1ac wave 1

1accybersecurity
A cyberattack is coming
Macri, 14
(Giuseppe, staff writer for the Daily Caller, citing NSA head Michael Rogers,
NSA Chief: US Will Suffer A Catastrophic Cyberattack In The Next Ten Years,
http://dailycaller.com/2014/11/21/nsa-chief-us-will-suffer-a-catastrophiccyberattack-in-the-next-ten-years/, BC)
N ational S ecurity A gency and U.S. Cyber Command head Adm. Michael Rogers warned
lawmakers during a congressional briefing this week that

the U.S. would suffer a severe

cyberattack against critical infrastructure like power or fuel grids in

the not-too-distant future. I fully expect that during my time as a commander, we are going to be tasked
with defending critical infrastructure in the United States, Rogers said while citing findings from an
October Pew Research Center report.

Its only a matter of the when, not the if , that

were going to see something dramatic I bet it happens before 2025 .

Rogers told the House Intelligence Committee Thursday he expected the attack to occur during his tenure

it would likely come from statesponsored hackers with ties to China, Russia or several other countries,
as head of NSA the U.S. militarys cyber-war branch, and that

many of whom have already successfully breached the systems of critical U.S. industries. There are
multiple nation-states that have the capability and have been on the systems, Rogers told the committee,
adding that many were engaged in reconnaissance activities to surveil specific schematics of most of
our control systems. There shouldnt be any doubt in our minds that there are nation-states and groups
out there that have the capability to shut down, forestall our ability to operate our basic infrastructure,
whether its generating power across this nation, whether its moving water and fuel, Rogers said,

Rogers also
predicted that in the coming years, cyber criminals previously engaged in stealing bank,
credit card and other financial data would start to be co-opted by nation-states
warning China and one or two others had already broken into the U.S. power grid.

to act as surrogates , obscuring countries fingerprints in the infiltration and theft of

information valuable to planning attacks. The admiral added that such criminal groups, which are often
Russian-speaking, have already been using state-developed cyber tools.

Backdoors creates vulnerabilities that threaten

cyberinfrastructure makes attacks likely
Burger et al 14
(Eric, Research Professor of Computer Science at Georgetown, L. Jean Camp,
Associate professor at the Indiana University School of Information and
Computing, Dan Lubar, Emerging Standards Consultant at RelayServices, Jon
M Pesha, Carnegie Mellon University, Terry Davis, MicroSystems Automation
Group, Risking It All: Unlocking the Backdoor to the Nations Cybersecurity,
IEEE USA, 7/20/2014, pg. 1-5, Social Science Research Network,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2468604)//duncan
This paper addresses government policies that can influence commercial practices to weaken security in

The debate on information

surveillance for national security must include consideration of the
potential cybersecurity risks and economic implications of the
information collection strategies employed. As IEEE-USA, we write to comment on
products and services sold on the commercial market.

current discussions with respect to weakening standards, or altering commercial products and services for
intelligence, or law enforcement. Any policy that seeks to weaken technology sold on the commercial
market has many serious downsides, even if it temporarily advances the intelligence and law enforcement
missions of facilitating legal and authorized government surveillance. Specifically,

we define and

address the risks of installing backdoors in commercial products,

introducing malware and spyware into products, and weakening
standards. We illustrate that these are practices that harm
Americas cybersecurity posture and put the resilience of American
cyberinfrastructure at risk . We write as a technical society to clarify the potential harm
should these strategies be adopted. Whether or not these strategies ever have been used in practice is

Individual computer users, large corporations and

depend on security features built into information
technology products and services they buy on the commercial
market. If the security features of these widely available products
and services are weak, everyone is in greater danger. There recently
have been allegations that U.S. government agencies (and some private
entities) have engaged in a number of activities deliberately intended to
weaken mass market, widely used technology. Weakening commercial products and
services does have the benefit that it becomes easier for U.S.
intelligence agencies to conduct surveillance on targets that use the weakened
outside the scope of this paper.
government agencies all

technology, and more information is available for law enforcement purposes. On the surface, it would
appear these motivations would be reasonable. However,

such strategies also inevitably

make it easier for foreign powers, criminals and terrorists to

infiltrate these systems for their own purposes. Moreover, everyone
who uses backdoor technologies may be vulnerable, and not just the handful
of surveillance targets for U.S. intelligence agencies. It is the opinion of IEEE-USAs Committee on
Communications Policy that no entity should act to reduce the security of a product or service sold on the
commercial market without first conducting a careful and methodical risk assessment. A complete risk
assessment would consider the interests of the large swath of users of the technology who are not the

A methodical risk assessment would

give proper weight to the asymmetric nature of cyberthreats, given that
intended targets of government surveillance.

technology is equally advanced and ubiquitous in the United States, and the locales of many of our
adversaries. Vulnerable products should be corrected , as needed, based on this
assessment. The next section briefly describes some of the government policies and technical strategies
that might have the undesired side effect of reducing security. The following section discusses why the

Government policies
can affect greatly the security of commercial products, either positively or
effect of these practices may be a decrease, not an increase, in security.

negatively. There are a number of methods by which a government might affect security negatively as a
means of facilitating legal government surveillance. One inexpensive method is to exploit pre-existing
weaknesses that are already present in commercial software, while keeping these weaknesses a secret.
Another method is to motivate the designer of a computer or communications system to make those
systems easier for government agencies to access. Motivation may come from direct mandate or financial
incentives. There are many ways that a designer can facilitate government access once so motivated. For

the system may be equipped with a backdoor. The company

that creates it and, presumably, the government agency that
requests it would know the backdoor, but not the products (or services)
purchaser(s). The hope is that the government agency will use this
feature when it is given authority to do so, but no one else will.
However, creating a backdoor introduces the risk that other parties will
example,

find the vulnerability, especially when capable adversaries, who are

actively seeking security vulnerabilities, know how to leverage such
weaknesses . History illustrates that secret backdoors do not remain
secret and that the more widespread a backdoor, the more
dangerous its existence. The 1988 Morris worm, the first widespread
Internet attack, used a number of backdoors to infect systems and

spread widely. The backdoors in that case were a set of secrets then known only by a small, highly
technical community. A single, putatively innocent error resulted in a largescale attack that disabled many systems. In recent years, Barracuda had a
completely undocumented backdoor that allowed high levels of
access from the Internet addresses assigned to Barracuda. However, when it was publicized, as almost
inevitably happens, it became extremely unsafe, and Barracudas
customers rejected it. One example of how attackers can subvert
backdoors placed into systems for benign reasons occurred in the network of the largest
commercial cellular operator in Greece. Switches deployed in the system came
equipped with built-in wiretapping features, intended only for
authorized law enforcement agencies. Some unknown attacker was
able to install software, and made use of these embedded wiretapping features to
surreptitiously and illegally eavesdrop on calls from many cell
phones including phones belonging to the Prime Minister of Greece, a hundred
high-ranking Greek dignitaries, and an employee of the U.S. Embassy in
Greece before the security breach finally was discovered. In essence, a backdoor created to
fight crime was used to commit crime.

Two scenarios to a cyberattack

First is the grid a cyberattack causes collapse
Reuters 15
(Carolyn Cohn, reporter, 7-8-15, Cyber attack on U.S. power grid could cost
economy $1 trillion: report, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/08/uscyberattack-power-survey-idUSKCN0PI0XS20150708, BC)
A cyber attack which shuts down parts of the United States' power grid could
cost as much as $ 1 trillion to the U.S. economy, according to a report published on
Wednesday. Company executives are worried about security breaches, but recent surveys suggest they
are not convinced about the value or effectiveness of cyber insurance. The report from

the

University of Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies and the Lloyd's of London
insurance market outlines a scenario of an electricity blackout that leaves 93 million people in New York
City and Washington DC without power.

technologically possible

The scenario, developed by Cambridge, is

and is assessed to be within the once-in-200-year probability for

which insurers should be prepared, the report said.

The hypothetical attack causes a

rise in mortality rates as health and safety systems fail , a drop in

trade as ports shut down and disruption to transport and
infrastructure.

"The total impact to the U.S. economy is estimated at $243 billion, rising to more

than $1 trillion in the most extreme version of the scenario," the report said. The losses come from
damage to infrastructure and business supply chains, and are estimated over a five-year time period. The
extreme scenario is built on the greatest loss of power, with 100 generators taken offline, and would lead

There have been 15

suspected cyber attacks on the U.S. electricity grid since 2000, the
to insurance industry losses of more than $70 billion, the report added.

report said, citing U.S. energy department data. The U.S. Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency
Response Team said that 32 percent of its responses last year to cyber security threats to critical
infrastructure occurred in the energy sector. "The evidence of major attacks during 2014 suggests that
attackers were often able to exploit vulnerabilities faster than defenders could remedy them," Tom Bolt,
director of performance management at Lloyd's, said in the report.

An attack decimates US infrastructure within 15 minutes

NYT 10

(Michiko Kakutani, Pulitzer Prize winning book reviewer, citing Richard Clarke,
former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
Counter-terrorism for the United States, 4-27-10,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/books/27book.html?pagewanted=all,
BC)
Blackouts hit New York, Los Angeles, Washington and more than
100 other American cities. Subways crash. Trains derail. Airplanes
fall from the sky. Gas pipelines explode. Chemical plants release
clouds of toxic chlorine. Banks lose all their data. Weather and
communication satellites spin out of their orbits. And the
Pentagons classified networks grind to a halt, blinding the
greatest military power in the world.

