Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
DRAFT TWO
Major Changes: Expanded history of cable industry; discussion of TCI’s John
Malone; review of problems facing interactive television.
FINAL
Major Changes: Style revision; format/layout revision; addition of abstract;
discussion of various technical systems likely to be used in interactive
television; predictions for various companies offered; conclusion added.
ABSTRACT
The future of television is interactive. Viewers will have a greater say in what
appears on their television and what services they have access to. First,
however, the government and the private sector must work out some differences
regarding the cooperation of telephone and cable television companies. Once they
do so, cable and telephone companies must design services appropriate to its
customers’ desires, and engineer systems capable of delivering these services.
Cable and telephone companies will be the driving forces behind the continued
construction of the information highway. When interactive television (ITV) is
widespread, viewers will communicate with each other and with information servers
in useful and innovative ways.
HISTORY
Though now one of the largest industries in the world, the cable industry has
humble origins. Beginning as an opposing force to broadcast technology, which had
been the status quo since television’s origins, cable television was a messenger
without a message. All the production companies wanted to stay with the broadcast
network, and none wanted to deviate from the mainstream. John Malone of Tele-
communications Inc. (TCI), says his company: “We started with six-channel cable
systems, and we could only find three channels” (Malone, 1994). By sticking to two
guiding principles, Malone asserts, his company eventually grew to be the largest
of its kind. The first principle was that “by expanding viewing choice to
customers, we could gain subscriptions” (Malone, 1994). Second, Malone decided
early to “go for growth.” He and his partners chose to pay low salaries,
compensate employees with stock in the growth in the company, and not pay
dividends on that stock. Malone calls this approach “sweat equity.”
Constantly working to improve the technology led to improving his company. TCI
continually reinvested in technology and system capacity, effectively reinventing
the industry every three years, “adding channels, adding capacity, adding
channels, adding capacity, gaining subscribers through a very tough period in the
early ’70s” (Malone, 1994). Malone in part thanks the government for helping TCI
during that decade. In 1972, the FCC demanded that the cable industry originate
its own programming. This opened the door to both smaller production companies and
larger cable systems, the former creating low-budget material for the latter.
Malone concludes, “Pursuing that strategy consistently - reinvesting, continuing
to grow - has pretty well got us to be a successful enterprise.”
In a strange twist of a traditional capitalistic supply-and-demand scenario, the
cable industry supplied improved technologies not because the consumers asked for
it, but because of companies like TCI were able to. Malone’s aggressive
development strategy centers on pushing the state of the art further and further,
paced only so as not to immediately overwhelm the consumer. A company as large as
TCI does not fear watching its products become obsolete, simply because its
dominance in the industry assures that almost any new technology will be their
technology. Malone’s stint as chairman of Cable Labs, and his past work for Bell
Labs, has shaped his strategy. He puts a quality product first, and has faith that
consumers will seek the best product or service available. Malone astutely
realized that this maxim holds true even in a monopoly or oligopoly, in which
consumer can compare only a company’s product with its other products, not with
products of other companies. Malone gambled that people will pay more for more
services, even when they are content with their current services.
At this stage, Malone seems to have reached the pinnacle of what TCI can do alone.
He has maximized the technology, but that has not kept him from looking further
into the future, outside the perimeters of his own company. Realizing that the
public could get little more out of sitting on a couch and staring at a glowing
box than it had for the past forty years, Malone pursued ways of getting the
audience involved with the programming. Because this required direct, real-time
communication between the viewer and the viewed, telephones seemed like the
cheapest, easiest answer. But because the FCC denied cable companies the right to
provide phone service to areas they supply with television, Malone had to turn to
the phone companies. To him, it seems like a natural move. “This is really a
converging thing - the computer industry, the communications industry, the cable
industry, the broadcast industry on a worldwide basis are converging because of
technology, because the digital technology is now making possible new things at
lower cost than was ever dreamt of in the past” (Malone, 1994). Once cable
companies gain access to telephone lines, whether on their own or with local phone
companies, the new technology will be interactive.
SOME POSSIBLE PROBLEMS
Public & Private Opposition. While the movement into telephony could bring the
cable industry its greatest strength, the transition leaves the industry in its
most vulnerable position. At the same time the government broke up AT&T
stranglehold on telecommunications in 1984, the FCC also moved to prevent cable
industries from providing phone service and phone companies from providing
television service. This step, apparently taken without serious regard for the
future of television, has hindered both regional bell operating systems (RBOCs)
and cable companies in their attempts to link the viewer to the viewed.
Since the FCC first made this decision, the government has interpreted the ruling
(and consequent legislation) as related to anti-trust concerns. They argued that
one company should not have the opportunity to control of information input and
output of any given home. The government feared out-of-control price hikes and
mega-corporations beyond the supervision of local, state, or even federal
government. In 1984, AT&T certainly seemed headed that way. No company could even
think of challenging Ma Bell’s market dominance.
To be sure, the battle between AT&T and the government was brutal and grueling,
and irreparably damaged the relationship between the federal government and the
communications industry. The government fears information brokers more powerful
than it can handle, while the industry fears crippling regulations. Both entities’
fears are justifiable, but a compromise might promote technological advances and
widespread enjoyment without forcing utility monopolies on Americans.
Recently, phone companies began to argue that restricting the providing of
television service to cable companies infringed on the phone companies freedom of
speech. The phone companies argued that since their wires were running into homes,
they should have the right to say what data flows over the wires. The government
(especially the Reagan and Bush Justice Departments) fought this argument
vehemently, and the case reached a US District Federal Court in Alexandria,
Virginia, a city in which Bell Atlantic was hoping to provide interactive
television service. The federal judge involved, TS Ellis, seemed to agree with
Bell that the 1984 ban is directed at content and not, as the defendants argue,
simply regulation of the delivery of video signals. The law prohibits telephone
companies from offering programming comparable to what was on the air in 1984. In
his opening remarks at a hearing, Ellis said he thought that the ban, as worded,
effectively knocked out a “category of speech.” He likened it to a rule
restricting telephone companies from carrying any show listed in 1984’s TV Guides.
When Justice lawyer Sarah Wilson tried to argue that the law regulated
transmission but not content, Ellis did not agree it. “It is form versus
substance,” Wilson said. “But it shuts up the speaker,” Ellis responded. (Bell
Atlantic, 1993). Judge Ellis’s decision supported Bell Atlantic’s efforts to
provide television programming to its subscribers. Soon after, Bell Atlantic
announced its proposed merger with TCI, a deal that fell through in March 1994
after the FCC announced a new rate regulation.
The case of Bell Atlantic highlights the government’s ambiguous approach to the
information age in general and interactive television in particular. While Judge
Ellis repudiates the government for antiquated bans on commerce and speech,
clearing the way for Bell Atlantic and TCI, the FCC cuts price limits, forcing the
two companies to abandon their $33 billion deal. The government seems unable to
make up its mind about which direction it wants to see the information
superhighway lead.
Even the federal and legislative branches are divided on the question. Vice-
president Al Gore has won favor with the communications industry for his outspoken
support of technology and data infrastructures. Gore is an excellent example of
compromise between the government and industry. In his landmark January 11, 1994
speech to the Television Academy, Gore dared the industry to work against creating
information “haves” and “have-nots”:
I challenge you, the people in this room, to connect all of our classrooms, all of
our libraries, and all of our hospitals and clinics by the year 2000. We must do
this to realize the full potential of information to educate, to save lives,
provide access to health care and lower medical costs.ÉThe best way to do so is by
working together.ÉWe must build a new model of public-private cooperation that, if
properly pursued, can obviate many governmental mandates. (Gore, 1994)
As an expression of its support of Gore’s proactive stance on technology, Bell
Atlantic and Pacific Telesis quickly announced plans to donate hook-ups to all the
schools in their respective local areas.
The industry’s relationship with the legislative branch of the federal government
seems less positive. Certain members of Congress are eager to stamp out the
perceived evils of big business, and occasionally hasten to do so, even at the
expense of technological progress. While these members may be correct in assuming
that corporations are more interested in making money than looking out for the
best interest of their customers, they cannot deny that this greed produces
competitive markets and better quality goods for consumers. The opinions of these
legislators, whether misguided or accurate, could be dismissed were it not for the
great power they hold in the regulation of the communications industry. One figure
intent on subduing the industry’s drive toward interactive television is Senator
Howard Metzenbaum. Sen. Metzenbaum clearly evinced his feelings when TCI’s John
Malone testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee:
I believe your company has a track record of hiding that which would appear to
others as being monopolistic, anti-competitive practices behind the rhetoric of
competition. And frankly, I’m afraid your proposed merger with Bell Atlantic is a
continuation of this behavior. I just hope that the antitrust authorities see
through the rhetoric and meet their responsibilities to the American people. I
also hope that the White House politicos permit the Department of Justice and the
FTC to exercise their best independent judgment. (Malone, 1994)
Metzenbaum went so far as to assert his dedication to the cause of stopping mega-
corporations from monopolizing information, even if the presidential
administration allowed it. “If they [allow communications megamergers to occur]
andÉmake an effort to put pressure on the antitrust agencies, you and the rest of
the country may be certain we in Congress will not sit idly by” (Malone, 1994).
