Rubio2015 Knowledge, Contemplation and Lullism

KNOWLEDGE, CONTEMPLATION
AND LULLISM
I N S T R V M E N TA PAT R I S T I C A E T M E D I A E VA L I A
Research on the Inheritance of Early and Medieval Christianity
67
S v b s i di a L v ll i a n a 5
KNOWLEDGE, CONTEMPLATION
AND LULLISM
Contributions to the Lullian Session
at the SIEPM Congress Freising, August 20-25, 2012
Edited by
Jos H iguera R ubio
2015
I N S T R V M E N TA PAT R I S T I C A E T M E D I A E VA L I A
Research on the Inheritance of Early and Medieval Christianity
Founded by Dom Eligius Dekkers (1998)
Rita Beyers Alexander Andre Emanuela Colombi Georges Declercq

Jeroen Deploige Paul-Augustin Deproost Anthony Dupont Jacques Elfassi
Guy Guldentops Mathijs Lamberigts Johan Leemans Paul Mattei
Gert Partoens Marco Petoletti Dominique Poirel Paul Tombeur
Marc Van Uytfanghe Wim Verbaal
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of the publisher.
2015, Brepols Publishers n.v., Turnhout, Belgium
D/2015/0095/118
ISBN 978-2-503-54853-1 (printed version)
ISBN 978-2-503-54890-6 (online version)
Printed in the EU on acid-free paper.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abbreviations .
vii
Vorwort .
ix
xi
Presentation .
.
.
1. Knowledge
Coralba Colomba, Lulls Art: The brevitas as a Way to
General Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Carla Compagno, La scienza geometrica nellArs lulliana:
linterpretazione di Ivo Salzinger . . . . . . . 17
Celia Lpez Alcalde, The Foundations of Analogical
Thinking in Llulls Epistemology . . . . . . . 41
Guilherme Wyllie, Ramon Llull on the Theoretical
Unification of Fallacies . . . . . . . . . . 53
2. Contemplation
Antoni Bordoy, Ramon Llull and the Question of the
Knowledge of God in the Parisian Condemnation of
1277 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Francesco Fiorentino, La critica lulliana alla teoria
averroista della felicit speculativa . . . . . . . 89
Jos Higuera Rubio, From Metaphors to Categories:
The Contemplative and Semantic Cycle of the Divine
Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
AnnemarieC.Mayer, Contemplatio in Deum or the
Pleasure of Knowing God via his Attributes . . . 135
3. Lullism
Josep Batalla, Regards sur Raymond Lulle .
. 153
Francisco Jos Daz Marcilla, El hilo luliano de la

madeja cultural castellana medieval. Nuevos aportes
al lulismo castellano medieval laico y religioso . . . 165
table of contents
VI
Esteve Jaulent, Un lulista responde a Paolo Flores

dArcais . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Rafael Ramis Barcel, Bernard de Lavinheta y su
interpretacin de las ideas jurdicas de Ramon Llull . 207
Alberto Pavanato & Alessandro Tessari, Ramon Llull,
Ren Descartes: From Analytics to Heuristics . . . 227
Indices .
245
Index personarum . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

Index operum Raimundi quae citantur . . . . . 251
Raimundi Lulli Opera latina: Concordantiae . . . 253
ABBREVIATIONS
AHDLMA
Archives dhistoire doctrinale et littraire du Moyen-ge
CCCM
Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Medieaevalis, Turnholti

1971 aa.
CUP
Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, 4 vols (Paris,

18891897)
EL
Estudios Lulianos (19571990, vid. SL)
MOG
Raymundi Lulli Opera omnia, ed. Ivo Salzinger, 8 vol.,

Moguntiae 17211742; reimpr. Frankfurt am Main 1965.
NEORL
Nova Edici de les Obres de Ramon Llull, Palma 1991ss.
ORL
Obres de Ramon Llull, 21 vols, Palma 19061950
ROL
Raimundi Lulli Opera latina, Palmae/Turnholti 1959ss.
SL
Studia Lulliana (1991-, olim EL)
VORWORT
Dieser fnfte Band der vom Raimundus-Lullus-Institut initiier
ten Reihe Subsidia Lulliana enthlt die Vortrge, die im Rahmen
der Special Session Lulliana (SSL) whrend des 13. Kongresses
der Societ Internationale pour ltude de la Philosophie Mdi
vale (SIEPM) vom 20. bis 25. August 2012 in Freising gehalten
wurden.
Schon auf der 12. Konferenz der SIEPM in Palermo im Sep
tember 2007 hatte sich erstmals eine eigene Abteilung mit Ramon
Lull und seinem Werk beschftigt. Als Jos Higuera fr den
Freisinger Kongress unter dem Titel Pleasures of Knowledge
erneut zu einer entsprechenden Session einlud, folgte eine beacht
liche Anzahl von Lull-Spezialistinnen und -Spezialisten seinem
Ruf. Ihre hier gesammelten und von Jos Higuera herausgege
benen Beitrge lassen sich drei groen Themenkreisen zuordnen:
dem Wissen bzw. der Erkenntnistheorie, der Kontemplation und
der historischen Rezeption von Lulls Werk vom 14. Jahrhundert
bis heute. So spiegelt der vorliegende Band ein breites Spektrum
gegenwrtiger Lull-Forschung.
Raimundus-Lullus-Institut der Universitt Freiburg,
im April 2015
Peter Walter
Viola Tenge-Wolf
PRESENTATION
Fernando Domnguez stated in his postfacium1 to the publica
tion of the contributions of the first SSL (Special Session Lulli
ana) held in Palermo (2007) that, until then, the figure of Ramon
Llull had not received the attention it deserved in scholarship on
medieval philosophy. This fact can be explained by the tension
between Llulls originality on the one hand and the rigour of
the Scholastic method on the other which seems to impose restric
tions on the aims of Llulls thought. Domnguez proposed over
coming this apparent clash by dealing with the issues and prob
lems with which Ramon Llull was confronted in his time, as well
as with the corresponding solutions that he presented to the mem
bers of the medieval studium.
During the second SSL held in Freising at the Congress Plea
sures of Knowledge, SIEPM 2012 2225 August the contribu
tors took up this suggestion and addressed relevant issues within
the philosophical tradition of the thirteenth century. Thus they
showed how Ramon Llull gave his own responses by developing
a philosophical Opus that is still relevant to current research on
the Middle Ages. In particular, the contributions deal with three
main areas: theory of knowledge, contemplative life and divine
delectatio, and the reception of Llulls work from the fourteenth to
the twentieth centuries.
The first area opens with a contribution by Coralba Colomba
(SISMEL-Florence) which focuses on the classical notion of brevitas
in order to highlight three important aspects of Llulls work: the
encyclopedic compilation of knowledge, the collection of the prin
ciples of different disciplines, and the synthetic function of Llulls
Art from a methodological perspective. Ramon Llull assumed a
critical stance with regard to the philosophical works of his age,
namely the voluminous scholastic commentaries and disputed
questions, and he promoted instead his own compendiosa version
1 F.Dominguez, Postfazione, Universality of Reason. Plurality of Philosophies in the Middle Ages: XII International Congress of the Society for the Study
of Medieval Philosophy, eds A. Musco et al., Palermo, 2012, v. II. 2, p.xxxv.
XII
presentation
of knowledge that made it available to secular teaching and useful

for theological dialogue.
Carla Compagno (Raimundus-Lullus-Institut, Freiburg) offers
an introduction to Llulls geometry, taking as a starting point
the reception of Llulls work by the Baroque editor Ivo Salzinger,
who recognised in Llulls thought an analogy between the geo
metric objects and the divine principia. Salzinger showed how a
geometrical representation could be a way to study the relation
ships between different magnitudes, if one took into account that
these relations showed the active meaning of the divine dignities.
The idea of the existence of a spiritual magnitudo is Salzingers
interpretation, which seems to follow the Augustinian concept of
quantitas virtutis in order to explain the geometry of Llulls Art.
Celia Lpez Alcalde (IEM-UAB, Barcelona), basing herself on
the edition of the Liber novus de anima rationali, shows that Llulls
thought dealt with a psychological model which offers an alter
native to the Aristotelian theory of abstraction. Llull sought to
determine the functions of the senses and the imagination in the
soul in relation to divine principia: a kind of knowledge that is
beyond the perceptible world. The concept of analogy resolves the
concatenation of cognitive actions that are based on perception
and tend toward the divine principia. This proposal also takes
into account Llulls interest in the unity of perception and the
relationship between imagination and metaphysical principles.
Guilherme Wyllie (URJ, Niteri) points out Llulls interest in
the tradition of the medieval commentaries on the Sophistici elenchi
with the intention of unifying the ancient fallacies into a new
one, called the fallacy by contradiction. As Wyllie remarks, the
resolution of the fallacies is not Ramon Llulls main goal, since
the contradiction and the ambiguity of the terms applied in theo
logical knowledge are an opportunity to demonstrate the validity
of the principles of the Art.
In the second part of this volume, Antoni Bordoy (UIB, Palma
de Mallorca) addresses the structure of Ramon Llulls commen
tary on Bishop Tempiers syllabus from 1277; he also points out
the importance of this text in the light of contemporary interpre
tations of the condemnations. Ramon Llull identified the ethical,
epistemological and theological problems gathered by Tempier in
the propositions of the syllabus. While Llull focused his efforts on
presentation
XIII
these issues, he did not deal so much with the text of the con
demnation itself, but preferred to discuss its main questions. To
a large degree, current historiography seems to follow this same
method of interpretation of the syllabus.
Francesco Fiorentino (UdS, Bari) focuses on the problem of
speculative happiness and refers to the philosophical activity in
Llulls works pointing out how the delectatio of human knowledge
is central to Llulls thought: intellectual happiness validates many
of his metaphysical positions.
Jos Higuera (UCM, Madrid) starts with a discussion of the
ambiguity of common language and the application of the sermocinal arts to theology. Higuera shows that Llull explored the
semantic interpretation of the divine names in two ways: one con
cerning the logical predication of the divine names in relation to
intellectual concepts, and another concerning the construction of
the fallacies in dictione. These two ways lead to a contemplative
and joyful mystic activity, since this production of meanings, as
it is called by Llull, exalts the intellect and provides access to the
divine virtues.
Annemarie Mayer (Faculty of Theology, Louvain) presents a
classification of the divine names, whose diversity shows the dif
ferent stages which, according to Llull, belong to the contempla
tive life. In this sense, there are divine attributes closer to nature
and to the human being, which are therefore more achievable, and
there are other attributes that require more effort and a deeper
approach to the divine essence. This distinction appears through
out the Liber contemplationis, and Mayer suggests observation of
the development of Llulls Art and of the theological dispute in
this perspective.
The third part of the volume is devoted to several cases of the
reception of Llulls work: three of them date from between the
fifteenth and seventeenth century, and two in our time. First,
Francisco Daz (IEM-Lisboa) draws a map of peninsular Lullism
in which one can clearly distinguish a courtly reception of Llulls
work in Seville, related in part to the Portuguese court, and a
monastic reception in the centre of the Iberian Peninsula (Lon).
Daz focuses on the pious aspects of Llulls work as well as on his
methods of preaching.
Rafael Ramis (UIB, Palma de Mallorca) examines Llulls pres
ence in the Parisian Faculty of Law during the first half of the
XIV
presentation
sixteenth century with a study of Master Bernard de Lavinheta,

who embraced the classifications of law elaborated by Llull. Thus,
he described the role of that discipline with respect to others
according to the model of the Arbor scientiae. In addition, Lavin
heta, along with Jos Bade, was the editor of and commentator on
other Lullian works.
Alberto Pavanato and Alessandro Tessari (UdP, Padua) study
some treatises which were published shortly before Descartes Discours de la mthode. These works, by authors such as Bruno, Alsted
and Snchez Lizarazo, show how new methodological approaches
were developed in Early Modern Times. Thus the task of arrang
ing a set of simple parts of knowledge principia could be the
starting-point for the new science. The same intention appeared
among Lullian readers in the context of the Cartesian opus, a fact
which seems to confirm the influence of Lullism on the birth of
modern thought.
Esteve Jaulent (IBFCRL, So Paulo) aims to discuss Paulo
Flores dArcais scepticism concerning faith using Lullian argu
ments. According to Jaulent, the Italian philosopher denies some
of Llulls basic assumptions, such as the relationship between
knowledge and faith, the unity of the intellect and will, as well as
free will. These ideas are not easy to accept, in Jaulents words,
if we see that Flores dArcais propounds a kind of pure faith
according to a philosophy of disenchantment that is far from
the weakness of reason.
Josep Batalla (Fundaci Quer Alt Santa Coloma de Queralt)
shows us that there are several possible historical representations
of the figure of Ramon Llull. One of them, the most common
and conventional one, sees Llull as a forerunner of the logical key
innovations of the twentieth century. In contrast, Batalla presents
another historical representation closer to the emergence of lay cul
ture during the Middle Ages. The comparison of these historical
representations offers us the opportunity to identify the aspects
of Llulls Idealtyp: a modest man, self-trained in the philosophical
tradition, and whose purpose was as many laymen attempted at
that time to achieve a fulfilling mystical life.
These contributions vindicate the philosophical study of Llulls
work, a task that justifies the title of this volume and its goal:
to point out that the Lullian opera philosophica are a mirror of
presentation
XV
the medieval philosophical tradition. In Llulls case, of course,

the speculative reflection has its own characteristics, and a 100%
fidelity to the Scholasticism of his time cannot be expected. For
that reason it is certainly essential to conduct further research
into the divergences, contradictions and traces of the philosophical
tradition in Llulls thought. Thus, his opera philosophica will no
longer be the simple quirk of a layman, or the romantic out
burst of a genius, but most of this work shall be placed in the
context of the textual, lexical and conceptual tradition of medie
val thought. In this sense SSL is not only a meeting for Llull-spe
cialists but a research project supported by a network of institu
tions and scholars across Europe and Latin America. This volume
is a starting-point for this endeavor that has the support of the
SIEPM-Commission of Latin Philosophy.
Alexander Fidora
Jos Higuera
ICREA-Institut dEstudis Medievals (UAB)
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Universidade do Porto
1. Knowledge
LULLS ART: THE BREVITAS AS A WAY TO

GENERAL KNOWLEDGE
Coralba Colomba
(Lecce)
The evolutionary process of the Lullian Art begins according
to the Vita coaetanea on the mountain of Randa (1274). There
Ramon Llull receives the vision of the perfect book, able to
rationally demonstrate (per rationes necessarias) the infidels errors
and the superiority of Christian faith.1 That illumination did not
give birth to only one book, but to a series of monumental books,
each one more perfect than the other, following a path of progres
sive improvement of the divine message which was to last for more
than thirty years (12751308). In a continuous tension between
the method of contemplation and that of universal science, from
the Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem to the Ars generalis ultima
(and then the Ars brevis), Lulls Art generalises itself and becomes,
in its last version, scientia generalis ad omnes scientias, a common
foundation of every particular science and the instrument of ency
clopaedic knowledge.2
In spite of that claim of universality, of the complexity of its
evolution and of the incredible number of treatises devoted to
it, the whole Art, from its first to its last version, is permeated
1 Raimundus Lullus, Vita coaetanea, ed. H.Harada, Turnhout, 1983 (ROL,
8; CCCM, 34), p. 280: Post haec Raimundus ascendit in montem quendam
[Randa prope Lluchmayor], qui non longe distabat a domo sua, causa Deum
ibidem tranquillius contemplandi. In quo, cum iam stetisset non plene per
octo dies, accidit quadam die, dum ipse staret ibi caelos attente respiciens,
quod subito Dominus illustrauit mentem suam, dans eidem formam et modum
faciendi librum, de quo supra dicitur, contra errores infidelium.
2 Raimundus Lullus, Ars generalis ultima, ed. A.Madre, Turnhout, 1986
(ROL, 14; CCCM, 75), p. 4 ll. 915: idcirco requirit et appetit intellectus
quod sit una scientia generalis ad omnes scientias. Et hoc cum suis principiis
generalibus in quibus principia aliarum scientiarum particularium sint impli
cita et contenta sicut particulare in universali.
Knowledge, Contemplation and Lullism. Contributions to the Lullian Session at the

SIEPM Congress Freising, August 20-25, 2012, ed. by Jos Higuera Rubio,
IPM, 67 (Turnhout, 2015), pp. 3-16.
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107304
coralba colomba
by consistent references to the brevitas. Running through the list

of Lulls works, in fact, the terms compendiosa, brevis, abbreviata
recur first in reference to the general Art itself and its various
particular arts (Ars compendiosa, Ars brevis, Ars abbreviata), then
in reference to the expositive format (Lectura brevis, Lectura compendiosa). Moreover, it is on its brevity as a qualifying element of
the discourse that Lull insists in many of his prologues (though
not only there), where the breviter et leviter arguing characteris
tic at least in the authors intentions of the new method is in
opposition to the prolixitas and labilitas of the traditional science. 3
Although conciseness as a stylistic ideal already exists in Medi
eval literature, which inherits it from classical rhetoric4, Lulls
brevitas is not a simple rhetoric issue but an intellectual attitude
which seems to have a double epistemological and methodological
value
1. The brevitas as epistemological characteristic of the Art
In the distinctio III of the Liber de fine Lull writes:
Distinctio ista in duas partes sit diuisa: Prima est de Arte generali
aut compendiosa siue inuentiua uel demonstratiua.
He then goes on to explain in the following paragraph what

he means by each of those adjectives: compendiosa dicitur, quia
breuiter est tractata.5 It is immediately clear that in Lulls view the
adjective compendiosa qualifies the Art in the same way as generalis, inventiva and demonstrativa.
Lulls Art is nova and compendiosa because it renews the instru
ments of knowledge and traditional disciplines (logic, rhetoric,
geometry, and so on) 6. Lull shows a new way of conceiving science,
Raimundus Lullus, Logica noua, ed. W.Euler, Turnhout, 1998 (ROL,

23; CCCM, 115), prol. p.15.
4 See in particular Rhetorica ad Herennium (I, 1415), Ciceros De oratore
(II, 326), Quintilians Institutio oratoria (IV 2, 4051).
5 Raimundus Lullus, Liber de fine, ed. A.Madre, Turnhout, 1981 (ROL, 9;
CCCM, 35), pp.285, 286.
6 It is a path of renewal which starts after 1300 when Lull has definitely
developed the mechanism of combinatoria.
3
lulls art: the brevitas
logically organised following generalissimi7 principles common to

the three monotheistic cultures he addresses, with the main aim
of converting the infidels, firstly the Muslims 8. It is a way to the
discovery of the truth,9 knowing and discussing the dogmas of
Christianity and all creation. It resolves the incapacity of Scholas
tic theology to overcome the infidels opposition and it responds
to the verbosity and the weakness (ad prolixitatem et labilitatem)
of traditional (Aristotelian) knowledge, as we can read in the pro
logue of the Logica nova:
Considerantes ueterem logicam et antiquam, ab inquirentibus
eam, propter sui prolixitatem et multorum librorum diuersitatem
cum labore maximo acquiri plenarie, et eam, iam acquisitam,
propter sui labilitatem, cum difficultate maxima in memoria reti
neri continue; ideo ad prolixitatem et labilitatem ipsius uitandam,
cogitauimus, divino auxilio mediante, nouam ac compendiosam
logicam inuenire, quae sine difficultate, a desiderantibus eam,
acquiratur, et acquisita, in memoria conseruetur plenarie ac tota
liter, et leuiter teneatur.10
Even more exhaustive is the prologue of the Liber de venatione

substantiae, accidentis et compositi:
Quoniam logica est scientia difficilis, labilis et prolixa, et natu
ralis scientia est delectabilis, permanens et immutabilis, idcirco ex
istis duabus scientiarum arboribus colligimus hunc ramum, uide
licet istum librum.
Quem hac intentione facimus, ut illi, qui logicalia ignorant et
naturas, et in earum acquisitione ratione prolixitatis et taedii nol
unt expendere tempus suum, uerumtamen sine ipsis ad habendum
alias scientias intellectum desiderant eleuare, ut per ipsum possint
attingere adoptatum []
7 Liber de fine, op cit., p. 286: Ars generalis eo dicitur generalis, quia
decem et octo principia generalissima et decem quaestiones siue regulas gene
ralissimas ipsa habet.
8 Raimundus Lullus, Liber de Deo ignoto et de mundo ignoto, ed. H.Harada,
Turnhout, 1980 (ROL, 8; CCCM, 34), p. 12: Ad inuestigandum altissimum
obiectum uerum, intelligibile facimus nouum modum, compendiosum et arti
ficialem.
9 Raimundus Lullus, Ars univerali.cos (seu Lectura Artis compendiosa inveniendi veritatem), ed. I.Salzinger, Mainz, 1721 (MOG, 1), Int. viii, p. 483:
Finalis intentio huius Artis est reperire veritatem.
10 Logica nova cit. p.15.
coralba colomba
Cum igitur intellectus ad maximam altitudinem suae intelligibi
litatis attingere non ualeat sine iuuamine principiorum genera
lium et etiam regularum, ideo in hoc libro siue Arte compendiosa
ipsum intellectum tractare et nutrire uolumus cum principiis et
regulis Artis generalis.11
And the examples could be multiplied.12

The tedium and prolixity Lull refers to are not only a topos
of rhetoric. The discourse becomes shorter not for reasons of nar
rative style but in order to allow the reader to understand and
acquire the method.13 The Art is a compendious science, offered
mainly to a readership lacking in scholastic education but inter
ested in the acquisition of knowledge; it is offered to anybody
who is eager for knowledge but who is inhibited by the tiresome
prolixity of traditional science (difficilis, labilis and prolixa). It is
exactly this ability of the Art to make itself concise which renders
its comprehension easy and quick (facilis, levis), to the point that
it can be understood according to the indications of Lull him
self sine difficultate within only two months: one month for the
theory and the other for the practice (within a time-limit of six
months for less gifted people). Ramon Lull is really convinced of
the excellence of his method and he attributes possible incompre
hensions or differences in learning to cases of uncultivated intel
ligence (rudem intellectum) or to the lack of goodwill (diligentiam).14
11 Raimundus Lullus, Liber de venatione substantiae, accidentis et compositi,
ed. A. Madre, Turnhout, 1998 (ROL, 22; CCCM, 114), p.14.
12 Among several examples it is particularly significant the prologue of
Liber clericorum in which Lull addresses ignorant clerics: Ratio quare faci
mus istum librum, est, ut clerici ignorantes doctrinam habeant, ut sciant
agere de praedictis (i.e. de doctrina catholica) [] Et quia istum librum
facimus clericis non multum scientibus, ideo planiori modo, quam possumus,
hunc tractamus. Et ualde breuiter ipsum facere intendimus, quia prolixitatem
super omnia euitamus, Raimundus Lullus, Liber clericorum, ed. A.Madre,
Turnhout, 1998 (ROL, 22; CCCM, 114), p.316.
13 See above note 10: quae sine difficultate, a desiderantibus eam,
acquiratur, et acquisita, in memoria conseruetur plenarie ac totaliter, et
leuiter teneatur.
14 Raimundus Lullus, Ars generalis, op. cit., pp. 525526: Nam homo,
habens optimum intellectum, et fundatum in logica et in naturalibus, et diligentiam, poterit ipsam scire duobus mensibus: Vno mense per theoricam, et
altero mense per practicam. Homo habens intellectum meliorem, fundatum
in logica et in naturalibus, et diligentiam, poterit ipsam scire quattuor men
The brevitas, thus, characterises not only the expositive nature of

the Art, but also its quick and lasting learning.
The stylistic manner of the brevity is already widespread in
the Middle Ages (above all in the twelfth century) from prose to
poetry, from hagiographic to theological literature15 and it will
play a fundamental role in developing the art of memory during
the Renaissance. Think about Anselms Proslogion, a master
piece of brevitas16 which, by using only one argument (unum
argumentum), keeps everything: the knowledge of God and the
divine existence itself;17 or we should quote Marguerite Porete
who, in the Speculum simplicium animarum, criticises the Scho
lastics for approaching God at a snails pace (qui incedunt per cursum lumacae) owing to the excessive subtlety of their reasonings.18
Within the historical context in which Lull works, the brevitas
has a strongly anti-Scholastic element. It contains the proposal
of a powerful reform of traditional knowledge, which brings into
question methods and ways of Scholastic theology, starting from
sibus: Duobus per theoricam, et duobus per practicam. Homo, habens intel
lectum subtilem et bonum, et fundatum in logica et in naturalibus, et bonam
diligentiam, poterit ipsam scire medio anno, uidelicet tribus mensibus per
theoricam, et tribus per practicam. Et si non poterit addiscere isto tempore,
signum est, quod ipse habet rudem intellectum, et quod non habet bonam
diligentiam, aut est occupatus in aliis. Et talis homo numquam addiscere
poterit ipsam.
15 Formulas of brevitas are used in various fields of literature, often linked
to the topos of fastidium. Matthew of Vendme criticizes the classical authors
for their prolixity and in the same century we can find many new versions in
abbreviated forms of classical texts. See E.R. Curtius, La concisione come
ideale stilistico, in Letteratura europea e Medio Evo latino, trad. A. Luzzato
& M. Candela, Firenze, 1992, pp.543551.
16 F.Santi, Let metaforica. Figure di Dio e letteratura latina medievale da
Gregorio Magno a Dante, Spoleto, 2011 (Uomini e mondi medievali, 25), p.99.
17 I.Sciuto, Introduzione, in Anselmo dAosta, Proslogion, trad. I.Sciuto,
Milano, 1996, p. 7: lunum argumentum non serve solo a dimostrare lesi
stenza di Dio, ma anche un argomento in senso boeziano, cio uno stru
mento che guida la soluzione di tutti i problemi speculativi che successiva
mente si presentano.
18 Margareta Porete, Speculum simplicium animarum, ed. R. Guarnieri
& P. Verdeyen, Turnhout, 1986 (CCCM, 69), cap. 53 ll. 912 p.157 (Love
responds to Reason): Et interrogationes uestrae fecerunt eum [i.e. librum
istum] longum et loquacem propter responsiones, quibus indigetis pro uobis
et illis quos nutritis, qui incedunt per cursum lumacae.
coralba colomba
its most representative product, i.e. the quaestio. Scholastic reason

ing (disputatio) does not take into account brevity of discourse, it
proceeds dialectically in a series of divisions indispensable for ver
ifying the truth.19 Whilst, according to Lull, concision serves an
epistemological function, which runs through all his work, also in
his literary work where the use of the exemplum is widely used.20
Lull is a layman, self-taught and with an irregular education,
and perhaps this attention to brevity of discourse is the exact
result of a personal need he had after his conversion and which he
finds in the circles to whom his message is addressed: among those
homines saeculares thirsty for knowledge appears to them difficult
and arduous to acquire, due to their lack of adequate education.21
19 On the Scholastic disputatio see P.Glorieux, La disputa teologica

allUniversit di Parigi, in Filosofi e teologi. La ricerca e linsegnamento nelluniversit medievale, ed. L.Bianchi & E.Randi, Bergamo, 1989, pp.153168.
See also R. Schnberger, La scolastica medievale. Cenni per una definizione,
Milano 1997 (Lectures 11) [transl. Was ist Scholastik?, Hildesheim, 1991]
pp.6771.
20 The exemplum is a decisive figure in Lullian prose for its capacity of
inventio and probatio, which comes from linking brevity with verisimilitude.
For an insight on the exemplum in Ramon Lull see T. Barry, Some Com
plexities of the Exemplum in Ramon Llulls Llibre de les bsties, The Modern
Language Review, 90 (1995) 646658; but see, in particular, R. Luzn Daz,
Una aproximacin a la nocin de exemplum en la obra luliana, seguida de
un breve comentario en los exempla del captulo 62 del Llibre de meravelles,
Revista de lenguas y literaturas catalana, gallega y vasca, 12 (2006) 253276,
p. 258: los procedimientos analgicos que se constituyen como razn de ser
bsica del exemplum luliano no son un mero artificio literario, sino que son
manifestacin prctica de una determinada concepcin del mundo. Desde esta
perspectiva, el exemplum tiene una funcin utilitaria, ya que es un medio
para hacer explcitas las relaciones en la escala del ser que, de otro modo, per
maneceran ocultas a nuestro entendimiento. Su papel es doble: pedaggico
y rememorativo. On the exemplum in the Middle Ages see P. von Moos,
Sulla retorica dellexemplum nel Medioevo, in Entre histoire et littrature:
communication et culture au Moyen ge, Firenze, 2005 (Millennio medievale,
58; Strumenti e studi, n.s., 11).
21 Raimundus Lullus, Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus, ed. A.Madre,
Turnhout, 1981 (ROL, 9; CCCM, 35), p. 1: Quoniam sunt aliqui homines
saeculares qui desiderant scientias acquirere et optant, et quia non habent
propria uocabula scientiarum nec in principio suum intellectum in acquiren
dis scientiis nutrierunt, ideo quando uolunt scientias adipisci, introitus est eis
ualde difficilis et etiam ualde grauis.
However, this brevitas is also the fruit of a form of idealism (in

Anselmian fashion): the deified mind builds rationaliter the world
which it knows and it is, thus, enclosed in every one of its cor
rect formulations. Truth is the consequence of a rigorous chain
of logical steps. The validity of Artistic reasoning, based on an
extremely normalised procedure, is independent of the length of
the reasoning itself, but it is strongly linked to the correct func
tioning of the mechanism which rules it (i.e. the combinatory). In
this sense Lulls brevitas tries to communicate the greatest amount
of knowledge within the shortest possible way (breviori modo).
The Art is a new method, compendious and artificial (compendiosus
et artificialis), because it translates the concepts into signs (letters)
and combines them one after the other following a fixed series of
rules through graphic, even moveable, devices (figures). The use
of geometrical figures answers the need to reduce the space and
time of the discourse into the greatest expressive synthesis. The
Artist, who has correctly understood the principles and the rules
of the Art, can formulate and solve any kind of question through
the disposition and the combination of the letters of the Artistic
alphabet in circles, squares and triangles:
In hac Arte tot sunt significationes alphabeti, quot in figuris
apparent: hoc enim ita habet esse, ut Ars possit tractari brevius
et intellectus sub verborum compendio verum obiectum possit
attingere.22
The great number of possible combinations, although in a rig

idly defined structure (9 absolute principles, 9 relative principles,
10 rules, 9 subjects), allows the expert Artist to embrace an ency
clopaedic knowledge.
The Artistic discourse is sublimated in the image (in keeping
with the sensibility typical of that period), which Lull originally
revises. Figures, images and tables span the entire theological
mediaeval literature in different ways, but they are full of alle
gorical references and elements strongly linked to Christian sym
bolism (e.g. the beautiful miniatures which translate Hildegard
of Bingens visions or Joachim of Floras figures). Lull abandons
traditional symbolism in order to build an intercultural dialogue
22 Raimundus Lullus, Compendium seu commentum Artis demonstrativae,
ed. I.Salzinger et al., Moguntiae, 1742 (MOG, 3), p.294.
10
coralba colomba
which goes beyond the borders of Christianity, and he thus trans

lates his verbal reasoning into geometrical figures commonly
shared by the three Mediterranean cultures. It is a perfect lan
guage which can also be understood and learned by illiterates;23
it is universal, because the mathematical combinatory which rules
the Artistic arguments is universal and so are the principles at the
basis of the Art.24
The perfect book reveals its technical character from its very
name: ars.25 It is a science but also a method (know-how) and it
originates mainly as an instrument of conversion designed for a
new apostolic generation, acting at the same time as a rational
method of acquisition and organisation of knowledge. The concise
ness, whether in the shape of compendium verborum or of letters
and figures, is also functional for the memorisation of the Arts
components and its combinatory mechanism, indispensable for its
use.26 Memorising, cordetenus scire, is a demand which insistently
runs through Lulls entire work.27 Moreover, it is a requirement
For the definition of illitteratus as a synonym of laical, as a person
lacking in scholastic education (sine litteris), see R. Imbach, Laien in der
Philosophie des Mittelalter: Hinweise und Anregungen zu einem vernachlssigten
Thema, Amsterdam, 1989, pp.1626.
24 U.Eco, La ricerca della lingua perfetta nella cultura europea, Roma, 2004,
pp.61 et passim.
25 On the basis of the Aristotelian distinction between theoretic, prac
tical and poetical sciences (Eth. Nic. VI, 35) Lull develops a new method,
the so-called combinatory, able to lead the Artist to produce possible reality
(and in this sense the Tabula generalis constitutes, as we shall see, a deci
sive moment). Such an idea of science as a productive form, which develops
in Spain under the Arab influence and, above all, of Al Farabi, represents
an element of great change within the traditional Western philosophical tra
dition and would lead to extraordinary results. See Ch. Lohr, Chaos nach
Ramon Lull und Nikolaus von Kues, in Ramon Lull und Nikolaus von Kues:
eine Begegnung im Zeichen der Toleranz. Raimondo Lullo et Niccol Cusano: un
incontro nel segno della tolleranza, ed. E. Bidese, A. Fidora & P. Renner,
Turnhout, 2005, p. 127; Id., Mathematics and the Divine: Ramon Lull, in
Mathematics and the Divine: A Historical Study, ed. T. Koetzier & L. Berg
mans, Amsterdam, 2005, pp.221224.
26 Lulls attention to the problem of memorising and mnemonic devices
marked the success of his combinatory in the sixteenth century. SeeP.Rossi,
Clavis universalis. Arti della memoria e logica combinatoria da Lullo a Leibniz,
Bologna, 2003, pp.63102.
27 Cf. ibid.
23
11
fundamental for the use itself of the via artistica28 . The Art must
not remain confined within a book, but it has to become forma
mentis. Therefore the discourse is reduced, the word becomes sign
and the sign imprints on the human heart (impectorabilis), 29 the
room of Lulls memory:
Finiuit Raimundus istam Lecturam, et est breuis, ut sit impec
torabilis, ratione cuius impectorabilitatis artista sciens Artem
habeat in promptu sine libro suae solutionem quaestionis. 30
2. The brevitas as a methodological instrument

The colophon of the Lectura compendiosa Tabulae generalis
reveals another aspect of the brevitas, which is functional within
the didactic path conceived by Lull for his method. Besides being
attributes characteristic of the Art, compendiosus and brevis are
also used to indicate an expositive technique which Lull con
stantly returns to: i.e. the abbreviatio or the synthesis.
Every stage of his Artistic evolution is fixed in a sequence of
works, short and medium treatises devoted to the analysis of a
main text or to its specific parts in a more synthetic and clear
form. It is, for example, the case of the Tabula generalis, for which
Lull writes a series of propaedeutical readings: Lectura compendiosa Tabulae generalis (1295), Lectura super tertiam figuram Tabulae
generalis (12946?), Brevis practica Tabulae generalis seu Ars compendiosa (1299). The brevity serves here a didactic function, as the
prologue states in the Lectura compendiosa:
Facimus tamen pro istis et aliis [bonis intellectibus] ex abundanti
hanc lecturam breuem, quam uideant et habituent, postquam
ipsi praedictam Tabulam [generalem] perlegerint et intellexerint,
et alphabetum ac definitiones principiorum cordetenus sciuer
int, et etiam species regularum, ut sic tandem, adiuuante Deo et
Lull keeps repeating his invitation to memorize the Arts basic com
ponents (alphabet, rules and so on) in several of his Artistic works by using
approximately the same words: oportet scire cordetenus.
29 C. Du cange, Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis, Graz, 1945 (repr.
ed. 18831887), vol. 4 p.303: impectorare, pectori recondere.
30 Raimundus
Lullus, Lectura compendiosa Tabulae generalis, ed.
C. Colomba, Turnhout, 2014 (ROL, 35; CCCM, 248), p. 57.
28
12
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magistro, dum praesens fuerit, in faciendis et soluendis quaestion
ibus omnimodis ualeant esse prompti. 31
Once one has read the Tabula generalis, and memorised the con
stitutive principles of the Art (alphabet, principles, rules), the
Lectura compendiosa becomes an exercise book to keep in mind
(impectorabilis), to train the aspiring Artist to solve every kind of
question from the Artistic method.
At other times the abbreviatio works as an introduction to the
main text which it refers to; as in the Ars brevis, which could be
read before the Ars generalis ultima, according to the indications
given by the author himself. 32 The practice of abbreviating works
was part of intellectual life in the Middle Ages, where reference
to previous authors, to the auctoritates, acts as a guarantee for the
new arguments. Paraphrases, compendia, anthologies and tables
proliferate both in scholastic and university circles, aimed at the
passing on and understanding of the texts. 33 The compendium,
in particular, allows for access to and the spreading of the overly
large, and thus also the overly expensive, works. It was a kind
of pocketbook of that time, to recall an efficacious expression by
Cf. ibid.
Raimundus Lullus, Ars generalis ultima, op. cit., p.526: Verumtamen ad
addiscendum hanc Artem citius, consulo, quod primo addiscatur Ars breuis.
The Tabula generalis also satisfies the same intention: Et intentio, quare
istam tabulam compilamus, haec est, quia in illa breuiter demonstrabimus
modum Artis inuentiuae et Artis amatiuae et etiam modum, per quem fieri
poterit Ars memoratiua, quae multum ad sciendum est necessaria. Item ut in
breui tempore habeatur cognitio necessariarum scientiarum in hoc mundo,
et ut intellectus in illis gradibus ascendere possit, in quibus naturae secreta
existunt, attingendo ea secundum terminos naturales. Raimundus Lullus,
Tabula generalis, ed. V.Tenge-Wolf, Turnhout, 2003 (ROL, 27; CCCM, 181),
prol., pp.12.
33 The practice of abbreviating and summarising the texts developed in
a complementary way with the spreading of universities, offering different
methods of approach to a wide range of philosophical and theological liter
ature. Besides compendia, paraphrases, anthologies and tables, there is evi
dence of abbreviationes, glossae, propositiones notabiles or notabilia, conclusions,
summae. All these instruments of work expressed in many prologues
aimed at offering the students quicker access to an increasing understanding
of a subject. See J. Hamesse, Parafrasi, florilegi e compendi, in Lo spazio letterario nel Medioevo I. II, ed. G.Cavallo, C. Leonard & E. Menest,
Roma, 1995, vol. 3, pp.197220, at 197198, 217.
31
32
13
J.Hamesse, able to offer comfortably accessible documents. 34 Such

a pedagogical aim can be found even in the compendia of Ramon
Lull who, however, used these textual genres in a very original
way, as a practice coherent with his own scientific, catechetic and
apologetic program.
In the case of Lull it is neither about simplified rewritings of
the same work for a less prepared readership, as in Boethius;35 nor
about a modulation of the content in size and literary genre in the
manner of Averroes. 36 Lulls compendia do not change in style and
language in relation to the works they refer to, but they present a
reduced number of examples, cases and combinations.
Ramon Lull was a layman who devoted himself to the Chris
tian cause adhuc iuvenis. The moment of his conversion and par
ticularly of his illumination, as described in the Vita coaetanea,
is aimed at offering Divine legitimacy to his action and thought.
Lull is the repository of a new revelation: the librum meliorem de
mundo which, in its authors intention, was to reform not only the
scientific and cultural system but to bring about a renewal of the
entire Christian societas. Perhaps it was also to achieve that ambi
tion that he tenaciously tried throughout his entire life to intro
duce his doctrine into the traditional places of knowledge, i.e. the
Cf. ibid. p. 21.

According to a praxis typical of Boethius, he used to write two differ
ent comments for the same work, the one more introductory (mediocris styli),
intended for a non-expert readership, and the other more elaborate for a
learned audience. This is the case with the Boethian comments to Porphyrys
Isagoge and Aristotles Categories. SeeG.Spinosa, La lingua che vela. Boezio
teologo traduttore, Roma, 2012 (Negotia litteraria. Studi 17), pp.6064.
36 As is well-known, Averroes wrote three different kinds of commen
tary for several Aristotelian works: short, medium and long. The differences
between the three diverse typologies of commentary are not always imme
diately evident and their identification is linked to the commented work.
SeeS.Harvey, Three Commentaries on Aristotles Physics, in La lumire
de lintellect. La pense scientifique et philosophique dAverros dans son temps,
ed. A.Hasnawi, Leuven, 2011, pp.8197, at p.81; M.Blaustein, The Scope
and Methods of Rhetoric in Averroes Middle Commentary on Aristotles
Rhetoric, in The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy: Essays in Honour of
MuhsinS.Mahdi, ed. C.E. Butterworth, Cambridge MA, 1992, pp.262303.
I thank A.Fidora for his suggestion.
34
35
14
coralba colomba
universities, and above all the University of Paris. 37 Considered

crazy (phantasticus) by his contemporaries, 38 he never obtained
that recognition which he hoped for from the circles of high cul
ture. The approval that his doctrine received from the Chancellor
of the University of Paris in 1311, by which time he was eighty
years old, was, in fact, more the fruit of his good political acquain
tances (Philip the Fair) than of his scientific qualities. 39
Lull was and remained a layman,40 wahrscheinlich der bedeu
tendste Laienphilosoph des Mittelalters in Imbachs words ,41
layman in his intellectual openness to new models of rationality,
in connection with his work and with the strategies of propaganda
used to spread his Art.42 He planned a real editorial program for
the dissemination of his Art, planning the copying and transla
tion of his texts and the establishing of holdings in various cities
(Paris, Palma de Mallorca and Genoa), setting a curriculum stu
diorum for the learning of the new general science43. Lecturae,
37 H.Riedlinger, La ltima estancia de Ramn Lull en Pars, Estudios
Lulianos, 12 (1968) 8793, p. 88: Ramon Lull se sinti siempre atrado por
el incomparable encanto de Pars, la metropolis del poder, del espritu y de
la ciencia.
38 Lull was perfectly aware of the bizarre reputation of being a fool, vision
ary, or utopian man (phantasticus) which he had acquired among his contem
poraries, as the Liber disputationis Petri et Raimundi known also as Phantasticus testifies. See Raimundus Lullus, Disputatio Petri et Raimundi, ed.
A. Oliver et al., Turnhout, 1988 (ROL, 16; CCCM, 78), p. 14: Mox uero
clericus, ut haec uerba audiuit, risum profudit uehementer. Credebam, inquit,
Raimunde, te phantasticum esse. Modo uero per haec tua uerba cognosco te
non modo phantasticum, sed esse phantasticissimum.
39 On Lulls Parisian stays and on the approval that his Art received in
1311 see F.Domnguez & J.Gay, Life, in Raimundus Lullus. An Introduction to his Life, Works and Thought, ed. A. Fidora & J. E. Rubio, Turnhout,
2008 (Supplementum lullianum, 2; CCCM, 214), pp.5762, 8594, 108110.
40 Ramon thought of himself as a layman, see H. Harada, in Raimun
dus Lullus, Liber lamentationis philosophiae, Turnhout, Brepols, 1975 (ROL, 7;
CCCM, 32) pp.8089.
41 Imbach, Laien in der Philosophie des Mittelalter, op. cit., p.102.
42 M. Romano, Un modo nuovo di essere autore: Raimondo Lullo e il
caso dellArs amativa, SL, 41 (2001), pp.3963.
43 See Testamentum Raimundi Lulli, ed. A.Soria Flores et al., Turnhout,
1991 (ROL, 18; CCCM, 80), p. 261262: et etiam de omnibus aliis denariis,
quos habeo tempore obitus mei, [] uolo et mando, quod fiant inde et scri
bant libri in pergameno, in romancio et latino ex illis libris, quos diuina fau
15
abbreviations and compendia are, from this perspective, the clavis

to access the Art. Lull creates real textbooks in which he explains
the most difficult points of the Artistic mechanism, summarises
its fundamental elements and gives precise suggestions to the
master/Artist on the teaching method and to the aspiring Artists
on how to practice it. Those manuals are addressed in primis to
a new apostolic generation able to bring together rationaliter the
whole of mankind under the Christian banner. They address, in
particular, a new audience of illiterates, without scholastic educa
tion but interested in the acquisition of knowledge.
Though being propaedeutical to the more important works,
these compendia should not be thought of as marginal within the
principal canon of the Art. All Lulls texts (even those more typ
ically literary) are linked to one another in a web of internal ref
erences. Lulls opus is a closed system within a textual self-refer
entiality, which legitimises itself within itself, without basing its
authority on external sources: the Art is revealed, it cannot be
compared with authorities different from God. Lull elevates him
self to a living auctoritas, he enriches the Art with an exegetical
apparatus when such an apparatus was until then devoted only to
the Bible or to important philosophical and theological texts (such
as the Aristotelian corpus, or Peter Lombards Sentences within
the university curriculum) thus becoming an exegete and a com
piler of himself.
However, as an enlightened layman, Ramon reverses the tradi
tional item of access to the auctoritas. The perfect book, the book
of the new revelation, is not fixed and immutable as the sacred
page, nor is it accessible at the end of a long course of study, but
it is an open book which through simplifications and transla
tions becomes accessible to the reader/disciple and adapts itself
ente gratia nouiter complilaui [] De quibus quidem libris omnibus supra

dictis mando fieri in pergameno in latino unum libro in uno uolumine, qui
mittatur per dictos manumissos meos Parisius ad monasterium de Xarcossa,
quem librum ibi dimitto amore Dei. Item: Mando fieri de omnibus supra
dictis libris unum alium librum in uno uolumine in pergameno scriptum in
latino, quem dimitto et mando [] apud Ianuam misser Persival Espinola
[] Item: Lego monasterio de Regali unum coffre meum cum libris, qui ibi
sunt, quem habeo in hospitio dicti Petri de Sanctominato.
16
coralba colomba
to the cultural and intellectual background of the readership

which it addresses; it is a generalis book because it can deal with
everything and speak to everyone: a book brevis and facilis to be
read and leviter to be kept in mind, a book even impectorabilis.
Lulls Art is a book offered to anyone, clergyman or layman, who
is diligent and endowed with a good intellect.
Abstract
Lulls Art: The brevitas as a Way to General Knowledge
The stylistic way of the brevity was a mainstream in the Middle
Ages (above all in the twelfth century) both in prose and poetry,
hagiographic and theological literature, and it will play a funda
mental role in developing the art of memory during the Renais
sance. Under this topic, Lull creates textbooks in which he
explains the most difficult points of the Artistic mechanism, sum
marises its fundamental elements and gives precise suggestions
to the master/Artist on the teaching method, and to the aspiring
Artists on how to practice the Ars. Thus brevitas has also an epi
stemological value. The validity of Artistic reasoning is strongly
linked to the correct functioning of the mechanism which rules it
(i.e. the combinatory). In this sense Lulls brevitas tries to com
municate the greatest amount of knowledge within the shortest
possible way.
Coralba Colomba
coralbacolomba@gmail.com
Universit del Salento - Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici
Palazzo Parlangeli - Via Stampacchia
73100 Lecce
Italy
LA SCIENZA GEOMETRICA NELLARS LULLIANA:

LINTERPRETAZIONE DI IVO SALZINGER
Carla Compagno
(Freiburg im Breisgau)
1. Introduzione
[] quod per gratiam Dei vidimus et audivimus, annunciamus vobis
(non enim hallucinamur, et videre nos fingimus aut somniamus, quod
non videmus) sed quod vidimus oculis nostris, quod perspeximus,
hoc testamur et annunciamus vobis, ut et vos societatem
habeatis nobiscum, et haec scribimus vobis, ut gaudeatis,
et gaudium vestrum sit plenum.
Nel Praecursor, parafrasando San Giovanni, Ivo Salzinger si

rivolge cos con citazioni sacre ai suoi lettori, ai quali indicher la
via per accedere alla conoscenza dellArs Magna Univeralis di Rai
mondo Lullo. Questa, essendo concessa dalla grazia divina per illu
minazione, fonte suprema di Verit e dunque gaudium plenum.
Com noto, Ivo Salzinger (16691728) fu promotore nel Set
tecento delledizione, conosciuta dal suo toponimo come Editio moguntina, dei testi latini di Raimondo Lullo. La moguntina
si sviluppa integralmente in otto volumi. Nel primo e nel terzo
volume il Salzinger non pubblica soltanto opere lulliane ma inserisce sia documenti importanti per la storia del lullismo sia i pro
pri scritti; questultimi sono: i Perspicilia lulliana philosophica, la
Revelatio secretorum artis e il Praecursor introductoriae in algebram
speciosam. Leditore moguntino mor prima che il quarto volume
fosse dato alle stampe, lasciando un dettagliato piano editoriale
per la pubblicazione dei volumi successivi.1
1 Su Ivo Salzinger e la storia della Editio moguntina cfr. il recente contri
buto di F. Domnguez Reboiras, Raimundus Lullus in der Martinus-Bi
bliothek. Ivo Salzinger und sein Vermchtnis, in Neues Jahrbuch fr das
Bistum Mainz. Beitrge zur Zeit- und Kulturgeschichte der Dizese, ed. B.Nicht

IPM, 67 (Turnhout, 2015), pp. 17-40.
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107305
18
carla compagno
In questa sede mi concentro sulla Revelatio secretorum artis e

sul Praecursor introductoriae in algebram speciosam. In particolare
si analizzano i capitoli della Revelatio che lautore dedica alla
ritmetica e alla geometria, del Praecursor quei concetti che in
maniera pi immediata riportano al campo matematico. Questa
seconda opera infatti abbastanza vasta, e racchiude in s tanti
altri temi come quello della significazione e della metafora,2 che
saranno approfonditi in altra occasione. Tale studio quindi non ha
la pretesa di essere esauriente, al contrario si presenta come un
approccio preliminare allargomento e ha il fine di tracciare delle
linee guida di una ricerca di pi largo respiro.
2. Revelatio secretorum artis
Nella Revelatio secretorum artis3 lintento di Salzinger esporre
lintero sistema dellArs lulliana e lo fa immaginando un dialogo tra
lui e il maestro Lullo, il quale rivela i secreta della sua arte. Allin
terno dellopera alcuni paragrafi sono quindi dedicati alla trattazione
di temi prettamente matematici, ovvero aritmetici e geometrici.4
Il paragrafo De secreto Arithmeticae porta il sottotitolo de Aequatione. Il magister Lullo spiega subito le ragioni del sottotitolo: laequalificatio, detta volgarmente aequatio, loperazione di egua
wei, MainzWrzburg, 2012, pp. 165191. Confronta anche A. Gottron,
Ledici maguntina de Ramn Lull, amb un apndix bibliogrfic dels manu
scrits i impresos lulians de Maguncia, Estudis de bibliografa luliana, 1 (1915),
Barcelona, pp.1105 e Idem, Die Mainzer Lullistenschule im 18. Jahrhun
dert, Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia, 1 (1923), pp.229242.
2 A tal proposito un approccio allargomento viene sviluppato gi da
J. E. Rubio, Un captol en ls de lallegoria en Ramon Llull, Studia Lulliana, 47 (2007), pp.527.
3 I. Salzinger, Revelatio secretorum artis, Moguntiae, 1742 (MOG, 1),
pp.253432.
4 I paragrafi attinenti allaritmetica sono il De secreto Arithmeticae (sotto
titolo: de Aequatione) il De quattuor Operationibus universalibus Arithmeticae, a
seguire il De Additione et Subtractione e il De Multiplicatione et Divisione. Suc
cessivamente, dopo aver trattato del De secreto musicae, del Cyclus Harmonicus
e della Scala Diatonica Universalis, Salzinger torna a scrivere di matematica e
in particolare De secreto geometriae e De proportione in Genere. Sulla formazione
e gli studi musicali di Salzinger cfr.: A. Gottron, Was versteht Ivo Salzin
ger unter Lullistischer Musik, Miscelnea en homenaje a Mons. Higinio Angls,
ed. Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientficas, Barcelona, 195861, Vol.
I, pp.361368.
19
la scienza geometrica nellars lulliana
glianza attraverso la quale si produce la soluzione ad ogni quesito.5

Nella quarta distinctio del Liber principiorum medicinae, a propo
sito della mixtio di K (una medicina al quarto grado di siccit)
e O (una medicina al quarto grado di umidit), il discipulus
Salzinger pu trovare lesempio pi esplicativo di come funzioni
loperatio aequalitatis, che nel suo meccanismo corrisponde al trian
golo croceo della figura T contenente i principi relativi maioritas,
minoritas ed aequalitas. Salzinger interpreta dunque loperazione
che il medico compie con la mixtio delle medicine ad unoperazione
aritmetica, indipendentemente dal fatto che essa sia di maggio
ranza o di minoranza, di moltiplicazione o divisione.6 Le quattro
operazioni elementari dellaritmetica implicano tutte le altre, non
dunque necessario aggiungere la radice quadrata e cubica.7 Sulla
base dei principi relativi del triangolo croceo e dei principi relativi
del triangolo verde (differentia, concordantia, contrarietas) il magister costruisce una figura che insieme alla figura quadrangularis
logicae, descritta precedentemente, ordina il sistema generale di
ogni equazione particolare.8
Diffe
Contrasine
Maioritas
cd.
B.
3.
gradus
d.
C.
2.
gradus
ren
Concordantia
per medium
Minoritas Aequalitas
D.
1.
gradus
E.
Scala
Aequationis.
tia
rietas
medio
Minoritas
F.
1.
gradus
f.
G.
2.
gradus
Maioritas
fg.
H.
3.
gradus
Figura 1. Figura costruita dal Salzinger in De secreto Arithmeticae,

in Revelatio secretorum artis, p. 354.
5 I. Salzinger, Revelatio, op. cit., p. 354: et quia Aequalificatio, seu vul

gari nomine Aequatio, est operatio aequalitatis, per quam producitur inventio
omnis particularis, et solutio omnis quaesiti, ideo ab hac operatione merito
intitulavimus nostram Arithmeticam.
6 Per il concetto di mixtio in relazione alla teoria dei quattro elementi in
Raimondo Lullo cfr. J. Gay Estelrich, Introduccin general, ROL XX
(1995), pp.162.
7 I. Salzinger, Revelatio, op. cit., p. 355: Disc. quare non addidisti extrac
tionem Radicis Quadratae et Cubicae? Mag. quia in operatione harum qua
tuor universalium hae speciales implicantur.
8 I.Salzinger, Ibid.: Huic Figurae applica Figuram quadrangularem Logicae, et ordinasti Systema generale omnium aequationum particularium.
20
carla compagno
Figura 2. Figura logicalis, Revelatio secretorum artis, p. 330.
Se per la figura logicalis Salzinger esplicita lalfabeto (E/e =

Esse/Aer, I/f = Non esse seu Privatio/Terra, g/N = Perfectio/Ignis, h/R
= Defectus/Aqua), per la figura costruita nel paragrafo precedente
(figura 1.) non spiega in maniera evidente il significato di B, C,
D, E, F, G e H. Linserimento dei quattro elementi, si ricorda,
ha spesso una funzione metaforica e analogica sia nelle opere di
Lullo sia in Salzinger, il quale riprende in questo la dottrina del
maestro. I processi che regolano la loro mixtio rispecchiano infatti
i processi della mixtio dei principia dellArs.9
Le condizioni universali per il funzionamento della figura
costruita nel De secreto Arithmeticae (figura 1.) sono quattro: la
prima riguarda le operazioni di eguaglianza condotte attraverso
il triangolo croceo come appena spiegato, la seconda riguarda la
9 Per una introduzione allo studio dellArs di Raimondo Lullo e dei suoi svi
luppi allinterno delle sue opere cfr. J.E. Rubio, Thought: the Art, in Raimundus Lullus. An Introduction to his Life, Works and Thought, ed. A. Fidora
& J.Rubio, Supplementum Lullianum II, Turnhout, 2008, pp.243310.
21
duplicit delloperatio aequationis, che indaga il verum quando si

rivela necessaria, e si misura con il falsum quando si rivela impos
sibile. La terza e la quarta condizione riguardano ancora la neces
sit e limpossibilit dellaequatio, che riguarda nel primo caso
aequalia e nel secondo caso inaequalia. Definite le conditiones che
regolano tutte le dimostrazioni che si riducono al necessarium o
allimpossibile,10 il magister studia pi approfonditamente le quat
tro operazioni fondamentali dellaritmetica.
Le quattro operazioni sembra siano solo al servizio dellarit
metica e della geometria, ovvero della scienza del numero e della
quantit. In realt lArs riveler al discepolo il segreto e lapplica
zione delle quattro operazioni anche per la misura della qualit,
della sostanza, della grandezza non quantificata etc.11 Inevitabil
mente si delinea la differenza tra quantitas e Magnitudo. La
prima si riferisce a una quantit fisica sostanziale e/o accidentale
dunque indagabile dalla logica matematica che astrae il sensibile a
ente intenzionale,12 ovvero mentale e logico. La Magnitudo invece
riguarda le cose intellettuali e spirituali13 ed misura di altri modi
della sostanza come la qualit, che non quantificabile attraverso
10 I. Salzinger, Revelatio, op. cit., p. 355: Per has quatuor Conditiones
regulantur omnes demonstrationes, quae mediante aequatione reducuntur ad
necessarium et impossibile.
11 Ibid., nam cum hae quatuor operationes hucusque soli Arithmeticae
et Geometriae inservierint, hoc est, numero et quantitati mensurandis, nec
qualitati, substantiae, magnitudini non quantae et reliquis supremis ac uni
versalissimis principiis fuerint adaptatae, integritas meae Artis exigit, ut
Secretum universalitatis et applicationem ad particularia harum quatuor
operationum vobis revelem.
12 Ibid., [] et haec majoritas, minoritas et aequalitas non consideratur
secundum quantitatem physicam, quae est accidens, quia magis vel minus
calidum, magis vel minus rubeum, magis vel minus igneum, non est idem
ac magis vel minus quantum, quia minus quantum potest esse magis cali
dum, quam magis quantum, ut patet in pipere et zingibere: nec consideratur
secundum quantitatem logicam aut mathematicam, scilicet in abstracto artificiali
et intentionali, sed secundum magnitudinem realem intrinsecam naturalem sive
substantialem sive accidentalem rebus ipsis inexistentem, quae ab intellectu cre
ato est considerabilis et cognoscibilis in se, et comparabilis ad aliam magni
tudinem, sicut quantitas ad aliam quantitatem, et per consequens mensura
bilis. (il corsivo nella citazione mio).
13 Ibid., pp.355356, Magnitudo convenit rebus intellectualibus et spiri
tualibus, et Quantitas rebus sensualibus et corporalibus.
22
carla compagno
il numerus non essendo un quantum ovvero non possedendo longi

tudine, latitudine e profondit.14 La Magnitudo si eleva a principio
dellArs; essa parte sostanziale della sostanza,15 esistente allin
terno ed intrinseca naturalmente alle cose stesse. La Magnitudo
misura della quantit e non viceversa. Dopo tale precisazione il
magister passa ad analizzare finalmente le quattro operazioni: la
propriet e la natura delladdizione si oppongono alla sottrazione,
la moltiplicazione opposta alla divisione. Per conoscere luso
generale delle quattro operazioni nellArs il maestro elabora una
tabula di principi generalissimi che si riconducono in parte alla
figura T, alla figura X16 e alla figura logicalis.
a
b
c
d
e
Esse
Privatio
Necessitas
Contingentia
Actus
f
g
h
i
k
Potentia
Possibilitas
Impossibilitas
Perfectio
Defectus
Figura 3. Tabula in De quatuor Operationibus universalibus,

in Revelatio, p. 356.
Esse e Privatio sono i principi generalissimi (da intendere come

fondamento in questo contesto), che hanno unopposizione gene
ralissima. Tutti gli altri principi si aggiungono o si sottraggono
a questi attraverso le quattro operazioni algebriche rivelando i
segreti della loro opposizione.17 Il primo esempio anche il pi
semplice: se si aggiunge Necessitas allEsse bisogna sottrarla alla
Privatio e cos via. Riguardo alla moltiplicazione e alla divisione
c da dire che la moltiplicazione riguarda la generazione e laccre
scimento, si oppone dunque alla divisione che riguarda invece la
corruzione e la diminuzione. Se luna attiva, laltra passiva e
14 Ibid., p. 356: nam nihil est quantum, nisi quod habet longitudinem,
latitudinem et profunditatem.
15 Ibid., Magnitudo est unum ex principiis meae Artis substantialibus,
quia est pars substantialis substantiae.
16 Sulla figura X cfr. J.E. Rubio, Come s la vertadera Figura X de lArs
compendiosa inveniendi veritatem, SL, 40 (2000), pp.4780.
17 I. Salzinger, Revelatio, op. cit., p. 356: Cum a et b sint generalissima
Principia, et habeant generalissimam oppositionem, omnia alia principia ipsis
addita revelant Secreta suarum oppositionum, addendo, subtrahendo, multi
plicando, dividendo, hoc modo.
23
viceversa. Attraverso unulteriore tabula composta da 20 principi,

10 generali e 10 speciali, viene chiarito il significato della multiplicatio e dunque della divisio.
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
k
Bonitas
Magnitudo
Duratio
Potestas
Sapientia
Voluntas
Virtus
Veritas
Gloria
Perfectio
l
m
n
o
p
q
r
s
t
u
Actio
Passio
Virtus
Materia
Magnitudo
Quantitas
Punctum
Linea
Superficies
Corpus
Figura 4. Tabula in De Multiplicatione et Diuisione,

Il magister afferma che i dieci principi generali in questione sono

quelli che costituirebbero il tronco dellArbor scientiae. In realt
il principio k della Perfectio, inserito da Salzinger nella tabula,
non una delle radici dellalbero ma una delle 100 forme. Questi
dieci principi generali dellarte vengono detti anche principi natu
rali reali. Ogni principio generale principio di azione nel punto:
ovvero, utilizzando lalfabeto del Salzinger, ogni l di a, b, c e d etc.
inizia in r. Il magister richiama la definizione di punto data nelle
100 forme dellArbor scientiae18 e spiega come il punto attraverso
lazione produca la linea, la linea produca la superficie ed infine
lazione della superficie produca il corpo attraverso loperazione
della moltiplicazione.19
18 Raimundus Lullus, Arbor scientiae, ed. P. Villalba, Turnhout, 2000
(ROL, 24), p. 94: Punctualitas est una pars simplex in Arbore elementali,
quae exit ex pluribus lineis, sicut bonificare, quod est unus punctus, qui est
in medio bonificatiui et bonificabilis, sicut centrum, quod est in medio cir
culi, et hoc idem de magnificare et ceteris.
19 I. Salzinger, Revelatio secretorum artis, op. cit., p. 358: Quia a. b. c.
d. e. f. g. h. k. sunt Principia generalia meae Artis, et sunt Principia realia
naturalia in mea Philosophia, et sunt radices, ex quibus componitur truncus
Arboris Scientiae, ut ibi est videre, et quodlibet convenit cum l. m. n. o. p.,
et quatenus sunt inter se composita et componentia dictum truncum, etiam
cum q., et quodlibet sit r., ut docui in dicta Arbore Scientiae in fructu Arb.
Elem. de 100. formis in Punct., convenit, quod omne l. ipsorum a. b. c. d.
24
carla compagno
Il maestro studia dunque la moltiplicazione e la divisione in

relazione a problemi geometrici che coinvolgono la nozione non
solo di punto (nel quale i principi cominciano la loro azione) ma
anche di semplice e composto per potersi muovere sia nel campo
della corporeit sia nel campo dei principi e dunque della semplici
t.20 Il discepolo chiede a ragione perch il maestro abbia inserito
nella trattazione dellaritmetica il punto (r), la linea (s), la superfi
cie (t) e il corpo (u) che, in realt, dovrebbero essere oggetto della
geometria. Il maestro risponde che luna scienza non pu esistere
e operare senza laltra.21 Con lo studio dellArs generalis, dellArbor
scientiae, dellArs naturalis intelligendi, del Tractatus novus de Astronomia, della Geometria nova e del Liber de triangulatura et quadratura circuli il discepolo pu inoltre comprendere la differenza tra
aritmetica particolare ed universale e tra geometria particolare
ed universale. Salzinger dunque dimostra di conoscere le opere
geometriche lulliane, la cui pubblicazione nelledizione moguntina
forse era destinata ai volumi successivi mai pubblicati.
Lautore continua a trattare dellaritmetica lulliana non esimen
dosi dal citare le critiche che essa ricevette, in particolare quella
di Vincenzo Mut22 (16141687) che accus Lullo di ragionamenti
assurdi e paralogismi per la dimostrazione della quadratura del
etc., incipiat in r.; quia si non, sequeretur, quod a. b. c. d. etc. non essent r.,
vel quod non essent principia ipsius l.; et hoc est impossibile: unde cum r. per
l. producat s., et s. producat t., et t. producat u. multiplicando, et e converso
dividendo [].
20 Sul concetto di punto nelle opere mediche e geometriche di Raimondo
Lullo cfr. C. Compagno, Einleitung, in: Raimundus Lullus, Liber de leuitate et ponderositate elementorum, ed. C.Compagno, Turnhout, 2011 (ROL, 34),
pp.153182.
21 I. Salzinger, Revelatio secretorum artis, op. cit., p. 359: Disc. Quare,
Pater, posuisti r. s. t. u. in Arithmetica, cum sint principia Geometriae? Mag.
quia una non potest esse sine altera, nec operari sine altera [].
22 Su questo personaggio cfr. S. Trias Mercant, Diccionari descriptors
lullistes, Collecci Blaquerna 6 (2009), pp.299300. Sullastronomia e la
matematica di Vincenzo Mut cfr. V. Navarro Brotons, Fisica y Astrono
mia Modernas en la obra de Vicente Mut, in Llull, Vol. 2 (1979), pp.4362.
In particolare egli scrisse una Historia del Reyno de Mallorca (1650) in dodici
libri; il secondo che tratta la vita e le opere Raimondo Lullo, viene traman
dato col titolo Vida del venerable mrtir Raymundo Lulio.
25
cerchio23 eseguita nellArs generalis.24 In particolare la critica del