This might sound like a takeoff on the 2007 Bruce Willis Die Hard movie, in

which a group of cyberterrorists attempts to stage what it calls a fire sale: a systematic shutdown of the nations vital communication and utilities infrastructure.

According to the former counterterrorism czar Richard A. Clarke, however, its a

scenario that could happen in real life and it could all go down in 15 minutes . While the
United States has a first-rate cyberoffense capacity, he says, its lack of a credible defense system,
combined with the countrys heavy reliance on technology, makes it highly susceptible to a devastating
cyberattack. The United States is currently far more vulnerable to cyberwar than Russia or China, he writes. The U.S. is more at risk from cyberwar

than are minor states like North Korea. We may even be at risk some day from nations or nonstate actors lacking cyberwar capabilities, but who can hire teams of highly
capable hackers. Lest this sound like the augury of an alarmist, the reader might recall that Mr. Clarke, counterterrorism chief in both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush
administrations, repeatedly warned his superiors about the need for an aggressive plan to combat al Qaeda with only a pallid response before 9/11. He recounted this

there is a lack of coordination between the

over how to handle a potential attack. Once again,

campaign in his controversial 2004 book, Against All Enemies. Once again,
various arms of the military and various committees in Congress

government agencies and private companies in charge of civilian infrastructure are ill prepared to handle a possible disaster. In these pages Mr. Clarke uses his insiders
knowledge of national security policy to create a harrowing and persuasive picture of the cyberthreat the United States faces today. Mr. Clarke is hardly a lone wolf on
the subject: Mike McConnell, the former director of national intelligence, told a Senate committee in February that

if we were in a

cyberwar today, the United States would lose . And last November, Steven Chabinsky, deputy
assistant director for the Federal Bureau of Investigations cyber division, noted that the F.B.I. was looking into Qaeda sympathizers who want to develop their hacking
skills and appear to want to target the United States infrastructure. Mr. Clarke who wrote this book with Robert K. Knake, an international affairs fellow at the Council
on Foreign Relations argues that

because the United States military relies so heavily upon

databases and new technology, it is highly vulnerable to

cyberattack. And while the newly established Cyber Command, along with the Department of Homeland Security, is supposed to defend the federal
government, he writes, the rest of us are on our own:

There is no federal agency that has the

mission to defend the banking system, the transportation networks

or the power grid from cyberattack . In fact, The Wall Street Journal reported in April 2009 that the United States
electrical grid had been penetrated by cyberspies (reportedly from China, Russia and other countries), who left behind software that could be used to sabotage the system
in the future.

Economic decline causes nuclear war

Harris and Burrows 9
(Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National
Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NICs Long Range
Analysis Unit Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial
Crisis http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf)
Increased Potential for Global Conflict
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a
number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample
Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so,

history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great
Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful
effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and
1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same
period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as
much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater
conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic
environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the
likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the

Terrorisms appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the

Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in
international agenda.

2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the worlds most dangerous
capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long
established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures
necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that

become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would

become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any
economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the
Middle East. Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed
Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with
external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own
nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great
powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low

conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended
escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established.
The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance
capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in
intensity

achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack .

short warning and missile flight times,
and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense,
potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience,
such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and
there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will
drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could
result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy
resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their
regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security
The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel,

concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as Chinas and Indias

If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed

turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of
regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and
counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting
critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East,
cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly
difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
development of blue water naval capabilities.

Grid collapse leads to nuclear meltdowns

Cappiello 3/29/11 national environmental reporter for The Associated
Press, masters degrees in earth and environmental science and journalism
from Columbia University (Dina, Long Blackouts Pose Risk To U.S. Nuclear
Reactors Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/29/blackout-risk-us-nuclearreactors_n_841869.html)//IS
should power be knocked out
it "would be unlikely that power will be recovered in the time frame
A 2003 federal analysis looking at how to estimate the risk of containment failure said that

by an earthquake or tornado

to prevent core meltdown."

In Japan, it was a one-two punch: first the earthquake, then the tsunami. Tokyo Electric Power Co., the operator of the crippled

plant, found other ways to cool the reactor core and so far avert a full-scale meltdown without electricity. "Clearly the coping duration is an issue on the table now," said Biff Bradley, director of risk assessment for
the Nuclear Energy Institute. "The industry and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will have to go back in light of what we just observed and rethink station blackout duration." David Lochbaum, a former plant
engineer and nuclear safety director at the advocacy group Union of Concerned Scientists, put it another way: "

you play beat-the-clock and lose

Japan shows what happens when

." Lochbaum plans to use the Japan disaster to press lawmakers and the nuclear power industry to do more when

A complete loss of electrical

power, generally speaking, poses a major problem for a nuclear
power plant because the reactor core must be kept cool, and backup cooling systems mostly pumps that replenish the core with
water_ require massive amounts of power to work. Without the
electrical grid, or diesel generators, batteries can be used for a time,
but they will not last long with the power demands. And when the
batteries die, the systems that control and monitor the plant can
also go dark, making it difficult to ascertain water levels and the
condition of the core. One variable not considered in the NRC risk
assessments of severe blackouts was cooling water in spent fuel
pools, where rods once used in the reactor are placed. With limited
resources, the commission decided to focus its analysis on the
reactor fuel, which has the potential to release more radiation
it comes to coping with prolonged blackouts, such as having temporary generators on site that can recharge batteries.

. An analysis of

individual plant risks released in 2003 by the NRC shows that for 39 of the 104 nuclear reactors, the risk of core damage from a blackout was greater than 1 in 100,000. At 45 other plants the risk is greater than 1 in
1 million, the threshold NRC is using to determine which severe accidents should be evaluated in its latest analysis. The Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1, in Pennsylvania had the greatest risk of core melt 6.5 in
100,000, according to the analysis. But that risk may have been reduced in subsequent years as NRC regulations required plants to do more to cope with blackouts. Todd Schneider, a spokesman for FirstEnergy
Nuclear Operating Co., which runs Beaver Creek, told the AP that batteries on site would last less than a week. In 1988, eight years after labeling blackouts "an unresolved safety issue," the NRC required nuclear
power plants to improve the reliability of their diesel generators, have more backup generators on site, and better train personnel to restore power. These steps would allow them to keep the core cool for four to
eight hours if they lost all electrical power. By contrast, the newest generation of nuclear power plant, which is still awaiting approval, can last 72 hours without taking any action, and a minimum of seven days if
water is supplied by other means to cooling pools. Despite the added safety measures, a 1997 report found that blackouts the loss of on-site and off-site electrical power remained "a dominant contributor to the
risk of core melt at some plants." The events of Sept. 11, 2001, further solidified that nuclear reactors might have to keep the core cool for a longer period without power. After 9/11, the commission issued
regulations requiring that plants have portable power supplies for relief valves and be able to manually operate an emergency reactor cooling system when batteries go out. The NRC says these steps, and others,
have reduced the risk of core melt from station blackouts from the current fleet of nuclear plants. For instance, preliminary results of the latest analysis of the risks to the Peach Bottom plant show that any release
caused by a blackout there would be far less rapid and would release less radiation than previously thought, even without any actions being taken. With more time, people can be evacuated. The NRC says improved
computer models, coupled with up-to-date information about the plant, resulted in the rosier outlook. "When you simplify, you always err towards the worst possible circumstance," Scott Burnell, a spokesman for
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said of the earlier studies. The latest work shows that "even in situations where everything is broken and you can't do anything else, these events take a long time to play out,"
he said. "Even when you get to releasing into environment, much less of it is released than actually thought." Exelon Corp., the operator of the Peach Bottom plant, referred all detailed questions about its

all Exelon nuclear

plants are able to safely shut down and keep the fuel cooled even
without electricity from the grid
a core melt at Peach Bottom could begin in one hour if
electrical power on- and off-site were lost, the diesel generators
the main back-up source of power for the pumps that keep the core
cool with water failed to work and other mitigating steps weren't
taken. "It is not a question that those things are definitely effective
in this kind of scenario,"
preparedness and the risk analysis back to the NRC. In a news release issued earlier this month, the company, which operates 10 nuclear power plants, said "

." Other people, looking at the crisis unfolding in Japan, aren't so sure. In the worst-case scenario, the NRC's 1990

risk assessment predicted that

said Richard Denning, a professor of nuclear engineering at Ohio State University, referring to the steps NRC has taken to prevent

incidents. Denning had done work as a contractor on severe accident analyses for the NRC since 1975. He retired from Battelle Memorial Institute in 1995. "They certainly could have made all the difference in this
particular case," he said, referring to Japan. "That's assuming you have stored these things in a place that would not have been swept away by tsunami."

