Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
LouiseSundararajan
Understanding
Emotion in
Chinese Culture
Thinking Through Psychology
Louise Sundararajan
Understanding Emotion
in Chinese Culture
Thinking Through Psychology
Louise Sundararajan
Rochester Psychiatric Center, NY
Rochester, NY, USA
ISSN 1574-0455
ISSN 2197-7984 (electronic)
International and Cultural Psychology
ISBN 978-3-319-18220-9
ISBN 978-3-319-18221-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-18221-6
Library of Congress Control Number: 2015937941
Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London
Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
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Preface
I dont have time for that, I kept telling myself and my friend Tony Marsella, who
has been asking me for quite some time to edit a volume on indigenous psychology.
It didnt work. I finally put my foot down and said No to Tony in a roundabout
way, so typical of many Asians: If I ever do a book, Id rather write a book of my
own. Thatll stop him, I thought. Fine, said Tony, send me the book proposal.
Little did I know that I would be stuck with my own pretense. The result is this book.
vii
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Preface
It is, therefore, not simply an academic exercise for me to weave together phenomenal descriptions and abstract terms and concepts in psychology. In addition to
being a personal quest, this book is an invitation to think things through with me. By
thinking I mean double thinkingnot only to think through culture, as recommended by Shweder (1991), but also to think through psychology. In thinking
through psychology, I make subdisciplines talk to each other. For instance, in citing
empirical evidence to support theoretical conjectures, I do not mean that the validity
of the latter is thereby boosted by the former. Termssuch as validation, truth, and
factshave no purchase in this book. This book is not about apodictic truth so
much as cross-fertilization of ideas, especially ideas from different lines of inquiry
or different levels of analysis in psychology.
Preface
ix
Preface
Potential Contributions
This book has the potential to make the following contributions to culture and psychology, and more specifically global psychology, for it is in investigating painstakingly the innards, case by case, of the multiple and diverse mental universes sported
by cultures that psychology, in its aspiration to become a global science, can hope
to attain a comprehensive understanding of the mental life (Teo & Febbraro, 2003):
This book is the first systematic study of Chinese emotions from a theoretical
framework that seeks not only to do justice to the indigenous perspectives, but
also uses the latter to interrogate mainstream psychological theories and research
on emotions.
It intends to enhance genuine understanding across cultures at a level deeper than
the utilitarian purposes of tourism and trade. By rendering accessible the episte-
Preface
xi
Tips on Reading
Take small bites, with savoring. Inviting thinking and reflection, chapters in this book
are not meant to be finished in one sitting. Your best bet is to read a few chucks of ideas
at a time, allow time for your mind to play with the ideas, and savor the journey.
Have fun skipping. If you come across a terminology that you either dont know
or dont care enough to know, just skip it. Rest assured that there is enough redundancy in this book that you are not missing anything by skipping. I usually say the
same thing twice, one in lay terms, and one in psychological jargons. The point
made in one chapter will also be reiterated in other chapters, so skip as you like and
you may still be able to follow the thread.
No need to start from the beginning. There is more than one way to skin the
cat, so it is with reading this book. If you are not a theory person, you may consider starting in the middlebegin with Part II and continue to Part III. When you
read about the Chinese experiences in these sections, you will realize that descriptions inevitably come with conceptsyou may consider these cultural phenomena as uniquely Chinese, or something universal, typical of all cultures, or a
mixture of both, universal and unique. How do you decide? How far do you agree
with my interpretation of the Chinese experience? What is the basis of my interpretations? When you start wondering about such questions, you may want to
turn to the first and the last sections (Parts I and IV) to address the question of
psychological theory.
In case you are a theory person. In case you think the way I do that psychology
is all about theory and constructsthe so-called empirical evidence, facts, and
behaviors are all consequences of theory, since these are contingent upon sampling,
xii
Preface
and sampling flows right out of theory implicit and/or explicit, then you can take a
plunge into the first (Part I) and last (Part IV) sections, with no particular order
you can start with the last chapter if you want to. After you have digested these
theory-laden sections, you will be able to read the middle sections (Parts II and III)
as footnotes to the theoretical investigations.
It would be good to know in advance what to expectwhat you will and not find
in this book.
This is not a book on Chinese philosophy. I make no attempt to give a comprehensive introduction to Chinese philosophy. In order to map out the conceptual
space of Chinese emotions, I focus on early, primarily Confucian and Daoist, texts
during the formative period of the Chinese civilization.
Where is emotion? If you are looking for explicit treatment of blue ribbon emotions, such as happiness, anger, sadness, and so on, you will be disappointed. For
reasons explained in Chap. 12, Chinese emotions are registered in an implicit code,
like salt flavor in the soup, rather than explicitly represented like clumps of salt that
spoil the soup. In comparison to the English term emotion, the Chinese counterpart
qing covers a much broader spectrum, ranging from moods and sentiments to ever
so subtle emotional nuances that color everything we see through the affective lens.
Furthermore, the following chapters on emotion may contain chunks of discussions
based on cognitive psychology, since the Chinese term xin , which constitutes the
heart radical () in the Chinese character of qing , refers to both heart and mind.
Lastly, you can expect certain peculiarities about books on Chinese culture.
The confusing Romanization system. Anyone who tells you that cultures can be
a neat and tidy system is lying. There is no consensus among different Chinese
populations, any more than among scholars, concerning the two Romanization systems of Chinese characterspinyin versus Wade-Giles. In this book, the pinyin
method will be followed, except in citations from scholarly works that employ
Wade-Giles.
Chinese names. I will follow the Chinese convention, in which the family name
goes first, in contrast to the Western custom of putting the family name last.
No clear demarcation of things. Things seem to be clear only on paper. For
instance, it is possible to differentiate the three traditions of Confucianism, Daoism,
and Buddhism, but it is near impossible to find a Chinese who is only one and not
the other. When I was a student of Zen Buddhism under the late Master Nan HuaiJin, I used to participate in parties he gave in honor of a visitor. Master Nan would
ask us our preference: Shall we be Daoist or Buddhist tonight? Since the former
drinks alcohol and the latter does not, we all opted to be Daoist for the occasion.
Now you are on your way. Hope you will have as much fun reading this book as
I had writing it. I wish to thank Tony Marsella for talking me into it. Had I known
that writing a book could be so much fun, I would have done it sooner.
Rochester, NY
Louise Sundararajan
Preface
xiii
References
Gergen, K. J., Gulrerce, A., Lock, A., & Misra, G. (1996). Psychological science in cultural context. American Psychologist, 51, 496503.
James, W. (1884). What is an emotion? Mind, 9, 126.
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality.
American Psychologist, 58, 697720.
Nisbett, R. E. (2003). The geography of thought. New York: Free Press.
Norenzayan, A., Smith, E. E., Kim, B. J., & Nisbett, R. E. (2002). Cultural preferences for formal
versus intuitive reasoning. Cognitive Science, 26, 653684.
Shweder, R. A. (1991). Thinking through culture: Expeditions in cultural psychology. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Sternberg, R. J. (2006). The nature of creativity. Creativity Research Journal, 18, 8798.
Sundararajan, L. (2014a). Eastern Psychologies. In T. Teo (Ed.), Encyclopedia of critical psychology (Article 85). New York: Springer.
Sundararajan, L. (2014b). Indigenous psychology: Grounding science in culture, why and how?
The Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 45, 6380. (Special issue on indigenous
psychology).
Sundararajan, L., Misra, G., & Marsella, A. J. (2013). Indigenous approaches to assessment, diagnosis, and treatment of mental disorders. In F. A. Paniagua & A. M. Yamada (Eds.), Handbook
of multicultural mental health (2nd ed., pp. 6987). San Diego, CA: Elsevier.
Teo, T., & Febbraro, A. R. (2003). Ethnocentrism as a form of intuition in psychology. Theory &
Psychology, 13, 673694.
Acknowledgements
The reigning emotion that I felt throughout the process of writing this book is gratitude. First of all, I wish to thank a linguistic scholar from The Australian National
University, Zhengdao Ye, who not only coauthored a chapter with me (Chap. 5), but
also supplied all the Chinese characters in this book. I wish to acknowledge my debt
to fellow researchers in the diverse fields of psychology, anthropology, and philosophy. In particular, I am indebted to James R. Averill, who has been a long time
collaborator and whose insights and erudition have nurtured many of my ideas that
give content and expression to this book. I also wish to thank the Indigenous
Psychology Task Force, which is a bourgeoning international community of
researchers in whose company I never feel alone. At the personal level, I wish to
thank my daughter Radhika Sundararajan for giving permission for me to use baby
Lukas Bodhis pictures for this book (Figs. 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3). I thank my husband
K. R. Sundararajan for taking good care of himself, thereby setting me free to roam
the universe with my ideas. Last but not least, I am eternally indebted to my mother,
who taught me everything I need to know about Chinese emotions.
xv
Contents
Part I
3
3
4
7
9
11
12
13
15
18
18
21
21
21
24
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25
27
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43
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xviii
Contents
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48
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61
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Part II
77
77
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81
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85
86
88
90
93
93
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102
103
106
107
Contents
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117
118
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121
122
125
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
139
Part III
9
xix
Chinese Creativity
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143
143
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145
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148
150
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Contents
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163
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11
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176
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Part IV
12
Conclusion
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202
Part I
This book is an attempt to replace the ever expanding list of cultural attributes
prevalent in cross-cultural psychology (Sundararajan, Misra, & Marsella, 2013)
with a coherent explanatory framework which is the task of this section to explicate.
This section consists of four chapters. The first chapter explains the methodology
and theoretical frameworks of my investigation. The second chapter presents a root
metaphor of Chinese thoughtharmony. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the two primary
conceptual spaces carved out by Confucianism and Daoism, respectively. Buddhism
as a late comer is not included, since the focus of this section is on ways of thinking
that can trace their roots to the formative period of Chinese civilization.
Reference
Sundararajan, L., Misra, G., & Marsella, A. J. (2013). Indigenous approaches to assessment,
diagnosis, and treatment of mental disorders. In F. A. Paniagua & A. M. Yamada (Eds.),
Handbook of multicultural mental health (2nd ed., pp. 6987). San Diego, CA: Elsevier.
Chapter 1
What Is Culture?
as a Chinese jar still Moves perpetually in its stillness.
T. S. Eliot
Thus, I may use data from Japan and Korea sometimes to shed light on Chinese
thinking because of their shared cultural heritage with the Chinese.
A conceptual space is defined and constrained by a set of generative rules, which
are largely implicit (Boden, 2009). These rules serve a similar function as the
English syntax that determines the extent to which any word string is a grammatically acceptable English sentence. The rules that define and constrain a conceptual
space are part and parcel of rationality.
Culture as rationality. Rationality may be defined as a functional mindset that
operates in a particular ecological niche for which it is evolved (Todd, Gigerenzer,
& The ABC Research Group, 2012). The central question addressed by rationality
is this: What does mind do in its ecological niche in order to contribute to a life that
is good, right, and reasonable? This is consistent with Richard Shweders definition
of culture: Culture is the affect-laden ideas about what is good, true, beautiful and
efficient made manifest or expressed in the customary practices of a group (personal communication, December 21, 2011). Shweder (1991) claims that rationality
is not one size fits all, but rather comes in multiple and varied formsin a phrase,
as he puts it famously one mind, many mentalities (Shweder et al., 1998). A nice
footnote to Shweders claim would be Dantes statement:
Since the power of human thought cannot be fully simultaneously translated into action by a
single man and a single specific community, there must be within the human race a multitude
through which this power in its entirety can be realized. (cited in Moscovici, 2013, p. 51)
But Shweder takes the multiplicity claim one step furtherfrom many mentalities to many worlds.
By many mentalities Shweder (1991) means the multiplicity of mental worlds. In
his own words: It is a supposition of cultural psychology that when people live in
the world differently, it maybe that they live in different worlds. It is an appreciation
of those different worlds that cultural psychology tries to achieve (p. 23, emphasis
added). He has also spelt out the consequences of this formulation of culture: If
cultures disagree, They are not contradictions battling with each other in the same
world. They are arguments in different worlds When you live in the same world
all disagreements are matters of error, ignorance, or misunderstanding. When you
live in different worlds there is far more to a disagreement than meets the eye
(p. 18, emphasis added). Thus, there is the possibility of incommensurability in
meaning across cultures, says Shweder.
While this model gets individualism right, its formulation about collectivism is overly
vague and sometimes misleading (Harb & Smith, 2008; Voronov & Singer, 2002).
Fiske (2002) has opined that individualism is the sum of cultural characteristics by
which Americans define themselves, while collectivism is formalized to show characteristics of the antithetical other in accordance with the American ideological
understanding that we are not that kind of person (p. 84).
Going back to the drawing board, I propose to replace individualismcollectivism with an explanatory model that casts the East and West difference in cognitive
styles as difference in rationality. Cognitive styles are distinct habitual approaches
to information processing and knowledge representation that are evolved to serve
the purposes of different ecological environments (Kozhevnikov, Evans, & Kosslyn,
2014). From the perspective of ecological rationality (Todd et al., 2012), cognitive
styles shape as well as being shaped by different types of adaptations in response to
the varying environmental demands. For illustration, we may look at culture at a
smaller scalecorporate culture.
Let us start with the best known East and West differencesassociative/holistic
versus rule-based/analytic reasoning (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001).
These cognitive styles are also the topics of management and other fields of research.
Pertinent to these cognitive styles is the four knowledge categories proposed by the
management researcher Martin (2009; 2009, Winter)mystery (something we
cant explain), heuristic (a rule of thumb that guides us toward solution), algorithm
(a predictable formula for producing an answer), and code (when the formula
becomes so predictable it can be fully automated). Here, the associative/holistic
processing subtend the first two knowledge categories, i.e., mystery and heuristic,
whereas rule-based/analytic reasoning the last two knowledge categories, i.e., algorithm and code. To see how these families of cognitive styles operate as different
rationalities, let us follow Martins analysis of corporations.
Using McDonalds Corporation as illustration, Martin (2009, Winter) points out
how in 1955 at a time of the emergence of freeways and beach culture in Southern
California, the McDonald brothers stared into the face of a mystery: how and what
do Californians want to eat (p. 6)? For an answer, they came up with a heuristicthe
quick service restaurant. When the investor Ray Kroc bought the McDonalds restaurant chain, he developed an algorithmexactly how to cook a burger, exactly how to
hire people, and so on. From there, it was only a short step to management by code:
Under Kroc, nothing was left to chance in the McDonalds kitchen: every hamburger
weighing exactly 1.6 ounces, its thickness measured to the thousandth of an inch, and the
cooking process stopped automatically after 38 seconds, when the burgers reached an internal temperature of exactly 155 degrees. (p. 7)
Table 1.1 Cognitions and cognitive styles that differentially serve the cultural ideals of symmetry
versus asymmetry
Types of cognition
Ecological niche
Cultural ideals
Mental mapping
Cognitive orientation
Cognitive task
Attributes
Relational cognition
Similar other, strong ties, synergistic
community
Symmetry
Dao/chaos
(orderly contrast low, ambiguity high)
Communal sharing
Mind-to-mind transaction
Within-mind mappings
Between-mind mappings
Inner
Private
Making social connections
Cognitive control low
Similarity-based reasoning
(resonance, analogy)
Privileging awareness to preserve the
wholeness of experience
Leveling (similarity)
Implicit code
Associative, heuristic, intuitive
Associative connection between
things
Holistic
Integrative, relation between
subsystems
System 1
High capacity
Perceptual/nonverbal
Rapid
Low cognitive effort, unconscious
Non-relational cognition
Dissimilar other, weak ties,
scarcity-based community
Asymmetry
Order (orderly contrast high,
ambiguity low, clarity high)
Market pricing
Mind-to-world transaction
Mind-world mappings
Outer
Public
Control and mastery of the
environment
Cognitive control high
Difference detection
Privileging information to
increase knowledge production
Sharpening (difference)
Explicit code
Rule-based reasoning
Overruling associative
connection between things
Analytic
Linear, fragmenting
System 2
Low capacity
Conceptual/language
Slow
High cognitive effort, conscious
which is highly recommended, you may take a peek at the chart attached at the
end of this chapter (Table 1.1), as you navigate your way through the thickets of
the following discussions.
who points out that the amount of knowledge in any culture is far greater than the
capacity of individuals to learn or figure it all out on their own. Challenging the
supremacy of non-relational cognition, he suggests that individuals tap into the cultural store of knowledge simply by mimicking those around themand social mimicking is something even lower animals can do. Thus, it is group-living that constitutes
the niche for which our big brains are evolvedthis is known as the social brain
hypothesis.
The social brain hypothesis can be further refined. Dunbar and Shultz (2007)
suggest that it is not the computational demands of living in a large group per se, but
rather the demands of intense pair-bonding that spurred the evolution of large brains
in primates (see also Dunbar, 2014; Fletcher, Simpson, Campbell, & Overall, 2015).
The pair-bonding hypothesis can be extended from mating to family relationships.
Physical anthropologist Konner (2011) has documented how the development of
our big brains has to do with the long protected childhood that was a by-product of
the bipedal locomotion. Humans distinctive upright bipedal mode of locomotion
meant that the mammalian pelvis was substantially narrower, making it necessary to
deliver babies when they are still extremely immature. This makes it possible for
greater extra-uterine brain development in the context of an extended period of
dependence. So it all goes togethergroup living, long protected childhoods,
enduring social bonds, and big brainsfactors that contribute to the extraordinary
success of the human species in the animal kingdom.
Consistent with the two competing hypotheses about our big brainscognitive
versus socialis Blooms (2009) claim that there are two independently evolved
systems for reasoning about the worldone for the physical world and the other for
the social world. While it is necessary to have both types of rationality, cultures differ in their emphasis on one or the other. The rationality of individualist cultures
capitalizes on non-relational cognition, generally referred to as intelligence, whereas
that of collectivist cultures, such as China, relational cognition.
These two types of rationalityreasoning about the physical world versus reasoning about the social worldmay also be understood in terms of two types of
transactions of the mind: Mind-to-world versus mind-to-mind. In psychology, mental transactions have been investigated in the framework of mental mappings
(McKeown, 2013), where mind-to-world transaction corresponds to mind-world
mappings, whereas mind-to-mind transaction entails two types of mental mappingwithin-mind and between-mind mappings. Mind-to-world transaction focuses
on difference, whereas the mind-to-mind transaction similarity; or to anticipate later
discussion, the former privileges asymmetry, whereas the latter symmetry.
Similarity versus difference detection. Difference detection is essential to cognition
and intelligence. This central doctrine of psychology is part and parcel of the mindto-world mindset, which operates on the assumption of a deep-seated subject-object
dichotomy, a dichotomy well articulated by the Kantian dictum that We are
subjects thinking about objects (Freeman, 2000, p. 117). Note the disparity
or asymmetry here: The mind can think about objects, but not the other way around.
In sharp contrast is the symmetrical relationship in the mind-to-mind transaction, as
Ecological Niche
evidenced by the mutual gazing between the Tang poet Li Bo (701762) and the
mountain:
Never tired of looking at each other
Only the Ching-ting Mountain and me. (Liu & Lo, 1975, p. 110)
The symmetrical relationship between the two parties lies in the fact that it makes
no difference to say who is gazing at whomboth are agents or subjects. How to
relate to objects in the world as a similar other? You will need relational cognition
for that.
Perception of the similar other seems to be innate. Even infants and young children prefer those who are similar to themselves (Mahajan & Wynn, 2012)infants
even prefer those who harm dissimilar others (Hamlin, Mahajan, Liberman, &
Wynn, 2013). Detection of similarity is something the Chinese seem to be preoccupied with. Hall and Ames (1987) point out that the term comparison (pi) in the
Confucian Analects is always a comparison of likenesses, not differences
(p. 287). Getting much mileage out of the perception of similarity is the Chinese
notion of lei. Lei literarily means category, but it is a concept that pertains to the
intrinsic affinity between things of the same kind (Munakata, 1983; Sundararajan,
2009). Central to the notion of lei is ontological parity, for instance, the mind relating to the world as its equal, namely as another mind. A relationship of deep affinity
with nature to the extent of finding a responsive heart in rocks and stones is well
documented in Chinese aesthetics (Rowley, 1974).
For the poets mutual gazing with the mountain, there is no need to invoke magical thinking as an explanation. The propensity of the human mind to find its double
everywhere it looks is a robust phenomenon in human history, ranging from animism to anthropomorphism (Waytz, Epley, & Cacioppo, 2010). This phenomenon
may be attributable to relational cognition which is particularly sensitive to similarities. In the words of Bloom (2007), our tendency to attribute agency and intention
based on minimal cues is attributable to a hypertrophy of social cognition (p. 149).
Now let us take a look at the other side of the cointhe ecological niches that
differentially privilege relational versus non-relational cognitions.
Ecological Niche
Strong versus weak ties. Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002) claim that collectivist cultures are characterized by the permanent bonds formed among similar
others, whereas individualist cultures temporary relations formed in complex
societies among dissimilar others (p. 3, emphases added). This point can be further
elaborated by the theory of strong versus weak ties, proposed by Granovetter (1973).
The important contribution of Granovetter lies in his insight that tie strength is a
useful variable in the study of social networking (p. 1371, ft. 15). Tie strength, it
turns out, has to do with similaritystrong among similar others, and weak among
dissimilar others. Along the divide between similar and dissimilar others, strong ties
10
Cultural Ideals
11
Cultural Ideals
Within the ontological sphere the possible is higher than everything actual.
(Heidegger, 1982, p. 308)
Each hair of the lion contains the potentialities of the whole lion, and therefore all the hairs
of the lion have the potentialities of the infinitude of lions and this infinitude of lions is
further contained within each single hair. (A Buddhist analogy cited in Chang, 1970, p. 204)
Chaos and its vicissitudes. The sense of plenum characteristic of the synergistic community may be understood in the framework of chaos. In everyday language, chaos is
the opposite of order. The technical term for chaos is entropy. So far as possibilities
of things are considered, the relationship between order and chaos/entropy is that
between scarcity and abundance. Campbell (1982) illustrates this point with a pack of
cards, of which a particular orderly arrangement is one out of an astronomically large
number of possible arrangements. Thus, the higher the entropy, the more numerous
are the possible ways in which the various parts of the system may be arranged
(p. 44). According to this perspective, the path from the possible to the actual is that
of degeneration from an original plethora to impoverished simplification.
A similar view is found in Daoism. As Hall (1978) puts it succinctly: Tao is
Chaos as the sum of all orders (p. 279). More precisely, in Daoism, The Cosmos
becomes, like Chaos, the sum of all orders. Somewhere or somewhen, every possible order is extant (p. 278). This notion is compatible with the superposition of
states in quantum mechanics, according to which an electron can be located in multiple places and spin in multiple directions at once. The Daoist metaphor for this
primordial state of plenum is an uncarved block, a matrix of actualizable orders,
passive to infinite patterning (p. 278). How did we get from chaos to order, from
the world of plenitude to that of scarcity and limitations? This is the theme of a
famous parable in the Chuang Tzu:
The emperor of the Southern Sea was Lickety, the emperor of the Northern Sea was Split,
and the emperor of the Center was Wonton [or Hun-tun]. Lickety and Split often met each
other in the land of Wonton, and Wonton treated them very well. Wanting to repay Wontons
kindness, Lickety and Split said, All people have seven holes for seeing, hearing, eating,
and breathing. Wonton alone lacks them. Lets try boring some holes for him. So every day
they bored one hole, and on the seventh day Wonton died. (Mair, 1994, p. 71)
The death of Wonton signifies the loss of undifferentiated wholeness, and the
emergence of clarity, order, knowledge, and information made possible by the
organs of differentiationthe seven senses.
The connection between differentiation and scarcity/limitations is only hinted at
here by the tragic death of Chaos. For a more explicit exposition of this connection,
we need to turn to modern physics. Our way is prepared by Mair (1994) who underlines a connection between the humble Chinese wonton soup and cosmic chaos by
noting how the term wonton refers to The undifferentiated soup of primordial
chaos. As it begins to differentiate, dumpling-blobs of matter coalesce (p. 386).
With Mairs exegesis, we elide subliminally into the story of the Big Bang, where
instead of Wonton we meet the protagonist called symmetry.
12
13
rules governing the ordering of books on the shelves by title and author within the
red section, the number of possible ways of arranging the books there is much
greater (p. 47); whereas in the second library: There is only one possible way in
which War and Peace can be arranged in relation to all the other books (p. 47).
It is in the same vein that Bolender (2010) talks about symmetry breaking. A drop
of water, for instance, contains all possible patterns of a snowflake. From this plethora of possibilities, only one particular snowflake pattern emerges, when that drop
of water freezes and all the other possible patterns for snowflakes are lost.
Bolender (2010) uses the phase transitions from plasma to gas to liquid to solid
(p. 95) to describe the sequence of symmetry breaking found in nature as a descending chain of symmetry subgroups nested like the Russian dolls, with each lower
symmetry concealed by the next higher symmetry. For instance, water in its frozen
state, such as the ice crystal, is a lower symmetry subgroup of the group for liquid
water. He further claims that the same sequence of symmetry breaking is found in
thought, as evidenced by the four measurement scales: nominal (A versus not A),
ordinal (plus direction of difference), interval (plus quantifiable amount of difference), and ratio (plus an absolute zero)note the increasing restriction in admissible transformations with each added plus. Bolender (2010) considers this
progression as a descending chain of symmetry subgroups:
the four scales correspond to a descending sequence of subgroups, a group for the nominal scale containing the group for an ordinal scale, the group for that ordinal scale containing
the group for an interval scale, and the group for that interval scale containing the group for
a ratio scale. (86)
Thats nice. But what has all this got to do emotions, not to mention Chinese
emotions?
14
Upside-Down Universes
15
the relational cognition as formulated by Fiske (1991). Hwangs (2000, 2012, 2014)
research on guanxi has done just that.
According to Hwang (2000), guanxi consists of three subtypesexpressive ties
among family members, mixed ties among friends and acquaintances, and instrumental ties among strangers. Hwang (2014) has demonstrated the compatibility
between his guanxi matrix and Fiskes (1991) fourfold model of relational cognition.
Elsewhere, Sundararajan (2014) has further mapped Hwangs guanxi matrix unto
the descending chain of symmetry subgroups as adumbrated by Bolender (2010).
Upside-Down Universes
In sum, I have transposed the individualismcollectivism hypothesis of culture onto
two axes of cognitioninvolvement and differentiationthe former focuses on
similarities, the latter differences (Sundararajan, 2002; Sundararajan & Averill,
2007). At the intersection of these two axes can be located strong-ties- and weakties-based social networkingthe former is characterized by high involvement and
low differentiation, as exemplified by Communal Sharing, whereas the latter low
involvement and high differentiation as evidenced by Market Pricing. These ecological niches give rise to different rationalities.
To see how rationalities East and West constitute an upside-down universe to
each other, let us refresh our memories of symmetry and symmetry breakdown.
Schrdingers cat is both live and deadthis is a state of symmetry. The cat is in
either one or the other state but not both, after you take a peek, an act which constitutes symmetry breakdown. Thus, symmetry is high in ambiguity and low in informationwe dont know whether the cat is alive or dead. Symmetry breakdown, on
the other hand, results in less ambiguity and more informationnow you know
exactly the status of the cat.
The Chinese version of symmetry and symmetry breakdown is found in the Dao
De Jing (Chapter 42): Dao begets the One; the One begets two; two beget three;
and three beget the myriad things (Lynn, 1999, p. 135). Cast in the framework of
Fiske (1991), twoness corresponds to Communal Sharing which is marked by the
distinction between two terms, i.e., in-group and out-group. But oneness is anticipated by Bolender (2010), who speculated that there could be a level of ultra-symmetry beyond Communal Sharing, called Oceanic Merging. Oceanic Merging is
defined by Bolender as the perception of being united in love with everything
(p. 107). Incorporating the Daoist version of symmetry ad symmetry breakdown, I
have expanded Fiskes (1991) model of relational cognition to include Oceanic
Merging, see Fig. 1.1.
The mirror image of Fig. 1.1 is Fig. 1.2.
For interpretation of Fig. 1.1, I rely on the East and West comparisons of a marketing scholar Zhou (2011, 2012). Figure 1.1 represents the Chinese value hierarchy
where merging with and participating in the Dao ranks the highest, while the low
involvement and high differentiation mode of Market Pricing ranks the lowest
values in the former framework have more to do with the cultivation of life, whereas
16
Dao
Oceanic Merging
Communal
Sharing/Nominal scale
Authority
Ranking/Ordinal
scale
Equality
Matching/Interv
al scale
Market
Pricing/Ra
tio scale
Fig. 1.1 The descending chain of symmetry subgroups with progressive symmetry breakdown
Market Pricing/Ratio
scale
Equality
Matching/Interval scale
Authority
Ranking/Ordinal scale
Communal
Sharing/Nominal
scale
Oceanic Merging
Dao
Fig. 1.2 The descending progression of measurement scales from more to less precision, or from
order to entropy
Upside-Down Universes
17
those in the latter framework, the pursuit of profits (Zhou, 2012). This ranking order
is explained by Zhou (2011) in terms of gentlemen aspire to move upward, petty
persons, downward (,) (p. 3). The same logic applies to
Fig. 1.2, except in reverse direction.
Figure 1.2 represents the world of knowledge acquisition where explicit and concise representations are privileged. This value system is evident in the four measurement scales from ratio to nominal. The ratio scale is the ideal measurement, the kind
that Western gentleman/scientist would want to possess because it allows you to get
much information. The nominal scale, by contrast, is not very useful because it does
not give you a lot of information. In Fig. 1.2, if we look at the symmetry subgroups
as a ladder of knowledge, the Western orientation is going up, whereas that of the
Chinese seems to be going down the ladder. Why? Zhous (2011) answer is as succinct as it is convincing: The path to knowledge is by incremental increase; that to
Dao by incremental decrease (,) (p. 6). This contrast, says Zhou
(2011, 2012), stems from the fundamental difference between West and Chinathe
former capitalizes on the non-relational cognition of object-centeredness (
), whereas the latter relational cognition of human-centeredness ().
Reprise. In a nutshell, China and the modern West constitute upside-down universes to each other. I attribute the basis of their difference to the two types of cognitionrelational and non-relational, the former is needed for social bonding among
conspecifics, the latter mastery and control of the world. While life requires both
types of cognition to function, cultures have preferences for either one or the other.
Under the sway of relational cognition, Chinese culture tends to privilege the high
symmetry state of Communal Sharing as the ideal situation of life where harmony
prevails among members of strong ties. A rationality that privileges high degrees of
symmetry is likely to prefer the abundance of possibilities among close relations
over the effortful management of limited resources among strangers; the spontaneity and freedom of associative thinking that revels in the ambiguities and paradoxes
of meaning through implicit communication among similar others over the toils of
analytic, rule-based reasoning necessary for explicit, clear and concise communication among strangers; and the joyous widening of consciousness in resonance with
another mind among similar others over the acquisition of knowledge and information for its own sake. Conversely, a rationality that privileges the high asymmetry
state of Market Pricing, as is the case in the modern West, is likely to prefer the
either-or logic that drives ever more precise differentiations over the both-and logic
that harbors ambiguities and paradoxes.
To give the screw another turn, difference in cognitive styles between China and
the West may be summed up by a series of contrasting pairs that fall along the divide
between symmetry maintenance/restoration and symmetry breakdown, with the
first terms of the contrasting pairs leveling out differences thus maintaining or
restoring symmetry, and the second terms sharpening differences thus breaking down symmetry (for leveling versus sharpening, see Gardner, Holzman,
Klein, Linton, & Spence, 1959): holistic versus analytic; associative versus
rule-based; implicit (intuitive, heuristic) versus explicit code; system 1 thinking
18
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Chapter 2
Introduction
Harmony is a concept that plays a pivotal role throughout Chinese history (Li, 2008)
as much as love does in Christianity. Also similar to love in Christianity, much good
as well as evil has been done in the name of harmony. It is important therefore to
delineate the basic structure of this root metaphor in order to differentiate between
optimal and suboptimal versions of harmony. This chapter shows how casting
harmony in the framework of symmetry (Chap. 1) will help us in this endeavor.
Harmony may be defined as an aesthetic emotion, a pleasure derived from the
pleasure of attaining multiple goals at once. Aesthetic emotions are defined by
Deacon (2006) as essentially emotional relationships between emotions (p. 51). As
such, harmony entails two essential elementsrelations between terms, and awareness of the relations between terms. The topic of awareness, especially second-order
awareness (pleasure of pleasure), will be briefly mentioned but not explored here, as
it will be treated more fully in later chapters (especially Chap. 10). This chapter
focuses on only one of the key elements of harmonyrelations between terms.
My investigation is divided into three parts: First, a structural analysis suggests
that harmony is a high dimensional complex system that is invested in symmetry
maintenance. Second, I examine cognitive styles and associated strategies that serve
the purpose of symmetry maintenance. Third, I put forward the argument that there
are two factors that tip the balance between optimal and suboptimal versions of
harmonyavoidance of symmetry breakdown, and lack of cognitive complexity.
21
22
Harmony
Harmony is like soup. There being water and heat, sour flavoring and pickles, salt
and peaches, with a bright fire of wood, the cook harmonizing all the ingredients in
the cooking of the fish and flesh (Fung, 1962, p. 107). In reference to music, it is
said in another classical text, the Book of Documents: When the eight instruments
are in good accord and do not encroach upon one another, then the spirits and man
will be brought into harmony (Holzman, 1978, p. 23). Note the salience of multiplicity and diversity, as symbolized by the many ingredients of the soup and the
large number of musical instrument, in the above discourse on harmony. Thus,
Sundararajan (Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007; Sundararajan, 2010, 2013) defines harmony as a high dimensional structure that computes the equilibrium among multiple systems. This definition underlines two attributes of harmony that are relevant to
the notion of symmetry: high dimensionality, and dynamic, not static, equilibrium.
High dimensionality. Harmony is intrinsically pluralistic in structure, as evidenced by the prevailing yin and yang polarity. This point can be illustrated
by one well-known polarityinner (yin) versus outer (yang). Wu Daozi (d. 792),
the famous painter, had been working on a painting for the court for a long time.