Mut si concentra sulleguaglianza e isoperimetria del cerchio e del
quadrato affermate da Lullo attraverso le sue dimostrazioni geo
metriche e invece matematicamente impossibili. Il magister spiega
al discipulus che in realt Vincenzo Mut non ha ben interpretato
la sua geometria e non ha ben letto ci che viene scritto nellArs
generalis25 sul punto, la linea, il triangolo, il quadrangolo e il cer
chio.26 Qui Lullo esegue dimostrazioni nellambito della geometria
fisica per dimostrare verit che in realt appartengono alla geo
metria naturale, superiore ed universale. Quando Lullo parla della
quadratura del cerchio non si riferisce certamente al quadrangolo
della geometria volgare ma al quadrangolo dei quattro elementi
ovvero de quadrangulo elementorum rubificato et circulato
(dellArs generalis).27 Qui Salzinger si riferisce al quadrangolo che
Lullo costruisce nella figura magistralis dellArs generalis, ovvero
al quadrato intermedio tra il quadrato maggiore e il quadrato
minore. Il cerchio avrebbe secondo Lullo la stessa area del qua
drato intermedio.
23 Riguardo alla quadratura del cerchio di Lullo, la contestualizzazione
del problema e i rapporti tra la quadratura del cerchio in Lullo e il Cusano
cfr.: E. Pistolesi, Ramon Llull, la geometria i les quadratures del cer
cle, in Collecci Blaquerna 5 (2005), ed. M. I. Ripoll Perell, Barcelona,
pp.107144 e Eadem, Quadrar el cercle desprs de Ramon Llull: el cas de
Nicolau de Cusa, in 2n Colloqui Europeu dEstudis Catalans. La recepci de la
literatura catalana medieval a Europa, ed. A. Fidora & E.Trenc, Pronnas,
2007, pp.1732.
24 I.Salzinger, Revelatio, op. cit., p.320: quando examinat Quadraturam
Circuli, quam doces in Arte generali, te arguit de ratiocinio laborante vitio
manifesti paralogismi et consecutionis absurdae, eo quod figuram Circuli et
Quadrati volueris aequales et isoperimetras.
25 Salzinger cita dellArs generalis ledizione maiorchina; Revelatio, op. cit.,
p. 360: ut videre est dicta parte. 10. n. 229, 230. 231. fol. 373 et 374. Edi
tionis Majoricensis. Qui si riferisce quasi certamente alledizione di Maral
Francesc (1590/911688) che cita anche nei Testimonia Virorum Insignium, ed.
I. Salzinger et al., Moguntiae, 1742 (MOG, 1), pp.182212, p.191.
26 Raimundus Lullus, Ars generalis ultima, ed. A.Madre, Turnhout, 1986
(ROL, 14), pp.341343.
27 I. Salzinger, Revelatio, op. cit., p. 360: insinuando per terminum qua
dranguli rubei, me non loqui de quadrangulo Geometriae vulgaris, sed de
quadrangulo elementorum rubificato et circulato, in quo totus quadrangulus
est per totum circulum, et totus circulus per totum quadrangulum, et tota
superficies unius per totam superficies alterius, et tota extremitas essendi et
operandi et terminandi unius per tota extremitatem alterius [].
26
carla compagno
Figura 5. Figura magistralis, in Ars generalis ultima (ROL XIV), p. 359.
Il Mut inoltre non solo non penetra il nucleo metaforico (il

nucleum metaphorae)28 ma non tiene neanche conto della teoria
dei punti trascendenti, attraverso la quale lintelletto trascende
i sensi per comprendere realt superiori.29 Lo scopo della geome
tria lulliana si discopre dunque altro da s: ovvero la rivelazione
del Magisterium della natura e dellarte, i principi e il modo del
loro operare. 30 La figura magistralis del Liber de geometria nova e
riprodotta nellArs generalis diviene la metafora e lo strumento di
Ibid., et non penetrans ad nucleum metaphorae.
Ibid., quod hae figurae Quadranguli et Circuli phisici sint aequales et
isoperimetrae sine ullo vitio manifesti paralogismi et consequentiae absur
dae: per quod ostenditur Theorema Geometriae, quae est supra sensum et
imaginationem, nempe intellectualis pertinens ad materiam de punctis trans
cendentibus, ubi ostendi, quomodo intellectus intelligat mensuras, gradus et
quantitates entium simplicium et indivisibilium, dando exemplum de quatuor
elementis diversimode gradatis et aequaliter extensis, quae Mutus prius dis
cere debuisset, antequam prorupisset in impertinens judicium de mea Doc
trina.
30 Ibid., per illam revelaverim totum Magisterium Naturae, et Artis et
Naturae, scilicet Principia et Modum operandi Naturae, et Artis et Naturae.
28
29
27
indagine pi rappresentativo nellambito geometrico di un metodo

naturale di indagare i segreti della natura, tra questo la triangola
tura e la quadratura del cerchio. 31
Il Liber de quadratura et triangulatura circuli viene anchesso
citato a costituire insieme allArs generalis e al Liber de geometria nova una specie di trilogia dellintero, attraverso la quale si
rivela totus ordo (lintero ordine) della natura e dellarte. Il disce
polo tuttavia continua a non afferrare del tutto lesposizione del
maestro e chiede ulteriori delucidazioni sulla figura magistralis
presente nel Liber de modo naturali intelligendi (1310). La dimo
strazione condotta in questa opera, 32 e ripetuta poi nellArs generalis, appare infatti al discepolo svolta con un metodo artificiale
e non naturale, 33 sebbene lautore (Lullo) dichiari espressamente
che la comprensione avvenga extra sensum et imaginationem. 34 Il
maestro ribadisce al discepolo che quando lartefice disegna su
carta le figure, che col compasso porta dalla potenza in atto,
egli in realt trasmette allintelletto delle verit attraverso figure
apprese con i sensi; lintelletto poi le elabora tramite astrazione
per metafora e comprende le verit naturali. 35 Daltronde anche
il filosofo per rappresentare lopera della natura fa uso di mezzi
artificiali. 36 In effetti il magister ammette che se le sue dimostra
31 Ibid., quae in Geometria Nova, in qua ex professo egi de Triangulatura
et Quadratura Circuli, de hac methodo naturali quadrandi Circulum scripsi.
32 Raimundus Lullus, Liber de modo naturali intelligendi, ed. H. Riedlin
ger, Turnhout, 1978 (ROL, 6), pp.200202.
33 I. Salzinger, Revelatio, op. cit., p. 362: ipsissima haec est demonstra
tio, quam tradis in Arte generali a Muto sophisticam proclamatam, nec vide
tur sapere opus naturale, sed tantum artificiale.
34 Raimundus Lullus, Liber de modo naturali intelligendi, op. cit., p. 200:
Mathematicus intelligit cum sensu et imaginatione. Post hoc uero denudat
se ab istis, ascendendo. Et hoc in tribus doctrinis mathematicis patebit exem
plificando. Et primo de geometria.
35 I. Salzinger, Revelatio, op. cit., p. 362: cuius figurae naturalis signifi
catum Artifex addiscit per significationem figurae artificialis descriptae in
charta, et apprehensae per sensum et imaginationem ad literam, post vero
per metaphoram traditae intellectui abstrahenti a sensu et imaginatione, ut
mea verba indicant.
36 Ibid., nam si disconveniret, principia Philosophiae, hoc est, naturalia,
significari per principia artificialia, esset omnis Philosophus contrarius
Philosophiae per medium, per quod Philosophia opera naturalia cum artifi
cialibus rapraesentat.
28
carla compagno
zioni venissero studiate soltanto al livello letterale si rivelerebbero

false, come Mut ammonisce, ma il suo intento non la dimostra
zione della geometria artificiale, bens servirsi di questultima per
dimostrare le verit della geometria naturale attraverso lottava
regola dellArs inventiva veritatis, ovvero De punctis transcendentibus. 37 Infine il maestro si mette a disposizione per rispondere alle
domande del discepolo perch non pensi che la sua Ars generalis
non possa risolvere Theoremata dellaritmetica e della geometria
artificialis. 38
Il discepolo introduce successivamente il tema della proportio
geometrica artificialis e della proportio geometrica naturalis, che il
maestro chiarisce utilizzando una figura o metafora. Dio cre la
natura ex nihilo, ponendo il nihil al centro. La natura creata la
pose in una linea ovvero un semidiametro o scala, nella quale
le creature si trovano in gradi o intervalli dalla pi infima alla
suprema, seguendo una legge di proporzione geometrica simile a
quella che regola gli intervalli sonori nel monocorde, ovvero nella
scala musicale. Da un lato del semidiametro si ha il nulla (il non
esse), dallaltra Dio (il supremo, lesse) che giace dunque sulla cir
conferenza. Assimilando Dio ai suoi principia, i principia si tro
37 Ibid., pp. 362363: unde si hanc demonstrationem ad literam velles
intelligere de figuris artificialibus Geometriae vulgaris, utique totus proces
sus esset falsus et sophisticus, et Mutus me bene redarguisset; mea inten
tio, Fili, fuit vos docere maius artificium de Geometria naturali, quam illud
Geometriae artificialis, quod non sensu, sed solo intellectu potest concipi,
nec per se habet mensuras sensuales, sed intellectuales tantum, ideo usus
sum methodo demonstrandi, quam praescripsi in regula 8. meae Artis Inv..
Platzeck lega in qualche modo la teoria dei punti trascendenti alle cor
renti neoplatoniche e in particolare alla sursumactio bonaventuriana, cfr.,
E. W. Platzeck, Raimund Lull. Sein Leben Seine Werke. Die Grundlagen
seines Denkens (Prinzipienlehre), RomaDsseldorf, 1962, p. 168: Die Lehre
von den transzendenten Punkten ist wieder dem Neuplatonismus verpflichtet
und spielt in der Mystik des Mittelalters eine hervorragende Rolle. Alle Den
ker, die sich mit dem neuplatonischen Liber de causis befat haben, lehren
diese sursumactio, wodurch der menschliche Geist sich selbst bersteigt, um
zum Gttlichen vorzudringen.
38 I.Salzinger, Revelatio, op. cit., p.363: sed ne arbitreris, meam Artem
Generalem non esse utilem ad solvenda Theoremata Arithmeticae et Geome
triae artificialium, nec posse dari aeque fortes demonstrationes illis in hoc
genere scibilis [] igitur forma mihi aliquam Quaestionem arithmeticam vel
geometricam, vel compositam ex utraque Scientia [].
29
vano in proporzione tra di loro come i punti sulla circonferenza:

sono dunque uguali e tutti equidistanti dal centro. La proporzione
che riguarda i principi quindi una proporzione aritmetica che
coinvolge aequalia; la proporzione che riguarda invece le creature
una proporzione geometrica che coinvolge inaequalia.
virtus
magnitudo
bonitas
nihil
prima
creatura
Figura 6. ricostruita in base alle indicazioni del Salzinger in Revelatio, p. 380.
Il capitolo De Secreto Geometriae della Revelatio porta come sot

totitolo De Proportione. Salzinger tratta della geometria lulliana
elevando la proportio, ovvero il Principium proportionandi, a prin
cipio necessario dellArs, con la cui definizione sono possibili tutte
le dimostrazioni nel campo dello scibile. 39 Vengono stabilite 10
39 Ibid., p.378: Proportio in genere nihil est aliud, quam Principium pro
portionandi, sicut bonitas est principium bonificandi, seu est habitudo ordi
nata unius ad alterum [] specificata tamen per rationem Supremi, et quia
est suprema proportio, est supremum Principium proportionandi, sicut []
et est supreme necessaria in mea Arte, quia cum omnes demonstrationes in
omni scibili possint et debeant reduci ad aliquam proportionem.
30
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proportiones simplices40 e 14 proportiones speciales,41 combinando

le quali continua lautore si ottengono 140 combinazioni. In
maniera pi metodica viene ribadita poi la differenza tra proportio
arithmetica e proportio geometrica.
La proportio arithmetica quella i cui principi sono uguali, la
geometrica quella i cui principi sono soltanto simili.42 Riutilizzando
limmagine della circonferenza e del suo raggio (figura 6.) il magister spiega che la bonitas, la magnitudo, la duratio e la potestas etc.
sono principi uguali che riguardano dunque la proporzione aritme
tica, e vengono posti sulla circonferenza del cerchio a significare
che sono uguali come i punti della circonferenza stessa. I punti sul
raggio della circonferenza invece non sono uguali ma simili come
la prima bonitas, la seconda bonitas, la terza bonitas e cos via;
sono principi continuamente proporzionali in maniera geometrica.43
Sulla base di questa differenza si possono stabilire quattro
diverse scale proporzionali, due geometriche e due aritmetiche: la
scala geometrica continua, la scala geometrica discreta, la scala
aritmetica continua e la scala aritmetica discreta. Le definizioni
40 Ibid., a. Proportio universalis, b. Proportio particularis, c. Proportio

naturalis, d. Proportio artificialis, e. Proportio realis, f. Proportio intentio
nalis, g. Proportio substantialis, h. Proportio accidentalis, i. Proportio intel
lectualis, k. Proportio sensualis.
41 Ibid., pp.379380. l. Proportio continua, m. Proportio discreta, n. Pro
portio arithmetica, o. Proportio geometrica, p.Proportio simplex, q. Propor
tio composita, r. Proportio aequalitatis, s. Proportio majorititatis et mino
ritatis, t. Proportio concordantiae, u. Proportio contrarietatis, w. Proportio
recta et inversa, x. Proportio ordinata, y. Proportio alterna, z. Proportio
transposita.
42 Ibid., p.380: scire debes, quod Proportio Arithmetica in mea Schola sit
illa, cuius principia sunt omnino aequalia; Proportio vero geometrica, cuius
principia sunt tantum similia.
43 Ibid., [] unde cum bonitas, magnitudo, duratio, potestas sint prin
cipia omnino aequalia, ingrediuntur proportionem arithmeticam; et ideo
ponuntur in circumferentia circuli, ad denotandum, quod, sicut principia cir
cumferentiae, scilicet singula puncta illius sunt omnino aequalia, sic princi
pia primitiva meae Artis posita in circumferentia sint omnino aequalia: et
sicut semidiameter circuli seu radius a centro ad circumferentiam extensus
constat principiis, h. e. punctis seu unitatibus quantis similibus tantum, et
non aequalibus, sic a, quae est prima bonitas in radio, et b, quae est secunda
bonitas [] et sic usque ad circumferentiam, sint principia continue propor
tionalia geometrice.
31
date da Salzinger trovano un riscontro in matematica: la propor

zione aritmetica quella, in effetti, che riguarda laddizione e la
sottrazione, la proporzione geometrica quella che riguarda la moltiplicazione e la divisione. Le proporzioni, nelle quali i termini
medi sono uguali, vengono dette proporzioni continue, altrimenti
proporzioni discrete.44
Geometrice continue
Sicut se habet 1.a. ad 2.a, sic 2.a. ad 3.a., & 3.a. ad

4.a vel
Sicut se habet 1.a. ad 2.b., sic 2.b. ad 3.c. & 3.c. ad
4.d.
Nam quia 2.a. & 2.b. sunt arithmetice aequalia,
necessario est ut 1.a. ad 2.b. = 2.a., sic 2.b. ad 3.c.
= 3.b.
Geometrice discrete
Sicut se habet 1.a. ad 2.a., sic 4.a. ad 5.a., vel

Sicut se habet 1.a. ad 3.a., sic 2.a. ad 4.a., vel
Sicut se habet 1.a. ad 3.b., sic 2.b. ad 4.c.
Arithmetice continue Sicut se habet 1.a. ad 1.b., sic 1.b. ad 1.c.,&c., vel
Sicut se habet 2.a. ad 2.b., sic 2.b. ad 2.c. &c.
Arithmetice discrete
Sicut se habet 1.a. ad 1.b., sic 1.c. ad 1.d. &c., vel

Sicut se habet 3.a. ad 3.c., sic 3.b. ad 3.d., &c.
Figura 7. Schemata arithmetice et geometrice proportionalium,

Le proporzioni arithmetica e geometrica (sulla circonferenza

e sul raggio) sono entrambe proporzioni semplici ma con pro
priet diverse. La proportio che si colloca sulla circonferenza ha le
seguenti propriet: che ogni principio semplice sia eguale allaltro,
che tra i principi semplici non vi sia un ordine di anteriorit e
posteriorit e che quindi essi producano una proporzione soltanto
aritmetica che contempli le operazioni di addizione e sottrazione,
ma non quelle di moltiplicazione e divisione. La proporzione sulla
scala (raggio) presuppone che i principi collocati su di essa non
siano uguali. I principi posti sulla scala hanno un proprio ordine
e luogo cosicch vi sia tra di loro anteriorit e posteriorit. Le
operazioni che riguardano tali principi sono la moltiplicazione e
la divisione.
44
G.Gorini, Lezioni di aritmetica, Pavia, 1827, Vol. II, p.79.
32
carla compagno
3. Praecursor
Il Praecursor introductoriae in Algebram Speciosam Universalem
viene pubblicato da Salzinger nel terzo volume della Editio moguntina. Lopera si apre con una similitudine molto bella ispirata al
Liber Ecclesiae:
come gradevole agli occhi sensibili, dopo aver tollerato le tenebre
della notte, guardare il sole che sorge, cos agli occhi intellettuali
gradevole, dopo aver tollerato le tenebre dellignoranza, contem
plare il sorgere del sole della scienza e della sapienza.45
LAlgebra speciosa lulliana la scienza universale che mostra la

via piana, facile, certa e sicura verso lArs magna, ovvero verso
larte, la conoscenza del vero e dellamore per il bene, dunque
della memoria per entrambi.46
I fratelli Carreras Artau, nel capitolo La Edicin de Maguncia,
nel secondo volume della Historia de la filosofa espaola, eviden
ziano gi alcuni punti importanti e interessanti ai fini della nostra
trattazione in riferimento sia al Praecursor che alla Revelatio.47 Gi
dallinizio del Praecursor Ivo Salzinger sottolinea la superiorit
dellarte di Lullo rispetto allaritmetica e alla geometria comuni.
LAlgebra speciosa lulliana non unarte particolare, ma una scienza
universale nella quale rientrano tutte le altre. I suoi principi sono
reali, assoluti, naturali etc. e sono soprattutto noti gi di per s
(per se nota). Lautore sottolinea con forza questultima caratteri
stica, tutte le arti e le scienze particolari infatti hanno e devono
avere qualcosa in comune, ovvero principi che non hanno bisogno
di essere dimostrati. Se, infatti, i principi comuni alle scienze par
ticolari avessero bisogno di dimostrazione, ci avverrebbe attra
verso altri principi e cos in un processo che durerebbe allinfi
45 I. Salzinger, Praecursor, Moguntiae, 1742 (MOG, 3), p. 1: Quam gra

tum est oculis sensualibus post perpessam noctis caliginem intueri Solem
orientem, tam gratum est oculis intellectualibus post toleratas ignorantiae
tenebras amoenissimum Ortum Solis Scientiae et Sapientiae contemplari.
46 Ibid., ostendendo vobis viam planam, certam et securam ad Artem
Magnam sciendi verum, amandi bonum, et memorandi utrumque.
47 T. i J. Carreras i Artau, Histria de la filosofia Espanyola. Filosofa
cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV, Edici facsmil, BarcelonaGirona, 2001,
Vol. 2, pp.323353, in particolare pp.330344.
33
nito48. Quindi anche al livello sensibile esistono principi di per s

noti, e talmente evidenti anche alluomo rustico, che nessuna defi
nizione filosofica li renderebbe pi chiari di come appaiono: come
i colori. Con questultima considerazione Salzinger attacca dunque
Cartesio, il quale, come noto, sosteneva lillusoriet della cono
scenza sensibile e linesistenza delle qualit secondarie.49 I principia sensualia sono invece per Salzinger, che interpreta Lullo, significationes dei principi e delle cose intellettuali, preordinati tutti da
Dio, e dunque non portano in s fallacia.50 La conoscenza intellet
tuale rimane tuttavia la conoscenza superiore alla quale lintel
letto accede naturalmente grazie per all influxum che deriva
dalla Sapientia divina.51
Caratteristica precipua che rende larte speciosa inoltre lutilizzo di lettere in luogo dei numeri.52 Lutilizzo delle lettere in
campo matematico si attribuisce tradizionalmente a Franois
48 I.Salzinger, Praecursor, op. cit., p.4: Notandum igitur, omnibus Arti
bus et Scientiis particularibus hoc esse commune, quod habeant et habere
debeant principia per se nota, quae non indigeant probari (ut ab omnibus
tanquam certum supponitur) si enim ipsa principia essent probanda, hoc fieri
deberet per alia principia, et sic continuo, donec aut admitteretur processus
in infinitum, et sic nunquam haberetur Scientia.
49 Ibid., p. 4: Sensualiter experimur, quod per se notum et evidens est
oculis sanis, quid sit luciditas, diaphanitas, albedo et nigredo, et adeo notum ac
evidens, quod si a rustico vidente quaeras, quid sit album vel nigrum, statim
digito ostendat unum et alterum, quod vel summus Philosophus caecus nun
quam tam clare sua definitione notum redderet sibi ipsi vel rustico videnti,
si centies repeteret, quod color albus sit ille, qui disgregat visum, et color
niger, qui congregat: hoc ipsum nec Cartesius suis atomis globulosis, striatis,
uncinatis vel hamatis efficeret.
50 Ibid., Cum igitur principia sensualia naturalia rerum sensualium natu
ralium a Deo nobis tanta claritate et evidentia sint exposita, et per illa sine
fallacia possimus pervenire in notitiam omnium rerum sensualium natura
lium ab ipsis principiatarum, et omnia hae non sint nisi significationes prin
cipiorum et rerum intellectualium naturalium et supernaturalium, ad quae
tanquam suum finem a Deo sunt ordinata.
51 Ibid., p. 5: et quamvis dictum lumen universale transcendat omnem
intellectum creatum, sicut et caeterae Dignitates Dei, cum sit ipse divinus
Intellectus sive sapientia Dei, vocatur tamen naturale, eo quod praestat com
munem et generalem influxum in omnem intellectum humanum et in omnem
operationem eius, sine quo influxu intellectus non potest naturaliter operari.
52 Ibid., p. 2: Algebra Speciosa Lulliana est Ars et Scientia Universalis,
qua per literas alphabeti tanquam signa universalissima nominibus et rebus
34
carla compagno
Vite (15401603), tramite la cui opera il termine speciosus in que

sto campo arriva alleditore della moguntina. Franois Vite che
nel tentativo di fondare unalgebra nova istituisce appunto unal
gebra letterale, che chiama logistica speciosa.53 A questo propo
sito il silenzio di Salzinger.
Dopo aver sottolineato limportanza dellimpiego delle lettere,
lautore ne descrive le sette caratteristiche che le rendono superiori
anche alluso di nomi per esprimere concetti:54 1. intraprendono
pi facilmente il calcolo combinatorio, 2. lintelletto si muove pi
velocemente da una lettera allaltra che da unespressione allaltra,
3. nellArs tutte le cose si scrivono pi brevemente per lettere che
per nomi, 4. attraverso le lettere lArs pu manifestarsi e occul
tarsi a piacimento, 5. sotto una stessa lettera possono sottinten
dersi molti nomi, 6. le lettere sono indifferenti nella significazione,
7. ogni dimostrazione particolare condotta col sistema delle lettere
trasmutabile con altre mille dimostrazioni particolari.
Successivamente lautore costruisce una tabula suddivisa in tre
parti (figura 8).
universalibus et particularibus per nomina significatis substituta sit investi

gatio, inventio et demonstratio veritatis in omni Scientia particulari.
53 A. C. Garibaldi, Vecchia e nuova analisi di problemi geometrici da
Vite a Ghetaldi, in La matematizzazione delluniverso, Momenti della cultura
matematica tra 500 e 600, a cura di L.Conti, Perugia, 1992, pp.165204.
54 I. Salzinger, Praecursor, op. cit., p. 6: Quare autem literae alphabeti
his terminis sint praefixae [] quae literae alphabeti prae nominibus habent
has sequentes septem singulares Proprietates, quarum Prima est, quia facilius
ingrediuntur combinationem, quam nomina. Secunda, quia intellectus cele
rius fertur et movetur de una litera in aliam in mutua illarum comparatione,
quam de una dictione in aliam. Tertia, quia brevius omnia in Arte scribuntur
per literas, quam per nomina. Quarta, quia Ars per literas potest manifestari
uni, et occultari alteri. Quinta, quia sub eadem litera possunt plura nomina
simul significari artificialiter sine confusione, sicut in uno et eodem lapide
significantur naturaliter sine confusione frigiditas, siccitas, opacitas, pon
derositas, durities etc. [] Sexta, quia literae sunt indifferentes ad quaevis
nomina significanda, non autem termini. Septima et ultima, quia in forman
dis demonstrationibus assumpto quolibet numero literarum [] quaelibet
demonstratio particularis mediante systemate universali harum literarum
retento est transmutabilis in mille alias particulares.
Figura 8. Tabula, in Praecursor, p. 7.
35
36
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Ogni parte si riconduce alle figure lulliane S, T e A. A ogni

figura si assegnano tre settenari. I settenari sono costruiti tramite
i concetti ritenuti fondamentali per la ricostruzione dellAlgebra
speciosa. Tra questi interessante ai nostri fini lanalisi del con
cetto di aequatio, al quale Salzinger aveva gi dedicato molto spa
zio nella Revelatio. Nel Praecursor55 si ripete infatti che laequatio
nellaritmetica lulliana quello strumento al quale si riducono tutte
le dimostrazioni non solo nel campo dellaritmetica ma di tutte le
scienze particolari e persino dellArte Universale. In questultima
laequatio risolve tutte quelle questioni nelle quali si paragonino e
si mettano a confronto principi uguali, come sono appunto i prin
cipi costitutivi dellArs.56 Laequatio che o per necessarium o per
impossibile utilizza le quattro operazioni aritmetiche elementari
e ci trova fondamento nel fatto che i due principi universalis
simi sui quali si fonda lArs sono Esse e Privatio, come gi veniva
esposto nella Revelatio. Torna anche la definizione di proportio
aritmetica e proportio geometrica nelle figure della circonferenza e
del semidiametro. La proportio diviene inevitabilmente oggetto di
indagine: la natura stata infatti creata da Dio in maniera pro
porzionata nel numero, nel peso e nella misura57 e le sue propor
zioni discendono dalla suprema proporzione che si trova nel Crea
tore.58 Luomo, come parte delluniverso, ha dentro di s i principi
innati, intrinseci e proporzionati in gradi, tramite i quali cono
sce i principi estrinseci delle cose naturali. Il processo conoscitivo
dellintelletto avviene tramite i punti trascendenti, grazie ai quali
ogni potenza dellanima riesce a trascendere le potenze inferiori
fino al raggiungimento della verit. Ancora una volta Salzinger
rimanda alla regola ottava dellArs inventiva veritatis e critica tutti
coloro che dopo di Lullo hanno ignorato la dottrina dei punti tra
scendenti, come per esempio Cartesio.59
Ibid., p.11.
Implicitamente sembra inevitabile un collegamento concettuale tra laequatio del Salzinger e la demonstratio per aequiparantiam lulliana.
57 I.Salzinger, Praecursor, op. cit., p.13: Quapropter cum neminem fore
arbitrer, qui negare ausit, totam naturam creatam et omnes partes illius,
cum sit opus Dei, esse proportionatam, utpote conditam in numero, pondere
et mensura.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., pp. 1314: Quam multis erroribus sit obnoxius humanus intellec
tus ob defectum notitiae horum punctorum transcendentium, non est, quod
55
56
37
Infine, nella seconda parte del Praecursor, ovvero la Practica,

lautore espone la funzionalit delle tre figure A, T ed S, definen
done i principi e le regole. Queste tre figure sono molto importanti
e sufficienti nellesercizio di ogni practica perch racchiudono in
se stesse le tre forme semplici di cui lintelletto ha bisogno per
operare razionalmente; queste sono: il cerchio, che corrisponde al
concetto di unitas, il triangolo, che corrisponde al concetto di trinitas, e il quadrangolo che corrisponde alla quaternitas.60
4. Considerazioni
I fratelli Carreras Artau contestualizzano latteggiamento intel
lettuale di Salzinger evidenziandone lappartenenza alla corrente
filosofica dellidealismo enciclopedico, che fior nella Germania
del diciassettesimo e del diciottesimo secolo perseguendo lideale
cartesiano dellunificazione del sapere via mathematica.61 La stessa
considerazione viene ripresa da J.N. Hillgarth.62 Lappartenenza
singillatim enarrem adducendo exempla; faciant sibi Condiscipuli notam hanc
Doctrinam de Punctis transcendentibus, postea perlustrent Libros eorum,
quibus defuit hae notitia, et, quod dixi, nimis verum invenient: tota Philoso
phia Cartesiana merito partus ignorantiae Punctorum transcendentium nom
inari potest, quia vix unquam transcendit Imaginativam.
60 Ibid., pp. 1819: sunt autem hae tres Figurae sufficientes ad omnem
practicam, quia continent in se tres primas formas simplices, quibus huma
nus intellectus indiget ad operandum et ratiocinandum, quae tres formae sunt
Quadrangulus, Triangulus et Circulus; omnis enim dispositio Principiorum ad
formandas Demonstrationes necessariorum semper fit secundum Quadrangu
lum, Triangulum et Circulum, ex quibus simplicibus formis inter se mixtis
producuntur formae compositae, quales sunt v.g. septenarius, duodenarius vel
quicunque alius major numerus Principiorum in integro contextu vel integra
serie demonstrationum [].
61 T. i J.Carreras i Artau, Historia de la filosofa Espaola, op. cit.,
p.339: Salzinger pertenece, pues, a la corriente filosfica del idealismo enci
clopdico, tan vigorosamente representada en Alemania en lo siglos XVII y
XVIII, que persigue realizar el sueo cartesiano de la unificacin del saber
por va matemtica. []; Ibidem, pp.339340: En suma, Salzinger propone
pura y simplemente a sus contemporneos erigir el Arte magna de Lull, con
sus aditamentos, en la anhelada ciencia universal que andan buscando.
62 J.N. Hillgarth, Ramon Lull and Lullism in fourteenth-century France,
Oxford, 1971, p.315: In other words, as Carreras Artau points out, Salzinger
was interpreting the Art of Lull here in the light of the mathematical discov
eries of his own century and was attempting to use Lull to realize Descartes
ideal of the union of knowledge through mathematics.
38
carla compagno
di Salzinger ad una precisa corrente di pensiero un tema che in

realt apre ancora tante domande.
Tessari nel suo articolo Considerazioni sullArs di Ramon Llull
e la Mathesis Universalis di Ren Descartes63 a condurre uno studio
di comparazione tra Lullo e Cartesio, sottolineandone non soltanto
le differenze ma anche le somiglianze: In entrambi c forte la
percezione (tardomedievale
? tardorinascimentale
?) che luomo
senza laiuto di Dio non possa affrontare la doppia avventura della
conoscenza e della salvezza. In effetti, quando Lullo parla della
dottrina dei punti trascendenti nella Declaratio (1298), sottolinea
che questa capacit dellintelletto di trascendere se stesso avviene
comunque per grazia divina,64 lunico vero tramite per la cono
scenza della verit. Il riferimento alla grazia non esplicito nellArs
inventiva veritatis, sebbene lArs stessa nasca per illuminazione
divina. Nonostante Ivo Salzinger sottolinei quindi le differenze tra
larte di Raimondo Lullo e la matematica, non solo cartesiana ma
63 A. Tessari, Considerazioni sullArs di Ramon Llull e la Mathesis

Universalis di Ren Descartes, in Janus. Quaderni del Circolo Glossematico, ed. R. Galassi & B. Morandina, Lingua e Pensiero, Padova, 2004,
pp.199220, p.206: Le idee chiare e distinte di Descartes possono superare
i dubbi fondati sulla debolezza percettiva delluomo perch Dio si fa garante,
ci consente di scartare i dubbi iperbolici, i paradossi logici, quello che ci para
lizzerebbe nella nostra conoscenza. Esattamente come Lullo consapevole
che il suo strumento tecnico potrebbe cadere nella produzione di proposizioni
insensate quando linerzia meccanica delle ruote mettessero in combinazione
con il soggetto divino la ruota dei vizi, che invece si applicano bene agli
altri componenti della ruota dei subiecta. In entrambi c forte la percezione
(tardomedievale? tardorinascimentale?) che luomo senza laiuto di Dio non
possa affrontare la doppia avventura della conoscenza e della salvezza.
64 Raimundus Lullus, Declaratio Raimundi, ed. T. Pindl-Bchel, Turn
hout, 1989 (ROL, 17), p. 260: Sed cum se exspoliat et denudat a falsis sig
nificationibus, quas sibi inferiores potentiae repraesentant, et ipse suam natu
ram et uirtutem considerat, quam habet ultra potentias inferiores, tunc facit
uerum iudicium de significatis, quae sibi per potentias inferiores repraesentantur, ut hic superius exemplificauimus. Est et alius modus punctorum transcendentium, uidelicet cum intellectus mediante gratia Dei supra se ipsum
transcendit et in se ipso ueritatem primae causae et eius operationum attingit.
Quam tamen in se ipso, uidelicet in sua natura, intelligere non potest, ueluti
quando intellectus coniunctus considerat, quod Deus diligit hominem iustum,
sed quando ipse peccatum facit, Deus ipsum non diligit.
39
anche di altri matematici del suo tempo come Leibniz65 e Newton,

Vasquez e Izquierdo, si discopre in realt un campo di indagine
molto interessante, come daltronde gi sottolineava Yates.66
Abstract
La scienza geometrica nellArs lulliana: linterpretazione di Ivo Salzinger
I focus on Ivo Salzingers (16691728) works: Revelatio secretorum
artis and Praecursor introductoriae in algebram speciosam. In par
ticular, I analyse in the Revelatio the chapters devoted to arithme
tic and geometry, and how those concepts manifested in the Praecursor an immediate way of bringing back the mathematical field.
Inevitably, the Revalatio outlines the difference between quantitas and magnitudo. The first refers to an amount in a substantial
or accidental way, while the second looks for abstract aspects of
the body susceptible of being intentional or spiritual. From that
point, Llull performs demonstrations as part of physical geometry
to prove the truth of the superior and universal natural geometry.
For instance, when Lull speaks about the squaring of the circle,
he certainly does not refer to the quadrangle as common geom
etry, but to the quadrangle of the four elements. This vision of
geometry is reflected in the second part of the Praecursor, which
exposes the functionality of the three figures, A, T and S, defin
ing the principles and rules. These three figures are very impor
tant, and constitute a sufficient exercise of any practica, because
I. Salzinger, Praecursor, op. cit., p. 7: Reprehendit Leibnzius in sua
Arte Combin. Lipsiae impressa 1666. pag. 33. Doctorem Illuminatum, quod
principiis Artis annumeraverit Vitia et Virtutes ad Scientiam generalem pror
sus impertinentes, (ut putabat) sed quia hic Author in mathematicis Scientiis
perspicax, in Arte vero Lulliana nullum fundamentum penetrans, causas ac
naturas, numeros, ordines et cetera principiorum illius penitus ignoravit, non
est mirum, quod impertinens judicium de illa tulerit.
66 F.A. Yates, Larte di Raimondo Lullo, in Frances Amelia Yates. Raimondo Lullo e la sua arte (Saggi di lettura), a cura di S. Muzzi, Roma, 2009,
p. 137: Salzinger conosceva le opere di Newton e Cartesio, che menziona,
tuttavia preferiva i metodi del lullismo a quelli dei nuovi matematici. La sua
discussione del lullismo in rapporto al pensiero coevo degna di attenzione.
Era anche molto versato nella storia del lullismo, e gli accenni che fa non
sono di poco interesse.
65
40
carla compagno
they encapsulate the three simple forms which the intellect needs.
to operate rationally.
Carla Compagno
carla.compagno@theol.uni-freiburg.de
Raimundus-Lullus-Institut
Werthmannplatz 3
D-79098 Freiburg im Brsg.
Germany
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANALOGICAL THINKING

IN LLULLS EPISTEMOLOGY
Celia Lpez Alcalde
(Porto)
The Liber nouus de anima rationali (LNAR) was written by
Ramon Llull in Rome in 1296. The work deals with the existence
of the rational soul and the intrinsic and extrinsic dynamics of its
parts, parts which work together in order to achieve their ulti
mate goal, namely: to remember, to understand and to love God.
Since the book inquires into the human soul and its faculties, it
belongs to the psychological genre, broadly developed in the Mid
dle Ages, a genre based on the Aristotelian work De anima, and
in particular its third book, which examines the rational soul and
the mechanisms of knowledge acquisition. By calling his work the
New Book on the Rational Soul, Llull establishes a link with the
Aristotelian tradition while, at the same time, presenting his text
as a new approach which purports to go beyond that tradition.1
1. The dynamic nature of the rational soul
Our article2 will stress one fundamental aspect of Llulls theory
of knowledge as developed in the LNAR, namely, its characteristic
conception of the intellectual processes involved in the acquisition
of knowledge. This conception, which attempts to integrate an
Augustinian and an Aristotelian heritage, is based upon analog
ical inference as one of its particular mechanisms.
The Augustinian legacy is manifest from the very outset through
the tripartite conception of the rational soul, composed as it is of
Cf. C. Lpez Alcalde, El Liber nouus de anima rationali de Ramon

Llull dentro del discurso psicolgico del siglo XIII, Revista Espaola de Filosofa Medieval, 18 (2011), pp.8194.
2 This paper is a part of the project The Early Latin Reception of Aristo
tles De anima funded by Fundao para a Cincia e a Tecnologia of Portu
gal, project reference SFRH / BPD / 95373 / 2013.
1

IPM, 67 (Turnhout, 2015), pp. 41-51.
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107306
42
celia lpez alcalde
memory, intellect and will. These faculties are complex in them

selves: they actualise themselves by means of the so-called correl
atives, and consist of the principles of being: Bonitas, Magnitudo,
Duratio, etc. Llull grants to these principles a dynamic nature,
one which will prove essential to his conception of the rational
soul: far from being isolated and static notions, these principles
establish relationships and communicate their essential qualities
among each other:3
Bonitas substantialis appropriat suam bonitatem accidentalem
magnitudini substantiali, in quantum per ipsam est bona. Et illa
bonitas magnitudinis est qualitas appropriata, sicut ignis, qui
suum calorem appropriat aeri, et hoc idem facit magnitudo boni
tati, cui appropriat suam magnitudinem et sic de aliis principiis
animae.4
Nevertheless, such communication does not simply obtain

among the principles alone: the principles also operate as rationes
with regard to the faculties of the soul:
Anima habet in se sua propria et naturalia principia, scilicet boni
tatem, magnitudinem, durationem, potestatem, sapientiam, uolun
tatem, uirtutem, ueritatem, delectationem, differentiam, concor
dantiam, principium, medium, finem, maioritatem, aequalitatem
et minoritatem, per ista principia substantialia, ex quibus consti
tuta est, habet rationes. 5
Thanks to their active nature, they become the conditions of

possibility for the facultative dynamism which enables the acqui
sition of knowledge:
[] Sicut bonitas, quae est ratio animae ad memorandum bonum
et ad intelligendum bonum et ad amandum bonum; et magnitudo,
quae est ratio animae ad memorandum magnum et ad intelligen
dum magnum et ad amandum magnum, et sic de aliis obiectis dis
positis ad recipiendum per dispositiones proprias stantes sub sub
stantialibus rationibus, de quibus sunt qualitates.6
3 The texts of the Liber nouus de anima rationali are drawn from my
Ph.D.Thesis, Liber nouus de anima rationali. Edicin crtica y estudio, Bellaterra, 2012. On-line version: http://orbita.bib.ub.edu/llull/docs/Celia%20tesi%20
COMPL%20CORR.pdf.
4 LNAR, VI.II.1, 37.
5 LNAR, II.II.1, 37.
6 LNAR, VI.I.4, 2934.
the foundations of analogical thinking
43
These rationes, therefore, activate the epistemological process.

As Llull conceives matters, the principles in question incline the
faculties to find similitudes or likenesses of themselves in the out
side world. This coincidence between the qualities of the rational
soul and the qualities of other entities makes knowledge of sensi
ble entities possible, and, via such knowledge, a superior acquain
tance with the principles themselves. Human knowledge thereby
reveals two necessary poles: on the one hand, the faculties and
the nature thereof, which consists in the principles themselves; on
the other hand, information from the outside world, caused as this
is by the contact that the senses establish with sensible objects.
Species, understood by medieval authors as the format or man
ner according to which data are present in the faculties,7 consist,
therefore, in a synthesis of both of these moments; this is the
reason why species are defined by Llull as being both innate
and acquired:
Habet anima in se ipsa innatas species et impressas per suarum
trium potentiarum acquisitionem constitutarum de primis prin
cipiis, secundum quod diximus. Innatae sunt in quantum ipsas
potest producere; impressae sunt per rationum actus, et acquisitae
sunt quando de potentia in actum sunt productae, sicut Martinus,
qui filium suum intelligit album uel nigrum, bonum uel malum,
magnum uel paruum, et sic de aliis, et intelligere est innatum et
concreatum cum interiori actu, qui est de intellectus essentia, et
intelligibile non est de illius intelligere essentia, quoniam de alia
est substantia. Et illud quod intelligere ponit est species innata,
producta de potentia in actum; et intelligibile conuersum in intel
lectum est species acquisita, et ita quod species est de omnibus
tribus et potentiae interiores nihil in ipsa earum essentiae ponunt,
sed ipsam speciem in se ipsis habent. 8
2. The role of the senses

Llulls definition of species serves to condense his thinking with
respect to epistemological concerns. As previously mentioned, such
Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia q. 85 a. 2 s. c.: Sed con
tra, species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum, sicut species sensibilis ad
sensum. Sed species sensibilis non est illud quod sentitur, sed magis id quo
sensus sentit. Ergo species intelligibilis non est quod intelligitur actu, sed id
quo intelligit intellectus.
8 LNAR, II.II.5, 3246.
7
44
celia lpez alcalde
thinking consists in a synthesis of Augustinian and Aristotelian

perspectives, insofar as the species of the human rational soul are
innate on the one hand on account of that souls faculties, which,
being structured by the principles themselves, provide a template
modelled upon the very nature of those principles while, on the
other, these species draw sustenance from the data deriving from
external objects, data acquired as soon as the faculty of under
standing has understood those objects. For this reason, the knowl
edge acquired by human beings, unlike that of spiritual beings
such as God and the angels, is always mediated by the body and
its senses:
Est ergo differentia inter angelum et animam [], quoniam
angelus per unum modum attingit obiecta, et anima per alium,
quoniam angelus in suismet similitudinibus attingit obiecta
extrinseca absque multiplicatione specierum illorum et quod ipsas
ponat intus se ipsum, sed in se ipso illas accipit.9
According to Llull, the way that human beings are constituted

that is to say, as a combination of body and soul determines
the specific nature of human knowledge. Although it is based upon
the senses, this knowledge, however, is not limited to the realm of
the senses and is capable of ascending to that of spiritual beings
and of understanding them. The difference between the rational
souls knowledge and that of the angels concerns the mode, rather
than the degree, of cognition: in angels, cognition is an internal
process which has no need of empirical experience. In this sense,
an angels knowledge is similar to that which the rational soul
might enjoy once it has been separated from the body. So, whereas
during its life on earth, each soul that attains God, attains him by
means of species,10 in the next life, Llull writes, the souls attain
ment of God is immediate:
Si anima est separata, intelligit Deum in proprietatibus Dei, uide
licet in bonitate sua, magnitudine, aeternitate et caetera, et intel
ligit ipsum absque specie propter hoc quia sua intelligibilitas stat
in magnitudine bonitatis, potestatis, uoluntatis, uirtutis et uerita
tis et delectationis. Et intelligendo anima Deum in proprietatibus
LNAR, IX.I.q3, 146151.
LNAR, II.II.q9, 191192: In hac uita quaelibet anima quae attingit
Deum attingit ipsum per speciem.
9
10
45
ipsius quiescit sua intellectiuitas creata propter intelligibilitatem

Dei, et ab illa quiete procedit et deriuatur modus intelligendi ani
mae, quae intelligendo Deum intelligit se ipsam, et quiescendo
in Deo quiesquit in se ipsa. Et ideo dicitur quod anima beata et
Deus uident se facie ad faciem.11
During this life, however, man attains these intellectual and

spiritual realities via his body and his sensory apparatus, as con
ceived by Aristotelian epistemology. In other words, in order to be
considered scientific, this knowledge must be based upon mans
sensory nature and upon the conditions and possibilities which
enable the intellectual faculties to produce such scientific knowl
edge (scientia/episteme).
3. Analogical processes in human knowledge
The following quotation provides a more comprehensive picture
of Llulls system of knowledge. The various phases of the episte
mological process may be gleaned therefrom:
Quando intellectus incipit intelligere, incipit in se ipso et in sua
natura, sicut homo uolens facere cameram, qui incipit primo in
habitatione, quae est finis camerae, sicut clauus, qui est finis
martelli. Et incipiendo intellectus in sua natura interius, inquirit
exterius similitudines cum quibus possit habere interiores, sicut
per sensum, cum quo perquirit colores, uerba, saporem et caetera,
et de illis multiplicat species quas accipit in imaginatione, et ab
imaginatione accipit in se ipso, sicut considerare quod bonum est
uidere et audire, et ab illa consideratione considerat et accipit
quod bonum est memorare et intelligere, et ita habet modum in
attingendo bonitatem interiorem spiritualem attingendo bonita
tem exteriorem.12
The lines quoted above are highly instructive, insofar as they

show at least three different moments of the intellectual process,
moments which point to a degree of diversity as regards the direc
tion of its movement: The process begins with an inner search of
the intellect, which predisposes itself to make its descent to the
senses, and to look for similitudes of the principles of the soul. The
similitudes of goodness, greatness, etc., found in external objects,
11
12
LNAR, IX.I.q6, 174182.

LNAR, IX.I.q1,113123.
46
celia lpez alcalde
enable these to be remembered, understood and loved by the fac

ulties. Normally, it is this inner search which grounds the knowl
edge process, although Llull does not deny the fact that the latter
occasionally arises by chance.13
The second phase of the intellects activity is made manifest in
its clearly ascending movement. Once it has prepared the senses to
acquire the sense data in question, the intellect operates by elim
inating whatever is unnecessary: this is the moment of abstrac
tion, that mechanism analysed by Aristotle, and which essentially
consists of considering as separate from matter those things which
are not, in fact, separate.14 This mechanism enables one to extract
intelligible species from their sensible counterparts (species exteriores).15
Three phases having been identified in relation to the intellect,
phases which reveal the degree of diversity present in the direc
tion of its movement (the first of which involves a descent; the
second, an ascent), what we subsequently find at the end of the
passage quoted above refers to a moment separate from abstrac
tion, even though this moment likewise concerns the production of
intelligibilitates. The third phase describes a horizontal movement
of the intellect, one which facilitates the acquisition of knowledge
13 Llull explains in LNAR, IV.II.q10, 121127: Dum homo uigilat, nulla
potentia animae otiosa potest esse simpliciter, quoniam si esset, homo non
uigilaret, sed dormiret. Et quia homo multotiens non considerat finem quare
est, nec finem suarum partium, nec finem aliarum substantiarum, propterea
a fortuna accipiunt suae potentiae aliqua obiecta non desiderata ut moueant
totum, scilicet hominem, ad finem desideratum, et non mouent illum coacte,
sed excitanter et temptando ut ipse de necessitate ipsas moueat ad obiecta
desiderabilia.
14 Those things which are spoken of as in abstraction one thinks of just
as, if one thought actually of the snub, not qua snub, but separately qua hol
low, one would think of it apart from the flesh in which the hollow exists
one thinks of mathematical entities which are not separate, as separate,
when one thinks of them. Aristotle, De anima III, 431b, trad. D.W.Hamlyn,
Oxford/New York, 1993. For abstraction, cf. A. De Libera, Lart des gneralits. Thories de labstraction, Paris, 1999.
15 LNAR, IX.I.q3, 152156: Sed anima accipit species exteriores per
sensum, et de sensu ipsas transmutat in imaginationem et de imaginatione
ipsas ponit in se ipsa, quae sunt similitudines substantiarum corporalium, et
quando ipsas accipit spirituales transmutat ipsas de imaginatione in spiritua
litate denudata a corporalitate.
47
regarding non-sensible reality. The example given outlines the way

in which the intellect, by considering the goodness of the sensible
faculties, is similarly capable of considering the goodness present
in the rational faculties, and to acquire knowledge therefrom con
cerning the principle of goodness itself. By means of this exam
ple, Llull introduces into the cognitive process a new moment, one
which makes reference to the disclosure of the general principles
themselves. Although the latter are innately present within the
rational soul, they are not known in full, but rather come to be
known through this complex epistemological process itself, a pro
cess which, in turn, has its starting-point within the general prin
ciples themselves.
This process of intellectual comparison also functions in such a
way as to explore the nature of the principles that exist in God.
For this reason, Llull states:
Anima, cum aliqua similitudine, mouet suas rationes et suas
potentias ad aliam similitudinem, sicut cum magna potestate
regis considerat magnum posse Dei et cum antiqua duratione solis
considerat aeternitatem Dei, et cum magnitudine mundi conside
rat infinitatem Dei, et sic de una similitudine in aliam successiue
facit cum illa successione scientiam.16
The LNAR explains the analogical process as being one of the

particular functions of the human intellect, a function capable
of providing scientific knowledge (scientia/episteme) of the com
plex relationships between non-sensible things such as God and
his power, for example by submitting entities which are onto
logically diverse to a process of comparison. By so doing, Llull
admits the possibility of ones achieving true knowledge of pure
intellectualities and the dynamics thereof from the dynamics of
sensible realities, by reason of the ontological link which exists
between corporeal natures and their spiritual counterparts.17
When attributed to spiritual beings, therefore, concepts such as
quantity, temporality and place are best explained by means of
LNAR, X.I.4, 125129.

Cf. the definition of analogy given in Isidore of Sevilles Etymologies:
Analogia Graece, Latine similium comparatio siue proportio nominatur.
Cuius uis est ut, quod dubium est, ad aliquid simile, quod non est dubium,
referatur, et incerta certis probentur. Cf. Etimologas, Madrid, 2004, p.310.
16
17
48
celia lpez alcalde
analogy. It is in this sense, then, that the simple quantity of the

separated soul is compared to the quantity of silver found in a
denarius; the permanent brightness of the sun, to the permanent
properties of God.
4. The knowledge of supra-sensible realities
The aforementioned conception, according to which the struc
ture and dynamics of sensible reality explains its spiritual coun
terpart, enables Llull to broaden the limits of the Aristotelian
theory without succumbing to any kind of nave Neo-Platonism
or Illuminism: insofar as the intellect is structured with a view to
understanding things analogically, it succeeds in moving beyond
sensory knowledge and in establishing a continuity between ones
knowledge of sensibilitates and of intellectualitates. According to
this perspective, then, one in which an authentic knowledge of
supra-sensible realities is implied, the soul is, in fact, capable of
understanding realities which, at first glance, may appear to be
beyond its reach. This approach, however, should not be viewed
as an ecstatic vision of the intellect, or excessus mentis,18 for, con
trary to this, the rational soul is, in effect, designed to under
stand realities in whose regard knowledge cannot be attained by
empirical experience:
Si in homine non est anima rationalis, suus intellectus est ex
natura corporali, et sequitur quod homo intelligat per naturam,
ueluti uidet uel audit per naturam, quod est impossibile et contra
experientiam quam ex hoc habemus; quoniam plures homines
uident et audiunt multa per naturam, quae non intelligunt. Immo
intelligunt ipsa supra naturam, uelut miracula, creationem, resur
rectionem et alia istis similia. Et homo qui oculos tenet clausos
et nihil audit, intelligit seu intelligere potest. Est ergo intelligere
alterius naturae altioris illa corporis, et illam appellamus animam
rationalem.19
Llull would likewise develop this analogical capacity of the

intellect in his Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus, a work dat
ing from 1305. Here the intellect, in attempting to understand the
18 Ruiz Simon compares Llulls theory of the transcendental points to
other contemporary formulations, namely, the excessus mentis outlined by
Bonaventure. Cf. J.M. Ruiz Simon, LArt de Ramon Llull i la teoria escolstica
de la cincia, Barcelona, 1999, pp.159168.
19 LNAR, I.I.10, 108115.
49
complex reality of spiritual beings (beings such as itself), descends

to a less abstract level, the comprehension of which is immediate:
In essentia intellectus est intellectiuus; cum quo intellectus est
actiuus, et homo cum ipso. Sed intellectus quaerit: Per quem
modum homo mouet intellectiuum ad obiectum? Et tunc des
cendit ad ignem, qui calefacit aerem, ut possit multiplicare suum
actum, et suum destruere inimicum, scilicet ipsam aquam. A
simili suo modo homo mouet intellectiuum, ut per ipsum possit
cognoscere desideratum, sicut iustitiam, prudentiam, etc.; et ut
possit destruere iniuriam, auaritiam, etc. Item intellectus quaerit:
Per quem modum ipse facit species acquisitas intelligibiles? Et
tunc descendit ad uisum, qui habet in se tria concreta sibi coes
sentialia, scilicet uisitiuum, uisibile et uidere.20
In answer to the question of how man inclines the active part

of his intellect towards its object, the intellect, by means of a
descending movement, creates a link between the spiritual and
the sensory levels, establishing therein a relationship based upon
similarity. Thus, in order that it may itself understand how it
proceeds in the matter of apprehending a knowable object which
ought to lead man to virtue, the intellect operates by understand
ing things that help to distance it from vice and assist it in draw
ing closer to virtue, in the same way that fire heats air in order
to break down or overcome water. Similarly, in the second part of
the text quoted above, the analogy concerning vision helps one to
understand the presence and necessity of the correlatives within
the intellect, since in vision one can clearly distinguish the faculty
involved, the visible thing and the act of vision.
5. Conclusion
The Lullian theory of knowledge attempts to establish a form
of scientific knowledge that embraces both the corporeal and the
spiritual realms. The principles within the various faculties, here
conceived as their material component, or content, establish the
conditions of possibility for knowledge: the knowable object can
only be known by reason of the principles which constitute the
rational soul. Through a search for similitudes, it is possible to
20 Ramon Llull, Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus, ed. A.Madre,
Turnhout, 1981 (ROL, 9), pp.199, p.93, 165176.
50
celia lpez alcalde
achieve not only knowledge of external objects, but also that of

the spiritual parts of the human soul itself. In this sense, human
knowledge can be considered to involve a combination of innate
ness and acquisition, and this acquisition is carried out via the
mechanisms of the cognitive system, mechanisms which include
the intellects capacity to operate analogically by drawing com
parisons between ontologically diverse realities, and by estab
lishing relationships of similarity between different dynamics
or structures.
In sum, the theory of the intellect developed in the LNAR
shows how the mechanisms of the intellective soul account for
knowledge of the whole of reality, both corporeal and spiritual.
According to the Lullian conception, therefore, the intellect con
tains in se all the conditions of possibility for knowledge of the
natural and spiritual realms. The Augustinian part of Llulls epis
temology is represented by the innate presence of the principles,
while the Aristotelian part stresses the fact that the possibility
of full knowledge concerning these innate principles can only be
achieved by recourse to empirical realities.
As a result of the above, knowledge of the principles these
being one of the key elements of Llulls Art emerges from the
sensible realm, by abstraction as well as analogically by compari
son; this Art itself comprises, among other things, a combination
of letters intended to express universally valid functions, univer
sal for the reason that the diverse objects of reality (i.e. creatures,
souls, God) share a similar structure which can be understood by
all men by means of the analogical operations of the intellect.21
Once we have understood Llulls complex conception of intel
lectual processes, we can also understand more fully his use of
literary analogies, so abundantly present as these are through
out his texts. The weight and legitimacy of these latter as argu
mentative devices are founded upon the significance they occupy
within Llulls ontological and epistemological system, a system
which constitutes the back-drop to their discursive/demonstrative
functions.
21 About the role of analogy in Llulls Art, cf. R. D. F. Pring-Mill,

Lestructura analgica de lart Lulliana, in Estudis sobre Ramon Llull, ed.
L.Badia & A.Soler, Barcelona, 1991, pp.241252.
51
Abstract
The Foundations of Analogical Thinking in Llulls Epistemology
Ramon Llull, in his work Liber novus de anima rationali (1296),
explains how the intellect proceeds in order to reach knowledge
of intellectual objects that cannot be obtained through the ascen
ding process of abstraction from sense data. From Llulls point of
view, there is one privileged way to overcome the gap between the
res sensuales and the res intellectuales, namely, the knowledge that
results from the intellectual process of analogy. On this account,
analogy provides us with an understanding not only of intellec
tual realities but, particularly, of the relations between them, such
as the relations between the constitutive principles and the facul
ties of the soul. By means of this intellectual device, Llull tries
to reconcile Aristotles empirical approach to knowledge with the
Neo-Platonist idea of an autonomous realm of knowledge, focusing
especially on how to understand relations between concepts.
Celia Lpez Alcalde
uranias.celia@gmail.com
Instituto de Filosofia
http://ifilosofia.up.pt
Faculdade de Letras
Via Panormica, S/N
4150-564 Porto, Portugal
RAMON LLULL ON THE THEORETICAL

UNIFICATION OF FALLACIES
Guilherme Wyllie
(Niteri)
1. Introduction
Despite the opinion of those who, like Augustus de Morgan,
question the viability of a satisfactory theory of fallacies,1 it has
been attested that medieval thinkers demonstrated a great inter
est in determining not only the nature of fallacies but also the
conditions which assure their theoretical unification. In fact, at
least two approaches adopted in the Middle Ages advocate a uni
fied theory of fallacies. While the Aristotelian approach argues
that the fallacy of ignorantia elenchi would act as a unifying prin
ciple for other fallacies, the Lullian approach differs in general
terms as it claims that all fallacies would be assimilated by what
he calls the Fallacy of Contradiction.
2. The Medieval Classification of Fallacies
Throughout the twelfth century the recovery and the dis
semination of the Latin translation of On Sophistical Refutations
prompted medieval thinkers to affirm that all fallacies depen
dent or not on language would ultimately be reduced to the fal
lacy of ignorantia elenchi.
1 In addition to the traditional opinions of De Morgan and Joseph, who
believed it to be impossible to elaborate a satisfactory classification of
fallacies; Cf. A. De Morgan, Formal Logic: or The Calculus of Inference,
Necessary and Probable, London, 1847, p.237; H. W. B. Joseph, Introduction
to Logic. 2. ed. Oxford, 1906, p. 569. The recent works of Finocchiaro and
Massey are particularly influential. The conclusions of these works assure
us that all efforts to determine a fallacy theory would show themselves
to be unjustifiable upon final analysis; Cf. M. A. Finochiaro, Fallacies
and Evaluation of Reasoning, American Philosophical Quarterly, 18 (1981),
pp. 1322; G. J. Massey, The Fallacy Behind Fallacies, Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, 6 (1981), pp.489500.

IPM, 67 (Turnhout, 2015), pp. 53-62.
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107307
54
guilherme wyllie
Originally associated with a specific type of dialogue whose

basic objective is the refutation of the opponents, in the Middle
Ages the occurrence of ignorantia elenchi was still subject to the
violation of conditions required for a genuine refutation.2 Accord
ing to some of the most renowned logicians of that time, a refuta
tion would be nothing but a syllogism whose contradictory thesis
adopted by the respondent would logically follow from their own
affirmations. 3 Roger Bacon defends this idea when he says that
a refutation is a syllogism with a conclusion contradicting [some
other proposition]. For example, if a respondent says that Socrates
is not something white and an opponent constructs a syllogism
such as Every man is something white, Socrates is a man; there
fore Socrates is something white, this is a syllogism with a conclu
sion that contradicts that previously given by the respondent, and
it is a refutation. Thus the nature of a syllogism and the nature
of a contradiction are required for the nature of a refutation.4
2 This was, for example, the thought defended at the end of the XII
century by the author of Dialectica monacensis who, apparently supported
by passage 167a2329 of On Sophistical Refutations, affirmed that fallacia
autem secundum ignorantiam elenchi est deceptio causam habens a parte
nostri eoquod inpotentes sumus iudicare quid elenchus, quid non-elenchus.
A parte vero motivi extra habet pro causa apparentie pene-elenchitatem,
non-elenchitatem autem pro causa falsitatis. Cum enim multe particule sive
differentie exigantur ad elenchum, aliquis habens omnes preter unam non
advertit efectum illius que sibi deest propter multitudinem aliarum quas
habet. Et ita credit esse elenchus et non est, Anonymus, Dialectica monacensis,
in Logica modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic,
ed. L.M. De Rijk, v. II. 2, Assen, 19627, p.603.
3 There were, however, those who similarly to the author of the interesting
work De fallaciis unfolded such definitions, warned that the refutations
could involve not only one but two syllogisms (Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas,
De fallaciis, in Opera omnia, ed. Leonina, v. XLIII, 401418, Roma, 1976,
p. 414: Est autem elenchus sillogismus contradictionis; qui quandoque
est unus sillogismus, quandoque duo. Vnus quidem, quando sillogismus
concludit contradictoriam alicuius propositionis prius date; sicut si detur
aliquod animal esse incorruptibile, et procedatur sic: Omne compositum ex
contrariis est corruptibile, omne animal est huiusmodi, Ergo omne animal
est corruptibile; hec conclusio contradictoria est propositionis prius date.
Duo autem sillogismi constituunt elenchum quando ex duobus sillogismis
contradictoria concluduntur, sicut si predicto sillogismo componatur alius
talis sillogismus: Nullum beatum est corruptile, aliquod animal est beatum,
ergo aliquod animal non est corruptibile.
4 Roger Bacon, Summulae dialectices, AHDLMA, 53 (1986), pp.139289
and 54 (1987), p. 264 [] elenchus est syllogismus cum contradictione
ramon llull on the unification of fallacies
55
In principle, there would be two categories of error that would

typify the generic form of ignorantia elenchi. The error that some
call syllogistic is based on the hypothesis that the contradic
tion of the argument adopted by the respondent would be a logi
cal consequence of their respective premises, when in reality it is
not. Whereas the so-called error of contradiction would occur
when the conclusion of the apparent refutation would appear to
be, when in fact it is not, the contrary of the respondents thesis.
To the majority of medieval thinkers the contradictions that com
pose genuine refutations would depend on conditions referred to
by them as with respect to the same (secundum idem), related
to the same (ad idem), in a similar manner (similiter) and at
the same time (in eodem tempore). Consequently, the omission or
transgression of any one of these conditions would make contra
dictions apparent, thus prompting the emergence of four specific
subtypes of ignorantia elenchi.5
Since the beginning of the twelfth century both syllogistic and
contradiction errors have also been used as basis for the classifi
cation of fallacies. Through the influence of Aristotle, the major
ity of logicians of that time recognised that the deficiencies which
determine fallacies that depend on language, or in dictione, were
caused by contradiction errors, whereas deficiencies related to fal
lacies that do not depend on language, or extra dictionem, origi
nated from syllogistic errors. An example of this is what Peter of
Spain states regarding this matter:
Aristotle determines which fallacies come down to contradiction
and which come down to syllogism, affirming: those that depend
on language are reduced to contradiction a distinctive mark of
a refutation which is apparent, and the remainder are reduced
according to the definition of syllogism.6
conclusionis, ut, si respondens dicat, quod Sor non est album, et opponens
faciat talem syllogismum Omnis homo est album, Sor est homo; ergo Sor
est album, hic est syllogismus cum contradictione conclusionis prius data
a respondente, et est elenchus: et ideo ad naturam elenchi exigitur natura
syllogismi et natura contradictionis.
5 See, for example, Lambert of Auxerre, Logica
: Summa Lamberti, ed.
F. Alessio, Florence, 1971, p. 190: potest considerari ignorantia elenchi
secundum quod est omissio alicuius quatuor conditionum que sunt complexive
elenchi vel appropriate elencho in quantum elenchus est, que sunt: secundum
idem, ad idem, similiter, et in eodem tempore.
6 Peter of Spain, Tractatus called afterwards Summulae Logicales, ed. L.M. De
Rijk, Assen, 1972, p.184: determinat Aristotelis qui loci sophistici reducuntur
56
guilherme wyllie
This subsequently suggests to medieval thinkers that the two

errors committed by Aristotelian fallacies, syllogism and contra
diction, would be the same that would distinguish the fallacy of
ignorantia elenchi. They are thus led to admit that the fallacies
of both groups were nothing but examples of the generic form of
ignorantia elenchi. Concerning this topic, the author of the opus
cule De fallaciis afirms that
all of that which is against the definition of syllogism and con
tradiction is against the definition of refutation, as syllogism and
contradiction form the nature of refutation. Consequently, given
that in every fallacy the error occurs due to something which
is omitted from the definition of syllogism or contradiction, the
result is that every fallacy is reduced to ignorance of refutation as
a general principle.7
It is therefore evident that there are two forms of ignorantia elenchi.

Besides the specific form that unfolds into four subtypes due to the
transgression of the conditions that ensure the integrity of a contra
diction, there is also a generic form that assimilates all other falla
cies precisely because it omits the elements that define refutation.8
3. The Unitive Character of Llulls Fallacy of Contradiction
In October 1308, Llull publishes the Liber de nouis fallaciis, in
which he defends the theoretical unification of fallacies through
a parte contradictionis et qui a parte sillogismi, dicens: ergo qui sunt secundum dictionem, reducuntur quoniam est apparens contradictio, quod erat
proprium elenchi; alii autem reducuntur secundum sillogismi diffinitionem.
7 Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., p.414: Quia igitur de ratione elenchi est
sillogismus et contradictio, quicquid est contra deffinitionem sillogismi et contradictionis, est contra definitionem elenchi. Et cum in qualibet fallacia defectus
accidat per hoc quod aliquid omittitur de deffinitione sillogismi et contradictionis,
ideo omnis fallacia reducitur ad ignorantiam elenchi sicut ad aliquid generale.
8 Peter of Spain, op. cit., p. 180: Fieri quidem solet duplex distinctio
ignorantie elenchi, secundum quod est una specialis de tredecim fallaciis, et
secundum quod est generalis ad quam omnes tredecim fallacie reducuntur.
Uno enim modo distinguitur sic quod ignorantia elenchi dicitur specialis
secundum quod ignorantia elenchi causatur ignorantia harum differentiarum,
scilicet ad idem, et secundum idem et similiter et in eodem tempore; et sic
ignorantia elenchi est contra formam completivam elenchi, quia iste differentie
sunt completive contradictionis et sic elenchi, cum contradictio sit completiva
elenchi. Secundum autem quod ignorantia elenchi causatur communiter ab
ignorantia omnium differentiarum in deffinitione elenchi positarum, ita est
generalis, et sic ad ipsam omnes fallacie reducuntur.
57
an alternative method capable of assuring that all Aristotelian

fallacies be assimilated by his Fallacy of Contradiction. Before
presenting this method he performs a detailed analysis of the
new fallacy.
In general terms, the arguments affected by the definite form of
the Fallacy of Contradiction are formally made up of an inconsis
tent pair of categorical premises that consist of a universal nega
tive proposition and a particular affirmative proposition. Both, in
turn, act as basis for the conclusion that is characterised as a par
ticular proposition whose predicate is simultaneously affirmed and
denied of its subject. Based on this description, one can assume
that Llulls new fallacy has the form
No S is P.
Some S is P.
Therefore, some S is and is not P.
In the Middle Ages, most thinkers embraced two causes for any
fallacy.9 According to them, the cause of appearance (causa appa
rentie) of a fallacy is what gives it the ability to simulate being
that which, in effect, it is not. Whereas the cause of non-existence
(causa non existentie) of a fallacy is that through which an argu
ment where the fallacy emerges is not what it appears to be. By
using this differentiation, Llull establishes in the extract below
not only the motivating principle or cause of the appearance of the
Fallacy of Contradiction, but also the cause of its non-existence or
principle of its deficiency:
As the intellect has two acts, namely, believing and understand
ing, and in generating knowledge so that it is finally successive
rather believes than understands, so fallacies have their origin
9 See, for example, Peter of Spain, op. cit., p. 98 Quia fallacia dicitur
uno modo deceptio causata in nobis, alio autem modo fallacia dicitur causa
sive principium illius deceptionis. Et isto secundo modo intendimus hic de
fallaciis. Unde sciendum est quod in qualibet fallacia isto secundo modo
sumpta duplex est principium sive duplex causa, scilicet principium motivum
sive causa movens sive causa apparentie et per hoc omnia idem principium
nominatur; aliud autem principium sive alia causa est principium defectus
sive causa non existentie, quod idem est, sive causa falsitatis. Principium
autem motivum sive causa apparentie in qualibet fallacia est quod movet ad
credendum quod non est. Principium vero defectus sive causa falsitatis est
quod facit creditum esse falsum.
58
guilherme wyllie
and, consequently, opinions in the first act. Thus, is revealed in
the major proposition the apparent cause of its paralogism and in
the minor the cause of its deficiency.10
Despite Lulls affirmation that the cause of appearance of the

fallacy lies in the major premise and the cause of its non-existence
is due to the minor premise, there is no indication in this passage
about the nature of such causes. In order for the nature of these
causes to be determined, one needs to review a passage from the
Liber de refugio intellectus, where Llull warns us that in the argu
ments affected by the Fallacy of Contradiction the major premise
is always ambiguous, as in one sense it is considered false and in
another it is considered true, whereas the minor premise is true in
an absolute sense.11
In fact, such observations make it clear, on the one hand, that
by associating the cause of the appearance of the Fallacy of Con
tradiction with its major premise Llull is actually identifying it
with the ambiguity that such a proposition raises. On the other
hand, by linking the cause of its appearance to the minor premise,
he is referring, in the final analysis, to the inconsistency created
by the opposition between the proposition and one of the mean
ings of the major premise.
Another aspect which cannot be overlooked regarding the Fal
lacy of Contradiction is explained by Llull in an excerpt from the
Logica noua which states that it is so named because it seems to
involve a contradiction, although it does not.12 From this asser
Ramon Llull, Liber de nouis fallaciis, ed. Ch. Lohr, Turnhout, 1983
(ROL, 11), pp. 1213: Quia intellectus habet duos actus, scilicet credere
et intelligere, et in generando scientiam ante credat, quam intelligat, ut
sit finaliter successiuus, igitur in primo actu fallaciae habent ortum, et
per consequens opiniones. Et sic in maiori propositione ipsius paralogismi
causa apparentiae apparebit; et causa defectus ipsius apparentiae in minori,
concludendo realiter ueritatem.
11 Ramon Llull, Liber de refugio intellectus, ed. Ch. Lohr, Turnhout, 1983
(ROL, 11), p.232 maior propositio semper est duplex; et quoad unum sensum
falsa, sed quoad alium dicitur esse uera. Sed minor propositio simpliciter
dicitur esse uera.
12 Ramon Llull, Logica nova, ed. W. Euler, Turnhout, 1998, (ROL, 23),
p. 128: Dicitur autem haec fallacia contradictionis, quia uidetur concludere
contradictionem, sed non concludit, Cf. also Ramon Llull, Liber de nouis
fallaciis, op. cit., p. 12: Quam fallaciam apparentem contradictionem
10
59
tion one can immediately conclude that there are two phases that
distinguish such a fallacy. Firstly, it simulates the derivation of a
contradiction from an inconsistent pair of premises. Subsequently,
the identification and suppression of the ambiguity responsible
for the inconsistency prevents a contradiction from occurring as a
result of inconsistent premises.
Although the considerations mentioned so far reveal that many
characteristics of the new fallacy coincide with the basic prop
erties of ignorantia elenchi, at least one crucial difference can be
identified between them. During the thirteenth century when
many influential thinkers such as William of Sherwood defended
the idea that ignorantia elenchi would affect any argument that
seemed to involve a contradiction, but did not actually do so,13
without exception, they were indeed declaring that such an argu
ment would appear to be a genuine refutation.14 However, used
in an entirely differentiated way by Llull, this affirmation was
employed to point out that the Fallacy of Contradiction would
consist of the above-mentioned phases, as well as to distinguish
it from the Aristotelian fallacies. According to him, as it would
appear to involve a contradiction, without actually doing so, his
fallacy would make a true conclusion seem false, whereas the other
fallacies would make a false conclusion seem true.15
apellamus, eo quia uidetur contradicere, et nihil realiter contradicit;
Ramon Llull, Liber de refugio intellectus, op. cit., p.232: Fallacia ista uidetur
concludere contradictorie; et tamen non concludit.
13 William of Sherwood, Introductiones in logicam ed. Ch. Lohr et
al., Traditio, 39 (1983), p. 286: In his quattuor paralogismis est ignorantia
elenchi, quia videtur concludi contradictio et non concluditur.
14 See, for example, Albert the Great, Liber Elenchorum III, 9, in Opera
omnia, ed. A. Borgnet, v. II, Paris, 1890; Simon of Faversham, Quaestiones
novae super libro Elenchorum, ed. S.Ebbesen et al., Toronto, 1984, q. 27; and
John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super librum Elenchorum Aristotelis q. 55., in
Opera philosophica, ed. G.Etzkorn et al., v. II, 255566, New York, 2004.
15 Ramon Llull, Liber de nouis fallaciis, op. cit., p. 12: Quam fallaciam
apparentem contradictionem appellamus, eo quia uidetur contradicere, et
nihil realiter contradicit. Et per hoc ab aliis antiquis fallaciis est diuersa, qua
antiquae uerum significant, et uerum tamen non concludunt; Ramon Llull,
De fallaciis, quas non credunt facere aliqui, qui credunt esse philosophantes, contra
purissimum actum Dei verissimum et perfectissimum, ed. H.Riedlinger,
Turnhout, 1967 (ROL, 6), p. 485: aliae fallaciae significant, quod hoc, quod
est falsum, sit uerum, et ista fallacia significat, quod hoc, quod est uerum, sit
60
guilherme wyllie
Furthermore, it is worth noting that resorting to a strategy in

order to resolve ambiguities, so as to prevent contradictions from
being derived from inconsistent propositions, would suggest cor
roborated by a specific extract from De fallaciis where the modal
reading of the premises of the Fallacy of Contradiction is pro
posed that Llull would have adopted a non-adjunctive posture
in relation to the occurrence of inconsistencies. He would thus
have interpreted such premises as it is possible that p and it is
possible that not-p, therefore avoiding the emergence of a contra
diction from an inconsistency since possible-p and possible not-p
does not follow from possible-p, possible not-p.16
After determining the distinctive features of the new fallacy,
Llull strives to show that the Aristotelian fallacies would be assim
ilated by it. The following passage, for example, demonstrates
Llulls assessment of the Aristotelian fallacy of equivocation:
Every dog is able to bark. A celestial constellation is a dog; thus,
a celestial constellation is able to bark. No dog is able to bark.
But some dog is able to bark; thus, some dog is and is not able
to bark. The old major and the new major are contraries. In this
way, the old conclusion is absolutely false, as it is said of the same
thing, but the new conclusion is absolutely true as it is said of
different things. Through the new fallacy, we can thus observe the
error of the old fallacy.17
falsum; and p. 488: et quod sint uere fallaciae, patet in hoc, quia sophista
requirit habere species supra dictas oppositas, ut puta quod hoc, quod est
uerum, uideatur esse falsum, et quod est falsum, uideatur esse uerum.
16 Ramon Llull, De fallaciis, quas non credunt facere aliqui [], op. cit.,
p.485: Fallacia Raimundi est ista, quae est de contradictione; quae quidem
fallacia est separata a modo aliarum fallaciarum, quia medium intrat
conclusionem; et aliae fallaciae significant, quod hoc, quod est falsum, sit
uerum, et ista fallacia significat, quod hoc, quod est uerum, sit falsum; et
maior propositio istius fallaciae semper est duplex, causans disiunctionem, et
hoc sic: (1) Nullus lapis est uisibilis; quidam lapis est uisibilis; ergo quidam
lapis est uisibilis et non uisibilis. Quaero: Quae sunt causae istius fallaciae?
Et respondendum est, quod possibile et impossibile; quoniam possibile ponit,
quod lapis sit uisibilis per accidens; impossibile uero ponit, quod non sit
uisibilis per se, cum non sit substantia sensata.
17 Ramon Llull, Liber de nouis fallaciis, op. cit., p. 48: Primo intendimus
dare exemplum de fallacia aequiuocationis per unum modum, et postea ad
uicesimam dictam fallaciam applicare. Et sicut declarabitur primus modus,
sic possunt declarari alii modi per ipsam fallaciam generalem. Et talem
processum intendimus tenere in aliis fallaciis. Omnis canis est latrabilis.
61
Convinced that both causes of the Fallacy of Contradiction can

be used as fallacy-unifying principles, Llull examines each of the
thirteen Aristotelian fallacies and concludes that they all contain
ambiguities that cause inconsistencies. Basing himself on these find
ings, he utilises these ambiguities to develop a pair of inconsistent
propositions that would act as premises for the Fallacy of Contradic
tion. Such a procedure, according to Llull, would reduce the Aris
totelian fallacies to the new fallacy, thus assuring its unification.18
Abstract
Ramon Llull on the Theoretical Unification of Fallacies
In the third distinction of the Liber de nouis fallaciis, Ramon Llull
falls back upon his Fallacy of Contradiction to create a procedure
Caeleste sidus est canis; ergo caeleste sidus est latrabile. Nullus canis est
latrabilis. Sed quidam canis est latrabilis; ergo quidam canis est latrabilis et
non latrabilis. Maior antiqua et maior noua sunt contrariae. Et sic conclusio
antiqua est simpliciter falsa, quia dicitur de eodem; sed conclusio noua
est simpliciter uera, quia dicitur de diuersis. Declaratur ergo per fallaciam
nouam de fallacia antiqua, in quo peccat. The reduction of the rest of the
Aristotelian fallacies can be found ibid., pp.4852.
18 Probably motivated by the thesis that language is inherently imper
fect, Llull thus radicalizes the reduction, on the basis of the Fallacy of con
tradiction, to such an extent that even arguments which share one of the
valid syllogistic forms, as they involve some type of ambiguity, should be
assimilated by the fallacy in question (Ramon Llull, Liber de nouis fallaciis,
op. cit., p. 12: Quapropter antiquae ad istam fallaciam reducuntur, et sic de
syllogismis omnibus). See, for example, how Llull proceeds in the reduction
of a syllogism in Barbara: Pars ista erit de quibusdam syllogismis, deductis per
decem et nouem modos syllogismorum trium figurarum, de quibus uidetur, quod
sint ueri, et simpliciter non sunt, ut cum uicesima fallacia apparebit, ad quam
applicabimus antedictos. Et primo de primo sic. Omne animal est substantia.
Omnis homo est animal; ergo omnis homo est substantia. Nullum animal est
substantia. Quoddam animal est substantia; ergo quoddam animal est substantia
et non est substantia. Modo declarando ultimum syllogismum, declarabitur,
quod primus est sophisticatus; et istum modum declarationis intendimus in
aliis conseruare. Maior est duplex, quoniam quod est inferius, non est, quod
est superius, sicut animal, quod est inferius respectu substantiae, quae est
superius; et sic de homine respectu animalis. Minor simpliciter est uera,
quoniam ponendo secundum sensum maioris, priuat primum; eo quia hoc
animal est haec substantia. Patet ergo, per quem modum cum uicesima
fallacia ostenditur, quod primus syllogismus non est simpliciter uerus (ibid.,
p.52). Regarding the reduction of other valid syllogisms see ibid., pp.5356.
62
guilherme wyllie
able to ensure that the other fallacies can be assimilated by it,

thus promoting the theoretical unification of fallacies. At first,
the Fallacy of Contradiction affects those arguments that contain
some kind of ambiguity and share the form No S is P and some
S is P; therefore some S is P and is not P. According to Llull,
such arguments would appear to be invalid because they merely
simulate the derivation of a contradiction from an inconsistent
pair of premises, although shown to be valid in the light of the
identification and removal of the ambiguity responsible for the
apparent contradiction. Convinced that, once adopted as criteria
for identifying fallacious arguments, the notions of inconsistency
and ambiguity could act as principles of unification and systema
tisation of the fallacies, Llull endeavors to show that all Aristote
lian fallacies bring about some inconsistency generated by several
types of ambiguity. Overall, he examines each one of the thirteen
Aristotelian fallacies and gets through the analysis of their initial
premise a pair of inconsistent propositions, which will act as pre
mises of a new argument affected by the Fallacy of Contradiction.
Benefiting from the paraconsistent character of that fallacy, Lull
can once he has discarded the risk of trivialisation make use
of such inconsistency to detect the presence of some ambiguity
in the Aristotelian fallacy, which would guarantee according to
him its unrestricted reduction to the Fallacy of Contradiction.
Guilherme Wyllie
guilhermewyllie@id.uff.br
Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF)
Departamento de Filosofia
Campus do Gragoat Rua Professor Marcos Waldemar de Frei
tas Reis, Bloco O So Domingos
24210201 Niteri
Brazil
2. Contemplation
RAMON LLULL AND THE QUESTION OF

THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IN THE PARISIAN
CONDEMNATION OF 1277
Antoni Bordoy
(Mallorca)
The Parisian condemnation of March 7, 1277 has been defined
as one of the most decisive events in the history of medieval
thought,1 up to the point that it is described as the cause of a
thousand year break in the development of the civilisation.2 Nev
ertheless, even nowadays this condemnation continues to raise
some problematic issues. 3 The sentence condemned books, rolls,
or sheets dealing with necromancy, or containing experiments,
invocations of demons or incantations, things opposed to faith
and morals, and it makes a special mention of the De amore of
Andreas Capellanus.4 The edict also contains a total of 2195 arti
1 D. Pich, La condamnation parisienne de 1277. Texte latin, introduction et
commentaire, Paris, 1999, p.7.
2 F.L. Florido, 1277. La condena de la filosofa, in A Parte Rei. Revista
de Filosofa. Estudios monogrficos, 2007, p.8. F.Len Florido takes this
idea from E. Renan, Averros et laverrosme: essai historique, Paris, 1882.
E. Renans conception of the Parisian condemnation of 1277 was criticized
from 1960s by authors such as F.Van Steenberghen, A. de Libera or D.Pich.
Even so, his ideas have been recovered in modern studies by R. Hissette or
F.Len Florido, among others. Cf. n. 29 for more bibliographical information
about this subject.
3 R.Hissette, Enqute sur les 219 articles condamns Paris le 7 mars 1277,
Paris, 1977, pp. 913 identifies three types of questions to resolve: 1) What
was the meaning of the articles, according to the censors? 2) According to
1.), were they really unorthodox? 3) What is the real source of each article?
Although this study represents an important advance, Hissette recognizes
that it is impossible to offer a definitive solution for all cases.
4 Tempier, Ep. VII-X, CUP, pp.543544.
5 AlthoughE.Renan, Averros et lAverrosme. Essai historique, Paris,
1882, p. 258, identifies only 218 in Llulls commentary on the Parisian
condemnation of 1277; from the thirteenth century up the present, the

IPM, 67 (Turnhout, 2015), pp. 65-87.
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107308
66
antoni bordoy
cles, heterodox ideas attributed to some teachers of the faculty of

arts (artistae) of the epoch who, by going beyond what they are
allowed, dared to defend many ideas contrary to Christian faith6.
The annex roll containing those articles is, apparently, uncat
egorised, unordered and unstructured7. However, this apparent
absence of order is important, because it exposes the articles to
more than one interpretation.
P.Mandonnet 8 tried to solve this question by offering a new
structure for the articles. He uses the meaning and reference of
the articles in order to group them under two general categories
theological and philosophical mistakes divided according to spe
cific themes Trinity, intelligence, knowledge, etc. His proposal
was historically important for clarifying the meaning of certain
elements, but is based on a circular argument: the structure of the
articles departs from their interpretation and, at the same time,
the interpretation of them departs from their order.9 However, this
structure evidences new questions that are not displayed by the
number of articles is fixed to 219. D. Pich, La condamnation, p.24 and
p. 242 added another article, present in some manuscripts: Quod caritas non
est maius bonum quam perfecta amicitia. This article does not appear in the
CUP or in Llulls commentary on the Parisian condemnation of 1277.
6 Tempier, Ep. II, CUP, p.543: Magnarum et gravium personarum crebra
zeloque fidei accensa insinuavit relatio, quod nonnulli parisius studentes
in artibus proprie facultatis limites excedentes quosdam manifestos et
excrabiles errores, immo potius vanitates et insanias falsas, in rotulo seu
cedulis presentibus hiis annexo seu annexis contentos [].
7 A. de Libera, Philosophie et censure. Remarques sur la crise universitaire parisienne de 12701277, in Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?, ed.
J.A. Aertsen & A.Speer, Berlin, 1998, pp.7189. By using P.Mandonnets
edition of the Parisian condemnation of 1277, A. de Libera (pp.72 ff.) defends
the existence of a certain structure of the articles. According to this author,
we must conceive the Parisian event of 1277 as a continuation of the crisis
of 1270. D. Pich, La condemnation, op. cit., p. 152 defined the edict as a
collection of theses that were assembled apparently without any criteria of
order. Hissette talks about of surprising disorder.
8 P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et lAverrosme latin au XIIIe sicle,
Louvain, 19081911, p. v. As he says, the object of the proposed structure
is to offer an orderly distribution that will be useful to those who seek for
information in this doctrinal chaos of proposals.
9 Cf. 1. However, the problem underlying P. Mandonnets ideas became
evident only when E. Renans exegetical paradigm was criticized by some
modern studies.
ramon llull and the knowledge of god
67
original order. In this context, our study aims to analyse Ramon

Llulls interpretation of one of these new questions: the possibility
of human knowledge of God. With this analysis, we will try to
define the epistemological background of the Declaratio Raimundi,10
divided and biased by the dialogical nature of the discourse itself.
Our study analyses four elements: the classification of the four
philosophical errors concerning the knowledge of God; Llulls
conception of the Parisian condemnation of 1277; the principles
underlying the heretical consideration of the four articles concern
ing the knowledge of God; and the solutions proposed by Llull
as alternatives to the Aristotelian epistemology. We will conclude
that, in the case of the Declaratio Raimundi, the epistemological
divergence with radical Aristotelianism comes from a different
conception of ontology. The study is also based on various earlier
works concerning the meaning and reference points of these four
articles and their interpretation throughout the fourteenth cen
tury: certain points that may be of interest today are not explic
itly analysed.
1. Philosophical errors concerning the knowledge of God
What was the meaning of each article in the minds of the cen
sors? This is the first of three issues that, in his edition with
commentary of the Parisian condemnation of March 7, 1277,
R. Hissette conceives as current questions demanding response.11
In order to solve this problem, he proposes a simple procedure:
Usually, the sense of the articles is unambiguous; when in doubt,
we should refer to the historical context or, in its absence, to
the academic controversies of 1277.12 If this procedure could be
applied to all cases, there wouldnt be excessive doubts about the
sense of the articles and, by extension, there wouldnt be diffi
10 There are two editions: 1) O. Keicher, Raymundus Lullus und seine
Stellung zur arabischen Philosophie. Mit einem Anhang, enthaltend die zum ersten
Male verffentlichte Declaratio Raymundi per modum dialogi edita, Mnster,
1909; 2) Declaratio Raimundi per modum dialogi edita contra aliquorum
philosophorum et eorum sequacium erroneas opiniones et damnatas ab Episcopo
Parisiensi (= DL), ed. M.Pereira, Th. Pindl-Bchel, Turnhout, 1989
(ROL, 17), pp.219401.
11 R.Hissette, Enqute sur, op. cit., p.9.
12 Ibid.
68
antoni bordoy
culties in clarifying the meaning granted by Llull. Indeed, the

chronological proximity between the Declaratio Raimundi dated
February 1298 and the process of 1277, and the ideological sim
ilarities between Llull and tienne Tempier the Declaratio defi
nitely opts for the defense of the Christian orthodoxy,13 writes
R. Hissette , should result in the agreement of the modern and
Lullian interpretations. However, when comparing the four articles
that in P. Mandonnets classification might be called philosoph
ical errors about the cognoscibility of God, with Ramon Llulls
commentary on them, it is possible to see not only that there is a
coincidence, but also that their interpretations are opposed.
Ramon Llulls interpretation of the 219 articles, and also his
conception of the Parisian condemnation of 1277, have commonly
been considered to be fruitless. C. Bonmariage finds consistent
reasons to say that the Declaratio contains a different interpreta
tion of the condemnation,14 in which only a few items of interest
are especially developed.15 Far from being a systematic and com
prehensive review of philosophical doctrines, this book seems to
become a manifestation of the thought of its author. So, according
to A.Bonner, Llull was always much less interested in criticising
these traditions [] than he was in introducing a new system.16
Nevertheless, the Declaratio Raimundi is the first of the known
and preserved commentaries on the Parisian condemnation of
1277 and, according to R. Hissettes arguments, this book will be
important in resolving the ambiguities of the articles.
It will be noted that in all articles concerning the knowledge
of God, but also in the 219 articles condemned, the ambiguities
are frequent and important. Sometimes censors add notes with the
aim of limiting the possible meanings of the articles and to avoid
misunderstandings, even for contemporary readers. It is for this
R.Hissette, Enqute sur, op. cit., p.10.
C. Bonmariage & M. Lambert, Lulle et la condamnation de 1277. La
Dclaration de Raymond crite sous forme de dialogue, LouvainParis, 2006,
p.vii.
15 Ibid., p.ix.
16 A. Bonner, Ramon Llull i el rebuig de la tradici patrstica, in
Homenatge a Miquel Dol. Actes del XII Simposi de la Secci Catalana i I de la
Secci Balear de la SEEC.Palma, 1 al 4 de febrer del 1996, ed. M.C. Bosch &
M.A. Forns, Palma, 1997, p.385.
13
14
69
reason that there appears in the syllabus the expression error quia.
So, for example, article 18 talks about the impossibility for a phi
losopher to accept the resurrection, because it cannot be investi
gated by the intellect;17 and the censor writes, error, because the
philosopher must keep his intellect captive in submission to the
faith.18 The point is that not all affirmations that are currently
ambiguous have this kind of clarification and it is not always pos
sible to use the context of the time. Thus arises the impossibility
of determining the exact meaning and source of certain articles,
which leads R. Hissettes study of 1977 to consider some articles
as clearly contrary to the Christian doctrine, but others as sim
ply heretical in the sense that it is understood by the censor
(art. 151) and others to have contents that are not at all hetero
dox (art. 110).
The concatenation of causes leading to this situation is exac
erbated by two facts: first, the doctrinal precision and accuracy
of the articles, reflected in the number of theses condemned; sec
ond, the absence of a structure in the presentation of the arti
cles, mixing for example affirmations about the eternity of the
world with others on the substantiality of the intelligences. The
result is a text made up of very precise ideas, but lacking in struc
ture, which is far from the condemnation of only a few days later,
March 18, 1277, promulgated by R. Kilwardby: this other text
has only thirty articles, but these are divided into three groups,
grammar, logic and nature, and ordered hierarchically.19 For this
reason, in the late nineteenth century, the inquiry regarding the
internal order of the Syllabus became a methodology researching
the meaning of the articles.
17 In the centum formis (81) of the Ars brevis, Llull defines philosophy as
the subjectum in quo intellectus se contrahit ad omnes artes et scientias.
In opposition, proverb 276 of the Liber proverbiorum defines theology as
sermo ordinatum ad loquendum deo. The difference between philosophy
and theology is the object: philosophy uses the intellect to understand the
world and the sciences; theology uses the intellect to contemplate God. In
both cases, faith is necessary to reach the truth.
18 Art. 18 (ed. D.Pich, p. 84), CUP, p. 544: Error, quia etiam
philosophus debet captiuare intellectum in obsequium fidei. As in other
cases the clarifying sentence is not mentioned (DR, c.18, p.286).
19 CUP, pp.558560.
70
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There are three different structures for the 219 articles included
in the Syllabus. The first of these appears in the Universitatis Chartularium Parisiensis,20 in which it is not possible to find a clear
order. The second was proposed by Charles du Plessis dArgentr
in the eighteenth century, under the title Collectio judicorum de
novis erroribus.21 The structure of the Collectio has one advantage:
the author not only looks for the internal coherence, but also for
the connection the articles have with other condemnations, pro
viding a context for its meaning. The third structure was pro
posed by P.Mandonnet in his Siger de Brabant et laverrosme latin
au XIIIe sicle.22 This is a new structure, completely different from
the others, in which the errors are divided into two groups: phil
osophical and theological. The articles included in the philosoph
ical group are 179, and they are subdivided into 15 categories:
the nature of philosophy, the cognoscibility of God, divine science,
divine will and power, the creation of the world, the nature and
function of the intelligences, cycles and generation, the eternity
of the world, necessity and contingency in causes, the principles
of material beings, man and intellect, the activity of the human
intellect, human will and ethics. The articles included in the theol
ogy group are only 39, and they are subdivided into 4 categories:
Christian law, Christian dogma, Christian virtue and the finality
of the human being.
P. Mandonnets classification is important to clarify the mean
ing of the articles. However, this classification raises two ques
tions: first, even if it is based on medieval parameters, the classi
fication goes still further and is artificial, so not all affirmations
fit into one category; second, sometimes the exact meaning of the
articles is unknown, but they are included in one category, and
this inclusion becomes the interpretive point of the article. As a
result of these questions, many of the studies that use P. Mandon
nets classification have been forced to modify the order, and even
the latest publications tend to return to the order that appears in
the Chartularium. This is important for our proposals, because it
CUP, pp.543558.
Ch. du Plessis dArgentr, Collectio judicorum de novis erroribus,
Paris, 1724.
22 Complete reference can be found in note 8.
20
21
71
implies a return to the structure that, with exception of specific

cases, is the order that Ramon Llull uses in the composition of his
Declaratio Raimundi. However, this classification makes possible
the delimitation of the four articles that, in the syllabus, discuss
the possibility of a human being knowing God, a question exten
sively analysed by Llull.
Article 211 (8, 8.29): Our intellect can know, through its natural
abilities, the essence of the First Cause. This seems to be wrong
and it is an error if we understand an immediate cognition.23
Article 36 (9, 6.11): We can know God by essence during this life.24
Article 215 (10, 6.50): About God, we can only know that He
exists if He is being.25
Article 216 (11, 6.51): It cannot be affirmatively known that God
is an entity by itself, albeit negatively it is possible to know that
He is an entity by itself.26
Modern studies have emphasised three issues concerning these

articles. First, a general tendency to consider that, in spite of the
fact that the articles treat the same question, they reflect two
opposed doctrinal positions: a) the group formed by articles 211
and 36 refers to an ontological position, that is, the idea that
the human intellect can know God because it is capable of mak
ing an essential contact and generating the knowledge of the First
Cause; and also, this contact is possible even when the rational
soul is not separate from the body; b) the second group, formed
Art. 211 (ed. D.Pich, p. 144): Quod intellectus noster per sua
naturalia potest pertingere ad cognoscendum essentiam prime cause. Hoc
male sonat et est error, si intelligatur de cognitiones inmediata. DR, c. 211,
p. 211: changes pertingere for attingere and does not mention the expression
hoc male sonat [] inmediata.
24 Art. 36 (ed. D.Pich, p.90): Quod deum in hac uita mortali possumus
intelligere per essentiam (DR, c. 35, p. 302). The question concerning this
sentence is the possibility for a mixed being (constituted by soul and body)
to know a pure being (constituted only by a non-material substance). This
sentence cannot be considered heterodox without this specification, because
it is possible always according to Llulls interpretation to know God after
death; that is, if we have a vita beata.
25 Art. 215 (ed. D.Pich, p. 144): Quod de deo non potest cognosci, nisi
quia <ipse> est, siue ipsum esse (DR, c. 215, p.397).
26 Art. 216 (Ibid.) Quod deum esse ens per se positiue non est intelligibile,
set privative est ens per se DR, c. 216, p.398).
23
72
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by articles 215 and 216, corresponds to the opposite position,

according to which it is impossible to know anything about God
because the divine and human spheres are so far and knowledge is
only possible by the way of negation. In this sense, the heterodoxy
of the four articles can be defined without too many problems:
First, on the one hand, the human intellect can know rationally
all aspects of the divinity, on the other hand it denies any pos
sibility of knowledge, even theological. Second, it is possible to
distinguish the four articles by their internal relations: articles
215 and 216 not only talk about the same idea, but also, in the
order of the Chartularium, they are presented sequentially, and
in Charles du Plessis Collectio they are also related; whereas the
group consisting of articles 211 and 36 not only reverses the order
of Chartularium, but also involves items placed in the opposite
poles of the syllabus, and even appearing in the Collectio iudicorum in different categories (article 211 is included in the 1277 con
demnation, but the article 36 occupies a different category called
errors of the soul and the intellect). Third, the structure of the
sources of these four items does not correspond completely to their
categorisation, because although articles 36, 211 and 216 can be
deduced from the works of Sigerius of Brabantia, art. 215 seems
to be related to an interpretation of St. Thomas philosophy.
The confusion regarding the order and the grouping of these
articles has even more importance when comparing P.Madonnets
and Ramon Llulls interpretations. In the Declaratio Raimundi, the
author follows the order of the Chartularium, the only possible at
the end of the thirteenth century.27 Nevertheless, the expository
character of the book forces the author to provide an interpreta
tion of the meaning of the articles and, therefore, to group them
by themes. In fact, although it is true that the first interest of
27 Apart from Llulls Declaratio, there are two other medieval commentaries
on the Parisian condemnations of 1277: Conrad of Megenbergs De regimine
domus scolastice, composed around the middle of the fourteenth century,
and Quod Deus, an anonymous commentary that appears around the midfifteenth century. A panoramic vision of these commentaries can be found
in R. Hissette, Le Symbolum parisinum: approche de trois commentaires
mdivaux et vocation de doctrines significatives dAlbert le Grand, in
Il commento filosofico nelloccidente latino (secoli XIII-XV). Atti del colloquio
FirenzePisa, ed. F. Gianfranco, L. Claudio & P. Stefano, Turnhout,
2002, pp.469498.
73
Llull is to expound his thought, he does not want to write a long

book,28 and he uses expressions such as vade ad [number] capitulum or as it was demonstrated in multis aliis. IfP.Mandonnets
ordering of the articles is correct, the result of Ramon Llulls dis
course will be in agreement with the modern interpretation, which
means that the references in both cases must be in accordance.
However, the real structure is different: art. 36 is independently
answered, it is only connected to the three initial positions and
detached from art. 211; whereas art. 211 is answered in chapters
22 and 164, the first of which corresponds to the possibility of
God giving immediate happiness to man and the second to the
role of the appetite in human activity, while at the same time
being linked to chapters 118, 158, 159, 163, and 173, all of these
relating to free will and the existence of an active intellect. Art.
215 is solved partially in chapters 87 and 174, the first on the
eternity of the world, the second on the existence of fables and
falsehoods in Christian law. Art. 216 is analysed independently,
without reference to any other chapter.
In this sense, in opposition to the modern classification of
P. Mandonnet, Ramon Llulls interpretation of the meaning of the
four articles has an important difference regarding the cognitive
elements: specifically the epistemological question is displaced
by the analysis of the ontological relation that exists between
the human being and the Divinity. That is, and this is what will
be discussed below, that the problem of Gods knowledge is not
resolved through epistemological, but through ontological means,
so that the relationship between subject and object is determined
by determining the point of contact between man and God. A sit
uation that can be seen from two points of view: first, the deter
mination of the contact point between the divine and human
essences as based on the relationship between the agent and the
complement; and second, through definition of the models for
knowledge that Ramon Llull opposes to these articles.
For this reason, Llull writes (DR, De secunda positione p. 258, l. 2022):
Vt uitemus prolixitatem inutilem, oportet nos tenere communes opiniones
omnium maiorum philosophorum. For an analysis of the method of the
Declaratio Raimundi, vid. C.Bonmariage, Lulle et la condemnation, pp.xixxxiv.
28
74
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2. Main points of Ramon Llulls interpretation of cognoscibility

questions
a.) The meaning of the Parisian condemnation of 1277 according
to Ramon Llull
By the expression chronicle of an announced condemnation,
D. Pich tries to show that the Parisian edict of March 7, 1277
was not an isolated incident, but that its origins can be placed at
the beginning of the century:29 the absorption of Aristotelianism
by Latin authors, the redefinition of philosophy, the translatio studiorum process, the foundation of universities and the consequent
power struggles, the emergence of new religious orders, the impor
tance of secular and ecclesiastical power, these are some of the
elements that eventually provoked the reaction of Tempier. The
condemnation of the 219 articles is therefore the result of a con
catenation of causes, so this author refuses to see in the Parisian
condemnation of 1277 the simple expression of doctrinal conflict
that opposes the great principles of the traditional Catholic the
ology and the authors that defend a set of heterodox philosoph
ical theses that come from an Aristotelian or Peripatetic back
ground. 30 Current studies not only support this idea, but have
29 D. Pich, La condamnation, pp.151158. A. de Libera, Philosophie

et censure, pp. 7279 defines the Parisian condemnation as the end of an
historic process of crisis that dates from the decade of 1260 and continues until
1277. A comparative study of the most important theories on the edict of 1277
can be found in K. Emery & A. Speer, After the Condemnation of 1277:
New Evidence, New Perspectives, and Grounds for New Interpretations, in
Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universitt
von Paris im letzen Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte ed. J.A.
Aertsen, K.Emery & A. Speer, BerlinNew York, 2001, pp.319.
30 D. Pich, La condamnation , p.8. G.Bonafede, La condanna di
Stefano Tempier e la Declaratio di Raimondo Lullo, in EL 4, 1960, pp.2144
interprets the Lullian vision of the Parisian condemnation of 1277 from three
points: 1) The question about the value and structure of cognitive powers; 2)
The relation that exists between fides and ratio and the place of the necessary
reasons; and 3) The Divine dignities and their place in the Lullian process
of speculation. In the same revue and year, F. Van Steenberghen, La
Signification de lvrue anti-averroste de Raymond Lulle, EL 4, 1960,
pp.113118 criticizes those who, like G.Bonafede, interpret the Lullian vision
of the Parisian condemnation of 1277 from an epistemological perspective.
75
also shown the intention of some of the authors of the sentence to

create this image.
Article 87 illustrates the idea that we want to expose and gives
us the key to understand the object of the Declaratio Raimundi:
The world, concerning all species contained therein, is eternal;
and time is eternal, and motion and matter, the active and pas
sive; because it comes from the infinite power of God, and it is
impossible to have innovation in the effects without innovation
in the cause. 31 Intuitively, this article is related to the affir
mation discussed in Sigerus of Brabantias De aeternitate mundi.
But R. Hissette concludes that in a literal sense, this proposi
tion was not found. 32 This assertion is based on the fact that the
De mundi aeternitate discusses, but does not defend, the eternity
of species as an early demonstration of the eternity of the world:
Due to some of the arguments of those who believe it demon
strated that the human species began to be when it had previously
not existed, and that this holds true for all species of generated
and corruptible beings, it is necessary to ask if the human species
began to be when it had previously not existed, and if this holds
true for all kinds of generated and corruptible species, according
to the Philosopher. 33 In fact, the De aeternitate mundi concludes
with the sentence quod inceperit tenendum fide, and rejects any
philosophical argument in favor of the defense of the eternity of
the world. Thus all the modern commentators agree in condemn
G. Bonafedes thesis is based on E. Renans and P. Mandonnets conceptions;
F.Van Steenberghens ideas come from M.-M.Gorces interpretation.
31 Art. 87: CUP, p.548, (ed. D.Pich, p.106): Quod mundus est aeternus
quantum ad omnes species in eo contentas; et quod tempus est eternum, et
motus, et materia, <et> agens, et suscipiens; et quia est a potentia dei infinita,
et impossibile est innovationem esse in effectu sine innovatione in causa. A
complete exposition of this question can be found in F.Van Steenberghen,
Raymond Lulle contre lternit du monde, in Studia Lullistica. Miscellanea
in honorem Sebastiani Garcias Palou, Palma, 1989, pp.6976.
32 R.Hissette, Enqute sur, p.152.
33 Sigerus of Brabantia, De aeternitate mundi, ed. B. Bazn,
Louvain, 1974, p. 113: Propter quamdam rationem quae ab ALIQUIBUS
demonstratio esse creditur eius quod species humana esse incepit cum penitus
non praefuisset, et universaliter species omnium individuorum generabilium
et corruptibilium, quaeritur utrum species humana esse inceperit cum
penitus non praefuisset, et universaliter quaelibet species generabilium et
corruptibilium, secundum viam PHILOSOPHI procedendo.
76
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ing the materialist claim that the creation of the world never
took place.
This article allows us to observe how close Ramon Llull was
to the Syllabus and the general characters attributed to the text.
The Declaratio Raimundi was composed in the ternary phase of
the Art, before the Lullian discussions with Parisian Averroists.
This book shows, more than a fight against Averroism, the process
called by M.-M.Gorce: the combat between Christian thought and
the Gentiles. 34 At this point, Tempiers and Llulls interpretations
are in parallel. Indeed, the letter of the sentence makes it clear
that, first, it is directed against some men studying the arts who,
beyond the limits of their faculty, dared to expose and contest
in schools [] certain evident and execrable errors, [] up to
the point of supporting those mistakes [] through the writings
of the pagans. 35 Something that is not only outrageous for the
church, but also places the philosophers between Scylla and Cha
rybdis: unaware, or rather pretending, not to fall into the error of
double truth in a claim that certain truths are correct according
to philosophy but not according to theology.
The main objective of the Declaratio Raimundi is therefore to
reconcile philosophy and theology or, as the author says, to find
[] how it is possible that theology and philosophy agree in the
concordance which is required between the cause and its effect. 36
Llulls defense of the condemnation is based on the idea that it is
possible to reconcile both sciences, although it is necessary to fol
low the ontological hierarchy of the reality, it means, to subsume
34 M.-M.Gorce, La lutte contra gentiles Paris au XIIIe sicle, in tudes
dHistoire Littraire et Doctrinale du Moyen ge, vol. 1 (Mlanges Mandonnet),
Paris, 1930, pp. 223243. M.-M. Gorce is one of the first authors to interpret
the Parisian condemnation of 1277 as a discussion between Christian and
Pagan philosophy. However, M.-M.Gorce does not criticize P.Mandonnets
position, only adds some information on the historic discussion against the
Pagan philosophers and its use by medieval thinkers.
35 Tempier, Ep. II-III, CUP, p.543 (ed. D.Pich, p. 72): [] nonnulli
parisius studentes in artibus proprie facultatis limites excedentes quosdam
manifestos et execrabiles errores [], presertim dum errores predictos
gentilium scripturis muniant [].
36 Ramon Llull, DR, Prologus, p. 254, l. 2224: [] quomodo concordare
posset theologiam et philosophiam secundum illam concordantiam, quae
requiritur esse inter causam et suum effectum.
77
the philosophy in the theology. The response of the interlocutor

is clear: for many years I have wanted to know the concordance
between these two sciences. 37 However, Socrates is not sure about
the results.
We must consider the source of this problem. The Medieval
Student Guides38, a group of texts disseminated in the colleges,
not included in the condemnation, show that philosophy must
recover her place among the sciences. But this fact was not prob
lematic: the guides show how philosophy and theology, held in
their natural areas of action, can coexist and can be completed
without difficulties. In this sense, the question that Llull aims to
address is not that of the existence of philosophy, but what has
come to be known as the theory of the double truth, 39 which is
considered by some as a hermeneutic invention of Tempier to jus
tify the condemnation of the 219 articles. Moreover, the Declaratio
specifies the origin of this question:
Ancient philosophers did not know those principles [of the Chris
tian faith] and, therefore, they ignored the consequences of such
principles: because who does not know the purpose, cannot have
a clear understanding of those realities that exist for the purpose.
That is why some new philosophers, followers of the ancient phi
losophers, cause the dissension between me and you, Socrates.40
37 Ibid., p. 254, l. 2526: [] ipse illam concordantiam ex multis annis

praeteritis scire cupidebat.
38 Cl. Lafleur, Quatre introductions la philosophie au XIIIe sicle. Textes
critiques et tude historique, MontrealParis, 1988. See also Cl. Lafleur, Les
guides de ltudiant de la Facult des arts de lUniversit de Paris au XIIIe
sicle, in Philosophy and Learning. Universities in Middle Ages, ed. M.Hoenen,
J.Scheider & G.Wieland, LeidenNew York, 1995, pp. 137199.
39 M-R. Hayoun, A. de Libera, Averros et laverrosme, Paris, 1991, is
one of the first modern authors to interpret the theory of double truth as
an hermeneutic creation of Bishop Tempier. D. Pichs study of 1999 on the
Parisian condemnation of 1277 develops his interpretation from this idea,
also following some works of L.Bianchi.
40 Ramon Llull, DR Prol. p. 256, l. 7076: Sed antiqui philosophi de
illis principiis nullam cognitionem habuerunt. Et idcirco aliqui eorum
consequentiam illorum principiorum ignorauerunt, quoniam qui finem
ignorat, claram cognitionem de illis, quae sunt propter ipsum finem, habere
non potest. Et ideo aliqui noui philosophi, qui sunt sequaces antiquorum
philosophorum, sunt causa dissensionis, quae est inter me et te, o Socrates.
78
antoni bordoy
According to Llull, ancient philosophy is characterised by an

epistemological insufficiency caused by her ignorance of the First
Cause. This idea appears in many of Llulls works at the same
time, for instance in the case of the Tractatus nouus de astromonia where he points to the lack of precision of the ancient model
and the ignorance of the ancient astronomers about the origins
and structure of the universe, that is, the ignorance of Christian
science. In this sense, it is necessary to show that in the case of
ancient philosophers Llull did not see any problems because their
mistake is only historic, that is, they existed before the Chris
tian religion, and they cannot have known of its science. The
real problem is caused, according to Tempiers point of view, by
those who, trespassing beyond the limits of philosophical knowl
edge, discuss elements that belong to the realm of the theology,
and also revive ancient thought in which the division between
these two sciences does not exist. Article 87 reflects this point of
view: nobody, according to R. Hissette, could defend this idea in
the Middle Ages; consequently, it must be an idea used to show
the opposition of two worldviews: the ancient, based on circular
ity and eternity; and the modern, based on linearity and creation
ex nihilo.
b.) Duplicity and unity of the world: naturalisation of knowledge
What is the impact of this conception of the four articles con
cerning the knowledge of God? Those articles reflect, as we have
said, two opposed doctrines: ontology that assimilates the human
essence to the divine essence in the process of cognition; and the
absolute negation of any positive knowledge of God, except its
existence and entity, which is obtained by way of reason. How
ever, if we use as starting point Llulls perspective characterised
by the fight not against concrete or specific ideas but against a
complete worldview , these two theories must be considered as
the result of the same doctrine, i.e., there is one idea, but it has
two different derivations.
Is there any common nexus between the two positions? It is
possible to observe this unity in the discourse that Llull opposes
to each article. In the case of chapter 211 of the Declaratio, the
central argument refers to two chapters: 22, accompanied by the
expression et in pluribus, in which Llull demonstrates that God
can operate immediately on the entities of the universe; and 164,
79
in which he argues that the human will is free and is not lim
ited by bodily appetites. Furthermore, the response to article 164
is based on two other chapters: chapter 158, about the freedom
of the will, and chapter 118, which also refers to chapter 158, in
which is established the absence of a division of understanding
between active and passive, that is, the individuality of the human
intellect against the existence of a universal agent intellect. Arti
cle 36 corresponding to chapter 35 of the Declaratio refers to
the definition of God as the most intelligible to thereby assert
that the full knowledge of God implies also an essential contact,
and that this knowledge is necessary to fully love God who is the
most loving. According to Llull it is not necessary to reach this
knowledge during our lifetimes, and that is why we have a future
life in which God can reward us with bliss. Article 215 refers,
first, to chapter 87, which speaks of the eternity of the world, and
secondly to chapter 174, which reveals the absence of falsehoods in
the Christian law. The last article (216) gets a response by offer
ing a positive knowledge of God from the demonstration of divine
dignities, which permits a positive science-based understanding.
The structure of the Declaratio implies that the answer to the
four articles is based on the application of the three initial posi
tions. However, in all cases, including the chapters quoted as
complementing the arguments, the discourse turns on the same
principle: the contact between God and man on different levels
(ontological, ethical). In this sense, the response that Llull gives
to the four articles takes as its starting point the classic medieval
conception, this is, that the epistemology is only a derivation of the
ontology, and the question about what we can know is posterior to
the question of what exists. The knowledge of God is determined,
therefore, by the place of each of the elements that are suscepti
ble to be placed in the ontological scale of reality: the possibil
ity of contact is therefore what allows knowledge. This scale is,
in turn, interpreted from two different perspectives: the descent,
which corresponds to the action that God performs on man; and
the ascent, from which we can see how a human being can get
to the superior truths. This perspective makes clearer Llulls aim
which seems to be more appropriate to the human condition, since
original sin indicates the situation of man as a creature that par
ticipates in matter and, consequently, it eliminates any possibil
80
antoni bordoy
ity of contact between divine essences and human beings. So, the
possibility of achieving individual happiness is a discussion that
refers to Gods capacity to operate in the universe.
It should be noted that the Lullian conception of reality is sup
ported by the medieval Platonic-Aristotelian synthesis: based on
the metaphor of a pyramid whose highest point is occupied by
God. Reality is divided into two, Creator and creation, including
a set of relations of analogy as causeeffect relation. The reality
of the Creator remains unique, but creation is divided into two
sub-realities: spiritual and material, each of which has its own
levels, hierarchically ordered.41 The result of this conception is the
scale of being: a graded classification of things from inanimate
objects up to God.42 However, there is a point of rupture between
these two realities, defined by Ch. Lohr as the distinction between
the two movements of God43: the reflexive action, intrinsic, that
the Divinity takes upon itself; and the extrinsic action, the activ
ity that comes from God but goes outside. This is an activity
which is founded upon nothing and, for this reason, it is a creative
operation. As a consequence of this division there is a difference
between the two kinds of beings:44 the necessary and the possible.
The problem of this model of the scale of being comes from the
ascent, not from the descent. Indeed, the rational human soul,
which is what produces knowledge, is the result of creation and
therefore it is limited by its condition and faces the task of under
standing something that completely exceeds it. The problem that
unifies the four condemned articles is, according to Llull, the fact
that they defend a continuity between the two levels of being,
41 Vid. R. Pring-Mill, The Trinitarian World Picture of Ramon Llull,
in Romanistisches Jahrbuch 7, 195556, pp.229256; El microcosmos lulli,
Palma, 1961.
42 Ch. Lohr, Ramon Lull and Thirteenth-Century Religious Dialogue,
in Dilogo filosfico-religioso entre cristianismo, judasmo e islamismo durante
la Edad Media en la Pennsula Ibrica, Turnhout, 1994, pp.117129, p.120.
43 Ch. Lohr, Arbor scientiae: The Tree of the Elements, in Arbor Scientiae:
der Baum des Wissens von Ramon Lull. Akten des Internationalen Kongresses aus
Anlass des 40-jhrigen Jubilums des Raimundus-Lullus-Instituts der Universitt
Freiburg i. Br., ed. F.Domnguez, P. Villalba & P. Walter, Turnhout,
2002, pp.7984.
44 The development of this idea can be found in E. Antn, Plenitud
metafsica de la filosofa luliana, in EL 7, pp.131151.
81
and imply the naturalisation of the higher level by the transfer of

the categories from the natural to the divine. Thus, the epistemo
logical problem turns into an ontological question: to reach the
knowledge of God implies the possibility of the rational soul to
overcome this division between the two worlds. It is also a ques
tion raised by ancient authors, especially the Neoplatonists, for
whom knowledge occurs through the reversion of the soul upon
itself and the reaching of the previous level.
c.) Tools to overcome the cognitive limitations
The main question of the Declaratio Raimundi is, therefore, to
explain how it is possible to reach a positive knowledge of God
that exceeds the mere fact of His existence or entity, but without
falling into complete naturalisation of the epistemology. Indeed,
the basic principle is to avoid the truth of article 154, the philos
ophers are the only wise people of the world,45 that is, to keep the
principle that only reason can offer a true and positive knowledge,
so that faith is relegated to the intimate sphere of beliefs. Thus,
contrary to the thought attributed to the defender of the 219 arti
cles, the Declaratio proposes to continue a fundamental scheme for
ontological reality and maintains the division between the two
realms of reality as a result of the two movements of God. How
ever, this idea is in line with traditional thinking, but also suffers
the initial problem of the commentary: the ontological division
turns on the impossibility of knowledge, because the rational soul
cannot ascend beyond the principles of the universe and reach,
with certainty, the science of divine truths. Indeed, the absolute
separation of the divine and the natural realms at the epistemo
logical level, provokes the irreconcilability of reason and faith, by
which faith becomes non-demonstrable and therefore useless in
the conversion process of infidels. In order to provide a solution,
the Declaratio Raimundi develops a set of tools and methods that,
using as a starting point the indigence of the human intellect,
push their limits and lead the human being to acquire a positive
knowledge about God.
45 Cf. Art. 154, CUP, p.552, (ed. D. Pich, p. 125): Quod sapientes
mundi sunt philosophi tantum.
82
antoni bordoy
Causeeffect: the fundamental law of science46 (DR. 259.5778)

In the second position preceding his commentary on the arti
cles, Llull wants to transform ontological reality into an epistemo
logical tool, thereby justifying its mode of knowledge and defining
the relationships between theology and philosophy. Indeed, this
position begins with a set of statements about God which must be
accepted for their universality and which have the agreement of
the most important philosophers: its existence; the fact that He
is the First Cause; the world is the creation of God; He possesses
His own substantial unity; He is the beginning and the finish; He
is the perfect being and his dignities are real and equal. In fact,
these principles provide the same information as articles 215 and
216, that is, despite His positive character, they talk about the
entity of God and his mode of existence. For this reason, these
statements are followed by a second group of affirmations: the
dignities of God and his analogues in the creation, the eighteen
principles. With these, Llull tries to derive from the accepted prin
ciples some affirmations with positive content. No wonder, then,
that the acceptance of the first group contrasts with the question
asked by Socrates about the second group, for what reason do
you say these words?47 The answer to this question explains the
first of the ways to achieve true knowledge of divine truths:
Ramon responded that these words indicate the order to proceed
in the discussion: that is, we must proceed according to the con
cordance and order that exists between cause and effect, so that
according to the true opinion and conclusion there is no contra
diction between the First Cause and its effect, and that the effect
exists by the cause and not conversely. These should be so, if the
cause is to be the finality of the effect []48.
Ramon Llull, DR De secunda positione, p.259, l. 5778.

Ibid., p.259, l. 56: Quid faciunt ad propositum ista uerba?
48 Ibid., p. 259, l. 5764: [] ista uerba significant modum ordinatum
disputandi super hanc materiam: Ita uidelicet, quod nos ad concordantiam
et ordinem, qui est inter causam et effectum, recurramus taliter, quod inter
primam causam et effectum suum secundum ueram opinionem et conclusionem
non sit contrarietas, et quod effectus sit propter causam et non e conuerso. Et
oportet, quod hoc ita sit, ut causa sit finis sui effectus [].
46
47
83
This idea is based on the law of causality, and the argument

expresses the basic content of analogy: nothing exists in the effect
that does not exist before in the cause, so it is fair to assume,
by analogy, that God should be in the highest degree in accor
dance with the positive principles that also underlie the origin of
creation. This picture reminds one of the ontological argument
for the demonstration of the existence of God. But in this case it
appears endowed with a higher content: goodness, eternity, great
ness, power, and other dignities are positive statements about
the First Cause. So it is possible to know the dignities positively
during a lifetime without contact between the rational soul and
the divine essence.
However, this analogy is limited by the distinction between the
Divinity and created beings. An example is the case of article 1,
which defends the impossibility of the divine Trinity to be simple,
because real plurality implies composition and addition. Without
hesitation, Llull responds that In every plurality constituted by
form and matter, there is composition and addition, but if plurality
exists in an essence without matter, it does not follow that there is
composition in this essence.49 For this reason, Llull criticises his
interlocutor, because he considers the plurality of divine persons
under the mode of the plurality that is Gods effect, which comes
from the form and the matter.50 The same case is the parallel
between the generation of a son by God or by a man: we cannot
understand these if we use the same categories. The causeeffect
relationship serves, therefore, to establish an analogy of knowl
edge, but this should lead one to stop and consider the differences
between the two realms of reality.
The theory of transcendent points: between the sensible and the imagination of the divine
How to resolve the problems concerning the causeeffect anal
ogy? In the second of the previous positions to the commen
Ibid., c. 1, p. 262, l. 1013: In omni pluralitate, quae est de forma et
materia, oportet esse compositionem et additionem. Sed si pluralitas sit in
essentia sine materia, non sequitur, quod de illa essentia sit compositio.
50 Ibid., c. 1, p. 262. l. 2426: [] in quantum pluralitatem diuinarum
personarum consideras secundum pluralitatem, quae est per formam et
materiam in effectu Dei.
49
84
antoni bordoy
tary on the articles, Llull developed another tool, the theory of

transcendent points. This method of inquiry, which the author
claims to derive from the eighth rule of the Ars inventiva, seeks
to improve the human intellectual faculties. Despite the fact that
the epistemological process is linked with the sensible world, the
intellect can go further in extending its knowledge of the divine
truths. Using an argument that, initially, recalls the failure of the
senses in St. Thomas demonstrations of the existence of God, we
must depart from what is given by the sense data, while the exis
tence of a rational soul including three elements, intellect, mem
ory and will allows us to become aware of the shortcomings of
the imagination. There are two modes of transcendence:
The perception of the poverty of human knowledge. In this
doctrine that Llull attributes to the Latin Averroists, the main
problem is that in the process of cognition we have only two types
of data coming from the external and the internal perception.
These data constitute the base of the imagination, and they imply
that all kinds of knowledge must start with this imagination, a
realm of the cognition of the divine. But the human intellect is
capable of perceiving its own limits, and of understand that it
needs something more to know God. At this point, the human
intellect develops a special power that leads it to transcend and
contemplate the divine realm, now transcending the imagination.
This is, in fact, one of the techniques most applied by Llull in his
book, where Socrates is continually encouraged to transcend his
imagination and contemplate the truth.
Divine Grace. Not all intellect is capable of reaching this
process of transcendence successfully. Study, education, our own
capacities, but also will, are elements that determine human exis
tence and the possibility of having a consciousness of the limits of
imaginative knowledge. For this reason, in some cases the intellect
can ascend only to a lower level, but this is not to imply that it
does not have a desire to be elevated. Nevertheless, because God
is capable of operating on each created being, by Divine Grace,
one man can ascend using his capacities and contemplate the
divine truth.
Rapture and visions
With the aim of explaining the moment of transcendence, i.e.
the crossing point between the knowledge of the principles of the
85
world and the contemplation of God, Llull also refers to two medi
eval concepts: vision and rapture. Following the ancient tradition,
medieval philosophy endows vision with an importance higher
than that of the other senses, up to the point that it becomes
a principle of cognition; it takes the place formerly occupied by
intuition and speculation. Vision acquires the connotation of an
apprehension of the object, so that the vision of God entails con
templation, not knowledge. In fact, like St. Bonaventure and Duns
Scotus, Llull maintains in his commentary on articles 211 and 36
the idea of a life based on the beatific vision of God, so that the
knowledge of the first cause will not be problematic since man
is a pilgrim in hac vita. The complete rapture, meanwhile, the
path of vision imbued with the desire of the higher, allows the
rational soul to be separated for a moment from the body, so that
even while alive, a man may rise to the level of the blessed life.
Although this is a process associated with medieval mysticism,
Llull uses rapture as an epistemological process, and this claim
is recognised as such: the imaginary Socrates discusses the exis
tence or viability of rapture and vision regarding their natural or
unnatural origin (art. 33).
The suppression of the agent intellect
The acceptance of the mode of knowledge proposed by Llull
is only possible in the case of the unaccepted Aristotelian world
view based on the existence of a universal intellect always in
act. Indeed, articles 7 and 8 show an ontological model opposed
to the Lullian conception: the suppression of the intellect as the
ultimate perfection of man, and the consequent acceptance of
an intellect that penetrates and leaves the human body, depends
upon the actuality of the process of cognition. These notions stem
from the belief that there is a universal intellect that, as agent,
is always present in cognition and represents cognoscibility in its
pure state. The act of knowledge would be a simple appropriation
of something that is higher, which is endowed with the power to
absorb the intellect by means of a potential or possible intellect.
According to Llull, this scheme has two problems: the first is the
existence of a pure act of knowledge, different from God, which
is separated from Him, which means that when one thinks about
God, one thinks about Him as a kind of transcendent entity, like
the Neoplatonic One, which one can never get by way of science;
86
antoni bordoy
the other is that the human being is thus conceived as a simple

tool for something that is higher, because for Llull knowledge is
joined to the will and the memory, the motor of human activ
ity. The existence of a universal intellect breaks with the ultimate
aim of the human being postulated in the Lullian anthropology
and provokes the descent of knowledge to its lowest level, natural
ising the divine realm. Thus, Llulls cognitive model implies the
inexistence of a universal intellect in act, replacing the cognitive
level associated to this by the descriptive methods of ascension
and transcendence.
3. Conclusion
The Parisian condemnation of March 7, 1277 is one of the most
precise and lengthy medieval sentences. Modern studies tend to
describe this edict as a heterogeneous process where different
ideas, sometimes opposed, are apparently presented without order
or structure. Thanks to P.Mandonnet, this inordinate text has for
the first time a systematic structure, something that allows us to
see the existence of four articles concerning the possibility of the
human being reaching the knowledge of God even during his cor
poral existence. When analyzing Llulls commentary on the 219
articles we can see, however, another possible way to understand
the Syllabus: its heterogeneity is subjected to a fundamental unity
that comes from the idea that, behind the articles, there is only
one thought, Latin Averroism, in which ancient philosophy is res
tituted as though Christianity had never existed. In this sense, if
those articles seem to represent two different epistemological posi
tions, for Llull there is only one: the Aristotelian thought does
not consider the division of the being with regard to the realms of
God and creation, and for this reason its defenders believed that
it would be possible to know the divine through the same catego
ries that we can use to know the natural world. In opposition to
this, Llull proposes an epistemological model that follows the divi
sion of the two realities and considers the causeeffect relations
that exist among them. In order to justify this conception, the
Declaratio Raimundi develops four tools: the transformation of the
causeeffect model into a law of inquiry, the theory of the tran
scendent points, vision and rapture, and the suppression of the
universal intellect.
87
Abstract
Ramon Llull and the Question of the Knowledge of God in the Parisian Condemnation of 1277
I attempt to define the epistemological background of the Declaratio Raimundi in order to analyse Ramon Llulls interpretation of
the human possibility of knowing God. The Declaratio is a com
mentary on the 1277 condemnation by Tempier. Many studies
have emphasised some aspects concerning the knowledge of God
in the syllabus articles. A general tendency reflects two opposed
doctrinal positions: firstly, there is a group of articles, 211 and 36,
which refer to an ontological position, that is, to the idea that
the human intellect can know God because it is capable of produ
cing an essential contact with the First Cause; secondly, another
group of articles (215216) corresponds to the opposite position,
that it is impossible to know anything about God because the
divine and the human are separated spheres. Llulls defense of the
condemnation is based on the idea that it is possible to reconcile
faith and reason, although it is necessary to follow the ontological
hierarchy of reality, that is, to subsume philosophy in theology.
Antoni Bordoy
antoni.bordoy@uib.es
University of the Balearic Islands
Department of Philosophy
Crta. de Valldemossa, km 7,5
07122 Palma de Mallorca (Islas Baleares)
Spain
LA CRITICA LULLIANA ALLA TEORIA

AVERROISTA DELLA FELICIT SPECULATIVA
Francesco Fiorentino*
(Bari)
Com noto,1 secondo la teoria averroista della felicit specu
lativa la forma pi nobile della vita umana si esercita nello stu
dio filosofico, che rende il filosofo capace di pronunciarsi in ogni
materia in modo autonomo e non ossequioso della teologia e che
fa conseguire la felicit speculativa gi nello stato di viandante, a
scanso della resurrezione e della beatitudine ultra-terrena. Questa
teoria non trova lapprovazione di Lullo, che si oppone vigorosa
mente alle dottrine degli averroisti latini nel secondo e nel quarto
soggiorno parigino.2
Nellepoca contemporanea il primo a notare questa avversione
stato O.Keicher, che editando per primo la Declaratio Raimundi
nel 1909, ha ricostruito la biografia di Lullo, il suo secondo sog
giorno a Parigi, la datazione ed il luogo di composizione dello
* Ringrazio Carla Compagno per i suoi suggerimenti che mi hanno aiutato

a migliorare questo contributo, e Giuliana Musotto per avermi consentito di
leggere la sua dissertazione dottorale.
1 Cf. A. Arezzo, La felicit del teologo. Gloria, grazia e scienza in
Enrico di Gand, in Le felicit nel Medioevo. Atti del Convegno della Societ
Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale (SISPM) Milano 1213 settembre
2003, ed. M. Bettetini & F. Paparella, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2005,
pp.411424; L.Bianchi, La felicit intellettuale come professione nella
Parigi del Duecento, Rivista di filosofia, 78 (1987), pp.181199; L.Bianchi,
Censure, libert et progrs intellectuel lUniversit de Paris au XIII
sicle, AHDLMA, 63 (1996), pp.4592; C.Steel, Medieval Phylosophy. An
Impossible Project? Thomas Aquinas and the Averroistic Ideal of Happiness,
in Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X.Internationalen Kongresses
fr mittelalterliche Philosophie der Socit Internationale pour ltude de la
Philosophie Mdivale, 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt, ed. J. A. Aertsen &
A. Speer, Berlin, 1998, pp.152174.
2 Si conta come terzo soggiorno la fugace visita di Lullo a Parigi nel 1305.
IPM, 67 (Turnhout, 2015), pp. 89-107.
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107309
90
francesco fiorentino
pera, la sua tradizione manoscritta, lo stile ed i contenuti. 3 F. van

Steenberghen nel 1960 ha descritto la campagna anti-averroista
di Lullo, scindendola in due momenti principali. Il primo corri
sponde al secondo soggiorno parigino (12971299), durante il quale
Lullo compone la Declaratio Raimundi per modum dialogi edita,
altrimenti intitolata Liber contra errores Boethii et Sigerii, ultimata
il 22 febbraio 1298 e contenente la confutazione delle 219 asser
zioni condannate nel 1277 dal vescovo di Parigi, Stefano Tempier.
Il secondo momento collocato in concomitanza con lultimo sog
giorno parigino di Lullo dal novembre del 1309 al settembre del
1311 ed contraddistinto da 17 opere prevalentemente indirizzate
al re di Francia, Filippo il Bello, ed ai maestri dellUniversit di
Parigi. Immediatamente dopo Lullo si reca al Concilio di Vienne,
dove presenta la Petitio Raimundi, con cui chiede, tra laltro, lin
terdizione delinsegnamento universitario dellaverroismo.4
Nello stesso anno G. Bonafede ha inserito la Declaratio Raimundi nella corrente filosofica dellagostinismo francescano di
matrice bonaventuriana ed ha spiegato lavversione lulliana verso
le teorie averroiste delleternit del mondo, dellunicit dellintel
letto e della doppia verit, nonch verso il naturalismo determini
stico dascendenza aristotelica, che limita lonnipotenza divina ed
il primato della teologia.5
H. Riedlinger nel 1975 ha evidenziato la scarsa attendibilit
della conoscenza, che Lullo mostra di possedere riguardo ad Aver
ro: egli corrisponde ad una sorta di immagine idealtipica nella
mente di Lullo.6
F. Moreno Rodriguez nel 1982 ha sottolineato il carattere apo
logetico della campagna anti-averroista di Lullo: egli non impiega
3 Cf. O. Keicher, Raymundus Lullus und seine Stellung zur Arabischen

Philosophie, Mnster, 1909.
4 Cf. F. van Steenberghen, La Signification de loeuvre anti-averroste
de Raymond Lull, EL 4 (1960), pp.113128, in particolare 113117.
5 Cf. G. Bonafede, La condanna di Stefano Tempier e la Declaratio di
Raimondo Lullo, EL 4 (1960), pp.2144.
6 Cf. H. Riedlinger, Ramon Lull und Averroes nach dem Liber
reprobationis aliquorum errorum Averrois, in Scientia augustiniana. Studien
ber Augustinus, den Augustinismus und den Augustinerorden. Festschrift P.A.
Zumkeller zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. C.P. Mayer & W.Eckermann, Wrzburg,
1975, pp.184199.
la critica lulliana alla teoria averroista
91
unattitudine filologica nel distinguere tra Averro e laverroismo

o allinterno di esso tra laverroismo eterodosso e quello orto
dosso; ma considera gli averroisti sic et simpliciter come infideles e
si scaglia violentemente contro di essi ed in particolare contro la
negazione della Trinit, della creazione, dellintelletto individuale
e della conoscenza che Dio ha dei singolari, per ristabilire la fede
cattolica e con essa larmonia tradizionale tra la fede e la ragione
alla luce delle rationes necessariae. Inoltre Moreno Rodriguez ha
identificato tali averroisti con Antonio di Parma, Giovanni di
Gottinga, Giovanni di Jandun, Marsiglio di Padova, Tommaso
Wylton e Walter Burley e ha realizzato efficaci sintesi di ciascuna
delle opere anti-averroiste.7
R. Imbach nel 1987 ha concentrato la sua attenzione sul quarto
soggiorno parigino di Lullo dal novembre 1309 al settembre 1311.
In esso Lullo redige 36 opere, di cui 6 sono giudicate come per
dute. Lullo giunge a Parigi per cercare lappoggio del re di Fran
cia e del cancelliere dellUniversit di Parigi, che raccomanda nel
1311 linsegnamento dellarte; ma Lullo entra in contatto con
latmosfera culturale parigina, nella quale avverte sempre con
maggior durezza il pericolo averroista, che si manifesta particolar
mente nelle teorie delleternit del mondo, dellunicit dellintel
letto e della doppia verit e che sincarna in Bartolomeo di Bruges
e Giovanni di Jandun attraverso un catalogo anonimo di 44 errori,
trascritto nel Liber de syllogismis contradictoriis. Per sventare tale
pericolo Lullo propone larte combinatoria come metodo di incon
tro/scontro tra le ragioni degli averroisti e quelle degli anti-aver
roisti e di conversione dei primi. Cos Lullo finisce per concepire
laverroismo come una perversione, che minaccia la Chiesa cri
stiana a causa del divorzio tra la teologia e la filosofia e lautono
mia di questultima.8
A.Bonner nel 1995 ha sottolineato come Lullo nelle opere
dellultimo periodo parigino applichi la logica, che andato ela
borando nel precedente decennio. In particolare, Bonner si
soffermato sulla tecnica dei sillogismi opposti, su quella dellag
gettivazione superlativa del predicato, che inerisce a Dio, e sulla
7 Cf. F.Moreno Rodriguez, La lucha de Ramon Llull contra el averroismo,
Ph. D.Diss., Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, 1981
8 Cf. R. Imbach, Lulle face aux Averrostes parisiens, in Raymond Lulle
et le pays dOc. Cahiers de Fanjeaux 22, Toulouse, 1987, pp.261282.
92
composizione dei sillogismi, le cui premesse sono entrambe univer

sali, ma luna affermativa e laltra negativa, mentre la conclusione
particolare nisi clausa, ossia dipendente da una condizione espli
citata nella maggiore.9
Il quarto periodo parigino ha interessato anche A. Bordoy Fer
nndez nel 2002: egli ha comparato lattivit lulliana ad una mera
crociata contro gli averroisti ed Averro, confuso con Aristotele;
tale crociata, che culmina nel Concilio di Vienne, mira ad affian
care al senso ed allimmaginazione lintelletto in quanto facolt
cognitiva, capace di formulare i ragionamenti ed elaborare larte
combinatoria al fine di eliminare la doppia verit degli averroisti.10
C.Bonmariage nel 2006, traducendo la Declaratio Raimundi in
francese con M. Lambert, ha compiuto unaccurata analisi con
tenutistica e stilistica di tale opera, che stata contestualizzata
nellambito del secondo soggiorno parigino di Lullo dal 1297 al
1299. Ad avviso di Bonmariage, tale opera il primo e pi cele
bre commento del syllabus di Tempier, non un mero dialogo, ma
una Declaratio sotto forma di dialogo. In essa Lullo non si sovrap
pone completamente ai censori del marzo del 1277, senza tutta
via criticarli al modo di Egidio Romano e Goffredo di Fontaines.
Lobiettivo polemico di Lullo non Averro, la cui conoscenza
approssimativa anche nelle opere del quarto periodo parigino, ma
il razionalismo estremo e la visione dicotomica della filosofia e
della teologia.11
G.Musotto nel 2009 ha dimostrato la vicinanza testuale della
Declaratio Raimundi alla tradizione manoscritta delle condanne
del 1277, tradizione riconducibile al ms. Erlangen, Universitts
bibliotek, 251.12 Qui prender in considerazione tutte le opere del
secondo e del quarto periodo parigino, che la critica ha comune
mente considerato anti-averroiste. Eccone uno schema cronologico:
9 Cf. A. Bonner, Syllogisms, fallacies and hypotheses: Llulls new
weapons to combat the Parisian Averroists, in Aristotelica et Lulliana, ed.
F.DomInguez Reboiras et. al., Turnhout, 1995, pp.457476.
10 Cf. A. Bordoy Fernndez, Ramon Llull y la crtica al averrosmo
cristiano, Taula, 37 (2002), pp.2135.
11 Cf. C. Bonmariage, Introduction, in Lulle et la condemnation de 1277.
La Dclaration de Raymond crite sous forme de dialogue, ed. C.Bonmariage &
M.Lambert, Louvain, 2006, pp.i-xxxiii.
12 Cf. G. Musotto, Letica in Nicola di Ockham. Aspetti filosofici ed
antropologici. Ph. Diss. Salerno, 2009, pp.3745.

Titolo
Declaratio Raimundi per modum dialogi edita13
De modo naturali intelligendi
Supplicatio Raimundi
Liber reprobationis aliquorum errorum Averrois
Liber in quo declaratur quod fides catholica
est magis probabilis quam improbabilis
Liber de sancta fide catholica
Liber de possibili et impossibili
De fallaciis
Disputatio Raimundi et Averroistae
Liber Natalis pueri parvuli Christi Iesu
Liber lamentationis philosophiae
Liber contradictionis14
Liber de syllogismis contradictoriis
Liber de divina unitate et pluralitate
Sermones contra errores Averrois
Liber de efficiente et effectu15
93
Data di ultimazione
22 febbraio 1298
maggio 1310
luglio 1310
luglio 1310
luglio 1310
agosto 1310
ottobre 1310
dopo settembre 1310
ottobre
25 dicembre 1310
25 dicembre 1310
gennaio 1311
febbraio 1311
febbraio 1311
febbraio 1311
marzo 1311
aprile 1311
maggio 1311
Allinizio della Declaratio Raimundi per modum dialogi Lullo

triste e si trova nei pressi di una fonte nei dintorni di Parigi,
tenendo tra le mani il Liber errorum philosophorum, ossia una copia
delle asserzioni condannate da Tempier nel marzo del 1277.16 Il
topos del luogo ameno, ricco di alberi, fonti ed uccelli, utilizzato
da Lullo nellArbor scientiae, nel Liber de Sanctu Spiritu, Liber de
sancta Maria, Disputatio de quinque sapientibus e nel Liber de consolatione eremitae, dove tuttavia la fonte assente.17 Tale topos si
riaffaccia nel Liber lamentationis philosophiae, dove La filosofia
a lamentarsi presso un luogo ameno pieno di alberi e uccelli cin
guettanti perch si moltiplicano le opinioni e gli errori dei filosofi,
Altrimenti appellato Liber contra errores Boetii et Sigerii.
Altrimenti appellato Liber de centum syllogismis.
15 Altrimenti appellato De efficiente et effectu quae fuit disputatio Raymundi
et Averroistarum.
16 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Declaratio Raimundi per modum dialogi edita,
ed. M. Pereira & T. Pindl-Bchel, Turnhout, 1989 (ROL, 17; CCCM, 79),
pp.253256.
17 Cf. R.Friedlein, Der Dialog bei Ramon Llull. Literarische Gestaltung als
apologetische Strategie, Tbingen, 2004, pp.523.
13
14
94
privi di verit.18 Mentre in epoca classica il luogo silvestre simbo

leggia la perdizione e la deviazione dalla retta ragione,19 in Lullo
il luogo ameno viene a denotare la bellezza della ragione, con la
quale tutti gli uomini possono riconciliarsi e che si contrappone
alla sofferenza interiore di Lullo.
Nel Liber contradictionis un Raimundista ed un averroista sin
contrano a Parigi e si accorgono che credere nella trinit, nellin
carnazione e nella creazione e negare la loro verit naturale con
traddittorio, perch non si pu affermare e negare la stessa cosa
della stessa cosa. Quindi decidono di andare fuori Parigi presso
un boschetto con una fonte, dove possono aprire gli occhi e capire
il motivo della contraddizione. Dopo una preghiera appare sotto
un albero una donna bellissima, che si fa chiamare Contraddizione
e che li aiuter a convenire.20 Alla fine del libro Contraddizione
chiede allaverroista di formulare cento sillogismi, che tuttavia
sono assenti.21 Il Liber de syllogismis contradictoriis si apre dopo che
laverroista ha formulato i suoi cento sillogismi. Ora Raimondo
presenta 44 errori degli averroisti contro la fede cattolica e poi
prova i suoi sillogismi secondo le dieci dignit al grado superlativo.
Nella Declaratio Raimundi Lullo raggiunto da Socrate, che
inpersonifica il filosofo per eccellenza. Lullo e Socrate si accordano
a discutere ogni proposizione al fine di trovare la concordanza tra
la teologia e la filosofia, lasciando il resto ai maestri dellUniver
sit di Parigi.22 Lullo convince Socrate ad adottare il metodo dei
18 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Liber lamentationis philosophiae, ed. H.Harada,
Turnhout, 1975 (ROL, 7; CCCM 32), p.88.
19 Cf. J. Tavard, Les jardins de Saint Augustin. MontralParis, 1988,
passim.
20 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Liber contradictionis, ed. H.Harada, Turnhout,
1975 (ROL, 7; CCCM, 32), p.138.
21 Ibid., p. 158. Gli errori dellavverroista negano linfinit di Dio, la
trinit, lincarnazione, la creazione e la novit del mondo, la causazione di
Dio negli inferiori, dellangelo, la creazione di questultimo, lonnipotenza con
cui Dio pu porre una nuova stella nel cielo o una nuova specie, la conoscenza
divina dei particolari, delle cose esterne, lintelletto separato, Lesistenza dei
demoni, del Paradiso, dellInferno e del cielo empreo; Raimundus Lullus,
Liber de syllogismis contradictoriis, ed. H.Harada, Turnhout, 1975 (ROL, 7;
CCCM, 32), pp.171172.
22 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Declaratio Raimundi per modum dialogi, op. cit.,
pp.253256.
95
principi generali dellarte combinatoria, che ad avviso di Socrate

in quanto necessari spettano alla filosofia e non alla teologia
rivelata.23 La raggiunta concordanza sancita alla fine dellopera,
allorch Lullo e Socrate portano insieme il libro al vescovo, al
cancelliere ed ai maestri dellUniversit di Parigi.24
Le obiezioni di Socrate, che qui ci interessano, vertono su due
temi principali, ossia la resurrezione ultra-terrena ed il primato
della filosofia. Infatti, Socrate respinge a pi riprese la possibilit
di tale resurrezione. Ad esempio, nel cap. 15 essa negata, per
ch dopo la morte luomo perde ogni bene, avendo lo stesso intel
letto universale, ma non il senso, che deperisce con il corpo.25 Nel
cap. 17 lassurdit della resurrezione per via naturale appare in
tutta evidenza, perch un corpo cremato, disperso per terra e per
mare e trasformato in concime vegetale non pu ritornare nume
ricamente identico.26 La critica lulliana si focalizza attorno al fine
della vita umana, che non coincide con lo studio filosofico, ma
con il culto di Dio; per cui, essendo sommamente intelligibile ed
amabile, Dio desidera che luomo indirizzi ogni suo sforzo verso la
conoscenza e lamore verso Dio, che si realizzano pienamente nella
vita ultra-terrena e quindi grazie alla resurrezione; la perdita di
questultima comporta lirrimediabile insoddisfazione del fine, per
cui luomo stato creato da Dio.27 V una perfetta ordinazione
tra Dio in quanto causa e la creatura in quanto effetto.28 Segue un
rapido accenno alla teoria dellunicit dellintelletto:
Sed tu, Socrates, falsam habes opinionem et contra magnum finem
antedictum et contra finem tuae magnae utilitatis, quia supponis
esse in omnibus hominibus unum intellectum, quod est impossi
bile []29
Inoltre, negare la resurrezione significherebbe inficiare lonnipo

tenza e la giustizia di Dio: lonnipotenza, perch Dio pu sempre
trasgredire le leggi del corso ordinario della natura; la giustizia,
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
pp.256257.
p.401.
pp.280281.
p.282.
p.281.
p.286.
p.281.
96
perch il merito ed il demerito non potrebbero essere valutati da

Dio nel giorno del giudizio universale. 30
Idcirco sequitur circulus et triangulus, in quantum principium et
finis nostrae naturae se inuicem respiciunt et sibi inuicem corres
pondent supra cursum naturalem. Et nostra natura est in medio
illorum duorum terminorum supradictorum secundum cursum
naturalem. Vnde, cum hoc ita sit, colligitur finis corporis hominis
ita in fine per resurrectionem, sicut accipitur supra naturam in
principio per creationem. Et tu, Socrates, hanc philosophiam per
dis, quia negas resurrectionem. 31
Questo passaggio pone laccento sulla distinzione tra il corso

naturale e quello soprannaturale: mentre sul piano naturale il prin
cipio, che si riferisce sia al cerchio, ossia alla perfezione divina, sia
alla creazione, ed il fine, che rimanda sia al triangolo, ossia alle
tre facolt dellanima razionale delluomo, sia alla resurrezione,
confliggono vicendevolmente in quanto tali, pur riconoscendo un
punto medio, che inerisce alluomo in quanto sinolo di anima e
corpo, tale contrasto scompare sul piano soprannaturale, in cui il
principio ed il fine sono riassunti. Data la mediet delluomo tanto
tra il cerchio ed il triangolo quanto tra la creazione e la resurre
zione sul piano naturale, il filosofo, che respinge la resurrezione,
commette un errore sullo stesso piano naturale e quindi in filoso
fia prima che in teologia. Sarebbe vano cercare di dimostrare la
resurrezione per necessarias rationes, che coinvolgerebbero solo il
senso e limmaginazione, omettendo il ricorso alla fede. 32
Quanto al secondo tema, le obiezioni di Socrate si moltiplicano
a dismisura. Ad esempio, nel cap. 16 la fede risulta ampiamente
svalutata, perch de fide nihil est curandum, si dicatur aliquid
Ibid., pp.284286.
Ibid., p.285.
32 Ibid., p.286. Nella geometria lulliana, mentre il cerchio rappresenta
la perfezione divina ed il triangolo simboleggia le tre facolt dellanima
razionale, il quadrato denota il mondo imperfetto; cf. J.J.Hofmann, Ramon
Lulls Kreisquadratur, Heidelberg, 1942, pp.112; A. Llinars, Version
franaise de la premire partie de la Quadrature et triangulature du cercle,
SL 30 (1990), pp.121138; E. Pistolesi, Ramon Llull, la geometria i les
quadratures del cercle, in Actes de les Jornades Internacionals Lullianes. Ramon
Llull al s. XXI.Palma, 1, 2 i 3 dabril de 2004, ed. M. I. Ripoll Perell,
Barcelona, 2005, pp.107144.
30
31
97
esse haereticum, quod est contra fidem. 33 Nel cap. 24 la sola

disciplina filosofica necessaria, perch permette di guadagnare
la conoscenza delle verit naturali. 34 Nel cap. 34, il viandante pu
attingere alla conoscenza diretta dellessenza divina, che non pu
frustrare il desiderio naturale delluomo a conoscere. 35 Nel cap.
39 quod non est excellentior status quam vacare philosophiae. 36
Nel cap. 144, ogni bene possibile alluomo consiste nelle virt
intellettuali. 37
Il cap. 145 proclama il diritto del filosofo a disputare ogni
questione per rationem. 38 Nel cap. 157, Homo, quantum ad intel
lectum et quantum ad effectum dispositus potest esse sufficien
ter per virtutes intellectuales et alias morales, de quibus loquitur
Philosophus in 5 Ethicis, est sufficienter dispositus ad felicitatem
aeternam. 39 Il cap. 176 afferma a chiare lettere che la felicit si
raggiunge in questa vita e non nellaltra.40 Nel cap. 22, Dio non
pu dare la felicit ad alcuno, sconvolgendo il corretto ordine di
tutte le cause, che parte dal moto dei cieli.41 Nel capitolo succes
sivo, Dio non pu dare la felicit ad uno e non ad un altro senza
ragione.42
Lullo di fronte a questa messe di obiezioni restaura la necessit
della fede, che non distrugge, ma completa le verit filosofiche con
quelle teologiche.43 Tale restaurazione provoca la riaffermazione
del primato della teologia e delle scienze morali, che consentono di
conoscere le virt teologali e di rifuggire dalle pene dellInferno.44
Le virt morali ed intellettuali non sono il fine delluomo, ma uno
33 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Declaratio Raimundi per modum dialogi, op. cit.,
p.181.
34 Ibid., p.292.
35 Ibid., p.302.
36 Ibid., p.303.
37 Ibid., p.366.
38 Ibid., pp.366367.
39 Ibid., p.372.
40 Ibid., p.382.
41 Ibid., pp.290291.
42 Ibid., p.291.
43 Ibid., pp.281282, 302.
44 Ibid., p.292.
98
strumento, che deve riconoscere il primato delle virt teologali.45

Le verit di fede non sono visibili allintelletto per un impedi
mento del senso o dellimmaginazione e diventano intellegibili solo
in virt dellabito della fede.46
Fides est ipsa uirtus, quae intellectum cogit ad credendum uera
de Deo, quae homo non intelligit per necessarias rationes.47
Dunque, la fede una facolt cognitiva, che interviene in soc

corso dellintelletto, allorch esso si mostra incapace di procedere
in modo infallibile con la ragione naturale, con cui il filosofo pu
rimontare dagli effetti alle cause per dimostrare determinati arti
coli di fede, come la creazione.48 Poich il filosofo procede sem
pre dagli effetti alle cause o viceversa, la sua scienza inferiore
rispetto a quella del teologo, che considera Dio direttamente in s
secondo le ragioni delle dignit divine:
Vnde, cum in altiori gradu consistat consideratio theologiae
quam consideratio philosophiae, debent quaestiones theologiae
per rationes disputari siue naturales siue super cursum naturalem
miraculose, et per auctoritates sanctorum, attingentes per fidem
ueritates et secreta de Deo et de sua operatione, quam habet
intrinsece et extrnsece immediate, Deo scilicet agente in effectu
suo immediate. Et quia philosophus operationem Dei non conside
rat sine medio, et theologus ipsam considerat sine medio, conside
ratio theologi est altior et nobilior quam consideratio philosophi.
Vnde sequitur, quod quaestiones theologiae magis disputabiles
sunt per theologiam quam per philosophiam.49
Perci, il filosofo non pu determinare ogni questione, perch

quelle teologiche richiedono un metodo, che dia un accesso diretto
a Dio ed ammetta il miracolo e le autorit dei santi. La ragione
naturale assimilata da Lullo alle rationes necessariae. Con esse
la fede condivide la funzione coercitiva, ossia indipendente dalla
volont individuale, ma non trasforma mai luomo da apprehensor in comprehensor, ossia da viandante in beato.50 A differenza di
45
46
47
48
49
50
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
p.366.
p.282.
p.282.
p.282.
p.367.
p.282.
99
questultimo, il viandante deve conoscere Dio tramite una similitudo, ossia in modo indiretto e mediato da una specie, che rappre
senta in qualche modo lessenza divina.51 Ne esce ridimensionata
la stessa autonomia del filosofo:
Idcirco dicit quidam sapiens, quod ingrediens ad scientiam philo
sophiae per habitum fidei potest in breuiori tempore esse philoso
phus et habere magnum intellectum quam ille, qui ingreditur ad
ipsam sine habitu fidei. 52
La conclusione di Lullo sorprendentemente antagonista alli

deale del filosofo averroista: la fede non ostacola, ma accelera la
formazione del filosofo. Il filosofo pecca proprio nella sua scienza
filosofica, perch considera uno solo dei due modi dagire di Dio.
Nellun modo Dio in quanto causa prima provoca il movimento
del primo cielo e tramite esso quello del sole, che riscalda la legna,
facendola bruciare. Ma, laltro modo immediato:
Et ideo Deus priuilegium habet, quod sit prima causa omnium
causarum sine medio. Et per tale priuilegium Deus facit miracula
et in suo effectu agit ad suum placitum; et ignem impedire posset,
ne combureret ligna, quamuis sol sit causa ignis, quod igna com
burat. Potest ergo Deus per talem modum dare felicitatem homi
nibus sine medio et cuicumque homini uoluerit. 53
Questo passaggio evidenzia i limiti della conoscenza filosofica.

