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Cases 11-27-15
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1. People v. Escao
323 SCRA 754
FACTS: During a checkpoint, a police saw a firearm on the lap of the accused. As a result, other passengers
were searched and all firearms were seized. Are checkpoints illegal?
HELD: As long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection is limited to a visual search, such routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of the right
against unreasonable search.
c. Prohibited Article in Plain View / Custodial Investigation
2. Stonehill v. Diokno
20 SCRA 283 (1967)
Concepcion, CJ
Facts:
1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the petitioner and the
corporation to search persons and premises of several personal properties due to an alleged violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner and
in the corporation's premises.
2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus,he filed a petition with the Supreme
Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from being
introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner. The court issued the writ only for
those effects found in the petitioner's residence.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in both premises
RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the
corporation's premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a corporation has a
personality separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein petitioner regardless of the
amount of shares of stock or interest of each in the said corporation, and whatever office they hold therein.
Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal
right which cannot be exercised by a third party. The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st
group of documents, papers, and things seized from the offices and the premises).
Depending on the circumstances, while in one instance the particular wording of the warrant may
make it assume the character of a general warrant, in another context it may be considered perfectly alright.
SW only for one offense, if issued for more than two, it is void. Scatter shot warrant.
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Readily identify the items to be seized, thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items
Leave officers with no discretion regarding articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and
seizure
narcotics paraphernalia, any and all narcotics, and a quantity of loose heroin- ok!
Where should the requisite description appear- in the caption or body of the warrant? Body sufficient.
What if theres discrepancy between the address in the caption and in the body? Not sufficient to
invalidate. It is sufficient as long as you can identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in
the community.
4. Qua vs. Deportation Board / Kishu v. Deportation Boar
FACTS
Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao alias
Jose Chua, and Basilio King were charged before the Deportation Board with having purchased $130,000.00
without the necessary licensing from the Central Bank and having clandestinely remitted the same to Hong
Kong.
After the filing of the deportation charges, a warrant of arrest was issued for Qua Chee Gan, et al. pending
investigation.
They were granted provisional liberty upon their filing of a surely bond for P10,000.00 and a cash bond for
P10,000.00.
Qua Chee Gan, et al. filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges on the ground, among others, that such
charges are not legal grounds for deportation ad that the Board has not jurisdiction over such charges. The
motion to dismiss was denied.
Qua Chee Gan, et al. then filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition.
TIRAL COURT: Upheld the validity of the delegation by the President to the Deportation Board the power to
conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be
injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State.
The court also sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the
alien's temporary release pending investigation on the theory that the power to arrest and fix the amount of
the bond of the arrested alien is essential to and complement the power to deport aliens.
ISSUES/HELD
[1] WoN the President has the power to deport aliens and if such power is validly delegated to the
Deportation Board. YES.
[2] WoN the authority to deport aliens includes the power to order the arrest of such aliens. YES. BUT only
when there is already an ORDER OF DEPORTATION.
RATIO
[1]
Although CA No. 613 expressly grants the Commissioner of Immigration the power to effect the arrest and
expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners, but such power was not
intended to be delimited to the Immigration Commissioner as Sec. 69 of the Administrative Code, although
not expressly conferring such power, lays down the procedure for such deportation proceedings for the
President.
Therefore, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in 2 ways:
By order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code,
and
By the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Section
37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
And although the charges against Qua Chee Gan are not enumerated in CA No. 613, the act of profiteering,
hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations, which is tantamount
to economic sabotage, is a ground for deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503 amending
Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.
[2]
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Under EO No. 69, it is required that the alien charged in deportation proceedings shall file a bond with the
Commissioner of Immigration in order to secure their appearance.
However, the same did not authorize the arrest of the alien pending investigation.
It was in EO No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu proprio or upon the filing of formal charges by the
Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him
under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release in such amount and
under such conditions as may be prescribed by the Chairman of the Board.
However, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose authority the President's power to
deport is predicated, does NOT provide for the exercise of the power to arrest.
