(Studies in The History of Christian Traditions 172) Salvatore I. Camporeale, O. P. - Christianity, Latinity, and Culture - Two Studies On Lorenzo Valla 2014

Christianity, Latinity, and Culture
Studies in the History of

Christian Traditions
General Editor
Robert J. Bast
Knoxville, Tennessee
In cooperation with
Paul C.H. Lim, Nashville, Tennessee

Eric Saak, Liverpool
Christine Shepardson, Knoxville, Tennessee
Brian Tierney, Ithaca, New York
Arjo Vanderjagt, Groningen
John Van Engen, Notre Dame, Indiana
Founding Editor
Heiko A. Oberman
VOLUME 172
The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/shct
Christianity, Latinity,
and Culture
Two Studies on Lorenzo Valla
By
Salvatore I. Camporeale, O.P.

Translated by
Patrick Baker
Edited by
Patrick Baker
Christopher S. Celenza
With Lorenzo Vallas Encomium of Saint Thomas Aquinas

Edited and translated by
Patrick Baker
LEIDEN BOSTON
2014
Cover illustration: Detail of Filippino Lippi (ca. 1457-1504), Triumph of St. Thomas Aquinas over
the Heretics, fresco, 1489-1492 (Cappella Carafa, Santa Maria sopra Minerva, Rome), depicting the
equestrian statue of Marcus Aurelius in front of the Lateran (courtesy of Scala Archives).
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The editors dedicate this posthumous volume to the memory of

Salvatore I. Camporeale
CONTENTS
List of Illustrationsxi
Note on the Translation xiii
Acknowledgementsxv
Introduction: Salvatore Camporeale and Lorenzo Valla1
Lorenzo Valla and the De falso credita donatione: Rhetoric,
Freedom, and Ecclesiology in the Fifteenth Century 17
1Introduction to a Reinterpretation of the De falso
credita donatione 19
2Causa veritatis: From the Exordium to the Peroration 28
3The Antinomy of imperium and evangelium 37
4Section I of the Oration and Parallel Passages in
Vallas Works 54
5The Body of the Oration: From Section III to Section VI 57
6Section IV: From the Constitutum Constantini to the
Legenda Silvestri 73
6.1The Constitutum 76
6.2The Legenda Silvestri 84
7Section V: From the Pactum Hludovicianum to the
respublica romana; Vallas Anti-Caesarism in Opposition
to Augustine101
7.1The Hludovicianum and the Transfer of the Empire
(translatio imperii)102
7.2From imperium to respublica: The Second Part of
Section V109
7.3From Valla to Augustine: The Critique of the
City of God112
8Epilogue: Vallas Defense of the Oration in his Letters to
Cardinals Trevisan and Landriani134
viii
contents
Lorenzo Valla between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance:

The Encomium of St. Thomas 1457145
1At the Origins of Neo-Thomism in the Fifteenth Century145
1.1The Literary Encomium and the Iconographic
Triumph of St. Thomas Aquinas in the Dominican
Tradition145
1.2The History of Thomism and the Centrality of the
Summa Theologiae in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth
Centuries149
1.3Vallas Encomium: Its Place in History and Cultural
Significance154
1.4The Cappellone degli Spagnoli in Florence (Second Half
of the Fourteenth Century) and the Cappella Carafa in
Rome (End of the Fifteenth Century)156
2Encomium of St. Thomas164
2.1Exordium and Divine Invocation165
2.2The narratio and the Liturgical Celebration of the
Saint166
2.3Probatio and refutatio, the Central Section of the
Encomium170
2.4Knowledge, the Second Thematic Unit173
2.5Vallas Critique of Scholasticism and the Controversy
between Thomism and Anti-Thomism in the
Fifteenth Century175
2.6The Stylistic Qualities of Thomass Writings
and the Canons of Latin Rhetoric178
2.7The Critique of Scholastic Speculation and the
Humanist Refounding of Theological Study182
2.8Philosophy as an Impediment to Authentic Christian
Thought and the Distinction/Opposition between
Patristic Theology and Scholasticism184
2.9The Reduction of Philosophy to Rhetoric and
Vallas Quintilianism186
2.10The Linguistic-Semantic Critique of Scholasticism and
the Interrelation between Greek and Latin192
2.11Peroration and Closing of the Encomium196
contentsix
3The Aporias of Scholasticism203
3.1Philosophy/Theology203
3.2Dialectic/Rhetoric234
4Rhetoric as a Mode of Theologizing: The Humanist Solution
to the Problem254
4.1The proemium to Book IV of the Elegantiae255
4.2The Letter to Eustochium and Jeromes Dream257
4.3The Mechanical Arts, the Liberal Arts, and the
Christian Religion263
4.4The Opposition between Philosophical Theology and
Rhetorical Theology, and the Critical Reduction of the
Vulgate to the Greek Truth (veritas graeca)276
4.5The Preface to Thucydides History, Nicholas Vs
Literary Project, and the Question of Translation281
4.6The Arts and Sciences as a Middle Ground (medietas)287
4.7Erasmuss Humanism from the Antibarbari to the
Life of Jerome291
Lorenzo Valla, Encomium of St. Thomas Aquinas297
Patrick Baker (ed. and tr.)
Bibliography317
Index331
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
1Andrea di Bonaiuto (fl. 13431377), Triumph of the
Catholic Doctrine Embodied by St. Thomas Aquinas,
fresco, 13651367. Cappellone degli Spagnoli, Santa
Maria Novella, Florence (courtesy of Scala Archives)160
2Filippino Lippi (ca. 14571504), Triumph of St. Thomas
Aquinas over the Heretics, fresco, 14891492. Cappella
Carafa, Santa Maria sopra Minerva, Rome (courtesy of
Scala Archives)163
NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION

My intention has been to translate the work of Salvatore Camporeale not
only into English but into readable English. His Latinate and at times
highly technical style can be difficult to navigate, and it seemed that the
service of translation would be less if the text were simply rendered ad
litteram into an equally intractable analog. Thus long sentences have been
broken up and paragraph divisions reformatted, and wherever possible
extremely dense or opaque formulations have been unpacked. Whether
this has been done excessively or insufficiently is for the reader to judge.
Those intent on recovering Camporeales pristine intention can, of course,
avail themselves of the original.
Both essays translated here first appeared in Italian in the journal
Memorie Domenicane and were reprinted, with minimal revision, in the
2002 volume Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo, riforma e controriforma: studi e
testi. Occasionally very small portions of Camporeales text have been
omitted or altered when made irrelevant or redundant in the process of
translation. Typographical errors have been silently corrected. Every effort
has been made to provide precise citations for quotations, which
Camporeale, writing in another era of scholarship and assuming his readers knew the sources thoroughly, often did not provide. No systematic
attempt has been made to update the bibliography, though when possible English translations or original English editions of works cited by
Camporeale in Italian have been supplied. Such bibliographical and other
editorial additions, including a sprinkling of explanatory footnotes, appear
in square brackets. The essay, Lorenzo Valla between the Middle Ages and
the Renaissance: the Encomium of St. Thomas 1457, appears here in
slightly modified form: a lengthy appendix featuring a comparative reading of Aquinass commentary on St. Pauls letters with Vallas Adnotationes
has been omitted, while a Latin text and a new English translation of the
Encomium have been added.
All translations of Latin sources are mine except where noted. The
greatest borrowing of the work of others has occurred with Vallas Oration
on the Donation of Constantine, for which I have made use of the translation by G.W. Bowersock in the I Tatti Renaissance Library. It has, however,
been necessary at times to modify his renderings to fit the context of
Camporeales work; all such departures are noted. In translating primary
xiv
note on the translation
sources, I have generally tried to adhere to the interpretation Camporeale

gave them.
Camporeales Italian has presented many challenges, not least of which
is the consistent translation of key terms used somewhat idiosyncratically.
Of the greatest moment is statuto, a word whose original meaning in jurisprudence is statute, charter, constitution but which in the realm of science and scholarship is applied metaphorically to denote something along
the lines of theoretical foundations. Here statuto has been translated
thus but also as either principle or guideline, such as in the phrase, a
humanist principle of theology (statuto umanistico della teologia).
Another stumbling block has been gnoseologico, an adjective seemingly
synonymous with epistemologico. Yet Camporeale sometimes uses
gnoseological and epistemological as a pair in a way that seems to suggest that more than mere pleonasm is at stake. Caution and respect have
recommended retaining this usage. Similarly, the terms compossibilit and
incompossibilit have been retained, as in the incompossibility between
theology and philosophy or the compossibility between classical literature and sacred scripture. Here the sense seems to extend beyond simple
compatibility to denote able to be engaged in at the same time by the
same person or able to co-exist simultaneously.
In dealing with these and other difficulties I have benefitted from
invaluable assistance and advice, especially from Maurizio Campanelli,
Amos Edelheit, Jim Hankins, Lodi Nauta, Christian Peters, and Iolanda
Ventura. Furthermore, the readers for Brill, in particular Scott Blanchard,
caught numerous errors and offered several helpful insights. Gratitude
must also be expressed to my wife Katrin for graciously making room for
the figure of Salvatore Camporeale in our life. My greatest thanks, finally,
go to Chris Celenza for embracing the idea of this project, for obtaining a
grant from Villa I Tatti, and for meticulously reading through the translation and making countless suggestions for improvement.
Patrick Baker
Rome, 2013
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The editors would like to thank Memorie Domenicane for permission to
translate Camporeales essays, which originally appeared in its pages:
Lorenzo Valla e il De falso credita donatione. Retorica, libert ed ecclesiologia nel 400, Memorie Domenicane, n.s., 19 (1988): 191293; and Lorenzo
Valla tra Medioevo e Rinascimento. Encomion s. Thomae 1457, Memorie
Domenicane, n.s., 7 (1976): 11194. We would also like to thank the I Tatti
Renaissance Library for permission to use G.W. Bowersocks translation of
Vallas Oration on the Donation of Constantine (On the Donation of
Constantine, tr. G.W. Bowersock [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 2007]), as well as the Monumenta Germaniae Historica for permission to reprint large portions of Wolfram Setzs critical text of the Latin
Oration (De falso credita et ementita Constantini donatione, ed. Wolfram
Setz [Weimar: Bhlau, 1976], Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Quellen
zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 10). This volume was made possiblein part thanks to a Lila Acheson Wallace Readers Digest Publications
Subsidy from Villa I Tatti, The Harvard University Center for Italian
Renaissance Studies. It was put into final form at the American Academy
in Rome, where Patrick Baker resided in 20122013 as the Lily
Auchincloss Post-Doctoral Rome Prize Fellow in Renaissance and Early
Modern Italian Studies.
P.B. and C.C.
INTRODUCTION:
SALVATORE CAMPOREALE AND LORENZO VALLA
Italian Renaissance studies lost one of its most valued scholars on 17
December 2002, when the Dominican scholar Salvatore Camporeale
passed away. Camporeales life took him from southern Italy (where he
was born in 1928, in Bari), to California (where he attended a small Catholic
college, St. Alberts, receiving his Bachelors degree in 1950), Pistoia,
Florence, and to visiting lectureships all over the world. He was a regular
visitor to the Johns Hopkins University, where he taught yearly minicourses from the early 1980s until the later 1990s. And he was a beloved
interlocutor for many years at Villa I Tatti, the Harvard University Center
for Renaissance Studies in Settignano, near Florence, where Camporeale
had his real and final home, in the Dominican community of Santa Maria
Novella. After his death, no less than three publications in his honor
appeared, testimony to the immense esteem Camporeale enjoyed among
his students and colleagues worldwide, all the more noteworthy since he
never held a permanent university position.1
While Camporeale wrote on different topics, his principal contribution
to scholarship came in his studies of the fifteenth-century thinker
Lorenzo Valla (140657), a Roman intellectual whose historical, literary,
1See Francesco Ciabattoni and Susanna Barsella (eds.), The Humanists Workshop:
Special Issue on Salvatore I. Camporeale, special issue of Italian Quarterly, vol. 46 (179182 =
Winter to Fall, 2009), entire issue (there see Susanna Barsella, Biocritical Note, 1517 and
Bibliography, 1921, for a list of Camporeales publications); Walter Stephens (ed.), Studia
Humanitatis: Studies in Honor of Salvatore Camporeale (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2004), supplement to Modern Language Notes 119 (2004); and a section of
the Journal of the History of Ideas 66 (2005): 477556: Salvatore Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla,
Humanism, and Theology, edited by Melissa Meriam Bullard, with essays by Bullard, The
Renaissance Project of Knowing: Lorenzo Valla and Salvatore Camporeales Contributions
to the Querelle between Rhetoric and Philosophy (47781); Christopher S. Celenza,
Lorenzo Valla and the Traditions and Transmissions of Philosophy (483506); Brian
P. Copenhaver, Valla Our Contemporary: Philosophy and Philology (50725); Mariangela
Regoliosi, Salvatore Camporeales Contribution to Theology and the History of the
Church (52739); and Nancy S. Struever, Historical Priorities (54156). There are profiles
of Camporeale posted by Villa I Tatti (accessed 12.17.2012: http://www.itatti.it/camporeale
_memoriam.htm) and Santa Maria Novella (accessed 12.17.2012: http://www.smn.it/
convento/campo.htm).
christopher s. celenza
and philosophical works proved influential, both in his own epoch and,
more noticeably, after their rediscovery in the twentieth century.
Camporeale took part in that wave of rediscovery (indeed he was one of
its prime movers), and his work served to introduce serious analysis of
Valla into the then highly specialized scholarly conversation on the intellectual history of Renaissance Italy. Little of Camporeales work has
appeared in English, despite his international reputation; and now that
study of Lorenzo Valla has grown, aided by new editions and translations
of his work as well as by recent scholarship, the time has come to present
in book form the two monographs that Camporeale believed best encapsulated his life-long work on this important Renaissance thinker.2 To set
these studies in context, it is worthwhile to spend a little time with Valla
and on the two main works under discussion in this volume before moving on to Camporeales own background and guiding assumptions.
Lorenzo Vallas key preoccupations lay in the realms of the Latin language, Christianity, and culture. He saw those three areas as linked, believing them mutually interdependent. Both of the texts on which Camporeale
focuses here, Vallas treatise on the Donation of Constantine and his
Encomium of Saint Thomas Aquinas, serve as keystones to Vallas thoughts
and to Camporeales vision of Vallas importance. Both texts, especially
that on the Donation, have had traditional interpretations that are accurate on the surface but that, in light of Camporeales examination, reveal
much more: about Valla, about the history of philology, and about the history of institutional Christianity.3
2For recent editions, translations, and bibliography, see Christopher S. Celenza,
Lorenzo Vallas Radical Philology: The Preface to the Annotations to the New Testament
in Context, Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 42 (2012), 365394; Lorenzo
Valla, Dialectical Disputations, ed. and tr. Brian P. Copenhaver and Lodi Nauta, 2 vols.
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012); Lodi Nauta, In Defense of Common
Sense: Lorenzo Vallas Humanist Critique of Scholastic Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2009); Mariangela Regoliosi (ed.), Lorenzo Valla: La riforma
della lingua e della logica, 2 vols. (Firenze: Polistampa, 2010); eadem (ed.), Lorenzo
Valla e lumanesimo toscano (Firenze: Polistampa, 2009); eadem (ed.), Pubblicare il
Valla (Firenze: Polistampa, 2008); Lorenzo Valla, Raudensiane note, ed. Gian Matteo
Corrias (Firenze: Polistampa, 2007); Lorenzo Valla, Encomion Sancti Thome, ed. Stefano
Cartei (Firenze: Polistampa, 2008); Lorenzo Valla, Ad Alfonsum regem Epistola de duobus
Tarquiniis and Confutationes in Benedictum Morandum, ed. Francesco Lo Monaco (Firenze:
Polistampa, 2009); Lorenzo Valla, Emendationes quorundam locorum ex Alexandro ad
Alfonsum primum Aragonum regem, ed. Clementina Marsico (Firenze: Polistampa, 2009).
3See Lorenzo Valla, On the Donation of Constantine, ed. and tr. G.W. Bowersock
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007); there the Latin edition is based on
Lorenzo Valla, De falso credita et ementita Constantini donatione, ed. Wolfram Setz, in the
Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 10 (Weimar: Bhlau, 1976); Wolfram Setz, Lorenzo Vallas
introduction: salvatore camporeale and lorenzo valla3
The basic contours of Vallas life and work are easy enough to sketch, at
least in broad outline.4 Roman in origin, he was raised in the environment
of the papal court, and he spent part of his youth in the company of an
uncle, Melchior Scrivani, himself a curialist.5 Valla spent much of his life
trying to become part of the papal court. It was not until 1447 that he succeeded, when he obtained a position at the court of Nicholas V (the former Tommaso Parentucelli), a great supporter of humanistic studies.6 In
the intervening years, Valla spent a significant amount of time at the
Neapolitan Court of Alfonso of Aragon, and it was there that he drafted
most of his major works, the treatise on the Donation of Constantine
among them. Other works that date from this period include Vallas
Annotations on the New Testament, in which he applies his knowledge of
the Greek language to the Latin Vulgate translation of the New Testament,
which Valla argues does not always reflect adequately the meaning of the
Greek text; a dialogue On Pleasure, in which Vallas interlocutors take different positions regarding the place of pleasure in Christian life; a dialogue
On Free Will, in which Valla confronts the classic question of the relationship between divine omniscience and human free will; his On the
Profession of the Religious, a dialogue in which Valla, through his interlocutors, argues that sincere Christian religiosity cannot be measured by the
taking of religious vows; his Pruning, or Re-digging up, of all Dialectic, an
ambitious attempt on Vallas part to reframe the way logic was studied
and conceived in the late middle ages; and, among other works, his
Schrift gegen die Konstantinische Schenkung, De falsa credita et ementita Constantini donatione: Zur Interpretation und Wirkungsgeschichte. Bibliothek des Deutschen Historischen
Instituts in Rom, 44 (Tbingen: Niemeyer, 1975); Johannes Fried, Donation of Constantine
and Constitutum Constantini: The Misinterpretation of a Fiction and its Original Meaning
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 2007); Alfred Hiatt, The Making of Medieval Forgeries: False Documents
in Fifteenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 13674; and
for the Encomium, see the edition of Cartei, as in previous note.
4The most complete biography is still Girolamo Mancini, Vita di Lorenzo Valla (Firenze:
Sansoni, 1891). In a vast sea of studies, for basic orientation, see, in addition to the cited
studies, Jill Kraye, Lorenzo Valla and Changing Perceptions of Renaissance Humanism,
Comparative Criticism 23 (2001): 3755; Maristella Lorch, Lorenzo Valla, in Renaissance
Humanism: Foundations, Forms, and Legacy, ed. Alfred Rabil, 3 vols. (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), 1:33249. For a recent discussion on the meaning
of Vallas philosophical work, see W. Scott Blanchard, The Negative Dialectic of Lorenzo
Valla: A Study in the Pathology of Opposition, Renaissance Studies 14 (2000): 149189; and
Lodi Nauta, William of Ockham and Lorenzo Valla: False Friends, Semantics, and
Ontological Reduction, Renaissance Quarterly 56 (2003): 613651.
5W. von Hofmann, Forschungen zur Geschichte der kurialen Behrden vom Schisma bis
zur Reformation, 2 vols. (Rom: Loescher, 1914), 1: 232, 2:111; Mancini, Vita di Lorenzo Valla,
124.
6Mancini, Vita di Lorenzo Valla, 22678.
Elegances of the Latin Language, a guide to Latin usage that became Vallas
one major success in the early modern period (at least in terms of the
number of extant manuscript copies and early printed editions), adopted
as it was by many late fifteenth- and sixteenth-century educators as a
reference work for teaching and learning correct Latin usage.7
Yet it is certainly his De falso credita et ementita Constantini donatione
declamatio (Declamation on the falsely believed and lying Donation of
Constantine) that has earned Valla his modern reputation. For it was in
this treatise, so the story goes, that Valla used his knowledge of the Latin
language to unmask a forgery, showing that some of the language used in
the Constitutum Constantini (the document that represented the Donation
of Constantine in written form) derived from a later period than that of
the document itself. If Valla appears in textbooks of western history, it is
this unmasking for which he is centrally featured, with his linguistic skill
seen as a predecessor of scientific philology. Yet there is so much more to
be said about this work and about Camporeales interpretation thereof,
that it is worthwhile stepping back and examining the constituent parts,
as it were.
The first of these parts is the document of donation itself. The Donation
of Constantine refers to the notional gift of the Emperor Constantine,
whereby, converted to Christianity and ready to transfer the seat of imperial power from Rome to Byzantium, he decided to donate the western
territories of the Empire to Pope Sylvester. The consensus of modern
scholarship is that the document in which this gift was formalized (the
Constitutum) was produced in the environment of the Papal Court in the
eighth century; in other words, almost five centuries after the putative
event.8 It is often indicated, therefore, as a forgery, which at the most
literal level it surely is. Yet it is productive to reflect on what a forgery
might mean, not only in the pre-modern world but also in the pre-print
world. Suppose that consensus emerged, in the eighth-century curial environment whose members went on to produce the document, that
Constantine had indeed ceded the rights to the western territories to the
7On the Annotations, with literature, see Celenza, Lorenzo Vallas Radical Philology;
for the editorial state of play with respect to the other works mentioned, see Regoliosi
(ed.), Pubblicare il Valla.
8Fried, Donation of Constantine and Constitutum Constantini, has made the important
step of separating, conceptually, the Donation from the document, showing that each
had, in a sense, a separate existence in different intellectual and cultural communities
throughout the middle ages. This and the succeeding paragraph follow his emphasis; see
also Hiatt, Making of Medieval Forgeries, 13642, whose approach to the Donation has also
informed what follows.
Pope. How central would a document be in proving that this donation

had indeed taken place, in a world in which catastrophic loss of documentation was not uncommon?
Medieval archives often possessed mechanisms for ensuring authentication.9 Yet given (what now seems like) the instability of the world of
medieval documentary culture, arguments about proof were likely to
include, and to hinge upon, more than simply documentation.10 Indeed,
this is precisely what occurred during the medieval centuries in which the
legitimacy of the donation (rather than the authenticity of the document)
constituted matter for intense debate. To offer two from among a number
of possible (and similar) examples, the historian and bishop Otto of
Freising (111458) did not discuss the Donation with reference to the
Constitutum. Instead he wondered in his Chronicle how there could have
been Emperors subsequent to Constantine who disposed of the very same
land Constantine was supposed to have alienated.11 Even Gratian, the
foremost of the early legal scholars at the University of Bologna (where the
study of law was reborn in the middle ages) did not include the Constitutum
in his Concordance of Discordant Canons.12 Though his immediate successors added a version of the document, arguments for most of the middle
ages turned on other factors: whether the Pope or Emperor was the
supreme leader of Christendom, whether the Donation was legally possible (did the Emperor have the right to alienate the property under discussion?), whether the Pope, with his ecclesiastical responsibilities, could
legitimately have accepted such a gift, and so on. Different versions of the
document circulated, needless to say, along with different summaries of
the document.
So it is unsurprising that much of Vallas argumentation, too, turns on
factors other than just the text of the Constitutum. He, like everyone in his
era, took part in a culture shaped by manuscripts, and no one was more
aware than Valla just how precarious these could be. The force of his argumentation is compelling, all of it rooted in Vallas acute sense of history. If
the claim sounds implausible that a powerful secular ruler, expert in military affairs, would simply hand over large swaths of property for which he
and his predecessors had paid hefty prices in blood and treasure (I find no
9Bernhard Bischoff, Latin Palaeography: Antiquity and the Middle Ages, tr. Dibh
Crinn and David Ganz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3437.
10See, e.g., M.T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England, 10661307 (Oxford:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 295329.
11Fried, Donation of Constantine and Constitutum Constantini, 13.
12Ibid., 19.
record of any king, pagan or Christian, turning an empire over to priests),

Valla brings this implausibility into stark relief with a variety of techniques.13
These range from direct address to Constantine, to taking on the persona of
Constantines sons (who ask their father how he could do something like
alienating property that they, by right, should have inherited), impersonating the Roman Senate (Caesar, if you are unmindful of your own family,
nevertheless the Senate and People of Rome cannot be unmindful of its
right and reputation. Shall we accept an Empire of those whose religion
we scorn?) and ventriloquizing Pope Sylvester (I am a priest I could not
be induced by any argument to agree with you unless I wished to be untrue
to myself, forget my station, and almost deny my Lord Jesus).14
There are significant arguments about the text itself, through which
Valla shows himself a connoisseur of the traditions, history, and instability
of different forms of writing. If, he asks, such a monumental donation
indeed took place, why are there no other testimonies, such as would normally have been expressed in the various traditional forms of public writing (inscriptions, bronze tablets, and so on)? He writes:
But this Donation of Constantine, so splendid and unexampled, can be
proven by no document at all, whether on gold or on silver or on bronze or
on marble or, finally, in books, but only, if we believe that man [here Valla
refers to the person who added the Constitutum to Gratians Decretum] on
paper or parchment.15
There are the etymological arguments for which Valla is justly celebrated,
such as when he highlights the absurdity of the document containing the
term Constantinople when Byzantium had not yet acquired that name,
or when he shows that words are used that would have made no sense in
the documents supposed chronological context (such as the use of the
term satrap, for which there is no other contemporary evidence, or the
use of the word ecclesia for church referring to the building when
templum would have been more appropriate in that case).16
The criticisms that Valla makes add up to more than an unmasking of
a forged document. Taken together they amount to a strong critique of the
Church as it situated itself in Vallas day, which is to say as the custodian
of universal Christendom, on the one hand and, on the other (and simultaneously), a regional political power:
13The quotation comes from Valla, On the Donation of Constantine (tr. Bowersock), 12.
14The quotations come from ibid., 16 and 21, respectively.
15Ibid., 39.
16Ibid., 45, 42, 47, respectively.

The Pope himself makes war on peaceful nations and sows discord among
states and rulers. Christ lies dying of starvation and exposure among so
many thousands of poor.17
It is true that when Valla wrote this text he was in the employ of a ruler,
Alfonse of Aragon, who was at odds with the then Pope, Eugenius IV. But
the incisiveness, range, and sheer amount of Vallas criticisms belie the
notion that this text was little more than the product of a paid rhetorician.
There is a vision behind the text about Christianity, Latinity, and culture,
a vision also manifested in Vallas Encomium of Saint Thomas, the second
of the two texts around which Camporeales two studies revolve.
Valla delivered the Encomium, an oration, on 7 March 1457, the feast
day of St. Thomas Aquinas, at the seat of the Dominican Order in Rome,
Santa Maria sopra Minerva.18 As it turned out, this was his last work, and
it stands as a small masterpiece of restrained reflection: restrained for
Valla, that is. For here too, Valla launches a critique, but it is a subtler critique than those to which readers of Valla are accustomed. He had been
asked, after all, to speak at a commemorative occasion honoring Thomas
Aquinas, and in so far as it was possible for him to do, given his guiding
assumptions concerning philosophy and theology, he took the obligation
seriously. As is often the case, his critique emerges not against an auctoritas, in this case Aquinas, but rather against those who make uncritical use
of the authority. Valla followed the same procedure, for example, when
dealing with Aristotle in the Preface of his Repastinatio totius dialecticae,
where it is not Aristotle himself but his uncritical followers who bear the
brunt of critique.19
The entire Encomium, in fact, represents an attempt to put Aquinas in
his proper place, in the most literal sense of that expression. Valla notes
the difference, for example, between martyrs, who died because of their
faith, and confessors (confessores), who lived a chaste and spotless life
accompanied by divine signs and miracles.20 Aquinas is a confessor,
and as such possessed innumerable virtues, but he was not a martyr,
Valla reminds his audience, and he should not be accorded that sort of
17Ibid., 96.
18In addition to Camporeales own study, for context see the important work of John
W. OMalley, Some Renaissance Panegyrics of Aquinas, Renaissance Quarterly 27 (1974):
17492; idem, The Feast of Thomas Aquinas in Renaissance Rome: A Neglected Document
and Its Import, Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia 35 (1981): 127.
19See Valla, Dialectical Disputations, 213.
20The quotation is from Lorenzo Valla, Encomium of Saint Thomas, ed. and tr. Patrick
Baker (in this volume, pp. 297315), 2 (cited according to paragraph number).
veneration (unlike other Dominicans, such as Peter Martyr). Aquinass

birth was prophesied, as was that of the Dominican Orders founder,
Dominic. Valla thenceforth begins what one might term a relational strategy, evaluating Aquinas against others to whom he has been compared. In
this case, Dominic is a founder, and Thomas is a continuator, not to be
regarded as on the same level as the founder, one assumes, but important
nonetheless:
Dominic founded the house of the Preachers; Thomas covered its floor with
marble. Dominic built its walls; Thomas decorated them with the finest
paintings.21
The impression is that there can be only one founder, but that there could
have been more who contributed to ornamenting the original foundation.
As it happened, Aquinas was the most prominent of those later contributors, but he still should not be confused with the founder.
Similarly, Valla has in mind the larger history of Christian thinkers, a
history in which the early Church Fathers loom large, or at least ought to.
Valla expresses surprise at how Aquinas has been regarded:
It has not escaped me that certain people who held an oration here today
on the same subject not only made Thomas second to none of the doctors of
the Church but also placed him above them all.
What is more,
The reason they gave for being able to put him above everyone is that for
proof in theology he used logic, metaphysics, and all philosophy, which the
earlier doctors are supposed to have barely tasted with the tips of their
tongues.22
Recognizing how risky it seems even to appear to criticize Aquinas on his

feast day, in Romes central Dominican Church, Valla says that he still cannot disguise what he thinks. Furthermore, since he did not rise to speak of
his own accord but was instead asked to do so by the Dominicans themselves, he feels he must speak his mind.
Valla has already adumbrated his two principal concerns: the need to
protect the exemplary, authoritative status of the ancient Church Fathers
and the concomitant desire to put the focus where he believes it belongs
when treating of theology: not on dialectic and metaphysics but rather on
the message of the early Church and of its earliest and greatest thinkers.
21Ibid., 9.
22Ibid., 13.
These two themes dominate the remainder of the Encomium. Valla

admires the copiousness of Aquinass writings in sincere terms of praise
but he also marvels, he says, at something else Aquinas is supposed to
have said: that he never read a book that he did not fully understand.23
What is the audience to think? That Valla offers sincere praise? Or that he
is instead subtly mocking Aquinas for vaunting an omni-comprehensive
intelligence no human being could achieve? Or could audience members
believe either of the two opinions, depending on their predilections,
receptivity to possible irony, or even depending on Vallas delivery, something about which we cannot know anything definitively?
Valla goes on immediately to touch on one of the two themes
mentioned:
But those things which they call metaphysics and modes of signifying and
the like, which modern theologians regard with wonder like a newly discovered sphere or like the epicycles of the planets, I regard with no great wonder at all.24
Valla indicts what he sees as an overemphasis on metaphysics and dialectic at the expense of more important concerns. This move leads him to the
other concern, the Church Fathers:
This I will make clear not with my own arguments (although I could) but by
citing the authority of the ancient theologians Cyprian, Lactantius, Hilary,
Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine who were so far from treating such matters in
their works that they did not even mention them.
The Fathers do not devote themselves to detailed discussions of metaphysics and logic for two reasons. First, they do not seem to lead to the
knowledge of divine truths.25 Second, both of these areas operate with
crucial terminology that has roots in Greek philosophical discussion and,
23Ibid., 15.
24Ibid., 16. Modes of signifying = modi significandi. Valla is referring to philosophers
of the thirteenth and fourteenth century who studied the specialized ways that different
words acquired meaning in propositions and sentences. Martin of Dacia and Boethius of
Dacia are most commonly named when studying this tendency, though they profited from
the earlier work of twelfth-century speculative grammarians like William of Conches
(the term speculative grammarians is often used to refer to both groups). See Costantino
Marmo, Semiotica e linguaggio nella scolastica: Parigi, Bologna, Erfurt, 12701330 (Roma:
Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1994); Jan Pinborg, Speculative Grammar, in
The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony
Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 25469; idem, Die
Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter (Mnster: Aschendorff, 1967); and Irne
Rosier, La grammaire spculative des Modistes (Lille: Presse universitaires de Lille, 1983).
25Valla, Encomium of Saint Thomas (tr. Baker), 18.
10
ultimately, in the Greek language. Even if latterly coined Latin words exist
to reflect certain Greek concepts (concepts around which much discussion in metaphysics and dialectic revolve, such as the ten categories of
Aristotle), they are not organic to the Latin language and thus not organic
to the kind of thinking and writing about religion that the Church Fathers
prized. The Latin Fathers dreaded words which the great Latin authors
never used.26 Once again one observes that uncontaminated Latin,
meaningful Christianity, and human culture are linked for Valla, a presupposition he takes with him into his evaluation of the Fathers and their
exemplary value.
The Fathers mentioned are so important that Valla uses them to end his
oration, arguing that, to understand Aquinas, if he is indeed to be considered as having the kind of status that a Father should have, he must be
paired with a Greek Father, the way one might pair the older Latin Fathers
with Greek counterparts. And after suggesting that Aquinas should be
considered above a series of medieval theologians (St. Bernard, Peter
Lombard, Gratian, and Albert the Great, among others), this is precisely
what Valla does. Ambrose is paired with Basil, Jerome with Gregory
Nazianzen, Augustine with John Chrysostom, Gregory the Great with (for
us pseudo) Dionysius the Areopagite, and Aquinas with John Damascene.
Though Valla does not expatiate on these pairings beyond a few words
each, there is a rationale to them. Ambrose considered himself a rival to
Basil; Jerome claimed to have been a pupil and disciple of Nazianzen;
Augustine often followed and emulated John Chrysostom; and Gregory
the Great (Pope from 490504) is the first to have mentioned Dionysius
the Areopagite (Valla mentions that Gregory is the first of the Latins to
mention Dionysius and notes that Dionysius was unknown to the Greeks
as well).27 As for Aquinas and John Damascene, Valla writes that their
pairing is justified, because John wrote many logical and well-nigh metaphysical works.28
All things considered, one observes a restrained and balanced Valla. Yet
Valla adds what could be read as another note of ambiguity. Sacred writers
26Ibid., 19.
27For Vallas part in the story of the interpretation of ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite, see
John Monfasani, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite in mid-Quattrocento Rome, in
Supplementum Festivum: Studies in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller, ed. James Hankins, John
Monfasani, and Frederick Purnell, Jr. (Binghamton: MRTS, 1987), 189219, reprinted with
the same pagination as essay IX in John Monfasani, Language and Learning in Renaissance
Italy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994).
28Valla, Encomium of Saint Thomas (tr. Baker), 23.
always make music in the sight of God, and each pair has its part to play
in the musical group Valla outlines: The first pair is Basil and Ambrose,
playing the lyre; the second, Nazianzen and Jerome, playing the cithara;
the third, Chrysostom and Augustine, playing the psaltery; the fourth,
Dionysius and Gregory, playing the flute The fifth? John Damascene
and Thomas, playing the cymbals, which are, Valla says, an instrument
emitting happy, cheerful, and pleasing music.29 What sort of praise is
this? Happy, cheerful, and pleasing are positive attributes. But do
they imply the requisite gravity, holiness, and depth due on the occasion
of Thomass feast day? Valla does not address these questions and closes
his oration piously.
These and other moments in Vallas oeuvre demand interpretation, and
there was no finer interpreter of Valla than Salvatore Camporeale. To
understand Camporeales scholarship, two aspects come to the fore:
Camporeales work with his mentor, Eugenio Garin, and his attention to
language. Eugenio Garin (19092004), twentieth-century Italys leading
historian of Italian philosophy, had a powerful imprint on the many scholars who studied with him.30 After a period teaching in Italian secondary
schools Garin was Professor at the University of Florence from 1949 onward,
and then from 197484 at the Scuola normale superiore di Pisa, Italys equivalent to Frances cole normale. Garin was also a generous correspondent
and, both through his letters and through his tenure as President of Italys
National Institute for the Study of the Renaissance (198088), advised a
wide array of informal students. Camporeale was proud to have had
Garin as his mentor for his laurea (then Italys highest academic degree),
and it was Garin who encouraged Camporeale to publish his thesis, even
writing a preface to Camporeales Lorenzo Valla: Umanesimo e teologia.31
Garin believed that the Italian Renaissance gave birth to a distinct type
of philosophy, rooted in detailed attention to history, that had not been
given its due in the historiography of philosophy.32 Heir to the work of
29Ibid., 24.
30On Garin, see Michele Ciliberto, Eugenio Garin: Un intellettuale nel Novecento (Roma:
Laterza, 2011); Rocco Rubini, The Last Italian Philosopher: Eugenio Garin (with an
Appendix of Documents), Intellectual History Review 21 (2011), 209230; Luciano Mecacci,
Contributo alla bibliografia degli scritti su Eugenio Garin, Il Protagora 38 (2011), 519526;
Christopher S. Celenza, The Lost Italian Renaissance: Humanists, Historians, and Latins
Legacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 1657; and Garins autobiographical statement in Eugenio Garin, La filosofia come sapere storico (Roma: Laterza, 1990).
31(Firenze: Istituto nazionale di studi sul Rinascimento, 1972).
32See Eugenio Garin, History of Italian Philosophy, ed. and tr. Giorgio Pinton, 2 vols.
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008).
12
Italys two leading early twentieth-century philosophers, Giovanni Gentile

and Benedetto Croce, Garin took their original insight that there was a
large gap in the historiography of philosophy and, in the 1920s and 1930s,
began doing detailed investigations into sources. These manifested themselves in Garins early editions of and studies on the work of Pico della
Mirandola. Garin went on to write copiously on numerous topics in the
history of philosophy with a particular emphasis on Italian humanism.
For Garin, umanesimo represented both a chronological designation
(covering Italys late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries) but also a way of
looking at the world that was tied not to metaphysical abstraction but
rather to the place of human beings in the flow of historical events.33 As
such it was a variety of philosophy and deserved to be studied with the
same level of seriousness and engagement that the more traditional historiography of philosophy had commanded.
Garin believed one of the Italian humanists key contributions to have
been a different attitude toward authorities, one that manifested itself
first and foremost in the need to situate the ancient authority in question
in a proper historical context, to have shown that the logic of Aristotle is
not the word of God, but a product of history.34 By extension, this historicizing also meant that philosophy, the search for wisdom, could not give
timeless answers to the most important questions (those related to human
conduct), but rather had itself to be continually renewed and re-examined
without (what could be seen as) the straitjacket of metaphysics. Campo
reale inherited from Garin, and indeed tenaciously defended, this notion
regarding Renaissance humanisms importance and core message. For
Camporeale, this appreciation manifested itself in a life-long passion for
the work of Lorenzo Valla, whom Camporeale believed exemplified all
that was most important about Italian humanism, especially when that
movement was viewed along the lines that Garin had outlined.
33The fullest statement of these views can be found in Eugenio Garin, Lumanesimo
italiano: filosofia e vita civile nel Rinascimento (Bari: Laterza, 1957), which originally
appeared in German as Der italienische Humanismus (Bern: Francke, 1947) at the behest of
Ernesto Grassi; there is an English translation by Peter Munz: Italian Humanism: Philosophy
and Civic Life in the Renaissance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965). See Ciliberto, Eugenio Garin,
34; Rocco Rubini, Humanism as Philosophia (Perennis): Grassis Platonic rhetoric
between Gadamer and Kristeller, Philosophy and Rhetoric 42 (2009), 24278; idem,
Philology as Philosophy: the Sources of Ernesto Grassis Postmodern Humanism, in
Humanisms, Posthumanisms, and Neohumanisms, a special issue of Annali ditalianistica 26
(2008), 22348; Celenza, Lost Italian Renaissance, 3036; and Stphane Toussaint,
Humanismes / Antihumanismes: De Ficin Heidegger (Paris: Belles Lettres, 2008).
34Garin, Italian Humanism (tr. Munz), 4.
Camporeales attention to language predominates in his scholarship,

for he prized it in Valla and cultivated it in his own work. On the one hand,
there is no denying that Camporeale can be a dense and at times difficult
writer. He presumes specialized knowledge on the part of the reader, and
his prose can sometimes seem a commentary on a text, assuming that the
reader has before him or her the text under discussion. Yet it is worth the
trouble to follow him in his detailed and incisive readings, because one
finds there a laboratory for the kind of philological analysis that yields
important insights.
Readers will notice an extensive use of what Camporeale often terms
antinomies, by which he means mutually opposed, even mutually exclusive, ideas, each of which exerts a powerful sway. For instance, in his treatment of Vallas treatise on the Donation of Constantine, readers will
encounter Camporeales use of the antinomy imperium/evangelium.
Imperium (empire) denotes the institutional drive toward power, controlled and from the top. Evangelium (the good news or gospel), on the
contrary, reflects the notional core message of Christianity. More broadly,
it connotes the values that Valla, in Camporeales view, assigned to the
pre-Constantinian Church, or ecclesia, where the institution and its practices reflected the original meaning of that word in Greek: assembly.
For Camporeale, this antinomy serves a twofold purpose: first, it allows
him to identify a form of criticism present in Vallas work, whereby Valla
can be read as using this binary opposition as a critical instrument;
Camporeale reads Valla reading the document, as it were. Second, it serves
as an instrument for Camporeale himself. Camporeales position is that
Valla saw and acted on this and other irreconcilable oppositions that he
saw embedded in the Constitutum Constantini and hence in the very
idea of the Donation of Constantine as such. The crucial opposition, then,
existed between a religion that was turning away from its evangelical,
believer-centered mission towards an imperial identity, and an empire
that voluntarily ceded power to the very entity it was supposed to protect
and foster: the assembly of believers. In Vallas view (or in Camporeales
reading thereof), the Churchs imperial turn had actually occurred in a
post-Constantinian context and needed critical examination in his own
day; the empires ceding its prerogatives quite simply could not have
occurred, given the workings of power. It was a fiction and thus could not
and should not be used by the Church as the basis for any claims on secular power.
This example from Vallas treatise on the Donation of Constantine is
one among many in which Camporeales concern for precise analysis of
14
language comes to the fore; it also highlights another of Camporeales

overriding preoccupations in his study of Valla. It is noteworthy that
Camporeale, a Dominican, was also influenced by Marxism. Early in his
career, he championed liberation theology, often in the pages of the
journal Vita sociale, which he had a hand in editing. When it comes to his
scholarship on Valla, however, Camporeales Marxism can be observed
less in the kind of teleological political historiography that had such
an influence on the study of the French Revolution, to give one example
(one thinks of the work of Albert Soboul).35 Instead, one sees a focus on
issues of power, as Camporeale consistently highlights the various times
that Valla brings into relief the institutional politics of the Church. One
might also emphasize that his antinomies amount to what can also be
called dialectical oppositions, which bear a superficial resemblance to the
classic cycle of thesis/antithesis/synthesis, itself loosely associated with
Hegel and then with Marxist historiography.36
Yet, Camporeale was no starry-eyed utopian, rigid ideologue, or,
most importantly, anti-religious polemicist. If his Marxism was manifest in his work, it arose not in the form of grand narratives. Rather
one observes a concern for institutional power, inflected perhaps by the
twentieth-century Italian intellectual Antonio Gramsci and his theories
of hegemony, whereby the ideology of a ruling class becomes accepted
as normative by those who are subject to rule.37 One sees, in addition, a
merging of Camporeales interests with Vallas, a sense that there was
or should have been revolution in the air: if only the glaring contra
dictions of institutional hegemony were revealed, great change would
arise change whose direction one could not predict in the moment but
whose outlines would become clearer with hindsight. In some respects,
this notion was not far from wrong.
As readers will observe, Camporeale discusses Valla in relation to
Martin Luther and the Protestant Reformation toward the end of the essay
35See e.g., Albert Soboul, A Short History of the French Revolution, 17891799, tr. Geoffrey
Symcox (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); and for the most trenchant critique
of this approach, Franois Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, tr. Elborg Forster
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
36For a general account of Marxist historiography, with bibliography, see Matt Perry,
Marxism and History (New York: Palgrave, 2002).
37This theory ran throughout Gramscis prison notebooks, which enjoyed wide circulation among many who came of age in Camporeales generation; see Antonio Gramsci,
Quaderni del carcere, ed. Valentino Gerratana, 4 vols. (Torino: Einaudi, 1975); see also his Il
materialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce (Torino: Einaudi, 1966); and Thomas
R. Bates, Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony, Journal of the History of Ideas 36 (1975),
35166.
on Vallas Encomium. Camporeale stops well short of saying that Vallas

goals were Luthers, yet one notices a sense of tantalizing possibility, as if
a genie were being let out of a bottle. The idea that Valla was implicitly
propounding a new ecclesiology also recurs frequently in Camporeales
work; and while it is certainly true that Vallas vision of the Church in his
day included dissatisfaction, it must be said that it is easier to discern
moments when Valla is critiquing the Church, rather than explicitly outlining a positive program for reform. Yet there is no denying that Luther
knew and admired Vallas work, at least in part.38
To conclude, Camporeale left behind challenging work that deserves
attention, reflection, and debate. It is hoped that presenting two of
Camporeales most astute studies in English will allow a broader group of
scholarly readers interested in Lorenzo Valla to have access to Camporeales
fertile and interesting scholarship.
38For one example of Luther on Valla (after reading Vallas treatise on the Donation of
Constantine), see Martin Luther, Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, part 4:
Briefwechsel, vol. 2, ed. J. Ficker (Weimar: H. Bhlaus Nachfolger, 1931), 28.
LORENZO VALLA AND THE DE FALSO CREDITA DONATIONE:

RHETORIC, FREEDOM, AND ECCLESIOLOGY
IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY
(translated by Patrick Baker)
No one will ever get to the very bottom of Vallas arguments,
which were most certainly not ignorant, without first grasping
canon law and arriving at a true understanding of theology.
Felino Sandei1
In 1433 Lorenzo Valla presented his De voluptate (On Pleasure) to prominent members of the humanist circle in Florence: Leonardo Bruni, Carlo
Marsuppini, and Ambrogio Traversari. From these three readers he knew
to expect a rather critical response, or at least one not without reservations. Nevertheless, his respect for the Florentine humanists and for their
special competence in both Greek and Latin literature moved Valla to
offer up his De voluptate to their reading and judgment.
Contrary to what would be said of him later, and above all in the wake
of Poggio Bracciolinis invectives against him, Valla always submitted his
own writings, especially the most demanding, to the judgment of those he
esteemed and admired. He had already done so with his first essay, De
comparatione Ciceronis Quintilianique (A Comparison of Cicero and
Quintilian). This he sent by way of his friend Antonio Beccadelli to
Marsuppini, whom he (Valla) considered the greatest connoisseur of the
classical tradition among all his contemporaries.
In the specific case of De voluptate, Valla nurtured the desire for a positive, even if critical, reaction from the Florentines. With this his most
demanding work since the Comparatio, he even hoped for the affirmation
1Wolfram Setz, Lorenzo Vallas Schrift gegen die Konstantinische Schenkung, De falsa
credita et ementita Constantini donatione: Zur Interpretation und Wirkungsgeschichte.
(Tbingen: M. Niemeyer, 1975), 123: Rationes autem, quibus Valla non certe omnino
indocte motus est, nemo unquam medulitus evacuabit, nisi pontificium ius et veram
theologie cognitionem adeptus fuerit.
18
salvatore i. camporeale
of the humanists of the Roman curia, and in particular of Bracciolini.

What he got instead was heavy criticism from Poggio, who, to Guarino
Veronese (and others), denounced both the Comparatio for its anti-Ciceronianism and De voluptate for its fully elaborated anti-Stoicism and
neo-Epicureanism. Poggio was the first of all his contemporaries to perceive the young Vallas originality and arrogance toward authority and
tradition, as he (Poggio) wrote to Guarino and was wont to repeat
thereafter.2
The letters that Bruni and Marsuppini wrote to Valla in response to
his De voluptate are well known, although they have perhaps not yet
been adequately analyzed. Traversaris response is also known, but it
will be worth our while to recapitulate its salient aspects here. The
Camaldolese monk admits first that he is incapable, at least for the present, of giving a considered response to the theses argued in De voluptate;
his many duties have permitted him only a hasty reading. Nevertheless,
he does not neglect to make known (and with a certain insistence, it
must be added) his personal approval for the freedom with which Valla,
in imitation of the ancients, criticized the classical ethics of the philosophers and elaborated new ideas. Traversari concludes his letter to Valla
thus:
Everyone is free to defend and steadfastly argue his own opinions; there
is nothing inappropriate in coming to conclusions contrary to the judgments of the philosophers, as long as we defend them with worthy and true
arguments.3
Now, it is undoubtedly true that Traversari was busy with activities that
denied him the leisure to discuss in detail Vallas ethics of the Good (summum bonum) as pleasure (voluptas). Nevertheless, one has the impression
2Lorenzo Valla, Epistole. Ed. Ottavio Besomi and Mariangela Regoliosi (Padova:
Antenore, 1984), 125f., 215f. Poggio Bracciolini, Lettere. Ed. Helene Harth. 3 vols. (Firenze:
Olschki, 19841987), 2:178ff.: it is the first letter (to Guarino Veronese, Roma 17 October
1433) in which Bracciolini sets forth in strongly polemical terms his critique of Valla and his
early writings (denouncing his loquendi arrogantia, 178.9); in fact, the letter contains in
nuce what Poggio will explain more fully, both in form and in content, in his Orationes in
L. Vallam, at the height of his controversy in the 1450s with Valla and his school.
Cfr. Salvatore I. Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia (Firenze: Istituto nazionale di studi sul Rinascimento, 1972), passim and especially 31146; idem, Poggio Bracciolini
contro Valla. Le Orationes in L. Vallam, in Poggio Bracciolini: 13801980: nel VI centenario
della nascita (Firenze: Sansoni, 1982), 137161.
3The text of Traversaris letter to Valla is in Luciano Barozzi and Remigio Sabbadini, Studi
sul Panormita e sul Valla (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1891), 64ff.: Liberum [est] semper cuique et
tueri et constanter asserere opiniones suas; non itaque improbo si quid contra philosophorum sentiamus inventa, si modo nostra probabilibus verisque rationibus muniamus.
lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione19
that he uses these extraneous duties as an excuse to hide some kind of

uncertainty, or at least to suspend his judgment of Vallas specific proposals. He had to have read De voluptate with great attention to have so fully
understood its roots, or better, its fundamental premises. In this, the first
of the young humanists major works and among his most important theoretically, these premises distinguish themselves in two ways. First, they
display a critical originality with respect to both method and content
in the face of classical philosophy and contemporary scholasticism.
Second, Vallas critical originality consists in an attitude of radical freedom in rethinking the past and in reflecting on contemporary ethics. All
this, let us repeat, was not only a question of method, but also, and above
all, of content. At stake were the essential theses of De voluptate.
1.Introduction to a Reinterpretation of the De falso credita
donatione
I have referred to Traversaris epistolary response (and its pertinent context) to De voluptate because it suggests interpretive keys for understanding Vallas famous Oration on the Falsely Believed and Forged Donation of
Constantine (De falso credita et ementita Constantini donatione). The critical originality and radical freedom that Traversari identified in Vallas
early dialogue will allow us to penetrate Vallas later oration against the
Constitutum Constantini.4
In this essay we shall proceed in the following manner. As a prelude we
shall first enunciate in three points the fundamental themes that constitute the fabric of the Oration. Then we shall sketch a cultural outline of
4[The Constitutum Constantini is the legal privilege supposedly stipulating the Emperor
Constantines grant of the Western Empire to Pope Sylvester I, i.e. the document commonly known as the Donation of Constantine. Eds.]
The reinterpretation of Vallas Oration proposed in this essay assumes familiarity with
the following fundamental works: Setz, Lorenzo Vallas Schrift; and Setzs critical edition of
the Oration: Lorenzo Valla, De falso credita et ementita Constantini donatione, ed. Wolfram
Setz (Weimar: Bhlau, 1976) (hereafter cited as Valla, De falso, page and line number [with
the corresponding paragraph numbers of the edition and English translation in the I Tatti
Renaissance Library in parentheses: Lorenzo Valla, On the Donation of Constantine, tr.
G.W. Bowersock (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007); all English translations of the Oration are Bowersocks]), together with Valla, Epistole, 176, n. 2; also important
are Vincenzo De Caprio, Retorica e ideologia nella Declamatio di Lorenzo Valla sulla
donazione di Costantino, Paragone-Letteratura 29, n. 338 (1978): 3656; Riccardo Fubini,
Papato e storiografia nel Quattrocento. Storia, biografia e propaganda in un recente studio, Studi medievali, III s., 18, fasc. I (1977): 321351; Joachim W. Stieber, Pope Eugenius IV, the
Council of Basel, and the Secular and Ecclesiastical Authorities in the Empire. The Conflict
over Supreme Authority and Power in the Church (Leiden: Brill, 1978).
20
Valla the humanist, from both a theoretical and a biographical point of

view, with the intention of identifying the immediate and decisive context
from which his treatment of the Constitutum emerged. In this way we
hope to provide an introduction that will equip the reader to grasp the
detailed and intricate analysis of Vallas Oration that follows.
First: with his Oration on the Constitutum Valla elaborates an alternative to the medieval and scholastic ecclesiology of the Constantinian
Church. Vallas ecclesiology follows specifically and directly from the
christiana libertas (Christian freedom) of the New Testament and is
invested, by analogy, with the political semantics of the classical
(Athenian) ecclesia.5 The foundation of Vallas new ecclesiology is
Christian freedom, understood in the Pauline sense as a specific dimension of the christianus homo (Christian man) and deriving from the dictates of the Gospel and the advent of saving grace. His discourse on the
Christian church has an extra-theological but nonetheless fundamental
element: the civil and strictly human community (civitas), i.e. the community as founded on political liberty (polis). It is in fact the polis, the
politically free community, that is specific and peculiar to man as such,
whom Valla defines as an animal liberum (free animal).
According to Valla, this notion of civil community and political freedom
achieved its greatest historical actualization in the respublica romana
(Roman republic) and in romana libertas (Roman freedom). Both were set
in motion, or better, were founded and instituted, by the senatus populusque romanus (the Senate and the People of Rome). At first Valla merely
outlines this ethico-political perspective, namely the conceptions of man
as an animal liberum and of the Roman civitas. He then deepens his analysis
through historical critique, first with regard to communities and peoples
that subjected others and deprived them of freedom, and then considering
communities who of their own will submitted themselves to the authority
or servitude of an absolute power. One such absolute power was the empire
established by Caesar and the Augustan emperors. Valla repeatedly affirms
that these emperors were the usurpers of the respublica, i.e., of the freedom
and powers of the Senate and the People of Rome. Eventually, Constantine
the Great would embody that imperial power when absolutism had
achieved its apex in the history of the Roman republic.
In summary, the chain of reasoning of Vallas ecclesiological discourse
seems to develop along the lines of various aspects of freedom: from the
freedom of man as such the animal liberum to the freedom of man as
5[I.e., the assembly of free citizens. Eds.]
redeemed by saving grace christianus homo both of which are determined by the freedom of man as an essentially political animal. Freedom,
although it is a specific property of human nature, can necessarily only
achieve actualization in the civitas or polis. This is Vallas romana libertas.
Both natural and civil liberty receive their fullest explication and actualization within the sphere of the evangelical6 ecclesia and according to its
economics of salvation (in the age of grace), and together they constitute
for Valla christiana libertas. Therefore, if the community of believers
should ever cease to be the home of Christian freedom, the ecclesia would
find itself in antithesis with the message of the Gospel. More precisely, it
would constitute a negation of both civil and natural freedom, both of
which pertain to the (defining) essence of man.7
Second: Vallas reflection on the Constitutum Constantini is at once historical and philological. Consequently he chose for the method and content of its written form, in accordance with his humanist conception of the
art of rhetoric, the literary genre of the oration. With this argumentative
method Valla attempts to identify contradictions in scholastic, ecclesiological, and political language as well as juridical and theological antinomies, all based on the language historically derived from the Constitutum.
For the tradition of the Constantinian Church had in fact been founded
on the pseudo-Constantinian Pagina Privilegii.8 The Constantinian ecclesiological tradition was elaborated in various ways, actualized by the
Roman Church, theorized by theologians and canon lawyers, raised almost
to the level of dogma by Innocent III and Boniface VIII, and was still being
perpetuated in the time of Eugenius IV.9 Therefore Vallas rhetorical
strategy instead of being an apodictic demonstration or the proposal of
a new ecclesiological and/or political theory is an historical and philological analysis that reduces the tradition to its ideological foundations. In
this way Valla intends to demonstrate how the Constitutum Constantini, as
well as the practices resulting from it and the very language of the Roman
Church, are falsifiable by means of the internal contradictions found in the
text itself and in its successive re-elaborations.
6[In the sense of deriving from the Evangelium, i.e., the Gospel. Eds.]
7Valla, De falso, 147.16 (76), 162.10ff. (86), 163.17ff. (87), 65f. (9), 7375 (1718), 78.12,
163167 (8789), with Setzs notes and commentary.
8[The formal Document of Privilege supposedly authorizing the Donation of
Constantine. Eds.]
9Valla, De falso, 90f. (33), 158f. (83), 160f. (84); cf. as well Setz, Lorenzo Vallas Schrift,
1824.
22
This method is no different in fact it is exactly the same except for

variations necessitated by the particular text under consideration from
that used by Valla in other works, for example: in the Adnotationes, in
which he collated the Vulgate Bible with the veritas graeca10 of the New
Testament; in the Repastinatio,11 in which he analyzed the basic terms of
Aristotelian scholasticism (transcendentals, predicaments, and predicables) with the aim of showing that philosophical vocabulary to be nonsense; and in De voluptate, which subjected terms and categories such as
bonum (good), virtus (virtue), and voluptas (pleasure) to a philological and
anti-ideological investigation.12
Third: the Oration on the Constitutum is a speech declaimed to the
entire Christian community, i.e., the whole Church, understood to include
both its religious and political components as if in an assembly of kings
and princes, writes Valla.13 The orator demonstrates his awareness of the
antinomies on which the Constantinian Church had been founded in the
past and with which or better, on account of which it survives into his
own time. With such a demonstration really a denunciation Valla proposes to bring the Church, both its head and its members, to this very
10[Literally the Greek truth, i.e., the original Greek text. In the Adnotationes in Novum
Testamentum (Annotations on the New Testament) Valla compared the Latin of the Vulgate
with the Greek found in the manuscripts at his disposal in order to show problems in the
traditionally accepted text and thus to arrive at a more truthful understanding of the New
Testament, i.e. one based on a more solid philological foundation. Eds.]
11[Repastinatio dialecticae et philosophiae (The Rentrenching of Dialectic and
Philosophy). The work was revised by Valla several times and subsequently became known
under the title Dialecticae disputationes (Dialectical Disputations). Eds.]
12For an overall look at Vallas method both in theory and in practice, see Camporeale,
Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 31208; idem, Lorenzo Valla tra Medioevo e
Rinascimento. Encomion s. Thomae 1457, Memorie Domenicane, n.s., 7 (1976): 11194
(reprinted in idem, Umanesimo, riforma e controriforma. Studi e testi [Roma: Edizioni di
Storia e Letteratura, 2002], 121330, and translated in the present volume, 145296); idem,
Lorenzo Valla. Repastinatio, liber primus: retorica e linguaggio, in Lorenzo Valla e
lumanesimo italiano. Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi umanistici (Parma, 1819 ottobre 1984), ed. Ottavio Besomi and Mariangela Regoliosi (Padova: Antenore, 1986), 217239
(along with other important contributions in the same volume concerning the relationship between philology and methodology in Valla). More recent studies include: Maristella
De Panizza Lorch, A Defense of Life: Lorenzo Vallas Theory of Pleasure (Mnchen: Fink,
1985); Brian Vickers, Vallas Ambivalent Praise of Pleasure: Rhetoric in the Service of
Christianity, Viator 17 (1986): 271319; Riccardo Fubini, Richerche sul De voluptate di
Lorenzo Valla, Medioevo e Rinascimento 1 (1987): 189239; Lorenzo Valla, De professione
religiosorum, ed. Mariarosa Cortesi (Padova: Antenore, 1986) (in addition to the critical
edition itself, Cortesis ample introduction and full and accurate commentary are fundamental); Richard Waswo, Language and Meaning in the Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1987), 88113 and passim.
13Valla, De falso, 62.9 (6): quasi in contione regum et principum.
awareness for the purpose of overcoming the antinomies in question: My

intention is to eradicate error from peoples minds.14
Valla identifies three major historical and theological contradictions of
the Roman Church (along with others in both the political and spiritual
realms): imperium/evangelium (empire/Gospel), vicarius Christi/vicarius
Caesaris (vicar of Christ/vicar of Caesar), and servitudo/libertas (slavery/
freedom). These contradictories, he believes, can be resolved through a
renewal of evangelical freedom, which flows from saving grace, and of
political freedom, which is demanded by our very nature inasmuch as
human beings are born for freedom.15
Valla is aware, and he says so many times, that by proposing such
solutions publicly he is exposing himself to charges of recklessness and
impiety.16 Nevertheless, and precisely because he is an orator and an
imitator of the apostle Paul, Valla feels obliged to pit himself and his
radical criticism against tradition: I overturn the combined wisdom of
the ancients with my works.17 Vallas procedure gives further evidence
that the very rhetorical structure of the Oration is determined by its fundamental theme (elaborated in the first point): freedom, which here
must be understood specifically as freedom of speech, a concept which
Valla borrows from Quintilians Institutio oratoria (The Orators
Education). Indeed, we read in the first pages of the Oration: no one who
knows how to speak well can be considered a true orator unless he also
dares to speak out.18
So much for the fundamental themes of Vallas Oration. Now we shall
attempt to outline the intellectual and biographical context that determined these themes and thus gave the Oration its shape. In the Repastinatio
dialecticae et philosophiae (from the same period as the Oration), Valla
insistently pursued his linguistic analysis as a semantic investigation. He
was fully aware and often says so that by putting pressure, so to speak,
on the vis verborum, or the force (meaning) of words, one could cause to
emerge, as if by a self-revelation of the words themselves, what he calls the
14Ibid., 59.5f. (3): id ago ut errorem a mentibus hominum convellam.
15Ibid., 166.19 (89): homines libertati natos [translation modified].
16Ibid., 55.6ff. (1): inasmuch as there are those who feel ill treated and accuse me of
recklessness and impiety (cum sint, qui indigne ferant meque ut temerarium sacrilegumque criminentur).
17Ibid., 58.7ff. (2); idem, Epistole, 215.8ff.: omnem veterum sapientiam meis operibus
everto.
18Valla, De falso, 57.1f. (1): loquendi libertas; 57.18ff. (2): neque enim is verus est
habendus orator qui bene scit dicere, nisi et dicere audeat (emphasis added) [translation
modified]; Setz, Lorenzo Vallas Schrift, 4851.
24
vis rerum, the force (meaning) of things.19 Therefore by exposing in his

Oration the counterfeit gift to the Roman Church the patronage of falsity and embellished falsehood, the perverse deception that pollutes
Christendom and its history Valla attempts in every way possible to
draw out and revivify original Christian candor, i.e., the sacrament of
truth of the Gospel and of the ancient, apostolic Church. Let us reflect on
his words: Dear Jesus, what force, what divinity there is in the truth,
which, on its own, defends itself without great effort from all treachery
and deceit.20
The force of truth (vis veritatis). The inquiry into the Constitutum thus
becomes an undertaking for the renewal of Christian freedom within the
Church. It is in fact freedom evangelical freedom, together with political
and civil freedom, the freedom to disagree in speech and in writing while
inquiring into truth that is proclaimed in the Oration and that is held up
as the ideal of contemporary Christianity. What is more, certain pages of
Vallas text reveal his religious and political vision to be the fundamental
inspiration, the authentic motivation (theoretical and practical) for his
Oration on the Constitutum Constantini.
Without a doubt, the immediate context and the decisive circumstances
of the Orations composition and diffusion are to be found in the political
conflict between Alfonso of Aragons court in Naples and the Papacy of
Eugenius IV (Gabriele Condulmer). Also important were the rifts in Vallas
own friendship with Eugenius, whose causes are to be found in the humanists personal biography, in his open disagreement and conflict with Father
Condulmer, and in his life-long intellectual development.21
Banned from papal Rome, Valla had to move continually for the next
twenty years from north to south along the peninsula in search of a place
to call home. Forced to depart from the familiar environment of the cultural and civic context of his birth, where he had been educated and
intensely promoted, the humanist carried forth in his own person the
19Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Repastinatio, 219.
20Valla, De falso, 148.6 (76): patrocinium falsitas; 110.2 (46): adornare mendacium;
155.2 (81): fallaciam; 148.5f. (76): sinceritas christiana; 66.21 (10): sacramentum veritatis; 99.1719 (39): Bone Jesu, quanta vis, quanta divinitas est veritatis, que per sese sine
magno conatu ab omnibus dolis ac fallaciis se ipsa defendit [translation modified].
21For Vallas biographico-cultural development (beyond the citations in notes 4 and
12), see Mario Fois, Il pensiero cristiano di Lorenzo Valla nel quadro storico-culturale del suo
ambiente (Roma: Libreria editrice dellUniversit Gregoriana, 1969); and Mariangela
Regoliosis chronological commentary in Valla, Epistole (with further and more recent contributions by Ottavio Besomi, Mariangela Regoliosi, and Martin Davies in Besomi and
Regoliosi (eds.), Lorenzo Valla e lumanesimo italiano, 77109).
conflict between the Roman curia, papal government, and his status as
a citizen of Rome. This conflict slowly intensified, and it expanded
not only in the arena of Vallas own intellectual work and the circle of the
best-known curial humanists, but also in that of the dominant culture of
scholasticism. His inquisitorial trial at the hands of the scholastics in
Naples in the 1440s, and the polemics of Poggio Bracciolini and his supporters in the 1450s, ultimately constituted the furthest and thus the
most evident extremes of this clash of opposed positions.
This constant and forced wandering, this intellectual journey, this frustrating relationship with Eugenius IV, for whom Valla would not only nurture a sense of friendship and esteem but to whom he would also direct
(as did other humanists like Bruni and Flavio Biondo) his appeals for an
effective promotion of the new cultural renaissance all these form, it
would seem, the biographical background and the rather personal rationale, perhaps the true motivation, for Vallas consideration of and discourse on the Donation of Constantine.22
This is the source of Vallas determination to investigate what he himself calls a matter of canon law and theology, and he therefore directs his
attack against all canonists and theologians.23 Hence his exordium,
which is dominated by that I dissent with which the Oration begins.24
This dissent is an ecclesiological awareness contrary to tradition and a
manifest expression, within the very context of Christendom, of a new
paradigm of criticism that is at once theological and political. It is different from the classic paradigm of heresy, which is a stance contrary to
dogma.25 In line with this dissent Valla rejects and denounces what he
calls the new tyranny of the Pope, the hypocrisy (in the strong, original
sense of the word) by which the vicar of Christ behaves as a despot in the
persona of Caesar instead of acting in the persona of Christ. Such rule is
characterized as tyranny because the Roman pope presents himself as
the historical heir of the very imperial power which had violated the
political and civil freedom of the Roman Republic. Now it reveals itself as
22Cf. Setz, Lorenzo Vallas Schrift, 5975; and Eugenio Marino, Eugenio IV e la storiografia di Flavio Biondo, Memorie Domenicane, n.s., 4 (1973): 240287.
23Valla, Epistole, 192f.: res canonici iuris et theologie; contra omnes canonistas atque
omnes theologos; Setz, Lorenzo Vallas Schrift, 5159.
24Valla, De falso, 55.6 (1): dissentio [translation modified].
25Salvatore I. Camporeale, Giovanmaria dei Tolosani O.P.: 15301546. Umanesimo,
Riforma e teologia controversista, Memorie Domenicane, n.s., 17 (1986): 145252, passim
(reprinted in idem, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo, riforma e controriforma, 331461), on Valla
and heresy as a stance contrary to tradition; John M. Headley, The Reformation as Crisis
in the Understanding of Tradition, Archiv fr Reformationsgeschichte 78 (1987): 522.
26
a new tyranny, since the usurpation of evangelical freedom in the

respublica christiana is linked to Caesars suppression of the respublica
romana.26
Vallas personal difficulties with Eugenius IV are bound up, as has been
mentioned, with his call for the pope to take up his cause. The Oration on
the Constitutum Constantini is aimed at Eugenius. So is a personal letter, in
1434, and a public one as well, the Apologia of 1444.27 In the letter of 1434
Valla had requested that the pope promote and give institutional support,
outside the realm of the clergy, to the studies and cultural efforts of laymen. In the Apologia of 1444, Valla asked, again in line with his theological
heterodoxy, to be defended by the pope from the inquisition of scholastic
theologians. Now, in the Oration, Eugenius IV is called in the name of
Christendom to take up the task, as Bishop of Rome and successor to
St. Peter, of effecting an historical break in the tradition of the Con
stantinian Church; he is called to revive both Christian evangelical freedom and Roman civil and political freedom. This he should do before
someone decides to take up arms against the Roman papacy, a course of
action which, for his part, Valla claims in no way to support. The peroration concluding Vallas speech is an explicit plea to Eugenius IV to undertake this institutional change and ecclesiastical renewal. To be precise, the
pope should definitively reject and abrogate the Constitutum Constantini,
and he should historically mark his papacy with the de-Constantinization of the Roman Church.28
Everything said so far can be reduced to two final considerations that
serve to further refine and deepen this reinterpretation of the Oration on
the Constitutum. The first concerns Vallas method of studying the
Donation; the second regards the content, and more precisely the aim, of
his work.
As for the first consideration, Valla understands philological and historical analysis to be an argumentative procedure by means of which the
26Valla, De falso, 78.1114 (21): vicarius Christi; 134f. (65): hypocritam; 166f. (89):
novam pape tyrannidem [translation modified]. For the expression christiana respublica,
cf. idem, Dialogue sur le libre-arbitre, ed. Jacques Chomarat (Paris: Vrin, 1983), 27.9.
27Valla, Epistole, 145149. The Apologia ad papam Eugenium IV (Apology to Pope
Eugenius IV) is in idem, Scritti filosofici e religiosi, ed. Giorgio Radetti (Firenze: Sansoni,
1953). See in particular Gianni Zippel, La Defensio quaestionum in philosophia di L. Valla e
un noto processo dellInquisizione napoletana, Bullettino dellIstituto Storico Italiano per il
Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano 69 (1957): 319347; idem, Lautodifesa di Lorenzo Valla
per il processo dellInquisizione napoletana (1444), Italia medievale e umanistica 13 (1970):
5994.
28Valla, De falso, 172176.
truth or non-truth, the authenticity or inauthenticity, of a given thing can

be proven simply by demonstrating the falsifiability of the specific language that expresses or intends to express that thing. In fact, in Vallas use
of the syntagma res-verba (things-words), the understanding or correlative evaluation of a res (thing) is provided by the verification or falsification of the verba (words) that have that res as a referent. But such a
procedure is properly speaking a rhetorical mode of argument in both
Quintilians and Vallas understanding of rhetoric, as described by
Quintilian (Institutio oratoria, books II and III) and fully elaborated by
Valla (Repastinatio, book I) as the science (scientia/episteme) of language.In this sense rhetoric rises first in Quintilian and then above all in
Valla to the level of a critical and interpretive discipline that consists in
the philological and historical analysis of a specific language (logos/
sermo); it places particular emphasis on how that language signifies and
makes references with respect to a distinct reality made up of res, i.e.,
deeds, things that have been done (pragmata).29
Consequently, Valla uses the rhetorical analysis of the Constitutum
Constantini to establish the vis verborum of the text, in order then to arrive
at an historical and definitive evaluation of the vis rerum from which that
very text was derived and of which it became at the same time a transmitter. Continuing along these coordinates, Valla passes (inductively) from
the analysis of an ideological document (the Constitutum) to the falsification of the praxis (praxis/actum) of which that document is supposed to
be a theoretical foundation and historical manifestation (in this case, both
politically and ecclesiastically).
Therefore, Vallas Oration must be understood within the coordinates
vis verborum/vis rerum of this kind of inductive, rhetorical analysis. Only
on the basis of this kind of interpretation can we understand the full
meaning of what Valla wrote to Giovanni Aurispa with regard to the
Oration: I have written nothing more rhetorical.30
As for the second consideration, specifically concerning the Orations
proper and thematic subject, we should first of all stress what has already
been mentioned about its content and purpose. Both, and thus the works
central message, are to be identified in the novel political and religious
29Lorenzo Valla, Repastinatio dialectice et philosophie, ed. Gianni Zippel, 2 vols.
(Padova, Antenore, 1982), 1:18.14: res, idest pragmata; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria,
III.6.28. Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 160f.; idem, Lorenzo Valla.
Repastinatio, 233237.
30Valla, Epistole, 249252, at 252.9: nihil magis oratorium scripsi (cf. Vallas letter to
Guarino Veronese in ibid., 244ff.). Setz, Lorenzo Vallas Schrift, 4651.
28
perspective that Valla intends to propose to Christendom, viewed against

the background of his relationship with Eugenius IV and of his own complex ethical and intellectual experiences. This novel perspective emerges
from the Oration as the reaffirmation of absolute political and Christian
freedom, or better, as the will to human freedom according to the various
levels and multiple dimensions that this same freedom assumes in Vallas
composition, the libertas that was indicated earlier as the humanists
ideal.
Finally, let us consider Vallas letter to Cardinal Trevisan, written from
Naples in 1444. Within the context of Vallas personal life and intellectual
work, the letter must be interpreted not only as the clear refusal to retract
(even minimally) his Oration on the Constitutum Constantini, but also, and
perhaps above all, as a testimony to the truest and most authentic motivations and meanings of the work as a whole. As he expresses himself to
Trevisan, Valla has spoken and written in the service of truth both to benefit the Christian faith and, not least, to reaffirm his role and value among
his contemporaries as an engaged intellectual in the service of political
and religious freedom: Bear one thing in mind. I was not moved by hatred
of the Pope but acted for the sake of the truth, of religion, and also of a
certain renown to show that I alone knew what no one else knew.31
2.Causa veritatis: From the Exordium to the Peroration
So far we have provided a general overview of the meaning and immediate context of Vallas Oration. Now follows an interpretation of the whole
text according to the division of its arguments, which Valla himself explicitly divided into discrete sections.32
31Valla, Epistole, 246248: Hoc tantum consideres velim, non odio pape adductum, sed
veritatis, sed religionis, sed cuiusdam etiam fame gratia motum, ut quod nemo sciret, id
ego scisse solus viderer (cf. ibid., 227ff.). For the term religio in Valla, see the index verborum and Cortesis corresponding notes in idem, De professione religiosorum.
32Valla, De falso, 61f. (5) (emphasis added): But before I come to refuting the Donation
document, which is the sole authority those people have, something that is not only false
but even rude, structure demands that I go back farther. First, I shall assert that Constantine
and Sylvester were not such men as, with the former, to want to make a donation, to be in
a legal position to do so, and to have in his power the ability to hand over these territories
to someone else, and, with the latter, to want to receive them and be in a legal position to
do so. Second, even if these points were other than absolutely true and very clear, I shall
assert that the one did not accept and the other did not hand over the possession of the
things that are said to have been donated, but that they remained forever under the jurisdiction and authority of the Caesars. Third, I shall assert that nothing was given by
Constantine to Sylvester, but rather to the previous pontiff before he received baptism,
Conceived as a procedure of rhetorical argumentation, Vallas Oration

begins (exordium) and ends (peroration) with assertions about the causa
veritatis, or cause of truth, which he intends to investigate historically
and defend theoretically.33 The investigation and defense of the truth
have a double purpose in the Oration. First, they are to demonstrate the
falseness of the Constitutum Constantini and make the papacy aware of
that falseness. These are explicit assertions in the exordium. Second, they
are to bring about the effective abrogation of the Constitutum on the
part of the papacy and therewith the elimination of the theoretical and
practical consequences deriving from the Constantinian ecclesiological
tradition. These are the concluding affirmations of the peroration. The
establishment of this double purpose allows us to connect the exordium
directly to the peroration: the point of departure coincides with the point
of arrival in the circular path of this rhetorical discourse.
In the first pages of the Oration Valla writes:
Many, many books have issued from my pen in almost every area of learning, and in these I dissent from some great authors of long established
and that these were modest gifts of places where the Pope could spend his life. Fourth,
I shall assert that it is falsely claimed a copy of the Donation was found among the emperors decrees or was extracted from the Story of Sylvester, because it is neither found in that
story nor in any other, and because in it are contained various contradictions, impossibilities, stupidities, barbarisms, and absurdities. Furthermore I shall speak about donations of
certain other emperors whether fictitious or worthless and there I shall add from abundant evidence that if Sylvester ever had taken possession, once he or some other pontiff had
been deprived of it, after so great an interval of time it could not be recovered by any legal
claim, human or divine. Lastly, I shall assert that the supreme pontiffs current possessions
could not, in the course of time, have been administered under his authority. (Verum antequam ad confutandam donationis paginam venio ordo postulat, ut altius repetam.
Et primum dicam non tales fuisse Constantinum Silvestrumque: illum quidem, qui donare
vellet, qui iure donare posset, qui, ut in manum alteri ea traderet, in sua haberet potestate;
hunc autem, qui vellet accipere quique iure accepturus foret. Secundo loco: si hec non
essent, que verissima atque clarissima sunt, neque hunc acceptasse neque illum tradidisse
possessionem rerum, que dicuntur donate, sed eas semper in arbitrio et imperio Cesarum
permansisse. Tertio: nihil datum Silvestro a Constantino, sed priori pontifici, antequam
etiam baptismum acceperat, donaque illa mediocria fuisse, quibus papa degere vitam posset. Quarto: falso dici donationis exemplum aut apud decreta reperiri aut ex historia Silvestri
esse sumptum, quod neque in illa neque ulla in historia invenitur, in eoque quedam contraria, impossibilia, stulta, barbara, ridicula contineri. Preterea loquar de quorundam aliorum Cesarum vel simulata vel frivola donatione, ubi ex abundanti adiiciam: si Silvester
possedisset, tamen sive illo sive quovis alio pontifice a possessione deiecto post tantam
temporis intercapedinem nec divino nec humano iure posse repeti. Postremo: ea, que a
summo pontifice tenentur, nullius temporis longitudine potuisse prescribi.) In the B manuscripts, this section is glossed (at the first line) Divisio (i.e. Plan of the work): ibid., 61.30.
33On the expression causa veritatis, see Gregorio Tifernates letter to Valla regarding
the Oration, in Setz, Lorenzo Vallas Schrift, 84. On the technical use of the term causa in the
Oration, cf. Quintilian, Institutio oratoria: III.3.15; III.4.1ff.; III.6.27; III.10.13; III.11.5; IV.1.40.
30
reputation . I know that for a long time people have been waiting to hear
the accusation I would bring against the Roman pontiffs: a massive accusation assuredly, of either supine ignorance or monstrous avarice, which is
enslavement to idols [Eph. 5:5], or pride of rule, which is always accompanied by cruelty. Already for several centuries they either did not realize that
Constantines Donation was a lie and a fabrication, or else they invented it
themselves. Their descendants, following the deceitful path of earlier generations, defended as true what they knew to be false dishonoring the majesty of the pontificate, dishonoring the memory of the pontiffs of old,
dishonoring the Christian religion . For, as I shall show, that Donation,
from which the supreme pontiffs want to derive their legal right, was
unknown to Sylvester and Constantine alike.34
The dissent put forward in the Oration is aimed at the papacy and its
authority in the realm of Christendom. More precisely, Vallas criticism is
directed against the historical ecclesiology surrounding the Roman
papacy and the exercise of papal authority, as well as how both have been
jointly theorized and put into practice on the foundation of the Donation
of Constantine.
The course of the argument proceeds as follows. The validity of a doctrine, as well as of any political, juridical, or spiritual authority, depends
on the (historically and/or theoretically verifiable) origin and premises to
which it is reducible. But the Donation (from which the supreme pontiffs
want to derive their legal right) is an historical and ideological forgery.
Therefore the basis of Constantinian ecclesiology and the consequent historical development of the Roman papacy is invalid. In reality, both constitute a perverse heterogeneity of ends in the history of the papacy, the
vicariate of Christ, and of the Christian religion (dishonoring the
Christian religion).
Again, by expressing the purpose of his dissent in these terms, Valla
also affirms and it is made quite explicit in the Oration that tradition in
itself alone can guarantee neither theological orthodoxy nor canonical
34Valla, De falso, 55.1ff/59.1760.10/60.2061.2 (14): Plures a me libri compluresque
emissi sunt in omni fere doctrinarum genere, in quibus a nonnullis magnisque et longo
iam evo probatis auctoribus dissentio . Scio iandudum expectare aures hominum, quodnam pontificibus Romanis crimen impingam: profecto ingens sive supine ignorantie sive
immanis avaritie, que est idolorum servitus, sive imperandi vanitatis, cuius crudelitas
semper est comes. Nam aliquot iam seculis aut non intellexerunt donationem Constantini
commenticiam fictamque esse aut ipsi finxerunt sive posteriores in maiorum suorum dolis
vestigia imprimentes pro vera, quam falsam cognoscerent, defenderunt, dedecorantes
pontificatus maiestatem, dedecorantes veterum pontificum memoriam, dedecorantes
religionem christianam . Nam ut ostendam donatio illa, unde natum esse suum ius
summi pontifices volunt, Silvestro pariter et Constantino fuit incognita [translation
modified].
legitimacy for the papacys exercise of political and spiritual power.

