The Effect of Emigration on Human Capital Formation

Author(s): Jean-Pierre Vidal

Source: Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Dec., 1998), pp. 589-600
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20007606
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J Popul

Econ

( 1998)

11: 589-600

?Journal

o(

Population
Economics
?

Springer-Verlag

1998

The effect of emigration on human capital formation

Jean-Pierre

Vidal12

2 rue de la Charit?, F-13002 Marseille,

France
^REQAM-CNRS,
2
of Cambridge,
of Applied
Economics,
University
Sidgwick
Department

Avenue,

Cambridge CB3 9DE, UK

Received: 16 July 1997/Accepted: 28 July 1998

on human
This paper focuses on a possible effect of emigration
a
to
returns
to
formation.
skill
country provides an
Emigration
higher
capital
incentive to invest in human capital. The level of human capital formation
in
the source country can therefore be positively
correlated with the probability
a surge in emigration can lead the source coun?
of emigration.
Incidentally
an
out
of
try
trap. The implications of the model for the
under-development
are
also
discussed.
convergence
controversy

Abstract.

JEL

classification:

F22

Key words: Emigration,

human

capital,

overlapping

generations

1. Introduction
It is often advocated
that labour migration
has a negative
impact on the
source country (see, for example, Haque and Kim 1995; Miyagiwa
1991). This
issue has been paid much attention under the nomenclature
of the "brain
drain" during the 1970s. Mountford
(1997), and more recently Stark et al.

I wish

to thank Bertrand

Oded Galor,
Crettez,
Jayasri Dutta, Fr?d?ric Docquier,
Philippe Michel,
Hillel Rapoport,
Oded
and three anonymous
Mountford,
Stark, Bertrand Wigniolle,
referees of this journal for helpful comments
I am also grateful
to Alexia
and/or encouragements.
Prskawetz
for the reference
to her work with Helmenstein
and Stark and for fruitful discussion
of the European
the 1997 meeting
for Population
Economics.
This research has
during
Society

Andrew

benefitted

from

of Researchers'
Christoph

M.

the financial
Commission
under Training
and Mobility
support of the European
The usual disclaimer
editor:
grant #ERBFMB1CT961100.
applies. Responsible
Schmidt.

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590

J.-P. Vidal

this conventional wisdom and shown the possibility of

(1997) have questioned
a "brain drain with a brain gain". They put the emphasis on the incentives for
in the source country. Higher
returns to skill in a
human capital formation
on
human
at
formation
home.
foreign country impinge
capital
This paper rests on the same economic
intuition, and focuses on the dy?
on human capital formation
namic consequences
of labour emigration
and
to two recent strands of literature, the inter?
economic growth. It contributes
literature and the human capital and growth literature.
national migration
Since Galor's
seminal article (1986), there has been a growing interest for the
in the international
labour migra?
(OLG) approach
generations
overlapping
tion literature (see, among others, Crettez et al. 1996, 1998; Galor
1992; Galor

and Stark 1990, 1991, 1994;Karayalcin 1994;Kochhar 1992;Kondo 1989;

Mountford 1997; Stark 1991).
initiated by Lucas (1988) - has
The human capital and growth literature
the role of human capital in economic growth. Lucas points out
investigated
that human capital formation
is both a private and a social activity. Through
in human capital, individuals enhance their earning ability
their investment
and contribute to the aggregate level of productivity. The formation of human
incentives and externalities within and
capital is thus driven by individuals'
across generations.
One of the interesting features of the OLG approach
to
human capital and economic growth is the possibility of multiple
steady-state
systems characterised
(see
by threshold externalities
equilibria and dynamical
and Tsiddon
Azariadis
and Drazen
and
1990; Galor
1996, 1997). Galor
in which the evolution of income inequal?
Tsiddon
(1996) develop a model
and Tsiddon
ity and output conforms with the Kuznets
hypothesis. Galor
the pattern of human
and economic
(1997) analyse
capital distribution
(1997) apply the model de?
growth. Galor and Stark (1994) and Mountford
labour
(1996, 1997) to the issue of international
veloped inGalor and Tsiddon
Galor and Stark (1994) examine the pattern of labour immigration
migration.
and human capital accumulation.
Mountford
(1997) analyses the interaction
human capital accumulation,
between
income distribution,
and labour emi?
this research stream by investigating
the effect
gration. This paper continues
of labour emigration on human capital formation and economic development
is uncertain.
when migration
The basic model follows rather closely the framework developed by Galor
and complements Mountford's
and Tsiddon,
analysis in two ways. First, it
abstracts from problems relating to the distribution of human capital and de?
can in fact be constructive
for
velops further the novel idea that emigration
an
source
incentive
for
human
formation
in
the
capital
growth by providing
country. Due to the simplicity of the model the dynamical
system can be fully
causes a bifurca?
which
I
derive
the
under
condition
characterised;
migration
In this case, interestingly, emigration can
tion in the dynamics of the model.
of
free the sending country from a poverty
trap. To do so the probability
and
emigration must be high enough; there is a threshold effect as in Azariadis
in which the probability
of
Drazen
(1990). Second, I consider an extension
on
source
to
the
it
is
assumed
is
endogenised;
depend
economy's
emigration
level of human capital. In this setting, two dynamical
average
patterns of
interest emerge. First of all, the economy can be trapped at a low stage of
in the short run provided that its initial level of human capital is
development
the model
in the
low.
Therefore
is consistent with club convergence
sufficiently
a
for
dis
in
Galor
1996
the
short run and conditional
convergence
long (see

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and human

Emigration

capital

591

formation

of these alternative hypotheses). The model is also consistent with club

in the long run for some parameter values.
convergence
The rest of the paper is organised as follws. Section 2 sets up the model.
Section 3 discusses
implications of labour emigration for human capital for?
Section 4 concludes.
economic
mation,
growth, and convergence.
cussion

2. The model
a small open overlapping-generations
that operates
in a
economy
over
an
extends
infinite
discrete
Economic
world.
activity
perfectly competitive
time. In every period a single homogenous
good is produced using capital and
to a neoclassical
in efficiency units according
labour measured
production
or
can
saved
used as an input in the for?
be
The
consumed,
good
technology.
mation of human capital. In each period a new generation which consists of a
continuum
of individuals of measure N is born1; for the sake of simplicity
are two period-lived
and supply one
there is no population
growth. Agents
unit of labour in both periods of their life. When young they choose to save
and to invest in human capital formation. They face a probability p to emi?
grate to a high wage country at the beginning of their second period of life.
The supply of capital in every period consists of domestic savings in addition
to international
lending or borrowing. The supply of efficiency labour in every
to
the supply of the young that depends on the average in?
is
period
equal
herited level of human capital in the economy and the supply of the old who
have not emigrated.
Consider

sector

2.1 The production

Production
tion which
Yt

occurs according
to a constant-returns-to-scale
is invariant through time. The output produced

F{KUHt)

Htf{kt);

kt

func?
production
at time r,Yu is:

Kt/Ht

where Kt and Ht are the capital and efficiency labour employed at time t. The
supply of efficiency labour at time t equals the supply of the young Nht and of
the old who have not emigrated,
(1 p) Nht; JVis the size of each generation,
and ht is the level of human capital of an individual born at t that equals the
? 1 at the
average level of human capital of individuals born at t
beginning of
their second period of life. The production
function is twice continuously
dif
ferentiable,
strictly monotonie
increasing and concave, and satisfies the Inada
conditions.
so that production
The economy
is perfectly competitive
factors are paid
their marginal product:

R, = f'(kt)
w, = f(k,)-ktf'(kt)
Rt is the gross rate of return on physical
per efficiency unit of labour.

where

capital

and w, the wage

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rate

592

J.-P. Vidal

Suppose now that the world rental rate is stationary at a level R. Since the
its rental rate is set
small economy allows unrestricted
lending or borrowing,
equal to the world rental rate. Hence the ratio of capital to efficiency units of
labour is stationary over time at level k and the wage rate per efficiency unit of
?
labour is equal to w = f{k)
kf'{k).