Metzenbaum appears unwilling to compromise on many points central to the
development of interactive television, and if enough senators and representatives
share his beliefs, the government could stall developments in the field. If any
plan for ITV is to succeed, it first must answer the fears of government officials
whose philosophy does not tolerate entities such as a Bell Atlantic / TCI merger.
Public Disinterest or Fear. Assuming some plan, whether sponsored by a RBOC
(regional Bell operating company), a cable company, or both, jumps through the
appropriate government hoops, the sponsoring company must get the public
interested in its services. That those services are nothing like anything the
public as seen before is both a blessing and a curse in this instance. Certain
industry analysts predict consumers will take all they can get, loading up on ITV
services like squirrels hoard nuts. Other, more skeptical, critics argue
consumers will be overwhelmed with the multiplicity of choices offered them. They
say it is overly optimistic for industry executives to assume viewers who cannot
program their VCRs will want to use a large controller to conduct business, select
movies, or play along with game shows. As one Yale computer scientist suggested,
most people who watch television do so precisely because it is not interactive
(Washington Post, 4/3/94). A TV that requires the viewer to do anything but view
ceases to be a TV; it becomes a threat. TVs currently do not require interaction
either with the TV, the network, or even the viewers’ family. Once the viewer
realizes he has to think about his TV, the entertainment value - or some less
definable value - of the TV diminishes. Many people like to be soothed by their
television, without having to worry about keying in special combinations or
scanning through hundreds of channels.
Television’s history, from the viewer’s perspective, is a passive one. Color
television took many years to catch on (although its popularity sky-rocketed after
all TV was broadcast in color) (CED, 1992). The two major revolutions - color TV
and cable - were motivated almost entirely by the industry, creating a market for
better technology it had developed. Before TV, no one sat around clamoring for
TV; before color TV, few people (presumably) refused to buy one simply because it
was not color; before cable, everyone, including the government, thought broadcast
technology more than sufficed. Those viewers who are unsatisfied with what cable
has to offer buy satellite dishes. Very possibly, nearly everyone else has had
enough TV.
On the other side, the industry optimists expect that once a consumer gets a taste
of the services offered in conjunction with her phone lines, she will pay to get
more. When a large number of people purchase the services, the popularity will
induce the remainder to “catch up,” until shopping through television is as common
as watching television is now. If that occurs, some say, the television and
related enterprises will reap hundreds of billions of dollars yearly. It is just a
matter of people opening themselves to the future.
THE SYSTEMS
Before wonders such as ZING! and TV Guide On Screen can astonish viewers across
the country, phone and cable companies must literally lay the groundwork through
which the new services will pass. The innovation most fundamental to interactive
television, and the one which distinguished ITV from regular TV, is a two-way
communication system. Currently, TV-oriented signals enter the house, but they do
not leave. A single source sends identical information to thousands of homes.
Telephones, on the other hand, are by nature two-way, or point-to-point. The
secret to ITV, then, is mixing the two systems to create a flexible, fast method
of sending data both “downstream” (i.e., from the headend to the viewer) and
“upstream” (i.e., from the viewer to the headend). Such a system will open the
way to customizable home shopping, video-on-demand, interaction with various
networks (such as the Internet or America Online), and televised “virtual”
classrooms. Clearly, each of these options will require enormous data
transmission facilities, capable of sending data as complicated as continuous
full-motion video with stereo sound in real time with little or no signal loss.
The current information infrastructure is not sufficient to handle these complex
information interchanges. It can handle telephony, and it can handle TV, but it
cannot yet cope with a hybrid of the two.