Tradition, even the internal tradition of Christianity, is in and of itself
powerless to constitute the authenticity and juridical validity of ministerial power in general, and of the papacy in particular.
In this case tradition is based on the historical duration, on the praxis,
and on the doctrine of the Constantinian Church. Valla identifies it
historically not only as a deterioration of the primeval Christian community, but also and this is a much more radical position as the overturning of the evangelical church. Since the nature of the Constitutum is
anti-evangelical i.e., contrary to the Gospel the church whose foundation and continued existence are based on it cannot be properly Christian,
i.e., has no connection to Christ and his message. Consequently, there can
be no valid tradition justifying a Church derived from the Constitutum,
which stands in fundamental antithesis to the very being of the Christian
community.
Furthermore, within the spectrum of the Orations specific objective, an
equal focus is put on the Churchs historical fallibility. Through the identification of its actual imperfections, the Constantinian Church is portrayed
as a deterioration of the evangelical origins of Christianity. It is a deterioration, in other words, of that which constitutes the necessary essence of
the Church. But there is more to Vallas historical retrospective. The
Church has not only shown itself in its earthly existence to be at odds with
its own origins in its practice and behavior. It has also arrived, at least in
certain respects, at the exact opposite of itself, at a profound historical collapse, at the negation of its own nature. Implicit in Vallas retrospective is
the historical law of the heterogeneity of ends, which is intrinsic to every
human institution and every political or religious movement. For Valla,
even the Church is subject to this law during its earthly existence. This
applies as well to its theological nature, beyond its practices or possible
modes of behavior.
With similar premises indeed, remaining within the same retrospective account of the Churchs fallibility Valla argues (in the peroration)
for the possibility of a renewal and authentic rebirth of the contemporaryChurchs evangelical origins. In fact, the Christian religion could be
radically different if the Constitutum were abrogated and thereby the
Constantinian past of the Roman church definitively repudiated. Valla
writes in the concluding section of the Oration:
But in this first speech of mine I do not wish to encourage rulers and peoples
to restrain the Pope as he surges ahead in his unbridled course and to force
him to stay within his own borders, but only to counsel him, when perhaps
32
he has already recognized the truth, to move back voluntarily from a house
that is not his own into the one where he belongs and into a haven from
irrational tides and cruel storms . I wish, how I wish that one day I might
see indeed, I can scarcely wait to see, particularly if it is carried out on my
initiative that the Pope is the vicar of Christ alone and not of Caesar as well
. At that time to come the Pope will be called, and really will be, Holy
Father, father of all, father of the church. He will not provoke wars among
Christians but, through apostolic censure and papal majesty, bring an end to
the wars provoked by others.35
The abrogation of the Constitutum, together with the evangelical renewal

of the church of God (ecclesia Dei) to which the Oration, declaimed in
the forensic space of all Christendom, specifically aspires would no
doubt result primarily and immediately in a different historical and spiritual role for the papacy.
Valla repeatedly maintains that the Roman papacys practice of political power has made it the de facto political model for Christians. And since
the politics of the papacy has been one of dominion, of conquest, and of
subjection even of Christian peoples and communities such has
become the standard politics of Christian nations and their rulers: wicked
men find an excuse in the Pope. For he and his companions furnish an
example of every kind of misdeed.36 This would certainly not be the case
if the papacys politics had been of a different character, i.e. evangelical
and properly Christian. The only proper political practice for the pope as
vicar of Christ is administering Christ and the Gospels, there in the place
where Christ took bodily form, among the poor and the weak: as Christ
lies dying of starvation and exposure among so many thousands of poor.37
This means, moreover, that the papacys (spiritual and ecclesiastical)
power and rule should be executed through the communication of the
message and through the administrative practice that are proper to it: the
reconciliation of peoples, especially of Christian peoples with one another
35Ibid., 175.18f.-176ff. (97): Verum ego in hac prima nostra oratione nolo exhortare principes ac populos, ut papam effrenato cursu volitantem inhibeant eumque intra suos fines
consistere compellant, sed tantum admoneant, qui forsitan iam edoctus veritatem sua
sponte ab aliena domo in suam et ab insanis fluctibus sevisque tempestatibus in portum se
recipiet . Utinam, utinam aliquando videam nec enim mihi quicquam est longius quam
hoc videre, et presertim meo consilio effectum ut papa tantum vicarius Christi sit et non
etiam Cesaris . Tunc papa et dicetur et erit pater sanctus, pater omnium, pater ecclesie,
nec bella inter christianos excitabit, sed ab aliis excitata censura apostolica et papali
maiestate sedabit [translation modified].
36Ibid., 174.1416 (96): impii homines a papa sumunt excusationem, in illo enim comitibusque eius esse omnis facinoris exemplum.
37Ibid., 174.7f. (96): cum Christus in tot milibus pauperum fame ac nuditate moriatur.
(He will not provoke wars among Christians but bring an end to the
wars provoked by others). This is the politics that behooves the pope and
to which he is bound by duty. Only thus will he be the Holy Father, the
one destined by vocation to evangelize. Only thus will he be the father of
all, the shepherd of all believers. Only thus will he be the father of the
church, the bringer of peace to Christendom if necessary even by means
of the apostolic censure that is his due, invested as he is with papal majesty as the Bishop of Rome, the successor to St. Peter.
These are the objective dimensions of Vallas dissent as outlined in
the exordium and peroration of the Oration. But the subjective dimensions of that dissent are also made explicit in these very same sections.
This is another aspect of Vallas initial motive that helps to explain better,
as if from within, the complexity of the goal towards which he strives in
this composition.
As a text, the Oration brings historical and ecclesiological criticism to
bear on the jurisdictional, political, and spiritual rule assumed and exercised by the Roman papacy over the course of centuries. This exercise of
power was taken up in accord with the Constitutum, from which, according to the exordium, the supreme pontiffs want to derive their legal right,
and which in the peroration is called the principle of papal power.38
The position that Valla adopts as the ultimate justification for his criticism of the pope his dissent towards the Bishop of Rome, the successor
to Peter is that he (Valla) is imitating Paul.39 After having made reference to the conflict between Peter and the Apostle of the Gentiles in
Galatians 2:11 a reference that he will use again in his letter of defense
to Serra regarding the Oration Valla writes:
But I am not a Paul who can reproach a Peter: I am rather a Paul who imitates Paul in such a way which is something much greater as to become
one spirit with God, since I scrupulously obey his mandates. Personal status
does not make anyone safe from attacks. It did not do so for Peter and for
many others endowed with the same rank .40
38Ibid., 60.2061.1 (4): unde natum esse suum ius summi pontifices volunt; 173.1f. (96):
principium potentie papalis.
39Ibid., 58.4ff. (2), and Setzs notes.
40Ibid., 58.7ff. (2): At non sum Paulus, qui Petrum possim reprehendere: immo Paulus
sum, qui Paulum imitor, quemadmodum, quod multo plus est, unus cum Deo spiritus efficior, cum studiose mandatis illius optempero. Neque aliquem sua dignitas ab increpationibus tutum reddit, que Petrum non reddidit multosque alios eodem preditos gradu . [The
letter to Giovanni Serra is available in idem, Epistole, 193209 and in English translation in
idem, Dialectical Disputations, ed. and tr. Brian P. Copenhaver and Lodi Nauta, 2 vols.
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012), 2:436447; the reference to Gal. 2:11 is
found in idem, Epistole, 204.241243 and Dialectical Disputations, 2:444 (par. 26). Eds.]
34
As Paul clashed with Peter over the necessity of circumcising the Gentiles
converted to the new faith, thus Valla clashes with the Roman papacy over
the assumption of the Constitutum as the political and spiritual norm
for the government of the Christian community. The opposition to Peter
in the first case, and the criticism of his successor in the second, are both
raised in the name of evangelical freedom, which is the sole foundation of
the community of believers in Christ. It is precisely in this similarity of
intentions between the apostles action and his own Oration that Valla
sees himself as an imitator of Paul. In the exordium, where this comparison is made, Valla elaborates upon his Pauline imitation. To the citation of
Galatians 2:11, Valla adds Pauls confession (Acts 23:1ff.) to the high priest
Ananias and his ensuing punishment: to be struck on the mouth. Valla
cites another similar instance from the Bible, this time from Jeremiah
20:1ff., when the priest Phasur has Jeremiah imprisoned for his outspokenness.41 Therefore Valla despite the certainty of a political and spiritual anathema from the papacy will openly take up the part of
opposition to the new priesthood of the Law in the name of evangelical
liberation from the Law. By thus obeying the Gospels mandates, by giving
evidence and an open declaration (with the Oration) of his dissent, he
will become similar to the apostle Paul and to the prophet Jeremiah. The
imitation of Paul which Valla adopts as both a justification and a thematic motivation for his dissent towards the papacy thus becomes a
normative criterion for his argument in the Oration.
Having followed in the footsteps of the Apostle in the defense of evangelical liberation from the Law, Valla wants to continue along the same
path in his method of argumentation. This procedure consists in using
demonstrative rhetoric, in the realms of both preaching and theology.
This, according to Valla, was Pauls method of theologizing, as he would
eventually argue in more explicit terms in his later Encomion s. Thomae
(Encomium of St. Thomas).42
Vallas Pauline imitation advances on several levels in the Oration.
First, as Paul argued against Peter by revealing the (implicit and explicit)
contradictions in the latters behavior (on the one hand liberation from
the Law, on the other making a distinction between Jews and Gentiles),
41Valla, De falso, 5657 (1): os eius verberari; ob libertatem loquendi.
42On Vallas imitation of Paul, whom he describes as by far the prince of all
theologians and the master of theologizing (omnium theologorum longe princeps ac
theologandi magister), see Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla tra Medioevo e Rinascimento,
47 (= idem, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo, riforma e controriforma, 169 and translated in the
present volume, 194).
thus Valla lays bare the papacys theoretical and operative contradictions
with respect to its necessary role as vicariate of Christ for an evangelical
church. Second, Valla explicitly reaffirms (in the exordium) that his oration should not be understood as a Philippic, that is as a speech of a
persecutory juridical character whose aim is to convict the pope.43 He has
no intention of appealing to the Christian community, nor to any member
of it, to employ the force of violence or of right against the pope or to
deprive him of the rule usurped on the basis of the pseudo-Constitutum.
Indeed, no one, neither a community nor a single member of a community, could have such authority or juridical competency. Valla is an anticonciliarist, as can be seen clearly by this section of the Oration (and as
Wolfram Setz has emphasized with great perspicacity).44
To Vallas mind the Oration is, let us repeat, a demonstrative mode of
argumentation, not a judicial one. He wants to persuade the papacy and
induce it to dismiss the donation, not by force but by dint of its own
awareness of the ecclesiological and historical contradictions in which the
Constitutum has placed the Roman church:
I am not acting to satisfy a desire to harass anyone and to write Philippics
against him may I not be guilty of such a heinous deed , but to eradicate
error from peoples minds, to remove persons from vices and crimes by
admonition and reproof. I would not dare say that others, instructed by me,
should prune with steel the papal seat vineyard of Christ which is teeming with undergrowth, and force it to bear plump grapes instead of emaciated berries.45
In this passage Valla makes it clear that the protest included in his dissent is no different in intention or in form from Pauls confession, which
is manifestly critical towards Peter.
Finally, although aware that his Oration also undermines the spiritual
power employed by the papacy to condemn transgressors to proscription
from the Christian community,46 Valla refuses to behave politically and
43Valla, De falso, 59.3ff. (3).
44Ibid., 58.1559.1f. (2) and Setzs n. 21.
45Ibid., 59 (3): Neque vero id ago, ut quenquam cupiam insectari et in eum quasi
Philippicas scribere hoc enim a me facinus procul absit , sed ut errorem a mentibus
hominum convellam, ut eos a vitiis sceleribusque vel admonendo vel increpando summoveam. Non ausim dicere, ut alii per me edocti luxuriantem nimiis sarmentis papalem
sedem, que Christi vinea est, ferro coerceant et plenas uvas, non graciles labruscas ferre
compellant. But to understand Vallas passage correctly, it is necessary to relate it directly
to the definition of rhetoric fully discussed and established by Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, II.1521.
46[I.e., through excommunication, anathema, or execration, as explained in Valla, De
falso, 56.5f. (1). Eds.]
36
intellectually in the manner of the Roman orator Asinius Pollio. That eminent political personage and grand orator, whom his contemporaries
were wont to call a man for all seasons, had said, I am unwilling to write
against those who have the power to proscribe. Valla alludes to Pollio in
order to take a stance diametrically opposed to him.47 Driven by his search
for truth and justice, Valla feels that he must opt for the one posture
towards the Christian political community that seems to guarantee
authentic virtue in deed:
But there is no reason why this double threat of danger [political and ecclesiastical proscription] should trouble me or keep me from my plan. For the
supreme pontiff is not allowed to bind or release anyone contrary to human
and divine law, and giving up ones life in the defense of truth and justice is
a mark of the greatest virtue, the greatest glory, the greatest reward .
Anxiety be gone, let fears retreat far away, and worries disperse! With a
bold spirit, great confidence, and good hope, the cause of truth, the cause
of justice, and the cause of God must be defended. No one who knows
how to speak well can be considered a true orator unless he also dares to
speak out.48
Thus Valla contrasts Roman virtue (virtus romana), which he had subjected to criticism in De vero bono (On the True Good),49 with the courage
(fortitudo) of a Christian. This virtue constitutes the only mode of acting,
i.e., the sole praxis possible on the ethical plane, that exhausts the full
semantic pregnancy of the word virtus.50 And it is precisely along these
ethical lines that the freedom of the orator without which there can be
no art in oratory becomes the freedom of the Christian orator (orator
47On Gaius Asinius Pollio, see Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, VI.3.110ff. ( a man for all
seasons [ esse eum omnium horarum]; Erasmus will use this expression in the prefatory letter to Thomas More in his Praise of Folly, and he will also dedicate one of his Adages
to it: Desiderius Erasmus, Opera omnia (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1969-), ord. 2, tom. 1
(1993), 286 (= pp. 389390). Cf. Wolfgang Buchwald, Armin Hohlweg, and Otto Prinz (eds.),
Tusculum-Lexicon griechischer und lateinischer Autoren des Altertums und des Mittelalters
(Mnchen: Artemis, 1982), sub voce, 659. [Vallas allusion to Pollio (Valla, De falso, 56.9f. [1]:
nolo scribere in eos, qui possunt proscribere) is adapted from Macrobius, Saturnalia,
II.4.21. Eds.]
48Valla, De falso, 57.812/1520 (2): Verum non est causa, cur me duplex hic periculi
terror conturbet arceatque a proposito. Nam neque contra ius fasque summo pontifici licet
aut ligare quempiam aut solvere, et in defendenda vertitate atque iustitia profundere animam summe virtutis, summe laudis summi premii est . Facessat igitur trepidatio, procul
abeant metus, timores excidant. Forti animo, magna fiducia, bona spe defendenda est
causa veritatis, causa iustitie, causa Dei. Neque enim is verus est habendus orator, qui bene
scit dicere, nisi et dicere audeat.
49[A revised version of De voluptate. Eds.]
50Valla, Repastinatio, 408422, 7398. Cf. Lorch, A Defense of Life, 119130; Fois, Il pensiero cristiano di Lorenzo Valla, 476481.
christianus). All this is similar to Paul, writes Valla, who made his confession to Ananias in line with his own good conscience (bona conscientia).
Later, in a letter to Cardinal Landriani in defense of the Oration, Valla
will confirm that he had been directed by his conscience to write what
he did.51 These words confirm the comprehensive sense, both objective
and subjective, of that I dissent that is asserted programmatically in the
very first lines of the Oration and fully elaborated from the exordium to
the peroration.
3.The Antinomy of imperium and evangelium
The first section of the Oration deals with the relationship between imperium (rule or empire) and evangelium (the Gospel). This relationship is
characterized by radical conflict and extreme opposition and is resolvable
only through the reciprocal negation of the two terms. This theme is a
constant that runs throughout the Oration. In section I and also in section II, which is actually an extension of the first this theme is treated
specifically and is taken up as an historical and theoretical premise to the
overall argument against the Constitutum Constantini.
Section I is composed of four parts made up of speeches given by the
dramatis personae involved in Constantines supposed donation of the
empire to the papacy. In the manuscript tradition of the Oration, each part
is glossed with a heading. These are indicated in Setzs critical apparatus
and in all likelihood are attributable to Valla himself.
The first part of the section begins with a question posed by the Orations
author himself to kings and princes, those seasoned in the wielding of
power, regarding the Donations supposed historical possibility: would
Constantine have ever given the empire to another?52 The question
posed to the wielders of power constitutes the authors own direct discourse; it is the oration of the orator Valla himself. How could the Donation
of Constantine ever have occurred, when all of history teaches that he
who conquers and exercises rule can never cede his own power without
falling into an absurd repudiation of himself?
I speak to you, kings and princes. Since it is hard for a private person to form
any idea of a royal disposition, I probe your mind, I examine your conscience, I ask for your testimony: Would any one of you, had he been in
51Valla, Epistole, 256.2: contentus animi conscientia.
52Marginal manuscript heading (Valla, De falso, 62.5): nunquam Constantinum fuisse
facturum ut alteri daret imperium.
38
Constantines place, have thought he should act to bestow upon another
person, by gracious liberality, the city of Rome his own fatherland, the
center of the world, the queen of cities, the most powerful, noblest, richest
of peoples, which triumphed over nations and was sacred to behold ? As
far as I have heard or read, not one of you was ever deterred from the effort
to increase his empire . On the contrary, this blazing passion for extensive
rule most of all goads and drives one who is already supremely powerful .
I forebear to mention how many crimes, how many abominations have
been committed in the cause of gaining or increasing empire . In no other
endeavor does human recklessness normally assert itself so much and so
fiercely . But if dominion is apt to be sought by so great an effort, how
much greater must be the effort to keep it! Not enlarging an empire is not so
wretched as reducing it. Even more grotesque than not adding anothers
realm to yours is allowing yours to be added to anothers.53
The second part of the section contains the speech of Constantines sons
and kinsmen to him.54 They urge the emperor not to disinherit them, giving to others (the Roman pope) that rule which is their due in virtue of
dynastic succession and of their service in capturing the imperial crown
and the government of the empire.
Father, do you really deprive, disinherit, and cast off your sons, you who
loved your sons very much until now? We do not so much bemoan as wonder at your desire to strip yourself of the best and greatest part of your
empire. But bemoan it we do, because you are transferring it to others at our
expense and to our disgrace. What reason is there for you to cheat your children from the anticipated succession to your empire, when you yourself
ruled together with your father? What have we done against you? In what
way do we appear guilty of disrespect towards our fatherland, the name of
Rome, and the majesty of her empire? If only, Caesar, we had fallen in
battle with your reputation intact and victory secure rather than look upon
53Valla, De falso, 62.1263.1/63.1520/64.1122 (78): Vos appello, reges ac principes,
difficile est enim privatum hominem animi regii concipere imaginem, vestram mente
inquiro, conscientiam scrutor, testimonium postulo: nunquid vestrum quispiam, si fuisset
Constantini loco, faciendum sibi putasset, ut urbem Romam, patriam suam, caput orbis
terrarum, reginam civitatum, potentissimam, nobilissimam, ditissimam populorum, triumphatricem nationum et ipso aspectu sacram, liberalitatis gratia donaret alteri ?
Siquidem neminem vestrum aut audivi aut legi a conatu ampliandi imperii fuisse deterritum : quin ipse hic ardor atque hec late dominandi cupiditas, ut quisque maxime potens
est, ita eum maxime angit atque agitat . Taceo quanta scelera, quot abominanda propter
imperium assequendum ampliandum ve admissa sunt . Adeo nusquam magis, nusquam
atrocius grassari solet humana temeritas . Quod si tanto conatu peti dominatus solet,
quanto maiore necesse est conservetur? Neque enim tantopere miserum est non ampliare
imperium quam imminuere, neque tam deforme tibi alterius regnum non accedere tuo
quam tuum accedere alieno .
54Marginal manuscript heading (Valla, De falso, 68.17): oratio filiorum ac necessariorum Constantini ad illum.

this! You can indeed do what you want with your empire and even with us,
with one exception, which we will fiercely uphold unto death we shall not
desist from the worship of the immortal gods and shall serve as a great
example to others, so that you may know what your vaunted largesse does
for the Christian religion .55
The third part of the section is the speech of the Roman people to
Constantine.56 The Senatus Populusque Romanus claim for themselves
the right of directing the affairs of the respublica and the imperial government of the city. They beg Constantine in the name of romana libertas not
to subject Rome and its empire to a barbarian, a worshiper of a religion
foreign and adverse to the cult of the household gods.
Caesar, if you are unmindful of your own family and even of yourself , nevertheless the Senate and the People of Rome cannot be unmindful of its
right and its reputation. For how can you arrogate to yourself so much of the
Roman empire, which was brought forth from our blood, not yours? You,
Caesar, will look after yourself, but this matter concerns us just as much as
you. You are mortal. The empire of the Roman people must be immortal
and, insofar as lies with us, it will be not only the empire but our sense of
honor as well. But shall we accept an empire of those whose religion we
scorn? And shall we, as princes of the world, be subservient to this most
contemptible creature? And, since you force us to speak rather candidly
in support of our right, you need to realize that you have no legal claim on
the empire of the Roman people: Julius Caesar seized rule by force, Augustus
took over the crime and made himself the ruler by wiping out the opposing
factions. Tiberius, Gaius, Claudius, Nero, Galba, Otho, Vitellius, Vespasianus
and all the rest plundered our freedom by the same or a similar route. You
too became ruler after expelling or exterminating others, and I forbear to
mention that you were an illegitimate child. Therefore, to make our mind
known to you, Caesar, if you do not care to keep the government of Rome,
you have sons, one of whom you may put in your place with our permission,
and on our proposal, in accordance with the law of nature. Otherwise it is
55Valla, De falso, 68.1769.7/69.2570.2 (14): Ita ne, pater antehac filiorum amantissime, filios privas, exheredas, abdicas? Nam, quod te optima maximaque imperii parte
exuere vis, non tam querimur quam miramur. Querimur autem, quod eam ad alios defers
cum nostra et iactura et turpitudine. Quid enim cause est, quod liberos tuos expectata succesione imperii fraudas, qui ipse una cum patre regnasti? Quid in te commisimus? qua in
te, qua in patriam, qua in nomen Romanum ac maiestatem imperii impietate digni videmur? Utinam nos, Cesar, salva tua dignitate atque victoria in bello contigisset occumbere potius quam ista cernamus. Et tu quidem de imperio tuo ad tuum arbitratum agere
potes atque etiam de nobis uno duntaxat excepto, in quo ad mortem usque erimus contumaces: ne a cultu deorum immortalium desistamus magno etiam aliis exemplo, ut scias
tua ista largitas quid mereatur de religione christiana .
56Marginal manuscript heading (Valla, De falso, 70.17): oratio populi romani ad
Constantinum.
40
our intention to defend the public interest together with our own personal
reputation. For this is no less an affront to the descendants of Romulus than
was the rape of Lucretia, nor will a Brutus be wanting to offer himself as a
leader to this people against Tarquinius in the restoration of our freedom.57
The final part of the section contains Sylvesters speech to Constantine.58

Pope Sylvesters discourse is entirely made up of quotations, and corresponding interpretations, from New Testament passages, mostly taken
from the Gospel of Matthew and the Letters of Paul.
Caesar, my excellent liege and son, I am a priest and a pontiff, who has to
determine what I may allow as an offering at the altar, to protect against the
offering of an animal that is not just impure but a viper or a snake. So consider this. Suppose you had the right to hand over to someone other than
your sons a part of your empire containing Rome, the reigning capital of the
world something I do not at all believe ; suppose this people, suppose
Italy, suppose all the other nations, seduced as they are by worldly attractions, would agree, against all plausibility, that they preferred to be subject
to those whom they hate and whose religion they have hitherto spat upon.
Even so, my most loving son if you think you owe me some credence
I could still not be induced by any argument to agree with you unless
I wished to be untrue to myself, forget my station, and almost deny my Lord
Jesus. Your gifts, or, as you prefer, your remunerations would stain and immediately wipe out the glory, innocence, and sanctity of myself and of all those
who will come after me, and they would block the way for those who will
come to know the truth [1 Tim. 2:4] . Should I be for others, Caesar, both
an example and a cause of wrongdoing? I who am a Christian man, priest of
God, Roman pontiff, vicar of Christ? I know that when Peter was asked by
the Lord from whom the kings of the earth received tribute or tax, whether
57Valla, De falso, 70.1771.1/73.39/74.1275.11 (1618) Cesar, si tu tuorum immemor es
atque etiam tui , non tamen senatus populusque Romanus immemor potest esse sui iuris
sueque dignitatis. Etenim quomodo tibi tantum permittis de imperio Romano, quod non
tuo, sed nostro sanguine partum est? Tu, Cesar, quid ad te spectet, ipse videris, nobis
autem hec res non minus quam tibi cure esse debet. Tu mortalis es, imperium populi
Romani decet esse immortale et, quantum in nobis est, erit, neque imperium modo, verum
etiam pudor: scilicet, quorum religionem contemnimus, eorum accipiemus imperium? et
principes orbis terrarum huic contemptissimo homini serviemus? Atque ut intelligas
quandoquidem nos pro iure nostro cogis asperius loqui nullum tibi in populi Romani
imperio ius esse: Cesar vi dominatum occupavit, Augustus et in vitium successit et adversariorum partium profligatione se dominum fecit, Tiberius, Gaius, Claudius, Nero, Galba,
Otho, Vitellius, Vespasianus ceterique aut eadem aut simili via libertatem nostram predati
sunt, tu quoque aliis expulsis aut interemptis dominus effectus es . Quare, ut tibi nostram
mentem testificemur, Cesar , nobis in animo est publicam amplitudinem cum privata
dignitate defendere. Neque enim minor hec iniuria Quiritum quam olim fuit violata
Lucretia, neque nobis deerit Brutus, qui contra Tarquinum se ad libertatem recuperandam
huic populo prebeat ducem .
58Marginal manuscript heading (Valla, De falso, 76.12): oratio Silvestri ad Constantinum.

from their sons or from foreigners, He declared, when Peter answered from
foreigners, Therefore their sons are free [Matt. 17:2427]. But if all people
are my sons, Caesar, as they surely are, all of them will be free, no one will
pay anything . Our power is the power of the keys, as the Lord says: I shall
give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven [Matt. 16:19] . Nothing can be
added to this power, nothing to this rank, nothing to this kingdom. Whoever
is not content with this is demanding something else for himself from the
devil, who dared to say even to the Lord: I shall give you all the kingdoms of
the world, if you fall on the ground and worship me [Matt. 4:9]. Therefore,
Caesar allow me to say this without offense do not play the devil for me,
you who tell Christ, namely me, to accept kingdoms of the world that are
given by you. I prefer to repudiate them than to possess them; and to speak
of unbelievers but, I hope, future believers do not turn me from an angel of
light into an angel of darkness for those whose hearts I want to draw into
piety, whose necks I do not want to bring under the yoke. I want to subject
them to myself with the sword that is the word of God [Eph. 6:17], not with
a sword of iron, so that they may not become worse, kick back, gore me, and,
vexed by my error, blaspheme the name of God . Finally, to come to an
end, on this matter hear that remark which He uttered as if directed to you
and me: Render to Caesar the things that are Caesars, and to God the things
that are Gods [Matt. 22:21]. Wherefore it turns out that neither you, Caesar,
should give up what is yours nor should I accept what is Caesars. Even if you
should offer it a thousand times, I would never accept.59
59Valla, De falso, 76.1277.15/78.1113/83.49/84.423/84.2885.4 (21, 2526): Princeps

optime ac fili, Cesar, ego sacerdos sum ac pontifex, qui dispicere debeo, quid ad altare
patiar offerri, ne forte non dico immundum animal offeratur, sed vipera aut serpens. Itaque
sic habeas: si foret tui iuris partem imperii cum regina orbis, Roma, alteri tradere quam
filiis quod minime sentio , si populus hic, si Italia, si cetere nationes sustinerent, ut, quos
oderunt et quorum religionem adhuc respuunt, capti illecebris seculi eorum imperio
obnoxii esse vellent quod impossibile est , tamen, si quid mihi credendum putas, fili
amantissime, ut tibi assentirer ulla adduci ratione non possem, nisi vellem mihi ipsi esse
dissimilis et condicionem meam oblivisci ac propemodum dominum Iesum abnegare. Tua
enim munera sive, ut tu vis, tue remunerationes et gloriam et innocentiam et sanctimoniam meam atque omnium, qui mihi successuri sunt, polluerent ac prorsus everterent
viamque iis, qui ad cognitionem veritatis venturi sunt, intercluderent . Ego, Cesar, aliis
quoque sim et exemplum et causa delinquendi? christianus homo, sacerdos Dei, pontifex
Romanus, vicarius Christi qui scio a Domino interrogatum Petrum a quibusnam reges
terre acciperent tributum censumve, a filiis an ab alienis? et, cum hic respondisset ab
alienis, ab eodem dictum: ergo liberi sunt filii. Quod si omnes filii mei sunt, Cesar, ut
certe sunt omnes liberi erunt, nihil quisquam solvet . Nostra potestas est potestas clavium, dicente Domino: Tibi dabo claves regni celorum . Nihil ad hanc potestatem, nihil
ad hanc dignitatem, nihil ad hoc regnum adiici potest. Quo qui contentus non est, aliud
sibi quoddam a diabolo postulat, qui etiam Domino dicere ausus est: Tibi dabo omnia
regna mundi, si cadens in terrram adoraveris me. Quare, Cesar, cum pace tua dictum
sit , noli mihi diabolus effici, qui Christum, idest me regna mundi a te data accipere
iubeas, malo enim illa spernere quam possidere; et ut aliquid de infidelibus, sed ut spero
futuris fidelibus loquar noli me de angelo lucis reddere illis angelum tenebrarum,
quorum corda ad pietatem inducere volo, non ipsorum cervici iugum imponere, et
gladio, quod est verbum Dei, non gladio ferreo mihi subiicere, ne deteriores efficiantur,
42
The orations addressed to Constantine regarding the supposed transfer of

the empire to the papacy serve to define the historical dimensions of the
Donation. These historical dimensions in turn constitute the forensic
space of the speeches: the temporal and ideological space both of imperial
Rome (from the beginning of the fourth century on, after the Christian
emperors victory at the Milvian Bridge in 312) and of the Roman-Catholic
church (Roman-Catholic in the sense that Christianity became the state
religion of the Roman Empire; it was in the curial and Lateran tradition as
a state religion that it arrived at the Constitutum).
Furthermore, within this forensic space the orations have the function
of highlighting the comparison between Constantine, who offers the
empire to the papacy, and Sylvester, who in the name of the Gospel rejects
the donation. In this comparison between Constantine and Sylvester
animated by the speeches that express the contrasting positions of the
respective personages is revealed, in its various dimensions, the antinomy between imperium and evangelium.60
Having explained the formal composition of section I of the Oration, it
remains now to analyze this central theme as debated by Valla and to
examine the method of argumentation employed: the demonstration of
the irresolvable antinomy, and thus of the radical contradiction, between
imperium and evangelium.
As was highlighted in the introduction, Vallas Oration proceeds with
arguments aimed at identifying the explicit and implicit contradictions in
ne recalcitrent, ne cornu me feriant, ne nomen Dei meo irritati errore blasphement .
Cuius ad extremum, ut iam finem faciam, illam de hac re sententiam accipe, quam quasi
inter me et te tulit: Reddite, que sunt Cesaris, Cesari, et que sunt Dei, Deo, quo fit, ut nec
tu, Cesar, tua relinquere neque ego, que Cesaris sunt, accipere debeam, que, vel si millies
offeras, nunquam accipiam.
60In addition to what has been said here about the speeches constituting temporal and
ideological historical spaces, it should be added that Valla employed in section I of the
Oration (and perhaps for the first time in the context of early humanism) the historiographico-rhetorical genre developed and used by Thucydides in his Histories, which Valla
would be the first to translate into Latin. On Vallas proemium to his Latin version of the
Histories, see Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla tra Medioevo e Rinascimento, 126131 (= idem,
Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo, riforma e controriforma, 250255 and translated in the present
volume, 281286); and above all Giacomo Ferra, La concezione storiografica del Valla: i
Gesta Ferdinandi Regis Aragonum, in Besomi and Regoliosi (eds.), Lorenzo Valla e lumanesimo
italiano, 265310. On Vallas translation of the Histories, see Giovan Battista Alberti, Tucidide
nella traduzione latina di Lorenzo Valla, Studi italiani di filologia classica, n.s., 29 (1957):
224249; idem (ed.), introduction to Thucydidis Historiae, 3 vols. (Roma: Typis publicae officinae polygraphicae, 19722000), vol. 1 (1972) [idem, Lorenzo Valla tradutore di Tucidide,
in Tradizione classica e letteratura umanistica per Alessandro Perosa, ed. Roberto Cardini et
al. (Roma: Bulzoni, 1985), 243253]; and Filippo Ferlauto, Il testo di Tucidide e la traduzione
latina di Lorenzo Valla (Palermo: Universit di Palermo, Istituto di filologia greca, 1979).
the document of donation (donationis pagina) as well as at exposing its

historical inconsistencies. Within this perspective, the attempt to falsify
the document, i.e. the text providing the principle of papal power,
begins with a political and theological observation aimed at demonstrating the historical unreality of the Constitutum and its supposed Christian
authenticity. This is the point of the entire first section (and, as we shall
see, of the second as well). More clearly: if the document of donation
indeed possessed the historical reality attributed to it, then that reality is
in clear contradiction with the Christian Gospel, on the one hand, and
with the contemporary politics of imperial power, on the other.
The Constitutum in and of itself is placed primarily outside of, if not at
the extreme opposite pole from, the Christian, evangelical world. In fact it
could not be countenanced with regard to a church (ecclesia) that is within
the boundaries of the Gospel, but only in view of a Church characterized
by enormous political and religious power. The Constitutum lies to one
side or the other of a Christendom based on saving grace and the evangelical dictates of the Sermon on the Mount, to which Vallas composition
continually refers.
In other words, Valla shows how the Constitutum is entirely dislocated
and self-contradictory with respect to both chronological and geographical parameters. By its very nature, it is unthinkable unless outside the
space and time, i.e., outside the contextual circle, of the early Christian
church, which was profoundly evangelical and completely consistent with
itself. (This last point is an historical presupposition about early
Christianity that underlies the Oration and other of Vallas major works.)
Similarly, Valla demonstrates that the Constitutum is placed outside the
proper political context of Roman rule and the Roman Empire. He repeats
in various ways and according to diverse points of view that the Donation
would have been an absurd event given the historical nature and the
internal logic of Roman, and especially Constantines, imperial power. It
would have been an event, therefore, entirely foreign and inconceivable
within the historical reality of the Roman Empire, which had achieved the
apex of its military might and internal political cohesion precisely with
the advent of the emperor Constantine.61
61Cf. Giulio Giannelli and Santo Mazzarino, Trattato di storia romana, 2 vols. (Roma:
Tumminelli, 1962), vol. 2: LImpero Romano, in particular part V: Il basso impero e la prospettiva carismatica, I. Dal Milvio al Frigido (312394), (pp. 421490); Andreas Alfldi,
Costantino tra paganesimo e cristianesimo, tr. Augusto Fraschetti (Bari: Laterza, 1976)
(English edition: The Conversion of Constantine and Pagan Rome, tr. Harold Mattingly
[Oxford: Clarendon, 1948]); Arnaldo Momigliano, Il conflitto tra paganesimo e cristianesimo
44
The document of donation, therefore, is placed by Valla within the

coordinates of a double contradiction. The document contradicts both
the evangelical character of early Christianity (until the first decades
of the fourth century) and the nature of the Roman Empire at the time.
In light of this collocation/dislocation, the document of donation
understood both as a possible event and as an actual document loses all
sense. Language and reality, signifier and referent, lack all historical and
ideological authenticity. The falseness of the Constitutum, therefore its
non-truth both historically and ecclesiologically derives from the fact
that it places itself of its own accord outside of every context. Indeed, it is
configured in opposition to the very times and spaces that are assumed as
its immediate referent as a text.
That these are the conclusions reached by Valla will become clearer
with an in-depth reading of section I. The speeches of which it is composed are directed towards the historical presentation of the following
phenomena. Of first importance is the nature and historical manifestation
of the Roman Empire, with special attention to the form of imperial power
generally and to the degree and mode in which it was taken up and exercised by Constantine specifically. Second is the Gospel, as a message of
servitude (servitium) placed at the foundation of the Christian community, and specifically as it must be (and was in fact) put into practice by
one particular member of that community (the evangelical polis), i.e. the
vicar of Christ. Third and finally, the opposition between imperium and
evangelium is brought to the fore.
The first point is elaborated in the first three speeches: the discourse of
the orator (i.e. the author of the Oration) on Constantine and the supposed donation; that of Constantines kinsmen, who claim for themselves
the dynastic succession to the government of the empire; and that of the
Senate and the People of Rome, who urge Constantine not to abuse his
imperial power, a military and political despotism that in itself already
constitutes a usurpation of the respublica as a res privata.62 The second
point is treated in Pope Sylvesters statement on the nature of the servitude of the Churchs authority as it is exercised ministerially, i.e. in the
name of Christ. Servitude is a defining quality of evangelium, which is
the foundation of Christianity. All together, finally, the speeches are
nel secolo IV: saggi, tr. Anna Davies Morpurgo (Torino: Einaudi, 1968) [English edition = The
Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century: Essays (Oxford: Clarendon,
1963)].
62[A private affair, as opposed to the republic (respublica), which is the public affair
par excellence. Eds.]
declaimed and put in a position to be compared to stress the falseness

of the Constitutum, inasmuch as the document of donation is disfigured
by the antinomy of imperium/evangelium. And since the terms of this
antinomy are radically irreconcilable, it follows that the Constitutum rests
on one massive contradiction that comprehends all the other contradictions underlying the document of donation like the one Valla has
already brought to the fore, and like others that will be revealed in the
sequel.
With incisive strokes and a dense succession of abridged formulas,
Valla seems in the first three speeches to want to explain the origins, the
self-manifestation, and the very nature of power in and of itself. He
sketches what amounts to an historical phenomenology of power, with
particular attention to the form and event of imperial power.63 Imperial
power has its birth with the coming of Alexander the Great, who, according to Valla, establishes imperial rule and puts an end to the Greek polis. It
is then broadened and developed by the Roman Caesars during the
decline of the Roman respublica. Finally, it reaches its apex with
Constantine. He (and his successors down to Theodosius) then, exercising
absolute rule, decides the fate of Rome, capital of the world, by depriving
the civitas of its foundation: the senatus populusque romanus.
As Setz has noted, Alexander is for Valla the prototype of empire. The
humanist draws a sketch of him as the first incarnation of imperial power;
then he engraves the image with the person and power of Constantine.
[Alexander] seemed to himself to have accomplished nothing at all without
the subjugation of the West and all its nations either by force or by the
authority of his name. Indeed, he had already planned to explore and bring
under his control the Ocean as well as any other world there might be .64
Constantine is no different:
This was a man who launched wars on nations out of lust for rule; who had
deprived allies and relatives of their empire after pursuing them in civil
war ; who remembered, just like the other Caesars, that he had taken his
rule not through senatorial election and consent of the plebs, but through
an army, weapons, and war.65
63Setz, Lorenzo Vallas Schrift, 59ff.; Valla, De falso, 64, n. 43; 74, n. 70.
64Valla, De falso, 64.48 (7) and Setzs n. 43: Ipse sibi nihil effecisse videbatur, nisi et
occidentem et omnes nationes aut vi aut nominis sui auctoritate sibi tributarias reddidisset. Parum dico: iam Oceanum transire et, si quis alius orbis esset, explorare ac suo subicere arbitrio destinaverat [translation modified].
65Ibid., 65.911/1921 (9): hominem, qui cupiditate dominandi nationibus bella
intulisset, socios affinesque bello civili persecutus imperio privasset ; qui se meminisset
more aliorum Cesarum non electione patrum consensuque plebis, sed exercitu, armis,
bello dominatum occupasse .
46
Therefore, Valla argues, power is nothing other than the human lust for
rule far and wide. Such was its origin, and such is thus its nature. The
advent of power and its self-manifestation throughout history are determined by the constants of its own internal logic, by the requirements necessary for its subsistence and survival. Power can perpetuate itself only by
reaffirming itself, which is possible only to the degree that it expands itself
in depth and in breadth in the direction of absolute and total rule. Since
power is by its nature identified with rule, it had to rise to the forms and
strategies of imperial rule: expanding to the greatest extent possible by
means of the force of arms and territorial conquest. Its very survival was
necessarily determined by its own increase and by the destruction of every
other competing power.
It was first the use of force against the civitas founded on the senatus
populusque romanus with the resulting rule over the Roman Republic,
and then the subjection of other peoples outside of Rome and Italy, that
established Caesar and Caesarism, the emperor and the Roman Empire.
Through their conquest of power, those who suppressed the Republic
gained full control over civil and political liberties: the Roman people
lost its true Romanness. That conquest went on to be gradually consolidated through the mass of power that flowed to the Caesars from the political subjugation of other peoples and the territorial extension of the empire,
which was executed by the military force the emperor himself had created.
Here Valla reinterprets Jeromes statement that it is the army that makes
the emperor, making it so that its truth is understood adequately only if
the terms of the proposition are taken as reciprocally convertible. That is to
say that it is true that the army makes the emperor, but it is equally true,
and perhaps historically more precise, that it is the emperor who creates
the army and establishes his rule, the emperor who executes the conquest
of power and the destruction of civil and political liberties.66
Vallas argument is continuously unfolded along lines of historical
induction the specific method of composition in section I, as should
now be evident from what has been said. If power is essentially the effort
to increase empire, and such turns out to be historically true, then the
Donation can be nothing other than an historical absurdity. It would be an
event in no way in agreement with the nature and existence of Roman
66Ibid., 74, n. 70 (the quotation who suppressed the Republic [qui oppressere
Rempublicam] is from the Elegantie, IV.70 suffragia, in Lorenzo Valla, Opera omnia, ed.
Eugenio Garin, 2 vols. [Torino: Bottega dErasmo, 1962], 1:145) and 165.14f. (88); 174.22 (96):
populus Romanus veram illam Romanitatem perdidit; 65, n. 46.
power, which with the advent of Constantine had risen to the apex of
imperial power. The Donation would have brought about the very negation and self-destruction of the power that Constantine had established
for himself and greatly reinforced with conquests on the borders of the
empire and victories over his rivals.
Hence according to Valla the attempt of the Constitutum and the
Legenda Silvestri (Legend of Sylvester) to posit the strictest of ties between
Constantines abdication of the Western Empire in favor of the papacy
and his conversion to Christianity. Because he had become a Christian
is the response to whoever objects to the Donation and considers impossible such an imperial gesture towards the papacy.67 But the evidence of
the document of donation, counters Valla, testifies against itself; indeed,
it would stress with greater force the falseness of the Donation. The irreconcilable relationship between imperium and evangelium would sink the
imperial gesture deeper into the void of inexplicability. If Constantines
conversion to Christianity had indeed been authentic, he should not
have abdicated his imperial power but rather put it in the service of
Christians:
In fact, if you wish to show yourself a Christian, to demonstrate your piety,
to provide for I do not say the Roman church, but the church of God you
should now, now above all, play the prince, to fight for those who cannot
and must not fight, to keep safe through your authority those who are subject to plots and injuries.68
Valla proceeds insistently, with greater urgency and still in accordance

with his historical criticism of the imperial regime. If Constantine had
become a Christian, then in conformity with his evangelical faith he
should have restored civil and political liberty to the people of Rome and
to all the other peoples subject to the empire. In direct contrast to what
the Constitutum purports, Constantine, if he had remained faithful to his
Christian duty, should have restored freedom to the cities, not replaced
their lord with the vicar of Christ!69
What is more, it was in such an actual liberation from imperial domination that the sacrament of truth could have been revealed, the sacrament
67Ibid., 66.3ff. (10): quia affectus erat Christianus.
68Ibid., 66.1520 (10): Tu vero, si christianum te ostendere, si pietatem indicare tuam, si
consultum non dico Romane ecclesie vis, sed ecclesie Dei, nunc, precipue nunc principem
agas, ut pugnes pro iis, qui pugnare non possunt nec debent, ut eos tua auctoritate tutos
reddas, qui insidiis iniuriisque obnoxii sunt.
69Ibid., 66.9f. (10): restituere urbibus libertatem, non mutare dominum [translation
modified].
48
that the God of Israel had demanded for the Hebrew people from their
ancient masters and imperial conquerors:
God wanted the sacrament of truth to be made manifest to Nebuchadnezzar,
Cyrus, Ahasuerus, and many other princes, and yet he demanded of none of
them to withdraw from empire or to make a gift of part of his realm, but only
to give back freedom to the Hebrews and to protect them from hostile
neighbors. This was enough for the Jews. This will be enough for the
Christians too. Did you become a Christian, Constantine? Yet it is most
improper for you now as a Christian emperor to have a smaller dominion
than you had as an unbeliever. Dominion is a certain special gift of God, for
which even pagan princes are thought to be chosen by God.70
The transfer of the (Western) Empire to the papacy (after Constantines

victory at the Milvian Bridge) would also have encountered the opposition of the Roman Senate; it would have entered into full conflict with the
will of the highest legitimate authority of the Roman civitas. This is the
other historical reference central to Vallas argument about the effectual
impossibility, in right and in fact, of the Donation of Constantine.
How could the Roman Senate have accepted the further deprivation of
its autonomy, of its political and civil power, and allowed itself to be
reduced to conditions still worse than those imposed by the emperors?
The loss of civil and political freedom, which the Senate of Rome had suffered at the hands of the Caesars, was now to be perpetuated by
Constantine in favor of a Christian, a worshiper of a divinity foreign to the
Roman civitas:
But shall we accept an empire of those whose religion we scorn? And shall
we, as princes of the world, be subservient to this most contemptible creature? turn over the very capital of the kingdom to a foreigner of the lowliest kind?71
The Senates opposition to Constantines deed (the Constitutums supposed donation) would have been voiced, as far as Valla is concerned, in
terms necessarily and consistently in accordance with the political power
70Ibid., 66.2067.3 (10): Nabuchodonosor, Cyro, Assuero multisque aliis principibus
sacramentum veritatis Deus aperiri voluit, a nullo tamen eorum exegit, ut imperio cederet,
ut partem regni donaret, sed tantum libertatem Hebreis redderet eosque ab infestantibus
finitimis protegeret. Hoc satis fuit Iudeis, hoc sat erit et Christianis. Factus es, Costantine,
christianus? at indignissima res est christianum te nunc imperatorem minori esse principatu, quam fueras infidelis. Est enim principatus precipuum quoddam Dei munus, ad
quem gentiles etiam principes a Deo eligi existimantur [translation modified].
71Ibid., 73.79/74.7f. (17): quorum religionem contemnimus, eorum accipiemus
imperium? et principes orbis terrarum huic contemptissimo homini serviemus? ipsum
regni caput peregrino atque humillimo homini addicere?
that was technically still its legitimate right under Roman law, although at
this point only partially and formally. The Senate had to act resolutely
towards Constantine in defense of its power as a last attempt to recover
its strength on its deathbed, which would in fact happen during the fourth
century and claim its former republican freedom to the extent still
possible.
In other words, for Valla particularly in this first section if Constan
tine had actually instituted the Constitutum, he would have acted in contradiction with the very nature of his imperial power. Similarly, if the
Senate had quietly suffered the transfer of the empire, it would have repudiated itself. It alone would have deprived itself of its authority and ancient
republican liberty, soiled by Caesar and gradually usurped by his successors. Therefore Valla has the Senates speech to the emperor end with the
lapidary assertion: you have no legal claim on the empire of the Roman
people.
With the first three speeches (of the orator, of Constantines kinsmen,
and of the Senate), Valla aimed to expose the Donations historical unreality by demonstrating its irreconcilability with the historical reality of
Roman power generally and especially of Constantines imperial power.
The nature and logic of imperium brought forth by Valla through his
analysis of the historical phenomenology of power cannot lead to an act
like the Donation without slipping into the self-negation both of imperium
and of whoever enjoys its power. With the final speech, of pope Sylvester,
the humanist goes on to treat the other and not dissimilar historical
and ideological irreconcilability of the donation and its acceptance: the
irreconcilability of imperium with the evangelium of the vicar of Christ.
Sylvesters assent to the transfer of the (Western) Empire to the papacy
would have entailed the negation of his own position as the vicar of
Christ, as head of the Church (caput ecclesiae) in the apostolic administration of the pontifical office (munus pontificale). Just as Constantine
would have repudiated his own status as the supreme wielder of Roman
power if he had ceded the empire an absurdity thus Pope Sylvester
would have committed the greatest possible betrayal of his evangelical
faith also an absurdity in the context of Christianity in its first few centuries. But, Valla reaffirms, Pope Sylvester was fully aware of being at the
head of that Christian army an army in stark contrast to the Roman
legions in which the convert Constantine, general of the Roman military, was a mere recruit.72
72Ibid., 78.12f. (21); 83.16 (26); 76.16 (21): in christiana militia tiro.
50
A patchwork of passages from the Old and New Testaments (citations

typical for those with an evangelical bent), Sylvesters speech hinges on
two points. First, the Gospels significance as bringer of salvation and
redemption comes to the fore, words whose semantics Valla analyzes in
terms of liberation. Second, the Gospel is essentially understood as a
message against power and against rule. For Valla, the message of the
christianus homo is essentially a direct and radical antithesis to the lust
for domination, where power and rule have their origin and on which
they constantly nourish themselves in historical reality.73
Therefore Pope Sylvester must refuse the imperial gift. Otherwise he
would have to deny the lord Jesus, and he would be untrue to himself as
the one who represents Christ (personam Christi gerens). If he had
accepted the donation, Sylvester would have failed to overcome the temptation that Satan offered to Christ in the desert. And he, the vicar of Christ,
would have been transformed from an angel of light into an angel of
darkness. Sylvester would have turned the popes succession from Peter
into its opposite, i.e. a succession from Judas, which (Valla has Sylvester
say), would stain and immediately wipe out my successors and block
the way for those who will come to know the truth.74
Moreover, Sylvesters acceptance of the Donation would have brought
with it (as in fact it did after the establishment of the Constitutum) the
distortion of the power of the keys. Apostolic power, whose nature and
whose foundation are described in the Scriptures, would have undergone
(as actually happened in the history of the papacy) an illicit enlargement,
in truth a perverse disjunction with regard to rule and the earthly kingdom
with which Satan had tempted Christ: I shall give you all the kingdoms
of the world. But Christ refused Satan, and he forbid Peter (and his vicar
in the person of Peter) from wounding (and from defending himself)
with the sword, from resorting to force and to the power of worldly rule.75
The papacy, therefore, has only a spiritual function, the power (potestas) flowing from the sword that is the word of God. This sword-word
is not only irreconcilable with worldly power, but it is also understood as
the exact opposite of rule deriving from the sword of iron. It will never
be permissible to use such a weapon to govern the Christian community
or subject the world to the faith (fides). The power of the keys, an
73Ibid., 83.20 (26) and n. 110.
74Ibid., 77.1115 (21): qui mihi successuri sunt, polluerent ac prorsus everterent
viamque iis, qui ad agnitionem veritatis venturi sunt, intercluderent.
75Ibid., 83.2184.8 (26): potestas clavium; in persona Petri.
evangelical ministry of openness and liberation, comes virtually to be

defined in direct contrast to the power of the two swords and thus in
contrast to the ecclesiological politics attached to it from the Decree of
Gelasius to Boniface VIIIs Unam sanctam.
The power of the two swords, in fact, not only constitutes an impossible marriage (desired in Unam sanctam), but it cannot even be justified
by the Gelasian distinction (of powers and the respective wielders of
power) between spiritual and temporal rule. This is because rule and
power only exist in worldly form. The spiritual and apostolic function can
be neither one nor the other. Rather it is an evangelical alternative that
consists solely in the servitude of its ministry, the servitude of the pontifical office that is by nature and design the exact opposite of any temporal government whatsoever. The sword that is the word of God is the
negation of the iron sword that establishes and violently imposes power
and rule. It is the substantial reversal, in the context of the spiritual realm,
of every political government in the world.
Sylvesters speech thus arrives at the height of the contradiction implicit
in the Donation and in its supposed historical possibility: the conflict
between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of Caesar.76 Within the
proper dimensions of the original Christian message, the two kingdoms
are placed on opposite slopes on account of their mutual exclusivity and
the correlation of their antitheses. Sylvesters concluding words and the
defining passage for the entire speech come from the classic text of
Matthew, here reinterpreted (compared with the traditional reading of
the text) to stress as much as possible the diversity and incompatibility
between the two kingdoms:
Finally, to come to an end, on this matter hear that remark which He uttered
as if directed to you and me: Render to Caesar the things that are Caesars,
and to God the things that are Gods [Matt. 22:21]. Wherefore it turns out
that neither you, Caesar, should give up what is yours nor should I accept
what is Caesars. Even if you should offer it a thousand times, I would never
accept.77
This biblical text specifically highlights the contrast between the Roman
emperor and the vicar of Christ. The former wields the power of
76Ibid., 82.1ff. (24): regnum celi; regnum seculare.
77Ibid., 84.2885.4 (26): Cuius ad extremum, ut iam finem faciam, illam de hac re sententiam accipe, quam quasi inter me et te tulit: Reddite, que sunt Cesaris, Cesari, et que
sunt Dei, Deo, quo fit, ut nec tu, Cesar, tua relinquere neque ego, que Cesaris sunt, accipere
debeam, que vel si millies offeras, nunquam accipiam.
52
imperium; the latter is an apostle of evangelium. The former is an incarnation of power in the form of Roman rule; the latter is anti-power incarnate in the form of Christian servitude.
The conflict between imperium and evangelium (and their representatives) is made to derive directly from their respective natures and historical forms: each one manifests itself and exists as the opposite of the other.
Their reciprocal contradiction is so radical that if the two terms were to be
placed outside of their natural and necessary logic, the same contradiction would be duplicated inside each of the terms themselves taken individually. If Constantine puts the Donation into effect, he repudiates
himself and self-destructs in his imperium. If Sylvester consents to the
Donation, he betrays himself and his evangelium. He would deny the absolute difference between the Gospel and worldly power, and he would
destroy it by turning it into its opposite.
Therefore, if the donation had in reality occurred, it would have been a
transaction (Valla will later call it a collusion) in which Constantine and
the Roman Empire on the one hand, and Sylvester and Christendom on
the other, fell into complete contradiction with themselves and with their
historical reality. All this serves to identify the radical antinomy between
imperium and evangelium as the greatest and all-inclusive contradiction
of the Constitutum. This antinomy corrupts the whole Constitutum from
its roots: both the Constantinian Church, existing, theorized, and in fact
deriving from it; and the theocratic ideology of the papacy, gradually
developed until virtually dogmatized by the Bishop of Rome.
The particular conclusions of Pope Sylvesters speech set up the transition to section II of the Oration. Valla returns to direct discourse and proceeds from arguing about the historico-ideological inauthenticity of the
Constitutum to demonstrating the absence of documentary sources for
Sylvesters theoretical acceptance of the donation.
There seems to be no evidence at all, he writes, either direct or indirect,
that such an acceptance ever occurred. But if Sylvester had never
accepted the Donation, i.e. never effectively received it in a formal manner and according to juridical norms, then the Donation could not be
endowed with any real moment, either political or jurisdictional:
Let us move on. To believe in that donation, which your document mentions,
there has to be some evidence of Sylvesters acceptance. None now exists .
We do not have to think that the donation was accepted just because the
grant is mentioned in the document about the donation. On the contrary, we
must say that the donation was never made because there is no mention of
an acceptance. There is more evidence against you that Sylvester rejected

the gift than that Constantine wanted to make it. A benefaction cannot be
bestowed upon someone who does not want it. [Digest 50, 17, 69]78
Vallas argument here as in the whole of the Oration is rather complex

and variously elaborated, even with a view to its form. It will suffice to
emphasize one particular aspect of it: the rhetorical and forensic strategy
of irony. Valla uses irony, which will play an important role throughout
the Oration, from the very beginning of his discourse both to reveal the
internal contradictions of the opponents case and to unmask the latters
ignorance and guilty conscience with regard to the case at hand. Consider
the following witticisms and their immediate context, all taken from this
section:
we do not know anything about this, you answer [i.e., about the signs and
practices judicially required in a transaction of delivery and possession]. So
I imagine that everything was accomplished in the dead of night, and that is
why no one saw anything. All right, Sylvester had possession: Who deprived
him of it? For neither he nor any of his successors remained in possession in
perpetuity, at least down to Gregory the Great What an amazing episode!
The Roman empire, acquired with so much effort and with so much blood,
was acquired or lost by Christian priests so calmly and so quietly and no
one at all knows by whom this was done, when, how, and for how long. You
would think that Sylvester ruled in the woods among trees, not in Rome
among men, and was expelled by winter rains and chills, not by people.79
No greater evidence is needed for section II. It will suffice to quote from its
concluding passage, as illustrative as any of Vallas rhetorical use of irony:
You do not perceive that, if the Donation of Constantine is true, the
emperor I am speaking of the one in the Latin West has nothing left.
What sort of Roman emperor or king will he be, if any holder of his kingdom
78Ibid., 85.2086.6 (28): Age porro, ut credamus istam donationem, de qua facit pagina
vestra mentionem, debet constare etiam de acceptatione Silvestri. Nunc de illa non constat . Nec quia in pagina privilegii de donatione fit mentio, putandum est fuisse acceptatum, sed e contrario, quia non fit mentio de acceptatione, dicendum est non fuisse
donatum. Ita plus contra vos facit hunc donum respuisse quam illum dare voluisse, et beneficium in invitum non confertur.
79Ibid., 87.24ff. (3031); 88.189.2 (31): nihil horum scimus, respondetis; ita puto nocturno termpore hec omnia gesta sunt et ideo nemo vidit. Age, fuit in possessione Silvester.
Quis eum de possessione deiecit? Nam perpetuo in possessione non fuit neque successorum aliquis, saltem usque ad Gregorium Magnum O admirabilem casum! Imperium
Romanum tantis laboribus, tanto cruore partum tam placide, tam quiete a christianis sacerdotibus vel partum est vel amissum et per quos hoc gestum sit, quo tempore, quomodo, quandiu prorsus ignotum. Putes in silvis inter arbores regnasse Silvestrum, non
Rome et inter homines, et ab hibernis imbribus frigoribusque, non ab hominibus
eiectum.
54
who lacks another kingdom has absolutely nothing at all? But if therefore it
is plain that Sylvester did not have possession, in other words that
Constantine did not hand over possession, there will be no doubt that, as I
have said, he did not even give the right to possess, unless you assert that the
right was given but that for some reason possession was not assigned. Thus
did he clearly give what he realized would not at all come into being? Did he
give what he could not assign? Did he give what could not pass into the
hands of the recipients before it ceased to exist? Did he give a gift that would
not be valid until five hundred years later or never? To talk or think like this
is lunacy.80
4.Section I of the Oration and Parallel Passages

in Vallas Works
The interpretation proposed thus far of section I of the Oration is confirmed by other writings in Vallas corpus, especially in certain passages
that to my mind run parallel to it. We shall limit our references to the
prologue of De libero arbitrio (On the Freedom of the Will) and to the first
book of the Repastinatio. The comparative reading of these texts will not
be informed by considerations of compositional chronology although
chronological correlations in themselves would contribute to what will be
said later but rather by a more detailed study of the gnoseological and
epistemological modalities of Vallas rhetorical argument. Valla develops
this argument along constant themes, themes that in the context of early
humanism are decisive and original.
It has already been seen how Valla depicts the conflict between the
two kingdoms (the kingdom of God and the kingdom of Caesar) and
reduces it in the final analysis to a relationship of reciprocal negation: the
antinomy between imperium and evangelium. In the prologue to De libero
arbitrio and in the first book of the Repastinatio, Valla describes, with similar concepts although in different terms, another conflict: that between
the pagan language (sermo gentilis) of philosophy (philosophia) the
language of classical philosophy and the respublica christiana. Here the
80Ibid., 92.821 (33): Non cernitis, si donatio Constantini vera est, Cesari de Latino
loquor nihil relinqui? en qualis imperator, qualis rex Romanus erit, cuius regnum si quis
habeat nec aliud habeat, omnino nil habeat? Quod si itaque palam est Silvestrum non possedisse, hoc est Constantinum non tradidisse possessionem, haud dubium erit ne ius quidem, ut dixi, dedisse possidendi, nisi dicitis ius quidem datum, sed aliqua causa
possessionem non traditam. Ita plane dabat, quod minime profuturum intelligebat? dabat,
quod tradere non poterat? dabat, quod non prius venire in manus eius, cui dabatur, possibile erat, quam esset extinctum? dabat donum, quod ante quingentos annos aut nunquam valiturum foret? Verum hoc loqui aut sentire insanum est.
Gospel bars, indeed proscribes, all alien terms, every foreign tongue (lingua peregrina). Indeed, the language of the Christian city would deteriorate in specificity and meaning if philosophical discourse were made use
of in the theological language of Christianity. In such a case theological
language would be forced into an impossible marriage; it would be unable
to discourse in evangelical speech, but rather would have to make due in
a barbarian tongue (lingua barbara) that is devoid of sense and in itself
false (falsa) in the context of the Gospel. Such is the case in the text of
the Constitutum. It is an ideological statute that has been utilized to introduce the political language of the kingdom of Caesar into the Christian
polis. As a result the Christian message is expressed there in a foreign
language, i.e. in a language alien to the Gospel.
Setting aside metaphors, the situation can also be described historically.
If the vicar of Christ had also become the vicar of Caesar, the papacy
would have introduced into the community of believers and right from
the first centuries of the diffusion of the new religion the will to power of
the kingdom of Caesar in place of the Christian message. Thus the evangelical praxis of Christendom would have transformed into its opposite,
into the praxis of the power of rule the power of the Roman Empire.
Thus Valla identifies an historical and ideological convergence between
the Constitutum and the advent of scholastic theology. Let us now see how
he describes that convergence in the first section of the Oration and in
parallel passages in other works. The assumption of philosophy into
theological discourse (according to De libero arbitrio) had acted as the
seedbed (seminarium) for heresy within Christendom, and the reception
of the precepts of philosophy (praecepta philosophiae), or rather the
doctrines of the philosophers (dogmata philosophorum), had distorted
evangelical wisdom (folly). Similarly, the Constitutum had moved the
foundation of the Church away from Christ and apostolic praxis and
toward worldly power and the politics of rule, corrupting the pastoral duty
of the vicar of Christ and of the community of believers. In this way the
praxis of charity and evangelical freedom was perverted into a rule of
imperial power that was both political and spiritual.
Valla sees the Constantinian ecclesiology that emerges from the
Constitutum, both for its ideological meaning and for the chronology of its
origins, as an integral part of medieval scholasticism. For Valla, the scholasticism which began with Boethius flourished in his own day in the form
of the absolute cultural hegemony of metaphysical and theological
thought. He considered this thought at length and quite incisively in the
first book of his Repastinatio.
56
There the falsifiability of philosophical language and its illicit assumption into theological discourse are treated in a particularly rhetorical way.
This approach consists in a critical (morphological and semantic) analysis
of the language of philosophy for the purpose of demonstrating that the
logical and ontological categories of Aristotelianism are devoid of any real
referent, and particularly of the referent which those categories had presumed as a given in itself and substantial. Those categories, Valla concludes in the most incisive statements of the first book of the Repastinatio,
are devoid of meaning in the strongest sense of the word. The same criticism is repeated, even amplified, with respect to philosophical language
subsumed into theological discourse. In this case, in fact, Valla not only
demonstrates that the philosophical categories do not comprehend the
res (things) that they presume to express, but also, and a fortiori, that these
same categories cannot comprehend the mystery-res of biblical revelation, of faith, or of saving grace of supernatural realities, as the scholastics would have called them.
Hence the conflict between philosophy and theology on the one hand
and the proposal of a functional convergence between rhetoric and theological study on the other. Valla expresses this conflict and convergence in
different ways, but both are based on the same fundamental epistemological premises. He consistently sees philosophy as an absurd handmaiden (in the scholastic expression) to theology and as a mistaken
adhesion to theological discourse. Rhetoric, on the other hand, becomes
for Valla a tool for analyzing both secular and sacred literature. It is the
only epistemological methodology compatible with theology, because
rhetoric is a purely formal instrument (without contents of its own irreconcilable with biblical faith) and at the same time one abounding in criteria for the critical analysis of philosophical and theological language.81
In the specific case of the Constitutum, Valla stresses how the language
and political praxis of empire fail to comprehend the fundamental realities of civil life; indeed, they destroy the freedom of the respublica as such.
More importantly, this language and praxis lie at the polar extremes of the
respublica christiana, a spiritual and religious community based on the
message of the Gospel. Therefore, neither imperial language nor any other
civil and political strategy deriving from it can be used by the individual
81Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla tra Medievo e Rinascimento, 6382 (= idem, Lorenzo
Valla. Umanesimo, riforma e controriforma, 185204 and translated in the present volume,
pp. 212233); idem, Lorenzo Valla. Repastinatio, passim; idem, Da Lorenzo Valla a
Tommaso Moro. Lo statuto umanistico della teologia, Memorie Domenicane, n.s., 4 (1973):
9102 (reprinted in idem, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo, riforma e controriforma, 19119).
destined to govern the evangelical Church. The Roman pontiff can be the
vicar of Christ and of him alone, but not also of the Roman emperor.
As a result of his critical analysis of the political and anti-evangelical language of the Constitutum, Valla concludes first the ideological and second
the historical falseness of the document of donation. Its (pseudo)-origins
simply cannot be found in a time when Christendom was still expanding
along evangelical lines. Its Christian inauthenticity and the anachronism of
its origins thus lead Valla to state and this is the central theme of the
Oration that the Constitutum is an ideological and historical imposter
(falso creditum), flimsily attributed to early Christianity, and a juridicocanonical forgery (ementitum). It is a legal counterfeit tailored to the papal
theocracy of the Constantinian Church of medieval Christendom.
5.The Body of the Oration: From Section III to Section VI
With the first section of the Oration together with the second, which is
an extension of Pope Sylvesters speech we have seen how Valla falsifies the Constitutum by demonstrating it to be unsuitable to, indeed
incompatible with, its ostensible immediate context. Covering the entire
range of the imperial donations supposed context, Vallas argument
reveals Constantines act to be an inauthentic event in light of the historical and ideological dimensions of imperium and evangelium, dimensions
which are personified in the Oration by Constantine and Pope Sylvester.
In other words, Valla falsifies the Constitutum by falsifying its referents.
The imperial power (Constantine) and the papacy (Sylvester) the referents assumed as the real agents of the Constitutum would have contradicted (or negated) themselves if the donation had actually occurred. And
this means that the reference of the document of donation is in and of
itself absurd, and thus not true. Therefore, as the title of the Oration claims,
the Constitutum is falsely believed and forged.82
The continuation of Vallas analysis in sections III, IV, and V is respectively dedicated to the early church, to the true and proper text of the
Constitutum, and to the Pactum Hludovicianum (Pact of Louis the Pious).
These sections seem, in the context of the Orations overall structure, to
constitute its body of the text. This is the part of his discourse in which
Valla fully elaborates the philological procedure that he pioneered and
82On falsification of reference and textuality, see the essential analysis on language in
Ennio Floris, Sous le Christ, Jsus: mthode danalyse rfrentielle applique aux vangiles
(Paris: Flammarion, 1987), especially 41219.
58
that has justifiably made his Oration famous. But this part is also marked
by a change in argumentation with respect to the preceding sections
that is decisive for understanding the work as a whole.
Indeed, in the body of the Oration, Vallas argumentation shifts from
the context of the Constitutum to its text. The analysis moves to the content of the document to the text of the document of donation and
subjects it to an enarratio, a form of morphological and semantic criticism that Valla derived from Quintilians Institutio oratoria and fully reelaborated himself. His rhetorical argumentation (as a critical analysis of
language) therefore takes on a strictly philological character. It nevertheless retains the aim, which is the aim of the whole Oration, of exposing
the explicit and implicit contradictions in the text of the Constitutum.
Let us further refine the foregoing considerations on Vallas argumentation and on the way it changes in the transition between sections I and II
and the body of the Oration. Valla bases his rhetorical strategy, which
examines the truth and falseness of the relationship between res (things)
and verba (words) (in this case between the donation and the Constitutum),
on intertextuality. The change, or new direction, therefore, in argumentation travels along the same path as the correlation between text and context (precisely of intertextuality). Valla believes this correlation to be
inseparable. In section I (and II) of the Oration Valla had proceeded from
the context to the text of the Constitutum. Starting from the context of
imperium and evangelium, that is from the nature and historical phenomenology of each, he had arrived at the text (and an evaluation) of the
Constitutum and concluded by induction from the historical reality and
nature of imperium and evangelium the logical absurdity of the donation and thus its historical unreality. Within these boundaries of inter
textuality, Vallas analysis seems to have proceeded from the truth of the
context the historical reality and the awareness of imperial power and
the Christian Gospel to the falseness of the text in consideration. And
since the context and the text of the Constitutum turned out to be in
mutual conflict and negation, the supposed reality of the donation was
revealed as false: it contradicted the effectual (historical) truth of imperium and the essence of evangelium.
Valla uses quite a different method of argumentation in the Orations
body. He reverses direction, so to speak, and proceeds from the text of the
Constitutum to its context. But the context to which Valla refers, it must
be noted immediately, is not the one presumed by the Constitutum (in the
intentions of its forger), but rather its authentic historical context, the
context of its real origins. Thus, Valla proceeds along intertextual lines
from the text of the document of donation, de-falsified by philological

analysis, to its authentic context. That authentic context is the historical
and ideological reality from which the document of donation was truly
born and derived, and to which it thus necessarily belongs. More explicitly, Valla begins the body of the Oration by de-falsifying the text of the
Constitutum in order to reveal the Constantinianism of medieval
Christendom, that is of the theocratic and imperial ideology of the papacy,
variously formulated across the centuries from the Decree of Gelasius to
Boniface VIIIs Unam Sanctam. The effectual context of the Constitutum,
and thus its more authentic truth, turns out to be the Lateran (lateranense) ecclesiology of the papal court in Rome.83
It is precisely this more authentic truth both of Constantines donation and of the document of donation that Valla subjects to historical
and theological criticism. His intention is to expose the perverted and
anti-evangelical falseness of both. Therefore he continually emphasizes
how the Constitutum and the ideology of which it was a product (and of
which it was also the greatest theoretical expression) both constitute an
historical collapse of the Gospel and, at the same time, a continuation of
Roman imperialism, the ultimate example of absolute rule. The
Constitutum and its ideology instituted the most complete, and also the
most paradoxical, union of political and religious empire in the world of
Western Christendom.
83The following works should be added to Setzs ample bibliography: Pietro De Leo,
Ricerche sui falsi medievali, I. Il Constitutum Constantini. Note e documenti per una nuova
lettura (Reggio Calabria: Meridionali Riuniti, 1974); Giuseppe Martini, Traslazione
dellImpero e Donazione di Costantino nel pensiero e nella politica dInnocenzo III,
Nuova Rivista Storica 65 (Jan.-Apr., 1981), fasc. I-II (Scritti di Giuseppe Martini): 372; idem,
Regale Sacerdotium, ibid.: 73156; idem, Per la storia dei pontificati di Niccol IV e
Bonifacio VIII, ibid.: 157190; idem, Alcune considerazioni sulla dottrina gelasiana, ibid.:
282292, at 291; Walter Ullmann, Il papato nel medioevo (Bari: Laterza, 1975), esp. 84ff., 121,
124, 142 [English ed. = A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen,
1972)]; Gerhart B. Ladner, The Concepts of Ecclesia and Christianitas, and their Relation
to the Idea of Plenitudo Potestatis from Gregory VII to Boniface VIII, in idem, Images and
Ideas in the Middle Ages. Selected Studies in History and Art, 2 vols. (Roma: Edizioni di storia
e letteratura, 1983), 487515; Stanley Chodorow, Christian Political Theory and Church
Politics in the Mid-Twelfth Century. The Ecclesiology of Gratians Decretum (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1972); Michele Maccarrone, Il Papa Vicarius Christi. Testi e
dottrina dal sec. XII al principio del XIV, in Miscellanea Pio Paschini: Studi di Storia
Ecclesiastica, 2 vols. (Roma: Facultas Theologica Pontificii Athenaei Lateranensis, 1958),
1:427500; Arsenio Frugoni, Incontri nel Medioevo (Bologna: Il mulino, 1979), 73177; and
finally, Pietro De Leo, Gioacchino da Fiore. Aspetti inediti della vita e delle opere (Soveria
Mannelli: Rubbettino Editore, 1988), 2550; Giovanni Farris and Benedetto Tino Delfino
(eds.), Jacopo da Varagine, Atti del I Convegno di Studi (Varazze, 1314 aprile, 1985)
(Cogoleto: Edizioni SMA, 1987).
60
Having specified the modalities and variations of Vallas procedure

from sections III to V, we may now take an overall look at the succession
of these sections that constitute the body of the Oration. It will thus be
possible to identify and locate Vallas transitions in argumentation from
one section to another, to note their connections, and to grasp the particular themes of each. The major questions of the body of the Oration will
then be treated in the following sections of this essay, including Vallas
analysis of the Legenda Silvestri (Legend of Sylvester) and of the Pactum
Hludovicianum (Pact of Louis the Pious).
Valla conducts his linguistic-semantic analysis of the Constitutum on
the basis of the distinction between historia (history) and fabula (legend,
fiction, or myth). In line with this criterion, he attempts to falsify the
donation by means of textual criticism, the intention being to identify
how much of the Constitutum and its (traditionally) presumed sources is
historically true and how much fictional. This is the place of section III in
the course of Vallas text.
There Valla indicates which documentary sources he believes to be
authentic and properly historical. Such sources are almost entirely
reduced to Eusebius of Caesareas Ecclesiastical History (continued by
Rufinus), which covers the first four centuries of Christianity (from its
beginning to the post-Nicene period). Valla also accepts as a legitimate
historical source the De primitiva ecclesia (On the Early Church) of Pope
Melchiades. From this work he cites the passage reported in Gratians
Decretum (C. XII q. 1 c. 15) concerning Constantines donation of the
Lateran Palace (the imperial seat) to Melchiades and his successors.
On the basis of these historical documents, and excluding all others,
Valla defines and appraises the ecclesiastical and institutional dimensions
of the pre-Constantinian Church. Thus section III is decisive for the body,
indeed for the entirety, of his Oration. Let us therefore consider this section, here reproduced nearly in full:
But now it is time to administer a mortal blow to my opponents case,
already battered and mangled, and to slice its throat with a single stroke.
Virtually all history that is worthy of the name reports that Constantine was
a Christian from childhood together with his father Constantius even well
before the papacy of Sylvester. So Eusebius, author of an ecclesiastical history which Rufinus, a man of considerable erudition, translated into Latin,
adding two books devoted to his own time. Both of these men were near
contemporaries of Constantine. Add to this the testimony of a Roman pontiff who did not merely participate in the course of these events but was in
charge of them, not as a passive witness but as an active instigator, a narrator not of someone elses affairs but of his own. He is Pope Melchiades, who

immediately preceded Sylvester, and this is what he says: The Church has
reached the point when not only peoples but even Roman emperors, who
held sway over the whole world, might join together in the faith of Christ
and its sacraments. Of these emperors, Constantine, a highly religious man,
first openly espoused faith in the truth and made it permissible for those
who lived anywhere in the world under his rule not only to become
Christians but to build churches, and he arranged for the assignment of
properties. Finally the aforementioned emperor provided immense largesse
and started the construction of the first basilica of the see of St. Peter, so that
he gave up his own imperial residence and granted it to St. Peter and his successors for their future use [Decretum C. XII q. 1 c. 15]. You see that
Melchiades says Constantine gave nothing except the Lateran palace and
the properties that Gregory very often mentions in his register. Where are
those who do not allow us to question the validity of the Donation of
Constantine, when the actual donation took place before Sylvester and consisted solely of private properties?84
Section IV is entirely dedicated to a linguistic, morphological, and semantic analysis of the Constitutum. It is the longest section of the Oration. Here
are laid down, indeed laid bare, the foundational materials for Vallas
treatment of the historical and ecclesiological question of the Donation of
Constantine. His critical epistemology, together with his philological and
historical methodology, reveal here the full measure of the original argumentation that he pioneered.
Valla proceeds concentrically from a direct and indirect analysis of the
Constitutum considering its implicit and explicit sources along with the
84Valla, De falso, 93f. (34) and Setzs notes: Sed iam tempus est cause adversariorum iam concise atque lacerate letale vulnus imprimere et uno eam iugulare ictu. Omnis
fere historia, que nomen historie meretur, Constantinum a puero cum patre Constantio
christianum refert multo etiam ante pontificatum Silvestri, ut Eusebius, ecclesiastice
scriptor historie, quem Rufinus, non in postremis doctus, in Latinum interpretatus duo
volumina de evo suo adiecit, quorum uterque pene Constantini temporibus fuit. Adde
huc testimonium etiam Romani pontificis, qui his rebus gerendis non interfuit, sed prefuit, non testis, sed auctor, non alieni negotii, sed sui narrator. Is est Melchiades papa, qui
proximus fuit ante Silvestrum, qui ait, Ecclesia ad hoc usque pervenit, ut non solum
gentes, sed etiam Romani principes, qui totius orbis monarchiam tenebant, ad fidem
Christi et fidei sacramenta concurrerent. E quibus vir religiosissimus Constantinus primus fidem veritatis patenter adeptus licentiam dedit per universum orbem suo degentibus imperio non solum fieri christianos, sed etiam fabricandi ecclesias, et predia
constituit tribuenda. Denique idem prefatus princeps donaria immensa contulit et fabricam templi prime sedis beati Petri instituit, adeo ut sedem imperialem relinqueret et
beato Petro suisque successoribus profuturam concederet. En nihil Melchiades a
Constantino datum ait, nisi palatium Lateranense et predia, de quibus Gregorius in registro facit sepissime mentionem. Ubi sunt, qui nos in dubium vocare non sinunt, donatio
Constantini valeat nec ne, cum illa donatio fuerit et ante Silvestrum et rerum tantummodo privatarum?
62
document itself to the individual lexemes of its text. Hence the opening
passage of the section:
Although this issue [the Constitutum] is clear and obvious, we must nevertheless discuss the document itself, which those blockheads keep putting
forward. First of all, not only must we charge with dishonesty the person
who wanted to pose as Gratian by making additions to Gratians work, but
we must also charge with ignorance those who think that the text of the
document was included in Gratians collection.85
This is the point of departure not only for the section in consideration, but
also for a kind of analysis that must indubitably be classified as deconstructionist literary criticism, to use a modernist term of our own day.
What better analytical tool, what more fitting type of literary criticism
could Valla have employed to expose a text like the Constitutum as a
forgery?
Valla maintains first off that the text of the grant (pagina privilegii)
does not belong to Gratians original Concordantia discordantium canonum (Concordance of Discordant Canons). On the contrary, it is a later editorial addition inserted by another hand (Paucupalea) into the collection
of canons. There is no trace whatsoever of the text of the grant in any of
the oldest manuscripts of Gratians Decretum. What is more, its text
stands in utter contradiction to everything else collected by the renowned
jurist Gratian, whom Valla describes as learned in civil law. Furthermore:
it is highly demeaning to suggest that the compiler of decrees [Gratian]
either did not know what this man [Paucupalea] added or valued highly and
considered it authentic.86
Actually, Valla maintains, the text of the grant was taken from the
Legenda Silvestri, and it is there that it has its origin. And since the Legenda
Silvestri is just that a legend, or fabula the text of the grant (pagina
privilegii, i.e. the Constitutum), as an integral part of that Legenda, is itself
also a fabula.
Now, in the received text of the Decretum, and more precisely in the
brief introduction to the text of the grant (Decretum Gratiani, Dist. XCVI
85Ibid., 95.17 (35): Que res quanquam plana et aperta sit, tamen de ipso, quod isti
stolidi proferre solent, privilegio disserendum est. Et ante omnia non modo ille, qui
Gratianus videri voluit, qui nonnulla ad opus Gratiani adiecit, improbitatis arguendus est,
verum etiam inscitie, qui opinantur paginam privilegi apud Gratianum contineri .
86Ibid., 95.8f. (35): in vetustissimis quibusque editionibus; 13 (Gratianus, doctus in
iure civili is quoted from the Adnotationes in Novum Testamentum, Rom. 15:29); 96.25
(35): indignissimum est credere, que ab hoc adiecta sunt, ea decretorum collectorem
aut ignorasse aut magnifecisse habuisseque pro veris.
cap. 13), two references are made to it and its tradition: one from the
Decree of Gelasius, and the other from the Gesta Silvestri (Acts of Sylvester).
This double reference is supposed to sustain: (1) that the Constitutum
comes directly from the Gesta Silvestri; (2) that the Gesta Silvestri is
respected as authentic by the Decree of Gelasius; and (3) that consequently
the Constitutum must also be respected as an authentic text, since it is said
(by the Decretum) to be an integral part of the Gesta Silvestri.87
But, Valla objects, this double reference, brought forth to prove the
authenticity of the original source (the Gesta Silvestri) from which the
text of the grant is supposed to derive, is belied by its ambiguity. Indeed,
the Gesta Silvestri to which Gelasius Decree refers and to whose existence
it testifies together with its liturgical reading current in the Roman
Church and in others as well is not to be identified with the Legenda
Silvestri. The two hagiographic texts are different. While the Gesta does
not contain the Constitutum, the Legenda does. Valla writes:
Gelasius testifies that it [the Gesta Silvestri] was read by many Catholics, and
Voragine mentions it. We too have seen thousands of copies written long ago,
and they are read out in almost every cathedral on Sylvesters birthday. Yet
no one says that he has read there what [i.e., the Constitutum] you put in it.
No one says he has heard of it, or dreamt of it.88
So far Valla has made the following points. First, the insertion of the
Constitutum into Gratians Decretum is inauthentic, since it was actually
added later by a fellow canonist, Paucupalea. Not only is it an editorial
addition, it is in conflict (almost dysfunctionally so) with the original
ordering and juridico-canonical systematics of the Concordance as they
were established and understood by its author. Second, the Constitutum
does not come from the Gesta Silvestri but from another source or text.
Valla identifies this other source as the homonymous Legenda.
As a result of these conclusions and of the Constitutums being an
integral part indeed the most significant and prominent part of the
Legenda Silvestri, Valla is ready to proceed to his own reading and evaluation of the Legenda. At the same time, he is able to conduct his philological and historical analysis of the Constitutum within the investigation of
the Legenda. Therefore, ascending and descending along an analytical
87Ibid., 95.15ff. (35) and n. 156.
88Ibid., 98.1217 (38): Testatur Gelatius a multis catholicis legi, Voraginensis de eo
meminit, nos quoque mille et antique scripta exemplaria vidimus, et in omni fere cathedrali
ecclesia, cum adest Silvestri natalis dies, lectitantur, et tamen nemo se illic legisse istud ait,
quod tu affingis, nemo audisse, nemo somniasse (emphasis added).
64
spiral, the humanist proceeds from the falsification of the Legenda

Silvestri to the falsification of the Constitutum. These falsifications then
bring him to the verification of the historical falseness of the event of
Constantines donation. Then he continues with this process in the opposite direction.
This last observation deserves greater consideration. Once again we are
made to see an additional modality in Vallas argumentation, a new variation characterizing his discourse in section IV. Having pointed out the differences between the Legenda and the Gesta and thus having resolved the
ambiguity arising from the references in the Decree of Gelasius, Valla turns
his discourse to the historical and ecclesiological significance of the
Legenda Silvestri. Then, having identified the Legendas historical and
ecclesiological support for the document of donation, the humanist
treats the Constitutum itself. This treatment, however, is located within a
fuller and deeper critical analysis of the entire text of the Legenda Silvestri.
Valla takes the Legenda to be the founding ideological fabula (myth), the
primary source, of Constantinian ecclesiology. In other words, the Legenda
Silvestri is considered to constitute the origins of the Constantinian
Church. It stands in clear contrast if not in direct and utter antithesis
to the historia (history) of the event and of the development of Christianity
as it is described in the (documentary) narration of Eusebius and Rufinus
Ecclesiastical History.
Hence Vallas insistence on the ecclesiological and theological inauthenticity of the Legenda (which includes the Constitutum) and on its falseness
and impiety in the light of evangelical faith. It is a thaumaturgical tale about
the divine and about Christian revelation, similar to pagan myths about the
divine origin of peoples and in full conformity with the scriptural tradition of the New Testament Apocrypha. Accordingly, Valla writes:
Look at how great a difference there is between my judgment and yours: Not
even if the donation were contained in the Gesta Silvestri would I think it
should be reckoned authentic, since that history is not historia but a poetic
and very brazen fabula as I will show later and no one else of the slightest
authority makes mention of this donation. Even Jacopo da Voragine, as an
archbishop enthusiastically inclined towards the clergy, nevertheless in his
Gesta sanctorum [Acts of the Saints] kept silent about the Donation of
Constantine as fictitious and unworthy of inclusion among the Gesta
Silvestri. In a way this was a judgment against those who might have written
about the matter.89
89Ibid., 97.2198.5 (37): At videte, quantum inter meum intersit vestrumque iudicium:
ego ne si hoc quidem apud gesta Silvestri privilegium contineretur pro vero habendum
Valla concludes that the Legenda Silvestri and the Constitutum share a
relationship of what can certainly be called infratextuality. With this term
we clarify that, for Valla, the Constitutum is not only an integral part of the
Legenda in the sense that the latter contains the former and is thus its
original source, but also that the Constitutum gives structure to the text
and (literary and ideological) meaning of the Legenda. This infratextual
relationship of the Legenda to the Constitutum, and the corresponding
structural relationship of the Constitutum to the Legenda, necessarily
result in the following conclusion: the fictional aspect of the hagiography
of Sylvester its evangelical inauthenticity and historical falseness
makes the Constitutum equally fictional.
The Roman nationalists of Arnold of Brescias revolution had called
the Constitutum a lie and an heretical fabula (mendacium et fabula heretica, as Wezel reported to Frederick Barbarossa in a letter of 1152). Now
Valla uses the same phrase to characterize the Constitutum, on the grounds
that the perverted Legenda Silvestri itself is a very brazen fabula.90
Thus the humanist proceeds from a consideration of the whole literary
composition of the Legenda to its structural component, the Constitutum.
Then he continues in the opposite direction from the Constitutum to the
Legenda, since the latter stands in infratextual relation to the former. For
Valla, then, the Legenda is the true and specific infratext that governs the
entire (formal and semantic) textuality of the Constitutum; in the same
way, the inauthentic text of the Constitutum is the buttress stabilizing the
historical falseness of the pseudo-Donation of Constantine.
Following on what has just been said, it is necessary to highlight two of
Vallas observations on the Constitutum. Here is the first:
But this Donation of Constantine, so splendid and so unexampled, can be
proven by no document at all, whether of gold or on silver or on bronze or
on marble, or finally, in books, but only, if we believe that man, on paper or
parchment.91
putarem, cum historia illa non historia sit, sed poetica et impudentissima fabula ut posterius ostendam nec quisquam alius alicuius duntaxat auctoritatis de hoc privilegio
habeat mentionem. Et Iacobus Voraginensis, propensus in amorem clericorum ut archiepiscopus, tamen in gestis sanctorum de donatione Constantini ut fabulosa nec digna, que
inter gesta Silvestri poneretur, silentium egit, lata quodammodo sententia contra eos, si
qui hec litteris mandavissent [translation modified].
90Martini, Traslazione dellImpero e Donazione di Costantino, 65f.
91Valla, De falso, 100.37 (39): Ista vero tam magnifica Constantini et tam inaudita
donatio nullis, neque in auro neque in argento neque in ere neque in marmore neque
postremo in libris, probari documentis potest, sed tantum, si isti credimus, in charta sive
membrana.
66
The Donation, since it was a fabula, could not be entrusted to a permanent written form that would withstand time, as had been the practice
(and still was) with the great documents of the past concerning the historical, and not fictitious, origins of peoples, for example the Mosaic tablets of the Ten Commandments or the Twelve Tables of Roman law. From
antiquity on, Valla observes, the statutory provisions of peoples assumed
a monumental written form in order to provide an everlasting and indelible witness to historical reality against the ravages of the elements, the
length of time and the violence of fortune.92
Such was not the case with the Donation. The entire history of Sylvester
is demoted to the status of a myth (fabula) and the Constitutum to a
charter (chartula). These most fragile and inconsistent witnesses are
supposed to testify to the transfer of the Roman Empire to the papacy!
For its part, Valla continues, the Constitutum accrued the most absurd
title possible: text of the grant (pagina privilegii). As a mere grant we
are to understand the gift of the whole world (donatio orbis terrarum).
And a puny text is supposed for centuries to have constituted, in the
tradition of the Roman curia, the statutory basis for the Constantinian
Church!93
Vallas second observation, also made in the course of the fourth section, is as follows:
Some who have been overcome by all arguments are apt to answer me:
Why have so many supreme pontiffs believed that this was true? You are
my witnesses that you urge me where I would not go, and you force me
unwillingly to speak ill of supreme pontiffs over whose mistakes I would
rather draw a veil. But let us continue to speak frankly since this case cannot
be conducted in any other way so that I may admit that they held that belief
and did so without malice.94
This passage seems to have been inserted by Valla almost by chance into
his discourse on the Constitutum, but it is actually essential to the general
flow of his argument. Indeed, it occurs in the context of his discussion
according to the headings glossed in the margin on the ignorance of the
92Ibid., 101.2 (39): diuturnitatem temporis et fortune violentiam.
93Ibid., 100.7; 101.1216 (39): chartula; imperium Romanum; 1721 (39): Paginam
privilegii; privilegium; 136.11137.4 (67); 137.1315 (68).
94Ibid., 140.17141ff. (7172): Quidam omnibus defecti rationibus solent mihi respondere: cur tot summi pontifices donationem hanc veram esse crediderunt? Testificor vos,
me vocatis quo nolo, et invitum me maledicere summis pontificibus cogitis, quos magis in
delictis suis operire vellem. Sed pergamus ingenue loqui quandoquidem aliter agi nequit
hec causa ut fatear eos ita credidisse et non malitia fecisse (emphasis added) [translation modified].
supreme pontiffs / why the popes believed the donation to be true, if

indeed they did believe it.95
With this passage Valla declares that he cannot continue further in his
discussion of the case in question without respecting or accepting the
limitations constraining him to speak frankly, i.e. constraining him to
narrow the dimensions of his ecclesiological and historical criticism of the
Constantinian Church. But does such a declaration not actually force the
reader, for his part, to understand Vallas criticism in a perspective that
transcends the direct and explicit attack on the Constitutum? Must the
reader not hear precisely that which is not said in Vallas Oration, that
which is left unexpressed but nevertheless subtly delivered, as if it had
been made crystal clear? It seems to us that we should respond without a
doubt in the affirmative.
Valla was intimately acquainted (let us remember his reference to the
Historia ecclesiastica) with the historical character that Christianity and
the Catholicism of the Late Empire assumed as a result of the religious
and political revolution against the official Roman cults (religio). This process developed across the fourth century, from Constantines Edict of Milan
(312) to the assembling of the Codex Theodosianus, begun towards the end
of the century and completed in the first decades of the following one.96
Let us rehearse some of the more significant events between
Constantines victory at the Milvian Bridge in 312 and the death of the
emperor Theodosius I in 395. The secta catholica (Catholic sect) rises to
the status of state religion and the Roman cults (religio) are banned.
Constantine presides over the Council of Nicea in 325 and employs his
combined imperial authority to halt the trend towards schism and preserve the unity and uniformity of Christendom. Finally, the Roman army
is defeated at the River Frigidus by the Emperor Theodosius in 394, which
results in the complete suppression of the Roman Senate. A consequence
of enormous historical importance is the overthrow of the Roman intelligentsia and of its leader, the Prefect of the City Symmachus. Roman religion and ancestral traditions (mos maiorum) of worship are repressed in
favor of the absolute hegemony of Catholic Christianity. Most of this was
the work of Constantines successors.
95Marginal manuscript headings (Valla, De falso, 141.5/140.19): de inscitia summorum

pontificum / cur Pape donationem veram crediderunt, si tamen crediderunt.
96Lidia Storoni Mazzolani, SantAgostino e i pagani (Palermo: Sellerio, 1987), with texts
from the Codex Theodosianus in the appendix.
68
Vallas criticism in the Oration (beyond the falsification of the Legenda