2.2

The

individuals

as well as
In every time period a new generation
of size N is born. Within
across generations,
individuals are identical in their production
technology of
t inherits the economy average level
human capital. A member of generation
of human capital that works as an intergenerational
externality. At time t he
can invest et units of real resources
in the formation
of human capital to
increase his second period level of human capital. His labour supply during
his second period of life is given by:

ht+i=/i + g(ht)et (2.1)

where // > 0, a e ]0,1[, and g{ht) is an externality that depends on the average
level of human capital in the economy
{g'{ht) > 0).
their first period of life, individuals born at time t supply ht units of
During
labour and earn htw. They save st and invest et in human capital formation.
For simplicity we will assume that agents do not consume during their first
period of life:
htw

st +

et

to a high wage country at the

face a probability p of emigrating
Individuals
of their second period of life. The high wage country is charac?
beginning
terised by a Hicks-neutral
technological
superiority so that unrestricted capital
a
rate
in
results
differential
wage
(see Galor and Stark 1991); in?
mobility
dividuals born in the technologically-inferior
country have an incentive to
to
I
denote with w* > w the wage
the
one2.
migrate
technologically-superior
In
the
absence
of
restriction on labour mobil?
rate in the destination
country.
to the high wage country. Here I assume
ity, every individual would migrate
that individuals cannot emigrate during their first period of life and that only
a fraction p of old individuals
to emigrate. This can reflect re?
is allowed
such as quotas.
strictions on labour mobility
are not allowed
to emigrate and
With
probability
(1 p) individuals
consume:

ct+\ =Rst

+ ht+\w

With

probability p they spend

country and consume:
c*t+x =Rst

I assume

their second

period

of life in the high wage

ht+iw*

that individuals

are risk neutral

so that they choose

the level of in

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Emigration

and human

vestment

in human

593

formation

capital

capital

so as to maximize

their expected

income3:

(1 p)[R{htw et) + {fi+ g(ht)ef)w] + p[R{htw et) + (//+ g(ht)ef)w*]

3. Implications

of labour emigration

of emigration affect the pattern of

How does an increase in the probability
returns to skill in a
in the source country? Higher
human capital formation
an
to
additional
incentive
investment
in human capi?
foreign country provide
tal. I first show this possible effect of emigration on human capital formation.
Then I show that, in the Galor and Stark (1994) setting, labour emigration
can lead the source country out of an underdevelopment
trap. Finally, I con?
in which the probability
of emigration
sider an extension
is endogenised,
and
discuss the implications
of the model
for the convergence
In
controversy.
is
the
model
is
it
shown
that
consistent
with
club
in
convergence
particular,
in the long run as well as with club
the short run and conditional
convergence
in the long run.
convergence

3.1 Emigration

human capital formation

fostering

Given
the assumptions
concerning
there exists a unique and interior
problem characterised
by:

et

the production
function of human capital,
solution to the individuals' maximisation

+ pw^)]l/^

Mht){{l-p)w
R

(3l)

The return on human capital is increasing with the probability

of migra?
tion to the high wage country. We thus have the following proposition:
3.1. The higher the probability of emigration the higher the level of
Proposition
human capital formation.
The long-run level of human capital is positively cor?
related with the probability
of emigration.
(3.1) one obtains:

Proof: Differentiating
det

<xg{ht)[w*

dp
The

w]e*

(l-a)i?

law governing

ht+i

ju+

human

capital accumulation

+ pw*)]

\*((l-p)w
R

is given by:

[0(/O]1/(1-a)

Starting from any initial condition on the level of human capital, ho, we can
of emigration,
compare the dynamic paths for two different probabilities
say
>
the
law
we
the
p. Inspecting
p
governing
dynamics,
obviously have: h\ >

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594

J.-P. Vidal

follows that the long-run

hi => hi > hi and so forth. It straightforwardly
of human capital is positively correlated with the probability of emigration.

3.2. Out of the underdevelopment

level

trap

From this section on, I assume that the externality

is of the Galor-Stark
accumulation
(1994) type:

governing

human

capital

"""*
9(h,)= {Z
06]O,1[ (3.2)
h*
VA,> h
1
Following

(2.1), (3.1) and (3.2), the dynamics

of human

capital are governed

by:
a((l

p)w+pw*)
R

oi{{\-p)w+pw*)
R

a/(l-a)

A?'(l->

if ht < h

h?/V-")=H{p)

ifht>h

?/(l-a)

this
given and G is convex, that is ? > 1 a. Under
This dynamical
system is akin to that described by
The difference lies in the probability of emigration, p.
state of the economy. In what follows I choose h such
to assume: h >
that G{h) > h, for all p e [0,1] and p > 0; this amounts

Ao is historically
= 0.
assumption,
G'(0)
Galor and Stark (1994).
is always a steady
H{p)
where

?
(

. Depending

on

the value

of parameters

the system may

be

characterised by one, two or no other steady-state equilibria (see Fig. 1).