The continued construction of the information highway is a multi-billion dollar
project that will be divided not between the public and private sectors, but
rather between an assortment of enormous communications companies. Cable
companies like TCI and Cox Cable will work either with or against telephone
companies like Pacific Telesis and Bell Atlantic in expanding the network of fiber
optics, copper wire, coaxial cable, and radio waves that now serve as a barebones
outline of what is to come. Eventually, out of the tangled assortment of wires
and radiation will come several standards of communication, and those companies
which create, promote, or align themselves with the standards will profit
immeasurably. Because of the reality of competition, each of the driving forces
behind the infrastructure will be forced to commit hundreds of millions, perhaps
billions, of dollars to the building and implementation of the highway. No savvy
corporations would enter this unless they knew they had the opportunity to win
back many times their investment. If a company is fortunate (or clever) enough to
set the standard in a given medium, all other companies will have to accept the
standard or fold.
ADSL. Most of the companies have just left the starting gate in this race to
deliver a standard for the data highway in general and ITV in particular. Some
phone companies, especially the RBOCs, look to the already-installed copper phone,
or twisted pair, wire as a cost effective means of providing video and other
services to their customers. Bell Atlantic, for example, has used a new
technology called ADSL (Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line) that lets copper
plant carry up to 1.54 megabits per second (Mbps) of data - enough to deliver one
channel of precompressed movies to a single viewer (Byte, 1994). The movie signal
is sent through a phone network to a set-top box that will decompress it and
convert it from digital to analog, then port it to the TV. Such a system, when
matched with telephone service, could allow for a basic version of true video-on-
demand, which is to say any subscriber could view a film at any time, regardless
of other viewers. ADSL, writes Andy Reinhardt in Byte, is “a quick-and-dirty way
to pump digital video over existing copper plant” that does not really compare to
the expansive capacity (bandwith) of coaxial cable or fiber optics. But if a RBOC
could offer its subscribers this service as only a part of the subscriber’s total
communications package, so viewers could choose programming from either a RBOC or
a cable company. The latter, of course, would continue to provide nearly as many
channels as it could squeeze into its cables, but phone companies might be able to
get interactive ADSL running sooner, because of its direct link to telephony. A
variation on ADSL, called DMT (Discrete Multi-Tone) compressed four one-way video
channels into twisted-pair wiring, in addition to a two-way interactive channel
and two-other channels, all while leaving room for ordinary analog phone service
(Byte, 1994). Industry analysts expect ADSL to quadruple its capacity to 6 Mbps
by late 1994. After that time, set-top box computers will be quick enough to
offer real-time decompression of video and sound signals, which would allow for
live digital TV (Byte, 1994)
Fiber Optic and Hybrid Systems. A more aggressive system, also being pursued by
Bell Atlantic, involves fiber optics - glass-like threads which transmit pulses of
light as digital information. Two fiber optic strands, together as thin as a
single hair, can hold a sophisticated interactive interchange from subscriber to
head end. Like ADSL, this system makes use of phone switching mechanisms, but the
optics provide much faster service than twisted pair copper wires because the
former employs light, not electrical current. Working with Broad-Band
Technologies (BBT) of Durham, North Carolina, Bell Atlantic has devised a system
of many components. The system still uses copper wire and coaxial cable, but much
of the head end work passes through optics. The technique, if adopted, would be a
watershed, because in its early stages it would almost guarantee deep cooperation
between telephone and cable companies. The technology may be promising enough to
aid the companies in their legal bids to merge. Byte’s Reinhardt concisely
describes the BBT/Bell Atlantic process:
A host digital terminal combines telephony feeds from central phone offices and
digital video feeds from cable headends and sends them over a single paired-fiber
cable to an optical network unit.ÉThe optical network unit, located at or near the
customer site, then splits the signal back into digital video and analog telephony
and sends them, respectively, via coaxial cable to a digital set-top box and via
copper wire to a standard phone. Returning signals follow the reverse path.
(Byte, 1994)
This process could well overcome those companies who put their money into ADSL.
While initially less expensive, ADSL cannot provide comparable bandwidth to a
fiber optic and coaxial system. Once ITV catches on, customer will look for high
quality, high capacity networks that can deliver a variety of video options and
easy, clear telephony. ADSL runs the risk of providing one low quality channel,
and status quo (at best) telephony, while BBT’s plan would deliver crystal clear,
digital television along with improved telephone clarity. Proponents of ADSL
might argue that copper plant already exists, and that will save ADSL servers from
rewiring their customers homes but, according to Reinhardt, most
telecommunications and cable companies are already rewiring to the curb with fiber
optics.
