or as a result of improper use, conversion or
diversion of government funds or property. Recovery of these assets
determined as prima facie ill-gotten falls within the unquestionable jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation Inc.
(COCOFED), et al v. Republic of the Philippines, respondent; Wigberto E.
Tanada, et al, intervenors/Danilo S. Ursua v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R.
Nos. 177857-58 and G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
Sandiganbayan; jurisdiction. PD 1606, as amended by RA 7975 and EO 14,
Series of 1986, vests the Sandiganbayan with original jurisdiction over civil and
criminal cases instituted pursuant to and in connection with EOs 1, 2, 14 and 14A. Correlatively, the PCGG Rules and Regulations defines the term Ill-Gotten

Wealth as any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of

persons within the purview of [EOs] 1 and 2, acquired by them directly, or
indirectly thru dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates. The Republics averments in the amended complaints, particularly
those detailing the alleged wrongful acts of the defendants, sufficiently reveal that
the subject matter thereof comprises the recovery by the Government of ill-gotten
wealth acquired by then President Marcos, his cronies or their associates and
dummies through the unlawful, improper utilization or diversion of coconut levy
funds aided by PD 755 and other sister decrees. There was no actual need for
Republic, as plaintiff a quo, to adduce evidence to show that the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaints as it leaned on the
averments in the initiatory pleadings to make visible the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the ill-gotten wealth complaints. A perusal of the allegations
easily reveals the sufficiency of the statement of matters disclosing the claim of
the government against the coco levy funds and the assets acquired directly or
indirectly through said funds as ill-gotten wealth. Moreover, the Court finds no
rule that directs the plaintiff to first prove the subject matter jurisdiction of the
court before which the complaint is filed. Rather, such burden falls on the
shoulders of defendant in the hearing of a motion to dismiss anchored on said
ground or a preliminary hearing thereon when such ground is alleged in the
answer. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation Inc. (COCOFED), et al, v.
Republic of the Philippines, respondent; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al,
intervenors/Danilo S. Ursua v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58
and G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.

3.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Information; waiver of defect. Appellants aver that the information filed before the
trial court was substantially defective considering that it accuses Abdul and
Ampuan as one and the same person when in fact they were identified as
different persons. As such, Ampuan was not able to comprehend the nformation
read to him. However, appellants failed to raise the issue of the defective
Information before the trial court through a motion for bill of particulars or a
motion to quash the information. Their failure to object to the alleged defect
before entering their pleas of not guilty amounted to a waiver of the defect in the

Information. Records even show that the information was accordingly amended
during trial to rectify this alleged defect but appellants did not comment thereon.
Moreover, objections as to matters of form or substance in the information cannot
be made for the first time on appeal. People of the Philippines v. Renandang
Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan, G.R. No. 179497, January 25, 2012.
Jurisdiction; territorial jurisdiction of trial court. In criminal cases, venue is
jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense committed outside its limited territory. The prosecution must not only
prove that the offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of the
accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the
court. In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under
sec. 1(b) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was committed within
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Other than the lone
allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution evidence which
even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati.
The Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation
as to where the offense was committed, and there is nothing in the documentary
evidence offered by the prosecution that points to where the offense, or any of its
elements, was committed. Although the prosecution alleged that the check
issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an
element of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC. There
being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the Regional
Trial Court of that city has no jurisdiction over the case. Hector Trenas v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 195002, January 25, 2012.
Promulgation of judgment; presence of counsel during promulgation. Petitioner
claims that his right to due process was violated when his counsel failed to assist
him during the promulgation of the judgment. He faults the Sandiganbayan for
proceeding with the promulgation despite the petitioner not then being assisted
by his counsel, and being a layman he is not familiar with court processes and
procedure. Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, provides: The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence
of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered.However, if
the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative. There is nothing in the rules that
requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation of the judgment of

conviction to be valid. While notice must be served on accused and his counsel,
the latters absence during the promulgation of judgment would not affect the
validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of the accused on the
merits was prejudiced by such absence of his counsel when the sentence was
pronounced. Marino B. Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, et al, G.R. No. 185960,
January 25, 2012.
Testimonial evidence; positive identification prevails over mere denial and alibi.
On appeal, the accused claims that the Court of Appeals improperly ignored
inconsistent testimonies regarding the question of whether or not he wore
sunglasses during the robbery. However, the fact is that Addun and Johnny
categorically identified him as the robber among the three who was armed with
a .45 caliber pistol and the mere fact that one of these witnesses had the
impression that Israel wore sunglasses could not diminish the strength of such
identification. Thus, in the absence of any improper motive to incriminate Israel,
the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses must prevail over
his mere denial and alibi. People of the Philippines v. GlenfordSamoy and
Leodigario Israel, G.R. No. 193672, January 18, 2012.