I am particularly
interested in the sensibility of the dynamics with respect
=
to p. I proceed further by assuming that the closed economy
0) is char?
{p
and one
acterised by three steady state equilibria
(two stable, hi and H{0),
=
unstable, hi); the fully open economy
{p
1) only has the stable high level of
human capital equilibrium, H {I). As shown in the appendix this amounts to
restrict the admissible values of p for the problem at hand: p. e [p,fl]. This
means
of emigration denoted with
that there exists a value of the probability
two
the
exhibits
that
such
economy
steady-state
equilibria. Technically
p{p)
the im?
the dynamical
bifurcation;
system is characterised
by a saddle-node
plicit function theorem fails to apply at the bifurcation point p{p).
3.2. If p e [p,fi], there exists a critical level of the probability
of
Proposition
If p >
emigration p{p) e [0,1] lit which the economy exhibits a bifurcation.
the economy leaves the underdevelopment
trap and converges to the high
p{p),
level of human capital equilibrium H{p)
regardless of its initial level of human
capital.
Proof: See Appendix
to labour emigration does not imply conver?
The opening of the economy
The prob
level
of human capital accumulation.
to
the
gence
highest possible

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Emigration

and human

capital

hb

Fig.

595

formation

h2 H(p) K<p(M))K($) ht

1.

ability of emigration must be high enough to guarantee

upper level of human capital; there is a threshold effect.

3.3. Consequences
As

for

convergence

to this

convergence4

established

in the previous
to a high
section, the prospect of emigrating
an
to
in
additional
incentive
invest
human
wage country provides
capital for?
in low wage countries. What are the implications of the model for the
mation
convergence
controversy?
Let me first consider this question in the basic model. Again I assume that
p e [//,//]; emigration generates a bifurcation of equilibria. I consider two set?
tings, one with a high probability of emigration
{p > p{ju)) and the other with
a low probability
of emigration
The
system with p
dynamical
{p <p{p)).
has three steady state equilibria (two stable, one unstable) while there exists a
unique steady-state
equilibrium with p. In the dynamical
system associated
with p the low level of human capital equilibrium, A1, is an underdevelopment

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596

J.-P. Vidal

trap (see Fig. 1). Economies

starting with an initial level of human capital
below h2 are trapped in a low level of human capital steady-state equilibrium;
economies
starting with a sufficiently high initial level of human
capital
(above A2) cluster towards the high level of human capital equilibrium. The
in both the short and the long run. On
model can generate club convergence
the other hand, the dynamical
system associated with p is characterised by a
converge towards the
(see Fig. 1); economies
equilibrium
unique steady-state
high level of human capital steady state regardless of their initial level of
human capital. The model
that
convergence
generates conditional
provided
is sufficiently high.
the probability
of emigration
to endogenise
I now amend the basic model
the probability of emigration.
of emigration depends positively on the average
I assume that the probability
to immigration quotas
level of human capital. This assumption
corresponds
are biased
in favour of educated
individuals.
Individuals
which
living in
countries with a low average level of human capital face a lower probability of
countries. For sim?
than those living in relatively more developed
emigration
a
as
I
function
in
and
Tsiddon
Galor
consider
(1996):
step
plicity

pih,)=
\p>P

Xht>h*

in the probability
of emi?
does the presence of a threshold externality
system is now char?
patterns? The dynamical
gration affect the convergence
economies
acterised by a threshold externality. Would
converge to the same
state
of
their
initial
level
of
human
regardless
steady
capital? Is club conver?
gence a likely outcome? As shown by Galor
(1996) the neoclassical
paradigm
and the club convergence
is consistent with both the conditional
convergence