Nuclear meltdowns cause extinction

Lendman 3/13/11 BA from Harvard University and MBA from Wharton
School at the University of Pennsylvania (Stephen, Nuclear Meltdown in
Japan Rense, http://rense.com/general93/nucmelt.htm)
For years, Helen Caldicott warned it's coming. In her 1978 book, "Nuclear Madness," she said: "As a physician, I contend that nuclear
technology threatens life on our planet with extinction . If present
trends continue, theair we breathe, the food we eat, and the water
we drink will soon becontaminated with enough radioactive
pollutants to pose a potential health hazard far greater than any
plague humanity has ever experienced." More below on the inevitable dangers from commercial nuclear power
proliferation, besides added military ones. On March 11, New York Times writer Martin Fackler headlined, "Powerful Quake and Tsunami Devastate Northern Japan," saying:

The 8.9-magnitude earthquake

"
(Japan's strongest ever) set off a devastating tsunami that sent walls of water (six meters
high) washing over coastal cities in the north." According to Japan's Meteorological Survey, it was 9.0. The Sendai port city and other areas experienced heavy damage.
"Thousands of homes were destroyed, many roads were impassable, trains and buses (stopped) running, and power and cellphones remained down. On Saturday morning,

Striking at 2:46PM Tokyo time, it caused

vast destruction, shook city skyscrapers, buckled highways, ignited
fires, terrified millions, annihilated areas near Sendai, possibly killed thousands, and caused a nuclear
the JR rail company" reported three trains missing. Many passengers are unaccounted for.

meltdown, its potential catastrophic effects far exceeding quake and

tsunami devastation, almost minor by comparison under a worst
case scenario. On March 12, Times writer Matthew Wald headlined, "Explosion Seen at Damaged Japan Nuclear Plant," saying: "Japanese officials
(ordered evacuations) for people living near two nuclear power plants whose cooling systems broke down," releasing radioactive material, perhaps in far greater amounts
than reported. NHK television and Jiji said the 40-year old Fukushima plant's outer structure housing the reactor "appeared to have blown off, which could suggest the
containment building had already been breached." Japan's nuclear regulating agency said radioactive levels inside were 1,000 times above normal. Reuters said the 1995
Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly ever natural disaster. This time, from quake and tsunami damage alone, that figure will be dwarfed.

, under a worst case core meltdown, all bets are off as the entire
region and beyond will be threatened with permanent
contamination, making the most affected areas unsafe to live in. On March
Moreover

12, Stratfor Global Intelligence issued a "Red Alert: Nuclear Meltdown at Quake-Damaged Japanese Plant," saying: Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan,
appears to have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already
may have happened - the ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s long as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to contain high
levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains intact, the melted fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility built around (it) remains intact,

Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster killed nearly one

million people worldwide from nuclear radiation exposure. In their book titled,
"Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment," Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko said: " For the
past 23 years, it has been clear that there is a danger greater than
the melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at

nuclear weapons concealed within nuclear power. Emissions from

this one reactor exceeded a hundred-fold the radioactive
contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki."
"No citizen of any country can be assured that he or she can be
protected from radioactive contamination. One nuclear reactor can
pollute half the globe. Chernobyl fallout covers the entire Northern
Hemisphere." Stratfor explained that if Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly likely that the melting fuel will burn through (its) containment system and
enter the ground. This has never happened before," at least not reported. If now occurring, "containment goes from being merely dangerous, time consuming and
expensive to nearly impossible," making the quake, aftershocks, and tsunamis seem mild by comparison. Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized. Japanese officials
said Fukushima's reactor container wasn't breached. Stratfor and others said it was, making the potential calamity far worse than reported. Japan's Nuclear and Industrial
Safety Agency (NISA) said the explosion at Fukushima's Saiichi No. 1 facility could only have been caused by a core meltdown. In fact, 3 or more reactors are affected or at
risk. Events are fluid and developing, but remain very serious.

The possibility of an extreme catastrophe

can't be discounted.

Moreover, independent nuclear safety analyst John Large told Al Jazeera that by venting radioactive steam from the
inner reactor to the outer dome, a reaction may have occurred, causing the explosion. "When I look at the size of the explosion," he said, "it is my opinion that there could
be a very large leak (because) fuel continues to generate heat." Already, Fukushima way exceeds Three Mile Island that experienced a partial core meltdown in Unit 2.
Finally it was brought under control, but coverup and denial concealed full details until much later. According to anti-nuclear activist Harvey Wasserman, Japan's quake

If the cooling system fails (apparently

it has at two or more plants), the super-heated radioactive fuel rods
will melt, and (if so) you could conceivably have an explosion ," that,
fallout may cause nuclear disaster, saying: "This is a very serious situation.

in fact, occurred. As a result, massive radiation releases may follow,

impacting the entire region. "It could be, literally, an apocalyptic
event .

The reactor could blow." If so, Russia, China, Korea and most parts of Western Asia will be affected. Many thousands will die, potentially millions under a

worse case scenario, including far outside East Asia. Moreover, at least five reactors are at risk. Already, a 20-mile wide radius was evacuated. What happened in Japan can
occur anywhere. Yet Obama's proposed budget includes $36 billion for new reactors, a shocking disregard for global safety. Calling Fukushima an "apocalyptic event,"
Wasserman said "(t)hese nuclear plants have to be shut," let alone budget billions for new ones. It's unthinkable, he said. If a similar disaster struck California, nuclear
fallout would affect all America, Canada, Mexico, Central America, and parts of South America. Nuclear Power: A Technology from Hell Nuclear expert Helen Caldicott
agrees, telling this writer by phone that a potential regional catastrophe is unfolding. Over 30 years ago, she warned of its inevitability. Her 2006 book titled, "Nuclear
Power is Not the Answer" explained that contrary to government and industry propaganda, even during normal operations, nuclear power generation causes significant
discharges of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as hundreds of thousands of curies of deadly radioactive gases and other radioactive elements into the environment every

nuclear plants are atom bomb factories. A 1000 megawatt

reactor produces 500 pounds of plutonium annually. Only 10 are
needed for a bomb able to devastate a large city, besides causing
permanent radiation contamination.
year. Moreover,

Second is retaliation
Cyberterror leads to nuclear exchanges traditional
defense doesnt apply
Fritz 9 (Jason, Master in International Relations from Bond, BS from St.

Cloud), Hacking Nuclear Command and Control, International Commission

on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, 2009, pnnd.org)//duncan

This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to

nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source knowledge to identify the
structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through
computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists capabilities,

If access to command and control centres is obtained,

terrorists could fake or actually cause one nuclear-armed state to
strategies, and tactics.

attack another , thus provoking a nuclear response from another

nuclear power. This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups
than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb
themselves. This would also act as a force equaliser, and provide
terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of
geographical distance, and a relatively low cost. Continuing difficulties in
developing computer tracking technologies which could trace the
identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed
upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations, point
towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to
manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing
the hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals. All computers
which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration
and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised
by various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points,
embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing
targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an
open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the
open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access these closed

Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on

computer networks, including experimental technology such as
autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch
options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry
points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps
networks directly.

isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple
attempts have been made by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the
US Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet
system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to
establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the event
that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the possibility of
cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer network operations in an attempt to engage
Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further
enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using
proxies, multi-layered attacks could be engineered . Terrorists could remotely

the system.

commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia
would believe it was under attack from the US and the US would believe China was responsible. Further,

emergency response communications could be disrupted,

transportation could be shut down, and disinformation, such as
misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief
effort and maximizing destruction. Disruptions in communication
and the use of disinformation could also be used to provoke
uninformed responses.

For example, a nuclear strike between India and Pakistan could be

coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would have further
difficulty in identifying what happened and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out

amidst the
confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of
responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an
communications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively,

attempt to instigate a hasty military response. These false claims could be

posted directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media
and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials. A
sophisticated and all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could be
enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own, without the need for compromising command and control
centres directly.

1acheg
Backdoors destroy US tech innovation and
competitiveness
Kohn 14

(Cindy, writer for the Electronic Freedom Foundation, 9-26-14, Nine Epic
Failures of Regulating Cryptography,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/09/nine-epic-failures-regulatingcryptography, BC)
For those who weren't following digital civil liberties issues in 1995, or for those who have forgotten, here's a
refresher list of why forcing companies to break their own privacy
and security measures by installing a back door was a bad idea 15 years
ago: It will create security risks. Don't take our word for it. Computer security
expert Steven Bellovin has explained some of the problems. First, it's hard to secure
communications properly even between two parties. Cryptography with a back door adds a
third party, requiring a more complex protocol, and as Bellovin puts it: "Many previous attempts to add such
features have resulted in new, easily exploited security flaws rather than better law enforcement access." It doesn't end
there. Bellovin notes: Complexity in the protocols isn't the only problem; protocols require computer programs to
implement them, and more complex code generally creates more exploitable bugs. In the most notorious incident of this
type, a cell phone switch in Greece was hacked by an unknown party. The so-called 'lawful intercept' mechanisms in the
switch that is, the features designed to permit the police to wiretap calls easily was abused by the attacker to
monitor at least a hundred cell phones, up to and including the prime minister's. This attack would not have been possible
if the vendor hadn't written the lawful intercept code. More recently, as security researcher Susan Landau explains, "an
IBM researcher found that a Cisco wiretapping architecture designed to accommodate law-enforcement requirements a
system already in use by major carriers had numerous security holes in its design. This would have made it easy to
break into the communications network and surreptitiously wiretap private communications." The same is true for
Google, which had its "compliance" technologies hacked by China. This isn't just a problem for you and me and millions
of companies that need secure communications. What will the government itself use for secure communications? The FBI
and other government agencies currently use many commercial products the same ones they want to force to have a
back door. How will the FBI stop people from un-backdooring their deployments? Or does the government plan to stop
using commercial communications technologies altogether? It won't stop the bad guys. Users who want strong
encryption will be able to get it from Germany, Finland, Israel, and many other places in the world where it's offered for
sale and for free. In 1996, the National Research Council did a study called "Cryptography's Role in Securing the
Information Society," nicknamed CRISIS. Here's what they said: Products using unescrowed encryption are in use today
by millions of users, and such products are available from many difficult-to-censor Internet sites abroad. Users could preencrypt their data, using whatever means were available, before their data were accepted by an escrowed encryption
device or system. Users could store their data on remote computers, accessible through the click of a mouse but
otherwise unknown to anyone but the data owner, such practices could occur quite legally even with a ban on the use of
unescrowed encryption. Knowledge of strong encryption techniques is available from official U.S. government publications
and other sources worldwide, and experts understanding how to use such knowledge might well be in high demand from
criminal elements. CRISIS Report at 303 None of that has changed. And of course, more encryption technology is more
readily available today than it was in 1996. So unless the goverment wants to mandate that you are forbidden to run
anything that is not U.S. government approved on your devices, they won't stop bad guys from getting access to strong