Infatti, Dio pu eliminare la mediazione delle cause seconde, come
il cielo ed il sole, provocando direttamente leffetto, ossia la com
bustione della legna. Parimenti, Dio pu soprannaturalmente ren
dere felice un uomo anzich un altro senza alcuna ragione, che il
filosofo possa comprendere. Poich latto, con cui Dio d la grazia
a Guglielmo e non a Martino, assolutamente libero e gratuito,
non v maggiore dignit in Guglielmo che in Martino54.
Nelle opere, che Lullo redige durante lultimo soggiorno pari
gino probabilmente nel monastero cartusiano, si nota la persi
stenza dellintento di concordare la teologia con la filosofia, che
concepita come lancella della prima. Ci accade, ad esempio, nel
51
52
53
54
Ibid., p.302.
Ibid., p.283.
Ibid, pp.290291.
Ibid., p.291.
100
De modo naturali intelligendi, 55 nel Liber de quo declaratur quod fides

catholica sit magis probabilis quam improbabilis56 e nel Liber de possibili et impossibili, in cui larte combinatoria chiamata in causa
per disvellere gli errori sia della filosofia sia della teologia.57 Men
tre la teologia una scienza in s, la filosofia, che si contrappone
alla teologia, figmentum.58
Tale persistenza si rivela anche nel Liber lamentationis philosophiae dedicato a Filippo il Bello, re di Francia, ai maestri e bac
cellieri dellUniversit di Parigi59 e nel Liber de efficiente et effectu60.
Nel De modo intelligendi si osserva la distinzione tra la teologia
rivelata e quella provata per rationes.61 Il tema della resurrezione
si ripresenta tra gli errori del Liber reprobationis aliquorum errorum
Averrois, dedicato a Papa ClementeV e Filippo il Bello, secondo
largomento dellimpossibilit del ritorno del corpo numericamente
identico.62 Qui Lullo adduce due esempi per sostenere lidentit
numerica e la capacit, che Dio ha di restaurare soprannatural
mente il corpo numericamente identico. Il primo esempio riguarda
la rosa, che passa dalla potenza allatto o si trasforma, restando
numericamente identica, ma ricevendo e perdendo alcune pro
priet. Il secondo esempio concerne una massa composta di unon
cia doro ed unaltra di argento; tale massa rimane numericamente
una, allorch loro e largento vengono introdotti in un forno per
essere combinati o la stessa massa subisce un successivo processo
di riscaldamento.63 Perci, Dio puo restaurare il corpo di Socrate,
55 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, De modo naturali intelligendi, ed. H.Riedlinger,
Turnhout, 1978 (ROL, 6; CCCM, 33), pp.189, 217.
56 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Liber in quo declaratur quod fides catholica sit
magis probabilis quam improbabilis, ed. H.Riedlinger, Turnhout, 1978 (ROL,
6; CCCM, 33), pp.328330.
57 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Liber de possibili et impossibili, ed. H.Riedlinger,
Turnhout, 1978 (ROL, 6; CCCM, 33), p.384.
58 Ibid., p.448.
59 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Liber lamentationis philosophiae, op. cit.,
pp.125126.
60 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Liber de efficiente et effectu, ed. H.Harada,
Turnhout, 1975 (ROL 7; CCCM 32), p.174.
61 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, De modo naturali intelligendi, op. cit., p.209.
62 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Liber reprobationis aliquorum errorum Averrois,
ed. H.Riedlinger, Turnhout, 1978 (ROL, 6; CCCM, 33), p.314.
63 Ibid., p.315.
101
gi corrotto dopo la morte. Questa soluzione corroborata con

largomento dellinsufficienza del senso e dellimmaginazione e con
quello del giudizio universale, a cui si aggiunge largomento della
maggior perfezione della vita ultra-terrena, in cui tutti gli intel
letti particolari degli uomini trovano quiete.64
Largomento del giorno del giudizio riutilizzato nel Liber de
sancta fide catholica.65 Nel De fallaciis la resurrezione negata
con la fallacia, per cui nihil agit extra naturam. Lullo dimostra
lesatto opposto del contenuto della fallacia, ossia che Dio pu
soprannaturalmente far passare un corpo dallessere al non-es
sere o viceversa, lasciandolo numericamente unico; solo il nulla
pu resistere allazione divina.66 Largomento dellinimpedibilit
dellagire divino ricompare nel Liber contradictionis67 e nel Liber
de syllogismis contradictoriis, dedicato a Filippo il Bello da Lullo
che si qualifica come magister.68 Qui Lullo attribuisce al beato la
possibilit soprannaturale di godere della felicit degli angeli, che
tuttavia sono slegati dalla materia, non avendo bisogno di cibo ed
acqua.69 Perci, Lullo pu concludere:
Auerroista, ait Raimundista, probatum est duodecimo capitulo,
quod resurrectio non est impossibilis. Ex quo sequitur, quod
non est impossibile idem numero resurgere, quoniam, sicut diui
nus intellectus ambit et obiectat omnes partes corporis mortui
Socratis aut Platonis cum summo possibili, et summum impossi
bile impedit et cogit omne impossibile inferius siue possibile, sic
diuina aeternitas conseruat illas partes quamlibet in suo numero,
et diuina potestas potest ipsas congregare et iterum componere.
Et hoc bonum, magnum etc. est, ut appareat altissima bonitas,
magnitudo etc.70
Largomentazione lulliana si fonda sullonnipotenza, con cui Dio

pu conservare ed aggregare le varie parti del corpo del defunto,
Ibid., pp.316317.
Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Liber de sancta fide catholica, ed. H.Riedlinger,
Turnhout, 1978 (ROL, 6; CCCM, 33), pp.354355, 373.
66 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, De fallaciis, ed. H.Riedlinger, Turnhout, 1978
(ROL 6; CCCM, 33), p.486.
67 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Liber contradictionis, op. cit., p.153.
68 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Liber de syllogismis contradictoriis, op. cit., p.198.
69 Ibid., pp.186187.
70 Ibid., p.191.
64
65
102
evitandone la putrefazione. Nel Liber de syllogismis contradictoriis

gli articoli 11, 25, 31 e 38 si riferiscono alla resurrezione, alla vita
ultra-terrena ed alla felicit.71 Tale vita sancita come patrimo
nio comune dei cristiani, degli ebrei, dei mussulmani e dei filosofi
antichi.72
La considerazione, con cui Lullo si rapporta ad Averro ed ai
suoi seguaci, ben riassunta nei Sermones contra errores Averrois,
allorch Lullo spiega la negazione dellincarnazione in base a due
caratteristiche di Averro, ossia lessere mussulmano e lessere
philosophus per sensum et imaginationem.73 Nel Liber reprobationis
aliquorum errorum Averrois Lullo pronto a scusare Averro per
la diversit della confessione religiosa, ma non gli averroisti, che
reputa cavillatores nel Liber de sancta fide catholica.74
[] quoniam cum sensu et imaginatione non potest attingere fidem
sanctam et catholicam. Et ideo Auerroes errauit; quia uidens,
quod per sensum et imaginationem probari non poterat, credidit
ipsam esse improbabilem per omnem modum; quod falsum est;
ut probatum est supra. Et ideo si errauit, non est mirum, cum
fuerit Saracenus et ignorauerit, quidquid in prima distinctione fuit
dictum. Sed mirandum nimium | est et dolendum de christianis
quibusdam, qui dicunt se esse philosophos et adhaerent istis opi
nionibus Auerrois secundum modum intelligendi, ut dicunt, cum
audiuerint illa, quae in prima distinctione dicuntur. Ex quibus
deberent confiteri et cognoscere fidem christianam fulcitam esse
ueris rationibus et eius contrarium inueni falsis positionibus et
friuolis, sophisticis ac phantasticis fundamentis.75
In altre parole, Lullo non negativamente impressionato da

Averro, che, non avendo la fede cristiana, non poteva far altro
che impiegare il senso e limmaginazione, ma dai philosophi che,
pur professandosi cristiani, si ostinano a rigettare le verit di fede
con ragioni sofistiche. Nel Liber lamentationis philosophiae Lullo
precisa la distinzione tra Averro e gli averroisti:
Ibid., p.172.
Ibid., p.197.
73 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Sermones contra errores Averrois, ed. H.Harada,
Turnhout, 1975 (ROL, 7; CCCM, 32), pp.257258.
74 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Liber de sancta fide catholica, op. cit., p.373.
75 Raimundus Lullus, Liber reprobationis aliquorum errorum Averrois, op.
cit., p.318.
71
72
103
[] et ideo infdelis contradicit articulis fidei. Et hoc duobus

modis, credendo et intelligendo. Credendo, sicut Saracenus, qui
non credit Deum esse trinum et incarnatum, et huiusmodi. Alio
modo sicut Auerroista christianus, qui asserit, quod secundum
modum intelligendi impossibile est Deum esse trinum et incar
natum; sed dicit se credere, quod Deus sit trinus et incarnatus,
cum se dicat esse catholicum. Et ideo catholicus et Saracenus se
habent contradictorie. Et etiam catholicus et Auerroista; quoniam
si uere et simpliciter est impossibile trinitatem et incarnationem
esse, impossibile est fidem catholicam ueram esse. Fides autem
est habitus, sub quo catholicus uerus ponit altitudines diuinarum
rationum per infinitatem omnimode simplicem; Saracenus autem
et Auerroista christianus negant. Et ideo catholicus ponit Deum
esse habentem bonitatem optimam, infinitam, magnitudinem
maximam, infinitam etc.; et est Dominus naturae creatae licen
tians ipsam naturam, quod ipsa agat naturaliter; et quod non sit
aliquid resistens ei, quod impediat, quod non possit agere super
naturam ad placitum et miraculose. Et hoc ponit fdes per infini
tam bonitatem, magnitudinem etc. Ad quod sequitur, quod fdes
est positiua et infdelitas per me priuatiua. Dico: per me, quia
intellectus per me est corruptus et peruersus; et hoc, quia homo
infidelis talis est.76
Vale a dire che sia Averro sia gli averroisti sono infideles, ossia
non-credenti, ma per ragioni differenti: Averro per la completa
mancanza della fede cristiana, gli averroisti per il primato della
ragione naturale, con cui escludono il piano soprannaturale e mira
coloso dellagire divino. Mentre Lullo molto comprensivo verso
Averro, non riesce a scusare gli averroisti in quanto cristiani.
Perci, nel Liber Natalis parvuli Christi gli averroisti e non Aver
ro sono tacciati di eresia, perch sono essi a distruggere dallin
terno la fede cattolica.77 Nei Sermones contra errores Averrois gli
averroisti sono ritenuti solo devoti sul piano religioso ed ignoranti
in filosofia, perch sono abituati sulla scorta di Averro ad usare
solo le facolt inferiori, ossia il senso e limmaginazione, con una
compromissione dellintelletto, che risulta offuscato e deviato.78
Nel Liber de possibili et impossibili il disprezzo di Lullo risuona
Raimundus Lullus, Liber lamentationis philosophiae , op. cit., p.104.
Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Liber Natalis pueri parvuli Christi Jesus, ed.
H. Harada, Turnhout, 1975 (ROL, 7; CCCM, 32), pp.6970.
78 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Sermones contra errores Averrois, op. cit.,
pp.246248.
76
77
104
in philosophantes invece di philosophi. Vale a dire che essi

non assurgono al grado di filosofi ad imitazione di Aristotele, ma
sono ridotti a professionisti della filosofia, che non oltrepassano il
nexus del corso naturale, verificabile con il senso e limmagina
zione.79 Di conseguenza, la seconda delle cinque questioni della
Disputatio Raimundi et Averroistae si domanda Utrum hoc, quod
intelligit Auerroista per Commentatorem Aristotelis contra sanctam
fidem catholicam sit uera intellectio.80 Laverroista spiega che egli
in quanto cristiano crede nella verginit di Maria, nellincarna
zione, nella creazione dal nulla e nella risurrezione dei morti; ma
non pu intelligere philosophice queste verit, perch esse risultano
impossibili secondo la ragione naturale.81 Raimondo risponde che
limpossibilit vale solo per una parte della ragione naturale, ossia
il senso e limmaginazione, non per la conversione delle ragioni
alla luce dellarte combinatria.82
La frattura tra lintelligere ed il credere dellaverroista cristiano
si riaffaccia nel Liber lamentationis philosophiae e nel Liber de fallaciis. Nel primo Gli averroisti credono, ma non intelligunt per
via naturale la verginit di Maria, lincarnazione e la creazione
dal nulla, distruggendo la fede cattolica. Per Lullo la non intelle
zione vale solo per il senso e limmaginazione.83 Nel secondo Lullo
tenta di sventare il rischio della doppia verit, ossia di una verit
filosofica, che rivendica la sua autonomia rispetto al dato di fede:
Etiam dico, quod implicas contradictionem, quoniam si uere intel
ligis et philosophice, quod fides catholica est impossibilis, necessa
rium est quod sit impossibilis; ergo non oportet, quod tu credas,
quod sit uera: Et si non credis, non es catholicus neque christia
nus. Sed bene posses dicere, quod credis Deum esse incarnatum,
creatorem etc., sed philosophice hoc non intelligis. 84
Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Liber de possibili et impossibili, op. cit., p.384.

Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Disputatio Raimundi et Averroistae, ed.
H. Harada, Turnhout, 1975 (ROL, 7; CCCM, 32), p.11.
81 Ibid., p.11.
82 Ibid., pp.1112.
83 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Liber lamentationis philosophiae, op. cit., p.87.
84 Raimundus Lullus, Disputatio Raimundi et Averroistae, op. cit., p.12.
79
80
105
Come si vede, la soluzione lulliana consiste nella restaurazione

della verit teologica, che si rivela incomprensibile a livello filo
sofico.
*
**
In conclusione, il primo elemento che balza agli occhi rap
presentato dalla sostanziale omogeneit speculativa delle opere
del secondo e del quarto periodo. Lanalisi di tali opere avvalla in
prima istanza il giudizio di Riedlinger e Bonmariage sulla scarsa
conoscenza di Lullo nei confronti delle teorie di Averro; egli
assume tratti idealtipici, che suscitano una critica superficiale dal
punto di vista squisitamente speculativo. Questo atteggiamento
accomuna Lullo al contemporaneo Francesco Petrarca.85 Ma, men
tre la critica petrarchesca risulta piuttosto agressiva, quella lul
liana si contraddistingue per la tolleranza. Infatti, Lullo riesce
a scusare Averro a causa della sua diversa confessione religiosa.
Invece, Lullo dirige i suoi strali verso i filosofanti: essi non pos
sono essere definiti filosofi, perch seguono la filosofia di Averro,
che coinvolge solo il senso e limmaginazione, e finiscono per igno
rare la filosofia o almeno la parte che Lullo giudica superiore in
quanto basata sulluso dellintelletto e dellarte combinatoria. Cos
tali filosofanti, pur professandosi cristiani, si rendono totalmente
infideles agli occhi di Lullo, perch trasformano la religione cri
stiana in una mera devozione e producono una completa frattura
tra il credere e lintelligere, la verit di fede e quella filosofica, che
diventa autonoma dalla prima grazie alluso della ragione naturale
ed a dispetto del piano soprannaturale.
85 Franciscus Petrarca, Epistula XX ad Ludovicum Marslium, in

Le anepigrafe di Francesco Petrarca, ed. O.Duva, Sassari, 1895, p. 78:
Extremum quaeso, ut cum primum perveneris quo suspiras (quod cito fore
confido), contra canem illum rabidum Averroim, qui furore actus infando,
contra Dominum suum Christum contraque catholicam fidem latrat, collectis
undique blasphemiis eius (quod, ut scis, iam ceperamus, sed me ingens semper
et nunc solito maior occupatio nec minor temporis quam scientiae retraxit
inopia), totis ingenii viribus ac nervis incumbens, rem a multis magnis viris
impie neglectam, opusculum unum scribas.
106
Latteggiamento lulliano verso gli averroisti latini configura la

campagna apologetica nei termini di Moreno Rodriguez o la cro
ciata nei termini di Bordoy Fernndez; ma tale crociata va inserita
innanzi tutto nel generale progetto lulliano di conversione degli
infideles e solo secondariamente nel tentativo di ricomposizione del
divorzio tra la filosofia e la teologia nei termini di Imbach e Bon
mariage, tentativo che riecheggia fin nel prologo dellOrdinatio di
Giovanni Duns Scoto. Nelle intenzioni di Lullo tale ricomposizione
si avvia dalla riconsiderazione del fine della vita umana e quindi
della felicit: essa si realizza pienamente nella vita ultra-terrena
non in questa vita e grazie al culto di Dio non grazie alla
speculazione filosofica.
Tale riconsiderazione implica due conseguenze. In primo luogo
Lullo restaura la fede, che completa le verit filosofiche, soccorre
lintelletto umano di per s fallibile con luso della sola ragione
naturale e ed accelera la formazione del filosofo, perch gli fa con
seguire la conoscenza del piano soprannaturale. Infatti, con que
sta conoscenza che la resurrezione in quanto patrimonio comune
pu essere spiegata, garantendo la giustizia e lonnipotenza di Dio,
che pu sempre supplire lazione delle cause seconde e sconvolgere
lordine naturale, verificabile con il senso e limmaginazione.
In secondo luogo, il filosofo si vede ridimensionato nel suo
campo dazione; egli rimane capace di determinare alcune que
stioni teologiche per via naturale, dimostrando, ad esempio, la cre
azione quia, ossia a partire dagli effetti, o la resurrezione per la
mediet delluomo tra il cerchio ed il triangolo. Ma il filosofo deve
riconoscere la limitazione del suo metodo, che procede dagli effetti
alle cause o viceversa senza assicurare un accesso diretto a Dio in
quanto causa onnipotente e senza penetrare il miracolo e le auto
rit dei santi. Questo accesso e questa penetrazione caratterizzano
il metodo teologico, che ritenuto superiore da Lullo.
In definitiva queste due conseguenze sono in grado di ricom
porre il divorzio, ma con il chiaro rigetto della felicit speculativa,
della doppia verit e dellautonomia della filosofia, che ritorna ad
essere lancilla della teologia.
107
Abstract
La critica lulliana alla teoria averroista della felicit speculativa
Aquinas believes that natural desire is ordered towards the goal
of the beatific vision, which is both natural and supernatural, but
human nature cannot achieve this through its natural resources
alone, and it requires the help of supernatural grace. This the
ory diverges from Averroism, whereby man is naturally ordered
to achieve full happiness through philosophical knowledge. For
Aquinas, the human being in via is inevitably linked to per
ception and objects, and knows clearly that these are effects that
lead back to the supreme cause. However, the question about the
quid est of all causes is an impenetrable field for rationality. Henry
of Ghent demonstrates in the Summa (art. 4) that natural desire
is a property of the intellect, whose perfection must seek good of
its own free will; this improvement aims at the movement from a
less perfect knowledge to a more perfect one. But, as Henry main
tained, that movement cannot be confined to the natural level, a
view that the Averroist philosophers and Dante in the Convivio
defended: the natural desire is not capable of reaching out bey
ond what is possible because it is a property of natural reason.
This contribution aims to show how Llull reacted to this Aver
roist thesis, after the Paris condemnation of 1277, particularly in
the Declaratio Raymundi per modum dialogi edita (1298) and other
works against the Averroists (13091311).
Francesco Fiorentino
fiorentino12@libero.it
Via Ponte Don Melillo
I-84084 Fisciano (SA)
Italy
FROM METAPHORS TO CATEGORIES:

THE CONTEMPLATIVE AND SEMANTIC CYCLE
OF THE DIVINE NAMES
Jos Higuera Rubio
(Madrid-Porto)
The divine names that derive from specific passages in the sacra
pagina show a complex semantic relationship with the logical-meta
physical language of ancient philosophy. The sermocinal disci
plines of the trivium (grammar, logic and rhetoric) were charged
with combining these two axes on the one hand, the sacred text,
and on the other, the tradition of the liberal arts within a single
speculative discourse. In the XIIth century the study of the ways
in which the instability of ordinary language affects the meaning
of the terms attributed to the divinity in the sacred texts was, to
a large degree, at the center of theological reflection. These names,
which in grammatical terms are part of normal discourse and the
object of a set of norms of propositional construction, for logic are
terms that display a predicamental meaning with respect to other
terms. The ancient linguistic disciplines, which developed outside
of the Christian tradition, caused the emergence of the semantic
complexity of the divine names that translate the intellectual
and natural meaning of the creature-Creator relation.
As Chenu has explained, ancient and medieval grammatical
theory attempted to demonstrate the essential structure that
underlies propositions, while logic sought a semantic unity among
the diverse modes in which a term can be used with respect to
another. In this way, theological statements maintain the struc
ture provided by the discursive arts, so long as the meaning of the
terms is equivalent to the theological conception of the simple and
immobile unity that represents the divinity and its properties.1
1 Lapplication la theologie de la thorie grammaticale [] lunitas
nominis sest dvelope selon les etapes dun passage de la grammaire la
logique, puis de la logique la psychologie et la pistmologie, y comprise

IPM, 67 (Turnhout, 2015), pp. 109-134.
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107310
110
jos higuera rubio
It can be said that Llulls Art is a specific example of the way

in which the discursive arts worked to determine an order within
the multiplicity of meanings that, from the theological point
of view, terms such as goodness, justice, wisdom and greatness
possess.2
The semantic plurality of the divine names feeds a theological
reflection about the Creators relation with nature from a meta
physical, causal, ethical and mystical point of view. 3 As I will show
in what follows, Ramon Llull employs the inheritance of theologi
cal interpretation within the sermocinal disciplines as he seeks to
situate the divine names within a logical-grammatical perspective.
The peculiarity of Llull appears when we see that this perspective
gives rise to a super-Art (ars magna et major) 4 that aims to encom
pass the order of the signification of the divine names in radically
diverse constructions: the allegorical statements that describe the
direct intuition of the divine within the context of the contempla
tive life, the demonstration of the intra-Trinitarian relations and
the essential union of God with his virtues. To this can be added
the propositions that enunciate the rational understanding of the
causal influence of the divinity in nature.
In these constructions Llulls recourse to the linguistic arts
contributes the equivocal signification of metaphors in the case of
mystical allegories, as well as the categorial classification of the
lpistemologie sacre, M.-D. Chenu, La theologie au douzieme siecle, Paris,
1957, p.100.
2 Sic enim creatura rationabilis dicitur bona uel iusta uel sapiens uel fortis
uel potens quoniam illum qui uere bonus est, qui natura iustus est, uerus est
fortis est sapiens est potens est imitator. Non ergo cum hec uel ad nos uel
ad nostra transsumtur uocabula putanda erunt in nobis diuinam significare
naturam uel denominationis consortium quod grece dicitur metonimia uel
similitudinem imitatoriam qua scilicet intelligimus deum imitari. Diuine
ergo appelationes aliud in naturalium usu aliud in supernaturalium speculatione
significare recte intelliguntur, Pierre of Poitiers, Die Zwettler Summe, ed.
N. Hring (BGPhThM, 15), Mnster, 1977, p.70.
3 Ramon Llull, Llibre de contemplaci en Du, ed. M.Obrador, M.Ferr
& S. Galms, (ORL, 5), Palma de Mallorca, 1911, p.21.
4 Ramon Llull, Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem seu Ars magna et
major, ed. F.Ph. Wolff, J.M. Kurhummel, Moguntiae, 1729 (MOG IV, reimpr.
F.Stegmller, Frankfurt, 1965).
from metaphors to categories
111
simple terms that serve as a semantic structure for the demonstra

tion of a natural theology. Metaphors, as stated in the definition
in Aristotles Poetics, transfer the meaning of a genus, species or
accident from one term to another, according to the proportion5
that the latter admits of. In the case of the meaning of the superessentia of the divine names in creatures, the proportion is lim
ited by material privation and the plurality of subjects. While the
categories do not have an allegorical or comparative function per
se, they acquire this characteristic because they represent to the
intellect the extrinsic action of the divinity in the multiplicity of
accidents that substances in nature suffer. This translative con
dition of metaphors and categories elevates language, but at the
same time highlights its weakness: the equivocal condition of the
divine names.
Ambiguity, which is dangerous for logic, represents a great
source of richness for allegorical discourse. During the complex
evolution of Llulls Art, the equivocal function of language, rep
resented by metaphors and categories, generates distinct semantic
functions for the divine names. Ramon Llull calls these functions
virtues or divine dignities, and identifies them with the principia of the Art. According to legend, they were infused in him
by divine inspiration. The principia are also called substantialia
et accidentalia,6 since they represent a set of simple terms that
Aristotle, Poetics, 1457 b27; Omne autem nomen est aut proprium
aut lingua aut metaphora aut ornato aut poetizatum aut superextensum aut
sublatum aut permutatum [] metaphora autem est nominis alieni illatio
aut genere ad speciem aut proportionale, Aristotle, De arte poetica, trad.
G. de Moeberke, ed. L.Minio-Paluello (Aristoteles latinus 33), Paris, 1968,
p.26; Donato, Ars grammatica, III, 6: Metaphora est rerum uerborumque
translatio; Averroes, Averrois expositivo poeticae, ed. L.Minio-Paluello
(Aristoteles latinus 26), Paris, 1968, p.42, Verumptamen translationes
potissime dici possunt concambia ex accidentibus rei sive concomitantibus
rem; et transumptio est concambium pro suo comproportionali, videlicet,
quando fuerit alicuius proportio ad secundum proportio tertii ad quartum,
tunc permutatur nomen tertii ad primum et contrario.
6 O Deus, qui tui gratia mihi hodie principia substantialia et accidentalia,
Thomas Le Myesier, Breviculum, seu Electorium parvum Thomae Migerii, ed.
Ch. Lohr; T. Pindl-Bchel, W. Bchel (Supplementum Lullianum, 1),
Turnhout, 1990, p.xxxiii; Ipsa autem principia sunt substantialia. Aliter
5
112
jos higuera rubio
demonstrate the divine unity with respect to the plurality that

their causal influence generates in nature. These terms are beyond
any categorisation, although they are located by Llull in proposi
tional and syllogistic constructions that are designed for the cate
gories and predicables.7
In parallel with the principles of his Art Llull is able, over
the course of his writings, to insert a more or less homogenous 8
list of the categories inherited from the Latin tradition, of both
Boethian and Pseudo-Augustinian origin. Inspired by the equiv
ocal function of the categories,9 Llull seeks to represent the sim
ilarities between the divine substance and attributes without
exhausting the divine essence, which for John Scotus Eriugena is
the metaphorical meaning of the categories, i.e. another example
of the translatio to the Creator of what is proper to creatures. The
Llullian Art is not foreign to the issue of categorial equivocity
and its relation to metaphorical meaning, since it inserts both in
diverse contexts: the mystical interpretation of the divine names,
the knowledge of elemental nature, dialectical demonstration and,
finally, predication and theological debate.
non essent primitiua, uera et necessaria, et essent accidentalia et in aliis

principiis sustentata, Ramon Llull, Liber correlatiuorum innatorum, ed.
H. Riedlinger, 1978 (ROL, 6), p.131.
7 Los principios del Arte no son, pues, como los principios aristotlicos,
proposiciones per se notae, las dignitates lulianas son conceptos. Tambin son
vera, necessaria (es decir, non contingentia), substantialia (es decir. non
accidentalia), propria (es decir, non appropriata et non peregrina) et evidentia
(no para la ratio sino para el intellectus), F. Dominguez, Geometra,
filosofa, teologa y arte, SL 35, 1995, p.7.
8 Cf. Ramon Llull, Compendium Logicae Algazelis, ed. Ch. Lohr, (Quellen,
Lehre und Stellung in der Geschichte der Logik), Freiburg i. Br., 1967,
p. 113; Logica nova, ed. W. Euler, Turnhout, 1998 (ROL, 23), pp.5681;
Arbor scientiae I, ed. P. Villalba, Turnhout, 2000 (ROL, 24), pp 4354.
9 Et ideo sicut non dicimus tres essentias sic nec tres magnitudines; hoc
est enim deo esse quod est magnum esse [...] eadem causa nec magnos tres
dicimus sed unum magnum quia non paticipatione magnitudinis deus magnus
est sed se ipso magno magnus est quia ipse sua magnitudo. hoc et de bonitate
et de aeternitate et de omnipotentia dei dictum sit omnibusque omnino
praedicamentis quae de deo possunt pronuntiari, quod ad se ipsum dicitur non
translate ac per similitudinem sed proprie, si tamen de illo proprie aliquid ore
hominis dici potest, Augustine, De Trinitate, V. 10.
113
In what follows I will attempt to show the cycle that equiv

ocity, metaphor and the categories produce in Llulls work, and
will present the hypothesis that Llulls intention is to apply these
aspects of the linguistic arts to the ars major, whose purpose is to
reach a mystical-contemplative relationship with the divinity. The
first issue to deal with is the Llullian response to the following
question in the Sentences: Deus sit in genere <aliquo>? (or Utrum
deus sit in praedicamenta?)10 This question gives us an idea of the
meaning of the equivocity of simple categorial terms with respect
to the divine essence and its creative production in nature. Llull
responds, as we will see, that the answer is negative from a theo
logical point of view, but it is not so from the perspective of the
knowledge of that which is created. In what follows I will discuss a
kind of discipline, or method, that can recognise the equivocity of
terms and which, in the words of Llull, unifies knowledge between
the elemental composition of nature and the divine virtues: the
metge teolec. In diverse places in the medieval tradition the equivo
cal meaning of the terms health and medicine appears, just as Aris
totle discussed.11 Here the art of medicine represents, in a second
ary manner, the health of the body, but in a metaphorical manner
it is the path for healing the soul. The theologian is the doctor of
the spirit, just as the physician is the doctor of the body. In var
ious writings Llull compares medicine with spiritual knowledge,
but it is in the Liber principiorum medicinae that he uses the term
metaphor as the instrument that will exalt the intellect in order
10 Quod dei simplicitas nulli praedicamentorum subiicitur, [] illa
praedicamenta artis dialecticae dei naturae minime conuenire, quae nullis est
subiecta accidentibus, Petrus Lombardus, Liber IV Sententiarum I, d. 8, c. 6.
11 Ens autem multis quidem dicitur modis, sed ad unum et unam
aliquam naturam et non equivoce, sed quemadmodum salubre omne ad
sanitatem, hoc quidem in conservatione, illud vero in actione, aliud quia
est signum sanitatis, hoc autem quia illius est susceptibile, et medicinale
ad medicinam, Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1003a 33 1003b 1, ed. L. MinioPaluello, Paris, 1968 (Aristoteles latinus 1), p. 60; [] nomen per prius
dicatur de eo quod ponitur in definitione aliorum, et per posterius de aliis []
sicut sanum quod dicitur de animali, cadit in definitione sani quod dicitur
de medicina, quae dicitur sana inquantum causat sanitatem in animali; et
in definitione sani quod dicitur de urina, quae dicitur sana inquantum est
signum sanitatis animalis. Sic ergo omnia nomina quae metaphorice de Deo
dicuntur , Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 13 a. 6 co.
114
jos higuera rubio
to reach an integral knowledge of the divine operations in the ele

mental nature of substances. This recourse to metaphor explains
the irruption in the Ars inventiva of the so-called demonstratio
similitudinaria. This procedure extracts the similarities between
the divine operations and those of the elements, and implies a
probable, rather than necessary, knowledge of the divine essence.
The expression similitudinaria is found in texts that point in the
same direction: the use of metaphors exalts the intellect and leads
the soul on the path of theological knowledge.12
The irruption in the Lullian Art of metaphorical equivocity as
a function that exalts the intellect also serves to characterise the
logical use of simple categorial terms, genus, species, properties
and accidents in propositions and syllogisms. This explains Llulls
recourse to the exposition of fallacies and his analysis of paral
ogisms in the argumentative development of the Art. As Fidora
and Wyllie have noted,13 the section on fallacies in the Logica nova
is a transcription of the De fallaciis, erroneously attributed to
Thomas Aquinas. This recourse to the tradition of the Sophistici
elenchi has interesting implications. On the one hand, as De Rijk
indicates, the book of Pseudo-Aquinas and the section entitled De
fallaciis in the Summulae of Peter of Spain have a common source
that has not yet been identified. In addition, in some Italian man
uscripts of the Summulae copied in Paris the text attributed to
Thomas Aquinas occupies the place that corresponds to De fallaciis
12 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si idem possit per diversa signa

significari, determinare tamen quo signo sit utendum ad significandum,
pertinet ad significantem. Deus autem est qui nobis significat spiritualia
per res sensibiles in sacramentis, et per verba similitudinaria in Scripturis,
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae III, q. 60 a. 5 ad 1.; Hoc autem
astruit per similitudinem: quia intellectus hominis imaginationi coniunctus,
connaturales habet exemplares et similitudinarias instructionis. Psalm 77.
Aperiam in parabolis os meum; loquar propositionis ab initio, Albertus
Magnus, In evangelium secundum Lucam, ed. B.Borgnet, Paris, 1894, (Opera
omnia, 22) p.291.
13 Aquesta familiaritat de Llull amb la lgica escolstica es veu
perfectament corroborada per la Logica nova: aix, es pot constatar que la
distinci de la Logica nova que tracta de les fallcies s una recopilaci fidel
de lopuscle De fallaciis (12721274?) del pseudo-Toms dAquino (exceptuant
la fallcia de la contradicci), G. Wyllie & A. Fidora, Ramon Llull i el
tractat De fallaciis del pseudo-Toms dAquino, Enrahonar, 42 (2009), p.14.
115
in the Peter of Spains Tractatus.14 There is no way for us to know

whether Llull knew about this fact, but it is plausible that the
transcription in the Logica nova could derive from a manuscript
of the Summulae that contained the treatise of Pseudo-Aquinas.
The hypothesis about a common source for the De fallaciis can
be corroborated by the study of the fallacia aequivocationis and
the amphiboliae, which unite a series of expressions (canis latrabile,15 pratum ridet,16 litus aratur) that belong to a tradition that goes
back to the twelfth century, in the commentaries on the Sophistici
elenchi.17 In addition, the first two expressions appear in another
context within the linguistic arts, i.e. poetics. The equivocity of
canis latrabile as well as that of litus aratur is a case of transla
tive, or metaphorical, meaning, as described by Averroes in his
commentary on Aristotles Poetics. These expressions were taken
by Llull from the enormous storehouse of the medieval tradition
and are used as instruments for argument analysis, since once
they have been assimilated by the Art they can demonstrate the
semantic unity of theological principles with respect to the equiv
ocity of simple categorial terms.
Each of these aspects is at the service of the contemplative life,
and is personified in the one who is anamorat de Deu. This expres
sion synthesises the Llullian ideal of the Ars amativa which seeks
to instruct the artist who will be able to recognise the seman
Petrus Hispanus, Tractatus Called Afterwards Summule logicales, ed.

L.M. de Rijk, Assen, 1972, p.xciv.
15 [] latrabile animal est canis, id volunt intelligi: latrabile animal esse
vel latrabile animal vel marinam beluam vel caeleste sidus, hoc est aliquam
de his tribus rebus quas significat canis. Sed hoc quidem non est praedicari
multa, sed unum, quando scilicet unum tantum illorum trium attribuit,
Petri Abelardi, Dialectica, ed. L.M. De Rijk, Assen, 1956, p.226.
16 Si primo modo, sic non contingit in eis mendacium, quia in figurativis
locutionibus non est sensus verborum quem primo aspectu faciunt, sed quem
proferens sub tali modo loquendi facere intendit, sicut qui dicit, quod pratum
ridet, sub quadam rei similitudine intendit significare prati floritionem,
Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 38 q. 1 a. 3 ad 4.
17 Aristoteles, De Sophisticis elenchis, 166a 1533; This is the case of
the Fallacie parvipontanae; Dialectica monacensis, in Logica modernorum: A
Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic, ed. L.M. de Rijk, Assen,
19627, v. I, pp.553575; v. II. 2: pp.453638.
14
116
jos higuera rubio
tic unity of the divine principia in the midst of equivocity and,

at the same time, recognise the similarities between categorial
and metaphorical language in the different contexts proposed by
the Llullian Art. This condition helps to consolidate a process of
contextual semantic analysis which is the path for attaining the
mystical knowledge of the deep unity of the divine names (the
secrets of nature) in the midst of the apparent equivocity of their
enunciations. This process, in my opinion, is the cycle that sus
tains the intelligibility of the principles of the Art in its diverse
developments. The point of departure of the Llullian cycle, which
reinitiates over and over again, is the semantic plurality that dis
plays itself in the metaphorical exaltation of the metge teolec and
in the probable demonstratio similitudinaria. This latter attains the
level of demonstration via the contradiction inherent in the paral
ogisms, whose equivocal meaning shows the necessity for a set of
principles, or essential semantic unities, that can only be reached
through a delectatio of the divine virtues.
1. Nomen theologicum
Boethius notes the difficulty of presenting arguments in favor
of the divine unity that respect human logic and reasoning.18 He
appears to resolve this difficulty when he shows that the same
categories cannot be applied to the three persons of the Trinity in
the way they would be applied to three subjects or things. This is
because, in the first place, the difference between three subjects,
even of the same species, is rooted in their accidents; in the second
place because plurality and alterity can only be said of subjects
of which some essential or accidental difference can be predicat
ed.19 In the case of the three divine persons, there is no difference
whatsoever, since their essence is the same and, since they are not
18 Qua in re quid mihi sit animi quotiens stilo cogitata commendo, cum
ex ipsa materiae difficultate, tum ex eo quod raris, id est vobis tantum,
conloquor, intelligi potest, Boethius, De sancta trinitate (= De trinitate), in
De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica. Ed. C.Moreschini, Munich,
2000, pp.165181; p.166.
19 Principium enim pluralitatis alteritas est
; praeter alteritatem enim
nec pluralitas quid sit intelligi potest. Trium namque rerum uel quotlibet
tum genere, tum species, tum numero diversitas constat; quotiens enim idem
dicitur, totiens diversum etiam praedicatur, Boethius, op. cit., p.167.
117
constituted as a corporeal subject, no accidents at all can be pred

icated of them. Finally, if it cannot be predicated of the three per
sons that they are different, or that one is distinct from another,
it is because they are the same, something that cannot be said
of any subject that suffers accidents or is distinct in essence from
another. Hence, Boethius states that God is not different from
God (Deus vero a Deo nullo differt). This indifference between the
persons of the Trinity means that naming the three persons is like
repeating the same word three times, as with: sun, sun, sun.
There are not three suns, nor is one independent of the other, but
rather they are one and the same sun.20
This means that the categories can only be applied to that
which admits accidental attribution, such as substance. Therefore,
one can only say of the divine that it is beyond-substance (ultra
substantiam)21. In this sense, the divinity is transcendent over all
categories, since if one says quantity, its quantity is the great
est. If we say when, it will be at all instants and days; if one
says habit or disposition, the divine represents all dispositions,
every way of being and acting. This same difference appears
when one predicates of something that it is just, because it is
said to be just by reason of justice. This is an attribute that
pertains to a single subject of which it is said that it is justice.22
Parallel to the reception of De trinitate, Boethiuss translations
and commentaries on the logica vetus were known to Llull and his
contemporaries, as well as the Periphyseon of John Scotus Eriu
gena. In the first book of this latter treatise,23 the categories (kategoriae) appear as related to the question of what can properly be
predicated of the divine (de summa divinae bonitatis), and whether
20 [] haec enim unitatum iteratio potius est, non numerario, velut si ita
dicamus: ensis mucro gladius, repetitio quaedam est eiusdem, non numerario
diuersorum, uelut si dicam: sol sol sol, non tres soles effecerim, sed de uno
totiens praedicaverim, Boethius, op. cit., p.172.
21 Boethius, op. cit., p.173.
22 [] cum uero iustus, qualitatem quidem sed non accidentem, sed eam
quae sit substantia sed ultra substantiam: neque enim aliud est quod est,
aliud est quod iustus est, sed idem est esse Deo quod iusto, Boethius, op.
cit., p.174.
23 Iohannis Scotti seu Eriugenae, Periphyseon I, ed. E. Jeauneau,
Turnhout, 1996 (CCCM, 161).
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jos higuera rubio
the categories can be predicated of its supersubstantial nature24

(Utrum omnes kategoriae de deo praedicandae sint proprie). Eriugena
says that certain names are attributed to the divine essence, such
as truth, justice, wisdom and on certain occasions genus, since the
divine is that which signifies the creative essence of the divin
ity. Nevertheless, in these names the divine substance and essence
are signified in a metaphorical way (metaphorica) because they are
mere predicates that are transferred from the creature to the Cre
ator.25 All these names contain within themselves their contrary
and, despite having a simple meaning, in reality they have a dou
ble signification (simplum ad duplum), since they allude to diverse
natures. This does not occur with the divine essence of a simple
subject, which does not have plurality and whose totality is com
pleted from beginning to end. As a result the word essence does
not signify the divine essence because the latter is not properly an
essence, and is opposed to the manner in which essence exists in
subjects. Therefore it is correct to call it superessential (superessentialis).26 The same thing occurs with that kind of goodness
that has evil as its opposite, and therefore in reference to the
divinity goodness signifies that which is beyond goodness (plus
quam bonitas).
Eriugena says that something similar occurs with respect to the
categories, since everything that is said of the divine essence or
substance is said in a translative (translatiue) way, just as occurs
with the attributes of goodness, wisdom and truth. In order to
explain this translative character of the categories he focuses on
two points: the first indicates the manner of adequately predicat
ing the divine attributes, and the second says that in nature there
is a form of signifying the Creator, even if only metaphorically.
For the first topic he recurs to abnegativa theology, which attri
butes to the divinity that which does not contradict its nature,
such that the qualifier super or plus quam is used preceding
Iohannis Scotti seu Eriugenae, op. cit., p.26.

[] et nihil aliud praeter illam ipsam diuinam substantiam seu
essentiam significare, metaphorica fieri, id est a creatura ad creatorem
translata, Ibid., p.27.
26 Iohannis Scotti seu Eriugenae, Ibid., p.28.
24
25
119
any divine predicate, in order to clarify whom these attributes are

being predicated of.27
Regarding the second aspect, he affirms that the categories are
used of subjects in nature, and that the intention of the Greeks
was to name the innumerable beings of creation in order to distin
guish one from another, something which is extremely useful for
knowledge and especially for dialectic. Nevertheless, these things
reveal in their very nature the condition of being created. This
condition (conditio) means that in the categories the possibility
of signifying this created nature prevails. Therefore, every predi
cation contains, metaphorically, this condition which, by trans
lation, represents its creating cause.28 This is the metaphorical or
translative function of the praedicamenta that Llull seems to take
up in his Doctrina Pueril: Tots quantes coses sn creades, van,
fill, pre X coses, o s a saber [].29
This perspective tells us that the categories cannot be predi
cated of the divinity, although they can be predicated of its oper
ations in nature in an equivocal fashion, given that creatures are
signs of their Creator. Things have been completed and disposed
in an order that nature transmits to the intellect by way of simple
terms such as the categories. In his commentary on the Sentences
Llull affirms that the genera cannot be predicated of the divine
(Deus est alia substantia, quam genus existens extra genus, et non
27 Non enim proprie sed translatiue dicitur essentia, veritas, sapientia,

caetera que huiusmodi, sed superessentialis, plus quam veritas, plus quam
sapientia et similia dicitur, Ibid., p.29.
28 Attamen, ut praediximus, quemadmodum fere omnia quae natura
conditarum rerum proprie praedicantur de conditore rerum per metaphoram
significandi gratia dici possunt, ita etiam kategoriarum significationes,
quae proprie in rebus conditis dinoscuntur, de causa omnium non absurde
possunt proferri, non ut proprie significent quid ipsa sit, sed ut translatiue
quid de ea nobis quodam modo eam inquirentibus probabiliter cogitandum
est suadeant., Ibid., p.33.
29 Ramon Llull, Doctrina pueril, ed. J. Santanach i Suol, Palma de
Mallorca, 2005 (NEORL, 7), p. 190; Fili, omnia, quae sunt creata, uadunt
per decem res, scilicet per substantiam, quantitatem, relationem, qualitatem,
actionem, passionem, situm, habitum, tempus et locum. Et istae decem res
sunt decem praedicamenta, de quibus habebis cognitionem per logicam; per
quam cognitionem scies habere scientiam [], Ramon Llull, De doctrina
puerili, ed. J. Medina, Turnhout, 2009 (ROL, 33), p.363.
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jos higuera rubio
existens sub aliquo accidente). 30 This affirmation appears after an

argument that bears a certain likeness to that in De trinitate, given
that Llulls point of departure is an examination of the way in
which the categories are unable to signify the distinction between
the divine persons. Therefore, the difference between creatures
and God is the same as between causam et effectum, inter infinitum
et finitum: without this difference the intellect cannot attain the
distinct species. The divine substance is extra genus, although both
created substance and our understanding of the Trinity depend on
it. This explains why categories such as relation, action, passion,
time and place are manners of understanding the divine opera
tions qua eternal, infinite and essential: intellectus conjunctus ponit
Deum in genere, ut per aliqua media possit comtemplari et attingere
ueritates, quas Deus habet in se. 31
This possibility of contemplating the divine operations by way
of the categories also reaches to the elemental qualities. In regards
to the same issue, Llull says that the difference between singu
lars depends on the difference among the persons of the Trinity,
just as the heat of the fire is opposed to the cold of the water,
since they are contraries that depend on one another. The intellect
needs the genus extra genus in order to understand what the genera
are, the nature of which is opposed to and at the same time pro
duced by the divine. The need that the intellect has to put Deum
in genere in order to contemplate and attain knowledge establishes
a relationship between singular sensible substances, intellectual
conceptions and the divine virtues. Llull explains this relationship
in the Llibre de contemplaci by means of the mutual signification
between the essential qualities of nature (qualitats essencials) and
the divine virtues (vertuts):
30 Quaestionis, scilicet, quod deus non sit in genere quoad suam

substantiam, quae non est genus, sed sit in genere quoad substantiam, quae
est genus; quae substantia non est deus, cum omne genus sit supra aliud uel
sub alio; sicut genus est supra species, et sicut substantia creata quae est sub
accidentibus; et sic per unum modum negatiua quaestionis est tenenda, et per
alium non Ramon Llull, Disputatio eremitae et Raimundi, ed. F. Ph. Wolff,
J.M. Kurhummel, Moguntiae, Hffner, 1729 (MOG IV, reimpr. F.Stegmller,
Frankfurt, 1965), q. xi, p.238.
31 Disputatio eremitae et Raimundi, op. cit., p.239.
121
En les qualitats essencials e en les vertuts qui son en vos, Snyer,

les quals son a nosaltres coses entellectuals en aquelles apercebem
nosaltres les vostres obres; car segons que a nostre enteniment
es significada la vostra infinitat e la vostra eternitat e la vostra
forsa e la vostra saviea e les altres vertuts, segons aquells signi
ficats aperceb la nostra anima quals son les vostres obres; car les
vostres obres covenen esser segons los significats que donen de les
vostres vertuts e de les vostres qualitats. 32
Creatures are subjects that are constituted and completed

according to these qualitats essencials: time, place, quantity and
quality. This form of understanding the divine virtues occurs in
two senses: i. segons vs; ii. segons relaci de ns [e de les creatures].33 The first sense lacks accidents and is simple, while the
second describes creatures on the basis of their elemental consti
tution, their genera, and accidents. The intellect, perception and
imagination know the divine virtues by way of the operations of
the elemental qualities that constitute subjects; accidents, in turn,
are predicated of this composition. As a result the notions that
provide this perceptive and logical signification of the divine vir
tues are called raons necesaries, which is the point of departure
for Llullian theological dialogue. In this sense, these notions are
above all dialectical and are placed into question within argu
ments, which explain the risk that the equivocal signification of
the necessary reasons may lead to confusions in language:
Snyer, per so car les coses sensuals no enpatxen les intellectuals
e les intellectuals endressen les sensuals; e ass per que fa perolo
gisme en la discordia de paraula e de entendiment, es per so car
les sensualitats no son endressades per les intellectuals, e les intel
lectuals son torbades per les sensuals. 34
The overcoming of discord, of the equivocity between words,

between the sensual and the intellectual, between the intellectual
and the essential, is the purpose of the distinction of significa
tion between work and artifice. The mode of achieving this is the
Llibre de contemplaci en Du, op. cit., p.21.
Snyer, vertuts en vos en dues maneres, una com les entenem segons
vos, altra com les entenem segons relacio e a esguart de les creatures, per ass
es l enteniment nostre endressat e entn sanament; mas la paraula defall e
no dona ver significat, Llibre de contemplaci en Du, op. cit., (ORL, 5), p.86.
34 Llibre de contemplaci en Du, op. cit., (ORL, 4), p.333.
32
33
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jos higuera rubio
description of the distinction of significations between elemental

qualities and divine virtues, and he who can best do this is the
one who knows the composition of the elementally-composed bod
ies and the variation of their complections: the physician.
2. Metge teolec
In the Llibre de contemplaci a meaningful link is established
between the elemental qualities that make up subjects and the
creative action of the divine virtues. This is a common idea in the
medieval tradition, whereby the elemental composition of bodies
is held to represent the divine attributes in an equivocal manner.
Medicine, ever since antiquity, studied elemental complexions in
order to re-establish them. When subjects suffer an imbalance that
must be resolved via an operation on the nature of the subjects, it
is the physician who is to be called on35 (metge fisici). According
to Llull, this doctor acts as does the theologian, who recognises
the sicknesses of the soul and re-establishes spiritual health. In
his Liber principiorum medicinae he explains the way in which the
dispositions of the elemental qualities act upon one another in cer
tain agent-patient/action-passion relationships. That quality which
most acts upon the others represents the grade or potency that
characterises the complexion that a subject possesses. Llull calls
the likenesses between the operations of the elemental qualities
and the divine operations in nature by the name of metaphor:
Et per istam metaphoram de simili operatione naturali diuinum
reuelatur secretum existens in beatissima trinitate domini Dei.
Nam sicut quaelibet creatura conatur naturaliter, quantum potest,
facere sibi similem, ita in diuina essentia conuenit esse diuersas
operationes, et quod in ipsa sit, quod faciat sibi ipsi similem infi
nita uirtute, potentia, sapientia, et amore et essentia. 36
35 Enax com lo metge fisici si vol atrobar ni conxer la malauta del

malaute cov que la serc e que la deman en la natura del cors del home, enax
lo metge teolec si vol atrobar ni conxer la malauta de la anima peccadora,
cov que enserc la malauta en la natura de la anima, Llibre de contemplaci
en Du, op. cit., (ORL, 4), p.81.
36 Ramon Llull, Liber principiorum medicinae, ed. M. Snchez Manzano,
Turnhout, 2007 (ROL, 31), p.546.
123
The relation or conuenientia between elemental and divine

operations is a way of resolving the equivocity of the terms that
denominate them by way of metaphors that allude to the secrets
of creation: the operations of the divine virtues. This is a notion
that derives from the Logica Algazelis, of which Llull wrote a partial transcription. Here al-Ghazali affirms that the ambiguous
meaning of a term whose multiplicity we recognise can, in some
cases, generate a convergence or conuenientia between diverse
meanings.37 Llull adopts this way of signifying the multiplicity
of elemental and categorial meanings, which is preceded by the
simple unity in which they converge: the operations of the divine
virtues. Conuenientia also appears among the forms of demonstra
tion in the Ars inueniendi, 38 specifically in probable demonstra
tion. This has two modes: ad propositum and in contrarium. 39 The
first shows the unity of distinct meanings, such as the elemen
tal qualities in a single subject; the second shows the differences
and contradictions between these same qualities, although it also
enunciates the unity that underlies them. Llull calls this type of
demonstration similitudinaria or metaphorica, and by means of it
one can infer probabilities or conuenientias, given that by the anal
ysis of similarities and dissimilarities no necessary knowledge is
obtained of the divine essence.
Therefore, metaphors transmit to the intellect the signification
of the divine principles in their operative effects in nature, as well
Convenientia sunt media inter univoca et aequivoca, ut ens, quod
dicitur de substantia et accidente. Non enim est sicut haec dictio canis.
Ea enim quae apellantur canis non conveniunt in aliqua significatione
canis. Esse vero convenit substantiae et accidenti. Nec sunt sicut univoca.
Animalitas enim convenit equo et homini indifferenter et eodem modo, Ch.
Lohr, Logica Algazelis. Introduction and Critical Text, Traditio 21 (1965),
p.245; This passage of the Summulae is similar to the al-Ghazalis text about
the divergence between meanings and the possibility of the paralogism:
quando una dictio habet tantum unum modum significandi et propter
convenientiam aliquam quam habet cum alia dictione, videtur habere modum
significandi illius alterius, cum sumitur sub illa altera ad medium, ut patebit
in paralogismis, Petrus Hispanus, op. cit., p.89
; Compendium Logicae
Algazelis, op. cit., p. 118; 120-121..
38 Et sciendum est, quod metaphorae non inferunt necessitatem, sed
convenientiam, Ramon Llull, Ars inventiva veritatis, ed. F. Ph. Wolff, J. M.
Kurhummel, Moguntiae, Hffner, 1729 (MOG V, reimpr. F. Stegmller,
Frankfurt, 1965), d. iii, septima regula, p.45.
39 Ars inventiva veritatis, op. cit., p.45.
37
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jos higuera rubio
as the equivalence between the potencies and acts of their opera

tions. The Ars inueniendi proposes that on the basis of equivocal,
probable and metaphorical knowledge arises a univocal need for
the operations of the divine virtues in the simplicity of the divine
essence. Llull calls this exalting the intellect by way of an iden
tification-in-diversity of the contrarieties between the species that
possess a maxima intensio: the divine virtues. We observe that
these modes of demonstration derive from the equivocal suppo
sition that implies similarity and metaphor in nature, since the
divine virtues are univocal necessary principles. This supposition
results in a certain confusion that Llull describes in the Llibre de
contemplaci:
Molts homens veg, Snyer, qui son pintors de paraules e d exem
plis e qui fan bells parlecs e bells sermons e belles comparacions,
sots moltes de belles paraules veg moltes de falsetats e moltes de
falces entencions e molts de decebiments.40
The falsity of examples and beautiful words generates decebiment and discordi between the intellectual, sensible and essential
meanings, which is shown in language by way of the perologismes:
[] les sensualitats no son enderssades per les intellecttuals, els
intellectuals son trobades per les sensuals.
The meanings that the metge teolec or demonstration similitudinaria provide to knowledge correct this deception of the intellect.
This type of paradoxical intellectual state defines the paralogisms
that express fallacies. These are a deceptio due to the multiplicity
of meanings and the incorrect use of the expressions that contain
them. Llull is interested in the demonstration and signification of
the simple divine essence that influences with its operations in ele
mental compositions, and as a result must resolve this discordance
the deception of the paralogisms and fallacies that weaken the
demonstratio similitudinaria created with metaphors and similitudes.
3. Similitudes and metaphors
Albert the Great points out how the probable arguments have
equivocal relations between the simple terms of syllogisms, some
40
Llibre de contemplaci en Du, op. cit., (ORL, 4), p.114.
125
thing dealt with by Aristotle in the Sophistici elenchi. The dia

lectic art represents a methodus41 very close to the demonstratio
similitudinaria which seeks to detect the similarity, difference
and contradiction present in the ambiguous meanings of the terms
in those syllogisms that are proposed as a demonstration, despite
the fact that they are confused or paradoxical. Llull wanted to
develop a semantic analysis of fallacies applicable to the princi
ples of his Art concerning those equivocal terms that generate
false intentions. Llulls purpose was to introduce himself into
the tradition of the Sophistici elenchi with a new fallacy (differens a fallaciis antiquis) which is at its base a probable argu
ment about the unity of the divine essence and its virtues.42 Falla
cies become, from the Llullian point of view, one more tool in his
debates with the masters of Paris (philosophantes/artistae) and in
his dispute with the infidel (euadere infidelis).43
I will only focus on those fallacies in dictione that are equivocal
(aequivocatione) and ambiguous (amphiboliae),44 as well as the spe
cies of these that show a signification that is metaphorical (trassumptiva) regarding their terms. The examples used by Llull as
examples of the species of fallacy that transfer equivocal mean
ings to simple terms are also used in the medieval tradition in a
considerable number of commentaries:
41 Albertus Magnus, Topica, ed. B.Borgnet, Paris, 1890 (Opera omnia, 2),
Lib. 1, cap. II, p.235B-236A.
42 Sed tu contra hoc, quod dico, facis fallacias, quas soluimus in libello,
qui sic intitulatur: De fallaciis, quas non credunt facere aliqui, qui credunt esse
philosophantes contra purissimum actum Dei uerissimum et perfectissimum,
Ramon Llull, Disputatio Raimundi et Auerroistae, ed. H.Riedlinger, Turnhout,
1975 (ROL, 7) p.469.
43 Et ideo per talem modum bene possent conuenire saraceni et christiani,
prolongando se ipsos a fallacia aequiuocationis siue accidentis, Ramon Llull,
De participatione, ed. A.Oliver, Turnhout, 1988 (ROL, 16), p.247; Per istas
fallacias possunt conuenire theologi catholici cum philosophis, ut patebit
in processu, Ramon Llull, De fallaciis, ed. H. Riedlinger, Turnhout, 1978
(ROL, 6), p. 478; quae conuenientia esset ualde utilis; Diximus de fallaciis
Raimundi, cum quibus catholici et artistae possunt conuenire, De fallaciis,
op. cit., p. 487; Per istam autem fallaciam credunt euadere infideles contra
diuinam trinitatem dicentes, De fallaciis, Ibid., p.481.
44 Ramon Llull, Ars generalis ultima, ed. A.Madre, Turnhout, 1986 (ROL,
14), pp.108109; Liber de nouis fallaciis, ed. Ch. Lohr, Turnhout, 1978 (ROL,
11), p.48; Logica nova, op. cit., pp.115116; De fallaciis, op. cit. pp.478479.
126
jos higuera rubio
1. Canis latrabile.45
2. Flos ridet.46
3. Liber Aristoteles.47
4. Litus aratur.48
In the Compendium logice algazelis and in its Catalan transla
tion, Logica de Gatzell, these examples appear together with others
such as (1a) Quicumque surgebat, stat. Sedens surgebat; ergo sedens
stat, (2a) Omne expediens est bonum. Sed quaedam mala sunt expedientia; ergo quaedam mala sunt bona. in the fallacia aequivocatione
and (3a) Quidquid scit, pomerium scit. Sed hoc scit pomerium; ergo
pomerium scit. in the amphiboliae.49 In later works such as the Liber
de fallaciis and in the De novis fallaciis expressions 1 and 3 occur,
while in the Logica nova 1 through 4 appear. The examples given
in the Compendium disappear, and there is no clear explanation as
to why; we also dont know why the species of the fallacies change
in certain treatises.
With regard to the examples in Llulls last works there is a long
prior tradition that uses them as cases of equivocal expressions,
45 [] dictio principaliter plura significat: ut hoc nomen canis
principaliter significat latrabile animal et marinam belluam et caeleste
sidus [] omnis canis est latrabilis. Caeleste sidus est canis. Igitur caeleste
sidus est latrabile, Ars generalis ultima, op. cit., p.108; Compendium Logicae
Algazelis, op. cit., p.105.
46 [] unum nomen principaliter unum significat, et aliud metaphorice
siue transumptiue: sicut hoc uerbum ridere principaliter significat actum
hominis proprium; metaphorice autem siue transumptiue significat prati
floritionem [], Logica noua, op. cit., p.115.
47 []
una oratio principaliter plura significat manente eadem
constructione, propter diversam habitudinem constructorum: sicut haec
oratio liber Aristotelis plura significat [] quidquid est Aristotelis, possidetur
ab Aristotele. Iste liber est Aristotelis. Ergo possidetur ab Aristotele. op.
cit., p.116.
48 [] una oratio principaliter significat unum, et aliud metaphorice
sive transumptiue, sicut haec oratio: littus aratur, principaliter significat
littoris scissuram, transumptiue uero operis amissionem. Et formatur sic
paralogismus: quandocumque littus aratur, tunc terra scinditur. Sed quando
indocibilis docetur, littus aratur: ergo quando indocibilis docetur, terra
scinditur, Ibid.
49 Compendium logicae Algazelis, op. cit., p. 105; Ramon Llull, Logica
del Gatzel, ed. M. Obrador, M. Ferr & S. Galms, Palma de Mallorca,
19061914 (ORL, 19), p.44.
127
with the most common being canis latrabile and flos ridet. These
expressions show the attribution of a property that a species or
individual lacks. The problem highlighted by the interpreters of
fallacies of the twelfth century, such as Peter Abelard and William
of Conches, is the change of referent in the term canis: star, fish or
animal. The same thing occurs with the verb ridere with respect
to the subject to which the property of laughing is attributed: a
man or a flower. Finally, it also occurs with the habit owner of
in the example of the book of Aristotle: i.e. the owner is a sub
ject that could either be the philosopher or the current possessor
of the book.
The treatment of semantic differences in accordance with con
text, the anterior or posterior signification of the terms, as well as
the relation between them, is similar to the demonstratio similitudinaria in Llull: a tool for detecting the metaphorical use of lan
guage in a paralogism that has a demonstrative function, such as
the new fallacy. In this way, just as one can analyse the seman
tic context of the term canis, of the verb ridere and of the habit
possidere, one can also study the meaning that the divine attri
butes acquire in a syllogism in order to infer a necessary proof of
their existence by similarity, difference and contradiction. In the
case of the fallacy by equivocation, canis latrabile, Llull opposes
another type of syllogism:
Omne aeternum est infinitum. Deus est aeternus. Ergo Deus est
infinitus.
Omnis canis est latrabilis. Caeleste sidus est canis. Igitur caeleste
sidus est latrabile.
The first syllogism can be used as a necessary argument,

because the reference to an eternal and infinite subject is not
equivocal since it is in fact the same. This identity does not occur
with the second syllogism, in which the reference changes from
the animal to the star, which in turn lacks the property which
is being attributed to it. In the case of the fallacy by ambiguity
Quidquid est Aristotelis, possidetur ab Aristotele. Iste liber est Aristotelis. Ergo possidetur ab Aristotele, the action that occurs to the
subject is temporal, such that the owner of the book written by
Aristotle is a subject that is distinct from its autor. Llulls argu
ment against this fallacy says that in the operations of the divine
128
jos higuera rubio
virtues, which are infinite, simple and atemporal, there is a single

subject that is the executor and owner of its actions.
Llull develops a semantic analysis of the simple terms of the
propositions of syllogisms and applies the demonstratio similitudinaria by similarity and contradiction in the fallacia novis or fallacia Raimundi, which in turn is formulated on the basis of the use
of the syncategorematic quantifiers: nullum, quoddam and aliquid.
The syllogisms obtained by Llull in the Novis fallaciis have the
form:
Nullum Ax est B
Quoddam Ax est B
ergo aliquid Ax est B et non-B
The use of the syncategorematic terms establishes a semantic
analysis that delimits the term a delimitation that is neces
sary for Llull that one seeks to demonstrate: the existence of
a single subject that complies with the univocal attribution of a
certain property. The syllogism conserves the form of the equiv
ocal and ambiguous fallacies, since there is a change of the sub
ject being referred to in the propositions, and a certain property
is attributed in an equivocal or contradictory fashion. Thus the
major premise affirms that there is no A to which the property B
(a divine attribute) can be attributed, the second proposition says
that of any subject Ax, B can be predicated, and the conclusion
states that some subject Ax exists of which it can be predicated
that it is B and that it is not B.Llulls interpretation is that B is
a property that cannot be attributed to Ax, because it is exclusive
to the essential nature of a single subject A, and therefore the
existence of A is necessary.
Llull begins with an empty set Ax that is postulated with
regard to a universe of attributions B. His reasoning opposes this
universe B to the empty set Ax in order to show the existence of a
subject A that is outside of Ax and which admits the attributions
of B. Thus the contradictory proposition affirms the necessity of
the existence of a subject A outside of Ax with respect to the
universe of attributions B. The contradictory conclusion is neces
sary from Llulls perspective, while from the logical perspective
this syllogism merely states that it is probable that some Ax be B
or not-B. This construction does not say what kind of subject Ax
129
is, nor what relation it has with universe B, nor does it even assert
the possibility of the existence of a subject A.
For Llull the universe of attributions B is that of the divine vir
tues defined by theology, the empty set is the created nature Ax,
while the subject A is the necessary entity independent of Ax that
possesses all the attributions of B.This explains the necessity that
Llulls theological perspective has for the universe of equivocal
and metaphorical attributions B, in order to derive necessary con
clusions from the contradictory propositions present in this kind
of syllogism. In contrast, the masters of arts (philosophantes/artistae) that followed the Peripatetic tradition of the Sophistici elenchi
depend on an equivocal, ambiguous, and metaphorical universe
of attributions in which there are propositions that signify contradictory arguments, but which only have a probable meaning.
The purpose of the demonstration/fallacy in Llull reminds us
of the response to the question Deus sit genus? in his commen
tary on the Sentences. Llull holds that no genus is said of the Cre
ator, because he is extra genus. Nevertheless, it is by means of the
genera that we can reach in nature an indirect knowledge of the
Creator. Just as we see in the Liber contemplationis, God does not
suffer accidents, is simple and lacks limitations; nevertheless the
subjects that suffer accidents signify him in a contradictory way,
since they do not share his nature. God is not a genus, although
the genera permit us to know him, because they are predicated of
the operations of his virtues.
The Llullian response can be formalised by following the fallacia that he invented. In this new paralogism the universe of attri
bution B is predicated of the universe of attribution P, i.e. that
of the categories. This universe of attributions is contradictory
to the divine nature, but conserves an equivocal or metaphorical
signification with respect to universe B. With this, one obtains
a new fallacy that is the inverse of Llulls, since the universe of
attribution P is not attributed to the subject A but rather to the
universe of attributions B. In addition we begin from the suppo
sition that A=B:
Postulate: A=B
Nullum B est P
Quoddam Bx est P
ergo aliquid Bx est P et non-P
130
jos higuera rubio
According to Llulls argument in his commentary on the Sentences, A is extra genus, although the genera depend on its exis
tence, and therefore A in some metaphorical sense is a genus
(P). As a result, the final proposition of the syllogism tells us that
there is a B that is extra genus and that also is not, since the genera
are predicated in an equivocal, or metaphorical, form of B and of
A (by A=B). This formula shows the equivocity of the categories,
which possess a metaphorical meaning when they are predicated
of God. The language of the sacra pagina, as well as that of the
linguistic arts, maintains this semantic behavior, and the proofs
elaborated with it are probable, not necessary. They depend on
the conuenientia between a universe of semantic interpretation and
the univocal, essential, and simple divine nature that sustains the
multiplicity of senses by means of the simple and immobile unity
of its existence.
Llull recommends that this form of conuenientia, extracted by
contradiction via the fallacia Raimundi, be applied to natural
philosophy in the question regarding the efficient action of the
primary cause in nature.50 In the Declaratio, Ramon Llulls com
mentary on the syllabus of 1277,51 he discusses whether in a meta
phorical sense the first cause, which is an intelligence and a sub
stance separated from nature, can be an efficient and eternal cause
of movement. The text that formulates this question, in chapter
70 of the Declaratio,52 alludes to two other propositions of the syllabus (3738) in which it is asked whether God can be both eternal
and at the same time an efficient cause in a metaphorical sense.
The negative response to this question is attributed to Aver
roes,53 who says that the first cause is not the cause of movement,
50 Per istam fallaciam credunt euadere illi, qui dicunt, quod mundus non
est inceptus [] quod motus, mutatio et principium extrinsecum sint per
ipsum simpliciter creata, De fallaciis, op. cit., p.487.
51 R. Hissette, Enquete sur les 219 articles condamnes a Paris le 7 mars
1277, Louvain, 1977, pp.7677; D. Piche, C. Lafleur, La condamnation
parisienne de 1277, Paris, 1999, pp.100101.
52 R.Llull, Declaratio Raimundi per modum dialogi edita contra aliquorum
philosophorum et eorum sequacium opiniones, ed. M. Pereira & T. PindlBchel, Turnhout, 1989 (ROL, 17), pp.320321.
53 Propter quod dicit Commentator Super librum de caelo et mundo, quod
in separatis a materia non est efficiens, nisi secundum transsumptionem:
loquimur enim de efficiente secundum quod ei primo imponitur nomen, et
131
since it does not possess matter and cannot be an efficient cause,

not even in a metaphorical sense (transsumptio). In his response
Llull affirms that in nature there are no uncreated effects, since
the divine cause, which is eternal and external to nature, tends
to action, creation, and production. Therefore, movement does not
precede the first cause, whose wisdom is prior to nature. Llulls
argument follows the structure of the fallacia Raimundi:
Nullus ens est principians sine motu et mutatione; quoddam ens
est principians sine motu et mutatione; ergo quoddam ens est
principians et non principians sine motu et mutatione.
With this fallacy he argues with those who affirm (illi, qui
dicunt) that the world is not created and that movement was not
initiated in an external manner. According to Llull, the interpre
tation of this kind of fallacy must eliminate the secondary sense
(secundum sensum) of the final proposition, i.e. the contradiction,
and affirm its principal sense.54 This principal meaning represents
the existence outside of nature of a subject to which correspond
all the attributions, despite these being metaphorical or equivocal.
This divergence of senses is explained in the Llibre de contemplaci
by the ambiguous nature of language:
En so, Snyer, que enteniment ha ms d acabament a saber veri
tat de la cosa, que paraula no ha poder a revelar veritat de la
cosa, per ass s engenra descordansa e contrast enfre enteniment
e paraula; car moltes vegades se esdev que enteniment entn una
cosa, e paraula ne significa altra contraria a la veritat quel ente
niment entn. 55
This explains that language possesses two senses, one spiritual

and the other literal. Nevertheless, in this initial work Llull does
not yet see the potential of the paralogisms to which he attributes
hoc est unde principium motus, Siger of Brabant, Questions sur la Physique
dAristote, ed. P. Delhaye, Louvain, 1941, p.100; this is a Commentary
attributed to Siger of Brabant, although it is anonymous: W.B. Dunphy, The
Similarity between Certain Questions of Peter of Auvergnes Commentary on
the Metaphysics and the Anonymous Commentary on the Physics Attributed
to Siger of Brabant, Mediaeval Studies, 15 (1953), pp.159168.
54 De fallaciis, op. cit., p.487.
55 Llibre de contemplaci en Du, op. cit., (ORL, 4), p.329.
132
jos higuera rubio
the very equivocity that he will later use in order to invent his
own fallacy:
Con paraula e enteniment se concorden es convenen, adoncs,
Snyer, sengenra en lur concordansa argument silogisme; e con
nos concorden es desconvenen, adoncs sengenra en lur descordansa
argument perologisme per lo qual esdev hom en contrast e en
esputacio. 56
This contradiction in the fallacia Raimundi points to two mean

ings, the first equivocal and the other spiritual and metaphorical.
Based on this first sense Llull formulates the way to mystical,
direct and ineffable knowledge in which there occurs the conuenientia between opposite universes of meaning linked translatively
to each other.
4. Contemplatio metaphorica: the figures of the Art
Llull denominates as giving meanings (donen significats) the
activity that limits the literal equivocal meaning and develops the
spiritual sense. This expression represents the semantic relations
between elemental qualities and divine virtues in the Llibre de
contemplaci, in a process which concerns the significaci sensual
e de significaci entellectual e de significaci esencial e de signifi
caci accidental.57
The essential significaci is elaborated based on the divine
virtues that produce reciprocal significations among nature, the
intellect and, the simple unity of the divine essence. With this sig
nifying sequence the Llullian artist adjusts himself to the intellec
tual invention of the species in nature in order to journey towards
the divine attributes. The artist applies the four attributed senses
to the interpretation of the sacra pagina, but it is the metaphori
cal sense that the understanding falls back on: sensus allegoricus
considerat uidere per lucem sensus litteralis, quem in se purificat,
attrahendo ad se lumen littere; et sic considerat uidere metaphor
ice, hoc est intelligere.58
Llibre de contemplaci en Du, Ibid. p.333