How

hypotheses.
If the threshold A# is below the low level of human capital steady state A1
of the previous dynamical
system is char?
system with /?, the new dynamical
Economies
endowed
acterised by a unique stable steady-state
equilibrium.
with an initial level of human capital hL below A# will tend to converge
towards A1 as long as ht < A# (see5 Fig. 2). Once the threshold is reached, the
endowed with an
economy converges to the long-run steady state. Economies
initial level of human capital hH above A# will converge to the high level of
towards this long-run equilibrium
human capital steady state, H. Convergence
will therefore be preceded by clustering. Club convergence will occur in the
results in the long run.
short run; conditional
convergence
If A2 > A# > A1 (again A2 and A1 are steady states of the previous dynam?
ical system with p), the dynamical
system is characterised by two stable steady
state equilibria. In this case, economies
starting with a level of human capital
below h* will converge to the low level of human capital equilibrium. Those
starting with a level of human capital above A# converge to the high level of
therefore occurs both in the
Club convergence
human capital equilibrium.
short and the long run.
4. Concluding

remarks

This paper has further developed

for economic
fact be constructive

a novel

idea that labour emigration may in

an incentive for human

growth by providing

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Emigration

Fig.

and human

capital

formation

597

2.

in the source country. This very simple model

does not,
capital formation
the effects of labour emigration and has been purposely
all
however, capture
1997 for
designed to isolate the effect of a general emigration
(see Mountford
an analysis with heterogenous
individuals).
In turn the model - albeit very simple - can explain why the level of human
low and high wage regions of a same
capital formation differs less between
no
in
which
there
is
to
barrier
labour mobility
than across countries.
country,
Barriers to labour emigration to high wage countries discourage
the formation
of human capital in low wage countries. On the other hand, job opportunities
in a technologically-superior
country create a spillover effect on
neighbouring
the formation
of human capital in the sending country. These results are
consistent with the empirical findings of Chua (1993) and Beine et al. (1998).
Chua shows that convergence
ismore likely to occur between countries within
a region than between regions within the world6. Beine et al. provide
empiri?
cal support for a positive effect of emigration on the source country's growth
rate.

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598

J.-P. Vidal

Appendix
are given by:

For ht < A, the dynamics

ht+l=p + 9(p)h?m-a) = G(ht)

where 6(p) = \u((\-p)w+pw*)y/(i-a)
R
Define:
has:

A(h)

fi + d(p)h^l~^

h. Assume

that G(h) > h. Then,

one

J(Q) =n>0
=

A(h)
A

G(h)

sufficient

- h> 0
(on this, see Azariadis_1993)
equilibria (in addition to H) is:

condition

stationary

positive

for the existence

of two

J* = min A(h)<0
Note that A"(h) > 0. One has:
(l-a)/(/?-l+a)

"J,(i)-0 ?
I proceed

'-(m)

further by studying

the sign of A* = A{h) with

respect to/?. One has:

A* =p-AX
where
-

1+ a n

a\ ?/(?-i+?)

1-a { ? )

>0

and

Hence:

A*<0

op

<

X>
R

ol{w*
Since p{p)

W
w)

L/<J

is a strictly decreasing

W*

function

= p(e)
of range-,

+00

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, there

and human

Emigration

exists an interval

599

formation

capital

[p,p] such that p{p)

e [0,1] <=>p e [//,//] where:

?/(/?+?-1)

,-a(*)
and

that p e [p,p]. At the bifurcation point p = p the two hyperbolic

equilibria (one stable and one unstable) merge. The model provides an exam?
1993).
(see Azariadis
ple of saddle-node bifurcation
I now assume

Endnotes
1

Since we

are

assume

could

of life and emigrate without

them.
assume
could alternatively
that there

One

land, whose
3
4
5
6

in a migration
is questionable.
I
setting, this simplifying
assumption
Alternatively,
rear their child during their second period
that individuals
live for three periods,

endowments

differ across

is a third factor

countries.

Unrestricted

et al. 1998).
of wage rates (see Crettez
equalization
to isolate the effect I wish
is made
This assumption
when young would mitigate
the result.
consumption
to thank an anonymous
hx is not attainable,

I wish

course

Of

See Ades

and Chua

(1997)

of production

supply such as
does not result in

in fixed

capital mobility

to highlight;

introducing

risk aversion

or

of this journal for urging me to write this section.

not represented
on Fig. 2.
for empirical
evidence
concerning
negative
regional
spillovers.
referee

and

is therefore

References
curse: regional
A, Chua HB (1997) Thy neighbor's
instability and economic
growth. Journal
Growth 2:279-304
of Economic
Azariadis
C (1993) Intertemporal Macroeconomics.
Oxford
Blackwell,
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