When he was finally done, the Emperor came to the unveiling of the painting. As
Wu carefully drew aside the coverings, the Emperor gazed at the magnificent scene
down to every detail:
woods, mountains, limitless expanses of sky, speckled with clouds and birds, and even
men in the hills. Look, said the artist pointing, here dwells a spirit in a mountain cave.
He clapped his hands and the gate of the cave immediately flew open. The artist stepped in,
turned, and said, The inside is even more beautiful. It is beyond words. Let me lead the
way! But before the Emperor could follow or even bring himself to speak, the gate, the
artist, the painting and all faded away. Before him remained only the blank wall with no
trace of any brush marks. (Chang, 1970, p. 95)
Chang Chung-yuans (Chang, 1970) commentary of this anecdote is illuminating: within the outward appearances of all beauty there lies the unity of background It is through this ultimate reality that our minds are opened to see our
own wholeness of spirit, and enter into the wholeness of the universe, the deep
underlying harmony of all things (pp. 9596). Note the Russian doll structure in
the binary oppositions of figure and ground or outer appearance and inner reality,
where the lower symmetry subgroup (figure; outer appearance) is embedded in the
higher symmetry subgroup (ground; inner reality), with the former deriving its significance from the latter. Thus, Chang (1970) writes: According to the Taoists, our
daily life gains its significance by being rooted in a deep underlying harmony, or
ultimate reality (p. 96).
This two-tiered structureinner and outerof harmony has direct implications for harmony maintenance strategies. A case in point is the way Chinese
make compromises by conforming to conventions in ones outer, public reality,
while remaining a nonconformist in ones inner reality. In one phrase, obey publicly and defy privately (Hwang, 2000, p. 172). An illustrious example of this
approach to harmony maintenance is found in the physicist Nobel laureate Hideki
Yukawa (1973), who attributed his scientific creativity to his rebelliousness in a
23
characteristically East Asian waydocile on the outside, but a rebel on the inside:
I can never work on a problem that Ive been told to solve by someone else. My
subconscious always rebels against being ordered to do something. Personally,
I look on myself as a docile kind of man (p. 37).
Harmony as a dynamic equilibrium. In everyday life, harmony is generally
understood as moderation, a form of self-regulation guided by the principle of the
golden mean (zhong yong ). One of the most insightful formulations of harmony is found in the text Zhong Yong (The Doctrine of the Mean, 1971):
While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in the
state of EQUILIBRIUM. When those feelings have been stirred, and they act in their due degree,
there ensues what may be called the state of HARMONY. (p. 384, emphasis in the original)
Note here that harmony is differentiated from equilibrium along the divide
between pre- and post-perturbation. Cast in the framework of symmetry and symmetry breaking, this passage tells a story that goes something like this: The original
symmetry, referred to as equilibrium, is characteristic of the pre-perturbation state of
the mind, which, often compared to still waters in the Daoist texts, is a condition in
which homogeneity looms large. Emotional episodes result in symmetry breaking;
and successful symmetry restoration is referred to as harmony, in the words of Fung,
(1962): To have the emotions welling up and yet in due proportion is also a state of
the mean [equilibrium] (p. 107). As such, harmony is not the original but the second,
restored symmetry, otherwise known as dynamic equilibrium (Fung, 1962). Whereas
the original symmetry before the Big Bang, so to speak, is an order of reality characterized by the absence of differences, harmony as second, restored symmetry is an
emergent order contingent upon the shifting balance within the mix of differences.
As Sundararajan (2013) points out, the Chinese notion of harmony as a dynamic
equilibrium has far reaching ramifications:
First, not hankering after the primordial symmetry (Bolender, 2010) where
homogeneity reigns supreme, harmony as a second, restored symmetry thrives in
the aftermath of symmetry breaking (Bolender, 2010)a world rife with difference and diversity.
Second, subsisting in the aftermath of symmetry breakdown, the main function
of harmony is necessarily symmetry maintenance and restorationto prevent
further symmetry break down.
Third, as a symmetry maintenance and restoration mechanism, the Chinese
notion of harmony may have a built-in aversion toward (further) symmetry
breakdown.
There may be an inherent tension within harmony: Aversion toward symmetry
breakdown can lead to rejection of differences, whereas harmony as dynamic equilibrium works well only to the extent that it gives importance to difference and diversity.
Thus, aversion toward symmetry breakdown maybe a determining factor between the
optimal and not so optimal types of harmony, to be elaborated later. For now, let us
examine the optimal use of cognitive strategies for symmetry maintenance.
24
Harmony
Dialectic Thinking
One cognitive style privileged by harmony is dialectic thinking, best exemplified by
the yin and yang dialectic (Fang, 2010; Li, 2012). The yin and yang dialectic may be
understood as an order-preserving transformation (Bolender, 2010) that neutralizes
differences by means of the principle of complementarity (Peng & Nisbett, 1999).
According to the principle of complementarity, the opposing forces A and Not-A are
needed antipode and complement to each other. Thus, it is stated in the Tso Chuan
that the five-note pentatonic scale; the six-pitch pipes; the seven sounds all of
which complement each other. There are the distinctions between clear and turbid,
small and great plaintive and joyous all of which augment each other (cited
in Ames & Rosemont, 1998, p. 255). Here in spite of the multiplicity of musical
instruments and the diverse and contrasting sounds they produce, harmony is maintained thanks to the dialectic of yin and yang which neutralizes differences by playing the terms of opposition off of each other. This is how the yin and yang dialectic
works: No term can ever make an irrevocable difference, since whatever difference
term A makes is counterbalanced by the opposing term Not-A.
But the yin and yang dialectic does more than preserving the existing order. It also
creates a new order of harmony which has the capacity to encompass both A and
Not-A. Thus, one unique feature of the complementarity principle is its inclusiveness
toward difference. This point can be illustrated by the statement of Yen Tzu in the
Tso Chuan that The salt flavoring is the other to the bitter, and the bitter is the other
to the salt. With these two others combining in due proportions and a new flavor
emerging, this is what is expressed in harmony (Fung, 1962, p. 108). Difference,
referred to as the other in the above quote, is not to be eliminated but rather
included and duly combined to create harmony. This is consistent with the observation of Cheng, Lee, and Chiu (1999) that Chinese dialectical thinking has a high
Holistic Thinking
25
Holistic Thinking
Another cognitive style favored by harmony is holistic thinking. Holistic thinking
has two attributes: (a) it subsists in a high dimensional conceptual space; and (b) it
specializes in forming sets. First, high dimensional conceptual space. The yin and
yang dialectic can be understood as the logic of both-and in contrast to that of either/
or (Li, 2014a). The either/or framework entails a one-dimensional space, which
allows for only one term at a time to operate. By contrast, the both-and framework
consists of a multidimensional space that allows for parallel processing on multiple
levels at the same time.
Second, holistic thinking is sensitive to relations between terms, thereby capable
of combining multiple terms into one unit of analysis or a set. In everyday life,
holistic thinking approaches life not in terms of a choice between different orders of
26
Harmony
reality so much as affirming both realities, and negotiating for a viable relationship
between the two. In science, holistic thinking is the basis of the mathematical model
called dynamical systems or chaos theory, which approaches diverse systems such
as the predator and the host as one unit of analysis (Sabelli, 2005), in contrast to the
conventional linear, causal analysis.
Since holistic thinking contributes to symmetry maintenance and recovery by
forming sets, we can expect a corresponding aversion in holistic thinking toward
symmetry breakdown. There is some empirical evidence for this conjecture.
Set and set breaking. You are asked to choose for a friend two puppies from five
photographs and then learned that the landlord would allow only one pet per apartment. What a bomber! This is the type of experiment known as the blocked-choice
paradigm. Consider this scenario: You get to choose a drink and a snack from three
bottled beverages (milk, soda, fitness water) and three packaged snacks (cookies,
chips, fitness bar). Say you picked soda and chips. Then you are told, Whoops! A
mistake had been made: Instead of getting to choose two options, you can select
only one. How would you like to proceed? Pick one out of the selected pair (soda
or chip)? Or start over and choose one from the unelected items (milk, fitness water,
cookies, or fitness bar)? It turns out that the choice you make in this type of situations depends on whether you have a collectivist or individualist mindset, according
to a series of studies conducted by Mourey, Oyserman, and Yoon (2013).
Mourey et al. (2013) found that compared with those in the individualist-mindset
condition, participants in the collectivist-mindset condition listed more reasons
their initial snack and beverage selections went together and then, when told that
one of their selected items was unavailable for consumption, chose to select a new
snack or beverage instead of consuming their other initially selected item that was
available (p. 1620). Participants in the individualist-mindset condition seemed to
be more rationalthey would simply go for soda or chips, if they are allowed to
pick only one, as can be predicted by the theory of rational decision-making. For
instance, the dominance principle in choice (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) predicts
that if prospect A is as good as prospect B in every respect and better than B in at
least one respect (for instance, you picked it), then A (soda or chip) should be
preferred to B (the rest of the items you did not pick initially). But participants with
the collectivist mindset thought otherwise.
Proceeding with only the available products meant that participants had broken
up their selected set, whereas not willing to proceed with it suggests an unwillingness to break up with their initially selected set. Mourey et al. (2013) found repeatedly that an accessible collectivist mindset increased the likelihood of rejecting a
partial set and the willingness to pay more to complete the set (p. 1618). And
again: Latinos and people randomly assigned to the collectivist-mindset condition
were more hesitant to break up a set, more willing to pay extra to restore a set, and
more sensitive to the existence of a relationship among members of a set (p. 1620).
Why is a set, even an arbitrarily chosen one such as the soda and chips pair, so
important to people with a collectivist mindset? For an explanation, Mourey et al.
(2013) attributed this to the penchant for forming relationships in collectivist
cultures: a collectivist mind-set creates a momentary attunement to the possibility
27
of a relationship, such that people with collectivist mind-sets can and do create
relationships among objects on the spot and are loath to break up these relationships (p. 1620). Following this line of reasoning, one would expect Asians to be
especially prone to the minimal group effect (Tajfel, 1970). In a series of studies
conducted by Tajfel (1970), individuals were randomly assigned to groups on the
basis of some bogus group differences. Regardless, participants seemed to have
readily identified with these arbitrarily formed groups as evidenced by their ingroup favoritism. The minimal group effect has been widely replicated in the West,
but not in the Chinese population. In fact studies (e.g., Brewer & Yuki, 2007) show
that the very opposite seems to be the caseAsians are less likely, relatively to
Westerners, to form relationships on the spot.
A more cogent explanation for the findings of Mourey et al. (2013) lies in the
robust finding (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001) of the difference between
the holistic thinking style of collectivist cultures in comparison to the analytic reasoning of individualist cultures. In holistic thinking, when items combine they form
a new entitya set. Thus, if:
a = soda; b = chips; a + b = C
The question of C did not arise for analytic thinking, which sees (a) and (b) as
individual items only (a, b), even when combined. Thus to the individualist mindset,
the blocked-choice paradigm simply means a reduction of the number of ones
choice from two items (a, b) to one(a) or (b). But to the holistic mindset, the
blocked-choice paradigm entails the symmetry breakdown of C, which is something
to be avoided if possible. This is consistent with my hypothesis of an aversion
toward symmetry breakdown, which predicts that when confronted with the
blocked-choice problem, this particular mindset would prefer choosing from the
unselected items that have never formed a set over choices that involve breaking a
ready-made set. This is exactly what the researchers (Mourey et al., 2013) found.
28
Harmony
29
Cognition with and without control (see Chaps. 5 and 7) can be illustrated by two
different approaches to cookingrecipe versus harmony. The difference between
these two approaches may be explored along the two components of cooking:
A. External regulation, which refers to what the cook does.
B. Internal process, which refers to transformation of the food stuff in the
cooking pot.
Recall the code approach to cooking at McDonalds (Martin, 2009, Winter; see
Chap. 1). This is an example of the recipe approach, in which A directly controls B
such that emphasis is placed entirely upon A, which attempts to get the cooking
process down to a science by specifying with precision the ingredients, the proportion, and the exact sequence of action. By contrast, according to the harmony
approach, cooking is considered a subtle art. The Lushi chunqiu puts it this way:
In combining your ingredients to achieve a harmony, you have to use the sweet, sour, bitter,
acrid, and the salty, and you have to mix them in an appropriate sequence and proportion.
Bringing the various ingredients together is an extremely subtle art in which each of them
has its own expression. The variations within the cooking pot are so delicate and subtle that
they cannot be captured in words or fairly conceptualized. (Ames & Rosemont, 1998,
pp. 257258, emphasis added).
30
Harmony
31
keeping the status quo and fitting in. By contrast, harmony in the classical Chinese
texts is pursued as an end in and of itself. A similar distinction is made by Huang
(1999) between true and surface harmonythe latter is found to be a contributing
factor to the Asian preference for usefulness/conformity over novelty (Leung &
Morris, 2011), whereas the former is found to be beneficial in creative conflict management (Leung, Koch, & Lu, 2002).
The same applies to the two corresponding versions of zhong yong (the
golden mean). The disintegration-avoidance version of zhong yongcharacterized
by the preference for moderation and the avoidance of extreme positionswas
found by Yao, Yang, Dong, and Wang (2010) to be a contributing factor to the suppression of creative ideas. By contrast, the harmony enhancement version of zhong
yong plays an important role in emotion refinement (Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007),
emotional creativity (Sundararajan, 2002, 2004), and aesthetic savoring (Frijda &
Sundararajan, 2007; Sundararajan, 2010).
In sum, since the structure of harmony is intrinsically pluralistic as a relation
between terms/systems, avoidance of symmetry breakdown would result in reduction of diversity hence compromising the structure of harmony. Thus, the difference
between optimal and suboptimal versions of harmony may be measured by the commitment to diversity or the lack thereof. In the optimal version of harmony, neutralization of differences is intended to preserve diversity by preventing the hegemonic
takeover by extreme differences. In suboptimal versions of harmony, avoidance of
symmetry breakdown invariably results in reduction of difference and diversity. Let
us examine, in the following sections, how optimal harmony is committed to the
preservation of difference and diversity.
Preservation of difference and diversity in harmony. Historically, the distinction
between optimal and suboptimal harmony goes all the way back to Confucius, who
once said explicitly: Exemplary persons seek harmony not sameness; petty persons, then, are the opposite (Analects, 13/23, in Ames & Rosemont, 1998, p. 169).
Lu (2004) explains that the Confucian gentleman can be in a harmonious relationship with the world without losing his individuality, whereas the petty person simply follows the crowd (p. 182). Thus contrary to the collectivistic stereotype of the
Chinese culture, Confucius argued emphatically against simply blending in.
The distinction drawn by Confucius between the optimal and suboptimal versions of harmony can be further clarified by the difference noted by Abler (1989)
between particulate and blending systems (see Fig. 2.1).
As Fig. 2.1 shows, novelty in a blending system is an averaging of inputs, such
that repeated blending results in decreasing difference and increasing uniformity.
By contrast, combination in a particulate system results in greater variety. In this
light, optimal harmony, as represented by the Confucian gentleman, is a particulate
system, whereas the suboptimal harmony, as exemplified by the petty person, a
blending system.
Besides Confucius, other thinkers in ancient China have also recognized the
importance of difference and diversity. For instance, an association of diversity
with growth, and uniformity with sterility, is found in the Kuo Y which states,
32
Fig. 2.1 Blending systems
(upper tier) and particulate
systems (lower tier). In the
former, repeated combination
of things may lead to greater
uniformity, while in the latter,
to greater variety. Adapted
from Abler (1989, Fig. 1,
p. 2), with permission from
Journal of Social and
Biological Structure
Harmony
+
+
To ameliorate one thing with another is the meaning of harmony. The result is
flourishing and growth, and thereby creatures coming into existence. But supposing
uniformity is supplemented by uniformity, nothing new can be produced (Fung,
1962, p. 107). In sum, consistent with the blending versus particulate systems divide
(Abler, 1989), suboptimal harmony operates like a melting pot, whereas optimal
harmony toss salad or stir fry (Sundararajan, 2010), in which the diverse ingredients
contribute to the overall flavor of the whole by each retaining its uniqueness in taste
and texture. The insightful statement of the Lushi chunqiu is worth quoting again:
In combining your ingredients to achieve a harmony, you have to use the sweet, sour, bitter,
acrid, and the salty, and you have to mix them in an appropriate sequence and proportion.
Bringing the various ingredients together is an extremely subtle art in which each of them
has its own expression. (Ames & Rosemont, 1998, pp. 257258, emphasis added).
33
34
Harmony
Optimal harmony in emotional refinement. How do the Chinese make compromises? Take the middle road, be moderate in what you say or dothis is the zhong
yong (the golden mean) way of thinking, according to Ji, Lam, and Guo (2010). This
formulation raises the question as to whether emotion moderation of the Chinese
results in more refined and differentiated experience as would be the case of a particulate system, or more blunted, less differentiated affect as would be the case of a
blending system. The foregoing analysis of optimal harmony suggests the possibility of the particulate scenario and that emotional refinement (Frijda & Sundararajan,
2007) would therefore be a more appropriate framework for our understanding of
the moderate emotions in China.
For an illustration, consider the following description of Confucius as a moderate, well-balanced person:
The Master was mild, and yet dignified; majestic, and yet not fierce; respectful, and yet easy
(Confucian Analects, 7/37, 1971, p. 207).
Emotional refinement requires two capacities: awareness and cognitive complexitythe former serving as the scaffold for the latter. First, awareness: To appreciate
the very fine quality of Confucius as portrayed here, one needs to sense in oneself the
tension that arises from reactions to personality traits that belong to two diametrically
opposedvertical versus horizontaldimensions of collectivism: authority versus
friendliness; austerity versus easy going; standing on ceremony versus being casual.
To have an emotional experiencesuch as tension, relief, and so onof these complex reactions rests squarely upon the capacity to be aware of ones own responses
and experiences at multiple levels, a skill known as intrapersonal attunement (Siegel,
2007), or savoring (Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007). The levels of awareness along
with the feedback loops between them can be adumbrated as follows:
(a) Awareness level 1: A juxtaposition of discrete emotions: fear, respect, and awe
toward an authority figure, on the one hand; and feeling at ease, comfort, and
casual toward a friend, on the other.
(b) Awareness level 2: The mind presenting to itself, unconsciously, a mental representation of (a) as a matrix of relationships between emotionscontrast and
complementarity, or the yin and yang dialectic.
(c) Awareness level 3: Conscious awareness of ones own affective responses to the
mental representation of (b), resulting in an experience of the emergent aesthetic emotion known as harmony.
According to Deacon (2006), aesthetics constitutes an emergent domain:
Emergent in the sense that its function is more a reflection of the form of the relationships that have been brought into being than of the component emotions that are
necessarily constitutive of the experience (p. 52). As an appreciative (i.e., savoring)
awareness of the intricacies of relationships between multiple subsystems that are
fostered by the cognition without control mode of processing (Thompson-Schill
et al., 2009), harmony constitutes a fine example of aesthetic emotions.
As for cognitive complexity, the refined emotions evoked by the portrait of
Confucius as the model of a life governed by harmony cover all the bases of cognitive
35
36
Harmony
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Chapter 3
Introduction
Once Nisbett (2003) asked a Chinese scholar why Westerners and Easterners had
developed different ways of thinking, the scholar replied, Because you had Aristotle
and we had Confucius (p. 29). This chapter explains this enigmatic answer.
My investigation takes three steps: First, I start with an agenda highly valued by
Confucius, namely the rectification of names concerning collectivism. I distinguish
various types of collectivism, and show how Confucianism is relational rather than
group based. Next, I introduce the Confucian project as a unique approach to the
problems posed by mass society. I focus on two choice points in the history of
human civilizationstrong ties versus big gods; and inner/private space versus
outer/public space. Monotheism and the law, representing the choice of big gods
and public space, respectively, have been important milestones in the history of
Western civilization. Confucius, by contrast, chose strong ties and the inner/private
consciousness as the arena for the development of a rites-based society. In the concluding section, I examine how this particular approach of Confucius is both shaped
by relational cognition and also makes important contributions to it.
39
40
3 Confucianism
41
(see also Gergen, 2009). Testing the communal/relational dimension in collectivism, Bresnahan, Chiu, and Levine (2004) found that relational interdependent selfconstrual was indeed related to the communal orientation, while collective interdependent self-construal was only marginally associated with it. The distinction
between relational versus group-based collectivism has also surfaced in the laboratory studies of yielding, which is one of the hallmarks of collectivism.
Two versions of yielding. To study cross-culture differences in social behavior,
Kim and Markus (1999) came up with an ingenious pen-choice paradigm:
Participants were asked to pick one among five pens that came in two colors, with
the ratio of 23 or 14 pens of the same color. A common finding is that collectivists
relative to individualists tend to favor the majority choice rather than picking the
pen with the unique color. Modifying slightly the pen selection paradigm by adding
a private condition, Hashimoto, Li, and Yamagishi (2011) found that when by themselves or being the last to choose, most people seemed to prefer the unique object
regardless of cultural background. This is consistent with an earlier study by
Yamagishi, Hashimoto, and Schug (2008), who found that people avoid the option
for the unique object when under social pressure. Invoking the group-based version
of collectivism as explanation, the authors attributed the majority choice to the strategy to not stand out and accrue negative reputationa strategy that is contingent on
the presence of others, hence is not operative in the private condition.
Van Doesum, Van Lange, and Van Lange (2013) made another modification to
the pen-choice paradigm by adding a consideration for others: Which object would
you choose? You pick first, then the other (p. 89). Participants were told to imagine
playing with another person a decision task to choose one among three objects, of
which two were identical, and the third different. The participants were asked (a) to
keep the perspective of the other in mind, (b) to keep the others best interest in
mind, or (c) to think of their own preferences (p. 90). The authors predicted and
found that majority choices were the result of Social mindfulness [which] makes
people leave choice for others out of other-regard (p. 88). Invoking the communal
orientation, the authors claim that refraining from taking the last single cookie (or
pen) is to leave a next person something to choose from (p. 86). Challenging the
group-based interpretation of the majority choice, the authors argue for the communal dimension of collectivism, in which social mindfulness is the driving force
behind the proverbial self-effacement of collectives: Self sacrifice by the socially
mindful person is motivated by improving relationships with the person(s) one is
being mindful of (p. 98).
In sum, two competing interpretations for yielding have been offered by laboratory studies, one invoking group-based collectivism which focuses on conformity to
group norms and adaptation under social pressure; the other invoking a communal
dimension of the same that is concerned with the quality of relationships, along with
a genuine concern for the otherthe former emphasizes the vertical orientation of
obedience to hierarchy and authority, whereas the latter, according to Van Doesum
et al. (2013), the horizontal orientation of making other-regarding choices (p. 98),
such as leaving choice options for others (p. 86).
42
3 Confucianism
Two versions of power. Corresponding to the two types of collectivism, groupbased versus relational, there are two power motivespersonalized versus socialized, according to Torelli and Shavitt (2010). Personalized power orientation focuses
on recognition and status enhancement, whereas socialized power orientation puts a
premium on the need of others, caring, and positive transformation of others.
Furthermore, parallel to these power orientations are two viable strategies to gain
power and influencedominance and prestige, according to Cheng, Tracy,
Foulsham, Kingstone, and Henrich (2013). Dominance is characterized by the use
of force and intimidation to induce fear, whereas prestige, the sharing of expertise
or know-how to gain respectthe former is a strategy that humans share with other
animals (recall the pay-to-stay strategy of the fish); the latter, as exemplified by
teachers/gurus, seems to be uniquely evolved to suit the human needs for social
learning and information sharing.
In ancient China, the dominance orientation is found in the Realist, also known as
the Legalists. According to Waley (1939), they held that law should replace morality (p. 151); and that Force can always secure obedience; an appeal to morality,
very seldom (p. 155). Consistent with the pay-to-stay strategy of the fish, which
involves punishment as a means for dominants to control payment by subordinates
(Bergmller et al., 2005), the Legalists capitalized on punitive measures to motivate
behavior: When offences are concealed, the people become stronger than the Law;
when crimes are punished, the Law is stronger than the people. When the people are
stronger than the Law, there will be disorders in the land; when the Law is stronger
than the people, the land will be powerful in war (Waley, 1939, pp. 172173).
By contrast, the agenda of Confucius was to humanize power by the prestige
strategy to power, in which respect is earned through sharing and helping, and by the
socialized power orientation, which Torelli and Shavitt (2010) found to be associated with horizontal collectivism, characterized by caring for others, and opposition
against authoritarian aggression and social inequality. In other words, faced with the
choice between a government which is suffused with the spirit that maintains the
harmony of an ideal family life and a government in which hierarchy and authority
are based on brute force or mere interest without any sense of spiritual-moral constraint (Schwartz, 1985, p. 70), Confucius opted for the former by capitalizing on
the relational cognition, as embodied in the transformational power of rituals.
43
Instead of big gods, Confucius found his answer in strong ties (Chap. 1). This could
be as significant a milestone in human consciousness as the evolution of big gods.
According to Read (2010), a major transition in human evolution is a shift to relational reasoning in social groups.
Relational reasoning of strong ties was seen as the solution to mass society by
both Confucianism and Daoism, except that the latter privileged the maternal order,
whereas the former the patriarchic order, according to Bollas (2013):
Lao Tzu, Confucius, and other philosophers of the 100 year period (4th century BCE) all perceived the hazards of the large group. Daoism brings the group together through mystical
unity with the maternal order and Confucius convenes the group around filial identity. (p. 47)
Daoism is reserved for the next chapter. For now, we consider the Confucian
project of humanizing power through strong ties.
44
3 Confucianism
The external form of rituals. Bollas (2013) makes the interesting observation that
if The Book of Songs sequesters the soul in poetry (to be elaborated later), then
The Book of Rites is a literary boot camp for character formation (p. 42). The Book
of Rites is a compendium of texts (dating back to twelfth century BC, and standardized in the third century AD) that address:
amongst other things, how and where one should stand in the presence of others, where
one should sit at a table, how one should eat, how men and women should behave in one
anothers presence, how rulers should behave in the presence of the people, how sons
should behave in relation to fathers and elders, how long one should mourn and in what
manner. It is a seemingly endless, meticulous detailing of behavior. (Bollas, 2013, p. 42)
Referring to the rites as reverent formality (Bollas, 2013, p. 67), Hsn Tzu
outlined the many rituals one can live byfor example, how the sounds of different
bells announce different events. He claimed that rituals are needed because humans
find pleasure in a patterned, regulated existence. Thus, Rites are a means of satisfaction, said Hsn Tzu (Bollas, 2013, p. 67).
The internal substance of rituals. Ren (benevolence) refers to virtues and
capacities modeled on the nurturance and reciprocity of affection among those near
and dear. Although taking social hierarchy for granted, Confucius put emphatic
stress not on the group-based behaviors of obedience or fitting in, so much as on
benevolence or nurturance (ren): When asked by his disciples to share his personal
aspirations, Confucius said (Analects, 5/25), in regard to the aged, to give them
rest; in regards to friends, to show them sincerity; in regard to the young, to treat
them tenderly (Confucian Analects, 1971, p. 183).
While Confucian morality is based on strong ties, the moral identity one gains
through a life-time cultivation of ren may also help to attenuate one major drawback
of strong-ties-based rationality, namely in-group favoritism. There is some empirical support for this conjecture: In a series of experimental studies, Smith, Aquino,
Koleva, and Graham (2014) found that in-group favoritism, as evidenced by supporting torture of or withholding help from out-group members, was attenuated
among participants who also had a strong moral identity. Otherwise put, people with
a strong moral identity are more likely than those with weak moral identity to extend
moral concern to out-groups.
One of the virtues of ren that lies at the core of ritual action (li) is yielding (rang ),
which according to Confucius holds the key to humanizing power: If one is able to
rule a state by li and the spirit of yielding [rang] [appropriate to it] what difficulty will
there be? If one is not able to rule a state by li and the spirit of yielding, of what use is
li? (Analects, 4/13, translated by Waley, 1983, p. 104). Schwartz (1985) explains:
The spirit of yielding to others involves precisely the capacity to overcome such
passions as the love of mastery, self-aggrandizement, resentment and covetousness
of which he speaks elsewhere (p. 73).
Yielding to others can be understood in the context of social mindfulness.
According to Van Doesum et al. (2013), Being socially mindful means to safeguard other peoples control over their own behavioral options in situations of interdependence (p. 86, emphasis in original). This entails other-oriented capacities
45
and/or tendencies (p. 87) with a benevolent focus on the needs and interests of
others (p. 86). In everyday life, yielding (rang) translates into being considerate or
being polite.
Integration of form and substance. Integration of the two components of ritualsform and essenceconsists in a dual emphasis of both li and ren. This vision
of Confucius is summed up by Schwartz (1985) as follows (where the older
Romanization of jen was used instead of ren):
only through the established channels of li can ones inner self-mastery make itself manifest to society and lead within to the higher moral excellence of jen . Acting according to
the civilized practices of the normative tradition is a necessary ingredient of Jen, and making
ones Jen manifest through the li is the only way in which li can be brought to life. (p. 77)
So far, so good. But the weight of adaptive formality can also stiffen the life of
the (natural) self, a problem that Confucius was keenly aware of.
Cast in the framework of rituals, the two worlds of the selfa spontaneous, relational being, and a collective, codified beingraises the question as to whether
over-adaptation to the group may cause dispossession of the true self (Bollas, 2013).
After all, how can the self be natural and spontaneous (hence true) after what
amounts to a rigorous training in adaptation through li? (Bollas, 2013). Atrophy of
the (true) self results in observance of rituals in hollow form, a practice toward
which Confucius expressed strong objections.
46
3 Confucianism
Lau points out that each of the things Confucius detested bore a superficial
resemblance to the proper thing, and it is because of this superficial resemblance
that the specious can be mistaken for the genuine. Confucius abhorrence is directed
against this spuriousness (cited in Hall & Ames, 1987, p. 279). The simulacrum
par excellence is the village worthy, one who shows outer conformity but lacks the
inner spirit. Thus Confucius said: The village worthy is the thief of virtue (Ames,
1996, p. 236). And again, I dislike weeds lest they be confused with grain .
I dislike the village worthy lest he be confused with the virtuous (Ames, 1996,
p. 237). Mencius explained: If you want to condemn the village worthy, you have
nothing on him; if you want to criticize him, there is nothing to criticize. He chimes
in with the practices of the day and blends in with the common world. Where he
lives he seems to be conscientious and seems to live up to his word, and in what he
does, he seems to have integrity. His community all like him, and he sees himself as
being right. Yet one cannot pursue the way of Yao or Shun [the sage kings] with
such a person (Ames, 1996, p. 236). In the final analysis, the village worthy,
according to Ames (1996), is a case of lack of creativity: the creative element necessary for his personalization and renewal of the exemplary role is absent. He has no
blood. He is a hypocrite because he has nothing of quality to contribute on his own
(Ames, 1996, p. 237).
To understand Confucius abhorrence of hypocrisy, we do well to follow
Fingarettes (1972) lead in locating the efficacy of ritual action in that of magic.
The basic principle of magic is like produces like, effect resembling cause, a
principle summed up by the Chinese term kan-lei (Munakata, 1983,
p. 107; Chaps. 6 and 12), which means literally, similar natures or kinds [lei]
mutually influence or respond to each other (Goldberg, 1998, p. 36). For illustration, consider the ritual for rain:
The leading principle in organizing this ritual [Asking for Rain] was apparently that everything in the ritual should be of similar kinds in order to get a sympathetic response. Since
the basic nature of rain is water with the force of yin, the things related to water, and things
which are yin, feature prominently in the components of the ritual. (Munakata, 1983, p. 110)
Imagine what happens if one of the ingredients of this elaborate preparation turns
out to be a sham. From the perspective of sympathetic magic, the problem with
simulacrum lies in the fact that it has the appearance of the real thing but cannot
effect a sympathetic response from the real thing, due to its lack of inner
substance. That is why hollow form is not merely trivialfor Confucius, it is insidiously deceptive (Hall & Ames, 1987, p. 279).
By locating the power of rituals in the (true) self, Confucius has redefined power.
He replaced the collective force of coercion with the relational power of attraction
as captured by the notion of gan-lei (like attracts like) that lies at the core of magic.
Furthermore, to make clear that the power of the individual (to attract others) is a
moral one, he situates the power of attraction in sincerity: A commentary on the
47
I-Ching hexagram (61) Inner Truth (Chung Fu) reads: This is the echo awakened
in men through spiritual attraction. Whenever a feeling is voiced with truth and
frankness, whenever a deed is the clear expression of sentiment, a mysterious and
far-reaching influence is exerted . The root of all influence lies in ones own inner
being (Wilhelm, 1967, p. 237).
To solve the problem of the hollow forms of rituals, and to foster the true self
with its natural goodness, Confucius has a twofold agenda: To counterbalance group
living with the private life of the self, and to complement ritual with the arts.
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3 Confucianism
Personalization. Hall and Ames (1987) point out that ritual action is truly meaningful only as a particular and personal disclosure of meaning (p. 274). They argue
that ritual action is best translated as propriety meaning to make ones own,
for appropriate ritual actions require a personalization and a making over fitting
to ones own specific condition (p. 274). But the classic text shall have the last
word. The text Hsn Tzu cites three responses, reflecting three levels of moral
understanding, to the question of Confucius: what is the jen (ren) person like?
Tzu-lu replied, one who causes others to love him; Tzu-kung replied, one who
loves others; Yen Yan replied, an authoritative person is one who loves himself
(Ames, 1991, p. 106). Amess exegesis is illuminating. He suggests that the first
level of moral understanding as indicated by the first answer entails a selfishness;
the second level as indicated by the second answer is higher, but is self-effacing.
Ames concludes: The highest level, then, is necessarily reflexive (1991, p. 106).