Silvestri and of the Constitutum) casts suspicion simultaneously on
Constantines anti-republican Caesarism and on the anti-evangelical,
ecclesiological Caesarism of the papacy. The intention is then to stake the
claim for political and Christian freedom from and against any kind of
imperium whatsoever, be it temporal or spiritual. All this is then inscribed
within a retrospective look at (and connected to a precise historical judgment of) the reality and historical development of the fourth century.
This reality and historical truth consist in a break or deviation in the
Christian tradition involving the stance of the religion and the community
of believers towards the Gospel. Its salient events are the coming to power
of Constantine and his successors in Constantinople and the radical transformation of Christianity from a message of redemption and freedom into
a religious instrument of power. In this light, Vallas Oration also becomes
an historical treatment of the fourth century, critically executed by means
of philologico-historical analysis. Its extremely negative historical assessment rejects the coming of the Constantinian and Theodosian Catholic
Church as the Christian empire of the papacy, born and raised to maturity
in the fourth century.
For Valla, the fourth century represents Christianitys most radical period
of crisis, marked by a grand anti-evangelical and anti-Christian collapse of
the Community of Believers in Christ. The Oration as a whole, then, should
be seen as an anti-Constitutum. It is the complete reversal not only of the
ecclesiological ideology molded by the Constitutum but also of the historical retrospective in which the text of the Donation came to be written.
Valla knew full well that the Constitutum was no simple fake but rather
a direct and mature consequence of an historical fact. Its ideological roots
and Constantinian retrospective are to be found in the transformation of
the Christian religion that actually occurred over the course of the fourth
century. Thus Vallas argumentation necessarily had to shift from the
scriptural and diplomatic inauthenticity of the Constitutum to its more
radical Christian and evangelical inauthenticity.97 But this further necessitated arguing against the theoretical basis of the Constitutum, i.e. arriving at an historical judgment and criticism of Constantines actions and of
the positive assessment indeed, the providential exaltation of the
political and religious revolution effected by the emperor of Christian
victory. Indeed, that positive assessment and religious exaltation first
97R.-J. Loenertz, En marge du Constitutum Constantini. Contribution lhistoire du
texte, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Thologiques 59 (1975): 289294.
created and then buttressed the entire theocratic ideology of the papacy,
formulated over time and eventually canonized by the Constitutum.
Valla intends with his Oration, then, to overturn the Constitutum by
means of the most radical historical criticism of it ever dared. He hopes
therewith to spark a renaissance of pre-Constantinian Christianity and a
renewal of the Christian and patristic evangelism that preceded the Edict
of Milan and the Codex Theodosianus. More generally, the Oration aims to
restore Christianity to the state it was in before the rise of the ChristianRoman Empire of the fourth century.
Let us now turn to sections V and VI, the sections that conclude the
body of the Oratio. After having identified (in section III) the texts of
Eusebius and Rufinus, Pope Melchiades, and Gratian as the documents
that are historically valid for a critical-philological analysis of the Legenda
Silvestri and the Constitutum (carried out in section IV), Valla turns in section V to a consideration of the so-called Pactum Hludovicianum, a pact
drawn up in 817 between the emperor Louis the Pious (814840) and Pope
Paschal I (817824). Valla uses the text of the Pactum as it appears in
Gratians Decretum, Dist. LXIII cap. 30.
The Pactum Hludovicianum was the first explicit historical confirmation of the Constitutum, illustrating for the first time the Roman Churchs
effective use of the document. On account of its historical and canonical,
ecclesiastical and jurisdictional importance, Gratian included the text of
the agreement between pope and emperor in his Concordantia discordantium canonum. And it was as such, on account of its juridical and ecclesiological significance, that Valla read the Pactum Hludovicianum.
The Pactum provided a juridical norm and theoretical basis for policy as
well as for diplomatic relations between the Empire and the papacy. Such
was the case as much for the papacys political and ecclesiological praxis
in the past as for the canonistic and scholastic ecclesiology contemporary
with Valla. It is precisely in consideration of these political and ecclesiological premises, brought to light by the Pactum, that Valla conducts his
critical analysis in section V. And again, in accordance with the modes and
objectives of his peculiar argumentative procedure, he attempts to identify and highlight the internal contradictions that invalidate both the
Pactums juridical validity in civil and canon law and its use in governing
relations between pope and emperor.
The sections opening passage is indicative of Vallas argumentative criteria, as well as of his tone (sharp irony), in this section of the Oration:
Louis, are you really making an agreement with Paschal? If all this belongs to
you, in other words the Roman empire, why are you granting it to someone
70
else? If it belongs to Paschal and is his possession, what is the point of the
confirmation? How much Roman empire will you have left, if you lose the
capital itself? The Roman emperor is so called from the name of Rome. Tell
me, is everything else you possess yours or Paschals? Yours, I suppose you
will say: therefore the Donation of Constantine is invalid if you are the
owner of what he gave the pontiff. If it is valid, by what right does Paschal
turn all the rest over to you after retaining for himself only what he already
possesses? What is the sense of such largesse involving the Roman empire,
either yours to him or his to you? You therefore rightly speak of an agreement as if it were a kind of collusion.98
In section V together with section VI, its continuation Valla does not
change his style of argumentation, at least in the sense that he sticks to the
fundamental modality of his critical analysis. Nevertheless, in these two
final sections of the body he seems to turn his discourse with a direct
comparison and extremely explicit language more towards the canonistic and scholastic ecclesiology of his own day. Valla aims his criticism specifically at the Constantinian rule and corresponding praxis (based on
the Constitutum) of the contemporary papacy, still in full force in the fifteenth century with Pope Eugenius IV, the actual addressee of the Oration.
Hence, again, Vallas fully articulated response in section VI (the last
before the peroration) to the final objection of those who would defend
the Constitutum on the basis of the right of prescription:99
Our adversaries, who have been kept from defending a donation that never
was and, even if it had been, would have collapsed over the course of time,
resort to another form of defense, and, as if they had retreated from their
city, gather themselves into the citadel, which they are compelled to surrender just as soon as the food runs out. The Roman church, they say, has
exercised its authority in those territories it possesses.100
98Valla, De falso, 156.16157.7 (82): Tu ne, Ludovice, cum Pascale pacisceris? Si tua,
idest imperii Romani sunt ista, cur alteri concedis? si ipsius et ab eo possidentur, quid
attinet te illa confirmare? Quantulum etiam ex imperio Romano tuum erit, si caput ipsum
imperii amisisti? A Roma dicitur Romanus imperator. Quid, cetera que possides, tua ne an
Pascalis sunt? Credo, tua dices: nihil ergo valet donatio Constantini, si ab eo pontifici
donata tu possides. Si valet, quo iure Pascalis tibi cetera remittit retentis tantum sibi que
possidet? Quid sibi vult tanta aut tua in illum aut illius in te de imperio Romano largitio?
Merito igitur pactum appellas quasi quandam collusionem.
99[In Roman law, the right of prescription (longe possessionis prescriptio) is a right to
property that one does not technically own based on authority over that property over a
long and established period of time. Eds.]
100Valla, De falso, 167.5ff. (90): Exclusi a defendenda donatione adversarii quod
nec unquam fuit et, si qua fuisset, iam temporum condicione intercidisset confugiunt
ad alterum genus defensionis, et velut relicta urbe in arcem se recipiunt, quam statim
deficientibus cibariis dedere cogerunt: prescriptsit, inquiunt, Romana ecclesia in iis que
possidet .
Thus section VI concludes the body of the Oration by denying the papacys
ability, on the basis of the Constitutum, to appeal to the right of prescription in defense of powers supposedly devolving to the Roman Church
from the pseudo-Donation of Constantine.
This last consideration on section VI still concerns only its formal
aspect and structural placement in the Orations literary composition. Let
us remember, however, that Vallas writing has its motivations and origin
in an assault, against the papacy in general and Eugenius IV in particular,
in defense of the Aragonese succession to the Kingdom of Naples, and that
it is thus an issue of Alfonso the Greats chancery. From this point of view,
section VI enjoys a nearly absolute preeminence, whether it is considered
in and of itself or viewed within the scope of a decidedly relativistic interpretation of the Oration (a type of interpretation, by the way, that would
be more than legitimate).
Indeed, the Oration was born, drafted, and developed in a complex
articulation of theoretical and historical arguments. It is a political, juridical, and canonistic discourse aimed at radically criticizing contemporary
papal power (potestas papalis), especially as that power was manifested in
the political and ecclesiological praxis of Pope Eugenius IV. Valla is quite
explicit about all this right in section VI, which constitutes the final and
definitive conclusion of his whole discourse. Therefore, this section
becomes a paradigmatic and formal expression of his chief intention, and
thus of the primary and determining purpose of the Oration as a whole.
Here are Vallas most significant and prominent statements:
The Roman church has exercised its authority [Codex 7, 3335]: Why, therefore, is it so often concerned that this right be confirmed by the emperors?
Why does it boast of the donation and the imperial confirmation, if just one
of these would suffice? How can it have done this, when it is based on no
title but only on possession in bad faith? If you deny possession in bad faith,
you certainly cannot deny in stupid faith. Or, in a matter so great and so
conspicuous, ought ignorance of fact and law to be excused? Fact because
Constantine did not give Rome and the provinces: an ordinary person might
be unaware of this but not the supreme pontiff. Law because those places
could not have been given or accepted: one could scarcely be a Christian
and not know this. Will stupid credulity give you a right to what would never
have been yours, had you been more prudent? Now at least, after I have
demonstrated that you had possession through ignorance and stupidity, will
you not forfeit that right, if you ever had it? But if you persist in keeping
possession, your ignorance is straightaway transformed into malice and
deceit, and you plainly become a possessor in bad faith.
The Roman church has exercised its authority: You transfer to man an
authority that is exercised over mute and mindless objects. The longer a
72
man is kept in slavery, the more detestable it is. Birds and wild animals do
not want to be subject to authority, but however long they have been confined, as soon as the occasion presents itself, they escape as they like. Will a
man, when possessed by a man, not be free to escape? But the Pope, as
may be observed, assiduously plots against the liberty of peoples. Therefore,
as the occasion arises, they rebel in turn every day look at Bologna recently.
If any of them ever voluntarily consented to papal rule which can happen
when some danger is threatening from another quarter, it must not be imagined that they consented to make themselves slaves, that they could never
pull their necks out from under the yoke, that afterwards they and their offspring would have no jurisdiction over themselves. This would be foully
unjust. Voluntarily, supreme pontiff, we came to you to govern us: voluntarily we now go away from you, lest you govern us any longer . As for you,
look after your sacral duties. Do not enthrone yourself in the North and
thunder from there as you hurl bolts of lightning against [the Roman] people and all others.101
The preceding excursus has served as an overview of sections III, IV, V, and
VI of the Oration. The following pages will be dedicated to highlighting
certain aspects and nodal points that are essential for fully comprehending Vallas investigation into and meditation on the Constitutums pseudodonation. The following essential aspects and themes will be treated:
(1) Vallas philological study of the Constitutum within the context of
101Ibid., 167.1416 (91); 167.20168.15 (92); 169.713 (94); 170.18171.9 (94); 172.11ff. (95):
Prescripsit Romana ecclesia: cur ergo ab imperatoribus totiens curat sibi ius confirmandum? cur donationem confirmationemque Cesarum iactat, si hoc unum satis est? Et
quomodo potest prescripsisse, ubi de nullo titulo, sed de male fidei possessione constat?
Aut si male fidei possessionem neges, profecto stulte fidei negare non possis. An in tanta re
tamque aperta excusata debet esse et facti et iuris ignorantia? facti quidem, quod Romam
provinciasque non dedit Constantinus quod ignorare idiote hominis est, non summi
pontificis , iuris autem, quod illa nec donari potuere nec accipi quod nescire vix christiani est. Ita ne stulta credulitas dabit tibi ius in iis, que, si prudentior fores, tua nunquam
fuissent? Quid, nonne nunc saltem, postquam te per ignorantiam atque stultitiam possedisse docui, ius istud, si quod erat, amittes? Quod si adhuc possidere pergis, iam inscitia
in malitiam fraudemque conversa est planeque effectus es male fidei possessor.
Prescripsit Romana ecclesia: Prescriptionem, que fit de rebus mutis atque irrationabilibus, ad hominem transfers, cuius quo diuturnior in servitute possessio eo est detestabilior. Aves ac fere in se prescribi nolunt, sed quantolibet tempore possesse, cum libuerit
et oblata fuerit occasio, abeunt: homini ab homine possesso abire non licebit? At papa,
ut videre licet, insidiatur sedulo libertati populorum. Ideoque vicissim illi quotidie oblata
facultate ad Bononiam modo respice rebellant. Qui si quando sponte quod evenire
potest aliquo aliunde periculo urgente in papale imperium consenserunt, non ita accipiendum est consensisse, ut servos se facerent, ut nunquam subtrahere a iugo colla possent,
ut postea nati non et ipsi arbitrium sui habeant, nam hoc iniquissimum foret. Sponte ad te,
summe pontifex, ut nos gubernares, venimus: sponte nunc rursus abs te, ne gubernes diutius, recedimus . Tu vero, que sacerdotii operis sunt, cura, et noli tibi ponere sedem ad
aquilonem et illinc tonantem fulgurantia fulmina in hunc populum ceterosque vibrare
[translation modified].
the Legenda Silvestri; (2) Vallas anti-Caesarism/radical republicanism and

his historical and theological criticism of Augustines City of God; and
(3) Vallas defense of the Oration to the Roman curia.
6.Section IV: From the Constitutum Constantini
to the Legenda Silvestri
From a formal point of view, the method adopted by Valla in section IV is
an enarratio: a study of the Constitutums textuality and infratextuality by
means of morphological, syntactic, and semantic analysis. Valla uses the
interpretive procedure of the enarratio, however, in his own particular
fashion, arriving at the study of the Constitutums grammar by way of the
documents literary textuality/infratextuality. In a similar way, Valla concludes the non-correspondence between the text of the grant and the
language which that text presumes as contemporaneous with itself. The
language of the text is considered in two different ways: on the one hand
as language in the sense of a spoken tongue (lingua), i.e. as a system of
verbal signs, and on the other as language in the sense of linguistic usage
(linguaggio), i.e. as a system of meanings and conceptual categories.
The Constitutum, in other words, is shown not only to be meaningless
in itself, but clearly also, on a deeper level of analysis, to bear witness to its
own falseness, once it is examined by methods aimed at identifying the
reference it presumes as contemporaneous with itself. Ultimately, the
Constitutum is betrayed as the work of a forger no matter how it is analyzed and compared by the language and linguistic usage of the Latinity
and/or Christianity in which it contextualizes itself. Thus Valla highlights
the linguistic and semantic inconsistencies of the text of the grant.
Similarly, and as always in virtue of his historical and philological criticism, he also unmasks its ideological contradictions, on both a political
and a theological (particularly an ecclesiological) level.
The Constitutums anachronism and falseness betrayed by its own
text (the diplomatic edition) and wording thus lead Valla to relocate
it within historical and doctrinal dimensions that are, actually and legally,
entirely different from the ones presumed by the document of donation.
Indeed, these dimensions are far removed and distinct from the times and
spaces of the original, evangelical Christianity of the earliest centuries.
More particularly, to Vallas retrospective view the wide divergence
between verba (words, i.e. the elements composing the text of the
Constitutum) and res (things, i.e. the definitely anachronistic referents
74
of the text) makes manifest the natures of Constantinian and preConstantinian Christianity, as well as the historico-ideological distance
between them. Ultimately, we are speaking of a profound divergence
between modern (medieval and scholastic) and ancient ecclesiology, to
use a terminology of binary opposition (moderna/antiqua) typical of
Valla.102 Indeed, we must add immediately and in part to justify fur
therthe interpretation of the Oration proposed here that the point of
bifurcation (as seen by Valla) between pre-Constantinian (antiqua) and
Constantinian (moderna) ecclesiology is the fundamental premise of the
entire Oration, and thus of its criticism of contemporary canon law and
theology. At the center of this controversy is the meaning of the formulation, the pope is the vicar of Christ (papa, vicarius Christi).
It is known that the popes status as Christs vicar had been the premise
and the point of departure for scholastic and modern ecclesiology. By way
of a full and sophisticated reformulation on the part of scholastic theorizers of canon law, that assertion the pope is the vicar of Christ had
become the final conclusion of the papacy (as the vicariate of Christ), as
well as a package description for a host of secondary attributes encompassed by the formula. Since the pope was the vicar of Christ, he was also
the high priest (summus sacerdos), the successor of Peter (successor
Petri), and the Bishop of Rome (Romanus pontifex),
to whom all kings of the Christian people must be subjects, just as to the lord
Jesus Christ himself . Accordingly, divine providence miraculously saw to
it that in the city of Rome, which God had prophesied would become the
capital of the Christian people, the custom slowly took root that the leaders
of the cities were subject to the priests.103
Valla accepts the statement, the pope is the vicar of Christ, as a point
of departure and a first premise for his criticism, and he recognizes it as
102Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla tra Medioevo e Rinascimento, 3637 [= Camporeale,
Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo, riforma e controriforma, 157159, and translated in the present
volume, 182184].
103Maccarrone, Il Papa Vicarius Christi, passim, together with his Vicarius Christi.
Storia del titolo papale (Roma: Facultas Theologica Pontificii Athenaei Lateranensis, 1952).
For this passage, quoted from the De regimine principum, I.15 (summus sacerdos, successor
Petri, Romanus pontifex, cui omnes reges populi Christiani oportet esse subditos, sicut ipsi
Domino Iesu Christo . Propter quod mirabiliter ex divina providentia factum est ut in
Romana urbe, quam Deus praeviderat Christiani populi principalem sedem futuram, hic mos
paulatim inolesceret ut civitatum rectores sacerdotibus subiacerent.), see Kurt Flasch, Das
philosophische Denken im Mittelalter. Von Augustin zu Machiavelli (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1986),
333; Charles Till Davis, Dantes Italy and other Essays (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 254289: Ptolemy of Lucca and the Roman Republic, esp. 273
278. See also idem, Dante and the Idea of Rome (Oxford: Clarendon, 1957), 139 and passim.
completely valid. But, one step at a time, he ends up arguing against the
whole of scholastic ecclesiology, which is based on the same premise.
The papacys ecclesiological attributes are said to be inconsistent with the
premise (the pope is the vicar of Christ) from which they were derived.
Some are even judged to be in clear contradiction from a strictly evangelical point of view with the very nature of the papacy, insofar as it is
the primary apostolic see of the other Christ (alter Christus) on earth. It
might be noted, by way of digression, that Vallas writings often show
affinities with the evangelical ecclesiology of Wycliffe and Hus.
Valla reaches his ecclesiological conclusions in the following way. First
he reduces every religious title (high priest, successor of Peter, Bishop of
Rome, to whom all kings ) that with the passage of time was tacked
onto the syntagma the pope is the vicar of Christ, or which was developed on the basis of that syntagma, to the one authentic attribute of the
bishopric of Rome, the one on account of which the papacy exists, always
and only, as the vicariate of Christ. Then he reinterprets and reconfirms
the statement the pope is the vicar of Christ in a strictly evangelical
sense: the pope, since he has the preeminent claim to apostolic succession, is the perfect personification of the christianus homo, and thus he is
always (and only) the vicar of Christ par excellence.
Once again, it may be observed that in the Oration Valla follows the
very same argumentative procedures with respect to the ecclesiological
language of scholasticism as he does in the Repastinatio with respect to
scholasticisms philosophical and theological language. In the first book of
the Repastinatio, Valla uses philological, morphological, and semantic
analysis in a two-step operation. First, he reduces the transcendentals (for
example) to the single concept of res (thing), or the predicaments (another
example) to the category of qualitas-actio (quality-act). Then he reinterprets those basic terms to which the theoretical language had been
reduced by charging them with new meanings.104 Here, in the Oration,
Valla follows the same procedure and repeats the same operation. First he
reduces the multiple ecclesiological attributes of the papacy developed by
scholastics and canonists to one fundamental affirmation: the pope is the
vicar of Christ. Then he reinterprets that affirmation according to a meaning that it could have in the light either of the New Testament scriptures
(restricted to the evangelical books) or of a spiritual and reforming tradition, which had often emerged in Christianitys history in the form of
radical evangelism.
104Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 153171.
76
Let us now see exactly how and in what sense Valla executes in
section IV his critique of the ecclesiological language of medieval and contemporary scholasticism and canon law. He begins his philological and historical critique with the Constitutum the text of the grant or document
of donation and finishes with the Legenda Silvestri taken as a whole, that
is as the comprehensive whole of the Constitutum. It should be added
that Valla develops his analysis, both of the Constitutum and of the Legenda,
at various levels. These are pursued distinctly one after another, but they
are always correlated within the individual texts under consideration.
6.1.The Constitutum
Valla first uses his grammatical study to reveal the barbarity of language
(loquendi or sermonis barbaries) typical of the document of donation. He
conducts this study on the text of the Constitutum by subjecting it to a
linguistic analysis based on fourth-century Latin, the language that the
document has as a referent and in which it most often presumes to
express itself.105
According to Valla, the linguistic analysis of the Constitutum reveals
inelegant and often inexact syntactical structures:
He is so enchanted by the sound of turgid vocabulary that he repeats the
same things and regurgitates what he has already said . A fine reason to
speak like a barbarian, to make your utterance go more prettily, as if anything pretty could be found in such coarseness.106
The composer (or forger) of the Constitutum is revealed as endowed with

no literary taste. He is unworthy of being the scribe of the Caesars, and
he is far, far from the eloquence of a Lactantius, whom he pretends to have
as both his contemporary and his model.107 There is therefore a difference
between the Latinity of the Constitutum and the neo-classical Latinity of
the fourth century, the Latin used by Constantine and Lactantius:
105Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Repastinatio, 230ff.; Vincenzo De Caprio, La rinascita
della cultura a Roma: la tradizione latina nelle Eleganze di Lorenzo Valla, in Umanesimo a
Roma nel Quattrocento, ed. Paolo Brezzi and Maristella De Panizza Lorch (Roma: Istituto di
Studi Romani, 1984), 163194; idem, Appunti sul classicismo delle Eleganze di Lorenzo
Valla, Annali della Facolt di Lettere e Filosofia, Istituto di filologia moderna, Universit di
Roma 1:2 (1981): 5980.
106Valla, De falso, 106.13, 79 (43): ita verborum turgentium strepitu delectatur, ut
eadem repetat et inculcet, que modo dixerat; honesta ratio barbare loqui, ut venustius
currat oratio, si modo quid in tanta scabritia venustum esse potest.
107Ibid., 112.8 (48): nulla litteratura preditus; 106.5 (43): Cesarum scribe; 107.4 (43);
117.15 (51).

Who ever heard of a Phrygian tiara in Latin? Although you talk like a barbarian, you apparently want me to think this is the language of Constantine
or Lactantius. In his play Menaechmi [426], Plautus used the word phrygio
for a clothesmaker, and Pliny [Nat. hist. VIII 106] calls embroidered garments phrygions because the Phrygians invented them. But what would a
Phrygian tiara signify?108
And again,
A style worthy of Constantine, an eloquence worthy of Lactantius, not only
in other places but also in that phrase be mounted on mounts! May God
destroy you, wickedest of mortals, for ascribing barbarous speech to an age
of learning.109
Still using the criterion of Latinity (and with particular reference to fourthcentury Latinity), Valla continues on to the morphological, semantic, and
pragmatic analysis of the lemmas and syntagmas of the whole Constitutum:
Should I attack the foolishness of ideas more than words? You have heard
about the ideas. Here is the foolishness of words.110
He devotes the rest of section IV to this analysis in order to leave no doubt

that the Constitutum lies outside of Constantines historical context.111
As linguistic analysis shows the Constitutum to be contrary to proper
Latinity, thus an analysis of the Christian religion based on the New
Testament shows it to be contrary to the evangelical ecclesia. The
Constitutum makes the claim, which it even reaffirms in several ways, that
as a result of the Donation of Constantine the Romans became a people
subject to the rule of the Church of Rome.112 But this is unheard-of, protests Valla. How could an imperial decree, in only three days, obliterate
that Romanitas (Romanness) consisting of civil and political autonomy
and the governance of other peoples on the basis of law which was understood as the special historical destiny of Rome and of the Roman people?
108Ibid., 117.13118.4 (51): quis unquam phrygium latine dici audivit? Tu mihi, dum
barbare loqueris, videri vis Constantini aut Lactantii esse sermonem? Plautus in Menechmis
phrygionem pro concinnatore vestium posuit, Plinius phrygionas appellat vestes acu
pictas, quod earum Phryges fuerint inventores: phrygium vero quid significet?
109Ibid., 124.16f. (56), 120.20ff. (53): dignus Constantino sermo, digna Lactantio facundia cum in ceteris tum vero in illo equos equitent . Deus te perdat, improbissime
mortalium, qui sermonem barbarum attribuis seculo erudito.
110Ibid., 123.12ff. (55): utrum magis insequar sententiarum an verborum stoliditatem?
Sententiarum audistis, verborum hec est (emphasis added).
111The most important passages are ibid., 123125 (5556), 126f. (57), 129133 (6164),
138f. (70), 143 (73).
112Ibid., 102.13ff. (42): populo imperio Romane ecclesie subiacenti.
78
What people is this? The Roman people? Why not say Roman people rather
than subject people? What is this new insult to the Quirites, whom the best
of poets eulogized: You, Roman, take care to rule over peoples with your
imperial power [Virgil, Aeneid 6.851]. So the people that rules over other
peoples is itself called a subject people. This is unheard of. For, as Gregory
attests in many of his letters, the Roman emperor differs from all other rulers
in this particular point: he alone is the leader of a free people. But even if
what you claim be granted, are not other peoples also subject? Or do you
also have other people in mind? How could it happen in three days that all
peoples subject to the rule of the Church of Rome were on hand for that
decree?113
As a result of the donation Valla notes again the papacy would have
risen to the absolute and total imperium of the Roman Empire. The Roman
pope would have been invested by Constantine with its power and absolute rule, which would now have a priestly nature to boot. What is more,
the neo-Christian emperor whom Valla deprecates as made to take over
epithets of God and to effect an imitation of the language of Sacred
Scripture, which he had never read114 would have converted the pope
from the successor of Peter to the vicar of Peter. Pope Sylvester would
thus appear to have been called to the primacy of the Roman see by the
will and deliberation of the emperor Constantine:
He calls the Roman pontiffs vicars of Peter, as if Peter is still alive or all the
others are of lesser eminence than Peter was. Although the Roman see
received its primacy from Christ, and the Eighth Synod [Constantinople,
869/70] declared it, according to Gratian and many of the Greeks, it is said
[in the Constitutum] to have received this from Constantine, who was barely
a Christian, as if from Christ . In honor of blessed Peter, as if Christ were
not the most important cornerstone on which the temple of the Church has
been built, but Peter . He not only makes Constantine similar in office to
Moses, who adorned the High Priest on the order of God, but he makes him
an expounder of secret mysteries something extremely difficult even for
those who have long been immersed in sacred texts. Why did you not also
make Constantine the chief pontiff, as indeed many emperors were, so that
113Ibid., 104.19105.5 (42) (and Setzs note 191): Et quis iste est populus, Romanus ne? At
cur non dicitur populus Romanus potius quam populus subiacens? Que nova ista contumelia est in Quirites? de quibus optimi poete elogium est: Tu regere imperio populos,
Romane, memento. Qui regit alios populos, ipse vocatur populus subiacens, quod inauditum est. Nam in hoc, ut in multis epistolis Gregorius testatur, differt Romanus princeps a
ceteris, quod solus est princeps liberi populi. Ceterum ita sit ut tu vis: nonne et alii populi
subiacent? an alios quoque significas? Quomodo fieri istud triduo poterat, ut omnes populi
subiacentes imperio Romane ecclesie illi decreto adessent?
114Ibid., 107.1214 (43): titulos Dei sibi arrogare fingitur et imitari velle sermonem
sacre scripture, quem nunquam legerat.

his decorations might be more conveniently transferred to another supreme
pontiff? But you knew no history.115
According to the Constitutum, Constantine had also given to the pope the
imperial insignia and vestments belonging to the Caesars. Thus,
Constantines investiture of the pope with Roman imperium over the
church of believers is described by the Constitutum as a ritual transmission of signa and vestimenta from the emperor to the vicar of Christ. Valla
dwells thoughtfully on this extensive passage of the Constitutum (which
he quotes in its entirety) describing the emperors investiture of the pope.
Among other things he observes:
You Roman pontiffs, will the vestments, the appurtenances, the pomp,
the horses, in short the lifestyle of an emperor thus befit the vicar of Christ?
What does a priest have to do with an emperor? The wickedest of men
fail to understand that Sylvester ought rather to have put on the garments
of Aaron, who was Gods highest priest, than the vestments of a pagan
ruler.116
Then, with a subtle interlacing of linguistic criticism, biblical exegesis,

irony, and bitter sarcasm towards the imperial investiture of the vicar of
Him who had suffered a similar ritual as the joke of a Roman cohort, Valla
considers the Constitutums statement, To the blessed Sylvester, his
[Peters] vicar we hand over as well the purple cloak and the scarlet
tunic and all imperial vestments.117 He points out first of all together
with other glosses on morphology and semantics that the forger of the
document of donation is unaware that the two expressions (in italics
115Ibid., 106.12ff (43), 108.1114 (44), 126.1820 (57), 128.15129.3 (60): Et pontifices
Romanos appellat vicarios Petri, quasi vel vivat Petrus vel minori dignitate sint ceteri,
quam Petrus fuit . quod cum a Christo primatum acceperit Romana sedes et id Gratiano
testante multisque Grecorum octava synodus declararit, accepisse dicatur a Constantino
vixdum christiano tanquam a Christo . Pro honore beati Petri, quasi Christus non sit
summus angularis lapis, in quo templum ecclesie constructum est, sed Petrus .
Constantinum non tantum officio similem Moysi, qui summum sacerdotem iussu Dei
ornavit, sed secreta mysteria facit exponentem, quod difficillimum est iis, qui diu in sacris
litteris sunt versati. Cur non fecisti etiam Constantinum pontificem maximum ut multi
imperatores fuerunt , ut commodius ipsius ornamenta in alterum summum pontificem
transferrentur? Sed nescisti historias.
116Ibid., 115.15116.1, 116.35 (49): O Romani pontifices ita ne vestimenta, apparatus,
pompa, equitatus, omnis denique vita Cesaris vicarium Christi decebit? Que communicatio sacerdotis ad Cesarem! Sceleratissimi homines non intelligunt Silvestro magis vestes
Aaron, qui summus Dei sacerdos fuerat, quam gentilis principis fuisse sumendas.
117Ibid., 114.49 (49): beato Silvestro, eius vicario tradimus verum etiam chlamydem purpuream atque tunicam coccineam et omnia imperialia indumenta (emphasis
added).
80
above) have the same meaning, and thus that his repetition of them
results in banal pleonasm. However, Valla continues ironically, maybe the
forger wanted to conflate in his composition, as if to endow it with a
devout scriptural resonance, the texts of Matthew 27:28 and John 19:2,
where the two evangelists describe the burlesque regalia placed upon
Christ by the Roman soldiery.118 But it is precisely these perverted scriptural resonances, it is this treacherous and faithless language employed by
the forger in the Constitutum the barbarous language of this most monstrous of men (improbissimi mortalium sermo barbarus) that amplifies
the sharp dissonance between the document of donation and the Gospel
and the Christian community:
Would that very modest emperor [Constantine] have been willing to say
this, and that very pious pontiff [Sylvester] to hear it? What is more idiotic
than to say that all the emperors vestments are appropriate for a pontiff?
There is nothing emptier, nothing more inappropriate for a Roman pontiff
than this.119
To repeat, according to the Constitutum the imperial investiture effected

by Constantine involves the pope directly and immediately. Indeed, the
pope is the successor of Peter who presided over the Roman see, and as
such he is first and foremost the vicar of Peter, even before being the vicar
of Christ. Yet the imperial investiture is not limited to the pope or to his
person but is extended to the entire Roman clergy. This is said explicitly
in the Constitutum, and it is particularly emphasized during the description of the ceremonial for imperial investiture. Valla, who penetrates to
the deepest level of meaning of this ceremonial, glosses the text thus: But
how great is your generosity, Emperor, who are not content to have
adorned the pontiff without adorning the entire clergy as well.120
But if Constantine confers the imperial insignia and vestments on all
members of the Roman clergy (bestowing the decorations of a general
on clerics as a whole), he places them at the highest grade of political and
civil status in Rome (they are made patricians and consuls). He gives
them a place at the pinnacle of exceptional authority and prominence.
He elevates the Roman pope and his curia both to the supreme hierarchy
118Ibid., 11820 (52).
119Ibid., 108.14f. (44); 119.15120.1 (52); 121.10f. (53): Hoc ille modestissimus princeps
dicere, hoc piissimus pontifex audire voluisset? Quid stultius quam omnia Cesaris indumenta dicere convenire pontifici? Nihil est vanius nihilque a pontifice Romano
alienius.
120Ibid., 121.17f. (54): verum quanta est munificentia tua, imperator, qui non satis
habes ornasse pontificem, nisi ornes et omnem clerum.
of the universal Church and to the equally supreme rule of the Western
Empire.121
Further glosses on the many and dire inconsistencies of such an absurd
text lead Valla to reaffirm sarcastically, yet again, the Constitutums falseness on every level:
Will servants in the employ of the Roman church be assigned the rank of
general? Who fails to see that this fiction was concocted by persons who
wanted complete license for themselves to dress up? I would imagine that if
somewhere various games took place among the demons who live in the air,
those creatures would be engaged in copying the ritual of clerics, their pageantry, and their luxury, and they would derive their greatest pleasure from
this kind of theatrical competition.122
Beyond the list of imperial insignia and vestments (the Constitutums

repeated insistence on which, notes Valla, is highly inappropriate),
Constantine sees to the luxurious furnishing of St. Peters and St. Pauls
basilicas, the churches (ecclesiae) built on the confession-tombs of the
two Apostles. But at the time of the Constitutum those basilicas did not yet
exist. Valla must gloss these blatant anachronisms before going deeper
into a more relevant ecclesiological critique. He does so by bringing into
relief the term ecclesiae, used in the text of the Constitutum to indicate the
Roman basilicas of St. Peter and St. Paul. But the Roman basilicas, Valla
observes, are templa sacred places designated for worship while the
Greek word ecclesia signifies a gathering place for people, or an assembly
of human beings (coetus hominum) who are fellow-citizens (concives).
Such citizens are constituted in the polis, i.e., endowed with civil and natural freedom, and at the same time are constitutive of the polis, since they
possess the capacity to deliberate on it effectively. Hence the adoption
and the transposition of the term ecclesia with all its proper and specific
semantic pregnancy to indicate the evangelical gathering of the faithful (congregatio fidelium). Hence the use in a religious context by Paul
and the Koine Greek of the New Testament of a classical term with political and civil connotations.
121Ibid., 12223 (54): imperialia vestimenta universis clericis; effici patricios consules; culmen singularis potentie et precellentie.
122Ibid., 123.1f./611 (54): Ministri, qui Romane ecclesie servient, dignitate afficientur
imperatoria? Et quis non videt hanc fabulam ab iis excogitatam esse, qui sibi omnem
vestiendi licentiam esse voluerunt? ut existimem, si qua inter demones, qui aerem incolunt, ludorum genera exercentur, eos exprimendo clericorum cultu, fastu, luxu exerceri et
hoc scenici lusus genere maxime delectari.
82
Valla outlines a path from the political ecclesia of Athens (and of the
Roman respublica) to the religious ecclesia of the Gospel. It is a development, at once semantic, political, and theological, to which he will often
refer in his writings, from the Elegantiae to the Adnotationes on the New
Testament.123 Here in the document of donation, he seems to hope to
secure the most authoritative testimony to the perversion of that term,
which was established by apostolic and New Testament linguistic usage to
mean above all evangelical communion and the community made up (in
the various cities) of the first Christians. Valla makes the parallel clear: as
the evangelium had been institutionalized as an imperium divided among
secular and religious, juridical and cultural hierarchies of power, thus the
evangelical ecclesia had mutated from a communion of believers into a
construction of walls and arches (stones that were in no way living).
From a community of the faithful it was changed into a templum (in no
way built on the foundation of apostolic faith). According to Valla, the
Constitutum was responsible for this utterly profound historical and
semantic degradation of ecclesiology. It provided the essential testimony,
as it was the original act of canonical institution and standardization.
Hence the tone of sarcasm in Vallas comment:
You miserable dog, did Rome have ecclesiae, or rather templa, dedicated to
Peter and Paul? Who built them? Who would have dared to build them?
After all, as history tells us, nowhere was there any place for Christians apart
from secret places and hidden dens. If there had been any templa at Rome
dedicated to those apostles, they would not have required great lamps to be
lit inside them. They were little shrines, not buildings; chapels, not templa,
places of prayer in private dwellings, not public places of worship. No one
therefore had to worry about temple lamps before there were the templa
themselves. What are you talking about when you make Constantine speak
of Peter and Paul as blessed, but Sylvester, when he is still alive, as most
blessed, and his own ordinance as sacred when he had been a pagan shortly
before? Does so much have to be provided for keeping up the lamps that the
whole world is worn down?124
123On the semantics of ecclesia, see Lorenzo Valla, Collatio Novi Testamenti, redazione
inedita a cura di Alessandro Perosa (Firenze: Sansoni, 1970), 169 (Acts 19:39); idem,
Elegantiae, IV, 47 (cited in Valla, De falso, 111, n. 218); Adnotationes in Novum Testamentum
(Acts 19:39) in Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 297.
124Valla, De falso, 111.417 (47): O furcifer, ecclesie ne, idest templa Rome erant Petro et
Paulo dicate? Quis eas extruxerat? quis edificare ausus fuisset? cum nusquam foret, ut historia ait, christianis locus, nisi secreta et latebre. Aut si qua templa Rome fuissent illis
dicata apostolis, non erant digna, in quibus tanta luminaria accenderentur, edicule sacre,
non edes; sacella, non templa; oratoria intra privatos parietes, non publica delubra: non
ergo ante cura gerenda erat de luminaribus templorum quam de ipsis templis. Quid ais tu,
qui facis Constantinum dicentem Petrum et Paulum beatos, Silvestrum vero, cum adhuc
Valla penetrates ever deeper with his critico-philological analysis into the
dense textual thicket of the Constitutum. He clearly perceives that it is
impossible to offer an adequately comprehensive exegetical reading of
the heap of contradictions rising up from the document of donation.
Thus he observes:
But why do I attack one individual point after another? I should run out of
time if I try to mention, to say nothing of discuss, all of them.125
Nor will it be possible for us to follow Vallas whole discourse in its particulars. It is far too complex, even if we were just to consider the details of its
philological analysis. Let us then limit ourselves to a consideration of a
final, insightful annotation, with which it seems Valla hopes to underline
the fundamental contradiction of the whole Constitutum and of its corresponding Constantinian ecclesiology. First Valla cites from the text of the
Constitutum:
Before all else, however, we assign to the blessed Sylvester and to his successors, according to our indiction [sc. the Constitutum], the right to name anyone he wishes to the clergy at his pleasure and by his own decision and to
include that person in the pious ranks of the pious clergy, and that no one
whatsoever should consider that he is acting arrogantly.
And later, at the very end of the Constitutum:

If, moreover, anyone which we believe likely emerges as a falsifier in this
context, let him be condemned and subjected to eternal damnation. Let him
know that his enemies are the holy apostles of God, Peter and Paul, in the
present and in the life to come, and let him be burned in the lower reaches
of hell and waste away together with the devil and all who are wicked.126
Valla immediately points out the dreadful inelegance of the Latin. In a few
sentences the text piles up a heap of absurdities that are not only graceless
but also and this is much more injurious heterodox. Constantine,
vivit, beatissimum et suam, qui paulo ante fuisset ethnicus, iussionem sacram? Tanta ne
conferenda sunt pro luminaribus continuandis, ut totus orbis fatigetur? [translation
modified].
125Ibid., 125.1012 (56): Verum quid ego in singula impetum facio? Dies me deficiat, si
universa non dico amplificare, sed attingere velim (emphasis added).
126Ibid., 125.1317 (57); 134.711 (65): Pre omnibus autem licentiam tribuimus beato
Silvestro et successoribus eius ex nostro indictu, ut, quem placatus proprio consilio clericare voluerit et in religioso numero religiosorum clericorum connumerare, nullus ex
omnibus presumat superbe agere . Si quis autem, quod credimus, in hoc temerator extiterit, eternis condemnationibus subiaceat condemnatus, et sanctos Dei apostolos Petrum
et Paulum sibi in presenti et in futura vita sentiat contrarios, atque in inferno inferiori
concrematus cum diabolo et omnibus deficiat impiis [translation modified].
84
havingrecently converted to the Christian religion, would have used his

imperial authority to confer on no one less than the Bishop of Rome
Pope Sylvester, by whom he had been baptized only days before and on
his successors (exclusively) the (episcopal) right of priestly ordination. In
addition, the text even seems to assert that the emperor himself consecrated the Bishop of Rome! What is more, Constantine would have placed
the seal of his own imperial power on a new (secular and spiritual)
creation the Roman papacy and threatened anathemas and punishments (worldly and otherworldly) on whoever dare violate the eternal
prescriptions of the Constitutum, issued with the absolute and unchallengeable authority that he enjoyed over the empire and over the Catholic
Church!
This and other ideological and historical distortions render the
Constitutum a perverted document describing an ecclesiology gone mad.
In response Valla protests:
Who is this Melchizedek, who blesses Abraham the patriarch? Did
Constantine, hardly yet a Christian, assign the privilege of making priests to
the man by whom he was baptized and whom he calls blessed, as if Sylvester
would not, and could not, have done this before? Such terrorizing, and
such threatening are not characteristic of a secular ruler, but of the priests of
old and the keepers of the flame, and nowadays of ecclesiastics: so this is not
the speech of Constantine, but of some dim-witted petty cleric . But if
those threats and curses were really Constantines, I would curse him in turn
as a tyrant and destroyer of my respublica, and I would threaten to take vengeance on him myself in my capacity as a Roman.127
6.2.The Legenda Silvestri

Valla now brings his analysis, begun on the text of the Constitutum, to bear
on the Legenda Silvestri. His motivations for doing so were given above,
but we will do well to rehearse them before proceeding further with our
interpretation. The Constitutum seems to Valla to be an integral part of the
Legenda Silvestri, such that the literary structure of the Legenda (taken in
the entirety of its composition) specifies and gives meaning to the
127Ibid., 125.1822 (57); 134.1215 (65); 134.25135.3 (65): Quis est hic Melchisedech, qui
patriarcham Abraam benedicit? Constantinus ne vix christianus facultatem ei, a quo baptizatus est et quem beatum appellat, tribuit clericandi, quasi prius nec fecisset hoc Silvester
nec facere potuisset? Hic terror atque hec comminatio non secularis principis solet esse,
sed priscorum sacerdotum ac flaminum et nunc ecclesiasticorum: itaque non est
Constantini oratio hec, sed alicuius clericuli stolidi . Quod si mine he execrationesque
Constantini forent, invicem execrarer ut tyrannum et profligatorem rei publice mee et illi me
Romano ingenio minarer ultorem (emphasis added) [translation modified].
Constitutum as a part of that entirety. In line with this premise, Valla conducts his analysis as if by expansion and contraction: from the Constitutum
to the Legenda and then back again. That is, the analysis proceeds in opposite directions along lines of infratextuality. These link, on the one hand,
the pseudo-Donation of Constantine as it appears in the text under consideration in Vallas Oration, with the Legend of Sylvester on the other,
which, since it contains the Constitutum as part of its structure, underlies
it at the same time as an infratext.
Valla writes:
I shall say something about the fabula of Sylvester, because the entire issue
turns on this, and for me it will be fitting to speak above all about the Roman
pontiff, since my discourse is concerned with Roman pontiffs, with a view to
facilitating inferences about the others from this one example. Of the many
absurdities that are told, I touch only upon the one about the dragon, in
order to show that Constantine never had leprosy. For the acts of Sylvester
were written down by a certain Eusebius, a Greek man according to the testimony of the translator. That nation is always highly inclined to mendacity,
as Juvenal says in a satirical assessment [Sat. X 174f.]: whatever the lying
Greeks make bold to claim as history.128
In this passage we must note the reappearance of the distinction (first

made in section III) between fabula (legend) and historia (history) as
different narrative genres, and then we must turn our attention to the
explanation of this distinction that is provided here and further on in
section IV. The distinction between legendary narrative and historical
narrative comes from book II, chapter 4 of Quintilians Institutio oratoria.
Valla reinterprets this text by rather cogently modifying the meanings of
its terms, as can be seen from his glosses of it contained in the autograph
manuscript in the Bibliothque Nationale in Paris (Lat. 7723, f. 19 and ff.).129
128Ibid., 144.414 (74) and Setzs notes: Disputabo de fabula Silvestri, quia et omnis in
hoc questio versatur et mihi, cum sermo sit cum pontificibus Romanis, de pontifice Romano
potissimum loqui decebit, ut ex uno exemplo facile aliorum coniectura capiatur. Et ex multis
ineptiis, que ibi narrantur, unam tantum de dracone attingam, ut doceam Constantinum
non fuisse leprosum. Etenim gesta Silvestri ab Eusebio quodam Greco homine, ut interpres
testatur, composita sunt, que natio ad mendacia semper promptissima est, ut Iuvenalis
satyrica censura ait: quidquid Grecia mendax audet in historia (emphasis added) [translation modified].
129On the autograph glosses on the Institutio in the Parisian manuscript, see:
Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 8f., 120; Alessandro Perosa, Ledizione
veneta di Quintiliano coi commenti del Valla, di Pomponio Leto e di Sulpizio da Veroli, in
Miscellanea Augusto Campana, 2 vols. (Padova: Antenore, 1981), 575610; Lucia Cesarini
Martinelli, Le postille di Lorenzo Valla allInstitutio Oratoria di Quintiliano, in Besomi
and Regliosi (eds.), Lorenzo Valla e lumanesimo italiano, 2150. The text of Vallas glosses
on Institutio oratoria, II.4.2: [Quintilian] did not agree with Cicero that fabula is that in
86
For Valla, fabula takes on a double meaning. The first is that of a fictional narrative that is in and of itself false, being an account or discourse
totally devoid of factual events (res gestae) either present and contemporary or handed down in memory from the past. It stands in contrast to
historical narration, which, being an authentic account or discourse
reporting factual events, is in and of itself true. The second meaning of
fabula is that of a narrative (narratio) that is in itself false but nevertheless
still capable of taking on, and indeed of bearing in itself, a certain verisimilitude towards accounts or discourses reporting factual events. In this
way it is portrayed or offered to the reader as a true and authentic history.
The typical kind of verisimilar fiction narratio is for Valla the hagiographic legend, which developed as a sacred fictionalization in the sphere
of Christianitys origins, spanning from the apocryphal Gospels to the
Legenda Silvestri. The defining characteristic of this type of sacred fictionalization or hagiographic legend is the constant interweaving of the
miraculous (the thaumaturgical) into the narrative, or rather of divine
intervention in events and worldly reality as the object (as if they were
factual events) of narration. The verisimilitude of such fictional narratives
comes, in this case, from the (supposed) similarity and even intended (at
least implicitly) assimilation of the miraculous and the thaumaturgical to
the apparently similar canonical scriptures of the Old and New Testaments.
Hence Vallas attempt in section IV to demonstrate the falsities contained
in the Legenda Silvestri, the hagiographic legend that contains and determines the documentary act of the Constitutum and thus the whole event
of the Donation of Constantine.
Valla takes two aspects in particular of the Legenda into consideration.
The first is the healing of Constantines leprosy, which occurs at the
which there is neither truth nor anything resembling truth [De inventione, I.27 and
Rhetorica ad Herennium, I.13], since, to give only one example, comedies are fabulae but
nevertheless resemble the truth. As Terence says, [the poet] should compose the kind of
fabulae that would please the public [Andria, prol. 3]. Likewise, [Quintilian] did not say
that historia is comprised of events remote from our own time, since again to name
only one example of many Sallust refers to the works he himself composed as histories
[cf. Cat. 14]. Nor did [Quintilian] say that argumentum is a fiction that nevertheless could
have happened, since only in comedies is argumentum a fiction. (Non dixit quemadmodum Cicero, fabula est in qua nec vere nec verisimiles res continentur, quia, ne alia dicam,
comediarum fabule sunt, et tamen verisimiles. Ut apud Terentium: populo ut placerent
quas fecisset fabulas. Item, non dixit: historia est gesta res ab etatis nostre remota, cum hic
quoque plura non dicam, ipse Sallustius historias de se compositas dicat. Nec dixit: argumentum est ficta res, que tamen fieri poterit, quia non nisi in comediis argumentum est
ficta res) [f.19r]. On Quintilians text (lib. II.iv.2), cf. Wesley Trimpi, The Quality of Fiction:
the Rhetorical Transmission of Literary Theory, Traditio 30 (1974): 1118, at 47 and
passim.
moment of his conversion to Christianity and baptism by Sylvester. The

second is Sylvesters miraculous freeing of the sacred virgins from the vile
slavery of the diabolical dragon (a thaumaturgical element).
Of the first Valla makes quick work, referring back briefly to what he
had said earlier in sections II and III. The testimony of the Legend of
Sylvester is undoubtedly false, he repeats, because it is in clear contradiction with Eusebius of Caesareas Ecclesiastical History. That is to say, the
former is fabula, the latter historia. The verisimilitude of the hagiographic
fictionalization results from the fact that the healing of Constantines leprosy (paganism) by means of his conversion (to Christianity) and baptism
by Sylvester is an implicit scriptural citation, assimilating Constantines
conversion to the New Testament story of Jesus healing of the leprosy of
those who convert to the faith of the divine messiah.130
But, Valla objects, the miraculous in this sacred fiction is not in line
with the origins of the Christian people (because belied by the historia
ecclesiastica, the actual history of the Church) nor even with Gods intervention in the world, which was manifested to mankind with the
Incarnation of the Word. Only the evangelical miraculousness of the messianic signs, in line with faith in Christ, is an essential part of the history of
salvation (historia salutis). Hagiographic legends of any type, then, and
specifically that of Sylvester, are always and only fake history the term
used in the glossed heading of this section of the Oration.131
Valla dedicates more time to the second thaumaturgical aspect of the
Legenda Silvestri: concerning Sylvester, the virgins, and the dragon.
Indeed, he concentrates his arguments entirely on these miracles, thus
demonstrating the Legendas utter inauthenticity. He shows it to be an
extravagant hagiographic fabula composed of events and things that are
contradictory, impossible, stupid, barbarous, absurd ; it is utterly fake
history (falsa historia).
Valla poses a series of questions to determine the veracity of the Legend:
Where had that dragon come from? No dragons are born in Rome. Where
too had his poison come from? Besides, where had so much poison come
from so as to infect such a big city ? Why then did Sylvester not kill it as
Daniel is said to have done, by binding it with a cord of hemp and wiping out
its progeny forever? The fabricator of the legend did not want the dragon to
be killed for fear that the derivation from the story of Daniel would seem
obvious [Dan. 14:2224]. Yet if Jerome [Commentary on Daniel], a most
130Valla, De falso, 67 (11) and 152 (79).
131Marginal manuscript heading (Valla, De falso, 144.8): de falsa historia Silvestri.
88
learned and reliable translator, Apollinaris, Origen, Eusebius, and others
maintain that the story of Bel is a fiction, if even the Jews do not know it in
the original of the Old Testament, in other words if the most learned of the
Latin writers, most of the Greeks, and certain Hebrews condemn it as a fabula, shall I not condemn this story [the Legenda Silvestri], which is inspired
by it, when it is supported by the authority of no writer and greatly surpasses
its model in idiocy?132
We ought to take notice here of Vallas procedure. First he strongly emphasizes both the Legendas implicit allusion to the Book of Daniel and the
former texts verisimilitude, through intentional assimilation, to the latter.
Then he resolutely extends his criticism to the inauthenticity of the Book
of Daniel itself, for the purpose of demonstrating, almost as an argument
a fortiori, the unquestionable non-veracity of the Legend of Sylvester.
Valla reminds the reader that the Book of Daniel was thrown out of the
Hebrew scriptural canon and was never included in the Christian one,
either in the Greek or the Latin patristic traditions. Although technically
within the sphere of the Christian scriptural canon, it will always be numbered among the so-called deuterocanonical books. What is more, Valla
continues, the reasons for the books elimination from the canon nearly
all stem from the peculiar nature of its narrative. It is a tale full of extraordinary events and purported miracles, just like the Legend about Pope
Sylvester, the virgins, and the dragon.
Considerations of this type recur throughout Vallas writings, not only
in the Oration but also in other works of commentary and annotation. One
can thus say that it is Vallas standard operating procedure to reduce all
apocryphal writings, in a most radical way, completely to the status of
fabula. This is the case both for biblical pretenders to a place in the Old or
New Testaments the deuterocanonical books and the apocryphal
Gospels of early Christianity and for the mass of medieval hagiography,
132Valla, De falso, 144.14146.15 (7475): Unde draco ille venerat? Rome dracones non
gignuntur. Unde etiam illi venenum? Unde preterea tantum veneni, ut tam spatiosam
civitatem peste corrumperet ? Cur ergo, ut Daniel illum dicitur occidisse, non et Silvester
hunc potius occidisset, quem canabaceo filo alligasset, et domum illam in eternum perdidisset? Ideo commentor fabule noluit draconem interimi, ne plane Danielis narratio
referri videretur. Quod si Hieronymus, vir doctissimus ac fidelissimus interpres,
Apollinarisque et Origenes atque Eusebius et nonnulli alii narrationem Beli fictam esse
affirmant, si eam Iudei in veteris instrumenti archetypo non agnoscunt, idest si doctissimi
quique Latinorum, plerique Grecorum, singuli Hebreorum illam ut fabulam damnant, ego
non hanc adumbratam ex illa damnabo, que nullius scriptoris auctoritate fulcitur et que
magistram multo superat stultitia? [translation modified]. The reference to Jerome is
found in Commentariorum in Danielem libri III, ed. Franciscus Glorie (Turnhout: Brepols,
1964), 773, 774.
collected by the Dominican Jacopo da Voragine as the Golden Legend

(Legenda aurea). This summa of Christian hagiography enjoyed incredible
popularity, as is attested, among other things, by the omnipresent iconography of the Legenda Silvestri. In a gloss on Quintilian (on the same section of the Institutio oratoria referred to above: II.4.18), Valla writes about
historia and fabula: This can be found even in sacred things, like with
regard to Susanna, to Tobias, to Judith; likewise in more recent accounts,
like those of St. George and of others still, where there are many reasons
for rejecting them.133
To Valla, completely dedicated to falsifying the Constitutum and to
demystifying the Donation of Constantine, the legend of Sylvester had to
seem a sacred fiction, and one whose apocryphal elements had provided
the founding paradigm for a Constantinian ecclesiology opposed to the
Gospel. In fact, the legends infratextual relationship to the document of
donation ends up establishing and defining the falseness of that document. That is to say, as the sacred fiction of the Legenda attacked the
evangelical truth of the history of salvation (historia salutis) at its core,
thus the Constitutums falseness threatened the foundation of the history
of the church (historia ecclesiastica), understood as the historical development of the Christian community, sprung from and built on the Gospel.
At this point, Valla expands his reflections to include the production of
Christian literature and hagiography. It is obvious to him that the mythological fiction used by pagan peoples to establish their own heroic and
divine origins would also be taken up by Christians and applied, with an
almost sacrilegious transposition, to their own origins. But, Valla asserts,
the origins of the Christian people have their roots solely and exclusively
in the revelation of the Gospel, which is the authentic history of salvation. There the heroic and the miraculous are Gods worldly presence in
Christ and the Holy Spirit; hence the historical presence of the divine, in
temporal affairs, which is only and always perceptible through faith
(fides) in the mystery of the Incarnation. Thus Valla writes:
We should be ashamed, we should be ashamed of this silliness and frivolity
beyond anything in theatrical shows. A Christian, who calls himself a child
of the truth and light [John 12:36], should blush to utter things that are not
133Paris, Bibl. Nat., Lat. 7723, f.19v: Hoc queri potest etiam in rebus sacris, ut de
Susanna, de Tobia, de Iudit, item de historiis recentioribus, ut Sancti Georgii, ut aliorum
multorum, ubi plura sunt argumenta ad improbandum. [Camporeales reading of the
manuscript differs slightly from that found in Lorenzo Valla, Le postille allInstitutio oratoria di Quintiliano, eds. Lucia Cesarini Martinelli and Alessandro Perosa (Padova: Antenore,
1996). Eds.]
90
only not true, but not even plausible [see Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, II.4].
But, they say, demons gained this power among the pagans to mock those
who served the gods. Be quiet, you utterly ignorant people, not to say criminals, who invariably draw a veil like this over your fabulae. Christian candor
has no need to shelter under falsehood. It is defended enough and more
than enough on its own through its light and truth without those lying and
flashy tales that are profoundly insulting to God, to Christ, and to the Holy
Spirit. Had God so turned over the human race to the will of demons that
they would be seduced by such obvious, such imperious miracles, to such an
extent that he could almost be accused of injustice for having entrusted
sheep to wolves, and men would have a signal excuse for their errors? But if
the demons had so much license before, they would have even more now
among the infidels. We see that this is not at all the case, and no fabulae of
this kind are advanced by them. I shall say nothing of other peoples: I shall
speak about the Romans, among whom very few miracles are reported, and
these both ancient and uncertain.134
It need arouse no wonder, Valla continues, that pre-Christian peoples created various myths about their origins and told their prehistory in epic
language, where human actions are muddled with heroic and divine intervention. He reminds us of Livys statement that the traditions of extraordinary events concerning Romes origins, diversely found in ancient
recorders of Roman affairs, must be used by historians to construct fables
that will establish an epic version (epos) of the peoples roots. Historians
must create a poetic (mythic) fiction of a past that has been lost in prehistory. Valla quotes two passages of Livys text:
This allowance is granted to antiquity, that by commingling the human
with the divine it may make the origins of cities more grandiose, and elsewhere: But in such ancient history I would be satisfied if whatever is like the
truth be accepted as truth. All this is more suited to theatrical spectacle,
134Valla, De falso, 147.15148.18 (76): Pudeat nos, pudeat harum neniarum et levitatis
plus quam mimice, erubescat christianus homo, qui veritatis se ac lucis filium nominat,
proloqui, que non modo vera non sunt, sed nec verisimilia. At enim, inquiunt, hanc
demones potestatem in gentibus optinebant, ut eas diis servientes illuderent. Silete,
imperitissimi homines, ne dicam sceleratissimos, qui fabulis vestris tale semper velamentum optenditis. Non desiderat sinceritas christiana patrocinium falsitatis, satis per se
superque sua ipsius luce ac veritate defenditur sine istis commenticiis ac prestigiosis fabellis in Deum, in Christum, in Spiritum sanctum contumeliosissimis. Siccine Deus arbitrio
demonum tradiderat genus humanum, ut tam manifestis, tam imperiosis miraculis seducerentur? ut propemodum posset iniustitie, accusari, qui oves lupis commisisset, et homines magnam errorum suorum haberent excusationem? Quod si tantum olim licebat
demonibus et nunc apud infideles vel magis liceret, quod minime videmus, nec ulle ab eis
huiusmodi fabule proferuntur. Tacebo de aliis populis, dicam de Romanis, apud quos paucissima miracula feruntur eaque vetusta atque incerta (emphasis added) [translation
modified].

which loves miraculous events, than to reliability, and it is not worthwhile
either to affirm or refute it.135
Valla approves of Livys learning (doctrina) and weightiness (gravitas)

as he does of that of Valerius Maximus and Varro regarding the ancient
fables that record the origins and prehistory of the Roman people. On the
other hand, he feels the need to reject categorically the introduction of
this kind of mythical and sacred fictionalization from the sphere of the
pagan world into that of Christianitys origins:
But our own fabula-spinners indiscriminately bring in talking statues, about
which pagans themselves and idolators say nothing. They repudiate such
stories more strenuously than the Christians affirm them. Among pagans
the very small number of miracles does not depend upon the trustworthiness of the authors but, as it were, upon a certain holy and venerable claim
of antiquity. Among Christians relatively recent miracles are recounted,
even though those who lived at that time knew nothing about them. I do not
impugn admiration of the saints nor deny their divine works, since I know that
as much faith as a mustard seed can move even mountains [Matt. 17:20]. On
the contrary, I defend and protect those works, but I refuse to let them be confused with made-up stories. I cannot be persuaded that those writers were
anything other than infidels, who did this in mockery of the Christians to
see if these fictions would be conveyed by treacherous men into the hands
of the ignorant and accepted as true , or believers aspiring to imitate God
but without knowledge, men who were bold enough not only to write about
deeds of the saints but to compose irresponsible pseudepigrapha on the
Mother of God and Christ himself. The supreme pontiff calls these books
Apocrypha, as if there were nothing wrong with an unknown author as if
the stories told were believable as if they were sacred and served to
strengthen religion, so that now whoever approves something bad is no less
culpable than the person who made it up.136
135Ibid., 149.1420 (77): Datur hec venia antiquitati, ut miscendo humana divinis primordia urbium augustiora faciat, et alibi: Sed in rebus tam antiquis, si qua similia veri
sunt, pro veris accipiantur, satis habeam, hec ad ostentationem scene gaudentis miraculis
aptiora quam ad fidem, neque affirmare neque refellere est opere pretium. [The passages
of Livy are Pref. 7 and 5.21.9.]
136Valla, De falso, 151.326 (78): At vero nostri fabulatores passim inducunt idola
loquentia, quod ipsi gentiles et idolorum cultores non dicunt et sincerius negant quam
christiani affirmant. Apud illos paucissima miracula non fide auctorum, sed veluti sacra
quadam ac religiosa vetustatis commendatione nituntur; apud istos recentiora quedam
narrantur, que illorum homines temporum nescierunt. Neque ego admirationi sanctorum
derogo nec ipsorum divina opera abnuo, cum sciam tantum fidei, quantum est granum sinapis, montes etiam posse transferre. Immo defendo illa et tueor, sed misceri cum fabulis non
sino. Nec persuaderi possum hos scriptores alios fuisse quam aut infideles, qui hoc agerent
in derisum christianorum, si hec figmenta per dolosos homines in manus imperitorum
delata acciperentur pro veris, aut fideles habentes quidem emulationem Dei, sed non
secundum scientiam, qui non modo de gestis sanctorum, verum etiam Dei genitricis atque
92
The section of this passage in italics is one of extreme importance for

Vallas argument, which is aimed at determining the truth of faith (veritas fidei). Valla makes a crystal clear distinction between the miracles
(miracula) or thaumaturgical events of the pagans and idol worshipers
on the one hand, and the divine works (opera divina) or thaumaturgical
events of the saints (sancti) on the other. The former belong without a
doubt to a peoples heroic prehistory, to its mythical origins and epic narrative. The latter, on the other hand, are works of faith (opera fidei). They
are events that occur in the context of the secular and spiritual history of
the church (ecclesia) of the religious faithful, in formal and real continuity with the extraordinary interventions of the divine in the human and
worldly sphere as they are reported in the Scriptures.
The Scriptures report these thaumaturgical events as, and precisely
because they are, messianic signs of the Incarnation of the divine
(semeia-signa, according to the New Testament conception and linguistic
usage of John). Or rather, the Scriptures report them as, and because they
are, extraordinary events in the context of the history of salvation
(terata-miracula, according to the conceptions and linguistic usage of the
Synoptic Gospels). In this sense, Valla had already had occasion in his
Collatio137 of the New Testament (Matt. 7:22) to define the thaumaturgical events of the Scriptures as miracles and works of divine power, which
without love do no good.138
Valla denies any intention whatsoever of detracting from the admiration of the saints with his criticism of traditional hagiography. Nor has he
any desire to deny the saints admirable lives, inasmuch as they are held to
be divine works (divina opera). He knows well, he affirms, that with even
a mere mustard seed of evangelical faith (fides) everything is possible in
the sphere of divine action and saving grace. Furthermore, precisely
because he proposes to defend (tueri) this proposition, he can permit neither himself nor others to transpose the acts (gesta) of the saints and
especially not those of Christ and Mary from their authentic historical
context to the unmerited one of hagiographic fabula and apocryphal
adeo Christi improba quedam et pseudoevangelia scribere non reformidarunt. Et summus
pontifex hos libros appellat apocryphos, quasi nihil vitii sit, nisi quod eorum ignoratur auctor; quasi credibilia sint, que narrantur; quasi sancta et ad confirmationem religionis pertinentia, ut iam non minus culpe sit penes hunc, qui mala probat, quam penes illum, qui
mala excogitavit (emphasis added) [translation modified].
137[The Collatio Novi Testamenti (Collation of the New Testament) was an early version of
the Adnotationes. Eds.]
138Valla, Collatio Novi Testamenti, 38.1112: miracula et opera potentie divine, que sine
caritate nil prosunt.
writing. Moreover, such a transposition is motivated, in Vallas view, either

by anti-Christian treachery (dolus) or by the aspiration to imitate God
but without knowledge. That is to say it would lack the kind of knowing
that is proper to the believer, i.e. the scientia fidei (the knowledge of faith,
or theology) promoted by Paul. Indeed, it was precisely this kind of ignorance and perversion of evangelical faith, dating from the Middle Ages all
the way back to ancient Christianity, that brought about both Jacopo da
Voragines Legend of the Saints (Legenda sanctorum) and the apocryphal
scriptures of the Old and New Testaments (the deuterocanonical books of
the Old and the pseudoevangelia, or pseudo-Gospels, as Valla calls them,
of the New).
Valla writes all this and we refer in particular to the last passage
quoted above for the express purpose of reviving a more authentic evangelism. He does so by criticizing on the one hand the promise of miracles
found in the (strongly ideological) hagiography produced by ancient and
medieval Christianity, and on the other hand the (specifically theologicoscholastic) conception of biblical and extra-biblical miracles as events or
actions whose possibility is defined and measured in relation to their
proximity to the laws of nature.
In the admittedly wide and variegated sphere of scholasticism, miracles
are understood as events beyond the laws of nature, and thus they are
essentially (out-of-the-ordinary) supernatural occurrences. With his criticism of this conception of miracles, Valla seems to want to restore the
acts of the saints and, first and foremost, the divine works of the
Scriptures, to the biblical perspective of such events and actions as essentially divine and messianic signs. This can be formulated differently but
still in line with what is, I believe, a correct interpretation of Vallas distinction between pagan heroic narrative and the scriptural narrative of
the Judeo-Christian tradition. For Valla, once all is said and done, mythepic is and always will be historia within the biblical and evangelical history of salvation. In the context of paganism and the non-Christian
religions, however, it was and remains essentially fabula.
Thus we understand Vallas deeper motive for censuring the papacy: it
allowed the tradition of Christian hagiography to be replaced by the reading of texts outside the tradition of the Bible, such as the deuterocanonical
books and the apocryphal Gospels. Valla acutely observes that the attribution of apocryphal texts is purely mechanical and thus without any doctrinal value a point which in any case, he stresses, ought to have been
expressed and defined somehow. In other words, the Magisterium ought
to have clarified the nature of the difference, if not the conflict, between
94
the apocryphal and canonical Gospels: the former subvert the latter
because they deny the properly evangelical truth of specifically Christian
historia. Regarding the apocryphal Gospels, then, one must not only confess to not knowing their authorship. One must also affirm, and without
reservation, their falseness, which was propagated in an anti-evangelical
and anti-Christian way. The apocrypha are then pseudo-scriptures,
impious pseudo-Gospels.
Therefore Valla blames Pope Gelasius for not condemning in the least
an indubitably legendary and apocryphal hagiography like the Actus
beati Silvestri presulis (the title of the book recording the gesta Silvestri, or
acts of Sylvester). The failure to take such a position had the effect of
according to the Actus and other hagiographic legends (like the apocrypha of the Old and New Testaments) an official sanction of credibility. It
is as if such pseudo-scriptures, while they do not have to be recognized as
canonical, can instead be regarded as if they were sacred and served to
strengthen religion (emphasis added). Let us not forget here Vallas position. He goes beyond even Jeromes skepticism and his cautionary principle regarding the entire body of Old Testament apocrypha/hagiography.
Jerome, for his part, stands in direct contrast to Augustine, who considered the deuterocanonical books as accepted along with the canonical
ones and having equal authority. On the contrary, Jerome reduced the
apocryphal/hagiographic parts of Scripture to the following general principle, which is of a wholly pastoral order: these books are read by the
church to edify the people, not to strengthen the authority of ecclesiastical
doctrines.139
Valla, instead, with his criticism of the papacy vis--vis the credibility of
apocryphal and hagiographic texts, goes well beyond Jeromes position.
He peremptorily indicts both the authors of such writings and above all
the papacy for having inserted such anti-Scriptural fabulae into the
Christian tradition and thus for having counterfeited the true faith:
The supreme pontiff calls these books Apocrypha, as if there nothing wrong
with an unknown author, as if the stories told were believable, as if they
were sacred and served to strengthen religion, so that now whoever [i.e., the
pope] approves something bad is no less culpable than the person [i.e.,
the author] who made it up.
139Augustine, De doctrina christiana, lib. II, cap. 8 (PL 34: 4041): aequalis auctoritatis,
in auctoritatem recipi meruerunt; Jerome, Praefatio in libros Salomonis, PL 28:12411244,
at 1243: ad edificationem plebis, non ad authoritatem ecclesiasticorum dogmatum confirmandam (emphasis added). Cf. Camporeale, Giovanmaria dei Tolosani, 170174 (= idem,
Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo, riforma e controriforma, 363367).
He continues:
We detect spurious coins, we separate them out and throw them away: shall
we not detect spurious teaching, but rather hold on to it? Shall we mix it up
with good teaching and defend it as good?140
Therefore the acceptance of apocryphal hagiographic literature into the

religious tradition and into Christian piety corresponds, in Vallas metaphor, to putting counterfeit currency (nummos reprobos) into circulation.
The creation of that literature, then, is to be compared to the act of counterfeiting money, which constitutes an almost fatal attack on the civil life
of the community, since it corrodes the structure of commercial, economic, and social transactions. The sacred and hagiographic fictionalization of the apocryphal Gospels, of the Legenda Silvestri (including the
Constitutum), and of the entire Golden Legend together with their respective author-forgers is thus the coining of a linguistic usage that is, contrary to its common appearance, illegal and false. Indeed, it is by its very
nature a non-scriptural and false language, because it does not say the
revealed truth. Worse still, it is the sheer reversal of the truth of the
Scriptures and evangelical faith.
The metaphor of language (and literature) as money is taken directly
from Quintilian, who in his Institutio oratoria writes, authoritative customary usage is the sure guide for speaking, and language is clearly to be
used like money: as common currency.141 Now, both Quintilians conception of language as authoritative customary usage and his related metaphor of language as money were first used explicitly by Valla, and at the
same time revised by him, in the first version of the Repastinatio. There
Valla quotes Quintilians text directly and modifies it by clarifying further
the nature and function of language. Indeed, one could say and we have
argued as much elsewhere that this passage from the Institutio provided
the origin and foundation, chronologically as well as analytically and theoretically, for the whole gnoseological and epistemological spectrum
developed throughout the Repastinatio. Here we refer to Vallas
140Valla, De falso, 151.26152.2 (78): et summus pontifex hos libros appellat apocryphos, quasi nihil vitii sit, nisi quod eorum ignoratur auctor; quasi credibilia sint, que narrantur; quasi sancta et ad confirmationem religionis pertinentia, ut iam non minus culpe
sit minus penes hunc [sc. pontificem], qui mala probat, quam penes illum [sc. auctorem],
qui mala excogitavit. Nummos reprobos discernimus, separamus, abiicimus: doctrinam reprobam non discernemus, sed retinebimus? sed cum bona miscebimus? sed pro bona defendemus? (emphasis added).
141Institutio oratoria, I.6.3: Consuetudo certissima est loquendi magistra, utendumque
plane sermone ut nummo, cui publica forma est.
96
sophisticatedconception of the science (scientia) of rhetoric as the new

instrument (novum organon) of knowing and understanding in general,
and of the function and meaning of language specifically.
Let us quickly recapitulate the essential elements of Vallas conception
of language, which he developed in the wake of his reinterpretation of
Quintilian. Linguistic usage, as a phenomenon that comes into being in all
historical languages, is essentially a convention originating in civil society.
It is the civitas as such that establishes language, which then slowly diversifies over space and time according to variations in the types of civil society and their respective cultural differences. Therefore, it is the customary
use (consuetudo) of a language (sermo), its historical and consistent
usage (usus loquendi) whether spoken or written or, above all, literary (and this is the true certissima consuetudo, the authoritative customary usage par excellence) that ultimately invents and determines the
grammatical and semantic structures of any one language (sermo) in particular. Hence the metaphor formulated by Quintilian and revised by
Valla: language is to be used like money: as common currency.
Once having introduced it, Valla continues to develop and extend this
metaphor. He returns to it again and again throughout his text, making
the most of the pregnant likeness it bears in terms of value and origin.
Every language, precisely because it is the foundation of civil communication, is a political convention in the strongest and fullest meaning of the
term. To coin money different from that minted by the civil and political
community is to coin a worthless and counterfeit money that is extremely
harmful, if not fatal, to the city. It undermines first the citys subsistence
and then its well-being, which are constituted by social relations and
financial and commercial transactions. Similarly, the counterfeiter of language, i.e. of the laws by which the community itself has sanctioned
language the certissima consuetudo of that sermo corrodes the foundation of civil and political society. He frustrates interrelations and communication, and he devalues the richness of its culture.
Consequently, the punishment befitting the counterfeiter of language,
who deprives even his own speech of meaning, is expulsion from the city.
Similarly, and commensurate with his heinous crime, the counterfeiter of
money is eliminated from the civil and political community by means of
capital punishment. It was in this sense that Valla had previously written
in the first version of his Repastinatio (bk. 2, ch. 9):
Whoever deviates from common linguistic usage must be expelled from the
circle of the literati, just as the despiser of laws and mores must be expelled
from the city. And as there are various mores and laws among the various

nations and peoples, thus there are various languages, and among each their
own is sacred and inviolate. This language is therefore sanctioned by the
usage of the most reputable authors and by a kind of public approval of the
people. It is treated like law and right.
Later, in the second version of the Repastinatio (bk. 2, ch. 4), he would add:
Nor should we accord any mercy to the jurists and theologians of our time,
the dialecticians and philosophers who do not obey the words of their own
discipline. Rather, with their debased manner of speaking they seem to have
conspired and, like a group of daughter cities, to have sworn an oath against
their own metropolis.142
In section IV of the Oration, Valla borrows Quintilians language-money

metaphor in a similar way. Nevertheless, he deploys its terms for a different, specific end. In the Repastinatio, Valla has his eye on the counterfeiting of philosophical language in the realm of Aristotelian-scholastic
speculation. Here in the Oration, he deploys the metaphor against a different kind of linguistic counterfeiting, one that is more properly ecclesiological and which took the form of sacred and hagiographic fictionalizations
like the deuterocanonical books, the apocryphal Gospels, the legends of
the saints, and thus also the Legenda Silvestri. An integral part of the
Legenda is of course the Constitutum, the sacred fiction par excellence.
For Valla, then, all parabiblical literature (of the New and Old
Testaments) and all of medieval hagiography is false money that has
been treacherously introduced into the civitas christiana. It constitutes
the coining of a vile and false linguistic usage that is fatal to the church
(ecclesia), which is founded on faith (fides) and pervaded by the language
(sermo) of the Gospel. Such literature is the fruit of sacred, pseudoevangelical story-telling and is thus of necessity a pseudo-ecclesiological
language. Its most outstanding exemplar is the Constantinian language of
the Constitutum. Thus Vallas argument continues:
For my part, to speak candidly, I deny that the Gesta Silvestri is apocryphal,
because, as I have said, a certain Eusebius is alleged as author, but I consider
142Valla, Repastinatio, 475 and 198: [A consuetudine loquendi] siquis desciverit, non
secus a choro litteratorum repellendus, quam legum morumque contemptor a civitate
expellendus est. Et ut sunt varii mores varieque leges nationum ac populorum, ita varie
linguarum, apud suos unaqueque intemerata et sancta. Hec itaque usu clarissimorum auctorum et publico quasi populi consensu sancita, inter leges ac iura reponuntur; Quominus
danda venia est iurisperitis ac theologis recentibus, dialecticisque ac philosophis nostris
qui verba scientie sue non audiunt, sed in prave loquendo nescio quomodo conspiraverunt et quasi diverse civitates in suam metropolim coniurarunt.; Camporeale, Lorenzo
Valla. Repastinatio, 228ff.
98
it false and not worth reading, not only in other points but particularly in
what is related about the dragon, the bull, and the leprosy, which I have done
so much to refute. If Naaman was a leper, we shall not say straightaway that
Constantine was too. Many authors have mentioned the former case, but
about the latter, involving the ruler of the world, no one, not even one of his
own citizens, has written, unless some foreigner did.143
Writings like the Actus beati Silvestri (whether including the document of
donation or not), and even more so those which subsequently, according
to Valla, make up the Legenda Silvestri, are without a doubt false literature. As texts they are unfit for reading in the context of a Christian liturgical assembly, especially (as attested by Pope Gelasius) in the liturgical
assemblies of the Roman church. The hagiographies of Pope Sylvester are
singularly false and unworthy, both and above all for what is said about
Sylvesters miraculous healing of Constantines leprosy, and for the connection they posit between the miracle, the emperors conversion to
Christianity, and the donation. Here is the core of the fabula of Pope
Sylvester and Constantine. Here is the foundation and the origin of the
donations status as a legend. Here is the source from which springs Vallas
Oration, the source which I have done so much to refute. This sentence
contains the key both to understanding Vallas procedure and to reading
his text.
All in all, Vallas thesis can be summed up as follows. The Donation of
Constantine is a legend because it can be distilled to the legendary status
or inauthentic account of Pope Sylvesters miraculous healing and conversion of the emperor. And it was the sacred and hagiographic fictionalization about Pope Sylvester (the Legenda Silvestri) that simultaneously
forged and contained the pseudo-Donation of Constantine.
Let us now conclude by returning to our reading of this section of Vallas
discourse. It continues:
But why should I be surprised that the pontiffs did not understand these
things, when they are ignorant about their own name? They claim that Peter
was called Cephas because he was the head of the apostles, as if this word
were Greek from kephal, and not Hebrew or rather Syriac. The Greeks write
Kphas, which among them is translated as Petros [John 1:42] not head.
143Valla, De falso, 152.312 (79): Ego vero, ut ingenue feram sententiam, gesta Silvestri
nego esse apocrypha, quia, ut dixi, Eusebius quidam fertur auctor, sed falsa atque indigna
que legantur existimo, cum in aliis tum vero in eo, quod narratur de dracone, de tauro, de
lepra, propter quam refutandam tanta repetii. Neque enim, si Naaman leprosus fuit, continuo et Constantinum leprosus fuisse dicemus. De illo multi auctores meminerunt, de hoc
principe orbis terrarum nemo ne suorum quidem civium scripsit, nisi nescio quis alienigena (emphasis added) [translation modified].

Petrus/Petra is a Greek word, and Petra is stupidly explained by a Latin etymology [of Balbi of Genoa] as meaning trodden underfoot. The pontiffs
distinguish a metropolitan from an archbishop and want [according to the
etymology of Isidore] the former to be derived from the size of the city,
although in Greek it is not metropolis but mtropolis, that is mother state
or city. They [e.g., Isidore] explain patriarch as if father of father, and
many other similar errors that I omit, lest I seem to be charging all the
supreme pontiffs with the mistakes of some.144
In this final part of section IV, Valla shifts the focus of his critical analysis
from the text of the Constitutum and its wider context in the Legenda
Silvestri to the medieval grammarians and their etymology. Using a philological procedure similar to that deployed in his Adnotationes on Livy and
on the New Testament, Valla brings morphological and semantic analysis
to bear on the grammar of medieval etymologies spanning from the
Etymologiae of Isidore of Seville (the first and the most arrogant among
the unlearned) to the Catholicon of Balbi of Genoa (the rather unlearned
teachers Eberhard, Huguccio, the Catholicon, and Aymo, who profess to
know nothing for a high fee).145
As the hagiography of the Legenda established Constantinian ecclesiology for the purposes of the papacys imperial theocracy, thus medieval
grammar later helped to nourish that same ecclesiology for the purposes
of that very theocracy. As hagiography was a false coinage with the power
to de-evangelize original ecclesiological language, thus that counterfeit
currency was later recoined and defused by the ideological etymology of
144Ibid., 153.3154.6 (80) and Setzs notes: Sed quid mirer hec non intelligere pontifices, cum nomen ignorent suum: Cephas enim dicunt vocari Petrum, quia caput apostolorum esset, tanquam hoc vocabulum sit Grecum apo tou kephal et non Hebraicum seu
potius Syriacum, quod Greci Kphas scribunt, quod apud eos interpretatur Petrus, non
caput. Est enim Petrus et petra Grecum vocabulum stulteque per etymologiam Latinam
exponitur petra quasi pede trita. Et metropolitanum ab archiepiscopo distinguunt voluntque illum a mensura civitatis dictum, cum Grece dicatur non metropolis, sed
mtropolis, idest mater civitas sive urbs; et patriarcham quasi patrem patrum, et multa
alia similia, que transeo, ne culpa aliquorum omnes summos pontifices videar insectari.
[Valla does not himself identify the etymologists he attacks in his text; their names have
been supplied here in square brackets from Setzs apparatus. Eds.] See also Francisco Rico,
Nebrija frente a los brbaros. El canon de gramticos nefastos en la polmica del humanismo
(Salamanca: Universidad, 1978), 2227.
145[Valla, Elegantiae, book II, preface: primus indoctorum arrogantissimus; indoctiores Hebrardus, Hugutio, Catholicon, Aymo magna mercede docentes nihil scire.
Eugenio Garin, Prosatori latini del quattrocento (Milano: R. Ricciardi, 1952), 602, n. 1, identifies three of the teachers and texts as Ebehrard of Bethune, Graecismsus, Huguccio of Pisa,
Magnae derivationes, and Giovanni Balbi of Genoa, Catholicon. Aymo might refer to Nicola
de Aymo, whose Interrogatorio (1444) was a Latin-vernacular grammar; see La grammatica
latino-volgare di Nicola de Aymo (Lecce, 1444), ed. Maria dEnghien (Galatino: Congedo,
2008). Eds.]
100
the medieval grammarians, who converted it into halfpenny words whose

semantic value depreciated from ecclesial (evangelical) to ecclesiastical
(institutional).146
Valla offers only a few examples. Nor could he have done otherwise
within the confines of his discourse, even though it is concentrated fully
and, we should add, insightfully so on the specific topic of ideological
etymology in order to make the case definitively for all of section IV.
Valla takes up the etymology of Cephas/Petra as an emblematic example. Christ had given this new name to the apostle Peter because he was to
provide the foundation and support of the new faith (fides); he was to be
the rock on which to erect the new church (ecclesia) of the Gospel.
Isidores etymology resolves this name in the meaning of caput, the head
of the apostolic and ecclesiastical hierarchy. For Isidore, Peter becomes, as
a result of his renaming by Christ, the absolute wielder of power (in capite
constitutus), both spiritual and jurisdictional as well as doctrinal and political. Valla contests this etymology as a grammarian (grammaticus): he
highlights the discourses pseudo-ecclesial and Constantinian ideology by
subjecting its text to an analytical and philological investigation. This is
Vallas method throughout the Oration, and indeed it is a constant across
his entire literary production. By means of grammatical analysis and a
critical-historical investigation into the authenticity and/or inauthenticity of the vis verborum, Valla proceeds, to the extent possible, to the truth
of the vis rerum.
Let us briefly sum up what has come to light in our investigation of section IV of the Oration. Vallas philological analysis of the Constitutum and
the Legenda Silvestri helped him to locate the roots of the Constantinian
Church and its corresponding ecclesiology as well as the point from
which they sprouted theoretically and practically in all their breadth. He
finds them in an historical space and ideological and linguistic semiosis,
which on the whole turn out to be inauthentic inasmuch as they subvert
the original, evangelical ecclesia of ancient Christianity. Valla uses his philological analysis to expose their roots and attack them there. Little by little
he highlights how the sum of their historical praxis and ecclesiological
language is in and of itself one giant contradiction. Indeed, it is based on
the extreme and absolutely irresolvable antinomy between evangelium
and imperium. Ultimately, Valla concludes that the entire theoretical and
historical development of Constantinian ecclesiology, together with the
whole theocratic, imperial tradition of the papacy, is a deception of such
146Nancy Struever, Fables of Power, Representations 4 (1983): 108127.
enormous proportions that it results in an almost total subversion of the

Gospel and of original Christianity. The final lines of section IV thus serve
as both a concise summation of the section and an opening strike for
the next (section V):
Let these points be made, so that no one may wonder why many popes were
unable to grasp that the Donation of Constantine was a forgery, even though
in my opinion this deception originated with one of them.147
7.Section V: From the Pactum Hludovicianum to the respublica

romana; Vallas Anti-Caesarism in Opposition to Augustine
In section V Valla deals with the Pactum Hludovicianum. Although admitting its historical authenticity, he gradually scrapes away the layers of its
juridical and canonical validity until it flakes off into a flurrying mass of
contradictions. Once again, Valla employs his usual method: he focuses
his historico-critical analysis on the internal antinomies which make up
the textual structure of the Hludovicianum. Then he turns to the historical
and pseudo-juridical consequences resulting from the ratification of the
so-called Pactum.
Let us consider, for example, Vallas analysis of its formulas for the
oaths sworn by the emperors upon their coronation at the hands of the
Roman popes, a practice still alive and well in his own day. This reference
to imperial oaths provides the point of departure for Vallas argument
across the whole of section V:
But, you say, why do the emperors not deny the Donation of Constantine,
since it worked to their detriment, instead of acknowledging, affirming, and
preserving it? Substantial point marvelous defense! But which emperor
are you talking about? If you mean the Greek, who was the true emperor,
I shall deny the admission, but if you mean the Latin, I shall gladly admit it.
For who is unaware that the Latin emperor was gratuitously installed by a
supreme pontiff, Stephen [Stephen II, 752757] (I believe)? He stripped the
power of the Greek emperor because he would not come to the aid of Italy,
and he named a Latin one, with the result that the emperor received more
from the Pope than the Pope from the emperor. To be sure, Achilles
and Patroclus divided up the treasures of Troy according to certain arrangements among themselves alone. The words of Louis [Louis the Pious,
814840] seem to me to point to this sort of thing, when he says
147Valla, De falso, 154.7155.2 (81): Hec dicta sint, ut nemo miretur, si donationem
Constantini commenticiam fuisse pape multi non potuerunt deprehendere, tam et si ab
aliquo eorum ortam esse hanc fallaciam reor.
102
Hereupon follows the text of the Hludovicianum (as found in Gratians

Decretum, Dist. LXIII, cap. 30), which is glossed in the margin of the
Oration as The text of Emperor Louis pact with Pope Paschal [Paschal I,
817824].148
Vallas reply to the arguments of his imaginary interlocutor, who
defends the Constantinian right of the papacy, develops against the background of what we could call the praxis of the pseudo-Constitutums historical use and the curial theorization of that praxis. Let it suffice to recall
here the writings of a pope like Innocent III, to whom Valla refers explicitly and implicitly throughout the Oration: specifically the bull Per venerabilem of 1202, in which the papacy, acting on its own authority, transfers
the Roman Empire from the Greeks to the Germans in the person of
Charlemagne, and his Sermo de sancto Silvestro, a peculiarly Innocentian
interpretation of how the pseudo-donation occurred.149
7.1.The Hludovicianum and the Transfer of the Empire
(translatio imperii)
The pope transfers the empire to the Latin emperor on the authority of the
pseudo-Donation. In exchange the neo-Latin emperor swears to confess
and reconfirm him by perpetuating the pseudo-Constantinian imperial
act. Behold, Valla comments, underlining the historical and juridical
absurdity, how the pope and emperor divide up the Roman empire (like
Achilles and Patroclus with the spoils of Troy). It is a vicious circle: the
pope creates the emperor, and the emperor repays him by reproposing
the Constantinian act of donation, by virtue of which the pope then
actualizes the transfer of the empire! This means, according to Valla, that
148Ibid., 155.4156.5 (82) and Setzs notes: At, dicitis, cur imperatores, quorum detrimento res ista cedebat, donationem Constantini non negant, sed fatentur, affirmant, conservant? Ingens argumentum, mirifica defensio! Nam de quo tu loqueris imperatore? Si de
Greco, qui verus fuit imperator, negabo confessionem, sin de Latino, libenter etiam confitebor: etenim quis nescit imperatorem Latinum gratis factum esse a summo pontifice, ut
opinor, Stephano? qui Grecum imperatorem, quod auxilium non ferret Italie, privavit
Latinumque fecit, ita ut plura imperator a papa quam papa ab imperatore acciperet. Sane
Troianas opes quibusdam pactionibus soli Achilles et Patroclus inter se partiti sunt. Quod
etiam mihi videntur indicare Ludovici verba, cum ait . Vallas marginal manuscript
heading (156.6.): Verba pactionis Lodoici imperatoris cum Papa Paschale.
149The Sermo de sancto Silvestro can be found in PL 217:481484 (= Sermo VII. In festo
d. Silvestri pontificis maximi); it is referred to by Martini, Regale Sacerdotium, 141. It is
difficult to prove that Valla knew Innocents text, but a comparative reading of section IV
of the Oration and the Sermo shows that the same nodal points of the Constitutum/Legenda
Silvestri are highlighted in each, and that from them the pope and Valla reach diametrically
opposed conclusions. It seems as if Valla intends his critical and historico-philological
analysis as a direct, point-for-point response to Innocent IIIs Sermo.
the negotiation between pope and neo-emperor is rather a pact of collusion meant to appropriate the Roman empire for themselves. What is
more, this pact was agreed upon in contempt of every norm of civil
(Justinianic) law. Thus what we have is a legal absurdity contracted by
parties who ought to have been the guarantors of civil law. The parties
(the pope and emperor) to this negotiation-collusion, therefore, which
was effected against all civil and natural law, ought to have paid the penalty stipulated by Roman law for forgers: capital punishment.150
Similar to section I, where Valla made use of characters arguing diverse
points of view, here he has the emperor Louis the Pious argue his own case
and defend his behavior towards the pope.
But what am I going to do? you say, Shall I recover by armed force what the
Pope is holding? But he has now become more powerful than I am. Shall
I recover it by legal action? But my legal right is no more than he wants it to
be. I did not come to the empire by inheritance, but by an agreement that if
I wanted to be emperor I should make various promises to the Pope in
return. Shall I say that Constantine gave away nothing of his empire? In that
way I would be making a case for the Greek emperor and would be cheating
myself of all imperial rank. The Popes rationale in making me emperor is
that I am, as it were, his vicar, and if I fail to make promises he will not do
this, and if I fail to obey he will depose me. As long as he gives to me, I shall
admit to anything, I will agree to anything. Only believe me if I actually
owned Rome and Tuscany, I would not be acting as I am now. Paschal would
be chanting in vain the tune of the Donation, since I consider it a forgery. It is
not my business to look into the legal rights of the Pope, but it is the business
of the emperor of Constantinople.
You are altogether forgiven in my eyes, Louis, and every other ruler in
your position.151
This is the tone of the emperors self-defense in justification of the Pactum

Hludovicianum. And Vallas reference to the pseudo-Constitutums
150Valla, De falso, 156.16157.7 (82), with Setzs commentary and notes.
151Ibid., 157.7158.6 (8283): Sed quid faciam, inquies, repetam armis, que papa occupat? At ipse iam factus est me potentior. Repetam iure? At ius meum tantum est quantum
ille esse voluit. Non enim hereditario nomine ad imperium veni, sed pacto, ut si imperator
esse volo hec et hec invicem pape promittam. Dicam nihil donasse ex imperio Constantinum?
At isto modo causam agerem Greci imperatoris et me omni fraudarem imperii dignitate.
Hac enim ratione papa se dicit facere imperatorem me quasi quendam vicarium suum et,
nisi promittam, non facturum et, nisi paream, me abdicaturum. Dummodo mihi det, omnia
fatebor, omnia paciscar. Mihi tamen crede, si Romam ego ac Tusciam possiderem, tantum
abest, ut facerem que facio, ut etiam frustra mihi Pascalis donationis sicut reor false
caneret cantilenam. Nunc concedo, que nec teneo nec habiturum esse me spero. De iure
pape inquirere non ad me pertinet, sed ad Constantinopolitanum illum Augustum.
Iam apud me excusatus es Ludovice, et quisquis alius princeps es Ludovici similis
(emphasis added).
104
historicalimpact on the transaction between pope and emperor could not

have been more to the point.
The emperor articulates his self-defense in a series of motives that can
all be reduced to three basic reasons. The first is that according to the
Constitutum the pope has, as a matter of fact, the power to appoint the
Western emperor. It is thus from the pope that the emperor, once elected
and crowned, derives his imperial power. This power, then, is nothing
other than a participation in papal power, and it subsists only when acting
as the vicariate of that power. Consequently, the emperor of the West,
precisely because he is the imperial vicar of the Roman pontiff, will never
be able to contest the power of the papacy. For that power is the foundation and the source for the emperors own (vicariate) power. Therefore, if
the emperor of the West attacks papal power, he necessarily erodes the
very foundation of his own imperial power.
Hence the second plank of the self-defense. The emperors right extends
only so far as conceded and accorded to by the pope. Indeed, the foundations of imperial right are exactly those laid by the will of the papacy.
Therefore, if the emperor should cease to be the vicar of the pope, the latter would immediately depose him: The Popes rationale in making me
emperor is that I am, as it were, his vicar, and if I fail to make promises he
will not do this, and if I fail to obey he will depose me.
The third and final part of the emperors self-defense is the most convincing justification of his behavior. I should contest the Donation of
Constantine, Valla has Louis say, but that would mean taking up the
defense of the Eastern emperor my direct antagonist against the
papacy. To contest the historical reality of the donation would affect
the Emperor of Constantinople and not me, for I have received the empire
by the election and power of the pope! Of course I think the Donation is
fake, but to triumph with this position I would already have to be in possession of Rome; I would have to be emperor as a direct successor to
Constantine. If such were the case, I would not admit to anything. Nor
would I agree to anything, and the Roman pontiff would be chanting in
vain the tune of the Donation.
For Valla, the juridical absurdity of the Pactum Hludovicianum is the
historical constant that subtends every transaction between the Roman
papacy and the German empire. This absurdity is manifested most clearly
in the transaction par excellence: the popes crowning of the emperor.
Indeed, papal coronation of the emperor in its investiture ceremonial, in
the emperors oath, in the popes intentions had continued unchanged
for centuries. Since the popes investiture of the emperor was based on
exactly the same juridical pretensions that underpinned the papacy, it

had always been constitutionally invalid and juridically contradictory.
Such was still the case in Vallas own time:
What must we suspect about the agreements that other emperors have
made with supreme pontiffs, when we know what Sigismund [14101437]
did, an otherwise excellent and very courageous man, and yet less courageous under the impact of his age? We saw him [keep in mind Vallas sojourn
during that period in Milan152] in Italy encompassed by just a few retainers
and living from day to day, about to die of starvation in Rome if Eugenius had
not given him food but at the price of extorting the Donation. When he had
come to Rome to be crowned emperor of the Romans, he could not have
been crowned by the Pope [Eugenius IV, 14311447] without acknowledging
the validity of the Donation of Constantine and making a donation of everything all over again.153
After placing the Pactum Hludovicianum in its effective historical context,