The BBT program rests on the notion that with ITV, two wires will run into every
home - the coaxial cable and the twisted pair copper wire. The coaxial cable will
provide the bandwith necessary for diverse programming, and the copper plant will
allow for the inherently interactive nature of telephony. Once the cable gets to
the curb, the fiber optic strands will pick up the signals and transmit them at
light speed to the host digital terminal, where a computer will decide what the
subscriber requests.
Predictably, some leaders of cable companies would like to see only one wire
entering the house - a coaxial cable. Since cable companies already have coax
running into 60 percent of American homes, continued with that medium would be
easy and would allow them control that they would not have if they bowed to phone
companies’ ideas of twisted-pair wiring. Fiber optics at first might seem like a
compromise, but running fiber into the home, rather than just to the curb, is
beyond the financial means of even the strongest telecommunications companies.
Estimates for that kind of work range as high as $400 billion to outfit every
home, business, and school in the United States (Byte, 1994).
These cable companies will have to reach a compromise with telephone companies
that wish to use only twisted pair ADSL. The Bell Atlantic/BBT might be one
solution to competing desires, as might Pacific Bell’s system that counters recent
predictions that all information devices in the home will be integrated into a
single device. Moving toward a video dial tone, Pac Bell wants to rewire
California with fiber and coaxial cable system that would emulate a telephone
system more than and cable-access television (CATV) operation. Such a set-up
would be point-to-point and symmetrical, giving the user the ability to send as
much data upstream as the server can downstream. This, some argue, is an
empowering element of television. The hierarchy of corporation over user begins
to break down with the introduction of symmetrical operations.
Over the short run, Pac Bell does not plan to provide its customers with the
integrated box. Instead, it wants to explore a heterogeneous mix of end-user
devices, such as standard analog phones; standard cellular phones; personal
computers linked (with either digital or analog modems) to a cable/phone network;
modems that attach cable television to a PC; analog set-top boxes; advanced
digital set-top boxes; and regular cable-ready TVs and VCRs (Byte, 1994). Such an
plan would allow customers to maintain much of their older equipment, and would
eliminate the need to spend several hundred (even thousand) dollars frequently
just so they could access new services. It also removes the phone company from
the difficult position of trying to sell non-standard television to families who
may still be angry over the cable box that made it difficult to record with their
VCR. In the next few years, I believe an incremental approach may be the best way
to obtain customer satisfaction and trust, a feature which may become increasingly
important as various information companies are allowed to compete against one
another. If I had to choose between a phone company that would allow me to keep
my VCR, my computer, my television, and my phones, all while having access to
interactive services, and cable company that was pushing me to buy expensive cable
boxes that merely compresses much of the electronics I already own, I would choose
the former.
The Pac Bell system would work similarly to the BBT/Bell Atlantic switched
systems. Headends would send signals through fiber to neighborhood nodes of, say,
500 customers. Fiber nodes would branch of into coaxial cable. The signal is
then split into copper wire and more coaxial cable to video and telephone devices.
A Pac Bell analyst says such a plan would open enough band width to provide video
telephony (Byte, 1994). The video dial tone presents the intriguing (perhaps
dismaying) possibility of callers to talk shows actually appearing on the talk
show. Larry in Peoria could appear alongside neurotic cross-dressers on Oprah. At
the same time, the phone wire would allow customers to navigate on-screen menus
which would provide them with a wide array of viewing choices.
Set-top Boxes. Once incremental systems have run their course, and more and more
subscribers opt for set-top boxes as complicated as today’s higher end PCs,
another battle will begin in the ITV war. The largest companies, like the RBOCs
and the cable companies, will have other companies manufacture their set-top
boxes. Silicon Graphics and General Instruments, two firms responsible for most
boxes in use today, likely will bid savagely on the contracts, since the cable
companies would nearly be dependent on their products. In the future, a TV
without a decoder box would be like a telephone without a handset. The box will
handle all incoming and outgoing data, facilitating communication between the
subscriber and the headend. In the first few years of the ITV war, box
manufacturers will do equally well, since their assembly processes will be
flexible enough to shift from one cable companies requirements to another, without
much attention paid to standards. But as one cable or phone company dominates the
market, that companies box manufacturer also will take over the field. That
partnership will result in enormous profits for both companies, but will involve
less risk for the box manufacturers. By the turn of the century, set-top box
production is sure to become one of the fastest growth industries in the world.