Self-reflexivity. The Chinese notion of the self is consistent with Kierkegaards
purely structural definition of the self: The self is a relation which relates itself to
its own self (cited by Neville, 1996, p. 204). On this view, the self is not necessarily
knowledge representation, an aggregate of attributes so essential to the Western selfconcept, so much as relational consciousnesswhere there is self-reflexive consciousness, there the self must be. Chinese classic texts are replete with
self-reflexivity. Cua (1996) investigated reflexive binomials such as tzu-locutions in
ancient texts, and came up with: examine oneself, reproach oneself, disgrace oneself (The Analects); do violence to oneself, nourish oneself, realize [Dao] in oneself (Mencius). This self-reflexive orientation is referred to by Tu (1985b) as
authenticity: the word authenticity seems to me more appropriate than narrowly conceived moralistic terms such as honesty and loyalty to convey the original Confucian sense of learning for the sake of the self (p. 52). Self-reflexivity
plays an important part in Confucian virtues such as ren (benevolence), which
includes a capacity of self-awareness and reflection (Schwartz, 1985, p. 75), and
cheng (sincerity or inner truthfulness), which is defined by Mencius as He who
is sincere with himself is called true (Tu, 1985b, p. 96).
Toward the cultivation of this true self, Confucius turned to the arts. Thus in
contrast to Plato who privileged logic and rhetoric, Confucius made poetry and
music the foundation of his pedagogy.
Contrary to the utilitarian orientation of the secular worldviews, the ritual consciousness is essentially aesthetic (Dissanayake, 1992). Thus rites are supposed to
function in tandem with the arts, especially poetry and music. In comparison to laws,
49
rituals are transformative rather than coercive. The regulatory function of poetry rests
squarely upon this noncoercive, transformative power of rituals. Owen (1992)
explains: Poetry occupied a very important place in the Confucian cultural program,
but its instruction is not supposed to be coercive . when combined with music, the
poems of the Book of Songs were supposed to influence people to good behavior
unconsciously: listeners apprehended and thus came to share a virtuous state of mind,
and the motions of their own affections would be shaped by that experience (p. 45).
Chinese aesthetics is an eloquent articulation of the two cardinal principles of the
ritual consciousnessveneration of tradition and hegemony of the inner reality
the former prefers continuity over innovations in domain constraints; the latter seeks
creativity in the inner spirit that transcends all outer forms (Li, 1997). Through
these two aspects of the ritual, poetry integrates the two worlds of the selfpublic
and private. Bollas (2013) points out how poetry not only offers a dwelling place for
the soul, thereby housing the intimate particularity of individual experience, the
privacy of deep emotional experience (p. 40), but also allows us to dive into an
unconscious matrix, in which we find a shared canon of common objects that yield
deeply private and idiosyncratic meaning. This two-tiered structure characteristic of
the ritual consciousnessthe public, shared formality on the one hand; and private,
idiosyncratic meaning, on the otheris what makes poetry the ideal instrument for
integrating the self and the group. Bollas (2013) explains:
Structured, ritualized, mannered and stylized, the poem is the quintessential human reflection of the Eastern mind. As mass society develops in China and human behavior is codified, people live within the parameters of social metrics and rhythms, rhyming with one
another through collective being. In the poem, however, they find their double a literary
Doppelgnger which obeys all the rules and yet finds in the poetic structure room for
unique arrangements of common themes. (p. 39)
To see how the two aspects of the ritual consciousnessinner substance versus
outer form; private versus public; self versus groupinterweave into the larger
wholeness of Communal Sharing (Chap. 1; Fiske, 1991), we need to see the
Confucian curriculum in its full spectrum, which reads as follows, in the words of
Confucius: Aroused by the Odes [the Book of Song]; established by the Rites;
brought into perfect focus by Music (Fang, 1954, p. 9). In this threefold program,
emotions are first aroused by poetry, then molded by li. This makes sense. According
to Dissanayake (1992), rituals pattern and manipulate emotions by means of shaping and elaboration.
Molding emotions with rituals are distinctly different from the Western notion of
emotion regulation (see Chap. 10). In the latter, it is reason that does the regulating,
whereas in the former, rituals are guided by the logic of emotion to serve the purpose of emotion. This point is made clear by the fact that emotional engagement is
considered by Confucius to be the sine qua non of ritual action: In the ceremonies
of mourning, it is better that there be deep sorrow than a minute attention to observances (Confucian Analects, 1971, p. 156).
Hsn Tzu (cited in Bollas, p. 67) asked: What is the point of a period of mourning that lasts 3 years? He answered himself: it is a form which has been set up after
consideration of the emotions involved. He claimed that there is a temporal logic
50
3 Confucianism
to rites, one that follows emotional needs. Rites trim what is too long and stretch
out what is too short. Thus rituals, said Hsn Tzu, satisfy human emotions. Indeed
when rites are performed in the highest manner, then both the emotions and the
forms embodying them are fully realized. This would be an apt description of
music, in which form and substance, the group and the self are fused in the mode of
Communal Sharing (Chap. 1; Fiske, 1991).
In the Confucian project, the trajectory of emotions is from personal to communal, culminating in a synergistic community (Chap. 1; Katz & Murphy-Shigematsu,
2012). Now, we are back to Durkheims (1995) collective effervescence, but we get
there via a detour through the cultivation of the self. It is this detour that constitutes
the lifes journey for a Confucian gentleman.
But is this detour through the inner, private self to group harmony worth all that
trouble? What if alternative or even more efficient means to social coordination
exists? In fact, there is some evidence, based on a series of experimental studies by
Thomas, DeScioli, Haque, and Pinker (2014), that public knowledge provides the
most effective and reliable path to coordination (p. 659). If the Confucian project
of the inner, private self is not absolutely necessary for social coordination, what
advantage is there?
Let us pause for a moment here. How to make sure that people will curb their
selfish impulses in a mass society? In comparison to the Western solution of big
gods and the law, the choice made by Confucius seemed to be a more circuitous
routecultivation of strong ties and private consciousness. In the following section,
I revisit this choice by a close examination of the study by Thomas et al. (2014) on
the cooperation games.
51
partner, which has the potential to make more money only if the partner makes the
same choice: If one party decides to work with a partner, but the partner chooses to
work alone, both parties earn nothing. The scenario of the coordination game involves
two merchants, a butcher and a baker, with the only means of communication between
the two an unreliable messenger boy. Working independently, the butcher sells
chicken wings, and the baker dinner rolls. Working together they can sell hot dogs for
which they earn more. The hot dog price varies from day to day, rendering their collaboration sometimes profitable, and sometimes not. The hot dog price was conveyed
to the participants by a messenger boy displayed in a private box they were told only
the participant and the partner could see, or by a loudspeaker displayed in a public
box they were told other participants could see. Four conditions were set up to model
the knowledge states as follows (as seen from the bakers experience):
Common knowledge (a). In the public box, the baker read that the loudspeaker
broadcast the market price of today. In the private box the baker read, The
Messenger Boy did not come by. Because the market price was broadcast on the
loudspeaker, the Butcher knows [todays price], and he knows that you know this
information as well (p. 663).
Private knowledge (b). In the private box, the baker read, The Messenger Boy
has not seen the Butcher today, so he cannot tell you anything about what the
Butcher knows (p. 662). The public box said that the loudspeaker was silent.
Secondary shared knowledge (c1). The baker read in the private box, The
Messenger Boy says he stopped by the butcher shop before coming to your bakery. He tells you that the Bucher knows what todays hot dog price is. However,
he says that he forgot to mention to the Butcher that he was coming to see you,
so the Butcher is not aware that you know todays hot dog price (p. 662). The
public box said that the loudspeaker was silent.
Tertiary shared knowledge (c2). The baker read in the private box, The
Messenger Boy mentions that he is heading over to the butcher shop, and will let
the Butcher know todays price as well. The Messenger Boy will also tell the
Butcher that he just came from your bakery and told you the price. However, the
Messenger Boy will not inform the Butcher that he told you he would be heading
over there. So, while the Butcher is aware that you know todays price, he is not
aware that you know that he knows that (pp. 662663). The public box said that
the loudspeaker was silent.
Nicely captured here are the two epistemological spacesprivate versus public:
The loudspeaker, signifying the public space, is on in only one of the four conditionscommon knowledge. The rest of the conditions, from private to shared
knowledge, belong to the private space where the loudspeaker plays no role (i.e., is
silent). Corresponding to the knowledge states modeled here are different states of
the mind. The knowledge states of (b) and (c), above, are associated with subjective
awareness, whereas (a), objective awareness. The (a) condition of public knowledge
can be formulated in accordance with the mind-to-world transaction:
A, B, C all know about X.
Where A, B, C = multiple minds; X = objective knowledge about the world (price
of hot dogs).
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3 Confucianism
Note that in this condition (a), there is no transaction between the minds, since the
messenger boy is rendered unnecessary by the loudspeaker that publicizes the message. Mind-to-mind transaction takes place in the private space of (b) and (c). The
condition of (c), denoting (privately) shared knowledge, has two variantssecondary and tertiarywhich permit the following formulations: A knows that B knows
X (secondary, p. 658); and A knows that B knows that A knows X (tertiary,
p. 658). Another variation of (c) is (b) which refers to private (unshared) knowledge,
where A and B have coalesced into the same person, thus A knows that A knows
X. Note the prominence of relational cognition in both (b) and (c), which are concerned with the parity between two mind states (I know what you know or I know
that I know), not simply the objective knowledge X. Corresponding to these mental
states are the three levels of mind mappings proposed by Gary McKeown (2013).
Objective awareness of common knowledge (a) corresponds to mind-world mapping; subjective awareness of private knowledge (b), within-mind mappings; and
subjective awareness of privately shared knowledge (c), between-mind mappings.
Public versus private knowledge representation. Mind-to-mind mapping(b)
and (c)is a messy business, full of uncertainties. By contrast, public broadcast
comes with knowledge explicit and clear, thereby rendering unnecessary all the
convoluted loops of private awareness in (b) and (c) as symbolized by the highly
idiosyncratic and unpredictable itineraries of the Messenger Boy. It is publically
shared knowledge, not mind-to-mind transactions through the labyrinth of private
awareness, that facilitates mutualistic cooperation, so the study of Thomas et al.
(2014) found: In comparison to all the other conditions (b and c), participants were
more likely to choose the cooperation game when the loudspeaker broadcasted the
daily price of hot dogs. Why then did the traditional Confucian society prefer (b)
and (c) over (a)?
The short answer to this question is that the subjective reality of (b) and (c) cannot always be shared publically. There may be good reasons why traditional societies
keep distinct these two realitiesprivate and public. Conflation of the two in modern times has caused much concern:
every disaster inevitably brings the television journalist who protrudes a microphone
into the face of the distraught victim and asks, How does it feel? to have had your son
killed by a snipers bullet, to have been raped Once the private domain of individuals
reacting to personal losses, emotions such as grief and rage are now broadcast around the
world (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 97).
The long answer to this question is the social brain hypothesis (Chap. 1), which
posits social interaction, rather than food gathering and tool use, as the key factor
behind the evolution of human intelligence. In particular, Dunbar and Shultz (2007)
locate the main contributing factor not in group living per se so much as in the
strong ties through social cohesion, and pair-bonding.
Rationality of Community Sharing. The study of Thomas et al. (2014) is based on
the rationality of Market Pricing (Chap. 1; Fiske, 1991) which is privileged by the
modern societies of weak ties. A very different paradigm for the mutualistic cooperation game can be derived from the rationality of Communal Sharing (Chap. 1;
Fiske, 1991), which is privileged by the traditional societies based on strong ties.
53
Suppose the Baker and the Butcher are siblings or a couple, how would they make
business decisions concerning whether to sell hot dogs or not on any given day?
Should they follow the algorithm of Communal Sharing (Chap. 1; Fiske, 1991)
one for all and all for oneonly one of the partners needs to know the hot dog price
at any time, and makes a decision accordingly for both parties. In this strong-tiesbased cooperation game, investment of energy would shift from objective states of
knowledge (daily fluctuation of the hot dog price) to subjective knowledge representations, such as shared intentions and desires. As McKeown (2013) points out, in the
mode of transaction that capitalizes on within-mind mappings (Are you thinking
what I am thinking?), the representational options for communication will likely
include a high proportion of social relationships and group dynamics rather than the
concrete perceptual representations of mind-world mappings (the hot dog prices).
Thus when shared subjective reality is the primary concern, the mutualistic cooperation game also changes: According to the rationality of Market Pricing, cooperation is based on careful analysis of cost and benefit, whereas according to the
rationality of Communal Sharing (Chap. 1; Fiske, 1991), cooperation is not necessarily the end in itself, but also serves as a means of communication. According to
McKeown (2013), humans communicate for three purposes(1) exchange propositional information (the hot dog price), (2) align representational parity (Are you
thinking what I am thinking?), and (3) display mind-reading abilities (I bet you will
like this.). The shift from (1) to (2) and (3) entails a transition from mind-to-world
orientation to mind-to-mind transactions. This shift has far reaching ramifications.
McKeown (2013) and others claim that shift to relational reasoning paves the
way for a more abstract representations. For instance, mothers mother is a categorization based on relations and recursive reasoning, which is much more abstract
than hot dog prices. One of the best fruits of the relational cognition is the arts,
which constitute the core of the Confucian curriculum. In contrast to the world of
objective reality which is the primary focus of science, art resides in a world of
subjective reality, a reality made possible by mind-to-mind transactions. Thus
McKeown (2013) points out that literature may confirm more strongly to a world
defined by between-mind mappings rather than the stochastic realities of an objective world (p. 281). In the following chapters we will have the opportunity to delve
into this shared subjective reality which is sustained by the relational cognition and
honed to nuance and precision by the Confucian curriculum.
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3 Confucianism
who believed in neither man nor God, but simply that government must be based on the
actual facts of the world as they are, and who, following this principle, worked up a blueprint for a totalitarian society more thorough and more detailed than any the West was to
know for two thousand years. (backcover)
References
55
The combined influence of poetry, music and the rites has left an indelible mark
on the emotional landscape of the Chinese, which we will explore in the following
chapters.
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Chapter 4
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60
4 Daoism
Due to the high esteem for hermits, many Chinese intellectuals were proud to add to
their names the comment lived as a recluse, and would not serve in office (p. 299).
In this protocol, the Chinese hermits share in common with the asocial fish the
following traits which will be examined in the following sections:
Refusal to serve.
Splitting rather than staying.
Breeding independently.
Refusal to Serve
According to Mote (1960), the keystone of Chinese eremitism (p. 204) lies in
refusal to take office. The distance to which one withdrew, the firmness with which
one barred the gate, and the seriousness with which one cultivated oneself (p. 203)
were not the deciding factors. It was the renunciation of office-holdingeither at
the outset or after a period of public lifethat defined the recluse (pp. 203204).
The Confucian gentlemen were supposed to serve the state. With its characteristic
apathy toward politics, Daoism becomes a major source of inspiration for the
Confucian gentlemen who decided to make a drastic career change. Chuangzi
famously preferred fishing to high status and political office. He asked what a turtle
would choose if offered the option of being nailed in a place of veneration and honor
in some place of worship or staying at the lake and dragging his tail in the mud
(Watson, 1964, p. 109). This radical career choice has far reaching ramifications for
the hermits.
Independence as fitness. In order to make it on their own without the security of
a salaried position in the government, the hermits need to have a relatively high
degree of autonomy and competence. In other words, they need skills to eke out a
living that is self-reliant and financially independent. Thus instead of scholars who
figure prominently in the Confucian texts, the Chuang Tzu finds inspiration in the
skilled performance of lowly occupations such as butchers, lute players, cicada
catchers, and wheelwrights.
Staying or Splitting
61
In addition to the practical needs for financial independence, the skilled execution
of virtuosity also serves for Chuangzi the model of a good life, in which superior
wisdom is acquired through experience and practice. Chuangzi was particularly
interested in the uniqueness of the individual performance which defies replication.
His attention to uniqueness contributes importantly to the Chinese notion of unique
individuality (Ames, 1991, p. 109), which is defined by Ames (1991) as the character of a single and unsubstitutable particular, such as a work of art (p. 108).
Staying or Splitting
Whether to come forth and serve, or to retire in withdrawal, is not a fortuitous decision.
(Chao Meng-fu, 12541322) (Mote, 1960, p. 236)
Whereas the asocial fish cant tell us why they disperse rather than stay and pay,
the hermits have been articulate about their reasons for leaving society. According
to Mote (1960), social withdrawal as an alternative way of life gained importance
in times of disorder and impending doom, when thoughtful pessimism seemed
more attractive to educated men than the normal pattern of life (p. 205). This is
consistent with the Chinese belief that when things are under the sway of the Dao,
one endeavors to benefit oneself as well as the world; when the world is exhibiting
no evidence of the Dao, one retires to cultivate oneself alone (Porter, 1993). Thus,
the main reason behind voluntary withdrawal from active participation in public life
seems to be self-preservation in times of social upheaval, or circumstances that
threatened ones integrity and/or ones life. This sentiment behind eremitism is well
expressed by the Confucian scholar Liu Yin (124993), who lived as a hermit under
the rule of the Mongols:
When one is born in a degenerate and disorderly age
And there is no one worthy of being called a ruler, who would want to serve?
If one must drift and float like a cross-current in a measureless ocean,
Is it because one would have chosen to do so? (Mote, 1960, p. 225)
In Chinese history, when the intellectual climate and moral tone sank into pessimism and apathy during hard times, stayers consist of two groups of literatione
group would continue to serve the corrupt court, while another group would turn in
despair to various forms of escapism, such as indulgence in wine and sex. Eremitism
represents the third choice, which renounced both state service and extreme selfindulgence and chose some variety of withdrawal (Mote, 1960, p. 203). In contrast
to the first two groups which remained in society, the third choice entails the abandonment of the existing social order in search of a new habitat which is solitude.
Solitude as habitat selection. When solitude is sought as a particular life style, it
may be understood as an alternative habitat in lieu of society. The hermits choice
of solitude over society may be understood in light of the distinction between
civilization and genuine culture drawn by Edward Sapir (1956). Sapir claims that
genuine culture is reflected in the energy set free for the pursuit of the remoter
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4 Daoism
This Daoist vision of an ideal society is consistent with the findings of Oishi and
Kesebir (2012) that strong-ties-based communities do well in environments of low
mobility. It also finds support in the social brain hypothesis. According to Dunbar
(2014), the optimal group size is 150, characteristic of communities ranging from
small-scale societies to Facebook. His explanation is that communities of this size
strike a balance between the minimum size for effective functionality and the maximum size for creating a sense of commitment to the community (and, hence, willingness to compromise on self-interest) (p. 112).
However, whereas under the rule of the sage kings people in the mythical past
might not have traveled beyond the bounds of their villages, the attempt to regain
paradise lost through habitat selection necessarily entails high mobility.
Mobility and creativity. Mobility has been found to be associated with certain
personality traitsindependence or the frontier spirit, explorativeness, and creativity. Concerning independence, Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, and Ramaswamy
(2006) found greater independence in Hokkaido than in the rest of Japan, which is
a collectivistic culture that privileges interdependence. The authors attribute the
spirit of independence to the voluntary settlement of the population in Hokkaido.
Scholars are in general agreement that The central theme of the Chuang Tzu
may be summed up in a single word: Freedom (Watson, 1964, p. 3); more specifically, freedom from the world and its conventions (Mair, 1994, p. xliii). To
Chuangzi, low mobility and mental stagnation are intimately related such that mental emancipation requires venturing out of ones comfort zone in thinking. He makes
this point through a parable: You cant discuss the ocean with a well froghes
limited by the space he lives in . You cant discuss the Way with a cramped
Staying or Splitting
63
This parable makes a vivid contrast between stayers and dispersers. The stayers,
as exemplified by the silk bleachers, moved within their clan (strong ties), were
invested in the maintenance of the trade (doing the same thing for generations), and
evinced no interest in novelty and innovations. By contrast, the disperser, as exemplified by the traveler who was just passing through as a stranger (weak ties), was
able to come up with novel ideas for the use of a device the maintenance of which
he made no contribution to.
The connection between eremitism and creativity is robust in Chinese history.
According to Han (1998), the hermits were pioneers in Chinese philosophy, scholarship, poetry, music, painting, the arts of tea, medicine, geography, health sciences,
64
4 Daoism
and more. For instance, the founding fathers of Daoism are two famous hermits,
Laozi and Chuangzi. Many eminent poets and painters took hermitage in the mountains. Since creativity involves independent production of memes (novel ideas), it
may be considered the human counterpart of the fishs independent breeding.
Breeding Independently
Humans use solitude for a wide variety of reasons, such as relaxation, freedom from
social pressure, and so on (Averill & Sundararajan, 2014). But when it comes to the
more serious pursuit of solitude as a habitat selection, humans seem to approximate the
asocial fish which seeks a new habitat for one purpose onlybreeding independently
instead of taking care of the brood of the breeding pair. Similarly, independent production of memes, rather than maintenance of the reigning ideology, rank high on the priority of hermits. Indeed, many hermits are meme machines in the sense that they tend
to dedicate their lives to the production of high quality memes. For illustration, consider the following lines of the Tang hermit and one of the most influential theorists in
Chinese poetics, Si-Kong Tu (837908) (Chap. 9; Owen, 1992; Sundararajan, 2004):
Myriad problems in this world do not concern me,
The only thing that I am ashamed of is this:
Not to have poetry this fall. (Cited in Zhu, 1984, p. 13)
Here, the hermits concerns seemed to have made a drastic shift from things
worldly to a life dedicated to poetry, which is one of the most important memes in
Chinese society.
The fish analogy goes further. In order to defend their new territory, the disperser
fish tend to be more aggressive than the stayers. Likewise, when it comes to defending their own principles (memes), hermits are relatively more aggressive.
The heroic hermits. Hermits were willing to give up the comforts of society, the
financial security and social status procured by a career in public service, and much
more, for their memes/ideals. As Mote (1960) points out, bona fide hermits were
uncompromising men of principle, who saw in office-holding the chief threat to
their ethical principles, and whose refusal to serve was an expression of protest
against the ruler and his government. Some would refuse to serve even unto death.
A case in point is Jie Zhi-tui (600 BC). As one of the chief advisers of King Wen
Gong of Jing, Jie contributed much to the kings success in conquests. After the king
secured his power, Jie was disgusted with the strife for power and profits at the
court. He left without a notice and went into the deep mountains to become a hermit.
Not able to find Jie, the king set fire in the hope of forcing Jie to come outonly to
find Jies body in the mountain, burnt with the trees (Han, 1998).
Another principle for which the hermits are willing to defend at any cost is freedom to be oneself, especially in terms of emotional and spiritual integrity. Since
public service puts much demand on fitting in, refusal to manage ones emotional
expressions for the sake of fitting in constitutes one of the major reasons behind the
65
hermits pursuit of solitude. As the hermit Guo Pu (276324) put it: Giving free
reign to my feelings lies in going it alone (Li, 1986, p. 251). The most famous
example of this trend is the poet Tao Yuanming (365427).
Tao was born of an official family, but managed to secure only minor positions
in the government. One day upon being told to dress up to receive an inspector sent
by his superior he quit, saying famously, How could I bow to the country bumpkins
for the sake of five bushels of rice! (Han, 1998, p. 24). Retiring to his home and
gardens while still in his early 1940s, he spent the rest of his life as a gentleman
farmer in the foothills of Lushan. He led a simple and contented life devoted to
poetry and wine, amidst abject poverty. A later recluse Chao Meng-fu (12541322)
wrote of his admiration for Tao Yuanming:
How readily he gave up his official position.
And bore poverty, dozing contentedly by his north window. (Mote, 1960, p. 237)
Social withdrawal is at best passive aggressiveness. The offensive type of aggressiveness is not prominent in Daoism, due to the Chinese penchant for transcendence. In comparison to the crowd-defying genius in the West, the hermits
approximate more closely the disperser fish that take off to new territories.
Transcendence names this counterpart tendency in the humans to open up new frontiers in mental space.
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4 Daoism
Anti-hierarchy
In Confucianism, the Dao (Way) is a system of moral truths; in Daoism, it is Nature
in the most fundamental senseeternal, nameless, indescribable. The Confucian
Dao is embodied in the asymmetry of order and hierarchy; the Daoist Way, in the
highest order of symmetry that levels all order and hierarchy to a thoroughgoing
pluralismas Chuangzi puts it, the Dao resides in everything down to excrements.
Along with hierarchy goes orthodoxythe belief held by Confucius and other
thinkers that proper order would be achieved only when society follows a single,
true, Dao. Daoism has no use for orthodoxy. Mair (1994) is not exaggerating when
he writes that Master Chuang was the first great proponent of true diversity and
that he had the good sense to recognize that it could not be achieved through government fiat (p. xli).
The Confucian sage is one who speaks the authoritative voice of the truth that
cuts through the polyglot of half-truths. In stark contrast is the Daoist text Chuang
Tzu, which delights with fantasy conversations between multiple and equally valid
perspectives. Demonstrating open-mindedness and receptivity to all the different
voices of the Dao, particularly the voices of those who have run afoul of human
authority or seem least authoritative, these fantasy conversations take place among
a motley group of interlocutors ranging from crooked and foul-smelling trees, millipedes, convicts, physically deformed individuals, to musicians and the wind. And
the arguments tend to end with a reflective question (is it or isnt it ?) than a
strong conclusion (see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/taoism/). In sum, denying
that the Cosmos is one world, Daoism rejects any privileged order, since at any
given time any one factor may take the highest place in a hierarchy of cause and
effect (Hall, 1978, p. 277).
Recall that Confucianism has two componentsAuthority Ranking and
Communal Sharing (see Chap. 3). Daoism seeks to demolish the former, but retain
and improve on the latter.
Alone, Together
To refresh our memories, symmetry (see Chap. 1) refers to the superposition of all
potentials, which can be understood in terms of quantum mechanics. For instance,
Schrdingers cat is both live and deadthis is a state of symmetry. The cat is in
either one or the other state but not both, after you take a peekthis is symmetry
Alone, Together
67
breaking. Thus, OM as the highest order of symmetry necessarily entails a superposition of multiple states. This opens up for Daoism the possibility of endorsing both
strong and weak ties at once, a possibility not available in the lower symmetry subgroups, where one ends up with either one or the other type of relationships, depending on whether one decides to stay (strong tiesnetworking among kith and kin) or
split (weak tiesnetworking with strangers). With OM it is now possible for hermits to be amphibianto stay and be away at the same time, for instance to be a
hermit in the market place (see Chap. 9 for details).
Spiritualizing strong ties. In endorsing strong ties, Daoism has also spiritualized
it. This consists of several important modifications. First, Daoism privileges the
only horizontal relationfriend to friendout of the five cardinal, predominantly
vertical, relations of the Confucian society (ruler and minister; father and son; husband and wife; elder and younger siblings; friend and friend). One of the most celebrated friendships in China is that between Y Po-ya and Chung Tzu-chi (Henry,
1987, pp. 910): Y Po-ya was a great official; Chung Tzu-chi a woodcutter.
Whether Chung Tzu-chi was a hermit or not, he represents many important motifs
in Daoism: (a) self-employment as woodcutter or fisherman is one of the few career
paths preferred by hermits; (b) equalitarianism, as evident in the leveling effect of
the friendship between the high official and a humble woodcutter; (c) weak ties in
which mobility and association between strangers play an important role. Let us
take a closer look at this celebrated friendship.
The two met by chance when the woodcutter recognized the musical talent in
Po-ya, who tried to amuse himself by playing the zither as his boat was moored
beneath a mountain in wilderness. They had but a single night to appreciate each
others skills before Po-ya must continue north to report to his superiors in court. A
year later, when Po-ya returned to the wilderness on the anniversary of the occasion,
his friend had died. After that Po-ya smashed his zither and played no more.
This story gives dramatic expression to many essential elements of mind-tomind transactions (see Chaps. 3 and 6). First, it underlines the importance of
between-mind mappings (McKeown, 2013; Chap. 6). It is said that when Po-ya
played the zither, Chung Tzu-chi the woodcutter could always tell from the sounds
what Po-ya was thinking of. Second, sharing of information, acquisition of knowledge, mastery and control of resources, be they objects or peoplenone of these
familiar themes of the Western epistemology loom large in the narrative landscape
under consideration. It is not epistemology but ontology that takes center stage here.
Why is it, asked the great historian Ssu-ma Chien, that Po Ya never again played
his zither after Chung Tzu-chi died? And he answered his own question: A gentleman acts on behalf of one who knows him, as a woman adorns herself for one
who delights in her. He goes on to say that the one thing without which it is
impossible to act is the presence of a knower (Henry, 1987, p. 12).
The second modification of strong ties by Daoism lies in the extension of
Communal Sharing beyond the blood ties and the in-group. This allows the hermits
to find their kith and kin in trees, rocks, mountains, and rivers (Rowley, 1959). More
important, this expansion of strong ties makes it possible for Daoism to advocate
68
4 Daoism
universal altruism (Lee, Chen, & Chan, 2013) beyond the confines of reciprocity
and in-group favoritism. An altruism modeled on water that benefits all things
(Lee et al., 2013, p. 89) has remained a central aspiration in Daoism throughout history. Broadening the scope of Communal Sharing (Fiske, 1991), however, does not
necessarily entail diluting the interest in intimacy. If anything, the opposite is true
with Daoism.
The third modification of strong ties lies in a shift in the basis for intimacy from
paternal to maternal order. Bollas (2013) claims that the mother and infant relationship is the basis for maternal order. In contrast to the rank and hierarchy characteristic of the paternal order, maternal order is a maternal world based on fusion
between self and other, empathic attunement rather than speech, and form-language
rather than linguistic discourse as a means of being-together (p. 73). A case in
point is the chance meeting at night between Y Po-ya and Chung Tzu-chi (Henry,
1987, pp. 910). Their (nonverbal) communication took place in the enshrouding
darkness of the night that concealed all differences in social status between the government official and the woodcutter, thereby bringing to the fore their resonating
affinities in music appreciation.
69
Intense competition of the mating game tends to drive displays to ever costly and
hard to fake signals of mate quality. This explains why ready-made displays such as
conventional expressions are avoided in art in favor of displays that are fast, novel,
spontaneous, and contextualin other words, hard to fake (McKeown, 2013). This,
according to the sexual selection hypothesis, is how competition for mates via display of artistic creativity becomes the driving force behind the evolution of social
bonding and alignment skills. If we broaden the notion of mate selection to include
partners in social networks, we can apply the sexual selection hypothesis to an analysis of the hermits contributions to society.
Consider the anecdote of carpenter Shih as recounted by Chuangzi (Mair, 1994,
p. 244): Master Chuang was accompanying a funeral when he passed by the grave
of Master Hui. He told his attendants a story:
There was a man from Ying who sent for carpenter Shih to slice off a speck of plaster like a
flys wing that had splattered the tip of his nose. Carpenter Shih whirled his ax so fast that it
produced a wind. Letting the ax fall instinctively, he sliced off every last bit of the plaster but
left the nose unharmed, while the man from Ying stood there without flinching. When Lord
Yan of Sung heard about this, he asked the same to be done for him. Sorry, your servant
used to do that kind of thing, said carpenter Shih, but my chopping block died long ago.
Then Chuangzi gave the punch line of his story: Since your death, Master Hui,
I have had no one who can be my chopping block, I have had no one with whom
to talk. (adapted from Mair, 1994, p. 244)
Chuangzis personal narrative is a story of intimacyan intimacy punctuated
by loneliness and nostalgia, characteristic of the mixed modes of strong and weak
ties that constitute the warp and the weft of a hermits life. The talk between
Master Chuang and his friend Huizi the logician, as recorded numerous times in
the Chuang Tzu, is riddled with differences of opinions as if the two thinkers simply could not see each other eye to eye. Attesting to the Daoist openness to diversity and tolerance of differences, there is yet another, completely different
conversation between the two at the nonverbal level that is marked by a high degree
of intimacy as exemplified by the story of carpenter Shih. Yet, perfect communion
with another person tends to be fleeting moments that reside mostly in nostalgia
(see Chap. 9), rather than in the everyday reality where the hermit finds himself
alone, having no one with whom to talk.
The story within Chuangzis storythe anecdote of carpenter Shihis pertinent
to the sexual selection hypothesis of creativity. The virtuosity of carpenter Shih
consists of mastering a full range of alignment skills. First, his skillful use of the ax
entails within-mind mapping (McKeown, 2013), a perfect coordination in body,
mind, and action. This type of skilled performance is much celebrated in Daoism as
What he achieves in his heart is made known by his hand (Fu Tsai cited in Chang,
1970, p. 207). Second, it entails between-mind mapping, as evidenced by the perfect
trust and communion between carpenter Shih and his partnera state of intimacy
that approximates the bond between the infant and mother. But these alignment
skills were coopted for display purposes.
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4 Daoism
The skill and virtuosity of carpenter Shih in whirling his ax without hurting his
partners nose was used as a personal display for multiple purposes: First, to gain
social status by impressing his audience; second, to celebrate and advertise the superb
alignment skills with a partner; third, to snub the admiring authority, Lord Yan of
Sung, as an unfit partner. Consistent with the sexual selection hypothesis of creativity
(McKeown, 2013), this story is a tapestry of two interwoven motifs in Daoismthe
asocial tendencies of the hermit, on the one hand; and their contribution to the depth
and scope of the alignment, or mind-to-mind transaction, skills, on the other.
71
a twofold senseas the undomesticated species and as the man-less expanse needed
for the survival of the undomesticated species. The first sense of wilderness refers
to the asocial fish in search of a new niche, or the unconventional individuals in need
of solitude. The second sense of wilderness is embodied in the ecological insight
best expressed by Paul Errington (1967): For every living creature [including
humans!], there are places where it does not belong (p. 251). Errington goes on to
say: I believe it is a public responsibility to safeguard what we can of wilderness
before the great push of mans numbers; and to safeguard with it the shy wild
ones that need man-less expanses in which to thrive (p. 262).
All these potential contributions of Daoism are underutilized so far.
Underutilization of Daoism may have to do with the charges of escapism that
Daoism in general, and hermits in particular, have to endure throughout history.
This is understandable. From the stayers point of view, those who do not pull their
weight in the maintenance of the status quo are morally suspect. Tolerance for eremitism varies in Chinese history. According to Mote (1960), eremitism fared better
with the tender-minded (p. 207) strand of Confucianism. Hermits were one of the
endangered groups that Confucius advocated for in his political vision that consists
of rebuilding the vanquished state; reviving the extinct tradition; and promoting
the recluse (Han, 1998, p. 7, emphasis added). But the touch-minded strand of
official Confucianism under the influence of the Legalists thought otherwise.