Llibre de contemplaci en Du, op. cit., (ORL, 6), p.73.
58 Ramon Llull, Ars compendiosa Dei, ed. M.Bauz Ochogava, Turnhout,
1985 (ROL, 13), p.326.
56
57
133
Metaphor is a way to access an understanding of the divine

(lumen littere), which occurs especially when the artist focuses
on the combinations of meanings in the letters of figure A. Llull
states that they are like three lamps that make up a single
flame that illuminates the intellect.59 The continuous revolution
of the circle in this figure (uoluendo circulum) is the support and
content60 of the contemplative understanding of the divine attri
butes: cumque uoluntas magno desiderio Deum intendius con
templari [] delectetur in se ipso et in essentia et natura atque
bonitate, magnitudine et cetera.61
This activity leads to a pleasant enjoyment that becomes a con
stitutive part of the intellectual life (illam delectationem, quae pars
est substantialis intellectus et mouetur iterum intellectum62). Thus,
artificialiter et amorose contemplante, it attains the direct and plea
surable knowledge of the signifying movement of the divine digni
ties in their own essence.
The dynamic and intrinsic contemplation of the divine digni
ties is a reality attained by the intellect, and is something which
becomes part of it, as represented by figure A. The equivocity
of the categories, of the fallacies, and of the paralogisms serves
as a mean in order to exalt the intellect by way of similitudes,
similarities, metaphors, and contradictions. This equivocity paves
the way for that knowledge that reaches the anamorat de deu of
the divine virtues, which is the most pleasant, loving, and intel
ligible. Nevertheless, this contemplative delectatio is preceded by
a complex application of the linguistic arts in the equivocal and
metaphorical signification of the divine names, which transforms
them into principles, into terms of a syllogism, and finally into a
dialectical demonstrative tool applied by Ramon Llull in his theo
logical disputations.
59 Sicut tres candelae accensae in simul iunctae componerent et efficerent
unam flammam, sic BCD multiplicarent unum lumen intellectui, per quod
esset illuminatum ad cognoscendum quidquid posset abstrahi a praedicta
camera, Ars compendiosa dei, op. cit. p.329.
60 Et sic patet, per quem modum ista Ars est magnum subiectum siue
materia intellectui [], Ars compendiosa dei, p.330.
61 Ramon Llull, Ars amatiua boni, ed. M. Romano, Turnhout, 2004 (ROL,
29), p.164.
62 Ars amatiua boni, op. cit., p. 165; []uoluntas et intellectus con
tem
plantes delectantur, sic que delectantes uehuntur ad altissima, quae
delectando et intelligendo possunt uix sustinere, op. cit., p.166.
134
jos higuera rubio
Abstract
From Metaphors to Categories: The Contemplative and Semantic Cycle
of the Divine Names
The legend of Ramon Lulls revelation (Dominus illustrauit mentem
suam, Vita, 16) tells us that he received from God the principles
of divine and natural knowledge (generalia principia ad magis specifica, Vita, 16). That account may simply be the happy recollec
tion of one medieval master, but the story serves to illustrate the
different senses of the principia divina or dignitates dei. The result
is a defense of the univocal sense of divine names, and also of the
divine names as metaphors that work as intellectual rules of their
equivocal meanings. The different uses of the terms which are
designated in Llulls thought as divine attributes are derived
from the metaphorical and logical contents. God transcends cate
gories. The identification of the divine being with the unity of his
attributes and his creative production is a heritage of the medie
val tradition, which Llull assimilated in a logical and semantic
way, in applying the ambiguity of metaphors in the context of
fallacies to achieve the contemplative life.
Jos Higuera
higuejose@gmail.com
Complutense University of Madrid
Facultad de Filosofa Campus Moncloa
Ciudad Universitaria 28040 Madrid, Spain
Instituto de Filosofia
Faculdade de Letras
Via Panormica, S/N
4150-564 Porto, Portugal
CONTEMPLATIO IN DEUM OR THE PLEASURE

OF KNOWING GOD VIA HIS ATTRIBUTES
AnnemarieC.Mayer
(Leuven)
Ramon Llull firmly believes that God is characterised by a mul
titude of attributes. And these attributes are not an absolute secret.
They are neither hidden nor unknowable although God is tran
scendent. If God created the world, human beings can have a thor
ough look at Gods creation and, thus, they can draw conclusions
about its creator. By contemplating the world, by employing the
reason God has gifted them with, human beings can also contem
plate God. The insights which such contemplation affords result in
pleasure because they constitute a knowledge related to salvation.
Llull explains this already in his very first theological treatise,
The Book of the Contemplation of God. This is Llulls most volu
minous and presumably most important work.1 Looking at it,
it seems that Llull was obsessed by structure. It comprises 366
chapters, one for each day of the year and an extra one for the
leap year. Each chapter contains 30 sections which consist of three
groups of ten paragraphs each. They are composed as personal
invocations of God; in this respect the treatise reminds the reader
of Augustines Confessions. The Book of Contemplation is subdivided
into three parts: the first volume on God offers in its first part
guidance for the contemplation of God concerning his attributes
and the Trinity (ch. 129). The second part contemplates Gods
activity, looking at his virtues, i.e. his attributes and his being
the creator and redeemer of the world (ch. 30102). The second
volume on man devotes its first part to contemplating the five
bodily senses of human beings in their role as being the instru
1 Llull claims to have written the first version of the book in Arabic,
which he then translated into Catalan. Yet for reasons of easier reference I
shall cite from the Medieval Latin translation. Though Llull claims in the
introductions to several of his books that the version at hand represents
merely a translation of the Arabic original, no Arabic copy of any of his works
has so far been found in any of the North African or European libraries.

IPM, 67 (Turnhout, 2015), pp. 135-152.
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107311
136
annemarie c. mayer
ments for perceiving the outward reality (ch. 103168), while the
second part reflects on the function of the spiritual senses and
the mental activity (ch. 169226). The third volume summing up
insights for Christian life gained by contemplating God and man,
formulates in its first part principles which can be deduced from
the first two volumes and which are visualised in Llulls trees,
figures which depict the logical dependencies and serve as a mne
motechnic device (ch. 226268). The second part of the third vol
ume consists of a description of the practical application of these
methodological principles (ch. 269366). Thus The Book of Contemplation already contains the major basic views on which Llulls Art
is based: the fundamental function of the divine attributes, the
capability of the human intellect to explain articles of faith by
way of necessary reasons, and the use of figures, forms and letters
for explaining an argument.
1. Stocktaking of the Liber contemplationis
In The Book of Contemplation Llull wrote at some length about
divine attributes in chapters 4 to 102 and, in a very condensed
way, in chapter 178. In this chapter 178 he explains that divine
attributes are by no means arbitrarily ascribed, using infinitas
as his example. The attributes of God can be deduced per qua
litates finitas,2 by way of finite qualities in creation. This is true
for all attributes of God. Moreover, they characterise him in such
a way that he cannot be imagined without them. Gods being,
for instance, is so great as Llull explains in chapter 4 that
one could never imagine that God was finite. 3 Llull understands
infinity at the same time as eternity, where God is both with
out beginning and without end.4 Llull comes back to this when
Ramon Llull, Liber contemplationis in Deum, ch. 178, 4, ed. I.Salzinger
et al., Mainz, 1742 (MOG, 9), p. 423: certificate invenerimus te esse in esse
et hanc certificationem habuerimus per tuam infinitatem, quam percepimus
per qualitates finitas, quae sunt in creaturis, per hoc certo cognoscimus tuam
infinitatem esse in te qualitatem essentialem.
3 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 4, 2, ed. I.Salzinger et al., Mainz,
1740 (MOG, 9), p.8: quod tuum esse sit tam magnum quod non possit cadere
in intellectum hominis, quod tu sis finitus.
4 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 7, 9 (MOG, 9), p.14: Cum nos miremur,
quomodo tu non habeas finem; multo magis deberemus mirari, si tu haberes
finem; nam est impossibile, quod id, quod non habuit principium, possit habere
finem. The other option, to have a beginning but no end, is true of angels.
2
137
contemplatio in deum
arguing for the unitas of God: to predicate unity of God does not
only mean that he is one and unique and that he does not have his
equal, but since God existed before space and time, there can be
neither spacial nor chronological division nor composition in him. 5
To God corruptio as well as compositio are alien6 and, although God
has many attributes, he is one substantia.
The Trinity as one of the attributes of God is fairly unusual.
Llull deduced it from our insight into the inner-divine processions.
On Llulls list the Trinity follows the divine unity, and it follows
from it, it does not constitute an opposition to it.
T h e B o o k o f th e C o n te m p la tio n o f G o d
c h . 4 -1 0 2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
a ttrib u te s o f G o d q u o a d D e u m
in fin ita s
a e te rn ita s
u n ita s
trin ita s
p o te sta s
s c ie n tia
v e rita s
b o n ita s
fundamental attributes
d ist.
II
I II
IV
V
VI
V II
V III
IX
a ttrib u te s o f G o d q u o a d n o s
- -- - -
a ttr ib u te s o f re fe re n c e
v o lu n ta s /p o te s ta s
s a p ie n tia /p o te s ta s
b o n ita s
b o n ita s
in fin ita s /a e te r n ita s
b o n ita s
p o te s ta s
s c ie n tia /s a p ie n tia
a e q u ita s /iu s titia
s a p ie n tia
v o lu n ta s /p o te s ta s
iu s titia
b o n ita s
la rg i t a s
b o n ita s /p e r fe c tio
a d iu to riu m m a g n a b o n ita s
h u m ilita s
a e te r n ita s /in fin ita s
p e r fe c tio p o te s ta tis / s a p ie n tia e
m a g n a b o n ita s
m is e ric o r- b o n ita s
d ia
X
XI
X II
X III
X IV
9 c re a tio
1 0 o rd in a tio
1 1 re c re a tio
1 2 v o lu n ta s
1 3 d o m in iu m
XV
XVI
X V II
X V III
X IX
14
15
16
17
18
XX
19
- -- - XXI
g lo ria p a ra d is i
- -- - X X I I 2 0 p e r fe c t i o
ch. 178
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
-- - - -
i n fi n i t a s
a e te rn ita s
v ita
s a p ie n tia
p o te s ta s
am or
b o n ita s
s im p lic ita s
p e rfe c tio
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
c re a tio
g ra tia
iu s titia
m is e ric o rd ia
d o m in iu m
h u m i li t a s
la rg ita s
m a g n itu d o
h o n o r a tio /n o b ilita s
See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 8, 13 (MOG, 9), p.19: Tua substantia
est vere una in simplicitate [] quia fuit prius, est impossibile, quod ipsa sit
composita substantia.
6 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 8, 14 (MOG, 9), p.19.
5
138
annemarie c. mayer
One could enumerate now Llulls arguments for attributing

to God power, wisdom, truth, and goodness.7 Yet what has been
said so far may be sufficient to illustrate his use of this kind of
attributes, which I call fundamental attributes and which Llull
predicated quoad Deum.
In The Book of Contemplation Llull ascribes to God 20 attributes
altogether. In distinctio IX Llulls list of attributes is crowned
by bonitas at least for the time being, for in distinctio XXII,
which tops the whole list of 20 attributes, it is headed by perfectio.
After chapter 29 and the explanation of bonitas follows a caesura.
Inserted is a second class of attributes consisting of those qualities
which God employs with regard to the created world, quoad nos
as Llull says. Starting with distinctio X Llull lists from creatio up
to misericordia examples of the latter. There are eleven attributes
which are directed towards the divine acting for us. Only the
twelfth and last attribute, perfectio in distinctio XXII, returns to
the level of fundamental attributes. Llull distinguishes two sorts
of attributes: the fundamental attributes which are basic in describ
ing God as such and in their function as attributes of reference help
to explain the second kind of divine attributes, those quoad nos.8
Llull defines his second class of attributes as those attributes,
by which your [i.e. Gods] doing can be recognised.9 This kind of
attributes is founded in and explained by way of attributes of ref
erence taken from the fundamental attributes quoad Deum. Gods
attributes which he employs in relation to creation, such as will,
power, or justice, are in need of justification, and this does not
at least not exclusively consist of the same sort of attributes,
namely attributes quoad nos, but of attributes which pertain to
God in relation to himself. The most impressive example of such
an attribute of the second class quoad nos is dominium. Human
kings, according to the example which Llull employed, exercise
dominium, power over their subjects. Yet man is finite, only God
is infinite and eternal; because of his infinity and eternity God
has a right to supreme power. Both infinity and eternity are fun
See distinctiones VI to IX.
I have printed them in italics.
9 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 178, 14 (MOG, 9), p.424: illas qualitates,
per quas percipiuntur tua opera.
7
139
damental attributes quoad Deum which are used as attributes of

reference in this context. Gods power stands above all powers in
the created world and covers all that is. God has the power over
that which is and even over that which is not. Concerning the rela
tion of Gods dominium to his fundamental attributes Llull draws
the following conclusion,
Therefore, you, Lord God, are so perfect concerning your goodness
and all other virtues, that, since our reason is not sufficient to
understand your great goodness and your great virtues, our ears
not to hear them, our mouth not to proclaim them, our eyes not
to see them, it is only meet and just that you are the Lord over all
since you are the Supreme in goodness and virtues.10
In short, Gods virtutes, his attributes with reference to himself,

above all his goodness, entail Gods dominium to such a degree
that it exceeds the capability of the human intellect and senses.
Before Llull returns to the basic attributes, he outlines in a
separate distinctio the gloria paradisi as a place of the pleasure
of knowing God. In via, here in this life, this cognition is not so
easily possible because of our distance from God. This distinctio
serves as a turning point in order to emphasise the absolute cul
mination of Gods attributes, perfection.
In the Liber contemplationis Llulls lists of divine attributes are
still open extensible enumerations; attributes can either be added
or deleted. This shows a comparison of chapters 4 to 102 with the
divine qualities listed in chapter 178 of the Liber contemplationis.11
Comparisons with later works lead to a similar result. There is
accordance in all lists (e.g. potestas, bonitas, perfectio). But how do
the differences come about? Do the selection and compilation of
Gods attributes in an open list become a merely arbitrary matter
of judgment? Which criteria does Llull employ in the predication
of divine attributes?
10 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 66, 9 (MOG, 9), p. 145: Igitur tu,
Domine Deus, sis adeo perfectus in bonitate et in omnibus virtutibus, quod
intellectus non sufficiat ad intelligendum, nec aures ad audiendum, nec os ad
loquendum, nec oculi ad videndum tuam magnam bonitatem et tuas magnas
virtutes, dignum est te esse dominum omnium rerum quia es supremus in
virtutibus et in bonitate.
11 See figure 1 above.
140
annemarie c. mayer
2. Minimum requirements of God?

Llull was by no means the first Christian writer to list the
attributes of God. As to a classical Christian example Llull may
have referred to the first chapters of De divinis nominibus by Pseu
do-Dionysius the Areopagite (ca. 500).12 Probably he also consulted
Richard of Saint Victor (1173) on the subject,13 who insisted: It
is therefore the guiding principle of every scholar and a common
conception imprinted in the hearts of all to ascribe everything we
regard as most valuable to God.14 Llull echoed this in the Vita
coaetanea, but in a modified form, adapted to his inter-religious
purpose: It is appropriate for every wise man to hold that belief
which attributes to God in whom all sages of the world believe
higher goodness, greatness, power, perfection, etc.15 But if the
divine attributes were nothing but human qualities compared to
the superlative and brought to a point of culmination, would that
12 See Dionysius Areopagita, De diuinis nominibus, ed. B. R. Suchla,
Berlin, 1990 (Corpus Dionysiacum I, PTS, 33).
13 SeeH.Merle, Dignitas: signification philosophique et thologique
de ce terme chez Lulle et ses predecesseurs mdivaux, EL, 21 (1977),
pp. 173193; p. 184: E. Longpr, dans larticle du Dictionnaire de Thologie
Catholique cit plus haute, crit que Raymond Lulle, qui na pas reu la
formation classique, philosophique et thologique, des clercs de son temps, a
cependant certainement lu Aristote et Richard de Saint Victor. De ce dernier,
il ne pouvait ignorer le De Trinitate, dans lequel, comme S.Anselme, Richard
veut prouver (convincere) lexistence du Dieu Un et Trine laide darguments
rationnels (ex rationis attestatione). Aussi, au chapitre XX du Livre I de cette
uvre, dans le titre du chapitre, il propose ceux qui font des recherches
sur lexistence de Dieu et qui disputent ce sujet une maxima propositio, une
proposition maximale, et en quelque sorte un principe universel de lesperit
(velud communis quedam animi conceptio).
14 Richard of St. Victor, De trinitate I, 20, ed. G.Salet, Paris, 1999
(SC, 63), p. 98: Est itaque eruditis velut maxima propositio, est cunctis in
commune velut communis animi conceptio Deo attribuere quidquid altius
attingit humana aestimatio.
15 Llull, Vita coaetanea 26, ed. H.Harada, Turnhout, 1980 (ROL, 8; CCCM,
34), pp. 259309; p. 290: illam fidem tenere decet quemlibet sapientem,
quae Deo aeterno, quem cuncti credunt mundi sapientes, attribuit maiorem
bonitatem, sapientiam, uirtutem, ueritatem, gloriam et perfectionem et cetera
huiusmodi; et haec omnia in maiori aequalitate et concordantia. Illa etiam
fides de Deo laudabilior est, quae inter Deum, qui est summa et prima causa,
et inter eius effectum maiorem ponit concordantiam seu conuenientiam.
141
not open up the way for projection and human self-deception?

Moreover, the predication of Gods attributes is not entirely with
out problems, as obvious as it may seem to Llull: Can God have
any attributes at all?
The classical doctrine of God in all three monotheistic world
religions answered this question by distinguishing between Gods
essence and Gods attributes. Yet can there be any distinction
between the two? Does this very distinction not already cause
logical and methodological difficulties when applied to God? For,
firstly, the term essence is not unequivocal and is thus prob
lematic in relation to God. The singular and unique essence of
God cannot simply be understood as individual along the lines
of Aristotles primary substance, if individual means that it is
only conceivable as demarcated from and in relation to others.
Similarly, speaking of Gods essence in the sense of a generic term
(as Aristotles secondary substance) tends to promote polytheistic
notions, since it does not exclude, but rather seems to include, the
possibility of other Gods.16
Llull does not deal in a separate chapter with the set of prob
lems concerning the classical doctrine of God. Nevertheless he
implicitly gives an answer to the problems associated with these
issues. He is aware that his doctrine of attributes would otherwise
not be able to outline a coherent picture of God. Llull brings his
thoughts on the multiplicity of attributes, which prima facie stand
in contradiction to the one divine being, to the point in the follow
ing sentence: Although you, Lord, are only one being (substantia),
it does not follow from all this that we should not ascribe to you
many attributes and predicate of you many basic dignities; for in
you are many attributes and they can be stated very well by you
and viewed in relation to yourself.17 It is revealing that Llull in
the section, which immediately precedes this statement, regrets
16 See on this at more length: A. C. Mayer, Drei Religionen ein Gott?
Ramon Lulls interreligise Diskussion der Eigenschaften Gottes, Freiburg i. Br.,
2008, pp.162167.
17 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 8, 28 (MOG, 9), p. 19: Quamvis tu,
Domine, sis una substantia tantum, per totum hoc non sequitur, quod nos tibi
non debeamus attribuere multas virtutes, et quod non debeamus dicere de te
multas nobilitates; nam multae virtutes sunt in te, et valde bene possunt dici
et intelligi de te.
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annemarie c. mayer
the miseri infideles who believe contra veritatem. For his argumen
tation also has an inter-religious orientation, for example against
the Muctazilite thinking or against Maimonides, who with his neg
ative theology of attributes vehemently supports in the Guide of
the Perplexed a position which is diametrically opposed to Llulls
point of view.
3. The common characteristics of divine attributes
In order to create his image of God, Llull is constrained to a
tightrope walk between the need of speaking of God on the one
hand and the inadequacy of the human categories in naming God
on the other. Llulls attributes of God must meet certain charac
teristics; they themselves must possess certain attributes so that
they can be attributes of God. What are the provisions allowing
Llull to undertake in all human inadequacy the adventure of
thinking God? Or put in other words: What makes an attribute a
divine attribute? Llull started from the finite attributes by which
the divine qualities become immediately knowable to us, since
they are the very attributes of man created by God. To deduce
the divine attributes per qualitates finitas18 from finite created
qualities is legitimate, according to Llull, because God has cre
ated everything. In his creation God operates in an analogous way
when causing things, i.e. the created reflects Gods characteristic
traits. It contains similarities of the primary cause,19 for to
put it more colloquially God does not lie. If he expresses him
self in his creation, this expression mirrors the way he really is.
It must contain the reflection of his divine attributes. This was
Llulls criterion for distinguishing between attributes quoad nos
and quoad Deum: Does God intentionally express himself in them
in such a way that we may recognise him or is our knowledge of
him not his primary intention?
18 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 178, 4 (MOG, 9), p. 423: certificate

invenerimus te esse in esse et hanc certificationem habuerimus per tuam
infinitatem, quam percepimus per qualitates finitas, quae sunt in creaturis,
per hoc certo cognoscimus tuam infinitatem esse in te qualitatem essentialem.
19 Ramon Llull, Declaratio Raymundi, Secunda positio, ed. M.Pereira
& Th. Pindl-Bchel, Turnhout, 1989 (ROL, 17; CCCM, 79), pp.219402;
p.259.
143
This entails the conclusion that divine attributes are evident.

God does not want to hide the way he is. His attributes are even
self-evident and can be deduced logically by necessary reasons,
since without them God would not be God. God would not be God,
if he, for instance, did not have his goodness. God is his goodness,
he is his justice, he is his power. He could not be without them
at least if he were, he would no longer be God. The same is true
of his other qualities. They are not just present in one part of him
and absent in others. They are not merely moods of hi, that pass
away. They are no state which would be limited in time. Conse
quently one single attribute of God cannot be part of him inde
pendently from his other perfections.
Let us take as an example Gods potestas to illustrate what con
stitutes an attribute of God. By the fact of creation the self-ev
idence of the divine attribute power is manifested: the cre
ated being cannot have its being of itself,20 rather Gods power
bestowed on it its being and keeps it in being.21 In contrast, Gods
power is entirely from God. For it endlessly stands firm. It is lia
ble to nobody and to nothing; it is not on one occasion larger and
smaller at other times; according to its nature it always remains
the same, infinitely large.22 It is absolute power because nothing
is in your essence which in itself would have a defect.23 This con
clusion arises above all from Gods unitas. Llull phrases his rele
vant line of thought as follows: If your power is perfect, it is such
because you are a divine unity in which there is nothing opposite,
contrary or restrictive.24 Gods power does not lead to any con
20 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 15, 1 (MOG, 9), p. 30: nullum esse
creatum habeat de sua natura esse, quia devenit de non esse.
22 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 14, 8 (MOG, 9), p. 29: nam tua
[scil. potestas] non est maior nec minor in uno tempore, quam in alio, sed
est firmiter manens sine omni incremento vel decremento. See also Liber
contemplationis, ch. 14, 2 (MOG, 9), p. 28: Tua potestas est tam alta et
nobilis, quod de sua natura sit esse sine fine, nam, sicut est de sua natura
sine principio, sic est de sua natura esse sine omni fine.
23 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 14, 18 (MOG, 9), p.29: nam nihil est in
tua essentia habens defectum in se.
24 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 14, 16 (MOG, 9), p. 29: si tua potestas
est perfecta, talis est, quia es una unitas divina, in qua non est ulla res
contrarians nec discordans nec impediens.
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annemarie c. mayer
tradiction and multiplicity in the concept of God. There is a close

connection between Gods essence and his potestas, Your power is
so strongly one in your essence, that wherever your power is, there
is also your essence, and wherever your essence is, there is also
your power.25 Llull is now relating the attribute power to other
attributes of God. By his power God creates justice and righteous
ness, because it repays each one according to what he has done,
be he righteous or a sinner.26 Kings also punish unjustly, God
however only for justice.27 Gods power transcends all powers, it
stands above all.28 Moreover, unlike in human beings, potestas and
voluntas are convertible in God: Your power and your will accord
to such an extent and are in essential harmony so that there is no
contradiction between the one and the other; for all that your will
desires your power can do and all that your power is able to do
your will wants.29 It would be interesting to pursue further this
observation in connection with the theodicy question: Is it possible
that God does not want evil and therefore is not able to bring it
about? Llull at least indicates one possible way of thinking: With
his ordinatio of the world God translates his potestas into action.
Llull mentions astronomy as an example; but on closer inspection
it is rather astrology: It is a very big mistake of the people who
rely on astronomy, because they ascribe all power to nature and
do not reserve any for you, because they do not believe that you
determine and limit its [scil. natures] course.30 Llull calls people
25 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 14, 28 (MOG, 9), p. 30: Tua potestas
tam fortiter est una in tua essentia, quod ubicunque est tua potestas, ibi sit
tua essentia, et ubicunque est tua essentia, ibi sit tua potestas.
26 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 16, 12 (MOG, 9), p.33: quia ipsa reddet
unicuique, secundum quod fecerit, sive sit iustus, sive sit peccator.
29 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 17, 3 (MOG, 9), p. 35: Tua potestas
et voluntas tam fortiter conveniunt et concordant in natura, quod non sit
contrarietas inter unam et alteram; nam omne id, quod tua voluntas vult,
potest tua potestas, et omne id quod tua potestas potest, vult tua voluntas.
30 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 15, 22 (MOG, 9), p.32: Valde magnus est
error hominum confidentium in astronomia, qui naturae attribuunt omnem
potestatem et nihil reservant tibi, quia non credunt te cogere et constringere
cursum ipsius.
145
who believe such a thing male instructi et orbati suo sensu.31 In

contrast, Llull emphasises that everything, even the bad or the
evil, is put in its place by Gods power and kept in check. 32 Fur
thermore Llull explicitly states: because your power is infinite, it
can do anything, and because it can do everything, it can redeem
whomsoever it wants; for could it not do this, it would follow that it
were finite in the sense that it could not save whomsoever it wanted.33
Gods attributes are independent of creation, for, firstly, in God
they pertain to Gods essence and are thus essential, whereas in
the human being they only manifest themselves as accidental.
This is the main difference between the Creator and the created,
between the Divine and the human. 34 And, secondly, God is not
dependent on his creation to enact his attributes. By their own
intrinsic characteristic activities they become distinguishable.
This means as Llull points out in the definitions of the Art of
Finding Truth that Gods goodness makes good, Gods greatness
great, Gods eternity eternal etc. Gods goodness, greatness, power
etc. call for a corresponding activity as their enacting. This activ
ity of the divine attributes is an essential one. 35 It does not need
the created world and it does not cause any gap between Gods
31 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 15, 16 (MOG, 9), p. 31: quam male
instructi et orbati suo sensu sunt, Domine, quod ignorant et non cognoscant
tuam magnam potestatem, quae facit de omnibus rebus quidquid vult et
quando vult.
32 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 15, 26 (MOG, 9), p. 32: nam daemon
est tam potens in faciendo malum, quod, si non esset tua potestas, quae
constringit et refraenat ipsum, ne faciat malum, totum mundum destrueret
in una hora vel in minore tempore.
33 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 17, 5 (MOG, 9), p. 35: quoniam tua
potestas est infinita omnia potest, et quia omnia potest, potest salvare
quemcunque velit; nam, si hoc non posset, sequeretur, quod esset finita in
hoc, quod non posset salvare, quem vellet.
34 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 178, 27 (MOG, 9), p. 426: sicut
tuae qualitates sunt in te essentiales, et omnes sunt una et eadem res cum
tua substantia ratione tuae magnae perfectionis, ita qualitates, quae sunt in
homine, sunt accidentales et distinctae a substantia ipsius hominis ratione
defectuum, qui in eo sunt.
35 SeeE.Colomer i Pous, El problema de la relaci fera en Ramon Llull:
proposta de soluci, Vic, 1996 (Actes del Simposi Internacional de Filosofia de
lEdat Mitjana. VicGirona, 1116 dabril del 1993, Actes nm. 1), pp. 1120;
p.16.
146
annemarie c. mayer
being and acting. In God there is something which is good mak

ing, which is good makeable and the act of good making. 36
For Llull this pointed towards the existence of the Trinity. Since
this is true of every attribute, different predications like God
is good or God is powerful still make sense, although in God
all attributes are essentially one: All that is called attribute in
you, is one and the same thing, for your justice is your mercy and
your mercy your justice, and the same is true of all your virtues,
because whatever is in you is your divine essence. 37 Although the
attributes are many, they are convertible among themselves and
ultimately they even coincide in Gods essence. 38 There can be nei
ther composition nor accidens, neither createdness nor corporeality
in God, for Llull combines the convertibility and co-possibility
of the divine attributes with their essential identity and intrinsic
activity. According to Platzeck, identity means in this context
equivalence of all the dignities in the sense of full reflexivity both
among themselves as well as of each with the divine essence. The
dignities, although primarily used in a transcendent sense, are
here exclusively applied to Gods essence. In this exclusive appli
cation they coincide totally with the essence of God. 39
36 See for instance for the divine attribute of unity: Ramon Llull, Liber de
ente absoluto, ed. J.Sthr, Palma de Mallorca, 1959 (ROL, 1), pp.149154;
p. 154: Non potest esse unitas absoluta sine distincta relatione absoluta per
absolutum unissimantem, absolutum unissimatum, absolutum unissimare.
Sine quibus non haberet naturam absolutam, et esset vacua et intrinsece
otiosa, ligata et imperfecta; quod est falsum et impossibile. Ostensa est ergo
divina trinitas et cum ea divina unitas absoluta.
37 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 178, 28 (MOG, 9), p. 426: Omnes res,
quae dicuntur in te qualitates, sunt una et eadem res, quia tua iustitia est tua
misericordia, et tua misericordia est tua iustitia, et hoc idem est de omnibus
aliis tuis virtutibus; quia, quidquid est in te, est tua substantia divina.
38 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 180, 1 (MOG, 9), p.431: omnes tuas
qualitates sint una res in te, licet quoad nos demonstrentur multae.
39 E.-W. Platzeck, Raimund Lull Sein Leben Seine Werke. Die
Grundlagen seines Denkens, vol. 1, DsseldorfRome, 1962, p. 155: Identitt
besagt hier die quivalenz aller Grundwrden im Sinne einer vollen
Reflexivitt sowohl untereinander als auch jeder einzelnen mit der gttlichen
Wesenheit. Die Grundwrden, wiewohl zunchst transzendental gemeint,
werden hier ausschlielich auf Gottes Wesen an sich angewandt. In dieser
ausschlielichen Anwendung fallen sie vllig mit Gottes Wesen zusammen.
147
The activity of the divine attributes is an essential activity.40

Insofar as one is looking at the essence of God and its simplicity,
God is truly one without a multiplicity of attributes that would
mean accidentality. Provided one looks at Gods activity, the attri
butes are truly enumerable. Thus Llull does not represent just the
nominalist position that the basic dignities are only distinguished
in our perception, but in reality cannot be differentiated from the
divine essence or being. This nominalist position would question
Gods action since it would imply that the attributes do not have
a real reference to God and therefore could not be intrinsic, but
arise from human imagination or a deficit of human perception.
Nevertheless Llull did not hold the view that the divine attri
butes can be known thoroughly and ultimately. For example, he
insisted, Nothing is sufficient to recognise all your goodness.41
This is, however, not due to a lack of perfection in Gods being or
essence, but must be attributed to the limited possibilities of the
human intellect, for that we cannot know you does not stem from
a defect on your side, but from a defect of our five corporeal senses
which are not sufficient.42 Even the spiritual senses are only capa
ble of making us see by them that we are limited and finite and
that your being is eternal and infinite.43 Yet, even if we do not
come to see Gods essentia in this world, it is nonetheless true.44
4. Instead of a conclusion: Llulls perfect example of an attribute
In concluding let us turn to the most interesting and most basic
of the fundamental attributes of God in the Liber contemplationis,
See Colomer i Pous, El problema de la relaci fera, p.16.
Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 19, 6 (MOG, 9), p.39: nihil est sufficiens
ad cognoscendum totam tuam bonitatem.
42 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 23, 14 (MOG, 9), p. 48: quia non posse
attingere te, non venit ex tuo defectu, sed ex defectu quinque sensuum
corporalium ad hoc non sufficientium.
43 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 23, 15 (MOG, 9), p. 48: cum illis
intelligimus nos esse terminatos et finitos et tuum esse esse aeternum et
infinitum.
44 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 23, 13 (MOG, 9), p. 48: Quamvis
tua essentia sit nobis invisibilis in hoc mundo ratione quinque sensuum
corporalium, quibus est occulta, in quantum non possunt attingere ad
sentiendum illam; per hoc tamen non sequitur, quod sit in falsitate.
40
41
148
annemarie c. mayer
to perfectio. For Llull, God is most perfect perfection. Thus he

already starts in his invocation of chapter 100: O Deus gloriose,
perfecte in omnibus perfectionibus! 45
God is perfect goodness, perfect greatness, perfect mercy
etc., even perfect perfection. Llull understands perfection as an
absence of any fault or defect: If a being is without beginning or
end, it reflects its perfectio because deprivation of being would be
a defect.46 God is perfectio because he is without equal.47 Gods
perfection is evident in the Trinity: the Father is perfect power,
the Son is perfect wisdom, the Holy Spirit is perfect love.48 This
shows that God is totus perfectus,49 totally perfect, because he
was already absolutely perfect, even before time existed,50 and it
will remain so in the future.51 God is perfect out of himself, out
of his own perfections. Concerning his perfection he is not depen
dent on anything or anyone, and certainly not on his creation.
Conversely, however, the reason for the creation lies in Gods per
fection: The creatures should recognise the perfection and good
ness of God. This they cannot do completely as it is impossible
that an infinite thing can be fully captured by a finite.52 This,
however, does not show as with the other attributes a defi
ciency in the work of creation itself, it only confirms that God
Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 100, 1 (MOG, 9), p.219.
See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 100, 1 (MOG, 9), p. 219: quia esse,
quod est sine principio et sine fine, significat habere perfectionem in se, cum
privatio ipsius esse significet defectum.
47 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 100, 2 (MOG, 9), p.219: Cum tu, Domine
Deus, sis solus sine pari et socio, et nulla res, quae est in esse, habeat virtutes
et qualitates similes tuis; ideo demonstratur et manifestatur, quod habeas
omnem perfectionem, et in te nullus sit defectus.
49 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 100, 10 (MOG, 9), p.219.
50 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 100, 5 (MOG, 9), p. 219: quia nulla
res erat, de qua tibi veniret ullus defectus; et nunc, quando tempus est in esse,
es totus perfectus; quia nulla res est, quae possit repugnare tuae perfectioni,
cum sis potens super omnes res.
51 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 100, 5 (MOG, 9), p. 219: quando
tempus non erit in esse, etiam eris totus perfectus, quia nulla res poterit
repugnare tuae voluntati.
52 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 100, 9 (MOG, 9), p. 219: cum sit
impossibile rem infinitam posse totam comprehendi a re finita.
45
46
149
is even more perfect than one can think and see.53 Our lack in
recognising and praising God is due to ourselves, to our own inad
equacy and imperfection.54 On the other hand Gods perfection is
not surprising. It is closely related to his essence.55 But Gods per
fection for Llull is not without problems because it means immu
tability: Your great perfection, Lord, has the result that your
divine being cannot accept any change or mutation; for nothing
that has infinite perfection can produce in its state any change or
any mutation.56 Is God therefore damned to keeping still and to
absolute inaction? No, that would run entirely counter to Llulls
approach. But there are certain things which would contradict
Gods perfection and which God therefore cannot do. God cannot
create a God equal to himself. But because of this God is more
perfect than if he could do so.57 Even God can have no beginning.
Otherwise he would not be perfect.58 Similarly, there is a question
which comes up once again today in the analytic philosophy of
religion: Has God the power to want his own non-being? Gods
See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 100, 8 (MOG, 9), p.219.

See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 100, 14 (MOG, 9), p.220. Moreover,
despite starting with the qualitates finitae Llull takes into account the
principle a finito ad infinitum nulla proportio a principle that goes back
to Aristotle, De coelo I, 6, 274a78.
55 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 100, 16 (MOG, 9), p. 220: Sicut
tuae essentiae est proprium esse divinam et infinitam et aeternam, ita est ei
proprium esse perfectam.
56 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 100, 21 (MOG, 9), p. 220: Ratione tuae
magnae perfectionis evenit, Domine, quod tuum esse divinum non possit
recipere ullam mutationem nec ullam alterationem; quia nulla res, quae
habeat infinitam perfectionem, potest habere in suo statu ullam mutationem
vel alterationem.
57 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 100, 20 (MOG, 9), p. 220: Si tu,
Domine Deus, posses creare unum Deum similem tibi, non esses adeo
completus et perfectus, sicut es nunc quando non potes facere Deum aequalem
tuae deitati; et hoc est ratione tuae perfectionis, quae est adeo perfecta et
abundans omnibus bonis, quod impossibile sit aliam rem posse habere tantam
perfectionem, quantam tu habes.
58 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 100, 19 (MOG, 9), p. 220: Quia
omnia excepto te habent principium, melius demonstratur perfectio, quae est
in te.
53
54
150
annemarie c. mayer
power cannot facere sine ratione59 or contra rationem et sine

causa.60 Thus, there is no deficiency in Gods wisdom or in his
goodness nor in any of his other virtues,61 although we need to
attach an impossibilitas to his power, namely that God cannot do
anything contra rationem et sine causa. Yet basically this is not
an impossibilitas,62 but the perfectio potestatis of God. Here one can
see very well that the perfectio functions as a second order attri
bute, which characterises the other attributes and even increases
them. As a second order attribute it tops Llulls list of attributes.
It indicates, in analogy with Anselms ontological argument that
for Llull God is id quo perfectius cogitari nequit, in comparison to
which nothing more perfect could be thought.
Perfectio, however, is not only the logical culmination of the list
of attributes, it also has a spiritual meaning. The created, also,
has a certain God-given perfection, but this consists mainly in its
closeness to God.63 For everything created needs God, but God
does not need the created.64 All perfection in the human being and
the world comes from God. Just as Gods essence is perfect, so too
59 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 18, 2 (MOG, 9), p. 37: imo, si tu,
Domine, posses sine ratione aliquid facere, sequeretur, quod esses defectuosus
in potestate, quia posses errare.
60 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 18, 21 (MOG, 9), p.38.
61 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 18, 3 (MOG, 9), p.37: Unde, quando
nos intelligimus, Domine, quod tua potestas non possit facere aliquid sine
ratione, intelligimus eam magis perfectam et virtuosam et nobilem et altam;
quia non possumus intelligere secundum rationem in tua potestate defectum
sapientiae nec bonitatis nec ullius virtutis [] quia omne id, quod vis, potes,
et omne id, quod potes, vis.
62 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 18, 21 (MOG, 9), p. 38: Si nos,
Domine, attribuamus tuae perfectae potestati impossibilitatem dicendo: quod
non possis facere aliquid contra rationem et sine causa, non est nobis vitium
nec tuae potestati; quia hoc secundum veritatem non est impossibilitas, sed
est perfectio potestatis et sapientiae et virtutum.
63 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 100, 23 (MOG, 9), p. 220: est
proprium tuae perfectioni dare nobis perfectionem et complementum
approximando nos ad se ipsam.
64 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 100, 22 (MOG, 9), p. 220: omnia,
quaecunque sunt creata et facta, indigeant te in omnibus rebus et in toto
tempore, in quo sunt, et [], quam parum tu indigeas omnibus rebus creatis
et factis.
151
his works are perfect.65 In the praise of the perfection of Gods

works and therefore of God himself is to be found the way of the
human being to his or her own perfection: Because your works,
O Lord, are all perfection, hence human beings, the more they
praise them, the closer they come to perfection and move away
from deficiency.66 Llulls anagogical aim is to bring his readers
to the point from which they seek their fullness and perfection
where they can find them.67 The Liber contemplationis serves this
goal, the instruction to the praise of Gods perfection in God and
in Gods creation. For God is all our perfection and refinement.68
Abstract
Contemplatio in Deum or the Pleasure of Knowing God via his
Attributes
Ramon Llull firmly believes that God is characterised by a multi
tude of attributes, and those attributes are not an absolute secret.
They are not hidden or unknowable, although God is transcen
dent. If human beings believe that God created the world, they
can look thoroughly at Gods creation, see how it is modelled and
structured, and they can draw conclusions about its Creator. By
contemplating the world and the way it is, by employing the rea
son God has gifted them with, human beings can also contemplate
God. The insights that such contemplation affords result in plea
sure, because they constitute knowledge related to salvation. In
65 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 101, 2 (MOG, 9), p.221: Unde, cum
tua gloriosa essentia Domine Deus, sit perfecta in omnibus rebus, necessario
convenit, quod omnia tua opera sint perfecta in omnibus bonis, quia non est
ulla res illarum, quae facis ex qua posset devenire defectus et diminutio tuae
sanctae essentiae.
66 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 101, 29 (MOG, 9), p. 223: Quia tua
opera, Domine, sunt omnia in perfectione, propterea quo plus homo ea laudat,
eo plus accedit ad perfectionem et recedit a defectu.
67 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 102, 27 (MOG, 9), p. 225: beati sunt
omnes, qui suam plenitudinem et perfectionem inquirunt in te et petunt a te;
quia ibi eas inquirunt, ubi possunt eas invenire.
68 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 102, 15 (MOG, 9), p. 225: perfectio et
complementum omnium nostrum; see also ibidem 102, 19 (MOG, 9), p.225.
152
annemarie c. mayer
his Liber Contemplationis in Deum Ramon Llull lists 20 different

divine attributes. He distinguishes between the attributes with
reference to God (quoad Deum) and the attributes with reference to
us (quoad nos). How does Llull deduce these attributes? How does
he distinguish them? What do they tell us about Lulls notion of
God? In later works Llull reduces the number of divine attribu
tes to seven. Does the concept become more elaborate as the list
of attributes becomes shorter? This paper argues that the entire
conceptual framework that Llull will use later for his endeavours
in inter-faith dialogue with Jews and Muslims is already in nuce
in the Liber Contemplationis. This paper analyses also the relation
between the different attributes, and asks why bonitas and perfectio are given such a prominent role. It introduces also the notion
of attributes of reference, i.e., of the divine attributes that Llull
uses to qualify other divine attributes. On the basis of the concept
developed in the Liber Contemplationis, this paper shows how Llull
could employ his notion of divine attributes in inter-church and,
above all, in inter-faith dialogue.
Annemarie C. Mayer
annemarie.mayer@theo.kuleuven.be
University of Leuven
Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies
Research Unit Systematic Theology
Sint-Michielsstraat 4 box 3101
3000 Leuven, Belgium
3. Lullism
REGARDS SUR RAYMOND LULLE

Josep Batalla
(Santa Coloma de Queralt)
When reading the works of an important thinker, look first for the
apparent absurdities in the text and ask yourself how a sensible per
son could have written them. When you find an answer, when these
passages make sense, then you may find that more central passages,
ones you previously thought you understood, have changed
their meaning.
T. S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension,
Chicago, 1977, p. xii.
1. Limage dconcertante
Ablard, Bonaventure, Thomas dAquin, Duns Scot, Ockham
tous ces thologiens et philosophes mdivaux peuvent susciter le
dsaccord dun lecteur critique sans pour autant le dconcerter.
Pour peu quil soit inform, le lecteur peut les situer assez facile
ment dans lhistoire de la pense car il peut connatre les matres
auprs de qui ils se formrent, les contemporains avec qui ils
conversrent et les disciples qui dvelopprent leurs ides. Par ail
leurs, tous partagent les approches et la terminologie en vigueur
dans les coles de lpoque.
Lulle, en revanche, incommode le lecteur critique. Nous ne
savons quasiment rien de sa formation intellectuelle; les dbats
avec ses contemporains furent apparemment des dialogues infruc
tueux1 et tout laisse penser que les multiples lullismes ayant
exist ont, tout au plus, pris comme point de dpart une ide de
Lulle interprte de faon unilatrale.
Seuls les lullistes se sentent laise en lisant Lulle. Les non-lul
listes se mfient de lArt. On leur a assur que la conversion des
1 R. Imbach, Laien in der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Amsterdam, 1989,
pp. 102130: Der unmgliche Dialog. Llull und die Pariser Universittsphi
losophie (13091311).

IPM, 67 (Turnhout, 2015), pp. 155-164.
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107312
156
josep batalla
infidles tait la raison dtre de lArt2 , mais ils nont pas de

preuve que personne se soit jamais converti au christianisme grce
lArt. On leur a dit que lArt est une sorte de logique universelle
une manire de raisonner valide pour toutes les sciences 3 , mais
ils dcouvrent que la version dfinitive de cette Art, lArs generalis
ultima, fait une large part un discours De Deo per principia et
aussi per regulas deducto4 .
Puisque aucun magister artium ne soutenait que la logique
devrait traiter de Dieu, les lecteurs non-lullistes se demandent:
Quest donc que lArt? On leur dit quil ne sagit pas dune
logica theorica, mais dune logica utens5 , toutefois ils savent bien
que, sauf chez les lullistes bigarrs du baroque 6, personne ne la
jamais utilise. On leur assure que lArt est un engin pistmolo
gique7 avec lequel Lulle aurait pu rpondre, une fois pour toutes,
aux questions que se posait la scolastique lors de ses interminables
disputes 8, cependant ils savent bien quil sagit dune thse des
plus invraisemblables9.
Face au dlire enthousiaste des lullistes, les historiens de la
logique se sont toujours montrs prudents. En faisant abstraction
des dclarations outrancires qui ont disqualifi Lulle en le trai
tant avec mpris de ttu talentueux (begabter Querkopf) et de
demi-fou (halber Narr)10, il est incontestable que les historiens
de la logique se sentent mal laise lorsquils tudient lArt de
2 A.Bonner; L.Badia, Ramon Llull. Vida, pensament i obra literria, Bar
celone, 1988, p.85.
3 Ramon Llull, Ars generalis ultima, ed. A. Madre, 1986 (ROL, 14), prol.,
pp.56: Scientia universalis ad omnes scientias.
4 Ibid., 9.1, pp.189216.
5 A. Bonner, The Art and Logic of Ramon Llull. A Users Guide, Leiden
Boston, 2007, p.ix.
6 P. Rossi, Clavis universalis. Arti della memoria e logica combinatoria da
Lullo a Leibniz. Bologne, 1983, pp.63129.
7 J.M. Ruiz Simon, LArt de Ramon Llull i la teoria escolstica de la cincia,
Barcelone, 1999, p.16.
8 L. Badia, Compte rendu de J. M. Ruiz Simon. El joc de Ramon Llull i
la significaci de lArt General, SL, 42 (2002), p.132.
9 J.Batalla, Die lullsche Art als philosophische Theologie, Jahrbuch fr
Religionsphilosophie, 9 (2010), pp.129158.
10 C. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, Leipzig, 1867, vol. 3, p.146 i 156,
(rimpr. Bristol 2001).
regards sur raymond lulle
157
Lulle, car il part de principes et emploie des rgles de dduction

qui divergent des procdures dductives habituelles dans les trai
ts surgis des milieux universitaires. Philotheus Boehner exprime
ce malaise avec une rticence emplie de prudence:
Nous avons exclu luvre de Raymond Lulle parce que nous ne
sommes pas suffisamment familiariss avec sa logique particulire
pour tre en mesure de la traiter correctement, mme si nous nous
doutons quelle a davantage de valeur que celle que lui attribuent
les historiens11.
Wilhelm Risse fait part de la mme distanciation respec

tueuse lorsquil signale qu la diffrence des traits logiques de
ses contemporains, lArs magna de Lulle soriente mystiquement
vers ce qui est suprarationnel, et non, logiquement, vers ce qui
est rationnel12 . Tadeusz Kontarbinski et Robert Blanch font eux
aussi preuve de cette distanciation prudente13. En revanche, la cri
tique ironique que nous trouvons chez Jzef M. Bocheski et, en
plus grande mesure, chez William et Martha Kneale, est plus cat
gorique14. Mais il y a eu aussi des critiques moqueurs qui ont quali
fi lArs lullien de rve logique15 ou de gantisme de la raison16.
Ce contraste criant entre la candeur avec laquelle les lullistes
portent aux nues lArt et la rticence prudente des mdivistes
lorsquils le mettent en doute, a conduit la cration dune rigide
11 Ph. Boehner, Medieval Logic. An Outline of Its Development from 1250 to

c. 1400, Chicago, 1952, pp.xiv-xv.
12 W.Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit, Stuttgart, 1964, vol. 1, p.533.
13 T. Kontarninski, (1964), Leons sur lhistoire de la logiques, Paris,
pp. 98100; R.Blanch, La logique et son histoire. DAristote Russell, Paris,
1970, pp.164167.
14 J. M. Bochenski, Formale Logik, Munich, 1956, p. 319: Mit einer ech
ten Logik hat dies alles nur wenig zu tun; W. et M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford, 1961 p. 242: His selection of fundamental concepts
did not show great philosophical ability; and his method of combinig them
has not produced any results, either in the conversion of the Moors or in the
advancement of science.
15 M. de Gandillac Le rve logique de Raymon Lulle, Revue de Philosophie de la France et de ltranger, 157 (1967), pp.187221.
16 L. Sala-Molins, El gegantisme de la ra lulliana, Palma de Mallorca,
1989.
158
josep batalla
secte lullienne, didologie sculaire17, dcide bannir tous ceux

qui remettent en question la valeur strictement logique et pas
religieuse de cette prtendue logique lullienne. Lune des caract
ristiques de cette secte est quelle ne figure jamais dans aucune
rencontre de logique mdivale pour y exposer les soi-disant excel
lences de la logique lullienne.
Outre cette rigide secte lullienne, il existe une autre sorte de
regroupement lullien non officiel, plus diffus, pas excluant, mais
tout aussi marginal. Cest celui constitu des spcialistes centrs
exclusivement sur la pense de Raymond Lulle. Dpourvus de
connaissances mdivales plus vastes et sans possder, ainsi, une
vritable formation de mdivistes, ils ne peuvent parler de rien
dautre que de Lulle. Le rsultat: leur recherche devient unilat
rale et prsente peu dintrt pour les mdivistes dont les intrts
sont plus vastes. Je me demande si les six sessions lulliennes de ce
congrs ne sont pas une activit quil faudrait attribuer cette
sorte de regroupement marginal lullien.
Les spcialistes dautres penseurs mdivaux ne ressentent pas
un besoin aussi imprieux que celui qui anime irrsistiblement les
lullistes de senfermer dans un groupe isol. Les scottistes, par
exemple, peuvent se regrouper occasionnellement ou rgulirement
pour tudier Duns Scot, mais ils ne refusent pas la confrontation
de la pense scottiste avec celle dautres auteurs, mdivaux ou
modernes. Les lullistes, en revanche, de gr ou de force, ont ten
dance sisoler pour tudier Lulle.
Cependant, il pourrait peut-tre exister une autre manire dvi
ter la confusion provoque par lArt de Lulle qui ne soit pas lisole
Les lullistes sculaires les plus radicaux ont mme insinu quil faudrait
interprter Lulle comme un idologue des croisades, de sorte que son Art
serait une arme intellectuelle conue pour contribuer liminer lislam. Cf.
J. M. Ruiz Simon; A. Soler, Vida, pensament i context de Ramon Llull,
Catalan Historical Review, 1 (2008), p. 202: Le Docteur illumin na jamais
cess de concevoir son Art comme une arme de conversion massive au service
de llimination de lislam et de la christianisation de toute lhumanit. Et si
la premire de ses crations littraires fut conue comme un manuel pour une
cole de missionnaires situe dans un lieu isol et idyllique, les uvres lArs
generalis ultima et sa version portable, lArs brevis, furent conues comme
des armes spirituelles indispensables pour les croiss qui devaient conqurir,
par la force des armes matrielles, et dans le contexte dune grande opration
belliqueuse par terre et par mer, les domaines desinfidles.
17
159
ment. Cette manire pourrait consister rechercher lorigine de la

confusion et tenter de comprendre la raison pour laquelle Lulle
nous dconcerte. Nous pourrions alors probablement comprendre
son Art dune autre faon. Mais si nous voulons aller au-del de
limage reue de lArt lullien, celle qui dconcerte le lecteur cri
tique, il faudrait commencer par dcrire limage que, sous diverses
variantes, nous trouvons bauche dans nombre des prsentations
du personnage de Lulle, en particulier dans les manuels dhistoire
de la philosophie.
2. Limage reue
Il ne fait aucun doute que Lulle, de par le volume et la diver
sit de son uvre, est un personnage qui offre de grandes possi
bilits lactivit acadmique. Autrement dit, les textes de Lulle
peuvent aisment faire lobjet dinnombrables tudes de la part
des disciplines scientifiques les plus diverses. Les autorits comp
tentes peuvent ainsi valuer et, le cas chant, noter ces tudes,
condition que les rsultats obtenus naient aucune raison de mettre
en doute limage reue de Lulle. Bien au contraire, on prsuppose
tacitement quils viennent la complter.
Le trait le plus important de cette image reue de Lulle est
quelle considre la Vita coetanea comme un rcit historique, dict
par Lulle au moment de sa vieillesse. Avec cette interprtation, qui
nglige les procdures de lhagiographie de lpoque18, la conver
sion et lillumination de Lulle deviennent deux faits anodins que
tout le monde accepte comme rels. Ainsi, tout ce que reprsenta
pour Lulle la conversio ad paenitentiam nest pas suffisamment sou
ligne, de mme que la mission de convertir les infidles est consi
dre de manire non critique comme le souci principal de Lulle.
Il sensuit que lArt est compris comme une mthode foncire
ment apologtique qui part dune logique de laquelle dcoule une
pistmologie capable de combler toutes les insuffisances de laris
totlisme scolastique. Inutile de rappeler que les mdivistes nont
mme pas pris en compte cette hypothse insense.
Nous pourrions rsumer en quatre points limage de Lulle la
plus rpandue aujourdhui.
18 D.Von Der Nahmer, Die lateinische Heiligenvita. Eine Einfhrung in die
lateinische Hagiographie, Darmstadt, 1994.
160
josep batalla
Tout dabord, on affirme que Lulle est lauteur dun systme

logique original qui doit tre considr comme le noyau le plus
prcieux de sa pense;
ensuite, on prtend que les tapes marques par lvolution de
la mcanique combinatoire de lArt dterminent lvolution
de sa pense;
de mme, on admet sans critique que les divers lullismes ont
dvelopp des ides logiques centrales dans la pense de
Lulle19;
enfin, on prsuppose tacitement quil ny a pas une pense lul
lienne, oriente vers la mystique, qui savre digne dtre tu
die.
Je crois que cette interprtation de luvre de Lulle repose sur
des prsuppositions errones que je voudrais reveler:
lacceptation du fait quune combinatoire empirique clairement
prsente dans lArt lullien est un systme logique dinfrence,
comme cela est en fait insinu lorsquon compare lArt la
logique aristotlicienne;
lide que la mentalit encyclopdique prsente dans le dsir
dintroduire tous les savoirs dans lArt est comparable la men
talit scientifique, telle celle prsente dans la logique terministe et
la grammaire modiste, contemporaines de Lulle20;
lapprciation de la disparit entre la manire de raisonner de
Lulle et la logique aristotlicienne labore par les scolas
tiques, comme si cela voulait dire que les lments ration
19 Soulignons qu la diffrence dautres coles comme prsent le tho

misme et le scotisme, par exemple, troitement lis la pense de Thomas
dAquin et de Duns Scot , pratiquement tous les lullismes ont t fonds,
et se fondent encore, sur linterprtation de lArt comme un mcanisme com
binatoire. Ainsi, les tudier implique de pntrer plus avant dans lhistoire
culturelle et, mon avis, de sloigner de lauthentique pense de Lulle.
20 Par ailleurs, les traits encyclopdiques de Lulle avec lesquels il rin
terprte le savoir de son poque Rhtorique nouvelle, Logique nouvelle, Gomtrie nouvelle doivent tre considrs comme une caractristique de la
culture laque, mme sil faut admettre quils prsentent trs peu dintrt
pour lhistoire de la science; cf. J. Batalla, Ego, qui sum laicus, SL 48,
(2008), p.85.
161
nels inhrents lArt taient rellement la proposition dune

logique alternative.
Ces erreurs aboutissent un systme de combinatoire apparem
ment intressant, mais que les historiens de la logique ne peuvent
pas considrer comme un systme logique cohrent. Analys de
prs, lArt lullien, tel quil est propos par limage reue, se rvle
comme un systme compliqu et nigmatique de combinaisons
possibles entre des lments, qui ont perdu le contenu ontologique
quils avaient chez Lulle. En consquence, les logiciens et les his
toriens de la philosophie regardent ce systme avec mfiance, ou
avec un ddain ironique.
Je me risque dire que, dans ses prsentations plus scolaires,
lArt peut mme arriver devenir un jeu de socit inoffensif,
certes amusant, mais pouvant facilement tre tourn en ridicule
car il cherche ingnument prouver ce qui nest gure facile
dmontrer: la foi chrtienne.
3. Une image alternative
Pour rinterprter le personnage de Lulle, la proposition mtho
dologique avance par Max Weber peut nous tre utile: la cration
dun Idealtyp21. partir de ce que nous croyons savoir, en nous
centrant sur ce qui nous proccupe et en tenant compte de nos
prfrences, nous dessinons idalement la faon dont pouvait tre
le personnage du Lulle rel que nous voulons connatre. Ce per
sonnage idal oriente la recherche et il est modifi mesure que le
requirent les donnes quil permet dinterprter.
Je crois que la premire tche raliser est de remettre en
question lune des thses les mieux tayes dans limage reue de
Lulle: lArt fut conu pour lapologtique22 . Cette thse, fonde sur
une interprtation littrale de la Vita coetanea, ne fonctionne avec
aucun des prologues des diverses versions de lArt, o la conver
21 M. Weber, Die Objectivitt sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpoliti
scher Erkenntnis, in Gesammelte Aufstze zur Wissenschaftslehre, Tbingen,
1985, pp.190214.
22 Sans aucune justification, la prsentation de lArt lullien dans Qui est
Raymond Lulle (http://quisestlullus.narpan.net/61_art.html) commence
de faon abrupte avec cette phrase premptoire: LArt dbuta comme une
mthode conue pour la conversion des infidles.
162
josep batalla
sion des infidles, si elle est mentionne, ne constitue quune seule

des nombreuses finalits de lArt et nest jamais considre comme
la principale23.
La Vita coetanea nous parle galement de la conversio ad paenitentiam de Lulle, et nous savons avec assez de vraisemblance en
quoi consistait la vie dun laicus paenitens lpoque de Lulle.
Cela signifiait entreprendre des plerinages, se consacrer la
contemplation, sengager vangliser, voire assumer la mission
de prcher24. Lulle, dcid se former spirituellement afin de pou
voir respecter pleinement (integre) toutes les exigences de sa foi
redcouverte, se livra la contemplation et ltude. Le fruit de
ces annes dtude et de contemplation est un rsum de logique
philosophique intitul Compendium logicae Algazelis et une mdi
tation trs personnelle, Llibre de contemplaci en Du, crite sous
forme de thologie spirituelle.
Lactivit contemplative fit entrevoir Lulle probablement de
faon soudaine, ce quil exprima plus tard comme une illumina
tion divine25 quune logique mtaphysique inspire de la theologia naturalis, commune aux trois religions abrahamiques, pouvait
laider laborer la vision thologique de la ralit quil souhaitait
tant. Nous sommes la source originaire de lArt: laborer une
vision thologique du monde lui permettant de rendre compte de
23 Il est certain que la Vita coaetanea, ed. H. Harada, Turnhout, 1980
(ROL, 8), c. 2, 6, p.275, relie la gense de lArt lactivit missionnaire
quand cette uvre mentionne lunum librum meliorem de mundo que Lulle
dcida dcrire contra errores infidelium. Je crois toutefois que ce texte reflte
la faon dont Lulle interprtait sa vie lge de 79 ans alors quil se sentait
ananti par les checs de ses projets missionnaires et non la gense de sa
pense quand il avait 40 ans. Cela pour deux raisons: dune part parce qu
lorigine, son apologtique tait destine dmontrer la foi chrtienne et non
rfuter les erreurs des infidles et, dautre part, car dans les avant-propos
des premires versions de lArt, la conversion des infidles ntait quune des
nombreuses finalits de lArt et na jamais t considre comme la princi
pale et encore moins la seule. Ainsi, ceux qui affirment que la conversion des
infidles tait la raison dtre de lArt dnaturent son noyau originaire: la
contemplation.
24 A. Vauchez, Les pnitents au Moyen ge, in Les lacs au Moyen ge.
Pratiques et expriences religieuses, Paris, 2007, pp.105112.
25 Plus de quarante ans plus tard, la Vita coaetanea, op. cit., c. 3, 14,
p.280, en fournit une interprtation hagiographique Subito Deus illustravit
mentem suam.
163
tout: du monde peru par les sens, de lexprience intrieure et du

contenu de la foi chrtienne.
Il est certain que petit petit, lArt se dtacha partiellement
de la contemplation, mais Lulle ne la jamais considr comme
une faon de penser indpendante de lacte contemplatif. Dans la
mesure o lensemble du message lullien tait centr sur la rcu
pration intgrale de la foi, lArt explicitait successivement tout ce
que cela impliquait dans la vie dun lac lettr et pnitent.
Par consquent, afin de dterminer les finalits originaires de
lArt, il faut exclure strictement que Lulle se soit propos de crer
un systme logique dgag de la spculation thologique; bien au
contraire, Lulle visait laborer une conception de toute la ra
lit atteinte partir de la foi. Il faut galement viter de situer la
conversion des infidles au centre de ses proccupations initiales.
Certes, la mission dvanglisation fonde sur des raisonnements
convaincants (cogentibus rationibus) y est prsente, mais plutt
comme une consquence de la contemplation.
Dans le prologue du Compendium seu commentum Artis demonstrativae, rdig (1289) peu avant lArs generalis ultima (1305), Lulle
soutient que lArt a de nombreuses finalits. Soulignons que
Lulle prsente ces finalits non comme ce que lon peut obtenir
avec un instrument oprationnel, mais comme ce que lon peut
atteindre avec un instrument ducatif. Certes, lArt permet de
faire des oprations combinatoires, mais il facilite surtout lobten
tion de capacits spirituelles: comprendre, aimer, choisir, raison
ner, justifier, rsoudre
La premire finalit dit le prologue du Compendium consiste
nous apprendre comprendre et aimer Dieu (intelligere et
diligere Deum);
la deuxime vise nous montrer comment vivre honntement,
cest--dire adhrer aux vertus, har les vices;
la troisime consiste nous enseigner raisonner la foi et la
justifier, cest--dire rfuter au moyen de raisons convain
cantes les opinions errones des infidles;
la quatrime a pour objectif de nous apprendre tout raisonner
partir de la foi, autrement dit poser et rpondre des
questions;
164
josep batalla
la cinquime vise nous initier intgrer tous les savoirs en

une vision thologique de la ralit, cest--dire acqu
rir dautres sciences et les conduire vers leurs conclusions
ncessaires26.
LArt lullien est donc bien plus quun mcanisme combinatoire
ou une apologtique raisonneuse. Cest une mthode emplie de
sagesse, ne de la contemplation et conue pour apprendre com
prendre, aimer et agir.
Abstract
Regards sur Raymond Lulle
Llulls opus and its magnitude has allowed a large variety of inter
pretations with a consequent multiplicity of valuations. This dis
parity has been increased by the fact that scholars take up two dif
ferent positions. On the one hand, there is an historicist approach
and, consequently, the description of the evolution of Llulls
thought and its possible connections with other medieval authors.
On the other hand, there is another school of critical exegesis that
assesses the doctrinal contributions of Llull. It should also be possi
ble to define a set of basic issues that Lullian scholars should start
from. I propose 3 points: (a) Llull was a cultured layman with a
deep spiritual experience; (b) Llull assimilated the spirituality of
enthusiastic laymen of his time and was dedicated to contempla
tion and to the propagation of the Christian faith; (c) the pursuit of
these two goals made Llull develop a theology based on a philoso
phical Ars, a combination of elements from religious metaphysics.
Josep Batalla
direccio@obradoredendum.cat
Obrador Edndum S.L.
Pl. de la Llibertat 5
43420 Santa Coloma de Queralt, Spain
26 Ramon Llull, Compendium Artis demonstrativae, ed. I.Salzinger et al.,
Moguntiae, 1742 (MOG, 3), prol., p.293: Multae sunt utilitates propter quas
haec Ars est inventa: instruit enim nos intelligere et diligere Deum, adhaerere
virtutibus, odire vitia et confundere cogentibus rationibus infidelium erro
neas opiniones. Docet etiam facere et solvere quaestiones et alias scientias
sub brevi spatio temporis posse acquiri et reduci ad necessarias conclusiones
secundum exigentiam materiae.
EL HILO LULIANO DE LA MADEJA CULTURAL

