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...Appellant(s)
...Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
GANGULY, J.
1.
Leave granted.
2.
second
wife).
The
first
defendant
had
two
the
first
and
second
1
plaintiffs;
and
another
fourth
two
children
defendant
from
his
namely,
second
the
wife,
second
and
the
third
defendant.
3.
The
plaintiffs
children)
separate
their
had
property
filed
possession
1/4th
(first
share
which
suit
with
been
and
her
two
partition
and
defendants
for
for
against
each
had
wife
the
respect
given
to
to
ancestral
the
first
the
first
defendant
had
married
the
fourth
therefore,
the
children
born
in
the
said
4.
However,
the
defendants
contended
that
the
self-acquired
properties,
except
for
one
defendant
also
contended
that
it
was
the
fourth
to
claim
partition.
Further,
the
first
5.
The
Trial
Court,
by
its
judgment
and
order
divorced
marriage
the
of the
third
first
plaintiff.
defendant
with
The
the
second
fourth
while
his
first
marriage
was
still
6.
Aggrieved,
the
defendants
filed
an
appeal
the
entire
evidence
on
record
and
was
void
and
thus
children
from
such
7.
The
Appellate
Court
held
that
children
born
properties
Accordingly,
the
of
the
Appellate
first
Court
defendant.
held
that
the
were
entitled
to
equal
share
of
1/6th
the
said
8.
The
plaintiffs,
being
aggrieved
by
before
the
High
Court
of
Karnataka.
The
void
marriage
are
regarded
as
b) At
partition
between
the
coparceners
9.
their
suit for
partition
against
maintainable.
defendants
However,
were
coparcenary
the
not
property
first
the
entitled
by
defendant
second
to
birth
and
share
but
was
third
of
were
the
only
on
partition,
then
the
second
and
third
case
is
whether
illegitimate
children
are
can
only
parents,
claim
and
interesting
advisedly
rights
no
to
used
to
the
property
one
else.
However,
note
that
the
the
word
we
of
his
find
legislature
property
and
it
has
has
not
general.
catena
illegitimate
were
of
cases.
children
recognized
in
The
to
the
property
their
cases
rights
fathers
of
Sudras
of
property
to
some
extent.
Kamarajendra
Ramasami
Pandiya
Naicker
v.
had
died
leaving
behind
an
illegitimate
son,
The
in
his
fathers
property,
along
with
the
legitimate children.
16. In
P.M.A.M.
Vellaiyappa
Chetty
&
Ors.
v.
the
illegitimate
son
of
Sudra
from
partition
of the
joint
family
property,
but
was
Mulla,
speaking
for
the
Bench,
observed
born in
a wedlock,
and
he
had
no
right
by
property
along
with
the
legitimate
sons.
17. In
Raja
Jogendra
Bhupati
Hurri
Chundun
to
the
property
11
of
the
Raja.
The
Privy
18. In Gur Narain Das & Anr. v. Gur Tahal Das &
Ors., [AIR 1952 SC 225], a Bench comprising Justice
Fazl Ali and Justice Bose agreed with the principle
laid down in the case of Vellaiyappa Chetty (supra)
and supplemented the same by stating certain wellsettled
principles
to
the
effect
that
firstly,
demand
partition
against
the
coparcener
illegitimate
to the
father
son
separate
his
succeeds
estate
of
the
as
father
the
legitimate
son(s)
and
that
on
son.
However, the
Bench
was
referring
to
those
of
Raja
Jogendra
Bhupati
(supra)
and
is
established
that
for
the
purpose
of
his
putative
fathers
entire
self-acquired
logical
position
succeed
to the
that
other
he
shall
half
share
be
entitled
when
to
succession
marriage
(hereinafter,
such
children).
on
such
children
under
of
included
right
ancestral
their
to
property
parents,
both
of
such
property
self-acquired
the
parent.
as
This
rights
well
as
Court,
of
such
an
express
mandate
of
the
legislature
as
illegitimate
any
further
rights
than
only
violence
to
the
provision
specifically
subject
under
the
guise
of
interpretation,
of
the
appellants
were rejected.
22. In
our
humble
opinion
this
Court
in
Jinia
Jinia
Keotin
(supra)
and
held
that
illegitimate
voidable
marriage
was
not
entitled
to
claim
Section
16(3)
given
in
Jinia
Keotin
(supra),
legitimate,
then
they
cannot
be
in
and
Section
ancestral.
16(3)
17
will
The
prohibition
apply
to
such
children
with
respect
to
property
of
any
person
27. With
changing
social
norms
of
legitimacy
in
stems
from
social
consensus,
in
the
time
to
meet
the
challenges
18
of
the
changing
28. The
amendment
to
Section
16
of
the
Hindu
virtually
substituted
the
previous
the
relevant
notes
appended
in
the
clause
done
to
remove
difficulties
in
the
upholding
Parayankandiyal
the
law,
Eravath
this
Kanapravan
Court
in
Kalliani
Amma
held
that
Hindu
Marriage
Act,
beneficial
social
conferment
of
reforms
and
social
status
19
further
of
held
legitimacy
that
on
with
unamended
language
amendment,
Section
Sections
and
of
16(1)
and
Section
on
children
12
Section
Section
11
legitimacy
11
stands
born
16(1)
from
in
view
16.
of
But
after
de-linked
which
void
the
from
confers
marriages
been
conferred
on
the
children
whether
they
32. It
has
been
held
in
Parayankandiyal
(supra)
intends
Therefore,
16(3)
by
to
the
this
bring
about
social
interpretation
Court
in
given
Jinia
reforms.
to
Keotin
Section
(supra),
such
children
declared
legitimate
recognises
property
which
of
the
rights
their
has
and
of
parents.
been
legislatively
simultaneously
such
children
This
is
in
law
law
the
to
21
34. However,
benefit
one
given
thing
under
must
the
be
made
amended
clear
Section
that
16
is
35. In
our
view,
in
the
case
of
joint
family
it
on
their
own
right.
Logically,
in
the
is
share
regarded
of
as
the
their
the
the property
parents
self
on
of
acquired
such
and
The
only
limitation
22
even
after
the
parents
partition
but
such
they
children
can
cannot
ask
for
this
right
only
differ
from
the
exercise
36. We
are
constrained
interpretation of Section
to
16(3) rendered
by this
the
constitutional
values
enshrined
in
the
on
individual
dignity.
The
Court
has
to
in
Section
16(3).
23
However,
some
the
property
of
their
parents.
Such
rights
cannot be further restricted in view of the peexisting common law view discussed above.
It is well known that this Court cannot interpret a
socially beneficial legislation on the basis as if
the
words
therein
are
must
be
legislation
cast
in
stone.
given
Such
purposive
principles
voiced
under
Part
IV
of
the
In our
view this
flows from
the
It is no longer in
dispute
would
higher
that
judiciary
today
in
State
this
24
country.
include
the
Considering
Mathew
Sripadagalvaru
v.
in
Kesavananda
State
of
Kerala
and
Bharati
another
from
Article
39(f),
Article
300A
also
is
Constitutional
right
and
Article
300A
not
impose
any
restriction
on
the
property
26
42. For
the
reasons
discussed
above,
we
are
by
Neelamma
this
(supra)
Court
and
in
Jinia
Bharatha
Keotin
Matha
(supra),
(supra)
on
43. We
are,
therefore,
of
the
opinion
that
the
.......................J.
(G.S. SINGHVI)
New Delhi
March 31, 2011
.......................J.
(ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)
27