Valla penetrates further to its specifically juridical meaning in relationship to the pseudo-donation. He focuses ever more closely on its juridical
aspect in order to bring to light the mass of contradictions of which the
Pactum had been the bearer. Ultimately he lays bare a dense synchronicity
of historical factors and juridical elements in conflict with one other, thus
exposing the documents intrinsic contradictoriness and therefore its
structural non-validity and juridical falsity.
If indeed, Valla says, the donation of the empire to the papacy were
historically true, there would have been nothing left for Constantines
eventual successor in the West. The resulting paradox is that the newly
(papally) elected (German) emperor of the West is bound to reconfirm,
and even to reiterate, Constantines act of donating the empire to the
papacy. He must donate something that he does not yet possess but that
he will obtain by means of his late election by the pope! Even more paradoxical, the very newly (papally) elected (German) emperor must reiterate Constantines act in order to reconfirm and reconstitute the papacys
152[Sigismund received the iron crown of Lombardy in Milan on 25 November 1431,
after which he entered into negotiations with Eugenius IV to be crowned Holy Roman
Emperor. Eds.]
153Valla, De falso, 158.616 (83), and Setzs notes: Quid de aliorum imperatorum cum
summis pontificibus pactione suspicandum est, cum sciamus quid Sigismundus fecerit,
princeps alioquin optimus ac fortissimus, sed iam affecta etate minus fortis? quem per
Italiam paucis stipatoribus septum in diem vivere vidimus, Rome etiam fame periturum, nisi
eum sed non gratis, extorsit enim donationem Eugenius pavisset. Is enim cum Romam
venisset, ut pro imperatore Romanorum coronaretur, non aliter a papa coronari potuit,
quam Constantini donationem ratam haberet eademque omnia de integro donaret (emphasis added).
106
power to create the Western emperor. And it was this very power that the
pope, according to his claim, had received from Constantine with the
Constitutum! Finally and here we arrive at the height of juridical absurdity in this case the papacy bases on the Donation its claim to the right
and the power of imperial election and coronation. But electing and
crowning the emperor in Rome are the sole and exclusive right of the
respublica romana and, more precisely, of the Senate and the People of
Rome. Valla writes:
What is more contradictory than for someone to be crowned a Roman
emperor when he had renounced Rome itself? And to be crowned by a man
whom he acknowledges and, to the extent it lies with him, makes the lord of
the Roman empire? And to consider valid a donation which becomes true
only if the emperor has nothing left of his empire? In my view, not even
children would have done such a thing. So it is hardly surprising if the Pope
takes upon himself the coronation of a Caesar, which ought to be the responsibility of the Roman people. If you, Pope, can deprive the Greek emperor of
Italy and the western provinces and create the Latin emperor, why do you
make use of agreements? Why do you divide up Caesars property? Why do
you transfer the empire to yourself? Therefore anyone who is called emperor
of the Romans should know that in my judgment he is neither Augustus nor
Caesar nor emperor if he lacks full power at Rome, and that if he makes no
effort to recover the city of Rome he is clearly guilty of perjury. Those former
Caesars Constantine first among them were not forced to take the oath
by which todays Caesars are bound. As far as human resources allowed, they
would take away nothing from the size of the Roman empire and would zealously augment it. But this is not why they were called Augusti, because they
were supposed to augment the empire (as some [like Isidore and Accursius]
think in their ignorance of Latin), for Augustus is called, so to speak, sacred
from the gustatory habits of those avians that were customarily used in taking the auspices . Better for the supreme pontiff to be called Augustus,
from augmenting, except that in augmenting his temporal resources he
reduces his spiritual ones.154
154Ibid., 158.16160.7 (8384), and Setzs notes: Quid magis contrarium quam pro
imperatore Romano coronari, qui Rome ipsi renuntiasset? et coronari ab illo, quem et confiteatur et, quantum in se est, dominum Romani imperii faciat? ac ratam habere donationem, que vera si sit nihil imperatori de imperio reliqui fiat? Quod, ut arbitror, nec pueri
fecissent. Quo minus mirum, si papa sibi arrogat Cesaris coronationem, que populi Romani
esse deberet. Si tu, papa, et potes Grecum imperatorem privare Italia provinciisque occidentis et Latinum imperatorem facis, cur pactionibus uteris? cur bona Cesaris partiris? cur
in te imperium transfers? Quare sciat, quisquis est, qui dicitur imperator Romanorum, me
iudice se non esse nec Augustum nec Cesarem nec imperatorem, nisi Rome imperium
teneat, et, nisi operam det, ut urbem Romam recuperet, plane esse periurum. Nam Cesares
illi priores, quorum fuit primus Constantinus, non adigebantur iusiurandum interponere,
quo nunc Cesares obstringuntur: se quantum humana ope prestari protest, nihil imminuturos esse de amplitudine imperii Romani eamque sedulo adaucturos. Non ea re tamen
As pointed out by Setz in his magisterial commentary to Vallas text, the

italicized section of this passage is Vallas explicit reference to the formula
(ordo) of the oath that the new Western Augustus was bound to swear
at his crowning by the pope. That formula for the emperors oath to the
papacy, already in force in the thirteenth century and still in use at
the time of Vallas writing in the fifteenth, was in reality supposed to be the
reiterated, historical reconfirmation of the Pactum Hludovicianums presumed legitimacy and validity. The papacy thus considered the Pactum in
its turn as the witness to the pseudo-Constitutums historical truth and
juridical validity. And thus we arrive back at the specific foundation of the
ecclesiology and related political (civil, ecclesiastical, and territorial)
praxis of the Constantinian tradition.
Following Vallas line of thought, it was this Constantinian ecclesiology
and praxis that, thanks to the scholasticism and canon law of the time,
had nearly achieved the status of dogma in Boniface VIIIs Unam Sanctam
of 1302:
So you see that the worse the supreme pontiff, the more he insists on defending this donation. Such was Boniface the Eighth . He writes about the
Donation of Constantine and despoiled the king of France, whose very kingdom he decreed to have been and to be subject to the Roman church, just as
if he had wanted to implement the Donation of Constantine.155
The formula for the emperors oath, which he was bound to swear in obedience to the pope as his candidate, did not just have its (pseudo-)juridical
foundation in the Constitutum. It first and foremost took from that document the notion and the politics of the imperialism that was created by
the Roman Caesars and brought to perfection by Constantine in the fourth
century. Valla makes this point with an aside on classical syntagmas,
which seems to be a mere erudite digression but actually serves as a premise to what is argued later in the final pages of section V. At stake is the
etymology of the word augustus as either coming from augmenting temporal resources (ab augendo temporalia) or as meaning sacred, so to
vocati Augusti, quod imperium augere deberent ut aliqui sentiunt Latine lingue
imperiti est enim Augustus quasi sacer ab avium gustu dictus, que in auspiciis adhiberi
solebant . Melius summus pontifex ab augendo Augustus diceretur, nisi quod, dum temporalia auget, spiritualia minuit (emphasis added).
155Ibid., 160.7161.4 (84), and Setzs notes and commentary: Itaque videas, ut quisquis
pessimus est summorum pontificum, ita maxime defendende huic donationi incumbere,
qualis Bonifacius octavus . Hic et de donatione Constantini scribit et regem Francie privavit regnumque ipsum, quasi donationem Constantini exequi vellet, ecclesie Romane
fuisse et esse subiectum iudicavit .
108
speak, from the gustatory habits of birds (quasi sacer ab avium gustu).
Valla treats both etymologies as more or less philologically plausible; they
are distinguishable only by their ideological charge.
Valla insistently criticizes both the etymologist Isidore and the jurist
Accursius as ignorant of Latinity and elegance (latinitas atque elegantia).
Both had made the imperial title Augustus derive directly from the verb
augere (to augment), thus indicating that the primary duty of the emperor,
as an augustus, was to extend (territorially) and to consolidate (politically) the imperium of Rome. With this double valence of meaning, the
imperial title was taken up by the papacy and later transferred along with
the empire to the Western emperor. At his coronation, then, the emperor
had to swear solemnly to the pope that he, as a new Augustus, would take
away nothing from the size of the Roman empire and would zealously
augment it in line with the formula of the imperial oath quoted by Valla.
Against Isidores interpretation (an etymology that might be original to
him), Valla takes up a piece of classical elegantia according to which the
lemmas augustus and sacer (sacred), whether said of a place or a person,
are related. More precisely, he connects the imperial title (assumed for the
first time by Octavian) to the immediate context from which it was taken:
the divination of the augurs. In Suetonius biography of Octavian Augustus,
which Valla follows on this point, the term augustus is said to come from
the increase or the movement or the gustatory habits of birds, as Ennius
teaches.156 Nevertheless, the semantic implications of Isidore and
Accursius (much more reliable than Valla would have thought) had been
established historically by the fact that the title of Augustus which initially
possessed a strong religious patina (like its Greek counterpart, sebastos)
came to be more and more associated with the enlargement (in extension)
and the consolidation (in sovereignty and unification) of the empire.
Vallas attack on Isidores etymology is harshly critical and bitterly
ironic: Better for the supreme pontiff to be called Augustus, from augmenting, except that in augmenting his temporal resources he reduces his
spiritual ones. This philological observation is attuned to both the remote
implications and the immediate consequences of the event (whether historically true or false) of the Constantinian donation. He accuses it of having led the papacy to the enlargement of its imperium in terms of temporal
156In addition to Setzs note 438, see: Thesaurus Linguae Latinae (Leipzig: Teubner,
1900-), vol. 2, augustus, 13791413, at 13791392; ibid., vol. 2, augur, 13631367; Alois Walde,
Lateinisches etymologisches Wrterbuch (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1910), augeo, 73, augur,
73f.; Giannelli Mazzarino, Trattato di storia romana, 49.
extension all to the detriment of its particular (evangelical) spiritual

dimension. This was only made possible because the donation rewarded
the papacy with imperial Rome.
So the papacy could not effect the transfer of an empire that did not
belong to it, since the donation of Constantine never occurred. And the
German emperor could not swear to renew the donation, since nothing
can be reconfirmed that never actually happened to begin with. Finally,
both the Roman pope and the German emperor end up having been
deceived by the example of Constantine, who with his gift of the empire
to the papacy would have conferred something that did not belong to him.
For he, just like the other Caesars before him, had come upon imperium
illicitly.
But, Roman pontiffs, what is the meaning of that anxiety of yours in demanding that the Donation of Constantine be confirmed by one emperor after
another, unless you mistrust your own legal authority? But, as the saying
goes, you are washing a brick. For that donation never existed, and what does
not exist cannot be confirmed. Whatever the Caesars give, they do because they
are deceived by the example of Constantine. They are unable to give the
empire.157
7.2.From imperium to respublica: The Second Part of Section V

Up to this point in section V, Valla has discussed the Pactum Hludovicianum
with special reference to its juridical non-validity. This non-validity, he
argues, was derived from the historical inauthenticity of the Constitutum
itself demonstrated on historico-philological grounds in section IV, and on
historico-theoretical grounds in section I. Furthermore, the Pactums nonvalidity highlighted how the papacys transfer of the empire to the
German West had no foundation, either historically or juridically.
Now Vallas argumentation indicates a further and definitive turn in his
spiral-shaped discourse. It can be best understood by recalling briefly the
conclusions reached in section I. Throughout that section, Valla had concentrated his argument on the impossibility of the fact of the donation. If
it had actually occurred, it would have necessarily brought about a contradiction between both the nature and the historical reality of (Roman and
157Valla, De falso, 161.612 (85): Verum quid sibi vult ista vestra, pontifices Romani, sollicitudo, quod a singulis imperatoribus donationem Constantini exigitis confirmari, nisi
quod iuri diffiditis vestro? Sed laterem lavatis, ut dicitur, nam neque illa unquam fuit, et
quod non est, confirmari non potest, et quicquid donant Cesares, decepti exemplo Constantini
faciunt, et donare imperium nequeunt (emphasis added).
110
Constantinian) imperium, and the nature and the historical reality of

evangelium (understood as the faith and practice of the early Christian
community and Pope Sylvesters evangelical vicariate of Christ). Therefore,
the (real and ideological) historical dimensions of both Roman imperium
and Christian evangelium demand that the Donation of Constantine be
considered a factual impossibility.
This assumption about the donations factual impossibility is now taken
up again in what we can call the second part of section V. But here it is
used to change, if not to invert, both what the donation signifies (its segno)
and what it means (its senso) in Vallas argument. What the donation signifies is inverted, because its factual impossibility here becomes its real,
historical possibility. What the donation means is inverted, because its
referent is no longer the forger of the Constitutum (the Legend of Sylvester)
but the shift to Christian empire that took place in the fourth century
the shift initiated by Constantine and completed by Theodosius I.
Valla manages to change what the donation signifies transforming its
factual impossibility into its real, historical possibility by hypothesizing
for the sake of argument that Constantines donation to Pope Sylvester
actually did occur.
All right, let us suppose that Constantine gave and Sylvester was in possession . What more can I grant you than to concede that what never
existed and could not have existed, did exist?158
But, Valla proceeds, if the donation was effectively actuated, it becomes

an historical transaction against divine and human law, both for the
emperor and for the pope. By divine law (ius divinum) Valla understands
the Sacred Scriptures, the Torah, and the Gospel, as we shall see further on
in his own terms. By human law (ius humanum) he understands the natural law deriving from the distinguishing quality (in the animal world) of
humanitas (humanity), as well as the law of nations, which also descends
from the peculiar nature of humanitas. More precisely, the law of nations
is a norm of inter-human relations that corresponds to the essence of
humanitas and emerges in the historical process whereby human beings
create the civitas. In that moment, man, who is an animal liberum (free
animal), reaches his potential and achieves the status of an animal politicum (political animal).
158Ibid., 162.16 (86): Age vero, demus Constantinum donasse Silvestrumque possedisse . Quid possum vobis magis dare, quam ut ea, que nec fuerunt nec esse potuerunt,
fuisse concedam?
To get the measure of divine law, Valla scans the Scriptures and runs
through the history of salvation as found in the Old and New Testaments.
To understand natural law and the law of nations, he reconsiders Roman
history, from the republic to the empire. Valla does not argue by means of
theoretical and philosophical analysis. That is, he does not use the analytical methods of philosophy, as he defines the term. Rather, and in conformity with the procedure of rhetorical discourse, he unfolds his argument
along the lines of explicitly historical considerations. His method is to
rethink the history of salvation and the history of Rome as a unified
whole.159
Vallas discourse proceeds in short stints and makes direct reference to
indeed it mirrors Augustines historical reflections in books IV and V of
his City of God. This reference to Augustine was, incidentally, as unavoidable for Valla as it is unmistakable for his readers. Indeed, Valla explicitly
cites a particular passage of Augustines text. We shall have more to say
about this later. For now let us consider the following.
In books IV and V of the City of God, Augustine reflects on Roman history from a Christian perspective. He is especially interested in the origins
of the Republic and the formation of the Roman Empire. Augustine considers the following issues in particular: the evolution and/or fall of the
republic in the context of its own ethical and political dimensions and
also of diverse historical situations; the expansion of Roman rule and the
transformation of the republic into an empire as a result of the military,
territorial, and political conquest of other peoples; the Roman empires
move towards Christianity with the coming of Constantine. His treatment, which comes from an historico-Christian standpoint, is highly original and critical, and it was just as formative for medieval ecclesiology.
For Augustine, the territorial and political expansion of Rome, as well
as the perverted imposition of its rule across the centuries up to the point
of becoming an empire, are the result of a double order of factors. And
although they are dissimilar indeed they stand on opposite sides of good
and evil they nevertheless remain strictly complementary in the (both
teleologically and theologically) providential economics of history.
According to one way of seeing things, Augustine attributes the expansion of Roman rule to the pride (superbia) and the will to power of the
Roman people, which were sustained by military heroism and the desire
159Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Repastinatio, 222; idem, Lorenzo Valla tra Medioevo e
Rinascimento, passim (reprinted in idem, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo, riforma e controriforma, 121330 and translated in the present volume, 145296).
112
for glory. The conquest and subjection of other peoples was initially
imposed on the Romans by the necessity of self-preservation. But the
republics later wars of conquest were also brought on, Augustine argues
with a heavy tone of irony, by the specifically Roman will to subdue the
injustice of other peoples. Once conquered, they were then ruled and
governed with justice, and thus they were made fit to participate,
although always as subjects, in the Roman civitas.
According to another way of seeing things that is, from the Christian
viewpoint of the City of God Augustine retells the history of Rome along
the dimensions of the economics of salvation. Here his markers are the
divine order and the providential course of universal history and of
Roman history in particular. Rome creates its empire in the sphere of the
divine order the order of God and of the Sacred Scriptures and pursues
its hidden end (telos) within the salvific economics of the coming of
Christianity. This is the historical juncture at which the Roman empire of
the pagan gods is transformed into the Roman empire of the Christian God.
The Christian historical turn occurred in the fourth century, with the
emperors Constantine and Theodosius. Constantine, after having converted to the Christian religion, nevermore made supplications to
demons, but adored the one and true God. For this he had a long reign
and was the sole Augustus ruling over the entire Roman world. Theodosius
defeated the final resistance of the worshippers of pagan Rome, ordered
the demolition of the temples and images of the idols, and reconstituted
Roman law in favor of the religio catholica,160 which had by then ascended
to the status of the one and true religion of the empire. In return God
rewarded him with a vast and unified imperial rule. With this encomiastic exaltation of the fourth-century Christian turn and the advent of
Constantines and Theodosiuss empire, Augustine brings his historicoprovidential reflection to a climax, wrapping it in highly charged terms.161
7.3.From Valla to Augustine: The Critique of the City of God
Valla contrasts his own reflection on Roman history with that of Augustine
by means of a point-by-point critique. He begins with the fundamental
premises of the City of God and continues through Augustines entire
discourse.
160[I.e., the Catholic religion, but with the the understanding that catholicus connotes
universality and orthodoxy. Eds.]
161Cf. Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo. A Biography (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1969), 287328.
Before continuing further, it is necessary to clarify more precisely this

observation on the comparison between Valla and Augustine. First of all,
the comparison is here made within the context of Vallas reading of
Augustine (in this specific case, of the City of God) and thus according to
the interpretation given by Valla to Augustines works (both in the Oration
and in other writings, such as, for example, De libero arbitrio). Second, we
cannot ignore the more or less evident fact that Vallas critique of Augustine
takes place on two levels. If on the one hand Valla calls into question the
providential premise of Augustines historical vision, on the other he
adopts Augustines trenchant criticism of Rome and of Roman imperial
expansion. Thus Vallas reading of the City of God is at once one of consent
and of dissent, but on different levels. On the historiographic level, the
condemnation of Roman rule and power is accepted in nearly the same
terms as in Augustines formulation. On the theological level, however,
Augustines providential resolution of Roman imperialism is rejectedand
substantially attacked. This resolution had subsequently been adopted
and unduly expanded by scholastic theoreticians of so-called just war,
and Vallas critique of Augustine is aimed equally at them.
In Vallas historiographic retrospective, there is no justification for the
military and territorial expansion undertaken by Rome during its transformation from republic to empire. This applies both to the political realm,
in the domain of human law, and to the historical one, in its teleological
and providential dimensions. Valla supports his position in the following ways.
First, he argues that only a war for the defense of a community or a state
has the possibility of being justified. If, however, a defensive war should
turn into a war of conquest, and thus result in the rule (imperium) of
another community or state, it would be transformed into an injustice. It
would become unjust with regard to natural law and the law of nations as
well as in relation to man as an animal liberum and animal politicum.
Second, the origins of the empire and its expansion from Caesar to
Augustus, and thence to their successors down to Constantine lie in the
oppression and then definitive extinction of the Roman respublica,
the civitas founded on the Senatus Populusque Romanus, the Senate and
the Roman People. For Valla, when Rome became an empire, the original
and authentic sense of what it meant to be Roman Romanitas, the life of
free men and citizens in a political community disappeared forever.
Finally, Augustine sees the coming of Constantine as the acme of
Roman history. The Roman world achieves its providential destiny and
becomes the civilizational seedbed for the historical planting of the
114
Christian religion. For Valla, however, the Constantinian revolution takes

on a meaning of equal historical importancebut one that is diametrically opposed to that assumed by Augustine. His reasoning is as follows. In
the fourth century, from Constantine to Theodosius and his immediate
successors, the religio catholica takes on a particularly imperial aspect.
There is one state and one universal juridical system in the Roman world,
through which, on the one hand, Christianity becomes the supreme and
statutory religion for the whole Roman Empire. On the other hand, the
cult of the gods of Rome decays into a pagan superstition (superstitio gentilium) practiced by those who, according to the Theodosian Code, impiously defile themselves with the error or the crime of a pagan rite.162 The
result of all this, however, in Vallas historical retrospective, was the rupture, if not the historical fall, of the Gospel and of the Community of
Believers in Christ.
Let us rephrase this in Vallas own terms. As the rise of the empire was
made possible by the Caesars suppression of the Roman respublica, thus
the fourth-century construction of the Christian empire was enabled by
the fall, or at least the demotion, of the evangelical ecclesia, i.e. of the
respublica christiana. This historical fall brought with it the repudiation of
primeval Christianity, which had been in accordance with its evangelical
origins. Evangelium is the direct antithesis of any kind of imperium. And
the Christian faith (fides), by its nature (just like every other religious or
secular faith) cannot be imposed by legislative decree or by violating the
human freedom of consent. Nor can it be sucked into the juridical and
political quagmire of ruling by the use of force (imperare ac vim afferre), in
whatever way that occurs.
As stated earlier, Valla gives a further turn to his discourse in the second
part (the final pages) of section V. He hypothetically accepts that the
donation actually occurred, and he takes advantage of this hypothesis to
proceed from the donations absolute (historical and theoretical) impossibility, as argued in section I, to its factual (real, historical) possibility in
section V. The cause of Vallas argument comes to signify something different in the transition from section I to section V: it shifts from the absolute impossibility of the donation to its hypothetical possibility. It also
changes its meaning, for the referent of the Constitutum is no longer the
forger of the document of donation, the fantastic and ahistorical Legenda
Silvestri, but the fourth century of the Christian era.
162Codex Theodosianus XVI.x.21 20 August 399: qui profano pagani ritus errore seu
crimine polluntur. Cf. Storoni Mazzolani, SantAgostino e i pagani, 112ff.
Acutely grasping this new referential meaning of the Constitutum, Valla

uses the tools of critical philology to tease out the more historical and
authentic dimensions of the document of donation. Going well beyond
the forging of the Constitutum, Valla rediscovers the real, historical roots
of the document. That is, he finally penetrates to a context that is truer
and more authentic, more properly befitting the Constitutum: he identifies
the place where the ideological text was first composed and thus the historical moment of the founding of its ecclesiology. But now the Donation
of Constantine understood as the Constantinian revolution of the
fourth century is no longer a fabula, like the forgers Legenda Silvestri or
like the Laterans curial ideology. On the contrary, the forged Donation of
Constantine is a proper historia: the Historia Ecclesiastica as recorded by
Eusebius of Caesarea and Rufinus.
Thus, in the final pages of the fifth section, as if rounding the last switchback on the winding road of his argument, Vallas Oration reaches its destination at the radical critique at once philological and ecclesiological
of the conversion of the Roman Empire from paganism to Christianity.
The Oration ends as a criticism and an outright rejection of the
Constantinian shift, understood on the one hand as the historical fall of
the Gospel and primeval Christianity, and on the other as the origin and
foundation of Western Christianity by means of the transfer of the
empire to the pope in Rome. Thus, moreover, the hypothesis about the
Constitutum, which was assumed but never formally conceded, is transformed in the course of the argument into a statement regarding the real,
historical effectuality of the fourth-century rise of the Constantinian
Church. It is also transformed into an effective criticism of Constantinian
ecclesiology, portrayed with its origins in the City of God and then as fully
theorized and re-elaborated, in a more or less systematic and partially distinct way, by scholastic theology and canon law.
For the purposes of substantiating what has been said so far, let us carry
out as precise an exegesis as possible of this part of the Oration, the final
pages of section V.
All right, let us suppose that Constantine gave and Sylvester was at one time
in possession, but that later either he himself or one of his successors was
removed from possession
thus Valla introduces his hypothesis about the donations factual possibility
Even so, I say that neither divine nor human law enables you to effect a
recovery.
116
[1] In the Old Testament a Hebrew was forbidden to be a slave to a Hebrew
for more than six years [Deut. 15:12], and also every fifty years everything
returned to its original owner [Lev. 25:10ff.];
[2] In the age of grace shall a Christian be oppressed in eternal slavery by
the vicar of Christ, who redeemed us from slavery? What should I say: will he
be recalled to slavery [Gal. 2:4] after he has been made free and long enjoyed
his freedom?163
The final phrase (in italics) contains Vallas most explicit statement on
christiana libertas, which for him is the pivot on which the entire structure
of the Oration hinges. It is from this point that it gains its force against the
Donation of Constantine and the related ecclesial ideology developed by
the papacy and scholasticism. Valla uses human and divine law to substantiate this notion of freedom and to show its deepest foundations.
As for divine law, he first cites the orders of the Torah: personal servitude
of whatever kind had to be dissolved every sixth year, and every fiftieth
year all property (in whatever way acquired) had to be returned to its original owner. The consequence is implicit but clear: even the acceptance of
the Donation whose authenticity was assumed for the sake of argument
in section II had to be subject to these Old Testament ordinances.
Moving on to the divine law of the New Testament, which is fundamentally an economics of saving grace, Valla depicts the Donation in all its
absurdity. The Donation is revealed to be the absolute negation of christiana libertas and to stand in extreme antithesis to Pauls teaching in the
Letter to the Galatians. By accepting the Donation of Constantine, the
vicar of Christ ends up claiming a (spiritual and political) slavery for
Christians in the age of grace. That is, in the age of the economics of salvation he would reduce Christians to the (spiritual and political) subjection of a slave after they had been redeemed and returned to freedom by
Christ himself: he has been made free and long enjoyed his freedom.
Whence flow the historical consequences of the papal and Roman
priesthoods barbaric exercise of power and rule:
I keep quiet about how savage, how violent, how barbarous the domination
of priests often is. If this was unknown previously, it has recently been
163Valla, De falso, 162.114 (86): Age vero, demus Constantinum donasse Silvestrumque
aliquando possedisse, sed postea vel ipsum vel aliquem successorum a possessione deiectum . Tamen dico vos nec iure divino nec iure humano ad recuperationem agere posse.
[1] In lege veteri Hebreus supra sextum annum Hebreo servire vetabatur, et quinquagesimo quoque anno omnia redibant ad pristinum dominum;
[2] tempore gratie Christianus a vicario Christi, redemptoris nostre servitutis, premetur
servitio eterno? quid dicam, revocabitur ad servitutem, postquam liber factus est diuque
potitus libertate? (empasis added) [translation modified].

recognized from that depraved monster, Giovanni Vitelleschi, cardinal and
patriarch, who wearied the sword, by which Peter had cut off the ear from
Malchus, with the blood of Christians. This is the sword by which he too died.164
This domination of priests then deteriorated into an absolute tyranny

over the Christian community. As a result the priesthood lost all the apostolic authority and the status as vicariate of Christ to which it had been
ordained. It follows that such a priesthood could be deposed or repudiated by the Christian community in the name of the Gospel:
Did the people of Israel truly have permission to revolt from the house of
David and Solomon, whom prophets sent by God had anointed, because
their burdens were overwhelming? Did God approve what they did [cf. 1
Kings, 12:24], while we in the face of such tyranny will not have permission to
revolt, especially from those who are not kings and cannot be, and from
those who were shepherds of sheep that is, of souls and have become
thieves and robbers [cf. John 10:1f.]?165
Having completed his critique of the Donation and of Constantinian

ecclesiology in the light of divine law (the Torah and the Gospel), Valla
turns to discussing the Donation and its corresponding ecclesiastical ideology on the basis of human law:
To turn to human law, who is unaware that there is no legal right conferred by
war, or, if there is, it has force only so long as you are in possession of what you
gained by war? For when you lose possession, you have lost your legal claim.
That is why no one customarily goes to court to recover captive prisoners if
they have escaped. The same is true of booty, if the former owners have recovered it. Bees and certain other kinds of flying creatures cannot be recovered if
they have flown away a considerable distance from my private property and
settled in someone elses [cf. Dig. 43,1,3]. When it comes to human beings not
only free creatures but masters over others will you try to reclaim through legal
action those who have asserted their freedom by force and weapons, just as a
person would do to reclaim his cattle, and not by force and weapons?166
164Ibid., 162.14163.2 (86) and Setzs note 448: Sileo, quam sevus, quam vehemens,
quam barbarus dominatus frequenter est sacerdotum. Quod si antea ignorabatur, nuper
est cognitum ex monstro illo atque portento Ioanne Vitellesco cardinale et patriarcha, qui
gladium Petri, quo auriculam Malcho abscidit, in christianorum sanguine lassavit, quo gladio et ipse periit (emphasis added). With his reference to John 18:10, Valla seems to portray
Vitelleschis death as the fulfillment of Christs words to Peter.
165Ibid., 163.39 (86): An vero populis Israel a domo David et Salomonis, quos prophete a Deo missi unxerant, tamen propter graviora onera desciscere licuit factumque eorum
Deus probavit: nobis ob tantam tyrannidem desciscere non licebit? ab iis presertim, qui nec
sunt reges nec esse possunt et qui de pastoribus ovium, id est animarum, facti sunt fures et
latrones (emphasis added).
166Ibid., 163.1020 (87): Et ut ad ius humanum veniam, quis ignorat nullum ius esse bellorum aut, si quod est, tam diu valere quandiu possideas, que bello parasti? Nam cum
118
First, Valla maintains that no right of possession or rule, either territorial

or political, can be legitimately derived from a war of conquest. Second,
assuming but not conceding (a point he will take up later) that such
a right could obtain, no one can claim, for the purposes of restoring to
himself, a possession or rule at one time acquired by force (what you
gained by war) and now lost. Indeed, if the right of emancipation and reacquisition of personal autonomy is valid for brute animals, it will be all
the more valid for human beings. Now, the papacys claims to the restoration of its long-lost rule over the peoples of the Western empire (human
beings not only free creatures but masters over others who have
asserted their freedom by force and weapons) entail the utter subversion
of the right of emancipation, especially since that restoration is claimed
precisely as a right as provided by Constantines donation (just as a person [the Pope] would do to reclaim his cattle [human beings]).
Valla continues:
Nor can you say to me: The Romans justly waged war upon nations, and they
justly deprived them of liberty.
Do not bring me into that debate, lest I be compelled to speak against my
fellow Romans. Yet no crime could have been so serious as to warrant peoples
everlasting slavery, since they have often waged wars through the fault of a
leading man or some great citizen in the respublica and then, after being
defeated, were undeservedly penalized with slavery. The world is full of examples of this sort of thing.167
At this point the Oration takes the form of a series of conflicting arguments
enunciated by the principle interlocutors, who again act in the guise of dramatis personae. One part is played by the pope, who appeals to the Donation
of Constantine to claim his territorial and political rule as a right; the other
by the orator Valla himself who as a citizen of Rome contests the
popes pseudo-right as baseless. Indeed, he denounces it as a usurpation in
possessionem perdis, et ius perdidisti. Ideoque captivos, si fugerint, nemo ad iudicem
repetere solet, etiam nec predas, si eas priores domini receperint. Apes et quedam alia
volucrum genera, si e privato meo longius evolaverint et in alieno desederint, repeti non
queunt: tu homines, non modo liberum animal, sed dominum ceterorum, si se in libertatem
manu et armis asserant, non manu et armis repetes, sed iure, quasi tu homo sis, illi pecudes?
(emphasis added).
167Ibid., 163.20164.8 (87) and Setzs commentary: Neque est quod dicas: Romani iuste
bella nationibus intulerunt iusteque libertate illas exuerunt.
Noli me ad istam vocare questionem, nequid in Romanos meos cogar dicere, quanquam
nullum crimen tam grave esse potuit, ut eternam mererentur populi servitutem, cum eo, quod
sepe culpa principis magni ve alicuius in re publica civis bella gesserunt et victi immerita
servitutis pena affecti sunt. Quorum exemplis plena sunt omnia (emphasis added) [translation modified].
violation of the right, guaranteed by natural law and the law of nations
(and first and foremost of Roman citizens), to natural and civil liberty.
To the orators denial of legitimacy, in the name of human law, to any
war of conquest, the pope, as heir to the empire, responds with
Augustines justification of Romes subjection of peoples: the Romans
justly waged war upon nations, and they justly deprived them of liberty.
As Setz has noted, this is a reference to book IV, chapter 15 of Augustines
City of God (Setz has also noted that this passage is used by Gratian in the
Decretum, C. XXII q. 2.).168 It seems worthwhile to dig deeper into the
meaning and the implications of this reference to Augustine, a reference
introduced as the objection of Vallas dramatic antagonist, the pope.
We should first observe that the phrase, the Romans justly waged war
upon nations ), is not a precise quotation but rather an abbreviated
formulation of what Augustine said in book IV (chapters 115) of the City
of God. What is more, although the phrase is a deduction based on what
Augustine wrote, it should have been precluded by Augustines statements to the contrary in chapter 14 of the very same book. For Augustine
offers no defense whatsoever for the theoretical or actual lawfulness of the
war of conquest. In point of fact, he writes eloquently and profoundly
against it. He condemns all types of war in favor of the most peaceful
cohabitation possible among peoples and cities (for example, in chapter 7
of book XIX of the City of God). On the contrary, Augustine considers the
justification of the wars of conquest of the Romans in particular, who
were forced to conquer and rule other peoples on account of those peoples injustice. Indeed, the Romans could not otherwise have defended
their own respublica founded on law and freedom, nor would it have been
possible to extend to the barbarian peoples Roman justice and law, the
bases of civil and political freedom and thus of romana libertas. Thus the
Roman empire sprang from the will to justice and freedom. Its expansion
was the inevitable product of its victories, of good fortune, and of the
destiny of the city of Rome. For into the Roman empires progressive journey Augustine inscribes the providential, divine plan for the coming of
Christianity.
Augustine concedes, however, that it would have been better had the
empire never existed. He would have preferred for concord among peoples to have permitted a multiplicity, even of various forms, of autonomous and free kingdoms and cities, communities and states, none subject
to another. But such was not permitted by the goddess Injustice, who
168Ibid., 164, n. 455.
120
held sway among the enemy peoples hostile to Rome. For their part, the
Romans were constrained almost by necessity whether considered
in the light of their own common good or that of the enemy peoples
themselves to conquer and rule other cities and nations, all for the purpose of endowing them with Roman justice.
Augustines premises, when developed by Gratians canon law and the
political thought of scholasticism, had led to the thesis of just war. Valla
critiques these premises minutely, then, in order to combat the theory of
just war at its root. First, he argues that Romes expansionist wars were
not provoked by the hostilities of other peoples towards the Romans. The
true reasons for which the Romans waged wars of conquest are to be found
solely in the fault of a leading man or some great citizen in the respublica.
Valla, it is true, declares his intention not to overstep the bounds of historical analysis: do not bring me into that debate, lest I be compelled to
speak against my fellow Romans. But this suspension of judgment is
purely formal. It is a rhetorical figure that actually functions to highlight
his own personal judgment. For Valla and these are his own terms no
matter why Romes wars (defensive or offensive) were waged and eventually won, they should never have led to the rule and subjection of conquered peoples. Nevertheless this is what happened, against the right of
nations: no offense could have been so serious as to warrant peoples
everlasting slavery.
Furthermore, Vallas formal reluctance to universally condemn Roman
military expansionism allows him to emphasize better the real reasons
that, according to his historical reflection, underlie the truer origins of the
wars of conquest and the subsequent rule over other peoples: they have
often waged wars through the fault of a leading man or some great
[Roman] citizen in the respublica and then, after being defeated, were
undeservingly penalized with slavery. The origins, therefore, of Romes
expansionism, of the foundation of the empire, and of the subjection of
other peoples, are for Valla to be found in the power acquired within the
civitas romana itself by historically identifiable leading men and great
citizens. This power was assumed in opposition to the Senatus Populusque
Romanus and was therefore subversive of the respublica and of civil liberty. So, the subjection of peoples to the rule of Rome, and their resulting
loss of autonomy and civil liberty, were the direct political and historical
consequences of the subjection and destruction of the Roman republic. It
remains only to observe the historical reprisal of the law of nature itself,
which makes itself felt every time that law is broken by the violence of
power and rule.
Valla now elevates his discourse on the history of Rome to the theoretical level in order to incorporate further support for his personal judgment
of the citys military and political expansion:
Nor in truth is it assured by the law of nature that one people subjugate another.
We can instruct others and persuade them. We cannot rule over them using
force, unless, abandoning our humanity, we want to imitate the wilder beasts
which impose their bloody imperium upon the weaker, as the lion upon
quadrupeds, the eagle upon birds, and the dolphin upon fish. But even these
creatures do not make claims upon their own kind, but upon lesser breeds.
We ought to do this all the more, and a man should scrupulously respect
another man, since as Quintilian said, no creature on earth is so fierce that it
does not revere the likes of itself [ps.-Quintilian, Declamatio XII.27].169
Valla had written above that there is no baser crime than the subjection of
a community or a people. In the passage cited here, he reaffirms that it is
a crime against nature to subject a people to ones own rule and power,
depriving it of political independence and civil liberty. It violates the specific nature of humanitas.
Vallas discourse now takes the form of a clarification of the vast semantic range he finds in the term humanitas. Here he continues a point made
in section I, where he quotes a relevant passage from Ciceros De amicitia
(13,48). For Valla, the meaning of humanitas can be understood by reflecting on the binary opposition between praecipere/exhortari (instructing/
persuading) and imperare/vim afferre (ruling/using force). This binary
opposition evinces a contradiction between terms and correlative functions concerning the essence of humanitas: the first element (praecipere/
exhortari) is a requirement of humanity, while the second (imperare/vim
afferre) is a negation and an annihilation of it. The two sides are utterly
and mutually exclusive.
It should be noted that persuasion, or exhortari (when practiced with
fellow humans), is understood as an integral component of instructing, or
praecipere. Thus Valla considers the art of rhetoric, as the technique or
strategy of persuasion, to be the supreme art of human communication
and learning. It is the (one and only) preferred instrument for transactions
169Ibid., 164.919 (88): Neque vero lege nature comparatum est, ut populus sibi populum subigat. Precipere aliis eosque exhortari possumus, imperare illis ac vim afferre non possumus, nisi relicta humanitate velimus ferociores beluas imitari, que sanguinarium in
infirmiores imperium exercent, ut leo in quadrupedes, aquila in volucres, delphinus in
pisces. Veruntamen he belue non in suum genus sibi ius vindicant, sed in inferius. Quod
quanto magis faciendum nobis est et homo homini religioni habendus, cum, ut M. Fabius
inquit, nulla supra terras adeo rabiosa belua, cui non imago sua sancta sit (emphasis
added) [translation modified].
122
on all levels in human relationships. The exercise of power over fellow

human beings (imperare), on the other hand, is essentially an act of violence (vim afferre). Without violence there is no power of rule, nor can
there be any. And since every exercise of human violence is in itself
(self)-destructive of man in his particular nature human violence is an
antinomy whose terms mutually deny each other the use of violence on
other human beings constitutes at the same time a transgression of human
nature into the realm of animal brutality. Indeed, it is unworthy even of
the animal kingdom. For there, violence and the power of rule are exercised not among beasts equal in kind but by superior ones on their inferiors: the wilder beasts impose their bloody imperium upon the weaker,
as the lion upon quadrupeds, the eagle upon birds, and the dolphin upon
fish. Let us not miss Vallas biting irony here, which underlies his comparison of behavior in the animal world with that found in the perverted
relations of the human community.
Vallas examples are neither literary quotations nor erudite citations on
the three species of fauna. They are an explicit reference to ancient imperial heraldry, still widely known today. The lion, the eagle, and the dolphin
had always been the preferred emblems of imperial supremacy and rule,
long before they were taken up (in Vallas time and thereafter) by the great
dynasties of Europe in their bid for the crown of the Holy Roman Empire.
Imperial heraldry provides Valla with an extremely meaningful expression of and one perfectly apt to represent emblematically the bloody
imperium of the pretenders to the throne.170
Vallas historical reflection establishes that the violence of power and
domination (vim affere), within the human community, shows itself to be
essential and intrinsic to imperare and a direct consequence of animalization and the loss of humanitas: abandoning our humanity, as his text
reads. Against the historical reality that man is a wolf to man (homo
homini lupus),171 Valla repeats the ethical and political imperative of the
humanist perspective: a man should scrupulously respect another man.
This is because, despite possible defects in humanitas proper, at either an
individual or a collective level, man will never become a creature so fierce
as to cease to revere the likes of itself.
170Cf. Pierio Valeriano, Hieroglyphica, (Lugduni [Lyon]: Sumptibus Pauli Frelon, 1602)
(reprint = New York: Garland, 1976); and Percy Ernst Schramm, Herrschaftszeichen und
Staatssymbolik, 3 vols. (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 19541956), sub vocibus.
171[The phrase man is a wolf to man (homo homini lupus) is a Roman commonplace
first attested in Plautus, Asinaria, 495. Eds.]
Valla offered a similar treatment of the nature of man in relation to that

of brute animals in the first book of his Repastinatio, which can be considered a parallel passage to the Oration. There he defined that relationship
according to cognitive and rational capacities, making the following
points. A brute animal is a living being endowed with cognitive capacities;
however, it is mute and without speech. Man is a living creature capable
of cognition that exists as a rational being and is distinguished by the
peculiar quality of being the creator of language. Man, then, exists and
differentiates himself in the animal kingdom not so much as an animal
rationale (a rational animal, according to the Aristotelian and scholastic
conception) but properly and essentially as an animal loquens, a speaking
animal.172
At the end of his treatment in the Repastinatio, and as a final proof for
his definition of man, Valla cited the first chapter of the book of Genesis,
where the Scripture says that man and woman were created by the divine
word in the image and likeness of God. In section V of the Oration, when
treating man as an animal liberum and, as such, as distinguished from
brute animals, Valla cites not Genesis but his favorite Quintilian (for us, in
this case, known to be pseudo-Quintilian). He takes his ethical and political concepts from the author of the Declamationes: no creature on earth
is so fierce that it does not revere the likes of itself. As if compelled by his
own method and the context of his argument, Valla seems to draw on the
rhetorical literature of the Romano-Hellenistic world in order to further
bolster and more clearly define his conception of humanitas.
It is precisely within this conception of humanitas that Valla goes well
beyond Augustines position (in favor of the Romans) and absolutely
undermines any and all possible justification for wars of conquest aimed
at rule. He denies and repudiates such a justification both on the ethical
and political level and in the retrospective of historical events. His judgment on the historical processes of Roman expansionism in all time
periods from republican Rome to the empire of the Caesars to the contemporary papacy ends up being aimed against the polar opposite positions of Augustine and his scholastic and medieval successors. In this
sense Valla writes, following his citation of pseudo-Quintilian:
There are therefore four reasons for making war: (1) to avenge a wrong and
defend friends, (2) fear of incurring a disaster in the future if the strength of
others is allowed to grow, (3) the expectation of booty, (4) a desire for glory. Of
172Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Repastinatio, 225ff.
124
these the first is, to some extent, honorable, the second less so, and the last
two in no way at all.173
Beyond stating an ethical and political position, expressed here so clearly

and firmly by Valla and almost a prelude to Erasmus Dulce bellum inexpertis (Adagia)174 this passage is meant to continue the critique of books
IV and V of Augustines City of God. Valla begins by barely admitting the
theoretical and political justifiability of wars for individual and collective
defense, and then extending it, although with less authority, to similar
defensive wars. Then he unleashes a firm condemnation on wars of conquest of any kind, whether directed by strategies for expanding territorial
and/or political rule, or motivated by the acquisition of riches and/or the
ambition for power and glory. Hence Vallas discourse proceeds:
In fact wars were frequently launched against the Romans, but after they
had defended themselves they waged wars against their enemies and others
too, and no nation has come under their domination without being conquered and subjected in war how rightly or for what reason is theirs to know.
I would not wish to condemn them for having fought unjustly, nor to acquit
them for acting justly. I would only say that the Romans made war on others for
the same reason as most peoples and kings, and that those who were attacked
and conquered in war had the same license to defect from the Romans as they
had from other masters, so that all authority not be assigned something no
one would accept to the most ancient peoples, who were the first masters,
in other words to those who first took away the property of others.175
Here, too, Valla observes his formal dictum: to suspend all value judgments regarding Romes wars on other peoples. And he repeats here what
was said above in nearly the same exact terms. Valla does not want to
speak about the justice or injustice of Roman wars of conquest.
173Valla, De falso, 164.19165.2 (88): Itaque quattuor fere cause sunt, ob quas bella inferuntur. [1] aut ob ulciscendam iniuriam defendendosque amicos, [2] aut timore accipiende
postea calamitatis, si vires aliorum augeri sinantur, [3] aut spe prede, [4] aut glorie cupiditate. Quarum prima nonnihil honesta, secunda parum, due posteriores nequaquam honeste
sunt (emphasis added).
174See Desiderius Erasmus, Adagia. Sei saggi politici in forma di proverbi, ed. Silvana
Seidel Menchi (Torino: Einaudi, 1980), 195295 (Latin text with facing Italian translation),
with the introduction and commentary by Seidel Menchi.
175Valla, De falso, 165.314 (88): Et Romanis quidem illata fuere frequenter bella, sed,
postquam se defenderant, et illis et aliis ipsi intulerunt, nec ulla gens est, que dicioni
eorum cesserit nisi bello victa et domita, quam recte aut qua causa ipsi viderint. Eos ego
nolim nec damnare tanquam iniuste pugnaverint, nec absolvere tanquam iuste. Tantum
dicam eadem ratione Romanos ceteris bella intulisse qua reliqui populi regesque, atque ipsis,
qui bello lacessiti victique sunt, licuisse deficere a Romanis, ut ab aliis dominis defecerunt, ne
forte, quod nemo diceret, imperia omnia ad vetustissimos illos, qui primi domini fuere,
idest qui primi preripuere aliena, referantur (emphasis added).
It will be useful to recall what this suspension of judgment actually

means. On the one hand it underlies Vallas critique of Augustine regarding the historical and providential justification of Romes destiny. On the
other it operates as a rhetorical figure that actually emphasizes Vallas
historico-political criticism of Roman military expansionism. And this is
the point to which he leads his discourse.
Romes military and political expansionism had to result in its own
defeat, which is exactly what happened. The very will to justice that had
brought Rome, often in a self-serving way, to conquer and subject other
peoples to its own rule eventually determined the revolt of the conquered
against this subjection. Indeed, these peoples separated from Rome or
rebelled against its rule in order to recover their original autonomy and
civil and political freedom. They acted in accord with their right to freedom as guaranteed by natural law and the law of nations the freedom, in
fact, of romana libertas, from which the republic itself had sprung.
This is Vallas historico-political assessment of the fall of the empire.
Flavio Biondo a humanist very close to Valla, who shared both his friendship and his study of ancient and modern Roman history had pointed to
the end of Romes universal rule as the definitive decline of the Roman
Empire (inclinatio Romani imperii).176 Valla turns Biondos vision of history around, approaching the issue from the other side. The fall of the
empire began with the political and military renewal and reemergence of
its subject peoples and neighbors. The Gothic and barbarian peoples,
once subjected to the rule of Rome, rise against Roman imperialism to
claim and recover their lost autonomy and freedom, to impose in place
of the Roman versions their own right and their own justice.
But there is more, proceeds Valla, bringing his argument to a crescendo
of fabulous effect: if the peoples claim to autonomy was fully legitimate
with regard to the republic, even more so was the claim to liberty with
regard to the empire of the Caesars and the Caesarism of Constantine,
and, a fortiori, so is that against the Constantinian Caesarism adopted and
embodied by the Roman papacy:
176[The title of Biondos history of medieval Italy and Europe was Historiarum ab inclinatione romani imperii decades (finished 1453), on which see Angelo Mazzocco, Decline
and Rebirth in Bruni and Biondo, in Paolo Brezzi and Maristella de Panizza Lorch (eds.),
Umanesimo a Roma nel Quattrocento (Roma: Istituto di Studi Romani, 1984), 249266;
Denys Hay, Flavio Biondo and the Middle Ages, Proceedings of the British Academy 45
(1960): 97128, reprinted in idem, Renaissance Essays (London: Hambledon, 1988), 3266;
and Riccardo Fubini, Biondo Flavio, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani 10 (1968): 536539.
Eds.]
126
And yet the Roman people had a stronger claim over nations conquered in
war than the emperors who demolished the Republic. Accordingly, if it was
right for nations to revolt from Constantine and, even more, from the Roman
people, it will certainly be right to revolt from the man to whom Constantine
surrendered his authority. To speak too boldly, if the Romans were free to expel
Constantine as they did Tarquin or to kill him as they did Julius Caesar, all the
more will the Romans and the provinces be free to kill that man, whoever he
may be, who has taken Constantines place. True as this is, it goes beyond my
subject, and therefore I want to restrain myself and not exploit anything that
I have said except this: it is foolish to apply a verbal claim where there is
armed force, because anything acquired by force is lost by force.177
Vallas text, always extremely dense, here has particular need of explication, above all to highlight the shifts that shape the course of the Oration.
The Caesars, in Vallas view, were responsible for subduing the respublica
to their command and then suppressing it altogether. Now, if the people
subject to Rome had full right to claim their territorial and political autonomy from the republic, all the more so, Valla continues, could they exercise that right to freedom by rising against the empire, based as it was on
the Caesars innovations in political and civil structures. Indeed, the
Caesars had appropriated for themselves the republics conquests (in
themselves already illicit) after stripping the autonomy and freedom from
the Senate and the People of Rome, the civil and institutional foundations
of the republic.
But these subject peoples, formerly in revolt against the empire, would
now have even greater reason to rebel against the papacy, to which the
last and most imperial of the Caesars (Constantine with his monarchism)
decided to bequeath, as if his own inheritance, the right to rule over Rome
and the Western Empire. And as it would have been fully licit for the
Romans to banish Constantine from their City for betraying the respublica
(as happened with Tarquinius Superbus) or rather to kill him (as happened with Julius Caesar, the founder of the Augustan clan), thus now it
would be licit and legitimate for the citizens of Rome and the Roman
provinces to banish or kill Constantines direct successor, the Roman
177Valla, De falso, 165.1427 (8889): Et tamen melius in victis bello nationibus populo
Romano quam Cesaribus rem publicam opprimentibus ius est. Quocirca si fas erat gentibus
a Constantino et, quod multo plus est, a populo Romano desciscere, profecto et ab eo fas erit,
cuicunque cesserit ille ius suum. Atque ut audacius agam, si Romanis licebat Constantinum
aut exigere ut Tarquinum aut occidere ut Iulium Cesarem, multo magis eum vel Romanis vel
provinciis licebit occidere, qui in locum Constantini utcunque successit. Hoc et si verum, tamen
ultra causam meam est, et iccirco me reprimere volo nec aliud ex his colligere que dixi, nisi
ineptum esse, ubi armorum vis est, ibi ius quenquam afferre verborum, quia quod armis
acquiritur, idem rursus armis amittitur (emphasis added) [translation modified].
pope: all the more will the Romans and the provinces be free to kill that man,
whoever he may be, who has taken Constantines place.
It should also be noted that this trenchant observation is introduced by
a qualifying to speak too boldly (ut audacius agam), with which Valla
emphasizes (and he will insist on it again in the peroration), that he in no
way intends to solicit violence from anyone against the pope. This is not
only because the force of violence does not establish (nor is it capable of
establishing) any right, but also, and above all, because anything acquired
by force is lost by force.
With this last declaration (because anything acquired by force is lost
by force), Valla has reused almost verbatim (from section I of the Oration)
the final words of the Senates speech dissuading Constantine from effecting the Donation. He does so to make definitively explicit that the hypothesis of the donation has by now become its thesis as a real event. It is a
reality brought about by history, and it took place in the fourth-century
shift also an historical occurrence marked by the political and religious
convergence between Christianity, the pope, and the empire.
Valla has thus called into question the very foundations, and more precisely the Christian premises themselves, of Augustines historical assessment. Thus he has also radically de-theologized the Bishop of Hippos
historical retrospective. Augustine had posited an evangelical preparation (praeparatio evangelica) in Romes shift from republic to empire,
thus rendering it the providential juncture for the rise of Christianity,
constituted by the foundation of a Romano-Christian empire and the victory over paganism announced by Constantine and his successors. Valla
denies this is the case and in so doing arrives at the following conclusions.
First, the gospel can give rise only to a church of believers founded on
christiana libertas (saving grace) and thus a community of believers in
Christ that is constituted as a respublica christiana. Second, Constantines
conversion of the Roman empire into a Christian empire was in reality the
definitive historical fall both of the civil and political libertas of the Roman
republic and of the evangelical libertas of the new respublica christiana.
Third, the Bishop of Rome, from the succession from Christ (the apostolic and evangelical vicariate of Christ) lapses into the succession from
Caesar, so that the pope is the new High Priest of imperial Rome and the
Augustus of the Western Empire.
These developments, in Vallas description, created a new historical
reality: the Roman papacy with its primacy and imperial hegemony, both
juridico-political and spiritual, over the West. But the papacys inheritance,
Valla goes on to reflect critically, was the inheritance of imperial Rome,
128
erected by the Caesars down to Constantine on the ashes of the Roman

republic. Consequently, the very historical process that eventually assailed
the empire (particularly in the West) would come around to the papacy
in turn.
With the decline of the empire, Romes imperial rule is shattered, as it
were, by its subject peoples, who rise up to recover their freedom and
autonomy. And in this way, the decline of the empire could be defined as
the historical nemesis of the republican romana libertas that was
oppressed by the Caesars and the emperors. But with the same decline of
the empire, crisis will also come to the imperial primacy of the papacy,
i.e. to the juridical and spiritual rule, or hegemony, bequeathed to it in the
fourth century. What is more, the crisis of the papacys imperial rule
together with that of the Western Empire will come, more severely, with
the rise of peoples never conquered by or subjected to Rome: the Goths
and the Germanic peoples, who end up participating in the configuration
of the Roman West.
The Goths were new peoples for the empire, fought by the Romans but
never brought under their domination. Settling within the empires borders, they became a part of it despite maintaining their autonomy and
political and national identity. With the conquest of imperial Rome they
rose in the course of the centuries to become the dominant peoples of the
Western Empire.
What is more, the Goths occupied Rome in 410 and were the first to
master and conquer the empire. Rome, however, was saved by this
destruction, because on the ashes of its pagan idols rose the City of the
new Christianity, in which the Goths participated as believers in the new
religion. This is Augustines original interpretation of the historical event
that inspired not only the opening of the City of God but the whole of its
historical and theological argumentation on the destinies of Rome and
the Roman Empire.
Against Augustine, Valla emphasizes that these Goths, who were
opposed to and fought against Roman imperialism, could not have
accepted the primacy of the Roman papacy, much less become its subjects. As a matter of fact, they would come to oppose the papacys pretenses to political and religious sovereignty over the Western Empire,
precisely the sovereignty of which the pope had made himself heir on the
basis of the first Christian emperors presumed transfer of the empire.
With this argument, however, Valla also emphasizes other historical
motives underlying the Constitutum. The pope uses Constantines
conversionand donation of the empire to legitimate his own primacy and
to have his imperial hegemony accepted as well, and perhaps most of all,
by the Germanic peoples. He will also have to adduce the same reasons to
have his universal power recognized by all those cities and nations that, in
the process of the empires crumbling, had arrived at their own civil and
political freedom, their own autonomy and self-government, with the
installation of urban seignories or national monarchies. The West had
become a map of juridical and political autonomies, of communes, of cities and nations after the fall of the Roman Empire. They had set themselves up as sovereign states precisely for the purpose of defense from the
barbarian invasions that followed the collapse of the empire and of central government at Rome.
Now, if the Germanic peoples who had inherited the empire, along with
the cities, nations, and states that had emerged from the wreck of imperial
government, had affirmed with a fresh will and energy and also often
with arms their personal autonomy and identity against the universal empire and absolute rule of the Caesars, then these same cities,
nations,and states were spurred to reaffirm, perhaps more steadfastly and
willfully, their freedom and sovereignty against the papacys imperialChristian rule, the new tyranny of the pope. Thus Valla writes:
It is foolish to apply a verbal claim [i.e. the Constitutum and its derivatives]
where there is armed force . All the more since other new nations (as we
have learned about the Goths), nations never subject to Roman rule, have
occupied Italy and many provinces after driving out the original inhabitants:
what is the justice in making them slaves, which they never were, particularly since they are victors and would perhaps be slaves of the people they
conquered? At the same time, if any cities and nations which were deserted by
the emperor, as we know happened, considered it necessary, as the barbarians
were approaching, to choose a king under whose leadership they won a victory,
should they depose this man from his position? Should they order his sons,
esteemed as much for their fathers advocacy as for their own virtue, to be
reduced to private status? So that they might be once again subject to a
Roman emperor, particularly when they were in great need of the sons support and hoped for help from no other source?
If that emperor or Constantine were to come back to life or the Senate and
the Roman People were to summon them to a general tribunal, such as the
Amphictyons had in Greece, he would be immediately rebuffed on his first plea,
because he was calling back into dependence and slavery those who had been
formerly deserted by him as their protector, those who had been living for a long
time under another ruler, those who had never been subject to a foreign king,
those who were, in short, born to freedom and laid claim to their freedom by the
strength of their minds and bodies. Hence it is clear that if the emperor and the
Roman people are excluded from reclaiming their control, the Pope is excluded
much more decisively, and if other nations that were under Rome are free either
130
to create their king or maintain a republic, the Roman people is much more
free, especially in opposition to the new tyranny of the Pope.178
This incisive passage constitutes the final part of section V, which should,
as I have already hinted, be considered the effective conclusion of Vallas
entire discourse on the Donation. The closing of section V encapsulates
the whole meaning of the Oration. It highlights (1) Vallas dissent (his
personal ethical stance) towards Constantinian ecclesiology, and (2) the
fundamental premise (his objective understanding of that ecclesiology)
underlying both his philologico-historical considerations and the course
of his rhetorical argumentation.
It must be added immediately, however, that Vallas personal dissent
comes to coincide, if not to be identified with, that fundamental premise of
the Oration. Indeed, this dissent is the very freedom posed by Valla the orator, the Roman citizen who stands up to contest the papal rule of Rome;
and the fundamental premise underlying the whole critical discourse on the
pseudo-Donation is itself also freedom: the romana libertas of the respublica,
destroyed by the empire of the Caesars, and the christiana libertas of the
Gospel (Evangelium), suppressed by the papacys Constantinian primacy.
In the final analysis, Vallas speech is revealed as a study of historical
retrospection and reflection with unquestionably critical aspects on
the fourth century and the major events that constituted its historical
significance: the coming of Constantine and his conversion, and the
resulting Constantinian foundation of the Christian empire in connection
178Ibid., 165.25167.3 (89): ineptum esse, ubi armorum vis est, ibi ius quenquam
afferre verborum . Eo quidem magis, quod alie nove gentes ut de Gothis accepimus
que nunquam sub imperio Romano fuerunt, fugatis veteribus incolis Italiam et multas provincias occuparunt, quas in servitutem revocari, in qua nunquam fuerunt, que tandem
equitas est, presertim victrices et fortasse a victis? Quo tempore si que urbes ac nationes, ut
factum fuisse scimus, ab imperatore deserte ad barbarorum adventum necesse habuerunt
deligere sibi regem, sub cuius auspiciis victoriam reportarunt: nunquid hunc postea a principatu deponerent? aut eius filios tum commendatione patris tum propria virtute favorabiles
iuberent esse privatos? ut iterum sub Romano principe essent, maxime cum eorum opera
assidue indigerent et nullum aliunde auxilium sperarent?
Hos si Cesar ipse aut Constantinus ad vitam reversus aut etiam Senatus Populusque
Romanus ad commune iudicium, quale in Grecia Amphictyonum fuit, vocaret, prima statim
actione repelleretur, quod a se olim custode desertos, quod tam diu sub alio principe degentes,
quod nunquam alienigene regi subditos, quod denique homines libertati natos et in libertatem robore animi corporisque assertos ad famulatum servitiumque reposceret, ut appareat, si
Cesar, si populus Romanus a repetendo exclusus est, multo vehementius papam esse exclusum, et si licet aliis nationibus, que sub Roma fuerunt, aut regem sibi creare aut rem publicam
tenere, multo magis id licere populo Romano, precipue adversus novam pape tyrannidem
(emphasis added) [translation modified]. I would like to thank Charles Till Davis (cited
above in n. 103) for his attentive, pointed, and critical reading of my manuscript, which has
given me greater insight into the comparison between Augustine and Valla.
with the religio catholica and the Roman papacy. Vallas historical judgment
of these events comes, therefore, to stand in opposition to the one expressed
variously by the Christian writers and rhetoricians of that age and the next.
Specifically, Valla has his eye on the range of authors from Eusebius of
Caesarea and Rufinus (Ecclesiastical History), along with Lactantius (On the
Deaths of the Persecutors), down to Augustine (City of God).
Valla reaches his own historical and critical assessment of the fourth
century by means of a rhetorical argumentative strategy supplemented
by critical techniques. With his initial historico-philological reinterpretation of the Constitutum its immediate contextual and infratextual
dimensions Valla establishes the temporal dimension of the document
of donation down to the remote past, to the outer margins of its origins.
Panofsky assimilated Albertis geometric perspective (as the rediscovery
of the third dimension of space) to Vallas philological retrospective of history (as the rediscovery of the third dimension of time), which the humanist created through the morphological and semantic analysis of classical
literature (humanae litterae).179 And in fact, in his Oration on the Donation
of Constantine Valla does identify the Constitutums most proper historical place, and he reveals its origins openly in the most adequate and true
temporal dimension possible. By retracing the complex and multiform
tradition of Constantinian ecclesiology in canon law and theology, Valla
arrives at the impulse for that tradition: the fourth-century appropriation
of Christianity by Constantine and his successors.
The multiple aspects of the Orations overall meaning, which we have
tried to explain here, as well as the importance of its historico-philological
critique of the Constitutum, were fully understood by the canon lawyers
and scholastic theologians of Vallas time. Those of them who were
strongly critical of Valla, in addition to humanist writers and other attentive readers of the text, reacted to specific sections of the Oration with
arguments that were often as insightful as they were erudite. The texts
greatest historical impact, however, was felt in the following century, in
the first decades of the Cinquecento with the coming of the Reformation.
The Oration was first printed and popularized by Ulrich von Hutten in
1518/19.180 Luther knew the text, profoundly absorbed it, and was busy
reworking it for his written manifestos already in 1520/21. Its presence can
179Cf. Erwin Panofsky, Renaissance and Renascences in Western Art (London: Paladin,
1970), 108.
180[Actually, the first printed edition was issued in 1506. It was, however, little noticed
and is now very rare (G.W. Bowersock, Introduction, in Valla, On the Donation of
132
be felt particularly in his To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation.

Vallas falsification of Constantines donation and pseudo-Constitutum
would inspire politico-ecclesiological considerations in thinkers like von
Hutten and Luther, who would more than once take up the theme of the
Roman Churchs Konstantinheit (Constantinity). It thus indirectly sparked
that ages criticism of the papacy and assisted in the renewal of the German
nation and its juridical and spiritual autonomy within Christendom.
In fact, the juridical and spiritual autonomy that Luther and the
entire Reformation had demanded from the papacy was founded on an
originaland profoundly evangelical ecclesiology of christiana libertas, set
within an ecumenical and multi-confessional vision embracing all of
Christendom. But Luthers quite innovative conception of christiana libertas also owes a debt to the equally radical evangelical overtones of Vallas
Oration. To see this, we need only consider a few specific passages of the
Oration, such as, for example, the radical antinomy Valla posits between
imperium and evangelium in section I. Or, regarding christiana libertas, we
could think of Vallas treatments in section V: his historico-political analysis of the Pactum Hludovicianum (first part of the section) and his critique
of Augustines City of God regarding the rise of the Goths within the confines of the Romano-Christian empire (second part of the section). These
passages of the Oration, in which Valla presents as clearly as possible the
crisis pertaining to the Roman papacy and Western Christendom, would
have a strong effect first on Von Hutten and then on Luther. The
Reformations protest was, in fact, the most radical evangelical and ecclesiological criticism of the papacys absolute primacy in jurisdiction and
orthodoxy. It constituted the most complete rejection of the Church of
Rome in its guise of Constantinian Caesaropapism.
With noteworthy documentary contributions, Wolfram Setz has
already traced this history of the reception, diffusion, and reinterpretation
of Vallas Oration in the first decades of the Reformation. Setz has also
highlighted the humanist Cochlaeus criticism of Luthers reading of
Vallas work, namely that Luther self-servingly used elements of the
Oration that supported his own political and theological criticism of the
papacy. Yet Setzs observations on this count must be elaborated upon
and expanded in the light of the reinterpretation of Vallas text offered in
the present essay.181
Constantine, vixv, at ix). For all intents and purposes, it was von Huttens edition that
secured the Orations fame. Eds.]
181Setz, Lorenzo Vallas Schrift, 151176.
Cochlaeus was undoubtedly right when he noted that Luthers interpretation of the Oration did not adhere to Vallas specific arguments in criticism of the papacy or to the (explicit and/or implicit) intentions of Vallas
text. No different from Cochlaeus, in this respect, were certain preeminent
theorists of controversialist (and still pre-Tridentine) anti-Reformation
theology such as Augustino Steuco and Giovanmaria dei Tolosani.
Although Vallas humanism (together with that of Erasmus) was in their
view linked in many ways to Luthers ecclesiological criticism, they never
claimed an operative, fully continuous connection between Vallas Oration
and Luthers writings against the papacy.182 What is more, the judgmentshared by Steuco and Tolosani reveals an awareness on the part of
contemporaries critical of both Luther and of humanism, and especially
of Valla that seems the most authoritative verification of what Coch
laeus had discerned. Indeed, as far as these critics were concerned,
Vallas Oration was not, nor could it be, the premise leading to Luthers
conclusion that the pope was the incarnation of the Antichrist, as Luther
would write (for example) in the Vorrede to the Apocalypse of his Biblia
deudsch for the Oration was founded completely on the presumption
that the Bishop of Rome is the vicar of Christ.183
Moreover, Cochlaeuss point of view, like that of the controversialist
theologians Steuco and Tolosani, constitutes further exemplary evidence
of humanist cultures autonomy, as Charles Trinkaus has written, with
regard first to the Reformation and then to the Counter-Reformation.
Renaissance humanism both in Italy and north of the Alps in the early
sixteenth century was a literary, philosophical, and theological culture
with its own distinct features. It came into its own, above all in the camps
of theology and politics, rather as what Delio Cantimori has called the
heresy of the sixteenth century and what Friedrich Heer identifies as the
third power of ideas and practices in the Confessional Age (between
the pluralist Reformation and the unitary Counter-Reformation).184
182Camporeale, Giovanni Tolosani, O.P., e la teologia antiumanistica agli inizi della
Riforma, 809831; Ronald Keith Delph, Italian Humanism in the Early Reformation:
Agostino Steuco (14971548) (Ph.D. dissertation in History, University of Michigan), 1987,
esp. ch. 3: Humanist Scholarship in Defence of Papal Supremacy (pp. 218326).
183Camporeale, Giovanmaria dei Tolosani O.P.: 15301546. Umanesimo, Riforma e teologia controversista, 216227 (= idem, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo, riforma e controriforma,
416428).
184Delio Cantimori, Eretici italiani del Cinquecento (Firenze: Sansoni, 1939); Friedrich
Heer, Die Dritte Kraft. Der europische Humanismus zwischen den Fronten des Konfessionellen
Zeitalters (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1959); Charles Trinkaus, The Scope of Renaissance
Humanism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983).
134
Vallas philological and historical humanism must be seen within these

historico-cultural parameters. The Oration on the pseudo-Donation thus
becomes an emblematic case. Vallas text, among the most important of
Italian humanism generally, proposes the most radical criticism of the
papal politics and ecclesiology of the first half of the fifteenth century.
And yet it cannot be understood as the necessary premise to, even if it is
quite suggestive of, the corresponding politics and ecclesiology of Martin
Luther. On the contrary, Vallas Oration, despite its warm reception among
the reformers, would always remain an autonomous proposal and a distinct position (albeit the losing alternative) with respect to the opposite
poles of Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the ruling horizons of
Christendom in the first half of the sixteenth century.185
8.Epilogue: Vallas Defense of the Oration in his Letters to
Cardinals Trevisan and Landriani
This essay began with a letter sent by Ambrogio Traversari to Valla in 1433,
in which the Camaldolese monk responded to his reading of De voluptate,
which Valla had submitted to his judgment. There he expressed his admiration for the young humanist and assented both to his freedom in criticizing the philosophers of the past and to his willingness to take up an
equally critical consideration of contemporary ethics. I would like now to
conclude this study with the reinterpretation of two letters, both written
by Valla himself in defense of the Oration on the Donation of Constantine.
These pages from Vallas correspondence are of particular importance.
There we find his justification for refusing to recant even in the least
degree what he had written regarding the document of donation. We
read of the personal and cultural motivations that lie at the origin of his
text. And finally, we learn the profound and pregnant meaning that Valla
accorded to the work that he addressed with such frankness to the papacy
and Christendom of his age.
These two letters briefly mentioned in the opening pages of this
essay have a particular context that determines their importance for
Vallas personal and intellectual autobiography as it was written across
the whole of his correspondence. After years of exile from Rome, Valla
185See Paolo Prodi, Il sovrano pontefice. Un corpo e due anime: la monarchia papale nella
prima et moderna (Bolonga: Il Mulino, 1982) [English translation = The Papal Prince: One
Body and Two Souls. The Papal Monarchy in Early Modern Europe, tr. Susan Haskins
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)].
requested permission from Eugenius IV and his court once again to enter
the city the place of his birth, which gave him the privilege of calling
himself a Roman citizen. His objective was to visit his mother, who at that
point was in difficult circumstances (not precisely identifiable from the text
of the letter, but probably related to her health). To this, Vallas umpteenth
request to enter Rome came a response naming the condition: he must
retract his writing on the Donation of Constantine, which he had composed to aid King Alfonso of Aragon in his dispute with Pope Eugenius IV.
In the letters to Trevisan and Landriani both influential personages in
the Roman curia we are thus able to trace the issues and characteristics
of Vallas personal and emotional life, which intersect in his cultural development and give shape to his biography. The letters provide us with the
clearest view of the most distinctive and original ideal of this humanist of
the early fifteenth century: critical intellectual study and radical freedom
of spirit.
Vallas letters are dated between the end of 1443 and the beginning
of 1444. The first was written from Naples to Cardinal Trevisan on
19 November (1443), the second, again from Naples, to Cardinal Landriani
on 21 January (1444).186 The central theme of both letters is the demand,
made by Eugenius IV and by several members of his curia, that Valla definitively retract the Oration in its entirety. Valla pointedly refuses, and the
reasons he gives for doing so are quite illuminating for the composition
and contents of the Oration. Indeed, what Valla says here in his private
correspondence is as valuable for understanding that text as his Apologia,
published in response to his imminent inquisitorial trial in Naples (April,
1444), would be for his Repastinatio. In both his public apology and private
pleas, Valla refuses to retract any part of any of his works. He justifies such
action on the one hand with arguments exonerating himself from the
charge of heresy. On the other, he provides further evidence confirming
the validity of his writings, both on a strictly doctrinal level and on a
broader cultural and political plane.
In the sections of the letters that interest us, Valla highlights the fundamental dimensions, at once objective and subjective, of his writing on the
Constitutum. These can be summarized as human and Christian freedom.
This freedom must be understood on the one hand as the specific domain
of the intellectual in his critical and historical studies. On the other hand
it is the freedom to publicly proclaim ones insight and dissent regarding
186Valla, Epistole, 246248, n. 22; 254256, n. 25.
136
the ecclesiological tradition of the papacy and of Constantinian

Christendom, whose seeds were sown and cultivated in a territory foreign
to the Gospel. And it is precisely this insistence of Vallas on human and
Christian liberty that has prompted us to recapitulate this interpretive
study of the Oration with a reading of the two letters.
There are two passages that interest us in particular. The first is from
the letter to Landriani, the second from that to Trevisan. Of the two, the
latter elaborates more fully and explicitly on our theme and is thus the
more important. Nevertheless, when compared with each other and with
the Oration, both aid in discerning the motivations of the text and in
understanding Vallas character.
In the letter to Cardinal Landriani we read:
I think you know the issue: my work on the Donation of Constantine, which
has brought on me the prejudice and accusations of many cardinals, not
to mention the persecution of my enemies and detractors. For although
I myself make confessions and stand as my own accuser, I seem to be at the
mercy of Lucian, who according to Lactantius [Div. Inst. I.9.8] spared neither
men nor gods the grounds for complaint are endless. And now a new burden has been added to my load. I am censured for having attacked not only the
dead but the living, and certain people are terrorizing me for it. If not for the
sake of my mother, who is in Rome, I would consider this censure and terror
of no account. In accordance with my customary manner, I would not write
to you, nor would I make supplications to anyone. Directed by my conscience,
happy with my discoveries, I would subsist on the noble freedom of saying what
I think. But filial piety summons me to my mother, and I am forced backward
like a ship whose sails are hit by a contrary wind. Both my longing to see her
and good reason compel me to satisfy our common desire. Perhaps it will be
possible to do in the city that which is difficult from afar: to make amends.187
In this text the observation is rather obvious the explicit reference to

the work on the Donation of Constantine comes immediately to the fore.
187Ibid., 255f.2239: Causam meam, ut opinor, nosti: de opere, inquam, Constantiniane
donationis, ob quod multis sancte apostolice sedis senatoribus invisum sum et reus agor,
immo peragor ab inimicis meis atque invidis. Nam, cum ipse de me fatear ac me quoque
accusem nec hominibus nec diis pepercisse videar quod de Luciano Lactantius ait non
deest volentibus carpendi materia. Accessit huc novissimum onus, quo vivos, non modo
defunctos exagitasse reprehendor et a quibusdam ob id terror mihi proponitur; quam ego
reprehensionem terroremque, nisi matris causa, que istic est, pro meo more nihili facerem
nec ad te propterea scriberem aut cuiquam supplicarem, contentus animi conscientia
inventionibusque felix ac generosa quod sentiam dicendi libertate me pascens. Sed pietas
matris me ad se revocat et quasi ventus quidam adversus alio vela flectere ac pene retrorsum cogit; eam nunc visendi et amor et ratio mihi necessitatem imponit ut amborum, et
ipsius et meo, desiderio satisfaciam, fortasse emendaturus presens quod absenti emendare
difficile est (emphasis added).
We can also clearly see the contents of the Orations exordium and peroration. Let us remember that in the Oration Valla had given dramatic expression to his dissent from the reigning cultural tradition in general and from
Constantinian ecclesiology in particular. And he had affirmed his stance
contesting the pseudo-Donation and the papacy, attacking the roots of
their juridical and ecclesial premises. In his letter to Landriani he uses
nearly exactly the same terms as in the Orations exordium. In their new
context, however, these arguments serve most of all to defend the Orations
validity, as well as its original motivations and fundamental themes.
Valla protests his right of conscience (directed by my conscience ):
it is from this principle, operating on the planes of morality and of
religion/Christianity, that Valla derives the right to communicate, publiclyand for the benefit of the community of believers, the historical and
ecclesial truth he has discovered ( blessed with discoveries). Above all,
however, Valla is sure to guarantee Landriani that the Oration was born
and bred of that noble freedom of speech with and in which the orator,
and in the first place the Christian orator, fulfills his task in imitation of
the Apostle Paul, as he had written the Orations prologue.
In accordance with the original motivations for and results of his study,
as well as the freedom of speech he claimed within the Christian church,
Valla has absolutely no intention of justifying (so as to excuse) what he
had written in the Oration. His insight had never been invalidated, nor
would it ever be, by the jurisdictional and spiritual terror and power exercised by hierarchical authority in the Church and in Christendom. Indeed,
once the papacy was declared to have usurped an illicit imperium over the
civil and political society of the community of believers, what sense could
it have to make retractions or to supplicate for absolution from heresy?
And what sense could such retractions and supplications have in the light
of that freedom of dissent by which Valla had charted his course? After all,
he had come to identify the Orations very historical study and critical
reflection with the freedom of conscience and of speech guaranteed
within Christendom. Thus Valla insistently informs Landriani that his
request (supplication) to reenter Rome after long exile is not spontaneous but rather forced upon him by his love for his mother (filial piety).
Valla seems to perceive at this moment in his life that his personal existence hangs, as if stretched between opposing forces, at the intersection of
the tensions that had stirred him most: the freedom of the orator and of
the intellectual, and the love of family and of his own origins. He feels like
a ship surprised by adverse winds and forced to strike the sails, a metaphor that he had previously employed in the proem to the second book of
138
the Repastinatio.188 We see here the autobiographical strains in Vallas

letter to Landriani.
Valla had in fact been, and he still was, the eccentric intellectual who
managed to survive his forced wanderings only by breaking from the
bonds of a private existence of sentiments (filial piety/longing and reason). These were often in conflict with the emotional situations in his life
and with his intellectual activity, characterized as it was by philological
study and radical challenges to tradition. They were in conflict with his
civil and ecclesial calling as an orator, a figure who keeps his conscience
clean by giving voice to it.
What has been observed so far acquires deeper meaning in light of a
long passage from the letter to Trevisan:
Why did I write about the Donation of Constantine? This is what I have to justify, as there are more than a few who disparage me for it and regard it as a
crime. Ill-will was definitely not my motivation. Indeed, I would have wished
most of all to have had to write under another pope, not under Eugenius. At
this point nothing lends itself to the defense of my cause except the words of
Gamaliel: If this plan or this work is of men, it will come to nothing; but if it
is of God, you cannot overthrow it [Acts 5:3839]. My work has been written
and issued. I could not emend or suppress it if I had to, nor should I if I could.
Either its truth will protect it, or its falseness will refute it. Others are now its
judges and arbiters, not I. If I have spoken in error, they will bear witness to
my error [cf. John 18:23]; but if I have spoken well, fair judges will not scourge
me. Please, let us allow this work to stand on its own merits. Bear one thing in
mind. I was not moved by hatred for the Pope, but acted for the sake of truth, of
religion, and also of a certain renown to show that I alone knew what no one
else knew. I could have done still more damage, if I had been writing hostilely
on these matters that are so arousing to the mind and spirit. For what I did
redounds to the shame not only of the living but also of the dead and of those
not yet born: certainly he who spares no one, offends no one. But the benefit
I bestow upon posterity will be no less than the harm I have brought with one
little book. Nevertheless, in the name of the good-will and respect I bore for
the supreme pontiff in my youth, I beg you this (in itself an easy thing, and for
your virtue the easiest of all): no benefice, no gift, no favor, no indulgence just
188Valla, Repastinatio, 448.2126 and 176.28177.2: rhetoric is arduous and by far the
most difficult, nor should it be engaged in by all. For it enjoys sailing amidst the waves over
the open sea, its sails billowing full, not giving way to the currents but ruling them: this is
the nature of the highest and perfect eloquence. Dialectic, on the other hand, is the friend
of safety, the ally of the coast; preferring to behold land rather than waters, it rows within
sight of shores and cliffs ( longe difficillima rhetorica est et ardua, nec omnibus capessenda. Nanque lato mari mediisque in undis vagari et tumidis ac sonantibus velis volitare
gaudet, nec fluctibus cedit, sed imperat: de summa et perfecta loquor eloquentia. Dialectica
vero amica securitatis, socia litorum, terras potius quam maria intuens, prope oras et
scopulos remigat) (emphasis added).

that you be yourself, that you behave as you always have. I want your true
feelings about how I stand with you and the supreme pontiff, even if it means
hearing that I am hateful to you and that I am not permitted [to return] to
my fatherland . Or does it seem to you too little that I suffer exile on account
of such a petty annoyance? Or are you determined to punish me further?189
With this passage together with what precedes it in the letter Valla
reaffirms first and in no uncertain terms what was already implicit in the
Oration, namely that his criticism of the pseudo-Donations tradition and
of the papacys Constantinian primacy throughout the ages was the
product of an historico-philological analysis and no mere personal attack
on Pope Eugenius IV.
Valla is able to support these declarations by recalling the familiarity
and friendship that he had enjoyed with Condulmer. Accordingly he
reminds Trevisan of the esteem the future pope had expressed for his De
comparatione Ciceronis Quintilianique, the first work he wrote as a young
man on classical literature. And he calls to mind how, many years earlier,
when he was barely a youth, he had attended the private lessons in Greek
that Condulmer had received from Giovanni Aurispa:
When still just a boy I felt great respect and love for Eugenius. This was
before he became pope, when we studied Greek with the same teacher ,
when he accorded high praise to my treatise.190
189Valla, Epistole, 247f.4073: Cur de Constantini donatione composui? Hoc est quod purgare habeam, ut quod nonnulli optrectent mihi et quasi crimen intendant. Id ego tantum
abest ut malivolentia fecerim, ut summopere optassem sub alio pontifice necesse mihi
fuisse id facere, non sub Eugenio. Neque vero attinet hoc tempore libelli mei causam defendere, nisi Gamalielis verbis: Si est ex hominibus consilium hoc aut opus, dissolvetur; sin
autem ex deo, non poteritis dissolvere. Opus meum conditum editumque est, quod emendare
aut supprimere nec possem si deberem, nec deberem si possem. Ipsa rei veritas se tuebitur aut
ipsa falsitas se coarguet. Alii de illo iudices arbitrique iam sunt, non ego. Si male locutus
sum, testimonium perhibebunt de malo; sin bene, non cedent me virgis equi iudices. Sed
opus illud in sua, queso, causa quiescere sinamus. Hoc tantum consideres velim, non odio
pape adductum, sed veritatis, sed religionis, sed cuiusdam etiam fame gratia motum, ut quod
nemo sciret, id ego scisse solus viderer. Multum etiam nocere potuissem, si alieno animo
fuissem in rebus que mentem animumque magis solicitant. Nam quod feci, hoc non modo
ad pudorem presentium, sed mortuorum etiam ac futurorom pertinet: qui enim nemini parcit,
nullum ledit. Verum cum non minus prodesse in posterum possim quam uno libello offendi,
ego te per superiorum temporum meam in summum pontificem benivolentiam pietatemque obsecro id (quod, cum per se facile, tum vero tue virtuti facillimum): non beneficum, non munus, non gratiam, non veniam, sed ut similis tibi sis, ut quod semper fecisti
facias, ne aliter ac sentis de animo erga me tuo summique pontificis rescribas, etiamsi me
tibi odio esse nec licere mihi in patriam [redire] dicas . An parum tibi videtur ob tantulam
noxam me exilium pati? an ulterior tibi ultio querenda est? (emphasis added).
190Ibid., 246f.2024: Ego Eugenium ante papatum dilexi atque amavi adhuc adolescentulus, cum eidem preceptori grecarum litterarum uterque operam daret cum
opusculum meum magnopere laudasset (emphasis added).
140
After these allusions to his personal history with Eugenius IV, Valla sets
forth his arguments in defense of the Oration. They are of two kinds. The
first line of defense is to stress his clear opposition to contemporary conciliarism and the conflict raging between Eugenius IV and the conciliarists
of Basel. Here again he refers to what he had said, at least implicitly, in the
Oration, even though his fundamental ecclesiological ideas were perhaps
more radical than those of the conciliarists. Indeed, his ideas attacked the
very foundations of the papacy and of traditional ecclesiology, and thus he
did not emphasize them in the letter to Trevisan. As for conciliarism, it is
noteworthy that Valla seems to have been impervious to the influence
even of Tudeschi, one of the greatest canon lawyers of conciliarism. And
this despite their close personal ties and the fact that Tudeschi represented Alfonso of Aragons interests at Basel.191 It is his theoretical and
political autonomy from the conciliarist struggle against Eugenius IV that
allows Valla to boast to Cardinal Trevisan obviously with the intention
of addressing the pope himself of never having written against the pope
like the conciliarists, in spite of their explicit solicitation:
I never went to Basel, although many people promised me great rewards;
nor did I write against the pope, although with respect to writing and every
kind of learning I was as capable, if I do say so myself, as anyone there past
or present.192
These declarations shed light on Vallas other line of defense, which is

based on his own person as the author of the Oration. He clearly places the
blame on the situation and the conditions within whose courtly and political context the Oration had been prompted, written, and diffused. If he
had not been coerced by these circumstances, he never would have written against Eugenius IV: I would have wished most of all to have had to
write under another pope, not under Eugenius. But what precisely does
this last statement mean? In what way should the hypothetical desire and
the necessity be understood? One place to search for and grasp the meaning of this necessity is in the immediate context of the letter to Trevisan.
191On Niccol de Tudeschi (the Abbot of Palermo [Abbas Panormitanus] in Vallas
Antidota, in Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 271, 427), cf. Stieber, Pope
Eugenius IV, 401402, 512513. On the ecclesiology/conciliarism question, see also Ulrich
Horst, Zwischen Konziliarismus und Reformation. Studien zur Ekklesiologie in
Dominikanerorden (Roma: Istituto Storico Domenicano, 1985), passim.
192Valla, Epistole, 247.3539: Ego neque illuc me contuli, cum multi non parva mihi
policerentur; neque adversus papam scripsi, cum in scribendo atque in omni doctrina tantum possem quantum, ut apertissime dicam, quivis unus potuit illorum qui Basilee aut
sunt aut fuerunt.
The other is against the background of what Valla had written in the
Orations exordium, about the orators autonomy and freedom when menaced with proscription by censors and men of power.
There is no doubt that Valla was commissioned to defend the Crown of
the Kingdom of Naples from the feudal power of the papacy. Nevertheless,
the exact methods and contents, and above all what we can call the rhetorical strategy of the work were fully of Vallas own independent will and
choosing. Therefore, his composition of the Oration ends up being configured against an ample background, in which the defense of Alfonso is
situated according to relationships of continuity and discontinuity with
the political and ideological struggle that had always existed between the
Empire and the papacy. Indeed, in writing the Oration Valla was on the
one hand aligning himself with the tradition of the imperial chanceries
and jurists, employing their tried and true practice of claiming the
Constitutums inauthenticity. On the other hand he was taking up a novel
line, discontinuous with the past at least on an ideological level, and thus
his philological exegesis of the Constitutum and his rhetorical strategy
constitute something new and all his own.
In this context of tradition and originality, Vallas claim to necessity in
writing the Oration (to have had to write) cannot simply be reduced to
the necessity of courtly service and the fealty owed to a prince. Instead it
must be expanded and understood as conditions of necessity that
imposed themselves on his conscience and dignity as an intellectual. In
this sense he could not remain silent. In the name of truth he had to publicize political and ecclesial ideas that put the Constantinian papacy in
crisis and dictated the emancipation of the nations of Christendom from
its feudal rule. The necessity, then, that gave rise to the Oration was the
singular challenge of high political and theological value that Valla could
not resist. Alfonso of Aragons commission coincided with the ecclesiological and historical notions that Valla had been developing for some
time, both regarding the Constantinian Church, as lacking in evangelical
authenticity, and concerning the decline of the empire, as occasioned by
the emancipation of the subject peoples from Romes rule.
With his critique of the empires Caesarism and his exaltation of the
Roman respublica as a form of radical evangelism in the face of the
Constantinian pope, Valla gave an alternative (historical and ideological) meaning to the insurrection of peoples against the rule of the Roman
empire as well as to their will to emancipation from the feudal and spiritual rule of the Roman papacy. At stake in the first case was the conquered
barbarians recovery and reappropriation of their civil and political
142
freedom in the face of Roman imperialism. In the second it was the citizens of the respublica christianas recovery of their evangelical and ecclesial freedom, which the Rome of the popes had expropriated with the false
Donation of Constantine.
These are the very themes addressed in the Oration, the work whose
incrimination Valla laments (there are more than a few people who
regard it as a crime) and whose retraction had been demanded from him.
Hence the necessity of erecting a new defense both of dissent and of
rhetorical freedom (of speech) in the face of the Church. Valla accomplishes this task by drawing on Gamaliels response (in Acts 5:38f.) to the
Sanhedrins resolute condemnation of the new doctrine of the Apostles,
and by citing Christs words (in John 18:23) to the man who beat him
before the High Priest for having announced his new message. And he
offers a commentary. The truth or falsity of a doctrine or message, once it
is written, is perpetuated or destroyed without the necessity of outside
help, either from the original author or from censors. Every written work,
by the fact of having been reduced to the letter, has a life of its own. An
object of interpretation for both the present and the future, Vallas work is
already independent of its author and of its individual readers. It will
stand or fall only in virtue of its truth or falsity.
Valla concludes his defense of the Oration to Trevisan by reaffirming
that his writing is a civil and ecclesial witness to the truth and to the faith:
I was not moved by hatred of the Pope but acted for the sake of the truth, of
religion, and also of a certain renown to show that I alone knew what no
one else knew.
This declaration was quoted in the introduction to the present essay

because it is relevant for identifying the Orations highly original ideals
and for understanding them as a comprehensive whole, just as they had
formed a synchronic whole in the experience of Vallas everyday life. Now
I would like to return to this declaration to conclude my interpretive study
of Vallas Oration.
With this declaration Valla gathers and assembles into one phrase the
words and concepts that provided the solid foundation for the Oration:
truth, religion, and renown. Truth was the object of his philological and
critical study. Religion, that is faith in the Gospel, was the standard to
which he returned Christianity and its history. Renown was the essential
aim of the role he played as an intellectual, an orator, and a humanist
in the society and culture of his time, and more properly in the community of the church, which recognized the Gospel as the primary font of
truth and of faith.
Valla, then, composes the Oration by developing the complex theme of

truth and faith on various registers and in multiple keys. He aspires to
the glory accorded to the intellectual who shows that he knows and
who bestows his knowledge in its pure form upon the society in which
he lives and works. The Oration thus fulfills the authentic dictate of the
orator, as understood and defined by Quintilian as the true wise man,193
and as personified by Valla in civil society and in the domain of the
Church both as a humanist grammarian of classical and biblical literature, and as an engaged intellectual and a philologist specialized in history
and theology. The Oration is truly how Valla had described it in his letter to
Aurispa: I have written nothing more rhetorical.194
193Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Repastinatio, 238.

194Valla, Epistole, 252.91f.: Orationem meam De donatione Constantini, qua nihil magis
oratorium scripsi, sane longam .
LORENZO VALLA BETWEEN THE MIDDLE AGES AND THE

RENAISSANCE: THE ENCOMIUM OF ST. THOMAS 1457
(translated by Patrick Baker)
1.At the Origins of Neo-Thomism in the Fifteenth Century
The sum of research on Thomas Aquinas, especially in the wake of
Kristellers work on Thomism and the Italian Renaissance, shows quite
clearly that the Dominicans life and teaching were continuously celebrated in literature and iconography, and in various contexts (hagiographic, liturgical, and academic), from the mid-fourteenth century to the
end of the fifteenth.1
1.1.The Literary Encomium and the Iconographic Triumph of
St. Thomas Aquinas in the Dominican Tradition
The encomium of Aquinas has its origins in the canonization literature
mentioned by Fra Giovanni di Napoli during the official celebrations in
his city (July, 1323) for Thomass canonization by Pope John XXII. Fra
Giovanni was the most renowned master of theology and promoter of
Thomism in the Neapolitan Studio, and his sermons for the canonization
initiated the liturgical tradition of panegyric surrounding Aquinass teaching. At the same time they took up the defense of that teaching, a defense
which Giovanni had begun in Paris in 1316, when he was dismissed for
his disputation on whether it is permitted to teach the full doctrine and
all the conclusions of brother Thomas in Paris an obvious polemic on
the condemnation of 1277.2
1Paul Oskar Kristeller, Medieval Aspects of Renaissance Learning, ed. and tr. Edward P.
Mahoney (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1974); John W. OMalley, Some
Renaissance Panegyrics of Aquinas, Renaissance Quarterly 27 (1974): 174192. See also:
Angelus Walz, Saint Thomas dAquin, ed. Paul Novarina (Louvain: Publications universitaires, 1962); Cornelio Fabro, Breve introduzione al tomismo (Roma: Desclee, 1960); Daniel
Ols, Tommaso dAquino, in Enciclopedia delle Religioni, vol. V, (Florence: Vallecchi, 1973),
180925. For the immediate context of Vallas Encomium, see OMalleys decisive and innovative study, The Feast of Thomas Aquinas in Renaissance Rome: A Neglected Document
and its Import, Rivista di storia della chiesa in Italia 35 (1981): 127.
2Innocenzo Taurisano, Discepoli e biografi di S. Tommaso. Note storico-critiche (Roma:
Societ Tipografica A. Manuzio, 1924), 45: licteratura canonizationis; an extract of Fra
146
The literary encomium has an equivalent in the iconographic triumph.