It will harm innovation . In order to ensure that no

"untappable" technology exists, we'll likely see a technology
mandate and a draconian regulatory framework . The implications of
encryption.

this for America's leadership in innovation are dire. Could Mark

Zuckerberg have built Facebook in his dorm room if he'd had to build
in surveillance capabilities before launch in order to avoid government fines? Would
Skype have ever happened if it had been forced to include an
artificial bottleneck to allow government easy access to all of your peer-to-peer
communications? This has especially serious implications for the open
source community and small innovators. Some open source
developers have already taken a stand against building back doors
into software. It will harm US business . If, thanks to this proposal, US
businesses cannot innovate and cannot offer truly secure products,

we're just handing business over to foreign companies who don't

have such limitations . Nokia, Siemens, and Ericsson would all be
happy to take a heaping share of the communications technology
business from US companies. And it's not just telecom carriers and VOIP providers at risk. Many
game consoles that people can use to play over the Internet, such as
the Xbox, allow gamers to chat with each other while they play.
They'd have to be tappable, too.

Data proves
Bloomberg, 13

(Allan Holmes, staff writer, 9-10-13, NSA Spying Seen Risking Billions in U.S.
Technology Sales, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-10/nsaspying-seen-risking-billions-in-u-s-technology-sales, BC)
the National Security Agency persuaded some U.S. technology
companies to build so-called backdoors into security products, networks and devices to
Reports that

allow easier surveillance are similar to how the House Intelligence Committee described the threat posed
by China through Huawei. Just as the Shenzhen, China-based Huawei lost business after the report urged

the NSA disclosures may reduce U.S.

technology sales overseas by as much as $180 billion, or 25 percent
of information technology services, by 2016, according to Forrester
Research Inc., a research group in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The National Security
U.S. companies not to use its equipment,

Agency will kill the U.S. technology industry singlehandedly , Rob

Enderle, a technology analyst in San Jose, California, said in an interview. These
companies may be just dealing with the difficulty in meeting our numbers through the end of the decade.
Internet companies, network equipment manufacturers and encryption tool makers receive significant
shares of their revenue from overseas companies and governments. Cisco Systems Inc., the worlds
biggest networking equipment maker, received 42 percent of its $46.1 billion in fiscal 2012 revenue from
outside the U.S., according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Symantec Corp., the biggest maker of
computer-security software based in Mountain View, California, reported 46 percent of its fiscal 2013
revenue of $6.9 billion from markets other than the U.S., Canada and Latin America. Intel Corp., the
worlds largest semiconductor maker, reported 84 percent of its $53.3 billion in fiscal 2012 revenue came
from outside the U.S., according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Exact Flipping The New York Times, the
U.K.s Guardian and ProPublica reported in early September that NSA has cracked codes protecting e-mail
and Web content and convinced some equipment and device makers to build backdoors into products.
That followed earlier reports that the NSA was obtaining and analyzing communications records from
phone companies and Internet providers. The revelations have some overseas governments questioning
their reliance on U.S. technology. Germanys government has called for home-grown Internet and e-mail
companies. Brazil is analyzing whether privacy laws were violated by foreign companies. India may ban email services from Google Inc. and Yahoo Inc., the Wall Street Journal reported. In June, China Daily labeled
U.S. companies, including Cisco, a terrible security threat. One year ago we had the same concern
about Huawei, James Staten, an analyst at Forrester, said in an interview. Now this is the exact flipping of
that circumstance. Tarnished Reputations An Information Technology and Innovation Foundation report in
August found

U.S. providers of cloud services -- which manage the networks, storage,

stand to lose as much as $35

applications and computing power for companies --

billion a year as foreign companies, spooked by the NSAs

surveillance, seek non-U.S. offerings.
on a companys reputation, and

Customers buy products and services based

the NSA has single-handedly tarnished the

reputation of the entire U.S. tech industry , said Daniel Castro, the reports author
and an analyst with the non-partisan research group in Washington, in an e-mail. I suspect many foreign
customers are going to be shopping elsewhere for their hardware and software.

Tech leadership in the private sector is uniquely key to

heg
Segal 4
(Adam, director of the Program on Digital and Cyberspace Policy at the
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), An expert on security issues, technology
development, November/December 2004 Issue, Is America Losing Its Edge,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2004-11-01/americalosing-its-edge, BC)
The

U nited S tates' global primacy depends in large part on its ability to

develop new technologies and industries faster than anyone else .

For the last five decades, U.S. scientific innovation and technological
entrepreneurship have ensured the country's economic prosperity
and military power . It was Americans who invented and
commercialized the semiconductor, the personal computer, and the
Internet; other countries merely followed the U.S. lead. Today, however, this technological
edge-so long taken for granted-may be slipping , and the most serious challenge
is coming from Asia. Through competitive tax policies, increased investment in research and development
(R&D), and preferential policies for science and technology (S&T) personnel, Asian governments are

The
percentage of patents issued to and science journal articles
published by scientists in China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan
is rising. Indian companies are quickly becoming the second-largest producers of application services
improving the quality of their science and ensuring the exploitation of future innovations.

in the world, developing, supplying, and managing database and other types of software for clients around

South Korea has rapidly eaten away at the U.S. advantage in

the manufacture of computer chips and telecommunications
software. And even China has made impressive gains in advanced
technologies such as lasers, biotechnology, and advanced materials
used in semiconductors, aerospace, and many other types of
manufacturing. Although the United States' technical dominance remains solid, the globalization
the world.

of research and development is exerting considerable pressures on the American system. Indeed, as the
United States is learning, globalization cuts both ways: it is both a potent catalyst of U.S. technological

The United States will never be able to prevent rivals

can remain dominant only by continuing to

innovation and a significant threat to it.

from developing new technologies; it

innovate faster than everyone else.

But this won't be easy;

to keep its

privileged position in the world, the U nited S tates must get better at
fostering technological entrepreneurship at home.

This is correlation is supported by a consensus of

international relations theory
Taylor 4 (Massachusetts Institute of Technology research assistant Department of Political Science)
(Mark Zachary, Ph.D. candidate, lecturer, The Politics of Technological Change: International Relations
versus Domestic Institutions http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/wip/Taylor.pdf)

Technological innovation is of central importance to the study of international relations (IR), affecting almost every
aspect of the sub-field.2 First and foremost, a nations technological capability has a significant effect on its
economic growth, industrial might, and military prowess; therefore relative national technological capabilities
necessarily influence the balance of power between states, and hence have a role in calculations

of war and alliance formation. Second, technology and innovative capacity also determine a nations
trade profile, affecting which products it will import and export, as well as where multinational
corporations will base their production facilities.3 Third, insofar as innovation-driven economic growth both attracts investment and
produces surplus capital, a nations technological ability will also affect international financial flows
and who has power over them.4 Thus, in broad theoretical terms, technological change is important to the study of IR because of its
overall implications for both the relative and absolute power of states. And if theory alone does not convince, then history also tells us that
nations on the technological ascent generally experience a corresponding and dramatic
change in their global stature and influence, such as Britain during the first industrial revolution, the United States and
Germany during the second industrial revolution, and Japan during the twentieth century.5 Conversely, great powers which fail to
maintain their place at the technological frontier generally drift and fade from influence on
international scene.6 This is not to suggest that technological innovation alone determines international politics, but rather that shifts in
both relative and absolute technological capability have a major impact on international
relations, and therefore need to be better understood by IR scholars indirect source of military doctrine. And for some, like Gilpin
quoted above, technology is the very cornerstone of great power domination, and its
transfer the main vehicle by which war and change occur in world politics.8 Jervis tells us
that the balance of offensive and defensive military technology affects the incentives for war.9 Walt
agrees, arguing that technological change can alter a states aggregate power, and thereby
affect both alliance formation and the international balance of threats .10 Liberals are less directly
concerned with technological change, but they must admit that by raising or lowering the costs of using force,
technological progress affects the rational attractiveness of international cooperation and
regimes.11 Technology also lowers information & transactions costs and thus increases the applicability of international institutions, a cornerstone of
Liberal IR theory.12 And in fostering flows of trade, finance, and information, technological change can lead to Keohanes interdependence13 or Thomas
Friedman et als globalization.14 Meanwhile, over at the third debate, Constructivists cover the causal spectrum on the issue, from Katzensteins
cultural norms which shape security concerns and thereby affect technological innovation;15 to Wendts stripped down technological determinism in
which technology inevitably drives nations to form a world state.16 However most Constructivists seem to favor Wendt, arguing that new technology
changes peoples identities within society, and sometimes even creates new cross-national constituencies, thereby affecting international politics.17 Of
course, Marxists tend to see technology as determining all social relations and the entire course of history, though they describe mankinds major fault
lines as running between economic classes rather than nation-states.18 Finally, Buzan & Little remind us that without advances in the technologies of
transportation, communication, production, and war, international systems would not exist in the first place.19

We control uniqueness, competition among states for

relative status is inevitablepromoting US primacy is the
only option

Wohlforth 09 Professor of government @ Dartmouth College. [William C. Wohlforth, Unipolarity,

Status Competition, and Great Power War, World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009]
Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively
independent of the distribution of capabilities . If the status of states depends
in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then
different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different
income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building on
research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities
distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status
hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status
quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is.

Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for
direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to
prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into

social status is a positional good

something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others .7
If everyone has high status, Randall Schweller notes, no one does.8 While one actor might
increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and
competitions for status tend to be zero sum.9 I begin by describing the puzzles facing
predominant theories that status competition might solve. Building on recent research on
social identity and status seeking, I then show that under certain conditions the
costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because

ways decision makers identify with the states they represent may prompt
them to frame issues as positional disputes over status in a social hierarchy. I
develop hypotheses that tailor this scholarship to the domain of great power politics, showing how the probability
of status competition is likely to be linked to polarity . The rest of the article investigates
whether there is sufficient evidence for these hypotheses to warrant further refinement and testing. I pursue this in three

the theory advanced here is consistent with what we know about

large-scale patterns of great power conflict through history; by [End Page
ways: by showing that

30] demonstrating that the causal mechanisms it identifies did drive relatively secure major powers to military conflict in
the past (and therefore that they might do so again if the world were bipolar or multipolar); and by showing that
observable evidence concerning the major powers identity politics and grand strategies under unipolarity are consistent
with the theorys expectations. Puzzles of Power and War Recent research on the connection between the distribution of
capabilities and war has concentrated on a hypothesis long central to systemic theories of power transition or hegemonic

major war arises out of a power shift in favor of a rising state

dissatisfied with a status quo defended by a declining satisfied state . Though
stability: that

10

they have garnered substantial empirical support, these theories have yet to solve two intertwined empirical and
theoretical puzzleseach of which might be explained by positional concerns for status. First, if the material costs and
benefits of a given status quo are what matters, why would a state be dissatisfied with the very status quo that had
abetted its rise? The rise of China today naturally prompts this question, but it is hardly a novel situation. Most of the best
known and most consequential power transitions in history featured rising challengers that were prospering mightily
under the status quo. In case after case, historians argue that these revisionist powers sought recognition and standing
rather than specific alterations to the existing rules and practices that constituted the order of the day. In each
paradigmatic case of hegemonic war, the claims of the rising power are hard to reduce to instrumental adjustment of the
status quo. In R. Ned Lebows reading, for example, Thucydides account tells us that the rise of Athens posed
unacceptable threats not to the security or welfare of Sparta but rather to its identity as leader of the Greek world, which
was an important cause of the Spartan assemblys vote for war.11 The issues that inspired Louis XIVs and Napoleons
dissatisfaction with the status quo were many and varied, but most accounts accord [End Page 31] independent
importance to the drive for a position of unparalleled primacy. In these and other hegemonic struggles among leading
states in post-Westphalian Europe, the rising challengers dissatisfaction is often difficult to connect to the material costs
and benefits of the status quo, and much contemporary evidence revolves around issues of recognition and status. 12
Wilhemine Germany is a fateful case in point. As Paul Kennedy has argued, underlying material trends as of 1914 were set
to propel Germanys continued rise indefinitely, so long as Europe remained at peace.13 Yet Germany chafed under the
very status quo that abetted this rise and its elite focused resentment on its chief trading partnerthe great power that
presented the least plausible threat to its security: Great Britain. At fantastic cost, it built a battleship fleet with no
plausible strategic purpose other than to stake a claim on global power status. 14 Recent historical studies present strong
evidence that, far from fearing attacks from Russia and France, German leaders sought to provoke them, knowing that this
would lead to a long, expensive, and sanguinary war that Britain was certain to join. 15 And of all the motivations swirling
round these momentous decisions, no serious historical account fails to register German leaders oft-expressed yearning
for a place in the sun. The second puzzle is bargaining failure. Hegemonic theories tend to model war as a conflict over
the status quo without specifying precisely what the status quo is and what flows of benefits it provides to states. 16
Scholars generally follow Robert Gilpin in positing that the underlying issue concerns a desire to redraft the rules by
which relations among nations work, the nature and governance of the system, and the distribution of territory among
the states in the system.17 If these are the [End Page 32] issues at stake, then systemic theories of hegemonic war and
power transition confront the puzzle brought to the fore in a seminal article by James Fearon: what prevents states from
striking a bargain that avoids the costs of war? 18 Why cant states renegotiate the international order as underlying
capabilities distributions shift their relative bargaining power? Fearon proposed that one answer consistent with strict
rational choice assumptions is that such bargains are infeasible when the issue at stake is indivisible and cannot readily

Most aspects of a given international order are readily

divisible, however, and, as Fearon stressed, both the intrinsic complexity and richness of most matters over which
be portioned out to each side.

states negotiate and the availability of linkages and side-payments suggest that intermediate bargains typically will
exist.19 Thus, most scholars have assumed that the indivisibility problem is trivial, focusing on two other rational choice
explanations for bargaining failure: uncertainty and the commitment problem. 20 In the view of many scholars, it is these
problems, rather than indivisibility, that likely explain leaders inability to avail themselves of such intermediate bargains.

recent research inspired by constructivism shows how issues that are

physically divisible can become socially indivisible, depending on how they
relate to the identities of decision makers.21 Once issues surrounding the status quo are
framed in positional terms as bearing on the disputants relative standing,
then, to the extent that they value their standing itself, they may be unwilling to pursue
intermediate bargaining solutions. Once linked to status, easily divisible
issues that theoretically provide opportunities for linkages and side payments of various sorts may themselves be
seen as indivisible and thus unavailable as avenues for possible intermediate bargains. The
historical record surrounding major wars is rich with evidence
suggesting that positional concerns over status frustrate bargaining:
expensive, protracted conflict over what appear to be minor issues; a propensity on the part of
decision makers to frame issues in terms of relative rank even when doing so
makes bargaining harder; decision-makers [End Page 33] inability to accept
Yet

feasible divisions of the matter in dispute even when failing to do so imposes high
costs; demands on the part of states for observable evidence to confirm their estimate of an improved position in the
hierarchy; the inability of private bargains to resolve issues; a frequently observed compulsion for the
public attainment of concessions from a higher ranked state; and stubborn resistance on the part of states to
which such demands are addressed even when acquiescence entails limited material cost .
The literature on bargaining failure in the context of power shifts remains inconclusive, and it is premature to take any
empirical pattern as necessarily probative. Indeed, Robert Powell has recently proposed that indivisibility is not a
rationalistic explanation for war after all: fully rational leaders with perfect information should prefer to settle a dispute
over an indivisible issue by resorting to a lottery rather than a war certain to destroy some of the goods in dispute. What
might prevent such bargaining solutions is not indivisibility itself, he argues, but rather the parties inability to commit to
abide by any agreement in the future if they expect their relative capabilities to continue to shift.22 This is the credible
commitment problem to which many theorists are now turning their attention. But how it relates to the information
problem that until recently dominated the formal literature remains to be seen. 23 The larger point is that positional
concerns for status may help account for the puzzle of bargaining failure. In the rational choice bargaining literature, war
is puzzling because it destroys some of the benefits or flows of benefits in dispute between the bargainers, who would be
better off dividing the spoils without war. Yet what happens to these models if what matters for states is less the flows of
material benefits themselves than their implications for relative status? The salience of this question depends on the

Mainstream
theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo
only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding
relative importance of positional concern for status among states. Do Great Powers Care about Status?

assumption is that a states satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of
the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a states status in an
international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on

But the assumption is undermined by cumulative

research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary
biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that
human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social
status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a
basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals .25
People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but
because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will
cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest
in security and/or prosperity. Pg. 33-35//1ac
decisions for war or peace.

Heg is key to global stability and solves major conflicts

Thayer 6
(Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Study @ Missouri State
University, Former Research Fellow @ International Security Program @
Harvard Belfer Center of Science and International Affairs (Bradley, In
Defense of Primacy, The National Interest, November/December)
A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one
power-the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States
should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from
its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial
overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy
and called for retrenchment.1 Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include
isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to
centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would
have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to
defend its interests. But

retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such
would lead to far greater instability and

a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that

war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There

are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should
it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities.
The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities
and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that
will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment
acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of
retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action but they fall to realize what is good about American
primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not.
A GRAND strategy of ensuring

American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of

the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like

oil

flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that

Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in
part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians
in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives
of the United States. Indeed,

retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the
threats will exist no matter what role America

present grand strategy of primacy. This is because

chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats.
Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats
must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its
commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean
that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to
eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional
and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies
must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from .American soil.
Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they
use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical,
on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S.
primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global common"--the oceans, the world's airspace
and outer space-allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common
avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are
reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased.' This
is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly. A remarkable fact about international politics today--in

a
world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries
want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of
altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the U nited
States for their own purposes, their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are
allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements-and
they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and
a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus

U.S. primacy-and the bandwagoning effect-has also given us extensive influence in international
the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies.

politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence

comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to
free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the where it can be stymied by opponents.
American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur
or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in
dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the
typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the
United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezeula. Of course, countries like
India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi
is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of
the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even
Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it
will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such
as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be
confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the
foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates.
The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba-it is an
anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a
change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and
stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States
today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international

the current international order - free trade, a

robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is
directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be
politics. Everything we think of when we consider

maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded

Appalling things happen when international orders

collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order
established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States
will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Rai Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until
of one of history's most significant lessons:

you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of
the United States and its allies, American

primacy within the international system causes many positive

a more peaceful world. During the Cold War,

outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been

U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most

American primacy helps keep a number of

complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and
Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not
notably France and West Germany. Today,

to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not

Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood,

particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United
States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a
seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a

source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these
pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic

once states are

governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly
reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because
they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in
concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as
to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition,

well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to
spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation
of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers
from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a
peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab
states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has
brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October
2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in
January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington
fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is
increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been
made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of
democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world
has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically
liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and
mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this
economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World.
The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America.
This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits
defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster
the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the
benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at
the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the
positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third

market economic policies and globalization, which are

facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is
World is through the adoption of free

one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides.

1acplan
The United States federal government should ban the
creation and surveillance of backdoors as outlined in the
Secure Data Act of 2015.

1acsolvency
The plan bans backdoors entirelythat strengthens
cybersecurity and revitalizes tech competitiveness
McQuinn, 14

(Alan McQuinn is a research assistant with the Information Technology and

Innovation Foundation (ITIF), The Secure Data Act could help law
enforcement protect against cybercrime, 12-19-14,
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/227594-the-secure-dataact-could-help-law-enforcement-protect-against, BC)
Last Sunday, Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) wrote an op-ed describing the role that
U.S. law enforcement should play in fostering stronger data encryption to
make information technology (IT) systems more secure. This op-ed explains
Wydens introduction of the the Secure Data Act, which would prohibit
the government from mandating that U.S. companies build
backdoors in their products for the purpose of surveillance . This
legislation responds directly to recent comments by U.S. officials, most
notably the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director James Comey,
chastising Apple and Google for creating encrypted devices to which law
enforcement cannot gain access. Comey and others have argued that U.S.
tech companies should design a way for law enforcement officials to access
consumer data stored on those devices. In this environment, the Secure Data
Act is a homerun for security and privacy and is a good step towards
reasserting U.S. competitiveness in building secure systems for a global
market. By adopting its position on the issue the FBI is working against its
own goal of preventing cybercrime as well as broader government efforts to
improve cybersecurity. Just a few years ago, the Bureau was counseling
people to better encrypt their data to safeguard it from hackers. Creating
backdoor access for law enforcement fundamentally weakens IT
systems because it creates a new pathway for malicious hackers,
foreign governments, and other unauthorized parties to gain illicit
access. Requiring backdoors is a step backwards for companies actively
working to eliminate security vulnerabilities in their products. In this way,
security is a lot like a ship at sea, the more holes you put in the system
government mandated or notthe faster it will sink. The better solution is
to patch up all the holes in the system and work to prevent any new
ones. Rather than decreasing security to suit its appetite for surveillance, the
FBI should recognize that better security is needed to bolster U.S. defenses
against online threats. The Secure Data Act is an important step in
that direction because it will stop U.S. law enforcement agencies from
requiring companies to introduce vulnerabilities in their products. If
this bill is enacted, law enforcement will be forced to use other means
to solve crimes, such as by using metadata from cellular providers, call
records, text messages, and even old-fashioned detective work. This will
also allow U.S. tech companies, with the help of law enforcement, to
continue to strengthen their systems, better detect intrusions, and
identify emerging threats. Law enforcement, such as the recently

announced U.S. Department of Justice Cybersecurity Unita unit designed

solely to deter, investigate, and prosecute cyber criminals, should work in
cooperation with the private sector to create a safer environment online. A
change of course is also necessary to restore the ability of U.S. tech
companies to compete globally , where mistrust has run rampant
following the revelations of mass government surveillance. With the 113th
Congress at an end, Wyden has promised to reintroduce the Data Secure Act
again in the next Congress. Congress should move expediently to advance
Senator Wydens bill to promote security and privacy in U.S. devices and
software. Furthermore, as Congress marks up the legislation and considers
amendments, it should restrict not just government access to devices, but
also government control of those devices. These efforts will move the efforts
of our law enforcement agencies away from creating cyber vulnerabilities and
allow electronics manufacturers to produce the most secure devices
imaginable.

Closing backdoors strengthens digital securitythat

doesnt trade off with law enforcement priorities
Bankston 15
(Kevin Bankston is the Director of New Americas Open Technology Institute
and Co-Director of New Americas Cybersecurity Initiative, 7-7-15, Its Time
to End the Debate on Encryption Backdoors,
http://justsecurity.org/24483/end-debate-encryption-backdoors/, BC)
Tech companies, privacy advocates, security experts, policy experts,
all five members of President Obamas handpicked Review Group on
Intelligence and Communications Technologies, UN human rights
experts, and a majority of the House of Representatives all agree:
Government-mandated backdoors are a bad idea . There are
countless reasons why this is true, including: They would unavoidably
weaken the security of our digital data, devices, and
communications even as we are in the midst of a cybersecurity
crisis; they would cost the US tech industry billions as foreign
customers including many of the criminals Comey hopes to catch turn to more secure
alternatives; and they would encourage oppressive regimes that abuse
human rights to demand backdoors of their own. Most of these arguments are
not new or surprising. Indeed, it was for many of the same reasons that the US
government ultimately rejected the idea of encryption backdoors in the 90s, during
what are now called the Crypto Wars. We as a nation already had the debate that
Comey is demanding we had it 20 years ago! and the arguments against
backdoors have only become stronger and more numerous with time.
Most notably, the 21st century has turned out to be a Golden Age for
Surveillance for the government. Even with the proliferation of encryption,
law enforcement has access to much more information than ever
before: access to cellphone location information about where we are
and where weve been, metadata about who we communicate with
and when, and vast databases of emails and pictures and more in

the cloud. So, the purported law enforcement need is even less
compelling than it was in the 90s . Meanwhile, the security implications of trying to
mandate backdoors throughout the vast ecosystem of digital communications services have only gotten
more dire in the intervening years, as laid out in an exhaustive new report issued just this morning by over
a dozen heavy-hitting security experts. Yesterday, Comey conceded that after a meaningful debate, it may
be that we as a people decide that the benefits of widespread encryption outweigh the costs and that
theres no sensible, technically feasible way to guarantee government access to encrypted data. But the
fact is that we had that debate 20 years ago, and weve been having it again for nearly a year. We are not
talking past each other; a wide range of advocates, industry stakeholders, policymakers, and experts has
been speaking directly to Comeys arguments since last fall. Hopefully he will soon start listening, rather
than dooming us to repeat the mistakes of the past and dragging us into another round of Crypto Wars.

We have already had the debate that Comey says he wants. All
thats left is for him to admit that hes lost.

Misc

politics link turns

The Secure Data Act is overwhelmingly bipartisan
Volz, 14
(Dustin, writer for the National Journal, 12-4-14, House Lawmakers to
Reintroduce Bill to Limit NSA 'Backdoor' Spying,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/house-lawmakers-to-reintroduce-bill-toend-nsa-backdoor-exploits-20141204, BC)
House lawmakers are attempting to revive a popular bill that would limit the

National Security Agency's ability to spy on Americans' communications data, a day after the measure was

the Secure Data

Act and spearheaded by Democratic Rep. Zoe Lofgren, would block the NSA and other intelligence
agencies from compelling tech companies to create so-called backdoor vulnerabilities into
left out from ongoing government funding negotiations. The measure, dubbed

their devices or software. Sen. Ron Wyden, also a Democrat, introduced a similar version of the bill earlier
Thursday. A Lofgren aide said the bill is expected to be introduced later Thursday with Republican
cosponsors.

A broader form of the legislation overwhelmingly passed

the House in June with bipartisan support on a 293-123 vote, in the form
of an amendment tacked on to a defense appropriations bill. That previous bill additionally would have
prevented intelligence agencies from engaging in content surveillance of Americans' communications data
without a warrant. But the language was left out of ongoing negotiations between both chambers over a
spending package that would fund most government agencies into next year. The House has additionally

30 civil-liberties
groups of both liberal and conservative leanings wrote to House
leadership to urge it to retain the proposal as part of its funding
package. "Failing to include this amendment in the forthcoming FY15 omnibus will send a clear
barred amendments to that omnibus measure, a common practice. On Thursday,

message to Americans that Congress does not care if the NSA searches their stored communications or if
the government pressures American technology companies to build vulnerabilities into their products that
assist in NSA surveillance," read the letter, whose signatories include the Electronic Frontier Foundation
and TechFreedom.

The plan has bipartisan support

Geuss, 14

(Megan, writer for Ars Technica, 6-20-14, House votes 293-123 to cut funding
for NSA spying on Americans, http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2014/06/house-votes-293-123-to-cut-funding-for-nsa-spying-onamericans-building-backdoors/, BC)
In a surprising vote late Thursday night, a strong majority of the House of
Representatives voted to cut funding to NSA operations that involve
warrantless spying on Americans or involve putting hardware or software "backdoors"
into various products. The amendment to a defense appropriations bill, offered by
Reps. James Sensenbrenner (R-WI), Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), and Thomas Massie (R-KY), passed 293 to
123. The amendment specifies that, with a few exceptions, none of the funds made available by this
Act may be used by an officer or employee of the United States to query a collection of foreign intelligence
information acquired under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1881a) using a United States person as an identifier. In addition, none of the funds made available by
this Act may be used by the National Security Agency or the Central Intelligence Agency to mandate or
request that a person...alter its product or service to permit the electronic surveillance...of any user of said
product or service for said agencies. Since Edward Snowden began leaking documents about the NSA's
tactics in June of last year, security experts have worried about reports of intentional weaknesses left in
widely used cryptography specifications. The amendment is a contrast to the USA Freedom Act passed
last month. That bill was initially intended to reform the NSA but, in its final form, still permitted the spy
agency to access its vast trove of phone call metadata. Because the item passed tonight was an
amendment to an appropriations bill, it went to the floor without being scrutinized by the intelligence

committee, which is "basically a proxy for the intelligence community, as Julian Sanchez of the Cato

The amendment still has to be approved by the

Senate in order to take effect in 2015.
Institute explained to Wired.

The Secure Data Act is bipartisan

EFF, 14
(Electronic Freedom Foundation, Security Backdoors are Bad NewsBut
Some Lawmakers Are Taking Action to Close Them, 12-9-14,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/12/security-backdoors-are-bad-newssome-lawmakers-are-taking-action-close-them, BC)
That being said, this legislation is a good thing. First and foremost, its
important to remind the incoming (and overwhelmingly Republican)
Congress that NSA spying isnt a partisan issue. The bipartisan MassieLofgren amendment garnered votes from Republicans, Democrats, and
Independents. And like the Massie-Lofgren amendment, Democrats and
Republicans are already supporting this legislation. While its not
likely that Congress will touch the Secure Data Act this term, by
introducing this legislation Senator Wyden and Representative
Lofgren have made it clear that they will continue to push for
privacy, civil libertiesand strong security.

solvency shit
UN experts agree bruh
Kaye, prof law, 15
(David, UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression, clinical professor of law at the University
of California, Irvine, School of Law. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression,
5-22-15, http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Kaye-HRC-ReportEncryption-Anonymity.pdf)
57. States should revise or establish, as appropriate, national laws and regulations to promote and protect
the rights to privacy and freedom of opinion and expression. With respect to encryption and anonymity,
States should adopt policies of non-restriction or comprehensive protection, only adopt restrictions on a
case-specific basis and that meet the requirements of legality, necessity, proportionality and legitimacy in
objective, require court orders for any specific limitation, and promote security and privacy online through
public education. 58. Discussions of encryption and anonymity have all too often focused only on their

But emergency situations do

not relieve States of the obligation to ensure respect for
international human rights law. Legislative proposals for the revision or adoption of
potential use for criminal purposes in times of terrorism.

restrictions on individual security online should be subject to public debate and adopted according to
regular, public, informed and transparent legislative process. States must promote effective participation
of a wide variety of civil society actors and minority groups in such debate and processes and avoid
adopting such legislation under accelerated legislative procedures. General debate should highlight the
protection that encryption and anonymity provide, especially to the groups most at risk of unlawful
interferences. Any such debate must also take into account that restrictions are subject to strict tests: if
they interfere with the right to hold opinions, restrictions must not be adopted. Restrictions on privacy that
limit freedom of expression for purposes of the present report, restrictions on encryption and anonymity
must be provided by law and be necessary and proportionate to achieve one of a small number of

National laws
should recognize that individuals are free to protect the privacy of
their digital communications by using encryption technology and
tools that allow anonymity online. Legislation and regulations
protecting human rights defenders and journalists should also
include provisions enabling access and providing support to use the
technologies to secure their communications. 60. States should not
restrict encryption and anonymity, which facilitate and often enable the rights to
freedom of opinion and expression. Blanket prohibitions fail to be necessary and proportionate. States
legitimate objectives. 59. States should promote strong encryption and anonymity.

should avoid all measures that weaken the security that individuals
may enjoy online, such as backdoors , weak encryption standards and key escrows. In
addition, States should refrain from making the identification of users a
condition for access to digital communications and online services
and requiring SIM card registration for mobile users. Corporate actors should
likewise consider their own policies that restrict encryption and anonymity (including through the use of
pseudonyms). Court-ordered decryption, subject to domestic and international law, may only be
permissible when it results from transparent and publicly accessible laws applied solely on a targeted,
case-by-case basis to individuals (i.e., not to a mass of people) and subject to judicial warrant and the
protection of due process rights of individuals.

The plan protects us from cyber threats without trading

off with national security
Schneier 14

(Bruce, cybersecurity expert, fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and
Society at Harvard Law School, a program fellow at the New America
Foundation's Open Technology Institute, Stop the hysteria over Apple
encryption, http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/03/opinion/schneier-appleencryption-hysteria/, BC)
Law enforcement has been complaining about "going dark" for decades
now. In the 1990s, they convinced Congress to pass a law requiring phone companies to ensure that phone

They tried and failed to ban strong

mandate back doors for their use. The FBI tried and failed again to ban strong
encryption in 2010. Now, in the post-Snowden era, they're about to try again. We need to fight
calls would remain tappable even as they became digital.
encryption and

this. Strong encryption protects us from a panoply of threats. It protects us from

hackers and criminals. It protects our businesses from competitors and foreign spies. It

protects people in totalitarian governments from arrest and detention. This isn't just me talking: The FBI

As for law enforcement? The

recent decades have given them an unprecedented ability to put us
under surveillance and access our data. Our cell phones provide them with a
detailed history of our movements. Our call records, e-mail history, buddy
lists, and Facebook pages tell them who we associate with. The
hundreds of companies that track us on the Internet tell them what
we're thinking about. Ubiquitous cameras capture our faces
everywhere. And most of us back up our iPhone data on iCloud,
also recommends you encrypt your data for security.

which the FBI can still get a warrant for. It truly is the golden age of
surveillance.

2015 Secure Data Act closes backdoors

Nichols 2/5 (2/5/15 Shaun Nichols US anti-backdoor bill: If at first you're

shot down in flames try, try again

Second Secure Data Act bid hopes to keep Uncle Sam from tapping
mobes, gadgets,
etchttp://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/02/05/us_lawmakers_take_another_shot_at_backdoor_busti
ng_bill/)

Lawmakers in the US are making an effort to revive legislation

that would ban government agencies from demanding backdoor
access to hardware, websites and software. Under the proposed
Secure Data Act, developers cannot be forced to insert security
holes into devices and code. The FBI, for one, would like to use
such flaws to hijack phones and other gadgets, view their contents
and snoop on their owners hackers would like to use these
vulnerabilities, too. The bill is sponsored by Jim Sensenbrenner (RWI), Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) and Thomas Massie (R-KY), and was
reintroduced into the House of Representatives on Wednesday. Last
year's attempt, which died at the subcommittee stage, can be found
here, and sought to "prohibit federal agencies from mandating the
deployment of vulnerabilities in data security technologies." "Congress
has allowed the administrations surveillance authorities to go
unchecked by failing to enact adequate reform," the trio said in a

statement this week, announcing the reintroduction of the bill to the

House. "With threats to our homeland ever prevalent, we should not tie
the hands of the intelligence community. But unwarranted, backdoor
surveillance is indefensible. "The Secure Data Act is an
important step in rebuilding public trust in our intelligence
agencies and striking the appropriate balance between national
security and civil liberty."

Impacts
Cyber-terror causes accidental nuclear war
Jason Fritz 9, Former Captain of the U.S. Army, July, Hacking Nuclear
Command and Control,
www.icnnd.org/Documents/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.doc
The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under this rule two authorized
personnel must be present and in agreement during critical stages of nuclear command and control. The President must
jointly issue a launch order with the Secretary of Defense; Minuteman missile operators must agree that the launch order
is valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must agree that the order to launch is
valid. In the US, in order to execute a nuclear launch, an Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a
preformatted message that directs nuclear forces to execute a specific attack. The contents of an EAM change daily and
consist of a complex code read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and videos posted to
YouTube provide insight into how these work. These are issued from the NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the
designated hierarchy of command and control centres. Once a command centre has confirmed the EAM, using the twoman rule, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the weapons and the message is sent out. These
messages are sent in digital format via the secure Automatic Digital Network and then relayed to aircraft via singlesideband radio transmitters of the High Frequency Global Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to
nuclear capable submarines via Very Low Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF
submarine communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF reception. Some reports have noted a

a potential electronic back door into the US Navys

system for broadcasting nuclear launch orders to Trident submarines (Peterson
2004). The investigation showed that cyber terrorists could potentially infiltrate this
network and insert false orders for launch. The investigation led to elaborate new
Pentagon review, which showed

instructions for validating launch orders (Blair 2003). Adding further to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing control over
submarine launched nuclear missiles; The Royal Navy announced in 2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft Windows
operating system on its nuclear submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating system, apparently based on Windows

This may attract hackers and narrow

the necessary reconnaissance to learning its details and potential exploits . It is
XP, is not as alarming as the advertising of such a system is.

unlikely that the operating system would play a direct role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain.