According to Mote (1960), legalism in its insistence on the importance of ruler and
state left little room for a man to maintain any private and personal moral standards
that might under any circumstances conflict with the primary duty of serving the
ruler (p. 207). In the language of the fish: No independent breeding allowed; all
helper fish must take care of the brood of the reigning pair. Thus, some Legalist
writers considered the hermit ungovernable, disloyal, and even guilty of a
crime meriting death (p. 207).
It may not be a coincidence that the times when eremitism flourished were Tang
and Song dynasties when Chinese civilization was at its zenith; and conversely that
the decrease in tolerance toward hermits was evinced in the last three dynasties
beginning with the Mongol rulers, when imperial China was on the decline. The
most intolerant period for the hermits was the China under the last majority Han
ruler before the Manchus took overnamely the Ming dynasty, during which time
refusal to take office was a punishable crime. Might it not be that a societys tolerance for the shy wild ones (Errington, 1967, p. 262 ) is in direct proportion to its
capacity for opening up new frontiers in thought?
Maybe we can learn a thing or two from the fish. You can divide the mosquito fish
into two personality typessocial and asocial (Bergmller & Taborsky, 2007). The
asocial fish flee the crowds and move readily into open habitat, when a population
builds up. And they keep drifting on from one frontier to the next without building up
big numbers in one place. According to a Science News report (Milius, 2012), a
healthy mix of the social and asocial fish is essential to optimal functioning of the fish
society. For instance, when the social fish numbers build up and some of them spill
over, they will find the new frontier already opened up by the asocial fish. Researchers
also found that a social mosquito fish that hangs out with the asocial ones may have
better access to food than a social fish that travels with the social ones.
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4 Daoism
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http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/taoism/
Part II
Having delineated the conceptual spaces carved out by ancient Chinese thought in
the previous chapters, this section fills in some details of the Chinese emotional life
that inhabits these conceptual spaces. The following four chapters will cover empathy-based emotions, resonance-based emotions, freedom-based emotions, and
indulgence/gratitude-based emotions, respectively. These are general contours of
the emotional landscape, in which can be found a wide spectrum of emotional
states, but none of the blue ribbon emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, etc.) or the
so-called basic emotions receive special treatment here. I have spelled out the reasons for my approach to emotions in Chap. 12. For now, it suffices to say that I
believe that researchers of Chinese emotions do well to emulate the poet Lu Ji
(261303), who attempts to trace the phenomena with a gentle paintbrush, rather
than to nail discrete emotions down, if there is such a thing, with codified labels and
categorizations.
Reference
Fang, A. (1951). Rhymeprose on literature: The Wen-fu of Lu Chi (A.D. 261-303). Harvard
Journal of Asiatic Studies, 14, 527566.
Chapter 5
In the above quote, the wifes love for her husband comes in many distinct avors, resulting in a nuanced (Sundararajan, 2002)not mixedemotional state.
There is the widely accepted notion that Asians have a proclivity for mixed, otherwise known as ambivalent, emotional states, due to their subscription to the dialectics that allow for the simultaneous experience of positive and negative emotions
(Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001; Miyamoto, Uchida, & Ellsworth, 2010). The
problem with this formulation is that emotion is treated by the researchers as a
blending system, when it is in fact a particulate system (Abler, 1989). An example
of the blending system is color such that gray results from mixing black and white
(see Chap. 2, Fig. 2.1). But emotions operate as a particulate system such that blends
of feeling states do not necessarily become one monochromatic emotional state,
called ambivalent or mixed feelings. For many people, emotional blends are nuanced
experiences with a richness and complexity that cannot be found in the simple structure of ambivalence or mixed feelings.
A good example of nuanced emotional blends is heart-aching love (xin-teng
or teng for short). How far are the Chinese in command of these complex
feelings of love? Shaver, Wu, and Schwartz (1992) found that 70 % of the Chinese
mothers of 30- to 35-month-olds claimed that their children could understand the
term heart-aching love (xin-teng) rendered sorrow/love (p. 199) by the authors.
How the emotions embodied by the term teng govern the lives of the Chinese from
the cradle to the grave is the focus of this chapter. In the following analysis, all the
passages in Chinese are retrieved from the CCL Corpus (2009).
77
78
5 Heart-Aching Love
Teng can be explored in three interrelated frameworkstender feelings in intimate relations, empathy toward others, and innate vulnerability to others.
Tender love: There is some overlap and afnity between teng and feelings of
tenderness. This is evident in the dictionary denition of xin-tengheart-aching
love; cannot bear; cherish (: ; ;)suggesting the connotations of attachment to and cherishment of something precious and fragile.
The tenderness connection is consistent with the nding of a study by Shaver,
Schwartz, Kirson, and OConnor (1987), who categorized a sub-cluster of love as
tenderness which was associated with emotions such as love, adoration, fondness,
attraction, caring, and compassion. This association of terms that converge on tenderness can be understood in the framework of attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969),
according to which the caregiving behavioral system is sensitive to and can be triggered by signs of vulnerability. One of the signs of vulnerability is appearance of
innocence and need (as exemplied by babyish features such as big head combined with small body and large Bambi-like eyes, etc.). It is these signs of vulnerability and defenselessness that trigger the tender feelings.
The tender feelings can be sexually arousing:
Lin Jiaozi pulled the woman into his arms. She started to shake in his arms, which made
him feel this heart-aching love for her. The more his heart ached for her, the more she
moaned and groaned, and the more ecstatic Lin Jiaozi became. (,
, , ,
, )
79
In order for the transient tender feelings to become the deeper, more enduring
emotions entailed in teng, the caregiving behavioral system has to be activatednot
partially triggered by signs of vulnerability but fully activated by a deep love.
Teng and the caregiving behavior system: Teng reects the importance of lial
bonds in the Chinese culture, in particular the parents emotional experience towards
their esh and blood. A few examples shall sufce:
In the whole wide world, the person whose heart aches the most for me is no more. (
). (This expression usually refers to mothers passing.)
The child is the esh on the mothers heart. Is there a mother whose heart does not ache
for her own child? (, ?)
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5 Heart-Aching Love
The cognitive structure of teng turns out to be quite complex. Components (b)
(this someone is like part of me) and (c) (this someone cant do much) seek to
reect the parentchild relationshipthe prototypical relationship associated with
81
teng. In particular, (c) reects the inability of the other to take care of themselves in
the eyes of the experiencer. Component (d) (because of this, bad things can happen
to this someone at any time) captures the consequent concern of the experience
that the other is vulnerable. The good wish to protect and care for the child is shown
in components (e)(f) (I dont want bad things to happen to this someone; I want
to do many good things for this someone all the time because of this). One may not
be able to protect their young all the time, thus component (g)if I do this, maybe
bad things will not happen to this person. This maybe may well be the constant
source of pain. Component (i) (because of this, this someone does many good
things for someone Y all the time) shows that the wish is realized through constant
care of the other person.
So much for the pity-pain-protection structure of heart-aching love. Now we
proceed to examine its unique properties through everyday usage.
There are parents, especially mothers, who take their children out of school or
sports training, because they cannot bear to see the child going through the hardships of rigorous training. Critics consider this irrational:
The teacher said with a sigh: This type of heart-aching love is going too far! (
: , !)
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5 Heart-Aching Love
What is missing from this fathers love is teng, the soft spot in most parents that
constraints them from using excess force in the name of love.
Capitalizing on perceptual cues of suffering. Heart-aching love tends to be a
painful feeling triggered by perceptual cues of the suffering intimate other.
Seeing their hardships and feeling the heart felt pain (teng) for them, their children, who
worked in the city, pleaded repeatedly for them to move to the city, but the elderly couple
would not budge. (, ,
, .)
In this episode, the heartfelt pain was triggered by seeing that capitalizes on
the perceptual cues, rather than appraisals of suffering at the conceptual level.
Teng is also a mental pain that carries an action impulse, which is evident in the
following episode of heart-aching love triggered by sound, not sight, of the beloved:
His daughter called. The minute she greeted him, he was lled with such a heart-aching
love that he wished he could y to her instantly. (,
.)
The action impulse of heart-aching love has its roots in the caregiving system of
attachment, in which pain is a signal that prompts one to take immediate action to
care or protect.
Sometimes Xu Yanru was so tired that she fell asleep on the desk involuntarily. With a heartaching for her, her sister usually let her sleep for 10 minutes before waking her up. (
, 10,
.)
The perceptual cues are evident in the above scenario, although the term seeing is omitted as the story line hurries to underscore the intimate connection
between teng and the protective and caring action.
The seeing and empathic pain connection is found again in the following scenario, where the action impulse did not materialize in any specic response, but
instead interfered with the current action programstudying, which was discontinued by the protagonist, because he could not bear any more to see the continual
suffering of his parents.
His parents are starving themselves to feed the children. Seeing it all, Jiang Wei felt the pain
inside (his heart). Seeing his parents getting thinner by the day, he could not bear any more
to continue his studies. (, , ,
, , .)
One more example of the intimate connection between seeing and feeling
(the sadness) will sufce to make a mental note of the importance of perceptual cues
in teng, to be elaborated later:
Seeing that her husband took such painstaking care of her, Bao Junqings heart ached so
much that she cried numerous times. (,
.)
83
Chinese between inner/private and outer/public (see Chap. 3), teng always falls on
the inner/private side in contrast to facial expressions that can be shown publicly:
Father and mother showed happiness in their faces, but felt the pain [for the child] inside.
(, .)
The hidden pain is like the bitterness of chocolate that adds to the richness and
complexity of positive responses evoked by the success of the belovedpleased on
the one hand, empathic pain for the hardship the beloved endured, on the other. Here
is another example:
Promptly every month, Xiaoli Guniang gave all the money she earned from hard labor to
her mother. Her mothers heart ached for her on the one hand, and proud for her on the
other. (, )
Teng as a component of filial piety: To the extent that reciprocity lies at the very
core of lial piety, parents heart-aching love can be reciprocated by adult
children.
In the past mother had heart-aching love for the child; now child has lial piety for mother.
(, .)
Daughter loves mother; mothers heart aches for daughter. (,
.)
Their hearts ached for the elderly couple, such that they came on their pass-days to cook
a weeks supply of food for them. (,
.)
In most families, mother cajoles daughter, and gives her tender loving care (teng). In my
house, its the daughter who cajoles the mother and gives tender loving care (teng) to the
mother. (, .)
If children dont follow this path of empathy, they can be called on it:
I have to be running around to do everything for you. Dont you have a heart (that aches) for
your mothers old bones? (, ?)
Thus children learn to anticipate the heartache parents go through on their behalf:
They all hurried away and hid. When asked why, they said, I dont want my mother to see
this and feel pain-stricken [teng]. (, , :
.)
This harkens all the way back to the denition of lial piety by Confucius: Give
your mother and father nothing to worry about beyond your physical well-being
(Ames & Rosemont, 1998, p. 77). In sum, it is not an exaggeration to say that heartaching love is the foundation for the relational version of lial piety, in contrast to
84
5 Heart-Aching Love
the authoritarian version of the same (Chap. 3). Whereas intimate relationships are
the breeding ground of teng, the implications of teng have extended beyond the
in-group to empathy for all, thanks to the philosophy of Mencius.
In this extension of kinship from the similar other (kith and kin) to the dissimilar
other (tiles and stones), the moral impulse gains a wider scope of application while
its instinctual drivenness is kept intact.
85
There is increasing evidence that from an early age, humans seem to have
genuine concern for others. Using pupil dilation, Tomasello and colleagues found
that 2-year-old children showed intrinsic motivation both when they helped a person as well as when they saw the latter being helped by someone else (Hepach,
Vaish, & Tomasello, 2012). It is in the same vein that Mencius proposed his famous
thought experiment. Consider the scenario, he says, of rescuing a child about to fall
into a well: Now, when men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they all
have a feeling of alarm and distress . (Chan, 1963, p. 65, emphasis added). In
this hypothetical scenario, the child belongs to the out-group, unrelated to the rescuer, whose unbearing mind, once triggered by perceptual cues (seeing), automatically carries out the action impulse of altruism. Mencius further points out that this
altruistic action is not to be contaminated by deliberations of personal concerns:
not to gain friendship with the childs parents, nor to seek the praise of their
neighbors and friends, nor because they dislike the reputation [of lack of humanity
if they did not rescue the child] (Chan, 1963, p. 65). To shed some light on these
stipulations of Mencius, we turn to theories of cognitive appraisal.
Paraphrasing Arnold, Mencius seems to be saying that it is better not to stop and
reect, if you wish to run with the ball when the unbearing mind kicks in. Thus the
agenda of Mencius for the unbearing mind is to privilege the simple and basic
appraisals of valence over the more complex cognitive processing. The radicalness
of Menciuss agenda becomes clear, if we factor in the neuroscience behind it.
LeDouxs study of fear in rats found two separate routes of information to the
amygdalaone going through the cortex, one does not. The implication of this
nding for emotions is spelled out by Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1996), who posit
two separate signals for the emotion system: the emotion signal and a propositional signal of the evaluation that caused it. (p. 364). The emotion signal, corresponding to simple appraisals, has a direct route to the amygdala: Because it
bypasses the cortex, the signal depends on only a crude analysis. It is purely
emotional: One feels fearful without knowing why. Only the cortical route allows
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5 Heart-Aching Love
one access to a full representation of what caused the response (Johnson-Laird and
Oatley, 2000, p. 466). It is in the same vein that Clore and Ortony (2000) have identied two ngers on the emotional trigger: one controlled by early perceptual processes that identify stimuli with emotional value and activate preparation for action,
and a second controlled by cognitive processes that verify the stimulus, situate it in
its context, and appraise its value (p. 41).
Received wisdom in the eld is that complex processing/appraisal is a necessary
condition for higher emotional development, and by extension, morality. Along the
same line is the prevalent assumption that the effortful, reective system 2 thinking
is superior to the stimulus-bound, error-prone system 1 thinking in decision making
(Kahneman, 2011). In direct contradiction to all this is the agenda of Mencius,
whose algorithm of the unbearing mind may be spelled out as follows: Capitalize on
the instinctual, unreective trajectory of system 1 thinking, on the one hand; and
avoid traversing the trajectory of system 2 thinking characterized by reections and
deliberations, on the other. Is it reasonable to build a moral edice on the errorprone system 1 instead of the rational deliberations of system 2 thinking?
To understand the rationality behind the unbearing mind, we need to situate this
phenomenon in the context of care-based morality.
Care-Based Morality
The unbearing mind presupposes an innate vulnerability to the other. The sympathy
that capitalizes on our innate vulnerability is a case of what Decety and Cowell
(2014) refer to as care-based morality (p. 533). The authors claim that this system
of sympathy piggybacks on older evolutionary motivational mechanisms associated
with parental care (p. 533), in particular emotional contagion which constitutes one
primary component of empathy (p. 529).
The concept of the unbearing mind entails two presuppositions:
(a) Sympathy hinges on the low threshold for stress at the sight of others
suffering.
(b) This innate vulnerability can be interfered with by rational deliberations, such
as utilitarianism.
These assumptions are consistent with the properties of emotional contagion
referred to by Decety and Cowell (2014) as a component that plays a fundamental
role [a] in generating the motivation to care and help another individual in distress
and [b] is relatively independent of mindreading and perspective-taking capacities
(p. 529). The second attribute (b) of emotional contagion can be further elaborated.
The authors reported studies that show that utilitarian judgments are facilitated by a
lack of empathic concern. For instance, the orbitofrontal cortex/vmPFC is a region
across species that is critical for care-giving behavior, particularly parenting
through reward-based ad affective associations (p. 533). Lesions or dysfunctions of
this region lead to decreased empathic concern and increased utilitarian judgment.
Care-Based Morality
87
In sum, the notion of the unbearing mind has the following insights that are
borne out by psychological studies on morality:
Feeling plays a more important role than thinking in moral decisions (Haidt, 2001).
Altruism is more of an instinct than rational thinking (Righetti, Finkenauer, &
Finkel, 2013; Zaki & Mitchell, 2013).
Being moved is essential to emotional development. Decit in the capacity of
being moved plays an important role in emotional disorders such as autism
(Hobson, 2007).
Direct route to the amygdala plays an important role in empathy. Abnormity of
this route is implicated in psychopathy (Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005).
So far, so good. But whats the next step? How do we advance from care-based to
more mature morality? Or as Decety and Cowell (2014) put it, how to extend empathic
concern outside the tribe (p. 533)? Answers to this million dollar question diverge
along the divide between non-relational and relational cognitionthe former climbs
a cognitive ladder; the latter an awareness ladder (see Table 1.1, Chap. 1).
Typical of the cognitive ladder approach to morality is Kohlbergs (1984) paradigm of moral reasoning that privileges cognitive deliberation, decision making,
and top-down control. By contrast, the notion of heart-aching love develops along
an awareness ladder, which covers the whole spectrum of perception from sense
perception at the low end to mental perception of feeling states at the high end.
Along this awareness ladder, action, which is stimulus-bound at the low end, drops
out of the picture at the high end, where emotion becomes what the medieval
German mystic Johannes Tauler (around 13001361) referred to as an inward,
contemplative desire (Shrady, 1985, pp. 139140).
To elaborate on this awareness ladder, we may turn to William Grays (1979)
theory of emotional renement. Gray maintains that
the basic global emotions differentiate during child development into a large number of
ever ner less intense emotional nuances, or feeling tones, of precise, sharply dened quality, and that these become patterned in a nearly innite number of ways to constitute an
emotional language for coding cognitive experience. (p. 7)
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5 Heart-Aching Love
and action tendencies; heart-aching love belongs to the fourth level of blended
emotions; while the last stages of blends of blends are evidenced by the following:
Loving him, yet also vexed at him, and yet still heart-aching (teng) for him, Xiao Geng
gazed attentively, with deep feelings (qing), at her husband who was waxing eloquent on
the podium. (CCL Corpus, 2009)
At this last stage of emotional blending, there are no specic action correlates.
Here emotion, along with all its impulses, has come to serve the same function as
what Levi-Straus said about deathits good for thought.
Whereas the cognitive ladder puts a premium on the higher levels over the lower
ones such that system 2 is privileged over system 1 thinking, the awareness ladder
in Chinese emotions seems to value both high and low levels equally. The Confucian
agenda consists in self-cultivation that starts with the unbearing mind at the lower
levels of the awareness ladder, to culminate in rened emotions (Frijda &
Sundararajan, 2007) at the higher levels of the same ladder. This affective path to
morality is gaining support in recent years.
Let us go back to the question posed by Decety and Cowell (2014): How to
extend sympathic concern beyond the tribe? After all, it is natural for our sympathic
concerns to stay within the connes of strong tieseven rodents, as the authors
point out, do so. For instance, female mice had higher fear responses when exposed
to the pain of a close relative than to that of a more distant relative. How do humans
manage to extend this empathic concern to strangers? The key lies in the education
of the heart through literature and the arts, according to Confucius (see Chap. 3).
Steven Pinker (2011) would have agreed, as he nds a similar agenda in Europe
thousands of years later. More specically, Pinker claims that the expansion of
empathy is the result of the expansion of literacy during the eighteenth century in
Europe. Decety and Cowell (2014) explain: Mounting evidence [e.g., Djikic et al.
(2009)] seems to indicate that reading, language, the arts, and the media provide
rich cultural input that triggers internal simulation processes and that leads to the
experience of emotions inuencing both concern and caring for others (p. 534).
In sum, we learn our morality at our mothers lap. In our adult years, heartaching love with all its variegated expressions at the higher levels of awareness may
serve the function of chronic priming for social mindfulness, which, while manifest
as sensitivity and responsiveness in everyday social transactions, can spring into
altruistic action at any moment when the unbearing mind kicks in.
Concluding Observations
The unbearing mind brings into sharp relief the difference between the two pathways to moralitycold (non-relational) cognition privileged by the West and hot
(relational) cognition privileged by the Chinese. When addressing moral questions,
the West asks: Can you think rationally about it? The Chinese asks, by contrast:
Concluding Observations
89
Can you feel it? Not grasping this difference can lead to misunderstandings about
the Asian practices of no-mind in one form or another (Zen, the Daoist cult of
spontaneity, and so on). To the Western observer, putting rational thinking on hold
risks losing ones moral moorings. To the Chinese, such worries are not warranted,
since no thinking is not so serious a threat to morality as no feeling.
The gut-feeling approach to morality is effective in the world of strong ties
(Chap. 1), where moral parameters are known and familiar such that it is quick
action that makes the difference. The effortful, reective, cold cognition approach
to morality is probably advantageous in the modern world of weak ties where conventions are not binding, and where problems, such as global warming, rely on
abstract reasoning rather than proximal, perceptual cues for a solution. Nevertheless,
even in the globalizing era where weak ties hold sway, a healthy morality still takes
its roots in the empathy one learns from mothers lap, and still needs to be nurtured
throughout life by the rich emotional undercurrents of strong tiesthis, in a nutshell, sums up the function and purpose of teng in our lives.
To show how a little unbearing mind can go a long way, we conclude with an
experience of Michelle Brenner (Brenner, 2015, p. 324) in Australia:
A couple of years ago I had an accident. My thumb was almost cut off and even now,
my stomach turns as I think about it. In the emergency room at the hospital, the
surgeon was able to sew it back together. Strangely enough, I remember that there
was no actual pain from by thumb; I think the fright blocked out the pain, however
the feeling of trauma was very much a part of the experience. I remember after the
surgeon did a great job of sewing back my thumb, he asked the nurse to put a bandage on it. The nurse placed a tiny translucent band-aid on the stitched up thumb.
I sat there in shock. How can they expect me to leave with this little band-aid after
almost losing my thumb? I looked up at the nurse and said, I think you need to
put something more on, this is not enough. Her response was strong and adamant
that there was no need. I sat looking at my thumb and feeling the trauma of the
accident knowing that this band-aid did nothing to recognize what my thumb had
been through. I needed padding, something to soften the impact of any unfortunate
future knock as well as a sign of care, soft comforting care. I waited till the surgeon
came back and then insisted. Please put something else on my thumb as a bandage. The nurse was told to put a bandage on top of the band-aid. With an attitude
of deance, the nurse put a more protective layer of padding on my thumb.
Compassion is a transcendent emotion. Compassion is by this denition beyond
logic, beyond rational thinking. It was obvious from the perspective of the nurse
that my thumb needed only a small band-aid; this was her logical, rational
response to bandaging my thumb. However, I was experiencing my thumb being
in the process of moving from the trauma of disconnection to the process of
recovery, a band-aid did little to symbolize or care for what I as a person had just
been through and what my thumb needed to feel secure and ready to reengage in
life. Compassion in practice goes beyond rational logical sense making, and
embraces a more sensitive awareness of existence.
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5 Heart-Aching Love
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cn:8080/ccl_corpus/index.jsp?dir=xiandai
Chapter 6
Introduction
Americans described intimacy much more often in terms of mutual closeness and mutual
friendship ; Indian respondents describe their intimate relations more often than
American participants in terms of what might be called a we feeling.
(Mascolo, Misra, & Rapisardi, 2004, pp. 1819, emphasis in original)
When you have leisure time how often do you choose to spend it with him/her
alone? (Miller & Lefcourt, 1982, p. 516). This item from the Miller Social Intimacy
Scale (Miller & Lefcourt, 1982) is representative of a general tendency in the West
to define intimacy in terms of the behavioral and experiential characteristics of a
relationship. By contrast, the Chinese notion of intimacy focuses on the epistemological and ontological transformations of this relationship. Underscoring a transcendent function of emotion (Sundararajan, 2014), the Chinese notion of intimacy
poses to emotion theory an interesting question: Does the self get a boost from positive emotions, such as intimacy, to be grounded more firmly in its self-esteem, or
does it thereby vault over its ego and land in a different universethe we-ness?
Encoding the epistemological and ontological transformations involved in the
journey to we-ness, the Chinese notion of intimacy has the following attributes: It
privileges bonding through shared intention; it is modeled on the parentchild
instead of the mating pair; and it is not a mental so much as an inter-mental phenomenon. The following investigation consists of three parts: First, I trace the epistemological foundation of intimacy to the Chinese notion of affectivity (gan ), in
particular to two of its many compoundsgan-lei (responding in kind) and
gan-ying (stirring and responding). Next, I examine the phenomenology of
resonance through mental sharing, with special focus on mind perception and the
attribution of intent. Lastly, I present a wide variety of mind-to-mind transactions as
illustrations of intimacy and resonance.
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A magistrate of Jing Zhou district prohibited Buddhism and ordered hundreds of monks to
return to society. Everybody panicked; both old and young were weeping in sorrow. The
statue of Buddha in one temple of Chang Sha was found perspiring continuously for five
days. The abbot of the temple, Master Hung Chang, was summoned by the magistrate to
give an explanation. Master Hung said, No matter how far away the sage is, nothing can
be hidden from him. The Buddhas past and present, they think of each other. Is it possible
for the present Buddha not to mind the other Buddhas? (Dao Xuan, 1929, p. 415c)
Yans claim for the superior human capacity for mind perception is supported by
empirical studies on anthropomorphism. Powers, Worsham, Freeman, Wheatley,
and Heatherton (2014) argue that as a social species, it is important for humans to
efficiently detect targets in the environment capable of making meaningful mental
connections. Along this line, we can go one step further to predict that those cultures
or individuals who are invested in making connections would be more readily able
to detect mind where it may not be. This hypothesis was tested and found to be true.
Using animacy as a proxy for mind perception, Powers et al. (2014) tested perception of animacy with morphed faces and found that individuals who experienced a
greater desire for social connection actually decreased their thresholds for mind
perception, consistently observing animacy when fewer definitively human cues
were present in the morphed faces. The authors argue that overattributing animacy
may be a fundamentally adaptive strategy, since those who can more readily detect
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animacy can cast a wider net when identifying possible sources of social connection, thereby maximizing opportunities for renewing social relationships.
The parity principle of lei offers the epistemological grounds for the mind-andworld coupling, but leaves out the affective dimension of this coupling. As Reddy
points out that similarity (parity) is not sufficient ground for engagement (2008).
What explains engaged living? Enter gan (responsiveness) which makes it clear that
when affinity is felt rather than simply perceived, powerful things happen, as Byrne
(1971) would have predicted with his theory of similarity-based attraction. Gan as
affinity-based responsiveness gives rise to a cosmology that is inherently affective:
According to Confucian teaching, a mutual attraction of things for each other functions at all levels of reality as the interior binding force of the cosmic, social, and
personal life (Berry, 2003, p. 96).
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lated components: (a) The Chinese SR arc consists of a resonating feedback loop
(gan-ying ); (b) this resonating feedback loop is sustained by an affective bond of
mutual attraction among all things in a sympathetic universe; (c) this sympathetic
universe is governed by the principle of parity (lei). All these connotations of gan
are embodied in the protoconversation (Trevarthen, 1993) between infant and the
caregiver.
99
Conventional account of this scenario would go something like this: The babys
expressive behavior is appraised by the parent as anger, which is deemed in need of
an intervention to de-escalate. The parent acts accordingly, with good effect. An
alternative account is to approach protoconversations as mind-to-mind transactions,
in which exchange of intentions take center stage. Thus Greenspan and Shanker
(2004) paid special attention to how the parent responds to the babys signal of
intent, how the baby responds back, and how together the two negotiate an outcome
characterized by shared soothing pleasure rather than a unilateral aggressive
action (p. 32). The authors continued to say that this initiation into a (proto)conversation is crucial for the emotional learning of the young child: As his intentions are
responded to, the baby becomes better and better able to signal intent without escalating into direct action (p. 32).
Casting this scenario into the framework of gan (affectivity), the key player here
is lei (parity)the ontological categorization that opens up a common ground
between similar others. This process is initiated by the caregiver (Mind1), who
interprets the babys facial grimaces as expressions of a being capable of sharing
intentions, just like herself. When a relation of parity between Mind1 (caregiver)
and Mind2 (baby) is thus established, the responsive order becomes operative,
which subsequently unfolds as a chain of emotional signaling in recurrent feedback
loops. The babys ticket to the game is an innate responsiveness (gan) to the caregiver. That suffices. The rest of the story is told by the feedback loops between
Mind1 and Mind2, with more rounds of the mind-to-mind (proto)conversation
resulting in more refined development in emotional signaling. On this view, the
childs emotional development can be summed up as a footnote to the affective law
of attraction, which is eloquently expressed by Johannes Tauler (around 1300
1361), a medieval German mystic: So God [read caregiver] attracts, invites, and
draws man [read child] out of himself, from a state of unlikeness into one of likeness (Shrady, 1985, p. 142).
This is the prototype of intimacy characterized by shared intentions. The hallmark of this intimacy is resonance.
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101
in empathy we experience another human being directly as a personthat is, as an intentional being whose bodily gestures and actions are expressive of his or her experiences or
states of mind. (p. 386)
Unlike instrumental actions, expressive actions are not meant to change the
world so much as to expand consciousness. A case in point is resonance. Attuned or
shared intentions result in resonance, as Siegel (2007) points out: An attuned system is one in which two components begin to resonate with each other (p. 206).
Resonance as a result of mental sharing, through what McKeown (2013) refers to as
between-mind mapping, will be illustrated in the following sections.
Topic concerns what the statement is aboutinformation necessary for the evaluation of whether ones personal goals are at stake. By contrast, comment has to do
with the sharing of personal take on things: The comment is some mental take or
mental relation to a topic, expressing an experience, emotion, stance or attitude
(Bogdan, 2000, p. 78). Comment looms large in the protoconversation between the
child and the caregiver. Joint attention (Tomasello, 1995) is another instance in
which the sharing of (the caregivers) personal take on things is of paramount
importance to the child.
Bogdan (2000) claims that comment in protoconversations is topic irrelevant,
since its utility is in the shared homeostasis between infant and the caregiver, and
nothing else. For instance, infants smile at a facial expression or gesture is topicless
in the sense that it is not about anything in particular (see Fig. 6.3 for an example).
Thus comments concern not the current goals and behaviors, so much as the mode
of communionto be with, to share, or to join in the inner states of another
person (Stern, 1985).
The topic and comment distinction is often exploited in classical Chinese poetry.
Here is an example:
Calling for Little Jade [the maid] time and again
For no particular reason,
Except in the hope that the beloved
May recognize my voice. (Du, 1976, p. 367)
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Here the communicative act of calling for the maid serves no practical purposes,
other than to be mentally together with the beloved. According to Bogdan (2000),
communications that serve the sole purpose of mental sharing is uniquely human.
Attention to Intention
Intention is closer to a wish than a goal. Whereas intention is an impulse or an
inclination of heart as Germer (2009, p. 138) puts it, goals are stored representations that are stable over time. The difference between goals and intentions seems to
fall along the divide between cognition with and without control (see Chaps. 2 and 7).
As Siegel (2007) points out, goals have to do with planning, whereas intentions priming. Planning is a prefrontal intervention, involving the use of abstract concepts, and
is outcome oriented. Priming by contrast is a parallel distributed process of the brain
that is always readying itself for the next moment. Siegel explains: Intentions create an integrated state of priming, a gearing up of our neural system to be in the
mode of that specific intention: we can be readying to receive, to sense, to focus, to
behave in a certain manner (p. 177).
Siegel (2007) claims that resonance is created when what is happening matches
what the brain was primed to anticipate. He points out that, for instance, attending
to our own intentions creates an internally resonant state. He claims that In mindful
awareness, the attention to intention creates an important resonance of what is
and what was anticipated (p. 180). For instance in the mindful awareness of breathing: During the out-breath we are readied for the in-breath, and then it arrives, and
the mapping matches (p. 175), the result is resonance.
What Siegel (2007) talks about is resonance through within-mind mapping
(McKeown, 2013). It is possible to extend this priming-based resonance to betweenmind mapping (McKeown, 2013) as well. For illustration, consider a vignette from
the memoir of Sei Shnagon (965?-c. 1020), lady in waiting to the Japanese Empress
around the turn of the eleventh century (Sei, 1967):
103
It was a clear, moonlit night a little after the tenth of the Eighth Month. Her Majesty, who
was residing in the Empresss Office, sat by the edge of the veranda while Ukon no Naishi
played the flute for her. The other ladies in attendance sat together, talking and laughing; but
I stayed by myself, leaning against one of the pillars between the main hall and the veranda.
Why so silent? said Her Majesty. Say something. It is sad when you do not speak.
I am gazing into the autumn moon, I replied.
Ah, yes, she remarked. That is just what you should have said. (Section 66, 125)
The intention of the lady in waiting (A) was to savor her experience of the moon;
that of the Empress (B), to find out about As intention in the hope for resonance
with her own. Resonance as a result of between-mind mapping (McKeown, 2013)
was indeed experiencedThat is just what you should have saidwhen Bs prediction of As intention matched As self-report. Note that the emphasis here falls on
the self avowal of intent (what A said explicitly to B) which is a case of within-mind
mapping (McKeown, 2013), rather than Bs mind reading which was rendered uninteresting by the self-evident behavior of As gazing at the moon. Furthermore, resonance is not simply a brain event so much as the building block of a shared reality
(Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 2009), a reality that both parties knew all along,
namely that they belonged to a special class (lei, similar other) of individuals with
sensibilities far more refined than the rest of the crowd, who chose to amuse themselves with talking and laughing instead on this enchanted occasion.
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Consider, for instance, this evocative image from The She King (the Book of
Songs):
Kwan-kwan go the ospreys,
On the islet in the river.