Moreover, the right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by Sec. 1 Art III of the
Constitution: ...no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce...
Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et al. expands the requirement "to be determined by the judge" to any
public officer who may be authorized by the Legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the
warrant of arrest.
Therefore, the arrest of a foreigner, which is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid
only when there is already an order of deportation.
QUA VS. DEPORTATION BOARD 6
However, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested.
It is enough that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was
authorized in EO69.
DISPOSITIVE
Executive Order No. 398 insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the
filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the
temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal.
The order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed
pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancel.
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Kishu Dalamal, a British subject, was charged, together with other aliens, with having committed certain irregularities
in violation of the Central Bank Rules and Regulations before the Deportation Board in a complaint filed by a Special
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice.
Acting on the complaint, the Chairman of the Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest against Dalamal pursuant
to the authority given to said Board by Section 1-(b) of Executive Order No. 398. On August 5, 1958, Dalamal was
accordingly arrested, but he was subsequently released upon filing a bond in the amount of P10,000.00.
Considering that the warrant for his arrest issued by the Deportation Board is illegal because it was issued in violation
of Section l-(3), Article III, of our Constitution, Dalamal interposed the present petition for habeas corpus seeking the
annulment of the warrant of arrest as well as the cancellation of the bond filed by him for his provisional liberty.
Question: Is the issuance of the warrant of arrest by the Chairman of the Deportation Board valid? Explain.
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reliable information received on 3 November 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects,
allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the
port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a
duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate 1 of the customs zone. When
the trucks left gate 1 at about 4:30 p.m. of 4 November 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went
after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks,
consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon
investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name
of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two
trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction (Civil Case 67496),
praying for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the police and customs authorities, or their
agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods
and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor. On 10
November 1966, Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining Ricardo Papa (as Chief of
Police of Manila) and Juan Ponce Enrile (as Commissioner of Customs) in Civil Case 67496. However, when
the restraining order was received by Papa. et. al., some bales had already been opened by the examiners of
the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal
and a representative of Remedios Mago. Under date of 15 November 1966, Mago filed an amended petition,
including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao
of the Manila Police Department. At the hearing on 9 December 1966, the lower court, with the conformity of
the parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the
representatives of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti- Smuggling Center of the
Manila Police Department. On 23 December 1966, Mago filed an ex parte motion to release the goods,
alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the
same should be released as per agreement of the parties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may
be determined bythe court. On 7 March 1967, the Judge issued an order releasing the goods to Mago upon
her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00. On 13 March 1967, Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila
Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods
pending termination of the seizure proceedings. Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for
reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, Papa, et. al. filed the action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before the
Supreme Court.
Held: The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the
Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect
searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or
other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed
undercustoms and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other
container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast
or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted,
therefore, that Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in
question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect
said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. This was what happened
precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks
loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of
Police to make the interception of the cargo. Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to
effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does
not require said warrant herein. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of
the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or
building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any
trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling
house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued
by a judge or justice of the peace." Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising
police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws. Herein, Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make any
search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. But even if there was a search, there is still authority
to the effect that no search warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining herein. The guaranty
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of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary difference
between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be
obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought. Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police
Department of the goods in question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs
had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws,
to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
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Section 12 Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on criminal Procedure is not applicable because at the time the
police officers identified themselves and apprehended petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not know
that he had committed or actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.
They just suspected that he is hiding something.
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri
bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and
duty of the police officers to inspect the same
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner
only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such exercise may prove to be useless,
futile and mush too late.
9. US v. Ocampo
Facts:
On November 5, 1908, an information was filed in the court of first instance of the
city of Manila, charging plaintiffs in error, with others, as editors, proprietors, owners,
directors, writers, managers, administrators, printers, and publishers of the newspaper 'El
Renacimiento,' with publishing in that city a libel against Dean C. Worcester, then a
member of the Philippine Commission. The information was subscribed and sworn to by
the acting prosecuting attorney, and appended to it, and likewise sworn to by him, was the
following declaration: 'A preliminary investigation has been conducted under my direction,
having examined the witnesses under oath, in accordance with the provisions of 39 of
act 183 (Manila charter), as amended by 2 of act 612 of the Philippine Commission.'