This is especially the case in panegyric and apologetic painting, whose
themes and subjects were almost always chosen with an eye to increasing
the greater glory of the Dominican Order. Thus the symmetric correspondence between the encomium and the triumph turns out to be historically indissoluble, fully illustrative and indicative of the strict parallelisms
and convergences that exist between sermons and frescoes whose theme
is the exaltation of Thomas. One thinks of the multiple historical and doctrinal references repeated in literary texts and pictorial works; of the comparisons and combinations, variously arranged, of Aquinas with the Greek
and Latin patristic tradition; and of the complex and rich symbology of
Thomist teaching as a synthesis and transcendence of Hellenic speculation, and as a definitive refutation of philosophical error (Averroes) and
theological heresy (Arian).
Beyond hagiographic and apologetic motives, the literary encomium
and the pictorial triumph served an immediate and incisive purpose: they
commemorated Aquinass works, which were read and commentated in
the Dominican schools before a learned and devout audience (that could
be either favorable or averse to the Orders doctrinal tradition). The Order
of Preachers had nourished itself on Thomass corpus to the point of its
becoming an integral part, and eventually the dominant part, of the
Dominicans own cultural history. Aquinass solar splendor had been
assumed into the personal identity and glory of the Preachers, such that
Thomas and the Dominican Order would ultimately converge in an indissoluble nexus. Such was the case not only in more solemn and official
moments like an ecumenical council the Council of Florence and above
all the Council of Trent come to mind but also in seemingly marginal or
peripheral places and occasions that would end up being defining and, to
say the least, extremely significant for the construction and reaffirmation
of its tradition.
Giovannis disputation, utrum licite possit doceri Parisiis doctrina fratris Thomae quoad
omnes conclusiones suas, is given on p. 68. See also Fabro, Breve introduzione al tomismo,
5455. For the general context, see: Martin Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, 3 vols.
(Mnchen: Hueber, 19261956), 3:370410; idem, La scuola tomista italiana nel sec. XIII e
principio del XIV sec., Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica 15 (1923): 97155; P. Glorieux, Les
premires polmiques thomistes. Vol. 1: Le Correctorium corruptorii Quare (Kain: Revue
des sciences philosophiques et thologiques, 1927); idem, La premire pntration
thomiste et son problme, Revue dApologtique 53 (1931): 257275, 385510. See also
Eugenio Marino, La questione tomista nelle fonti giuridico-encomiastiche dellOrdine
Domenicano, 12441974 [Camporeale indicated in 2002 that this essay by Marino was
forthcoming in Memorie Domenicane, but it does not appear to have been published there,
nor has it been possible to locate it elsewhere. Eds.].
lorenzo valla between the middle ages and the renaissance147

Let us consider, to take an example from the first decades of the fourteenth century, the sensational case of Fra Uberto Guidi di Nepozzano,
the Dominican bachelor in the Studio Generale of Santa Maria Novella in
Florence. On the solemn and official occasion of a quodlibetal disputation in cathedra, Guidi impugned Aquinass teaching, arguing against his
lectors position (determinando contra determinationem sui lectoris). The
disputation was held in 1315, right at the time when efforts for Thomass
canonization were underway. It seems that his lector on that occasion
was Fra Remigio de Girolami (d. 1319), the authoritative promoter of the
most orthodox form of Thomism in the Florentine school. Guidi himself
appears to have been a person of some account in the Studio, thanks to
both his theological training and his reputation in the Tuscan city. The
death registry of Santa Maria Novella sings his praises, noting the course
of his studies (begun in Paris, where he was sent by the same Fra Remigio
de Girolami, then Provincial of the Roman Province) and his teaching in
various monastic Studi (Viterbo, Arezzo, Siena, Perugia, and especially
Florence). We also know that Bishop Francesco Silvestri commissioned
him in 1330 to redact the Statutes of the Santa Maria Nuova hospital in
Florence. The case of Guidis anti-Thomist thesis must catch our eye for
its noteworthy repercussions. The Provincial Chapter of the Dominicans,
held in Arezzo in that year, ordered the contradictor of the Florentine
Studio to retract his thesis, barred him from teaching for two years, and
transferred him to the monastery in Pistoia. The rehabilitation of this
leading Dominican exponent of dissent to Thomism would come only
years later. In the meantime the disputation of 1315 established a rigid continuity and fidelity to the Thomist tradition in the Roman Province of the
Order.3
Such conflicts, of which the case of the Florentine scholar is only one
example, are set on a larger stage where the debate over Thomism was
played out in various guises and scenes; their most intense period was
between the end of the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth. But beyond the scholastic controversy, the canonization of 1323
signals a decisive turn towards the consummation of the indissoluble
union between the Dominican Orders historico-ecclesial identity and
the cultural tradition of Thomism. The solemn declaration of 1323 materialized in the Orders defining appropriation of Thomas as its doctrinal
3In addition to the bibliography in the previous note, see also Grabmann,
Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, 1:361369, 2:530547; Stefano Orlandi (ed.), Necrologio di
S. Maria Novella, 2 vols. (Firenze: Olschki, 1955), 1:276307, 502503, 522523.
148
luminary, as well as in the church communitys conscious acceptance of

his sainthood, which broadened its liturgico-devotional horizon and
deepened its own evangelical and theological awareness. This explains
the fact that, in the first half of the fifteenth century, we can see its impact
even in a learned audience situated on the periphery of, if not outright
removed from, theological and academic disputations. Similarly, we find
hints or explicit statements about the glory of Aquinass wisdom, the very
wisdom that the Order of Preachers came to provide to the Church.
It is certainly not without significance that the exaltation of Aquinas,
the glory of the Dominican Order, becomes a basis for resolving major
disputes between monastic communities and the secular clergy over
issues of pastoral activity and civic harmony. This is what we find in a letter to Carlo dei Federici, the Florentine ambassador to the papal Curia (of
Eugenius IV), which was issued from the Chancery of Carlo Marsuppini on
10 June 1447:
Since there is an open dispute between Santa Reparata and Santa Maria
Novella over the solemnity of Corpus Christi, we want you to request of the
pontiff that he issue a bull declaring the forenamed feast to be celebrated in
Santa Maria Novella. Say that this has heretofore been customary and has
been provided for by many of our laws; that this is also the place where the
Signoria and all the Guilds go; and finally, that several pontiffs have lived in
that most noble church, and that it has no other solemn feast. This should
also be done out of respect for the many most noble citizens that frequent it,
as well as in observance of Saint Thomas and many other friars, the outstanding theologians of [the Dominican] Order.4
Such praise of Thomas will crop up often in the correspondence of humanists. Even though they would seem to be at a greater distance from the
philosophical and theological disputations of the contemporary Schools,
they, too, are capable of appreciating Thomass precise literary place in
the history of culture. And indeed, this is what we find when they speak of
Thomas, such as in a letter Poggio Bracciolini sent to Niccol Niccoli from
London in 1420:
4Firenze, Archivio di Stato, Signori, Carteggi, Legazioni e Commissarie, Reg. 12, f. 16r-v:
Perch fra quelli di santa Reparata e di santa Maria Novella certa discordia per la solennit del Corpo di Christo, voglamo che in nostro nome supplichiate al prefato pontefice
degni provedere per sua bolla decta festa si celebri a santa Maria Novella, assegnando che
sempre quivi fu usitato farla, et factone provedimento per pi nostre leggi. Et che sempre
va l, la Signoria et tucte lArti. Et finalmente come nobilissima chiesa nella quale sono
habitati pi pontefici. Et non ha altra festa solenne. Et etiandio per rispecto di molti nobilissimi citadini populari di decta chiesa. Et ancora per contemplatione di Santo Thomaso et
molti frati singularissimi theologi di quello Ordine.

For I have already been able to devote three months to Aristotle, not so much
for the sake of learning at present as of reading and seeing what is contained
in each work. But this reading of mine is not altogether fruitless. I learn a little something every day, even if only superficially, and this is the reason
why my love of Greek literature has come back so strong: I am becoming
acquainted, in his own language, with an author who is practically speechless and ridiculous in translation. For a commentator I have Thomas Aquinas,
a great man and a good scholar, as the seriousness of the subject demands.
The inventory of books in Bracciolinis possession confirms what is said

in this passage from the letter to Niccoli. The Florentine humanists personal library contained two of Aquinass most important commentaries
(expositiones) on Aristotles works: on the Metaphysics (In XII libros
Metaphysicorum) and on the Physics (In VII libros Physicorum).5
1.2.The History of Thomism and the Centrality of the Summa Theologiae
in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries. Capreolo (d. 1444) and Gaetano
(d. 1534): The Two Poles of Thomisms Cultural Evolution in the Period
Cornelio Fabros observation still holds true today: we lack a complete,
critical history of Thomism that reaps and sorts through the abundant
harvest of available materials, organizing them critically and historically
according to their polemical and doctrinal aspects. Indeed, the need for a
scholarly synthesis is even more pressing today in view of the growing
number of contributions in recent years, particularly in the wake of the
last centenary of Aquinass death (12741974).6
5Poggio Bracciolini, Epistolae, ed. Tommaso Tonelli, 3 vols. (Firenze: L. Marchini, 1832
61), 1:8 (p. 39) (also avaialble in Bracciolini, Lettere, ed. Helene Harth, 3 vols. (Firenze:
Olschki, 19841987), 1:1516) [English translation = idem, Two Renaissance Book Hunters:
The Letters of Poggius Bracciolini to Nicolaus de Niccolis, tr. Phyllis Walter Goodhart Gordon
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 43]: Ego jam tribus mensibus vaco Aristoteli,
non tam discendi causa ad praesens, quam legendi ac videndi quid in quoque opere contineatur: nec est tamen omnino inutilis haec lectio, disco aliquid in diem, saltem superficie
tenus, et haec est causa potissime, cur amor graecarum litterarum redierit, ut hunc virum
quasi elinguem, et absurdum aliena lingua, cognoscam sua. Expositorem habeo Thomam
de Aquino, virum egregium et facundum, prout patitur pondus rerum (tr. Gordon). Ernst
Walser, Poggius Florentinus. Leben und Werke (Leipzig: Teubner, 1914), 422: doc. 141, n. 71
and 72. Bracciolini often rebukes Valla for having dared to criticize Aquinas; see, e.g., his
Invectiva in L. Vallam V, where he writes, among our own, he criticizes Albert the Great
and Thomas Aquinas for ignorance of philosophy (e nostris Albertum Magnum et
Thomam Aquinatem ut ignaros philosophiae reprehendit), in Poggio Bracciolini, Opera
omnia, ed. Riccardo Fubini, 4 vols. (Torino: Bottega dErasmo, 19641969), 1:246.
6Fabro, Breve intoduzione al tomismo, 139. For a general view of the state of Thomist
historiography, see the Atti del Congresso internazionale (Roma-Napoli, 1724 aprile 1974):
Tommaso dAquino nel suo settimo centenario, 9 vols. (Napoli: Edizioni domenicane italiane, 19751978).
150
This gaping lacuna leaves the historiographical problem of Thomism

open to many possible solutions. It would also, however, seem to allow us
in good conscience to continue making use of the periodization commonly applied to Thomism. Although its phases do not exactly coincide
and are a bit too imprecise, it furnishes a working hypothesis for historically situating individual pieces of information and studies regarding general and specific questions. The Thomist tradition is generally divided into
the following periods, marked by significant variables and defining
moments in the historical evolution of Aquinass thought: primitive
Thomism, until about 1350; the establishment of Thomist theologys
authority, from 1400 to 1550; the development of post-Tridentine Thomism,
across the broad period from 1550 to 1800; and finally, contemporary
neo-Thomism.
Within this chronology of the history of Thomism and its various
phases, let us focus our attention on the second period, from 1400 to 1550,
in order to discern its particular character. We find there a determining
factor that seems to characterize the fifteenth century in particular and
that constitutes a significant shift in the tradition of Aquinass thought. On
the basis of Grabmanns research, Kristeller formulated and contextualized the phenomenon in the study to which we referred at the beginning
of this essay: What may be called the second period of the history of
Thomism is marked by the tendency to adopt the Summa theologiae
instead of the Sentences as the basic text in theology.7
The Summas rise over the course of the fifteenth century, first in
Germany and then in Italy, to the status of an academic text as a substitute, or at least as a competitor, to the work of Peter Lombard (the basic
textbook in traditional theological instruction) involved a precise reappraisal of Aquinass doctrinal preeminence. This fact requires emphasis,
as it becomes a unique and extremely illuminating point of reference for
understanding the intended objective of Vallas Encomium of St. Thomas,
delivered in March of 1457 in the church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva in
Rome. It is therefore necessary to establish the contours within which the
cultural conflict incited by Valla took place. These were, on the one hand,
the precise connotations and contextual dimensions of contemporary
Thomism, which were represented by the very assembly and official
7Kristeller, Medieval Aspects, 40, who in n. 32 cites: Pierre Mandonnet, Frres Prcheurs
(la thologie dans lordre des), in Dictionnaire de thologie catholique (Paris: Letouzey et
An, 19231972), 6:863924, at 906907; Ricardo G. Villoslada, La Universidad de Paris
durante los estudios de Francisco de Vitorio (Roma: Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1938),
279307; and Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, 3:411448.

setting to which the Encomium was addressed, and, on the other hand, the
perspectives and breadth of the anti-Thomism underlying the humanist
problematic and polemic that emerged on the occasion of Vallas solemn
disputation.
The preeminence acquired by the Summa theologiae in the course of
the fifteenth century is a reliable indicator of the progressive expansion of
Aquinass doctrinal influence and of the Thomist traditions growing
autonomy in academic teaching. Eventually the Summa achieved cultural
hegemony over the theological tradition of writing commentaries to the
Sentences. In this process, Aquinas transcended his place within the history of medieval thought and became an autonomous norm of theological
and philosophical doctrine, a doctrine whose synthesis was inscribed in
exemplary fashion in the textbook of the Summa. What is more, the
Summas shift in theologico-cultural status seems to have occurred as a
movement that straddled Dominican Schools and academic institutions
independent of the Order, feeding on and motivated by the study of theology (and philosophy) itself. Indeed, it is telling if we have not overlooked
anything in our direct consultation of the sources that the acts of the
Capitula Generalia of the fifteenth century lack even one explicit declaration, imperative or exhortative, for the adoption of the Summa as a basic
text for theological instruction. And this despite the fact that it was up to
the general chapters, in practice at least, to assign and transfer the lectors
in the Orders major Studi throughout Europe.
At this point we can trace the boundaries that mark the clear beginning
and end of the Summas cultural shift in the fifteenth century, orienting
ourselves chronologically and qualitatively by the major writings of
Giovanni Capreolo (d. 1444) and Cardinal De Vio, commonly known as
Gaetano (d. 1534).8 Capreolos Defensiones theologiae Thomae Aquinatis
(Defenses of the Theology of Thomas Aquinas), which dates to around 1432,
is generally seen as concluding the grand controversy between Thomism
8On Capreolo, see Umberto DeglInnocenti, Capreolo, Giovanni, in Enciclopedia
Cattolica, 12 vols. (Citt del Vaticano: Ente per lEnciclopedia cattolica e per il Libro
cattolico, 19481954), 3:71922; Martin Grabmann, Joannes Capreolus, der Princeps
Thomistarum und seine Stellung in der Geschichte der Thomistenschule, Divus Thomas
(Freiburg) 22 (1944): 85109, 145170; Kristeller, Medieval Aspects, 3839; Fabro, Breve introduzione al tomismo, 61 and 104105. On Gaetano, see Umberto DeglInnocenti, De Vio,
Tommaso detto il Gaetano, in Enciclopedia Cattolica, 4:150609; Il cardinale Tomaso de Vio
Gaetano nel IV centenario della sua morte (Milano: Vita e pensiero, 1935; special issue of
Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica); Martin Grabmann, Die Stellung des Kardinals Cajetan in
der Geschichte des Thomismus, Angelicum 11 (1934): 547560; Pierre Mandonnet, Il cardinal Gaetano (14681534), Memorie Domenicane 48 (1931): 38102.
152
and anti-Thomism that raged in the fourteenth century. Nevertheless it

should be mentioned that Capreolo, princeps Thomistarum (prince of the
Thomists), also authored what is perhaps the last great commentary on
Peter Lombard. This text is not only apologetic in nature but also delves
deep into content. Furthermore, it is fully elaborated in strict adherence
to Aquinass Scriptum in libros Sententarium (Commentary on the Books of
the Sentences), and thus it privileged the Thomism of the commentary
on the Sentences more than that of the Summa theologiae.
The outer boundary of Thomisms historical development in the fifteenth century is marked by Gaetanos magnum opus: his commentaries
on Aquinass Summa theologiae, written between 1507 and 1522. This classic work of Cardinal De Vio stands at the opposite pole from that of
Capreolo and concludes the decisive shift that occurred in the second
period of Thomisms history. With the Council of Trent and the post-Tridentine period, it will be the Summa, as the normative text of Aquinass
theological and philosophical doctrines, that determines the preeminence
and precise value of the Thomist tradition, particularly in the sphere of
dogmatic opposition to the Reformation. The so-called Piana edition of
Thomass corpus, promoted by Pius V, acts as a kind of bookend. We are
now quite far indeed from the Dominican Chapters 1308 order to the
members of the Roman Province regarding the teaching of theology in
cathedral schools: that lectors and bachelors teach from the Sentences
and not from Thomass Summa.9
Bartolomeo Spina, the Dominican Master of the Sacred Palace and a
tenacious defender of anti-Lutheran orthodoxy, showed a clear understanding of this change in the retrospective appraisal of Thomisms history and Gaetanos work that he issued a few years after De Vios death, in
his preface to the posthumous edition of Gaetanos commentary on the
Secunda-secundae (first published in Lyon in 154041):10
9Thomas Kaeppeli and Antonio Dondaine (eds.), Acta Capitulorum Provincialium
Provinciae Romanae (Roma: Institutum Historicum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 1941), 169:
quod lectores et baccellarii legant de Sententiis et non de Summa Thomae. Cf. Angelus
Walz, Ordinationes Capitulorum Generalium de Sancto Thoma eiusque cultu et doctrina, Analecta Sacri Ordinis Praedicatorum 31 (1923): 168173.
10Caietanus, Commentarii in ImIIae Summae Theologiae S. Thomae Aquinatis, finished
by Gaetano in February, 1517 and dedicated to Leo X. Reference is to the Lyon edition of
1558 [= Cajetan, Prima Secundae Partis Summae Sacrae Theologiae Sancti Thomae], III, f.
a2v-a3v, where Spinas praefatio is found. For the bibliography on Spina, who died towards
the end of 1546 or at the beginning of 1547, see Innocenzo Taurisano, Hierarchia Ordinis
Praedicatorum (Roma: Manuzio, 1916), 52; Angelus Walz, I domenicani al Concilio di Trento
(Roma: Herder, 1961), passim.

Among all the doctors of the church who have been declared saints, [Thomas
Aquinas] is called on as an authority even by those who oppose his teaching
in certain areas (which opposition reveals their ignorance). When disputing
or teaching the doctors were wont to say, such is the opinion of the holy
doctor, or, the holy doctor thought thus . Whoever does not admire or
praise the wisdom of this man is destitute of wisdom, or he is without a
doubt jealous and wicked. For with the rising of his sun, every mere shadow
of error and heresy was immediately chased away from the aspect of holy
mother church. Whatever doubt, whatever anxiety sprouts forth in the
church from the devils seed dissolves and vanishes at once when Thomas is
appointed judge. Through Thomas all of ecclesiastical dogma is strengthened, and its decrees receive confirmation. Who in our time, indeed who
since the rising of this sun, has become a logician, philosopher, or theologian of the highest caliber without seeking the support of divine Thomass
most constant wisdom? What learned and eloquent speaker ascends the
pulpit without borrowing from Thomas what instructs and moves the people? What venerable doctor in cathedra (if, that is, he should teach the truth)
does Thomas not furnish with the certitude of his wisdom? Finally, who
braves a scholastic competition without first girding himself with the arms
of Thomas? Nor has any of the glory of this holiest doctor been lost to the
disturbances of any detractors whatsoever in our lifetime. On the contrary,
like gold tempered by fire, his wisdom prevails untarnished over the unwise,
shining forth from a distance. And the fame amassed everywhere by the
most holy doctor, being defended by the many with all vigor, has grown
beyond all proportion.
Spina sees the timelessness of Thomism with the Summas rise to preeminence during the fifteenth century as the long route of the Dominican
theological tradition connecting the first Thomas, Aquinas, to the second,
Gaetano:
Thomas Gaetanus, coming much later, whose wisdom and exemplary life
were just about second to none in these days, like a living image of Aquinas
was inspired by the Lord to proceed with the work of this most incredible
man. His merits compel, and his perpetual monument induces, posterity to
imitate him . The doctrine which the divine Thomas had diffused throughout the whole world was given a brighter sheen by this second Thomass
interpretations . Thus everyone can rightly recite these verses when bursting into the praise of both princes: as the morning star in the midst of a
cloud, and as the moon at the full, and as the shining sun [Ecclus. 50:67],
thus they shine on the temple of God.11
11Bartolomeo Spina, preface to Cajetan, Prima Secundae Partis Summae, III, f. a2v-a3v:
[Thomas Aquinas] inter omnes ecclesiae doctores, sancti denominatione, ab his etiam,
qui doctrinae eius in aliquibus (ex hoc imperiti) adversantur, antonomasice vocitetur,
dum inter disputandum legendumve doctores dicere consueverunt: Haec est sancti doctoris sententia; vel, sic tenuit sanctus doctor . Sapientiam quoque illius qui non admiratur
154
The diptych sketched by Spina aims to demonstrate the timelessness and

the (wholly Dominican) continuity of the Thomist theological tradition
on the verge of the Council of Trent. Yet it is richer in parallelisms and
connections than these passages might lead us to suppose.
1.3.Vallas Encomium: Its Place in History and Cultural Significance
Vallas 1457 Encomium of St. Thomas Aquinas (Encomion sancti Thomae
Aquinatis) must be read within the cultural and ideological context of the
teaching of theology in the fifteenth century. And at the same time it must
be situated in the camp of critical opposition to Thomisms rise to hegemony in the study of theology in the same period. Taking Capreolos work
and Gaetanos commentaries as the polar extremes (from Peter Lombards
Sentences to Aquinass Summa) of Thomisms development in the fifteenth century, we see the beginning and the end of the theological arc in
which Vallas discourse was situated; it was an attempt to break this linear
continuity. Indeed, the Encomium is nothing other than the resulting critique of the extremes of Thomisms theological development in the century of humanism. It stands forth as a lucid and incisive call to arms to
block and interrupt the (to Vallas mind decidedly regressive) course of
Thomisms doctrinal development in particular and of theological study
in general. Every sentence of the work is informed by this call to arms and
aut extollit, non nisi sapientia ieiunus est, vel certe invidens ac malignus. Sole nanque isto
suborto, omnes errorum ac haeresum umbrae, a sanctae matris ecclesiae facie protinus
effugatae sunt. Quicquid dubietatis, quicquid scrupuli satore diabolo pullulat in ecclesia,
Thoma iudice constituto, confestim dissolvitur ac vanescit. Omne per Thomam ecclesiasticum dogma firmatur roborataeque sanctiones persistunt. Quis aevo nostro, imo quis post
solis huius ortum optimus logicus, philosophus, theologus evasit, qui non divi Thomae
firmissimae sapientiae auxilium imploraverit? Quisnam doctus ac facundus concionator
ambonem ascendit, qui non a Thoma mutuet, quae populum erudiant ac inflamment? Quis
cathedram venerandus doctor insedit, cui non Thomas (si tamen vera doceat) sapientiae
certitudinem subministret? Quis denique scholasticum certamen adoritur, qui non se prius
Thomae armis accinxerit? Neque tamen sanctissimi huius doctoris aliquid suae gloriae
deperit in hoc etiam nostrae peregrinationis tempore, ob quorumlibet etiam adversantium
infestationem. Quinimo veluti per ignem probatum aurum sapientia illius ab insipientibus
ex hoc impugnata praevalens, eminus fulget eiusdemque doctoris sanctissimi omnifariam
cumulata celebritas, dum a multis validissime defensatur, crevit in immensum.
Thomas Caietanus, postremus quidem tempore, sapientia vero ac vitae splendore his
diebus nulli forte secundus, a Domino quasi vivens Aquinatis imago suscitatus est Viri
huius singularissimi praeconia prosequi, eius compellunt merita, inducit monumentum
perpetuum, quo ad imitandum trahantur posteri . Doctrinam per divum Thomam in
mundo effusam, alter hic Thomas fulgidiorem reddit explanationibus suis ut merito
quisque in utriusque principis laudem prorumpens decantare possit: Quasi stella matutina in medio nebulae, et quasi luna plena in diebus suis lucent, et quasi sol refulgens sic
hi refulgent in templo dei.

by the determination to make a frontal assault on the timelessness of
Thomism and the specific direction that it was taking, as is clear from the
circumstances of time and place (and not only these) in which Valla
declaimed his panegyric. This oration at Santa Maria sopra Minerva
which Valla clearly saw as the densest abridged form for encapsulating the
essential aspects of his own thought should be considered in the direct
light of his most mature literary efforts, namely those from the last decade
of his life, the years 14481457 of his second Roman period. These are the
unpublished third edition of the Dialecticae disputationes (Dialectical
Disputations), the 1455 inaugural lecture in principio sui studii, which
should be read in tandem with the proem to the translation of Thucydides
History, and the second redaction of the Adnotationes in Novum Testa
mentum (Annotations on the New Testament). These are, in short, the
premises and limits, and above all the context and particular approach
that inform our interpretive and comparative reading of the Encomium of
St. Thomas Aquinas (in the context of Vallas oeuvre).12
12The text of the Encomion sancti Thomae was first printed by J. Vahlen, in
Vierteljahrsschrift fr Kultur und Litteratur der Renaissance 1 (1886): 384396 (facsimile
reprint in Lorenzo Valla, Opera omnia, ed. Eugenio Garin, 2 vols. [Torino: Bottega dErasmo,
1962], 2:339352). To the two manuscripts (Paris, Bibl. Nat., Lat. 7811 A and Rome, Bibl.
Angelica, 1500) mentioned and transcribed respectively by Vahlen and by G. Bertocci
(Roma, 1888) must be added Modena, Bibl. Estense alpha T 6, 15, which contains several
variants; this ms. was listed by Kristeller in Iter Italicum, 1:396b. A Spanish translation of
the Encomium with the Latin text, re-edited on the basis of the Parisian and Roman manuscripts, is available in Lorenzo Valla, Oraciones y Prefacios, ed. Francesco Adorno (Santiago:
Universidad de Chile, 1955), with introduction and notes, 290321. It is on the basis of this
edition that we shall conduct our analysis of Vallas text. An Italian translation of the
Encomium is also readily available in Lorenzo Valla, Scritti filosofici e religiosi, ed. Giorgio
Radetti (Firenze: Sansoni, 1953), 455ff., with introduction and notes. [A critical edition of
the Latin text is now available: Lorenzo Valla, Encomion sancti Thome Aquinatis, ed.
Stefano Cartei (Firenze: Polistampa, 2008); Carteis edition is the basis for the text and
translation of the Encomium in the present volume, pp. 297315, which is the source for all
citations of the Encomium throughout this essay (cited according to paragraph and, for the
Latin text, line number.] For bibliography on the Encomium, in addition to the indications
in Kristeller, Medieval Aspects, 6365 and notes, and in OMalley, Some Renaissance
Panegyrics of Aquinas, n. 1 and passim, we add Mario Fois, Il pensiero cristiano di Lorenzo
Valla nel quadro storico-culturale del suo ambiente (Roma: Libreria editrice dellUniversit
Gregoriana, 1969), 456469. Emblematic of a skewed reading of the Encomium is the article
by Michele Schiavone, Intorno allEncomion Thomae Aquinatis di Lorenzo Valla, Rivista di
filosofia neo-scolastica 47 (1955): 7379, where Valla is seen in a perspective quite different
from the more recent historiography, which considers him the theologian of the
Renaissance; thus Ekkehard Mhlenberg, Laurentius Valla als Renaissancetheologe,
Zeitschrift fr Theologie und Kirche 66 (1969): 466480. On the celebration in honor of
St. Thomas in Santa Maria sopra Minerva in Rome, see the documentation referred to by
Kristeller, Medieval Aspects, 61, n. 114. The liturgical feast of St. Thomas was solemnly celebrated as a cappella cardinalizia until recent times (1967), just as it had been, with all probability, since Vallas day and earlier than the period indicated by Johannes Burckardus in
156
1.4.The Cappellone degli Spagnoli in Florence
(Second Half of the Fourteenth Century) and the Cappella Carafa
in Rome (End of the Fifteenth Century): Iconographic
Themes at the Poles of the Thomist Tradition
The object of what has been said so far is to differentiate the neoThomism of the fifteenth century into two contrasting interpretive nodes
that simultaneously act as highly meaningful historical delimitations:
Capreolos Defensiones and the Commentarii on the Summa Theologiae.
Indeed, the works of Capreolo and Gaetano constitute the polar extremes
of a development the Thomistic revival of the fifteenth century that
underlies the organic partition of Thomass systematic theology. Let us
now turn from the panegyric of the commentators to the iconographic
triumph, and thus to the symmetrical correspondence between theological literature and pictorial visualization which we mentioned at the
beginning of this essay. In this way we shall find artistic confirmation
of the contrast, in terms of cultural distance and thematic variation,
between the two poles of the Thomist tradition in the century of Italian
humanism.
As is known, Thomist encomiastic iconology was born around the
middle of the fourteenth century with Trainis triumph (Pisa, ca. 1340).
Using narrative cycles and ecclesiological and dogmatic elements, the
painting elaborates an increasingly detailed and pregnant historicodoctrinal canonization of Aquinas. The Dominicans, who in Pisa, Florence,
Rome, and elsewhere summoned well-known artists to fresco the walls of
their city churches, were the ones who superintended the harmonic and
systematic orchestration of the triumph. They were the ones who suggested to the painter the symbolic figures, the historical and allegorical
personages, the doctrinal references and connotations. The triumph,
the Liber notarum and in the Diarium, as cited by Kristeller, ibid., p. 61 [= Johann
Burchard, Liber notarum: ab anno 1483 usque ad annum 1506, ed. Enrico Celani, 14 fasc.
in 4 vols. (Citt di Castello: S. Lapi, 19071942); idem, Diarium, sive, Rerum urbanarum
commentarii (14831506), ed. L. Thuasne, 3 vols. (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 18831885); precise
references in Kristeller]. An historical profile of this celebration at Santa Maria sopra
Minerva is found in A. Zucchi (d. 1956), Il Collegio di S. Tommaso dAquino alla Minerva,
unpublished work held in the churchs archives (Arch. Conv.), ch. IX: La festa di
S. Tommaso e il Collegio della Minerva, ff. 6171. I owe my photocopies of this
unpublished work to Father Benedetto Carderi, whom I thank cordially. Cf. also MarieHyacinthe Laurent, Autour de la fte de saint Thomas; Revue Thomiste 40 (1935): 257263;
see also B. Carderi, I Registri del Collegio S. Tommaso dAquino in Roma, conservati
nellarchivio del convento di S. Maria sopra Minerva, Memorie Domenicane, n.s., 7 (1976):
346358.

in short, was the defense and the reaffirmation of the timelessness of
Thomass philosophical and theological summa, of his Christian speculation and dogmatic orthodoxy; it portrayed Thomism as a paradigmatic
form in the ecclesiastical tradition, a genuine source for reanimating
and corroborating a revival of theological thought in the dynamic equilibrium where Christianity and culture meet. And the grand frescos, such
as those (exemplary ones) by Andrea di Bonaiuto, in the chapterhouse
of the Chiostro Verde in S. Maria Novella (second half of the fourteenth
century), or by Filippino Lippi, in the Cappella Carafa of Santa Maria sopra
Minerva in Rome (in the last decade of the fifteenth century), serve to
encapsulate the various rebirths of Thomism and the pictorializations
related to them.13
13George Kaftal, Iconography of the Saints in Central and South Italian Schools of
Painting (Florence: Sansoni, 1965), 10881096, n. 395, figs. 12681277; idem, Iconography of
the Saints in Tuscan Painting (Florence: Sansoni, 1952), 977988, n. 217, figs. 10991113;
Stefano Orlandi, I libri corali di s. Maria Novella con miniature dei sec. XIII e XIV, Memorie
Domenicane 83 (1966): 5557. On the Cappellone degli Spagnoli: Richard Fremantle,
Florentine Gothic Painters. From Giotto to Masaccio (London: Secker & Warburg, 1975),
203204, esp. figs. 416 and 418 (with bibliography); Millard Meiss, Painting in Florence and
Siena after the Black Death: The Arts, Religion and Society in the Mid-Fourteenth Century
(London: Harper & Rowe, 1973), ch. 4: The Spanish Chapel, 94104; Pierre Francastel,
Studi di sociologia dellarte, tr. Andrea Zanzotto (Milan: Rizzoli, 1976), 116 (original French
ed. = tudes de sociologie dart [Paris: Denol/Gonthier, 1970]); but above all, for our theme,
Julius von Schlosser, Giustos Fresken in Padua und die Vorlufer der Stanza della
Segnatura, Jahrbuch der Kunsthistorischen Sammlungen des Allerhchsten Kaiserhauses 17
(1896): 13100 (the interpretive scheme of the series of the artes and scientiae and the corresponding auctoritates is found on p. 47). Schlossers proposed identification of the allegorical figures of the scientiae and their corresponding personages (for the artes there are
no interpretive uncertainties) is partially dubious but seems at this point the most convincing. Nevertheless, we believe that the iconographic series of the scientiae (and thus of
the related historical personages) must be reinterpreted in light of a long text of the
Council of Constance regarding the condemnation of Wycliffes 29th proposition (Giovan
Domenico Mansi [ed.], Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, 53 vols. [Paris:
H. Welter, 19011927], 28:131137). In that text (of 1415, but actually a synthesis of the academic tradition of the late fourteenth century) we find the programmatic statute of the
medieval university for the artistic and scientific education of clerics. The scientific
one is given in tripartite form: law (civil and canon law), philosophy (natural philosophy,
ethics, and metaphysics), and theology (scriptural and dogmatic). But what must be particularly emphasized here is its reduction of the artes and the scientiae to the direct and
immediate service of the science of faith (scientia fidei). From this connection between
the text of the Council of Constance and the wall of the Cappellone we would conclude the
following: in Andrea di Bonaiutos triumph, Thomas is exalted for having effected the
greatest and most perfect synthesis (almost the incarnation of the medieval universitas
studiorum) of all the artes and scientiae, none excluded but with each one still retaining its
own specific function in relation to theoretical and practical sacra doctrina (cf. Eugenio
Marino, Umanesimo e teologia. A proposito della recente storiografia su Lorenzo Valla,
Memorie Domenicane, n.s., 3 (1972): 198218, at 209210). Also on the Cappellone del
Chiostro Verde, see J.-J. Berthier, Le triomphe de Saint Thomas, patron et protecteur des
158
The two endpoints of the progressive exaltation of Thomism that takes

place during the period of Italian humanism are perfectly contemporaneous with and strictly related to the mural cycles in the Florentine chapterhouse (or Cappellone degli Spagnoli) and the Minervan Cappella
(commissioned by Cardinal Oliviero Carafa). The triumph of Thomas
executed by Andrea di Bonaiuto who on 30 December 1365 was commissioned by the prior of S. Maria Novella to paint the entire chapterhouse is
coles catholiques peint par Taddeo Gaddi dans la Chapelle des Espagnoles Florence. tude
dhistoire et dart (Fribourg [Switzerland]: Saint Paul, 1897). In that work, however, it is not
only necessary to correct the attribution of the pictorial cycle to Taddeo Gaddi, but also to
note the unlikelihood (apart from civil and canon law, represented by the first two symbolic figures starting from the left) of the successive division of the scientiae into: moral,
dogmatic, scholastic, mystic, and apologetic, as well as the identification of the historical personages alligned with the same division. Unfortunately, Berthiers iconographic
interpretation has found its way into popular works, e.g., Maria Baciocchi de Pon, Il
Chiostro Verde e la Cappella degli Spagnoli (Firenze: Lumacchi, 1900) and Stefano Orlandi
and Isnardo Grossi, Santa Maria Novella e suoi chiostri monumentali. Guida storico-artisica
(Firenze: Edizioni S. Becocci, 1974), 4377.
Among the many works on the Cappella Carafa in the Minerva in Rome, see in particular: Mary Pittaluga, Filippino Lippi, in Enciclopedia universale dellarte, vol. 8:623631, at
627631; Urbain Mengin, Les deux Lippi (Paris: Plon, 1932), 153171; Alfred Scharf, Filippino
Lippi (Vienna: A. Schroll, 1935), 3945, pls. 4555; Valerio Mariani, Larte di Filippino
Lippi, in Saggi su Filippino Lippi (Firenze: Arnaud, 1957), 7184; J.-J. Berthier, Lglise de la
Minerve Rome (Roma: Cooperativa tipografica Manuzio, 1910), 148196; Carlo Bertelli,
Appunti sugli affreschi nella Cappella Carafa alla Minerva, Archivum Fratrum
Praedicatorum 35 (1965): 115130. For what will be said later about the Minervan Cappella,
it is worth remembering that Gaetano dedicated his Commentarium on the prima pars of
the Summa Theologiae, finished in May, 1507 (cf. n. 10 above) and published in Venice in
1508, to cardinal Oliviero Carafa. Gaetanos dedicatory praefatio ends with the following
passage: Now I come to myself, who have always been loved by you with fatherly affection, increased with benefices, and decorated with high offices. I would rightly have to be
censured for the vice of ingratitude if I should offer these fruits of my studies to another
rather than to you, to whom I have also dedicated lesser works, especially since you most
of all encouraged me to hammer out this intepretation, and, when it was nearly well finished, you not only requested often but even violently demanded that it be published.
Receive now this gift of ours favorably, and accept it as a pledge and a monument to my
faith and regard for you. For all time, be well. (Commentarii in ImIIae Summae Theologiae
S. Thomae Aquinatis, p. *2v: Venio nunc ad meipsum, qui paterna charitate semper abs te
dilectus, beneficiis auctus, dignitatibusque ornatus, ingrati animi vitio iure damnandus
sim, si alii quam tibi hos quoque studiorum meorum fructus detulerim, cui minora etiam
dedicavi. Praesertim cum tu me ad hanc cudendam expositionem adhortatus maxime
fueris, vixque bene absolutam, publicari non solum saepe petieris, verum etiam flagitaveris. Cape igitur munus hoc nostrum benigna fronte, meaeque fidei atque observantiae
erga te pignus hoc monumentumque agnosce. In aevum, vale.) Finally, let us add that the
triumph of Thomas would later find a Counter-Reformation iconographic expression in
its figurative assimilation of ancient Roman heroes. For this aspect, see the design of
Giuseppe Passeri (16541714) in Anthony Blunt and Hereward Lester Cooke, The Roman
Drawings of the XVII and XVIII Centuries in the Collection of Her Majesty the Queen at
Windsor Castle (London: Phaidon, 1960), 73 and 75, pl. 62. I would like to thank Prof.
Nicholas Turner for calling my attention to Passeris design.

an integral part of the larger, differentiated (yet uninterrupted) theme of
the event of salvation and its extension into the time of the Church
Militant and Triumphant. The Church (ecclesia) is depicted in its secular
historicity its hegemonic scope notwithstanding within the political
realm of culture and the city. Portrayed along the lines of the Florentine
communal polis and the Holy Roman Empire, it is simultaneously the
space of the civic community and of universal Christendom.
The Order of the Hounds of the Lord (Domini canes) serves a welldefined apologetic function against the heretical movements the references to Peter Martyr and Aquinass Contra gentes are explicit and
discharges a specific ministry of the Word within the Churchs apostolic
and pastoral mission. Aquinas, then, in an historic and privileged moment
of the Order, in a sense recomposed and incarnated in himself the practice and the speculation of the Christian community. Hence the pictorial
and architectural passage, from the right wall around to the opposite side,
which ascends from the narration of the journey (through various times
and places) of the hierarchical and communitarian Church (ecclesia) to
the triumph of Thomas. Inevitably, the central wall represents the event
of salvation.
In the triumph, Aquinas is exalted as the one who, in the saintliness
of his life, possessed the theological and the cardinal virtues (winged personifications in a circle above the doctoral chair) to an exemplary degree
and who magisterially illustrated them in his writings (Orlandi);14 at the
same time he is the one who achieved victory over dogmatic heresy (Arian
and Nestorius) and philosophical error (Averroes). Situated between the
apostle Paul and the New Testament Evangelists on the one hand, and the
Law and the Prophets of the Old Testament on the other, he is the doctor
Ecclesiae (Doctor of the Church) par excellence, the theologian organic to
the Christian community, as is indicated by the sage liturgical verse (Wisd.
of Sol. 7:7) inscribed on the open book held to his chest. But Aquinass
theological doctrine is at the same time a global synthesis, a place of convergence (also in the pictorial display) for the sacred and profane sciences
(from civil and canon law to the various disciplines constitutive of theology, the scientia fidei, or science of faith), as well as for the liberal arts of
the quadrivium and the trivium. Aquinass is a vast and systematic work of
theological investigation. It is situated in the (Greek and Latin) patristic
tradition and at the summit of scholasticism (from Boethius to Peter
14[It has not been possible to identify the precise source of this quotation from Stefano
Orlandi. Eds.]
160
Lombard). It makes use of civil and canon law and ecclesiology, takes up
the ancient Greek and Latin authorities (auctoritates), and comes to be
expressed, at the same time, in the divine rhythms of the Holy Spirit,
which breathes its gifts into the theologian. Corresponding in number and
pictorial space to the allegorical figures of the seven planets, which are
placed above the arts of the quadrivium and trivium, the seven gifts of the
Holy Spirit are represented by an equal number of allegorical figures, lined
up with the symbolic series of the sciences and a procession of the historical personages related to them.
It seems obvious that the synchrony of Thomass triumph is inserted
into an architectural and semantic arrangement with a specifically medieval perspective: it is an integral part of a space and time that is structurally Gothic and ideologically scholastic. The Cappellones vast mural cycle
is laid out and tied together in concentric circles: the triumph of Thomas
is set within the kerygmatic and apologetic function of the Dominican
Figure 1.Andrea di Bonaiuto (fl. 13431377), Triumph of the Catholic Doctrine

Embodied by St. Thomas Aquinas, fresco, 13651367. Cappellone degli Spagnoli,
Santa Maria Novella, Florence (courtesy of Scala Archives).

Order; the Orders apostolic mission is inscribed in the dimensions of the
Church (ecclesia), which is hierarchically ordered and understood as a
continuum from the time of its militancy to the final days of its glorification; finally, the event of salvation appears as omni-comprehensive of
Christianity, endowing it with form from its apostolic origins to recent times
and bringing it to completion. Thomass doctrine and works are therefore
projected, within the pictorial cycle, as the recapitulation of Christian
teaching and ancient culture, but also as a theological moment of
Christianity immediately related to the ecclesial time of an historical epoch.
At the close of the fifteenth century, the exaltation of Thomism is celebrated in the Cappella Carafa in a perspective largely different from that
of the Florentine Cappellone. The overall composition of the whole mural
cycle, finished in September 1492 and dedicated to the Divine Thomas,
canonizes Thomist theology as a doctrinal system of timeless contemporary applicability. Executed according to theological and cultural principles and with the illustrative character of the whole, envisioned as a
giant illuminated page, Lippis pictorial cycle takes on the aspect of an
ideal frontispiece not so much to Aquinass opera omnia, as Mariani
believes, but rather, and above all, to his Summa theologiae.15 It is ennobled by a Renaissance architectural structure, taking on dimensions of
Roman continuity and normativity.
Lippis pictorial narrative is executed along the walls of the Minervan
Cappella in a tripartite scheme, progressing naturally around a thematic
nucleus from the right wall (the triumph of Thomas, or disputation, as
Vasari calls it) to the opposite left wall (destroyed in 1566 to insert a monument to Paul IV, designed by Ligorio). Here, according to Vasari, Faith has
taken Infidelity captive . Hope has likewise overcome Despair and
there are many other Virtues that have subjugated the Vice that is their
opposite.16 The cycle finishes on the central wall with the Assumption
and the great Annunciation altarpiece. Lippis iconographic text is
informed by a thematic continuity and organic connectivity, and it seems
rather obvious (although this has been ignored by historians, even by the
likes of Berthier) that the pictorial cycle follows the same tripartite scheme
as the Summa theologiae. In our endeavor to expound this science (sacra
doctrina), Aquinas writes in the prologue to quaestio 2, pars 1 of the
Summa, we shall treat: (1) of God; (2) of the rational creatures advance
15[Mariani, Larte di Filippino Lippi, 80.]
16[Giorgio Vasari, Lives of the Painters, Sculptors and Architects, tr. Gaston du C. de Vere
(New York: Knopf, 1996), 567.]
162
towards God; (3) of Christ, who, as a man, is our way to God.17 The
Summas tripartite scheme is manifested in the Minervan Chapels walls
as follows: the dogmatic and philosophical disputation (with the sequence
of historical personages form the ranks of theological heresy and philosophical error) corresponds to pars 1 of the Summa (the unity and trinity
of God, and the nature of man); the portrayal of Christian theological and
moral practice corresponds to pars 2 (the theological and cardinal virtues,
and their contrary vices); and the Annunciation, the initium Incarnationis
(beginning of the Incarnation) corresponds to pars 3 (dedicated to the
mystery of the God-man who is the way to salvation).
The pictorial cycle, which takes us back to the right wall from which it
began, is nothing other than the doctrinal illustration of the large Book,
open in all its fullness, in the large rose window inscribed at the apex of
the Renaissance arch. Above the Disputation scene, the arch majestically outlines the throne where Thomas is seated; gathered at the feet of
the throne in a grouping that is significantly reduced in comparison with
the triumph of the Florentine Cappellone are the allegorical figures of
Grammar and Dialectic on one side, Philosophy and Theology on the
other. The large book of the Summa theologiae (as identified by Berthier),
decorated with lilies and illuminated by a sun above it, is held up by two
putti: the work of the Angelic Doctor hovers in an almost divine and timeless glorification that transcends its very author.18 Finally, the fresco runs
to the end of the high wall and continues through the entire curve of the
lunette. Here is depicted, in an uninterrupted sequence (as Bertelli has
noted), an event in Thomass life mocked by Valla in a long passage of
the Adnotationes that is directly related to the doctrine of his theological
work.19 Thomas deposits his Book at the feet of the Cross, and Christ gives
him the divine seal of dogmatic orthodoxy, saying: you have written well
of me, Thomas (bene scripsisti de me, Thoma).
If the triumph of Thomas in the Cappellone degli Spagnoli celebrates
Thomas as the greatest theologian of the universal church and as a thinker
profoundly organic to medieval Christianity, the triumph in the Cappella
Carafa is undoubtedly dedicated to the glorification of the Summa
theologiae.Is it not perhaps within this perspective which, incidentally,
17Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, prol. quae. 2, pars 1: Ad huius sacrae doctrinae
expositionem intendentes primo, tractabimus de Deo; secundo, de motu rationalis in Deum;
tertio, de Christo, qui, secundum hominem, via est nobis tendendi in Deum. Translation by
the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros., 1948).
18[Berthier, Lglise de la Minerve, 167, 180.]
19[Bertelli, Appunti sugli affreschi nella cappella Carafa alla Minerva, 117, n. 11.]
Figure 2.Filippino Lippi (ca. 14571504), Triumph of St. Thomas Aquinas over
the Heretics, fresco, 14891492. Cappella Carafa, Santa Maria sopra Minerva,
Rome (courtesy of Scala Archives).
does much to explain the location of Pius Vs monument to Paul IV that

the Summas systematic theology will define the specific Thomism of the
Council of Trent and the period of the Counter-Reformation, to say nothing of earlier anti-Lutheran controversialism? Aquinass Summa, and
more precisely its recovery, seem to be at the root of this doctrinal and
ecclesiological restoration a restoration which was often reiterated,
albeit with different elements, but which was initiated and raised to the
status of an ideological paradigm in the fifteenth century.
The polar extremes of the theological controversy of the fifteenth century thus came to converge in the former temple of Minerva: the humanist
critique found in the Encomium of 1457, arguing for a science of faith alternative to that of traditional scholasticism, and the counter-reaffirmation
of the 1492 pictorial cycle, illustrating the timeless contemporary applicability of Thomist theology. Emerging in all their fullness and profundity,
then, at the end of the fifteenth century, are on the one hand Vallas insight
into the ideological direction which would be taken by the theological
164
speculation of the Schools, and on the other hand the complex and systematic anti-humanist response of neo-Thomism. Vallas Encomium was a
programmatic call for a humanist theology, and in the early sixteenth century it would yield Erasmuss theory or method of true theology (ratio
seu methodus verae theologiae). In the mid-fifteenth century, however, it
functioned as a critique of scholasticism, which saw in Thomism the origins of a timeless and normative theology.
Timelessness is semantically a very rich category of iconography. Zeri
based his Pittura e Controriforma on it, thereby reconstructing the origins
of timeless art. By transferring this concept to theology and we are
prompted to do so on account of analogical correlations we could
describe the critical objective of Vallas 1457 speech as identifying, in the
fifteenth-century scholastic-Thomist shift, the beginning of a zeitlose
Theologie, a timeless theology, that would remain a constant in Christian
culture.20 Indeed, precisely this seems to be the essential, contextual
nucleus of the Encomium of St. Thomas. We now offer as close a reading of
the text as possible in order to substantiate this position, which has been
stated here as a mere hypothesis in a purely formal way.
2.Encomium of St. Thomas
The Encomiums composition is dense, full of literary and extra-literary
interrelations, contextual combinations and contrasts, and different
20We owe the phrase zeitlose Theologie (timeless theology) to Federico Zeri, Pittura e
Controriforma. Alle origini dellarte senza tempo (Torino: Einaudi, 1957). Our coinage zeitlose Theologie is based on his zeitlose Kunst (timeless art) (p. 84), which he defines as the
escape of a work (of art) from the fleeting frailty of taste and of style. His work also suggested the subtitle to our introduction: at the origins of neo-Thomism in the fifteenthcentury, as it also effects a conceptual transfer from iconography (the iconography of
timeless art) to the history of theology. But we owe not only this to Zeri; indeed our debt
to him involves something much more important. Beyond the intentions of the author himself, our reading of Pittura e Controriforma leads us to conclude the existence of a strict
parallelism between the vicissitudes of timeless art and the multiform course of theological study between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries although the relative periods
and corresponding chronological rhythms do not match up exactly. This proposition has
undoubtedly been stated too briefly for the observation that we would like to make in this
regard and that would require a fuller and more in-depth discussion. The reader, however,
will easily be able to comprehend it by rereading Zeris monograph from the point of view of
the history of theology and of the Church in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. What Zeri
wrote on p. 113 finds clear confirmation here: the artistic thermometer is the most precise
indicator of societys values and meanings. This is what the Renaissance art historian Georg
Weise demonstrated and repeated on many occasions (also with regard to other, more complex, aspects), in his Lideale eroico del Rinascimento e le sue premesse umanistiche (Napoli:
Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 1961), ch. 1: Il duplice concetto di Rinascimento, 178.

levels and types of argument. Its complex structure typically humanistic,
as will be argued later is not immediately clear. It will therefore be necessary to analyze it as a whole in order to understand its contents and to
discover the solutions proposed by Valla in relation to the question of
Thomisms theological validity in the fifteenth century. The following
observations, although derived or arrived at from different perspectives,
are all made with a view to the theme of timelessness just mentioned, a
theme which seems to us central to Vallas oration.21
2.1.Exordium and Divine Invocation
The very opening of the Encomium, with its references to and historicoliterary considerations on the divine invocation (invocatio coelestis
numinis), endows Vallas discourse right from the beginning with the
humanistic ambivalence between pagan cultural custom and Christian
liturgical revival. Indeed, the extremely short exordium (directly preceding the recitation of the Ave Maria) focuses on the transfer from the
idolatrous worship of false gods to that of the true God, Christ of this
beseeching prayer for the encomiastic celebration of the saint. Valla obviously has in mind the specific literary genre of the encomium, or laudativum genus (genre of praise), exemplified in Hellenic oratory (Isocrates,
Demosthenes) and thoroughly described first by Aristotle and then by
21For the relationship between Valla and Quintilian, of which much will be said here in
the first section of the present essay, see Salvatore I. Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo
e teologia (Firenze: Istituto nazionale di studi sul Rinascimento, 1972), where Vallas
Quintilianism is amply treated and demonstrated with pertinent texts. See also HannaBarbara Gerl, Rhetorik als Philosophie. Lorenzo Valla (Mnchen: Fink, 1974). References to
other sources in Vallas writings are discussed in two very important essays (made available by the generous courtesy of their author, although after our work was already completed) by Riccardo Fubini, Intendimenti umanistici e riferimenti patristici dal Petrarca al
Valla, Giornale Storico della Letteratura Italiana 151 (1974): 520578; and idem, Note su
Lorenzo Valla e la composizione del De voluptate, in I classici nel Medioevo e nellUmanesimo.
Miscellanea filologica (Genova: Universit di Genova, Istituto di Filologia Classica e
Medioevale, 1975), 1157. Vallas autograph glosses to the Institutio oratoria are found in the
ms. of Quintilians work in Paris, Bibl. Nat., Lat. 7723 (see Quintilian, Listituzione oratoria,
ed. and tr. Rino Faranda, 2 vols. [Torino: UTET, 1968], 1:3033). Vallas glosses have also
been collected in a ms. in Naples, Bibl. dei Gerolamini, M. XXVVII.2.15. For these two mss.,
see Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 119120. In this earlier work I made
an error which I would now like to correct: the ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 6174 does not contain glosses on Quintilian by Valla but only the autograph version of the Gesta Ferdinandi
regis Aragonum, now magisterially edited in a critical edition, with a full introduction,
based on this very codex, by Ottavio Besomi (Padova: Antenore, 1973). [For a critical edition of Vallas glosses on Quintilian, see Lorenzo Valla, Le postille allInstitutio oratoria di
Quintiliano, eds. Lucia Cesarini Martinelli and Alessandro Perosa (Padova: Antenore,
1996).]
166
Quintilian (Institutio oratoria, III.4.12ff.). The exordiums collocation and

content, therefore as Valla himself mentions were dictated by normative literary exigencies and by classical models. Hence the direct although
not explicit reference to book IV, 46 of the Institutio oratoria (Orators
Education) and to the prologue of Plinys Panegyric of Trajan. These references, incidentally, are suggested not only by textual parallelisms, but
even more by Vallas glosses on the passages just cited of the Institutio.22
We have said that the opening of Vallas celebrative oration is characterized by a humanist ambivalence towards the transfer, and even more
towards the justification given for that transfer, of the divine invocation
from pagan worship to Christian liturgy. We must now specify that it is
precisely this transfer that provides the immediate occasion for resolving
this ambivalence, unambiguously, in a Christian version of the genus laudativum, based on the model of ancient rhetoric. After the prologue, which
introduces the recitation of the Ave Maria and thus in this specific case
takes on a ritual force, Vallas Encomium embarks upon a theological criticism of medieval and contemporary scholasticism, an historical rethinking of the Greek and Latin patristic tradition, and the search for a new
principle of humanistic theology.
2.2.The narratio and the Liturgical Celebration of the Saint: The Testimony
of the Martyr/Confessor in the Army of Christ
After the exordium, or prologue (cf. Institutio oratoria, IV.1), the narratio
(cf. ibid., IV.2) begins with the words, although all who die in the Lord .
The theological nature of the orations opening is immediately felt. Indeed,
the celebrative-liturgical narration of the deeds accomplished by the
Christian hero, the saint, cannot be confined within the limits that circumscribe the encomium that genre of demonstrative rhetoric whose
aim is the exaltation of excellence (aret) within the realm of the polis.
This is the definition given by Aristotle (and used by Quintilian) in the
22Vallas gloss on Institutio oratoria, III.4.1314 is in ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 7723, f. 32r,
right margin: as of Isocrates and of many others; and after Quintilian: Plinys de laudibus
Traiani, Latinus Pacatus de [sc. laudibus] Theodosii, Mamertinus de Juliani, Nazarius de
Constantini (ut Isocratis et aliorum nonnullorum; et post Quintilianum: Plinii de laudibus
Traiani, Latini Pacati de Theodosii, Mamertini de Juliani, Nazarii De Constantini). See the
(rare) Panegyrici veteres, ed. Jacobus De La Baune (Venice: Javarina: 1728), ad usum
Serenissimi Delphini, with notes by Christian Schwarz, where the panegyrics of the
Latin authors named in Vallas gloss are collected. For Plinys text, see Pliny the Younger,
Letters and Panegyricus, trans. Betty Radice, 2 vols. (London: Heinemann, 1969), 2:322324
(Panegyricus, I.16).

Rhetoric, book I, chapter 9, 1367b-1368a. Among other things, we read there
that, while
praise is language that sets forth greatness of virtue , encomium deals with
achievements . Hence we pronounce an encomium upon those who have
achieved something.23
It is even specified that the mans praiseworthy actions must be rooted in

the sphere of the family and in the paideia connected to it, in the social
and civil dimensions where that action is carried out and made manifest
in a conspicuous way.
The Christian hero transcends the boundaries of the polis. His deeds
extend into, or at least make themselves felt in, the space and time of the
universal Church (ecclesia). This is why and here we see the theological
plane that the Encomium must reach Vallas narratio had to frame those
deeds in the historical dimensions of the religious community. At the
same time it had to exalt their doer as predestined by his heroic virtues
for the eternal orders of the (Dionysian) celestial hierarchy. With his
Encomium of St. Thomas, then, Valla was given the chance to treat themes
dear to him: the Christian army, a constant and privileged motif across
his entire corpus from the Dialecticae disputationes to De libero arbitrio
(On Free Will), and the glorification of paradise, described in the finale of
book III of De vero falsoque bono (On the True and False Good).24 What is
more, we should keep in mind that these two themes had been directly
suggested to Valla by the Breviarium romanum, and precisely by the
Communion of the martyrs and confessors recited for the feast of the
saints.25 Thus we see that the further course of Vallas oration is neither
without foundation nor bereft of (liturgical) contextual nodes.
And it is again the same liturgical context that presents Valla with the
opportunity to dwell on the hagiographic distinction, observed in the
23[Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, tr. John Henry Freese (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1926), 101.]
24In his Antidota to Poggio Bracciolinis Invectivae, Valla describes the end of De vero
falsoque bono as the place where I defend the Christian cause, where I attack all pagans,
where I depict the joys of paradise. [Lorenzo Valla, Antidotum in Pogium IV, in idem,
Opera omnia, 1:343: ubi causam christianam ago, ubi gentiles cunctos impugno, ubi gaudia
depingo paradisi.]
25On the theme of the Christian army and book III of De vero bono, see respectively
Fois, Il pensiero cristiano di Lorenzo Valla, 476481; and Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla.
Umanesimo e teologia, 340341. On the Communion of the martyrs and the confessors, cf.
Herman A.P. Schmidt, Introductio in Liturgiam Occidentalem (Roma: Herder, 1960), 519
528; Aim Georges Martimort, La Chiesa in preghiera. Introduzione alla liturgia (Roma:
Descle, 1966), 900937.
168
Latin Church, between martyrs and confessors, thus incorporating

themes into his oration that only on their surface appear to be bits of philological pedantry.
Although all who die in the Lord are blessed and saints, nevertheless the
Church expressly designates as blessed and saints those whom it recognizes
either as having met death for religion, for truth, for justice, or as having
achieved fame for leading a chaste and spotless life accompanied by divine
signs and miracles. It uses the Greek word martyrs (martyres) for the former and the Latin one confessors (confessores) for the latter, although both
terms have approximately the same meaning. For what else have martyrs
done in enduring torture and meeting death than confess themselves
unwilling to deny Christ? . On the other hand, what else have confessors
done in living piously and writing piously than bear witness (testimonium)
to the truth?26
The liturgico-hagiographic distinction is resolved, so to speak, in a series

of linguistic annotations regarding the semantic unity or the meaning
(vis nominis) of the two terms (testimonium), the analogic relationship of
their meaning (testimony of life and/or of death), the diversity of their
referents (the testimony of those killed for Christ or of those who lived
for Christ), and the variation in lexeme (Greek martyr, Latin confessor). But beyond these annotations, which are typical of his philological
writing, Valla brings up the disjunctive pair martyr/confessor in order to
frame the regulations and various duties that give form and order to the
Christian army:
The Church, as I have said at least the Latin one has decided that only the
former are to be called martyrs and honored with the privilege of that rank,
because, as vigorous and brave soldiers, they are recognized by their commander for their military service and especially for their deeds in battle. The
martyrs, then, who were soldiers of Christ, stood in the battle line for their
commander and poured out their blood and life. The confessors were themselves also soldiers of Christ, but they merely performed military labors
(albeit great and lasting ones); and although they were prepared to undergo
death for their commander, God, they did not actually undergo it or stand in
the battle line.27
In the specific case of Aquinas, the liturgical and hagiographic distinction

is overcome, as it were, by the dimension and importance of the army of
Christ (militia Christi) that he commanded as Doctor of the Church. His
confession (confessio), Valla continues, was certainly not without, or less
26Valla, Encomion, 2.3040.
27Ibid., 3.4553.

marked by, the witness (testimonium) to theological truth and ecclesial
fidelity of sublime martyrs like Peter of Verona (12061252) and Thomas
Becket (11181170). We should observe that the hagiographical connections suggested here by Valla do not merely refer to Jacopo da Voragines
ubiquitous Golden Legend, as Radetti has correctly pointed out.28 They
must also be seen in the light of the iconographic depictions of the
triumph, discussed above, in which (from Traini and Andrea di Bonaiuto
to Beato Angelico) the thematic diptych of Thomas Aquinas/Peter of
Verona often recurs. The one as Doctor of the Church, the other as Martyr
for the faith, together they constitute the duo par excellence fulfilling the
ecclesial calling of the Order of Preachers.
From Aquinass historical task of commanding the army of Christ,
the oration continues on to the saints place in the celestial hierarchy.
Thomass dance with the angels in the gardens of paradise, painted by
Fra Giovanni da Fiesole (Fra Angelico), has its literary echo in Vallas text,
which is aligned closely with the poetic tradition of Dante with regard to
Aquinass celestial glory:
Thomas Aquinas was like a kind of sun, shining forth in the dazzling splendor of his learning and burning bright with the ardor of his virtues. He is to be
placed among the Cherubim for the splendor of his learning, among the
Seraphim for the ardor of his virtues.29
It might be objected, Valla continues, that in glorifying Thomas in this way

he has ceded to the fanatical language of hyperbole, which ancient
rhetoric vilified as a friend of the foolish, enemy of the prudent.30 He
counters,
Let me respond that I do indeed think that all who are imbued with the
knowledge (scientia) of divine truths have something in common with the
Cherubim, just as all who are infused with the love (caritas) of God are the
fellows of the Seraphim to say nothing of Thomas, so incredibly full of
knowledge and love.31
In a quick gloss on Vallas discourse, let us note that Dantes theological

poetics comes to be joined here with the mystic theology characteristic of
Aquinas, although the indications of this are slight indeed (the symmetrical dyads of imbued with knowledge/infused with love and shining
forth in the dazzling splendor of his learning/burning with the bright
28[In Valla, Scritti filosofici e religiosi, 460463 (notes).]
29Valla, Encomion, 4.6873 (emphasis added).
30Ibid., 5.7576.
31Ibid., 6.8487 (emphasis added).
170
ardor of his virtues). Furthermore, it is precisely this second dyad that

provides the structure for Vallas panegyric, dividing it between the two
interrelated thematic units of virtue (virtus) and knowledge (scientia).32
2.3.Probatio and refutatio, the Central Section of the Encomium:
Virtue, the First Thematic Unit, Elaborated Along the Hagiographic
Topoi of Birth, Life, and Death and through a comparatio between
Thomas and Dominic
The narratio is followed by the probatio and refutatio (cf. Institutio oratoria, V.1). This is the demonstrative section of the Encomium, and it is actually the central and fullest part of Vallas speech.33 It is linked to the
previous narrative section by an introductory transitional passage indicating its main argumentative themes:
Justly, therefore, such a man let me speak first about his virtues and later
about his knowledge justly was he destined to be foretold to the world
before he was born, his birth prophesied, his life predicted, even his death
announced.34
The thematic unit of virtue is developed within a rhetorical grid system.

The horizontal axis is syntagmatic and relational and is composed of the
hagiographic, charismatic, and prophetic topoi of birth (ortus), life (vita),
and death (mors). The vertical axis, on the other hand, is systematic and
correlational and is articulated by means of typological biblical figures
representative of the kind of life to which God manifestly calls his elect.
The theology of the messianic calling replicates for the humanist Valla,
32On the iconographic theme under discussion, cf. Stefano Orlandi, Beato Angelico
(Firenze: Olschki, 1964), pl. VII and p. 24, pl. XLIII and p. 97, pl. LIII and pp. 104105;
L. Ferreti, Un trionfo di S. Tommaso nella chiesa dei Domenicani in Tivoli, in San
Tommaso dAquino O.P. Miscellanea storico-artistica, ed. Innocenzo Taurisano (Roma:
A. Manuzio, 1924), 299301. On hyperbole: Aristotle, Rhetoric, 3,11, 1413b; Quintilian,
Institutio oratoria, VIII.6.7376; cf. A.D. Leeman, Orationis ratio. Teoria e pratica stilistica
degli oratori, storici e filosofi latini, ed. Elio Pasoli, tr. Gian Carlo Giardina and Rita Cuccioli
Melloni (Bologna: Societ editrice il Mulino, 1974), 413414 [English ed. = Orationis ratio:
The Stylistic Theories and Practices of the Roman Orators, Historians, and Philosophers
(Amsterdam: A. M. Hakkert, 1963); unless otherwise noted, all references to precise page
numbers are to the Italian edition]. For the encomiastic attributes regarding Thomass
virtus and scientia, Valla certainly has in mind the liturgical texts of the divine office
recited for the saints feast: Breviarium iuxta ritum Ordinis Praedicatorum, ed. Michael
Browne, 2 vols. (Roma: Sabina, 1962), in die, 1:947ff.
33For the argumentative structure of the probatio-refutatio, keep in mind chs. 811 of
book V of Institutio oratoria, which Valla follows to the letter in the final section of book 20
of his Dialecticae disputationes.

albeit in a qualitatively different way, the telos of the theios anr (divine
man). But in this he was merely following medieval scholasticism, in
which the Christian saint had been repeatedly and at times systematically
theorized on the typology of the Hellenic hero.
Thomass birth is foretold to his mother according to the typology of
the messianic prophet, reference to which is expressly made:
God, whenever he has resolved to give something extraordinary and new to
the world, is wont to announce it with signs or prophecies. There are very
many examples of this .35
The typological model is here reflected in Dominic de Guzmn (St.

Dominic), the founder of this family [of brothers],36 to whom Thomas is
then compared. The text claims to pass over many examples for the sake
of brevity; it is content with one from the family.37 And yet the asymmetrical pair of father and son (pater/filius) need not entail a subordination in value either concerning the foretelling of the birth of one or the
other, or regarding their respective lives. And so much is expressly
confirmed:
Let the prophecies about each man be equal, equal the merits of both their
lives. Let neither be placed before the other . We must honor them with
equal veneration, both of them renowned for all the virtues, both for miracles without number.38
Then Valla introduces another, typically literary or humanist, pairing

that sees the two saints like two consuls, the highest of magistracies.39
Nonetheless, it is the asymmetric pair of father and son that underlies the
parallelism of the lives and works of the two men, of Dominic and Thomas.
The biographical sketch is thus executed, rapidly and concisely, by way of
the convergences of parallel lives but always in a series of asymmetrical
relations. Here they are set off against one another in the order of the text,
so as to make Vallas comparatio immediately clear:
Dominic founded the house of the Preachers
Thomas covered its floors with marble.
Dominic built its walls
Thomas decorated them with the finest paintings.
35Ibid., 7.99101.
36Ibid., 8.103.
37Ibid., 7.101102.
38Ibid., 8.106109.
39Ibid., 8.107108.
172
Dominic was the pillar of the brothers
Thomas their shining example.
Dominic planted
Thomas gave water.
The one shunned honors and episcopacies
the other fled nobility, wealth, kinsmen, and parents.
The one imitated the chastity and continence of Paul
the other the virginity of John the Evangelist.
Of the one nothing was more admirable than his humility
the other had so much humility that he was even astonished at the
boasting and bragging of others.40
From the praises of their virtues, the comparison continues to the corresponding testimonies of their virtues including the prediction of
their deaths:
Both men
saw and heard
the holy Apostles Peter and Paul,
the most holy mother of God,
the Lord our Savior.
Both men were told about their imminent deaths.
The one wrote the brothers most excellent Rule
the other the most outstanding and the greatest number of books.
Thomas devotes himself to writings
Dominic rules the provinces ,
Certainly Thomas sends no more men to heaven with his writings
than Dominic does with his Rule.
Hence the closing, which follows the sequence of binary oppositions:

Therefore let it be granted that virtue, glory, and miracles are equal in
Dominic and Thomas,
who are no more different and distinct from one another than
the morning from the evening star.41
Thus, by making use of the stylistic device of the comparatio, or

comparison to which he himself makes explicit reference Valla
succeeds in compressing the traditional and most relevant hagiographic
facts (derived from biographical sources on Aquinas, especially Guglielmo
da Tocco) into the briefest of outlines. He has rejected other stylistic
techniques, like the embellishment of ornatus and the exaggeration of
amplificatio, which in this specific case would have dressed up an oration
40Ibid., 9.114123.
41Ibid., 1011.128138.

that was supposed to be simple and almost unadorned (in accord with
the simple and plain brevity called for by Cicero).42 So much is confirmed
by Valla himself before he moves on to the discussion of Thomass knowledge (scientia), the Encomiums other thematic unit:
I have spoken of Thomass virtues and miracles briefly and simply, having
made no use of exaggeration (amplificatio) and embellishment (exornatio)
. I believe you would now like me to say something about this saints
knowledge, which I proposed to treat second, saying whom I would set him
above and whom I would call his equal.43
2.4.Knowledge, the Second Thematic Unit: Aquinas as the

Historical Model of Speculative Theology, and the refutatio
of Thomism's Timelessness as a Theological System
The passage cited just above ushers in the second part of the probatio, or
demonstrative section, of Vallas panegyric. Let us first emphasize the following. It is here in the discourse on Aquinass knowledge (scientia) the
opposite pole from virtue (virtus) on the structural axis around which the
whole text revolves that the probatio turns into its opposite: a refutatio,
or refutation. That is, the encomiastic probatio of Thomas, as the historical
model of virtue and knowledge, becomes the refutatio of Thomisms timelessness and perennity as a theological system.
42On comparatio, see Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, II.4.21; on ornatus and amplificatio,
see ibid., VIII.3 and 4; simple and almost unadorned: ibid, VIII.6.41 (nuda et velut
incompta); simple and plain brevity: Cicero, De oratore, 2.84.341 (brevitatem nudam
atque inornatam).
43Valla, Encomion, 12.142146. (emphasis added). The use of comparatio in the praise of
illustrious men can take the form of describing the respective merits of two characters.
This is of course a very similar theme to the preceding, but involves a duplication of the
subject matter and deals not merely with the nature of virtues and vices, but with their
degree as well, Institutio oratoria, II.4.2021, tr. E.H. Butler, 4 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 19201922). Moreover, contraries (contraria), examples (exempla), and comparisons (similitudines) (Institutio oratoria, V.10 and 11; VIII.3.72ff.) are the
three types of arguments (rationes: a ratio is that by which whatever has clearly happened is defended, ibid., III.11.4) made use of in argumentative rhetoric. [On this point, see
also p. 249 below. Eds.] The phrase with which the Encomium begins its comparison of
Thomas and Dominic because the rule of the Preachers is that the brothers go in
twos is a reference to the Rule of St. Augustine, which as is known was adopted by the
Dominicans: cf. Humbertus De Romanis, De vita regulari, ed. J.J. Berthier, 2 vols. (Torino:
Marietti, 1956), 1:244248. For all the biographical and hagiographic references, the
Encomiums principal source (although not direct) is Guglielmo da Tocco (d. 1323),
Vita S. Thomae Aquinatis, fasc. 2 of Fontes vitae S. Thomae Aquinatis, ed. D. Prmmer
(Saint Maximin, Var: Libr. Saint-Thomas-dAquin, 1924); for a more recent edition, see
S. Thomae Aquinatis vitae fontes praecipuae, ed. Angelico Ferrua (Alba: Edizioni domenicane, 1968).
174
In fact, it is precisely these final arguments that made Vallas Encomium

famous and unique (both for his contemporaries and for the history of
humanist and theological culture). They are what give the panegyric a precise historical significance in the tradition of anti-Thomism. Indeed, on
account of these final arguments the Encomium should be seen as a defining point of reference for the shift in Thomism and theological culture in
the fifteenth century. They constitute the pivotal point for all of Vallas
anti-scholastic theological writing.
The last words of the passage quoted above (whom I would set him
[Thomas] above and whom I would call his equal) indicate that the stylistic device of the comparatio will continue to be used in this part of the
speech to elaborate the theme of knowledge (as it was previously for virtue) but with a decisive variation: the use of this literary device takes on
a theological valence for the critical argumentation that follows. The
transposition of the comparatio from virtue to knowledge, then, is anything but formal. It will take Vallas oration to the center of the theological
debate surrounding neo-Thomism in the fifteenth century.
It was Valla himself who, in the commemorative debate held in the
temple of Minerva on 7 March 1457 for the feast of St. Thomas, identified
the essential nucleus of the theological controversy surrounding contemporary Thomism. Accordingly, he gave his speech the specific character of
a response (and such is exactly how the very short Encomium was received)
in opposition to the opinions expressed by those who had preceded him
in the course of that debate. The fifteenth-century scholastic revival of
Thomism was in fact a quaestio disputata, and it was as such in accordance with an ancient custom and a traditional form that it was treated
on the feast of Aquinas, before a devout and learned audience that
watched from under the gothic naves of the Roman church, the official
temple of the Order of Preachers. The information provided by Valla on
this point, which is quite noteworthy and valuable in and of itself, receives
confirmation from other sources.44
It can easily be seen from the text of the Encomium that the positions
argued by the participants in the debate (preceding Vallas oration) on the
revival of contemporary Thomism tended to affirm, at least implicitly,
Aquinass historical primacy as Doctor of the universal Church and,
44Uberto Guidi also expressed his opposition to the Thomist current during a disputation held in the church of S. Maria Novella, in 1315, in the presence of religious clerics and
learned laymen: Taurisano, Discepoli e biografi, 29. Cf. Kristeller, Medieval Aspects, 62 and
nn. 117 and 118. [See also p. 147 above. Eds.]

consequently, to exalt the Summas theological system as normative for all
further theological study. In his speech Valla attempted to reveal the foundation and highlight the premises, both explicit and implicit, on which
these positions were based. In point of fact, Renaissance neo-Thomism
encapsulated the triple iconographic theme of the triumph, where
Aquinas had become a symbol for the theoretical convergence of Greek
and Latin patristics, the Christian transcendence of Hellenic and Arabic
culture, and the definitive refutation of philosophical, religious, and dogmatic heresy. In Vallas eyes, the apologetics of that neo-Thomism obviously converged in the organization, by then considered complete and
definitive, of argumentative and methodological formulations normative
for any and all kinds of speculative theology. A neo-Thomism already rigorously systematized and formalized for philosophical and theological
speculation thus it had to appear to Valla. Here are his words:
It has not escaped me that certain people who held an oration here today on
the same subject not only made Thomas second to none of the doctors of
the Church but also placed him above them all . The reason they gave for
being able to put him above everyone is that for proof in theology he used
logic, metaphysics, and all philosophy, which the earlier doctors are supposed to have barely tasted with the tips of their tongues.45
2.5.Vallas Critique of Scholasticism and the Controversy between

Thomism and Anti-Thomism in the Fifteenth Century
The passage immediately following the one just cited is of extreme importance, as it suggests references and observations for reconstructing, from
within the spare, yet extremely dense Encomium, a retrospective view of
Vallas entire literary production. The text does not merely contain the
premises for the subsequent argumentation of Vallas clearly enunciated
anti-Thomist thesis. It is at the same time a pointed reference to the specific and constant theme ubiquitous in Vallas corpus of the crisis of
contemporary theology and, on the positive side, of the methodological
renewal of theological study. What is more, this passage of the Encomium
also provides confirmation that Valla was well aware of what was at stake
in the fifteenth-century controversy between Thomism and anti-Thomism;
his is a sufficiently full and sophisticated vision of the theoretical implications (of method, even more so than of content) for the study of theology
strictly speaking. This passage also shows, on the subjective plane of
176
Vallas role as an intellectual, the secure grasp which he had by then

reached of the historico-cultural import of his own critique of
scholasticism.
It should thus not surprise us to find, here at this point in the Encomium,
a recapitulation of what Valla had previously written in his Elegantiae
(Elegances of the Latin Language), in De libero arbitrio, in the Adnotationes
in Novum Testamentum, and above all in the Antidota (Remedies), a series
of invectives against Poggio Bracciolini that functions as an apologia pro
vita sua, a programmatic defense of his life. Let us now turn to the text of
the Encomium:
This is a slippery and perilous place for me, not only on account of the dignity of the saint we are praising, but also because of the deep-set opinion,
held by so many, that no one can become a theologian without the precepts
of the dialecticians, metaphysicians, and the other philosophers. What am I
to do then? Shrink in fear, make an about-face, disguise what I think, and
have my tongue contradict my heart? Since it was not of my own accord but
at the entreaty of the brothers that I rose to speak, and since it is not my way
to remain silent, I shall not give anyone cause to think that I have not spoken
my mind.46
Valla, then, has ascended the pulpit of the Minervan temple at the pressing request of the Dominican brothers. The historic Roman monastery
hosts a religious community that is both numerous and diverse, with
many different nationalities converging there from the various countries
of Europe. What is more, it is also the seat of the Provincial Prior (of the
Roman Province), the Master General of the Order, and the General
Curia. The commemorative debate for the feast of St. Thomas, therefore,
was planned and organized by the Dominicans of the Minerva themselves,
and put on for a cultivated Roman public of both clerics and laymen.
The decision to invite Valla to participate in the debate was by no
means random. He was by then a well-known personage: professor of
rhetoric at the Roman Studio, known and fiercely discussed in the liveliest
cultural centers across the entire peninsula, recognized by opposite camps
as the head of a new school of Italian humanism, opposed and accused
of heresy for his radical criticism of contemporary scholasticism and his
interpretive stance on the Vulgate Bible and the Donation of Constantine.
In spite of his notorious theological and ecclesiological ideas, Valla had
been taken into the service of Nicholas V. A translator of Greek classics for
the Vatican Library (directed by Giovanni Tortelli, the person closest to
46Ibid., 14.157164.

him culturally and a most loyal friend), he was considered by all (even by
his adversaries) to be a qualified member of the papal curia. And what is
most important to stress here, he enjoyed close friendships (partly on
account of common philological interests) with Dominicans then living in
Rome. The invitation extended to Valla by the Minervan friars had to
mean that they were taking a contrary position in the celebrative debate
on the life and works of Thomas Aquinas.
Now, if Vallas teaching in Rome and his constant polemic against scholasticism, which was gaining force in the 1450s (under the pontificates of
Nicholas V and Callixtus III), had reached the dimensions and the intellectual importance that we believe should be attributed to them, and if
Vallas work and extremely eccentric personality provoked reactions,
albeit of all different kinds, at the highest levels of political culture, it must
be concluded that the author of the Encomium had by then acquired a
position of prestige that could no longer be underestimated, particularly
within the context of the controversy between Thomism and antiThomism. Nor could this fact have escaped the interests of a cultural center like the Dominican monastery of the Minerva. In Rome, in March of
1457, the opposite occurred of what had happened in Naples in April 1444.
In Naples Valla had been subjected to an inquisitorial trial by influential
Dominicans of the Aragonese Province. In Callixtus IIIs Rome, he was
personally invited by the Dominicans of the Minervan congregation to
participate in a public debate as an authoritative critic of the Thomist
renewal. At the conclusion of Vallas oration, they would not have been
surprised. Nor would they have reacted this we can only suppose, but
with a high degree of probability like Cardinal dEstouteville, who, as
Gaspare da Verona reports, after hearing Lorenzo Valla speak in praise of
the most saintly Thomas Aquinas here, in the church of S. Maria sopra
Minerva, believed the orator to be insane.47
47Gaspare da Verona, De gestis tempore Pauli II, in idem, Le vite di Paolo II di Gaspare da
Verona e Michele Canensi, ed. Giuseppe Zippel (Citt di Castello: S. Lapi, 1904), 33: quum
audivisset L. Vallam de laudibus sanctissimi Thomae Aquinatis oratorem hic, in templo
sanctae Mariae supra Minervam, illum insanire iudicavit (emphasis added). For the inquisitorial trial in Naples, see: Fois, Il pensiero cristiano di Lorenzo Valla, 373382; Camporeale,
Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 201202; and above all Giovanni Di Napoli, Lorenzo
Valla. Filosofia e religione nellUmanesimo italiano (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura,
1971), 279312. On the Dominican bishop Giovanni Garca, whom Valla mentions in relation to his trial (beyond the indications in Fois, Il pensiero cristiano, passim), see Acta
Capitulorum Generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum, in Monumenta Ordinis fratrum
Praedicatorum historia, t. VIII, vol. III (13801498), ed. Benedictus Maria Reichert (Roma: In
domo generalitia, 1900), 195. Concerning the composition of the Dominican community in
the Minervan convent, an important notarial document of 1449 was discovered and
178
2.6.The Stylistic Qualities of Thomass Writings and the Canons
of Latin Rhetoric
Let us now turn from the historico-cultural context of the Encomium to

the textual analysis of its final pages. Here, still within the frame of a panegyric, Vallas discourse ascends to the highest level of clarification and
argumentative rigor. Its aim is to formulate a humanist principle of theology to act as an alternative to fifteenth-century scholasticism. Decisively
and with a full dose of irony, Valla contrasts the decadent theology of his
contemporaries with the intellectual stature of Thomas. He exalts him as
the historical model of the theologian and judges the value of his work by
its literary style, vastness of erudition, and doctrinal profundity and completeness. Vallas parameters clearly follow the criteria outlined in
Institutio oratoria, books X and XI (and parallel passages). Valla attributes
the style (elocutio) of Thomass writing, thus distinguishing it from that of
his own contemporaries sitting in the audience, with specific qualities
(and under the double aspect of res et verba) aimed at highlighting its
Attic character and doctrinal erudition. An analysis of these rhetorical
qualities (standard categories from the Ad Herennium to Cicero and
Quintilian), which are here correlated with the various levels of style, will
reveal what historico-literary place the Encomium attributes to Thomass
corpus. Valla writes:
I highly praise the exceptional simplicity (subtilitas) of St. Thomass writing;
I admire his carefulness (diligentia); I am amazed at the fullness (copia), the
variety (varietas), the completeness (absolutio) of his teachings. I add
another thing, with which many people would not credit him but which he
himself is supposed to have said: that he never read (legere) any book that he
did not fully understand. This is something that no one of our time can
claim: no jurist in civil law, no doctor in medicine, no philosopher in philosophy, no humanist in the reading (lectio) of ancient texts, nor anyone else
in the remaining arts and sciences, much less one man in all fields.48
I praise the simplicity (subtilitas) of his writing: subtilitas properly concerns argumentative prose, or better, linkage in probative discourse. It
consists in the absence of ornatus (adornment), which would obscure the
essential lines or somehow unravel the fabric of its demonstrative
published by Innocenzo Taurisano, Beato Angelico (Roma: Fratelli Palombi, 1955), 148149;
but cf. also Gilles Meersseman, La bibliothque des Frres Prcheurs de la Minerve la fin
du XVe sicle, in Mlanges Auguste Pelzer (Louvain: Bibliothque de lUniversit, Bureaux
du Recueil, 1947), 605631.

procedure. Indeed, subtilitas is the property exalted in Attic literature,
which was known for its studied purity and plainness of style that characterized the last of the three kinds of rhetoric (genera dicendi): high, or
elevated (grandis or sublimis), middle (mediocris or modicus), and simple,
or humble (subtilis or humilis). Cicero, in the tripartite distribution of the
orators various tasks (to persuade the audience with the high style,
which appeals to emotions or sentiments; to evoke the sense of taste or
beauty with the middle style; to educate and teach with the simple
style, which appeals to the listeners rational faculty) always points out
that the genus subtile is proper to pedagogical (in docendo) and demonstrative (in probando) discourse. Quintilian gives a similar definition when
speaking of the rhetorical style of the Greek Lysias:
simple and elegant, nothing more perfect can be found if the orator seeks
only to teach. For there is nothing in it that is empty, nothing far-fetched; it
is more like a clear spring than a great river.49
Would it exceed the limits of this passage of the Encomium if, within this
context of rhetorical critique, we were to note that Valla seems to be
applying Quintilians description of Lysias literary style to the quaestiones
of the Summa theologiae? At any rate, a more than superficial reading of
the Encomium cannot fail to notice that Valla, by exalting the subtilitas of
their prose, situated Aquinass works in the literary tradition of the Latin
Fathers. As Marrou and Auerbach in particular have shown, the patristic
tradition, especially from Augustine on, had theorized and developed the
sermo humilis (humble style) of Christian language, in which the lowest of
the classical genres of rhetoric was deployed for theology. Indeed, the
Christian orator and writer, conforming to the stylistic forms of Sacred
Scripture in order to achieve the utmost accessibility and comprehension
on the part of the faithful, had to assimilate his own language to the Word
made flesh, where the sublimity of the divine mystery was embodied in
the humility of the passion.
I admire his carefulness (diligentia): diligentia, which is closely connected to subtilitas, is another quality typical of Attic style. But here the
focus is on the accurate choice of words and terms, and thus of precision
and exactness of language, in argumentative discourse. Quintilian, following in the tradition of the Rhetorica ad Herennium and Ciceros rhetorical
works, speaks of the utmost carefulness in words and names C. Asinius
49Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, X.1.78: subtilis atque elegans et quo nihil, si oratori
satis sit docere, quaeras perfectius; nihil enim est inane, nihil arcessitum, puro tamen fonti
quam magno flumini propior.
180
Pollio as an instance of such linguistic precision.50 Need it be said that, in

calling attention to this pair of stylistic properties (subtilitas/diligentia),
Valla could not have described Aquinass writing more precisely? Without
a doubt Valla has in mind above all the prose of the Summa and the scriptural Expositiones (Commentaries), works of Thomas on which he draws
directly for the purposes of his anti-scholastic polemic.
I am amazed at the fullness (copia), the variety (varietas), the completeness (absolutio) of his teachings: here we turn from the literary form
of Thomass writings to their doctrinal content. The absolutio of which
Valla speaks refers specifically to the completeness of Aquinass philosophical and theological thought, with particular reference as seems
likely from the context to the Christian interpretation of Hellenic thought
(especially along the lines of Thomass polemics and apologetics against
Averroes). Quintilians terminology is illuminating for understanding
what Valla means by the expression, completeness of his doctrines (absolutio doctrinarum). A component of Ciceros vocabulary of preceptive rhetoric (De inventione I. 22.32), the word (as an adjective, absolutus) had been
defined and made extremely technical by Quintilian (Institutio oratoria,
VII.4.39). He recasts it as the Latin term for a particular type of forensic
argumentation (called katantilpsin) that, in the school of Hermagoras,
consisted in the transformation of an accusation into its opposite: by
means of a contrary and skillfully elaborated interpretation, the incriminated action is turned into an element in defense of the accused.
If absolutio defines the doctrinal scope of Thomass works, the pair
copia/varietas (fullness/variety) emphasizes the depth and the cultural
and intellectual dimensions of Aquinass theological speculation. More
precisely, the double attribution should be understood as copia rerum et
verborum (fullness of things and words) and varietas figurarum (variety of
rhetorical figures), but with regard to both language and thought. Thus it
should not be limited to the purely formal and literary aspect (in the
Ciceronian meaning: a fullness of words and a variety of rhetorical figures
must be employed51), but rather must be understood as extended to and
including the conceptual and thematic richness of Thomass theological
system. The reference, then, that determines the meaning and semantic
range of the pair copia/varietas again comes from chapters one and two of
book X of Quintilians Institutio.
50Ibid., IV.2.11618: summa diligentia in verbis; for Asinius Pollio, see ibid., X.2.113;
2.25.
51Cicero, De finibus, II.3.10: verborum sumenda copia est et varietas figurarum.