The modest, retiring, virtuous, young lady:
For our prince a good mate she. (Part 1, p. 1)
The connection between the ospreys and the princes sexual feelings is obscure,
at best. This lack of apparent connection between the evocative imagery (xing) at
the beginning and the rest of the poem is a peculiar feature of xing that has generated much discussion among critics. Some Song dynasty scholars described xing as
an essentially arbitrary opening to a poem or stanza, selected and varied for purely
formal reason such as rhyme, and simply juxtaposed without any meaningful connection to the human topic which follows (Yu, 1987, pp. 6263). Concerning this
particular poem, for instance, Zheng Qiao (11041162) wrote:
Guan guan cry the ospreys is what stimulated the writer of the poem at some time. He
saw something here, and it happened spontaneously to move his heart/mind. All examples
of a stimulus [xing] involve seeing something here and obtaining something there: there is
no relationship of categorical correspondence between the two situations, nor is there a
meaning to be sought. (Yu, 1987, pp. 6061)
Without any apparent connection to the main topic of the poem, the reader is left
with nothing but a trusting willingness to open herself up to the perturbation of the
evocative imagery (xing) in the hope of arriving intuitively at associations comparable to the writers own. In this way every comprehension of the poem becomes an
occasion for the meeting of the minds between the reader and the writer.
How do the minds meet in xing? We may turn to Indian poetics for some insight.
Wells-Jopling and Oatley (2012) draw a comparison between Western and Indian
which can be extended to Chinesepoetics along the mind-to-world versus mindto-mind divide: While the Western tradition has tended to concentrate on Aristotles
mimesis, how a text can relate to the world the Indic tradition has tended towards
dhvani and the relation between writer and reader or audience member (p. 247).
The Indian term dhvani means suggestion, which is an indirect and implicit mode
of communication. Xing may be considered the Chinese counterpart of dhvani (suggestiveness) (Oatley, 2004), which has been interpreted convincingly by Hogan
(1996) as priming.
How does priming work in dhvani? Hogan (1996) uses rasa-based stories for
illustration. In classical Indian literature, each rasa (literary emotion) portrayed provides a context within which certain kinds of associations are made more easily than
others. For instance, a story of erotic love would render certain sexual associations
more accessible to the reader than others. Here we see the parallel with xing: The
imagery of the ospreys in the Book of Songs is supposed to prime certain associations
in the reader. But priming works only to the extent that the reader is willing to be
primedherein lies the importance of mind-to-mind transactions between the reader
and the writer. As Wells-Jopling and Oatley (2012) point out: It [priming] only really
works when we are willing to engage ourselves in the story, and allow its associations
to resonate with remembered experiences and longings of our own (p. 248).
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To probe further the intimate relationship between reader and writer through
xing, let us follow the lead of Wells-Jopling and Oatley (2012) to cast dhvani , and
by extension xing, in the framework of metonymy. Metonymy, according to Oatley
(2010), has an association structure and works through suggestiveness in a personal
and idiosyncratic way. The associative structure of metonym has been contrasted
with metaphor by Jakobson (1956), who proposed that metaphor and metonym are
at the two poles of languageMetaphor is at the semantic pole (a is b); and metonym at the syntactic pole (a is juxtaposed with b). This structural difference
between metaphor and metonym corresponds nicely to the distinction between bi
(comparison) and xing (evocative image) in Chinese poetics.
According to Wells-Jopling and Oatley (2012), Metonymy is a principal means
by which intimacy can be achieved between a reader and writer (p. 248). They
claim that metonymy is a form of intimacy via language: telepathic transmission of thoughts wouldnt work because minds are too different from each other.
Language, however, acts as an interface so that, with metonymies, intimate
(telepathy-like?) communication can occur (p. 245). They went on to say: Pieces
of mindsequences of consciousness with their associations between memories
and future possibilities, between understanding what is happening and what can be
said about itcan thus be passed from one person to another. Metonymy is a making of connections of these kinds, which can be passed to readers (p. 245).
Coming back to the present context, we may ask: How does xing work to create
intimacy? The answer lies in its seeming arbitrariness as an entry point to the poem.
What is peculiar about xing is that there is no logical connection between the
objectsay the ospreysthe poet chooses to begin the poem with, and the associations of meaning in the rest of the poem. This arbitraries is a hallmark of metonymy.
Papafragou (1996) claims that the production or reception of metonyms need not
depend on any previous actual association between its terms or their referents. The
arbitrariness of metonymy only serves to highlight the importance of between-mind
mappings, which seem to be the primary basis for the poems comprehension. As
Papafragou (1996) puts it: the only constraint on the use of metonymy is its
expected computability by the hearer. Thus it is natural for metonymy to be
extremely context-dependent and idiosyncratic (p. 184).
The context-dependent and idiosyncratic nature of metonymy can be illustrated
by the choice of the ospreys. Why ospreys of all kinds of birds that might work
equally well as an evocative imagery for mating? This, in the framework of metonymy, is known as a novel fixation of reference for an existing expression
(Papafragou, 1996, p. 181). Wells-Jopling and Oatley (2012) remind us that this
arbitrary fixation of reference in metonymy can be traced back to the childhood
experience of between-mind mapping, known as joint attention (Tomasello, 1995).
Look, the caregiver points to an arbitrarily chosen object and calls the childs
attention. By the same token the poetic convention of xing works the same way.
According to Zhu Xi, The meaning of the word xing is to beginto begin with
an object and arouse a meaning (Yu, 1987, p. 63, note 43). Through joint attention,
the child comes to appreciate the particular perspective of the individual who called
her attention to an arbitrarily chosen object (Bruner, 1983). Do I see what you
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see? This is the task for between-mind mapping (McKeown, 2013) that the child is
called upon to learn through joint attention. The same task confronts the reader of
metonyms, such as xing.
The authors suggest that the son hides his gratitude by getting angry with the
mother; and the mother her disappointment by apologizing to the son. At a deeper
level, according to the authors, the strength of shimjung in close relationships is
reinforced by expressed emotions that are opposite to the real and hidden emotions
(p. 363), such that both feel identical shimjung (p. 364).
References
107
Perhaps Emily Dickinsons lines below may serve as an exegesis for this shared
intention between the Korean mother and son:
But trifles look so trivial,
As soon as you have come,
That blame is just as dear as praise,
And praise as mere as blame. (To March)
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Chapter 7
Successfully negotiated, freedom and emotion converge as expressions of spontaneity. Spontaneity in turn is considered the hallmark of authenticity and creativity.
This chapter focuses on an analysis of how freedom serves as the nexus of these
termsspontaneity, authenticity, and creativity in emotion. The key ingredient of
the Daoist recipe for emotional creativity lies in freedom from cognitive control.
Challenges posed by this Daoist recipe to the dual process theories and cognitive
appraisals of emotions will be examined.
A central theme in Daoism is freedom (Hall, 1978). How does this quest for
freedom impact on emotion? One influential articulation of this question is found in
Chuangzis claim that the sage has no emotions (qing ):
Are there really men without emotions? Master Hui asked Master Chuang.
Yes, said Master Chuang. (Mair, 1994, p. 49)
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responds to things, but does not retain them. Therefore the perfect man is able to
deal successfully with things but is not affected by them (Fung, 1966, p. 287). One
way to attain a mind that approximates the emptiness of a mirror and the evenness
of a balance (Fung, 1962, p. 183) is to take an objective perspective, as advocated
by the philosopher and literary critic Wang Fu-chih (16191692): those who are
not reduced to helplessness by ching [qing , emotions], they recognize that when
they are sad, things can still be happy, but this does not alter the fact that they are
themselves sad; when they are happy, things can still be sad, but this does not alter
the fact that they are themselves happy (Wong, 1978, pp. 128129).
This rational approach to emotion capitalizes on a notion of harmony as the preperturbation equilibrium, a state of perfect symmetry akin to a lake without a ripple
(see Chaps. 1 and 2). Note how Wang Fu-chihs extensive use of the yin-yang polarity (happy versus sad; inner versus outer reality) to neutralize the impact of emotionssadness in subjective reality is counterbalanced by happiness in the objective
world, and vice versa. Cast in the framework of harmony as symmetry (Chap. 2), we
may say that through the yin-yang polarity, emotional perturbations are rendered
differences that make no difference, thereby maintaining the original symmetry or
mirror state of the mind.
Freedom for emotions, by contrast, espouses the version of harmony as postperturbation, or dynamic, equilibrium (see Chap. 2). There are two variants of this theme.
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Another variant of the freedom for emotion theme is to modify the original
statement of Chuangzi from having no emotions (qing) to having emotions but
without ensnarement. This was the exegesis of Wang Bi (226249) on the Chuang
Tzu: That in which the sage is superior to ordinary people is the spirit. But what the
sage has in common with ordinary people are the emotionsand therefore cannot
[but] respond to things without joy or sorrow. He responds to things, yet is not
ensnared by them. It is wrong to say that because the sage has no ensnarement, he
therefore has no emotions (Fung, 1966, p. 238). How does one have emotions
without ensnarement? The answer from Neo-Daoism of the third and fourth centuries is feng liu.
The romantic spirit. Feng liu means literally wind and stream and is rendered by Fung (1966) as the romantic spirit (p. 231). According to Fung (1966),
in Neo-Daoism of the third century, feng liu was derived from zi-ran (spontaneity, naturalness), and is in opposition to morals and institutions (p. 240). The
essential quality of feng liu is to have a mind that transcends the distinctions of
things and lives in accord with itself, rather than with others (p. 291).
In this mode of independence, feng liu tends to privilege novelty. Consider the
following episode about the Neo-Daoist Liu Ling (c. 221c. 300):
Liu had a habit of going completely naked in his room. To his critics he said, I take the
whole universe as my house and my room as my clothing. Why, then, do you enter here into
my trousers? (Shih-shuo, chap. 23, cited in Fung, 1966, p. 235).
To his contemporaries, Liu was considered feng liu not because of his nudity, but
because of his novel take on it. And it is novelty in a radical way: One is to transcend
all given norms, from the biologically given sensory experiences to the socially
given codes of conduct. The result is what may be called a cult of spontaneity, characterized by a paradoxical combination of impulsivity, on the one hand, and a more
subtle sensitivity for pleasure and more refined needs than sheerly [sic] sensual
ones (p. 235), on the other. Thus individuals of feng liu acted according to pure
impulse, but not with any thought of sensuous pleasure (p. 235). With the romantic spirit, the question of ensnarement of emotions is no longer whether to have
emotion or not, but how: How are emotions to be expressed, with refined sensitivity
and freedom of the spirit, or not.
This brief overview of the two versions of freedom for emotions suggests a close
association between true and creative emotionsconcepts which share in common an emphasis on spontaneity. This observation is consistent with the claim of
Scheibe (2000) that there is an intrinsic connection among authenticity, spontaneity,
and creativity: Theater is authentic only if it is novel, spontaneous, and fresh
authenticity in the drama of everyday life has to do with our capacity to improvise
with creativity and originality on the materials and themes we have been given to
play on (p. 240).
Chinese poetics is one site where these interrelated ideas of the ideal states of
emotiontrue, creative, spontaneous, and freeconverge, as evidenced by the
traditional criteria of good poetry. One criterion in particular that melds together
creativity, authenticity, and freedom is the following: Simple message with deep
meaning flow freely (Okabe, 1983, p. 35). If you dont mind me jumping the gun
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the key to this ideal type of poetry or life lies in freedom from cognitive control. In
the following analysis, I will focus on the cognitive mechanisms behind the nexus
of freedom, authenticity, and spontaneity of emotions.
Authenticity as Spontaneity
Like the Sage, the poet moves with the Way [Dao], and takes what is given as it is given.
He transmits it to his work whenever he sets his hand to paper and is not allowed to brood
on his writing or to revise: it comes right out and comes out right. (Owen, 1992, p. 325)
The instinctual response of the young to the call of its mother may be understood
in terms of a hypothetical biologically shared signal system involving both sending
Authenticity as Spontaneity
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and receiving mechanisms (Buck, 1984, p. 6). Owren and Bachorowski (2001)
also suggest that the instantaneous signal pick up between the two parties suggests
the possibility of sending and receiving being integrated functions of a unitary
mechanism (p. 172)in other words, tight coupling between the two parties. In
addition to speed of communication, these naturally coupled signs tend to be nonvoluntary, hence not falsifiable (Buck, 1984)herein lies the connection, from the
Chinese point of view, between authenticity and spontaneity.
Timing is everything: Latency period, although necessary for deliberations, is not
always helpful. There is some evidence that implicit information-integration can be
impaired by latency period. In a study by J. D. Smith et al. (2014), participants performed two types of tasks that either had a rule-based solution, characteristic of
system 2 reasoning, or an information-integration solution, characteristic of the
holistic thinking of system 1 processes. Feedback on participants task performance
was provided after each trial (immediate condition) or at the end of each block of
trials (deferred condition). The researchers found that deferred reinforcement compromised information-integration learning (the system 1 processes) but not rulebased learning (system 2 processes). Thus one of the reasons why Daoism privileges
spontaneity could be due to the fact that latency interferes with its preferred processing style, namely holistic integration of information.
To the extent that immediate feedback entails tight coupling between signals,
spontaneity entails community.
Spontaneity and community.
Authenticity presupposes a community. (Mestrovic, 1997, p. 75)
More important than getting a cognitive map of the world, the community with
strong ties is interested in assessing each others trustworthiness. One of the measures of trustworthiness is spontaneity. As Edward Slingerland points out, spontaneity is an indication of freedom from cognitive control: if I see evidence of cognitive
control in you, I start to think that maybe somethings going on, because when were
being conscious and using cognitive control, were often doing it to deceive or lie or
figure out whats best for us. (Retrieved from http://edge.org/conversation/
the-paradox-of-wu-wei).
Spontaneity in the sense of latency-free interaction lies at the core of responsiveness. Parental responsiveness has been found to foster the development of speech
and the childs learning to turn-take in other situations (Tamis-LeMonda, Kuchirko,
& Song, 2014). Other aspects of social interaction also rely on responsiveness to
make the inter part of interaction work. Otherwise, we would each be performing social actions on each other without any interchange, says Tantam (2009).
Besides responsiveness, another form of spontaneity that serves the function of
social glue is empathy.
Empathy as Coupling.
Master Chuang and Master Hui were strolling across the bridge over the Hao River. The
minnows have come out and are swimming so leisurely, said Master Chuang. This is the
joy of fishes. Youre not a fish, said Master Hui. How do you know what the joy of
fishes is? (Mair, 1994, p. 165).
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Chuangzis answer is I know it by strolling over the Hao (Mair, 1994, p. 165).
This automatic knowing exhorted by Chuangzi is based on empathy. A modern version of Chuangzis approach is found in Tantams (2009) account of Wittgenstein:
Tantam claims that Wittgenstein dissolved the question, asked often by philosophers, of how can I know that others exist by arguing that he did not need to know,
because he just found himself taking that attitude. There is accumulating evidence
that individuals suffering from autism-related disorders have difficulty with automatic knowing of others states of mind, possibly due to deficits in empathy. These
individuals need theory of mind to figure out about others (Baron-Cohen, TagerFlusberg, & Cohen, 2000). Thus the more emotionally impaired, the more the individual is in need of the slow deliberative process of system 2 thinking to process
social and emotional informationand still may not get it right.
For our purposes, unmediated representation and expression of emotional energies entail freedom from cognition in a twofold sense: freedom from cognitive
appraisal (see Chap. 5), and freedom from cognitive control (see Chaps. 2 and 5).
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But what if one prefers to dwell, as many poets and artists do, in that dizzying
indeterminacy of the duckrabbit world (Sundararajan, 2004, 2008a)? The notion of
authenticity in the sense of emotion restored to its original innocence speaks to this
desire to experience the world beyond cognitive schemas.
Would it be possible to decouple emotion and appraisal? According to the strong
version of the cognitive appraisal theory, emotion is contingent upon appraisals.
The logical conclusion of this strong version would be no appraisal, no emotion.
This is the basis of the claim of Chuangzi who stated that the sage has no emotions
(qing), since the latter has transcended the discriminating mind of right and wrong,
good and bad. A broader definition of qing, however, would support the contention
of mindfulness researchers that the brain can experience raw, direct sensation without the personal identity constraints that usually filter ongoing experience (Siegel,
2007, p. 152). In order to get at the experience beneath narrative and memory,
emotional reactivity and habit (Siegel, 2007, p. 100), Chinese poetics joins forces
with mindfulness researchers to advocate putting classification on hold (Siegel,
2007, p. 250).
Cognitive appraisal theories are products of the mind-to-world framework,
where the agent is the subject standing over against the world as object and finding
out about it. This perspective capitalizes on stable, stored representations, such as
the self and goal representations, which can be constructed and maintained independently of the environment. Of all the mental representations, the self is the most
invested. The self seems to be the center of gravity for all cognitive appraisals,
which revolve around the main evaluative issues of Am I in trouble or being
benefited, now or in the future, and in what way? (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, P.
31). Working in concert, self-narrative and cognitive appraisal can drive up the reactive mode.
Mindfulness researchers claim that cognitive appraisals are self-generated
accounts about life (Brown & Cordon, 2009, p. 227) that interferes with living.
One of the problems of interference by stored representations is filtering. According
to the literary critic Wang Guo-wei (18771927), good poetry is measured by minimum amount of filtering (ge ) through stored representations that deprive experience of its immediacy and direct impact (Averill & Sundararajan, 2006; Yeh, 2000).
But simply trading lightly on cognitive appraisals is not enough. Freedom of emotion in the Daoist vein lies in freedom from cognitive control (Chaps. 2 and 5).
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ideal mode of communication is marked by spontaneityresponding is done without a deliberate mind (Fung, 1962, p. 184)cognitive control is not as helpful.
Bocanegra and Hommel (2014) conducted a series of experiments to find out
whether cognitive control is always adaptive. The results suggested that top-down
control can actually impair and interfere with the otherwise automatic integration of
information, rendering behavior less efficient. They concluded that cognitive control is not needed, if the environment provides sufficient information for the cognitive system to behave on autopilot based on automatic processes alone. This type of
processing, known as cognition without control (see Chap. 2), is what undergirds
the Daoist agenda of spontaneity.
Less is more: The advantage of cognition without control is evident in the learning tasks of children. According to Thompson-Schill, Ramscar, and Chrysikou
(2009), there are inherent trade-offs between learning and performance tasks: a
system optimized for performance may not be optimal for learning, and vice versa
(p. 260). Performance tasks capitalize on the PFC (prefrontal cortex) function as a
dynamic filter, selectively maintaining task-relevant information and discarding
task-irrelevant information (Chrysikou et al., 2014). While children with their
underdeveloped PFC are at a disadvantage in performance tasks, they excel in learning language and social conventions. This is because their learning is relatively less
interfered with by the top-down control processes, thanks to their immature PFC. In
addition to learning, creativity is another instance where it is advantageous to cruise
along with system 1 processing without the interference of top-down cognitive control. Since adult life in all societies is pretty much preoccupied with performance
tasks, the back-to-nature project of Daoism constitutes a call to put breaks on cognitive control in order to return to the creative and learning mode of the child.
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120
To those who were puzzled by his action, Wangs explanation was: I came on
the impulse of my pleasure, and now it is ended, so I go back. Why should I see
Tai? (Fung, 1966, p. 236). The key to the refined pleasure of Wang seems to lie in
the virtuosity of his controlled processing that selectively activated one impulse
(paying someone a visit) and inhibited another (seeing someone), thus defying the
ordinarily tight coupling of these action tendencies in the goal-oriented thinking
that Daoism never tires of disparaging.
Paradoxes abound in Daoism. Just as bonsai is not raw but cultivated nature, the
immediacy/impulsivity celebrated by the Neo-Daoists may best be understood as
mediated immediacy or controlled impulsivity. This formulation challenges the
dichotomy, prevalent in dual process theories (Kahneman, 2011), between the
impulsivity of system 1 thinking and the controlled processing of system 2 thinking.
Was the Daoist painter being impulsive? The traditional view is that he was modeling spontaneity, which was much celebrated during the period of Neo-Daoism (see
Fung, 1966). Daoist spontaneity mimics impulsivity, but rests squarely upon mindfulness, the very antithesis of impulsivity. The higher order awareness of mindfulness is evident in Wangs action: (a) minute attention to the ebb and flow of his urge/
impulse; and (b) an act of self avowal, thereby owning up to and allowing himself to
ride on the crest of his urges, but not one minute longer when the impulse was spent.
Was this action adaptive? Taking into consideration the cultural climate of the
time, the answer is definitely in the affirmative. The Daoist painter knew exactly
what he was doinghe was trying to impress his Neo-Daoist friends, including the
one who did not get a visit, by showing off the extent to which his heart s yearnings
could remain free, untethered to the goals and objectives of a conventional life.
Lastly, this episode of refined pleasure decouples intent and goal by pursuing the
former while inhibiting the later. As an impulse or an inclination of heart (Germer,
2009, p. 138), intent is more transitory than goals (see Chap. 6). Note that the artists
approach to intent is not quiet introspection, so much as active pursuit and deriving
of pleasure from its fulfillment. What remained unfulfilled was the goal plan of
visiting a friend which, as a stored representation unaffected by the ebb and flow of
the impulses, left the Daoist painter cold as butter to the flies.
Eccentric as it may seem, this legend has a grain of truth that is celebrated
throughout the ages in Chinese history, namely that creative action consists of a
paradoxical combination of simple cognitive mechanisms of the young child, on the
one hand; and a mature adults mindful awareness, on the other. The Taoist sage is
old and young at oncea paradox which is best expressed by Victor-Emile Michelet:
Alas! We have to grow old to conquer youth, to free it from its fetters and live
according to its original impulse (cited in Bachelard, 1964, p. 33).
To unpack this Daoist paradox, we may speak of two types of complexities
cognitive and consciousness (see also Chap. 5). In the Daoist tradition, these two
complexities are combined in reverse order: up the ladder in consciousness (secondary, or tertiary awareness), and down the ladder in cognitive mechanismsprivileging the system 1 processes such as impulses and uninhibited responsiveness to the
environment. The result is a unique appraisal profile of Chinese emotions, in which
responding is done without a deliberate mind (Fung, 1962, p. 184).
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A Lasting Legacy
Daoism is one of the major factors in the shaping of Chinese Buddhism, as Mair
(1994) points out, Chinese Buddhists received more inspiration from the Chuang
Tzu than from any other early Chinese text. This is especially true of members of the
Zen (Chan) school (p. xliv). Chinese poetics also owe much to Daoism for its
unique appraisal profile, in which the relatively simple and automatic processes are
privileged as the hallmarks of spontaneity and genuineness, whereas the more cognitively elaborate appraisals are distrusted for being calculative and infested with
value judgments.
A comparable perspective in the West is found in Christian mysticism
(Sundararajan, 2008b). Rudolf Otto (1970/1923), an authority on mysticism, claims
that the unleavened bread of mystical experience has no use for the yeast of discursive thought. He goes on to say that the mystical experience can be firmly grasped,
thoroughly understood, and profoundly appreciated, purely in, with, and from the
feeling itself (p. 34). Replacing the term mystical with affective in Ottos statement above, and we have a concise summary of the information processing strategies of emotion in Daoism and Chinese poetics. The unique processing strategies of
these traditions that privilege attention to experience over attribution of cause can
make a significant contribution to emotion research.
Might it not be that the alleged primitiveness of emotions and other human
functions are the result, not the justification, of the self-fulfilling prophecy of cognitive control? Put another way, cultural scripts can be self-fulfilling prophecies such
that chronically inhibited cognitive processes may stay primitive which in turn justifies their inhibition. One case in point is system 2 thinking in the Chinese context,
where concern with its calculating and manipulative potentials in the mind-to-mind,
relational (Chap. 1) context may have inadvertently inhibited its development in a
different contextthe mind-to-world non-relational arena, where science can flourish only with a sustained development in system 2 thinking.
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Be that as it may, cultural scripts cannot be modified at will without serious consequences. A case in point is the fanshen movement during the 1940s, in
which large-scale aggression was unleashed by a change in the traditional Chinese
appraisal of suffering. Ann Anagnost (1997) documented how the practice speaking bitterness (bitterness is a literal translation of suffering) as introduced by the
land reform led to unbridled violence and aggression when the Longbow villagers
learned to attribute their suffering to class exploitation rather than to fatetheir
traditional attribution of the cause of suffering.
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Online Resource
http://edge.org/conversation/the-paradox-of-wu-wei
Chapter 8
Introduction
With the exception of friendship, the majority of Chinese relationships are hierarchical in nature. An example of intimacy in a vertical relationship is sajiao .
Seemingly contrary to the Confucian emphasis on social mindfulness or being considerate to others (Chap. 3), selfishness has a place in the Confucian tradition, provided that you are young and immature, and provided that someone loves you
enough to put up with your immaturity. This is the gist of sajiao:
The youngest boy was often described to me by his mother as keai [adorable] and tiaopi
[mischievous], both of which were perfectly true. While she [the mother] was trying to
carry on a conversation with me, he constantly climbed on her back and implored her, in his
best sajiao voice, to carry him piggyback. She finally complied, saying with a laugh to me:
Sajiao! (Farris, 1994, p. 18).
According to Catherine Farris (1994), sajiao means adorably petulant (p. 161).
It is a term used only in reference to small children and young women. Sa means
letting loose; jiao means beautiful, tender, indulged, and petted. The compound
sajiao means (1) to show pettishness, as a spoiled child, and (2) (of a woman) to
pretend to be angry or displeased (pp. 1213). As a form of communication, sajiao
entails the use of verbal and nonverbal cues to construct a nurturing relation.
It makes extensive use of linguistic and nonverbal forms of communication:
Kinesically, head, face and body movements index the sajiao-ness of the utterance. At the phonological level, the sajiao tone indexes the speakers intent in and
of itself (p. 23). More specifically, facial kinesics include eye-rolling, rapid
blinking and extended, pouting lips (p. 16). linguistically, the particles (ma and la)
index a comment (see Chap. 6) which point to the speakers attitude toward the
speech event (p. 23). For instance, the particle Ma conveys an expressive overtone
to soften a remark made in a pleading style (p. 14).
Young children are demanding, who take you for granted, who want what they
want, and get what they want by exploiting your affection for them. This is a pro Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
L. Sundararajan, Understanding Emotion in Chinese Culture,
International and Cultural Psychology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-18221-6_8
125
126
totypical scenario of sajiao. Is it good to spoil our children like that? I leave this
question to experts of child rearing practices. For now, I ask a more practical question: Who has the stamina to deal with spoiled brats all day long? The short answer
to this question goes something like this: It may depend on whether you rely on
willpower or lovethe former but not the latter is susceptible to depletion. The
long answer to this question will take you through the meandering trails of inquiry
in this chapter. This inquiry will address three topics: First, synergistic community
as the ecological background of sajiao; second, the rationality of favor consisting
of two elementsthe cold computation of debt-based transactions, and the hot
cognition of gratitude; and third, the function of sajiao as the training ground for
gratitude. For illustration, I examine the modifications of the sajiao principles in
the males socialization practice of flower drinking. I conclude with the suggestion that gratitude may serve as an alternative route, instead of cold reason, to
self-control.
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128
In paying back the debt, one common strategy is to further increase the social
capital, such as face, of the benefactor. This is consistent with the algorithm of synergistic communities, namely that the more you use a resource [such as face], the
more it is there to be used (Katz & Murphy-Shigematsu, 2012, p. 54). For illustration, consider the following anecdote from a Chinese blog Boss, would you
please invite my father to dinner?(,?) (retrieved from
http://t.hexun.com.tw/20367218/30487805_d.html):
A young man fresh out of college found a job working at entry level at an international trading company in Suzhou. His father decided to pay him a visit in order to find out how he
was doingdoes he have friends; where does he live, and so on. But the young man was all
alone in a big city. He recalled how his father brought him up after his mother passed away;
how his father carried him on the bike, peddling from street to street selling bean curd.
He wanted to put his fathers concerns for him at ease, but how? With no friends to turn to,
the young man approached his boss. With great embarrassment and all flustered, the young
man asked his boss to take his father out to dinner. The boss more than accommodated his
requestupon arrival, the employees father was given a chauffeur along with the company
car, taken to an expensive hotel, entertained by a banquet at a fine restaurant, to which the
company staff were invited. In addition, the young man was given time off to tour the city
with his father in the company car. After the young mans father left, the boss called for a
company meeting to explain why he did what he did: An organization is not simply a place
to work. It is also a big family where people show concern and loving care for each other.
In addition to competition, benefits and development, there should also be the warmth of an
ordinary family. This is what makes a good organization, a forever progressive organization. The boss was right. This company grew and made money even during the recession
of 2009. To this day, the young man, now a business manager in the company, tells this story
to every new employee with this punch line: the all surpassing power is affection (qing).
Cast into the symmetry framework (Chap. 1), the gist of this blog goes something
like this: A young man low in social capitalall alone in a big city and a big company
went to his boss to borrow some social capital in the form of face and recognition, in
order to meet the expectations of his father who was coming to town to check on him.
The boss splurged favor on the young man, giving him and his father face and recognition far beyond what was warranted by the work relationship. To rectify this asymmetry
of imbalanced transaction, the young man, now rendered debtor, openly publicized the
favor he received from the boss, thereby increasing social recognition and reputation of
the latter. This, according to Lin (2001) is a common practice for debtors to maintain
relationship (in other words, to restore symmetry) in debt-based transactions.
Basking in Gratitude
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Basking in Gratitude
Gratitude is a moral emotion (McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, & Larson, 2001).
The Chinese term for gratitude is another gan compound: gan-ji. The gan-ji
compound refers to the sensitivity and responsiveness to the impact of indebtedness.
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131
ings in order to get along with others, so the collectivism narrative continues. Yet,
there is room for selfishness in the Chinese society. Selfishness, understood as a sign
of immaturity, is a prerogative of the very young. Sajiao marks this site of selfishness reserved in particular for the young and immature. This term refers to the
behaviors of young children who act like a spoiled brat, and by extension, young
women acting childish as a form of flirtation.
Sajiao can be outright manipulative. This is implied in many of its connotations,
according to Farris (1994): a general linguistic form expressing wheedling with
subordination which is a strategy available to children and adults of both sexes
(p. 13). Or the adorable petulance of a spoiled child or young woman who seeks
material or immaterial benefit from an unwilling listener (p. 13). Farris (1994)
points out that Children learn early not only to do sajiao so as to get what they
want, but also that this behavior has a specific label (p. 18), such as adorable or
mischievous.
Sajiao can be used to show displeasure by the use of linguistic forms that are a
metaphorical extension of baby talk (p. 16). Certain particles are used to indicate
the tone of voice: Ba is a particle which indicates mild imperatives like come on,
lets; ma is a particle used to soften a remark made in a pleading style, like
please! In response to her husband who called in to say that he couldnt come
home for dinner, a young bride said in a sajiao tone, I have already cooked dinner
(le la)! (p. 19). Baby talk legitimizes the display of anger-related affect, such as
peevishness, which is not considered negative so much as immature emotions.
The focus of sajiao, however, falls not on the selfish and sometimes downright
manipulative behaviors, so much as on the relational context of such behaviors. It is
the context of intimacy. Thus young children may act like a spoiled brat with parents, but not necessarily with teachers, and definitely not with strangers. And a
young woman may act childish only with selective mates. This deliberate act of
regression is done not in the service of the ego so much as in that of a relationship.
This point is best expressed by another dictionary definition of the term sajiao:
Relying on dotting affection to bring forth an indulgent attitude (Farris, 1994,
p. 13). This reminds us of the Japanese term amae.
132
maternal order in the other by behaving on the assumption that each of us has a
right to be loved by the maternal features resident in the other (p. 120).
The maternal order is a nurturing relationship characteristic of the parentchild
attachment, and is reminiscent of therapeutic relationships such as Rogers unconditional positive regard. However, what is unique about its manifestation in amae
and sajiao is the emphasis on the imbalanced transaction, as evidenced by indulging
the other. Cast in the framework of symmetry (Chap. 1), indulgence underscores a
superabundance of symmetry, sufficient enough to withstand the symmetry breaking acts of selfishness.
The connection between superabundance and self-indulgence finds empirical
support in the research by Emily Bianchi (2014), who reported a positive correlation
between economic affluence and narcissistic personality traits. Narcissistic individuals are full of themselves, characterized by self-focus, self-importance, and
self-deserving. To this type of brats, sajiao forms an illuminating contrast.
The difference between these two types of bratsone related to narcissism, the
other sajiaoseems to fall along the divide between two transactions of the mind:
mind-to-world versus mind-to-mind (see Chap. 1). In the context of mind-to-world
transaction, material affluence in the world contributes to indulgence which in turn
breeds narcissism. In the context of mind-to-mind transaction, maternal order is a
superabundance that breeds indulgence. But the brat in the relational context of
mind-to-mind transactions finds himself or herself in a subordinate position. Turning
upside down the rights-based reasoning of individualistic societies, sajiao says
something to the effect that My right of way is not what I am entitled to, but rather
what others grant me out of grace. Thus, instead of feeling entitled and deserving,
the sajiao brat is keenly aware of his or her dependence on the other mind, in which
alone lies the hope of invoking the maternal order.
133
As for young women, their display of sajiao is primarily found in the context of
the mating game. Young women act bratty to make sure that (a) a good mate is one
who finds them charming even when they let their hair down so to speak; and (b) to
bank their romantic relationship on gratitude. There is ample empirical evidence
that gratitude is good for relationships (Algoe, 2012), especially romantic commitment (Algoe, Gable, & Maisel, 2010). Algoe, Haidt, and Gable (2008) suggest that
gratitude functions to draw attention to that potentially high-quality relationship
partner, and provide fuel for the binding of the two people more closely together.
Consistent with this hypothesis is the finding that feelings of gratitude and appreciation constitute an important component in the marital intimacy of Chinese couples (Li, 1999).
While children and young women have had their fun with sajiao, how about
adult males? In the following sections I examine a male socializing practice in
Taiwan that involves significant modification of the sajiao game as the right-ofpassage in becoming a man.
134
Males self-enhancement in hostess clubs can be analyzed along the lines of the
sajiao game, which entails the following rules for a male child:
A. He is taking advantage of the benevolent other, who allows him to:
Let his hair down;
Indulge in his lower impulses;
Gain his self-worth through the adoring gaze of the other.
B. And he is expected to play this self-indulgence game with discretion.
But since flower drinking takes place in the context of mixed ties rather than in
that of the family, it entails one major modification of the sajiao game, namely that
the benevolent other is split into two rolesthe hostess who entertains you and the
boss who pays for all your expenses there. These two benevolent others take care of
two separate components of the sajiao game: The hostess takes care of activities
that fall under A above, which pertains to two essential components of selfenhancementfeeling good and ego repair. The boss takes care of activities that fall
under B, which pertains to the capacity for self-control and use of discretion.