Knowledge of the operating system may lead to the insertion of malicious

code , which could be used to gain accelerating privileges, tracking, valuable
information, and deception that could subsequently be used to initiate a
launch . Remember from Chapter 2 that the UKs nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the
central command has been destroyed. Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of
a decapitating strike could also be used to engage fail-deadly systems. Open
source knowledge is scarce as to whether Russia continues to operate such a
system. However evidence suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand, was
an automated system set to launch a mass scale nuclear attack in the
event of a decapitation strike against Soviet leadership and military. In a crisis,
military officials would send a coded message to the bunkers,
switching on the dead hand. If nearby ground-level sensors detected a nuclear attack on Moscow,
and if a break was detected in communications links with top military commanders, the system would send low-frequency
signals over underground antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military sites, these rockets
in turn would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via radio relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to some
Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos and on mobile launchers can

cyber terrorists would need

to create a crisis situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool it into
believing a decapitating strike had taken place . While this is not an easy task, the information
age makes it easier. Cyber reconnaissance could help locate the machine and learn
its inner workings. This could be done by targeting the computers high of
level officialsanyone who has reportedly worked on such a project, or individuals involved in military operations
be fired automatically. (Broad 1993) Assuming such a system is still active,

at underground facilities, such as those reported to be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy mountains in the central
southern Urals (Rosenbaum 2007, Blair 2008) Indirect Control of Launch

Cyber terrorists could cause

incorrect information to be transmitted, received, or displayed at nuclear

c ommand and c ontrol centres, or shut down these centres computer
networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket
was mistaken by Russian early warning systems as a nuclear missile
launched from a US submarine. A radar operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who
decided to alert the highest levels. Kavkaz was implemented, all three chegets activated, and the countdown
for a nuclear decision began. It took eight minutes before the missile was properly identifieda
considerable amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be decided upon (Aftergood

Creating a false signal in these early warning systems would be

relatively easy using computer network operations . The real difficulty would be gaining
access to these systems as they are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are transmitting
wirelessly, that may provide an entry point, and information gained through
the internet may reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for
gaining entrance to the closed network . If access was obtained, a false alarm could be
followed by something like a DDoS attack, so the operators believe an attack may be imminent,
yet they can no longer verify it. This could add pressure to the decision making
process, and if coordinated precisely, could appear as a first round
EMP burst. Terrorist groups could also attempt to launch a non-nuclear
missile, such as the one used by Norway, in an attempt to fool the system . The
number of states who possess such technology is far greater than
the number of states who possess nuclear weapons. Obtaining them
would be considerably easier , especially when enhancing operations
through computer network operations. Combining traditional terrorist
methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities neither could accomplish
on their own. For example, radar stations might be more vulnerable to a computer
attack, while satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a laser beam,
thus together they deny dual phenomenology. Mapping communications
networks through cyber reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and
automated scanning devices created by more experienced hackers can be
readily found on the internet. Intercepting or spoofing communications is a highly complex science.
2000).

These systems are designed to protect against the worlds most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are
recurring gaffes, and the very nature of asymmetric warfare is to bypass complexities by finding simple loopholes. For
example, commercially available software for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice commands within the
command and control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it back together in order to issue false
voice commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16). Spoofing could also be used to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of
starting a nuclear war. [they cut off the paragraph] In June 1998, a group of international hackers calling themselves
Milw0rm hacked the web site of Indias Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and put up a spoofed web page showing a
mushroom cloud and the text If

a nuclear war does start , you will be the first to scream (Denning

1999). Hacker web-page defacements like these are often derided by critics of cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance
which causes no significant harm. However, web-page defacements are becoming more common, and they point towards
alarming possibilities in subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit letter of apology from
Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website (Grant 2007). This took place amid the confusion of
mass DDoS attacks, real world protests, and accusations between governments.

A successful cyber-attack causes global nuclear war

studies prove
Johnson, 2009 - the Guardian's technology correspondent (Bobbie,

Terrorists could use internet to launch nuclear attack: report, 7/24/2009,

http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/jul/24/internet-cyber-attackterrorists ) DS
Terrorists groups could soon use the internet to help set off a
devastating nuclear attack , according to new research. The claims come in

study commissioned by the International Commission on Nuclear

Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), which suggests that under
the right circumstances, terrorists could break into computer
systems and launch an attack on a nuclear state triggering a
a

catastrophic chain of events that would have a global impact .

Without better protection of computer and information systems , the
paper suggests, governments around the world are leaving open the
possibility that a well-coordinated cyberwar could quickly elevate to
nuclear levels . In fact, says the study, "this may be an easier alternative for
terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty
bomb themselves". Though the paper admits that the media and entertainment industries often
confuse and exaggerate the risk of cyberterrorism, it also outlines a number of potential threats and

dedicated hackers could use information warfare

techniques to make a nuclear attack more likely. While the possibility of a
radical group gaining access to actual launch systems is remote, the study suggests that
hackers could focus on feeding in false information further down the
chain or spreading fake information to officials in a carefully
orchestrated strike. "Despite claims that nuclear launch orders can only come from the highest
authorities, numerous examples point towards an ability to sidestep the
chain of command and insert orders at lower levels ," said Jason Fritz, the
author of the paper. "Cyber-terrorists could also provoke a nuclear launch by
spoofing early warning and identification systems or by degrading
communications networks."
situations in which

Cyberattacks on the US trigger nuclear retaliation

Biddle, 13
(Sam, writer for Gizmodo and citing the Pentagon, Pentagon: Let's Threaten
Nuke Strike Against Hackers, 3-6-13, http://gizmodo.com/5988914/pentagonlets-threaten-nuke-strike-against-hackers, BC)
the
Pentagon isn't nearly content, and in a new report, insists we should keep our
nuclear arsenal ready for Internet retaliation. What could go wrong? The report,
Most of us are content keeping hackers away with a firewall and decent password. But

"Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat," was prepared by the Department of Defense's

if China ever
hacks us, "Protect the Nuclear Strike as a Deterrent." The phrase is repeated
Defense Science Board, and over the course of 138 pages makes one very clear point:

again and againthe word "nuclear" appears 113 times in a report ostensibly dealing with computer
warfare. The entire thing is riddled with jargon, euphemism, and rosy military metaphorclimbing the
ladder of deterrence!but

the notion that American nukes could ( and

should!) be part of the "cyber war" equation

(and insulated against any

is unequivocal . Let's put it plainly: China should know that we have nukes,
tons of 'em, and if China's stellar hacker platoons ever tried to, say, bring down
an American satellite, destabilize a dam, or switch off an enormous
chunk of the power grid as part of an open military attack, they
electronic disruption)

should be thinking about our nuclear missiles coming back in return.

The US government has already said that it'd consider internet-based offensives an act of war that'd have
IRL consequences, but nuking as a response to DDoS has never been so explicit. "The United States would
only consider the use of nuclear weapons in 'extreme circumstances,'" the report says. And that's always
been the case: you nuke us, we'll nuke you. But now the definition of what circumstances are extreme is
entirely remade: "Presumably one would characterize a catastrophic Tier V-VI adversary cyber attack on

the United States as 'extreme circumstances.'"Waitwhat's a Tier V-VI adversary cyber attack? That's
simple: "States with the ability to successfully execute full spectrum (cyber capabilities in combination with
all of their military and intelligence capabilities) operations to achieve a specific outcome in political,
military, economic, etc. domains."

Cyber attacks wipe-out the US military---causes nuclear

war
Robert Tilford 12, Graduate US Army Airborne School, Ft. Benning,
Georgia, Cyber attackers could shut down the electric grid for the entire east
coast 2012, http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easilyshut-down-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa ***we dont agree with the
ableist language
To make matters worse

a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for

could also cripple the U.S. military . The senator notes that is that the same
power grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell
towers and heart monitors also power every military base in our country. Although
bases would be prepared to weather a short power outage with backup diesel
generators, within hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out, he said. Which means
military c ommand and c ontrol centers could go dark . Radar
systems that detect air threats to our country would shut Down completely.
Communication between commanders and their troop s would also go
silent. And many weapons systems would be left without either fuel or
electric power, said Senator Grassley. So in a few short hours or days,
the mightiest military in the world would be left scrambling to
maintain base functions, he said. We contacted the Pentagon and
officials confirmed the threat of a cyber attack is something very
example

real . Top national security officialsincluding the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of
have said, preventing a
cyber attack and improving the nations electric grids is among the most urgent priorities
the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director

of our country (source: Congressional Record). So how serious is the Pentagon taking all this? Enough to start, or end a
war over it, for sure.

A cyber attack today against the US could very well be seen as

an Act of War and could be met with a full scale US military

response . That could include the use of nuclear weapons,
the President.

if authorized by