Confirmation of what has been said about the stylistic and doctrinal
descriptions of Thomass works is found in Vallas significant mention of
lectio as a tool and as a source of learning and methodology in Aquinass
theological study. Lectio, or close, detailed reading, is the engine of philological study, the analytical foundation for the examination and comprehension of the auctoritates (authorities). It is therefore the methodological
basis and the guiding principle for the acquisition of knowledge, both for
the orator, according to Quintilian (Institutio oratoria, I.8), and for the
theologian, according to the humanist Valla (cf. the prefaces to the
Elegantiae and the Disputationes).
But there is more and this observation comes much closer to the idea
undergirding the passage in question of Vallas Encomium. Lectio determines and defines the cultural education, the paideia, proper to the orator. Through lectio, conducted along the didactic lines traced by Quintilian,
the orator recovers, assimilates, and appropriates for himself the entire
cultural tradition (literary, historiographical, philosophical, and rhetorical) of Greek and Roman classical antiquity. The whole of book X of the
Institutio is dedicated precisely to this program of reading indispensable
to the future orator. For Valla (who in this respect follows in the footsteps
of the best tradition of early Italian humanism), the erudition of
Quintilians rhetoric is constitutive of culture in general and of theology in
particular. According to Valla, without the proper erudition the theologian falls into formalism and exhausts himself in the course of his own
speculation. Following the example of Aquinas, the theologian ought
instead to effect an almost ancillary integration of all the arts and sciences
in support of the theological disciplines. It should be noted that Valla constantly insisted on this cultural foundation for the scientia rerum divinarum (the science of divine truths, i.e. theology) as part of his polemic
against contemporary scholasticisms conceptualism and strict reliance
on logic. This point will receive greater clarity and definition in the following section of the Encomium.52
52Subtilitas and sermo humilis: cf. Leeman, Orationis ratio (1974), 2330 (Rhetorica ad
Herennium), 126128 and 188193 (Cicero), 431ff. (Quintilian); W. Peterson (ed.), Quintiliani
Institutionis oratoriae liber X (Oxford: Clarendon, 1903), 5556 (notes to ch. 1.78); Erich
Auerbach, Lingua letteraria e pubblico nella tarda antichit e nel Medioevo (Milano:
Feltrinelli, 1974), 3179 [English ed. = Literary Language and its Public in Late Latin Antiquity
and in the Middle Ages (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965)]; Henri-Irne Marrou, Saint
Augustin et la fin de la culture antique (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1958), 505545. Diligentia:
Leeman, Orationis ratio (1974), 207212, 251, 4048; Peterson (ed.), Quintiliani Institutionis,
74 (ch. 1.113). Copia: Leeman, Orationis ratio (1974), 123, 138, 158, 172174, 432434. Doctrina:
Leeman, Orationis ratio (1974), 57, 27173, 42630 and 499ff. In the liturgical texts for the
182
2.7.The Critique of Scholastic Speculation and the Humanist
Refounding of Theological Study
From the almost emblematic exaltation of Aquinas as the historical

model of theological thought in the medieval scholastic tradition, Vallas
panegyric now turns to the systematic and theoretical plane of Thomism.
It is precisely at this point of the Encomium that the laudatory probatio is
inverted, becoming a refutatio of the metaphysical speculation that
underlies the categorical and epistemological structure of Thomist theology. This refutation obliquely concerns the method of the Summa theologiae, but its central and explicit object is to criticize and directly oppose
the revival of neo-Thomism taking place in Vallas time. And it is precisely this shift in perspective (from medieval to contemporary scholasticism, from past to present) that gives the Encomium its specific historical
and theoretical importance. Here is the pivotal moment of Vallas discourse, the center-point around which it revolves, the thing that makes it
a watershed cultural document and above all an essential source for the
relationship between humanism and scholasticism in the fifteenth century. Is it not here, in the extremely dense and synthetic form of the
Encomium, that Vallas life-long polemic against scholasticism achieved
its highest, most complete elaboration? But let us now analyze the various arguments and aspects of the work, tracing its basic literary progression and noting its allusions and textual references. In the second part of
this essay we will then be able to reconstruct a full picture of its ideas and
context.
Valla enunciates his own view of the science of divine truths a view
that entails the critique of scholastic theological speculation and a humanist refounding of theological study by way of a theoretical and historical
saints feast, Thomass writing is described thus: his style is concise, his eloquence pleasing: his thought is lofty, intelligible, and powerful (stilus brevis, grata facundia; celsa clara
firma sententia), Breviarium Ordinis Praedicatorum, in die. Erasmus will take up the
same line: Moreover, Thomas Aquinas was a great man not only for his times. For to my
mind none of the modern theologians possesses equal carefulness, a greater soundness of
mind, or a firmer erudition: and he clearly would have been capable of mastering languages and the other aspects of the good arts, since he was so well acquainted with the
ones available in his time (Desiderius Erasmus, Annotationes in Novum Testamentum,
Rom. 1:5, in idem, Opera omnia, ed. Joannes Clericus [Jean LeClerc], 10 vols. (Lugduni
Batavorum [Leiden]: cura et impensis Petri Vander Aa, 17031706) [facsimile reprint =
Hildesheim: Olds, 1962], VI, col. 554: Thomas Aquinas, vir alioqui non suo tantum seculo
magnus. Nam meo quidem animo nullus est recentium theologorum, cui par sit diligentia,
cui sanius ingenium, cui solidior eruditio: planeque dignus erat, cui linguarum quoque
peritia, reliquaque bonarum litterarum supellex contingeret, qui iis que per eam tempestatem dabantur tam dextre sit usus).

comparison between ancient and modern phases of Christian thought.
Articulating his discourse by means of comparative references to scholasticism and to the Greek and Latin Fathers and making use of themes and
formulations he had already fully elaborated in parallel passages of other
works Valla executes his comparison between the two theologies on
both an epistemological and an historiographical level.
The contrary distinctions in epistemological foundation and historicocultural periodization of the two theologies indubitably remains, in Vallas
work, on the level of generalization and essential features. Not until
Erasmus and his theological and scriptural controversy (with Martin
Dorp and the Louvainists) will the respective scientific principles of
scholastic and patristic theology be precisely defined and compared on an
historical and historiographical level. Nevertheless, it is Vallas ideas and
formulations that will be borrowed and transformed (directly and with
full cognizance on the part of early-sixteenth-century theologians) in
the later understanding of scholasticism and patristic theology. Here,
obviously, we shall limit ourselves to describing the theoretical and historiographical distinction between ancient (veteres or antiqui) and modern
(recentes or novi) theologians as understood and described by Valla.53
After dealing with Thomass style and thought, Valla continues:
Those things which they call metaphysics and modes of signifying and the
like, which modern theologians regard with wonder like a newly discovered
sphere or like the epicycles of the planets, I regard with no great wonder at
all. Nor do I think, therefore, that it matters much whether one knows them
or not. And perhaps it is preferable not to know them, as they are like
impediments to better things. This I will make clear not with my own arguments (although I could) but by citing the authority of the ancient theologians Cyprian, Lactantius, Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine who were
so far from treating such matters in their works that they did not even mention them.54
According to Valla, scholastic theologians professed to explain the dogmatics of revelation by making use, for speculative purposes, of conceptual and argumentative tools like metaphysics, logic, the modes of
53Salvatore I. Camporeale, Da Lorenzo Valla a Tommaso Moro. Lo statuto umanistico
della teologia, Memorie Domenicane, n.s., 4 (1973): 9102 [reprinted in idem, Lorenzo valla.
Umanesimo, riforma e controriforma. Studi e testi (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura,
2002), 19119]; Heinz Holeczek, Humanistische Bibelphilologie als Reformproblem bei
Erasmus von Rotterdam, Thomas More und William Tyndale (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 138165.
See also Marie-Dominique Chenu, Antiqui, moderni. Notes de lexicographie mdivale,
Revues des Sciences Philosophiques et Thologiques 17 (1928): 8294.
184
signifying (modi significandi), and the like.55 But in doing so they transgressed the specific and irreducible boundaries of the things and the language that constitute the proper object of Christian faith; their endeavor
was just as useless for this seems to be the meaning of Vallas comparison as the attempt to correct the internal incoherence of geocentric cosmology by theorizing the ninth sphere and planetary epicycles. It might
be mentioned that Vallas words curiously echo the polemics found in the
Byzantine Cosmas Indicopleustess Topographia christiana, a work (probably written between 547 and 549) that was similarly critical of
Aristotelianism (that of John Philoponus) and that sharply rejected any
kind of synthesis between Greek science and Christian revelation. The
immediate source for Vallas scientific and astronomical knowledge, however, was certainly Johannes de Sacroboscos treatise De sphaera mundi
(On the Sphere of the World), an elementary text of the quadrivium.56
2.8.Philosophy as an Impediment to Authentic Christian
Thought and the Distinction/Opposition between Patristic
Theology and Scholasticism
In the practice of the scholastics, philosophy functioned as a handmaiden
to theology. Here it is described in a contrary way, as an impediment
(impedimentum) to Christian thought, an obstacle blocking its most
genuine and coherent development. Valla insists that the Latin Fathers,
together with their Greek counterparts, had in some fashion foreseen the
destination at which such a theoretical co-optation of Hellenic speculation would arrive, and that therefore they had rejected classical philosophy. He then goes on to inquire into the ancient (veteres) theologians
primary motivation for having rejected this kind of philosophical speculation, after which he gives his own incisive reply. It should be emphasized
that this reply accords with Vallas standard interpretation of the epistemological basis that, in his mind, underlies the theology of the Greek and
Latin Fathers of the Church.
55Cf. the parallel passages of the Dialecticae disputationes cited in Camporeale, Lorenzo
Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 178 and 229; and Alfonso Maier, Terminologia logica della
tarda Scolastica (Roma: Ateneo, 1972), passim (index sub voce modi significandi). For a
general view of the question: Eugenio Garin, Leducazione in Europa 1400/1600. Problemi e
programmi (Bari: Laterza, 1976), 329.
56On Cosmas Indicopleustes: Salvatore Impellizzeri, La letteratura bizantina (Firenze:
Sansoni, 1975), 186189. For the scholastic use of De sphaera mundi and De modis significandi
seu grammatica speculativa, cf. Armando F. Verde, Lo Studio Fiorentino 14731503. Ricerche e
documenti, 6 vols. in 9 (Firenze: Istituto nazionale di studi sul Rinascimento, 1973), 2:641.

The Fathers of the first centuries of Christianity rejected not only the
categories of classical philosophy but also philosophical language itself,
despite the excellent quality of their Latin (they were latinissimi) and
their close acquaintance with Greek. They stand in contrast to modern
(recentes) theologians, who, regarding classical languages, do not know
Greek and in Latin are nearly all barbarians.57 But how to explain,
how to understand the Fathers rejection of philosophical theory and
language?
Why, then, should they not have treated these subjects? Because they were
not supposed to be treated, and perhaps they were not even supposed to be
known and this for two reasons: one having to do with their contents (res),
the other with their words (verba).58
We immediately note that Vallas argument runs along the axis of the rhetorical relationship between res (contents) and verba (words). The polarization of the two terms is by no means merely formal; on the contrary, it
underlies a precise line of argument, in which a particular historiographical interpretation of the Church Fathers is offered and then infused into a
humanist principle of theology, which is presented as an alternative to
scholasticism.
Let us first consider the formulation of Vallas critique of scholasticism
in relation to divine truths, the object of theological science:
Regarding their contents: because these subjects did not seem to lead to the
knowledge of divine truths. Such also seemed to be the case to the Greek
theologians Basil, Gregory, John Chrysostom, and the others of that age.
They did not think that the sophisms of dialectics, the obscurities of metaphysics, or the trifles of the modes of signifying should be mixed in with
sacred questions. Nor did they even lay the foundations of their disputations in philosophy, for they heeded Pauls exclamation: not through philosophy and vain deceit [Col. 2:8]. This we know from experience as
well.59
Philosophy, then, is defined once again on the basis of dialectics, metaphysics, and the modes of signifying. And it is as such, according to Valla,
that it was rejected not only by the Latin Fathers named earlier but also by
the greatest figures in the Greek patristic tradition: Basil, Gregory, and
John Chrysostom (the same trio of Greek Fathers that recurs in identical
thematic contexts in other passages in Vallas corpus). Let us note in
58Ibid., 17.184186 (emphasis added).
59Ibid., 18.187195.
186
passing that the Gregory mentioned is Gregory Nazianzen, whose Oration

against Julian, to which Valla is implicitly referring here, is echoed in certain statements of De vero falsoque bono.60
It is clear, then, that Valla identifies philosophy with the conceptualization and speculation of logic, ontology, and grammar, i.e. with the scientific and methodological theoretics of the Aristotelian-Boethian tradition
and of scholasticism in general. And it is also in this sense that he understands the term philosophy as used by Paul in Colossians 2:8. Paul is not
only the orator par excellence, as will be said later, but also the rhetorician
who carries forward, into the realm of theology, the polemic against philosophy that had been articulated earlier by Isocrates and would later be
taken up by Quintilian. For Valla, Paul is the Christian rhetorician who
lays the new theoretical foundations of theology (institutio theologica),
which were grasped and consciously assimilated by the greatest Latin and
Greek Fathers of the Church.
The citation of Colossians 2:8 (which can also be found elsewhere, and
with the same connotations, in Vallas corpus) should thus not be thought
of as a mere appeal to authority. Rather, it must be understood as the
foundation, or better, as the scriptural premise to a line of argument
whose aim is normatively to identify the guiding principle of the scientia
rerum divinarum. The hollow abstraction and argumentation of philosophy this is the sense suggested by the allusion to the New Testament
passage impedes theological reflection on divine truths, just as, according to Pauls warning, it once hindered the Christians of Colosse from
understanding the divine mysteries.61
2.9.The Reduction of Philosophy to Rhetoric and Vallas
Quintilianism: Institutio oratoria, Book XII, Chapter 2.720
Up to now, Vallas critique of philosophy concerning the specific object,
the res, of theological discourse has been inspired by a particular phase
(patristics) of Christian thought, and it has been founded on Pauls scriptural testimony (Col. 2:8). Later on, these two foundational elements will
be taken up again and refined. But now, Vallas argument shifts decisively
60Bk. III, ch. 9: Valla, Scritti filosofici e religiosi, 197; cf. Fois, Il pensiero cristiano di
Lorenzo Valla, 166 and n. 272.
61De vero falsoque bono, bk. III, ch. 12: Valla, Scritti filosofici e religiosi, 204; Fois, Il pensiero cristiano di Lorenzo Valla, 188192 and 511. On Col. 2:8: O. Michel, Philosophia, philosophos, in Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich (eds.), Theologisches Wrterbuch zum
Neuen Testament, 10 vols. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 19311979), 9:169185; Heinrich
Schlier, Il tempo della Chiesa. Saggi esegetici (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1968), 330372.

from historical demonstration (the recovery of patristic theology) to
normative argumentation. The latter is based on the very nature of the res
of theology, and it is articulated along the lines of Quintilians rhetoric,
following the epistemological scheme of the second chapter of book XII
of the Institutio.
In passing we might note that chapter 2, book XII of the Institutio,
along with chapter 1, book X, have already been identified as the two
most significant passages of Quintilians corpus for understanding the
methodological problem and solutions that give the Encomium its
historical and theoretical significance. In his panegyric of 1457,
Valla revisits and draws to a close his discourse on method, which
had been the object of intense reflection and intellectual effort ever
since his Comparatio Ciceronis Quintilianique (Comparison of Cicero and
Quintilian). These two writings, the earlier one programmatic, the later
one recapitulating and reassembling his entire intellectual development,
mark the beginning and the end, theoretically as well as chronologically,
of his literary production.62
In the expository economy of the Institutio, the second chapter of book
XII summarizes the didactic articulation of the rhetorical paedeia proposed in the course of the work. It unites the diverse aspects and various
levels of all of book XII (the final book of the Institutio), and thus together
with the rest of the book it makes explicit the critique of philosophy
underlying Quintilians whole work. Indeed, the chapter explains why the
break between philosophy and rhetoric should be repaired and proposes
a solution for doing so, namely through the assumption of the former into
the latter, with rhetoric understood as the omni-comprehensive science
of language.
Since the orator is the good man skilled in speaking (vir bonus dicendi
peritus), according to the ancient definition of Cato, he must excel all others in his knowledge of the natural world, civil and political institutions,
moral values, and the linguistic and cultural structures related to them
in short, he must be intimately acquainted with the whole realm of human
conduct and action. To this end, Quintilian puts the acquisition of this
kind of knowledge into a perspective aimed at transcending the limits
within which Cicero (in De oratore III) had divided the tasks of philosophy
and rhetoric. That break between the two cultures, which Cicero had
sought in vain (if not with equivocation) to repair, had little by little
62Fois, Il pensiero cristiano di Lorenzo Valla, 3133; Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla.
Umanesimo e teologia, 89100.
188
worsened, such that for Quintilian it remained only to propose rhetoric as

the lone, valid science comprehending the entire encyclopedia of
knowledge,and the rhetorician as the only kind of intellectual living in an
organic relation to the civil and political society of his time. Since the path
of philosophy leads far from civil and political action, from moral and
institutional affairs, the rhetorician must decisively effect the definitive
transcendence of philosophical wisdom.
Quintilians text must be cited here, although we are forced to omit certain sections that nevertheless should be read in loco (XII, 2.720) in order
for its full significance and context to be comprehended. This passage is
crucial for understanding Vallas corpus, as well as for grasping his originality in critically adopting for he expands its power and application
the operative principle of reducing (reductio) all the disciplines, even
theology, to rhetoric. Quintilian writes:
I desire that he whose character I am seeking to mould should be a wise
man in the Roman sense, that is, one who reveals himself as a true statesman, not in the discussions of the study, but in the actual practice and experience of life. But inasmuch as the study of philosophy has been deserted by
those who have turned to the pursuit of eloquence, and since philosophy no
longer moves in its true sphere of action and in the broad daylight of the
forum, but has retired first to porches and gymnasia and finally to the gatherings of the schools, all that is essential for an orator, and yet is not taught
by the professors of eloquence, must undoubtedly be sought from those persons in whose possession it has remained. The authors who have discoursed
on the nature of virtue must be read through and through, that the life of the
orator may be wedded to the knowledge of things human and divine . O that
the day may dawn when the perfect orator of our hearts desire shall claim
for his own possession that science that has lost the affection of mankind
through the arrogance of its claims and the vices of some that have brought
disgrace upon its virtues, and shall restore it to its place in the domain of
eloquence, as though he had been victorious in a trial for the restoration of
stolen goods! And since philosophy falls into three divisions, physics, ethics
and dialectic, which, I ask you, of these departments is not closely connected
with the task of the orator? Let us reverse the order just given and deal first
with the third department which is entirely concerned with words. If it be true
that to know the properties of each word, to clear away ambiguities, to
unravel perplexities, to distinguish between truth and falsehood, to prove or
to refute as may be desired, all form part of the functions of an orator, who is
there that can doubt the truth of my contention? Proceeding to moral
philosophy or ethics, we may note that it at any rate is entirely suited to the
orator . Physics or natural philosophy on the other hand is far richer than
the other branches of philosophy, if viewed from the standpoint of providing exercise in speaking, in proportion as a loftier inspiration is required to
speak of things divine than of things human; and further it includes within

its scope the whole of ethics, which as we have shown are essential to the
very existence of oratory .63
The reduction of philosophy to rhetoric, as the omni-comprehensive science of res et verba, is thus absolute and radical in Quintilian. In the sections omitted from the passage cited, Quintilians discourse descends into
the particulars of the various branches and disciplines of philosophy in
order to demonstrate rhetorics epistemological and methodological
primacy.64
63Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, XII.2.720: Ego illum, quem instituo, Romanum quendam velim esse sapientem, qui non secretis disputationibus, sed rerum experimentis atque
operibus vere civilem virum exhibeat. Sed quia deserta ab his, qui se ad eloquentiam contulerunt, studia sapientiae non iam in actu suo atque in hac fori luce versantur, sed in
porticus et in gymnasia primum, mox in conventus scholarum recesserunt: id, quod est
oratori necessarium nec a dicendi praeceptoribus traditur, ab iis petere nimirum necesse
est, apud quos remansit, evolvendi penitus auctores, qui de virtute praecipiunt, ut oratoris
vita cum scientia divinarum rerum sit humanarumque coniuncta . Utinamque sit tempus
unquam, quo perfectus aliquis, qualem optamus, orator hanc artem superbo nomine et
vitiis quorundam bona eius corrumpentium invisam vindicet sibi ac, velut rebus repetitis,
in corpus eloquentiae adducat. Quae quidem cum sit in tris divisa partes, naturalem,
moralem, rationalem, qua tandem non est cum oratoris opere coniuncta? Nam ut ordinem
retro agamus, de ultima illa, quae tota versatur in verbis, nemo dubitaverit, si et proprietates vocis cuiusque nosse et ambigua aperire et perplexa discernere et de falsis iudicare et
colligere ac resolvere quae velis oratorum est . Jam quidem pars illa moralis, quae dicitur
Ethice, certe tota oratori est accommodata . Pars vero naturalis, cum est ad exercitationem dicendi tanto ceteris uberior, quanto maiore spiritu de divinis rebus quam humanis
eloquendum est, tum illam etiam moralem, sine qua nulla esse, ut docuimus, oratio potest,
totam complectitur (tr. E.H. Butler) (emphasis added).
64Leeman, Orationis ratio (1974), 395424; Gerl, Rhetorik als Philosophie, 8497. Here
we cite Vallas glosses to ch. 2, book XII of the Institutio oratoria contained in ms. Paris, Bibl.
Nat., lat. 7723, ff. 142v.-144r. [N.B. Not all the glosses transcribed by Camporeale are reported
in Valla, Le postille allInstitutio oratoria, and sometimes Camporeales readings differ from
those in the edition.] On the basis of clear graphic evidence it seems obvious that the
glosses were written at different times. Among other things, they constitute a series of
statements and references that are illuminating for a comparative reading of the preface to
book I of the first redaction of the Dialecticae disputationes. (We have printed the text of
the preface from ms. Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Urb. lat. 1207 in
Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 405408). Vallas glosses are transcribed
here with the incipits of Quintilians text in italics and the standard paragraph numbers in
brackets.
Quando igitur orator est vir bonus si forte accedamus iis [XII.2.12]: nature alone does
not establish mores (non constare sola natura mores). // Ad illud sequens [4]: the orator
must learn wisdom through and through (penitus perdiscendam oratori sapientiam). // Ac
philosophos cum ea [5]: this must be sought or obtained from the philosophers (hanc esse
petendam seu reperiendam a philosophis). // Quod Cicero pluribus libris [6]: as in the preface to the first book of the Tusculans and On Fate (ut in proemio primi libri Tusculanarum
et De fato). // Quapropter hec exhortatio [6]: the orator should not be a philosopher but a
truly civic wise man of the Roman type. Lactantius, Book III [Div. inst., ch. 14: PL 6:38990]
writes against Cicero: But how you confessed the truth about philosophy when instructing
your son, advising that he should know the precepts of philosophy, but that he should live
190
as a citizen (non philosophum sed romanum quendam sapientem ac vere civilem esse
oratorem debere. Lactantius Li III in Ciceronem: At quam fessus fueris philosophie veritatem docens ad filium composita precepta, quibus mones philosophie quidem precepta
noscenda, vivendum autem esse civiliter). // Quis denique in ipsa [7]: Macrobius, from the
Somnium Scipionis [II.17,8]: Greece was as full of men wholly given to wisdom as Rome was
bereft of them (Macrobius de Somnio Scipionis: soli enim sapientie [otio] deditos ut
abunde Grecia tulit, ita Roma nescivit). // Atque ego illum, quem instituto [7]: this means
that the philosophers did not treat of the republic completely, since they lacked experience of it (hoc significat non perfecte philosophos de re publica tradidisse, quam experti
non fuissent). // Evolvendi penitus [8]: the orator should read the philosophers (evolvendi
oratori philosophos). // Que ipse quanto maiores [9]: the same material can be treated better by orators than by philosophers, and if only it were treated such that it not be so hateful
on account of the vices of the philosophers and their reputation for pride. From this it is
clear that neither Aristotle nor Plato were eloquent enough (eandem materiam tractari
posse ab oratoribus melius quam a philosophis, et utinam tractetur ne tantopere sit invisa
propter vitia philosophorum et superbum illorum nomen. Ex hoc constat nec Aristotelem
nec Platonem satis eloquentes esse). // Superbo nomine et vitiis [9]: because philosophers
want to be the only lovers of wisdom, as their name indicates (quia philosophi solos se
sapientie volunt esse amatores, ut ipsorum nomen indicat). // De ultima illa, que tota versatur in verbis [10]: on dialectics (de dialectica). // Quanquam ea non tam [11]: how the
orator uses it (quomodo ea utatur orator). // Ita, si totum sibi vindicaverit [13]: pure dialectic
is inconsistent with the forum (abhorret a foro mera dialectica [N.B. Camporeales text
reads: meram dialecticam; this gloss is not reported in Valla, Le postille allInstitutio oratoria; the editors of the present volume have not consulted ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat., Lat. 7723.
Eds.]). // Iam pars illa moralis [15]: on moral philosophy [ethics] (de morali). // Sed ille vir
bonus [17]: orators speak more easily and better about moral philosophy than philosophers
(oratorum facilius ac melius moralem loqui quam philosophorum). // Profecto nemo dubitabit [18]: regarding general questions in philosophy (de generalibus questionibus in philosophia). // Pars vero naturalis [20]: on natural philosophy [physics] (de naturali). //
Siquidem, ut nobis placet [21]: this is clear, for example, from the experience of the greatest
orators (hoc constare vel experimento summorum oratorum). // Vim tamen quandam [22]:
Aristophanes and Eupolis, Plato in the Phaedrus, Thucydides book I, in the letters of
Demosthenes (Aristophanes Eupolisque, Plato in Phedro, Thucydides libro 1o, in epistolis
Demosthenis). // Nam M. Tullius [23]: in The Orator, in Partitiones oratoriae (in Oratore, in
Partitionibus). // Pyrron quidem [24]: Aulus Gellius, book 11: Those philosophers whom we
call Pyrronists are called skepttai in Greek, which means something like searchers and
considerers: for they decide nothing, determine nothing, but they are always busy searching and considering what of all things in the world it is possible to decide or determine. Nor
do they think that they see or hear anything clearly, but rather that they sense or are
affected only as if they saw and heard, etc. Although the Pyrronists and the Academics say
very similar things about this, they were thought to differ amongst themselves for several
reasons but mostly on this account: that the Academics determine as it were that nothing
itself can be determined, while the Pyrronists say that not even this seems to be at all true,
since nothing seems to be true. (A. Gellius libro XIo: Quos pyrrones philosophos vocamus
ii greco cognomine skepttai appellantur, id ferme significat quasi quesitores et consideratores: nihil enim decernunt, nihil enim constituunt, sed in querendo semper considerandoque sunt, quidnam sit omnium rerum de quo decerni constituique possit ac ne videre
quoque quidem plane quicquam, neque audire sese putant, sed id pati afficique quasi
videant vel audiant, etc. Cum hec autem ita consimiliter tam Pyrronei dicant quam
Academici, differe tamen inter sese et propter alia quedam et vel maxime propterea existimati sunt, quod Academici quidem ipsum illud nihil posse decerni quasi decernunt,
Pyrronei ne id quidem ullo pacto verum videri dicunt quod nihil esse verum videtur.) //
Sed hec inter ipsos [26]: the task of the orator is greater than that of the philosopher, and

This passage is the source (as is also clear from textual similarities, as
noted in italics) for the Encomiums statement:
For what is there in philosophy? I do not mean dialectics, the whole of which
lies in words; I have already spoken about it and will do so again. No, I mean
moral and natural philosophy. What is there in them that is indubitable and
settled except the things discovered in natural philosophy through the
observations (experimenta) of physicians and others?65
Clearly, this criticism of contemporary scholasticism must be understood

along Quintilians lines, and in the direct light of the Institutios book XII,
chapter 2. Nevertheless, Valla does not simply follow Quintilian, and we
would not understand the originality and the essence of his thought
should we fail to specify its relationship to Quintilians text and to differentiate it from the ancient rhetoricians theme. For here Valla goes far
beyond indeed, he proceeds in a divergent (if not a contrary) direction
from Quintilians classical theory of rhetoric. Quintilian wholly reduced
the philosophical disciplines to rhetoric essentially on the basis of the
omni-comprehensiveness of language, on account of which the totality of
res and verba is the proper sphere of eloquence. Valla, on the other hand,
although accepting this principle for dialectics, invokes a different one for
moral and natural philosophy: the absolute (extra-philosophical) principle of observation, or experience (experimentum). Indeed, it is empiricism
and praxis on which the humanist Valla will base his critique of the
Aristotelian-scholastic Physics and Ethics in his Dialecticae disputationes.
Thus in Vallas work rhetoric receives a new significance and equipage:
the ars rhetorica comes to be defined as the method of philological criticism, a new episteme articulated and distinguished by its own principles
and instruments of study.
thus he should not cleave to any one sect of philosophy (maius esse opus oratoris quam
philosophi, ideoque non debere se ad sectam aliquam philosophie astringere). // Quare in
exemplum [27]: which philosophers he should especially read (quos precipue philosophos
legat). // Exercitatione quidem [28]: in which parts of philosophy he should train himself
(in quibus se partibus philosophie exerceat). // Neque ea solum que [29]: even more than
the teachings of the philosophers he should read the famous words and deeds of the
ancients (magis etiam quam precepta philosophorum, legenda dicta et facta veterum preclara). // Quantum enim greci [30]: this is in no way the same opinion as the one found in
book III [ch. 34:137] of Ciceros De oratore: For as examples of virtue are to be sought in our
own people, thus examples of learning are to be sought in them (non est hec eadem
omnino sententia que apud Ciceronem in IIIo De Oratore: Nam ut virtutis a nostris sic
doctrine sunt ab illis exempla repetenda).
192
2.10.The Linguistic-Semantic Critique of Scholasticism and the
Interrelation between Greek and Latin: Pauls Genuine Mode of
Theologizing and Vallas Paulinism
The critique of scholastic theology, as was said above, operates on two

axes: the one categorical and semantic, the other linguistic and formal.
The first concerns divine truths, the object of theology insofar as theology
is the science of those things. The second properly regards the conceptual body of lexemes used in theological discourse. Valla had said there
were two reasons for his opposition to scholasticism and his call for a
rebirth of patristic theology, which he went on to express with the correlative pair, essential to rhetoric, of signified and signifier: one having to do
with their contents (res), the other with their words (verba). And so
Vallas argument, having dealt with the subject of theologys object and
contents, now turns to examining the linguistic issue of Aristotelianscholastic terminology, which it identifies as the (historical and theoretical) break between ancient and modern theologians.
Regarding their words: because the nature of Greek is different from that of
Latin. This would be a rather tedious subject to discuss, and it is a question
for another time. Let it suffice to have said that the Latin doctors of the
Church dreaded words which the great Latin authors (who were their teachers in the language), although experts in Greek, never used, words that are
continually pressed into service by modern theologians: ens, entitas, quidditas, identitas, reale, essentiale, suum esse, as well as those terms which are
given names like ampliari, dividi, componi, and other such things. Thus these
largely worthless trifles were either not to be treated, or else they were to be
disregarded, lest they lead to greater ignorance.66
This passage of the Encomium, once again synthetically dense and expressed
in concentric abbreviations, provides a retrospective summary of Vallas
essential ideas. An integral part of Vallas work as a humanist was the linguistic-semantic critique of the philosophical and theological terminology
of scholasticism and, more precisely, of the creation and formulation of
Aristotelian-scholastic language as begun by Boethius. Indeed, it is important to note how Vallas critique, simultaneously philological and theoretical in accord with a particularly humanist mode of analysis that sees the
two aspects as inseparable takes shape in the specific question of the relationship between the Greek and Latin languages and the issue of translating between them. Valla then goes on to treat this problem in greater depth
66Ibid., 19.199207 (emphasis added). [On the scholastic terminology in this passage,
see n. 9 on p. 311 below. Eds.]

with regard to its various manifestations in scholasticism, from biblical
exegesis to formal logic. Ultimately, he comes to consider it within the
broader context of the relationship between language and culture in general, the one intimately connected to and historically defined in the other:
that is, in the relationship between formal expression and content, of signifier and signified, on converging synchronic and diachronic planes.
To my mind, this variegated and complex theme underlies all Vallas
works from the Elegantiae to the Adnotationes in Novum Testamentum.
The reference to a fuller treatment of the nature of Latin and the nature
of Greek, which the Encomiums author makes a point of emphasizing,
has greater meaning than it might at first seem. We shall confine ourselves
here to explaining this reference with writings Valla composed around the
same time as the Encomium, writings in which this theme can be seen
most clearly: the preface to the Latin translation of Thucydides History
(1452) and the inaugural lecture in principio sui studii (of 1455).67
The problem of the relationship between Greek and Latin and the issue
of translating between them is without a doubt one of the central themes
that Valla derives directly from Quintilian. The latter, as Leeman has written and as we would confirm without any hesitation, seems to have been
the first fully to realize the fundamental differences between the two languages.68 They key passage is chapter 10 of book XII of the Institutio (and
parallel passages, such as book VIII, chapter 3). Valla, however, delved
deeper into the problem, attacking the entire categorical terminology that
was derived from Aristotelianism and that, from Boethius on, had been
transferred to scholasticism. This linguistic transfer, or transition, particularly interested Valla insofar as it concerned theological language, especially in the translation of the New Testament from Greek into the Latin
of the Vulgate.
According to Valla, the scholastic importation of philosophical and theological language from the Greek writings of Aristotle to medieval Latin culture was carried out by means of a mechanical transposition and not
through a process guided by analogical correlations. The latter procedure
67The preface to Thucydides History will be treated in part III, section 5 below. For the
Oratio in principio sui studii, cf. Fois, Il pensiero cristiano di Lorenzo Valla, 441448;
Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 103104; Gerl, Rhetorik als Philosophie,
235250. A critical edition of the Oratio is available in: Lorenzo Valla, Orazione per
linaugurazione dellanno accademico 14551456. Atti di un seminario di filologia umanistica,
ed. S. Rizzo (Roma: Roma nel Rinascimento, 1994), 192200. [Camporeale does not actually
discuss the Oratio in principio sui studii in this essay; instead, he treats the preface to the
fourth book of Vallas Elegantiae as a third important parallel text for the Encomium. Eds.]
68[Leeman, Orationis ratio (1963), 296.]
194
would have permitted the creation of a new terminology, an original form of

expression suited to the marriage between classical Latin and Christian culture. The mechanical continuity of terms, however, was unbound from the
morphological and semantic structures of the two languages as well as from
their respective historical contexts. This entailed obliquely, as it were
the transposition of a verbal-conceptual system, that of Aristotelianism in
general and metaphysics in particular, into the realm of theology, to whose
contents (i.e. Christian revelation) it was by its nature semantically unsuited
if not utterly antithetical. But what happened with the coming of scholasticism did not occur in early patristic theology. The Fathers, although connoisseurs of classical literature and Greek thought, refused to adopt the
metaphysical language of Aristotle or to employ its philosophical methodology. On the contrary, Valla insistently stresses, they completely embraced
the mode of theologizing exemplified in Pauls Epistles.
Valla does not limit himself to reminding his contemporaries of the
prestige and worthiness patristic texts had as foundational sources and
authorities of the theological tradition; in doing so he would only have
followed in the footsteps of high scholastic theology. Nor does he intend
to conduct his apology for ancient theologians against the moderns solely
by revaluating patristics vis--vis scholasticism. He has more in mind than
defending the former from the criticism of the latter, which charged the
theological speculation of the first Christian centuries with not having
attempted a synthesis between revelation and Aristotelian philosophy.
The originality of Vallas proposition, and thus of humanist theology
as an alternative to medieval and contemporary scholasticism, consists in
something more. Valla effects his recovery of patristics by exalting the
essential trait of ancient theology its rhetorical mode, or method (modus
rhetoricus), which was anti-philosophical and thus a-logical and a-metaphysical and contrasting it directly with Aristotelianism. In this sense,
patristic theology is considered and adopted not only as a source of tradition, but above all and specifically as a methodology. It is the foundational
guideline for theological study, derived directly from the lone valid model
of Christian speculation that of Paul:
I defend the ancients, who are unjustly blamed and abused [by modern
theologians] for not having theologized according to this method [that is, the
method of the scholastics]. Instead they devoted themselves wholly to imitating the apostle Paul, by far the prince of all theologians and the master of
theologizing.69

For Valla, then, patristic theology constitutes the historical renewal the
imitation of the rhetorical method that is characteristic of Pauls theology and that originates with it. He is the founder, the prince and master, of the Fathers speculation and theological discourse in the first
centuries of Christianity.
The apostle Paul is the model of style and method for theological writing. He is the greatest rhetorician of Christian culture, just as Demosthenes
was for classical Greece (according to a parallel formulated by Valla himself in his Adnotationes). Indeed, his manner of speaking (modus disserandi) and Paul was of all the apostles the most expert at speaking
(dicendi peritus) sublimely embodied the word of God that he desired
to announce to the Hellenistic world. In addition to evangelic preaching,
the Apostle of the Gentiles also established the specific and distinctive
methodology of Christian speculation, i.e. the theology of the word (logossermo), to which every later development in theology thus ought to
adhere. But whereas the ancient theologians had remained faithful to
Pauls speculative principle and rejected even the theoretical possibility of
a synthesis between theology and philosophy, modern theologians
behaved in exactly the opposite way. They saw patristic theology, at least
on the level of method, as an immature phase of Christian thought.
Vallas text, which will now be cited, possesses a surprising lucidity. We
have here the measure and precise meaning of what has been called (but
in the past in a rather restrictive, if not misleading, sense) Vallas Paulinism.
It is in this Paulinism in the precise sense just now explained along
with the radical Quintilianism of the Dialecticae disputationes (i.e. the
other methodological axis of his thought) that the uniqueness and originality of Lorenzo Vallas humanist theology lies.
This [i.e. Pauls] is the true and, so to speak, the genuine mode of theologizing. This is the true law of speaking and writing, and those who pursue it
doubtless pursue the very best manner of speaking and theologizing.
Therefore the ancients, the true disciples of Paul, should not be criticized by
modern theologians or placed second to our Thomas on account of not having mixed theology with philosophy.70
70Ibid., 20.216221. For the general context of Vallas Paulinism and the renewal of
patristic theology, one should keep in mind Foiss whole book and particularly the
passages cited in his index under the entry Padri della Chiesa; but see also the other recent
studies on Valla, and above all those of Di Napoli and of the present writer, as well as
Franco Gaeta, Lorenzo Valla. Filologia e storia nellUmanesimo italiano. (Napoli: Istituto
italiano per gli studi storici, 1955), with the earlier bibliography indicated there.
196
2.11.Peroration and Closing of the Encomium: Thomass Systematic

Philosophy and Theology between the Patristic and Scholastic Traditions
Let us now move on to the peroration, the closing section of the Encomium.
Here Valla assembles the panegyrics various motifs and elements, casting
them in dimensions and relationships reminiscent of iconography, in
order to create his own triumph of Thomas.
In Quintilian, the peroration (peroratio) has two functions: either to
refresh the memory or to move the mind.71 That is, it can conclude the
oration with a recapitulation (for mnemonic purposes), and it can provide
a concentrated dose of emotive energy (to create a lasting impact on the
mind of the listener). Moreover, throughout book VI where Quintilian
speaks expressly about the peroration he indicates that it is possible
either for only one of its functions to be employed (one could, for example, depending on the case at hand, use it simply as a recapitulation) or for
a summary of the argument to be combined with the persuasive thrust of
the whole speech.
In Vallas case, the rhetorical peroration appears as the conclusion to a
panegyric whose recapitulation is situated in a hagiographic and liturgical
context. That is, the objective reference of its elements and dimensions is
the Church (ecclesia), considered on the one hand historically, i.e. in its
theological tradition, and on the other hand at the eschatological moment
of the glorification of the Lamb of God in the triumphant vision of the
Apocalypse. Valla, therefore, makes full use of the double function of
Quintilians peroration. First, it acts as a summary of Thomass place in the
history of the theological tradition of the Christian Church, defining
Aquinass status vis--vis the great ancient and modern figures of
Christian thought. Second, it functions as a powerful exhortative and persuasive closing, describing the glorification of Thomas, before the Lamb,
in the choral presence of the Doctors of the Church. Thus the Encomium
ends with the vision of the glory of paradise in reference to Thomas; with
the same vision, but in reference to the just Christian in general, the
humanist had concluded the third and final book of De vero falsoque bono.
But let us take a closer look at this iconographic peroration, which Valla
arrayed copiously and symmetrically with figures in the manner of early
fifteenth-century painting. The characteristics or judgments of the individuals featured in this literary fresco, which resemble iconographic captions (and are often of a traditional or standard nature), take on the status
71Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, VIII, pr. 11: aut memoriam refici aut animos moveri.

of historical assessments, especially when they are read in the light of parallel passages from Vallas oeuvre in which the cultural and theological
contributions of the same individuals are discussed and critiqued.72
Aquinas is given a position of privilege (I place him before) within the
monastic tradition of theology and biblical exegesis. He is placed before
John Cassian (whom St. Dominic is said to have been in the habit of reading as if the best doctor), Anselm (the sharpest and most refined),
Bernard (a learned, sweet, eloquent, and sublime doctor), Remigius
(the most learned man of his age), Bede (more learned than all of
them), and Isidore (whom his admirers deny is second to anyone).
Thomas is also preferred to Peter Lombard and Gratian, who deserve
more to be called assiduous compilers than true authors.73
No differently is Thomas judged within the sphere of high scholasticism: he is given absolute primacy among modern theologians, both those
who preceded and those who followed him. Thus the great figures of the
main mendicant orders are named, from the Dominicans to the
Franciscans to the Augustinians: Albert the Great, Giles of Rome,
Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure and Duns Scotus, and still others of the
same orders, whose members exalt their own theological giants to the
point of denying their equivalence with the ancients, who in their
minds had by then been decisively surpassed.
Once again, in a third comparison, Aquinas is placed above others on a
level of superiority, at least from the point of view of the theological tradition. Thus he is accorded preeminence over Lactantius and Boethius,
although only in theology, for in other areas [i.e. erudition and literary
culture] there is no comparison.74 The same theological primacy is
granted over Cyprian, as well as over Hilary, Bishop of Poitiers, but with
qualification: I add, albeit unwillingly, Hilary as well; for what, finally, is
holier, more learned, more eloquent than his writings?75
In the triple comparison delineated above, the status of Thomas and his
theological corpus is determined on the basis of elements that are of indubitable significance in the Christian cultural tradition. Nevertheless, they
are not original, essential elements of that literary and theological tradition but rather constitute later, secondary developments. The decisive
72On this point, see the observations of Fois, Il pensiero cristiano di Lorenzo Valla,
464467.
73Ibid., 21.224231.
74Ibid., 21.235236.
75Ibid., 21.236238.
198
and defining comparison for determining Aquinass importance remains

that with the great Fathers and Doctors of the Greek and Latin Church.
It is here that Valla seems to frame the validity and the dimensions, simultaneously historiographical and theoretical, of the perspective within
which not only Thomas but also the hegemonic development of Thomism
are to be situated in the ecclesial community. Then again, Valla had already
stated the premises and announced the terms of this perspective throughout the Encomium. Indeed, the entire panegyric revolves around the problem of the relationship between scholasticism, with Thomas as its greatest
representative, and the Fathers, with the ultimate aim of militating for a
revival of the theological methodology of the ancient Doctors of the
Church a methodology adopted as an alternative for the radical renewal
of the science of divine truths. This is Vallas proposal to his contemporaries, trenchantly formulated in the Encomium and submitted on a solemn occasion to a Christian gathering. It had been constantly elaborated
across his oeuvre, above all in the Adnotationes, in a continual comparison
between Thomass writings and patristic texts. By comparing Aquinas to
the Greek and Latin Fathers, Valla was pulling together the threads of his
extensive study of theology, and thus summarizing his thought in a decisive climax.
Valla lists the most eminent Greek and Latin Fathers and symmetrically
distributes them into two groups of four, which he envisions as four-horse
teams (quadrigae) drawing the metaphorical chariots of the Western and
Eastern Church, composed of the foremost Doctors of ancient Christianity:
the greatest of all, like a second team of Evangelists.76 In so doing he
takes up a traditional theme that recurs in conciliar and magisterial texts,
in literary and theological writing in general (ancient and medieval,
monastic and scholastic) and, finally, in sacred and religious iconography.
But Valla modifies this traditional theme by introducing into it historiographical and theoretical variations that reassert the distinctively humanist perspective on theology. This emerges from the hierarchical order in
which the Greek and Latin Fathers are listed, symmetrically compared to
one another, and situated according to their respective contributions to
the development and formation of theological thought. The team of the
Latin Fathers, made up of Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, and Gregory
[Pope St. Gregory I (the Great)] (in the order assigned them by Valla), is
presented thus:
76Ibid., 22.240241.

I barely know which of them to prefer to whom, as each one had his own
extraordinary gift. For although Augustine is commonly preferred to all,
because he treated more theological questions and is in many respects indubitably to be preferred, nevertheless, if Ambroses writings were compared
with an equal number of Augustines, I do not think they would be ranked
second. Nor does Jerome yield in any way to Augustines intellect; he is so
much the greater in all areas of learning that Augustine seems to me like the
Mediterranean, Jerome the ocean, upon which few of our contemporaries
set sail. Gregory lags far behind all in erudition, but he equals them in carefulness and diligence and is possessed of such great sweetness and holiness
that he seems to speak like an angel.77
Valla then undertakes an analogous comparison with the greatest Doctors

of Greek (Eastern) Christianity:
I would compare them [the Latin Fathers] with the same number of Greeks:
Ambrose with Basil, whose rival I see he was; Jerome with Gregory
Nazianzen, whose pupil and disciple he claimed to have been; Augustine
with John Chrysostom, whom he often followed in his writings and rivaled
in the number of his books; Gregory with Dionysius the Areopagite, because
he is the first of the Latins, as far as I know, to mention him (for the works of
Dionysius were unknown to the others I named, not only the Latins but the
Greeks as well).78
In what relation, then, does Valla see Aquinass philosophical and theological works (and those of his school) with respect to the patristic thought
represented by the greatest Greek and Latin Doctors of the Church?
Turning once again to traditional themes and reasoning, he introduces a
final pairing: Thomas, the Latin, with John Damascene, the Greek.
Closest to these comes John Damascene, a most famous author among the
Greeks, as Thomas is amongst us. It will therefore be perfectly right for John
and Thomas to be paired together, and all the more so because John wrote
many logical and well-nigh metaphysical works.79
The heavenly choir before the throne of God and the Lamb,80 according
to the celestial vision of the Apocalypse of John (Apoc. 45), is now fully
described. The five pairs of princes of theology accompany the twentyfour elders of the Apocalypse in their eternal choral praise: for the writers
of holy things always make music in the sight of God.81 And to complete
77Ibid., 22.243252.
78Ibid., 23.254261.
79Ibid., 23.261264.
80Ibid., 24.265266.
81Ibid., 24.266267.
200
his fresco of the triumph of Thomas, Valla describes, using medieval and
Renaissance iconographic references, the orchestral and hierarchical
distribution of musical instruments among the five pairs: the lyre is
assigned to Basil and Ambrose, the cithara to Gregory Nazianzen and
Jerome, the psaltery to John Chrysostom and Augustine, the flute to
Dionysius and Gregory the Great, and the cymbals to John Damascene
and Thomas. Valla then adds immediately:
And it will not be unharmonious for their number to be five now instead of
four since for musicians there are five tetrachords, not four nor to have
Thomas playing the cymbals. For as the name Thomas means twin, and as
he enjoyed playing equally in the twin tones of theology and philosophy,
thus the cymbals are a double instrument emitting happy, cheerful, and
pleasing music.82
Valla forcefully reaffirms the Encomiums central thesis of the difference

between the theology of Aquinas (and scholasticism) and that of the
Church Fathers. To this end, and in line with Quintilians rhetorical precepts (Institutio oratoria, bk. I, ch. 10), Valla adorns his speech with normative references to music theory and musical instruments. Such references
were easily accessible to his listeners, who were certainly familiar (having
learned them in their study of the quadrivium) with the theoretical and
practical fundamentals of the harmonic relationships (from the octave to
the tetrachord) of the Greek Pythagorean musical system, as well as with
the three categories of musical instruments (wind, stringed, and percussion). Furthermore, reference to works like Boethiuss De institutione
musica (On Musical Education) (which Valla certainly has in mind, especially book I) and Isidores De musica (On Music) (cf. book III in particular)
is implicit in Vallas discourse. We might also note that the combination of
polyphonic choir and contrapuntal or supporting instrumentation, to
which Valla alludes here, echoes the musical (and liturgical) shift brought
about by the Florentine ars nova. The theoretical and instrumental notions
of music stressed here, however, are the traditional ones derived from classical Greece.83
82Ibid., 24.271276.
83Important for this point, and also for what will be said below, are Vallas glosses on
Quintilian in ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 7723, cited in n. 21 above. In particular, see the annotations to Institutio oratoria, bk. I, ch. 10, 533: ff. 14v-15v, and bk. XII, ch. 10, 68: ff. 150v-151r.
They give significant information on Vallas kowledge of music theory and his reading of
related ancient (Greek and Latin) and medieval texts. Here we confine ourselves to quoting
the gloss on I.10.5 (f. 14v): Quintilian associates these arts [sc. music and geometry] with
the orator better than Plato does with defenders of the fatherland, or Columella with

Now what did Valla mean by attributing the melodic function of the
fifth tetrachord to the pair Damascene-Aquinas, and, in his distribution
of instruments, by assigning the cymbals the percussion instrument to
Thomas?
The tetrachord, the core from which all Greek music theory developed,
consisted of four successive sounds descending in a diatonic line and
composed, therefore, of a series of two tones and a semitone, in an interval
of a perfect fourth: la, sol, fa, mi. An octave resulted from the duplication
in ascendant succession (mi, re, do, ti) of the diatonic tetrachord (let us
confine ourselves here to the Dorian or Hellenic tetrachord, omitting the
variations in the Lydian and the Phrygian). With the addition, finally, of
two further tetrachords, one above and one below the octave already
composed, a series of two octave scales resulted, a melodic whole composed of four diatonic tetrachords. Thus was constructed the general scale
of the Greek musical system, known as the Greater Perfect System. The
fifth tetrachord of which Valla speaks (with the quite technically precise
statement, for musicians there are five tetrachords, not four) did not
consist in yet another numerical addition to the general scale of the
Perfect System, but in a modulational variation (the ti natural became ti
flat in the higher octave) within the numerically unchanged structure of
the series of four tetrachords.
Without going further into the technical aspects of the Perfect
System of the Greek musical scale, we can use the few elements described
here to understand the meaning of Vallas text. Greek patristic theology,
farmers, or Vitruvius with architects (Melius has artes oratori Quintilianus attribuit
quam aut Plato propugnatoribus patrie, aut Columella agricolis, aut Vitruvius architectis).
Of authors who treated music theory and musical instrumentation, Valla cites and quotes
the texts of, among others, (ibid., f. 150v) Boethius, De musica, bk. I (PL 63:118392) and
Vitruvius, De architectura, bk. V (ch. 4, 68). These passages of Boethius and Vitruvius are
the direct sources for the Encomiums statement, for musicians there are five tetrachords,
not four (apud musicos quinque sunt tetrachorda non quattuor). Cf. Franco Abbiati,
Storia della musica, 4 vols. (Milano: Garzanti, 19671974), 1:8693, 151161, 316327; Andrew
Hughes, Music: the Sixth Liberal Art (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974); Nan Cooke
Carpenter, Music in the Medieval and Renaissance Universities (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1958), chs. 1 and 2; Emanuel Winternitz, On Angel Concerts in the 15th
Century: A Critical Approach to Realism and Symbolism in Sacred Painting, in idem,
Musical Instruments and their Symbolism in Western Art, New York: W. W. Norton, 1967,
137149; idem, Secular musical practice in sacred art, Early Music 3 (1975): 221226;
Edmund Addison Bowles, La Hirarchie des instruments dans lEurope fodale, Revue de
Musicologie 42 (1958): 155169; D.P. Walker, Musical Humanism in the 16th and early 17th
centuries, Music Review 2 (1941): 113, 111121, 220227, 228308; 3 (1942): 5571. I would like
to thank Profs. Carla Nolledi Martini and William Prizer for these bibliographical
references.
202
according to Valla, had already achieved the Perfect System of theological methodology and speculation. This system was complete in itself and
had long become a common element of traditional Christian culture. In
comparison to patristic theology, then, the achievement of scholastic
theology and its greatest representative, Aquinas (together with John
Damascene) i.e., the assumption of classical philosophy within the
realm of Christian thought and doctrinal language amounted to nothing
more than a thematic and formal variation. Valla reiterates this point by
assigning the cymbals to Thomas and John, a musical instrument composed of two small discs beaten together, similar to the twin tones of theology and philosophy. For Valla, they resound with the musical whole,
already complete and perfect in itself, of the four other instruments, one
wind (the pipe or flute) and three stringed (the psaltery, the cithara, and
the lyre).
It is with these theoretical references to music and instruments that
Valla ends the Encomium, doubtless in imitation of medieval and contemporary iconographic representations of the glory of paradise. Let it suffice to think of the paintings finished only a few years earlier by Beato
Angelico, during his first and second stays in Rome, on the invitations of
Nicholas V and Cardinal Juan de Torquemada. And Valla could very well
have known the works of the Florentine Dominican master, who died in
Rome in 1455 and was buried in the same temple of Minerva where in 1457
the humanist declaimed his Encomium. Even if the attribution to Valla of
the Latin couplets on Beato Angelicos tomb has still found no confirmation in any source or document, nevertheless the final lines of the
Encomium remain fully within the iconographic context of the Dominican
painter, completing the triumph of Thomas in heavenly glory:
Such is the tune of Thomass books. With this harmony Saint Thomas
delights both the pious men who read him and the holy angels who now
hear him. For he is always singing and playing before God with the other
holy doctors, perpetually either praising the Lamb of God, or entreating Him
that we mortals may reach the same place he has.84
84Valla, Encomion, 25.277281. In ms. Rome, Bibl. Angelica, 1500 (see n. 12 above), the
closing ( nobis concedat qui vivit et regnat in saecula benedictus. Amen) is followed by
this addition (printed in Valla, Oraciones y Prefacios, 321): Oration of Lorenzo Valla, a most
learned and eloquent man, which he held in praise of St. Thomas Aquinas in the Church of
Santa Maria sopra Minerva, in the city of Rome, a.d. 1457, the seventh day of March. He
died in the same year on the first day of August (Doctissimi viri ac eloquentissimi
Laurentii e Valle Oratio, quam habuit in laudem Sancti Thomae Aquinatis in Ecclesia
Sanctae Mariae Minervae, in urbe romana a.d. 1457, VII die Martii, obiitque eodem anno
die primo Augusti).

3.The Aporias of Scholasticism
3.1.Philosophy/Theology
The mode employed in treating the Trinity is twofold, namely,
through truths known on the basis of authority and through those
known by reason . Some of the holy Fathers employed but
one mode of explanation: namely, by setting forth those truths
founded upon authority. But Boethius chose to proceed according
to the other mode: namely, according to reasoned arguments.
Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on
Boethiuss De trinitate, prologue85
Boethius, for no other reason than that he loved philosophy
excessively, argued incorrectly about free will in the fifth book of
his Consolation of Philosophy.
Lorenzo Valla, De libero arbitrio, preface86
The Encomium of 1457 will have found its proper historical and theoretical
place if it is understood as the organic summary and the definitive statement of Vallas critique of scholasticism. Indeed, it contains the two essential features of that critique: the rejection of the fundamental premise of
scholasticism, which had informed the renewal of Thomism in the second
half of the fifteenth century; and the proposal of an alternative to Thomism,
a humanist principle for the epistemic refounding of theology. Within the
cultural and historiographical space of Vallas oration, these two features
have theoretical and normative value. On the one hand, the Encomium
identifies the epistemic principle underlying the restoration of Thomism:
that no one can become a theologian without the teachings of the dialecticians, metaphysicians, and the other philosophers. On the other hand,
it reproposes the mode of theologizing that had been fully elaborated by
Greek and Latin patristics and that was derived from the apostle Paul, the
normative model for Christian speculation.
Since these appear to be the two poles between which the Encomium
runs, it would seem worthwhile to deepen the analysis of them beyond
85Thomas Aquinas, Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate: Modus de Trinitate
tractandi duplex est, sc. per auctoritates et per rationes . Quidam vero sanctorum
Patrum alterum tantum modum prosecuti sunt, sc. per auctoritates. Boethius vero elegit
prosequi per alium modum, scilicet per rationes (tr. Brennan, as cited below in n. 100).
86Valla, De libero arbitrio, 526: Boethius nulla alia causa, nisi quod nimis philosophiae
amator fuit, non eo modo quo debuit, disputavit de libero arbitrio in V libro De Consolatione
(tr. Trinkaus, modified, as cited below in n. 87).
204
what was said in the first part of the present essay. Comparing the
Encomium with certain parallel and otherwise essential texts of Vallas
corpus will aid in understanding its deeper significance, as well as in situating its most original aspects within the context of the most important
moments and phases in Vallas intellectual development. We shall confine
ourselves to carefully chosen parallel passages, namely the opening pages
of De libero arbitrio, chapter 12 of book III of De vero falsoque bono, and the
preface to book IV of the Elegantiae.87
3.1.1.Boethius as the Starting Point for Scholasticism and Vallas AntiBoethian Critique: The Christian Religion and the Protection of
Philosophy
Valla consistently identifies Boethius with the starting point of scholasticism (increasingly so, and with greater significance, with each subsequent
redaction of the Dialecticae disputationes). It is in Boethius, he affirms
repeatedly and variously, that the essential epistemological dimension of
scholasticism the use of classical philosophy for theological study
emerges for the first time, immediately rife with consequences for the
Latin culture of the West and already charged with its full historical and
theoretical significance. And it is in this context, as far as Valla is concerned, that The Consolation of Philosophy throughout the Middle Ages
a renowned pedagogical and scholastic literary text takes on emblematic meaning, with respect both to its contents and to its methodology.
87These texts are available in the following editions: De libero arbitrio, in Prosatori latini
del Quattrocento, Latin text and Italian translation, ed. Eugenio Garin (Milano: R. Ricciardi,
1952), 523565; De vero falsoque bono, ed. Maristella De Panizza Lorch (Bari: Adriatica,
1970), 111113; Elegantiae, Book IV, Preface in Garin (ed.), Prosatori latini, 612622, and in
Valla, Oraciones y Prefacios, 228246, with Latin text and Spanish translation. [An English
translation of De libero arbitrio by Charles Trinkaus, which has been used here, appears in
The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, eds. Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John
Herman Randall (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 155182. De vero falsoque
bono has also been translated into English: Lorenzo Valla, On Pleasure, De voluptate, tr. Kent
Hieatt and Maristella Lorch (New York: Abaris Books, 1977).] An Italian translation of De
libero arbitrio and De vero falsoque bono is available in Valla, Scritti filosofici, 253282, and
3ff. (ch. 12, bk. III is found on 202205). For the text of the preface to bk. IV of the Elegantiae,
the following mss. (sec. XV) have also been consulted: Florence, Bibl. Laur., Conv. soppr. 187
(ff. 58v-60r); Vatican City, Bibl. Apost. Vat., Pal. lat. 1759 (ff. 89v-92r). See Jozef Ijsewijn and
Gilbert Tournoy, Un primo censimento dei manoscritti e delle edizioni a stampa degli
Elegantiarum linguae latinae libri sex di Lorenzo Valla, Humanistica Lovaniensia 18 (1969):
2541; idem, Nuovi contributi per lelenco dei manoscritti e delle edizioni a stampa delle
Elegantiae di Lorenzo Valla, Humanistica Lovaniensia 20 (1971): 13; [and Francesco Lo
Monaco and Mariangela Regoliosi, I manoscritti con opere autentiche di Lorenzo Valla,
in Pubblicare il Valla, ed. M. Regoliosi (Firenze: Polistampa, 2008), 6797, at 94].

For in this work Valla sees the functional use of philosophy as actually
displacing theological discourse proper, and this with regard to a singular
and deeply significant issue: the problem of the praxis and freedom of a
Christian.
Hence the fact that Vallas (very) first attack on philosophy takes the
form of a critical examination of the Consolation. De voluptate (like the
successive redactions that will converge in De vero falsoque bono) and De
libero arbitrio are directed against the series of arguments that underlies
Boethiuss text. Valla himself says as much, openly and programmatically,
in the opening pages of De libero arbitrio:
Here we want to show that Boethius, for no other reason than that he loved
philosophy excessively (nimis philosophiae amator), argued incorrectly
about free will in the fifth book of his Consolation of Philosophy. We have
replied to the first four books in our De vero bono. Now I shall exert myself as
far as possible in the discussion and solution of this problem, and, so that it
will not seem purposeless after so many other writers have held forth on this
subject, I shall add something of my own.88
It would go beyond the boundaries of the present study to consider the

multiple aspects of Vallas critique of Boethius, which, it should be noted,
was an original and defining aspect of the humanists polemic against
scholasticism and Aristotelianism.89 Here our object is rather to clarify
the terms and implications of Vallas critique of Boethius as a critique of
philosophy, undertaken in the service of a humanist alternative to the theology of medieval and Renaissance scholasticism.
In De libero arbitrio, Valla defines the fundamental premise of scholasticism that will be the focus of his examination and critique of philosophy.
In fact, the definition that he gives of that premise has close textual parallels with what he will say in the Encomium of 1457. In De libero arbitrio,
when treating human freedom and divine predestination, his goal is to
demonstrate the falsity of scholastic theologys methodological assumption that no one can become a theologian unless he knows the precepts
of philosophy and has learned them most diligently and thoroughly, and
thus to refute the position that those of former times who either did not
88Valla, De libero arbitrio, 526: In praesentiarum vero ostendere volumus Boethium
nulla alia causa, nisi quod nimis philosophiae amator fuit, non eo modo quo debuit disputasse de libero arbitrio in quinto libro De consolatione. Nam primis quattuor libris
respondimus in opere nostro De vero bono; atque hanc omnem materiam quam diligentissime potero discutere et resolvere conabor, ut de ea non frustra post omnes ego scriptores
videar disseruisse: aliquid enim de nostro ac praeter ceteros afferemus (tr. Trinkaus).
89Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 142145 and passim.
206
know or did not want to know them [the teachings of philosophy] were
stupid.90 Roman law, Valla continues, prohibited the speaking of foreign
languages (lingua peregrina) in senatorial assemblies, even in the official
reception of embassies, and stipulated that only the language of Rome
(vernacula Urbis) could be used. Scholastic theologians, in violation of the
laws of the evangelical church (ecclesia), introduced the language of
paganism (sermo gentilis) into the community of believers (respublica
christiana).
By attacking what has been called the methodological premise of scholastic theology in this way, Vallas critique actually rejected an entire tradition of theological thought. Although that tradition achieved its greatest
and most comprehensive systematization in Thomas Aquinas, it had its
origins in Augustine, who employed it not only for basic apologetic purposes but also, in a methodologically more sophisticated form, in his De
doctrina christiana (On Christian Doctrine). It is no accident that Vallas
critique of Boethiuss theology also involves Augustine and Thomas and
groups them all into the same historical perspective, both in De libero arbitrio and, especially and quite explicitly, in the Adnotationes.91
For Valla, the Christian religion (christiana religio) unlike the theological tradition that converged in scholasticism, from Boethius to Abelard
and then to Thomas and Thomism has no need of the protection of
philosophy (praesidium philosophiae). It is therefore necessary to condemn scholasticism absolutely, for it is a systematic theology contrary to
the preaching of the Apostles and thus to the normative model of theological study. The Apostles, although (or perhaps because) they were
ignorant and weaponless, preached the Gospel so effectively that they
reduced so much of the world to their authority. Hence the fact Valla
says with the Church Fathers in mind that men emerged at the origins of
Christianitys theological tradition who were truly pillars in the temple of
God and whose writings have now been extant many centuries. The
Fathers are at the head of the whole ecclesial community precisely
because they were in every way imitators of the Apostles. These men,
who were the first to proceed into theological study, took the imitation of
apostolic preaching, in contradistinction to philosophical doctrines, as a
premise and a methodological principle for that study. For they were
90Valla, De libero arbitrio, 524: neminem posse theologum evadere nisi qui praecepta
philosophiae teneat eaque diligentissime perdidicerit, stultosque eos qui antehac vel
nescierunt haec vel nescire voluerunt (tr. Trinkaus, modified).
91See, e.g., Valla, Opera omnia, 1:808a: Adnotationes in Matthew 4:10.

convinced that not only does philosophy not aid the holiest religion, but
she also does it great violence.92
That the Greek and Latin Fathers prejudice against philosophy was
fully justified, Valla argues (again in the opening pages of De libero arbitrio), is clear from the fact that heresies, beginning in the first centuries
of Christianity, had their origins in philosophy. This is the exact opposite of what scholastic theologians think:
But they of whom I speak consider [philosophy] a tool for weeding out heresies, when actually it is a seedbed of heresy. They do not realize that the
most pious antiquity, which lacked the arm of philosophy in combating heresies, and which often fought bitterly against philosophy itself driving it
forth like Tarquin into exile, never to allow its return is thus accused of
ignorance.93
Scholasticism, on the contrary, rejected this inheritance handed down

from the Fathers. It refused to recognize in it any authority, preferring
to enter upon a new path and behaving like a sailor who prefers to hold
an uncharted course.94 The ancients imitation of the Apostles was as if
turned on its head by the modern theologians of scholasticism, in their
constant, enormous effort to pursue the study of all dogmatic philosophy.
3.1.2.The Insoluble Antinomy between Gods Omnipotence/Absolute
Foreknowledge and Human Freedom/Predestination: The Polemic against
Boethius from Peter Damian to Lorenzo Valla
These are the terms in which Valla formulates his critique of philosophy in
the opening pages of De libero arbitrio. This critique had already been
92Valla, De libero arbitrio, 524: Male enim sentire mihi videntur de nostra religione,
quam putant philosophiae praesidio indigere; quod minime illi fecerunt quorum iam multis saeculis opera exstant, apostolorum imitatores et vere in templo Dei columnae. Ac quidem, si probe animadvertamus, quidquid illis temporibus haeresum fuit, quas non parum
multas fuisse accepimus, id omne fere ex philosophicorum dogmatum fontibus nascebatur, un non modo non prodesset philosophia sanctissimae religioni, sed etiam vehementissime obesset . Itane imperiti fuerunt illi et inermes? Et quomodo tantum orbis terrarum
in ditionem suam redegerunt? (tr. Trinkaus, modified).
93Ibid., 524: eam [sc. philosophiam] isti, de quibus loquor, natam esse ad extirpandas
haereses iactant, quarum potius seminarium est, nec intelligunt se imperitiae accusare
piissimam antiquitatem, quae in expugnandis haeresibus philosophiae arma non habuit,
et saepe contra ipsam philosophiam depugnavit acerrime et tamquam Tarquinium in
exilium eiecit, neque redire passa est (tr. Trinkaus).
94Ibid., 524: Si minus ratio, certe auctoritas illorum effectusque inducere debuit, ut se
imitaremini potius quam novam viam ingrederemini . Et nautam qui mavult insuetum
iter tenere, quam id per quod ceteri salva navi ac mercibus navigarunt (tr. Trinkaus,
modified).
208
developed more elaborately and at greater length in the Disputationes and

in De vero falsoque bono. But in De libero arbitrio Valla reproposes it as the
premise to a theme that, for the traditional opposition to philosophy, had
been standard in indeed was the age-old argument underlying the
final and irrefutable proof demonstrating the radical incompossibility
between philosophy and theology: the insoluble antinomy between Gods
omnipotence and absolute foreknowledge, on the one hand, and human
freedom and predestination, on the other.
As Jean Isaac has demonstrated, it was the wide and penetrating diffusion of Boethiuss translation and interpretation of Aristotles On
Interpretation (Peri hermeneias) that brought the problematic of philosophy/theology to the fore in all its theoretical and historical dimensions,
and precisely with regard to the aporia surrounding the relationship
between human freedom/predestination and saving grace.95 The historico-cultural controversy over classical philosophys functionality in, or
incompossibility with, theology perhaps ought to be traced (in early scholasticism) to Peter Damians reaction against philosophy in the first
decades of the eleventh century. Emblematic of the problem, in his mind,
was the attempt to resolve the antinomy between free will and predestination by means of Aristotelian logic, and precisely with chapter 9 of On
Interpretation, which discusses modal propositions and the contrary pairs
possible/impossible and necessary/contingent.
The proof that that antinomy could not be circumscribed, much less
resolved, within Aristotles propositional analysis and logical categories
was the best evidence against any compatibility whatsoever between philosophy and theology, even in the sense of an analogical functionality of
the former within the latter. Boethiuss attempt in his (second) commentary to On Interpretation and his reading of chapter 9 in relation to the
problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom thus had to be considered a failure. What is more, according to Peter Damian it was necessary to radically reverse the perspective clearly delineated in Boethiuss
procedure: his use, that is, of logical, metaphysical, and grammatical categories at every level of theological study. Damians reaction against philosophy consequently entailed a wholesale rejection of an even partial
accommodation of Christian thought to Greek culture: from logic to metaphysics, and from grammar to rhetoric. The irreducibility of the Christian
95Jean Isaac, Le Peri hermeneias en Occident de Boce saint Thomas. Histoire litteraire
dun trait dAristote (Paris: Vrin, 1953), 4449.

mystery to classical thought was not only conceptual and semantic; it
also undermined categories and procedures, such as rhetorical discourse,
on a meta-linguistic level:
Notice, therefore, how the blind foolhardiness of these pseudo-intellectuals
who investigate non-problems, by boldly attributing to God those things
that refer to the art of rhetoric . These men, indeed, because they have not
yet learned the elements of style, lose their grasp of the fundamentals of
simple faith as a result of the obscurity produced by their dull tricks; and,
still ignorant of those things boys study in school, they heap the abuse of
their contentious spirit on the mysteries of God. Moreover, because they
have acquired so little skill in the rudiments of learning or of the liberal arts,
they obscure the study of pure ecclesiastical doctrine by the cloud of their
curiosity. Clearly, conclusions drawn from the arguments of dialecticians and
rhetoricians should not be thoughtlessly addressed to the mysteries of divine
power.96
Thus wrote Peter Damian, the bitterest enemy of the liberal arts in the
history of medieval theology, in his De divina omnipotentia (On Divine
Omnipotence), in direct opposition to Boethius and scholasticism.
Nevertheless, and by a wonderful irony of fate, as Isaac says, it was precisely as a result of this attack against the theological use of chapter 9 of
On Interpretation that this renowned passage of Aristotle on modal logic
and future contingents would become an essential source for the philosophical and theological treatment of and solution to the question of free
will and predestination.97 In his De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio (On the Concord of Foreknowledge,
Predestination, and Gods Grace with Free Will), Anselm of Canterbury,
one of the greatest figures in scholasticisms formative period, used the
same passage of Aristotle, but in a positive way, to open the way for philosophico-theological argumentation of a kind diametrically opposed to
that of Peter Damian. And it is precisely this issue that would become
96Peter Damian, On Divine Omnipotence, in Peter Damian: Letters 91120, tr. Owen J.
Blum (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1998), 356: Videat ergo
imperitia sapientium et vana quaerentium caeca temeritas, quasi haec, quae ad artem pertinent disserendi, ad Deum procaciter referant . Qui nimirum, quia necdum didicerunt
elementa verborum, per obscuras argumentorum suorum caligines amittunt clarae fidei
fundamentum, et, ignorantes adhuc quod a pueris tractatur in scholis, querelae suae
calumnias divinis ingerunt sacramentis! Et, quia inter rudimenta discentium, vel artis
humanae, nullam apprehendere periciam, curiositatis suae nubilo perturbant puritatis
ecclesiasticae disciplinam! Haec, plane, quae ex dialecticorum vel rhetorum prodeunt argumentis, non facile divinae virtutis sunt aptanda mysteriis (emphasis added).
97[Isaac, Le Peri Hermeneias, 47: par une charmante ironie du sort, entre sous la plume
de lennemi le plus virulent des artes libraux dans lhistoire de la thologie mdivale.]
210
emblematic and extremely significant for reasserting Aristotelian philosophys function, especially in its logical and ontological categories, as the
handmaiden to theological investigation.
Thus Valla took up Peter Damians radical critique of philosophy, but
he placed it within the specific viewpoint of early humanism. The opposition to the introduction of philosophy into theology had continued, as is
well known, beyond Peter Damian. An entire cultural current of medieval
theology constantly maintained a contrary and antithetical stance to the
Boethian origins of scholasticism, from Bernard to the Victorines to
the Masters of theology at the University of Paris in the first decades of the
thirteenth century. Two of these Masters were Jean de Saint-Gilles
(the first to hold the second chair of the Dominicans), who polemicized
against the barbarization of theological language through Aristotelian
metaphysics, and Odo of Chteauroux (chancellor of the church of
Paris), who rebuked theologians who sell themselves to the sons of the
Greeks, that is to the philosophers.98
And yet, to understand the full import and the true sense of this comparison between the various anti-Boethian stances, which span from the
eleventh century to the thirteenth (but that continue thereafter as well),
and the introductory pages to De libero arbitrio, it must be added immediately that Valla profoundly modified Peter Damians critique of philosophy. Valla rejected any and every union of theology with philosophy, but
he did so within a perspective inverse to that of the Bishop of Ravenna.
For his rejection had a different aim, namely that of formulating a new
principle of theology: the use of rhetoric, as described in Quintilians
Institutio, as a new instrument of philological and categorical criticism,
both for the study of scripture and for theological argumentation. Thus
Vallas polemic inhabited a specific and unique historico-cultural context.
On the one hand, it stood in antithesis to the neo-Thomism of his time. It
was the critique of a theological methodology that Valla judged unsuitable
to the new exigencies arising from contemporary Christian praxis and
from the shift taking place in the first half of the fifteenth century. On the
other hand, it stood in opposition to Boethiuss theological Aristotelianism,
which had reached its culmination in Thomas and in the special role he
had given to philosophy, namely that of handmaiden to theology.99
98[For the full quotations, see pp. 229230 below.]

99Pierre Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et lAverroisme latin au XIIIme sicle, 2 vols.
(Louvain: Institut suprieur de philosophie de lUniversit), 19081911, 1:163; but see also

3.1.3.A Comparative Reading of Vallas Texts with Thomass Commentary
on Boethiuss De Trinitate
The Summa theologiae, which the Thomist restoration of the fifteenth
century held up as a normative model for theological study, was for Vallas
contemporaries (as well as for others) the most significant work in
Aquinass literary corpus. For the Summa embodied the perfect form, and
was in a certain sense the fullest and most mature expression, of philosophys role as handmaiden to theology in the tradition of medieval scholasticism. But there is another work, in the same scholastic tradition, in
which Thomas systematically and quite incisively identified the prolegomena to the epistemological principle of his own theological study. In
the Commentary on Boethiuss De Trinitate (Expositio super librum Boethii
De Trinitate, 125559), Aquinas had explained the theoretical foundations
of his own Wissenschaftslehre, not only in its historico-cultural and speculative aspects but also from an apologetic standpoint. In direct and immediate reference to contemporary methodological debates, he posited the
necessity of and gave the criteria for systematically using the rhetorical
and philosophical disciplines (as elaborated in Aristotelianism) for theological argumentation.
Considering this, let us undertake a comparison between Vallas antiphilosophical texts and the third article of Question II of Aquinass
Commentary on Boethius. This comparison will bring into relief the full
meaning of the historical dimension separating the humanist from the
great scholastic, showing them to be two poles marking the different
directions taken in a double shift in the history of theology. It will also
reveal the full historico-cultural significance of the critique of scholasticism contained in Vallas Encomium, whose aim was the radical renewal of
theology in the face of the investigative methodology of Thomism a
methodology that in its founder had been richly endowed with cognitive
possibilities and original ideas but that, in the fifteenth century, was being
reproposed as the restoration of a fully perfected and delineated system.
A comparative reading of Thomass text with Vallas oration is of great
interest: for although the same patristic references and the same problematic (the relationship between Christianity and Greco-Hellenistic culture)
recur, Thomas and Valla reach contrary solutions. Even more so, though,
reading Thomas in light of Valla is surprising, on account of how acutely
Marie-Dominique Chenu, La Thologie comme science au XIIIme sicle (Paris: Vrin, 1943),
2532.
212
Valla yet again identifies moments of cultural rupture and assaults the
theoretical foundations of his contemporaries (in this specific case, the
neo-Thomists of the fifteenth century). He achieves this complex operation by working on two levels. On one, he revaluates Thomass work per se
in an historiographic retrospective. On the other, he illustrates its unique
character, thus showing that its revival under wholly different circumstances is not valid. To Vallas mind, Thomass thought was organically
related to the historical circumstances of the thirteenth century. Lacking
new investigatory tools, it was unsuitable for resolving new problematics.
In this sense, the cultural break on which Valla insists appears as the clear
reversal of the theoretical arguments underlying the restoration of
Thomism in the fifteenth century.
3.1.4.The Epistemological Correlation between Philosophy and Theology in
Question II, Article 3 of the Commentary on Boethius, and the References
to Jeromes Letters to Eustochium, to the Orator Magnus, and to
Pammachius
Question II of the Commentary on Boethius is entirely devoted to the
theme of the epistemological relationship between philosophy and theology.100 In Aquinass terminology (as announced in the Questions very
title), the problem concerns the possibility of, and the analytical and argumentative instruments proper to, the manifestation of divine knowledge
(manifestatio divinae cognitionis). Article 3 constitutes the problematic
nucleus as well as the resolution of Thomass treatment. Since he desired
to demonstrate the reducibility of the knowledge of divine truths (cognitio divinorum) to a science (scientia), i.e. to demonstrate the very possibility of theology, he had to describe its method both on a formal level of
investigation and language (Article 1: treating divine truths by means
of inquiry; Article 4: concealing divine truths by new and obscure
words)101 and on the plane of its specific contents (Article 2: the existence of a science of divine truths; Article 3: whether in the science of
100For the text, we follow the critical edition: Thomas Aquinas, Expositio super librum
Boethii de Trinitate, ed. Bruno Decker (Leiden: Brill, 1965). For the dating of the work, cf.
ibid., p. 44. [English translations are based on those of Rose Emmanuella Brennan in
Thomas Aquinas, The Trinity and the Unicity of the Intellect, tr. R.E. Brennan (St. Louis:
B. Herder, 1946), from the on-line text (accessed 03.09.2013): http://dhspriory.org/thomas/
BoethiusDeTr.htm#23.]
101Aquinas, Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate, quae. II, art. 1: divina
investigando tractare; art. 4: divina velanda novis et obscuris verbis (tr. Brennan,
modified).

faith, which is concerning God, it is permissible to use the arguments of
the philosophers).102
The essential elements of the sic et non problematic regarding whether
there was a radical dichotomy between philosophy and theology or rather
a possibility of union had already been theoretically formulated and historically defined before Aquinas. Indeed, they emerged over centuries of
Christian thought and had become attached to a standard set of scriptural
and patristic references as obligatory as they were familiar. It is as such, i.e.
as premises to subsequent solutions, that these scriptural and patristic
texts are taken up by Thomas and dutifully listed and annotated.
Indispensable references in favor of a radical dichotomy see the series of
objections in Article 3 were to Paul (1 Cor. 1:17) and Jerome (Letter to
Eustochium), along with formulations based on the antinomy between
secular and divine wisdom (sapientia saecularis/sapientia divina). On the
opposite side (in the sed contra section), in support of the possibility of
union, the obligatory references were to other letters of Jerome (Letter to
the Orator Magnus, Letter to Pammachius), to Augustines discourse on
theological method, found in his De doctrina christiana, and to the same
authors scientific deployment of theological speculation, in his De
Trinitate (On the Trinity).
Let us take a closer look at the arguments found in Article 3, first those
in objection and then the respective responses in the sed contra. Thereafter
an interpretive and contextual reading of the third article will be proposed, and finally a few observations will be put forth regarding the counter-arguments that conclude Aquinass text.
The reasons adduced for rejecting a possible union between philosophy and theology had been derived from the kerygmatic praxis of the
Apostle of the Gentiles, particularly from texts like 1 Corinthians 1:17 (and
parallel passages). Pauls statements directly related to the failure of his
speech at the Areopagus were interpreted as an urgent admonition that
the Gospel could not be circumscribed within the dimensions of the
wisdom of the word (sapientia verbi): Christian logos could neither be
subsumed nor constrained within the linguistic and semantic structures
of the Greek logos. And the interpretive Gloss dutifully attached by
Aquinas in support and confirmation of the objector translated Pauls
102Ibid., quae. II, art. 2: de divinis esse aliqua scientia; art. 3: utrum in scientia fidei,
quae est de Deo, liceat rationibus philosophicis uti (tr. Brennan, modified).
214
formulation wisdom of the word as learning of the philosophers

(doctrina philosophorum).
This constant of Christian culture came to be corroborated by the
patristic reference to Jeromes Letter to Eustochium.103 For the dream of
Jerome that it describes, which condemned the Latin wisdom of the
word as incarnated in Ciceronian rhetoric, had taken on emblematic significance. The conflict in the Christian conscience driven by the opposition between the Gospel and classical Greco-Roman culture emerged in
Jerome and in his works, taking the form of a profound disturbance that,
despite the scope and development of contemporary patristic literature,
could be dismissed but not resolved. The pseudo-ideological compromise
between divine wisdom and secular wisdom (the sophia tou kosmou of
the Greeks mentioned by Paul in 1 Cor. 1:20) resembled the discount sale
of adulterated wine thus the ironic argument of another objection,
whose source can be traced to the anti-Thomist critique of Bonaventures
Hexaemeron. No different are barkeeps (caupones) who secretly mix and
degrade fine wine with water, to whom the prophet Isaiah (1:22) compared Jerusalem, the once faithful and righteous city that had become a
harlot for betraying the Ancient Alliance with Yahweh. In plain language: if the canons prohibited reading in the books of the Gentiles in
order to ensure the purity of Theo-logy as the Word of God and to
secure the theologians faith to that Word, all the more so did the study of
these books have to be prohibited, lest their contents be transferred to the
investigation of divine truths.
In the sed contra, on the other hand, we find the scriptural and patristic
references that substantiate the possibility of a synthesis between philosophy and theology. The arguments adduced here are aimed against the
supporters of a theological fundamentalism that rejected classical culture
and posited the absolute autonomy of the Judeo-Christian tradition. They
are admittedly of an ad hominem nature, but they gain objective validity
by the fact that they are drawn from other passages of Jeromes own letters. In particular, reference is made to the Letter to Magnus and to the
Letter to Pammachius.104 In the Letter to Magnus, Jerome recalled how the
apostle Paul, although warning the Christians of Corinth about the absolute antithesis between the folly of the Cross and secular wisdom, did
not intend therewith to condemn Greek culture. Like all orators of his age,
103Jerome, Epistola ad Eustochium (ep. 22) in PL 22:394425.
104Jerome, Epistola ad Magnum oratorem (ep. 70), in PL 22:66468; idem, Epistola ad
Pammachium (ep. 66), in PL 22:63947.

the Apostle, too, often made use of Greek poetry in his preaching
(Epimenides in Tit. 1:22; Menander in 1 Cor. 15:22; Aratus in Acts 17:28).
What is more, in the same letter Jerome reviewed the major representatives of (Greek and Latin) Christian culture from the first centuries of the
Church, including his own contemporaries, to emphasize the universal
and explicit use of ancient philosophy and rhetoric on the part of the
Fathers and doctors of Christianity. Cyprian and Origen, Clement of
Alexandria and Gregory Nazianzen as Jerome says
fill their books so full with the teachings and judgments of the philosophers
that you would not know what is more amazing, their secular erudition or
their knowledge of the Scriptures.105
There was an uninterrupted tradition of using Greek and Latin culture for
Christian apologetics and theology, constantly pursued even by those
closest in time to Jeromes cultural context. Thus, with a view to their literary style, Jerome characterizes Lactantius as Ciceronian and Hilary of
Poitiers as Quintilianesque. To those who took a stand against pagan
culture, Jerome was therefore able to respond in defense of his own works:
What is so amazing if I, too, desire to turn secular wisdom, on account of the
charm of its eloquence and the beauty of its aspect, from a slave and prisoner into an Israelite?106
Here Jerome makes metaphorical use of the precept found in Deuteronomy

(21:1014) regarding the beautiful prisoner, the woman captured in war
and made a bride, but only after having been stripped of her foreign ornaments and returned, liberating her, to Israelite beauty. Jeromes interpretation of this scriptural passage would become a classic of Latin
ecclesiastical literature, a slogan in defense of the re-appropriation of
Greco-Hellenistic wisdom on the part of a Christianity that reigns victorious over the pagan world. In practice, however, this re-appropriation
would take many various forms, assuming modalities often opposed to
one another and covering the most variegated positions. Even a thinker
like Peter Damian would believe that he respected the validity of Jeromes
criterion for cultural mediation within Christianity. In any case, the Letter
to Magnus and other parallel texts of Jerome (like his Letter to Pammachius,
105Jerome, Epistola ad Magnum oratorem, 667668: in tantum philosophorum doctrinis atque sententiis suos resarciunt libros, ut nescias quid in illis primum admirari debeas,
eruditionem saeculi an scientiam Scripturarum.
106Ibid., 666: quid ergo mirum, si et ego sapientiam saecularem propter eloquii venustatem et membrorum pulchritudinem, de ancilla atque captiva Israelitidem facere cupio?
216
where once again the adoption of secular wisdom in the sphere of

divine wisdom is considered a liberation of the prisoner woman, such
that from a Moabite she will be made an Israelite107), would be constantly utilized to defend the compatibility between philosophy and
theology.
3.1.5.Thomass Reference to Book II, Chapter 40 of Augustines De doctrina
christiana in the sed contra and the Corpus of Article 3 of the Commentary
on Boethius
Comparing Jerome and Augustine on the problem of the epistemological
mediation between philosophy and theology was de rigueur, especially
considering the diversity of their respective approaches. Hence Aquinass
reference, in the sed contra and in the corpus of Article 3, to Augustines
De Trinitate (On the Trinity) and De doctrina christiana. De Trinitate was a
unique and emblematic model for the mediation between divine and
secular wisdom. It treated the theme fully in order to provide a foundation for a Trinitarian theology that would remain and this is how it was
always seen in the Latin tradition a highly original and significant work
of theoretical inquiry in the Christian West. But let us pass over Aquinass
reference to Augustines De Trinitate, as it is of only marginal importance
for our purposes. Thomass other reference to Augustine, also found in the
sed contra but much more specific and precise, is to De doctrina christiana.
In Sadouss terms, this was the classic disquisition on rhetoric for
Christians. For Marrou, it was situated in a precise place in a time of cultural decline, namely at the twilight of the ancient world.108
De doctrina christiana was an obvious reference for Thomas. He well
knew that, throughout history, Augustines discourse on method had
always been considered the theoretical foundation for theological inquiry
and the exegetical analysis of Scripture; it outlined the principles for study
within the sphere of Christian thought. The context from which Aquinas
drew his citation of De doctrina christiana, namely from chapter 40
107[Jerome, Epistola ad Pammachium (ep. 66), 644 Sin autem adamaveris captivam
mulierem, id est, sapientiam saecularem, et ejus pulchritudine captus fueris, decalva eam,
et illecebras crinium atque ornamenta verborum cum emortuis unguibus seca. Lava eam
Prophetali nitro, et tunc requiescens cum illa, dicito: Sinistra ejus sub capite meo, et dextra illius amplexabitur me [Cant. 2:6], et multo tibi foetus captiva dabit, ac de Moabitide
efficietur Israelitis.]
108[Alfred L. de Sadous, Sancti Augustini de doctrina Christiana libri exponuntur, seu de
rhetorica apud Christianos disquisitio (Paris: apud Joubert Bibliopolam, 1847); Marrou,
Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique.]

of book II, gives prominence and specific meaning to the Augustinian
passage adduced in the sed contra. For it is precisely in book II that
Augustine systematically treats of signs (signa), i.e. the linguistic and argumentative instruments, the various forms of knowledge and of inquiry
that made up the classical culture institutionalized in the curriculum of
the liberal arts (artes liberales). Augustines treatment is both semiological
and methodological. Its aim is to identify the possible uses of antiquitys
cognitive instruments with a view to the Christian faith and its contents
the res, the divine truths about which Augustine had spoken at length in
the first book of De doctrina. This is the context in which Augustine, in the
final pages of book II (chs. 4042), considers the relationship between
philosophy and theology. There he identifies the reasons and adduces
the justifications for allowing even the most eminent branch of ancient
knowledge to undergo a conversion (conversio) for Christian use.
Augustine writes:
If anything true or suitable to our faith has ever been said by those called
philosophers, especially the Platonists, not only should it not be feared, but
it ought to be claimed for our own use from them as if from unlawful
possessors.109
This is the passage cited by Aquinas in the sed contra, but with a variant
and an omission that show his own peculiar take on it. Thomas leaves out
the phrase especially the Platonists and changes ought to be claimed
(vindicanda) to ought to be taken up (assumenda). As for the missing
Platonists, might Aquinas have had an interest (in the context of the sed
contra, and above all in the corpus of his solution to the problem at hand)
in enlarging and extending Augustines statement to all of pre-Christian
philosophy, and perhaps even in insisting (especially) on the peripatetic
strain (Aristotelians), thus diverging from Augustines view on GrecoHellenistic culture?
Regarding the expression ought to be claimed (vindicanda), it is
immediately connected in Augustines text to the discourse that follows,
and its meaning is illustrated allegorically with a scriptural reference to
Exodus 3:22, 11:2, and 12:35. In contrast, Thomass substitution of assumenda
for vindicanda removes the statement from its immediate context and
109Augustine, De doctrina christiana, II.40.14: Philosophi autem qui vocantur si qua

forte vera et fidei nostrae accommodata dixerunt, maxime Platonici, non solum formidanda non sunt, sed ab eis etiam tamquam ab iniustis possessoribus in usum nostrum
vindicanda.
218
obscures Augustines specific solution for reducing Greek and pagan philosophical knowledge to Christian preaching. Augustines text continues:
For just as the Egyptians had not only idols but also vases and ornaments
of gold and silver and clothing which that people [sc. the Israelites], when
leaving Egypt, secretly claimed as its own so as to put them to better use ,
thus the combined teachings of the pagans not only include false and superstitious images and heavy burdens of superfluous toil, which each of us,
departing the community of pagans with Christ as our guide, ought to
despise and avoid; but they also contain liberal disciplines that are quite
suited to the service of the truth as well as certain very useful moral teachings . What is perversely and unjustly abused in obedience to demons, a
Christian ought to carry away and apply to the just employment of preaching the Gospel.110
In the same ecclesial tradition as Jerome in his Letter to Magnus, Augustine

also validates the historical possibility of harnessing philosophy to evangelical preaching and thus to theological knowledge. As doctrinal models
he adduces the greatest figures of Christian literature and evangelical pastoral practice, making reference to the early Church Fathers both Greek
(innumerable Greeks) and Latin (Cyprian, Lactantius, Hilary, and others). But what is distinctive in Augustines proposition the claim, or
redemption (in the strong sense of the term in Roman law), of aspects of
culture, such as ethical and social forms as well as civil institutions, for use
within Christianity was derived from a doctrinal premise that had originally been elaborated by the Judeo-Alexandrian school and was widely
diffused in the West (as restated, for example, by Ambrose). It consisted in
the belief that pagan philosophy, and in particular Greek philosophy
(especially Platonism), was derived from the most ancient Old Testament
Scriptures and subsequently misappropriated for a use contrary to JudeoChristian revelation. Thus it is both legitimate and necessary Augustine
argues in book II, chapters 4142 of De doctrina christiana to claim for
Christianity that which had belonged to it by ancient right: to redeem
what had been carried away into slavery in foreign lands, to lead
110Ibid., II.40.423: Sicut enim Aegyptii non tantum idola habebant sed etiam vasa
atque ornamenta de auro et argento et vestem, quae ille populus exiens de Aegypto sibi
potius tamquam ad usum meliorem clanculo vindicavit , sic doctrinae omnes gentilium
non solum simulata et superstitiosa figmenta gravesque sarcinas supervacanei laboris
habent, quae unusquisque nostrum duce Christo de societate gentilium exiens debet
abominari atque vitare, sed etiam liberales disciplinas usui veritatis aptiores et quaedam
morum praecepta utilissima continent et, quo perverse atque iniuriose ad obsequia daemonum abutuntur , debet ab eis auferre christianus ad usum iustum praedicandi
Evangelii.

d octrines and institutions that had been deformed and abused back to
their country of origin, purifying them and restoring them to freedom.
All this follows the example of Christ, who had redeemed man and the
world from the rule of evil and had restored the spirit and the cosmos to
the freedom of the Gospel.111
111On the traditional double reference to Jerome and Augustine and related texts, cf.:
Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1953), 3942, 7274, 446450; R.R. Bolgar, The Classical Heritage and its
Beneficiaries (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 4558; Henri de Lubac, Exgse
Mdivale. Les quatre sens de lEcriture, 2 vols. (Paris: Aubier, 1959), 1:290304. In the apparatus to the text of the Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate, Decker did not note the
missing especially the Platonists (maxime Platonici) in the text of Augustine cited by
Thomas in Sed contra 5. Praeterea (p. 93.15). For a critical text of De doctrina christiana,
see the edition of Josef Martin in Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 32 (Turnhout:
Brepols, 1962) (p. 73: bk. II, ch. 40 = PL 34: 63). Augustines especially the Platonists is not
missing from Aquinass quotation of the same passage in his Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem (1255/56): Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia, Leonine ed., vol. 41 (Roma:
St. Thomas Aquinas Foundation, 1970), ch. 11.135140, p. A133; on the opuscules origin and
polemical aims, see H.-F. Dondaines introduction in ibid., pp. A513. But it is necessary to
say more on this topic. Ch. 11 (de hoc quod religiosi studio vacant) and the successive ch.
12 (de hoc quod religiosi verbum Dei ornate et gratiose proponunt) of Contra impugnantes (pp. A13134, A13437) constitute an extremely pregnant correlative passage to
Article 3, Question II of the Commentary on Boethius. These two chapters of Contra impugnantes prove to be, in the very structure of their argumentative procedure to say nothing
of their contents the literary precedent (regardless of the precise order of composition)
of Article 3, Question II of the Commentary on Boethius. If in the Commentary Augustine
and Jerome are introduced as authorities to determine the theoretical foundations of theology, in Contra impugnantes the same patristic citations (including the quotation of
whole passages, used more fully than in the Commentary) are adduced to provide a foundation and defense, in opposition to the anti-mendicant criticisms of the Paris university
world, of the very practice of theological study and teaching and of the kerygmatic praedicatio. Hence Aquinass insistence in affirming that it is suitable for doctors of sacred
Scripture to use secular eloquence and wisdom (ch. 12.14446, p. A136: quod doctoribus
sacrae Scripturae convenit eloquentia et sapientia saeculari uti). He further insists, revealing its full historical meaning, on both the compossibility and the necessity of synthesizing
the study of secular literature (studium litterarum saecularium) with the study of
sacred literature (studium litterarum sacrarum); he subscribes to the dictates of Jeromes
Letter to Pammachius and recommends continually making time (vacatio) for the study
of classical and Judeo-Christian texts (ch. 11.119ff., p. A133). Nevertheless, from the overall
context it seems clear not only that secular wisdom and eloquence are understood as
providing immediate and direct service to theology (sacra doctrina), but also, and more
importantly we highlight this in relation to our subject that the following points of
theological methodology are put forward. The first consists in the fact that the primacy
ofwisdom (as the handmaiden to theological science) over eloquence, that is of philosophy over rhetoric, remains absolute and clear. The second is that eloquence is conceived and viewed along the lines (and within the limits) of ornamentation (ornatus) (for
the ornamentation of words, after the manner of the rhetoricians, ch. 12.204f., p. A136: ad
ornatum verborum ut rhetores faciunt). Now, both the first and the second points, or better both together, characterize and describe what Seigel has called the Ciceronian model;
indeed, they are the constants of the rhetorical tradition of Ciceronianism. See Jerrold
220
E. Seigel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism. The Union of Eloquence and
Wisdom, Petrarch to Valla (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 330; and
Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 7687. It has not been possible to consult Edward Kennard Rand, Cicero in the Courtroom of St. Thomas (Milwaukee: Marquette
University Press, 1946). This means that also from the perspective of the use of secular
literature (litterae saeculares) within the realm of the study and the teaching of theology
(academic and pastoral), a profound difference distinguishes Valla from Thomas: rhetoric, as it is employed by Valla in the service of theological science, is placed outside of
Ciceronianism and, differently from Thomass conception, is essentially inscribed in
the Quintilianesque model. But this topic will be fully treated in the fourth part of the
present essay. Here it is important to cite a passage from ch. 12 of Contra impugnantes,
significant for its theoretical denseness and synthesis, which must be kept in mind during
the discussion of Vallas Quintilianesque rhetoric and theological investigations.
Thomass text reads: It should be known that the use of secular wisdom and eloquence
in theology is in a certain way to be approved, in another to be blamed. It is to be blamed
when someone uses them for boastful ostentation or when he is chiefly interested in
secular wisdom and eloquence: for then he thinks it necessary either to be silent about or
to reject what is not approved by secular knowledge, such as articles of faith that are
above human reason. And likewise whoever is chiefly interested in eloquence has as his
object to lead his listeners to admiration not of the subject of his speech, but of the
speaker himself; this is the way that worldly wisdom and eloquence were used by the
pseudo-apostles, against whom the Apostle spoke in his letter to the Corinthians . It is,
however, to be approved when someone uses secular wisdom and eloquence not for the
display of his own vanity but for the utility of his audience, who are thus at any moment
more easily and more effectively taught or, if adversaries, convinced; and likewise when
someone does not treat them chiefly as ends but uses them as means in the service of
sacred doctrine, which is his chief interest, just as he takes up all other things in its service
; it was thus that the apostles, too, used eloquence. Hence Augustine in bk. IV [ch. 7] of
De doctrina christiana says that in the words of the Apostle wisdom was the guide with
eloquence following as its fellow, and wisdom in the lead did not cast off eloquence following behind. But nevertheless later doctors have since made greater use of secular wisdom and eloquence, and this is the reason why earlier it was not philosophers and
rhetoricians who were chosen to preach but common folk and fishermen, who then converted the philosophers and orators: the reason is so that our faith would not consist in
human wisdom but in the power of God (ibid., ch. 12.14787, p. A136: Sciendum est
quod uti sapientia et eloquentia saeculari in sacra doctrina quodammodo commendatur
et quodammodo reprehenditur. Reprehenditur quidem quando aliquis ad iactantiam eis
utitur et quando eloquentiae et sapientiae saeculari principaliter studet: tunc enim oportet quod illa vel taceat vel neget quae saecularis scientia non approbat, sicut articulos
fidei qui sunt supra rationem humanam. Et similiter qui eloquentiae principaliter studet,
homines non intendit ducere in admirationem eorum quae dicit sed dicentis; et hoc
modo mundana sapientia et eloquentia pseudoapostoli utebantur contra quos Apostolus
loquitur in epistola ad Corinthios . Commendatur autem quando non ad se ostentandum sed ad utilitatem audientium, qui sic quandoque facilius et efficacius instruuntur
vel convincuntur adversarii, utitur aliquis sapientia et eloquentia saeculari; et iterum
quando aliquis non principaliter eis intendit sed eis utitur in obsequium sacrae doctrinae
cui principaliter inhaeret, ut sic omnia alia in obsequium eius assumat et ita etiam
apostoli eloquentia utebantur. Unde Augustinus in IV De doctrina christiana dicit quod
in verbis Apostli erat dux sapientia et sequens comes eloquentia, et sapientia praecedens
eloquentiam sequentem non respuebat. Sed tamen posteriores doctores adhuc magis usi
sunt sapientia et eloquentia saeculari propter eandem rationem qua non prius philosophi et rhetores sunt electi ad praedicandum, sed plebei et piscatores qui postmodum
philosophos et oratoresconverterunt: ut scilicet fides nostra non consistat in sapientia
hominum sed in virtute Dei).