135
playing ball. Most men go [to the hostess club] to play women (p. 88). What is
the difference between balls and women? Women, but not balls, have minds hence
can be mindful of you. The hostesses in high-class clubs in particular come from a
long tradition in which courtesans are trained to serve as mens intellectual companion. Most women in traditional China were not educated: Only courtesans studied
art, music, and literature. And they acquired these skills in order to serve as intellectual companions to men of the upper class (p. 89).
One salesman described the experience of being in the presence of the mindful
hostesses:
When you enter the place in a bad mood, the girls still smile at you. You want to smoke,
she lights up a cigarette immediately; your glass is empty, she pours more drinks. Its a kind
of respect you get sitting next to her. Girls nowadays? If you want something, get it yourself. (p. 88)
These skills of social mindfulness (see Chap. 3, Van Doesum, Van Lange, & Van
Lange, 2013) create the illusion that a hostess compliments him because she
admires and respects his social status and character, which is irrelevant to the fact
that she is being paid (Bedford & Hwang, 2011, p. 90). While this illusion of selfimportance feels good, it is tempered by another considerationyour boss is watching you.
136
collective consciousness of effervescence, at the hostess club is a form of male bonding that involves collective regression via alcohol and women. In the words of one
interviewee in the study of Bedford and Hwang (2011): Men get together to do something bad in order to cement their relationships (p. 88, emphasis added). As another
interviewee put it: These places are definitely necessary to men. They help us relax,
to be free, and let down our defenses. We can talk about anything (p. 87).
In addition to the collective excitement, flower drinking is a rite of passage for males,
as Bedford and Hwang (2013) point out: Participants bonded not just as individuals but
as men (p. 308), and I would add, as mature men. The hallmark of maturity here seems
to be discernment, for which flower drinking poses significant challenges.
137
favors bestowedthe longer the latency period, the more real things become. In the
context of strong ties, the in-group consists of the expressive ties of family, and the
mixed ties of friends (Hwang, 2012). The out-group, by contrast, consists of dissimilar others such as the hostesses who are sex objects for men to play with.
According to Bedford (2011), favors to family members need not be repaid,
whereas favors from nonfamily members must be (p. 150). Thus the latency in
payback is the longest (i.e., no need to reciprocate a favor) for the expressive ties of
family, and the shortest for the out-group which requires immediate and exact payback for services rendered. It is this no-latency-pay-schedule that marks the relationship with the hostess as unreal, as Bedford (2011) points out that immediate
repayment may be seen as an effort to close off the relationship (p. 152). As for the
mixed ties of friends and business associates, the payback is protracted to match the
slow process of building an affect-based connection (guanxi): Working guanxi is
developed slowly without knowing what payoff one may receive down the line
(Bedford, 2011, p. 154).
138
from payback right away, enduring the discomfort of being in debt, and so on) with
the hope for long-term gain such as an enduring relationship.
Short-term cost, long-term gain. The ability to delay short-term gratification for
future gains has been studied extensively in psychology under the rubrics of willpower, self-control, or self-regulation (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). One of the best
known studies on delaying gratification is conducted by Walter Mischel (2014) and
colleagues. In this now famous marshmallow test, young children were offered a
choice between one small reward of marshmallow provided immediately or two
small rewards if they waited for a short period, approximately 15 min, during which
time the tester left the room and then returned. In longitudinal follow-up studies, the
researchers found that children who were able to wait longer for the bigger rewards
tended to have better life outcomes, such as higher SAT scores, higher educational
attainment, better physical health, and so on.
In sharp contrast to the Western emphasis on delaying gratification for young
children is the scenario of sajiao. Gratification of impulses is not a problem, so long
as the child learns gratitude through it, for it is gratitude that will, later in adult life,
facilitate the self-control necessary for delaying gratifications so the reasoning
behind sajiao goes. There is some empirical support for this line of thinking.
First, there is the possibility that childrens ability to wait for a future reward depends
on other factors besides willpower. To find out, Kidd, Palmeri, and Aslin (2013) modified the original marshmallow test by dividing children into two groups: one group was
given a broken promise before the marshmallow test was conducted (the unreliable
condition), and the second group had a fulfilled promise before their marshmallow test
(the reliable condition). Children in the reliable condition waited four times longer than
those in the unreliable condition for the second marshmallow to appear. Along this line,
the sajiao scenario suggests that it certainly does not hurt for children to feel loved and
well taken care ofsecure attachment would enhance their ability to wait. This is consistent with the observation of Mischel (2014) that children from intact families showed
superior ability to delay gratification. But from the Chinese perspective, sajiao is simply preparing the ground for gratitude which is the main engine that drives the motivation for making short-term sacrifices for long-term gains in a relationship.
Support for the connection between gratitude and delay of gratification comes
from evolutionary theory. Trivers (1971) suggests that gratitude may be a proximate
motivator for reciprocal altruism, in which one has to accept short-term costs in
resources in an effort to access future gains. Following up on this line of thinking,
DeSteno, Bartlett, Baumann, Williams, and Dickens (2010) found empirical evidence that gratitude motivates behaviors that are costly in the moment but hold the
potential to build long-term cooperation in the future.
An affective route to self-control. The foregoing analysis suggests two competing
routeswillpower versus gratitudeto the goal of investing on future gains while
curbing temptations at the moment. Willpower, as we know, has a downside, namely
that it is energy consuming and can run out (Vohs et al., 2008). By contrast, gratitude can last a life time, especially if its action impulses are frustrated indefinitely. This
suggests the possibility of using emotion to regulate emotion (for more details, see
Chap. 10). More specifically, the positive emotion of gratitude that feeds on the delayed
gratification of its payback impulses may be able to mollify negative emotions of
References
139
frustration and impatience that also grow with delayed gratifications. Empirical support for this conjecture comes from a study by DeSteno, Li, Dickens, and Lerner
(2014), who found effects of gratitude in reducing impatience for delayed rewards.
The significance of this finding lies in suggesting the possibility that affect can serve
as an alternative approach to self-regulation, a route that bypasses the high cognitive-control (see Chaps. 2, 5, and 7) and energy consuming path of willpower. Thus
the authors conclude that in addition to the cold-cognition of rational decisions that
capitalize on effortful self-control or willpower, there is a second route to combat
excessive impatience. Moreover, this route can operate relatively intuitively and thus
effortlessly from the bottom up (p. 1265).
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Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 6, 455469.
Algoe, S. B., Gable, S. L., & Maisel, N. (2010). Its the little things: Everyday gratitude as a
booster shot for romantic relationships. Personal Relationships, 17, 217233.
Algoe, S. B., Haidt, J., & Gable, S. L. (2008). Beyond reciprocity: Gratitude and relationships in
everyday life. Emotion, 8, 425429.
Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., & Tice, D. M. (2007). The strength model of self-control. Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 16, 351355.
Bedford, O. (2011). Guanxi-building in the workplace: A dynamic process model of working and
backdoor guanxi. Journal of Business Ethics, 104, 149158.
Bedford, O., & Hwang, S. L. (2011). Flower Drinking and Masculinity in Taiwan. Journal of Sex
Research, 48, 8292.
Bedford, O., & Hwang, S.-L. (2013). Building relationships for business in Taiwanese hostess
clubs: The psychological and social processes of guanxi development. Gender, Work &
Organization, 20, 297310. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0432.2011.00576.x.
Bianchi, E. C. (2014). Entering adulthood in a recession tempers later narcissism. Psychological
Science, 25, 14291437.
Bolender, J. (2010). The self-organizing social mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bollas, C. (2013). China on the mind. New York: Routledge.
Bull, N. (1951). The attitude theory of emotion. Oxford, England: Nervous and Mental Disease
Monograph.
Cheney, D. L., Moscovice, L. R., Heesen, M., Mundry, R., & Seyfarth, R. M. (2010). Contingent
cooperation between wild female baboons. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
107, 95629566.
Chiu, C.-Y. (1990). Distributive justice among Hong Kong Chinese college students. Journal of
Social Psychology, 130, 649656.
DeSteno, D., Bartlett, M. Y., Baumann, J., Williams, L. A., & Dickens, L. (2010). Gratitude as
moral sentiment: Emotion-guided cooperation as economic exchange. Emotion, 10, 289293.
DeSteno, D., Li, Y., Dickens, L., & Lerner, J. S. (2014). Gratitude: A Tool for Reducing Economic
Impatience. Psychological Science, 25, 12621267.
Doi, T. (1981). The anatomy of dependence: The key analysis of Japanese behavior (Trans. John
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Online Resources
http://t.hexun.com.tw/20367218/30487805_d.html
Part III
Chinese Creativity
References
Burks, A. W. (Ed.). (1966). Theory of self-reproducing automata. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois
Press.
Sundararajan, L., & Averill, J. R. (2007). Creativity in the everyday: Culture, self, and emotions.
In R. Richards (Ed.), Everyday creativity and new views of human nature (pp. 195220).
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Chapter 9
Introduction
It is not that the Chinese did not get so far as the Greeks; they simply advanced in a different
direction. (Jean-Pierre Vernant, cited in Bollas, 2013, pp. 89)
The widespread canard that Asians are not very creative is unfortunately well
supported by robust empirical data (e.g., Bond, 1991; Gardner, 1996; Hannas, 2003;
Ng, 2001). One major flaw in these cross-cultural studies on creativity lies in looking for Asian creativity in the wrong places (Sundararajan & Raina, 2015). Toward
a more informed approach to Asian creativity, I first identify the essential attributes
of Chinese creativity. Then I demonstrate the application of these principles in the
context of Daoism, with special focus on solitude and its seekers. In particular, I cast
the ideal mental world of the recluse in the context of a designer environment that
nurtures as well as demands cognitive and emotional skills pertinent to solitude. For
illustration, relevant poems by Si-Kong Tu (837908) are examined to shed some
light on the emotional landscape of the poet/recluse.
143
144
145
Creativity in the Daoist vein is fostered by solitude. One third of classical Chinese
poetry is by hermits and about hermits (Han, 1998). The Chinese have many names
for hermits: the recluse, the Daoist immortals, the minister in the mountains (some
hermits were consultants for the emperor), the hermit in the market place, and so on.
Hermits exist even in contemporary China. There is a book (Porter, 1993) and a film
(Burger, 2005) documenting hermit monks in Chinas deep mountains which have
been home to recluses for thousands of years.
One consistent motivation behind hermitage is self-preservation.
An animal model of hermitage. According to a Science News report (Milius,
2013), self-preservation by hiding has its advantages: Cicadas spend the majority of
their lives underground. They emerge after 13 or 17 years to mate, reproduce, and
die shortly after. Hiding underground for a long time may be a good idea, if you are
a cicada. Samples of cicadas from underground dont show much evidence of premature death by predator, and spending more time growing may mean bigger bodies
to leave more offspring. Indeed, the 17-year cicadas were found to have more eggs
than the 13-year ones.
The wisdom of the cicadas can also be observed in contemporary Chinese leaders. There is a Chinese saying that The bird that sticks its head out gets shot (
). Zhou Nan, a marketing professor, explained: If we look at top leaders,
they need to stay very quiet and wait unbelievably patiently for their turn. In comparison, every 4 years there is a presidential election in USA (personal communication, April 23, 2014). This wisdom is described in more details by Jing and Van
de Ven (2014), who studied the Chinese notion of situational momentum (shi ).
Situational momentum (shi) can be favorable or unfavorable: Shi or situational
momentum is favorable when it aids efforts. Shi or situational momentum is unfavorable when it dampens efforts (p. 34). Open communication is used when situational momentum (shi) is perceived to be favorable, where actions must be done
quickly without delay. Change agents must use their clear vision and goals to
146
encourage internal actors to participate in the change process. Thus, open intentions
become reasonable (p. 50). By contrast, as the Chinese proverb goes, the master
holds back secret tricks, the authors point out that secrecy is often an auxiliary
strategy when situational momentum (shi) is perceived to be unfavorable. For illustration, the success story of the CEO of the Chengdu Bus Group is cited to show
how since unfavorable contexts bring high environmental uncertainty. By keeping his intentions secret, he had more opportunities to adjust his plans without losing authority or respect (p. 49). Thus, similar to the cicadas, change agentswait
and save their energy and credibility during an unfavorable shi to take better advantage of the next favorable shi (p. 50).
In addition to self-preservation, solitude also satisfies the need for self-creation.
The moral of the story is clear, namely liberation is from within: Independence
is won not by opposing the group, so much as by opening up a new frontier within
the self.
Prioritizing private over public. The private and public distinction exists in
Confucianism (Chap. 3; Sundararajan, 2002). But Confucius, while privileging the
private over the public, is interested in the integration of these two realms of reality.
For instance, he used rites to integrate alignment and display goals in communication (McKeown, 2013). In the funeral rites, music serves the alignment purposes of
facilitating attunement and social bonding, while wailing serves the purpose of public display of emotions. By contrast, Chuangzi, the hermit philosopher who has the
greatest impact on Chinese creativity, thinks otherwise. He dissociates the alignment
and display goals of communication by a display of unconventional
147
emotionssinging and drummingat his wifes death (Mair, 1994, pp. 168169).
The message of Chuangzi is loud and clear: How the person feels privately cannot
and should not be yoked to public coordination games such as the funeral rites.
The supremacy of inner/private over outer/public reality finds an eloquent
expression in the story of the old man who lives in the kettle: There was an old man
who sold medicine in the market place. He gave his daily income to the poor and the
hungry, keeping only the minimum for himself. Then every day when the sun went
down, he jumped into an empty kettle that hung above his seat and disappeared
without a trace (Q. C. Zhou, 2004, pp. 305309). The Taoist immortal in this story
is amphibian, one who does business with the world to meet his basic needs and to
help others, but when it comes to nurturing his soul and spirit, he dwells in an
entirely different universe.
The transcendent universe of the artist, or creativity for that matter, is known as
the ideal mental world or jing-jie .
The basic idea is that poetry, or art in general, is a projection of the artists ideal
mental world, a new frontier in mental space which can be co-inhabited by the audience, who thereby is able to attain similar states of consciousness as the artist. To
explain how the ideal mental world of poetry can facilitate the development of consciousness on the part of the audience, and more specifically for our purposes, how
a poets imageries of solitude can offer ideal mental worlds for the readers to inhabit
and thereby develop emotional skills necessary for the capacity to be alone, I turn to
the theory of designer environment.
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Designer Environment
to live deliberately (Thoreau, 1966, p. 61).
As social animals, humans tend to select society as their habitat, which satisfies
their need for belonging, but also imposes much pressure for conformity. Those
who choose to be alone will have to make a trade-off between freedom from social
pressure and loneliness. But it is possible to have the best of both worldsfreedom
from group living on the one hand, and emotional bonding, on the other. This can be
done, if one knows how to construct designer environments (Clark, 2008).
Many infrahuman animals have special skills that allow them to construct niches
in which to flourish, for example, spiders weave webs, birds build nests, and beavers
construct dams. Designer environments are the cognitive counterpart of niche construction by animals.
In contrast to natural habitats which are grounded in physical and social reality,
designer environments are found only in cognitive space. As a virtual reality, the
designer environment is a concept cast in the similar vein as the Chinese jing-jie or
ideal mental worlds.
Both the ideal mental world and designer environment share in common with
natural habitats the requirement of skillsincluding a particular lifestyle, and certain cognitive and emotional capacitiesin order for the organism to make it in
these environments. As descried by Clark (2008), humans construct and inhabit
cognitive niches which include designer environments in which to think, reason,
and perform as well as special training regimes to install (and to make habitual) the
complex skills such environments demand (p. 59). Likewise there is much emphasis in Chinese aesthetics on self-cultivation as prerequisite for anyone who wishes
to inhabit the ideal mental worlds of art/poetry.
To demonstrate how the jing-jie or ideal mental world of the poet/hermit is a designer
environment that nurtures as well as demands cognitive and emotional skills pertinent
to solitude, I turn to the work of a hermit-Si-Kong Tu (837908) (see Wu,1963).
The ninth century poet/critic Si-Kong Tu (837908) is best known for his The
twenty-four categories of poetry (Erh-shih-ssu shih-pin or Shih-pin for short)
(Owen, 1992). The Shih-pin is ostensibly a taxonomy of poetic styles. It consists of
a set of twenty-four poems dividing poetry into different categories and illustrating
these with vivid images (Wu, 1963, p. 78). But it is as much a typology of poetic
149
moods. In fact, what Hartman (1964) says about the romantic lyric of surmise
applies very well: this kind of lyricdisconcertingly turns all terms descriptive of
mode into terms descriptive of mood (p. 11). From here we need to make another
movetransitioning from the mood of poetry to that of the poetin order to complete the hermeneutic circle. This relatively smooth conceptual transition from
poetry to poet is made possible by the self-reflexivity in Chinese creativity, in which
the product of ones creativity is first and foremost the creative person him- or
her-self.
The central theme that serves as the root metaphor for all these moods/modes of
poetry as well as poet is solitude. As Pauline Yu (1978) points out, the ideal poet
in the Shih-pin is an aloof solitary figure (p. 91). In fact When Ssu-kung Tu
[Si-Kong Tu] employs any human figures at all, he characteristically chooses the
lone hermit. Specific mention of the hermit occurs in at least six poems, and the
word tu (alone) and references to the lofty crane in several more (p. 90).
In sum, if I may spell things out prosaically and in plain English, Si-Kong Tu
claims that the ideal poet is a recluse, and he has identified 24 categories of the ideal
mental worlds of both poetry and the poet to make his point. In the following pages,
I examine some of the imageries in the Shih-pin in order to gain some insight into
the ideal mental worlds of the poet/hermit. Since these categories in the Shih-pin
are arranged numerically from 1 to 24, I shall refer to each category by its number
as Cat. #.
Imageries of solitude. A good place to start is Cat. 16 entitled Lucid and
Strange: Here the recluse is compared to the atmosphere of autumn: Like autumn
in the weather (Owen, 1992, p. 338). Lu (1989, p. 189) explains that the personality style of lucid and strange involves risk taking, and using unexpected words to
shock others, such that its impact on others is comparable to that of the chilly and
desolate atmosphere of autumn (p. 189). This cold, lofty, chilly, and desolate
mood/mode (Lu, 1989, p. 189) of the poet/recluse is a far cry from the conventional
sage who embodies social harmony and is frequently compared to the spring
weather.
Consider another imagery of solitude in Cat. 5 (Lofty and Ancient):
The moon emerges in the eastern Dipper,
And a good wind follows it.
Tai-hua Mountain is emerald green this night,
And he hears the sound of a clear bell. (Owen, 1992, p. 313)
Owens (1992) exegesis of these lines captures well the mental world of a lofty
hermit: All is wind, light, and sound, with the only shape in the void being the
mysterious and dark mass of Mount Tai-hua, around which immortal beings from
the past play unseen (p. 315). It is reasonable to assume that this designer world of
solitude requires as well as nurtures emotional creativity. Indeed, emotional creativity, as assessed by the Emotional Creativity Inventory (Averill, 1999), was found by
Long, Seburn, Averill, and More (2003) to be the personality variable most highly
related to positive experiences of solitude. In the following sections, I use imageries
from Shih-pin to illustrate some emotionally creative skills that are pertinent to
solitude, with special focus on two sets of capacitiesfreedom and communion.
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Freedom Skills
Independence with a touch of arrogance. If arrogance is associated with creativity
(Silvia, Kaufman, Reiter-Palmon, & Wigert, 2011), the lofty hermits certainly
have their share. As Sundararajan (2004) points out, the Chinese protocol of creativity shares in common with creative individuals in the West a large dose of arrogance
and reward-independence, but not the hostility (aggressive, assertive, argumentative) traits (Feist, 1999) that plague Western creativity. More pertinent to solitude
than arrogance is independence.
Independence serves solitude well as a buffer against social rejection. In a series
of studies, Kim, Vincent, and Goncalo (2013) found that the experience of social
rejection may stimulate creativity but only for individuals with an independent selfconcept. More specifically, individuals who hold an independent self-concept performed more creatively after social rejection relative to inclusion. The results also
show that this boost in creativity is mediated by a differentiation mindset characterized by salient feelings of being different from others. Consistent with this profile is
the lofty hermit who is highly independent and unconventional. A few examples
from Shih-pin (Owen, 1992) shall suffice:
Cat. 5: In air he stands long in spiritual simplicity,/All limits and boundaries lightly
passed (p. 313).
Cat. 21: If for a moment you have the chi [qi] of the Way [Dao],/You will ultimately escape the ordinary (p. 346).
Cat. 22: Set apart, on the point of departing,/Rising loftily, not of the crowd
(p. 348).
As Owen (1992) points out, these lines describe a quality of personality that is
high-minded, free, and holds apart from others (p. 348).
A rolling stoneroaming, exploring, inaccessible. Consistent with Cloningers
(1987) conceptualizations of the high-novelty-seeking trait of creativity, hermits
tend to be engaged in extensive exploratory activities. Consider a portrait of the lone
poet/recluse in the following lines of Cat. 16:
An agreeable person, like jade,
Pacing clogs seek in secluded places.
Now peering, now stopping,
Emerald skies stretching on and on. (p. 338)
The hermit in this poem engages himself with extensive exploratory activities:
pacing, seeking, peering, and stopping from time to time. Here novelty and solitude
have coalesced, thereby rendering secluded places the goal of novelty seeking.
The designer environment for a hermit with high mobility is a poetic mode/mood
best represented by Category 22, called Drifting Aloof in which one moves with
things but has no attachments, no signs of care (Owen, 1992, p. 349). Elements of
this mode/mood can be found in the following poems:
Cat. 2: If there is some resemblance of shape,/The grasping hand has already
missed it (Owen, 1992, p. 306)
Community/Intimacy Skills
151
Community/Intimacy Skills
In creating the ideal self, the hermit is simultaneously creating an ideal community.
The ideal community of the hermit has the best of both worldsfreedom from
social constraints, on the one hand, and communion with like-minded others, on the
other. The paradoxical combination of freedom and community is the hallmark of
the hermits designer environment. This entails a novel emotional landscape, in
which both community and intimacy are redefined.
Ideal community. Society is only one type of community that humans make to
serve their needs as relational beings; other types of community include virtual
communities with God, Natureand even, on occasion, with inanimate objects.
This perspective allows us to appreciate how some individuals leave society for
another community in a manner analogous to the habitat selection (see Chap. 4) and
niche construction of nonhuman animals.
Hermits enjoy the visits of a select few:
Cat. 13: Someone comes to the emerald hills/Clear wine, a deep goblet (Owen,
1992, p. 332).
Cat. 6: Fine scholars are his guests,/All around him, fine bamboo (Owen, 1992,
p. 315).
With these lines, we can imagine the ideal community for the hermit to be a
gathering of like-minded individuals, a community marked by the absence of
unwanted companyresulting in bamboos outnumbering the human guests. This
152
Community/Intimacy Skills
153
into nostalgia. This makes sense, as nostalgia has been found to be effective in
countering loneliness (X. Zhou, Sedikides, Wildschut, & Gao, 2008). Beyond its
function as an effective buffer against loneliness, nostalgia seems to be closely
related to an orientation best exemplified by the hermits, namely an intrinsic, in
contrast to the extrinsic, self-focus. This is the finding from a series of studies conducted by Baldwin, Biernat, and Landau (2015). Defining extrinsic self-focus as
being concerned with meeting externally imposed value standards, and intrinsic
self-focus as being concerned with the true self, in other words authenticity (see
Chaps. 3 and 7), the researchers found that nostalgia is associated with authenticity
and a sense of well-being. More specifically, they found that state nostalgia was
associated with higher authenticity and lower extrinsic self-focus; that experimentally primed nostalgia increased perceived authenticity of the past self, which in
turn predicted reduced current extrinsic self-focus; that nostalgia increased the
accessibility of the intrinsic self-concept but not the everyday self-concept; that
recalling a nostalgic event increased felt nostalgia and positive affect, but this effect
was attenuated if participants were prompted to recognize external factors controlling their behavior during that event; and lastly, dispositional nostalgia positively
predicted intrinsic self-expression and well-being.
To shed further light on the emotional landscape of the ideal poet/recluse, I conclude this chapter with an exploration of longing, which constitutes the most emotionally creative component of nostalgia.
An anatomy of longing.
Longing the so-said mind long lost to longing. (Beckett, 2006, p. 481)
154
The sea below, the clouds above, in between there is the vast expanse of space
with nothing but wind and (moon) lightthis scene evokes a sense of freedom. The
ocean wind sweeps the clouds at will, just as the bright moonlight pours over the
nightly isles freely. The highest manifestation of mental and spiritual freedom is
reached when the hermit proves himself to be free from depression in the face of
harsh realitiesthe insurmountable barriers to communication (fine words to be
conveyed to the beloved), as suggested by the imagery of the mighty river that cuts
across his path. In sum, self-composure in the face of depression is the capacity to
hold in juxtaposition positive as well as negative ramifications of absencefreedom of mind and spirit, on the one hand; and longing for the impossible community,
on the other.
Coda
In case you think that these ideal mental worlds (jing-jie) along with their ethereal
imageries are the pastimes for the select few in another era far removed from the
hustles and bustles of modernity, nothing can be farther from the truth. The term
jing-jie is by no means obsolete, and the creative construction of such a mental
world is the aspiration of many in contemporary China. The following Chap. 10 will
give an example of this practice in mainland China.
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Chapter 10
Introduction
Proust argued that for the most part experience passes us byit goes too fast and its sensory
basis is dissipated, or our attention moves elsewhere before its meaning can be understood.
The coming together of a particular experience and its meaning is rare. (Oatley, 2002, p. 65).
Savoring (pin wei ) (Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007) may be defined formally
as appreciation and extensive processing of personal emotional information that
includes but is not confined to aesthetic experiences. In common parlance, savoring
names the coming together of experience and meaningan occurrence which is not
necessarily rare in the lives of the Chinese.
This chapter begins with an overview that distinguishes the Chinese notion of
savoring from its Western and Indian counterparts. Then I examine the temporal,
narrative, and cognitive structures of savoring. I focus in particular on Si-Kong Tus
formulation of aesthetic savoring, and analyze it in terms of engaged detachment, a
formulation that is consistent with modern explanations of the aesthetic paradox.
Along the way, I point out the wide-ranging implications of savoring for the
narrative-based theory of emotion, dual process theory, emotion regulation, and
self-reflection. Lastly, I examine savorings contribution to self-regulation and the
authentic self, focusing especially on its implications for problems in self-regulation such as self-deception and self-alienation. In the concluding section, I sum up
the principles of savoring with a contemporary Chinese application.
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Savoring
well as from the Indian rasa. The Western formulation is confined to positive
experiences (Bryant & Veroff, 2007), whereas the Chinese savoring includes
negative experiences as well, and has a relatively wider scope of temporality that
extends to both the aftertaste of an experience (Eoyang, 1993) and the subtle incipient phase of things (Sundararajan, 2004). Furthermore, the Chinese notion of savoring (pin wei) is more elaborate and wider in scope than what is implied by its English
counterpart. The English term savoring in its common parlance is restricted to
consumption or perception with prolonged attention. By contrast, the Chinese concept of savoring is linked to a number of process terms, such as evaluation of flavor
(pin wei ), being cognizant of flavor (zhi wei ), and retrospective flavor
(hui wei ). All these terms indicate specific modes of processing.
As an aesthetic emotion, the Chinese savoring differs from the Indian rasa
(Sundararajan, 2010) in three respects: first, whereas rasa concerns discrete emotions of anger, erotic love, and so on (Shweder & Haidt, 2000), the Chinese savoring
computes multiple emotional states to capture a particular affective brew; second,
whereas rasa seeks to transcend the self in its mundane existence, the Chinese
savoring is an affirmation of the individual self with its taste, values, and memories
as the sole measure of what is worth savoring; and third, whereas rasa is otherworldly oriented with its highest aspiration to be the tasting of ultimate reality
Brahman (Dehejia, 1996), the Chinese aesthetics of savoring is part and parcel of
the Confucian program of self-cultivation for social harmony and the art of
government.
An Overview of Savoring
The Chinese notion of savoring can be traced back to classical texts of high antiquity (third century BC, if not earlier), but the earliest and one of the most influential
theorists of savoring is the ninth century poet and literary critic Si-Kong Tu (837
908) (Chap. 12; Owen, 1992; Sundararajan, 1998, 2004). In its rudimental forms,
savoring is manifest in movements designed to enhance and prolong pleasurable
sensations that Frijda (2007) refers to as acceptance wriggles: when the tongue curls
around the savors from the morsel in ones mouth; when the fingers follow the surface of the loved skin while ones eyes follow the loved bodys contour. Acceptance
wriggles of taste and smell have their animal precursors in the orofacial patterns of
hedonic response in rats and other animals. In humans savoring has a stronger connection with meaning than with pleasurable sensations.
The following are a few contemporary examples of savoring from mainland
China, retrieved by Yahoo.Chinese (Ye, 2007)
(A) Pain is like a book. By studying it [tiwei], thinking about it, and digesting it,
one will come to have many special feelings about it (p. 123).
(B) [Only when you are not in front of me am I immersed in the feelings towards
you], and to experience [tiwei] my longing for you in every fine detail (p. 123).
159
(C) The lyric from a pop song adapted from an ancient poem refers to an emotional
experience as having a rather unusual kind of flavor [ziwei] in the heart
(adapted from Ye, 2007, p. 116).
In the above quotes, the three Chinese terms sharing the same root wei (taste,
flavor) are variants of the savoring theme: ziwei (in C) is simply flavor, whereas
tiwei (body-taste, in A and B) means savoring in an embodied way, a notion
that is at once experiential and cognitivea deep, fine and detailed thinking process (Ye, 2007, p. 122). The depth of processing implied by tiwei underscores one
essential feature of savoring, namely its readiness for meaning.
The information-processing strategy of savoring may be described in terms what
Pribram and McGuinness (1975) refer to as the arousal system. Characteristic of
arousal is readiness to respond meaningfully to input as evidenced by increase in
the number of sensory channels available (p. 135), in contrast to the lack of readiness to respond meaningfully to input, which is characterized by effort to cope with
the situation and attempt to shut off further input. This processing strategy characteristic of savoring is in direct contrast to the stress and coping model of emotion
regulation (to be elaborated later), which tends to approach emotion as an alien,
potentially disruptive force that must be controlled. In this respect, savoring is akin
to what Arnheim (1966) said about artistic creativity: Faced with the pregnant sight
of reality, the truly creative person does not move away from it but toward and into
it (p. 299).
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Savoring
Privileging the protonarratives of emotion renders many Chinese writers unwilling to settle for any particular emotion labels. One example from a classical novel
by Feng Meng-long (15741645) shall suffice:
Axiu was dumfounded upon hearing this. It is difficult to describe how she felt inside:
panicnot exactly; ashamednot exactly; worriednot exactly; sorrownot exactly.
Like being pierced by a disorderly multitude of needles, she felt an indescribable mixture
of pain and itch. (Feng, 1991, chap. 2, p. 142).
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There may be good reasons for the writers indecisiveness, for such mental states
have no names, says Gelernter in another context:
Its hard to get a purchase on such mental stateswhat a person might feel on an unexpectedly warm spring morning, on an empty beach in winteror pounding a nail squarely into
a wooden plank. Such occasions might evoke an emotional response. But those emotions
are a far cry from happy or sad.They are subtleThey are idiosyncratic, blended to
order for a particular occasion. They may contain recognizable traces of primary emotion
(a touch of sadness, a trace of anxiety), but these are nuanced, complicated mixtures. They
have no names. (Gelernter, 1994, pp. 2728)
By contrast, Si-Kong Tu (837908) used the same analogy to argue for the variability and combinatory freedom of feeling states, in his letter to a certain Mr. Li:
In my opinion we can adequately speak of poetry only in terms of making distinctions
in flavors. In everything that suits the palate in the region south of Chiang-ling, if it is
a pickled dish, then it is indeed sourbut it is nothing more than sour. If it is a briny
dish, then it is quite saltybut nothing more than salty. The reason people from the
north, when eating such food, simply satisfy their hunger and then stop eating is that
they recognize that it somehow falls short of perfect excellence and lacks something
beyond the distinction between the merely sour and the merely salty (Owen, 1992,
p. 351).
The ideal poet, according to Si-Kong Tu, is one who is able to make subtle discriminations beyond the conventional palette of emotions (see Sundararajan, 1998,
2004). Owen explains: The opposition is between gross categories that have
names, and fine judgments for which there are no names. Furthermore, those finer
gradations are learned by experience: one who knows only the gross categories can
apprehend only the gross categories; to be able to recognize the finer distinctions
requires the education of a sensibility (Owen, 1992, p. 352). Exactly this kind of
sensitivity lies at the root of creativity, writes Gelernter in reference to subtle discrimination of emotional nuances called emotional acuity (Gelernter, 1994,
p. 89). Emotional acuity constitutes the following components according to
Gelernter (1994):
1. That you are able to register subtle or nuanced emotionsto experience subtle emotional reactionswhere less acute people would have no emotional reaction at all;
2. That you are able to distinguish many elements in a subtle emotional palette,
where a less acute person would distinguish the emotional equivalent of red,
green, blue. (pp. 8990)
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Savoring
Self-reflexivity
163
Self-reflexivity
The application of Garcia to savoring would complement a better known extension
of the same in Paul Rozins theory of disgust. Disgust is understood as one of the
three other-condemning moral emotions (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000,
p. 644)disgust, contempt, and anger. In sharp contrast to this other-focused attribution, savoring shares with the sick rat a self-referential focus in attribution of the
cause of pain (or pleasure): It must have been something I ate (Garcia, Ervin, &
Koelling, 1966, p. 124, emphasis added).
Savoring (Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007; Sundararajan, 2008) entails response
(such as enjoying) to ones own response to the stimulus (the taste of food). Chinese
theories of savoring emphasize the self-reflexive awareness in which the intentional
object of emotion is the experience, rather than the experienced objectone does
not primarily relish the smelling rose, but the delightful smell. On this account, a
Western formulation of savoring also agrees (Bryant & Veroff, 2007), but does not
go into details of how this works.
Besides taste, other instances of self-reflexivity can be found. For instance in
perception, Humphrey (2006) claims that when S finds red light exciting, it is his
own phenomenal experiencethat he judges exciting, and not the fact that the
screen is colored red (p. 21). Self-reflexivity pertains to two attributes of savoring:
enhanced consciousness and a unique mode of knowing. As a re-entrant feedback
loop, self-reflexivity enhances consciousness.
According to Humphrey (2006), the key to the special quality of consciousness lies in the re-entrant circuits in the brain, namely, neural activity that
loops back on itself, so as to create some kind of self-resonance (p. 121). Selfreflexivity also underscores the fact that, as No (2009) points out: We are not
merely recipients of external influences, but are creatures built to receive influences that we ourselves enact (p. 181). One implication of this for information
processing is a mode of knowing referred to by Reddy (2008) as knowing feelingly (p. 26).
Knowing feelingly (Reddy, 2008) refers to certain modes of knowing in which
feelings precede and form the basis of appraisals. This point is well articulated by
the modern scholar Li Jian-Zhong who claims that Only when the mind is moved,
can one savor the text (Li, 1993, p. 336). Note that this assertion puts the conventional causal chain of appraisal and emotion (Arnold, 1960) in reverse order: Rather
than being the shaping factor of emotions, appraisals (in the sense of appreciation or
savoring) of the text seem to depend critically on whether one is moved or not by
the text. There is some empirical support for this position. Barefoot and Straub
(1974) conducted a study in which they used fake heartbeat sounds to make the
participants think that certain nude models were particularly exciting. Later they
tested the participants again without the fake heartbeat sounds, and found that the
same nude models were still preferredthe participants seemed to be still savoring
what moved them earlier. This is applicable to interpersonal contexts as well, as
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Savoring
Reddy (2008) points out, one must experience a response to an other in order to
know them appropriately (p. 234).
Second-order awareness. Self-reflexivity combines two variants of consciousness, as distinguished by Lambie and Marcel (2002)second-order consciousness,
as opposed to first-order consciousness, and self-directed as opposed to outwarddirected attention. Second-order consciousness consists of experience plus an
additional experience of that experience (Zelazo, 1996, p. 73). It involves awareness that can be recalled and reported. The Doctrine of the Mean stated that There
is no body but eats and drinks. But they are few who can distinguish flavors (1971,
p. 387). The term rendered here by distinguish is zhi , which means literally
cognize. To be zhi or cognizant of flavors implies knowing that one knows the
flavors. Articulate cognizance enables manipulating ones experience in ways characteristic of savoring by seeking and making fine discriminations.
This second-order awareness (awareness of awareness), is referred to in mindfulness literature as mindful awareness or reflexivity (Siegel, 2007, p. 98). Mindful
awareness can be differentiated from simple awareness, which is on a lower level of
consciousness. According to Siegel (2007), mindful awareness permits the decoupling of automaticity (p. 144), whereas mere attention to the present moment is not
able to do so.
Mind-to-mind transaction. One advantage of higher level awareness lies in the
fact that it renders the mind relational to itself. Mind-to-mind transactions (see
Chaps. 1, 3, and 6) are privileged in the East Asian cultures of China, Korea, and
Japan. For instance, Choi and Kim (2006) claim that the main currency in Korean
relationships is a mind exchange rather than a behavioral exchange (p. 358).
Savoring has its roots in the Chinese tradition of intrapersonal mind-to-mind
transactions, otherwise known as within-mind mapping (McKeown, 2013). Consider
the following passage from The Doctrine of the Mean (1971):
There is nothing more visible than what is secret, and nothing more manifest than what is
minute. Therefore the superior man is watchful over himself, when he is alone. (p. 384)
The main idea here is that in solitude one should pay attention to ones thoughts
and feelings down to their subtlest variations. The Chinese text puts a premium on
detecting (bringing to awareness) what is normally below the radar, thus capitalizing on expansion of awareness. The everyday reflection or introspection does not
have that emphasisit simply dwells on whatever is readily accessible, such as
ready-made self-narratives. By contrast, the Chinese introspection has the potential
to get past these ready-made self-narratives to bring to awareness protonarratives of
the moment. In this sense the above scenario of introspection foreshadows the
mindfulness practices today.
Furthermore, the text gives a transactional account of mindful awareness, as evidenced by the reference to how one should be watchful over oneself when alone.
Why all this fuss about being alone? According to Zhu Hsis commentary in The
Doctrine of the Mean (1971), alone refers to the place which other men do not
know, and is known only to ones self (p. 384, para. 3). Legge who translated the text
Engaged Detachment
165
explains: the secrecy must be in the recesses of ones own heart, and the minute things,
the springs of thought and stirrings of purpose there (p. 384, para. 3). Tu (1989) points
out that the ultimate goal of this self-examination is to be at ease with oneself (p. 27).
Savoring is not self-reflection. From the foregoing analysis, savoring is different
from the garden variety of introspection or self-reflection. Although both are selfreflexive, savoring differs from self-reflection along the divide between mind-tomind and mind-to-world transactions (see Chap. 1). This point can be illuminated
by the two types of attending distinguished by Charles Siewert (2001)Attending
to X versus attending to the way X looks to you. Savoring is attending to the way X
looks to you, where the focus is not on X per se so much as on how X is being experienced by a mind. Put another way, savoring is the mind talking to itself about how
X makes it feel. Self-reflection, by contrast, is simply attending to X, where X happens to be oneself. This formulation of savoring makes it clear why self-analysis,
self-criticism, and many other kinds of self-reflections do not qualify as savoring.
Engaged Detachment
A unique quality of savoring is referred to by Frijda and Sundararajan (2007) as
engaged detachment (p. 237). The detachment element entails a mental distance
from pragmatic actions. For instance, in savoring food or drink, one holds back from
swallowing; in witnessing actors on stage, one is not inclined to jump onstage to
intervene or participate. The engagement element lies in immersion in the aesthetic
experiences. These two elements have their precursors in the rats feeding schedule,
as Garcia (1989) points out that for rats taste plays the important role of ending the
instrumental action phase corresponding to human detachment, and initiating the
attention to internal feedback phase corresponding to human engagement.
Savoring constitutes a delightful interplay of these two elements of aesthetics
engagement and detachment. We may begin our investigation with the Chinese
notion of flavor. Flavor is an example of what Eoyang (1993) refers to as the peculiarity of much of Chinese literary criticism, which uses the lower sense metaphors when it attempts to characterize work of the highest quality (p. 215). Unlike
sight and sound, taste and smell are processed relatively fastbypassing the multiple editing processes of the brain. The relatively fast, rough, and unedited information in these lower senses is therefore ineffable, as Si-Kong Tu would say, to be
elaborated later. Empirical support for this conjecture comes from a recent study by
Olofsson et al. (2014), who found that participants had relatively more difficulty in
matching words with odors than with pictures, suggesting that unlike visual and
auditory information taste and smell do not translate very well into language and
concepts. But if Eoyang (1993) is right, it is the least abstract of the senses (such as
taste and smell) that the Chinese choose to use as vehicle to carry the freight of the
most abstract of ideas. How is it possible? Si-Kong Tu managed to accomplish this
feat by means of the rhetoric of beyondflavor beyond flavor (Zhu, 1984, p. 21),
and its corollary, image beyond image.
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Savoring
Image beyond image. Si-Kong Tu claimed that the aesthetic experience of poetry
comes from image beyond image (Yu, 1978, p. 97). In a letter to a certain Wang
Chi, he cited another poet to illustrate this point:
Tai Jung-chou said, Poets scenes, such as At Lan-tien [Indigo Field] when the sun is
warm, from fine jade arises smoke, can be gazed at from afar but cannot be placed in front
of ones eyebrows and lashes. An image beyond the image, a scene beyond the scenecan
these be easily verbalized? (Yu, 1978, pp. 9697, emphasis added).
An aerial view of mist and sunlight over bluish soilthat is all there is perceptually. The rest is invisible but can be palpably felt, such as the jade under the ground
giving off a vapor of mist, as it is getting toasty warm on a sunny day. Not unlike the
fine jade, experiences buried deep in memory can be evoked by poetry and warm up
to life in the process of savoringthis is one of the rich suggestions I get out of this
imagery, when it sets my mind off dreaming. But back to our analysis.
Si-Kong Tus aesthetic gazing entails both elements of detachment and engagement. The aerial view suggests detachment, via conceptual abstraction, from the
external reality of pragmatic concerns and instrumental action; while the palpably
felt but ineffable imageries suggest immersion in concrete experiences currently
lived or retrieved from memory. In sum, Si-Kong Tus theory of image-beyondimage brings to the fore the engaged detachment of savoring, which constitutes an
integration of the higher and the lower facultiesabstract contemplation made possible by detachment on the one hand, and immersion in the ineffable and concrete
experiences of life, on the other.
For further insight into this unique attribute of savoring, we may turn to an investigation of the aesthetic paradox (Mukhopadhyay, 2014, p. 237).
The aesthetic paradox. Dyutiman Mukhopadhyay (2014) defines esthetic delight
as a paradoxical combination of, or dynamic, oscillatory temporary balance
between (p. 241), two opposing phases of the aesthetic experience, each with their
respective neural networkssuspension of the belief of surface reality (p. 240),
on the one hand, and introspective detached contemplation, on the other. This
formulation of aesthetic delight reiterates the notion of engaged detachment
engagement in the aesthetic experience (via suspension of reality testing, pragmatic
concerns, etc.), and with detached contemplationas proposed by Frijda and
Sundararajan (2007).
To delve deeper into the aesthetic experience, Mukhopadhyay (2014) resorts to
the framework of reflexivity (metarepresentation) to formulate the aesthetic delight
as an integration of three types of metarepresentation (MR), which refers to the
representation of a representation (p. 241, emphasis in original), or image beyond
image (Yu, 1978, p. 97) as Si-Kong Tu would have said:
MR1. This brings into conscious awareness that it is I who is feeling an emotional
attachment toward the art.
MR2. This reminds us that this is a percept of representation
MR3. This is the aesthetic delight that makes us know that MR1 and MR2 are interlinked. We know that we are attached but simultaneously detached. (p. 241)
167
Cast into the framework of image beyond image (Yu, 1978, p. 97), MR1 refers
to awareness of engagement with ones personal experiences of art or life; MR2, the
detached contemplative phase as embodied in the rhetoric of beyond; MR3,
Si-Kong Tus imagery of gazing from afar in which one is aware of being simultaneously both attached and detached.
A face lift for dual process theories. The savoring discourse traverses in both
directionsthe high and the low roadof emotion (see Chap. 5), with much more
ease than mainstream psychology. Psychology of emotion can be divided into two
campsthose who take the low road, invoking evolution and neuroscience, tend to
argue for the continuity of basic emotions from animals to humans (e.g., Izard,
2007), whereas those who take the high road, invoking culture and language, tend
to emphasize the uniqueness of the human (J. A. Russell, 2003).
This dichotomy between nature and culture collapses in savoring. Cast in the
framework of information processing, the aesthetic paradox of savoring entails a
combination of both the low road that capitalizes on early, rapid, pre-attentive processing, and the high road that capitalizes on controlled, post-stimulus elaborationstwo processing strategies that are generally assumed to be dichotomous
(Christianson, 1992). Thus the aesthetic paradox of savoring opens up new possibilities for the dual process framework which posits (e.g., Kahneman, 2003) two
modes of information processing, system 1 and system 2. Consistent with the processing mode of taste and smell, system 1 is experiential, automatic, effortless,
intuitive, unconscious, energy efficient, and a faster mode of processing. Consistent
with the mode of introspective contemplation in savoring, system 2 is cognitive,
deliberate, consciously effortful, energy consuming, and a relatively slow mode of
reasoning. The foregoing analysis suggests that aesthetic paradox constitutes an
integration of these two systems.
Kahneman (2011) suggests that creativity requires the activation of both systems
in tandem, so that while system 2 is in operation, and the person is mindful, he or
she is also highly aware of intuitive cues generated by system 1. This requires being
in a state of cognitive ease that loosens the control of system 2 over performance
(p. 69). But what is this mysterious state of cognitive ease (Kahneman, 2011,
p. 69)? According to Hart, Ivtzan, and Hart (2013), this state of cognitive ease is
manifest in the phenomenon of flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1992), in which people are
fully immersed in their semiautomated activity, while at the same time fully aware
of their creative insights. Besides flow, savoring offers another, well-documented
case of cognitive ease.
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Savoring and the self. In contrast to the objectification of self and emotions in
emotion regulation, savoring contributes to the authentic self (see Chaps. 3, 7, and 9).
In the previous chapter (Chap. 9), I have reviewed the contribution of longing to
authenticity. Longing is a process in which savoring may be involved. Basically,
there could be cultural differences in peoples reaction to longing. In the context of
a culture that privileges presence over absence and positive over negative emotions,
longing may be accompanied by anxiety, whereas in a culture that is more accepting
of absence and negative emotions (Sundararajan, 2014), longing may be approached
with savoring. But apart from longing, savoring has its own contributions to make.
The meta-knowledge about the self fostered by savoring is experience near in
contrast to the experience distant forms of meta-cognition through the garden varieties of self-reflection. Bertrand Russell (1930) once compared the emphasis on
increasing self-awareness and consciousness raising (p. 161) to focusing on the
169
workings of a sausage machine rather than the productIf we knew how sausages
were made, we might lose our appetite for them.
This type of self-awareness is a far cry from savoring. The difference between
savoring and the self-objectifying type of awareness falls along the divide between
two forms of self-focus, variously referred to as experiential versus analytical
(Watkins & Teasdale, 2001); mindfully aware versus conceptual-evaluative
(Teasdale, 1999); or concrete process focused versus abstract-evaluative self-focus
(Watkins & Moulds, 2005). The experiential self-focus, relative to the abstractevaluative self-focus, was found to improve social problem solving in depressed
patients (Watkins & Moulds, 2005). Similarly, experiential self-focus (Teasdale,
1999), and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy were found to decrease depressive
relapses (Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Soulsby, 2000). In the same vein, development of self-reflexive awareness of present experience has been found to be effective in the prevention of depression relapse (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002).
Having adumbrated the benefits of the experiential self-focus, our investigation
of savoring will now focus on its contribution to self-regulation and self-integration
in a twofold senseit is coterminous with the authentic self; and it enhances the
accuracy of within-mind mappings (McKeown, 2013).
First, experience is inextricably connected with a sense of the self. According to
Humphrey (2006), phenomenal experience constitutes the very essence of ones
subjectivityit is the centerpiece of what its like to be me at this moment. When
attention is directed to the experience itself, the self is savored along with the experience. For instance, one may realize that the apples taste is ones own experiencea sense of mine-ness, due to the fact that sensations come with a sense of
ownership, as Humphrey (2006) points out. Awareness that emerges out of that
peculiar nearness between self and experience can contribute to ones self-model
(Metzinger, 2003), which is a form of meta-knowledge about oneself.
Savoring, as pleasure derived from ones own awareness of pleasure, is basically
a self-to-self transaction. This formulation of savoring is consistent with Siegels
(2009) definition of mindfulness as a relational process where you become your
own best friend (p. 145). Part and parcel of this intimate relationship with oneself
is a sense of agency. Savoring is a self-initiated action that cannot be done vicariouslyone cannot savor the taste or experience of someone elses, but ones own.
Neither can it be imposed from withoutthe devil can be made to taste his own
medicine, but not to savor it, unless he himself wants to. All of this protects us from
self-alienation, where the self is approached as an object or a stranger. This close
connection between savoring and the authentic self is also found in its Indian counterpart, rasa. Aesthetic experience in the rasa tradition entails an active participation
in ones own self, and thus the absence of the character of otherness proper to cognition of the thoughts of others (Gnoli, 1956, pp. 101102).
Second, fine discrimination of experience is not simply an exercise in aesthetics.
It reinforces a sense of self as the subject of experience, and contributes to the selfreflexive ability to make within-mind mappings (McKeown, 2013). This has relevance to many problems of self-regulation such as self-deception and self-alienation
(Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994).
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Cua (1996) explains that If a person really detests a bad smell, she will not pretend to herself or others to the contrary (p. 181). This formulation of self-deception
hinges on self-awareness of experience, otherwise known as within-mind mapping
(McKeown, 2013). If ones self-awareness of experience is as clear as detection of
a bad smell or the delight in beautiful color, then sincerity in the sense of being true
to oneself is more likely, and self-deception is less likely, so the argument goes. For
an empirical support of this perspective, we may take a look at one corollary of the
argument, namely that self-deception is more likely when there is impairment in
self-awareness of experience.
Savoring versus self-alienation. Self-deception may be understood as a form of
self-alienation. According to Kuhl and Beckmann (1994), an important issue concerning self-awareness or meta-knowledge about oneself is alienation, which refers
to alienation from ones deeper preferences and needs. Symptoms of self-alienation
include failure to perceive ones emotional preferences, to become immersed in
pleasant activities, and to perform preferred activityall of these deficits impact on
optimal self-regulation (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994). For our purposes, one pertinent
component of self-regulation is self-discrimination which, according to the
authors, is part and parcel of a learning process through which individuals attach a
self- or alien-attribute to any state or process that they become aware of.
(pp. 1819). Thus impairment in self-discrimination can be expected to impact on
the sense of mine-ness with regard to ones experience.
The authors conducted many studies, in which those who had deficit in selfdiscrimination were found in a later recognition task to confuse tasks assigned by
the experimenter with tasks that were self-chosen. In other words, these individuals
seemed to be confused about personal desires (self-chosen asks) and social obligations (tasks assigned by others). Thus self-discrimination is important for the negotiation between the two obligations of the self as a social being: the satisfaction of
personal needs and compliance with social demands. The authors claim that this
negotiation requires a valid discrimination between needs and demands (i.e., self
and non-self), a positive emotional response to self-related needs, a belief in ones
ability to perform actions necessary for need satisfaction, and, in a later stage of
development, an integration between personal needs and social demands (p. 19).
Each step of the way in this ongoing negotiation between the self and society, selfdiscrimination skills can be honed by savoring with its explicit representation of
ones emotional preferences, and its second-order positive emotional response
relishingtoward ones personal preferences.
171
Paying attention to ones state of mind is one of the savoring techniques involved in
the construction of the ideal mental world (Chap. 9). For the construction of the
ideal mental world known as jingjie (here rendered xinjing ), an integration of sensory input and higher cognitive functioning such as poetry appreciation is
crucial. Thus Zhou instructed her kids to:
Look at how the water in front of you twinkles like jade. Ripples on the surface of the water,
those phrases [in classical Chinese poetry], this is it, the image before your eyes. (p. 74)
She called their attention to the transitory nature of this state of mind, which
therefore requires savoring to be consigned to memory:
This kind of beautiful, calm, and peaceful state of mind (xinjing) [a more literal translation of
the term would be state of mind as a manifestation of the ideal mental world], Ill tell you,
you cant buy this with money, [we] only have these few minutes, here and now. Thats why
you are making deposits into your state-of-mind-bank (xinqing yinhang) right now. (p. 74)
Before departing, Zhou instructed the group to remember this very moment, to
store the moment in their qinggan [emotion] bank so as to have a good state of
mind in the face of daily tasks and difficulties (p. 75). Thus she concluded her lesson with the following instructions:
Having seen all this, the next time youre in pain, think a little, and go into your qinggan
[emotion] bank right away and move these things out. Your state of mind will immediately
return to the feeling you now have (p. 76)
Western readers will probably have no problem understanding all these instructions on savoring the moment in order to construct an ideal mental world for later
use in self-regulation, especially if you are familiar with the mindfulness literature.
The only term that might be jarring is Zhous use of a capitalist metaphorthe bank
(qinggan [emotion] bank)for the consolidation and retrieval of memory. This can
be easily fixed: Replace the emotional bank with another metaphor more familiar
in the Westthe emotional brain.
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Chapter 11
Introduction
The Chinese Buddhist notion of kong (emptiness) names an existential shudder
that results from savoring negative experiences in life. It may be considered the
affective side of the insight coin known as wu (enlightenment) in Chinese
Buddhism. According to the neuroscience of insight as adumbrated by Kounios and
Beeman (2014), solving problems by insight differs from solving it by analytic thinking. Compared to analytic solving, solution by insight requires (a) greater input from
and integration of relatively coarser semantic processing of the right hemisphere, (b)
a relative emphasis on internal processing and de-emphasis on external stimuli, and
(c) greater sensitivity to competing non-dominant associations supported by the
anterior cingulate cortex. The components of (b) and (c) are processing strategies of
savoring (Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007), which is the topic of the previous Chap. 10.
This chapter, therefore, will focus on an analysis of component (a), the coarse processing known as heuristics; and I will mention, but not explore, savoring when its
contributions to the emotional transformations in kong are duly acknowledged.
Heuristics are one particular type of holistic thinking. For heuristics to be smart
there are two requirementsgist-based intuition and metacognition. The following
analysis takes three steps. First, I introduce the two relevant attributes of heuristic
thinkingthe gist of things and categorical reasoning. Next, I demonstrate that the
same processing strategies of heuristics are cast in a different registermetacognition or higher level of consciousnessfor the Buddhist wu (enlightenment) and
kong (emptiness). Third, I suggest that the breakthroughs in kong (emptiness) are
driven by the combined forces of two factorsstrong evaluation made possible by
the categorical reasoning of heuristics and extensive processing made possible by
savoring severe loss and goal block in life. Lastly, I suggest that the breakthroughs
of insight do not simply solve problems so much as opening up new possibilities;
and it is savoring that explores and gives content to these new possibilities of thinking and feeling. For illustration, both popular and classic Chinese literature is used.
Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
L. Sundararajan, Understanding Emotion in Chinese Culture,
International and Cultural Psychology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-18221-6_11
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Emptiness (Kong)
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Emptiness (Kong)
The authors also found that the ability to quickly react to a small number of relevant cues (p. 20) increases with age. Indeed, the ability to base decisions on simple
qualitative gist increases with age, experience, and expertise. One important application of gist-based intuition is decision about risks. The authors point out that As
decision making becomes cognitively simpler (but not simpleminded) and gistbased, the tendency to take risksgenerally declines (p. 19).
To understand how and why gist-based intuition makes smart decisions, we have
to understand categorical reasoning.
Categorical reasoning. Deliberate, analytical thinking, characteristic of System
2 process, is supposed to be more developmentally advanced than holistic thinking,
characteristic of the automatic, non-deliberate System 1 process. Not so, according
to the fuzzy-trace theory of Reyna (2004). This point can be demonstrated with one
particular form of holistic thinking known as categorical reasoning.
Is it a good idea to swim with sharks? It turns out that adults and adolescents
process this question in very different ways. Adolescents showed longer reaction
time than adults in response to this type of questions, because they tend to capitalize
on the rational decision-making process, which stresses deliberate, quantitative
trading off of risks and benefits (Reyna & Farley, 2006, p. 1): Weighing the amount
of fun and degrees of risk, computing the costs and benefits, making fine-grained
distinctions about low frequencies of exposure to potential harm, and so on. This is
system 2 thinking, a process which is slow, and deliberatebut more accurate
(Kahneman, 2003), right? Wrong! According to Reyna (2004), most adults would
cut the chase and come up with a much faster and more accurate answer that says
something like No amount of fun can compensate for the risks (p. 65) involved,
or No risk is better than some risk. This is characteristic of categorical reasoning
that applies crude all-or-none categorization (p. 65) in assessing risks.
Consistent with the documented developmental increase in gist processing,
Reyna and Farley (2006) point out that adults process risks categorically or qualitatively rather than as a matter of degree, reflecting a developmental shift toward
greater gist-based reasoning with age and experience (p. 27). They further point
out that with age, analytical processing of risks and rewards gives way to the
cruder, qualitative processing (p. 36), and this contributes to risk avoidance. But
how? The authors explain in more details:
Mature adults apparently resist taking risks not out of any conscious deliberation or choice,
but because they intuitively grasp the gists of risky situations, retrieve appropriate riskavoidant values, and never proceed down the slippery slope of actually contemplating tradeoffs between risks and benefits. (p. 2)
179
generating new ideas. As Langer (1997) points out that in contrast to the intellectbased approach to creativity that privileges new solutions to problems, the
consciousness-based approach puts a premium on new optionsthe former capitalizes on the linear thinking from problems to solutions, whereas the later the nonlinear dynamics of shifting paradigms. More than the generation of new ideas, the
breakthroughs involved in the generation of new options rest squarely upon selfreflexive consciousness, in which the mind gets out of the cognitive entrapment of
its own making by stepping back from received problems and solutions to explore
new perspectives on the situation (Sundararajan & Raina, 2015).
It is in the arena of metacognition that the Zen tradition is best known for its acrobatics in radical set breaking (Pritzker, 2011). The set-breaking practices in Zen entail
an abrupt break between two paradigmsA versus B. The relationship between A
and B is incommensurable such that there is no linear progression from A to B. Getting
from A to B requires a quantum leap of consciousness, which constitutes wu or satori.
The relationship between B and A is comparable to that between gist and verbatim
representations, such that choice of the former (B or gist) over the later terms (A or
verbatim representation) entails a reduction in information processing, characteristic
of heuristics. But now the supremacy of gist over verbatim representation is played
out in another registermetacognition. In the arena of metacognition, the shift to
higher consciousness usually entails repudiation of lower consciousness. Thus the
function of B is to repudiate A, rendering the latter invalid; B in turn can be repudiated
or negated by insight based on a higher still level of consciousness, and so on.
Consider this classic example of wu (enlightenment): The time had come for the
Fifth Patriarch of the Zen school to select his successor. An announcement was
made for a competition to show the best comprehension of the religion. A learned
disciple by the name of Shen-hsiu composed a poem (A) and posted on the wall of
the meditation hall:
This body is the Bodhi-tree,
The soul is like a mirror bright;
Take heed to keep it always clean,
And let not dust collect on it. (Suzuki, 1956, p. 67)
Hui-neng (638713), who won the competition and later became the Sixth
Patriach, wrote the winning poem and posted alongside of Shen-hsius. The poem
(B) of Hui-neng went as follows:
The Bodhi is not like the tree,
The mirror bright is nowhere shining;
As there is nothing from the first,
Where can the dust itself collect? (Suzuki, 1956, p. 68)
Cast into the set-breaking framework, we have here two assumptions about meditation, A and B:
Athe conventional assumption that the mind is like a mirror that needs to be kept
clean by diligent practices of meditation.
Bthe metacognitive awareness that repudiates the lower level cognition (A) as a
delusion based on reification of the mind.
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Similar to the verbatim representation, (A) focuses on details about the meditation practice, of which the more is supposedly the betterthe more thoroughly one
keeps the mind pure from delusions through the diligent practice of meditation, the
closer one gets to the goal of enlightenment. Fat chance, said the Sixth Patriarch in
so many words. As a Zen saying goes, like polishing a brick in the hope of making
a mirror, enlightenment is an entirely different ball game from studies and practices
of the religion. It is along this line that (B) reiterates the gist of the Buddhist insight
that the attempt to rid the mind of its delusions inevitably creates a more intractable
delusionreification of the mind.
Such sudden shift in conceptual paradigms from A to B is an example of set
breaking. Set breaking was examined before in connection with a series of studies
by Mourey, Oyserman, and Yoon (2013) to shed some light on holistic thinking (see
Chap. 2). To refresh our memories, the studies by Mourey et al. (2013) went something like this: You get to choose a drink and a snack from three bottled beverages
(milk, soda, and fitness water) and three packaged snacks (cookies, chips, and fitness bar). Then you are told, Whoops! A mistake had been made: Instead of getting to choose two options, you can select only one (a beverage or snack) (p. 1619,
emphasis in original). How would you like to proceed? Pick one out of the selected
pair? Or start over and choose from the unelected items? The researchers found that
those primed with the individualist mindset, which privileges analytical reasoning,
would chose within the (broken) set, whereas those primed with the collectivistic mindset, which prefers holistic thinking, would abandon the (broken) set and start over.
Starting all over is a form of set breaking (in the sense of thinking outside the box). But
a more radical form of set breaking is a so far neglected option that was included in
Study 1 conducted by Mourey et al. (2013)to select nothing and exit. This is the
option represented by the Buddhist notion of kong (emptiness), which entails a radical
set breaking by which the agent says, in effect, Stop the busI want to get off.
Moral Maps
181
and strong evaluation of kong (emptiness); and how the emotional transformation of
kong (emptiness) with its characteristic palatability shift parallels the set breaking
of wu (enlightenment), which also capitalizes on metacognition.
Second-Order Desires
According to Frankfurt (1971), while all nonhuman animals exhibit desires, only
humans exhibit the desire to have certain kinds of desires and not others. This selfreflexive dimension of desires is referred to by Taylor (1985) as second order
desires, which is the power to evaluate our desires, to regard some as desirable
and others as undesirable (p. 16, emphasis in original).
Second-order desires are usually accompanied by second-order awareness. At
the level of second-order awareness, ones attention shifts from the object of emotion to emotion itself as the object of ones reflection. The first-order consciousness
is expressible through behavior but not reportable; the second-order awareness in
contrast is reportable (Lambie & Marcel, 2002). For instance, anger at the level of
first-order consciousness is expressible through the behavior of slamming the door,
but not necessarily reportable as the person may not be aware of his or her own
anger. Anger at the level of second-order awareness, in contrast, is always reportableI am angry when I slammed the door. Likewise, savoring (Chap. 10) is
always reportableI am savoring this moment. To anticipate later discussion, the
Buddhist notion of kong entails the savoring of loss and pain. But before we consider savoring, we need to consider one important consequence of the second-order
desire in kong, namely the moral map with strong evaluations.
Moral Maps
Moral map, according to Charles Taylor (1985), consists of certain essential evaluations which provide the horizon or foundation for the other evaluations one makes
(p. 39), such as happiness or the good life. The moral map has two versionsstrong
and weak evaluation (Taylor, 1985). Similar to verbatim representation, weak evaluations capitalize on pragmatic considerations such as the utility value of the object,
pros and cons of a situation, and so on. Similar to gist heuristics, strong evaluations
capitalize on categorical reasoning, as evidenced by its all-or-nothing thinking
based on moral and ontological categories such as right or wrong, good or bad, and
being or nonbeing (nothingness). Second-order desires tend to privilege strong
evaluations.
Strong evaluations with explicit articulation of the moral map can result in cognitive reappraisal of experiences and even transformation of the emotional intent. For
illustration, consider two contrasting perspectives on goal block (i.e., situations in
which ones goal attainment is impeded)the scientific theory of hope versus the
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Cai-gen Tan. The scientific theory of hope by Snyder, Cheavens, and Michael
(2005) deals primarily with first-order experiences, in which one is immersed in
action (Frijda, 2005) such that emotional experiences are understood in terms of the
consequences of goal pursuits, rather than as phenomena in and of themselves.
Reiterated in the hope theory is the received wisdom in psychology that emotions
reflect the persons perceived success (positive emotions) or lack of success (negative emotions) in goal pursuit activities (Snyder et al., 2005, p. 114).
The Cai-gen Tan, in contrast, deals primarily with second-order desires that are
undergirded by the moral map with strong evaluations, rather than being driven by
the allegedly hard wired circuits of stimulus and response. The contrast between the
two can be stark. For instance, the hope theory (Snyder et al., 2005) predicts that
impediments in pursuits of goals decrease well-being. Not so, says Cai-gen Tan,
frustration is good for you and gratification of desires rots like opium: Words that
grate on ones ears, and things that frustrate ones desires are the foundation stones
for self cultivation in virtue. A life filled with words pleasant to ones ears, and
things gratifying to ones desires is a life buried in opium (Wang, 2004, p. 24). This
calls for a closer examination of the reappraisal of experience in the Buddhist notion
of emptiness (kong).
The categorical reasoning of kong. Recall the categorical reasoning of risk
assessment in gist heuristics, which states that certain risks cannot be quantified
the risk of being infected with HIV is one time too many, for instance. Similarly, the
appraisal of meaning in kong tends to be in global, stark termslife either has
meaning or no meaning. Thus Cai-gen Tan says, All glamour is empty in the end
(Wang, 2004, p. 80). This statement is a strong evaluation based on the Buddhist
sentiment of vanity, vanity, all is vanity.
Typically kong entails not simply an appraisal of the success or failure of particular goals, so much as an appraisal so far reaching that it calls into question the very
possibility of having goals and concerns at all. Otherwise put, kong names the existential shudder that shakes up the very foundation of thingsthe very basis of our
goals and concerns that the Buddhists call attachment. Indeed a common expression for the word kong is ten thousand desires/concerns have become ashes. Or in
the words of Cai-gen Tan: Whats life like before you were born and after you are
dead? Upon such reflections all desires become cold ashes (Wang, 2004, pp. 303
304). However, this type of appraisal in kong does not necessarily spell nihilism.
Rather, it tends to come in tandem with emotional transformationwith the deconstruction of attachment comes the consolation of detachment.
Detachment entails a very complex emotional state, a phenomenon aptly captured by the following statement of Master Eckhart: Therefore, detachment is the
very best thing. It purifies the soul, cleanses the conscience, inflames the heart,
arouses the spirit, quickens desire, and makes God known (cited in ONeal, 1996,
p. 193). The above statement of Eckhart shows how detachment is not to be confused with resignation, nor with social withdrawal in sadness. In comparison to
these manifestations of negative affect in response to goal block, detachment is
much more complex in structure. It is second-order awarenessor savoring (see
Chap. 10)of loss and grief that results in transformation of the original emotional
183
intent. In Eckharts statement above, this emotional transformation takes the form of
a creative combination of emotional intentspurifies (the soul) and cleanses
(the conscience), on the one hand, and inflames (the heart) and arouses (the
spirit), on the other.
Lets slow down and take a closer look at the emotional transformations in kong.
Here concomitant with the palatability shift from happiness to disgust is the paradigm shift of wu (enlightenment), as evidenced by the claim that impermanence is
the rule of life, or something to that effect. But what is the cause of all these radical
shifts, both cognitively and affectively? We are only given the triggerssuch as
mortality salience, or when the party is overbut not an explanation for these radical shifts in consciousness. I surmise that for kong (emptiness) to happen, one contributing factor is the special way these triggers are processed, namely savoring (see
Chap. 10). One clue to the possible contribution of savoring lies in the fact that
affect and experience are acutely felt in all the above scenarios of kong.