Both affidavits were made before the judge of the court of first instance, who thereupon
issued warrants of arrest, pursuant to which the parties accused were on the same day
brought before the court. The information was read to them, and the court allowed them
until November 7th to answer. Their attorney, being present, asked that they be furnished
with a copy of the information, which request was granted, and a copy was delivered to
each of the accused. Thereafter, and on November 7th, before entering any demurrer or
answer, they moved to vacate the order of arrest, upon the ground that it was made
without any preliminary investigation held by the court, and without any tribunal, was
probable cause to believe the defendants having first determined that the alleged crime
had been committed, and that there was probable cause to believe the defendants guilty of
it.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest of defendants-appellants' arrest was without a preliminary finding
of probable cause, and therefore in violation of rights secured to them by the Philippine Bill
of Rights
Held:
No. The provision that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath
or affirmation is a provision in the Philippine Bill. The question whether "probable cause"
exist or not must depend upon the judgment and discretion of the judge or magistrate
issuing the warrant. It does not mean that particular facts must exist in each particular
case. It simply means that sufficient facts must be presented to the judge or magistrate
issuing the warrant to convince him, not that the particular person has committed the
crime, but that there is probable cause for believing that the person whose arrest is sought
committed the crime charged. No rule can be laid down which will govern the discretion of
the court in this matter. If he decides, upon the proof presented, that probable cause exist,
no objection can be made upon constitutional grounds against the issuance of the warrant.
His conclusion as to whether "probable cause" existed or not is final and conclusive. If he
is satisfied that "probable cause" exist from the facts stated in the complaint, made upon
the investigation by the prosecuting attorney, then his conclusion is sufficient upon which
to issue the warrant for arrest. He may, however, if he is not satisfied, call such witnesses
as he may deem necessary before issuing the warrant. The issuance of the warrant of
arrest is prima facie evidence that, in his judgment at least, there existed "probable cause"
for believing that the person against whom the warrant is issued is guilty of the crime
charged. There is no law which prohibits him from reaching the conclusion that "probable
cause" exist from the statement of the prosecuting attorney alone, or any other person
whose statement or affidavit is entitled to credit in the opinion of the judge or magistrate.
***Ocampo v. US (different opinion regarding probable cause on the same case, in case
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itanong ni dean)
It is insisted that the finding of probable cause is a judicial act, and cannot properly be
delegated to a prosecuting attorney. We think, however, that it is erroneous to regard this
function, as performed by committing magistrates generally, or under General Orders, No.
58, as being judicial in the proper sense. There is no definite adjudication. A finding that
there is no probable cause is not equivalent to an acquittal, but only entitles the accused to
his liberty for the present, leaving him subject to rearrest. It is expressly so provided by
14 of General Orders, No. 58, as it is by 2 of act 194, above quoted. Such was the
nature of the duty of a committing magistrate in the common-law practice. In short, the
function of determining that probable cause exists for the arrest of a person accused is
only quasi judicial, and not such that, because of its nature, it must necessarily be confided
to a strictly judicial officer or tribunal. By 9 of the act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 695,
chap. 1369), Congress enacted: 'That the supreme court and the courts of first instance of
the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and
such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the government of said
Islands, subject to the power of said government to change the practice and method of
procedure. The municipal courts of said Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as
heretofore provided by the Philippine Commission subject in all matters to such alteration
and amendment as may be hereafter enacted by law;' etc. Here we find clear warrant for
modifications of the practice and procedure; and since 5 of the same act (quoted above)
does not prescribe how 'probable cause' shall be determined, it is, in our opinion, as
permissible for the local legislature to confide this duty to a prosecuting officer as to intrust
it to a justice of the peace. Consequently, a preliminary investigation conducted by the
prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila, under act No. 612, and upon which he files a
sworn information against the party accused, is a sufficient compliance with the
requirement 'that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation.'