G.R. No.

182963 June 3, 2013

SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER,
Petitioners,vs.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.,
Respondent.
FACTS:
On February 15, 2001, the petitioners executed a Promissory Note with Chattel
Mortgage in favor ofCitimotors, Inc. The contract provides, among others, that: for
receiving the amount of Php834,768.00, petitioners shall pay Php 17,391.00 every 15th
day of each succeeding month until fullypaid; the loan is secured by a 2001 Mitsubishi
Adventure Super Sport; and an interest of 6% permonth shall be imposed for failure to
pay each installment on or before the stated due date.On the same day, Citimotors,
Inc. assigned all its rights, title and interests in the Promissory Notewith
Chattel Mortgage to ABN AMRO Savings Bank, Inc., which, on May 31, 2002, likewise
assignedthe same to respondent BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. Spouses Agner failed to
pay four successive installments from May 15, 2002 to August 15, 2002,respondent,
through counsel, sent to petitioners a demand letter dated August 29, 2002,
declaringthe entire obligation as due and demandable and requiring to pay
Php576,664.04, or surrender themortgaged vehicle immediately upon receiving the
letter. Getting no response, respondent filed onOctober 4, 2002 an action for Replevin
and Damages before the Manila Regional Trial Court. A writ of replevin was issued.
But still, the subject vehicle was not seized. Trial on the meritssucceeded.
August 11, 2005, the Manila RTC Br. 33 ruled in favor of BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.
and ordered Spouses Agner to jointly and severally pay the amount of Php576,664.04
plus interestat the rate of 72% per annum from August 20, 2002 until fully paid, and the
costs of suit. Petitioners appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals, but the CA affirmed the lower courts
decision and, subsequently, denied the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or Not the Respondent have cause of action, because the Deed
of Assignmentexecuted in its favor did not specifically mention ABN AMROs
account receivable from
petitioners;
(2) Whether or Not petitioners can be considered to have defaulted in payment for lack
ofcompetent proof that they received the demand letter;
(3)Whether or Not Respondents remedy of resorting to both a
ctions of replevin and collectionof sum of money is contrary to the provision of Article
1484 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
(1) Yes, BPI Family Saving Bank, Inc. have a cause of action. It would be sufficient to
state thatthe matter surrounding the Deed of Assignment had already been considered
by the trialcourt and the CA.

(2) No, petitioners cannot be considered to have defaulted in payment. Because even if
there isno demand letter sent by respondent, there is really no need for it because
petitioners legallywaived the necessity of notice or demand in the Promissory Note with
Chattel Mortgage,
which they voluntarily and knowingly signed in favor of respondents predecessor
-in-interest.The Civil Code in Article 1169 provides that one incurs in delay or
is in default from the timethe obligor demands the fulfillment of the obligation from
the obligee. However, the lawexpressly provides that demand is not necessary under
certain circumstances, and one ofthese circumstances is when the parties expressly
waive demand. Hence, since the co-signors expressly waived demand in the
promissory notes, demand was unnecessary forthem to be in default.
(3)No, the Respondents remedy is not violative of
Article 1484 of the Civil Code. Comparedwith the Elisco Case, the vehicle subject
matter of this case was never recovered anddelivered to respondent despite the
issuance of a writ of replevin. As there was no seizurethat transpired, it cannot be said
that petitioners were deprived of the use and enjoyment ofthe mortgaged vehicle or
that respondent pursued, commenced or concluded its actualforeclosure. The trial
court, therefore, rightfully granted the alternative prayer for sum ofmoney, which is
equivalent to the remedy of "exacting fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly,there is no
double recovery or unjust enrichment to speak of

G.R. No. 185595CALDERON VS ROXASFACTS:

Pe t i t i o n e r M a . C a rm i n i a C . C a l d e ro n a n d p r i v a t e re s p o n d e n t J o
s e A n t o n i o F. Rox a s , w e re married on December 4, 1985 and their
union produced four hildren. On January 16, 1998, petitioner fi led a
complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. While the action was pending, the trial
court granted Calderons request for support pende lite (while the action for
nullity is pending).On May 16, 2005, the trial court rendered its
decision declaring the marriage null and void, awarding custody of the
children to the mother and ordering Roxas to provide support to the
c h i l d re n .
S e v e r a l a c t i o n s w e re r a i s e d i n c o u r t , w i t h Rox a s a s k i n g f o r a d
e c re a s e o f t h e monthly support while Calderon asking for an increase in
the amount and Roxas payment onhis arrears for support.
ISSUE:
This petition is raised by Calderon not to assail the nullity of their marriage b
ut,r a t h e r , i s p r e m i s e d o n w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e m a t t e r
o f s u p p o r t p e n d e n t l i t e i s a l r e a d y interlocutory and final
HELD:

Pe t i t i o n e r c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e C A f a i l e d t o re c o g n i z e t h a t t h e i n
t e r l o c u t o r y a s p e c t o f t h e assailed orders pertains only to private
respondents motion to reduce support which was granted, and to her
own motion to increase support, which was denied. Petitioner points outthat
the ruling on support in arrears which have remained unpaid, as well as
her prayer for reimbursement/payment were in the nature of fi nal
ordersassailable by ordinary appeal. SC disagrees.An interlocutory order
merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to bedone to
resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is considered
final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or
terminates a particular stage of t h e s a m e a c t i o n .
C l e a r l y , w h e t h e r a n o r d e r o r re s o l u t i o n i s fi n a l o r i n t e r l o c u t o r
y i s n o t dependent on compliance or noncompliance by a party to its
directive, as what petitioner suggests. Moreover, private respondents
obligation to give monthly support in the amount fixed by the RTC in the
assailed orders may be enforced by the court itself, as what transpired in the
early stage of the proceedings when the court cited the private
respondent in contempt of court and ordered him arrested for his
refusal/failure to comply with the order granting support pendente
lite. A few years later, private respondent fi led a motion to reduce
support while petitioner filed her own motion to increase the same, and in
addition sought spousal support and support in arrears. This fact underscores
the provisional character of the order granting support pendente lite.
Pe t it ion e r s th eory t hat th e assaile d orde rs hav e cease d
t o b e p r o v i s i o n a l d u e t o t h e arrearages incurred by private
respondent is therefore untenable. The remedy against an interlocutory
order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special c i v i l a c t i o n u n d e r
Ru l e 6 5 p ro v i d e d t h a t t h e i n t e r l o c u t o r y o rd e r i s re n d e re d
w i t h o u t o r i n excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion