Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
CHAPTER 4 CASES
VIII. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
1. ANG TIBAY v. CIR
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 46496. February 27, 1940.]
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager
and
proprietor,
and
NATIONAL
WORKERS'
BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs.
THE
COURT
OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
INC., respondents.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for
the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia; for National Labor Union.
Claro M. Recto; for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal; for National Workers' Brotherhood.
SYLLABUS
1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER. The
nature of the Court of Industrial Relations and of its power is
extensively discussed in the decision.
2. ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE
PROCESS OF LAW. The Court of Industrial Relations is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure,
and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable
(Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No.
46673). The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial
Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard
the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative character.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS. There
are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the
right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given
an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty
to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision. Not only must
there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but
the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be
Avancea,
C.J.,
Villa-Real,
Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
Imperial,
Diaz,
KAPUNAN, J p:
2. KMU v. GARCIA
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115381. December 23, 1994.]
KILUSANG
MAYO
UNO
LABOR
CENTER, petitioner, vs. HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the
LAND
TRANSPORTATION
FRANCHISING
AND
REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUSES
OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
LUZON P0.385
VISAYAS/MINDANAO P0.395
PREMIERE CLASS (PER KM.)
LUZON P0.395
VISAYAS/ MINDANAO P0.405
AIRCON (PER KM.) P0.415.4
On March 30, 1992, then Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications Pete Nicomedes Prado
issued Department Order No. 92-587 defining the policy
framework on the regulation of transport services. The full text
of the said order is reproduced below in view of the importance
of the provisions contained therein:
AUTHORIZED FARES
LUZON
MIN. OF 5 KMS. SUCCEEDING KM.
REGULAR P1.50 P0.37
STUDENT P1.15 P0.28
VISAYAS/MINDANAO
Range Fare
to
be
(P0.05) P0.42
(P0.09) P0.56
(P0.12) P0.73
||| (Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No.
115381, [December 23, 1994])
EN BANC
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J p:
This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order
was filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters
(PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing
DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA
Memorandum Circular Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991,
temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment
agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and
vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the
task of processing and deploying such workers.
PASEI is the largest national organization of private
employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and
authorized by the POEA, to engage in the business of
obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers,
including domestic helpers. LLphil
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the
abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong
Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issuedDepartment
Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the
recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. 30, Rollo). The
DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of
deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers.
"In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance
the protection for Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong
Kong, the recruitment of the same by private employment
agencies is hereby temporarily suspended effective 1 July
1991. As such, the DOLE through the facilities of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration shall take over the
processing and deployment of household workers bound for
Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for said
purpose.
"In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the
Bureau of Local Employment's regional offices are likewise
directed to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a
manpower pool of prospective domestic helpers to Hong Kong
on a regional basis.
"For compliance." (Emphasis ours; p. 30, Rollo.)
Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA
issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated
July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government
processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to
"Subject: Guidelines
on
the
Temporary
Government
Processing and Deployment of Domestic Helpers to Hong
Kong.
and
Accreditation
of
Hong
Kong
confine, limit or stop" (p. 62, Rollo) and whereas the power to
"regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and
foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons"
(Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz,
180 SCRA 218).
"Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. . . . ." (Civil Code.)
SO ORDERED.
2. ID.;
ID.;
THE
COURT
MAY
BRUSH
ASIDE
TECHNICALITIES OF PROCEDURE IN CASES OF
TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE. The Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure in cases of transcendental
importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.:
A Party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality
which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view
of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency
Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality
because the transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
4. SANTIAGO v. COMELEC
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997.]
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA,
and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA &
CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding
members of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL
ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
(IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO
(LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
Roco Bunag Kapunan & Migallos for movant Raul S. Roco.
Rene V . Sarmiento and R.A.V . Saguisag for movants DIK &
MABINI.
Pete Quirino Quadra for respondents Sps. Alberto & Carmen
Pedrosa.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI;
COMELEC'S FAILURE TO ACT ON MOTION TO DISMISS
AND ITS INSISTENCE TO HOLD ON TO THE PETITION
RENDERED RIPE AND VIABLE THE PETITION UNDER
SECTION 2 OF RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid
no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper
for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action
when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. . . It must
be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a
motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the
petition. The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently
because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the
oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required
them to submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda. The COMELEC's failure to act on
3. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW;
1987
CONSTITUTION;
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS; PROVISION ON THE
RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO DIRECTLY PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, NOT SELFEXECUTORY. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is
not self-executory. In his book, Joaquin Bernas, a member of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated: Without
implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus,
although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last
analysis it still is dependent on congressional action. Bluntly
stated the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of initiative would
remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise,
while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the
people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason,
does not provide for its implementation.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; R.A. 6735; INTENDED TO COVER INITIATIVE
TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals,
intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505
and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the
committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of
Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to
it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, which dealt with the initiative
and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of
the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, which dealt with
the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with
initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article XVII of the
Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 solely, dealt with initiative and
referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local
government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee
consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into
a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989
by the Senate and by the House of Representatives. This
approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONGRESS, INVESTED WITH THE
POWER TO PROVIDE FOR THE RULES IMPLEMENTING
THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT. There is, of course, no
other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the
requirement.
Here
private
respondents'
petition
is
unaccompanied by the required signatures. This defect
notwithstanding, it is without prejudice to the refiling of their
petition once compliance with the required percentage is
satisfactorily shown by private respondents. In the absence,
therefore, of an appropriate petition before the Commission on
Elections, any determination of whether private respondents'
proposal constitutes an amendment or revision is premature.
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; EVERY PART OF THE
STATUTE MUST BE INTERPRETED WITH REFERENCE TO
THE CONTEXT. It is a rule that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that
every part of the statute must be construed together with the
other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. Thus, the provisions of Republic Act No.
6735 may not be interpreted in isolation. The legislative intent
behind every law is to be extracted from the statute as a whole.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW;
1987
CONSTITUTION;
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS; R.A. 6735; TAKEN
TOGETHER AND INTERPRETED PROPERLY, THE
CONSTITUTION, R.A. 6735 AND COMELEC RESOLUTION
2300 ARE SUFFICIENT TO IMPLEMENT CONSTITUTIONAL
INITIATIVES. While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law it
was as the majority openly concedes intended by the
legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains
enough provisions to effectuate an initiative on the
Constitution. I completely agree with the inspired and inspiring
opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice
Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative,
sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall no
longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with
this Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, that
"provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to
effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the
exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby'; and
in Garcia vs. Comelec, that any effort to trivialize the
effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected."
2. ID.; ID.; ID .; ID.; MAJORITY'S POSITION ALL TOO
SWEEPING AND ALL TOO EXTREMIST. I find the
majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is
equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats,
and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain. What Citizen
Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we
should not thereby preempt any future effort to exercise the
right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact that the
Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a
ban against its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do
the right thing at the right time and for the right reason.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC CANNOT ENTERTAIN ANY
PETITION IN THE ABSENCE OF THE REQUIRED NUMBER
OF SIGNATURES. Until and unless an initiatory petition can
show the required number of signatures in this case, 12% of
all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition
for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right
of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this
demands special attention, as this system of initiative was
unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few
scholars before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986
Constitutional Commission itself, through the original
proponent 1 and the main sponsor 2 of the proposed Article on
Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this
system as "innovative". 3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing
amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were
recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths
of all its members and (2) by a constitutional convention. 4 For
this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to
give due course to this petition.
elective officials,
performance. 20
but
not
as
premium
for
good
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid
no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper
for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action
when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. The
petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This being so, it
becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any
further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a
petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ
issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an
inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal
from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested.
(People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent
necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse
environmental consequences on the body politic of the
questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal
confusion and political instability begs for judicial
statesmanship.
II
MR. SUAREZ.
MR. SUAREZ.
MR. SUAREZ.
FR. BERNAS.
MS. AQUINO.
MR. SUAREZ.
That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing,
especially with respect to the budget appropriations which
would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be
called. We deemed it best that this matter be left to the
legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as
envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative can
be called until after five years from the date of the ratification of
this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be
proposed through the exercise of this initiative power would be
after five years. It is reasonably expected that within that fiveyear period, the National Assembly can come up with the
appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS.
Since the matter is left to the legislature the details on how
this is to be carried out is it possible that, in effect, what will
be presented to the people for ratification is the work of the
legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision
exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ.
MR. DAVIDE.
Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment
after taking into account the modifications submitted by the
sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona,
Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified
amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now
read as follows:
"SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST
TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER
THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS
RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ.
Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment
is reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our
completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed
amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified
amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a
legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right.
Thus:
MR. ROMULO.
Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for
the legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out the
initiative . . .?
MR. DAVIDE.
It can.
MR. SUAREZ.
MR. ROMULO.
MR. DAVIDE.
MR. DAVIDE.
Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as
follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST
TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER
THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
MR. DAVIDE.
With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG.
My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed
amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover
the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when
he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and
"revision"?
MR. DAVIDE.
No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should
be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned,
it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of
proposing amendments through initiative must be more
rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE.
A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is
involved is an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a
Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National
Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional
convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to
submit the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a
majority of the National Assembly is required, the import being
that the process of amendment must be made more rigorous
and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or
putting an end to a law proposed by the National Assembly by
way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the
requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative
because it would require another voting by the Committee, and
the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent.
Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an
Kapunan,
B. VALIDITY OF DELEGATION
i. COMPLETENESS TEST
5. US v. ANG TANG HO
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-17122. February 27, 1922.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NAG TANG
Ho, defendant-appellant.
Williams & Ferrier for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. ORGANIC LAW. By the organic law of the Philippine
Islands and the Constitution of the United States, all powers
are vested in the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. It is the
duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive; and
of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no
authority to execute or construe the law; the Executive has no
authority to make or construe the law; and the Judiciary has no
power to make or execute the law.
2. POWER. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of
each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for
the judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is
not constitutional.
3. THE POWER TO DELEGATE. The Legislature cannot
delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a
law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than
to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and
regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created
the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. One the
other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is
not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to
make it law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the
Governor-General, the is a delegation of legislative power, is
unconstitutional and avoid.
4. No CRIME TO SELL. After the passage of Act No. 2868,
and without any rules and regulations of the Governor-General,
a dealer in rice could sell it at any price and he would not
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868 in so
far as it undertakes to authorize the Governor-General in his
discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and
to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime,
is unconstitutional and void.
It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the
price of rice and profiteering, which worked a severe hardship,
on the poorer classes, and that an emergency existed, but the
question here presented is the constitutionality of a particular
portion of a statute, and none of such matters is an argument
for, or against, its constitutionality.
The Constitution is something solid, permanent and
substantial. Its stability protects the life, liberty and property
rights of the rich and the poor alike, and that protection ought
not to change with the wind or any emergency condition. The
fundamental question involved in this case is the right of the
people of the Philippine Islands to be and live under a
Executive
Order
shall
take
effect
E.
MARCOS
pumphouses,
sprayers,
appurtenances. 15
and
other
technological
who are lawyers and could have been more assertive of their
rights.
Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the
problem squarely presented to it and decide it as categorically
rather than dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical
objection raised and thus, through its inaction, allow them to
fester.
The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial
precedent. Unquestionably, the Court has the power to
suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power,
as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate
rules concerning "pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts." 2 In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or
suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which
otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic
adherence to such rules.
The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases,
notably Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 3 where Justice Tuason
justified the donation on the ground that "the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure."
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend
to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be avoided. (Aznar III vs. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May
9, 1988, 161 SCRA 276.) Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from
their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so
require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition
of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the
parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
(Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31) LibLex
Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the
other two were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as
all of them present the same fundamental question which, in
our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the
same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or
sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L3054 and case G.R. No. L 3056 and the question whether
prohibition lies in cases G.R. Nos. L-2044 and L2756. No
practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of these
procedural matters, since the decision in the cases wherein the
petitioners' cause of action or the propriety of the procedure
followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the
others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the public
of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 cited in
Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.)
Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed
by the Solicitor General a petition for prohibition against the
BOIE-TAKEDA
CHEMICALS,
INC., petitioner, vs. HON.
DIONISIO C. DE LA SERNA, Acting Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment,respondent.
[G.R. No. 102552. December 10, 1993.]
PHILIPPINE
FUJI
XEROX
CORP., petitioner, vs. CRESENCIANO
B.
TRAJANO,
Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment, and PHILIPPINE FUJI XEROX EMPLOYEES
UNION, respondents.
Herrera, Laurel, De los Reyes, Roxas & Teehankee for BoieTakeda Chemicals, Inc. and Phil. Fuji Xerox Corp.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WAGES; BASIC
SALARY, CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. Contrary to
respondents' contention, Memorandum Order No. 28did not
repeal, supersede or abrogate P.D. 851. As may be gleaned
from the language of Memorandum Order No. 28, it merely
"modified" Section 1 of the decree by removing the P1,000.00
salary ceiling. The concept of 13th Month Pay as envisioned,
defined and implemented under P.D. 851 remained unaltered,
and while entitlement to said benefit was no longer limited to
employees receiving a monthly basic salary of not more than
P1,000.00, said benefit was, and still is, to be computed on the
basic salary of the employee-recipient as provided under P.D.
851. Thus, the interpretation given to the term "basic salary" as
defined in P.D. 851 applies equally to "basic salary"
under Memorandum Order No. 28. The term "basic salary" is to
be understood in its common, generally-accepted meaning,
i.e., as a rate of pay for a standard work period exclusive of
such additional payments as bonuses and overtime. This is
how the term was also understood in the case of Pless v.
Franks, 308 S.W. 2d. 402, 403, 202 Tenn. 630, which held that
in statutes providing that pension should not be less than 50
percent of "basic salary" at the time of retirement, the quoted
words meant the salary than an employee (e.g., a policeman)
was receiving at the time he retired without taking into
consideration any extra compensation to which he might be
entitled for extra work. In remunerative schemes consisting of
a fixed or guaranteed wage plus commission, the fixed or
guaranteed wage is patently the "basic salary" for this is what
the employee receives for a standard work period.
Commissions are given for extra efforts exerted in
consummating sales or other related transactions. They are, as
such, additional pay, which this Court has made clear do not
form part of the "basic salary." In including commissions in the
computation of the 13th month pay, the second paragraph of
Section 5 (a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation
of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly expanded the concept of
"basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851. It is a fundamental rule
that implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the
provisions of the law it is designed to implement. Administrative
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law
they are intended to carry into effect. They cannot widen its
In the case of San Miguel Corp. vs. Inciong, 103 SCRA 139,
this Court delineated the coverage of the term "basic salary" as
used in P.D. 851. We said at some length: llcd
United
BF
Homeowner's
SYLLABUS
1. COMMERCIAL LAW; CORPORATION CODE; HOME
INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION (HIGC);
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS THEREOF; LIMITATIONS.
Originally, administrative supervision over homeowners'
associations was vested by law with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. On May 3, 1979, pursuant toExecutive
Order 535, this function was delegated to the Home Insurance
and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC). Section 2 of Executive
Order 535 provides: "2. In addition to the powers and functions
vested under the Home Financing Act, the Corporation, shall
have among others, the following additional powers; (a) To
require submission of and register articles of incorporation of
homeowners associations and issue certificates of
incorporation/registration, upon compliance by the registering
associations with the duly promulgated rules and regulations
thereon; maintain a registry thereof; and exercise all the
powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the
Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to
homeowners association, the provision of Act 1459, as
amended by P.D. 902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding;" By
virtue of this amendatory law, the HIGC not only assumed the
regulatory and adjudicative functions of the SEC over
homeowners' associations, but also the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: "(b)
Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership
relations, between and among stockholders, members or
associates; between any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are stockholders,
members or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as
it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such
entity." On December 21, 1989, the HIGC adopted its rules of
procedure in the hearing of homeowners' disputes. Section
1(b), Rule II enumerated the types of disputes over which the
HIGC has jurisdiction, and these include: "Section 1. Types of
Disputes The HIGC or any person, officer, body, board, or
committee duly designated or created by it shall have
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the
following: . . . (b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate
relations between and among members of the association,
between any and/or all of them and the association of which
they are members, and insofar as it concerns its right to exist
as a corporate entity, between the association and
the state/general public or other entity." Therefore, in relation to
Section 5 (b), Presidential Decree 902-A, the HIGC's
jurisdiction over homeowners' disputes is limited to
controversies that arise out of the following intra-corporate
relations: (1) between and among members of the association;
(2) between any or all of them and the association of which
they are members or associates; and (3) between such
association and the state, insofar as it concerns their individual
franchise or right to exist as such entity.
2. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT; AN
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CANNOT AMEND AN ACT OF
CONGRESS; RATIONALE; CASE AT BAR. As early as
1970, in the case of Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of
Administrators (PVA), 33 SCRA 585, 588 [1970], we ruled that
No costs.
Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
SO ORDERED.
C.J.,
Melo,
above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to
interpret, apply or implement it (the law). A judicial review of the
President's decision on a case of an employee decided by the
Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light
and the bringing of the case to the Courts should be governed
by the same principles as govern the judicial review of all
administrative acts of all administrative officers." 10
Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte,
Br. II, 11 is another case in point. Here, "the Executive
Office" of the
Department of Education
and
Culture
issuedMemorandum Order No. 93 under the authority of then
Secretary of Education Juan Manuel. As in this case, a
complaint for injunction was filed with the Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the
enforcement of the circular would impair some contracts
already entered into by public school teachers. It was the
contention of petitioner therein that "the Court of First Instance
is not empowered to amend, reverse and modify what is
otherwise the clear and explicit provision ofthe memorandum
circular issued by the Executive Office which has the force and
effect of law." In resolving the issue, We held:
" . . . , We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully
acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case No. II-240 (8) because the
plaintiff therein asked the lower court for relief, in the
form of injunction, in defense of a legal right (freedom to enter
into contracts) . . . Hence there is a clear
infringement of private respondent's constitutional right to enter
into agreements not contrary to law, which might ran the
risk of being
violated
by
the
threatened
implementation of Executive Office Memorandum Circular No.
93, dated February 5, 1968, which prohibits, with certain
exceptions, cashiers and disbursing officers from honoring
special powers of attorney executed by the payee
employees. The respondent Court is not only right but duty
bound to take cognizance of cases of this nature wherein a
constitutional and statutory right is allegedly infringed by the
administrative action of a government office. Courts of First
Instance have original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which
the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary
estimation (Sec.
44, Republic
Act
296,
as
amended)." 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 1 3 We ruled that a
judge of the Court of First Instance has the authority to decide
on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its validity had
been contested before the Secretary of Justice and an opinion
thereon had been rendered.
In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why
Resolution No. 105, issued by the respondent Professional
Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that
under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is
the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The
said law provides: