Santos vs.

Santos (2001)

FACTS:

Spouses Jesus and Rosalia Santos owned a parcel of land, which had a four-door apartment administered
by Rosalia who rented them out.
The spouses had 5 children, namely Salvador, Calixto, Alberto, Antonio, and Rosa.
The spouses executed a deed of sale of the properties in favor of their children Salvador and Rosa. (a TCT
was issued)
Rosa then sold her share to Salvador. (another TCT was issued)
Despite the transfer of the property to Salvador, Rosalia continued to lease and receive rentals from the
apartment units.
Later, Jesus died. Six years later, Salvador died. Shortly thereafter, Rosalia died.
Petitioner Zenaida Santos, wife of Salvador, demanded rent from a tenant of Rosalia.
Tenant refused, but Zenaida filed an ejectment suit against him, which eventually decided in Zenaidas
favor.
Private Respondents, the Santos siblings, filed an action for reconveyance of property, alleging that:
a
the two deeds of sale were simulated, therefore void.
b
The two sales were executed to accommodate Salvador in generating funds for his business ventures
and providing him with greater business flexibility.
RTC: two deeds of sale are null and void for being fictitious or simulated.
CA: affirmed decision.
Zenaida argues:
a
Art. 1477 ownership of the thing sold is transferred to the vendee upon its actual or constructive
delivery.
b
Art. 1498 when the sale is made through a public instrument, its execution is equivalent to the
delivery of the thing subject of the contract.
c
Applying these provisions, Salvador became the owner of the subject property by virtue of the 2
deeds of sale.

ISSUE: I. W/N the execution of a public instrument is equivalent to delivery of the land.

HELD: I. EXECUTION OF PUBLIC INST. NOT DELIVERY

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Nowhere in the NCC does it provide that execution of a deed of sale is a conclusive presumption of
delivery of possession.
The NCC merely said that the execution shall be equivalent to delivery. The presumption can be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
Presumptive delivery can be negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land
sold.
Although the spouses executed a deed of sale, they did not deliver the possession and ownership of
the property to Salvador and Rosa.
The original sellers retained their control and possession. Therefore, there was no real transfer of
ownership.

Addison vs Felix and Tioco (1918)

FACTS:

Addison sold to defendant Felix and Tioco (her husband) 4 parcels of land.
Under the instrument executed:
a
Felix is to pay P3000 as downpayment.
b
To pay the balance of P2000 on July 1914, then P5000 30 days after the issuance to her of a
certificate of title.

To pay, within 10 years, P10 for each cocoanut tree in bearing and P5 for each such tree not in
bearing, with the condition that the total price should not exceed P85,000.
d
Felix was to deliver to Addison 25% of the value of the products that she might obtain from the 4
parcels of lands from the moment Felix takes possession of the lands until a TCT has been issued in
her favor.
e
That within 1 year from the date of the TCT is issued in Felix favor, she may rescind the contract.
(everyone will return what they have given + interests)
Addison filed a suit in CFI to compel Felix to make payment of the 1 st installment.
Felix defense:
c
Addison had absolutely failed to deliver to her the lands that were the subject matter of the sale.
NOTE: After the execution of the deed of sale, Addison designated to a representative of Felix only 2 of
the 4 parcels of land. And these 2 lands were in possession of a 3 rd person.
Felix filed an application for the registration of the 4 parcels of land, which was dismissed for
failure to present the required plans within the period required.

RTC: ruled in favor of Felix; contract of sale be rescinded.

Addison argues:
d
Right to rescind not only did not exist from the moment of the execution of the contract up to 1 year
after the registration of the land, but does not accrue until the land is registered.
e
Right to rescind was subject to a condition, namely the issuance of the title.

ISSUE: I. W/N there was delivery of the thing sold

HELD: I. NO DELIVER; FELIX WON!!!