In contrast to conventional emotion regulation strategies which tend to downregulate emotions, the function of savoring in the context of kong is not inhibitory
so much as excitatoryto enhance and deepen emotional experiences. Let me put
forward a formal proposition, then, that in kong (emptiness), the breakthroughs in
consciousness, known as insight or wu (enlightenment), are driven by the combined
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As can be expected, there is much grief and loss in the last emperors reminiscences, but the sense of kong (emptiness) that concludes the poem is not simply all
that. The last emperor contemplated on the gleaming reflection of his palaces in the
river Qin-huai, and felt empty (kong). In vain is the beauty of the former palacesall their grandeur in reminiscence only mocks the dethroned ruler. Yet, there
is more. Kong is the feeling that everything is empty to the very core. Indeed the
imagery of the shimmering reflections of grandeur captures well this Buddhist sense
of emptiness: all that gleaming splendor of towers and palaces, of jade and marble,
turns out to be sheer reflection on water, a mirage shot through and through with
nothingness.
In the midst of all this disillusionment, there is yet a hint of consolation, an
appreciationso characteristic of savoringfor the aesthetic beauty of things,
without which it would not have been possible for the poet to capture that enchanted
moment, when the moonlight shines forth in full splendor against the coolness and
serenity of the evening sky. This imagery also captures well the moment of wu
(enlightenment), when a flash of insight dawns like the sudden emergence of the
moon in the nightly sky. This kong-related insight of the poet is reminiscent of the
flaming vision that Heidegger (1971) talks about: The souls greatness takes its
measure from its capacity to achieve the flaming vision by which the soul becomes
at home in pain (p. 180).
The second poem on kong is less emotionally wrenching while more philosophically contemplative.
185
Here again a sense of kong is triggered by the awareness that the party is over
tourists are gone and music bands dispersed at the famed West Lake. But more than
the realization that spring has come to an end, kong entails a self-reflexive appraisal
of ones attachment to spring as well. The concomitant emotional transformation
consists of, again, a paradoxical combination of emotions: on the one hand, there
are the sentiments of resignation and emotional withdrawal as suggested by the
fallen curtain; on the other, there is an appreciation of affective ties as suggested by
the return (presumably out of attachment to the nest-site) of the mated swallows.
There is also the emergence of a mental space. It is from this mental space, cordoned off as it were by layers of diaphanous screensthe gauze curtain and the fine
rainthat the poet welcomes the returning swallows with renewed appreciation but
without attachment. Note the profound transformation of the poets emotional intent
from tenacious attachment to springnot till (third line from the last) all the
merry making of the season has come to an end will he give up the hope for spring
to quiet resignation (letting down the curtain); from a sense of loss marked by the
departure of spring to a sense of gain as suggested by the returning swallows. But
things do not necessarily go full circlethe poet has come to approach loss and
gain alike with a sense of equanimity.
Along with the emergence of psychological space is the transformation of time.
The impetuousness of spring with its festivitiesthe tourists and the music bands
is transformed, with the realization of kong (emptiness), into a leisurely, contemplative time, as embodied by the willows that sway gently in the wind all day long.
Note the absence of goal directed energy characteristic of agency thinking
(Snyder et al., 2005) in this picture. What we have instead is receptiveness: the willows languidly in the wind with as little self-determination and purposeful pursuit
as the contemplative poet behind the gauze curtain.
Finally, concomitant with the shift from attachment to detachment, there is in
evidence a palatability shift characteristic of taste aversion (Chap. 10), except that in
the present context the realization of kong entails a double reversal of flavor from
good to bad, and back again. Shweder and Haidt (2000) found in Medieval Hindu
texts a subtype of disgust that entails horror and disillusionment, as well as
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References
187
References
Abadie, M., Waroquier, L., & Terrier, P. (2013). Gist memory in the unconscious-thought effect.
Psychological Science, 24, 12531259.
Frankfurt, H. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy, 67,
520.
Frijda, N. H. (2005). Emotion experience. Cognition and Emotion, 19, 473498.
Frijda, N. H., & Sundararajan, L. (2007). Emotion refinement: A theory inspired by Chinese poetics. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2, 227241.
Garcia, J. (1989). Food for Tolman: Cognition and cathexis in concert. In T. Archer & L.-G. Nilsson
(Eds.), Aversion, avoidance, and anxiety (pp. 4585). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Gigerenzer, G., & Gaissmaier, W. (2011). Heuristic decision making. Annual Review of Psychology,
62, 451482.
Heidegger, M. (1971). On the way to language (P. D. Hertz, Trans.). New York: Harper & Row.
Isobe, Y. (Ed.). (1926). Musings of a Chinese vegetarian. Tokyo: Yuhodo, Kanda.
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Part IV
Conclusion
Chapter 12
Introduction
some rooftops are overcrowded with people looking down at the same courtyard,
quibbling about specks of dirt in colleagues eyes, while some distance away, lies terra
incognita, a wild garden of knowledge.
(Picard, 2010, p. 251)
In 1884, William James (1884) asked the question: What is an emotion? More
than a century later, we now have a burgeoning affective science with multitude of
data on emotions. But there remains a significant lacuna in knowledge-base due to
sampling biases among other things (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010a,
2010b). Before the lacuna is filled by answers from the wild gardens of knowledge
that fall outside the pale of Western psychology, I propose a more modest beginning
toward an answer to James question. Instead of asking what an emotion is, we may
ask how we model emotions. In this chapter I will examine the Chinese folk models
of emotion.
This chapter presents the Chinese folk theories of emotion in three steps. First, I
define the Chinese terms of emotion, spell out the epistemology that undergirds
these terms, and draw out their implications for emotion theory. Next, I adumbrate
the possibilities for a theory of Chinese emotions by incorporating cognate ideas
from Western psychology. In particular, I put forward an impact-focus account of
Chinese emotions. Lastly, I conclude with the speculation that the Chinese theories
of emotion focus on the upstream, whereas the Western theories of discrete emotions, downstream of the river called emotions.
An overview of the Chinese folk theories of emotion may begin with a definition
of terms concerning emotion.
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What is an Emotion?
Definition of Terms
The modern Chinese term that comes closest to emotion is the compound qing
gan or gan qing with qing often serving as a short hand for the
compound. Although qing by itself is often taken as the Chinese term for emotion
(Hansen, 1995), it is well to remember that the Chinese notion of emotion has two
tributaries, qing and gan , which warrant separate treatment.
Qingemotion is for truth. The term qing , as documented in pre-Han texts
(500-200 BC), means primarily genuine, the facts, or what essentially is
(Graham, 1986, p. 63). This truth connotation of qing has two registersworld and
mind. Pertaining to the world, qing means the true condition of a situation; pertaining to the mind-and-heart (both denoted by the same character xin ), the term,
according to Harbsmeier (2004), means essential sensibilities and sentiments
(p. 94), or individual deep convictions, responses, feelings (p. 101). In a phrase,
qing refers to manifestations of human nature.
There is a long tradition in the West, from Plato to Sartre (with the exception of
Heidegger), that considers emotions to be somehow distorting reality. The Chinese
believe, on the contrary, that emotion (qing) discloses something that is true about
the person and the world. One of the most articulate expositions of this view is
found in the writings of Feng Meng-leng (15741645), the eminent compiler and
writer of folktales. Feng claims that it is qing that grounds us in reality; it is humans
who distort reality when they fail to be true to their qing (Feng, 1983).
Ganaffectivity that connects us all. Turning to the other half of the compound,
gan means stirring, affecting, but more often is used in the passive tense of
being affected or stirred. Gan is usually used in combination with two other terms:
gan-ying (responsiveness) and gan-lei (responding in kind) (Chap. 6).
Generally rendered as responsiveness, the compound gan-ying literally means
stimulating-responding which entails not a simple SR (stimulusresponse)
relation, but rather a resonating feedback loop based on an intrinsic affinity
between all things in a sympathetic universe. This point is clarified by the compound gan-lei. Lei literally means category, thus gan-lei means responding
according to categorical correlations (Goldberg, 1998, p. 35). In essence, lei
refers to the principle of parity or correspondence that lies at the core of sympathetic magic (like attracts like). It is said in the I-Ching commentary attributed to
Confucius: Things that accord in tone vibrate together. Things that have affinity
in their inmost natures seek one another. Water flows to what is wet, fire turns to
what is dry (Munakata, 1983, p. 106). Another ancient text Lieh n chuan puts
it this way: When an ox lows and a horse makes no response, it is not because the
horse does not hear the noise; it is because it belongs to another species [category]
(cited in Henry, 1987, p. 27).
Together, qing and gan make one important claim about what it is to be human:
Feelings are an integral part of human nature, the essence of which is affectivity. In
contrast to the reactive responses to occurrences or events that constitute the primary framework of emotion in mainstream psychology, the Chinese notion of qing-
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What is an Emotion?
195
According to Fan Fa-ti (Fan, 2004), during the Cultural Revolution Chinese
scientists conducted studies in collaboration with the masses to use animals as
earthquake detectors.
In addition to using animals, humans can also imitate them. The assumption that
information lies not in the head, so much as in the environment may have contributed to an arms race in the ability to pick up subtle cues in the environment. The
Chinese have many terms that denote subtle environmental cues.
One term that calls attention to the environment is shi which refers to the
momentum of a situation. Situational momentum can be favorable or unfavorable
(see also Chap. 9). As Jing and Van de Ven (2014) point out, From the yin-yang
view, environments constantly and cyclically change, so current situations eventually transform to their opposite, indicating either favorable or unfavorable momentum, called shi (p. 32). To take advantage of the changeable environment,
change agents must vigilantly keep monitoring the situation for evidence of momentum switching (p. 50). The authors explain: When situational momentum (shi) is
perceived to be favorable, change agents can take a leveraging momentum (ying-shi
) strategy to seize the opportunity to change. When situational momentum
(shi) is perceived to be unfavorable, change agents adopt a building momentum
(zao-shi ) strategy for the next favorable situational momentum (shi) to come
(p. 44). These strategies of manipulating the situational momentum have been documented by the authors in their analysis of the phenomenal success of She Chen, the
CEO of the Chengdu Bus Group. Their analysis of the ingenuity of Chen in taking
advantage of situational momentum (shi) to propel his business is reminiscent of
Clarks (1997) description of the fishs exploitation of aquatic swirls, eddies, and
vortices to turbocharge propulsion and aid maneuverability (p. 219), such that it
is even possible for some fish to exceed 100 % of swimming efficiency.
Savoring the subtle ji. Another term that calls attention to the environment is ji
. Ji in common parlance is the environmental cues that one does well to take
advantage of. In literary theory ji refers to the most subtle, incipient phase of a
movement in a natural process; in this case it is best translated as impulses or, in
the perception of chi [ji], intimations (Owen, 1992, p. 584). How to pick up such
subtle cues in the environment? Savoring will do, according to the poet/critic
Si-Kong Tu (837908).
In the framework of savoring (see Chap. 10; Sundararajan, 2004, 2008; Frijda &
Sundararajan, 2007; Sundararajan & Averill, 2007), ji has to do with the protonarratives of emotionthe amorphous undercurrents of feeling states too subtle and
nuanced to carry any conventional label. Thus wrote Si-Kong Tu: Reside in plainness and quiet:/How faint, the subtle impulses [ji] (Owen, 1992, p. 306). Here
Si-Kong Tus take on ji deviates from the everyday use of the term. In common
parlance, ji is associated with action, as the environmental cues that one may choose
to act on. In Si-Kong Tus usage, however, it is the stimulus feature, rather than
response outcome, of ji that takes center stage. Ji becomes for the poet not a cue for
action, so much as an end in itself, an affective experience to be savored. But it is
entirely possible that aesthetic savoring serves practical purposes in even more
important ways than the action-oriented version of jisavoring may very well be a
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What is an Emotion?
training ground for the mind to emulate the duck: In order to pick up subtle cues in
the environment, a good place to start would be the internal environment of feeling
states; and a good skill to learn would be making subtle distinctions, through savoring, of qualities that are both an essential part of emotional experience and are
exceedingly difficult to describe in any language, Chinese or English.
So much for the Chinese terms of emotion and associated epistemology. Now
back to the question of William James: What is an emotion? In the remainder of this
chapter, I adumbrate possibilities toward an answer that, by incorporating cognate
ideas in contemporary psychology, may develop into a coherent theory of Chinese
emotions.
197
Transactional account. The world is put back in the picture by the transactional
account of emotion, an approach which is compatible with the framework of gan-ying
(responsiveness), in both of which emotions emerge as unfolding reactions to a
responsive social environment (Parkinson, 2010, p. 160). The transactional account
highlights one major difference in epistemology between the appraisal theories and
the Chinese notions of emotion. In the appraisal framework, knowing is not doing
the latter (emotional response) is mediated by the former (knowledge representation
of the world). By contrast, the Chinese account shares with the transactional framework the assumption that knowing is doing (Woodward, 2009)one learns about the
world not through knowledge representation of it, so much as by world engaging
actions. As Griffiths (2010) puts it: Emotions are forms of skillful engagement with
the world which need not be mediated by conceptual thought (p. 24).
Mindfulness. Research on mindfulness makes a twofold contribution to Chinese
psychology of emotion: First, it calls for a moratorium of cognitive appraisals.
Brown and Cordon (2009) claim that appraisals are self-generated accounts about
life (p. 227) that interferes with living. Echoing the concern about filtering in
Chinese poetics (see Chap. 7), Siegel (2007) claims that filtering events and experience through cognitive representations of self and others twist our capacity to read
our own cues (p. 70) and obscure direct experience (p. 99). Second, it calls attention to the environment, as Siegel (2007) points out that in mindfulness practice,
the aim of our attention is primarily on the outer worldbut the self is a full participant (p. 255).
Lastly, the framework that holds the greatest potential for a psychology of
Chinese emotions is the impact-focus approach (Murphy, Hill, Ramponi, Calder, &
Barnard, 2010), which warrants a closer attention.
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What is an Emotion?
rate each one for its immediate impact. By this we mean that before you get to think
about what is in the picture you may be instantly affected by itwithout necessarily knowing why. We would like you to consider each picture as a whole. Just judge whether you feel
the content of the image created an instant sense of impact on you personally. Try not to
think in detail about the picture or its contents in terms of particular properties(e.g., fear,
anger, joy, etc.)or how many thoughts and ideas it leads to. We just want an estimate of
its overall immediate impact, irrespective of what it is that might underlie its impact on you
personally (i.e., whether its positive, negative or neither). (Murphy et al., 2010, p. 607)
Based on the above instructions for the impact rating scale, we may differentiate
the impact-focus (IF) approach from the mainstream psychology (MP) approach to
emotion along the following parameters:
1. How versus what: IF concerns how one is affected; MP asks What is it?
2. Effect versus cause: IF concerns the effect of the emotional stimuli; MP the
causal explanations for the effect.
3. Outward attention versus intrapsychic orientation: IF focuses on the stimuli attributes in the environment; MP has an inward focus, such as personal concerns or
brain mechanisms.
4. Holistic perception versus analysis of details: IF is concerned with an overall
impression of the situation; MP takes an analytic approach to discrete aspects of the
phenomenon such as arousal, valence, or categorical emotions (fear, anger, etc.).
5. Nonpropositional versus propositional representations: IF privileges nonpropositional representations such as images or protonarratives (see Chap. 10); MP
capitalizes on propositional representations or narratives of emotion.
Implications of these differences for a Chinese theory of emotion have been
addressed elsewhere (Averill & Sundararajan, 2006) and in the previous chapters
(see especially Chap. 1). A summary is presented below.
From appraisal to awareness. Appraisal theories (see Chaps. 5 and 7) claim that
a well-constructed cognitive map of the world, complete with identifiable causes
and intentional objects, is necessary for an adaptive emotional response (Deonna &
Scherer, 2010). The competing claim from Chinese aesthetics is that adaptive action
rests squarely upon higher levels of awareness, otherwise known as metacognition
(Chaps. 7 and 10). In savoring the protonarratives of experience, for instance, emotion scripts are held in check while awareness of impact (gan) reigns supreme.
Discrete emotions, now you see them, now you dont. Chinese use a large and
varied store of phrases to describe facial expressions suggesting that people do not
generally correlate facial expressions with a discrete emotion category (Ye, 2004,
p. 198). By contrast, categorically discrete emotions are the building blocks for the
basic emotions (Ekman, 1992) that are considered universal in mainstream
psychology.
Classical Chinese texts do not agree on what constitute basic emotions. A few
lists from Eifring (2004) should suffice: from The Book of Rites: joy and anger,
sorrow and fear, love, aversion and desire (p. 13); from Xunzi: cheerfulness and
gloom, joy and anger, sorrow and delight, love, aversion and desire (p. 28); from
Chuang Tzu: aversion and desire, joy and anger, sorrow and delight (p. 29). Liu
199
Xie (ca. 465522) wrote that Man is endowed with seven emotions [qing], which
are moved [gan] in response [ying] to objects. When moved [gan] by objects one
sings of ones intent totally spontaneously (Yu, 1987, p. 34). From the perspective
of mainstream psychology, this seems to be getting things backwards: the discrete
emotions were mentioned before the perturbation of the mind, then after one is
moved by external things (objects) in the world, intent gets expressed, and
the discrete emotions seemed to have dropped out of the picture!
The first part of the puzzle is easy to resolve: Emotion (qing) and human nature
are two sides of the same cointhe latter refers to the pre-perturbation phase, the
former, the post-perturbation phase of the mind (Eifring, 2004). Thus the discrete
emotions in the pre-perturbation phase refer to potentials in human nature rather
than actual emotions.
What is more illuminating is the second part of the puzzle: Intent takes precedence over discrete emotions as a privileged sign (see Chap. 6).
From personal stake to personal take on things. Cognitive appraisals, according
to Lazarus and Folkman (1984), revolve around the main evaluative issues of
personal stake such as Am I in trouble or being benefited, now or in the future, and
in what way? (p. 31). By contrast, impact has to do with ones personal take on
things. Thats why the instructions for the impact rating scale stated: Just judge
whether you feel the content of the image created an instant sense of impact on you
personally (Murphy et al., 2010, p. 607, italics added).
To reiterate a point made before (Chap. 6), the difference in orientation between
personal stake and person take falls along the divide between topic and comment in
linguistics. Topic concerns what the statement is aboutinformation necessary for
the evaluation of whether ones personal goals are at stake. By contrast, comment
has to do with the sharing of personal take on things: The comment is some mental
take or mental relation to a topic, expressing an experience, emotion, stance or attitude (Bogdan, 2000, p. 78). In developmental literature, the topic irrelevance of
infants expressions is attributed to their inability to focus on the cause of the emotion, a phenomenon which is expected to be superseded by topic-focused categorical emotions, as the child matures. For instance, Holodynski and Friedlmeier (2010)
point out that the expressive reactions used by neonates are not directed toward any
specific object (p. 102). As the child matures, these unfocused and undifferentiated
expressive reactions of the neonate will be superseded by the adults categorically
organized feeling focused on a cause that can be used to monitor the course of the
emotion and that allows coping actions to be triggered (p. 98).
The Chinese account of emotion suggests otherwise. Consistent with the Chinese
perspective is the observation of Stern (1985) that infants smiles (see Chap. 6,
Fig. 6.3) concern not the current goals and behaviors, so much as the mode of communionto be with, to share, or to join in the inner states of another person. Thats
why, says Stern (1985) that protoconversation is topicless, behaviorally irrelevant,
and world-indifferent (p. 76). There is ample evidence that humans have a particular propensity to share inner states with each other (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine,
2009). Thus the need for humans to share personal takes on things is continuous
from the cradle to the grave.
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What is an Emotion?
Whether or not you agree with this phenomenological account, one thing seems
clear, namely that the Chinese notions of qing focus on the upstream, whereas the
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What is an Emotion?
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Index
A
Amae, 131132
Anthropomorphism, 96
Attachment theory, 78, 79
Authority Ranking (AR), 6, 13, 14,
43, 54, 66
B
Benevolence (ren) , 4445, 48
Blocked-choice paradigm, 2627, 35
The Book of Rites, 44, 47, 48, 198
C
Cai-gen Tan, 180, 182, 183
Care-based morality
awareness ladder, 8788
cognitive ladder, 87, 88
emotional contagion, 86
emotional refinement, 87
empathic concern, 88
gut-feeling approach, 89
innate vulnerability, 86
LEAS scale, 8788
psychological studies, 87
sympathic concern, 88
Caregiving behavioral system, 78, 79, 84
Categorical reasoning, 175, 178, 180,
182, 184
Chaos theory, 26
Cheng , 48
Cognitive appraisal, 196, 197, 199
freedom, 116117
unbearing mind, 8586
205
206
Confucianism (cont.)
autonomy, 47
benevolence (ren) , 4445
big gods, evolution of, 42
Communal Sharing, 43
inner vs. outer, 47
personalization, 48
private and public selves, 45
reverent formality, 44
self and society, 43
self-reflexivity, 48
strong ties, relational reasoning of, 43
Core affect theory (CAT), 196
Coupling-style sensing, 193194
Creativity
Asian creativity, 143
creation myth
revolutionary creativity, 144
self-reflexivity, 144145
hermits (yin-i), 6364
ecology, 7071
sexual selection hypothesis of, 6870
relational vs. non-relational cognition,
143144
solitude
absence-based intimacy, 152154
designer environments, 148
direct communication, 152
freedom skills, 150151
ideal community, 151152
ideal mental world (jing-jie) ,
147, 154
self-creation, 146147
self-preservation, 145146
Shih-pin, 148149
Culture
associative/holistic vs. rule-based/analytic
reasoning, 5
cognitions and cognitive styles, 57, 1315
conceptual space, 34
corporate culture, 56
fourfold model of relational cognition,
6, 1315
individualism vs. collectivism, 45
mind-to-world vs. mind-to-mind
transactions, 68
order and chaos/entropy, 11
pair-bonding hypothesis, 8
as rationality, 4
repository of emotional knowledge, 3
similarity vs. difference detection, 89
social brain hypothesis, 8
strong vs. weak ties, 910
symmetry, 1213, 1517
symmetry breaking, 56, 12, 13, 1518
Index
symmetry restoration, 6
synergistic vs. scarcity-based community, 10
Curiosity, openness, acceptance, and love
(COAL), 30
D
Daoism
animal model, 59
anti-hierarchy, 66
Chinese poetics, 121
conceptual spaces, 3
freedom (see Freedom and emotions)
hermits/recluses (yin-i)
bona fide hermits, 64
Communal Sharing, 6768
creativity (see Creativity)
freedom, 6465
heroic hermits, 64
mobility, 6263
refusal to serve, 6061
social withdrawal, 61, 65
solitude as habitat selection, 6162, 64
spiritualizing strong ties, 67
independence vs. interdependence, 70
maternal order, 68
as Oceanic Merging, 6566
order and chaos/entropy, 11
solitude and creativity in, 145146
symmetry, 6667
Depression, 153154
Dialectic thinking
moderation/the golden mean
(zhong yong), 25
yin and yang dialectics, 2425
Direct communication, 152
Discrete emotions, 34, 158, 198201
Dual process theory, 177
freedom, 118119
savoring, 167
E
Emotion
core affect theory, 196
coupling-style sensing, 193194
definition, 192193
emptiness (see Emptiness (kong))
extended mind hypothesis, 193194
freedom (see Freedom and emotions)
harmony(see Harmony)
Heideggers mood theory, 200
impact-focus approach
appraisal, 197, 198
basic emotions, 198
207
Index
communion, 199
discrete emotions, 198201
mainstream psychology (MP)
approach, 198, 200
metacognition, 198
protoconversation, 199, 200
topic vs. comment, 199
intimacy (see Intimacy)
leaving information in environment
save energy, 194
savoring (ji), 195196
situational momentum (shi), 195
love (see Heart-aching love (teng))
mainstream psychology, 198, 200
mindfulness, 197
transactional account, 197
yin-yang fish, 201
Emotional contagion, 86
Empathy
freedom, 115116
heart-aching love, 8385
Emptiness (kong)
emotional transformations, 183186
gist-based intuition
categorical reasoning, 178
fuzzy-trace theory, 177
gist vs. verbatim representation, 177
less-is-more principle, 177
satori/wu, 178180
heuristics, 175, 176, 186
metacognition, 179181, 186, 187
second-order desires, 181
strong and weak evaluation, 181183
Enlightenment (wu) , 175, 178180, 187
Entropy, 11, 12, 16
Equality Matching (EM), 6, 14, 129
Eremitism. See Hermits (yin-i)
Evocative imagery (xing)
bi (comparison) , 103
dhvani (suggestiveness), 104105
explicitness and covertness, 103
joint attention, 105106
metonymy, 105
stirring/arousing, 103
Extended mind hypothesis, 95, 193194
Extrinsic motivation, 144
definition, 133
discernment, 136
discretion, 135
males self-enhancement, 133134
payback schedule, 136
self-control, 135
self-indulgence, 134135
Freedom and emotions
authenticity and spontaneity
community, 115
creativity, 111, 114
empathy, 115116
timing, 115
wu-forms, 116
cognitive appraisal, 116117
cognitive control, 117118, 121
feng liu , 113
harmony, 112
metacognitive skills
awareness, 119
dual process theory, 118119
refined pleasure, 119120
mirror state of mind, 111112
suffering, 122
true emotion, 112
Fuzzy-trace theory, 177, 178
F
Feng liu , 113
Filial piety
Confucianism, 54
heart-aching love, 79, 8384
Flower drinking
collective excitement, 135136
H
Harmony
aesthetic emotions, definition of, 21
cognitive complexity, 3335
concurrent vs. sequential goal pursuit,
3536
as dynamic equilibrium, 23
G
Gan-ji , 129
Gan-lei (responding in kind) , 192
affinity-based responsiveness, 97
anthropomorphism, mind perception, 9697
between-mind mappings, 95
extended mind hypothesis, 95
mind-to-mind transaction, 94, 95
mind-to-world transaction, 94, 95
similarity-based attraction, 97
within-mind mappings, 95
Gan qing , 192
Gan-ying (stirring and responding) ,
9798, 192
Ging gan , 192
Golden mean (zhong yong) , 23, 25, 31,
32, 34
Gut-feeling approach, 89
208
Harmony (cont.)
good and evil, 21
he , 2122
high dimensionality, 2223
particulate vs. blending systems, 31, 32
symmetry breakdown
blocked-choice paradigm, 26, 27
disintegration avoidance, 3031
four-stage process model, 3233
harmony enhancement, 31
high cognitive control, 2728
symmetry maintenance and restoration
admissible transformations, 24
COAL, 30
cognition without control, 2829
low cognitive control, 27, 28
moderation/the golden mean (zhong
yong), 25
neutralizing differences, 24
priming vs. planning, 2930
set and set breaking, 2527
yin and yang dialectics, 2425
Harmony seeking, 40
Heart-aching love (teng)
ambivalent/mixed feelings, 77
attachment theory, 78, 79
caregiving behavioral system, 78, 79
deep love, 78
definition, 78
as doting, 78, 8182
empathic pain, 8485
filial piety, 79, 8384
implicit, 8283
intimate relationships, 78, 84
linguistic analysis of, 8081
nuanced emotional blends, 77
pain/ache/hurt, 78
suffering, perceptual cues of, 82
tender feelings, 7879
unbearing mind
care-based morality (see Care-based
morality)
and cognitive appraisal, 8586
compassion, 89
Heideggers mood theory, 200
Hermits (yin-i)
bona fide hermits, 64
Communal Sharing, 6768
creativity, 6364
ecology, 7071
sexual selection hypothesis of, 6870
freedom, 6465
heroic hermits, 64
mobility, 6263
refusal to serve, 6061
social withdrawal, 61, 65
Index
solitude as habitat selection, 6162, 64
spiritualizing strong ties, 67
Holistic thinking
harmony
set and set breaking, 2527
yin and yang dialectics, 25
heuristics, 175, 176
Hope theory, 181182
Hui-wei , 159, 160
I
Ideal community, 151152
Ideal mental world (jing-jie) , 147, 154, 171
Impact-focus (IF) approach, 197199
Interpersonal relatedness, 40
Intimacy
evocative imagery (xing)
bi (comparison) , 103
dhvani (suggestiveness), 104105
explicitness and covertness, 103
joint attention, 105106
metonymy, 105
stirring/arousing, 103
gan-lei (responding in kind)
affinity-based responsiveness, 97
anthropomorphism, mind perception,
9697
between-mind mappings, 95
extended mind hypothesis, 95
mind-to-mind transaction, 94, 95
mind-to-world transaction, 94, 95
similarity-based attraction, 97
within-mind mappings, 95
gan-ying (stirring and responding) ,
9798
intention, priming-based resonance, 102103
Miller Social Intimacy Scale, 93
mutual closeness and friendship, 93
protoconversation
mind-to-mind transactions in, 9899
topic vs. comment, 101102
resonance and mental sharing
mind perception vs. mind reading,
99100
shared intentions, 100101, 106107
sajiao , 125
Intrinsic motivation, 85, 144
J
Jen, 45
Ji , 195196
Jing-jie. See Ideal mental world
(jing-jie)
Joint attention, 101, 105106
Index
K
Kan-lei , 46
Kong. See Emptiness (kong)
L
Legalists, 42, 53, 54, 71
Li . See Rituals (li)
Love. See Heart-aching love (teng)
M
Mainstream psychology (MP) approach, 198, 200
Market Pricing (MP), 6, 1417, 52, 53
Marshmallow test, 138
Maximally symmetric relational model, 65
Mei guanxi , 14
Mental sharing
and intentions, 100101
mind perception vs. mind reading, 99100
Metacognition, 198
awareness, 119
dual process theory, 118119
emptiness, 175, 179181, 186, 187
refined pleasure, 119120
Metarepresentation (MR), 166167
Metonymy, 105
Miller Social Intimacy Scale, 93
Mimicry, 100
Mind perception
anthropomorphism, 9596
vs. mind reading, 99100
Mysticism, 65, 121
O
Oceanic Merging (OM), 15, 6566
P
Pair-bonding hypothesis, 8
Pen-choice paradigm, 41
Pin wei. See Savoring (pin wei)
Protoconversation, 199, 200
mind-to-mind transactions in, 9899
topic vs. comment, 101102
R
Rang , 44, 45
Rationality
Confucianism
Communal Sharing, 5253
private, shared, and common
knowledge, 5052
209
culture
definition, 4
mind-to-world vs. mind-to-mind
transactions, 8
pair-bonding hypothesis, 8
similarity vs. difference detection, 89
social brain hypothesis, 8
Rejection avoidance, 40
Ren , 4445
Resonance
evocative imagery (xing) (see Evocative
imagery (xing) )
and mental sharing
mind perception vs. mind reading,
99100
shared intentions, 100101, 106107
Revolutionary creativity, 144
Rituals (li)
aesthetics (art, poetry, music), 4850
authenticity, 4647
autonomy, 47
benevolence (ren) , 4445
big gods, evolution of, 42
Communal Sharing, 43
inner vs. outer, 47
personalization, 48
private and public selves, 45
reverent formality, 44
self and society, 43
self-reflexivity, 48
strong ties, relational reasoning of, 43
Romantic spirit, 113
S
Sajiao ,
adorably petulant, 125
asymmetrical relationship, 130131, 137
communication, 125
debt-based transactions, 127128
delayed gratification, 138139
discretion, 132133
expressive ties, 130
flower drinking
collective excitement, 135136
definition, 133
discernment, 136
discretion, 135
males self-enhancement, 133134
payback schedule, 136
self-control, 135
self-indulgence, 134135
gratitude
delayed gratification, 138139
indebtedness and, 129130, 137
210
Sajiao (cont.)
intimacy, 125, 130
maternal order, 131132
mixed ties, 129
scarcity-based community, 126, 127
synergistic community, 126, 127
Savoring (pin wei)
acceptance wriggles, 158
basic emotions and protonarrative of,
160162
Chinese notion of, 157159
definition, 157
emotion regulation
authenticity vs. self-deception, 170
emotion refinement, 168
self-alienation, 170
self-awareness, 168169
two-factor approach, 168
engaged detachment, 165167
Garcias animal model, 162
ideal mental world (jingjie) , 171
Indian rasa, 158
information-processing strategy, 159
self-reflexivity
disgust, 163
enhanced consciousness, 163
knowing feelingly, 163164
mind-to-mind transactions, 164165
second-order consciousness, 164
sensory-based affect theory, 171
temporal structure of, 159160
Western formulation, 158
Self-creation, 146147
Self-focus, 132, 153, 169
Self-preservation, 61, 145146
Self-reflexivity
authenticity, 48
benevolence, 48
creativity, 144145
savoring
disgust, 163
enhanced consciousness, 163
knowing feelingly, 163164
mind-to-mind transactions, 164165
second-order consciousness, 164
Sensory-based affect theory, 171
Set breaking, 2627
Shared intentions, 100101, 106107
Shi , 145146
Shimjung, 106
Situational momentum (shi) , 145146, 195
Index
Social brain hypothesis, 8, 52, 62
Social mindfulness, 41, 44, 83, 135
Solitude
creativity (see Creativity)
habitat selection, 6162
Symmetry breakdown
culture, 56, 12, 13, 1518
gratitude, 127
harmony
blocked-choice paradigm, 26, 27
disintegration avoidance, 3031
harmony enhancement, 31
high cognitive control, 2728
symmetry maintenance/restoration,
3233
Symmetry restoration
culture, 6
gratitude, 127
harmony (see Harmony)
T
Tender love, 7879
Teng . See Heart-aching love (teng)
W
Wandering (you) , 63
Willpower, 138
Wu , 178180
Wuwei , 116
Wuyu , 116
Wuzhi , 116
X
Xing . See Evocative imagery (xing)
Xin-teng . See Heart-aching love
(teng)
Y
Yin-i . See Hermits (yin-i)
You , 63
You guanxi , 1415
Z
Zhi , 164
Zhong yong , 23, 25, 31, 32, 34