Just as the cable and phone companies will depend on their box manufacturers, so
will the box makers depend on computer chip manufacturers. Two of the largest
chip producers, Intel and Motorola, already consumed in battles over the new
Pentium and Power PC chips, will embroil themselves on yet another front of chips
for set-top boxes. Byte’s Tom Halfhill predicts a typical set-top box might
involve
a powerful CPU, such as a 486, Power PC, or Mips R4000. Add 1 to 3 MB of RAM; a
high-speed graphics chip for screen overlays and video games; a display chip; a 1-
GHz RF tuner; a demodulator; an error-correction chip; an MPEG-II decoder; logic
to strip the audio soundtrack from the incoming video; a Dolby decoder; two 16-bit
audio D/A converters; a video RGB converter; and RF modulator; and infrared
interface for remote control; flash ROM for the operating system; a security chip
to prevent theft of service; and a switching power supply (Byte, 1994).
Currently, a PC outfitted with all these utilities would run between two- and
three-thousand dollars. In the next ten years, the price of such a device for a
television has to drop to about $300 to be commercially viable. Computer
companies like Apple, IBM, and Microsoft have all realized the trend of ITV and
the necessity of set-top boxes, and they are scrambling to write the software that
will emerge as the standard for television boxes. Apple already has released the
MacintoshTV, a device that looks exactly like it sounds, but is not yet
sophisticated enough to handle the computing challenges of ITV. The MacintoshTV
serves as an interesting prototype, however, of what a future TV might look and
act like.
Programming Content and Management. With the fibers, cables, wires, and set-top
boxes in place, cable and phone companies will need to provide programming to fill
all the bandwith capacity. At the headend, video servers will require massive
storage drives to maintain and transmit data. One firm dedicated to enormous
storage systems is Oracle of Redwood Shores, CA, up to now has focused on
supplying hard drives to industries like credit history, where a great deal of
vital data on millions of individual must be tracked, stored, and available for
access. One credit history has a database approaching 1 TB (1034 gigabytes), but
the ITV industry eventually will require many times that to store information like
the world’s entire film library (estimated at 63,000 films), historical news
footage and popular TV shows, electronic catalogs, and interactive encyclopedias.
The films alone add up to about 95 TB (at 1.5 GB per film in MPEG-II) (Byte,
1994). Oracle and companies like it will profit immensely from the needs of ITV
companies, who always will require more films and services than the competition.
I suspect optical drives in the next few years will be designed to hold several
GB, since a single compact disc today can hold about .7 GB. A viewer will choose
from an index or menu of thousands of films, matched to his individual taste, a
signal will run from his phone line to a central office where an enormous jukebox
system will copy the film onto a local mass-storage device, buffering it in RAM
for smooth transmission, relay data through fiber-optic trunk, into coaxial cable,
into a set-top box, and then into the television. Such a system eventually would
allow for VCR-like control of the film, including pause, cue/review, even zoom.
The obvious problem with such a system is maintenance of the hundreds or thousands
of hard disks necessary to the storage and delivery of video. According to MTBF
(meant time between failure) statistics, “an array of 1000 hard discs will lose
and average of one drive per day” (Byte, 1994). This conjures the image of
harried, frantic technicians scampering down rows and rows of drives, replacing
failed units with working ones. The computers needed just to monitor the drives
would be Herculean.
Many analysts believe such a system requires a reconception of the way computers
are designed. A large-scale video juke-box, likely to be one of the most popular
features of any ITV system, would present an interface nightmare to any system
programmer. Protocols and processing speeds capable of handling problems like
five thousand people ordering the same film in one night can only be dreamt of
now, but it will be a very real issue in the near future. One expert at Hewlett-
Packard says of the video jukebox, “It’s really and I/O machine.ÉWe’re trying to
come up with the architecture that is appropriate to this problem. It’s a problem
of I/O and mass storage, not a problem of MIPS” (Byte, 1994). Comparable to
contemporary frustrations with busy messages at services like America Online, or
less recently, the intermittent buzzing before call waiting, a jammed video
jukebox will only irk cable customers, rather than provide them with a product
they will be satisfied with. There can be little doubt, however, that flawed
systems will reach a wide market before perfect ones, and irate customers will
provide the feedback that will motivate soft- and hardware engineers to design a
quicker, less frustrating I/O system.