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With respect to two of the parcels of land, Addison was not even able to show them to the purchaser;
and as regards the other two, more than 2/3 of their area was in the adverse possession of a 3 rd
person.
7
The thing is considered to be delivered when it is placed in the hands and possession of the vendee.
8
In order that symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor
shall have had such control over the thing sold.
9
It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of possession. The thing
sold must be placed in his control.
10 The execution of a public instrument is sufficient for the purposes of the abandonment made by the
vendor; but it is not always sufficient.
11 The mere execution of the instrument was not a fulfillment of the vendors obligation to deliver the
thing sold, and that from such non-fulfillment arises purchasers right to demand, as Felix demanded,
the rescission of the sale and the return of the price.

Danguilan v. IAC and Melad (1988)

Domingo Melad owned 2 lots in Cagayan, a residential lot and a farm lot.
Danguilan and Apolonia Melad both claim rights over the said lots.
Melads version: based on a Deed of Sale in 1943 signed by Domingo. This sale was supposedly entered
into by her mother when she was just a kid, the payment of 80 for such sale earned by her mother at the
Tabacalera Factory. She also claimed that she was the illegitimate daughter of Melad, who lived w/ them til
he died. (This was later on found to be very suspicious)
She explained that she vacated the place because Melad asked her permission to cultivate the land as her
tenant who would deliver of the harvest to her. But she filed a complaint since the deliveries have stopped.
-

Danguilans version: Donations in 2 private instruments were made by Domingo to him and his wife
(domingos niece), in exchange for taking care of the old man, and cultivating his land and with the
understanding that he would bury him upon his death.
It is important to note that the TC found that Danguilan was in open and continuous possn of the lots in
question. Melads version that she considered Danguilan as a tenant was not given much weight.

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w/n there was a valid donation, given that a donation must be made in a public instrument
- YES. While truly donations, the conveyances where onerous donations as the properties were given to the
petitioner in exchange for his obligation to take care of the donee for the rest of his life and provide for his
burial. There was a fair exchange as Domingo died really old, which means that Dnaguilan practically farmed
the land by himself.

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Assuming that there was a valid sale to Melad, was the contract consummated?
NO. Even assuming the validity of the deed of sale, the record shows that the private respondent did not
take possn of the disputed properties and indeed waited until 1962 to file the action for recovery of the
lands from the petitioner. If she did have possn, she transferred the same to Dnaguilan in 1946, by her
own admission.
She failed to show that she consummated the contract of sale by actual delivery of the properties to her
and actual possn thereof in the concept of purchaser-owner.
As ro the argument that symbolic delivery was effected through the deed of sale, the Code imposes upon
the vendor the obligation to deliver the thing sold and such is done when it is placed in the hands and
possn of the vendee. In order that symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, control over the
thing sold is necessary, and not just ownership and right of possn.

Danguilan has a better right to the lots.

Pasagui vs. Villablanca (1975)

FACTS:

Pasagui bought from co-defendants Bocar a parcel of agricultural land.

A deed of sale was executed, which was notarized and registered in the Registry of Deeds.
Later, defendants Villablanca took possession of the said property, harvesting coconuts, thus depriving
Pasagui possession.
Thus, this prompted Pasagui to file a complaint with the CFI against the Villablancas to surrender
possession.
Villablancas moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that since it was a complaint for forcible entry, CFI
had no jurisdiction.
RTC: dismissed complaint. MTC has jurisdiction. (at that time, Justice of the Peace)

ISSUE: I. W/N action of forcible entry should be granted

HELD: I. SHOULDNT BE GRANTED; PASAGUI NOT IN POSSESSION.

12 Complaint does not allege that the plaintiffs were in physical possession of the land and have been
deprived of that possession through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
13 It is true that the execution of the deed of absolute sale in a public instrument is equivalent to
delivery of the land subject of the sale. This presumptive delivery only holds true when there is no
impediment that may prevent the passing of the property from the hands of the vendor into those of
the vendee. It can be negated by the reality that the vendees actually failed to obtain material
possession of the land subject of the sale.
14 Pasagui did not physical possession of the land since its purchase.
15 As a matter of fact, their purpose in filing the complaint is precisely to get possession of the property.
16 Forcible entry should be denied because Pasagui had no prior physical possession of the property.