CASTELLANA MEDIEVAL.
NUEVOS APORTES AL LULISMO CASTELLANO
MEDIEVAL LAICO Y RELIGIOSO
Francisco Jos Daz Marcilla
(Lisboa)
1. Pequea introduccin
Quisiera empezar esta introduccin con una pregunta muy clara
y que tratar de responder a lo largo de este trabajo: qu moti
vaciones han tenido los diferentes lectores de Ramon Llull de la
Castilla del siglo XV, tanto laicos como religiosos, para interesarse
por un pensamiento tan complejo como el del pensador mallorqun
y, adems, tratar de evidenciarlo en su produccin escrita cuando
la acometen?
Para responder a esta cuestin, debemos, en primer lugar, iden
tificar quines han sido esos lectores. Podemos empezar diciendo
que la lnea que separa a religiosos de laicos, a medida que la
posicin social se hace ms relevante, se va volviendo mucho ms
sutil, encontrndonos varios casos de altos prelados que han sido
anteriormente nobles casados y con hijos. Esto va a ser crucial
cuando veamos ms adelante el rol cultural del noble.
A diferencia de lo sealado hasta ahora,1 soy de la opinin de
que los lectores de las obras de Llull pueden agruparse en torno
1 T. y J.Carreras i Artau, Historia de la Filosofa espaola. Filosofa cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV, II, Madrid, 1943, pp.499522, y en especial,
pp.517522; J.Carreras i Artau, Los comienzos del lulismo en Castilla,
in Mlanges Altamira. Homenaje a D.Rafael Altamira, ed. AA. VV., Madrid,
1936, pp.6572; J.Perarnau, El dileg entre religions en el lullisme
castell medieval, EL, 22 (1978), pp.241259; J.Perarnau, El lullisme
de Mallorca a Castella a travs de Valncia. Edici de lArt Abreujada de
Confessi, Arxiu de Textos Catalans Antics, 4 (1985), pp.6193; F.J. Daz
Marcilla, I lullismi: ambiti tematici dinteresse a confronto, in Ramon

IPM, 67 (Turnhout, 2015), pp. 165-190.
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107313
166
francisco jos daz marcilla
a menos focos de los que se haban sealado, pues estn ms rela

cionados entre s de lo que se crea, llegando a poder resumirse
en dos grandes focos. Cierto es que sus integrantes suelen tener
una actividad independiente, pero tambin es cierto que unos sur
gen de otros y me atrevera a indicar que, a medida que se vayan
descubriendo ms datos sobre el tema, ms se van a reforzar
estos lazos.
Empezar de manera negativa. No voy a incluir en ninguno de
los focos al primer lector de Llull del que se tiene noticia: Don
Juan Manuel, ya que aparece en poca muy temprana (13261330)
y no parece que haya tenido un seguimiento.2 Adems, una de sus
lecturas, el Libro de la orden de caballera, a diferencia de otras
reas de Europa donde tuvo mucha repercusin, en Castilla no
tuvo prcticamente ninguna. De hecho, un libre scrit en paper
en lenga castellana, apellat reglas de la orden de la cavalleria
aparece en la relacin de libros que pertenecieron al rey aragons
Alfonso el Magnnimo, es decir, fuera de Castilla. 3 Tampoco voy a
incluir a aquellos que, si bien han nacido en Castilla, su labor y su
inters por Llull lo desarrollan sin influir en los focos que se van
a ver a continuacin, caso de Juan de Crdoba (maestro de arte
luliana que aparece como corrector de latn en Venecia de obras
lulianas en 1480),4 y de Fernando de Crdoba (filsofo y protegido
de Lorenzo Valla y el cardenal Bessarione, adems de miembro de
Llull und Nikolaus von Kues: Eine Begegnung im Zeichen der Toleranz, ed.
E.Bidese, A.Fidora & P.Renner, Turnhout, 2005 (IPM, 46), pp.227245.
2 Los estudios que se han hecho al respecto son: F. de Paula Canale
jas, Raimundo Lulio y Don Juan Manuel, Revista de Espaa, 2 (1868),
pp.116137, y 4 (1870), pp.408431; J.M. Castro y Calvo, El arte de gobernar en las obras de Don Juan Manuel, Barcelona, 1945, pp.6365; R.-M.Lida
de Malkiel, Tres notas sobre don Juan Manuel, Romance Philology, 4
(195051), pp.155194; M. Ruffini, Les sources de Don Juan Manuel, Les
Lettres Romances, 7 (1953), pp.2749.
3 R. dAlos, Documenti per la storia della biblioteca dAlfonso il Magna
nimo, in Miscellanea Francesco Ehrle. Scritti di Storia e Paleografia pubblicati
sotto gli auspici di S.S. Pio XI in occasione dellottantesimo natalicio dellEmmo.
Cardinale Francesco Ehrle, ed. AA. VV., V, Roma, 1924, pp.390422.
4 M. Batllori, Ramon Llull i el lullisme, ed. E. Duran, Valencia, 1993
(Obres Completes, 2), pp.289, 296 y 374.
el hilo luliano de la madeja cultural
167
la academia platnica de Florencia),5 aunque s llamo la atencin

sobre el hecho de que provengan de Crdoba, como varios de los
lulistas que se vern inmediatamente.
2. Los focos de lulismo castellano
Para la exposicin de los datos que voy a comentar aqu, me
he basado en la imagen de una madeja enrollada de la que sale
un hilo conductor del que hay que ir tirando para ir llegando al
ncleo de la cuestin. As pues, siguiendo un hilo cronolgico, nos
encontraremos con estos dos grandes focos lulistas.
a.) Foco andaluz
Comienza con la traduccin al castellano en Valencia del Libro
del Gentil en 1378 por obra de Gonalo Snchez de Ueda,6 noble
mediano cordobs pues era jurado de la ciudad , y del que
se desconocen sus motivaciones y si tuvo algn contacto con los
grupos lulistas valencianos que algunos aos antes (13171330)
haban producido las primeras obras de lulismo autctonas, aun
que s sabemos que fue noble e leal cavallero [] el qual era
omne muy sabio e entendido en todas las sienias, espeialmente
en el artefiio e libros del maestro Remn, segn el Cancionero
de Baena.7 Esa traduccin le gust a Alfonso Ferrndes de Her
5 Ibid. pp.381384
; A.Bonilla y San Martn, Fernando de Crdoba
(14251486?) y los orgenes del Renacimiento filosfico en Espaa, Madrid,
1911; J.Monfasani, Fernando of Cordova. A Biographical and Intellectual Profile, Philadelphia, 1992.
6 Sobre l y el texto: B.Taylor, An old Spanish tale from Add. MS. 14040,
ff. 113r114v: Exenplo que acaesio en tierra de Damasco a la buena duenna
Climeia con su fija Climesta que avia veynte annos e la meia en cuna, The
British Library Journal, 22 (1996), pp.172185; H. R. Stone, A Critical Edition of the Libro del gentil e de los tres sabios (Castilian Text), Ph. D., University
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1965; F. Domnguez Reboiras, El Coment
del dictat de Ramon Llull: una traduccin castellana de principios del siglo
XV, in Studia in honorem prof. M.De Riquer, I, Barcelona, 1991, pp.169232;
M. Nieto Cumplido, Aportacin histrica al Cancionero de Baena, Historia. Instituciones. Documentos, 6 (1979), pp.35; B. Dutton, El cancionero
del siglo XV, I, Barcelona, 1991, p. 372; Ramon Llull, Llibre del gentil e dels
tres savis, ed. A. Bonner, Palma de Mallorca, 1993 (NEORL, 2), pp.1920.
7 Juan Alfonso de Baena, Cancionero de Juan Alfonso de Baena, ed.
B. Dutton & J. Gonzlez Cuenca, Madrid, 1993 (Biblioteca Filolgica Hispana, 14), pp.614615, poema 342.
168
rera, un veino que vivi en Sevilla en 1406 (en el barrio de

San Salvador, que fue en la poca zona noble de la ciudad),8 que
uni o mand unir en un solo cdice las dos traducciones lulianas
junto con el fragmento de las Flores Sancti Bernardi y el cuento
de Climeia. Sobre este personaje no hay una informacin clara,
pues, dependiendo de la fuente consultada, bien pudo ser: pagador
de las villas y castillos fronteros de los obispados de Crdoba y
Jan entre los aos 1385 y 1397 como indican algunas fuentes;9 o
jurado de Jerez de la Frontera y procurador de la villa en Cortes
en 1431,10 o todo a la vez.11 Andrs Fernndez, el otro copista,
dice terminar de trasladar la traduccin castellana del Coment del
Dictat de Llull por mandato de Alfonso Ferrndes, terminndose
de confeccionar as el ms. 14040 de la British Library Museum.
Cabra la posibilidad de plantear que a Gonzalo Snchez de Ueda
tambin le fue encargada la traduccin por Alfonso Ferrndes de
Herrera.
S proponemos que el hijo de Gonzalo, Pedro Gonzlez de
Ueda, noble con cargos concejiles en Crdoba pudo haber ledo
o haber sido informado sobre el Blanquerna de Llull, dado que el
poema 342 del Cancionero de Baena, escrito por l y que habla de
los sueos, recuerda en varios pasajes a ese libro: un viaje a Tar
taria, estudios en Bolonia, se hace rico para despus hacerse pobre
8 Segn se lee en el fol. 1r del ms. Add. 14040 de la British Library de
Londres.
9 M. Francisca Gmez Montalvo, Privilegios de frontera: Quesada
y Alcal La Real, in Actas del Congreso La Frontera Oriental Nazar como
Sujeto Histrico (s. XIII-XVI): LorcaVera, 22 a 24 de noviembre de 1994, ed.
P.Segura Artero, Almera, 1997, p. 160. Esto reforzara la hiptesis de su
origen converso mantenida en Domnguez Reboiras, El Coment del dic
tat, op. cit., p. 171, quien dice que se tratara del judo converso Alfonso
Ferrandes (llamado Semuel), del cual se burla en tres poemas del Cancionero
de Baena otro poeta, Alfonso lvarez de Villasandino.
10 J. Abelln Prez, Eleccin de oficiales pecheros en el concejo jere
zano. La parroquia de San Juan (1436), Anales de la Universidad de Cdiz, 78
(19901991), p.9. Como en el mismo artculo, en p.4, se menciona que uno de
los regidores de la ciudad era Juan Snchez de Bivanco, al que Pedro Gonz
lez de Uceda, hijo del traductor del Gentil que veremos despus, le dedica el
poema 342 del Cancionero, tambin esta hiptesis tendra cierto peso.
11 No es descartable que Alfonso Ferrandes fuera primero pagador en
Alcal La Real y, con el cambio de siglo, estuviera un tiempo en Sevilla,
pasando en ltima instancia a Jerez de la Frontera.
169
y ermitao, lo hacen Papa por su humildad, tambin se ve como

conde guerreando contra los paganos, como emperador, o como
sabio astrlogo y alquimista.12 Como se ha indicado antes, tambin
se da la circunstancia que el poema est dirigido a Juan Snchez
de Bivanco, lo que lo pone en relacin con los Ueda padre e
hijo y con Alfonso Ferrandes de Herrera. Aparte de haber sido
uno de los regidores de Jerez, el de Bivanco fue tambin testigo en
Crdoba, segn algunos documentos porque era alcalde mayor
de los seoros del duque de Medina Sidonia Enrique de Trastm
ara, que resida casi siempre en esa ciudad13. Parece que muri
en 1445.14 Eso s, no puede decirse que sea un lulista pues no hay
datos seguros por el momento.
Y tirando del hilo, del que no cabe ninguna duda sobre su luli
smo, y que es piedra angular del foco andaluz, es Juan Alfonso
de Baena, escribano del rey Juan II15 y compilador del Cancionero
que lleva su nombre. Se trasluce su lulismo en sus poemas: el
586, de 1432,16 donde dice Escuchen, pues, castellanos/ grandes
sabios remonistas/e sotiles alquimistas/ e los rudos aldeanos (lo
que indicara, por un lado, un cierto fermento lulista en la Corte,
y por otro, la vinculacin ya en Castilla de lulismo con alquimia),
indicando algunos versos ms adelante que, entre muchas lectu
ras, tambin ley en el muy sotil Remn;17 tambin en el poema
81 se puede leer, en respuesta a Alfonso lvarez de Villasandino,
12 Sobre este ltimo aspecto se detuvo Carreras, Historia de la Filosofa,
op. cit., p. 81, aunque piensa que ms bien se hace referencia a un lulista
extraviado en la alquimia.
13 M. Fernndez Gmez, La villa de Alcal de los Gazules (Cdiz), un
enclave fronterizo del reino de Sevilla en la Baja Edad Media, La Espaa
Medieval, 18 (1995), p.218.
14 M.Nieto Cumplido, Aportacin histrica al Cancionero de Baena, op.
cit., pp.200201; M.Nieto Cumplido, Juan Alfonso de Baena y su Can
cionero: nueva aportacin histrica, Boletn de la Real Academia de Ciencias,
Bellas Artes y Nobles Artes de Crdoba, 52 (1982), pp.4344.
15 M.Nieto Cumplido, Aportacin histrica al Cancionero de Baena, op.
cit., p.218.
16 Baena, Cancionero, op. cit., pp.739779, para las citaciones, p.741 y
p.742.
17 J. N. H. Lawrence, Juan Alfonso de Baenas Versified Reading List:
A note on the Aspirations and the Reality of Fifteenth-Century Castilian
Culture, Journal of Hispanic Philology, 5 (1981), pp.101122.
170
por ende, maestro, sabet que respenda/ de vuestra ordenana el

muy grant Remn,/ Ricardo e Pnfilo, Escoto e Agrimn,/ los
quales mandaron que vos reprehenda.18 Y tambin se trasluce por
haber sacado del Monasterio de los Jernimos de Valparaso, a las
afueras de Crdoba, tres libros de Llull para copiarlos en 1417:
Loores de Sancta Mara, De Prima Entenin y otro De Oraiones.19
Parece que Baena falleci antes de 1435, segn un documento en
el que la mujer habla de l en pasado.20 Por ltimo, me atrevo
a plantear una coincidencia de nombres muy sugerentes entre la
mujer de Juan Alfonso, Elvira Ferrndes de Crdenas,21 y la san
tanderina que leg 2 manuscritos lulianos al Monasterio Jernimo
de Guadalupe en 1451, Elvira Ferrndes Calderona (el Blanquerna
y el Flix)22 . De esta ltima no se sabe absolutamente nada ms
aparte de la informacin referida, pero podra ser un posible nexo.
Hay un hecho que hasta ahora ha pasado inobservado y es el
lulismo de otro poeta del Cancionero: Ferrn Manuel de Lando.
Salta a la vista por el contraste, en su dilogo potico con fray
Lope del Monte, franciscano Bachiller en Theologa, acerca de
qu fuentes son las correctas a la hora de intuir los designios de
Dios. Dice Lando, en el poema 272:23
Aunque vos seades famoso jurista,
sabed que delante de sabios sotiles
Baena, Cancionero, op. cit., p.108.
Documento en Archivo Histrico Nacional, Secc. Clero, libro n 2983,
publicado en M.Nieto Cumplido, Aportacin histrica al Cancionero de
Baena, op. cit., p.218. Debe tratarse del Hores de nostra dona Santa Maria, el
Llibre dintenci y el Oracions de Ramon. Cabe plantearse como veremos otras
veces, si el hecho de que aparezcan los ttulos en castellano es indicativo que
se trate de traducciones.
20 M. Nieto Cumplido, Juan Alfonso de Baena y su Cancionero: nueva
aportacin histrica, op. cit., pp.3940.
21 Baena, Cancionero, op. cit., p. xvii; M: Nieto Cumplido, Juan Alfonso
de Baena, op. cit., p.40.
22 G. Beaujouan, La bibliothque de lcole mdicale du monastre de
Guadalupe laube de la Renaissance, en Mdicine humaine et vtrinaire la
fin du Moyen ge, ed. G.Beaujouan, Y.Poulle-Drieux, J.-M.Dureau-La
peyssonnie, GinebraPars, 1966 (Hautes tudes Mdivales et Modernes, 2),
p.429. El texto est en el Legajo n 48 del Archivo del Monasterio de Gua
dalupe.
23 Baena, Cancionero, op. cit., p.472.
18
19
171
ya fize yo prosas por actos gentiles,/

maguer non s alto nin lindo partista.
Lope del Monte, al responder al de Lando en el poema 273, 24 le

dice que no le parece mal hablar de las Escrituras,
pero si me fabla de Remn Lulista,
sofrir non me cumple sus dichos eviles,
loar non se deve de lindos astiles
quien pule sus rayos como la amatista.25
A ello le responde el de Lando, en el poema 274:26

Aqu, seor padre, quitad el arista
e ved las metforas fondas, sutiles,
que algunas vegadas so letras muy viles
est sotileza de grant theorista
lo que considero una defensa de las teoras lulistas que atacaba

el fraile franciscano. Ferrn Manuel de Lando es un noble (un
donzel, segn dice el Cancionero)27 que pertenece a la nobleza
sevillana y cuya familia est muy bien posicionada en la Corte,
siendo su prima Ins de Torres, una de las privadas de Catalina
de Lancaster durante la minora de JuanII, y siendo su hermano
Pedro el ayo del prncipe Enrique por expreso deseo del Conde
stable lvaro de Luna.28 Parece que falleci poco despus de 1449.
En pro de su lulismo podemos decir tambin que en otros poemas
utiliza frmulas muy sugerentes: en el poema 52429 dice
Ibid., p.473.
Ibid., p.473, n. 273, comentan los editores que los dos ltimos versos les
resultan oscuros. Si se tiene en cuenta que ellos interpretan eviles como
crueles, cuando a lo largo y ancho de todo el cancionero el significado es
el de civiles, la interpretacin podra ser en el sentido que Lope del Monte,
religioso, no tiene por qu hacer caso de los comentarios de un civil en el
sentido de laico como Ramon Llull, aadiendo que no se debe vanagloriar de
conocerlo el que no tiene capacidad de entender las cosas divinas, en referen
cia al de Lando.
26 Ibid., p.474.
27 Ibid., p.449, en la Rbrica al poema 567.
28 Para todos estos datos: S. lvarez Ledo, Aproximacin a la vida y
a la obra de Ferrn Manuel de Lando, Cancionero General, 7 (2009), p.10.
29 Baena, Cancionero, op. cit., p.382387.
24
25
172

Ass que limosna e santa orain
qualquier buen christiano lo deve guardar,
e con abstinenia en Dios contemplar,
ca los que son santos por su bien obrar
ganaron la justa predestinain
donde la expresin en Dios contemplar en vez de a Dios con

templar recuerda el ttulo de la obra luliana Llibre de Contemplaci en Deu; a lo largo del mismo poema hay comparaciones a la
hora de explicar por qu todos nacemos libres y que, aunque Dios
sepa que nos condenaremos, depende de nosotros que recuerdan
al uso de los silogismos por parte de Llull, y sirva como ejemplo
cuando dice
Sotil argumento aqu resplandee,
ca por Dios fazer lo que era mejor,
si non es, por ende, su cuita mayor,
embargo ninguno a l non le cree
en donde se puede entrever el uso de las dignidades mayor y

mejor como correlativos que no producen error. 30
El Cancionero de Baena es indicativo del inters que su compi
lador y varios de los que aparecen en l tenan por las ideas de
Ramon Llull, lo que merecer un estudio ms exhaustivo para
detallar esta cuestin. Adems del citado Lando, valga como mue
stra el inicio del poema 556 31 de Garca Fernndez de Gerena: Por
una floresta estraa,/ yendo triste muy pensoso comparado con el
inicio del Consolaci dermit Per vn boscatge anaua Ramon trist
e consirs. Si a esto le sumamos el resto del poema donde hablan
Amor y Amigo, las sospechas de lulismo cobran fuerza. Cabe
aadir que Garca Fernndez tuvo una azarosa vida al convertirse
al Islam por amor, aunque volviendo despus a la fe cristiana.
Este dato entronca con lo que vamos a ver.
Siguiendo con el hilo discursivo, el poema 524 del de Lando
pertenece a los famosos poemas que debatan sobre preitos y
Esta hiptesis sabemos ser poco consistente pues se basa en una inter
pretacin que puede haber hecho Ferrn Manuel de Lando sobre textos lulia
nos. El hecho de proponerla se debe a que ese poema se enmarca en la serie
de Dezires sobre predestinacin y libre albedro que dio origen a un texto
castellano de lulismo autctono que veremos posteriormente.
31 Ibid., p.440.
30
173
predestinados que desembocaron en la primera produccin autc

tona de lulismo y que enlaza el foco andaluz con el foco caste
llano-leons que se ver enseguida: el Tratado de predestinain
de Gonalo Morante. Volveremos enseguida a l, pero antes, slo
queda recordar los participantes en esa disputa potica:32 Ferrn
Sanchez Calavera (que propuso el debate a Pero Lpez de Ayala el
Viejo y a otros muchos grandes sabios letrados), Pero Lpez de
Ayala (el famoso Condestable y cronista), fray Diego de Valencia
de Len (fraile franciscano), fray Alfonso de Medina (bachiller en
Teologa, jernimo del Monasterio de Guadalupe y, quiz, prior de
Montamarta en Zamora), Francisco Imperial (genovs afincado en
Sevilla y perteneciente a la nobleza media), Mahomat el Xartosse
de Guadalajara (mdico del almirante de Castilla Diego Hurtado
de Mendoza), Garca lvarez de Alarcn (escribano del rey, de
Madrid), y el ya citado Ferrn Manuel de Lando.
Quedara por comentar dos lectores de Llull que, por ubica
cin perteneceran al foco andaluz, pero que, por vnculos con
otros lulistas, muy tenues por otro lado, se deberan adscribir al
foco castellano-leons. Por eso, los dejamos en este limbo transi
torio entre uno y otro. Nos referimos primeramente a fray Juan
de Santorcaz, franciscano de posible origen andaluz (se le sita
en algunas fuentes en la ermita de Santa Eulalia de Mrida, en
Marchena provincia de Sevilla, que pasa a los franciscanos obser
vantes en 1420 por orden del arzobispo Diego de Anaya;33 otros
lo ubican proveniente de Crdoba). 34 Este fraile es ms conocido
por haber sido enviado, junto con el famoso andaluz san Diego
de Alcal o de San Nicols del Puerto (al norte de la provincia
sevillana) , en 1441 a las islas Canarias para ir a evangelizar
32 Ibid., pp. 364391. Vase tambin: Ch. F. Fraker, The Theme of

Predestination in the Cancionero de Baena, Bulletin of Hispanic Studies, 51
(1974), pp.228249; P.A. Cavallero, Praecitus-preitos (Rimado de Pala
cio, N 1152a y 1573b). Ayala y los problemas teolgicos, Incipit, 3 (1983),
pp.95127.
33 G. Rubio, La Custodia franciscana de Sevilla. Ensayo histrico sobre sus
orgenes, progresos y vicisitudes (12201499), Sevilla, 1953, pp.465, 472.
34 J.M. Pinto de la Rosa, Canarias prehispnica y frica Occidental
espaola, Madrid, 1954, p. 197, n. 313, donde dice que provena de San Fran
cisco del Monte, a cinco leguas de Crdoba, y que muri antes de 1449.
174
las. 35 Es adems el protagonista de un milagro que cuenta cmo

se encontr la Virgen de la Pea de Fuerteventura al perderse y
caer en un foso con agua sin morir ahogado. 36 Para el caso que
nos ocupa, en su viaje se llev un manuscrito con obras de Llull
(Sermones contra errores averroys, De Deo et de suis propriis qualitatibus, De demonstratione per equiparanciam, De maiori Dei gracia
(agencia) erit dictus, De conveniencia quam habent fides et intellectus
in objecto, y De inveniencia XII sillogismorum concludentium duos
actus finales unum intrinsecum et alium extrinsecum), y varias de
corte lulista (Disputatio saecularis et jacobitae de Ramon Astruch
de Cortielles, copiada parcialmente, un Opusculum in quo X legis
precepta XIII articuli fidey catholice continentur cum VII sacramentis
ecclesie, y el Ars generalis, de los lulistas valencianos, interrumpido
al final, y una ms que probable copia del Ars memorativa de Ber
nat Gar de 1338 pues coinciden los incipit ), que permaneci
all al pensarse que perteneca a San Diego de Alcal y se vener
como relquia. 37 Por desgracia, no sabemos cmo lleg el manus
crito a manos de Juan de San Torcaz, ni por qu, ni cundo, ni la
vinculacin con un posible lulismo franciscano, ni la vinculacin
con Diego de Anaya del que se hablar en breve , ni nada que
arroje un poco de luz.
Otro lector lulista que se debe incluir en este limbo es ms tar
do. Juan Alfonso de Astorga, cannigo de la Catedral de Crdoba,
desarroll su actividad ya en la segunda mitad del siglo XV pues
muri en 1505, legando entre otros libros al Cabildo de esa cate
35 Alonso de Villegas, Flos sanctorum: Historia general de la vida y hechos

de Jesu-Christo, Dios y Seor nuestro, y de los Santos, Toledo, 1794, pp.747748;
J.Garca Santos, La evangelizacin luliana. El Obispado de Telde, Almogaren, 9 (1992), pp. 5585, aunque del lulismo canario slo hace una breve
mencin.
36 S. Cazorla Len, Las ermitas de Nuestra Seora de la Pea y de San
Miguel de Fuerteventura, Puerto del Rosario, 1996 (Anuario del Archivo His
trico Insular de Fuerteventura, Anexo III), pp.1719.
37 Para todas estas informaciones: E.-M. Pareja Fernndez, El manuscrito luliano Torcaz I, del Seminario de Canarias. Con una introduccin acerca de
los Franciscanos de Fuerteventura de Elas Serra Rfols, La Laguna (Facultad
de Filosofa y Letras de la Universidad de La Laguna. Publicaciones de la
Facultad, 3), 1949; y tambin del mismo autor, El manuscrito luliano de San
Torcaz, Studia Monographica et Recensiones, 4 (1950), pp.4575.
175
dral uno de Llull que empieza Deus cum tua gracia. 38 El vnculo
con algn foco lulista, en realidad, vendra dado por un posible
contacto con otro cannigo de la catedral, Antn Ruiz de Morales,
que estudi y represent a los andaluces en el Colegio Mayor de
San Bartolom de Salamanca en los aos 60 y 70 del siglo XV. 39
Y uso el condicional, porque es la nica referencia plausible a falta
de otros datos que lo puedan vincular con el lulismo castellano
-leons ms que con el foco andaluz.
b.) Foco castellano-leons
Si fue antes el foco andaluz o el castellano-leons es algo dif
cil de definir con precisin, aunque se tiene certeza de estos tres
hechos: 1) que ambos se gestan casi a la par (en torno al ltimo
cuarto del siglo XIV); 2) que ambos tienen sus orgenes por con
tactos con Valencia y, supuestamente, con los grupos lulistas que
all tuvieron su actividad; y 3) que ambos difieren en los fines
para los que fueron creados pues el andaluz surge al calor de un
ambiente cultural laico mientras que el castellano-leons lo hace
al calor de un ambiente cultural eclesistico y, para ms seas, de
enseanza.
Los primeros datos se refieren precisamente a esa valenciani
dad de este foco pues, en el ms. VIII. b. 13 de Innichen,40 en
el colofn de la copia de la obra luliana del grupo valenciano De
decem praeceptis, quatuordecim articulis et septem sacramentis ecclesiae se lee que se termin in urbe Salamantina anno ab incarna
tione domini 1314. Es el mismo texto que se conserva en el ms.
2311 de la Biblioteca Universitaria de Salamanca,41 junto a otros
38 Archivo de la Catedral de Crdoba, Secretara, Testamentos, legajo 1, de
fecha 31 de mayo de 1505.
39 F. Cerrato Mateos, El monasterio de la Encarnacin de Crdoba.
Universalidad y originalidad de una fundacin cisterciense, in La clausura
femenina en el Mundo Hispnico, ed. F.J. Campos y Fernndez de Sevilla,
II, San Lorenzo de El Escorial, 2011, pp.725740.
40 J.Rubi i Balaguer, Los cdices lulianos de la biblioteca de Innichen
(Tirol), Revista de Filologa Espaola, 4 (1917), p.323; o tambin, J. Rubi
i Balaguer, Ramon Llull i el lullisme, ed. L.Badia Barcelona, 1985 (Obres
de Jordi Rubi i Balaguer, 2), p.408.
41 Esta Biblioteca, junto con otras ms de la zona, han sido tratadas en
dos estudios claves: F. Marcos Rodrguez, Los manuscritos pretriden
tinos hispanos de ciencias sagradas en la Biblioteca Universitaria de Sala
176
textos del grupo lulista valenciano y que perteneci al Colegio

Mayor de San Bartolom.
Es aqu cuando llegamos al ncleo del foco lulista castellano
-leons pues es el Colegio Mayor de San Bartolom y, sobre todo,
su biblioteca, de donde proviene la mayor parte de la informacin
de la que disponemos hasta la fecha sobre el lulismo castellano
en general. La fundacin de este Colegio se debe a Diego de Anaya
y Maldonado,42 obispo de varias sedes, entre las cuales Salamanca
(de donde era oriundo) y arzobispo de Sevilla (y esto representa
uno de los nexos entre los focos andaluz y castellano-leons). Su
empeo fue el de crear un centro de formacin de juristas, cano
nistas, telogos, filsofos, del ms alto nivel para servir de bastin
de la fe catlica y la expansin de la misma por va misionera e,
incluso, creando mrtires (segn se lee en la biografa de Fran
cisco Ruiz de Vergara), y dando una oportunidad a aquellos que
no tuvieran recursos. La fama de este centro provoc que en l
estudiaran, codo con codo, tanto nobles de alta alcurnia como ple
beyos desconocidos.
Uno de los primeros datos, en orden cronolgico, que se sacan
de los manuscritos conservados en el Colegio es la copia en latn
del Liber de gentili en el ms. 1875 43 hecha por el presbtero burgals
Juan Martnez de Balbs, quien protagoniz un curioso hecho por
su afn predicador en Sahagn: en 1399 sus prdicas contra los
judos, en la estela de las que provocaron en 1391 los pogroms, y
las quejas ante Enrique III del rabino Mordohay que fue agra
viado e incluso encarcelado en el monasterio de San Benito de la
villa , le llevaron a tener que refugiarse en ese monasterio al
manca, Repertorio de Historia de las Ciencias Eclesisticas en Espaa, 2 (1971),
pp. 261522; L.Prez Martnez, Fondos lulianos en bibliotecas espaolas,
EL, 15 (1971), pp.221236; 16 (1972), pp.7886; y 17 (1973), pp.197204. La
descripcin codicolgica del manuscrito en: Perarnau, El lullisme, op. cit.,
pp.6368.
42 Una antigua fuente pero muy documentada: F. Ruiz de Vergara y
lava, Vida del Illustrissimo Seor Don Diego de Anaya Maldonado, Arzobispo
de Sevilla, Fundador del Colegio Viejo de S.Bartolom, Salamanca, 1661.
43 Perarnau, El dileg entre religions, op. cit., p.245, n. 17. El texto
con la autora de la copia dice as: Ego nimis peccator sacerdos indignus,
Johannes Martini de Baluas, diocesis burguensis, tuus famulus, tibi humiliter
gracias refero propter beneficium veri intellectus mihi collatum. Et benedicta
sit virgo Maria.
177
amparo del abad porque era buscado para ser juzgado; al final un
dudoso milagro lo libr de prisin en 1403.44 Posibles conexiones
ms all del comn inters por la conversin de los infieles no
parece que haya entre este personaje y el Colegio.
Llegamos as a uno de los manuscritos que ms ros de tinta
han provocado y ms informacin ofrece sobre este foco: el ms.
1022 de la Biblioteca Casanatense de Roma que perteneci al
Colegio de San Bartolom. El ncleo de todas las interpretaciones
formuladas sobre este cdice y, por extensin, sobre el lulismo cas
tellano en su conjunto, emanan de las dos inscripciones que apare
cen en el f. 132v: una que dice Conventus Zamorensis; y la otra
que dice Este libro pertenese [al con, tachado] a la provincia
de Santiago, a la casa de amora. Est al uso de fray Juhan de
Robles. Me voy a permitir una tercera interpretacin que difiere
de la franciscana observante de Isaac Vzquez Janeiro45 y de
la benedictina de Josep Perarnau:46 Juan de Robles sera un
fraile jernimo del Monasterio de Nuestra Seora de Guadalupe,
que aparece firmando como testigo el documento fundacional del
Hospital para pobres de San Esteban y el Estudio de Gramtica,
ambos en la localidad segoviana de Cullar en 1424, por obra y
voluntad del arcediano de esa villa, Gmez Gonzlez, que tam
bin se hizo jernimo en 1431 y sobre el que volveremos despus.
El convento de Zamora o casa, como le llaman en ocasiones
los Jernimos,47 bien pudiera ser el Monasterio de Montamarta,
J.L. Senra Gabriel y Galn, Sahagn, en Enciclopedia del Romnico
en Len, ed. AA. VV., Aguilar de Campoo, 2002, p.684.
45 I. Vzquez Janeiro, Un lector de Raimundo Lulio y de Arnaldo de
Vilanova entre los Evangelizadores de la Amrica Colombina? En torno al
cdice Casanatense 1022, Antonianum, 54 (1979), pp.108115; I. Vzquez
Janeiro, Tratados castellanos sobre la Predestinacin y sobre la Trinidad y la
Encarnacin, del maestro fray Diego de Valencia OFM (siglo XV). Identificacin
de su autora y edicin crtica, (Bibliotheca Theologica Hispana, serie 2, Tex
tos Tomo 2), Madrid, 1984.
46 J. Perarnau, Dos tratados espirituales de Arnau de Vilanova en
traduccin castellana medieval: Dyalogus de elementis catholice fidei y
De helemosyna et sacrificio, Anthologica Annua, 2223 (19751976 [1978]),
pp.479480.
47 As la define el mismsimo cronista oficial de la orden jernima en el
siglo XVI: Fray Jos de Sigenza, La fundacin del Monasterio de El Escorial, Valencia, 2010, p.15.
44
178
situado a las afueras de la ciudad. Los vnculos del Colegio de

S.Bartolom y el mismo Diego de Anaya con la Orden de los
Jernimos quedan patentes en lo siguiente: cuando se produce el
pleito por la sede metropolitana vacante de Sevilla entre Diego
de Anaya y Juan de Cerezuela, hermanastro del Condestable de
Castilla, lvaro de Luna quien para auparlo acus a Anaya de
seguir fiel al antipapa Benedicto XIII, abrindose por tanto un
proceso que dej la sede vacante en manos de un administrador
(curiosamente el jernimo Lope de Olmedo) , Anaya se refugia
en el monasterio jernimo de San Bartolom de Lupiana (Guada
lajara) desde 1420 hasta 1434, fecha en que se resuelve el caso con
la marcha de Cerezuela al arzobispado de Toledo.48
En el mismo ms. 1022 hay una copia latina del Liber de ente
reali et rationis realizada por Franciscus de turre cumbusta cuya
ubicacin se ha demostrado muy complicada pues con el mismo
nombre tenemos: un franciscano observante que opt a provincial
de Salamanca en 1468;49 un poseedor de casas en el barrio judo
del Azoguejo, en Valladolid a finales del siglo XV;50 el sobrino del
famoso cardenal Juan de Torquemada;51 o incluso un miembro del
primer cabildo de Gran Canaria en 1480.52 Que se trate del mismo
personaje en todos los casos es difcil.
Tambin en el mismo manuscrito se encuentra otra obra de un
lulista vinculado con el lulismo de Valencia: el gerundense Ramon
Astruc de Cortielles y su Disputatio saecularis et jacobitae.53 Insinu
Ruiz de Vergara y lava, Vida del Illustrissimo, op. cit., pp.4045.
J. de Castro, Arbol chronologico de la Santa Provincia de Santiago, Sala
manca, 1722, p.80.
50 G. Ramos de Castro, El maestre Antn relojero de Valladolid en la
primera mitad del siglo XVI, Boletn del Seminario de Estudios de Arte, 76
(2009), p.146.
51 V.Beltrn de Heredia, Miscelanea Beltrn de Heredia I, Salamanca,
1972, pp.372373.
52 C. Platero Fernndez, La alcalda y los alcaldes de Las Palmas,
Boletn Millares Carlo del Centro Asociado de la UNED, 15 (1996), p.144.
53 J. de Puig Oliver, El procs dels lullistes valencians contra Nico
lau Eimeric en el marc del Cisma dOccident, Boletn de la Sociedad Castellonense de Cultura, 56 (1980), pp.319463; J. de Puig Oliver, Nicolau
Eimeric i Raimon Astruc de Cortielles. Noves dades a propsit de la con
trovrsia mariana entorn de 1395, Annals de lInstitut dEstudis Gironins, 25
(19791980), pp.309331; J. de Puig Oliver, La Brevis compilatio utrum
48
49
179
con poco fundamento Vzquez Janeiro que la autora de esta obra

era atribuible a fray Diego de Valencia de Len, uno de los poetas
del Cancionero de Baena, si bien ya Perarnau se mostr discon
forme, ya que muchas de sus interpretaciones no eran correctas.54
Lo que s se puede intuir, a falta de datos ms definitivos, es que
la presencia de este autor en el cdice apoya el origen valenciano
del lulismo castellano en su conjunto.
As, llegamos a una de las primeras obras autctonas del lulismo
castellano, el Tratado de predestinain de Gonzalo Morante, que
fue sacado de un libro fecho sobre una questin que fue entre
gonalo morante de la ventura, e un mal christiano que se torrno
moro el qual llamavan hean rrogely; e ste fue maestro en artes
e maestro en teologa. Ya de entrada se puede decir que hay
serias dudas sobre la existencia real de Gonzalo Morante pues no
hay ningn dato en ningn lugar que encaje con el perfil. Pro
bablemente se trate de un personaje inventado, como inventado
es tambin el Juan Rogel del que tampoco se ha encontrado ras
tro alguno (se le ha intentado identificar con Anselm Turmeda,
fraile franciscano que se convirti al islam y se fue a Tnez hacia
1387, pero hay dudas al respecto).55 Otra copia, conservada en el
ms. esp. 204 de la Bib. Nacional de Pars, dice que el texto fue
sacado por mi, frey Sancho de Aynar, bachiller en teologa,56 y
que el copista se llamaba Garsias Pardus, toletanus (del primero
sabemos que su apellido, Aybar, lo sita oriundo de Navarra, pero
beata et intemerata Virgo Maria in peccato originali fuerit concepta, Arxiu
de Textos Catalans Antics, 2 (1983), pp.241318. No nos ocuparemos de este
autor pues pertenece al mbito del lulismo cataln y su vinculacin con el
castellano es slo en calidad de texto de referencia.
54 Debo reconocer mi sorpresa ante la insistencia de Vzquez Janeiro
con la publicacin de, al menos, tres artculos sobre la autora de la Disputatio por parte de Diego de Valencia, cuando las pruebas son evidentes y
concluyentes sobre la autora del gerundense. Las dudas en la recensin de
J. Perarnau, en Arxiu de Textos Catalans Antics, 18 (1999), pp.844848,
donde le dedica unas palabras bastante duras.
55 J. Perarnau, Los manuscritos lulianos de las bibliotecas Casana
tense y Anglica (Roma), Anthologica Annua, 21 (1974 [1976]), pp. 197198;
Perarnau, El dileg entre religions, op. cit., p.251, n. 35, y sobre la hip
tesis de Anselm Turmeda, p.253.
56 J. de D. Mendoza Negrillo, Fortuna y providencia en la literatura castellana del siglo XV, Madrid, 1973, p.449.
180
poco ms; del segundo no sabemos nada). El texto sigue diciendo

que la entynin porque este traslado fue sacado especialmente
fue por responder a unas coplas que fueron enbiadas a pero lopez
de ayala el viejo sobre la materia de predestinain e sobre libre
alvedro. Las quales son escritas en el comieno deste quaderno.
Otros fue escripto por Responder a muchos omes syn sienia e
a otros que luego topan en faser questyn sobre esta materia de
predestinasin. Pues bien, fue Perarnau el que identific esas
coplas como las que hemos visto antes del Cancionero de Baena.57 Por tanto, pensar que alguno de los que participaron en esos
debates pueda haber hecho o mandado hacer el texto del Tratado
de predestinain no es algo excesivamente descabellado.58 Es ms,
el hecho de que, como indicaron Dutton y Gonzlez Cuenca en
su edicin del Cancionero,59 el tema poda ser de inters para el
mbito de la reina Catalina de Lancaster ya que su padre, Juan
de Gante, tuvo a su servicio a John Wycliff, el famoso filsofo
agitador ingls de finales del siglo XIV cuyas ideas discutan tam
bin sobre libre albedro y predestinacin. Lo que s est claro es
que esta obra y la que veremos enseguida es realmente el nexo
de unin textual entre el foco andaluz y el foco castellano-leons.
Este es un tema todava por explorar a fondo.
Cabe decir que hay un segundo texto, que parece en realidad
una continuacin del primero pero que el ms. 1022 lo presenta
como obra aparte: Disputain fue entre un moro filsofo, que
era almudano, e Gonalo morante. E por que non se entendan,
pasaban las razones por escritos, los quales declaravan los truja
manes. Esta obra habla sobre la Trinidad y la existencia de tres
personas en un nico Dios, y sobre el misterio de la Encarnacin,
que tambin son temas que se tratan en el Cancionero de Baena,60
Perarnau, Los manuscritos lulianos, op. cit., p.198.

De hecho, una posible hiptesis de trabajo invitara a poner en relacin
a Ferrn Manuel de Lando con el que se torrno moro Garca Fernndez de
Gerena, aunque despus volviera a la fe catlica, ya que ambos se interesaron
por Llull, como hemos visto. A eso hay que sumarle el inters precisamente
de Juan Alfonso de Baena en recopilar esas coplas.
59 Baena, Cancionero, op. cit., p.364, n. 517.
60 El poema 337, cuyo autor es Gonzalo Martnez de Medina, de Sevilla,
habla del tema: Ibid. pp.594598.
57
58
181
utilizando la teora de los correlativos de Ramon Llull.61 En esta

ocasin no hay ms referencias de lo dicho para la obra anterior.
As pues, saltaremos esta cuestin y la presencia de obras tradu
cidas de Arnau de Vilanova,62 presentes tambin en el ms. 1022
pues se salen de los parmetros de esta breve exposicin.
Es evidente que todas estas inquietudes temticas que vemos
aqu: predestinacin, el dogma de la Inmaculada Concepcin, la
Trinidad, responden al fermento que recorre Europa y que se
traduce en Castilla en los movimientos reformistas de las rde
nes religiosas como los Jernimos (y dentro de ellos, la escisin
observante de Lope de Olmedo en 1428), los Franciscanos (y la
aparicin de la rama observante en 1378), los Dominicos (cuyo
ncleo reformista se forj precisamente en Salamanca) y el resto
del clero regular, as como del clero secular (bajo la sacudida del
Cisma de Occidente). Ese fermento tiene su reflejo en los fines, de
los que hablar en la conclusin, que perseguan los lulistas laicos
y los lulistas religiosos.
La ltima de las obras autctonas lulianas castellanas est
recogida en otro manuscrito que perteneci al Colegio Mayor sal
mantino, el ms. 1866, y que, adems, es el que recoge explcita
mente la pertenencia a Diego de Anaya como poseedor del mismo:
se trata de la Novela moral de Grain.63 Cabe comentar que en
este libro las nicas ciudades que se mencionan explcitamente
son Crdoba, Sevilla y Lepe, lo cual es llamativo, y que, al final
del libro, el protagonista vende todas sus pertenencias y se retira
a un monasterio a orar y estudiar (a lo que hay que sumar una
presencia constante de escritos de San Pablo), lo que recuerda a
los gustos de los Jernimos. Este texto, junto a los dems, tie
nen un marcado carcter aleccionador de no sucumbir a los malos
consejeros dedicado a los que gobiernan (recordemos que el mismo
Anaya se ve perjudicado por las decisiones del Condestable lvaro
de Luna). No obstante, nada se sabe en esta ocasin de su autor,
Perarnau, El dileg, op. cit., pp.257258.
J. Perarnau, Dos tratados espirituales de Arnau de Vilanova en traduccin castellana medieval, Roma, 1976 (Publicaciones del Instituto Espaol de
Historia Eclesistica. Monografas, 25).
63 J. J. Satorre, La novela moral de Gracin (Un texto indito del siglo
XV), EL, 24 (1980), pp.165210; 25 (19811983), pp.83165; 26 (1983),
pp.165251; y 27 (1984), pp.215240.
61
62
182
aparte del hecho que el Grain del libro es como el Gonalo

Morante, personajes ficticios, por lo que conjeturar una posible
autora del mismsimo arzobispo Anaya no es demostrable por el
momento. S aparece en el colofn de uno de los textos recogi
dos en el manuscrito, el Chronicn Cordubense, la fecha, 1433, y
el copista, Fernando de Salmern, que sabemos que fue capelln
interior del Colegio Mayor de San Bartolom en 1417 y que quiz
acompa a Anaya en su destierro.64
Quiz ms vinculado con la Universidad que con el Colegio
Mayor, tenemos a Gonzalo de Vivero, obispo de Salamanca entre
1442 y 1480, que fue amigo y protector de Abraham Zacut, el
matemtico y astrnomo que ense en Salamanca pero que tuvo
que irse tras la expulsin65. Probablemente, el fermento intelectual
de Salamanca le hizo interesarse por la obra luliana, ya que don al
Cabildo cuatro libros de Llull, entre otros, al morir: Arbor scientiae,
Disputatio Raimundi christiani et Homeri sarraceni, Liber de septem
donis spiritus sancti, y Ars demonstrativa. Como se ve, todos en latn.
Siguiendo con nuestro hilo conductor, tambin ntimamente
ligado a la Orden de los Jernimos aparece el arcediano de Cullar,
Gmez Gonzlez66, sacerdote que desarroll su labor casi exclusi
vamente en el mbito de la Corte papal, primero de Avin y des
pus de Roma, y que recibi como premio el arcedianato segoviano
en 1407. Por su continuada ausencia, se le dio por muerto y hubo
un pleito por el arcedianato en torno a 1419. Aparte de esta simi
litud con el arzobispo Anaya, en cuanto a usurpadores y pleitos, la
otra semejanza es la de que quiso fundar una escuela para pobres.
A l se debe la fundacin del hospital de San Esteban y el Estudio
de Gramtica en 1424 (con los testigos antes mencionados Juan
de Robles y Lope de Olmedo). En sus diferentes viajes fue acu
mulando libros que, una vez hechos los votos en la Orden de San
64 Ibid., p. 182, donde se refiere el colofn del Chronicon: Este libro fue
acabado miercoles quatro dias de febrero anno de mill e quatro ientos e
treynta e tres annos estando mi sennor Don Diego de Anaya arobispo de
Sevilla en la muy noble ibdat de Cordova e yo Fernando de Salmeron lo
escrevi por su mandado.
65 F. Marcos Rodrguez, La antigua biblioteca de la catedral de Sala
manca, Hispania Sacra, 14 (1961), pp.281319.
66 B. Velasco, Gmez Gonzlez, cortesano de Benedicto XIII y Mar
tnV.Sus fundaciones en Cullar, Hispania Sacra, 26 (1973), pp.69121.
183
Jernimo en 1431, le acompaaron al Monasterio de Guadalupe,

donde ingres. El hecho de tener que regresar a ocuparse de su
fundacin por no ser bien gestionada le oblig a trasladarse al
Monasterio de Santa Mara del Paular en 1439, donde muere entre
14431445. Precisamente por el pleito que se abre entre los dos
monasterios para saber dnde deben ir sus pertenencias y, entre
ellas, los libros, es por lo que sabemos que fue un lector de Ramon
Llull, pero en latn, lo que sugiere que quiz los obtuvo en sus
viajes por Europa. Los libros se repartieron entre los dos monaste
rios, siendo: Liber de praedicatione, Liber de articulis fidei, Liber de
ente reali et rationis, Blanquerna, Liber super Psalmum Quicumque
vult y Ars amativa.
Otros lectores de Llull pertenecientes a este foco aunque con
una vinculacin mucho menos evidente al ncleo Anaya /Colegio
Viejo/ Jernimos, por razones temporales, fueron dos religiosos. El
primero es Luis de Acua,67 obispo primero de Segovia de 1449
a 1456 y posteriormente de Burgos hasta 1495, que leg en testamento muchos libros al Cabildo, uno de los cuales 68 parece ser
de Llull el Libro del Gentil ; si bien su vinculacin con el ncleo
de este foco parece ser inexistente, aparte de su ubicacin cas
tellano-leonesa, quiz por haber desarrollado su actividad ya en
la segunda mitad del siglo XV cuando los protagonistas antes
mencionados o son muy ancianos o han muerto. El segundo es
Alonso de San Cebrin, fraile dominico e inquisidor, que posey
un manuscrito con el Ars brevis69 y que sabemos que fue confe
sor de los Reyes Catlicos y prior del convento de San Pablo de
Valladolid en 1486,70 muy activo en el intento de conversin y el
proceso de expulsin de los judos.
67 N. Lpez, La biblioteca de D. Luis de Acua en 1496, Hispania, 20

(1960), pp.81110, aunque el autor no atribuye ninguna obra a Llull.
68 J.Perarnau, La traducci castellana medieval del Llibre de meravelles
de Ramon Lull, Arxiu de Textos Catalans Antics, 4 (1985), p. 15, es quien
atribuye esa obra a Llull. Aade una que lleva por ttulo Arte compendiosa de
buenas doctrinas y derechos pero no parece tener mucha base.
69 L.Prez Martnez, Fondos lulianos en bibliotecas espaolas, EL, 16
(1972), p.84, n. 68.
70 G. Nieva Ocampo, La creacin de la observancia regular en el con
vento de San Esteban de Salamanca durante el reinado de los Reyes Catli
cos, Cuadernos de Historia de Espaa, 80 (2006), pp.9596.
184
Vamos a mencionar slo como dato a tener en cuenta y para

demostrar que el lulismo religioso castellano-leons no slo no
mengu, sino que prevaleci sobre el lulismo laico andaluz con
el avanzar del tiempo la labor que desarrolla precisamente en
la segunda mitad del siglo XV el cardenal Francisco Ximnez de
Cisneros.71 Sin embargo, no vamos a entrar en ms detalles porque
se sale de las pretensiones de esta exposicin y est ms vinculado
con el lulismo castellano de poca moderna, ya que es el paso de
un lulismo textual de incgnito a las ctedras universitarias.
En medio de los lectores lulistas religiosos del foco castella
no-leons aparece una importante aportacin por parte de dos
nobles laicos. En primer lugar, los condes de Benavente y en espe
cial el que sabemos que dispuso de una amplia biblioteca entre los
que se encontraban libros de Llull, el tercer conde, Alonso Pimen
tel (14401461).72 Hay que decir que su vinculacin con los lulis
tas expuestos hasta ahora es poco clara. Se sabe que su padre,
Rodrigo Alonso Pimentel, acompa a Diego de Anaya en la
embajada que envi Juan II en 142021 a Francia. Puede que en
ese viaje pudieran hablar de gustos literarios y que el conde se los
transmitiera a su hijo. Lo que llama la atencin es que los 12
13 ttulos lulianos indicados en el inventario estn todos en castel
lano, mientras que otras obras de otros autores estn en latn, lo
que invitara a pensar, como as lo hizo Beceiro Pita,73 que estos
libros eran efectivamente traducciones castellanas de obras lulia
71 Carreras i Artau, Historia de la Filosofa espaola, op. cit., II,
pp.251254.
72 L. Sez, Demostracin histrica del verdadero valor de todas las monedas
que corran en Castilla durante el reynado del seor don Enrique III, y de su correspondencia con las del seor don Carlos IV, con un apndice de documentos y
varias notas o discursos, Madrid, 1796, pp.368 ss; J. H. Elsdon, The Library
of the Counts of Benavente, Annapolis, 1955; I.Beceiro Pita, Los libros que
pertenecieron a los Condes de Benavente, entre 1434 y 1530, Hispania, 43
(1983), pp.237280.
73 Beceiro Pita, Los libros, op. cit., pp. 263266. Aunque no carece de
lgica, slo uno de los cdices parece haber sido identificado con el ms. 74
de la Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid: M. W. de Diego Lobejn, El Libro
del amigo y del Amado en un manuscrito indito castellano del siglo XVI,
Castilla, 8 (1984), pp.4763, aunque en realidad es del siglo XV y se basa bas
tante en G. M. Bertini, Lo libre de amic e amat, di Ramon Llull, in una
versione castigliana inedita del secolo XVI, Bulletin Hispanique, 41 (1939),
pp.113125.
185
nas. Ser algo que estudios posteriores podrn clarificar, as como

las presumibles relaciones con el resto de lectores. Sin embargo,
hay que recordar que los condes de Benavente pasan a ser impor
tantes en la segunda mitad del siglo XV y que la biblioteca parece
dispersarse ya que no aparece en ningn otro inventario de esta
casa nobiliaria. Y el segundo gran noble, Iigo Lpez de Mendoza,
el famoso Marqus de Santillana, cuyos intereses literarios le lle
varon a formar una biblioteca impresionante para la poca en la
cual se conservaban dos, que sepamos, libros lulianos,74 lo cual
tampoco es muy significativo de su inters por Llull. De hecho, su
vinculacin tampoco es fuerte pues se resume en haber apoyado
financieramente a la formacin del primer monasterio jernimo de
San Bartolom de Lupiana (y quiz ms su esposa que l mismo)
y en haber tenido contacto con numerosos nobles-poetas de los que
hemos visto anteriormente, si bien, es llamativo que, aun habiendo
iniciado su produccin literaria en torno a 1422, no aparece, ni
siquiera mencionado, en el Cancionero de Baena. Su formacin lite
raria la recibi en la corte aragonesa y, adems, se mantuvo al
margen de las luchas entre nobles y de la vida poltica en general.
Hago tambin una breve referencia a un testimonio proveniente
de Valladolid y conservado en el ms. 5-1-42 de la Biblioteca
Colombina de Sevilla,75 ya que se nombran a dos poseedores del
cdice: Agustn Urbina, en el fol. 92v, con la fecha de 1490; y
el licenciado Esteban, fsico vecino de Valladolid. Por desgra
cia, aparte de la ubicacin, nada ms se ha podido averiguar sobre
estos personajes.
Un ltimo comentario, aunque la vinculacin con este foco es
realmente poco sostenible pues parece pertenecer a un lulismo ya
del siglo XVI, sin nexo con foco alguno, hay que hacerlo sobre
la informacin que refleja el ms. 990 de la Biblioteca Apostlica
74 M. Schiff, La Bibliotque du Marquis de Santillane, Paris 1905. Los
libros son: El cents noms de Du y Hores de nostra dona Santa Maria.
75 F. Stegmller, Raimundiana Hispalensia. ber Raimundus-LullusHandschriften in der Biblioteca Colombina zu Sevilla, Gesammelte Aufstze
zur Kulturgeschichte Spaniens, 19 (1962), pp. 171186. Ni qu decir tiene la
importancia de esta biblioteca para la historia del lulismo en Europa, con 15
cdices manuscritos lulianos sumados los de la Biblioteca Capitular anexa
y 11 incunables. No trataremos aqu el lulismo de Hernando Coln, pro
pietario y recolector de la biblioteca ya que excede el lmite temporal de la
Edad Media.
186
Vaticana.76 La procedencia es del Colegio Mayor de Cuenca, en

Salamanca, cuya fundacin se debi en 1500 a Diego Ramrez de
Villaescusa, antiguo alumno del Colegio Mayor de San Bartolom,
que quiso crear una universidad en Cuenca pero fue persuadido
precisamente por el cardenal Cisneros para que no lo hiciese al
existir ya la Universidad de Alcal de Henares y ste decidi crear
un Colegio Mayor como en el que haba estudiado y en el mismo
lugar, o sea, Salamanca. El manuscrito conserva tres obras lulia
nas dos apcrifas y una incompleta de Llull , pero nos inte
resa porque entre sus pginas, en el f. 23v aparece un misterioso
inventario que no ha podido identificarse que dice: E dan [quiz
quedan] en case contreras estos libros siguientes: 1 declaration
de las 4 figuras; 1 obra sobre el arte general, la mayo[r] y la
breve; 1 arte demostrativa; 1 arte inventiva; 1 arte compendiosa
y todo lo mas desto de mano, que viene a indicarnos no slo cua
tro libros de Llull sino una posible biblioteca entera. Una posible
ayuda podra venir de otra inscripcin en el f. 61r que reza as:
el primero del mes de agosto de Q y XX annos comena a ser
vir a mi sennora donna Ines puerto carrero, mujer del magnanimo
Sennor don Fernando Enrquez que dios aya da me cada anno de
comer y beber y posada dentro su posada y serviere mill mara
vedies de partido y que diga missa ala semana y que huelgue
desta. de mediado setiembre de mill D y XXIIII annos medieron
XXVIII [final ilegible].
Se supone que lo escribi un clrigo, cura o monje, que estaba

al servicio de Fernando Enrquez de Ribera, capitn general de
Sevilla y segundn del Adelantado Mayor de Andaluca, que efec
tivamente muri en 1522, y de su esposa Ins Portocarrero y Cr
denas. No sirven de mucho estos datos, pues se sigue sin saber qu
tienen que ver con la supuesta casa Contreras a falta de ms datos
o estudios.
3. Conclusiones
A diferencia de cuanto se haba pensado hasta ahora77, el lulismo
medieval de Castilla no consiste en focos aislados sin relacin
76 J. Perarnau, Un altre testimoni del lullisme castell medieval: Vat.
Ross. 990, Randa, 10 (1980), pp.7179.
77 Vanse todos los artculos de la nota 1.
187
alguna entre s. Simplemente faltaban datos. La vinculacin entre

los dos focos creo poder decir que se ver reforzada por estudios
posteriores. Tambin queda bastante ms claro que la pretendida
va franciscana como origen del lulismo castellano es poco sos
tenible. Todos los datos parecen indicar ms bien esa doble pene
tracin de las ideas lulianas que hemos planteado aqu: una laica,
que gira en torno al Cancionero y a su compilador, es decir, Juan
Alfonso de Baena; y otra religiosa, que gira en torno a la Orden
de los Jernimos y la figura del arzobispo de Sevilla, Diego de
Anaya y Maldonado.
Es por esto que afirmamos, a la vista de los datos disponibles,
que conviene hablar no de 6 7 focos diferentes sino de 2 deje
mos de lado las piezas sueltas como Juan de Santorcaz u otros,
porque estoy convencido que estudios posteriores los ubicarn en
un foco o en otro , con unas caractersticas propias muy bien
delimitadas:
Foco andaluz o laico: compuesto por aquellos lectores de Llull que
pertenecen a la nobleza media o baja o incluso que simplemente
frecuentan la Corte de los reyes de Castilla sin ser nobles , que
escriben poemas y cuyo inters reside en un saber erudito, o sea,
amplias lecturas que les permiten tratar amplios temas y, por
tanto, poder dedicarse a la gaya sienia de la poesa. La nove
dad que quiero transmitir aqu es que la poesa que ellos entienden
no es la nuestra, de valor puramente ldico. Estamos hablando
del medio de comunicacin de la poca comparable a la televisin
de hoy en da. Un espectculo, pero tambin un medio de difu
sin de ideas que impregnan a todos los niveles de la sociedad.
Aqu hemos visto los resultados en el ambiente cortesano, pero
lo mismo se puede decir de trovadores y juglares para el pueblo
llano. En este caso, es evidente que el fermento del Humanismo (o
pre-humanismo) ha dejado huella en un pensamiento, como se ve
en los poemas del Cancionero de Baena, que es: cosmopolita cultu
ralmente hablando (se habla y se viaja a sitios tanto fuera como
dentro de Castilla y se cambia de residencia sin ningn problema,
como ocurre con los poetas que libremente cambian de seor al
que narrar sus poesas, sin ataduras), cosmopolita religiosamente
hablando (si bien dentro del mbito catlico, la apertura a con
versos, judos o musulmanes, es amplia, quiz no tanto el afn
luliano de la conversin como por conocer otros modos de pen
sar), y cosmopolita polticamente hablando (estirando un poco
el significado del trmino, como quedara demostrado por los poe
mas a favor o en contra de un alto noble u otro, o como se dira
188

ahora, sin tomar partido, pero no es porque sean los altos nobles
los que pagan a estos poetas, sino porque los altos nobles quieren
que los poetas los instruyan y les hagan pensar). Muy probable
mente, esta serie de ideas revolucionarias para la poca como
son: construirse sus propias ideas sobre el catolicismo aunque res
petando sus parmetros; las ideas conciliaristas a raz del Cisma
interminable, que invitaban a extrapolarlas a la poltica a travs
de las Cortes y de la eliminacin del derecho privado del rey
en favor de un consejo del Rey (vase el odio generalizado hacia
lvaro de Luna); los casamientos entre linajes no slo por honor
o dinero, sino tambin por amor; y otras ideas similares , bien
pudieron propiciar en Castilla las revueltas nobiliarias como la
que provoc la batalla de Olmedo en 1445, o la de los Comuneros
en el XVI.Quiz no han sido interpretadas en toda su compleji
dad pues no slo fueron el resultado de las pretensiones de poder
de los nobles ante la debilidad del monarca. La idea del buen
gobierno no slo fue dirigida a los prncipes y monarcas sino,
creo, a todo aquel que tuviera responsabilidades en la gestin de
territorios y, por tanto, de las gentes que habitasen en los mismos.
A todos ellos les interesa el Llull que se estremece ante las injus
ticias, el que deja todo por seguir un ideal, el que usa la razn
para demostrar necesariamente la fe, el que se interroga por lo
que piensan los dems, o el que dialoga.
Foco castellano-leons o religioso: es el compuesto por aquellos lec
tores de Llull que, aun perteneciendo a la nobleza en varios casos,
se sienten ms pertenecientes a la Iglesia, como institucin y, me
atrevera a decir, como Estado. De hecho, muchos de ellos recor
ren muchos lugares en sus ministerios, desarrollando mucho menos
(aunque no desaparece del todo, caso de Diego de Anaya con Sala
manca) el concepto de patria como pertenencia a un lugar con
creto y usndolo ms como medio de expansin de la fe catlica.
Estamos hablando de clrigos seculares y regulares cuya preocu
pacin es la misma: que el mensaje cristiano catlico no entre en
crisis como ha entrado la jerarqua con el Cisma. A este ideal se
deben la autorreflexin llevada a cabo en el seno de todas las rd
enes regulares, dando como resultado: la aparicin de los Jern
imos (y su posterior escisin observante cincuenta aos despus),
una orden cuyo origen noble78 la asemeja a los planteamientos
que hemos citado para los laicos nobles hasta la aparicin de la
observancia (apertura a otros puntos de vista como la admisin
de conversos en sus filas, el dejarlo todo y seguir slo a Jess, el
desarraigarse de lo propio y de la patria, el informarse mediante
78 J. Snchez Herrero, Fundacin y desarrollo de la Orden de los

Jernimos, 13601561, Codex Aquilarensis, 10 (1993), pp.6395.
189
el estudio, la formacin paulina, etc.); la vuelta de tuerca de los

observantes franciscanos, la que ocurre en el seno de los dominicos
y que termin cuajando con el fortalecimiento de la Inquisicin.
En el campo del clero secular, la reaccin lleg con uno de los
valores que fundan a este grupo de lectores lulistas: el espritu
didctico, es decir, para que el mensaje cristiano catlico no se
pierda, hay que ensearlo, y de ah la creacin del Colegio Mayor
de Salamanca, la Escuela de Gramtica de Cullar, la Universi
dad de Alcal de Henares o el Colegio Mayor de Cuenca. Todas
estas instituciones responden al mismo espritu, que culminar
con el Concilio de Trento, una vez abierto el abismo del Cisma
protestante. Por estos motivos dicho foco lulista busca a un Llull
doctrinal, de un catolicismo razonado, con ganas de comunicar y
predicar las bases fundamentales de la fe catlica; que busca, ms
que dialogar, demostrar lo que tiene de bueno ser catlico y los
problemas que acarrea el no serlo; que se centra ms en la defensa
de la doctrina que de la jerarqua, aunque no la olvide pues el
Papa sigue siendo la cabeza de la Iglesia; que le habla en su pro
pio idioma, el latn, y no en las lenguas vernculas, aunque para
poder ensearlo se haga necesario recurrir al castellano (caso del
Tratado de predestinain, o la Novela moral); en definitiva, un luli
smo que se sume a la cruzada contra la desidia general que asol
Europa entre los siglos XIV y XV.
Me queda por comentar que ambos focos responden a intere

ses diferentes pero tienen un origen comn. No slo el hecho de
que ambos surgen al beber en el lulismo valenciano, sino al hecho
de que ambos surgen al beber en la misma fuente: las obras de
Ramon Llull. Y es que el filsofo catalano de Mallorques, es a la
vez laico y religioso. Y esto se transmite a toda su extensa obra y
permite al que lo lea quedarse con lo que es ms adecuado a sus
intereses.
Concluir diciendo que ambos lulismos acabarn diluyndose en
el reinado de Enrique IV, casi llegando a desaparecer y hacindose
anecdtico, pero reapareciendo en uno slo en los albores de la
Edad Moderna gracias a Francisco Ximnez de Cisneros, francis
cano ahora s y alumno del Colegio Viejo de San Bartolom.79
El cardenal condens a la perfeccin estas facetas: fue noble, cre
un centro de enseanza, puso abiertamente a Llull entre los te
logos a ser estudiados, viaj mucho, quiso conocer otras culturas,
79 J. Garca Oro, Cisneros
: un cardenal reformista en el trono de Espaa
(14361517), Madrid, 2005.
190
incluso traduciendo obras, luch contra la desidia en la Iglesia, y

se movi en la Corte como pez en el agua.
En definitiva, el estudio de la historia del lulismo en Castilla
sigue avanzando a pasos muy lentos dada la dispersin de las
fuentes , pero va demostrando que los lulistas estaban ms cohe
sionados de lo que primeramente se pens. Sin embargo, el lla
mamiento a la prudencia y a la necesidad de ulteriores investiga
ciones, que refuten o confirmen las hiptesis, es algo obligatorio y
constante que se tratar de llevar a cabo.
Abstract
El hilo luliano de la madeja cultural castellana medieval. Nuevos
aportes al lulismo castellano medieval laico y religioso
This paper presents the latest discoveries about the reception and
influence of Ramon Llulls works and thought in the Kingdom of
Castile during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The main
purpose is to detail the highlights of Castilian Lullism, identifying
their protagonists and the places where they appeared. This task
will run from Juan de San Torcaz in the Canary Islands to Car
dinal Francisco Ximnez de Cisneros in Alcala de Henares; pass
ing through the translators from Cordoba, Bishop Diego Lpez de
Anaya in Seville, the College of Old San Bartolom in Salamanca,
the Court of John II, the work of the layman Juan Alfonso de
Baena and his Cancionero de Baena, and finally Gonzalo Morante
in Zamora. Thus, this paper will analyse the construction of the
Castilian Lullist speech, of its works, concepts and ideas. Castilian
Lullism was interested both in religious and secular worlds (noble
and non-noble members). Finally, it will offer a comparative
analysis between Castilian Lullism and the general interests of
medieval Castilian intellectuals, trying to clarify the guidelines of
its philosophical thought.
Francisco Jos Daz Marcilla
qmarcilla@yahoo.com
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Instituto de Estudos Medievais (IEM)
Faculdade de Cincias Sociais e Humanas
Av. de Berna, 26 C
1069061 Lisboa, Portugal
UN LULISTA RESPONDE A
PAOLO FLORES DARCAIS
Esteve Jaulent
(So Paulo)
El trabajo que ahora presentar, sin ningn afn de polmica,
fue extrado de un libro que ahora est en proceso de revisin,
donde en dilogo con Paolo Flores dArcais, paso a paso, estudio
su visin del mundo.1 Pretendo analizar el texto de Paolo Flores
dArcais, Atesmo y Verdad a la luz del pensamiento de Ramon
Llull que, adems de practicar una lgica muy actual -hac ms
de 700 aos- muestra una visin cristiana del mundo muy simi
lar a la expuesta en el trabajo La pretensin de verdad puesta en
duda, de Joseph Ratzinger. Esta puede ser una manera de mos
trar como Ramon Llull es actual y puede servir para solucionar
muchas de las dificuldades con las que hoy nos deparamos en el
campo del pensamiento. Es muy instructivo poner estos tres auto
res en contacto, sobre todo porque Ratzinger es acusado por el
ateo militante Flores dArcais de afiliarse a Sren Kierkegaard,
quien pensaba que la fe comienza donde termina el pensamiento,
y por esta razn Flores dArcais afirma que la Iglesia ya no est
ms interesada en la verdad. A la luz del pensamiento de Llull,
que trabaj durante toda su vida para demostrar la convergencia
entre la razn y la fe, y la culminacin de esta ltima, queda claro
el error que implica esta acusacin. Debido al poco tiempo dispo
nible, har un resumen del pensamiento de Paolo Flores dArcais
implcito en su texto Atesmo y Verdad, y luego simplemente
1 En el ao 2000, el entonces cardenal Joseph Ratzinger y el ateo mili
tante Paolo Flores dArcais en pblico en un largo debate sobre la existencia
de Dios. La editorial Espasa public el texto en 2008: dos artculos escritos
por cada uno de los panelistas. El texto de Paolo Flores dArcais, el ltimo
del volumen, se ocupa de dos temas que hoy cautivan la atencin: Atesmo y
verdad, y lleva como subttulo la conocida frase de Sren Kierkegaard: La
fe comienza precisamente donde termina el pensamiento. En este trabajo se
usar la traduccin: J. Ratzinger, P. Flores dArcais, Deus existe?, Sao
Paulo, 2009.

IPM, 67 (Turnhout, 2015), pp. 191-205.
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107314
192
esteve jaulent
comentar algunos puntos sobre los fundamentos en que se basa.

Estos puntos son los siguientes:
1) Fe y Razn.
2) El problema del mal.
3) El ser y el deber ser.
A lo largo del texto, queda claro que Paolo Flores dArcais
desea la solidaridad, el dilogo, el trabajo conjunto entre creyen
tes y no creyentes,2 incluso la felicidad de todos, adems plan
tea las condiciones para que esto suceda. Sin embargo, la forma
que el autor escoge para alcanzar aquellas metas est demasiado
vinculada a su visin del mundo, oprime la libertad de las perso
nas y no respeta su voluntad, dejndolos sin otra opcin que la
salida propuesta por l. Como decimos en Brasil, derriba el palo
de la tienda de campaa y promueve la cada de todo bien y de
todos los valores. Obviamente, despus de esto, habr necesidad
de reconstruir todo de nuevo, pero ahora el edificio tendr que
ponerse en pie al servicio del los objetivos del autor:
1) Una nueva filosofa del desencanto que segn l es hoy en
da la de todos y cada uno de los que dependen exclusivamente
de las realidades finitas, y que no tiene en s misma una moral
propia pues el autor afirma categricamente que todas las
morales son infundadas 3. Esta filosofa requiere una eleccin
pura, libre de las restricciones ya existentes, tambin debera
demostrar la imposibilidad de la existencia de Dios y de un
alma inmortal.
2) Por otro lado, dice que la fe no pudo superar las objeciones
que el atesmo y el escepticismo de la filosofa moderna lanz
en contra de sus verdades y, finalmente, perdi el inters en
la verdad de la religin, no prestndole ms atencin y cam
biando la verdad por el sentido subjetivo. As que hoy, un
creyente tendra que renunciar a la verdad de su fe y asumir
una fe pura, reconocerse y presentarse a s mismo en un
credo quia absurdum; locura de la razn, puesto que la razn es
en s misma atea. Segn Paolo Flores dArcais, slo con esa fe
2
3
Cf. Deus existe?, op. cit., pp.124125.

Cf. Deus existe?, op. cit., p.124.
un lulista responde
193
se alcanzarn los objetivos previstos, especialmente la colabo

racin entre creyentes y no creyentes.
Con estos supuestos esa fe pura y esa filosofa queda bien
caracterizado cul es el deber de los hombres creyentes y no
creyentes de la posmodernidad. Dada la imposibilidad de per
manecer atados a la locura de la razn y del sin sentido y la
de la filosofa de la desilusin, que tambin puede ser entendida
como locura, por no estar sometida a la razn, necesariamente
la humanidad se siente arrojada a una crucial eleccin. Una elec
cin pura la eleccin por la eleccin, sin ninguna motivacin
slo sometida a la fe y a la filosofa del desencanto, tal como
Flores dArcais las entiende: incompatibles con la verdad y la
moralidad. En resumen, una pura eleccin tica sin moral que no
est basada en la verdad, sino en:
1) trabajar a favor de todos los individuos considerados de igual
rango , por lo tanto la primaca del tu, o
2) vivir en favor de una hipertrofia del s mismo.
Descartada esta ltima opcin, pues significa el retorno de
la arrogancia y de la opresin de los privilegios, Flores dArcais
explica que la nica opcin posible es la solidaridad en la lucha
comn de creyentes y no creyentes en favor de los valores del
Evangelio (el amor al prjimo como a ti mismo4 y que sea tu
lenguaje s, s; o no, no5) que son el verdadero fundamento de un
compromiso comn6. Ahora bien, agrega que para hacer esta elec
cin, los creyentes tendrn que renunciar a la racionalidad de su fe
y separar los valores evanglicos de la obediencia a las religiones
establecidas7.
Marcos, 12, 2931.
Mateo, 5, 3637.
6 En el famoso debate pblico que tuvo lugar entre el cardenal Joseph Rat
zinger y Habermas (Academia catlica de Baviera, Munich, 01/2004) se lleg
a la conclusin de que es necesario encontrar un mnimo tico en el que estn
de acuerdo creyentes y no creyentes; Cf. J. Habermas, J. Ratzinger, Dialctica
de la secularizacin: sobre la razn y la religin, Madrid, 2006.
7 Estas son sus palabras: Para propor os valores do Evangelho no sculo
e no para imp-los, o que seria uma injria ao Evangelho, o homem de f
tem de abjurar racionalidade e verdade de razo da prpria f., Deus
existe?, op. cit, p.127.
4
5
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Para los no creyentes, esta opcin requiere de ellos algo mucho

ms difcil: el deber de sacrificarse a s mismos que por lo general
slo tiene xito dice paradjicamente Flores dArcais cuando
se tiene fe en el Otro, entendido precisamente como Dios Padre.
Esta solucin tiene, sin embargo, un obstculo. Para el cristiano,
la tentacin siempre presente de dictar la ley en nombre de una
supuesta ley natural que coincide con la palabra ex cathedra,
mientras que para el ateo sta representa una incapacidad de ejer
cer la caridad.
El lector pensar que no hay necesidad de tanta destruccin y
de tan extraa reconstruccin. Si Flores dArcais no cree en un
Dios, por qu no dejar en paz a los que creen en l? Tal como
el autor present su cosmovisin, corre el riesgo de caer, preci
samente, en la actitud que l tanto crtica: imponer a otros sus
propias convicciones. Por qu hablar tanto sobre la filosofa del
desencanto, acaso no fueron los filsofos quienes mejor han des
crito a Dios? Adems, el autor propone como la nica solucin
para la humanidad algo bastante difcil de realizar cuando se
cuenta slo con las fuerzas de una existencia finita: exige a los
creyentes un cambio de fe y a los no creyentes el imposible deber
de sacrificarse por los dems. Esto es algo que l mismo reconoce
que slo tiene xito cuando se tiene fe en Dios Padre. Con esta
afirmacin el autor se declara poseedor de alguna fe.
Existen ciertas ambigedades en el texto de Flores dArcais. Sin
embargo, muchas de ellas son en trminos lulianos contradiccio
nes aparentes, precisamente porque nacieron de la ambigedad.
Eliminadas stas, desaparecen las contradicciones. Ramon Llull,
se especializ en este tipo de ambigedades, incluso descubriendo
una nueva falacia, la falacia por contradiccin8, que es la ms uti
lizada por Flores dArcais. A continuacin se examinarn, utili
zando esta misma metodologia, los tres temas citados antes: La fe
y la razn, el problema del mal, y el tema del ser y del deber ser.
1. Fe y razn
Paolo Flores dArcais trata de probar que la Iglesia renunci
radicalmente a cualquier deseo de demostracin racional de la ver
8 Para este tema, cf. G. Wyllie, Adaptive Reasoning in Ramon Llulls
Liber de syllogismis contradictoriis, in Ramon Llull: From the Ars Magna
to Artificial intelligence, ed. A. Fidora & C. Sierra, Barcelona, 2011,
pp.117127.
un lulista responde
195
dad de su fe y al mismo tiempo ella se enorgullece de su lealtad

a su fundador, porque, citando a San Pablo, interpreta incorrec
tamente las dos sabiduras a que este se refiere, la divina y la
humana, como opuestas e irreconciliables, y despus afirma:
O la razn o la fe, que para la razn es locura, hasta el punto
de que pudiendo demostrar la verdad de la fe se cree lo que es
absurdo: credo quia absurdum .9
De hecho, lo que San Pablo opone no es la fe a la razn, sino la

sabidura del mundo escogida por algunos judios y gentiles que no
reconocen a Dios en la doctrina de la Cruz. Por eso aquellos pensa
ban que era una debilidad y otros una estupidez seguir la sabidu
ra de la fe de los creyentes en Cristo como el verdadero vicario de
la humanidad que ha pagado por todos y cada uno. Por tanto,
si la cultura catlica dejase de interesarse por la defensa de la ver
dad de su fe, no se debera de ningn modo a esa mal supuesta
lealtad a su fundador, afirmada por Paulo Flores. Los primeros
cristianos pensaban que ya tenan claro el mensaje de Cristo: no
slo inclua palabras, sino vida, entrega, virtud, amor, en ltima
instancia, Cruz. Que slo de una vida bien vivida podra salir la
buena doctrina. Que el mal debe ser expiado, y no ser tenido por
menos de lo que es, y por lo tanto, una vez restaurada la justicia
por Cristo que pensaban que era Dios y hombre , l puede
reemplazar, y reemplaza, personalmente, a cada pecador. El desacuerdo que se encuentra en el texto proviene de que Flores dAr
cais no comprende adecuadamente las relacines entre el conoci
miento racional y el conocimiento obtenido a travs de la fe. Pero
lo que parece ser ms grave es que en toda su obra Flores dArcais
omite penetrar profundamente en este tema.
En 1303, Ramon Llull termin en Montpellier su obra Disputatio fidei et intellectus, en las que dos hermanas personificaciones
de la fe y del entendimiento discuten entre ellas. En la primera
pgina, Llull recuerda a Isaas cuando dice si no creis, no entendereis,10 mostrando que la fe es la disposicin y la preparacin
que nos predispone a la profundidad de Dios11, pues creyendo lo
Isaas, 7,9.
11 Cf., Ramon Llull, Disputa entre la fe i lenteniment, ed. J. Batalla &
A. Fidora, Santa Coloma de Queralt, 2011, p. 91: Adems, digo que tu
9
10
196
esteve jaulent
que se admite gracias a la fe el intelecto se puede elevar y acos

tumbrarse a ella. Llull aade: tu [la fe] ests en m, y yo [el
entendimiento] estoy en ti. As introduce el mallorqun lo que
entiende por entendimiento y por fe:
El entendimiento es la facultad de entender lo que es inteligible,
suponiendo, obviamente, que esta facultad no puede entender nada
de modo contrario a su forma natural de entender, de la misma
manera que la vista no puede ver contrariamente a su forma natu
ral de ver.12
Algo diferente es la fe:

Es la luz dada por Dios con la cual el entendimiento sobrepasa su
modo natural de entender y, creyendo en la verdad divina, alcanza
una verdad que no alcanzara solamente con el entendimiento.13
La fe es, por lo tanto, al igual que toda verdad, algo que

existe dentro del ser humano: tu [la fe] ests en m, y yo [el
entendimiento] estoy en ti. Existe entre el creer y el entender
un estrecho vnculo que se consolida poco a poco en el hombre.
Llull aade, sin embargo, otra razn que refuerza la unin que
se lleva a cabo en la persona humana, en esta subida del enten
dimiento iluminado por la fe. Se trata de la ayuda de la volun
tad: Al entender algo de Dios se establece la comunin del enten
dimiento con su hermana Voluntad, que es mayor que la que se
establece cuando uno cree.14 Todo el mundo puede tener una
experiencia de este hecho, pues para creer el hombre se siente
dbil y atado, pero cuando se trata de entender, incluso las rea
lidades ms profundas, se siente fuerte y libre. Creer y entender
[la fe] no fuiste creada primordialmente para que los hombres tengan algn
mrito, sino para que Dios sea venerado, entendido y amado por su pueblo,
pues la bondad y la nobleza tienen que ver ms con venerar, entender y amar
a Dios, que con recompensar a los hombres. Aado que, an admitiendo que
los artculos de la fe cristiana fuesen demostrables los hombres continuaran
teniendo el mrito de entender y amar, porque como est escrito, slo ama
mos un bien si lo entendemos (Cf. S.Agustn, De Trinitate, 10, 2). Isaas tam
bin dice Si no creis, no entenderis. Es evidente que tu, fe, eres la disposi
cin y la preparacin que nos habitua a tratar con las produndidades que se
encuentran en Dios, versin de Esteve Jaulent.
12 Disputa entre la fe i lenteniment, op. cit., p.87.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p.87.
un lulista responde
197
se efectuan en el interior del hombre, unificndose dentro de l

la actividad de la voluntad y el entendimiento con la luz de la fe,
pero esta actividad no se realizar si no existe al menos un deseo,
el amor, de intimidad con Dios, dice Llull. Se entiende que para
un ateo militante como es Paolo Flores dArcais este deseo de inti
midad con Dios resulte muy difcil de experimentar.
En cuanto a la creencia del autor acerca de la ineficacia de las
vias clsicas para convencer a aquellos que no creen en Dios, Llull
abre una nueva posibilidad revirtiendo la situacin: sera mejor
decir que cuando se cree en Dios, entonces se puede probar su
existencia. Acostumbrado a las verdades presentadas por la fe, con
la ayuda de esta nueva luz y fortalecido tambin por su amor por
ellas fruto de su afecto hacia Dios , el entendimiento humano
asciende sobre s mismo y puede avanzar en su comprensin por
medio de este esfuerzo conjunto de las tres Hermanas: la fe, el
entendimiento y la voluntad. Algo que sera imposible para el
hombre si contase slo con las fuerzas naturales del entendimiento.
Basado en este mecanismo, Llull desarroll un complejo sistema
unificador de todos los saberes: ciencia, filosofia y teologia, cono
cido como el Arte que ayuda a aquellos que lo utilizan arti
stas a alcanzar la verdad en todos los campos del conocimiento,
mediante acciones en s mismas simbiticas y no extrnsecas. El
Arte parte de un conjunto de primeros principios que forman el ser
concreto de todas las realidades de las ms altas hasta las nfi
mas y que tambin son principios del conocimiento. El sistema
no funciona de forma automtica y requiere ciertas condiciones
para el artista, pero si las tuviere, este podr entrar paulatina
mente en la demostracin de las verdades de fe mediante las lla
madas razones necesarias, que el artista puede formalizar en las
combinaciones de los primeros principios.
2. El problema del mal
Flores dArcais se pregunta: Cmo un Dios infinitamente
bueno y omnipotente que se ocupa de los mortales, permite
el mal en la creacin? Y responde con la conocida alternativa
que los estoicos y los epicreos planteban sobre esta cuestin.
Cuatro posibilidades podran explicarlo:

o Dios quiere evitar los males y no puede hacerlo,
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o puede y no quiere,
o quiere y puede,
o no quiere y no puede.15
En las cuatro situaciones Dios esta en desventaja, es celoso o

impotente. En la tercera, como el Querer y el Poder son atributos
de Dios, no s sabe por qu Dios no los ejerce y tambin queda
sin respuesta la pregunta por el origen del mal. Llull puede ayu
dar a resolver esta dificultad. De acuerdo con l, todos los seres
son sostenidos por una actividad: la actividad de ser, Dios es acto
puro de ser, infinito, y la creacin se compone de entidades finitas
que se sostienen en actos de ser finitos que proceden de Dios y que
permanecen durante todo el tiempo en que ellas existen.
Observando el mundo, se pueden alcanzar, de un modo ana
lgico e inmediato, algunos de los atributos del Ser Supremo: la
bondad, grandeza, eternidad, verdad, etc. atributos o Dignidades
divinas, todos ellos activos, que constituyen una actividad con
junta nica. Estas Dignidades pueden ser participadas por las
criaturas, aunque de un modo finito, pues son los principios de
todo lo creado. La diferencia ms importante que existe entre los
atributos divinos y los creados es que cada uno de estos, adems
de ser infinito, se identifica con la esencia divina. Sin embargo, en
los entes creados esto no ocurre y en ellos aparece una distincin
real entre su ser y su esencia individual.
De este modo se llega a una consecuencia importante que
recorre toda la obra luliana: slo en Dios, cada Dignidad divina
se identifica con la esencia divina. Al identificarse con la esencia
divina, la actividad de cada Dignidad debe ser igual a la actividad
de las dems. Por ejemplo, la Sabidura y el Poder deben equipa
rarse: Dios no es ms poderoso que sabio y lo mismo ocurre con
las otras Dignidades.
Por lo tanto, desde la perspectiva luliana, las posibilidades 1) y
2) no tienen sentido y deben ser eliminadas. Es imposible que Dios
quiera evitar los males y no pueda hacerlo, porque entonces su
poder sera inferior a su voluntad y su Querer tampoco puede ser
inferior a su Poder. En las posibilidades 3) y 4) hay igualdad de
Poder y de Querer divinos, pero en la 4) Dios se considera impo
15
Cf. Deus existe?, op. cit., pp.9798.
un lulista responde
199
tente, por lo que no es Dios. Slo queda por lo tanto la posibilidad

3) en la que se supone que Dios quiere eliminar el mal y lo puede
hacer, pero parece que no lo hace. Y las preguntas sobre el origen
del mal y su permanencia siguen sin respuesta.
Es evidente que Flores dArcais mezcle aqu lo concreto con lo
abstracto, porque considera de modo general la cuarta posibilidad
(no quiere, y no puede), ya que debera hacer la pregunta no sobre
el mal en abstracto, sino sobre los males concretos y particula
res. Conviene salir de lo abstracto y permanecer en la realidad
concreta. Es razonable que Dios quiera evitar ciertos males que
existen, y que de hecho los elimine, ya que puede hacerlo. En
cuanto a los dems, no los elimina porque no quiere hacerlo, y si
no quiere hacerlo, no puede eliminarlos. Quizs le cueste al ateo
Paolo Flores dArcais entender esto debido a una confusin lamen
table: la de equiparar el mal fsico al mal moral. El mal fsico
es la falta de ser en la realidad fsica, mientras que el mal moral
es la falta de ser en las acciones humanas. No hay culpa en el
dao fsico si no contiene un mal moral. Incluso, si un mal fsico
fuese producto de un acto humano malo, por error o por deseo, no
habra culpa en esa mala accin si le pareciera buena a su autor,
sindolo objetivamente.16 Obviamente, slo puede ser culpable (o
ganar mrito) la accin humana responsable.
Dios puede querer algunos males fsicos, por varias razones.
Algunos, porque forman parte del orden universal querido por
l; y permite otros, producidos por acciones humanas basadas
en errores no-culpables. Es razonable tambin que permita algu
nos males morales, porque debe ser un artista consumado en el
arte de dirigir hacia el bien hasta las peores -y ms culpablesacciones humanas. No es extrao que Dios sepa sacar bien del
mal. Insistiendo an en el origen del mal, Flores dArcais rechaza
una respuesta clsica: el pecado original, es decir, el mal moral
original.
16 Es el caso de la conciencia errnea. El autor de un acto objetivamente
malo, pero que le parece bueno tiene que seguir su conciencia errnea y al
hacerlo no le ser imputado el mal. Ahora bien, esta situacin no lo exime
de culpa por actos malos anteriotes que se tornaron hbitos y que le impiden
ver la maldad en el caso particular, en aquella accin fsica que le parece
buena. La culpa no estar en esa accin que le parece buena, sino en los actos
anteriores.
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esteve jaulent
Afirma Flores dArcais que Dios acept y quiso el pecado de

Adn y Eva, y por lo tanto, es responsable de su desobediencia.
Una declaracin un poco extraa en la boca de un ateo, y, ade
ms, incomprensible mediante deducciones exclusivamente racio
nales. Puestos a admitir otras razones, se puede argumentar que
Dios sabe extraer, con mucho arte, el bien de cualquier mal, como
dijo Agustn. Lo que importa es tener en cuenta siempre la visin
global del conjunto de las realidades. Flores dArcais piensa que
Dios tendra que haber creado el hombre incapaz de desobede
cerle, y as el mal no habra inundado la creacin. Pero luego se
queja de que algunos afirman que en este caso entrara en juego la
libertad humana. Sin ella los seres humanos pierden su dignidad,
dice dArcais.
Cabe sealar, sin embargo, que no es el hecho de tener una
voluntad que tiende libremente al bien lo que confiere dignidad
al hombre, sino el ser un ente religioso, capaz de comunicarse
con Dios. Es fcil comprender la dificultad que posiblemente
pueda tener un ateo para entender esa afirmacin. La volun
tad libre es una obra divina recibida por el hombre, sin mrito
alguno de su parte. La dignidad humana se aumenta usando bien
esta libertad para entrar cada vez ms en la intimidad con Dios.
Flores dArcais est de acuerdo en que la libertad de hacer lo malo
no es esencial para la dignidad del hombre, ni para completar el
bien de la creacin, pero est de acuerdo por razones diferentes.
Afirma que si la libertad de elegir el mal fuese esencial para la
dignidad del hombre y el bien de la creacin estaramos a merced
de la siguiente contradiccin: la posibilidad del mal sera necesaria
para el bien, y por lo tanto, sera inherente a Dios por ser el bien
supremo. De ello se desprende, dice, que la posibilidad del mal, la
capacidad del hombre para elegir la manzana y no la obediencia, exi
ste ya en Dios y por lo tanto la posibilidad del mal es la estructura
ms fundamental del ser, lo que coincide con el mismo Dios. La
contradiccin es falsa y es el resultado de confundir la potencia
antecedente con la consecuente. La diferencia entre las dos poten
cias es que, aunque las dos son reales, slo la consecuente existe.
Algo se puede decir que es real de muchas maneras, y una de ellas
es lo real an no existente, y la potencia antecedente de un ente
es una realidad que an no ha llegado al acto completo de existir.
Tal vez se entienda mejor esto teniendo en cuenta la siguiente
posibilidad. Al afirmar una proposicin, un filsofo sabe que tiene
un lulista responde
201
la posibilidad de cometer errores, pero sabe, con evidencia racio

nal, que antes de decir nada, el error no existe todava.
Al ser falsa la contradiccin, Flores dArcais debera decir que
la libertad de hacer lo malo no es esencial para la dignidad del
hombre ni lo es para completar el bien de la creacin. Adems
debera rechazar la falsa contradiccin, pero no lo hace y la acepta,
por eso afirma que:
Antes de la creacin del hombre slo exista el bien, no obstante el
mal ya estaba presente en el mundo con su mera posibilidad [].
La posibilidad del mal ya es un mal que destruye la equivalencia
entre el ser y el bien. Sin embargo, este mal es la misma libertad
humana.17
El mal moral, sin embargo, aparece con el mal uso de la liber

tad humana. En resumen, basndose en una premisa falsa y una
contradiccin, Flores dArcais slo puede llegar a una conclusin
falsa. Sin embargo, as lo hace, e insiste en que si Dios fuese ver
daderamente libre podra haber actuado de manera diferente y
creado al hombre incapaz de desobedecerle o incluso podra no
haber creado el mundo. El modo de argumentar de Llull destruye
tambin esta conclusin.
En efecto, Dios podra haber creado un mundo diferente, pero
su poder est condicionado por su sabidura y su amor, a causa de
la igualdad de sus atributos. Una vez que por amor quiso crear al
hombre, debera crearlo libre para que pudiese amar. Y as lo hizo.
Dios no podra haber creado un hombre incapaz de desobedecerle.
Sin embargo, Paolo Flores sigue: Dios es responsable de la crea
cin de la libertad humana, inclinada al mal, porque si no lo fuera,
nuestra libre decisin destruira su soberana absoluta: Dios sera
impotente ante la miserable voluntad humana. Esta sera decisiva
para la Voluntad divina y Dios coincidira con nuestra voluntad.18
Pero, cabra decir que as como no habra pecado sin libertad,
sin ella tampoco habra amor. Dios no es responsable de la incli
nacin de la voluntad humana hacia el mal; la razn nos muestra
que slo es responsable de la creacin de un deseo natural cuya
propiedad es siempre inclinarse libremente hacia el bien. Quien se
inclina hacia el mal es el hombre mismo que, con su libre albe
17
18

202
esteve jaulent
dro, no podra existir sin la libertad de creer qu es bueno y qu

es malo.19
3. El ser y el deber ser
Partiendo de la idea de que, en s mismo, el cosmos y todo lo que
existe, carece de contenido normativo, Flores dArcais se esfuerza
por demostrar que el deber ser viene determinado por los hom
bres y no est implicado en el ser de cada ente. La norma, el
deber ser, no existen en la naturaleza, nace con el hombre, dice.20
Llega a esta conclusin slo por la simple observacin de la con
ducta humana y de las normas contradictorias que el hombre esta
bleci a lo largo de la historia. Olvida que lo moral, aunque se
fundamenta en lo fsico no viene determinado por lo fsico, sino
en lo metafsico que est por encima de l, pues debido al libre
albedro que slo el hombre posee este puede alcanzar tanto
una naturaleza superior como degenerar en la suya propia. Debido
a esto, es difcil encontrar algn consenso o regularidades en el
comportamiento y las decisiones humanas.
As que una observacin superficial de la realidad, que no
alcanza el ser de las cosas ni de las acciones humanas, hizo que
Flores dArcais pensase que el hombre es el creador y soberano
seor de las normas o del deber ser. Si esto fuese as, la humani
dad seguramente extraera sus normas de conducta, su deber ser,
de su propia mente, estableciendo promedios o clculos sobre los
comportamientos observados, confundiendo de esta manera, en un
primer momento, la naturaleza humana principio de sus opera
ciones con el nucleo productor de los conductas observadas y,
finalmente, negando la existencia de esta naturaleza al observar la
19 Quoniam si uoluerit ipsas magnas habere, illae magnae sunt
; et si
uoluerit ipsas habere paruas, paruae sunt. Et hoc in ratione liberi arbitrii,
quod Deus dedit homini, ut acquirere posset magnum meritum aut paruum.
Sed uirtutes theologicae sunt ita magnae, sicut Deus ipsas magnas dare uolue
rit; homo tamen habet libertatem utendi ipsis aliquoties multum et aliquoties
paruum, sicut unus et idem homo, qui aliquoties multum intelliget et ama
bit Deum et suum proximum per caritatem, aliquando per spem, aliquando
per fidem, et aliquando habebit magnum recolere, intelligere et amare et ali
quando non, Ramon Llull, Liber de homine, ed. F. Domnguez, (ROL, 21),
Turnhout, 2000, p.232.
20 Cf. Deus existe?, op. cit., p.103.
un lulista responde
203
contradiccin de tales comportamientos. Este proceso confirma la

confusin de Flores dArcais entre pensamiento y realidad existente.
Solamente siguiendo este modo de pensar, o sea, entender al
ser como la esencia incompleta e imperfecta del ente, y por
esencia, la esencia completa, se podra pensar que el deber ser
no se origina en el ser, sino en las acciones escogidas por cada
uno a fin de alcanzar una esencia completa. Pero esto supone que
se conoce previamente esta esencia y en funcin de ella se juzga
cada una de las acciones que se pueden realizar, para escoger las
ms adecuadas a esa esencia previamente pensada. Esta posicin
es un esencialismo inadmisible que tendra como consecuencia que
la medida de las acciones humanas sera algo anterior a ellas y
adems construda por el hombre.21
Segn Flores dArcais, frente a la terrible responsabilidad que
acarrea el establecer las normas los hombres se desconectan de
ella imaginando una culpa original y afirmando tambin que
todas las normas creadas por el hombre sn ilusorias, pues todas
ellas cuentan como nico apoyo con los diferentes e imaginados
deber ser de cada ente. Siguiendo a Heidegger, concluye que
la nica discrepancia entre el ser y deber ser es inventada,
pues slo tiene como soporte un deber ser imaginado. Paolo Flo
res fue llevado a esta conclusin al entender que la posibilidad de
escoger el mal se da porque hay un mal existente. Pero ignora que
en el hombre el poder actuar no es lo mismo que tener el derecho
o el poder moral de hacerlo. Hay cosas que podemos hacer pero
no estamos moralmente autorizados a quererlas.
4. Conclusin
Llull aclara el tema de las relaciones entre pensamiento y reali
dad evitando cualquier esencialismo y definiendo las esencias indi
viduales a partir de la actividad de los entes, lo que introduce
cierta flexibilidad en las substancias. En el caso del hombre, su
actividad puede llevarlo a superar la naturaleza concreta de su
Este es el error implcito en la falacia naturalista: el esencialismo de
entender el ser como esencia incompleta y la esencia como esencia completa.
Cuando se entiende correctamente el sentido de las nociones de ser y de esen
cia, la frase agitur sequitur esse, es verdadera, y desaparece la falacia natura
lista.
21
204
esteve jaulent
substancia. Por esto, en muchos lugares de su extensa obra, define

los entes concretos como aquel acto de ser en el que se sustenta
su ser abstracto, que es la esencia individual pensada. No existe
ningn ente individual concreto sin sustentar es decir, tener en
s mismo lo que hace que sea tal ente, y que se produzca y acte
como tal.22 Es por eso que, como decan sintticamente los clsi
cos: la esencia (essentia) viene del ser (esse) y los principios de la
esencia se encuentran en el ser. Llull cierra la cuestin explicando
que en el momento de nuestra creacin pasamos del no ser al ser,
y por tanto nuestras acciones se situan siempre entre dos movi
mientos23 o tensiones, el que proviene del ser y el que proviene del
no ser. El primero incluye necesariamente la accin razonable; el
segundo es moverse sin razn y sin causa; por tanto, la medida
correcta de nuestras acciones implica siempre lo razonable que es
el impulso positivo que procede del interior de nuestro acto de ser.
Creyendo en las verdades de la fe el hombre se acostumbra a
ellas, y al entenderlas sube al escaln de la fe, pasando por encima
del entendimiento, lo que es denominado por Llull un punto tra
scendente. Todo esto puede suceder en el interior del ser humano.
Llull compara este proceso con el aceite que se encuentra siempre
por encima del agua.24
Abstract
Un lulista responde a Paolo Flores dArcais
I propose an analysis of Paolo Flores dArcais work Atheism and
Truth in the light of Ramon Llulls thought. This task shows
22 Inter essentiam et naturam est differentia, sicut in homine inter huma
nitatem et naturam hominis; quae non sunt idem numero, quia per humani
tatem homo est homo, sed per suam naturam habet inclinationem ad homificandum alium hominem, ed. M.Pereira, Th. Pindl-Bchel, Turnhout,
1989 (ROL, 17), p.327.
23 Cf. Ramon Llull, Libre de contemplaci en Du, ed. M. Obrador,
M. Ferr & S. Galms, Palma de Mallorca, 19061914 (ORL, 2), c. 46,
p.232: Com Dus ha ordenat lhome entre dos moviments.
24 [] idcirco Deus magnificat intellectum, ut ipse magnifice agat supra
suam naturam, simpliciter credendo. Et sic fides ascendit super intellectum,
sicut oleum superascendit ad aquam, Ramon Llull, Ars generalis ultima, ed.
A. Madre, (ROL, 14), Turnhout, 1986, p.276.
un lulista responde
205
Ramon Llull as a prevailing philosopher, who can help solve many

of the difficulties of the twenty-first-century thought. Paolo Flo
res dArcais departs from a philosophy of disenchantment that
depends only on finite realities, so that a believer of today would
have to give up the truth of his faith, and assume a pure faith,
which is introduced as credo quia absurdum, since reason is itself
atheist. I answer those statements with Lullian arguments: firstly,
the unity of knowledge and will that explains the relationship of
faith and reason in Llulls work Disputatio fidei et intellectus; and
secondly, Llulls active conception of being, which shows another
perspective on the problem of evil and the human free will.
Esteve Jaulent
ejaulent@ramonllull.net
Instituto Brasileiro de Filosofia e Cincia Raimundo Llio
Praa da S, n. 21 CJ 1005
CEP 01001001 So Paulo
Brazil
BERNARD DE LAVINHETA Y SU
INTERPRETACIN DE LAS IDEAS JURDICAS
DE RAMON LLULL
Rafael Ramis Barcel
(Universitat de les Illes Balears)
El franciscano Bernard de Lavinheta (1462- 1530?) es una
figura capital en la historia del lulismo. Podra decirse que con su
obra se concluye la interpretacin medieval de la obra luliana1 y
que empieza la propiamente moderna. Como figura de transicin,
con un pie en la Edad Media y otro en la Modernidad, Lavinheta
asimil el bagaje agustiniano-franciscano tardomedieval y lo puso
al servicio de una visin aristotlica renacentista y pre-racionalista,
que tuvo gran aceptacin y circulacin en buena parte de Europa.
En este escrito se pretende conocer con mayor profundidad la
interpretacin que hizo de las ideas jurdicas de Llull. Han sido ya
comentadas anteriormente las ideas alqumicas, cientficas y mdi
cas de Lavinheta y se ha subrayado la apertura del autor hacia las
corrientes doctrinales de su momento. Sin embargo, frente a otros
campos del saber, fue en el campo jurdico en el que Lavinheta
se mostr mucho ms fiel a Llull que a los autores lulianos del
siglo XV y de comienzos del XVI.Por esa razn, en la sntesis de
este autor se percibe la lectura directa de las obras lulianas, cuya
argumentacin Lavinheta reforz con el pensamiento de Arist
teles y los recursos de autoridad de la Patrstica latina. Antes de
pasar al estudio de la sntesis jurdica, cabe detenerse en las fuen
tes que manej el autor.
1. Las fuentes filosficas de Bernard de Lavinheta
Los focos del lulismo ms importantes del siglo XV eran el de la
Escuela de Barcelona y el parisino de Lefvre dtaples. El ncleo
1 B. Lavinheta, Bernhardi de Lavinheta Opera omnia: quibus tradidit artis
Raymundi Lullii compendiosam explicationem Coloniae, Sumptibus Lazari
Zetzneri Bibliopolae, 1612.

IPM, 67 (Turnhout, 2015), pp. 207-225.
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107315
208
rafael ramis barcel
de Barcelona estaba estrechamente relacionado con otros tantos

de la Corona de Aragn (principalmente de Mallorca y Valencia),
de la Corona de Castilla (Salamanca) y de Italia.2 Lefvre dta
ples recibi una influencia directa de Nicols de Cusa, antiguo
alumno de Emmerich van den Velde (Heymericus de Campo) y
otra, ms indirecta, de Sibiuda. Si se divide el lulismo bajo unas
coordenadas geogrficas europeas, podra decirse que el del Norte
era abiertamente humanista, antiescolstico y mayoritariamente
hermtico, mientras que el del Sur era predominantemente esco
lstico, filo-escotista, y tambin con algunos ribetes hermticos.
La primera figura docente de lulismo eclctico en Europa Cen
tral fue Heymericus de Campo, quien estudi Artes y Teologa en
Pars y en Colonia. Tal vez pudo conocer las obras de Llull en
Pars. Fue profesor en las Universidades de Colonia y Lovaina3
y, entre sus alumnos directos e indirectos, se pueden contar una
larga nmina de lulistas de la poca. Pese a ser un autor formal
mente albertista, sin duda, su presencia fue decisiva para el cono
cimiento posterior de Llull en Colonia en autores, por ejemplo,
como Andreas Canter, profesor de Artes en la Universidad.
Sin embargo, el alumno ms importante de Heymericus fue
Nicols de Cusa, que no ense lulismo, pero s lo propag amplia
mente.4 El Cusano estuvo en relacin con tres de los centros lulia
nos de su poca: el italiano, principalmente radicado en Padua, el
ya citado de Colonia y el de Pars. Entre Heymericus de Campo y
Nicols de Cusa pusieron las bases para el estudio del lulismo en la
Europa Central, que tuvo sus conexiones directas con el ncleo ita
liano y el parisino y, ms indirectas, con el de la Corona de Aragn.
El crculo de Colonia estuvo muy vinculado al parisino, encabe
zado por Lefvre dtaples,5 un lulista eclctico, muy influido por
2 Vase R. Ramis Barcel, Un esbozo cartogrfico del lulismo univer
sitario y escolar en los Reinos Hispnicos, Cuadernos del Instituto Antonio de
Nebrija, 15/1, (2012), pp.61103.
3 VaseR.Imbach, Theologia Raymundi Lulli memoriter epylogata, EL,
23 (1979), pp.185193.
4 Vase E. Colomer, Heimeric van den Velde entre Ramn Llull y
Nicols de Cusa, in Gesammelte Aufstze zur Kulturgeschichte Spaniens, Mn
ster, 1963, pp.216232.
5 A.Llinars, Le lullisme de Lfevre dtaples et ses amis humanistes,
Colloque International de Tours (XIV stage), Paris, 1963, pp.127136.
bernard de lavinheta y su interpretacin
209
Nicols de Cusa, que fue la figura ms importante para la difusin

del lulismo en Pars. Enseaba en el Collge du Cardinal Lemoine
de la Sorbona. Sin duda, la figura de Lefvre fue esencial para
la formacin de un grupo luliano en Pars, con discpulos como
Charles Bouvelles 6 (el ms relevante de ellos), Josse van Clichtowe
o Beatus Rhenanus.7 Gracias a la labor de Lefvre d taples como
profesor y editor, Llull fue un autor muy conocido en la Europa
Central. Sin embargo, su labor docente y editora no slo involu
craba a Llull, sino tambin al aristotelismo humanista, a la devotio moderna.8 Mantuvo contacto con Pico della Mirandola y Marsi
lio Ficino, a quienes hizo partcipes de sus intereses lulianos.
Lavinheta, un franciscano conventual originario del Barn,
Doctor en Artes y en Teologa,9 despus de haber residido en Sala
manca, Tolosa y probablemente en Barcelona, viaj a Pars, donde
comparti intereses con Lefvre dtaples.10 En su periplo inte
lectual conoci las distintas facetas del lulismo y su obra recogi
y sintetiz casi todas las corrientes interpretativas de la obra de
Llull. Tom, por una parte, el lulismo escotista de Dagu y de la
escuela de Barcelona que dio lugar al escoto lulismo tan propio
de los Reinos Hispnicos y tan afn, por otra parte, al espritu
franciscano 11 y por otra, una herencia ms agustiniana que pla
tonizante del Cusano y un aristotelismo no tomista, pero tampoco
averrosta, del magisterio indirecto de Heymericus de Campo. De
Dagu tom no slo su perspectiva escoto-luliana, sino su vocacin
enciclopdica, que pona las bases para la construccin de una sn
6 J. M. Victor, Charles de Bovelles, 14791553

: An Intellectual Biography,
Paris, 1978, pp.1215.
7 E. W. Platzeck, Einleitung, in B. Lavinheta, Explanatio compendiosaque applicatio artis Raimundi Lulli, Hildesheim, 1977, p.7.
8 M. Pereira, Bernardo Lavinheta e la diffusione del lullismo a Parigi
nei primi anni del 500, Interpres. Revista di Studi Quatrocenteschi, 5 (1983),
pp.242265.
9 Ibid., p.246.
10 J.M. Victor, Jacques Lefvre dtaples, Charles de Bovelles and Ber
nardo de Lavinheta: The Revival of Lullism at Paris 14991516, Renaissance
Quarterly, 28 (1975), pp.504534.
11 E.W. Platzeck, Einleitung, pp.1113.
210
rafael ramis barcel
tesis completa del Arte de Llull que sirviese para encontrar prin
cipios generales para todas las ciencias.12
Con Josse Bade y otros editores particip activamente en la
publicacin de varias obras lulianas. No sabemos a ciencia cierta
cul fue el papel de Lavinheta en todas ellas, pero parece ser que
estuvo detrs de la publicacin de siete obras lulianas desde 1514 a
1518, un perodo de febril actividad impresora. Edit el Ars brevis13
y segn Carreras Artau estuvo tambin vinculado al proceso
de edicin del Arbor scientiae,14 que tanta influencia tuvo en su sn
tesis de la obra de Llull. En Colonia edit la Ianua artis de Pere
Dagu,15 y en Pars y Lyon particip en la edicin de las obras
ms destacadas de Llull.
El lulismo durante los siglos XIV y XV, a falta de estudios
ms detallados que puedan precisarlo mejor, estuvo en un difcil
equilibrio entre el platonismo y el aristotelismo, alimentando el
sincretismo propio de la poca. El neoplatonismo, por ejemplo, de
un Sibiuda, contrastaba con el aristotelismo de Heymericus de
Campo.16 La obra de Llull, al ser realmente compleja e incluir una
reforma de la lgica y de la metafsica, al tiempo que consagraba
toda una vena mstica, tena una armonizacin igualmente fcil y
difcil con las otras doctrinas.
En efecto, repasando con atencin la obra de Lavinheta, si se
dejan de lado las citas de la Biblia, es Aristteles el autor ms
citado. Su eclecticismo le permita aglutinar varias fuentes: sigui
con fidelidad la tendencia aristotlica del lulismo parisino, conju
gndola con la tradicin agustiniana.17 Platzeck elabor un elenco
de autores citados en la Explanatio compendiosaque applicatio que
12 S.Trias Mercant, Histria del pensament a Mallorca. Palma, 1985, vol.
I, pp.104105.
13 Ars brevis Illuminati Doctoris Magistri Raymundi Lulli, ed. Bernardus de
Lavinheta, Lyon, tienne Baland, 1514.
14 Arbor scientiae venerabilis et celitus Illuminati Patris Raymundi Lullii
Maioricensis. Ed. Josse Bade, Lyon, Gilbert de Villiers, 1515.
15 P.Dagu, Ianua artis Lulli. Introductorium ad modum breue et succintum
ad omnes scientias quod Janua artis illuminati doctoris magistri Raymundi Lulli
nuncupatur. Ed. Bernardus de Lavinheta, Colonia, Quentell, 1516.
16 E. Colomer, De la Edad Media al Renacimiento. Ramon Llull. Nicols de
Cusa. Pico della Mirandola, Barcelona, 1975, pp.78118.
17 E.W. Platzeck, op. cit., Einleitung, pp.1823.
211
resulta elocuente por s misma. El autor ms citado despus de

Aristteles es San Agustn. Otros autores medievales que reciben
ms de una decena de citas son San Anselmo, Avicena, el Pseu
do-Dionisio, San Gregorio y San Juan Damasceno. Platn y San
Jernimo se sitan en un peldao inferior, seguidos por Boecio,
Cicern, Averroes, San Ambrosio y Ptolomeo. Mucho mayor inte
rs tienen las escasas (pero relevantes) citas a sus contemporneos
y correligionarios: Charles de Bouvelles, Guillermo de Ockham,
o Lefvre dtaples. Se cita una vez al Maestro Llobet (magister
Lupetus),18 a San Buenaventura, a San Francisco y a Duns Scoto.
Hay citas indirectas a Pere Dagu, a Pedro Lombardo y a Santo
Toms.19 Lavinheta mostr claramente que los temas jurdicos
(civiles o cannicos) no eran su especialidad, puesto que sus argu
mentos de autoridad se limitaban a consideraciones generales de
los Padres latinos sobre el derecho (San Agustn, San Jernimo).
El original planteamiento luliano, en tanto que heredero de una
tradicin agustiniana, poda considerarse parcialmente platnico.
Su racionalismo y su gusto por la combinatoria mostraban un vec
tor pitagrico, tampoco muy alejado del platonismo. Sin embargo,
la insistencia en la reforma de la retrica y de la lgica le haca
un interlocutor privilegiado del aristotelismo. No es de extraar
que en el Renacimiento, poca eclctica por excelencia, Llull fuese
un autor tan apreciado. En este perodo, como puede verse en las
obras de Lavinheta, se dieron tambin intereses hermticos que
hicieron de Llull un autor sumamente interesante por sus suge
rencias. Circularon profusamente obras alqumicas atribuidas al
Doctor Iluminado y en la interpretacin de Trithemius, Agrippa o
Paracelso no pueden distinguirse muchas veces el lulismo mgico
del autntico.
2. Entre el ejemplarismo y el enciclopedismo
Lavinheta hered una compleja tradicin luliana, que intent
extractar en su obra Practica compendiosa artis Raymundi Lulii, la
cual estableca un equilibrio entre el ejemplarismo metafsico en
18 Este hecho muestra su conocimiento del lulismo cataln-mallorqun.
Sobre Llobet, J. Gay, El Ars Notativa de Pere Joan Llobet, EL, 26
(1986), pp.149164.
19 E.W. Platzeck, op. cit., Personenverzeichnis, pp.3541.
212
rafael ramis barcel
el que las dignidades se combinaban con reglas y principios y

un enciclopedismo donde el Arte devena una suerte de sistema
tcnico para buscar la verdad. Sin duda, Lavinheta era un autor
con una importante proyeccin metafsica, pero su obra fue inter
pretada, ya en el siglo XVI, como artificio de combinatoria. De
hecho, la mayora de proyectos enciclopdicos de raz luliana se
basaron en la obra de este franciscano,20 aunque soslayando toda
su dimensin ontolgica.
Puede decirse que Lavinheta fue un autor que expuso el lulismo
medieval en odres modernos. La metodologa y la estructura de su
obra eran radicalmente modernas, mientras que el contenido era
una mezcla de fuentes clsicas y bblicas, de Llull y de la tradicin
luliana (muchas veces comprometida con obras pseudo-lulianas).
Hillgarth entiende que Lavinheta inici una poca que culmin
Salzinger21 y posiblemente sea sa la mejor periodizacin de la his
toria del lulismo moderno. Ciertamente, la obra de Lavinheta era
suficientemente amplia y plural para que cada lector encontrase
en ella motivos diferentes y su influencia fue profunda y duradera.
Uno de los campos en el que Lavinheta sigui a Llull con ms
fidelidad fue en el jurdico. Cabe suponer que, frente a las dems
esferas del saber, el franciscano era lego en materias jurdicas,
extremo que le hizo ser, al mismo tiempo, respetuoso con las obras
lulianas y audaz con la metodologa que intentaba aplicar.22 De
ah el inters que despierta la obra de Lavinheta para enhebrar no
VaseA. Angelini, Metodo ed Enciclopedia nel cinquecento francese, I: Il

pensiero di Pietro Ramo all origine dell enciclopedismo moderno, Firenze, 2008,
pp.239283.
21 As lo defiende J. Hillgarth, Ramon Llull i el naixement del lullisme,
Barcelona, 1998, p.349.
22 VaseF. Elas de Tejada y G. Percopo, Historia del pensamiento poltico cataln, Sevilla, 1963, p.172. Elas de Tejada era un gran admirador de
Lavinheta y lo consider siempre un innovador en la metodologa jurdica
luliana, cuyos tringulos, cuadrados y crculos consider verdaderos modelos
de concisin, claridad y eficacia metodolgicas. En su trabajo F. Elas de
Tejada, La metodologa jurdica lulliana, Anales de la Ctedra Francisco
Surez, 1 (1961), p. 155, indic que las aportaciones de Bernardo de Lavi
nheta a la metodologa jurdica luliana sern objeto de prximo estudio mo.
Salvo lo que se dice en la Historia del pensamiento poltico cataln, cit., no
me consta que llegara a escribir ningn trabajo especfico sobre el tema.
20
213
slo una historia de las ideas jurdicas lulianas, sino tambin para
establecer una historia de la transmisin del lulismo.
Como es sabido, Ramon Llull escribi cuatro obras en las que
aplic su Arte al derecho:23 Liber principiorum juris,24 Ars juris,25
Ars juris naturalis26 y Ars brevis quae est de inventione juris.27 A
ellas debe aadirse el Arbre de cincia o Arbor scientiae28 (1296),
verdadero compendio del saber filosfico-teolgico y social de
Llull. Las partes sptima (Arbre imperial) y octava (Arbre apostolical) trataban, respectivamente, del derecho poltico y del derecho
cannico. Su idea principal era dar una explicacin completa de
cul deba ser el modelo de la vida y de la organizacin poltica
de los prncipes y de la Iglesia. Su disposicin, siguiendo la met
fora del rbol, permita una estratificacin social muy plstica, de
acuerdo con lo que Llull pensaba de cada uno de los miembros de
una sociedad bien organizada.29
El primero de estos libros, escrito entre 1273 y 1275, debe enten
derse en el marco general de la voluntad luliana de escribir sobre
los principios generales de los nacientes saberes universitarios. Esta
obra presentaba algo ilusamente la posibilidad de aprehender
dichos saberes de forma sencilla. 30 En realidad, no se trataba sino
de especulaciones de carcter ontolgico que, bajo una aparente
Sobre las obras jurdicas lulianas, vase R. Ramis Barcel, Estudio
Preliminar en R.Llull, Arte de derecho, Madrid, 2011, pp.22 y ss.
24 Ed. M. A. Sanchz Manzano, 2007 (ROL, 31), pp.323412.
25 Ars iuris illuminati doctoris Raymundi Lulii: que breuissima est et artificio
quodam intellectuali clauditur, Roma, apud Iacobum Mazochium, 1516. Se cita
por la reimpresin en Omnium scientiarum Magistri Beati Raymundi Lulli Doctoris Illuminati et Martyris Tertii Ordinis Seraphici Patris Sancti Francisci. Ars
iuris et Arbor imperialis, Palma de Mallorca, Miquel Cerd Miquel Amors,
1745, pp.186.
26 Ed. J. Gay, 1995 (ROL, 20), pp.119177.
27 Ed. A. Madre, 1984 (ROL, 12), pp.257389.
28 Se citar aqu por la edicin Arbor scientiae venerabilis et caelitus Illuminati Patris Raymundi Lullii Maioricensis, opus nuperrime recognitum revisum et
correctum, Lyon, Jean Pillehotte, 1635, que es una reedicin de la ya mencio
nada edicin de 1515.
29 Una descripcin general de todas estas obras puede verse en A.Mon
serrat Quintana, La visin luliana del mundo del Derecho, Mallorca, 1987,
pp.7092 y en J.L. Muoz de Baena y Simn, Llull, un ensayo de epistemologa jurdica, Madrid, 1988, tesis doctoral indita.
30 VaseA.Monserrat Quintana, La visin luliana, op. cit., pp.7071.
23
214
rafael ramis barcel
presentacin jurdica, aportaban poco al jurista, al filsofo o al

telogo. Las definiciones eran tan complejas que lo nico que poda
extraerse de ellas era la necesidad de remontarse desde un caso
concreto a principios generales. Se trataba, por lo tanto, de un
ejercicio de abstraccin y de ontologa jurdica, con escasos resul
tados. Sin embargo, por su densidad ontolgica, sta sera a la
postre una obra muy llamativa para filsofos y telogos que qui
siesen adentrase, a partir de estas disciplinas, en el saber jurdico.
El segundo libro era el Ars iuris (12751281), una obra susten
tada sobre los principios de la anterior y concebida principalmente
para dar solucin a problemas de carcter jurisdiccional. Llull
crea que el mayor problema de la aplicacin del derecho era su
complejidad y su falta de sistematicidad, extremo que haca que
los pleitos se volviesen interminables. Con la finalidad de abre
viarlos, simplific el sistema anterior, reducindolo a una figura
geomtrica de ocho principios simbolizados con las letras siguien
tes: A (Deus), B (Actor), C (Ius), D (Reus), E (Anima B), F (Corpus
B), G (Corpus D) y H (Anima D). 31 Como puede verse, su contenido
es claramente antropolgico y teolgico, entremezclando la justicia
de Dios con la humana, y el fin del cuerpo y del alma tanto del
actor como del reo. Llull crea que con la aplicacin de las figu
ras del Ars iuris se podan obtener las soluciones jurdicas en cada
caso. Sin embargo, no era una solucin casustica, tal y como suce
da en el derecho civil o en el derecho cannico, sino el resultado
de una ponderacin.
En la definicin del arte del derecho del Arbor scientiae, se dice
que Iurista considerat iustitiam in his quae sunt licita ad evitandum illicita ut sit pax et charitas inter gentes in amando Deum et ei
serviendo et ad faciendum ei reuerentiam et honorem quae ei conueniunt. Idcirco dicunt quod principia iuris sunt Deum diligere honeste
viuere et unicuique quod suum est reddere. 32 Esta idea, que casaba
la teologa con el derecho romano-cannico, reflejaba la concep
cin luliana del derecho, enriquecida con algunos ejemplos sobre
su aplicacin a los casos del matrimonio y a los cnones. 33
Vase la primera figura, Ars iuris, primer folio, s. f.
Arbor scientiae, p.117. Vase tambin la bella traduccin de A. de
Cepeda, rbol de la ciencia, Bruselas, Foppens, 1663, p.104.
33 Arbor scientiae, p.553. rbol de la ciencia, pp.415416, 488.
31
32
215
En el Ars de iure (1304) pretenda obtener la reduccin de todos

los derechos particulares (fundamentalmente el civil y el cannico)
a principios universales del saber jurdico, enfatizando especial
mente la relacin que tenan todos ellos con el derecho natural. 34
En el Ars brevis quae est de inventione iuris (1308) se dio un modelo
ms completo de aplicacin del Arte al derecho, sobre todo desde
el punto de vista de la relacin entre el derecho y el pensamiento
filosfico-teolgico del autor mallorqun. 35 En ella se puso un
mayor nfasis en la solucin de problemas de derecho civil y can
nico a travs de un estudio filosfico-teolgico de amplio calado,
que inclua el comentario de algunas fuentes del ius commune.
3. La interpretacin de la jurisprudencia en Lavinheta
Despus de tratar la tica, Lavinheta hizo en su tratado una
presentacin de la obra jurdica de Llull mediante seis captulos.
En ellos elabor una sntesis de algunas pocas ideas del Liber principiorum iuris, algunas ms del Ars iuris y sigui bsicamente la
estructura y los ejemplos del Arbor scientiae. Es dudoso que Lavi
nheta consultase el Ars de iure, aunque hay una cierta familiaridad
con el Ars brevis quae est de inventione iuris, que intent sealar en
algunas ocasiones. Pese a que no es completamente descartable
la consulta de las obras jurdicas manuscritas de la poca terna
ria, las coincidencias temticas se deben, a mi entender, ms a las
repeticiones de Llull que a la amplitud de fuentes jurdicas lulia
nas que Lavinheta lleg a conocer. La Practica compendiosa artis
Raymundi Lulii de Lavinheta se public en 1523, ocho aos des
pus que la edicin romana del Ars iuris (1516). 36 Sin duda sta era
la obra jurdica ms conocida de Llull y una de las ms claras de
la poca cuaternaria.
Puede decirse que, en el mbito del derecho, al igual que en
otras disciplinas, Lavinheta represent un momento clave entre el
R.Ramis Barcel, Estudio Preliminar, op. cit., pp.5186.
R. Ramis Barcel, El derecho natural en el Ars brevis quae est de
inventione iuris de Ramon Llull en De natura: VI Congreso de la SOFIME,
Salamanca, 2015, pp. 741-749.
36 VaseR.Ramis Barcel, Lulismo y derecho en Italia durante el Rena
cimiento en M.Romano & F.Chimento, Il lullismo in Italia: itinerario sto
rico-critico. Volume miscellaneo in occasione del VII centenario della morte
di Raimondo Lullo, Palermo, Officina di Studi Medievali, 2015, pp. 407-425.
34
35
216
rafael ramis barcel
lulismo medieval y el moderno. Este autor fue capaz de presentar

una exposicin ordenada y racional del derecho luliano, apta para
interesar a los telogos, a los filsofos y a los juristas. Si autores
como Sibiuda y Heymericus de Campo haban adoptado algunas
ideas lulianas para sus sistemas, adaptndolas a las necesidades
del momento, 37 en la obra de Lavinheta se encontraba ya una
exposicin clara del pensamiento jurdico luliano, sin renunciar
a la dimensin ms metafsica del mismo, pero capaz de influir
directamente en los tericos del derecho.
En el primer captulo, De consideratione canonistarum iuristarumque, seu de utroque iure canonico videlicet et civili, Lavinheta
expuso la necesidad de una figura iuris capaz de reducir y expli
car los derechos, en el sentido del Arbor scientiae y del Ars iuris.
En este sentido, recalc la importancia de la justicia para alcan
zar la paz y el amor de la gente 38, a partir de los principios de
Ulpiano:39 Deum diligere, honeste vivere et uniquique quod suum est
reddere,40 recalcados por Llull en sus obras.
Como es sabido, el Doctor Iluminado sigui claramente la divi
sin que hizo Graciano en el Decreto entre el derecho natural, el
derecho de gentes y el derecho positivo,41 que a su vez provena
del derecho romano por mediacin de San Isidoro de Sevilla.42
Siguiendo al pensador mallorqun, Lavinheta destac cuatro principia primitiva iuris:43 ius divinum, ius naturale, ius gentium y ius
positivum. El ius divinum consista por definicin de la mayoridad,
minoridad y concordancia existente entre Dios y el hombre. El ius
naturale radicaba en la necesaria definicin de razn, definicin,
37 Sobre la recepcin de las ideas de Llull en Sibiuda y Heymericus de

Campo, vase R. Ramis Barcel, La recepcin de las ideas jurdicas de
Ramon Llull en los siglos XV y XVI, Revista de Estudios Histrico-Jurdicos,
34 (2012), especialmente pp.441447.
38 Arbor scientiae, p.117. rbol de la ciencia, p.104.
39 Ars iuris illuminati, f. 6. Vide Ulpiano, D. 1.1.10.1.
40 Bernhardi de Lavinheta Opera omnia, p.521. Tambin en Ars brevis
quae est de inventione iuris, p.323.
41 Cf., Decretum I, dist. I.
42 Para la evolucin conceptual, vase R. M. Pizzorni, Il diritto naturale
dalle origini a S.Tommaso dAquino: saggio storicocritico, Bologna, 2000.
43 Vase la extraordinaria similitud con el Ars brevis quae est de inventione
iuris, p.318.
217
concordancia etc. El ius gentium consista en la definicin de la

concordancia existente entre el hombre y el hombre. El ius positivum radicaba en la voluntaria razn del hombre que lo buscaba.44
Sin duda, con esta visin cuatripartita del derecho, Lavinheta
se aproximaba mucho ms a la visin romano-cannica del dere
cho que, al igual Santo Toms, tuvo tambin Ramon Llull en
sus ltimos escritos 45. Esta evolucin se palpa sobre todo en el
Ars brevis quae est de inventione iuris46, cuya configuracin de los
derechos muestra un progresivo acercamiento a la cultura del ius
commune. Esta dimensin se percibe, sobre todo, con la interpre
tacin luliana del ius gentium. De ah que Lavinheta adaptase y
sistematizase el pensamiento luliano de acuerdo con los intereses
del humanismo, aunque sin perder las races clsicas y medievales.
Despus de la clasificacin, Lavinheta trat la relacin de los
derechos entre s. El derecho natural poda ser comn (general)
y especial. Siguiendo a San Agustn, Lavinheta argument que
estaba subordinado al derecho divino y que el positivo estaba
subordinado tanto al natural como al divino. La relacin que exis
ta entre ellos, de acuerdo con San Jernimo, era la del amor que
conservaba la justicia en lo creado. Este equilibrio y medida de la
justicia, exigido por Aristteles, se daba gracias a la permanencia
del derecho divino y el derecho natural: omnes enim leges aut divinae sunt, aut humanae: divinae natura humanae moribus constant.47
En el segundo captulo, Lavinheta trat del origen de ambos
derechos, contraponiendo el derecho natural (ius naturale) al dere
cho humano (ius humanum), el cual tena una doble ramificacin:
ius gentium y ius positivum48. De este ltimo derivaban tanto la
ley cannica como la ley civil.49 Siguiendo a San Agustn, ninguna
Bernhardi de Lavinheta Opera omnia, p.521.
VaseR. Ramis Barcel, El pensamiento jurdico de Santo Toms y
de Ramon Llull en el contexto poltico e institucional del siglo XIII, Angelicum, vol. 90/2, (2013), pp. 189-216.
46 Vase E. Wohlhaupter, Die Ars Brevis, quae est de inventione
mediorum iuris civilis des Ramon Lull, Estudis Franciscans, 46 (1934),
pp.196215 y R. Ramis Barcel, La fundamentacin y la estructura del
derecho en el Ars brevis quae est de inventione iuris de Ramon Llull, Scintilla.
Revista de filosofa e mstica medieval, 10/1 (2013), pp. 79-97.
47 Bernhardi de Lavinheta Opera omnia, p.524.
48 Bernhardi de Lavinheta Opera omnia, pp.524525.
49 Ars iuris illuminati, ff. 1012.
44
45
218
rafael ramis barcel
ley humana era justa y legtima, si no era por la derivacin que

hacan de la ley eterna50. Respecto de la ley natural, deca que
ex parte naturalitatis suae habet aequalia, intellectum videlicet voluntatem et memoriam51 y que el derecho positivo consista ms en
memoria y voluntad que en memoria e intelecto.52
En el tercer captulo, referente a las diversas condiciones del
derecho natural en la ciencia terica y prctica, Lavinheta intent
explicar la aplicacin de la ciencia del derecho a partir de los tri
ngulos53 del perodo cuaternario, que aparecan en Liber principiorum iuris y del Ars iuris, as como tambin en el Arbor scientiae.
Muy probablemente, de la primera obra tom la referencia al ius
nutritivum.54 As, expona que el ius naturale conditiones nutritivas et nutribiles respicit, respiciens semper ad maiorem finem, et ius
nutrituvum conditiones naturales respiciens ad principia magis naturalia iuris.55
En este sentido, Lavinheta intent sintetizar los diferentes dere
chos que aparecan en el Liber principiorum iuris (ius antiquum,
ius novum, ius comparativum)56 para reducirlos al esquema del Ars
iuris. Todo ello tena que servir para construir la figura de ambos
derechos, expuesta en el captulo cuarto. Lavinheta, con un gran
sentido prctico, intent reconducir la dispersin del Liber principiorum iuris, en el que permanecan los elementos ms estric
tamente ejemplaristas, hacia una visin procesalista-teolgica del
derecho, cuya simplicidad pudiese cautivar tanto a juristas como
a filsofos y telogos.
As, tal y como se ha visto en la explicacin del Ars iuris, sim
boliz su esquema con unas letras muy parecidas a las de esta
obra. La figura representaba dos cuadrados secantes superpuestos
(duo magni quadranti secantes se aequaliter in angulis)57 de forma
que las ocho puntas representasen ocho letras, a las que se deba
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
Bernhardi de Lavinheta Opera omnia,

Ars iuris illuminati, ff. 89.
Ars iuris illuminati, ff. 25v.
Liber principiorum iuris, p.349.
Liber principiorum iuris, pp.344350.
p.525.
p.525.
p.528.
p.532.
219
aadir la ms importante, la A (el ius divinum), circunscrita el

medio de la figura. De esta forma eran nueve las letras, siguiendo
el espritu luliano. En efecto, en el centro estaba A (Ius divinum)
y las ocho puntas que formaban los dos cuadrados eran B (Ius
naturale), C (Actor), D (Ius positivum), E (Reus), F (Anima actoris),
G (Corpus actoris), H (Corpus rei), I (Anima rei).58 En el crculo ins
crito entre los cuadrados se encontraban doce dignidades: iustitia,
donnatio, bonitas, magnitudo, eternitas, potestas, sapientia, voluntas,
virtus, veritas, gloria y largitas.59
Con ello, Lavinheta haba hecho una reforma en toda regla de
la concepcin luliana del derecho, pues la figura haba devenido
una sntesis de la obra de Llull con una visin jurdico-procesal
algo menos ingenua, que integraba otras dignidades y, sobre todo,
basaba su interpretacin en la diferencia entre el derecho divino,
el natural y el positivo. En efecto, eliminando a Dios como parte
de la figura, y con la introduccin del derecho natural y del dere
cho divino, la estructura jurdica ganaba atractivo en el mundo de
los juristas y de los telogos.
El hecho de que Lavinheta se basase casi exclusivamente sobre
obras del perodo cuaternario le obligaba a una simplificacin
compendiosa y pedaggica del Arte, al tiempo que subrayaba, con
algunos matices, la dimensin ms ejemplarista y metafsica. Sin
embargo, tal ejemplarismo, como de hecho sucedi con las reedi
ciones de Zetzner y Alsted y probablemente antes no era visto
como tal, sino como un sistema combinatorio para alcanzar la ver
dad, con independencia del carcter ontolgico de las dignidades
o de los principios. Con todo, en Lavinheta permaneca, sin duda,
el ejemplarismo de Llull y la visin procesal del Ars iuris. Sin
traicionar el espritu del Doctor Iluminado, Lavinheta fue capaz
de estilizar y de presentar la figura jurdica de manera an ms
atractiva.
La aplicacin casustico-procesal de Lavinheta resultaba tam
bin ligeramente diferente de la de Llull y, en todo caso, suges
tiva. En el captulo quinto explicaba las tres causas de litigacin,
dependiendo de si reo y actor tenan culpa o no: differentia litigantium est triplex: nam quidam sunt simil in culpa: et quidam quo58
59
Ars iuris illuminati, ff. 3v4.

220
rafael ramis barcel
rorum unus est in culpa: alter vero caret ipsa, alii autem qui omnino
culpa carent.60
En el primer caso, Lavinheta puso el ejemplo clsico de Ticio y
Sempronio respecto de un prstamo con usura: este caso resultaba
muy grfico para ver que Ticio acusaba a Sempronio de usura, y
ste a aqul de lujuria61. Era necesario acudir a la ponderacin
en los tringulos para ver cul era la dignidad ms afectada.62
En el segundo caso, se estudiaba el caso de un paterfamilias que
haba instituido heredero universal al primognito. Tiempo des
pus ste se haba ordenado sacerdote y tena un beneficio, por lo
que el menor entenda que qui altari servit, de altari vivere debet.63
Era necesaria tambin una ponderacin entre ambos conten
dientes y de la voluntad del padre. El tercer modo de practicar
la figura estudiaba los casos fortuitos, o en el que nadie tena la
culpa directamente: el ejemplo era un asno que, habindolo dejado
su amo en un prado, entraba en una barca atada en la orilla de
un ro y se hunda.64 Tanto el amo del asno como el de la barca se
daban la culpa. Despus de haber examinado el alma (la intencin
de ambos) se decretaba que el caso era fortuito.65
El captulo sexto estudiaba, siguiendo la relacin detallada en
el Arbor scientiae, el modo de reducir todos los derechos positivos
y particulares a la verdadera ciencia del arte aplicada al derecho,
estableca cuarenta rbricas de temas jurdicos (Emptio, Venditio,
Commodatum, Redditio, Depositum, Promissio, Probatio, Confessio,
Negatio, Dubitatio, Statutum, Procuratio, Ablatum, Legatum, Accusatio, Excusatio, Permutatio, Perditio, Inventio, Datio, Conditio, Tormentum, Vituperium, Deceptio, Diffamatio, Furtum, Luxuria, Proditio, Homicidium, Blasphemia, Inobedientia, Mendacium, Indigentia,
Fortuna, Voluntarium, Ignorantia, Oblivio, Libertas, Servitus, PraeBernhardi de Lavinheta Opera omnia, p.533.
Tpico ejemplo que se repite en todas las obras lulianas, vase, por
ejemplo, rbol de la ciencia, p.365. Vase tambin Ars iuris illuminati, ff.
23v24.
63 Bernhardi de Lavinheta Opera omnia, p. 534. Recurdese San Pablo, 1
Ad Corinthios, 9, 13.
64 Arbor scientiae, p.575; rbol de la ciencia, p.481. Tambin Ars de iure,
p.166.
60
61
221
sumptio).66 Deban servir para la reduccin de todos los derechos

a la estructura del Arte.67 Lavinheta aprovech para elaborar,
siguiendo el Arbor scientiae, una ejemplificacin con los dos prime
ros conceptos: emptio y venditio,68 que acercaba a Llull a la teora
jurdico-econmica franciscana,69 ilustremente representada por
Pierre de Jean Olivi, Ockham y tantos otros.
Con esto se acababa la exposicin de la aplicacin del Arte al
derecho. Sin embargo, siguiendo el modelo de Llull, dej para el
final el examen de unas quaestiones. En ellas intentaba hacer acce
sible el mtodo luliano a travs de la exposicin escolstica. Con
ello pretenda mostrar que se llegaba a resultados similares y ms
grficos siguiendo el mtodo del Arte.
La primera de estas cuestiones era saber si el derecho deba exa
minarse ms por la forma o por la materia.70 Era un tema esen
cial desde la recepcin del aristotelismo en el siglo XIII: despus
de una larga discusin, Lavinheta pareca inclinarse ms por la
materia que por la forma,71 aunque fue un tema muy discutido en
Arbor scientiae, p.174; rbol de la ciencia, p.154.

68 Arbor scientiae, p.174180; rbol de la ciencia, pp.154157.
70 Bernhardi de Lavinheta Opera omnia, p.642. In oppositum est veri
tas: ut patet per primam figuram: nam in essentia Dei nulla est materia:
sed forma pura et simplex, quae est ipsamet essentia, in dignitatibus autem
est iustitia; quae est ipsemet Deus et essentia pura cuius scilicet justitiae
similitudo est ius ratione formae ipsius juris, non autem ratione materiae;
unde cum forma iuris quae est ipsa aequitas seu justitia sit similitudo Dei
ratione iustitiae, significatum est, quod ius simpliciter debet plus inquiri
ratione suae formae, quam ratione suae materiae: et hoc etiam patet per
secundam figuram, et primo per triangulum viridem: nam omni cretarura et
sensualis et intellectualis nobilior, et melior est simpliciter ex parte formae,
quam ex parte materiae: quia per primam formam distinguitur ununquodque
a quocunque alio: et ab ea propriam recipit denominationem: non autem a
materia: de multas etiam alias habet conditiones forma in sua substantia,
quae sunt nobiliores, quam conditiones materiae: ac etiam omnis operatio
naturalis: intellectualis et artificialis nobilique est ex parte formae agentis,
quam ex parte materiae patientis: quare manifeste concludendum est, quod
ius potius debet inquiri ratione formae quam materiae.
66
67
222
rafael ramis barcel
todas las obras de Llull72 , y en particular en el Ars iuris,73 donde el

polgrafo mallorqun pareca preferir una combinacin y una pon
deracin. Despus de esta cuestin, tanto en el Ars iuris como en
la obra de Lavinheta, se planteaba la manera en la cual el derecho
particular podra hallarse en el universal,74 lo que obligaba a una
exposicin detallada del funcionamiento de las figuras del Arte.
Lavinheta cerr el conjunto de cuestiones con las dedicadas al
derecho cannico. De acuerdo con las cuestiones de las races del
rbol apostolical, se pregunt si los cristianos deban obedecer al
Papa en contra de su conciencia y responda que, de acuerdo con
el Arte, si el Papa era hertico, no; pero si mandaba otra cosa que
no tocase a los temas de fe, deba obedecrsele. Se preguntaba si
un prelado deba ser ms temible o amable, y responda Lavinheta
con un espritu tan luliano como franciscano que era mejor ser
prelado por caridad que por quemar herejes (combustionem hereticorum).75 Tambin se cuestionaba si el Papa tena que enviar misio
neros a predicar a los infieles y, despus de una disquisicin, se
mostraba la conveniencia de hacerlo.76 Se preguntaba tambin si
se tena que dar mayor honor al Papa que a cualquier hombre y
se responda que s, porque en ningn hombre Dios estaba ms
representado que en el Papa.77
Asimismo se preguntaba por qu los prncipes besaban los pies
al Papa, y la respuesta era como en muchas otras grandes cues
tiones planteadas por Llull que por lo mismo que el aceite flo
taba sobre el agua.78 Tambin se cuestionaba por qu el Papa lle
vaba vestimenta blanca y responda que por el hecho de perdonar
los pecados de los dems y purificarlos. Por ltimo, Lavinheta79 se
cuestionaba por qu el Papa no tena esposa y la respuesta era que
si la tuviese, mirara a lo terrenal.80
Ars brevis quae est de inventione iuris, p.365.
Ars iuris illuminati, f. 7r-v.
74 Ars iuris illuminati, f. 7v8v y Bernhardi de Lavinheta Opera omnia,
pp.645649.
75 Arbor scientiae, p.451; rbol de la ciencia, p.483.
79 Bernhardi de Lavinheta Opera omnia, pp.649650.
72
73
223
4. Conclusiones y eplogo
Bernard de Lavinheta es una piedra angular en la historia del
lulismo. Al recoger la herencia de las diferentes tendencias lulia
nas en Europa, estableci una sntesis unitaria que sirvi para
difundir el lulismo metafsico de la poca cuaternaria y prepar
las bases para la eclosin luliana del XVI y del XVII.Su obra,
metafsica y teolgica, fue interpretada en la poca racionalista
como una presentacin casi nominalista de la combinatoria de
Llull. Con todo, su acabada sntesis permiti un conocimiento del
Arte en todas sus dimensiones.
Las fuentes jurdicas que Lavinheta tom fueron el Liber Principiorum iuris, el Ars iuris y, sobre todo, el Arbor Scientiae. Consi
dero improbable que consultase el Ars de iure, pero puede ser que
llegara a manejar el Ars brevis quae est de inventione iuris. Por el
hecho de que Lavinheta fuese lego en materias jurdicas, la cerca
na expositiva a los textos lulianos incluyendo los ejemplos fue
muy superior a la de otros textos filosficos y teolgicos, en los que
se senta ms seguro y poda revisar y aadir reflexiones persona
les. Sin embargo, conviene recalcar la figura de Lavinheta tanto
por su propia sntesis del derecho luliano, cuanto por la influencia
que tuvo en el mundo de los juristas y de los enciclopedistas.
Puede decirse que su influencia se proyect en tres dimensiones:
la primera es que en Lavinheta se dio la transicin interpretativa
del pensamiento jurdico luliano desde la teologa y la metafsica
hasta el derecho; la segunda, es que su obra puso las bases para
la concepcin enciclopdica de las ciencias de los siglos posterio
res,81 y finalmente, hay que destacar que fue capaz de presentar
de forma organizada (y de reformular) el pensamiento jurdico de
Llull, situndolo en un preludio del iusnaturalismo racionalista y
en el contexto de la emergencia de la scientia iuris.82
En un primer momento, a lo largo del siglo XVI, los comenta
rios y ediciones de Lavinheta sirvieron, sin duda, como base para
el humanismo jurdico francs, con figuras como Andreas Tira
81 Sobre la proyeccin de la obra de Lavinheta, vase A.Angelini, Metodo

ed Enciclopedia nel cinquecento francese, cit., pp.239283.
82 Vase R. Ramis Barcel, La recepcin de las ideas jurdicas de
Ramon Llull en los siglos XV y XVI, op. cit., pp.451453.
224
rafael ramis barcel
quellus y, sobre todo, con Pierre de Grgoire 83 y Giulio Pace. Lavi

nheta, a travs de su obra, facilit la comprensin de la adapta
cin del Arte al derecho, una labor imprescindible para que en el
XVII los juristas considerasen que la estructura luliana era apta
para la reforma del derecho y que, al final, cristalizase en escritos
netamente inspirados en Llull. El entrelazamiento entre el lulismo
y el mundo del derecho fue una mezcla progresiva, pero disconti
nua, en un marco terico-jurdico de grandes cambios y de inde
cisiones entre el modelo del mos italicus y una reforma del mismo.
El autor franciscano tuvo, en un segundo momento, una enorme
importancia en el nacimiento del enciclopedismo de finales del
XVI y del XVII: en dichas enciclopedias, la iurisprudentia era
una parte ms del conjunto de los saberes, tal y como ocurra
en la obra de Lavinheta. No en vano, Alsted fue su gran valedor
y sugiri a Zetzner la reimpresin de la Practica compendiosa. A
Lavinheta se le debe, en fin, una de las primeras sntesis del saber
jurdico en el marco de la Enciclopedia, que permitieron que el
derecho dejase de ser un conocimiento aislado y especializado y
que formase parte del ideal racionalista de la unidad de los saberes.
Su reformulacin de la estructura del Ars iuris represent, sin
duda, la base ms importante para la comprensin del lulismo
jurdico posterior (Gmez de Luna, Kircher, Leibniz), en el que
el Arte era un instrumento capaz de hallar todas las soluciones
jurdicas para cada caso, un hecho que permiti en gran medida
el paso desde el humanismo jurdico a la codificacin. sa, sin
embargo, es ya otra historia.
Abstract
Bernard de Lavinheta y su interpretacin de las ideas jurdicas de
Ramon Llull
The development of the history of Ramon Llulls legal ideas and
their influence is, virtually, an unexplored field. One of the high
lights in the transition from the Middle Ages to modernity is the
83 Vase R. Ramis Barcel, Las referencias lulianas en el humanismo
jurdico francs: Andreas Tiraquellus y Petrus Gregorius Tholosanus, Anuario da Facultade de Dereito da Universidade da Corua, 17 (2013), pp. 471-486.
225
synthesis made by Bernard Lavinheta. His work involves a sys

tematisation of Llulls thought, and an adaptation of his work
in the law school according to a Lullian rationale of all discip
lines, among them, jurisprudence. For instance, Elas de Tejada,
through Lavinhetas Practica compendiosa artis Raymundi Lulii,
carries out important innovations in legal methodology. Indeed,
Lavinhetas Ars iuris exposed two fundamental ideas that are con
nected with Llulls discourse: first, the necessity of systemising
legal knowledge by the reduction of different laws on the basis of
the natural law; secondly, the interpretation of the idea of natu
ral law in the light of the ius gentium, as it was started at that
time. It is necessary to deepen the analysis of Lavinhetas work
and to study his comments on Lullian iurisprudentia: for instance,
the tension between the exemplarist understanding of natural law,
and Lavinhetas intention of founding a Lullian science of law
based on the combinatory Art.
Rafael Ramis Barcel
r.ramis@uib.es
Universitat de les Illes Balears
Facultat de Dret
Carretera de Valldemossa Km. 7.5
07122 Palma de Mallorca
Spain
RAMON LLULL, REN DESCARTES:

FROM ANALYTICS TO HEURISTICS
Alberto Pavanato
(Padova)
Alessandro Tessari
(Padova)
For a long time all of those who have dealt with Ramon Llull
have ended up stumbling into the vexata quaestio of the relation
ship with Ren Descartes.1 Likewise, those who have dealt with
Descartes could do no more than stumble into the same ques
tion. In the three centuries that separate the life of the Major
can from that of the father of modern rationalism many things
happened that made it increasingly difficult to recognise the role
of the great thinker from Palma de Mallorca in the formation
and birth of modern science. His life and his work were in them
selves both complex and difficult to read, not just for the quan
tity of manuscripts left by Llull after his death. What has made
the reconstruction of Llulls identity both ambiguous and plural
is the amount of pseudo-Lullian works that multiplied following
his death and above all in the centuries of neo-Platonic cultural
dominance in Europe. The pseudo-Lullism and the neo-Platonic
tradition would pile up next to the already numerous registers of
authentic Lullian production. The power of neo-Platonic culture
minimised the authentic character of Lullian peculiarity, his phil
osophical combinatory art, and his computationalism.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Descartes, generally, but per
haps somewhat questionably, considered to be the father of mod
ern scientific rationality, even in the discordant company of Fran
cis Bacon and Galileo Galilei, was fascinated by a pseudo-Llull
founding text viewed through the glasses of Cornelius Agrippa von
1 References to works of Descartes are made in the edition of Adam and

Tannery (AT), originally published in 18971909 and republished with revi
sions in 196474. Thus the roman numbers refer to the volumes and the Ara
bic numerals to pages.

IPM, 67 (Turnhout, 2015), pp. 227-243.
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107316
228
alberto pavanato alessandro tessari
Nettesheim.2 The visionary ability of Descartes would allow him

to follow at length, secretly intrigued, an unauthentic Llull only
to offer it for public ridicule in the Discours de la mthode. In a
letter to Beeckman dated the 29th of April 1619, the very young
Descartes, who at that time used his true name, Du Perron, not
having yet latinised and enhanced his name, transforming it into
Cartesius or Descartes, had not had any direct knowledge of any of
Llulls writings. Having had striking news from a chance encoun
ter with a man who boasted of being able to, with the Ars parva,
(Ars brevis) of Llull, speak at length about everything, Descartes
asks his influential mentor if it were not possible to derive from
this ars parva a technical enacting of items from which rationes
might be inferred. There is, certainly, in this Cartesian expres
sion, a trace of the Cicero-Quintillian mnemotechnic of dispositio for loci et imagines. But Descartes shows here his modernity
compared to a classical mnemotechnic which had fascinated even
the great theologians of Scholastic philosophy. If these dispositive
techniques of images and places, which date back to Simonides of
Ceos, served mainly to remember elements in a certain order, for
Descartes they could be used for something more interesting than
simply memory. In rationes desumuntur there is already an idea of
logical and/or dialectical calculation. Although later in the letter
Descartes adds that his interlocutor, citing Llull and Agrippa, had
specified that neither Llull, nor Agrippa, had revealed the neces
sary keys to unlock the secrets of this art. In this extraordinarily
interesting letter there are many elements that are useful in form
ing an idea of what was going through the mind of the very young
Descartes. Although he had a remarkable mastery of mathematics
this was the element that had brought Descartes and Beeck
man together and despite showing a significant critical atti
tude towards the stranger who was performing the Lullian art, of
whom he says was performing ut admirationem captaret ignorantis,
he was curious to know more about this ars. Knowing that Beeck
man owned Llulls book, he asks him to examine it, if by chance
he could find aliquid ingeniosum in that art, if he could find the
2 Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim, In artem brevem Raymundi Lul

lii commentaria, in Raymundi Lullii Opera ea quae, ed. Lazari Zetzneri,
Argentorati, 1598, pp.331436.
ramon llull, ren descartes
229
claves. Specifying: I trust in your intelligence to such an extent

as to be certain that you will easily find, if they exist, the omitted
points that are needed to understand the others, that he calls
keys.3 Now this language is certainly full of neo-Platonic sugges
tions: how may it be an ars, a technique, that hides the necessary
keys for the understanding of all that it offers? This language cer
tainly evokes the magical-alchemic sapientialism that was very
common even in the time of Descartes. However, the letter that
Descartes had sent, also to Beeckman, the 26th of March of the
same year, complicates the Cartesian reductionist reading of this
letter of April 29th. In this earlier letter, after having discussed
problems of mathematics and cubic equations, Descartes reveals
his ambitious and still uncertain plan: non Lullij Artem brevem,
sed scientiam penitus novam tradere cupio4 which showed that
he wanted to distance himself from what he supposes is the sug
gestive knowledge of Llull: in this letter the contrast between the
Lullian term ars and that proposed by Descartes, scientia, serves
to underline the three hundred years that separate the two phi
losophers. But hereinafter Descartes decorates his completely new
science with the same ornaments as the Lullian ars: the possibil
ity to be able to generally solve all problems. Thus we can explain
why, in the following letter, he insists on the concept of clavis universalis, of secreta, of a sapientialism that seems inappropriate
for the century that saw the birth of the scientific method. But
if todays most disenchanted reading of the complex birth of the
scientific spirit leads us to glimpse residues of magical-alchemy
culture even in the work of Leibniz and Newton. In the middle of
the seventeenth century texts from three or four centuries earlier
can be seen in a neo-Platonic light and perhaps should be read
more carefully. Metaphors aside: if there is no doubt that in the
founding fathers of modern scientific thought there are still ele
ments of prescientific culture, including that of magical-alchemy.
It must be equally clear that in some thirteenth and fourteenth
century thinkers, from the calculatores of Oxford to Roger Bacon
and Ramon Llull, in addition to their own culture of the late
3 The latin text reads: Tantum ingenio tuo fido, ut certus sim te facile
visurum qualia illa sint, si quae tamen sint, omissa illa puncta ad aliorum
intelligentiam necessaria, quae claves vocat. AT, X, 165.
4 AT, X, 156157.
230
Middle Ages, one may glimpse elements of thought that are not
inappropriately defined as proto-scientific. Thirteenth-century
empiricism and computation stand in balanced opposition to the
magic and alchemy of Francis Bacon and Newton in the seven
teenth and eighteenth centuries.
From Descartes harsh criticism of Llull in Discours de la mthode in 1637,5 we can recognise that he shows essentially the same
arrogance witnessed by his letter of 26th March 1619 to Beeck
man: here he says that he is working on a scientiam penitus novam,
in Discours he says that Llulls art serves a parler sans iugement,
de celles <choses> quon ignore, qua les apprendre6.
The critical force that Descartes uses against a philosopher
who had died three centuries earlier may seem strange, while it
is quite clear that the controversy leads to attacks on Galileo and
Pascal, his contemporaries. In relation to them, the controversy
could be explained by the need to emphasise his own role as cen
tral to the spirit of the time. Above all, Galileo would tarnish
his prestige through the extraordinary and spectacular affair of
two papal condemnations, the burning of his books, imprisonment
and finally his retraction. Galileo had, after Copernicus, placed
his name alongside the birth of the new scientific method. To Des
cartes it seemed that only a marginal place for him remained.
This is the only way to explain the livid tone of his anti-Galilean
criticism.
After the acknowledgement made to Mersenne that without
Galileo there would be no Cartesian philosophy,7 with great ease
he put down Galileo as a bumbling scientist and certain plagia
rist, as evidenced in the shameful letter, again to Mersenne, in
1638.8 In the case of Galileo his fear that the Inquisition would
AT, VI, 17.
Ibid.
7 In the 1633 letter Descartes writes to Mersenne, after having learnt of
the conviction of Galileo, that sil est faux (le mouvement de la Terre) tous
les fondements de ma Philosophie le sont aussi. AT, I, 270273.
8 Descartes letter to Mersenne, 11 October 1638: after an analytical criti
que of Galileos work Discorsi e dimostrazioni matematiche intorno a due nuove
scienze, Descartes concludes: Et premierement, touchant Galile, ie vous
diray que ie ne lay iamais v, ny nay eu aucune communication avec luy, et
que par consequent ie ne saurois en avoir emprunt aucune chose. Aussy ne
5
6
231
put him among the Copernican heretics certainly played a role.

He expressed all his fear to Mersenne: if they have done this to
Galileo who was a personal friend of the Pope, what will they do
to me as I am not a friend of the Pope? 9 In the case of Llull, the
fact that he had been associated with Bruno, in the publication of
Zetzner, only two years before the Nolan was condemned to the
stake, in 1600, could also have weighed on him. But the printing
house of Lazarus Zetzner and his heirs would edit a monumen
tal collection in six volumes entitled Theatrum Chemicum, where
works alternated, authentic and inauthentic, bearing the names of
Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, Aristoteles, Arnau de Villanova,
Thomas Aquinas, Johann Heinrich Alsted, Hermes Trismegistos,
John Dee, Raimundus Lullus and many others; these were printed
in Strasbourg, the first volumes in 1602 and the last in 1661. This
work put before the eyes of the educated men of Europe, authori
tative writers who would legitimise, in the middle of the century
that saw the birth of the modern scientific method, the magical-al
chemical suggestions of the Corpus Hermeticum. When we recall
that throughout the life of Descartes the 1598 edition of Llulls
works was in circulation, where the editor Lazarus Zetzner com
bines Llull with Bruno and Cornelio Agrippa, we can understand
why during all of his life Descartes could not ignore the presence
of Llull and his Ars.
But perhaps the concern that the Lullian research might shadow
the originality that Descartes felt should be attributed only to the
more important role that played his own work, as will be shown
in the rest of this report. And perhaps this was the same concern
he felt regarding Galileo. To say that he had not found anything
interesting in his writings and that perhaps his best writings were
in the field of music is certainly a sign of the huge opinion he held
of himself. Particularly if we consider that Galileo did not know
voy-ie rien en ses livres qui me face envie, ny presque | rien que ie voulusse
avouer pour mien. Tout le meilleur est ce quil a de Musique; mais ceux qui
me connoissent peuvent plutost croire quil la eu de moy, que moy de luy:
car iavois escrit quasi le mesme il y a 19 ans, auquel tems ie navois encore
iamais est en Italie, et iauois donn mon escrit au Sr Beecman, qui, comme
vous sauez, en faisoit parade et en crivoit et l, comme de chose qui
estait sienne. AT, II, 389390.
9 AT, I, 270273.
232
Descartes music theories and certainly couldnt have copied the

Compendium Musicae that Descartes wrote in 1619, the Cartesian
fear that Galileo could occupy the scene of the new scientific and
philosophical method was the true reason for the malevolent read
ing of the work of the man from Pisa. Similar shadowy jealousy
is shown towards Pascal and Fermat by Descartes in his very rich
and cultured correspondence with educated Europe.
There is no doubt that Descartes throughout his life had an
interest flavoured firstly by fascination with and then by antago
nism against the work of Llull that he, however, never knew first
hand. So we cannot agree with the authoritative work of Garin
who considers the Cartesian interest in Llull as a youthful crush
which disappears with maturity, a stage reached with the draft
ing of the Regulae. For the prevailing presence of Lullism in Des
cartess more mature work, and for the acceptance of a Lullian
presence in the formation of the scientific thought of Descartes
we turn to the recent and interesting work of Desmond M. Clark,
2006.10 Therefore we will focus on the particularly interesting
proximity of LlullDescartes, until recently rarely studied. This
closeness is underlined by Pedro Jeronimo Sanchez de Lizarazo
Generalis et admirabilis methodus, ad omnes scientias facilius, et scitius addiscendas : in qua eximij & piissimi doctoris Raimundi Lullii
Ars breuis, explicatur.11 This publication appears in 1613, and it was
reprint in 1619, namely eighteen years prior to the Cartesian pub
lication of his method.12 The Greek term which latinised
becomes modus or ratio, except for some citations in Vitruvius
and Celius Aurelianus, as methodus or methodos, reappears in the
Cartesian work as the architrave of modern rationalism.
10 D. Clark, Descartes: A Biography, Cambridge, 2006, p. 57: The author
agrees with our thesis that vague hints of a general method proposed by
Llull and reported by Sanchez may also have inspired Descartes with the
ideal of a single method by which all the science can be discovered and uni
fied along the lines explored subsequently in the Rules.
11 Cfr. A. Tessari, Considerazioni sull Ars di Ramon Llull e la Mathesis
Universalis di Ren Descartes, in Janus, Quaderni del Circolo Glossematico,
Padova, 2004, pp.199-220.
12 P.J. Snchez de Lizarazo, Generalis et admirabilis methodus [], Turia
sonae, 1619. The Cartesian treatise appears anonymous in 1637 and its full
name is: Discours de la mthode pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la vrit
dans les sciences , plus la dioptrique, les mtores et la gomtrie qui sont des
essais de cette mthode.
233
In the aforementioned letter to Beeckman in 1619, we see that

Descartes wanted to stress his difference from Llull: Descartes
science was a scientia penitus nova. But immediately afterwards,
Du Perron specified that his was a scientia nova qua generaliter
solvi possint questiones omnes.13 It is interesting to see the Lullian
text of the Ars brevis. In the prologue he states that the subject
of this Ars is to give an answer to all questions (Subiectum huius
Artis est respondere de omnibus quaestionibus). We must believe that
Descartes did not have a copy of Llulls work, otherwise he would
not have asked for information from Beeckman in 1619. But it
is very difficult not to suspect that Descartes received, perhaps
only in fragments, from somewhere, news or partial news of the
Lullian texts published by Zetzner in 1598, under the title Raymundi Lullii Opera, for they were enormously widespread in all of
educated Europe, or at least Agrippas writing, contained in the
same Zetzenerian collection, where detailed news of Llulls work
are given, and a text to which Descartes makes explicit reference
in his letters to Beeckman.14 Is it too bold to declare a strong
similarity between these two statements? It is true that two dif
ferent verbs are used: solvere and respondere. But it is interesting
to compare the texts of these two methodological strategies, the
Ars lulliana and the Cartesian scientia nova: both have the aim of
resolving all issues or answering all questions. Clavis or Methodus?
That of Llull, we should not forget, anticipates the Cartesian one
by more than three centuries.
Almost twenty years later, in the preparation of the Discours,
distancing himself from the syllogism of logic that seemed to
explain something already known, he declares his detachment from
the Ars of Llull that serves to a parler, sans iugement, de celles
[choses] quon ignore, qua les apprendre.15 The Cartesian Mthode
searches for a space between the analytical sterility of classical
syllogism and what he considers to be confused and uncertain
heuristics of the Lullian Ars. In the definition of his method, after
the announcement of the clear and distinct ideas, the analytical
AT, X, 156157.
H. C. Agrippa von Nettesheim, In artem brevem Raymundi Lullii
commentaria, op. cit. In the letter of 29th April 1619 Descartes asks Beeck
man for his opinion about it.
15 AT, VI, 17.
13
14
234
division of the complex components, the synthetic restoration,

Descartes specifies that the fourth moment is that of complete enu
meration and revision, so general as to be sure to omit nothing.16
Thus, in the arc of twenty years from 1619 to 1637, Descartes
does not abandon his dream to construct a method, and this
method will have connotations that can be recognised in the Lul
lian Ars as evidenced by a three-hundred-year-old tradition of
study which in different ways has been witness to the powerful
influence of the vast works of Llull. We know of Cusas interest,
even if there are no explicit traces of Llulls work in his writings.
It is nevertheless very interesting that fourteen volumes of Lull
ian manuscripts from the end of the fifteenth century are still to
be found in the library of the Franciscans of San Candido where
Cardinal Cusa held jurisdiction as the Bishop of Brixen.17 What is
well-known, furthermore, is the red thread that leads from Cusa
to Pico della Mirandola and his complex and imaginative attempt
to draw up a Christian Cabalism through his recovery of the Lul
lian combinatory art.
This delicate and interesting passage remind us briefly of Zam
belli: among the theses that Pico had to argue with the schol
ars gathered in Rome in 1487 to examine the foundation and the
results of that method of universal knowledge in which he could
see a new unifying philosophical vision in his rich work, he states:
Whatever all other Cabalists say I would divide the cabala into
four speculative parts, in correspondence with the fourfold parti
tion of the philosophy that I usually cite. The first is the science
of the permutation of the alphabet (alphabetariae revolutionis) cor
responding to that part of philosophy that I call universal philoso
phy (catholicam). The second, third and fourth parts are the triple
Merkhavah and correspond to the particular threefold philosophy,
which treats divine, medium and sensitive things.18
AT, VI, 19.
For the story of this valuable collection see V. Tenge-Wolf, Nikolaus
Pol und die Llull-Handschriften der Stiftsbibliothek San Candido/Innichen
in Ramon Llull und Nikolaus von Kues: Eine Begegnung im Zeichen der Toleranz. Akten des Internationalen Kongresses zu Ramon Llull und Nikolaus von
Kues (Brixen und Bozen, 25.27. November 2004), eds E.Bidese, A.Fidora &
P.Renner, Turnhout, 2005 (Subsidia Lulliana, 2), pp.261286.
18 P. Zambelli, Lapprendista stregone. Astrologia,cabala e arte lulliana in
Pico della Mirandola e seguaci, Venezia, 1995, p.55; and Lambigua natura
16
17
235
The fascination that the Lullian work exerted on Giordano

Bruno is explicit. The association of the Nolan with the figure of
Llull is made dramatic by the mentioned publication of Zetzner:
following ten Lullian and pseudo-Lullian works, there are three
works of Bruno which comment on three Lullian works. The jux
taposition is dramatic as the Zetzner volume was published in
1598 just two years before the tragic death of the Nolan.
Particularly interesting is the story of the term methodus start
ing from the Lullian ars, as shown in the Brunian work Animadversiones circa lampadem lullianam,19 which dates back to 1587.20
In this work Bruno uses the latin term methodus in an extraordi
narily complex and modern way:
Cum ergo multae sint methodorum species, unica quae huic
congruit negotio ut ab aliis distinguatur, illud est animadverten
dum, quod methodorum quaedam sunt divisivae, quaedam com
positivae, quaedam inquisitivae, quaedam institutivae, quaedam
constructivae, quaedam mixtae.21
della magia, Milano, 1991. About Christian cabalism, Jewish mysticism,

C. Wirszubski, G.Picos Encounter with Jewish Mysticism, Harvard, 1989;
M. Idel, The Magic and Neoplatonic Interpretations of the Kabbalah in
the Renaissance, in Jewish Thought in the Sixteenth Century, Harvard, 1983,
pp. 196242. In this context the big question of the complex relationship
between the birth of scientific thought in the XVI-XVII centuries and the
continued notions of magical-alchemy remains. The reductive interpreta
tions and scanning of the history of European culture has always painfully
endured having to admit the survival in the Modern Age of traces more char
acteristic of medieval culture, as they also had to recognise scientific cultural
advances in the XIII and XIV centuries. We briefly remember the early work
of: E.Garin, Pico della Mirandola: Vita e Dottrina. Firenze, 1937; the work of
P.Rossi, Bacone, dalla magia alla scienza, Bari, 1959; and the valuable works
of Frances Yates, and particularly relevant to this paper: F.Yates, Giordano
Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, London, 1964; The Art of Memory London,
1966; The Occult Philosophy in the Elizabethan Age, London, 1979. Particularly
relevant to the views expressed here is Lull and Bruno, in Collected Essays
(198284) vol.I, London, 1982.
19 Cf. next note.
20 In his commentary on this work Marco Matteoli hypothesizes that it
forms part of the didactic work of the Lullian lessons that Bruno held in
Wittenberg in 1586. Cfr. Giordano Bruno, Opere lulliane, ed. M. Mateolli,
R.Sturlese & N.Tirinnanzi, Milano, 2012, p.517.
21 Ibid., p.498.
236
The four movements of the Cartesian method in Discours are

easily recognisable in these Animadversiones. From the fourth
movement, that of denombremens si entiers et des reveues si generales22 we can turn directly to the Ars brevis, as we have already seen.
Here we offer some evidence to support the hypothesis that
Descartes finds fertile and fertilised soil when he begins his philo
sophical adventure, culminating in the Discours of 1637, to define
a scientia poenitus nova, an original Mthode, an epistemological
strategy which remains in posterity as the birth of modern ratio
nalism. They are, in sequence, expressions used by Bruno in 1587,
by Alsted in 1609, by Sanchez in 1613 (see quoted texts below),
that we want here to put in parallel in order to highlight the
strong elements of similarity between them and the reflections of
Descartes in the preparation of his Discours23. In all four authors
the red thread that links them is the explicit reference to Llull
and the Lullian Ars.
G. BRUNO
1587
[] multae sint
methodorum
species, unica
quae huic congruit
negotio ut ab aliis
distinguatur, illud
est animavertendum,
quod methodorum
quaedam sunt divisivae, quaedam
compositivae,
quaedam inquisitivae,
quaedam institutivae,
quaedam
constructivae,
quaedam mixtae.
J. H. ALSTED
1609
Methodus est
instrumentum
dianoeticum, quo
uno vel plura
axiomata ex alio,
sine vi[a] syllogistica
colliguntur, ad rerum
cognitionem in suo
genere pecfectam
adipiscendam
P. J. SNCHEZ DE
LIZARAZO
1613
[...]in scholis agitantur
quaestiones, per
methodum artis quae
in talibus partibus
relucebat, ea qua potui
breuitate tractaui,
ut quilibet artifex et
professor scientiarum
quid sibi faciendum
esset in suo proposito,
posset cernere et [...]
ultra comunes artes
extendere hanc nostra
aperui.
AT, VI, 19.

Discours de la mthode pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la vrit
dans les sciences (1637). Tantum ingenio tuo fido, ut certus sim te facile
visurum qualia illa sint, si quae tamen sint, omissa illa puncta ad aliorum
intelligentiam necessaria, quae claves vocat, Letter to Beeckman, AT X,
p.165; [] cum plenus forem enthusiasmo, et mirabilis scientiae funda
menta reperirem, Letter to Beeckman, op. cit., p.179.
22
23

Animadversiones circa
lampa dem lulliana, in
Giordano Bruno, Opere
Lulliane, op. cit., p.498
Clavis Artis Lullianae,

ed. L. Zetzner,
Argentoratum, 1633,
f. 75
237
Generalis et
admirabilis methodus
ad omnes scientias
facilius et scitius
addiscendas, ed. C. a
Lauayen Turiasonae,
1619, f. xxxix
More evidences of the cultural debt which Descartes owes to

the lullian tradition may also be found on the accounts regarding
two mirrored concepts: the Ars naturalis described by Sanchez de
Lizarazo and Descartes Mathesis Universalis:
[] posse tamen dari artem gene
ralem ad omnes scientias sentiendo,
et multos ob hanc causam authores
perlegendo ab eis circa varias partes
artis instructus et in unum diver
sas eorum explicationes compilando
easque ad invicem comparando non
sine magno et continuo per multos
annos labore visus sum [] Ars natu
ralis, quia generalis est et ad omnia
scibilia se extendit: agit primo de
generalibus principjs rerum, de inter
medijs et specialibus, et de individu
alibus quae reperiuntur in omnibus
rebus creatis. Agit etiam de rebus
increatis, prout per ipsa generalia
principia, cognosci possunt.[] Nec
se astringit in cognitione rerum natu
ralium, ad dicta, et opiniones homi
num, sicut communiter contingit; in
speculatione, et tractatione Philoso
phorum: solum enim veritatem fidei,
et eam quae ipsam respiciunt colit
et principia omnia, et notitiam gen
eralem illi subijcit.
REGULA IV. Necessaria est metho

dus ad rerum veritatem investigan
dam [] Cum vero postea cogitarem,
vnde ergo fieret, ut primi olim
Philosophiae inventores neminen
Matheseos imperitum ad studium
sapientiae vellent admittere, tan
quam haec disciplina omnium facil
lima et maxim necessaria videretur
ad ingenia capessendis aliis majori
bus scientiis erudienda et praepa
randa, plane suspicatus sum, quam
dam eos Mathesim agnovisse valde
diversam a vulgari nostrae aetatis
[] ac proinde generalem quamdam
esse debere scientiam, quae id omne
|explicet, quod circa ordinem et
mensuram nulli speciali materiae
addictas quaeri potest, eamdemque,
non ascititio vocabulo, sed jam inve
terato atque vsu recepto, Mathesim
vniversalem nominari, quoniam in ac
continetur illud omne, propter quod
aliae scientiae Matematicae partes
appellantur.
Generalis et admirabilis methodus [], Ren Descartes, Regulae ad directioop. cit., pp. xxxix; 4.
nem ingenii, AT, X, p. 371; 378.
238
Furthermore, our four authors describe almost with the same

words the path that leads to meet the Ars, reporting their initial
concerns due to its public condemnation, that are eventually fol
lowed by a genuine revaluation:
Quid igitur sibi volunt
nasutuli isti, qui treis
illas nobiliores philoso
phorum sectas (quae
hodie vigent) puta Peri
pateticorum, Lullistarum, et Rameorum, ita
committunt, ut tan
tum, de lana caprina
disputent? Nostrum est
more apicularum omni
bus assultare flosculis,
et in alvearia mellige
nem, supersessis aconi
tis, comportare.
Quam diversitatem
in addiscenda arte
[Lullij] confiteor mihi
aliquando nimis
obfuisse, qui quasi in
bivio positus quo me
verterem nesciebam:
obidque et quia Docto
res gravissimi de arte
hac male sentiebant
insipienter (sicut alij
qui artem ignorant et
eam despiciunt) ego
quoque persequebar
inuiste[sic] authorem
ipsium et eius doc
trinam et professores
illius taxando
Mais, comme un homme

qui marche seul et
dans les tnbres, je
me rsolus daller si
lentement, et duser de
tant de circonspection
en toutes choses, que,
si je navanois que
fort peu, ie me gar
derois bien, au moins,
de tomber. [] Mais,
en les examinant [la
philosophie, la logique,
et la mathmatique], je
pris garde que, pour la
Logique, ses syllogismes
et la pluspart de ses
autres instructions seru
ent plutt expliquer
autrui les choses quon
sait, ou mme, comme
lart de Lulle, parler
sans jugement, de celles
quon ignore, qu les
apprendre
J.H. ALSTED, Clavis

Artis Lullianae, op. cit.,
p. iii.
Generalis et admirabilis
methodus, op. cit., p.
xxxix.
Ren Descartes, Discours de la mthode, AT,

VI, pp. 16-17.
Then they revaluate Llull:

Hi sane viri [Lullus]
artem penitissime cog
nitam habuerunt, sed
involucris tectas explica
tiones publici juris fece
runt, pro suam scilicet
[] Haec enim ars

et div ina methodus,
omnes professores sci
entiarum dirigit, nec
est qui satis possit eius
utilitates et commoda
Et bien quelle contiene,

en effect beaucoup de
prceptes trs vrais
et trs bons, il y en a
toutefois tant dautres,
mls parmi, qui sont
239
vel invidentia, vel pru

dentia. Artis enim est
artem arte tegere. Ego
autem (absit invidia
dicto) longue longueque
aliter affectus sum. Stat
enim sententia paucis
multa coarctare, claris
obscura illustrare, faci
libus difficiliora inscru
stare.
demonstrare, utilia
docet, magna detegit
eterna, euiterna, et
temporalia collimat,
potestatem ad ratio
cinandum in omnibus
scientijs et obiectis sci
bilibus habet; intellec
tum dirigit, memoriam
componit, voluntatem
sua doctrina ad bonum
inclinat; virtutes
quodam admirabili et
maximo lumine mani
festat; rerum veritates
artificiose penetrat
et utilissime compre
hendit, et ad gloriam
Dei innumera et altis
sima mysteria, tam in
naturalibus quam in
supernaturalibus ani
madvertit.
ou nuisibles ou super
flus, quil est presque
aussi malais de les en
sparer, que de tirer
une Diane ou une Min
erve hors dun bloc de
marbre qui nest point
encore bauch.
Clavis artis lullianae,

op. cit., pp. iv-v.
methodus, op. cit.,
pp. xli-xlii..
Discours de la mthode,
op. cit., p. 17.
We have already mentioned the difficulty in ascertaining

whether Descartes had only an indirect account of the works of
Llull. The correspondence with Beeckman attests that Descartes,
at least until the drafting of Discours, had not had direct knowl
edge of the Lullian texts nor of the commentaries of Agrippa and
Bruno contained in the famous Zetznerian anthology. Doubts
arise for what is considered as the mature age of Descartes, and
which coincides with the writing of Discours. At least since 1633,
the year of Galileos conviction, which triggers in Descartes the
need for public distancing from the work of the Copernicans, it is
difficult to imagine that he had not had information, at least indi
rectly, concerning Lullism, considering the authority and popular
ity of those that spread Lullism across Europe, through Lullist
professors, publications and sponsorships like the spectacular one
of Felipe II. But it is the same Descartes who leads us to suppose
that he did know much more of Llull than he tells us, as in the
preparation of his most significant work, Discours de la mthode.
240
All of educated Europe knew that the anonymous book was

written by Descartes, as well as everyone was aware of the nature
of the research that brought Galileo to trial before Roberto Bel
larmino. By confessing his interest in the motion of the earth,
Descartes feels the need to distance himself from Galileo by the
use of a very vulgar expression that informs his readers that his
research was also dealt by quelque autre. Descartes did not even
deign to name Galileo! He did the same for another suspected of
heresy, William Harvey, who appears as un mdicin dAngleterre.
The Discours is almost a public defense, an autodaf: there is no
place for anyone if not the penitent and a merciful God. This mer
ciful God appears fifty times in all the work, in the face of an I
(ie, in the authors seventeenth-century French) who dominates
the scene five hundred times. Yet, in this hypertrophic egotistical
exposure, where there is no room for any other protagonists, the
only name that comes through is that of Llull. We have already
seen in what terms it appears. Here it is enough to note that,
although Llull was merely a bizarre character who died three cen
turies earlier, he had the honor of being mentioned in the Carte
sian work.. If he received this honour, even in a negative tone, it
is a sign that Llull was certainly a cumbersome presence in the
1630s. We are left with a hypothesis for future research, a study
of the awareness that Descartes should have or could have had of
the Llull-Bruno link, emphasising in the aforementioned Zetzne
rian anthology, and thus of the danger of the name of Llull as
inspiration to the Brunian work. The suspicion of such awareness
transpires through the notes that Mersenne, the great and faithful
Parisian correspondent of Descartes, and his scientific and spir
itual advisor, sees as the justified punishment of Bruno. These
considerations appear while Mersenne advises Descartes, following
the conviction of Galileo, not to publish anything on the ques
tion of the motion of the earth in order not to fall foul of the
Inquisition. If the cynic may seem surprised by the endorsement
of Brunos death at the stake, he cannot fail to be impressed by
the courage which Mersenne testifies to, in organising the trans
lation of the works of Galileo in Paris, in those calamitous years.
Along with the definition of method introduced by Bruno, in the
following passages the reader may find three different definitions
of the Method:

Duae autem sunt species
methodi. Est enim vel
synthetica vel analytica.
Utraque est methodus:
quia utraque consistit
in priori et posteriori,
quae ordinis essentiam
in genere constituunt.
Ordo resolutivus seu
Analyticus a sine ad
media procedit com
positivus a mediis ad
finis adeptionem pro
greditur[...] Quoniam
disciplinarum praecepta
et vera necessario et
justo ordine, ut alia ex
alii connexa haereant,
esse oportet disposita,
duplicibus ad eis tum
componendas, tum judi
candas opus esse legibus
apparet: videlicet, aliis,
ad quas exigatur ipse
nexus et cohaerentia.
Illas axiomaticas, hanc
methodicas dicimus.
Axiomatica sunt, quae
docent, quomodo alicu
jus propositionis prae
dicatum ad subjectum,
seu pars consequens as
antecedentem debeat
esse affecta.
Quo pacto ut apparet

de solo elemento aquae
hauriretur maxima cog
nitio; quae item potest
haberi aliis elementis,
per hanc methodum
consideratis, simplic
iter et inse, aut prout
componunt cum aliis
mixta, lapidem scili
cet aut metallum, in
quibus ita per modum
mixtionis, habent
aliam considerationem,
methodo ista diuerso
modo adquirendam.
Quod suficit ad intel
ligendum tractanti de
rebus materialibus et
sensibilibus. Ex his
circa substantias mate
riales considerauimus;
deducitur regula et
methodus, ad consid
erandas substantias
sipirituales[...]
241
[...] au lieu de ce grand

nombre de prceptes
dont la logique est
compose, je crus que
jaurois assez des quatre
suivants, pourvu que je
prisse une ferme et con
stante rsolution de ne
manquer pas une seule
fois les observer.
Le premier toit de ne
recevoir jamais aucune
chose pour vraie que je
ne la connusse videm
ment tre telle; cest-dire, dviter soigneuse
ment la prcipitation et
la prvention, et de ne
comprendre rien de plus
en mes jugements que
ce qui se prsenteroit si
clairement et si distinc
tement mon esprit,
que je neusse aucune
occasion de le mettre
en doute.
Le second, de diviser
chacune des difficults
que jexaminerais, en
autant de parcelles
quil se pourroit, et
quil seroit requis pour
les mieux rsoudre. Le
troisime, de conduire
par ordre mes penses,
en commenant par les
objets les plus simples
et les plus aiss con
notre, pour monter peu
peu comme par degrs
jusques la connois
sance des plus composs,
et supposant mme de
lordre entre ceux qui
ne se prcdent point
naturellement les uns les
autres.
242

Et le dernier, de taire
partout des dnombre
ments si entiers et des
revues si gnrales, que
je fusse assur de ne
rien omettre.
Clavis artis lullianae,

op. cit., p. 76.
methodus, op. cit.,
p. 165.
Discours de la mthode,
op. cit., p. 19.
By way of a partial conclusion: we have pointed out the strat

egies of knowledge, Ars, Mathesis, Mthode, leading from Ramon
Llull (12351315) to Descartes (15691650), via some intermedi
ate passages that in recent times have not been studied enough
and that merit more attention and investigation. Llulls Ars is cer
tainly a starting point for the axis, here documented, that leads
to Descartes. At the same time it is an arrival point of the studies
that Islamic culture and Hebraic Cabalism have produced in the
Iberian Peninsula. It is difficult to affirm that all the well-known
strategies that mix the Porphyrian tree and the cabalistic Lullian
wheels are a document of the pleasure of pure knowledge.
Abstract
Ramon Llull, Ren Descartes: from Analytics to Heuristics
Sanchez de Lizarazos edition of Generalis et admirabilis methodus
artis lullianae (1613), twenty-four years before the publication of
Descartes Discours de la mthode, was an intellectual fact that
gave visibility to Llulls Art in the Early Modern period. The
combinatory of simple principles as the basic structure of wisdom,
and the concentric wheels system, taken from Bruno, were not
understood by Descartes. The modern ars combinatoria was more
than mnemotechnics: it was a vision of new heuristic signification.
The meaning of this fact can be found in the words of Llull, who
said that the Art was received through divine illumination, and
that that revelation pushed him to write unum librum meliorem
de mundo. What kind of book is it? It might answer all ques
tions: subiectum huius artis est respondere de omnibus quaestionibus.
243
The Lullism of the sixteenth century supported that position and

showed the possibility of thinking about a logical unity of knowl
edge based on the Lullian Art.
Alessandro Tessari/Alberto Pavanato
tessarialessandro2012@gmail.com
alberto.pavanato@gmail.com
Universit degli Studi di Padova
Dipartimento di Filosofia
Piazza Capitaniato 7
35139 Padova
Italy
INDICES
Index personarum
Index operum Raimundi quae citantur

Raimundi Lulli Opera latina: Concordantiae
INDEX PERSONARVM
A
Abelln Prez, J. 168n
Aersten, J. 66, 74n, 89n
Agrippa, C. 211, 227-228
Albertus Magnus 59n, 114n, 124, 231
Alfonso V (The Magnanimous) 166
Alfonso de Medina 173
Alos, R. de 66n
Alonso de San Cebrin 183
Alsted, J. 219, 231, 236-239
lvarez de Villasandino, Alfonso 169,
Alvarz Ledo, S. 171n
lvaro de Luna 171, 178, 188
Ambrosius 211
Anaya y Maldonado, D. de 173, 176,
178, 181, 187-188
Andreas Capellanus 65
Angelini, A. 212n, 223n
Anselmus 7
Anselmus de Turmeda 179
Antn, E. 80n
Antonio de Parma 91
Arcais Flores, P.d 191-195, 197,
199-203
Arezzo, A. 89n
Aristoteles 46n, 55, 92, 111, 113n,
115n, 125, 210-211, 217
Arnaldus de Villanova 181, 231
Augustinus 112n, 135, 200, 211, 217
Averroes 13, 92, 111n, 115
B
Bacon, F. 227
Bade, J. 210
Badia, L. 156n
Batllori, M. 166n
Beajouan, G. 170n
Beatus Rhenanus 209
Beceiro Pita, I. 184n
Beeckman, I. 228-229, 240
Beltrn de Heredia, B. 178n
Bernat Gar 174
Basilius Bessarion 166
Bertini, G. M. 184n
Bianchi, L. 8, 89n
Blanch, R. 157
Bochenski, M. 157
Boehner, Ph. 157
Boethius 13, 116, 211
Bonafede, G. 74n, 90
Bonaventura 85, 155, 211
Bonilla y San Martn, A. 167n
Bonmariage, C. 73n, 92n, 106
Bonner, A. 68, 91, 92n., 156
Bovelles, Ch. de 209, 211
Bruno, G. 235-240, 242
Butterworth, C. 13n
C
Caelius Aurelianus 232
Campos y Fernndez de Sevilla, F. J.
175n
Carreras y Artau, T. u. J. 32, 37n,
165n, 169n, 184n, 210
Castro y Calvo, J. M. 166n
Cavallero, P. A. 173n
Cazorla Len, S. 174n
Chenu, M.D. 109
Cerrato Mateos, F. 175n
Cicero 4n, 211
Clark, D. 232
Clichtoveus, J. 209
Colomer y Pous, E. 145n, 147n, 208n,
210n
Curtius, R. 7
D
Dee, J. 231
Descartes, R. 227-234, 237-242
Diego de Alcal (san) 173
Diego Lobejn, M. W. de 184n
Domnguez Reboiras, F. XI, 14n,
17n, 80n, 112n, 167n-168n
Donatus 111n
Du Cange, C. 11n,
Dunphy, W. 131n
Dutton, B. 180
Dionysius Areopagita (pseudo)140
E
Eco, U. 10n
Elas de Tejada, F. 212n
248
index personarvm
Elsdon, J. H. 184n
Emery, K. 74n
Enrique II (Trastamara) 169
F
Fernndez, A. 168
Fernndez Gmez, M. 169n
Fernando de Cordoba 166
Fernando Enrquez de Ribera 186
Ferrn Manuel de Lando 170-171,
173, 180n
Ferrndes, A. 168
Ferrndes de Crdenas, Elvira 170
Ficino, M. 209
Fidora, A. 10n, 14n, 20n, 25n, 114, 194n
Finochiaro, M. 53n
Fraker, Ch. 173n
Francesco Petrarca 105
Francisco Imperial 173
Francisco Ximenez 184
Franciscus 211
Franciscus Gracianus 216
Friedlein, R. 93
G
Galilei, G. 227, 230-231, 240
Gmez Montalbo, F. 168n
Gandillac, M. de 157n
Garca Fernndez de Gerena 172-173,
180n
Grcia Oro, J. 189n
Garca Santos, J. 174n
Garibaldi A. 34,
Garin, E. 235n
Gaya, J. 14n, 19n
Gianfranco, L. 72n
Glorieux, P. 8n
Gmez de Luna 224
Gmez Gonzles (archdeacon) 177
Gonalo Morante 173, 179, 182
Gonzlez Cueva 180
Gonzalo Martnez de Medina, 180n
Gonzalo Snchez de Ueda 167-168
Gorce, M. 76
Gorini, G. 31
Gottron, A. 18n
Gualterus Burlaeus 91
Guillelmus de Conches 127
Guillelmus de Ockham 211, 221
Guillelmus de Shyreswood 59
Gregorius Magnus 211

H
Habermas, J. 193n
Hamesse, J. 12
Harvey, S. 13n
Harvey, W. 240
Hring, N. 110
Hasnawi, A. 13n
Heymericus de Campo (Emmerich
van den Velde) 208-210, 216
Heidegger, M. 203
Henricus de Gandavo 106-107
Hermes Trimegistrus 231
Hieronymus 211, 217
Hildegardis Bingensis 9
Hillgarth, J. N. 37n, 212
Hissette, R. 65, 67, 72n, 75, 130
Hofmann, J. 96n
I
Idel, M. 235n
Imbach, R. 10n, 14n, 91n, 106, 155,
208n
Iigo Lpez de Mendoza 185
Ioachimus Florensis 9
Iohannes Damascenus 211
Ioahnnes de Gottingen 91
Ioahnnes de Ianduno, 91
Iohannes Duns Scotus 59n, 85, 106,
155, 158, 211
Iohannes Scotus Erigena 117-118
Ioahnnes Trithemius 211
Ioahnnes Wicleffus 180
Isidorus Hispalensis 47n, 216
Izquierdo, Sebastin 39
J
Jos de Sigenza (fray) 177
Joseph, H. W. 53n
Juan Alfonso Astorga 174
Juan Alfonso de Baena 167n, 169n,
187
Juan de Cerezuela, 178
Juan de Cordoba 166
Juan de Robles 177
Juan de Santorcaz 173-174, 187
Juan de Torquemada 178
Juan Manuel (don) 166
Juan Martinez de Balbs 176
index personarvm
Juan Rogel, 179
Mut, V. 24, 28-27
K
Keicher, O. 89, 90n
Kierkegaard, S. 191
Kircher, A. 224
Kneale, M. and W. 157
Kontarbinski, T. 157
Kuhn, T. S. 155
N
Nahmer, D. von der 159
Navarro Brotons V. 24n
Nicols de Cusa 208-209, 234
Nicolaus Copernicus 230
Nieto Cumplido 167n, 169n-170n
Nieva Ocampo, G. 183
Newton, I. 39, 229-230
L
Lafleur, C. 77n
Lambertus Altissiodorensis 55n
Lavinheta, B. de 207, 210-212, 217,
221-223
Lawrence J. N. 169n
Lefvre dtaples, J. 207-209, 211
Leibiniz, G. W. 38, 224, 229
Len Florido, F. 65
Libera, A. de 46n, 66, 77n
Lida de Malkiel, R.-M. 166n
Llinars, A. 208n
Lohr, Ch. 10n, 80n, 123n
Lope de Olmedo 181
Lpez, N. 183
Lus de Acua 183
Luzn Daz, R. 8n
M
Mahomat el Xartosse de Guadalajara
173
Mandonnet, P. 66, 70, 73, 86
Marcos Rodrguez, F. 175n, 182n
Margarita Poreta 7
Marsilius Patavinus 91
Massey, G. 53n
Mateolli, M. 235n
Mendoza Negrillo, J de 179n
Merle, H. 140n
Merssene, M. 230
Mestre Llobet 211
Minio-Paluello, L. 111n, 113n
Monfasani, J. 167n
Mordohay de Sahagn 176
Moreno Rodriguez F. 91n, 106
Morgan, A. de 53
Monserrat Quintana, A. 213n
Moss, R. von 8n
Musco, A. XIn
Mussoto, G. 92
249
P
Pace, G. 224
Paracelsus 211
Pareja Fernndez, E. M. 174n
Paula de Canalejas, F. de 166n
Pedro Lpez de Ayala (el Viejo) 173
Perarnau, J. 165n, 176n, 177, 179180, 181n, 183n, 186n
Pere Dagu, 210-211
Pereira, M. 209n
Prez Martnez, L. 183n
Perron, R. du (Descartes) 227, 233
Petrus Abaelardus 115n, 127, 155
Petrus Hispanus 55n, 57n, 114, 123n
Petrus Iohannis Olivi 221
Petrus Lombardus 113n, 211
Petrus Pictavensis 110
Piche, D. 65-66, 69n, 71n, 74n, 81
Pico della Mirandola 209, 234
Pierre de Gregoire 224
Pimentel, A. 184
Pinto de la Rosa, J. 173n
Pistolesi, E. 96n
Pizzorni, R. M. 216n
Platero Fernndez, C. 178n
Platon 211
Platzeck, E. 28, 146, 209n, 210, 211n
Plessis dArgent, Ch. du 70
Portocarrero y Crdenas, I. 186
Prantl, C. 156n
Pring-Mill, R. 50n
Ptolomaeus 211
Puig i Oliver, J. 178n
Q
Quintilianus 4n
R
Raimundus Lullus passim
250
index personarvm
Ramrez de Villaescusa, Diego 186

Ramos de Castro, G. 178
Ratzinger, J. 191
Raimundus de Sabunde (Sibiuda)
208, 216
Raimundus Astruch de Cortyelles
174, 178
Renan, E. 65
Richardus de Sancto Victore 140n
Riedlinger, H. 14n, 90n
Rijk, M. de 54n, 114, 115n
Ripoll Perell, M. 25n
Risse, W. 157
Rogerus Bacon 54, 229, 231
Romano, M. 14n
Rossi, P. 10n, 156n, 235n
Rubio, G. 173n
Rubio i Balaguer, J. 175n
Rubio, J. E. 14n, 18n, 20n
Ruffini, M. 166n
Ruiz de Morales, A. 175
Ruiz de Vergara y Alava, F. 176,
176n, 178
Ruiz Simon, J. 48n, 156n, 158n
S
Sez, L. 184n
Sala-Molins, L. 157n
Salmern, F. de 182
Salzinger, I. 17-29, 31, 34, 36, 212
Snchez Calavera, F. 173
Snchez de Bivanco, J. 169
Snchez Herrero, J. 188n
Snchez Lizarazo, P. 232, 236-240,
242
Satorre, J. J. 181
Schiff, M. 185n
Senra Gabriel y Galn, J. L. 177
Sigerus de Brabantia 72, 75, 131n
Simon Favershamensis 59n
Simonides of Ceos 228
Soler, A. 158n
Speer, A. 66n, 74n, 89n
Spinosa, G. 13n
Steel, C. 89n
Steenberghen, F. van 74n, 90n
Stegmller, F. 185n
Stephanus Tempier 65-66, 76n
Stone, H. R. 167n
Sturlesse, R. 235n
T
Tavard, J. 94
Taylor, B. 167n
Tenge-Wolf, V. 13n
Tirinnanzi, N. 235n
Thomas de Aquino 43, (ps-) 54, 84,
113n, 114, 115n, 155, 211, 217, 231
Thomas Migerii 111n
Thomas de Wylton, 91
Trias Merant, S 24, 210n
U
Ulpianus 216
Urbina, A. 185
V
Valencia de Len, D. de 173, 179
Valla, L. 166
Vauchez, A. 162
Vzquez Janeiro, I. 177, 179
Velasco, B. 182n
Victor, J. M. 209n
Vite, F. 34
Villalba, P. 80n
Vitruvius 232
Vivero, G. de 182
W
Walter, P. 80n
Weber, M. 161
Wohlhaupter, E. 217n
Y
Yates, F. 38, 235n
Z
Zambelli, P. 234n
Zetzner, L. 219, 224, 228n, 231, 233,
235
INDEX OPERVM RAIMVNDI QVAE CITANTVR

Arbor scientiae 23n, 24, 93, 112n,
182, 210, 213, 214n, 215, 218, 220221, 223
Ars amatiua 115, 133n, 183
Ars breuis 3, 4, 12, 69n, 158n, 183,
210, 213, 228, 233, 236
Ars breuis, quae est de inuentione
iuris 213, 215-217, 222n, 223,
Ars compendiosa dei 132n, 133n,
Ars compendiosa iueniendi ueritatem
seu Ars magna et maior 3-4, 22n,
110n,
Ars demonstratiua 182
Ars de iure 215, 223
Ars generalis ultima 3, 6n, 12, 6n, 12,
24-28, 125n, 126n, 156, 158, 163,
174, 204n,
Ars inuentiua ueritatis 28, 36, 123n,
124
Ars iuris 213-214, 218-219, 222-223
Ars iuris naturalis 213
Ars uniuersalis seu Lectura Artis com
pendiosa inueniendi ueritatem 5n,
Breuis practica Tabulae generalis seu
Ars compendiosa 11
Compemdium logicae Algazelis 112n,
126, 162,
Compendium seu commentum Artis
demonstratiuae 9n, 163,
Declaratio Raymundi per modum
dialogi edita 38, 67, 71-72, 75, 77n,
78-79, 81, 82n-83n, 86, 89-90, 9294, 97n, 130, 142n
De fallaciis 59n, 60n, 93, 101, 114115, 125n, 126, 131n
De modo naturali intelligendi 93,
100n
Disputatio eremitae et Raimundi
120n
Disputatio fidei et intellectus 195,
196n
Disputatio quinque hominum sapien
tium 93
Disputatio Raimundi christiani et
Homeri saraceni 182
Disputatio Raimundi et Auerroistae

93, 104n
Lectura compendiosa Tabulae gene
ralis 11, 12
Lectura super tertiam figuram
Tabuale generalis 11
Liber clericorum 6n. 12,
Liber contemplationis 110n, 120122, 124, 129, 131, 135-139, 141,
142n-151n, 162, 172
Liber contradictionis 93-94, 101
Liber correlatiuorum innatorum,
112n
Liber de ascensu et descensu intellec
tus 8n, 48, 49n
Liber de articulis fidei 183
Liber de ente reali et rationis 178,
183
Liber de consolatione eremitarum 93
Liber de conuenientia fides et intel
lectus in obiecto 174
Liber de deo ignoto et de mundo
ignoto 5n
Liber de demonstratione per aequipa
rantiam 174
Liber de diuina unitate et pluralitate
93
Liber de doctrina puerili 119
Liber de efficiente et effectu 93, 100
Liber de Euast et Blanquerna 168,
183
Liber de fine 4, 5n,
Liber de gentili et tribus sapientibus
167, 176, 183
Liber de geometria noua et compen
diosa 24, 27
Liber de homine 202
Liber de leuitate et ponderositate ele
mentorum 24n
Liber de modo naturali intelligendi
27, 100,
Liber de nouis fallaciis 56, 58n-61n,
125n
Liber de participatione christianorum
et saracenorum 125n
252
index opervm raimvndi qvae citantvr
Liber de possibili et impossibili 93,

100, 103, 104n
Liber de praedicatione 183
Liber de quadratura et triangulatura
circuli 24, 27
Liber de refugio intellectus 58, 59n
Liber de sancta Maria 93
Liber de Sanctu Spirito 93
Liber de septem donis Spiritus sancti
182
Liber de syllogismis contradictoriis
91, 93-94, 101
Liber de uenatione substantiae, acci
dentis et compositi 5
Liber in quo declaratur quod fides
sancta catholica est magis proba
bilis quam improbabilis 93, 100,
101-102
Liber lamentationis philosophiae 93,
100, 104
Liber natalis pueri paruuli Christi
Iesu 93
Liber nouus de anima rationali 41,

103
Liber principiorum iuris 213, 215,
218, 223
Liber principiorum medicinae 113,
122
Liber prouerbiorum 69n
Liber reprobationis aliquorum erro
rum Auerrois 93, 100n, 102
Liber super Psalmum Quicumque
uult 183
Logica noua 4n, 5, 58n, 112n, 114115, 125n, 126
Petitio Raimundi 90
Sermones contra errores Auerrois 93,
102-103, 174
Supplicatio Raymundi 93
Tabula generalis 12
Testamentum Raimundi Lulli 14n
Tractatus nouus de astronomia 24, 78
Vita coaetanea 3, 13, 140, 162
RAIMVNDI LVLLI
Opera latina
CONCORDANTIAE
Raimundi Lulli Opera latina
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
op. 213-239: Opera messanensia

anno 1313 composita, ed.
Johannes Sthr
op. 240-250: Opera messanen
sia; op. 251-280: Opera tunici
ana annis 1314-1315 composita,
ed. Johannes Sthr
op. 118: Liber de praedicatione
(1304), Dist. I - Dist. IIA, ed.
Abraham Soria Flores
op. 118: Liber de praedicatione
(1304), Dist. IIB: Centum ser
mones, ed. Abraham Soria
Flores
op. 154-155: Parisiis anno 1309
composita, ed. Helmut Riedlinger
composita, ed. Helmut Riedlinger
composita, ed. Hermogenes
Harada
composita, ed. Hermogenes
Harada
op. 120-122: In Monte Pessu
lano anno 1305 composita, ed.
Aloisius Madre
op. 114-117, 119: In Monte Pessulano anno 1304 composita, ed.
Louis Sala-Molins
op. 135-141: In Monte Pessulano annis 1308-1309 compos
ita, ed. Charles Lohr
op. 123-127: Barcinone, in
Monte Pessulano, Pisis annis
Corpus Christianorum,
Continuatio Mediaeualis

[Palmae Maioric. 1959]

CCCM 33 Turnholti 1978


(ILL, Series A, fasc. 7)


254
XIII
XIV
XV
XVI
XVII
XVIII
XIX
XX
XXI
XXII
XXIII

raimvndi lvlli opera latina

1305-1308 composita, ed. Aloisius Madre
op. 134: Ars compendiosa Dei in
Monte Pessulano anno 1308
composita, ed. Manuel Bauz
Ochogava
op. 128: Ars generalis ultima
Lugduni anno 1305 incepta Pisis
anno 1308 ad finem perducta,
ed. Aloisius Madre
op. 201-207: Summa sermonum
in ciuitate Maioricensi annis
1312-1313 composita, ed. Fernando Domnguez Reboiras et
Abraham Soria Flores ()
op. 190-200: Viennae Allobrogum, in Monte Pessulano et in
ciuitate Maioricensi annis 13111312 composita, ed. Antoni Oliver et Michel Senellart
composita, ed. Michela Pereira
et Theodor Pindl-Bchel
op. 208-212: In ciuitate Maioricensi anno 1313 composita, ed.
Abraham Soria Flores (),
Fernando Domnguez Reboi
ras et Michel Senellart
op. 86-91: Parisiis, Barcinonae
et in ciuitate Maioricensi annis
1299-1300 composita, ed. Fer
nando Domnguez Reboiras
op. 106-113: Ianuae et in Monte
Pessulano annis 1313-1314 com
posita, ed. Jordi Gay Estelrich
op. 92-96: In ciuitate Maiori
censi anno 1300 composita, ed.
Fernando Domnguez Reboi
ras
op. 130-133: In Monte Pessulano et Pisis anno 1308 composita, ed. Aloisius Madre
op. 101-105: Ianuae et in
Monte Pessulano et Pisis anno
1303 composita, ed. Walter
Andreas Euler







(ILL, Series A, fasc.
79)



concordantiae
XXIV- op. 65: Arbor scientiae, ed.
XXVI Pere Villalba Varneda
XXVII op. 53: Tabula generalis, ed.
Viola Tenge-Wolf
XXVIII op. 49-52: Liber de sancta Maria
et Liber de passagio, ed. Blanca
Gar et Fernando Domnguez
Reboiras
XXIX op. 46-48: Ars amatiua boni et
Quaestiones quas quaesiuit quidam frater minor, ed. Marta
M.M. Romano et Francesco
Santi
XXX
op. 97-100: In proximo Oriente
annis 1301-1302 conscripta ed.
Jaume Medina
XXXI op. 12-15: Quattuor libri principiorum, ed. Mara Asuncin
Snchez Manzano
XXXII op. 27: Ars demonstratiua, ed.
Josep Enric Rubio Albarracn
XXXIII op. 7-9: Annis 1274-1276 com
posita, ed. Jaume Medina
XXXIV op. 61-63: Annis 1294-1295
composita, ed. Ulli Roth et
Carla Compagno
XXXV op. 54-60: Annis 1294-1296 com
posita, ed. Coralba Colomba et
Viola Tenge-Wolf
XXXVI op. 1011: Liber contra Anti
christum et Liber de gentili et
tribus sapientibus, ed. Pamela
M. Beattie et scar de la
Cruz Palma
XXXVII op. 44: Ars inuentiua ueritatis,
ed. Jorge Uscatescu Barrn
XXXVIII op. 142-153: Montepessulano
anno 1309 conscripta, quibus
epistolae tres loco et tempore
incerto adnectuntur, ed. Fer
nando Domnguez Reboiras
CCCM 180A-C Turnholti 2000



CCCM 264 sub praelo

CCCM 266 sub praelo
Supplementum Lullianum
I
Breuiculum seu Electorium paruum Thomae Migerii (Le Mysier), ed. Charles Lohr, Wal
burga Bchel et Theodor Pin
dl-Bchel
255
256
II
III
raimvndi lvlli opera latina

Raimundus Lullus: An Intro
duction to his Life, Works and
Thought, ed. Alexander Fidora
et Josep E. Rubio
Ha-Melacha ha-Ketzara: A Hebrew Translation of Ramon
Llulls Ars Brevis, ed. Harvey
J. Hames
RAIMVNDI LVLLI
Opera latina
CONCORDANTIAE
Opera latina (op.)
ROL
CCCM
7-9
XXXIII 215
10-11 XXXVI 264
12-15 XXXI 185
27
XXXII 213
44
XXXVII 265
46-48 XXIX 183
49-52 XXVIII 182
53
XXVII 181
54-60 XXXV 248
61-63 XXXIV 246
65
XXIV-XXVI 180A-C
76-81 XVII 79
86-91 XIX 111
92-96 XXI 112
97-100 XXX 184
101-105 XXIII 115
106-113 XX
113
114-117 X
36
118 III-IV
119
X
36
120-122 IX
35
123-127 XII
38
128 XIV 75
130-133 XXII
114
134 XIII 39
135-141 XI
37
142-153 XXXVIII 266
154-155 V
156-167 VI
33
168-177 VII
32
178-189 VIII
34
190-200 XVI
78
201-207 XV
76
208-212 XVIII 80
213-239 I
240-280 II
SVBSIDIA LVLLIANA
1
Arbor scientiae. Der Baum des Wissens von Ramon

Llull. Akten des Internationalen Kongresses aus An
lass des 40-jhrigen Jubilums des Raimundus-LullusInstitutes der Universitt Freiburg. 29.September 2.
Oktober 1996, ed. F.Domnguez Reboiras, P.Vil
lalba Varneda, P.Walter
IPM 42
2002
Ramon Llull und Nikolaus von Kues: Eine Begegnung

im Zeichen der Toleranz Raimondo Lullo e Niccol
Cusano: Un incontro nel segno della tolleranza. Akten
des Internationalen Kongresses zu Ramon Llull und
Nikolaus von Kues (Brixen und Bozen, 25.-27.No
vember 2004), ed. E.Bidese, A.Fidora, P.Renner
IPM 46
2005
Il Mediterraneo del 300: Raimondo Lullo e Federi

co III dAragona, re di Sicilia. Omaggio a Fernando
Domnguez Reboiras. Atti del Seminario internazio
nale di Palermo, Castelvetrano Selinunte (TP), 17-19
novembre 2005, ed. A.Musco, M.Romano
IPM 49
2008
Gottes Schau und Weltbetrachtung. Interpretationen

zum Liber contemplationis des Raimundus Lullus.
Akten des Internationalen Kongresses aus Anlass des
50-jhrigen Bestehens des Raimundus-Lullus-Insti
tuts der Albert-Ludwigs-Universitt Freiburg, 25.28. November 2007, ed. F.Domnguez Reboiras,
V.Tenge-Wolf, P.Walter
IPM 59
2011
Knowledge, Contemplation, and Lullism. Contribu IPM 67

tions to the Lullian Section at the SIEPM Congress,
Freising, August 20-25, 2012, ed. J. Higuera Rubio
2015

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KNOWLEDGE, CONTEMPLATION

Research on the Inheritance of Early and Medieval Christianity

Research on the Inheritance of Early and Medieval Christianity

Founded by Dom Eligius Dekkers (1998)

Rita Beyers Alexander Andre Emanuela Colombi Georges Declercq

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

Francisco Jos Daz Marcilla, El hilo luliano de la

Esteve Jaulent, Un lulista responde a Paolo Flores

Index personarum . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

Archives dhistoire doctrinale et littraire du Moyen-ge

Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Medieaevalis, Turnholti

Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, 4 vols (Paris,

Estudios Lulianos (19571990, vid. SL)

Raymundi Lulli Opera omnia, ed. Ivo Salzinger, 8 vol.,

Nova Edici de les Obres de Ramon Llull, Palma 1991ss.

Obres de Ramon Llull, 21 vols, Palma 19061950

Raimundi Lulli Opera latina, Palmae/Turnholti 1959ss.

Studia Lulliana (1991-, olim EL)

of knowledge that made it available to secular teaching and useful

sixteenth century with a study of Master Bernard de Lavinheta,

the medieval philosophical tradition. In Llulls case, of course,

LULLS ART: THE BREVITAS AS A WAY TO

Knowledge, Contemplation and Lullism. Contributions to the Lullian Session at the

by consistent references to the brevitas. Running through the list

He then goes on to explain in the following paragraph what

Raimundus Lullus, Logica noua, ed. W.Euler, Turnhout, 1998 (ROL,

lulls art: the brevitas

logically organised following generalissimi7 principles common to

Even more exhaustive is the prologue of the Liber de venatione

And the examples could be multiplied.12

lulls art: the brevitas

The brevitas, thus, characterises not only the expositive nature of

its most representative product, i.e. the quaestio. Scholastic reason

19 On the Scholastic disputatio see P.Glorieux, La disputa teologica

lulls art: the brevitas

However, this brevitas is also the fruit of a form of idealism (in

The great number of possible combinations, although in a rig

which goes beyond the borders of Christianity, and he thus trans

lulls art: the brevitas

2. The brevitas as a methodological instrument

lulls art: the brevitas

J.Hamesse, able to offer comfortably accessible documents. 34 Such

Cf. ibid. p. 21.

universities, and above all the University of Paris. 37 Considered

lulls art: the brevitas

abbreviations and compendia are, from this perspective, the clavis

ente gratia nouiter complilaui [] De quibus quidem libris omnibus supra

to the cultural and intellectual background of the readership

LA SCIENZA GEOMETRICA NELLARS LULLIANA:

Nel Praecursor, parafrasando San Giovanni, Ivo Salzinger si

Knowledge, Contemplation and Lullism. Contributions to the Lullian Session at the

In questa sede mi concentro sulla Revelatio secretorum artis e

la scienza geometrica nellars lulliana

glianza attraverso la quale si produce la soluzione ad ogni quesito.5

Figura 1. Figura costruita dal Salzinger in De secreto Arithmeticae,

5 I. Salzinger, Revelatio, op. cit., p. 354: et quia Aequalificatio, seu vul

Figura 2. Figura logicalis, Revelatio secretorum artis, p. 330.

Se per la figura logicalis Salzinger esplicita lalfabeto (E/e =

la scienza geometrica nellars lulliana

duplicit delloperatio aequationis, che indaga il verum quando si

il numerus non essendo un quantum ovvero non possedendo longi

Figura 3. Tabula in De quatuor Operationibus universalibus,

Esse e Privatio sono i principi generalissimi (da intendere come