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THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF
TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTIONS
The purpose of this paper is first to explain a general notion ot
transcendental deductions, of which the Kantian are special cases;
next to show, and to illustrate by examples from Kant's work, that
no transcendental deduction can be successful; and thirdly to put
one of Kant's
his
oj a Transcendental
Deduction
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318
THE MONIST
ferentiations of other
gions of experience, e.g. sensory, moral
to
and aesthetic experience, which may or may not belong
categorial schemata. A schema of sensory differentiation would con
tain constitutive attributes of, and individuating attributes for, sen
for schemata of
sory objects. The* same would hold analogously
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IMPOSSIBILITY
OF TRANSCENDENTAL
DEDUCTIONS
319
definition is very
in differentiating a region of experience. This
wide indeed and will presently be shown to cover Kant's conception
of its generality it must
of a transcendental deduction. Because
of
be protected against such charges
vagueness as would rob the
can be
all
of
discussion
cogency. Such protection
subsequent
the
of
achieved by the following characterization
key-phrases which
occur in the definition. Although a "logically sound demonstration"
need not be a deductive argument, itmay contain deductive argu
ments
definition.
at
important and interesting examples of
tempted transcendental deductions are, of course, those found in
Kant's philosophy, on which I shall be drawing for illustrations of
are impossible.
the general thesis that transcendental deductions
of schemata of ex
This
choice will limit me to an examination
Among
the most
transcendental deduc
ternal and practical differentiation. Kant's
tions contain only such. He held that of all the methods of prior
differentiation of experience which he investigated, only those of
external and practical differentiation-and
not, for example, any
to categorial schemata.
method of aesthetic differentiation-belong
It would not be difficult to find, in these or other fields, many
arguments easily rec
simpler or more simple-minded philosophical
in the sense of
ognizable as attempts at transcendental deductions
our definition.
II. The Impossibility
of Transcendental
Deductions
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320
THE
MONIST
pointed out by and was perfectly clear to Kant, need not be the
case. But if the method of prior differentiation does
a
belong to
of
the
task
the
schema
feasible.
It
consists
is
schema
exhibiting
(a)
in searching for nonempty attributes, e.g. an attribute P such that
?x is an object of the region* logically implies and is implied by,
'x is a P\ Sometimes one may succeed in the more ambitious
task of giving a complete, finite enumeration of the simplest consti
tutive attributes, i.e. such as are not logically equivalent to a con
junction of other constitutive attributes. We might, following
Kant, call such simple and finitely enumerable attributes the "cate
gories" of the region and say that they are ultimately constitutive
of the region's objects. But this pleasant possibility may be ignored.
The task further consists (b) in searching for at least one non
to every object of
such that Q is applicable
empty attribute, say
the region, and is such that 'x is an object of the region and a Qf
demonstrate
How
the schema's
belongs
as I shall say,
uniqueness.
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IMPOSSIBILITY
OF TRANSCENDENTAL
DEDUCTIONS
321
three methods
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322
THE MONIST
to
the attributes is one, say P, such that P is applicable
objects
an
of the region and such that *x is
object of the region* logically
a
implies, and is implied by, (x is P\ (b) by statements to the effect
that one (ormore) of the attributes employed are individuating for
the objects of the region, e.g. that among the attributes is an at
tribute, say Q, such that Q applies to every object of the region and
such that *x is an object of the region and a Q* logically implies,
and is implied by, 'x is a distinct object of the region*. Let us now,
as Kant did, examine the logical status of (a) statements of compre
hensive applicability and (b) statements of exhaustive individuation.
Each of them is a conjunction of two statements. The first ex
presses that the extension of an attribute is, as a matter of fact, not
empty, that something exists, the existence of which could not be
guaranteed by logic or definitions alone. It is therefore a synthetic
statement. The
second is clearly logically necessary. Since a con
a
of
synthetic and a logically necessary statement is syn
junction
and exhaus
thetic, the statements of comprehensive applicability
tive individuation are all synthetic.
each of these two kinds of statements in question,
Moreover,
that
of
namely
comprehensive applicability and that of exhaustive
individuation, is compatible with any statement about objects, i.e.
with any statement expressing the applicability or inapplicability
of attributes to objects-provided
that such a statement is made
a
method
of
differentiation
which belongs to the schema.
by
prior
The reason for this is that in that case no attribute can be applied
or refused to any objects except such as are constituted and indi
viduated by the schema's constitutive and individuating attributes.
Thus no incompatibility can arise between the statements of com
and exhaustive
individuation
of a cate
prehensive applicability
on
one
the
and
schema
statement
hand,
any
gorial
expressed by a
to the schema on the
method of prior differentiation belonging
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IMPOSSIBILITY
OF TRANSCENDENTAL
DEDUCTIONS
323
The reasons why these points, which in our own day are not
too difficult to see, have escaped Kant, are
partly historical and
The
historical
of
that like most of
ones,
are,
course,
partly logical.
his contemporaries, Kant considered the mathematics
and physics
of his day and the moral code by which he found himself bound,
to be true beyond doubt; he felt in no way
compelled to consider,
therefore, the question of schemata other than those to which be
l See
Critique
of Pure
Reason,
B. 38, 80 etc.
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324
THE MONIST
unique
without
2 See
e.g. B
126.
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IMPOSSIBILITY
OF TRANSCENDENTAL
DEDUCTIONS
325
Kantischen
Begr
ndung
der Mathematik
und
der Naturwissenschaften*
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326
THE
MONIST
method
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IMPOSSIBILITY
OF TRANSCENDENTAL
DEDUCTIONS
327
falsehood of his beliefs and his desires. Such a relation need not
and is quite compatible
depend on the person's chosen maxims;
with the reasonable assumption that not every act is governed by a
maxim. The Kantian
schema of practical differentiation is non
and
its
transcendental
deduction therefore impossible.
unique
III. A Revised Notion
ofMetaphysical
Exposition
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328
THE
MONIST
It sees the
ing the strategy of the transcendental philosophy.
fundamental error not in neglecting the problem of demonstrating
the (undemonstrable)
uniqueness of any schema of differentiation,
but merely in a narrowness of the methods
investigated by Kant
of prior differentiation and a corresponding narrowness of the
schemata established by him.
the post-Kantian
of physics and
development
for example, would merely show the Kantian
schema
to be widened
differentiation as having
before a
is attempted; one need not regard a
transcendental deduction
as
in principle impossible. Thus
the indi
transcendental deduction
viduating attribute for external objects 'x wholly occupies a region
of space and an interval of time as conceived by Newton* is to be
On
this view
mathematics,
of external
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IMPOSSIBILITY
OF TRANSCENDENTAL
DEDUCTIONS
329
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330
THE
MONIST
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IMPOSSIBILITY
OF
TRANSCENDENTAL
DEDUCTIONS
331
for some
over
schemata
express preferences
others.
over
THE
and
over
UNIVERSITY,
again.
S. K
RNER
BRISTOL
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