DY, JR. vs. CA (1991)

1. Wilfredo Dy purchased a truck and a farm tractor through financing extended by Libra Finance Investment Corp.
Both truck and tractor were mortgaged to Libra as security for the loan
2. Perfecto DY, his brother, wanted to buy the tractor. Perfecto then wrote a letter to Libra for him to purchase such
and assume the mortgage. Libra approved the request. And Wilfredo executed a deed of absolute sale.
3. The tractor was withheld by Libra because of Wilfredos failure to pay amortizations. Despite offer of Perfecto to
pay the full amount, it could not be effected because Libra insisted also for the payment of the truck. A check was
then issued to Libra to settle the full amount.
4. A civil case of Wilfredo was also pending in Cebu to recover a sum of money. The provincial sheriff was able to
seize and levy on the tractor. The tractor was sold at the pubic auction where Gelac trading was the lone bidder.
Gelac later sold it Antonio Gonzales
5. When the check was cleared, it was only then Perfecto learned about the purchase of Gelac. He filed then an
action to recover the tractor against Gelac with the RTC of Cebu.

RTC: in favor of petitioner; CA: reversed

Issue: w/n there was a valid sale to Perfecto

Held: VALID
1. Mortgagor who gave the property as security under a chattel mortgage did not part with the ownership over the
same. He had the right to sell it although he was under obligation to secure the written consent of the mortgagee.
And even if no consent was obtained form the mortgagee, the validity of the sale would still be effected.
2. Court sees no reason why Wilfredo cannot sell the subject tractor. The consent of Libra was even obtained in this
case. The sale between the brothers was valid and binding even to the mortgagee.
3. Art. 1496 states that the ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered
to him in any of the ways in 1497 to 1501. In this case, actual delivery cannot be made. However, there was
constructive delivery already upon the execution of the public instrument and upon the consent and agreement of
the parties.
While it is true that Wilfredo was not in actual possession and control of the subject tractor, his right of ownership
was not divested from his default. Neither could it be said that Libra was the owner because the mortgagee can not
become the owner or convert and appropriate himself the property mortgaged.
4. When a third person purchases the mortgaged property, he automatically steps into the shoes of the original
mortgagor.
5. The payment of the check was actually intended to extinguish the mortgage obligation so that the tractor could
be released to the petitioner. The sale of the subject tractor was already consummated when it was levied upon the
by the sheriff. Gelac even knew of the transfer of the property to Perfecto when it received summons. Even with
that, they still continued to sell the subject tractor to Antonio.

POWER COMMERCIAL vs. CA (1997)

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Power Commercial and Industrial Development Corporation, an industrial asbestos manufacturer, needed a
bigger office space and warehouse for its products. For this, it entered into a contract of sale with the
spouses Reynaldo and Angelita Quiambao (private respondents).
Petitioner assumed, as part of the purchase price, the existing mortgage on the land. In full satisfaction,
Reynaldo paid PNB around 79k.
June 1 - Spouses again mortgaged said land to PNB to guarantee a loan of which was paid to spouses.
Petitioner agreed to assume the payment of the loan.
June 26 Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was executed by the parties. On the same
date, the manager of Power Commercial submitted to PNB said deed with formal application of the
assumption of mortgage.
Almost 7 months after said sale, PNB informed spouses that Power Commercial failed to submit papers
necessary for the approval of the mortgage. Thus application for assumption was withdrawn. The
outstanding balance deemed due and demandable. Power Commercial paid and sent a letter to PNB that
there are people who are physically occupying their lot and it is their desire to eject them immediately.
With that, they request that their assumption of mortgage be given favorable consideration. PNB replied
and asked that Power Commercial remit payments to cover interest and at least part of the principal.
Power Commercial then filed a case for rescission and damages before the RTC. Petitioner demanded
return of payments it made on the ground that its assumption of mortgage was never approved.
Subsequently, the mortgage was closed and was bought by PNB in the public auction.
TC: failure of respondent spouses to deliver actual possession to petitioner entitled the petitioner to
rescind the sale.
CA: reversed; deed of sale did not obligate the spouses to eject the lessees from the land as a condition of
the sale, nor was the occupation by said lessees a violation of the warranty against eviction; no
substantial breach to justify rescission

Issue: was there an effective symbolic delivery? (important issue for sales)

Held:
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There was no express stipulation in the contract that spouses will be guaranteeing ejectment of the
occupants although there was a proviso guaranteeing the peaceful possession by the buyer of the land.
Most authorities consider transfer of ownership as the primary purpose of sale, delivery remains an
indispensable requisite as our law does not admit the doctrine of transfer of property by mere consent.
Civil Code provides that delivery can either be actual (1497) or constructive (1498-1501). Symbolic
delivery as a species of constructive delivery, effects the transfer of ownership through the execution of a
public document. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the
enjoyment and material tenancy of the ting and make use of it himself or through another in his name,
because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the interposition of another will, then fiction yields
to reality the delivery has not been effected.
In this case, delivery was effected through the execution of deed. The lot sold had been placed under the
control of petitioner; thus, the filing of the ejectment suit was subsequently done. It signified that its new
owner intended to obtain for itself and to terminate said occupants actual possession thereof. Prior
physical delivery or possession is not legally required and the execution of the deed of sale is deemed
equivalent to delivery. This deed operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and
authorizes the buyer to use the document as proof of ownership. Nothing more is required. Petition
denied.

BEHN, MEYER & CO. vs YANGCO

Behn Meyer & Yangco entered into a contract of sale of 80 drums of Carabao Caustic Soda for P10,063.
These were shipped from New York on board the steamship Chinese Prince, w/c was detained by British
authorities & 71 drums of caustic soda were removed

Yangco refused to accept delivery of the 9 remaining drums on the ground that they were in bad order &
also refused the optional offer of Behn (waiting for remainder of the shipment until it arrived) or the offer
to substitute the 71 drums of caustic soda of similar grade from Behns stock (not of the Carabao
brand).
Behn sold, for the account of Yangco, 80 drums of caustic soda realizing P6,352, w/c was deducted from
the selling price of P10,063 making up the amount of damages claimed by Behn for alleged breach of
contract.
TC: For Yangco.

Issue on place of delivery:

A specification in a contract relative to the payment of freight can be taken to indicate the intention of the
parties in regard to the place of delivery. If the buyer is to pay the freight, it is reasonable to suppose that
he does so because the goods become his at the point of shipment. On the other hand, if the seller is to
pay the freight, it can be inferred that it is the duty of the seller to have the goods transported to their
ultimate destination & that title does not pass until the goods have reached their destination.
Contract also provided for c.i.f. Manila, pagadero against delivery of documents. What does this mean?

In British contracts, c.i.f. stands for costs, insurance & freight. They signify that the price fixed covers
not only the costs of the goods but the expense of freight & insurance to be paid by the seller.
In American mercantile contracts, the letters F.O.B. stands for Free on Board w/c means that the seller
shall bear all expenses until the goods ae delivered where they are to be delivered FOB at the point of
shipment or at the point of destination determines the time when property passes. Both the terms cif &
FOB merely make rules of presumption w/c yield o proof of contrary intention to be ascertained by a
consideration of all the circumstances.
In this case, the world Manila in conjunction with c.i.f. must mean that the contract price, covering
costs, insurance & freight, signifies that delivery was to be made at Manila. If Behn Meyer had seriously
thought that place of delivery was New York, it would not have gone through the trouble of making
fruitless attempts to substitute the goods but would have permitted the entire loss of the shipment to fall
upon Yangco.

Issue on time of delivery: The contract provided: Embarque: March, 1916 but the merchandise was shipped only
on April 12, 1916.

CONCLUSION: The contract was for 80 drums of Carabao caustic soda (costs, insurance & freight to be included)
to be shipped during March 1916, to be delivered at Manila & paid for on delivery of the documents. The soda
offered by Behn was not of the Carabao brand & the merchandise was not shipped on March but April. Behn has
not proved performance on its part of the conditions set forth in the contract as it failed to deliver the goods
contracted for. THUS, Yangco was rescind the contract of sale because of a breach in substantial particulars going
to the essence of the contract and so, Yangco is not liable. The vendee can demand the fulfillment of the contract
but as this is shown to be impossible, is relieved of his obligation.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Rudolf Lietz, Inc. vs CA, Agapito Buriol, Tiziana Turatello, Paola Sani
(Jal)19 Dec 2005 Tinga *land leased to Italians and subsequently sold; area lessthan what
was in the contract
Facts:
1. Agapito Buriol owned a parcel of unregistered land in Palawan.
2.On 15 Aug 1986, Buriol entered into a lease agreement with Flavia Turatello,
TizianaTuratello, and Paola Sani, all Italians, involving 1 hectare of the property.
Lease agreement wasfor 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.

3.The Italians then took possession of the land after paying a downpayment of
10,000. The lease agreement was reduced into writing in Jan 1987.
4. On 17 Nov 1986, Buriol sold the land to Rudolf Lietz , Inc. for 30,000. The Deed of
AbsoluteSale states that the land measured 5 hectares, more or less . It also
described the boundaries of the land.
5. Lietz later discovered that Buriol owned only 4 hectares , with 1 more covered
by thelease agreement. Hence, only 3 hectares were actually delivered.
6.Lietz then filed a complaint for Annulment of Lease with Recovery of Possession against
Buriol andthe Italians. He alleged that Buriol sold to him the lot in evident bad faith and
malice knowing that he owned only 4 hectares, not 5.
7. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the counterclaim of the Italians for
damages.
8. The CA affirmed the dismissal. It held that under Article 1542, Lietz is no longer
entitled toa reduction in price
.9.Lietz appeals. He contends that he is entitled to reduction under Article 1539.
Issue: Is Lietz entitled to a reduction in the purchase price of the lot because of the reduced
area of the property delivered to him?
Held:
No. Under Article 1542, there shall be no reduction in the purchase price even if the
area delivered is less than that stated in the contract.
Decision: Affirmed.
Ruling:
1. Article 1539 governs a sale of immovable by the unit, that is, at a stated
price per unitarea. In a unit price contract, the statement of area of immovable is
not conclusive and the price maybe reduced or increased depending on the area
actually delivered.
2. In some instances,
a sale of an immovable may be made for a lump sum and not at a rate per unit. In
the case where the area of the immovable is stated in the contract based on an estimate,
theactual area delivered may not measure up exactly with the area stated in the contract.
3. A vendee of land, when sold in gross or with the description more or less with
reference to its area,does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land.
The use of more or less or similarwords in designating quantity covers only
a reasonable excess or deficiency.
4. What really defines a piece of ground is not the area mentioned in its
description, but theboundaries therein laid down
, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. In a contract of sale of land in a mass, it is
well established that the
specific boundaries stated in the contract mustcontrol over any statement with
respect to the area
contained within its boundaries.
5. In this case, the sale is one made for a lump sum. The Deed of Absolute Sale
shows that theparties agreed on the purchase price on a predetermined area of 5
hectares within the specifiedboundaries and not based on a particular rate per area.
6. In accordance with Article 1542, there shall be no reduction in the purchase
price even if thearea delivered to Lietz is less than that stated in the
contract . The ar ea within theboundaries as stated in the contract shall
control over the area agreed upon.
7. Lietz had an ocular inspection prior to the perfection of the contract. Thus, he gained
a fair estimate of the area of the property sold to him. Also, his subscription to the
Deed of Absolute Sale indicates hisassent to the correct description of the boundaries
of the property.
Law:Art. 1539

. The obligation to deliver the thing sold includes that of placing in the control of the vendee
allthat is mentioned in the contract, in conformity with the following rules:If the sale of real
estate should be made with a statement of its area, at the rate of a certain price for aunit of
measure or number, the vendor shall be obliged to deliver to the vendee, if the latter
shoulddemand it, all that may have been stated in the contract; but, should this be
not possible, the vendeemay choose between a proportional reduction of the price and
the rescission of the contract, providedthat, in the latter case, the lack in the area be not
less than one-tenth of that stated. x x x