3.1.6.The Propositions of Jerome and Augustine: Appropriation of Ancient
Rhetoric ( Jerome), Re-Appropriation of Greek Philosophy (Augustine),
and the Corpus of Article 3 in Thomass Commentary on Boethius
Both Jeromes and Augustines propositions which lay out the guiding
parameters for overcoming the antinomy between classical culture and
theological knowledge began from the possibility of reducing philosophy in some way to an epistemological instrument of the science of
divine things. Nevertheless, the two propositions ultimately took different directions that, in typical patristic fashion, were expressed through
the (allegorical) reference to different scriptural passages. Jerome cited
the prescriptions of Deuteronomy 21:1014; Augustine referred to the
events of Exodus 3:22, 11:2, and 12:35. Hence their divergent solutions to
the antinomy between Greco-Hellenistic culture and Christian theological knowledge a divergence that not only affected the modalities and
issues immediately at hand but also had far-reaching consequences and
implications. Jerome was concerned with converting the cultural instruments of the classical world to the service of the Word of God and the
Sacred Scriptures, i.e. with appropriating the philological techniques and
categorical schemes of ancient rhetoric. These were to be employed as
instruments of Christian knowledge of that alternative culture that was
emerging from the community of believers in the Gospel. For Augustine
(especially as seen in the later development of his theological speculation
and in the influence of Augustinianism on the tradition of the Latin
Church), at issue was instead a reconversion of Greek philosophy (especially Platonism), and thus a re-appropriation of classical metaphysical
speculation. To his mind, it could and should provide theology with theoretical parameters for investigating Christian revelation and understanding the relationship between the City of God and that of men. At this point
we might preview in passing what we shall see in our upcoming analysis:
on the one hand, Valla takes up Quintilians rhetoric, along Jeromes lines
of appropriation, in the service of a humanist theology; on the other,
Thomas Aquinas seeks ontological foundations for reducing Greek philosophy to theological knowledge, and, in line with Augustines directive
of re-appropriation, he makes the natural truths of the pre-Christian world
flow into the science of faith (scientia fidei).
Before turning to Vallas texts, however, let us first examine the solution
proposed by Thomas (to the question whether in the science of faith it
is permissible to use the arguments of the philosophers) in the corpus of
Article 3. Here is the central passage:
222
Now, as sacred doctrine is founded upon the light of faith, so philosophy
depends upon the light of natural reason; wherefore it is impossible that
philosophical truths are contrary to those that are of faith; but they are deficient as compared to them. Nevertheless they incorporate some similitudes
of those higher truths, and some things that are preparatory for them, just as
nature is the preamble to grace. If, however, anything is found in the teachings of the philosophers contrary to faith, this error does not properly belong
to philosophy, but is due to an abuse of philosophy owing to the insufficiency of reason. Therefore also it is possible from the principles of philosophy to refute an error of this kind, either by showing it to be altogether
impossible, or not to be necessary. For just as those things which are of faith
cannot be demonstratively proved, so certain things contrary to them cannot be demonstratively shown to be false, but they can be shown not to be
necessary. Thus, in sacred doctrine we are able to make a threefold use of
philosophy .112
Aquinas continues with the various concrete ways in which philosophy, in

different contexts and on different levels, aids in the science of faith. First,
it provides preambles of faith (concerning God and his creatures).
Second, there are analogical relationships that connect philosophical to
theological knowledge, the role of which is
to give a clearer notion, by certain similitudes, of the truths of faith,
as Augustine in his book, De Trinitate, employed many comparisons
taken from the teachings of the philosophers to aid understanding of the
Trinity.
Finally, philosophical doctrines, or better their apologetic force, can be

used
to resist those things that are said against the faith, either by showing
that such statements are false, or by showing that they are not necessarily
true.113
112Aquinas, Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate, quae. 2, art. 3: Sicut autem sacra
doctrina fundatur supra lumen fidei, ita philosophia fundatur supra lumen naturale rationis; unde impossibile est quod ea, quae sunt philosophiae, sint contraria his quae sunt
fidei, sed deficiunt ab eis. Continent autem aliquas eorum similitudines et quaedam ad ea
praeambula, sicut natura praeambula est ad gratiam. Si quid autem in dictis philosophorum invenitur contrarium fidei, hoc non est philosophia, sed magis philosophiae abusus ex
defectu rationis. Et ideo possibile est ex principiis philosophiae huiusmodi errorem refellere vel ostendendo omnino esse impossibile vel ostendendo non esse necessarium. Sicut
enim ea quae sunt fidei non possunt demonstrative probari, ita quaedam contraria eis non
possunt demonstrative ostendi esse falsa, sed potest ostendi ea non esse necessaria. Sic
ergo in sacra doctrina philosophia possumus tripliciter uti (tr. Brennan).
113Ibid., quae. 2, art. 3: preambula fidei ad notificandum per aliquas similitudines
quae sunt fidei, sicut Augustinus in libro de Trinitate utitur multis similitudinibus ex

Augustines position on the possibility of reconverting philosophy to
theological knowledge, of re-appropriating philosophy within the science of faith, appears distinctly in Aquinass text. Thus Thomas reaffirms the possibility of reversing the negative aspects, or abuses, that
constituted the limits within which philosophy had been confined by
pre-Christian culture, just as the Hebrew people culturally plundered
the religion of the Egyptians, who had made an abuse of precious vases
and sacred ornaments and attire for idolatrous rites in honor of a false
divinity. Moreover, towards the end of the corpus Aquinas affirms, retracing the argument of De doctrina christiana (book II, chs. 41 and 42), that
Augustines proposition remains valid despite the fact that a renewed
abuse of philosophy could always crop up within theological study and
scriptural exegesis. Aquinas even notes that this eventuality had already
come to pass and could come about again in several apparently contrasting but actually identical ways for all would amount to an undue exaltation of philosophy over faith and Christian knowledge. Thomas points
to Origen as an historical example of such an exaltation of classical
philosophical culture: by using doctrines contrary to faith, which are
not truths of philosophy, but rather error, or abuse of philosophy, as
Origen did.114
The other possible abuse of philosophy is more complex in its consequences and takes two fundamentally contrary forms. It consists either in
rationalistically reducing faith to culture, or in positing relationships or
parallels between the two that make them seem indistinct from one
another. Either way, the union of faith and culture is pushed in a highly
attractive and suggestive direction, tending on the one hand towards
rationalism, on the other towards syncretism. In the first case, the result is
that the truths of faith are subject to the yardstick of philosophy, as if one
should be willing to believe nothing except what could be held by
philosophic reasoning (as is said in the final lines of the corpus).115 In
the second case, however which is the exact opposite of the preceding
error culture is used as a primary (quasi principalis) rather than an
doctrinis philosophicis sumptis ad manifestandam Trinitatem ad resistendum his quae
contra fidem dicuntur, sive ostendendo ea esse falsa sive ostendendo ea non esse necessaria (tr. Brennan).
114Ibid., quae. 2, art. 3: utendo his quae sunt contra fidem, quae non sunt philosophiae
sed corruptio vel abusus eius, sicut Origines fecit (tr. Brennan, emphasis added).
115Ibid., quae. 2, art. 3: ea quae sunt fidei includantur sub metis philosophiae, ut scilicet si aliquis credere nolit nisi quod per philosophiam haberi potest (tr. Brennan,
modified).
224
ancillary (quasi secundaria) tool in the contextual support and defense

of faith, as if the truth of faith were believed on account of [philosophical
doctrine] (as is said in the ad primum).116
That Aquinass argumentation moves along the lines of Augustines
proposition becomes even more explicit from the series of rebuttals to the
objections. For Thomas those objections are without real basis, since the
secular wisdom of which Paul speaks can in itself (insofar as it is true) be
neither the source of theological or dogmatic error nor the origin of heresy
(ad secundum). This is especially the case insofar as philosophy is placed
in subordination to theological knowledge (ad septimum) and philosophical proofs (documenta philosophica) are ordained (on account of
the reasonableness of the doctrine) for use as instruments of scriptural
analysis in the service of faith (ad quintum and ad octavum). Classical
culture, therefore, despite its manipulation by heretical movements, is not
something that must be considered as having to be avoided (vitandum);
indeed, only the abuse of philosophical doctrines leads to error (ad sextum).117 Aquinas must also rebut the objection that the development of
theological thought had in some way betrayed the primitive artlessness
(simplicitas) and original fragility (infirmitas) of apostolic preaching,
which rested entirely on the intrinsic potentiality of faith and on the wisdom of the Gospel. With a significant emphasis on the historical development of Christianity, he argues that, since the hegemony of the Christian
faith had by now been established in the world, it was also necessary to
re-subject power and worldly wisdom to the God of revelation (ad
primum).118
116Ibid., quae. 2, art. 3: ut scilicet propter eam [sc. doctrinam philosophorum] veritas
fidei credatur.
117Ibid., quae. 2, art. 3: quantum ad eius veritatem (ad secundum), propter rationem
dictorum (ad octavum), in obsequium fidei (ad quintum), solum in errorem ducit (ad
sextum) (tr. Brennan, modified).
118The fundamental study, also because it uses the earlier work of Mandonnet, Congar,
Chenu and others, is Martin Grabmanns ample analytical and historical work, Die theologische Erkenntnis- und Einleitungslehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin, auf Grund seiner Schrift In
Boethium de Trinitate, in Zusammenhang der Scholastik des 13. und beginnenden 14.
Jahrhunderts dargestellt (Freiburg, Switzerland: Paulus, 1948). In particular see ch. 1 (pp.
132) and ch. 4 (pp. 101186), for the contemporary cultural context and the analysis of
Question II, Article 3. Important are the references to the doctrinal theses against which
Aquinas argues, and the study of the developments given rise to by the discourse on theological method elaborated by Thomas in his Expositio. A direct reading of Chenu, La
Thologie comme science au XIIIe sicle, is still useful.

3.1.7.Thomass Solution to the Antinomy between Philosophy and Theology
and His Transcendence of Jeromes Capture and Augustines Claim
The preceding observations on the above-cited passage of the corpus of
Article 3 and on the related rebuttals to the objections (pro and contra,
which preface the article) must now be delimited and in some way transcended. The goal is to arrive at Thomass specific solution regarding the
relationship between philosophy and theology, to identify the determining and defining element that constitutes his original contribution to the
question whether in the science of faith it is permissible to use the arguments of the philosophers. From what has been said so far, it would be
reductive and misleading to conclude that Thomas remained tied to what
has been called, by way of simplification, the Augustinian line. It is therefore necessary to return to the passage cited from the corpus, as it contains
the essential core of the whole articles argumentation and of Thomass
response to the antinomy between philosophy and theology the central
problem of this section of the Commentary on Boethius.
It has been shown how Aquinass argumentation on this point is located
within the patristic context of Augustines claim or redemption (vindicatio, in De doctrina christiana), on the one hand, and Jeromes capture
(reductio in captivitatem, in his letters), on the other. In other words, both
notions the claiming of an idolatrous ritual patrimony, to be put to the
(culturally alternative) service of the God of Israel, as well as the capture
of the beautiful Moabite are used by Thomas as patristic citations and
normative premises for his solution to the antinomy between secular and
divine wisdom. But the emphasis placed on Augustines proposition leads
Thomas to take a further step, one that only seems to continue the same
line of thought. Actually, there is a qualitative difference in both the formulation and the foundation of his solution to the problem. Both
Augustines proposition and, even more explicitly and pointedly, Jeromes
remained within a sphere that could be characterized as juridical (claim)
and historical (capture). Thomas transcends Augustine and Jerome precisely by crossing that juridical and historical horizon, by founding his
solution to the whole problematic on an ontological plain and by sketching out, on that basis, a new principle for theological study.
The central point of Thomass argument, which constitutes the criterial
basis for transcending the antinomy in question, is formulated thus:
nature is the preamble to grace (natura preambula est ad gratiam).
This guideline, although compressed into an abbreviated formula, is
theThomist principle of theology as the science of faith. The immediate
226
application of this principle determines the criteria and parameters for

theological study in its essential dimensions and in its constitutive aspects,
from the level of gnoseology to that of epistemology and, above all,
methodology.
The specific gnoseological place of philosophy vis--vis theology is
illustrated in the following analogical (but not univocal) relationship: philosophy is to the light of reason as theology is to the light of faith (philosophia : lumen rationis :: sacra doctrina : lumen fidei). This gnoseological
analogy is undergirded by the ontological relationship between nature
and grace (natura : gratia), as a relationship of the objective possibility
(in Thomist terms, of potentia oboedientialis, or obediential potency) of
nature acting as an infinite gateway to saving grace. This is the true meaning of the statement, nature is the preamble to grace.
But this entails, as an immediate consequence, the possibility of epistemological transfer between the two poles of nature and grace. In fact, the
ontological relationship between them implies that they are linked to one
another by certain likenesses, denoted by Thomas as quaedam similitudines. This formulation is indicative of the contrary pair of similarity and
dissimilarity (between nature and grace) that underlies Aquinass whole
theological discourse, especially and almost systematically as it
appears in the Summa theologiae. The phrase quaedam similitudines
expresses both the multiple similarities between the two poles of nature
and grace (through the variable of similitudo) and the permanent, infinite
difference between them (through the constant of the qualifier quoddam
or quodammodo certain which recurs so often throughout the
Summa).
In this sense, Thomass theological argumentation arrives at logical
structures and consequential nexuses first and foremost on the basis of
the principle of analogy: secundum quid idem, simpliciter diversum (the
same in some respects, different in itself). Ultimately this kind of argumentative procedure becomes a defining characteristic, in the intensity
and extent of its use, of Thomass writing. By constantly adhering to the
principle of analogy, Aquinas succeeds in supplying his theological discourse with the aid of classical philosophy while at the same time avoiding the two abuses of philosophy: subjecting the truths of faith to the
yardstick of philosophy, on the one hand, and forcing philosophical argumentation into the space reserved for theology, on the other.
Let us digress a moment and make use of concepts and terms from
the language and operations of mathematical analysis to help us better
configure the dimensions and perspectives of Aquinass solution to the

epistemological problem of the relationship between philosophy and
theology. Let nature and grace be thought of as two functions, expressions corresponding to two geometric curves. We could then think of
secundum quid idem as the limit of convergence, and simpliciter diversum as the divergence to infinity. We could then compare the theological
study of the analogical relationship between nature and grace to the
mathematical analysis of the limit by means of approximation to an
infinitesimal.
Analogy is thus the foundation on which the whole epistemological
principle of the science of faith rests. Nevertheless, on account of the different gnoseological statuses accorded to philosophy and theology as well
as of the specific epistemological connection between the two sciences,
Aquinas is ultimately induced to establish in order to better define his
own response to the question at hand the methodological lines (both
divergent and approximately convergent) of the argumentative procedures proper to philosophy and to theology.
Philosophical argumentation should by its nature exclude error. Still, it
can easily result in error on account of what Aquinas calls abuse and
identifies, from the point of view of deductive logic, as an insufficiency of
reason (ex defectu rationis). Nonetheless and this is said explicitly in the
text of the corpus once philosophical error is discovered to be such from
the point of view of faith and thus in the theological dimension, it can be
corrected and overcome by a further application of philosophical argumentation. By means of a more penetrating analysis, but still remaining
within the realm of rational investigation, philosophical argumentation
can reach the following conclusions about a philosophical proposition
that is contrary to the truths of faith: either its non-truth or, at the least, its
non-necessity (since contrary to what is known through revelation). The
corpus reads:
Therefore also it is possible from the principles of philosophy to refute an
error of this kind [i.e., one that is contrary to faith], either by showing it to be
altogether impossible, or not to be necessary.
Theology, on the other hand, lacks demonstrative argumentation with

regard to its own specific object (the truth of revelation). Nor, as a result of
its epistemological status, does it even possess the logico-deductive tools
for demonstrating the non-truth of philosophical error contrary to the
truth of faith. It can only indicate or identify, by means of indirect argument, the non-necessity of such a philosophical proposition. To return
once again to Thomass text:
228
For just as those things which are of faith cannot be demonstratively proved,
so certain things contrary to them cannot be demonstratively shown to be
false, but they can be shown not to be necessary. (emphasis added)
Thus the distinctions already underlined on the gnoseological and epistemological level are repeated on the methodological level as well. From a
logico-argumentative point of view, the two sciences diverge without a
continuous solution, and thus neither interference nor immediate transfer between them is possible. Such an argumentative procedure as has
already been seen with Aquinass responses to the objections prefacing
the article in question would lead either to a type of philosophical rationalism (the reduction of theology to philosophy) or to its contrary (the
reduction of philosophy to theology): a theological syncretism that, only
when used ideologically, can succeed in establishing immediate implications and univocally apodictic (demonstrative) connections between
qualitatively different levels. But beyond these procedures of reduction,
which in one direction favor theology and in the other philosophy a
most disagreeable mixture of water and wine (ad quintum) Aquinas
sees a deeper, intrinsic relationship between classical philosophy and
Christian theology: a subordinate relationship (in subordinatione), in
which the principle of analogy directs the use of philosophical categories
within the language that is specific and proper to faith. The ontological
foundation for such a logical and cognitive transfer and not only on the
theoretical level, as Augustine noted in De doctrina christiana is
expressed in the formula nature is the preamble to grace. Thomas thus
takes up and expands Augustines proposition for resolving the antinomy
between Christian faith and classical culture, but at the same time he
moves it onto a theoretical plain informed by ontological and theological
principles.119
3.1.8.Thomass Commentary and the Controversy over Philosophy in the
Parisian Faculty in the First Half of the Thirteenth Century
Aquinass reformulation of Augustines proposition in his extremely lucid
Commentary on Boethius (1255/59) actually constituted a position diametrically opposed to the conservative views of his contemporaries, which
prevailed not only in the Parisian theology faculty but also within the
119On Aquinass responses to the obiectiones, which represent various contemporary
and traditional doctrinal positions, cf. Grabmann, Die theologische, esp. 179186. It must be
added, though, that we interpret Thomass text differently from Grabmann.

Dominican Order itself in the first decades of the thirteenth century.
Opposition to and condemnation of Aristotle had ultimately and inevitably resulted in the radicalization of the dichotomy between philosophy and theology, especially in light of the introduction of a conspicuous
part of the Aristotelian corpus (above all the Physics) into various cultural
centers. This went well beyond a simple defensive stance proclaiming the
impossibility of the co-existence of the kingdom of the spirit of Christ
(regnum spiritus Christi) with the lordship of the spirit of Aristotle (dominium spiritus Aristotelis). It had by then been forcefully asserted and
argued, on the basis of epistemological and methodological principles,
that the materialism of Aristotles Physics and De anima were in conflict
with the dictates of faith, that philosophical culture and the special analytical tools of Aristotelianism were incompatible with indeed, could
not co-exist with theological study and the scriptural investigation of
the Divine Word. What is more, strict ideological warnings had been
issued regarding the dangers of the secularization of the sacred study of
theology. Was it not perhaps in these terms that the Dominican Jean de
Saint-Gilles expressed himself, when in 1230 he reprimanded those who
claimed to apply themselves to theology with all the baggage of their
Aristotelianism and of other disciplines unrelated to theological knowledge? Jean, then the titulary of the Dominican Orders chair of theology in
Paris, chastised this error openly, even, and perhaps especially, to those
who ought to have been aware of the special nature of the science of
theology:
There are some people who have learned the spiritual language, i.e., theology, well but nevertheless introduce barbarisms into it, corrupting it with
philosophy. For whoever has learned metaphysics always wants to proceed
metaphysically in sacred Scripture, just as whoever has learned geometry
always speaks of points and lines in theology. Such men dress the king in
dirty and tattered robes; likewise they sprinkle dust into light, thus giving
birth to stinging insects.120
Odo of Chteauroux, chancellor of the church of Paris, speaks in the same

terms:
120Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et lAverroisme latin au XIIIme sicle, 1:33, n.1: Sunt
aliqui qui bene linguam spiritualem didicerunt, id est theologiam, sed tamen in ea barbarizant, eam per philosophiam corrumpentes; qui enim metaphysicam didicit semper vult
in sacra Scriptura metaphysice procedere: similiter qui geometriam didicit semper loquitur de punctis et lineis in theologia. Tales induunt regem vestibus sordidis et laceratis; item
spargunt pulverem in lucem et inde nascuntur cyniphes.
230
It is reprehensible for the theological faculty, which is and is called the city
of the sun of truth and understanding, to strive to speak in the language of
the philosophers. That is, those who study and teach in the theological faculty try to furnish it with authority from the sayings of the philosophers, as if
such had not been handed down by the highest wisdom, which is the font of
all other wisdom . Many almost despise the words of theology and of the
saints but think those of philosophy and of the pagans to be the best, and
they sell themselves to the sons of the Greeks, that is to the philosophers.121
The passages by these two figures (who were mentioned before the examination of Thomass text) have been reproduced here almost in their
entirety, as they are exemplary and indicative of the polemic against philosophy that was waged by Parisian theologians in the first half of the thirteenth century. Above all they are emblematic of the context in which
Aquinas outspokenly proffered his response to such sentiments. For
Thomas, philosophy is the indispensable instrument (organon) for creating a new theoretical foundation for theology. And philosophy, precisely
as secular wisdom and despite the (Pauline) antinomy between it, on the
one hand, and the folly of the Cross and divine wisdom, on the other
remained the noblest and historically the most fully developed cultural
fruit, the most scientifically structured episteme, the most perfect model
of rationality that Christendom could derive or receive from Greek and
Hellenistic antiquity. Furthermore, this philosophy came to be identified
precisely with Aristotelianism, which was taken up and reassessed in
Thomass time as the synthesis of Greek culture and the richest source of
analytical tools for the study of the material world. Nature (natura), having been rediscovered, was now studied and understood by way of the
Aristotelian concept of physis.122
3.1.9.The Prologue to De libero arbitrio and Vallas Renewal of the AntiPhilosophical Tradition
The passages cited above of the two eminent Parisians, polemicizing
against philosophy and for the purity of spiritual language, lead us, on
121Ibid., 1:32, n. 3: Reprehensibile est quod facultas theologiae, quae est et vocatur
civitas solis veritatis et intelligentiae, nititur loqui lingua philosophorum, id est illi qui
in facultate theologiae student et docent conantur ei praebere auctoritatem e dictis philosophorum, ac si non fuerit tradita a summa sapientia, a qua est omnis alia sapientia .
Multi, verba theologica et verba sanctorum quasi nihil habentes, verba philosophica,
verba ethnicorum optima arbitrantur, et seipsos vendunt filiis Graecorum, id est
philosophis.
122Cf. Grabmann, Die theologische, 147149.

the basis of literary similarities and common anti-philosophical elements,
back to the opening pages of Vallas De libero arbitrio. Vallas discourse
coincides with that of the Parisian theologians in defending the autonomy
of theological science and excluding philosophy from the Christian
republic (respublica christiana). For Valla, philosophy is a pagan language (sermo gentilis), which as a foreign tongue (lingua peregrina) pollutes the language of Rome (lingua vernacula Urbis). It is responsible for
the corruption of the ecclesial community. It is fertile ground, a seedbed
(seminarium), for heresy.123
In its immediate context, Vallas text makes a specific reference that
connects it to the whole anti-philosophical tradition and inserts it directly
into the quarrel between Boethius and Peter Damian. Namely, it makes
reference to the introduction of the propositional analysis of Aristotles
On Interpretation into the theological treatment of the relationship
between free will and predestination. This was a classic locus, then on
account of its philosophico-theological content and textual references
(i.e., Boethiuss commentary on and use of ch. 9 of On Interpretation) for
Valla to use to introduce his basic theme: the polemic against philosophy,
and the alternative proposal of rhetoric as a humanist guideline for
theology.
This becomes clear from an attentive reading of the argumentative
development of De libero arbitrio, and especially from an analysis of the
solutions proposed by the dialogue in its attempt to respond to the problematic of divine predestination and human freedom. Here it suffices to
point out that the reference (in the opening pages of De libero arbitrio) to
philosophical doctrines takes on a specific meaning in the dialogue, in
that Vallas critique of philosophy is given a theological valence in order to
resolve the antinomy between redemptive predestination and free will.124
In this particular case, the incompossibility between philosophy and theology is highlighted and made explicit in the contrast between the logical
and ontological analysis of future contingents on the one hand (contained
in ch. 9 of On Interpretation and developed variously by modern scholastic theologians from Boethius to Petrus Aureolus) and the scriptural
dogma of redemptive predestination on the other.125
123Valla, De libero arbitrio, 524526.
124Ibid., 524: philosophicorum dogmatum.
125Philotheus Boehner, The Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientiae Dei et de
futuris contingentibus of William Ockham (New York: Franciscan Institute, 1945). But for
an overview see also E.J. Ashworth, Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974).
232
If the theoretical nucleus of De libero arbitrio consists essentially in

what has been said here, then it follows that Vallas dialogue has an original and unique place in the history of theology. It represents a turning
point between the crisis of the relationship between Aristotelianism and
Christian dogma (which had already emerged, with Ockham and
Ockhamism, within scholastic theology itself) and the renewal, at the
beginning of the sixteenth century and especially with the Reformation, of
the question of the insoluble antinomy between freedom and predestination (then taken up on exegetico-scriptural grounds). That such is the
meaning and the theoretical valence of Vallas dialogue (with regard to the
relationship between humanism and theology in the fifteenth century)
will have to be demonstrated at greater length and with fuller documentation elsewhere; here such an analysis would amount to an undue and
excessive digression. Nevertheless we would like to conclude these considerations by mentioning the silence which the humanist theologian
imposes like an inviolable boundary on the investigator of the mystery
of redemption, lest the latter feel the need to choose between divine predestination and human freedom. In a context full of classical and scriptural (Pauline) references, Valla exhorts:
Let us therefore shun greedy knowledge of high things, condescending
rather to those of low estate. For nothing is of greater avail for Christian men
than to feel humble . I will no longer be anxious about this question lest by
investigating the majesty of God I might be blinded by His light.126
But Vallas exhortation for a theological understanding of the mystery of

salvation (in the language of Paul) as an unfathomable limit was this
not after all a commonplace in the scholastic tradition? And did Thomas
himself not perhaps dedicate the whole of Question II of his Commentary
on Boethius to the manifestation (manifestatio) of the secrets of faith
(secreta fidei) precisely in the hope of establishing the limits and the
potentialities of theological understanding and knowledge (from the
gnoseological plane to the linguistic one) with respect to this mystery?
The answer to this double question is that the problem is undoubtedly the
same in Aquinas and in Valla. But this does not change the fact that their
respective solutions to the problem distinctly highlight the difference
126Valla, De libero arbitrio, 562: Fugiamus igitur cupiditatem alta sapiendi, humilibus
potius consentientes; christiani namque hominis nihil magis interest quam sentire humiliter; de ista quaestione, quod ad me attinet, amplius curiosus non ero, ne maiestatem
Dei vestigans, obscurer a lumine (tr. Trinkaus).

between them. Here we see the profound cultural divide between the
Middle Ages and the Renaissance, as well as a characteristic expression of
how the circumstances have changed and not only with respect to the
exigencies of the Christian faith.
In Article 1 of Thomass Question, the objector maintains the position
that it is not permissible to investigate divine things by the arguments of
reason127 by citing the well-known text of Dionysius (the end of De coelesti
hierarchia, PG 3, 340B), where a final limit to theological discourse is
imposed in the form of absolute silence before the arcanum of the mystery, the unutterable secret of God. Aquinass response (ad sextum)
with a distinction (distinguo) that is actually made in stark opposition to
the absolute mysticism of Dionysian silence is equally clear insofar as
it coheres perfectly with the overall theological epistemology of the
Commentary:
God is honored by silence, but not in such a way that we may say nothing
of Him or make no inquiries about Him, but, inasmuch as we understand
that we lack the ability to comprehend Him.128
Here, however, let us note immediately that whatever seems common to

both Thomass statement and Vallas exhortation is merely apparent.
Their respective positions are actually undergirded by wholly divergent
argumentative methodologies regarding the secrets of faith, methodologies that derive from, or better are based on, vastly different epistemological guidelines for the study of theology. Thomass position presupposes
the use of philosophy (its ethical, metaphysical, psychological, and other
categories Aristotelian or Neoplatonic unfailingly articulated and
indeed constrained and delimited by the analogical constants of quoddams and quodammodos). Vallas position, on the other hand, depends on
the models and procedures of (Quintilians) rhetoric. This is what Valla
defends and argues most explicitly in the preface to the fourth book of the
Elegantiae, which will be the focus of analysis in the fourth part of this
essay.129
127Aquinas, Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate, quae. 2, art. 1: divina investigare
non licet argumentando (tr. Brennan).
128Ibid., quae. 2, art. 1, ad sextum: Deus honoratur silentio, non quod nihil de ipso
dicatur vel inquiratur, sed quia quidquid de ipso dicamus vel inquiramus, intelligimus nos
ab eius comprehensione deficisse (tr. Brennan).
129On the theme of Dionysian mystic silence, see Salvatore I. Camporeale, Amore e
conoscenza nellesperienza mistica secondo lAquinate (Viterbo: Agnesotti, 1961), originally
published in Sapienza 12 (1959): 237271 and 13 (1960): 360381.
234
3.2.Dialectic/Rhetoric
If only Boethius had preferred to devote the effort he expended
in writing dialectical texts to reading Quintilian! He would thus
not have made mistakes in rhetorical matters, and he would
have become a weightier and more religious philosopher.
L. Valla, De vero falsoque bono, III. 12.1518 (var. )130
With De libero arbitrio (1438), Valla definitively completed his anti-philosophical critique of Boethiuss Consolation of Philosophy. This critique was
begun in De voluptate (the alpha redaction of 1431), was developed gradually and elaborated into several individual themes, and was finally concentrated, the whole being nearly recapitulated in the classic problematic
of freedom vs. predestination, in the writing and immediate diffusion of
De libero arbitrio. To be sure, Valla would continue working on this topic,
slowly moving beyond the negative phase and towards the positive elaboration of a new guideline for theology alternative to that of Boethius. At any
rate, by 1438 he had definitively completed his critique of philosophy and
had made his consequent demand for an alternative theology, therewith
signaling a break with the philosophical and theological culture of scholasticism from Boethius to Thomas to the neo-Thomists of his own time. It is
on the basis of these radical positions that Valla made his name among his
contemporaries. He enjoyed the support of many humanists, who often
tenaciously agreed with his new propositions. Nevertheless he was attacked
and denounced as a heretic in the Invectivae (Invectives) of Poggio
Bracciolini, an accusation leveled at him earlier in his inquisitorial trial in
Naples in 1444 (and even by scholastics outside the Aragonese realm).
3.2.1.Chapter 12, Book III ofDe vero falsoque bono: Text and Context
Following in the scriptural footsteps of Paul (Col. 2:8), as he repeatedly
states throughout his oeuvre (from the Epistola apologetica [Letter of
Defense] to De professione religiosorum [On the Profession of the Religious]
all the way to the Encomium), Valla dedicated his De voluptate and De
libero arbitrio to a kind of damnatio philosophiae. On the one hand he condemns classical philosophy in almost courtroom fashion, definitively
130Valla, De vero fasloque bono, 202 (Apparatus I to p. 113.1518): Boethius qui utinam
operam quam scribendis dialecticis libris impendit, Quintiliano legendo maluisset impendere! Nam nec ita in rhetoricis errasset, et gravior et religiosior philosophus evasisset.

judging it a poisoner and murderer (venefica et homicida). On the other
hand, with the praise of Quintilian (laus Quintiliani) which he began
declaiming in the first redaction of the Disputationes (1438/39), he turns
his critique of philosophy into an exaltation of rhetoric.131 Indeed, it is
possible to pinpoint the shift from the condemnation of philosophy to the
exaltation of rhetoric in a highly significant passage of De vero falsoque
bono. Precious testimony of Vallas thought, it is also a fundamental text if
considered with a view to its variants (from one redaction to the next) and
its references to Vallas other writings and scholarly endeavors.
The passage in question is a long section from chapter 12, book III of De
vero falsoque bono:
Thus blessedness and virtue are called good, nevertheless the good are ultimately those who are graced with virtue, not with blessedness and happiness; here Boethius, who had a greater fondness for dialecticians than for
rhetoricians, was deceived. But how much more suitable would it have been
to speak rhetorically than dialectically! For what is more foolish than the
manner of the philosophers, in which the whole case is jeopardized if an
error is made with one word? But the orator uses many and various arguments: he adduces contraries, brings forth examples, makes comparisons, and
forces even hidden truth to reveal itself. How wretched and poor is the military commander who places the whole outcome of a war in the life of one
soldier! One must fight with all available resources, and if one soldier falls or
if a platoon is destroyed, then now this one, now that one should immediately be called in. This is how Boethius should have acted, who like so many
others was ensnared by an excessive love for dialectic. But how much error was
in dialectic, and that no one has written circumspectly about it, and that it is a
part of rhetoric, our Lorenzo here, in my opinion, has begun to write most truly.
But to return to our subject, hear how much better and how much more
briefly I, relying on the authority of faith, would respond than the philosophy of Boethius. I will fear neither to dismiss nor to condemn philosophy,
since Paul accuses her and Jerome and certain others call philosophers heresiarchs. So begone! Begone, philosophy! May she, as though a common
whore, remove her foot from the sacrosanct temple! May she cease singing
or chattering sweetly until the point of ruin like a siren! Suffering from foul
illnesses and multiple wounds herself, may she leave it to another doctor to
heal and cleanse the sick! Which doctor? Me. How exactly? Like this: Why
are you crying? Why are you groaning, sufferer? Why do you accuse God? If
you hope for eternal goods, why do you desire earthly ones? But if you prefer
these earthly goods (although it is sinful), why dont you pray to God rather
than accusing him, he who says that he does not love lovers of earthly
things? Thus although you deserve his punishment, you deserter, do you
131Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 36.
236
also damn him for not furnishing you with a reward? And will you dictate to
him which favors he should especially grant you, as if you were wiser or
greater than he? And although he, knowing what is to your advantage, has
done you a favor, will you reject it and most ungratefully call his kindness an
injury? This is the rebuke with which those who complained about fortune
and God ought to have been scourged. But boastful philosophy was never
able to do this, because it did not love and worship God, despite knowing
him or having the capacity to know him. It preferred instead to fornicate
with the lovers of the earth.132
The long passage cited here is an important part of a section of De vero

falsoque bono that received some of the most extensive revision (namely
chapter 12 of book III). Indeed, we seem to find concentrated here the
methodological core of Vallas critique of Boethian philosophy. From an
epistemological point of view, this critique is the objective underlying the
entire dialogue, and it takes on clear significance within a specifically
theological perspective, especially in book III (the long speech entrusted
to the Franciscan Antonio da Rho). Valla shows Boethiuss argumentative
procedure to be erroneous by demonstrating that the apodosis does not
132Valla, De vero falsoque bono, 113.438: Ita cum bonum beatitudo dicatur et virtus
boni tamen ii demum sunt qui virtute affecti sunt non qui felicitate et beatitudine, in quo
Boethius dialecticorum quam rhetoricorum amantior deceptus est. At quanto satius erat
oratorie quam dialectice loqui! Quid enim ineptius philosophorum more ut si uno verbo sit
erratum tota causa periclitetur? At orator multis et variis rationibus utitur, affert contraria,
exempla repetit, similitudines comparat et cogit etiam latitantem prodire veritatem. Quam
miser ac pauper imperator est qui omnem fortunam belli in anima unius militis ponit!
Universitate pugnandum est et si quis miles concidit aut si qua turma profligata est, alia
subinde atque alia sufficienda. Hoc modo agendum Boethio erat, qui ut plurimi alii nimio
amore dialectice deceptus est. At quantus in ea error fuerit et quod nemo de illa sobrie scripserit et eadem rhetorice pars sit hic noster Laurentius scribere instituit meo iudicio verissime.
Sed ut ad rem redeam, audite quanto melius quantoque brevius ipse quam boethiana philosophia respondeam nixus fidei auctoritate. Non verebor philosophiam aut contemnere
aut damnare, cum Paulus eam arguat et Hieronymus cum quibusdam aliis philosophos
heresiarchas appellent. Valeat igitur, valeat philosophia et a sacrosancta ede velut scenica
meretricula pedem effereat et sirena usque in exitium dulcis cantare seu garrire desinat et
morbis ipsa fedis ac plurimis affecta vulneribus egros alii curandos sanandosque medico
relinquat! Cui medico? Mihi. Quonam modo? Certe ita: Quid fles? Quid gemis eger? Quid
Deum incusas? Si expectas bona eterna, quid terrena desideras? Sin hec terrena malles,
licet prave, quin Deum potius deprecaris quam incusas, qui se dicit amatores non amare
terrenos? Itane cum a domino supplicium meritus sis, fugitive, etiam illi quod te non afficit
premio maledicis? Etiam illi prescribes que in te beneficia potissimum conferat, tanquam
tu sis illo aut sapientior aut maior? Etiam cum tibi beneficium prestiterit, sciens quid tibi
sit conducibile, non agnosces, sed benignitatem ingratissime iniuriam appellabis? Hac
omnes qui de fortuna ac Deo querebantur erant increpatione verberandi; quod nunquam
philosophia vaniloqua facere potuit quia Deum non dilexit ac coluit, cum vel cognosceret
illum vel posset cognoscere, malens fornicari cum amatoribus terre (emphasis added; the
translation of Hieatt and Lorch in Valla, On Pleasure has been consulted).

follow, as there is a rupture between the unicity of the deductions formal
correctness and the natural polysemy of language (ambiguitas verbi). This
rupture can be mended if and only if the argumentative procedure conjoins within itself formal dialectical correctness with a rhetorical analysis
of language. This indissoluble nexus between procedure and analysis in
argumentative discourse would be one of the central themes of the
Dialecticae disputationes; there Valla fully treats the relationship between
logical formalization and the semantic analysis of language, from colloquial and discursive language to the scientific and apodictic.133
The immediate consequence of Vallas critique of Boethian philosophy is for dialectic to be reduced to an integral part of rhetoric. Thus on
the one hand Valla places the logical formalization of argumentation
within the rhetorical analysis (methodological and historical) of language.
On the other he takes up the rhetoric of Quintilians Institutio oratoria as
an epistemological guideline. The second consequence, specific to the
context, is that explicit emphasis is placed on the insoluble antinomy,
theinsurmountable antithesis, between Boethian philosophy and moral
theology. Hence the decisive methodological decision: the theological
argument on Christian virtue (virtus) and blessedness, or happiness
(beatitudo) pronounced in book III by Antonio da Rho as the solution to
the ethico-theological problem of pleasure (voluptas) posed by the dialogue is conducted by Valla on the epistemological foundation of
Quintilians rhetoric.
It can therefore be concluded that chapter 12 of book III, since it
expresses the methodological premise of the entire work, provides the
principle for interpreting De vero falsoque bono and for understanding its
meaning and contents. This applies both to its scrutiny of the grand ethical systems of Greco-Hellenistic antiquity (Stoicism, Epicureanism, and
Aristotelianism) and to its explicit recourse to the foundational characteristics of early Christian praxis in the service of creating an alternative to
the Boethian, scholastic basis of theology.
The preceding observations on chapter 12, book III of De vero bono
must now be circumscribed and brought into greater relief by focusing on
one of the most significant variants that entered the above-cited passage
in the process of revision from the dialogues second to its third version. It
will first be necessary, however, to prefix an excursus collecting a series of
(in our opinion) essential observations on the chronology of Vallas famous
133Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 146192; Gerl, Rhetorik als
Philosophie, 191231.
238
work that indicate the stages of its transformation from one revision to the
next. Unfortunately, this issue is extremely complicated and has not, as far
as we are concerned, been definitively resolved by Lorchs critical edition
of 1970 and this despite her insightful introduction to the text. It will
therefore be necessary to pass over issues marginal to the chronological
sequence of the dialogues various drafts and revisions and to reduce
Lorchs complex solution, for use as a working hypothesis, to a rather simplified outline.
3.2.2.The Editorial Evolution of the alpha, beta, and gamma Versions of
De vero falsoque bono and De Panizza Lorchs Edition: Chronological
Correlations between the gamma Redaction and the First Version of the
Dialecticae disputationes, and the Impact of Vallas Inquisitorial Trial
(1444) on His Work
Lorch established the following stages in the editorial evolution of Vallas
dialogue. There are ultimately four versions of De vero falsoque bono, with
variant titles and continual expansion of the text: de voluptate (on pleasure), de vero bono (on the true good), de vero falsoque bono (on the true
and false good). The first two are: the alpha redaction of 1431 (often called
the Rome-Piacenza version, referring to Vallas geographical location at
the time of writing) and the beta redaction of 1433 (a revision of alpha,
finished during Vallas incomplete two-year teaching stint at Pavia, edited
at Milan, and known as the Pavia-Milan version). Vallas work undergoes
a clean temporal and qualitative break in its third redaction, gamma.
A profound and complex revision of beta, it is to be placed in the period of
Vallas residence at the court of Alfonso the Magnanimous, from 1435 to
1448. More precisely, Lorch hypothesizes that the gamma revision belongs
to ca. 1444 or, at the latest, 1449. Finally, the fourth and last version of the
work is delta. This is the definitive redaction, consisting in a further revision of the gamma text that is purely formal and stylistic. From what Lorch
writes, and according to the dating established for gamma (1444 or 1449),
it seems possible to infer that Valla completed the delta redaction in the
final years of his Neapolitan period, ca. 14471448, or at a time (immediately?) succeeding his move to Rome (the end of 1448), where he joined
the curia of the newly elected Nicholas V. Valla would serve the papal
court until his death in 1457, first under Nicholas V and then Callixtus III.
Since the revision of gamma to delta was, as has been said, mostly stylistic
and did not affect the central contents, Lorch combines both versions of
Vallas dialogue into one single redaction, thus taking the Neapolitan (or

Roman) gamma-delta phase as constitutive of a final and definitive text
on which to base a critical edition of De vero falsoque bono. In Lorchs own
words:
The text of the present edition is the text of the last version of the dialogue
delta. However, since the version delta is a slight revision of gamma and
since it is represented by one manuscript only, V [BAV, Ott. lat. 2075], and
this manuscript has numerous errors and omissions, we have proceeded to
correct the errors and fill the omissions with the help of the manuscript P
[Paris, Bibl. Nat., Lat. 6471], authoritative representative of the third version
of the dialogue gamma. Stylistic variants between gamma and delta are,
generally speaking, insignificant.134
This is a summary of the chronological succession of the various redactions of Vallas dialogue as amply reconstructed by Lorch in her critical
edition. It must nevertheless be noted that, although the broad outline is
valid, the chronological relationship between the Neapolitan revision
of De vero falsoque bono and Vallas overall literary production during
his years at the Aragonese court (143548) remains unclear. This problem must be confronted when trying to achieve precision with regard
to the various phases of revision of De vero falsoque bono, both from
achronological point of view and for understanding the dialogues contents in the context of Vallas broader humanistic and theological work.
In particular and at issue here is the passage cited above from chapter 12,
book III of the dialogue Lorch seems to fall into contradiction concerning the chronological nexus between the dating of the gamma revision of
De vero falsoque bono and the composition (first version) of the Dialecticae
disputationes. She retains 1438/39 as the date of the Dialecticae disputationes (first version), which is generally accepted and which, we believe,
ought to be considered approximately correct. Then, she maintains that
the gamma revision of De vero falsoque bono was completed by 1444 or
by 1449 at the latest. Finally, and despite what has been said so far, she
explicitly states that the gamma version of the dialogue was composed by
Valla while he was working at the Dialectica.135
This last statement is based on what is said in the long passage cited
above from chapter 12, book III of the dialogue, where the interlocutor
Antonio da Rho emphatically refers to Vallas Dialecticae disputationes.
Indeed, the reference is explicit and leaves no room for doubt:
134In Valla, De vero falsoque bono, lxxv.

135For the three issues of dating traced here, see ibid., lxx, li, and xlix, respectively.
240
This is how Boethius should have acted, who like so many others was
ensnared by an excessive love for dialectic. But how much error was in dialectic, and that no one has written circumspectly about it, and that it is a part of
rhetoric, our Lorenzo here, in my opinion, has begun to write most truly.
(emphasis added)
A basic reading of this passage and the context in which it occurs would
certainly suggest that the gamma redaction of De vero falsoque bono was
composed at the same time as (the first version of) the Dialecticae disputationes the very conclusion reached by Lorch.
Nevertheless, the force and the significance of the mention made of the
Disputationes in the dialogue transcend that of a simple chronological reference. Indeed, only by considering the larger theoretical import of the
statement made by Antonio da Rho (the main speaker in book III) can its
meaning be understood for the interpretation of the text. Thus while
accepting Lorchs sketch of the evolution of Vallas dialogue as the most
likely hypothesis, we would be inclined to move the chronological confines of the gamma redaction to the period (immediately) following 1444.
The general reasons and the particular textual analysis that induce us to
correct, or better, to refine the editorial phase of the gamma (and then the
delta) version can be encapsulated in the following points.
First, it seems necessary to repeat here something we have had occasion to note elsewhere: 1444 the year of the inquisitorial trial held in
Naples against Valla must not be considered solely as one biographical
fact or incident, important as it may be, among the various affairs and
complex situations that dot the humanists life. Instead it marks a turn, or
at the least it was a decisive moment, in Vallas cultural development,
which was starkly characterized by tenacious dissent and by a radical criticism of both the scholastic tradition and of contemporary Ciceronianism.
The inquisitorial trial had defining repercussions for and notable impacts
on Vallas successive literary production. It gives us the opportunity to
mark a biographico-cultural caesura in his residence at Alfonso of Aragons
court: between an early period (from 1435 to 1444) and a late one (comprising the final years of service to Alfonso, until Vallas return to Rome in
1448/49 and his definitive transfer to Nicholas Vs curia). This distinction
between the two periods, split by the year of the inquisitorial trial, is made
with a view to the following two objectives: on the one hand, to understand more adequately, even if only approximately, the fluctuations that
occurred in Vallas personal position in the Neapolitan chancery between
the years before 1444 and the period following the trial; on the other hand,
to establish a basis for grasping more precisely the developments and

relative meanings of Vallas work and writings between an early phase of
original composition (from 1435 to 1444) and a later one (from 1444 on) in
which he revised and reworked his major writings. This later, more reflective phase is both longer and more profound, above all on account of the
greater and more direct access Valla had to ancient and modern sources in
his final decade at the papal curia in Rome.
Now, it emerges clearly from the list of writings composed during the
early Neapolitan period (14351444) that those years constitute the most
intense decade of Vallas literary production, not only in a quantitative
sense but also, and above all, in that they witnessed the full and systematic
literary formulation of his early intuition of Quintilians importance (the
discovery of the Institutio oratoria, which led to the Comparatio Ciceronis
Quintilianique in 1428). In fact, Vallas radical Quintilianism (i.e., his conception of rhetoric as a critical theory of language and an epistemological
guideline for scholarship) takes on systematic form beyond that of the
minor dialogues De libero arbitrio and De professione religiosorum particularly in the major writings of a prevailingly (although not exclusively)
methodological character, especially the Dialecticae disputationes
(1438/39), the Declamatio on the Donation of Constantine (1440), the
Collatio Novi Testamenti (Collation of the New Testament) (1443), and the
Elegantiae (ca. 14411448), Vallas longest and one of his most laborious
works. This list is not complete, but it certainly demonstrates the fact that
between 1435 and 1444 Valla deployed the full range of complex philological and categorical tools derived from Quintilians Institutio and in all
different kinds of scholarship, including linguistic, philosophical, biblical,
theological, juridical, and ecclesiological. Informed by this analytical
principle and situated within this perspective, the first redactions of
the Disputationes, the Elegantiae, and the New-Testament Adnotationes
emerge as systematic compositions with all the pregnancy, only recently
apprehended but fully conscious, of the rediscovery of new horizons and
unexpected potentialities. From the trial of 1444 to his death in 1457, Valla
would continually revise and amplify the initial versions of these writings,
supplementing them with greater evidence and heightened precision.
Even now we lack comprehensive, i.e. analytical and comparative, studies of the contents of these various versions, of the theoretical and chronological differences that arose among them due to textual changes and the
influence of historico-cultural factors. Thus it is impossible at this point to
trace a complete and sufficiently detailed outline of the editorial revisions
that began with the late Neapolitan period and ended with the Roman
years at Nicholas Vs curia. And yet the significance of the textual changes
242
and the critical aims represented by those editorial revisions has already
proved revealing and incisive in the one particular case where successive
versions have been studied, namely with the Dialecticae disputationes.
Indeed, the comparison of the first redaction of the Disputationes (1438/39)
with the second and the third, to be placed respectively at the close of the
late Neapolitan period and the final years of the Roman decade, has led to
two conclusions of great importance for understanding the historico-cultural place of Vallas humanism.
The first conclusion concerns the significance of the inquisitorial trial
of 1444 and the dimensions that it eventually took on. It was not only a
specific reaction on the part of current scholasticism to Vallas theses,
namely his critique of logical and metaphysical Aristotelianism, and his
patristic renewal of rhetorical theology by means of a systematic deployment of philology and Quintilians categorical schematics. Actually, the
trial (to which Valla reacted with his Apologia ad papam Eugenium IV
[Apology to Pope Eugenius IV] of 1445) turned out to be the reactionary
counterpart of a simultaneous conservative counter-critique, more complex and thus more significant, hailing from humanist circles with
Ciceronian leanings. This other, humanist trial was geographically much
more diffuse and ideologically much more profound. Also begun within
the Aragonese chancery itself, by Bartolomeo Facio and Panormita, it was
prosecuted to the full as a veritable Kulturkampf by Poggio Bracciolini in
his Invectivae against Valla (14521454) and in related letters. Poggio had
fully understood from the very beginning the nature of the shift that Valla
and his followers were effecting within humanist culture. In his Invectivae,
he took up and sharpened nearly all of the essential elements of the
polemic against Valla that had already converged in Facios writings in
Naples and that had thenceforth ricocheted in humanist circles throughout central and northern Italy. Valla was gradually induced, indeed constrained, to undertake and devote increasing energy to a systematic
self-defense (going well beyond the appeal to Eugenius IV). This he produced in his Invectivae in Facium (Invectives against Facio) of 1447 and his
Antidota in Pogium of 1452/53. Here we might observe, with reference to
the general theme of this essay, that in the Encomium of 1457 Valla would
ultimately take what had initially been two lines of defense against his
accusers, gradually developed and elaborated in the Apologia to Eugenius
(against the scholastic tradition) and the Antidota in Pogium (in opposition to the old school of early humanism), and fuse them into a single
proposition for theological renewal (renovatio).

The other conclusion evinced from a comparative and contextual analysis of the editorial stages of the Dialecticae disputationes brings us to a
precise understanding of the works purpose. A comprehensive epistemological criticism of scholastic dialectic and philosophy, the Disputationes
is the fullest and most systematic attempt to refound the arts and sciences
in rhetoric. On the one hand, it proceeds organically to a philological and
gnoseological analysis of the linguistic and conceptual foundations of
scholastic metaphysics and logic (a critical examination of the predicaments and the predicables, of propositional and syllogistic structures). On
the other hand, it effects a radical reduction of all language-based issues in
philosophy and theology to the epistemological guideline of Quintilians
rhetoric. The Disputationes would ultimately act in three ways: as a synthesis of all of Vallas work to date (from the methodological plane in general to that of individual problems at various levels); as a mature literary
formulation of principles and models for use in ulterior investigation in
the most diverse areas (in syntactics and semantics, for example, with the
Elegantiae, or in biblical exegesis, as in the Collatio/Adnotationes); and
finally as a theoretical innovation that necessitated the review and revision of youthful writings (the case of De vero falsoque bono). Once again,
the most telling evidence that such was the import of the Disputationes
theoretical and functional premise is found in Vallas trial itself, at which
the inquisitorial reaction of contemporary scholasticism converged with
criticism from the distant camp of contemporary Ciceronian humanism.
What is more, this concentration of opposition to Valla helps to locate
more precisely the time frame in which the theoretical proposition encapsulated in the Disputationes emerged. It seems clear both from the reasons behind the inquisitorial condemnation of 1444 and from the polemics
of Facio and Bracciolini that the origin of the opposition to Vallas critique coincided in time and substance with the diffusion of the
Disputationes, i.e. in 1439/40. We therefore believe it possible to conclude
(although further and more precise documentation must still be adduced)
that the first version (1438/39) of the Disputationes actually constitutes a
turn in the trajectory of scholastic and humanist culture in early fifteenthcentury Italy. Furthermore, within Vallas oeuvre, this same first version
acts almost as a dividing line between the work he did before the early
Neapolitan period and that following the inquisitorial trial of 1444.
The preceding considerations on the context of the chronological and
biographical nexuses of the period spanning 14351444, as well as on
the significance of this decades theoretical innovations and literary
244
output, enable a more precise evaluation of Vallas cultural activity in his

early Neapolitan phase. In particular, we can now better approach the
question whether as Lorch believes the gamma revision of De vero
falsoque bono (third redaction) was composed at the same time as the
Dialecticae disputationes (first version). This is the problem to which this
excursus has been devoted, in the hope that its solution will aid in properly interpreting the long passage cited from chapter 12, book III of De vero
falsoque bono.
To circumscribe with greater precision the realm of possible solutions,
it should be noted straightaway that there is no reason not to believe that
the gamma revision of the dialogue was begun even before the inquisitorial trial (April, 1444), and thus that it coincided with the definitive draft
(of the first version) of the Disputationes. This would resolve some of the
inconsistency in the ambiguous contemporaneity that Lorch posits
between the two writings. For on the one hand she retains as certain (and
justly so) the date of 1438/39 for the (finished) draft of the Disputationes,
and on the other she argues for 1444 or at the latest 1449 as the date for
the gamma redaction of the dialogue. Still, in order to resolve this inconsistency fully, a new view must be proposed of the chronological succession of Vallas two works and of the relationship between them. We do so
in the following terms.
Conceding that the gamma redaction of the dialogue was begun before
1444 (as in fact seems quite likely), in terms of strict chronology and in the
sense of a completed and polished revision of all its parts, this version of
the work must nevertheless be placed after the trial, in the late Neapolitan
period, from 1445/46 to 1448. These are the years in which the insurgent
humanist criticisms and the inquisitorial judgment of April, 1444 had
profound repercussions for Vallas cultural activity and heavily impacted
his literary production. But a more important and decisive fact must be
highlighted, one that closes and, we believe, resolves the matter at hand.
Beyond the editorial evolution of De vero falsoque bono and the Dispu
tationes and the chronological interrelations between the two writings,
the most important and essential element for adequately understanding
the timeline and the development of Vallas work consists in the profound
impact that the Disputationes would have on the gamma revision of De
vero falsoque bono itself. The precise timing and the extent of the textual
interrelations between the gamma revision of the dialogue and the composition of the Disputationes will have to be the subject of a future study.
For now, the essential point is to place the Disputationes (of 1438/39) at the
(theoretical and editorial) origins of Vallas entire production from the

1440s onward, and especially of the gamma revision of De vero falsoque
bono.136
3.2.3.The beta-gamma Variant in Chapter 12, Book III of De vero falsoque
bono, the Quintilianism of the Dialecticae disputationes, and the Critique
of Boethius: Speaking Dialectically vs. Speaking Rhetorically
Having completed our excursus through the complicated interweaving of
positive and negative influences in the broadening of scope, the drafts and
revisions, and the critical reactions and condemnations that make up the
context in which the Dialecticae disputationes and the gamma version of
De vero falsoque bono were composed, we can now return to the interpretation of the long passage cited above, from chapter 12, book III of Vallas
dialogue. The reference it contains to the writing of the Disputationes
(that [dialectic] is a part of rhetoric, our Lorenzo here has begun to
write) now takes on broader and undoubtedly more significant dimensions. Actually, this passage is an editorial variant of gamma differing from
the preceding beta redaction of the dialogue, and it provides us with a
retrospective look at the distance separating the gamma version, posterior to the trial of 1444, from the beta (Pavia) version of 1433 a shift in
time and context whose discontinuity is strongly marked by the
Disputationes of 1438/39. Let us now compare the texts in order to reevaluate the editorial variant in question:
De vero falsoque bono
ch. 12, bk. III
gamma
beta
This is how Boethius should have

acted, who like so many others was
ensnared by an excessive love for
dialectic. But how much error was in
dialectic, and that no one has written
circumspectly about it, and that it
is a part of rhetoric, our Lorenzo
here, in my opinion, has begun to
This is how Boethius should have

acted. If only he had preferred to
devote the effort he expended in
writing dialectical texts to reading
Quintilian! He would thus not
have made mistakes in rhetorical
matters, and he would have become
a weightier and more religious
136This is the thesis that underlies the whole of ch. 1 of Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla.
Umanesimo e teologia, esp. 3387, and is treated explicitly in other parts of the same work.
But see also Di Napoli, Lorenzo Valla, 5799.
246
write most truly. But to return to our philosopher. But to return to our
subject .137
subject .138
Let us first consider the initial part of chapter 12, book III of the dialogue,
which directly precedes the long passage (including the editorial variant
in question) cited above. In this way we will be able to reconstruct in full
the extensive critique of Boethius that Valla elaborates in this important
chapter, clarifying its rationale and identifying the alternative solutions
proposed in its final sentences.
According to Valla, Boethius argued in book IV of The Consolation of
Philosophy that good men always possess the true good (verum bonum)
while evil ones lack it utterly, thus identifying the true good with upright
behavior and the integrity of moral virtue (honestas). Now, to say what I
think of him, Valla continues in the guise of Antonio da Rho,
begging the pardon of a man so learned in every area of study, he called in
philosophy as his patroness and bestowed upon her almost greater honor
than on our religion, and thus he did not resolve the question, nor did he
demonstrate what the true good is.139
Thereupon follow Vallas counter-arguments to Boethiuss thesis: virtue

is not actually the highest good, nor are the evil always wretched or the
good always happy.140 On the contrary, the good often find themselves
surrounded by misery while the evil enjoy well-being and happiness: the
evil are not necessarily wretched in this life, but in the next; and the just
are not blessed in the present time, but they will be in the future.141 Then
Boethiuss error is revealed, namely a linguistic ambiguity hidden in the
parasyllogistic reasoning of his dialectic:
137Valla, De vero falsoque bono, 113.1518: Hoc modo agendum Boethio erat, qui ut plurimi alii nimio amore dialectice deceptus est. At quantus in ea error fuerit et quod nemo de illa
sobrie scripserit et eadem rhetorice pars sit hic noster Laurentius scribere instituit meo iudicio
verissime. Sed ut ad rem redeam (emphasis added).
138Ibid., 202, App. I to p. 113: Hoc modo agendum Boethio erat, qui utinam operam
quam scribendis dialecticis libris impendit, Quintiliano legendo maluisset impendere! Nam
nec ita in rhetoricis errasset et gravior et religiosior philosophus evasisset. Sed ut ad rem
redeam (emphasis added).
139Ibid., 112.69: De quo ut dicam quod sentio, pace viri in omni doctrina peritissimi,
quia patronam philosophiam advocavit et ei propemodum maiorem honorem quam nostre religioni tribuit, illi cause non satisfecit nec quid sit verum bonum probavit.
140Ibid., 112.910: Non enim virtus est summum bonum, nec malos semper miseros nec
bonos semper felices.
141Ibid., 112.1214: Iniqui nanque non in hac utique vita miseri sunt sed in futura, et
iusti non nunc beati sed postea erunt.

who would believe that so careful and sharp, not to say elegant, a man fell
into this kind of error out of ignorance of one word, and such an easy one at
that? For good (bonum) is said both of virtue and of happiness, just as evil
(malum) is said of their opposites. But virtue and vice are actions (actiones),
whereas happiness and unhappiness are qualities (qualitates) things very
different from one another in the effect that they produce.142
Boethiuss reasoning is thus reducible to the following form:

Whoever is good has the good,
the good is blessedness
therefore every good man is blessed.143
But this reasoning, Valla observes, can be easily refuted. In the syllogisms
major premise, what is meant by the good (bonum)? Does it mean the
good of happiness (bonum felicitatis)? Then the statement must be denied,
for no one is called good because he is happy but because he is virtuous
(virtute praeditus). Does it mean the good of virtue (bonum virtutis)? Then
the reasoning remains completely valid, but it will be necessary to reformulate the argument in the following way:
Whoever is good has the good,
the good is virtue,
therefore every good man is virtuous.144
Valla notes that where Boethius errs, Cicero did not, namely in the
Tusculan Disputations (I 5,9), where he treated exactly the same question
using the same terminology: this linguistic ambiguity did not dupe
Cicero.145 Valla concludes:
although blessedness and virtue are called good, nevertheless the good are
ultimately those who are graced with virtue, not with happiness and
blessedness; here Boethius, who had a greater fondness for dialecticians
than for rhetoricians, was deceived.146
142Ibid., 112.1723: Quis crederet virum ita diligentem et acutum, taceo elegantem, in
huiusmodi errorem propter ignorationem unius verbi, et quidem facillimi devenisse? Nam
bonum tum virtutum tum felicitatem dicimus, sicut e contrario malum. At virtus
quidem et vitium actiones sunt, felicitas vero atque infelicitas qualitates, res etiam effectu
ipso inter se longissime distantes.
143Ibid., 112.3233: quicunque est bonus is habet bonum, bonum autem est beatitudo,
ergo omnis bonus beatus.
144Ibid., 112.3738: quicunque est bonus is habet bonum, bonum autem est virtus, ergo
omnis bonus, virtute praeditus.
145Ibid., 112.3839: non Ciceronem fefellit ista verbi ambiguitas.
146Ibid., 113.47: Ita cum bonum beatitudo dicatur et virtus, boni tamen ii demum
sunt qui virtute affecti sunt non qui felicitate et beatitudine; in quo Boethius dialecticorum
quam rhetoricorum amantior deceptus est.
248
Let us not be fooled by the apparent simplicity of Vallas refutation

(regardless of the validity of his proposed interpretation of Boethius).
A comparison of the various editorial phases from alpha to delta,
whose variants are collected by Lorch in the introduction to her critical
edition, shows that this was one of the sections of book III that Valla tinkered with most each time he revised the dialogue. Furthermore, here
Valla applies a principle which was fundamental to his attack on philosophy and on which he insists in his analysis of syllogistic procedure and
metaphysical language.
Vallas principle, which represented a paradigmatic turning point for
the humanism of his time, is given in nuce in the following definition: the
semantic polyvalence of certain words (transcendentals, predicaments,
and predicables) must be subjected to a linguistic hermeneutics that (1)
effects a reduction of philosophical categories, and (2) shows the invalidity of argumentative procedures that are correct from the formal point of
view of syllogism but inexact in the morphological and signifying structure specific to the language being used. To the latter aspect of the problem Valla would dedicate important pages (these, too, gradually reworked)
in book III of the Disputationes, a section that is more than explicit in the
very form of its title: certain words yield a manifold and multiple syllogism.147 Moreover, one of the cases considered there is precisely the syllogism of Boethius examined in chapter 12, book III of De vero falsoque
bono the very text currently under consideration. Valla himself directs
the reader from the pages of the Disputationes to this passage of the dialogue (obviously in the beta version, not gamma). And his interweaving of
the critique of Boethius, from a purely formal analysis (in the Disputationes)
to a specifically textual one (in De vero falsoque bono), is certainly worthy
of especial emphasis; indeed, it reveals the organic nature of Vallas work.
Boethius, then, had a greater fondness for dialecticians than for rhetoricians. But the opposition between dialectic and rhetoric is made even
more explicit as Vallas critique proceeds. The antinomy between the two
disciplines is taken up generally, beyond the specific case in question, in
the interest of displacing philosophy and formulating an alternative argumentative procedure. Therefore, the apparatus and the epistemological
foundation, the hermeneutical hinge, of inquiry ends up being no longer
logic, the scholastic art of arts (ars artium), but rhetoric, humanisms art of
147[The title of book III, chapter 11. See Lorenzo Valla, Repastinatio dialectice et philosophie, ed. Gianni Zippel, 2 vols. (Padova: Antenore, 1982), 1:304:] Quaedam verba reddere
numerosum ac multiplicem sillogismum (emphasis added).

arts. Boethius, Valla continues, was fooled because he preferred to speak
dialectically (loqui dialectice) rather than rhetorically (loqui oratorie). But,
the humanist adds, the manner of the philosophers easily leads into
error. For words crop up now and then like rocks to dash the most convincing and sturdiest argumentative structures, such that the whole case
is jeopardized if an error is made with one word.148
The contrast, or rather the difference, between speaking dialectically
and speaking rhetorically is specified even further when the argumentative principles proper to rhetoric are identified: the orator uses many and
various arguments: he adduces contraries, brings forth examples, makes
comparisons (emphasis added). Rhetorical discourse, in other words,
comprehends broader and more highly differentiated structures than logical or dialectical discourse does. It is not restricted but rather operates
with more complex and articulated reasoning procedures, such as enthymemic demonstration (e.g., ex repugnantibus) and paradigmatic argument. This will be treated in Vallas Disputationes, especially in books II
and III, whose final chapters, it might be added, contain some of his densest writing, taken verbatim from Quintilians Institutio (bk. V, chs. 811).
Valla continues: by means of procedures like adducing contraries
(afferre contraria), bringing forth examples (repetere exempla), and making comparisons (comparare similitudines) articulated and differentiated variously but directed towards the same objective rhetorical
argumentation investigates reality and forces even hidden truth to reveal
itself. Hence the comparison, which recurs in Vallas writings when he
deals with argumentative method, between demonstrative procedure and
forms of military operation. For the conquest of truth is achieved with a
strategy no less complex than that deployed by a military commander
(imperator) and his army to bend the will of the enemy and definitively
conquer him. It was therefore this kind of logistics that Boethius should
have taken up and investigated further for his own use: this is how
Boethius should have acted.
It is at this point that the comparative reading of the beta and gamma
versions of the text aids in clarifying Vallas critique of Boethius. The textual variant between beta and gamma quoted en face above (pp. 245
246) opens a passageway right into the interior of the critique, giving
insight into its various phases and developments. In the beta redaction,
148[For these and subsequent quotations of chapter 12, book III of De vero falsoque
bono, consult n. 132 above.]
250
Valla rebukes Boethius above all for devoting himself excessively to dialectic and neglecting rhetoric. This first criticism of Boethiuss work must be
traced to Vallas peculiar vision of scholasticism. For he was struck by how
forcefully Boethiuss logical writings influenced medieval culture and
scholastic theology itself. But there is something more important in his
critique of Boethius. Valla was certainly aware that Boethius had read and
studied Ciceros rhetorical works; he therefore had to substantiate his criticism in such a way as to implicate all of Boethiuss rhetorical and philosophical writings in the criticism of his dialectics. Hence the fact that the
ultimate cause of the polemic against Boethius must be sought in Vallas
anti-Ciceronianism, or better, in the absolute primacy he accorded to
Quintilians Institutio oratoria. This is what Valla underlines here in no
uncertain terms: If only he had preferred to devote the effort to reading
Quintilian. What follows is even more explicit: He would thus not have
made mistakes in rhetorical matters, and he would have become a
weightier and more religious philosopher. Thus Boethius not only
subordinated rhetoric to dialectic, but he also failed to grasp the dimension Quintilian added to rhetoric. That is to say, he remained within a tradition that left ample room for the dichotomy between rhetoric and
dialectic and accorded the latter a primacy and autonomy that it did not
deserve. Furthermore, by admitting that dichotomy and rejecting rhetoric
in the sense conceived by Quintilian as a universal and organic
science of language Boethian philosophy exhausted itself in the formalism of dialectic (and in the logicism of scholasticism). At the same
time, it kept itself from being used in a way that was more valid and
more consonant with the Christian religion than the Aristotelian Organon
(and the Aristotelianism of scholasticism) had been. In short, we have
here in nuce the motive force behind the full range of the critique of
Boethius, to which Valla devoted the three books of De vero falsoque bono
and De libero arbitrio.
With the gamma redaction, Valla switched to a new (and definitive)
formulation of his critique of Boethius. The purely negative assessment
and rejection of Boethian dialectic was replaced by the positive and thematic statement on the nature and validity of Quintilians rhetoric.
Boethius erred as Valla continues in the gamma redaction by letting
himself be seduced, like so many others, by the procedures of peripatetic
logic: he was ensnared by an excessive love for dialectic. That was the
source of formal and substantive errors which it was necessary to oppose
with a new conception of rhetoric, one that at the same time would assign
the art of dialectic a more precise and valid place.

But at this point Valla inserts another element into the variant. He had
already completed the literary work in which he overcame the antinomy
between rhetoric and dialectic. Therefore, he no longer needed to make
explicit and direct reference to Quintilians classic work and could instead
mention his own brand-new Dialecticae disputationes, his retrenching of
all dialectic and philosophy (repastinatio totius dialecticae et philosophiae). The aim of that work was (in addition to a constant, continuous
critique of Boethiuss writings) to re-assign logic a place within rhetorical
discourse and to effect a radical reduction of philosophy to rhetoric, all in
accord with the formal and categorical principles of the Institutio oratoria.
With the Disputationes, then, the new treatment (retractatio) of scholastic, Boethian, and contemporary logic reaches its final and definitive form.
What is more, Quintilians thesis, which constitutes the central theme of
the work, is clearly enunciated: that dialectic is a part of rhetoric.149
3.2.4.The damnatio philosophiae and the Reference to Jeromes Letter to
Ctesiphon
The variant reading between gamma and beta marks, in a most incisive
and explicit way, the distance in time and substance separating the two
editions of De vero falsoque bono. As for the question of whether the reference to the Disputationes contained in the gamma variant But how
much error was in dialectic, and that no one has written circumspectly
about it, and that it is a part of rhetoric, our Lorenzo here, in my opinion,
has begun to write most truly should be seen as a reference to an unfinished composition or to one that was final and definitive in all its parts,
this remains a marginal problem, especially as concerns the essential lines
of our interpretation of Valla. On the basis of syntactic construction and a
strictly textual analysis of the gamma variant but how much and that
no one and that dialectic is our Lorenzo has begun to write the
former possibility would, it is true, seem more likely. That is, the reference
to the Disputationes would indicate that the work was not yet finished, if
not still in the planning stages. As noted above, this is the sense in which
the gamma variant was understood by Lorch. No differently we should
add was the passage in question interpreted by Radetti in his translation
149See the references in note 136 above. The meaning of the related terms dialectic
and logic, as used by Valla, can be deduced from a comparative reading of the three different versions of chapter 1, book III of the Disputationes, entitled, Whence dialectic and
logic are thus-called (Unde dicatur dialectica logicaque ; [cf. Valla, Repastinatio dialectice et philosophie, 1:278]); cf. Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 117119.
252
of De vero falsoque bono. Nevertheless, on account of the arguments

adduced above and the significance that the gamma variant seems to take
on in the general context of Vallas work, we are inclined to think that the
reference to the Disputationes indicates a literary composition in its final
and definitive form. This is how it is understood by Valla; and it is, in fact,
the case. For otherwise and this is the clinching argument, a kind of
counterproof and definitive confirmation it would be impossible to
explain why the text of the gamma variant remains unaltered in the successive delta revision of De vero falsoque bono. For by then the Disputationes
had not only been completed and diffused but had undergone further
revision in a second and a third redaction.
For the general subject of our essay, however, it seems instead more
important to complete the interpretation of Vallas text currently under
examination. Such would help us both to understand better the import
and the contextual significance of the variant in the gamma redaction, and, at the same time, to clarify more precisely Vallas critique of
Boethius and the conclusions it reaches. For it is at this point that Valla
declares his rejection (contemnere) and condemnation (damnare) of
Boethian philosophy, appealing seemingly as a final argument but actually as a foundational one to the very fonts of theology and the faith:
Scripture and the Church Fathers. Vallas rejection of Boethian philosophy,
then, is not only based on his rediscovery of Quintilians Institutio, but first
and foremost on his invocation, resting on the authority of faith, of Paul
and Jerome.
According to Valla, Paul rejected philosophy, the wisdom of the
Greeks, while Jerome (and certain others) denounced philosophers as
heresiarchs. The textual references here are traditional topoi, easy to
locate: Colossians 2:8 and Jeromes Letter to Ctesiphon (ep. 133), in which
he quotes Tertulians statement (Against Hermogenes, ch. 9): philosophers are the patriarchs of the heretics.150 It suffices for the reference to
Paul to mention that it would be taken up again, and more explicitly, in
the Encomium. The reference to Jeromes Letter to Ctesiphon, however,
requires further clarification.
150Jerome, Epistola ad Ctesiphontem (ep. 133), in PL 22:11471161, at 1148 (tr. W.H.

Fremantle, G. Lewis, and W.G. Martley, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series,
eds. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, 14 vols. (New York: Christian Literature Publishing Co.,
18901900), vol. 6: St. Jerome: Letters and Select Works (1893), from the on-line text
(accessed 03.09.2012): http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3001133.htm).

Jeromes Letter to Ctesiphon is used as a contextual backdrop for the
antinomy between philosophy and theology. It is both brought up here
and emphasized again in the concluding section of chapter 12, book III of
De vero falsoque bono. Jerome adduces certain philosophical categories
and teachings (in this specific case, from the sphere of Stoicism) for the
purpose of demonstrating their incompossibility and general incompatibility with the categories and teachings of New Testament Scripture. It is
in this regard that is, with regard to these specific philosophical ideas
opposed to the Christian faith that Jerome writes,
Can there be greater presumption than to claim not likeness to God but
equality with Him, and so to compress into a few words the poisonous doctrines of all the heretics which in their turn flow from the statements of the
philosophers, particularly of Pythagoras and Zeno the founder of the Stoic
school?
Later he adds, well does one of our own writers say, the philosophers are
the patriarchs of the heretics. It is they who have stained with their perverse doctrine the spotlessness of the Church.151
Valla echoes Jeromes words, transferring them to the immediate context of his critique of Boethius. What is more, this same letter of Jerome
causes Valla to connect the theoretical antinomy (philosophy vs. theology) closely with the actual theological life of a Christian. Hence the final
words of Vallas passage, which once again echo well-known texts of Paul:
boastful philosophy did not love and worship God, despite its knowing
him or capacity for doing so. It preferred to fornicate with the lovers of the
earth.152
151Ibid., 1148: Quae enim potest alia maior esse temeritas, quam Dei sibi non dicam
similitudinem, sed aequalitatem, vindicare, et brevi sententia omnium haereticorum
venena complecti, quae de philosophorum et maxime Pythagorae et Zenonis principis
Stoicorum fonte manarunt? pulchre quidam nostrorum ait: philosophi, patriarchae haereticorum, Ecclesiae puritatem perversa maculavere doctrina (tr. Fremantle, Lewis, and
Martley, in Schaff and Wace (eds.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers).
152In Valla, De vero falsoque bono (ed. Lorch), 203 (apparatus II), Lorch cites as sources
for this passage Jerome, In Isaiam V 23,2 and In epistulam ad Galatas III 5, respectively in
PL 24:206207 and PL 26:416419. These same references are provided by Radetti in Valla,
Scritti filosofici e religiosi, 204, n. 3, but to our mind they are insufficient and should be substituted with those we have spoken about here. Vallas critique of Boethiuss Consolation of
Philosophy is not considered at all by Pierre Paul Courcelle, La Consolation de Philosophie
dans la tradition littraire. Antcdents et postrit de Boce (Paris: tudes Augustiniennes,
1967), 317332; but how to explain the new spirit developed by the Renaissance and that
this new spirit caused the Consolation to be read much less? It seems to us rather reductive to assign the reason to a change in literary taste: ibid., 332.
254
4.Rhetoric as a Mode of Theologizing: The Humanist Solution to

the Problem
Literature is the light of the intellect
L. Valla, gloss to Quintilians Institutio oratoria, book I, proem, 6153
In his book on Lorenzo Valla, Mario Fois writes compactly and suggestively, and with the full support of precise references to primary and secondary sources, on the problem of conscience in the realm of humanist
culture. The problem of conscience is the antinomy with which the religious believer has had to grapple, ever since the beginning of Christianity,
between the love of literature and the desire for God. This phrase is the
well-known title of a book by Jean Leclercq, who treated the theme
throughout the medieval period. Fois, who can be thought of as continuing Leclercqs work, followed the question of the antagonistic relationship
between the Christian faith and the study of ancient pagan literature
(humanae litterae) into the Renaissance, to see how it was recast in the
context of humanism. Moreover, Fois sought to identify the many and varied solutions offered to this problem across the whole arc of early humanism, beginning with the polemic between Albertino Mussato and
Giovannino da Mantova in the early fourteenth century and ending with
Vallas position, especially as it appears in the preface to book IV of the
Elegantiae. Fois concludes that, for Valla, eloquence is both the forum and
the definitive means for resolving the matter of conscience, such that
Vallas solution is the triumph of rhetoric in humanism.154
Foiss reference to the Elegantiae and his related conclusion are dead
on; they perfectly highlight Vallas original and unique contribution to
overcoming the problem of conscience (in the first half of the fifteenth
century). The preface, or proemium, to book IV of the Elegantiae is perhaps
the text that gives most explicit and complete voice to the humanist
attempt to establish the proper relationship between rhetoric and theological study. What would be declared programmatically in the Encomium
of 1457 regarding the proper mode of theologizing is developed compactly
153Ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat., Lat. 7723, f. 2v: Lumen ingenii sunt litterae.
154See Fois, Il pensiero cristiano di Lorenzo Valla, above all ch. 5: Il problema di coscienza dellUmanesimo e la soluzione valliana (pp. 195260), esp. 249258. The other
reference is to Jean Leclercq, Cultura umanistica e desiderio di Dio (Firenze: Sansoni, 1965)
(from the original French: Lamour des lettres et le dsir de Dieu [Paris: ditions du Cerf,
1957]) [English translation = The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic
Culture, tr. Catharine Masrahi (New York: Fordham University Press, 1961)].

in the preface from the 1440s. Beginning with a formulation of the problem, put in the mouth of an anonymous objector, Valla elaborates his own
particular solution to the antinomy between theology and pagan literature. We therefore think it opportune to offer a close textual analysis of
the preface to book IV of the Elegantiae, and then to compare it with the
theological epistemology sketched by Thomas in Article 3, Question II of
his Commentary on Boethius. The purpose of this comparison is to arrive at
a substantive verification of the difference between the methodology of
Vallas humanist theology and that of Thomist theology and scholasticism
in general.
4.1.The proemium to Book IV of the Elegantiae: The Place of the Problem
of Conscience and the Topos of Jeromes Dream in the Letter to Eustochium
I know well that some people, especially among those who think themselves
holier and more religious, will dare to criticize my purpose and my work as
unworthy of a Christian, because I recommend the reading of secular
books.155
These are the first lines of the preface, the first blows of the objection to
which Valla intends to respond with an apology both for his work in general and for the Elegantiae in particular. Actually, it was the same objection
that, ever since the beginning of Christianity, had continuously cropped
up across the centuries in the learned and devout tradition of the religious
community. Raised and sustained by those who think themselves holier
and more religious, it insisted on the radical antinomy between the reading of the secular books of the pagans and a specifically Christian culture,
i.e. the insuperable antagonism between the study of ancient pagan literature (humanae litterae) and being a Christian. According to this view, the
love of literature ought to stay on the fringes of the Gospel, if not be extinguished altogether in theological faith and repudiated as unworthy of a
Christian, since it stands in antithesis to the desire for God.
Thus we once again encounter, clearly enunciated in the first lines of
the preface to book IV of the Elegantiae, the same problematic that
Thomas recast in Question II of his Commentary on Boethius. If visualized
155Valla, Elegantiae, book IV, preface (ed. Garin), 612: Scio ego nonnullos, eorum praesertim qui sibi sanctiores et religiosiores videntur, ausuros meum institutum hoc
laboremque reprehendere, ut indignum christiano homine, ubi adhortor ceteros ad librorum saecularium lectionem. [All translations of the proemium are based on Garins Italian
version in ibid., which Camporeale follows.]
256
graphically, the coordinates of the problem would be plotted symmetrically: along the axis of the constant (being a Christian) they would overlap
or perhaps be identical, while in the quadrants of the variable (the various
aspects and heuristic tools of classical culture) they would diverge, perhaps radically. Therefore, their respective solutions, reached or devised in
different historical periods of Christianity, actually end up being positions
whose adoption and particular significance lie in systems with utterly disparate points of reference. In Thomas, the terms of the antinomy were:
philosophy, or secular wisdom (sapientia saecularis), on the one hand,
and theology (sacra doctrina), or the science of faith (scientia fidei),
on the other; in Valla, they are: eloquence, or knowledge of literature
(doctrina litterarum), on the one hand, and the Christian religion (chris
tiana religio), or being a Christian (christianus homo), on the other.
Nevertheless, both Thomass Commentary and Vallas text are founded on
the same patristic authority: Jeromes Letter to Eustochium.
Thus Vallas objector takes up the traditional topos of Jeromes dream
along with the unappealable and inescapable judgment handed down in
it by Gods tribunal: a Ciceronian, not a Christian. To Jeromes mind, so
the objection goes, every believer in the Gospel should aim to be the latter:
the same man cannot be both religious and a Tullian. But if Jeromes
reading of Cicero caused him to be sentenced to flogging and to repudiating his Ciceronianism both practically and theoretically, should not the
lovers and promoters of humanae litterae be prosecuted and punished in
like manner? Writings and undertakings like the Elegantiae, and more
generally the new literary culture of its time, should suffer the same judgment and be convicted of the same crime as Jerome, a crime perpetrated
against Christian tradition and thought:
this charge does not pertain so much to the present work [the Elegantiae] as
to me in particular and to other literati whose erudition and study of secular
literature is condemned.
The conclusion: lovers of literature ought therefore to be forced to repudiate pagan antiquity and to repeat Jeromes pledge that he would not read
secular books.156
Vallas ample response as if forced into methodological alignment
with the issues at hand had to be developed along argumentative lines of
156Ibid., 612: ciceronianus , non christianus, quasi non potest fidelis esse et idem tullianus. Eoque spopondisse libros saeculares se non esse lecturum. Hoc crimen non
magis ad praesens opus pertinet, quam ad me ipsum ac ceteros litteratos, quorum studium
ac doctrina litterarum saecularium reprehenditur.

a wholly rhetorical nature. It is thus natural for his refutation (refutatio) of
the anti-humanist thesis to begin with a counter-response in enthymemic
form, i.e. with an argument ex contrariis or ex repugnantibus (cf. Quintilian,
Institutio oratoria, V.14.14). This argument would ultimately be resolved
with the invocation of another traditional, authoritative topos from
Jerome this one in favor of the study of classical literature: the Letter to
Magnus (PL 22:664668). It is between these two passages from Jeromes
letters to Eustochium and to Magnus which had long been the extremes
of the enduring polarization underlying the debate over the love of literature and the desire for God that Valla now situates his own defense of
rhetoric as the handmaiden of theology. The essential traits of Vallas argument make the preface to book IV of the Elegantiae one of the most original expressions, in the fifteenth century, of the grand controversy
previously debated by Aquinas (on other grounds) in his Commentary on
Boethius. Vallas consideration and humanistic revision of both the problem and the solutions would directly inspire Erasmuss Life of Jerome (Vita
Hieronymi) of 1516.157
4.2.The Letter to Eustochium and Jeromes Dream: The Common PlatoPlautus Variant in Jeromes Text and PhilosophyEloquence,
Ornamentation, and Quintilians Rhetoric as a Science
The enthymeme used by Valla to counter the critique of humanism transcends the purely formal limits of an apologetic argument. Indeed, it is
turned around into a critique of scholasticism, and it attacks the very
theological praxis which gave rise to both the polemic against the study of
classical literature and the attendant alternative proposal for theological
study. Valla flings the ambiguity, or rather the contradictoriness, of their
position right back at the sustainers of the anti-humanist thesis, whom he
brands as responsible for the contemporary decline of letters (who are in
large part responsible for making a ruin and a shipwreck of Latin literature158). From his point of view, they cannot appeal to the authority of
Jeromes Letter to Eustochium. For if the study of classical literature is
indeed contrary to the Christian name, then the study of pagan philosophy is equally unworthy of evangelic faith, since it, too, is repudiated in
157On Jeromes dream and its use in humanism from Salutati to Erasmus, cf. the reference to Fois in note 154 above, and mile V. Telle, LErasmianus sive Ciceronianus dEtienne
Dolet (1535) (Genve: Droz, 1974), 389390 and 422423.
158Valla, Elegantiae, book IV, preface (ed. Garin), 612: quorum culpa non ex minima
parta latinae litterae iacturam naufragiumque fecerunt.
258
the same letter. Consistency demands that, if the divine condemnation of

Jerome is accepted as conforming with the Christian spirit, then it must be
extended to all the historical and literary expressions of secular wisdom:
all the orators, all the historians, all the poets, all the philosophers, all the
jurisconsults, and all the other writers of the pagan world, Greek and
Latin.159
Having been shown to be in contradiction with himself, the objector is
forced to repropose the thesis of Jeromes condemnation and its normative implications in a more circumscribed form. Specifically, he is forced
to reduce the opposition between Christianity (religio christiana) and
secular wisdom (sapientia saecularis) to the incompossibility between
Christian faith and classical eloquence (eloquentia):
When Jerome is rebuked for being a Ciceronian, it is actually for being an
enthusiast of eloquence. Therefore, whoever reads eagerly in order to
become eloquent knows that he will be condemned and rejected.160
But it is precisely this restriction of the antinomy between Christian and

classical culture that gives Valla the possibility of setting the problem and
its solution within a specific frame. The objectors extremely reductive
conception of eloquence (eloquentia) as ornamentation (ornatus), derived
from a decadent kind of Ciceronianism, is opposed with another, fuller
and more comprehensive conception: eloquence (eloquentia) as the discipline of rhetoric (rhetorica), a critico-stylistic analysis of language and of
systematic knowledge:
Is there really nothing in those [secular] books except eloquence? Do we
find no account of former times nor histories of the pagans, ignorance of
which befits only boys? Arent there many things pertaining to morals? Isnt
there a treatment of all the disciplines?161
Valla does not immediately pursue the contrast between rhetoric and
ornamentation, by which he might have resolved the antinomy in question. Instead, the differentiation, based on an organic and holistic conception of rhetoric (in the tradition of Isocrates and Quintilian), is taken up
159Ibid., 612: omnes oratores, omnes historici, omnes poetae, omnes philosophi,
omnes iurisconsulti, ceteri quoque scriptores.
160Ibid., 614: Cum Hieronymus quod ciceronianus est, reprehenditur, id reprehenditur
quod studiosus eloquentiae esset. Ideoque damnati et repulsi intelliguntur, qui comparandae eloquentiae gratia lectitantur.
161Ibid., 614: Nihil ne in illis libris [saecularibus] nisi eloquentia est? non memoria
temporum gentiumque historiae, sine quibus nemo non puer est? non multa ad mores
pertinentia? non omnium disciplinarum tractatio?

later, slowly, as the enthymemic discourse develops and focuses on the
alternative proposal of a humanist theology. For the time being, Vallas
argument remains entirely within the ambiguity of the restrictive definition according to which eloquence is stylistic technique and a discipline
for regulating the formal aspects of rhetorical expression. The Jerominian
objector is thus forced into self-contradiction, while the premises of his
critique of humanism vis--vis theology are themselves invalidated.
Therefore, either we shall read eloquent books or we shall not read
them at all, Valla reasons, pursuing the ambiguity of the rhetorical formalism maintained by his adversary.162 But Jerome, he adds immediately,
was condemned in the dream described in the Letter to Eustochium on
account not only of his love of Cicero but also of his reading of Plato.
The reference to Greek philosophy was actually a variant in the manuscript tradition of the text available to Valla, standing in place of the
original Plautus. The contraction of Plautus into Plato, owed to easily
deducible mechanisms of transmission, was in fact ancient and widespread; the authentic reading has only been restored in modern editions
of Jeromes letters.163 Be that as it may, this variant had the force to determine the development and the substance of Vallas argument, which continues: in both Plato and Cicero you dont know if the philosopher or
the rhetorician is greater. So then:
if the books of the ancients are all so eloquent that when they teach wisdom
they are possessed of the highest eloquence, and when they teach eloquence
the highest wisdom, which ones will we condemn for eloquence?164
In this way, the enthymeme of the counter-objection is simplified, brought

back to the immediacy of the terms in contradiction, and thus restored
through reduction to its basic contrary unit, namely the incompossibility
of philosophy and theology.
The variant of Plato for Plautus, as has been said, in large part determines the route along which Vallas discourse unfolds. And indeed, the
162Ibid., 614: Ita aut eloquentes, aut nulli libri legendi erunt.
163[See Eugene Rice, Saint Jerome in the Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1985), 231, n. 7: Several of the early manuscripts , all the medieval lives
of St. Jerome, and all commentators on this passage before Erasmus read Plato instead of
Plautus. See also the apparatus criticus to Jerome, Epistulae, ed. Isidorus Hilberg, 3 vols.
(Vienna: F. Tempsky, 19101918), vol. 1 (Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum, 54),
189, line 16. Eds.]
164Valla, Elegantiae, book IV, preface (ed. Garin), 614: quorum uterque nescias praestantior sit philosophus an orator. Quod si omnes libri veterum ita sunt eloquentes, ut vel
plurimum sapientiae, ita tradentes sapientiam, ut vel plurimum eloquentiae habeant, quinam isti erunt quos ob eloquentiam damnandos putemus?
260
inclusion of the reading of Plato as grounds for the judgment of Jerome

causes Valla to interpret the condemnation, a Ciceronian, not a Christian,
as an incrimination specifically of philosophy. It is the philosophy (philosophia) of Plato and Cicero that stands in opposition to the reading of
sacred scripture (lectio sacrae scripturae), not the forensic eloquence (eloquentia) of the Latin orator or the elegance (facundia) of the Greek
philosopher.
Since Jerome confesses to having eagerly read those two [sc. Plato and
Cicero], take care lest you ought to think it was said not so much about
Ciceros rhetorical works than about his philosophical ones. I have no doubt
that it was said about his philosophical works, since only philosophers are
named. As for the fact that no objection was made to his Platonism, as if by
reading Plato he were doing something holy, but only to his Ciceronianism,
it is because, as a Latin, he had a greater desire to imitate the style of
Cicero a style, I say, which he used in questions of philosophy, not in forensic cases or speeches or in the Senate. For Jerome strove to become a writer
of holy disputations, not a civil lawyer.165
Hence the counter-question Valla poses to his anti-humanist adversary,

who had brought up the traditional Jerominian topos in the first place:
Why shouldnt we then believe that Plato hurt him no less than Cicero? Why
not the philosophers more than the orators?166
The response to this question actually takes the form of a reiteration of the
anti-humanist stance. But once again, Valla brings the objectors insistence on combating the study of literature back around to the initial ambiguity between eloquence and ornamentation. Thus the renewal of the
objection is now turned on its head, transformed into the definitive and
precise clarification of the fundamental ambiguity. Vallas adversary
responds to the counter-question by repeating his own interpretation of
Jeromes text but the ornamentation, not the knowledge, of speaking is
what was rebuked167 and so Valla puts his case as explicitly as possible:
165Ibid., 61416: Cum eos duos lectitasse se Hieronymus fateatur, vide ne non tam de
oratoriis potius Ciceronis operibus quam de philosophicis dictum existimare debeas. Ego
certe de philosophicis dictum accipio, ubi soli philosophi nominantur; quodque platonicus esset ideo non obiectum, quasi sancte faceret Platonem legens, sed tantum ciceronianus, quod homo latinus magis Ciceronis stylum cupiebat exprimere, stylum, inquam, quo
ille utebatur in quaestionibus philosphiae, non quali in forensibus causis concionibusve
aut in senatu. Non enim orator causarum civilium Hieronymus, sed scriptor sanctarum
disputationum studebat evadere.
166Ibid., 616: Cur non ergo credamus non minus Platonem nocuisse ei quam
Ciceronem? Cur non magis philosophos quam oratores?
167Ibid., 616: at ornatus ipse dicendi reprehensus est, non scientia.

since eloquence (eloquentia) is an integral part of rhetoric, it is not possible to have authentic eloquence without knowledge (scientia), and vice
versa. The condemnation of eloquence would thus necessitate the rejection of all knowledge (scientia); and the accusation, a Ciceronian, not a
Christian, would then require, as its immediate consequence, that
Christians reject all culture, including both Ciceronian doctrines and, in
this particular case, Platonic philosophy:
Is there only ornamentation in Cicero? Is there not also philosophy?
Is there not, as I have said, elegance in Plato? Why shouldnt Ciceros
philosophy be thought to have hurt Jerome more than his art of
speaking?168
It is at this point that Valla raises the central issue, the one which the
entire preface is aimed at expressing and providing with argumentative
coherence: the distinction, or better, the contrast between philosophy
and eloquence vis--vis theology, stated here, finally, in its full range
of meaning. The ambiguity between eloquence and ornamentation
thefoundation of the objection to humanism disappears, and the art
ofspeaking (ars dicendi) takes on the organic and holistic significance of
rhetoric (rhetorica). Vallas text thus ends up being directly connected
(even the same expressions and patristic references are encountered)
with chapter 12, book III of De vero falsoque bono and with the openingpages of De libero arbitrio. The conclusions are identical: (1) philosophy is the origin and (historical) manifestation of heresy; (2) the
negativejudgment of philosophy is a constant in the Christian tradition;
(3) the incompossibility between philosophy and the Christian religion is
radical.
Now we come to the most significant passage of Vallas text, which follows immediately upon the last quotation:
Here I do not want to compare philosophy and eloquence by saying which
one is able to do more harm. Many people have spoken on this matter, showing that philosophy is barely consonant with the Christian religion and that
all heresies flow forth from the fonts of philosophy, whereas rhetoric has
nothing that is not praiseworthy: it teaches to invent and to arrange, as if
giving bones and sinews to speech; to ornament, that is, to endow speech
168Ibid., 616: numquid tantum in Cicerone ornatus? non et philosophia? non, ut

dixi, in Platone facundia? . Cur non potius Ciceronis philosophia nocuisse putanda
Hieronymo est quam ars dicendi?
262
with flesh and color; and finally to memorize and deliver properly, that is, to
give speech life and action.169
Against the concept of eloquence as ornamentation, Valla enunciates the

definition of rhetoric in all its fullness. Thus all the parts of speech
(oratio) understood as an expression crafted by the art of rhetoric (ars
rhetorica) are described, albeit with abbreviated formulations: invention
(inventio), arrangement (dispositio), elocution (elocutio), memory (memoria), and delivery (actio or pronuntiatio). There is an implicit reference to
Quintilians Institutio oratoria here, in which the five parts of speech (oratio) constitute the vast and complex structure along which the whole work
unfolds (cf. book III, chapter 3).
Having provided this definition of rhetoric, Valla moves on. How, he
asks, thus posing anew the whole question at hand, could rhetoric the
science of language, the technique and methodology of speaking hurt
the study of divine things and thus be incompossible with Christian discourse? There will be an insuperable contrast, an insoluble aporia in the
relationship between rhetoric and Christian speech if and only if the content and the praxis of the latter, namely true wisdom and the virtues
(veram sapientiam atque virtutes), are rejected. And it is precisely this
rejection of the Gospel may it be noted in passing, in support of what
Valla says here that Jerome actually confesses to when narrating his own
story of unhappiness in the Letter to Eustochium. Lord, Jerome cries, in
recognition of his sinful attachment to pagan wisdom, if ever again I possess secular books, if ever again I read them, I have denied You.170 But
Valla continues beyond this point, further clarifying and enriching his
argument, as will be clear from the sequel to our exposition.171
169Ibid., 616: Nolo hoc in loco comparationem facere inter philosophiam et eloquentiam, utra magis obesse possit, de quo multi dixerunt ostendentes philosophiam cum religione christiana vix cohaerere omnesque haereses ex philosophiae fontibus profluxisse,
rhetoricam vero nihil habere nisi laudabile, ut invenias, ut disponas, quasi ossa et nervos
orationi des, ut ornes, hoc est, ut carnem coloremque inducas, postremo ut memoriae
mandes decenterque pronunties, hoc est, ut illi spiritum actionemque tribuas (emphasis
added).
170Jerome, Epistola ad Eustochium (ep. 22), PL 22:394425, at 416: infelicitatis historia;
ibid., 417: Domine, si unquam habuero codices saeculares, si legero, te negavi (tr.
Fremantle, Lewis, and Martley in Schaff and Wace (eds.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers,
modified).
171For fifteenth-century discussions on the conception and practice of rhetoric, see the
important and rich contibution of John Monfasani, George of Trebisond. A Biography and a
Study of his Rhetoric and Logic (Leiden: Brill, 1976), esp. 241299.

4.3.The Mechanical Arts, the Liberal Arts, and the Christian Religion:
Temple of God/Word of God and the Recovery of the Original Text of
Sacred ScriptureQuintilians Definition: Oratory, Queen of the World
(Institutio oratoria, I.12.1729), and Vallas Conception of Rhetoric ( Jeromes
Letter to Magnus)
Rhetorics innate usefulness as a science in the service of Christianity,
Valla continues, is not inferior to that expressed by and embodied in the
other arts (artes), both liberal and technical. In other words, the liturgical
use of painting and sculpture, engraving and music to mention only the
artistic activities expressly indicated by Valla suggests that rhetoric, as
the science of language, should be used in theology to the same extent and
according to the same principles. Here it must be noted, and with a certain emphasis, that a close relationship is posited between the two kinds
of aesthetic and creative activity, despite the fact that they were generally
placed on disparate levels of value and differentiated according to kind.
Obviously, we intend to call attention here to the distinction between the
mechanical arts (artes mechanicae), like painting, sculpture, etc., and the
liberal arts (disciplinae liberales) of the trivium and the quadrivium.
Among the latter, in Vallas view, rhetoric enjoys hegemonic and educational primacy.
Valla, then, inscribes the whole arc of the expressive faculties within the
cycle of creative, artistic activities, all the while maintaining the traditional distinction between the two kinds of arts and the related subdivisions specific to each single art. He includes each and every one, focusing
the entire spectrum of creative activity through the lens of service to
Christianity. Thus, on the one hand, following Quintilian (Institutio oratoria, XII.10), Valla rhetorically effects the greatest possible connection
between the two kinds of arts (as has already been underscored by
Panofsky and recently confirmed by Baxandall).172 On the other hand, he
mirrors the actual artistic praxis of a society that is still culturally Christian.
And this artistic praxis was emerging, right at the time when Valla was
drafting the Elegantiae (between the 1430s and 1440s), in the form of the
most original and extraordinary renaissance in history. Valla himself
observes as much, and with a certain emphasis, right from the very beginning of the Elegantiae (preface to book I).
172Erwin Panofsky, Renaissance and Renascences in Western Art (London: Paladin, 1970),
16; Michael Baxandall, Giotto and the Orators. Humanist Observers of Painting in Italy and
the Discovery of Pictorial Composition: 13501450 (Oxford; Clarendon, 1971), 117120.
264
Here it should also be noted that Vallas tightening of the connection

between the two kinds of arts is not only found in the preface to the
firstbook of the Elegantiae and in the Oration of 1455. Rather, it is a theme
that runs throughout his writings, which consistently posit a close relationship between the cycle of the arts (artes) and the order of the various
sciences (scientiae), both of them impressed into the cultural service of
Christian society. In the preface to book IV of the Elegantiae, this theme
even recurs twice: first after the passage cited above, and then at the end.
This second passage would be reused, and with more precise force, in the
dedicatory letter to Nicholas V prefacing the Collatio Novi Testamenti
(1453). Furthermore, it must be noted that in the three passages just now
mentioned (the first two in the proemium to bk. IV of the Elegantiae, and
the third in the dedicatory letter to the Collatio) Valla makes use of the
highlysignificant distinction between the temple (templum) and the city
(civitas). And although in doing so he respects the traditional form of the
spatial, religious, and civic dimensions of the respublica christiana
(arising from scriptural sources), he defines them in a way that detaches
them from their past state, linking them instead to the very artistic and
intellectual advances then being made in the early-fifteenth-century
Renaissance.
Let us review the passages mentioned above and undertake a comparative reading of them:
Could I conceive of this art [rhetoric] having a harmful function? Certainly
no more than the art of painting, of sculpture, of engraving, or, to mention
the liberal arts, of music. And if much use and ornament derives for divine
things from those who sing well, paint well, and sculpt well, and also
from the other arts such that they seem to have been born for this very
purpose all the more so will such be derived from those who are eloquent.
(Elegantiae, book IV, proemium)173
The other sciences and arts occupy a middle ground, to be used for good or
for evil . You see what wondrous decoration adorned Aarons raiment, the
Ark of the Covenant, and Solomons temple. Thus eloquence seems to me to
have the meaning of what the noble tragedian calls the queen of the world
and perfect wisdom. And so others decorate their private dwellings, like
those who study civil law, canon law, medicine, or philosophy, making no
173Valla, Elegantiae, book IV, preface (ed. Garin), 616: Hanc ego artem obfuturam partem putem? Profecto non magis quam pingendi, fingendi, caelandi et, ut de liberalibus
dicam, quam musices artem. Et si ex his qui bene canunt, bene pingunt, bene fingunt,
ceterisque ex artibus multum usus atque ornamenti divinis rebus accedit, ut prope ad hanc
rem natae esse videantur, profecto multo plus accedet ex eloquentibus.

contribution to the divine. Let us decorate the house of God, so that those
entering it are not roused by its neglect to contempt, but by its majestic condition to religion. (Elegantiae, bk. IV, proemium)174
Each word of holy scripture is like a gem or precious stone from which the
heavenly Jerusalem is constructed. For the cities of other disciplines, so to
speak, were constructed partly of bricks, like civil law, partly of tufa, like
medicine, partly of marble, like astronomy, and the rest in like fashion. But
the city of the Gospel is of nothing but gems; it is nobler to be the humblest
builder there than to be an architect in the others. What then? Am I myself
an architect of this city? If only I were one of its builders! Yet it has fewer
architects and builders than is generally believed. Those who dare to construct works of stone in that city, to say nothing of wood, plaster, or straw, are
in no way worthy of the name of builder or architect, since they mix certain
vain and empty sciences with divine ones. For my part I am not building a
new work [referring to the Collatio] but have tried, as it were, to the best of
my abilities to keep the roof of this citys temple in good repair. Because if it
is not maintained, the temple itself must of necessity leak, and it will not be
able to accommodate the divine fittingly. (Collatio Novi Testamenti, dedicatory letter)175
Let us now consider these three passages, in order of last to first, with
regard to the theme in question, namely the relationship between rhetoric and theology. In the passage cited from the introduction to the
Collatio,rhetoric is taken up as the unique and necessary tool for biblical
174Ibid., 622: Ceterae autem scientiae atque artes in medio sunt positae, quibus et bene
uti possis et male . Vides quam mirabili ornamento vestes Aaron distinguantur, quam
arca foederis, quam templum Salomonis. Per hoc mihi significari eloquentia videtur, quae,
ut ait nobilis tragicus, regina rerum est et perfecta sapientia. Itaque alii ornant domos privatas: hi sunt qui student iuri civili, canonico, medicinae, philosophiae, nihil ad rem divinam
conferentes. Nos ornemus domum Dei, ut in eam ingredientes non ex situ ad contemptum,
sed ex maiestate loci ad religionem concitentur (emphasis added).
175Lorenzo Valla, Collatio Novi Testamenti, redazione inedita a cura di Alessandro
Perosa (Firenze: Sansoni, 1970), 6.25ff.-7.1ff.: Singula enim verba divine scripture sunt tanquam singule gemme lapidesque pretiosi, ex quibus Hierusalem celestis extruitur. Nam
aliarum doctrinarum, ut ita loquar, urbes partim e lateribus, ut ius civile, partim e topho,
ut medicina, partim e marmore, ut astronomia, et item cetere extructe sunt; evangelica
vero nonnisi e gemmis, in qua vel minimum structorem esse preclarius, est quam in ceteris
architectum. Quid igitur? Sum ne ego eius architectus? Utinam essem vel structor! Cuius
tamen non tot architecti sunt atque structores, quot vulgo creduntur, nequaquam digni
hoc nomine qui lapidea, ne dicam lignea, cretacea, stramentitia opera in ea edificare
audent, vanas quasdam ineptasque scientias divinis admiscentes. Equidem ipse nihil operis novi condo sed velut huius urbis templi sarcta tecta prestare pro mea virili conatus sum,
quod nisi prestetur templum ipsum perpluat necesse est, nec in eo res divina fieri commode possit. [The translation of Christopher S. Celenza has been consulted: Celenza,
Lorenzo Vallas Radical Philology: The Preface to the Annotations to the New Testament
in Context, Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 42:2 (2012), 365394, at
380383.]
266
exegesis, which for Valla consists in the collation of the Vulgate Bible with
the Greek truth (veritas graeca) of the original text of the New Testament.
Vallas statement, it might be noted, is the finale to a series of historicophilological premises considered and discussed in the long dedicatory letter to the Collatio.
Valla concludes that no science or art can substitute for rhetoric. It
is the sole art capable of supplying the proper tools for restoring the temple that is Sacred Scripture. For it is only in rhetoric that the divine (res
divina), i.e., the Word of God, can be recovered and unfurled in all its
solemnity and hieratic dignity. In plain language, rhetoric is the only scientific discipline that can offer an analytical and organic principle capable
of fully restoring the authentic, original text of the Bible. Despite their
great effectiveness, the other arts and sciences, from law to medicine to
astronomy, are unable to assist adequately in restoring this Temple of the
Word, this worldly reflection of the heavenly Jerusalem. Unlike the cities
constructed by the other arts and sciences, this temple has no architects
or builders but only, so to speak, restorators. It would certainly be a sin to
aim for more, to attempt a sacrilegious renovation of the Temple of the
Word, or at least to claim to repair and reinforce walls and roofs and every
other supporting element, but with an unsuitable and ruinous mixture of
divine truths and human arts.176
The relationship between the temple (templum) and the city (civitas),
as spaces for the arts and sciences to be put to use, takes on grander
dimensions (although still with specific reference to theology) in the second passage, cited from the preface to the fourth book of the Elegantiae.
With a statement as explicit as it is rare for his writings, Valla affirms that
the deployment of cultural tools involves, or better, is determined by an
ethico-political choice. The arts and sciences in general, he specifies further, are intended and often used for the purpose of decorating and adorning private dwellings (domus private). This example concerns not only
sciences like medicine and civil law, but also disciplines like canon law
176Valla, Collatio Novi Testamenti, 37. [For the full Latin text and English translation of
the preface, see Celenza, Lorenzo Vallas Radical Philology. Eds.] Vallas analogy is obvious, as are its implications, which are the result of a corresponding operational parallelism
between the restoration of the authentic text of the Bible and that of the sacred monument of the temple. In both cases the same attempt at reconstruction is put in motion, a
restoration to an original editorial (of the text) or architectural (of the building) state. We
are not able to ascertain the level of originality in Vallas comparison between operations
and techniques that continue to be expressed in terms of restoration. Let us only say that
here the analogy is used by Valla within the particular sphere of the historico-religious
world: Word of God/Temple of God (Verbum Dei/Templum Dei).

and philosophy a fact whose deep significance can only be fully understood by attentively noting its context in Vallas discourse. These are the
sciences and disciplines intended for the urban construction of the civitas,
or city, and yet they are to no avail in theology: [they make] no contribution to the divine. With this original and extremely radical exclusion of
canon law and philosophy from the catalogue of auxiliary disciplines to
theology, Valla paved the way to concluding that rhetoric is the true handmaiden of theology. Only rhetoric can provide organic mediation, on the
level of culture, between the divine (res divina) and a man-made adornment (ornamentum) consonant with and worthy of the house of God
(domus Dei). Indeed, this house must be as hieratic and solemn, in its
architectural and ornamental lines, as were Solomons temple, Aarons
priestly raiment, and the Ark of the Covenant, which contained the
ancient tablets of the Law.177
Rhetoric possesses this capacity for organic mediation on account of its
very nature as the omni-comprehensive science, preeminent above every
other art or discipline. It is dominion over all things, and at the same time
it is wisdom about life and knowledge: it is the queen of the world and
perfect wisdom. This definition of rhetoric, which Valla attributes to an
unnamed tragedian, actually derives from a standard passage (standard
even for the tradition of medieval rhetoric) of the Institutio oratoria one,
however, that Valla has changed and abridged in a significant way. In the
last section of chapter 12, the final, concluding part of book I of the
Institutio, Quintilian writes:
And I trust that there is not one even among my readers who would think of
calculating the monetary value of such studies. But he that has enough of
the divine spark to conceive the ideal eloquence, he who, as the great tragic
poet says, regards oratory as the queen of all the world and seeks not the
transitory gains of advocacy, but those stable and lasting rewards which
hisown soul and knowledge and contemplation can give, he will easily persuade himself to spend his time not, like so many, in the theatre or in the
Campus Martius, in dicing or in idle talk, to say naught of the hours that
are wasted in sleep or long drawn banqueting, but in listening rather to
the geometrician and the teacher of music. For by this he will win a richer
177Vallas text increases in meaning if understood within the more general humanist
discourse on the city. On this point cf. Eugenio Garin, Rinascite e Rivoluzioni. Movimenti
culturali dal XIV al XVIII secolo (Bari: Laterza, 1975), 235254; and idem, Scienza e vita civile
nel Rinascimento italiano (Bari: Laterza, 1965), 3356. But see also what Alberti says in De re
aedificatoria, book VII, chapter 1 and book IX, chapter 1: Leon Battista Alberti, LArchitettura,
Latin text and Italian translation by Giovanni Orlandi (Milano: Edizioni Il Polifilo, 1966),
529537 and 779788.
268
harvest of delight than can ever be gathered from the pleasures of the
ignorant.178
The unnamed tragedian apparently Vallas noble (nobilis) source

agrees with his great (non ignobilis) counterpart in Quintilian is the
Latin writer Pacuvius, who lived between about 220 and about 130 b.c.
Quintilian, in his historical review of Greek and Roman literature
(Institutio oratoria, ch. 1, bk. X), counts him as one of the earliest excellent
Roman tragedians:
Among writers of tragedy Accius and Pacuvius are most remarkable for the
force of their general reflections (gravitatem sententiarum), the weight of
their words (verborum pondere), and the dignity of their characters (auctoritate personarum).179
In his tragedy Hermiona, Pacuvius echoes a verse from Euripides

Hecuba persuasion, sole queen of mankind and with an expression
not unworthy of the original calls eloquence the highest and most effective art of persuasion: the persuader and queen of all the world.180
Pacuvius translation of Euripides had already inspired Cicero in De
oratore. And it is probably through the medium of Ciceros dialogue, if
not directly from it, that Quintilian takes up the description of eloquence
as queen of the world. In De oratore we read:
But so potent is that Eloquence, rightly styled, by an excellent poet, persuader and queen of all the world, that she can not only support the sinking
and bend the upstanding, but, like a good and brave commander, can even
make prisoner a resisting antagonist.181
178Quintilian, Istitutio oratoria, I.12.1719: nec velim quidem lectorem dari mihi quid
studia referant computaturum. qui vero imaginem ipsam eloquentiae divina quadam
mente conceperit quique illam (ut ait non ignobilis tragicus) reginam rerum orationem,
ponet ante oculos fructumque non ex stipe advocationum sed ex animo suo et contemplatione ac scientia petet perpetuum illum nec fortunate subiectum, facile persuadebit sibi, ut
tempora, quae spectaculis, campo, tesseris, otiosis denique sermonibus, ne dicam somno
et conviviorum mora conteruntur, geometrae potius ac musico impendat, quanto plus
delectationis habiturus quam ex illis ineruditis voluptatibus (tr. E.H. Butler; emphasis
added).
179Ibid., X.1.97: tragoediae scriptores veterum Accius atque Pacuvius clarissimi gravitatem sententiarum, verborum pondere, auctoritate personarum (tr. E.H. Butler).
180Euripides, Hecuba, v. 816: peith de tn tyrannon anthrpois monn; Pacuvius,
Hermiona, fr. 187: flexanima atque omnium regina rerum. Euripides passage should be
read in its fuller context (Hecuba, vv. 814819) as confirmation of the imitation of him that
underlies all of Pacuvius work.
181Cicero, De oratore, tr. E.W. Sutton and H. Rackham, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1988), II. 44.187: tantam vim habet illa, quae recte a bono
poeta dicta est flexanima atque omnium regina rerum, oratio, ut non modo inclinantem

But the art of persuasions sophistic ascendance to primacy does not keep
the conception of rhetoric from undergoing a radical transformation in
the Institutio oratoria. Indeed, in Quintilians text rhetoric takes on much
fuller dimensions and, as a consequence, acquires specific characteristics
that differentiate it from the conception of Euripides and Pacuvius as well
as from the one found in Ciceros De oratore. At the end of chapter 12, book
I of the Institutio (text quoted on p. 267 above), Quintilian does not stop
merely at extending the art of eloquence beyond the realm of forensic performance. On the one hand he elevates rhetoric to the primary and hegemonic function of governing ethical and civil conduct in society (queen
of all the world). On the other he considers it an instrument of knowledge
(scientia) and a context for contemplation (contemplatio), for the interior
formation of the individual. Thus rhetoric is simultaneously knowledge
and language (practical and theoretical), dealing both with contingent
events and with the social and personal world not subject to fortune, i.e.
the civic community and the individuals interior mind.
Since the text and the context of Quintilians work converge in substantiating this definition and conception of rhetoric, Valla could not have
found a better passage in the tradition of classical rhetoric to which to
refer for resolving the antinomy between rhetoric and theology. It was still
necessary, however, to make the reference to Quintilian act as more than
a mere citation in support of the counter-response to the objector and his
anti-humanist thesis. With a decisive and most effective act of linguisticsemantic dislocation, in which specific concepts are adopted but their
content and meaning simultaneously modified, Valla takes up Quintilians
precise conception of rhetoric and at the same time transcends its dimensions, attributing to it a definite theological function. In Vallas hands
rhetoric undergoes a true transformation in kind.
This becomes clear if the particular linguistic-semantic modality is
highlighted by which Valla draws on Quintilians text and incorporates it
into the context of his own argument. While repeating Pacuvius phrase,
excipere aut stantem inclinare, sed etiam adversantem ac repugnantem, ut imperator
bonus ac fortis capere possit (translation modified). See Leeman, Orationis ratio (1974),
425427. Important and suggestive, also for a thematic study of the relationship between
humanism and crisis in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, are Vernants observations
on the relationship between tragedy and rhetoric: Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre VidalNaquet, Mito e tragedia nellantica Grecia (Torino: Einaudi, 1976), 828 and esp. n. 1 [original French ed. = Mythe e tragdie en Grce ancienne (Paris: F. Maspero, 1972); English
translation = Tragedy and Myth in Ancient Greece, tr. Janet Lloyd (Sussex: Harvester
Press, 1981)].
270
eloquence, queen of the world (eloquentia, regina rerum), he encloses

and synthesizes Quintilians entire passage in the compact formula, rhetoric, perfect wisdom (rhetorica, perfecta sapientia). Since for Quintilian
rhetoric is both knowledge (scientia) and contemplation (contemplatio),
in Vallas terms it rightfully rises to the level of wisdom (sapientia), insofar
as it comprehends and governs the totality of human knowledge. It
includes not only theoretical knowledge but also the ethical and civic
knowledge peculiar to the collective and individual actions of human
beings. Thus Valla attributes to rhetoric the practical function of prudence, and he applies to it the definition that had been the exclusive
domain of Aristotles first philosophy (philosophia prima), metaphysics.
And thus Valla once again puts forth the thesis that had already been
indicted at his inquisitorial trial in Naples in 1444, although this time with
greater depth, precision, and meaning: the orator is more than a lover of
wisdom (philosophos); he is wise (sophos).182
Through the medium of Quintilians Institutio, then, Valla transforms
rhetoric into a concept that is incommensurate with the sophistic context
of Euripides and Pacuvius. For he transfers it, imparting it with qualitatively different characteristics, into the realm of Christian culture and of
that cultures foundation, the science of faith (scientia fidei). Indeed, it
must be stressed that in defining rhetoric as perfect wisdom, Valla
employed a terminology whose deeper significance could not escape
those familiar with the lexicon of the medieval, scholastic tradition.
Therefore, by using the name perfect wisdom, Valla enunciated rhetorics inherent power as forcefully as possible to the holder of the antihumanist thesis: he portrayed it as knowledge in the sense of both
(practical) prudence and (theoretical) wisdom, and thus as being of the
greatest organic use to theology.
This last conclusion brings us back to the other passage from the preface to book IV of the Elegantiae, the first of the three passages quoted
above. To paraphrase Valla: if all the arts, including painting, sculpture,
engraving, and (among the liberal arts) music, contribute together or
singly to the worship and the dignity of divine things (much use and
ornament derives for divine things), such that they seem to have been
182Cf. Camporeale, Da Lorenzo Valla a Tommaso Moro, 2425 (reprinted in idem,
Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo, riforma e controriforma, 3839). [See Vallas Pro se et contra
calumniatores ad Eugenium IV. Pont. Max. Apologia, in idem, Opera omnia, 1:799: oratorem
esse virum sapientem, quantum in hominem cadit: hoc est, plus esse quam philosophum
et sophon.]

designed for such an end by nature (such that they seem to have been
born for this very purpose), how much more beneficial will the art of
rhetoric be, how much greater profit will it bring, as an organic instrument
in the service of those same divine truths (all the more so will such be
derived from those who are eloquent)?
Once again it is Vallas very own formulations that call to mind parallels
with and departures from Aquinas. While Thomas bases the analogic
relationship between philosophy and theology on the ontological principle nature is the preamble to grace, Valla argues for the reduction of
rhetoric to theology on the basis of a certain historical connaturality of
artistic praxis, employed consistently throughout Christian tradition and
civilization ancient, medieval, and contemporary in liturgical and aesthetic service to the divine: such that they seem to have been born for this
very purpose. In other words, the principle of Thomass analogy seems to
be taken up by Valla and, so to speak, historicized; it is projected along the
dimensions of a Christian civilization that had reorganized the arts for the
service primarily not of the profane city (civitas) but of the temple of God
(templum Dei).
Hence the further consequence deduced by Valla: once rhetorics primacy among the other arts, as perfect wisdom, is rediscovered, and thus
also its status as the supreme art governing all the others, it becomes a tool
of direct and immediate use to theology, transcending the purely decorative function in the temple of God to which the other arts are limited. By
their very nature, the other arts can only operate on a level inferior to the
highest one, which is perfect wisdom. Vallas conclusion, reached by
continuing the line of his own counter-argument to the objection based
on the topos of Jeromes dream, appears to follow extremely well from the
initial premises:
Therefore Jerome was accused not of being a Ciceronian, but of not being a
Christian, as he wrongly proclaimed had been the case when he scorned
sacred literature. It was not the study of this art [rhetoric] but the disproportionate study of this or any other art, such that no place was left for better
ones, that was rebuked. Only Jerome was accused, not others; otherwise others would have been censured in a similar way.183
183Valla, Elegantiae, book IV, preface (ed. Garin), 616618: Quare non fuit illa accusatio
quod ciceronianus esset Hieronymus, sed quod non christianus, qualem se falso esse
praedicaverat, cum litteras sacras despiceret. Non studium huius artis sed nimium studium,
sive huius artis sive alterius, ita ut locus melioribus non relinquatur, reprehensum. Non
ceteri sed solus Hieronymus accusatus est, alioqui ceteri simili castigatione correpti
fuissent.
272
All that can actually be gathered from the Letter to Eustochium, Valla
argues, is the indication, or better, the declaration of a phase or moment
of cultural and religious crisis at this point along Jeromes development as
a Christian thinker. Jerome the Ciceronian, the worshipper of classical
rhetoric, is no longer a thinker organic to Christianity; and Jerome the
Christian, disgusted by the style of Scripture, is not yet able to understand rhetoric in its dimension as perfect wisdom. Jerome had arrived at
the dramatic impasse, experiencing it with deep personal suffering, of the
theoretical and practical opposition between pagan culture and biblical
revelation, manifested in the dilemma of the antinomy between human
and sacred literature (humanae litterae and sacrae litterae). Thus the
Jerominian topos, as invoked by the anti-humanist, is in its essence an
exemplary referent, emblematic both of and in the history of the Christian
tradition.
But equally emblematic, Valla immediately adds, is the solution provided to that specific antinomy by Jeromes own works a solution
embodied fully and profoundly in the interpretive task of translation and
the exegetical task of commentary to which the Latin Father would dedicate the rest of his life. For this he becomes the greatest exponent and the
exemplary figure in the Latin Christian tradition (much more so than the
other Church Fathers, who had not undergone the same punishment):
Nor did Jerome dare to prohibit others from engaging in it [the study of literature]; on the contrary he praised the eloquence of many, from both earlier times and his own. But why talk of others? Who is more eloquent than
Jerome himself? Who is more rhetorical? Who, although he is wont to hide
it, is more prepared, more eager, or more careful to speak well?184
The sense in which Valla interpreted Jeromes solution to the humanist

antinomy (the problem of conscience) and the organic use of rhetoric as
philological criticism can be highlighted by circumscribing it within a sufficiently clear frame, i.e. by connecting this passage, quoted from the preface to the Elegantiae, to a letter sent to Giovanni Aurispa in December of
1441. Referring to his brand-new Declamatio (1440) on the Donation of
Constantine, Valla praises his work in terms of literary composition:
I have written nothing more rhetorical.185 Here, in a piece of private
184Ibid., 618: Neque ille hoc aliis vetare ausus est ne facerent; contraque plurimos laudavit tum superiorum tum suorum temporum eloquentes. Verum quid multis agimus?
quid Hieronymo ipso eloquentius? quid magis oratorium? quid, licet ille saepe dissimulare
velit, bene dicendi sollicitius, studiosius, observantius? (emphasis added).
185Lorenzo Valla, Epistole, ed. Ottavio Besomi and Mariangela Regoliosi (Padova:
Antenore, 1984), 252.9192: qua nihil magis oratorium scripsi (emphasis added).

correspondence coeval with the writing of the Elegantiae, we find the
same expression with which Valla describes the sum of Jeromes exegetical
work on the Old and New Testaments.
We need not repeat what we have attempted to demonstrate elsewhere
(and amply so, we believe) in order to interpret the description rhetorical (oratorium), in the letter to Aurispa, as anything other than an expression of the very methodological principle and analytical basis on which
the entire Declamatio was constructed. Furthermore, the term rhetorical
also takes on prescriptive significance and a particular meaning within
the system of Quintilians rhetoric. Specifically, it is used to describe the
application of philological and historical analysis to a literary or diplomatic text, e.g. the pseudo-Donation of Constantine.186 In the passage of
the Elegantiae cited above, the term rhetorical undoubtedly has greater
meaning, albeit still falling within Vallas view of Quintilians rhetoric,
understood as the science of philological and historical criticism. Hence
the description of Jeromes work as rhetorical, meaning that it is eminently a work of rhetoric in a way that far transcends the boundaries of
formal Ciceronian eloquence.
What is more, Valla incorporates into the flow of his own reasoning the
arguments that Jerome himself had used in his Contra Rufinum (Apology
against Rufinus) when reflecting on the subject of his censure as
recounted in the Letter to Eustochium. When Rufinus reminds him of the
dream, Valla recalls,
[Jerome] ridicules him and openly acknowledges eagerly reading the works
of the pagans and says that they ought to be read eagerly; and yet this is clear
in many other passages, even without his confession, and especially in the
Letter to the Orator Magnus.187
It must first of all be noted that Vallas argumentative line regarding the
censure of Jerome, a reference that had been cited throughout history by
those opposed to philosophy and literature, actually follows a traditional
186Cf. Salvatore I. Camporeale, Giovanni Tolosani, O.P. e la teologia antiumanistica
aglinizi della Riforma. LOpusculum antivalliano De Constantini Donatione, in Xenia Medii
Aevi historiam illustrantia oblata Thomae Kaeppeli, eds. Raymundus Creytens and Pius
Knzle (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1978), 809831. [See also the discussion of
the term oratorium in idem, Lorenzo Valla and the De falso credita donatione: Rhetoric,
Freedom, and Ecclesiology in the Fifteenth Century, on pp. 27 and 143 of this volume. Eds.]
187Valla, Elegantiae, book IV, preface (ed. Garin), 618: Obiciente sibi hoc somnium
Rufino hominem deridet planeque fatetur se lectitare opera gentilium et lectitare debere,
idque cum in aliis multis locis, quamquam etiam sine confessione palam est, tum vero
epistola illa Ad Magnum oratorem.
274
interpretation. The parallelism with Thomass own procedure in the

Commentary on Boethius is obvious enough, although Valla exhibits peculiarities that we have already had occasion to point out. For example, his
references to the individual passages in Jerome are undergirded by a more
precisely philological interpretation. And of course, the two men aim their
arguments at different objectives: Thomas at the defense of philosophy,
Valla at the critique and overcoming of philosophy in favor of rhetoric.
But to move from general considerations to more detailed observations,
close attention must be given to Vallas reference to the controversy
between Jerome and Rufinus. As is clear not only from the Contra Rufinum
but also from parallel passages in Jeromes letters, this reference points
directly to the key question of the entire controversy, namely the problematic of the opposition between Christian language and literature,
which underlies Jeromes work on scriptural exegesis. Nor does Valla omit
to mention Jeromes ironic response to Rufinus admonitions:
You require of me in my sleep what you have never done in your waking
hours. Am I guilty of a great crime if I said that girls and virgins of Christ
should not read secular books and, when warned in a dream, promised not
to read them myself?188
Valla connects the reference from the Contra Rufinum to the pertinent
passage in the Letter to Magnus, which was the other traditional topos for
combating those who maintained the absolute incompatibility between
the love of Sacred Scripture and the study of literature. As mentioned
above, the Letter to Magnus was the counter-citation to the Letter to
Eustochium, i.e. to the topos of the dream in which Jerome was condemned
for Ciceronianism.189
At this point, Valla is in a good position to reject all reductive interpretations of Jeromes corpus. The utilization of Greek and Roman literature in
Jeromes hermeneutical work is so abundant and consistent that it cannot
be traced to any sort of sedimentation from his early school days. All of his
188Jerome, Contra Rufinum, bk. III, ch. 32: PL 23:481: te exigere a dormiente quod
numquam vigilans praestitisti. Magni criminis reus sum, si puellis et virginibus Christi dixi
saeculares libros non legendos et me in somniis commonitum promisisse ne legerem?;
but see also bk. I, chs. 3031: PL 23:421424.
189For an overview of Jeromes biblical exegesis and the controversies in which he was
involved, see Angelo Penna, Principi e caratteri dellesegesi di S. Girolamo (Roma: Pontificio
Istituto Biblico, 1950); E.F. Sutcliffe, Jerome, in The Cambridge History of the Bible, 3 vols.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19631970), vol. II (ed. G.W.H. Lampe, 1969),
80101; and ibid., vol. I (eds. P.R. Ackroyd and C.F. Evans, 1970), 510541; J.N.D. Kelly, Jerome:
His Life, Writings, and Controversies (London: Duckworth, 1975).

exegetical work on the Old and New Testaments stands as a constant witness to the compossibility between the organic use of pagan culture and
the philological interpretation of Sacred Scripture. This fact is of great
importance, as it clearly implies a continuous, ever-deepening familiarity
with and study of classical literature. Valla emphasizes that Jerome often
adduced pagan books as witnesses. And he immediately adds, with special reference to his anti-humanist interlocutor,
if it is not permitted to read pagan books, certainly less so is it to show that
they must be read; and if he were to dissuade us from reading them which
he does not do I would think it more necessary to pay attention to what he
himself does than to what he says others should do.190
Valla continues: once Jerome decided to devote his efforts to the study of
Sacred Scripture (which he had earlier scorned), he began reading pagan
authors again with equal seriousness, either to acquire their eloquence or
to condemn their false opinions while approving their correct ones.191
Actually Valla goes on all Jerome did was to continue along a trail
already blazed in the past, namely the early tradition of the Eastern and
Western Church Fathers. Indeed, Jerome himself testifies to this often,
especially in his letters. Valla identifies the particular authors as Hilary,
Ambrose, Augustine, Lactantius, Basil, Gregory, Chrysostom the same
names that would crop up again in the Encomium. At the end of this list he
immediately adds: and very many others who in every age adorned the
precious gems of divine utterance with the gold and silver of eloquence.
To Vallas mind, Jeromes exegetical work, as well as the dominant, most
significant part of the Greek and Latin patristic tradition, offers definitive
and irrefutable proof of the compossibility between classical literature
and Sacred Scripture, between Greco-Roman rhetoric and doctrinal study.
Indeed, the great Greek and Latin Fathers saw no insoluble antinomy
between the scientific disciplines of rhetoric and theology: they did [not]
abandon one science on account of the other.192
190Valla, Elegantiae, book IV, preface (ed. Garin), 618: Quid quod libros gentilium
saepe in testimonium assumit? Quod si non licet legere, minus profecto legendos exhibere; et si nos dehortaretur a lectione gentilium quod non facit magis intuendum putarem quid ipse ageret quam quid agendum aliis diceret.
191Ibid., 620: sive ut illinc eloquentiam mutuaretur sive ut illorum, bene dicta probans,
male dicta reprehenderet.
192Ibid., 620: Hilarius, Gregorius, Chrysostomus aliique plurimi qui in omni aetate
praetiosas illas divini eloquii gemmas auro argentoque eloquentiae vestierunt, neque
alteram propter alteram scientiam reliquerunt.
276
4.4.The Opposition between Philosophical Theology and Rhetorical

Theology, and the Critical Reduction of the Vulgate to the Greek Truth
(veritas graeca)
Having answered the objections of his adversary, by means of both ad
hominem arguments and appeals to authority (ex auctoritate), Valla can
now move on to the enunciation of his own thesis. This is his definitive
response my view to his anti-humanist interlocutor, the crucial and
defining premise for the final and most important part of the preface to
book IV of the Elegantiae.
But in my view, if someone undertakes to write about theology, it matters
little whether he brings to it some other study or not, be it canon law or geometry or medicine or philosophy. For they contribute more or less nothing. But
if he is ignorant of eloquence, I think he is utterly unworthy to talk about
theology. And without a doubt only the eloquent, like those I mentioned,
are the pillars of the church. And this was the case going all the way back to
the apostles, among whom Paul seems to me to stand out for nothing other
than his eloquence.193
Vallas thesis makes a distinction between the disciplines (named in the

manuscript variant in italics) that remain marginal to the sacred science
(scientia sacra) of theology, on the one hand, and rhetoric, on the other,
which is instead a tool and an integral part of theological study. He also
bases his thesis on the grand patristic tradition. What is more, he connects
this tradition in a direct and continuous line to the preaching of the apostolic church (out of which it in fact grew) and, above all, to Pauls writings.
Here it is clear that Vallas Paulinism, prescribed as a specific mode of theologizing in the Encomium of 1457, constitutes the maturation of an essential characteristic dating back to the 1430s and 1440s and is thus rooted in
his greatest rhetorical work: the Elegantiae.
In contrast to the rather defensive tone that had characterized his argument so far, Valla now wholly inverts the anti-humanist thesis it, too, a
constant element in the development and cultural life of the Churchs history, and one that had nearly run parallel to the dominant tradition of the
193Ibid., 620 (italicized section is a variant found in ms. Florence, Bibl. Laur., Conv.
soppr. 187, f. 60r): At mea quidem sententia, si quis ad scribendum in theologia accedat
parvi refert an aliam aliquam facultatem, sive canonum sive geometriam sive medicinam sive
philosophiam afferat an non afferat. Nihil enim fere conferunt. At qui ignarus eloquentiae
est, hunc indignum prorsus qui de theologia loquatur existimo. Et certe soli eloquentes,
quales ii quos enumeravi, columnae ecclesiae sunt. Etiam ut ab Apostolis usque repetas,
inter quos mihi Paulus nulla alia re eminere quam eloquentia videtur.

Eastern and Western Church Fathers. On the basis of his earlier references
to the Fathers and the New Testament writings of the Apostles, he insists,
So you see how the exact opposite conclusion is reached: it is not studying eloquence that must be rebuked, but not studying it.194
In Vallas work, and perhaps for the first time ever as Poggio clearly
understood and wrote in his Invectivae in L. Vallam (Invectives against
Lorenzo Valla) in the early 1450s the overcoming of the antinomy
between rhetoric and theology becomes the epistemological foundation
for a new, specifically humanist perspective on biblical and ecclesiological
study. Valla depicts the humanist principle of rhetorical theology as a
recovery both of the mode of theologizing underlying the apostolic
Scriptures (especially those of Paul) and of the epistemological basis of
the whole patristic tradition. Indeed, on this count it should be noted that
scholasticism to which rhetorical theology was radically opposed was
not able (and never tried) to raise consistent arguments for the defense
and elaboration of its own philosophical theology on the basis of this kind
of New Testament scriptural authority.
Even more illuminating is Vallas clarification, following directly upon
the last passage cited:
I am acting as if I were offering a defense of eloquence against its detractors,
which is more than I intended. For our object is not this but to write about
the elegance of the Latin language, which nevertheless acts as a stepping
stone to eloquence itself. If someone is not eloquent, he should not be censured if he was unequal to the task and did not shun the work involved. But
whoever does not know how to speak elegantly and yet commits his
thoughts to writing, especially in theology, is utterly shameless. And if he
says that he does so deliberately, he is completely out of his mind.195
Thus Valla defines more precisely the function of elegance (elegantia), a

theme which here is treated apologetically in the context of the dispute
over literature and is derived from a precise theological tradition. But at
the same time, Valla also intends to justify the place of this preface (to
book IV) in the context of the Elegantiae as a whole.
194Ibid., 620: Vides igitur ut in contrarium res ipsa recidit. Non modo non reprehendum est studere eloquentiae, verum etiam reprehendum non studere.
195Ibid., 620: Et ego sic ago tamquam eloquentiae contra calumniantes patrocinium
praestem, quod est maius proposito meo. Non enim de hac, sed de elegantia linguae latinae scribimus, ex qua tamen gradus fit ad ipsam eloquentiam. Verum si quis eloquens non
sit, ita demum non erit castigandus: si talis non potuit evadere, non si hunc laborem effugit. Qui vero eleganter loqui nescit, et cogitationes suas litteris mandat, in theologia praesertim, impudentissimus est; et si id consulto facere se ait, insanissimus.
278
Indeed, the object of the linguistic treatment of elegance was in no

way to consider, much less focus on, the study of classical literature in its
various relations with theology. On the contrary, the Elegantiae was aimed
directly at the cultivators of the Roman tongue (cultores romanae linguae) and those most eager to speak well (bene loquendi studiosissimi),
as Valla often repeats throughout the work. Its intention was to offer an
analytical and methodological tool for effecting what Quintilian had
called (following Ciceros terminology) the embellishment (exornatio)
of speaking and writing: the wondrous elegance of [Latin] speech.196 The
Elegantiae was thus on the one hand a study of the grammatical and syntactical composition of the Latin language (morphology of the partes orationis, or parts of speech), and on the other an analysis of that languages
semantic structure (the investigation of verborum significatio, or the
meaning of words).
But beyond the immediate substance of the Elegantiae and its complex
articulation, which called for its subdivision into six books, Vallas work
aimed directly at recovering the discipline of grammar (litteratura), in
both the methodological and historical dimensions that constitute
grammar according to Quintilian as opposed to grammar according to
Priscian. As can also be confirmed on the basis of other texts by Valla
(parallel to the Elegantiae), the specific objective was the typically humanist one of transcending medieval speculative grammar, the function of
which was essentially normative and prescriptive. In sum, with the
Elegantiae Valla restored to grammar (ars grammaticalis), in a formative
turn for post-medieval linguistics, an epistemological principle which can
properly be defined as the doctrine of the fundamentals of the science of
language.197
By stating that his treatment of the elegance of the Latin language was
restricted to a level preliminary to the science of rhetoric, one that was a
stepping stone on the way to eloquence itself, Valla was actually echoing
196Quintilian, Institutio oratoria X.1.114: mira sermonis [latini] elegantia.
197Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 101108. But for the general theme
of this fourth part of our essay, see first of all Charles Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness.
Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought, 2 vols. (London: Constable, 1970), in
particular vol. I, ch. 3: Lorenzo Valla: voluptas et fruitio, verba et res (pp. 103170). This is
the source of the expression rhetorical theology, (pp. 142f. and pp. 126128), which we
have applied to the context of Vallas Quintilianism. One should also keep in mind
Trinkauss observations (pp. 136ff., esp. 150170) on chapter 12, book III of De vero falsoque
bono, which we have already discussed. Finally, on Vallas use of philology in the service of
theology, Trinkaus speaks at length in vol. II, ch. 12: Italian Humanism and the Scriptures
(pp. 563614), esp. 571578.

Quintilians concept of grammar as the foundation of rhetoric. So much is
clear from chapter 1, book II of the Institutio, where this conception of
grammar is specifically discussed and explained (obviously within the
larger context of book II). This section of Quintilian was decisive for Vallas
linguistic analysis and, before that, for his own understanding and definition of rhetoric as philological criticism. On the other hand, it is precisely
on the basis of Quintilians conception of grammar (as an integral part of
and the structural basis for rhetoric) that Valla extends his discourse here
from rhetorics general function in theology to the relations (even more
fundamental and inescapable) between the art of grammar and theological language.
Methodological positions and polemical accents emerge here that Valla
would take up again in other places, especially in his exegesis of the Greek
and Latin New Testament in the Collatio of 1443 and then in the
Adnotationes of the 1450s. Once again he would raise his steady accusation
of those who refused to admit that theology, precisely because it is a science, must submit to the rules of grammar.198 But above all he would
show by the example of his own scriptural exegesis how elegance should
be transposed, or better, extended from secular to sacred literature: that
is, he provided a model for critical philologys decisive turn from classical
literature to New Testament scripture.
Theological argument based its premises on biblical language. And
since it, like every other language, fell within the specific sphere of grammar, theology could not escape the problematics dictated by the
grammatical art. Specifically, since New Testament revelation had been
historically written down in the standard tongues of Greece and Rome,
theological study had to confront the same issue with which the analytical
study of classical literature had already come to grips and to which
Quintilians grammar had given a specifically linguistic perspective: the
structural difference between the Greek and Latin languages.
Hence Vallas specifically theological problem: the linguistic difference,
in the editorial transmission of the Old and New Testament scriptures,
between the Latin Vulgate and the Greek truth (veritas graeca) of the
original text, and consequently the attempt semantically to reduce the
former to the latter. For Valla, this problem of biblical exegesis fell
withinthe broader context of the relationship between Greek and Latin
198[Lorenzo Valla, Adnotationes in Novum Testamentum, In Mattheum 4, in idem,
Opera omnia, 1:808: quamquam sint qui negent theologiam inservire praeceptis artis
grammaticae.]
280
literature and culture (both Christian and non-Christian). It would find

pointed expression in the opening pages of the Collatio/Adnotationes, but
it would be defined, both generally and specifically, in the preface to the
Latin translation of Thucydides:
What is more useful, more productive, or more necessary than the translation of books? It seems to me to be a kind of commerce in the best arts.
I compare it to a great thing when I say it is like commerce. For what is more
advantageous for human affairs than that which provides everything pertaining to nourishment, cultivation, defense, decoration, and finally, to the
delights of life, such that nothing may ever be lacking and everything may
everywhere be in abundance? And what is said to have been the case in the
golden age, namely that all things were somehow in common for all people,
holds equally for the translation of languages, except that translation is
more distinguished, since the goods of the mind are preferable to those of
the body. For this traffic in translation supplies us with things that nourish,
decorate, strengthen and delight our souls, nearly making them more divine.
What is more pleasant, more salutary, more worthy of love in a word, better than the books that are translated into our own language from Greek,
Hebrew, Chaldaean, or Punic, whether of historians, orators, poets, philosophers, doctors, or theologians? We Latins would not even have commerce
with God if the Old Testament had not been translated from Hebrew and
the New from Greek. We would need more time than is available here to
give a full praise of translation .199
The particular theme expressed in this passage, to which our analysis of

the preface to book IV of the Elegantiae also brought us, is directly echoed
in a quotation we encountered earlier in the Encomium: the nature
of Greek is different from that of Latin. This would be a rather tedious
subject to discuss, and it is a question for another time. It thus seems
199Valla, Oraciones y Prefacios, 278280: Quid utilius, quid uberius, quid etiam magis
necessarium librorum interpretatione? Ut haec mihi mercatura quaedam optimarum
artium esse videatur. Magnae rei eam comparo, cum mercaturae comparo: quid enim illa
in rebus humanis conducibilius quae omnia ad victum, ad cultum, ad praesidium, ad ornamentum, ad delitias denique vitae pertinentia comportat, ut nihil usquam desit, omnia
ubique abundent? Et quod in aureo saeculo fuisse fertur, sint cunctorum quodammodo
cuncta communia. Idem fit in translatione linguarum, sed tanto praeclarius quanto potiora
sunt bona mentis corporis bonis; siquidem ex rebus, quas ista transferendi negotiatio
nobis apportat, animi aluntur, vestiuntur, roborantur, delectantur ac prope diviniores
efficiuntur. Nam quid suavius, salubrius, amabilius et, ut uno complectar verbo melius
quam libri qui vel e graeca vel ex hebraea vel e chaldaica punicave lingua in nostram
traducuntur, sive historicorum sive oratorum sive poetarum sive philosophorum sive
medicorum sive theologorum? Adeo nullum cum Deo nos latini commercium haberemus, nisi Testamentum Vetus ex hebraeo et Novum e graeco foret traductum. Longiore
opus esset oratione quam ut huic tempori conveniret ad omnes laudes interpretationis
exsequendas .

appropriate to dedicate the next section of our essay to this subject. This
interlude will serve to tie together, by way of a comparative reading, the
variations and repetitions of this theme contained in the Encomium of
St. Thomas, in the introduction to the Latin translation of Thucydides, and
in the preface to book IV of the Elegantiae. Thereupon we will return in
the subsequent section to our analysis of the Elegantiae.200
4.5.The Preface to Thucydides History, Nicholas Vs Literary Project, and
the Question of Translation: Translation (translatio linguarum) as
Commerce (mercatura rerum)
The long passage just cited constitutes the most important part of the
praise of translation contained in the preface to Vallas Latin version of
Thucydides History, commissioned by Nicholas V and finished in the
summer of 1452. The preface praises the humanist pope (to whom it is
addressed as a dedicatory letter) for having set aside a whole sector of his
planned Vatican Library to Latin translations of Greek classical and patristic texts. This is Vallas cue, which he views as a golden opportunity, to
treat the complex question of translation and express his thoughts fully on
the subject. Indeed, Valla seeks here to define the philological activity of
translation and to praise it, especially with regard to the Greco-Hellenistic
and Semitic-Eastern literary patrimonies, as one of the greatest contributions to contemporary Latin culture, in every branch of sacred and profane knowledge. It is known that the subject of translation was variously
raised and discussed in the Middle Ages, from Boethius to Albert the
Great. Here Valla takes it up with his mention of Nicholas Vs project in
a specifically humanist way. On the one hand he sees languages and linguistic differences as historically different and semantically alternative
cultural spaces. On the other he conceives of translation as a kind of
traffic (transferendi negotiatio): a general exchange and circulation of
handmade goods and products.
Valla could not have chosen a comparison more meaningful for his contemporaries, and especially for the adherents to the new humanist culture, than that adduced in this praise of translation. The comparison
relates in an almost analogical way, beyond a simple metaphorical
200The text of the preface to the translation of Thucydides History is available in Valla,
Oraciones y Prefacios, 278289, but see also 7475 of Adornos introduction (to the anthology). Adornos entire essay (78 pp. with an invaluable bibliography) is still an excellent
piece of scholarship on Vallas work as a whole.
282
connection the philological operation of translation (interpretatio) to

the activity of commerce (mercatura). Both are defined as arts (artes)
whose similarity to one another stems from their incredibly intense contemporary flourishing, and as activities aimed at transcending geographic
and linguistic borders, at the creation of interrelations between different
communities and societies. That is, they operate in spatial and temporal
dimensions beyond every impediment and boundary; their aim is to facilitate civil society and intercourse in human language.
Commerce channels and puts into circulation, for the purpose of proper
distribution, every sort of good necessitated by civil society and social
interaction. By the exigencies and market conditions of supply and
demand, and through the mechanism of buying and selling, products
enter into commercial circulation according to their multiple and multiform needs and uses (everything pertaining to nourishment, cultivation,
defense, decoration, and finally, to the delights of life). Through commerce an attempt is made to return to complete and universal well-being
(such that nothing may be lacking and everything may everywhere be in
abundance), i.e. to the community of goods, as if with a view to the recovery of that mythical golden age in which all goods were available to one
and all according to need (all things were somehow in common for all
people).
The praise of commerce, which was not foreign (even if tangential) to
the mercantile ideology inherent in the humanist view of contemporary
civil and political society, merges into the exaltation of literary translation. This, too, consists in traffic, although here it concerns a much more
noble commodity: translation is more distinguished, since the goods of
the mind are preferable to those of the body. Undertaken for the satisfaction of the mind, this kind of linguistic exchange of writings hailing from
every branch of knowledge, from every literary form and cultural context,
aids in educating and nourishing the human spirit, almost making [it]
more divine. And we Latins Valla now concludes, with a statement in
which all the analogical tensions and resonances of liturgical language in
his discourse converge we Christians of the Western Church would not
even have commerce with God if not for the Latin translation of the Old
Testament from Hebrew and of the New Testament form Greek (especially in the form of the Vulgate).
Against the background of the analogical relationship between commerce (mercatura rerum) and translation (translatio linguarum) that
underlies the articulation of Vallas argument, Quintilians conception of
language as a primary function of exchange in social life emerges.

Language, in Quintilians view, as a mechanism and instrument of
exchange in human interrelations, as a social institution of communication, is similar to a monetary system in continuous circulation, structured
(by custom) according to relationships of relative value. Language,
Quintilian writes in the fundamental chapter 4, book I of the Institutio, is
to be used like money: as common currency.201
The Quintilianesque comparison of language to money portrays both,
according to a strict analogic parallelism, as institutional instruments of
communication and exchange, as social mechanisms of cultural and commercial transactions and not only within one community but also
between communities speaking different languages and engaging in different kinds of commerce. This extremely dense metaphor leads Valla to
the specific angle from which he views the act of translating texts belonging to culturally different spaces. The translators activity is seen as part of
the quest for and the broadening of political rule, as the intellectual duplicate of commercial and financial expansion. As a philological praxis,
translation is actualized through the collection and importation of bibliographic material from every part of the world. As such, this recovery
and reading of the literary, historical, and scientific texts of other peoples
presupposes a basic motive: the will to make ones own language dominant. It aims to assimilate the cultures of other civilizations, past and present, and somehow to bring them within the sphere of ones own linguistic
community. Likewise, the expansion of commercial and financial
exchange involves the imposition of ones own coinage as the dominant
one, almost as a standard currency. This is exactly what was happening
with Florences currency through the development and expansion of the
Medici bank under the direction of Cosimo and his collaborators.
Especially in the years in which Valla was completing his Latin translation
of Thucydides and its accompanying dedicatory letter, the florin was
establishing itself on the commercial routes of Europe and in the more
important financial centers across the Alps and, before that, in Italy (starting right in Nicholas Vs Rome).
Valla elaborates his praise of Nicholas Vs literary project quite a
magnificent undertaking of high culture, unique and worthy of the
201[Institutio oratoria, I.6.3: Consuetudo certissima est loquendi magistra, utendumque plane sermone ut nummo, cui publica forma est.] Cf. the references to Latin
authors (Aulus Gellius, Ulpian, Caesar, etc.) with which Valla glossed Quintilians passage
in ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 7723, f. 10v. [See also the discussion of this metaphor in
Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla and the De falso credita donatione, on pp. 9596 in this
volume.]
284
wisdom of the patron of the humanists202 along the parallels and contrasts of a series of significant comparisons and assimilations: commerce/
translation (mercatura rerum/translatio linguarum), language/money (lingua/nummus), traffic in translation/transfer into Latin (transferendi
negotiatio/in latinum traductio), etc. With this project, was the Pope not
extending, in breadth and depth, his Roman Empire (imperium romanum),
but in such a way that his hegemony would be different from that of the
ancient emperors? Certainly he expressed his will to conquer differently
from Augustus, Antoninus, and the other Roman emperors.203 He did so in
accordance with the specific character of his rule as a Christian Pope:
through your own person you see to sacred things, religion, divine and
human laws, and the peace, greatness, and welfare of the Latin world. But to
others, especially us, you have assigned other tasks, sending us off as your
prefects, tribunes, and captains, expert in both languages, to subject as
much of Greece as possible to your rule, that is, to translate Greek books into
Latin for you.204
In this sense, Valla resolves Nicholas Vs grand project later described as

ensuring the translation of the Greek books that are left in a cultural
logistic that is peculiarly humanist and different from the ancient one,
which was preeminently military although not dissimilar in its geographic
expanse or in the ethno-linguistic space at which it aimed. Its strategy of
cultural retaking and reconquest aimed at bringing the Greco-Oriental
world of the ancient empire back within the boundaries of Christian
Rome: adding Asia , Macedonia , the rest of Greece to the Roman
empire.205 Here it should be emphasized that Vallas preface composed
in August of 1452, on the eve of the fall of Constantinople (May 29, 1453)
is doubtless informed by an anxious concern, one that was by then felt
throughout the humanist world of Europe but that could be sensed ever
202Valla, Oraciones y prefacios, 278: Propositum sane magnificum singulare et vere
summo pontifice sapiente dignum.
203[The precise identity of Antoninus is unclear. It could theoretically refer to any of
the Antonine emperors, but the most likely candidates are Antoninus Pius (ruled 138161),
who enjoyed a peaceful reign and administered the provinces indirectly from Rome
through his governors, and Marcus Aurelius (ruled 161180), who ruled over an empire of
great extent and prosecuted many wars in the provinces. Eds.]
204Valla, Oraciones y prefacios, 278: cum sacra, religionem, divina atque humana iura,
pacem, amplitudinem, salutem latini orbis per te ipsum cures, mandasti cum alia aliis tum
vero nobis, quasi tuis praefectis, tribunis, ducibus, utriusque linguae peritis, ut omnem,
quoad possemus, Graeciam tuae dicioni subiceremus, idest ut graecos tibi libros in latinum traduceremus.
205Ibid., 282: non minus tibi gloriosum est, romane pontifex, libros graecos, qui reliqui
sunt, transferendos curare quam aut Asiam aut Macedoniam aut ceteram Graeciam
romano adicere imperio.

since the Council of Florence (1430s): the desire fully to salvage the remaining literary patrimony, both classical and patristic, of ancient, Hellenistic,
and Byzantine Greece.
From what we have observed, it seems clear that in the preface to
Thucydides History Valla was revisiting the grammatical problem of the
relationship between Greek and Latin in a manner informed by Quintilians
view of philology. And indeed, the traffic in translation planned and
organized by Nicholas V caused Valla to reconsider the complex operation
of translation as a philological, theoretical, and practical problem of vital
importance. This was a most important issue in philology, one that had
not only been present in Vallas writings but that had constituted a nodal
and structural point for the convergence of a complex and diverse series
of literary, philosophical, and theological problems. Such emerges clearly
and on various levels, particularly in the Disputationes and De vero falsoque bono, on the plane of grammatical analysis, in the terminological
and categorical exegesis of Aristotelian and scholastic logic, metaphysics,
and ethics, and in linguistic and conceptual questions surrounding
Trinitarian terminology. The statement in the Encomium of St. Thomas
because the nature of Greek is different from that of Latin. This would be a
rather tedious subject to discuss, and it is a question for another time
actually made reference, although only obliquely, to the persistent problematic that is at the heart of Vallas entire oeuvre. In that simple, allusive
formulation, Valla seems to have wanted to compress the long labor necessary for an adequate solution, as well as to temper his discontent at the
lack of one.
But by calling attention, in the same preface to Thucydides, to the problem of Scripture We Latins would not even have commerce with God if
the Old Testament had not been translated from Hebrew and the New
from Greek Valla raised the traffic in translation to a philological
question of theological grammar. Here the transaction between the
Latin of the Vulgate and the Greek truth (veritas graeca) of the New
Testament (and the Hebrew truth of the Old, to use Jeromes phrase)
involved by returning it to its beginnings the theological and dogmatic,
ecclesiological and liturgical question of Judeo-Christian revelation.
In this way Valla inserted into Nicholas Vs project exalted throughout
the entire introduction to his translation of Thucydides the scriptural,
philological, and theological question on which he himself had concentrated in his unpublished Collatio Novi Testamenti. Composed in 1443, during his early Neapolitan period, the Collatio would be publicly circulated
286
in the same years as the Latin translation of the History, and in 1453 Valla
dedicated it, too, to Nicholas V. He would subsequently return to the
Collatio, reconsidering and reworking the whole text for a second edition,
this time under the title Adnotationes in Novum Testamentum.
Scripture, then, was for Valla the original setting for commerce with
God and the space in which that commerce had its specific foundation.
Scripture was the literary source from which Valla drew his theological
problematic, which turned out to be essentially a hermeneutic investigation. Thus Vallas theological critique of scholasticism reached its culmination. He redirected his own basic arguments and made them converge
on a radical objective, reframing his critique as philological criticism
within the biblical space of the Old and New Testaments. He aimed at
nothing less than the transcendence of the Vulgate, from which theology
took its scriptural premises, and the reconstruction, through the exegesis
of the Greek truth (veritas graeca), of new, more pristine and authentic
premises for an alternative language of theology. Hence also Vallas other
decisive undertaking, chronologically the last but still fundamental to his
work: the critico-philological re-examination of Thomist exegesis as the
focal point of a more proper critique of scholastic theology. Returning the
Vulgate to the Greek truth through the linguistic and categorical critique
of Thomass theologico-scholastic exegesis was the specific operation,
both methodological and substantial, of Vallas humanist theology; and
the revision of the Collatio in the 1450s, which would eventually result in
the Adnotationes in Novum Testamentum, acted as the pivot for that
operation.
A reading of the Adnotationes that directly correlates Vallas philological analysis of the New Testament with Thomass exegetical Commentary
permits the reconstruction of the supporting axis of that operation, undertaken by Valla as a direct alternative to scholastic theology. Even if the
Adnotationes must indubitably be considered as the end of an incredibly
laborious journey that began with De vero falsoque bono and passed
through the Disputationes and the Elegantiae, it achieves full meaning on
its own. It stands as the greatest and fullest expression of that humanist
theology which Valla described in abridged and nearly concentric formulas in the Encomium of 1457.206
206See La caduta di Costantinopoli, ed. and tr. Agostino Pertusi, 2 vols. (Verona:
Mondadori, 1976). This important collection, fastidiously and perceptively furnished with
an introduction and notes by Pertusi, could be supplemented with further witnesses from
the correspondence of other contemporary humanists. Concerning the cultural function

4.6.The Arts and Sciences as a Middle Ground (medietas): Vallas Solution
to the Relationship between Literature and Theology
The study of eloquence, from the level of grammar to that of rhetoric
proper; the study of morphology and syntax, from the stylistic function of
ornamentation (ornatus) to the hermeneutical and linguistic techniques
that are most elaborated and raised to the level of a system in Quintilians
work these are the elements that make up the supporting arch of humanist theology. It is this conclusion which Valla reaches with the final passage of the preface to book IV of the Elegantiae, whose terms and
formulations seem to leave no room for interpretive doubt.
The language of the pagans, Valla affirms, has every possibility of being
incorporated into Christian language. It is necessary, however, to respect
the integrity, the valences of meaning, and the syntactical relationships
that are proper and specific to that language. Through a grammatical criteriology and a rhetoric of theology and Scripture, even the language of
the pagans can become a preliminary object of study for the theologian.
and theoretical conception of translation, it should be noted that Valla discusses them,
both here (in the preface to the Thucydides) and elsewhere (e.g., in the Adnotationes), in a
manner quite similar to Jerome, Epistola ad Pammachium, ep. 57 (de optimo genere interpretandi) in PL 22:568579. On Vallas translation and biblical exegesis, see Camporeale,
Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 172192 and 277ff. For a comparative reading of
Aquinass exegetical commentary on Scripture with Vallas Adnotationes, see the appendix
to the original Italian version of this essay in Memorie Domenicane, n.s., 7 (1976), 149194
[reprinted in Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo, riforma e controriforma, 266330].
There we have limited ourselves to a comparison of their exegeses of St. Pauls letters:
Thomas Aquinas, Super Epistolas s. Pauli lectura, 2 vols. (Torino: Marietti, 1953) (cited by
page and paragraph number for each Bible passage); Valla, Opera omnia, 1:803b-895b. We
have collated the text of the Adnotationes, published by Erasmus in 1505 at the Parisian
press of Josse Bade (cf. Ph. Renouard, Bibliographie des impressions et des oeuvres de J.
Badius Ascensius imprimeur et humaniste: 14621535, 3 vols. [Paris: E. Paul et fils et Guillemin,
1908], 3:344345) with ms. Brussels, Bibl. Royale, 40314033 (cf. J. van den Gheyn, Nicolas
Maniacoria, correcteur de la Bible, Revue Biblique 8 [1899]: 289295), which contains the
Adnotationes on ff. 37r-122r. Returning to what was said in Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla.
Umanesimo e teologia, 25, we would now clarify that the variants between the Brussels ms.
and the text of Erasmuss edition are not always of a formal nature. A lacuna, for example,
in the Brussels ms. (which is noted in our appendix), in addition to various other considerations, might indicate that Erasmus relied on a different manuscript tradition of Vallas
work from the one represented in the Brussels ms. And now one final observation regarding the appendix. The comparison between Vallas (extremely short) commentary and
Thomass (much fuller) one is not meant exclusively to emphasize the formers critique of
the latter. It intends, rather, to offer a list of biblical passages in which different methodologies, interpretations, and perspectives can be readily compared, and which thus clearly
shows (to our point of view) how much distance separates in both philological technique
and theological study the humanist of the fifteenth century from the great scholastic of
the thirteenth.
288
To the ancient and contemporary objection, it is not proper for Christians

to speak the way that pagans did,207 Valla responds:
Not the language of the pagans, not the grammar, not the rhetoric, not the
dialectic, nor the other arts are to be condemned since the Apostles wrote
in Greek but the doctrines, the religions, the false opinions regarding the
practice of the virtues through which we rise to heaven. The other sciences
and arts occupy a middle ground, to be used for good or for evil. Therefore
let us please try to reach, or at least approach, the place reached by the
luminaries of our religion [i.e., the Greek and Latin Fathers mentioned
earlier].208
It is therefore not the classical and Hellenistic science of language (litteratura) nor its related analytical tools that the Christian must reject as nontransferable to his own cultural studies and creations. On the contrary,
since the New Testament and, above all, the letters of Paul occupy an
important place among writings in Koine Greek, the message of the
Gospel must be studied and deciphered, and in two ways: on the one hand
in relation to the contribution it made to the stylistic and semantic development of Koine, and, on the other hand, as a text whose comprehension
is accessible only along the synchronic and diachronic coordinates of that
language. These are the two sides, the two points of view, whose convergence or referential system defines and clarifies the exegetical method put
into practice by Valla in his Adnotationes.
Litteratura must therefore not be rejected prejudicially but used freely,
though mediated and made commensurable with Sacred Scripture. What
the Christian must reject, however following in the footsteps of the
Fathers theological and literary practice, and in line with the principles of
the methodological theory enunciated by Jerome in his letters are the
doctrines (dogmata) of the philosophers, the religion (religio) underlying
the cultural and political praxis of the pagans, and the opinions (opiniones) of Greek and Hellenistic ethics. This is precisely what Valla had
attempted to put into practice, in order to find solutions on which to
base an authentic humanist theology, respectively in the Disputationes
207Valla, Elegantiae, book IV, preface (ed. Garin), 620: gentiles hoc modo locutos esse,
non decere eodem loqui.
208Ibid., 620622: Non lingua gentilium, non grammatica, non rhetorica, non dialectica, ceteraeque artes damnandae sunt, siquidem Apostoli lingua graeca scripserunt; sed
dogmata, sed religiones, sed falsae opiniones de actione virtutum per quas in coelum scandimus. Ceterae autem scientiae atque artes in medio sunt positae, quibus et bene uti possis
et male. Quapropter conemur obsecro eo pervenire, aut saltem proxime, quo luminaria illa
nostrae religionis pervenerunt.

and De libero arbitrio (against philosophical doctrines), in De falso
Constantini Donatione (with the programmatic call for the pope to be the
vicar of Christ alone and not of Caesar as well), and in De vero falsoque
bono (with its investigation of the true virtues that lead us to the true
good as compared with Aristotelian, Stoic, and Epicurean ethics).209
In this sense, the Christian must be open to a reappropriation of traditional pagan culture. The sciences and the arts, a human artifact of the
pagans, occupy a middle ground and thus admit of evangelical deployment and transformation. Aquinas would have said that they possess obediential capacity (capacitas oboedientialis). Here Thomass capacitas and,
even more so, Vallas concept of a middle ground (medietas), indicate that
culture, in its many and various historical forms, has an essential and
qualitative valence with respect to Christian faith and praxis. Indeed, it
must be noted that this essentially ambivalent character of knowledge
and, more precisely, the possibility of using literature (humanae litterae)
for good or evil in theological epistemology, are here affirmed by Valla not
only explicitly and programmatically, but above all in a way that is unique
within humanist culture itself. Poggios opposition to Valla comes to mind;
for him, no theological mediation was possible between literature and the
science of faith. Instead he saw a dichotomy that could in no way be surmounted or modulated.210
In contrast, Vallas view of the sciences and the arts as a middle ground
requires that they converge with Christianity in forming dynamic units
pregnant and rich with theoretical and practical possibilities. On the one
hand it affirms the necessity of critical revision each time a particular culture is assumed within theological discourse. On the other it emphasizes
that each piece of human knowledge is uniquely autonomous and thus
that no one science or art can have a privileged position in relation to
Christianity in order that Christianity not be continually redefined by
the very historicity of culture in general and by the combination of its particular forms of expression (even if these are correlated with the temporal
limits and rhythms of the Gospel).
The historical rhythm of the forms of cultural expression is incongruous with the temporo-ecclesiological rhythm of the Gospel. This is what
209Valla, De libero arbitrio, 524: philosophicorum dogmatum; idem, De falso credita et
ementita Constantini donatione, ed. Wolfram Setz (Weimar: Bhlau, 1976), 176.89 (97): ut
papa tantum vicarius Christi sit et non etiam Caesaris; idem, De vero falsoque bono, 1.1314:
de veris virtutibus quibus ad verum bonum evadimus.
210[See, e.g., Poggio Bracciolini, Invectiva in L. Vallam I, in idem, Opera omnia,
1:199200.]
290
Valla gives concrete form to when he exalts rhetoric as queen of the world
and perfect wisdom in relation to contemporary theological discourse.
Hence his identification of patristic theology, which he understands as
rhetorical theology (theologia rhetorica), as the source of the humanist
alternative to the contemporary decadence of late scholasticism.
Valla continues:
I cant hold back from saying what I think. Those ancient theologians seem
to me like certain bees that, flying to far-off pastures, have used their marvelous art to produce the sweetest honey and wax; modern theologians, however, rather resemble ants who steal off into their hiding places with pieces
of grain swiped from their neighbor.211
This is Vallas contrast between the Fathers and the scholastics, between
the theology of the ancients, which is critically rigorous but still open to
cultural acquisitions and developments, and that of the moderns, crawling with disputations and dialectical subtleties, by now encased in its own
inaccessible jargon. He programmatically proclaims his choice between
the two:
For my part, I would not only rather be a bee than an ant, but I would also
rather fight in the service of a king bee than captain an army of ants. We are
confident that this will be approved by right-minded youths; the old are simply hopeless.212
This last statement finds an echo in the break, already in force while Valla
was writing, between the Laurentians (laurentiani) and the Poggians
(pogiani), between the followers of Valla and the old school (antiqua
schola), as Bracciolini would himself call it in his Invectivae.213
In the Elegantiae Valla intends to limit himself to offering a methodological and historical (in Quintilians terms) investigation of Latin grammar to be used by theological discourse in its own argumentative
procedure and exegetical study of Scripture. That is, he intends to systematically elaborate theologys morphological and semantic premises,
211Valla, Elegantiae, book IV, preface (ed. Garin), 622: Non possum me continere quominus quod sentio dicam. Veteres illi theologi videntur mihi velut apes quaedam in longinqua etiam pascua volitantes, dulcissima mella cerasque miro artificio condidisse; recentes
vero formicis simillimi quae ex proximo sublata furto grana in latibulis suis abscondunt
(emphasis added).
212Ibid., 622: At ego, quod ad me attinet, non modo malim apes quam formica esse, sed
etiam sub rege apium militare quam formicarum exercitum ducere. Quae probatum iri
bonae mentis iuvenibus, nam senes desperandi sunt, confidimus.
213On the controversy between the Laurentians and the Poggians, cf. Camporeale,
Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, 128129, n. 13 and 374ff.

namely the rules of grammar (praecepta grammaticae) that the science
of faith, since it is verbalized in human language, must be made to accept.
Hence the concluding lines of the preface, the text whose meaning and
substance we have sought to interpret in relation to the humanist solution
to the dichotomy between literature and theology:
Now I return to the work at hand, although what follows differs greatly from
what came before. For we shall treat [in the fourth book] the meaning of
words not all words but rather a sampling, as it were, especially of those
not treated by others; to treat all words would be a nearly endless endeavor.214
4.7.Erasmuss Humanism from the Antibarbari to the Life of Jerome: His

Solution to the Problem of Theology and Literature, and Vallas Influence
The role played by the preface to book IV of the Elegantiae in Erasmuss
dispute over the relationship between classical literature and theology
does not seem to have been adequately described. Vallas text was more
influential and certainly had a greater impact than can be deduced from
the mere identification in Erasmuss corpus of quotations from the various books of the Elegantiae.215 Instead it must be affirmed that Vallas
arguments and solutions (as traced in the preface) regarding the antinomy between literature and theology constitute the supporting arch of
Erasmuss response to the anti-humanism he faced at the turn of the
sixteenth century. The editorial evolution of the Antibarbarorum liber
between 1489 and 1494 tracked by James Tracy in a 1971 article shows
how Erasmus takes up and reworks Vallas preface.216 His reliance on the
214Valla, Elegantiae, book IV, preface (ed. Garin), 622: Nunc ad inceptum redeo, quamquam ea quae sequentur nonnihil a superioribus. Tractabimus enim de verborum significatione, neque de omnibus vocabulis sed quasi gustum quemdam, et eorum maxime quae ab
aliis tractata non sunt; nam de omnibus dicere prope infinitum est (emphasis added).
215For what follows, see: Emile V. Telle, Erasme de Rotterdam et le Septime Sacrament,
(Genve: Droz, 1954), 7197; Ernst Wilhelm Kohls, Die Theologie des Erasmus, 2 vols. (Basel:
F. Reinhardt, 1966), 1:3568; Charles Bn, Erasme et saint Augustin, ou Influence de saint
Augustin sur lhumanisme dErasme (Genve: Droz, 1969), 1595, 281333; Albert Rabil,
Erasmus and the New Testament: the Mind of a Christian Humanist (San Antonio: Trinity
University Press, 1972), 1426. For the text of the Life of Jerome (Hieronymi stridonensis vita)
we have followed: Desiderius Erasmus, Opuscula, ed. Wallace K. Ferguson (The Hague: M.
Nijhoff, 1933), 125133 (intr.) and 134190 (text and notes). Too late for consideration, we
became aware of two essays by Silvano Cavazza: La cronologia degli Antibarbari e le origini del pensiero religioso di Erasmo, Rinascimento, ser. 2, 15 (1975): 141179; and La
formazione culturale di Erasmo, La Cultura 13 (1975): 2040. We thank the author for
bringing these works to our attention and for providing offprints.
216James D. Tracy, The 1489 and 1494 versions of Erasmus Antibarbarorum Liber,
Humanistica Lovaniensia 20 (1971): 81120.
292
preface seems clear in his two thematic foci: first, the formulation of the
terms of the aporia as it was reproposed by the anti-humanism of the barbarians; second, the arguments and solutions put forward regarding the
supposed dichotomy between theological culture and classical literature.
Erasmus consciously takes his own anti-barbarian counter-response
directly from Valla, proposing a rhetorical theology in the place of the
philosophical theology of the contemporary scholastic tradition. It must
nevertheless be observed that Erasmuss reiteration, while expanding
Vallas proposal for a humanist theology to include multiple levels of culture, nevertheless ends up being less convincing, since less radical, than
Vallas proposal.
More precisely, if on the one hand Erasmus repeats arguments that are
distinctly and originally Vallas, on the other he revises Vallas solutions to
the problem. Alongside the commonplace of Jeromes Letter to Magnus in
defense of rhetoric, Erasmus invokes with equal insistence the authority
of Augustines De doctrina christiana, book IV, chapter 11, where the reference to classical culture principally concerns philosophy. In his preface,
however, Valla had deliberately excluded Augustine and instead focused
on Jerome as the authority for his radically unequivocal stance, namely
the exclusive exaltation of rhetorical theology in direct opposition to the
philosophical theology of the scholastic tradition.
In upholding the humanist principle for a theology founded on the science of rhetoric (along the lines traced in Vallas preface), Erasmus also
seems to want to bring De doctrina christiana into the Jerominian sphere
of a specifically philological and scriptural theology. In so doing he
attempted to bridge, at least on a theoretical level, the methodological
and analytical divide underlying the theological work and thought of the
two greatest Fathers of the Latin Church. Here Erasmus in no way agrees
with Valla, for whom there subsists an absolute epistemological difference
between the writings of Augustine and Jerome. And thus Erasmus and his
works variously conditioned by controversialist concerns, by his choice
of literary tools, and by the related periods of his own cultural development display an attitude and critical stance towards scholasticism that
are actually less radical than what appears in Valla, especially concerning
the more important aspect of traditional and contemporary speculative
theology. All this appears more clearly with regard to their respective
revivals of patristic theology. Erasmuss stance is much more complex and
variegated, developed in different times and in relation to multiple lines of
theological inquiry. Vallas is strongly univocal and unilateral, concentrated on Jerome and his works of New Testament exegesis.

The preceding observations, which emerge when the Antibarbari is
read in the light of the preface to the Elegantiae, take on precise contours
if the same text of Valla is compared to another work of Erasmus, completed in 1515/1516 the same two-year period that witnessed the publication of the Novum Instrumentum and Jeromes Letters. We are referring to
the Life of Jerome (Hieronymi stridonensis vita), the biography justly considered the leading exemplar of humanist hagiography. It served as an
introduction to the Letters, the first volume of Jeromes corpus, which
appeared at the beginning of March, 1516 at the same time as the Novum
Instrumentum.
The Life of Jerome, which also from an editorial point of view is closely
related to the prefaces to the Novum Instrumentum, provides the best and
most decisive evidence for the shift that marks the coming of humanist
theology. The guiding principles for such a theology, which as we have
seen were outlined completely in the Encomium of St. Thomas of 1457, had
their epistemological foundation in the preface to book IV of the
Elegantiae. It is Erasmus himself who, with a reference in an important
passage of the Life of Jerome (the reference was precisely identified by
Ferguson in his critical edition), connects his own work directly to Vallas
Elegantiae.217 But it must be immediately added that this reference underlies the entire composition of the Life of Jerome. The topos of the cautionary dream and the aporia regarding eloquence and theology, as drawn
from Jeromes letters and exegetical work on scripture, constitute the central theme of Erasmuss biography, just as they did in Vallas preface. This
is said expressly in the passage to which we have just made reference and
whose text we now offer:
It is painful even to remember the daily growling we hear from some wickedly religious and stupidly learned men who belittle in Jerome what is the
finest thing about him. I refer of course to his extravagant learning, as they
term it themselves, and to his eloquence, which to them is somewhat more
than befits a theologian. They know nothing at all about Jerome except that
he was pronounced a Ciceronian and scourged. But with regard to this, a
full reply was made by the most learned men Lorenzo Valla and Angelo
Poliziano, and I too once in my youth when less than twenty years of age
disported myself against the folly of those men in the dialogue entitled
Antibarbari.218
217[Erasmus, Hieronymi stridonensis vita, ll. 1133 and 1463, with notes.]
218Ibid., ll. 1126ff.: Audimus quotidie quosdam impie religiosos et inscite doctos nobis
ad aurem obgannire, id in Hieronymo calumniantes quod in eo pulcherrimum est, nimirum doctrinam, ut ipsi vocant, immodicam, et plusculum eloquentiae quam theologum
294
Indeed, as penetratingly traced by Erasmus, the course of Jeromes biography followed a cultural evolution and a lifelong ideal directed towards
overcoming the antinomy between Christianity and the pagan world. To
this end he deployed the theoretical tools of classical literature in his exegetical work on New and Old Testament Scripture. Jeromes entire life was
characterized by constant and intense study, whose goal was to formulate
a rhetorical theology, i.e. a theology that would put the classical science of
language (litteratura) to critical use for understanding the sources of
Judeo-Christian revelation.
Jeromes humanistic education is seen by Erasmus as serving a precise
theological goal: he occupied himself with rhetoric more diligently,
hoping that more would take pleasure in sacred literature if theologians
were to match the majesty of their discipline with dignity of style.219 In
other words, Erasmuss own alternative proposition for theology provides
the perspective for Jeromes biographical and cultural journey, namely his
rediscovery, along the arduous and complicated trails of the philological
criticism of Scripture, of that philosophy of Christ (Christi philosophia)
that flows from the purest fonts, i.e. the literary sources of JudeoChristian revelation.220
It is in this context that Erasmus places the sum of Jeromes analytical
inquiry and writing. Jeromes corpus is as if focused on a convergence of
profane, secular literature with sacred, divine literature, whose combined
stream flows towards a theological grammar of the earliest Christian language and writings. Hence Erasmuss view of the scriptural controversy in
which Jerome engaged with Rufinus and Augustine. Hence also the way
Erasmus depicts the peculiar and original theological position that Jerome
occupied among the Latin Church Fathers. Finally, it is this originality of
thought in Jerome that Erasmus along the line that connects him to
Valla attempts to demonstrate and somehow to appropriate for himself
with the publication of a new edition of Jeromes works.
deceat. Neque quicquam omnino norunt de Hieronymo, nisi quod Ciceronianus dictus
vapularit. Verum huius rei, ab eruditissimis abunde responsum est, Laurentio Valla et
Angelo Politiano, et nos olim adulescentuli minores annis viginti lusimus in istorum stultitiam Dialogis quos Antibarbaros inscripsimus. Translation by James F. Brady and John C.
Olin, Collected Works of Erasmus, vol. 61: The Patristic Scholarship, the Edition of Jerome
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), p. 50.
219Erasmus, Hieronymi stridonensis vita, ll. 236ff.: in rhetorica sese studiosius exercuit sperans futurum ut plures sacris litteris delectarentur, si quis theologiae maiestatem dignitate sermonis aequasset (tr. Brady and Olin, 27, modified). See also Hieronymi
stridonensis vita, ll. 195338 and 489ff.
220Ibid., ll. 489ff. and 1213.

The special significance, then, of the Life of Jerome, which Erasmus
intended as a programmatic and normative introduction to Jeromes
whole corpus, is as a critique of scholasticism one no less radical than
Vallas for the proposition of an alternative, humanist theology. Echoing
Valla, Erasmus starkly contrasts the exemplarity of Jerome and his works
with scholasticisms new breed of theologians. Totally ignorant of all
the arts and relying on a smattering of Aristotelian philosophy,
they rush into the profession of theology with unwashed feet and hands.
And as for the science of the Scriptures, they turn a sacred discipline into
something Sophistic or Thomistic or Scotistic or Ockhamistic.221 Erasmus
adds that none of Jeromes contemporaries had treated ecclesiological
controversies, scriptural inquiries, or dogmatic questions more theologically than he.222 Finally, after running through the whole debate over the
antinomy between literature and theology, from Valla to the literati of his
own day, Erasmus concludes by encouraging the intelligentsia of Christian
Europe to take up Jeromes works and study them in the light of the
humanist Renaissance and the decadent speculation of scholasticism:
Till now Jerome has labored under a disadvantage as he was not read by
very many, so he was understood by very few . But henceforth, when
throughout the entire Christian world the study of classical literature has
revived and not a few men of talent and of great promise have begun to
awaken to that old and genuine theology, we all may embrace a Jerome
reborn, as it were, in our common studies; and each individual may claim
him as his very own . Let each sex and each age study him, read him, drink
him in. There is no kind of teaching which cannot use his support, no way of
life which may not be formed by his precepts. Let only the heretics abhor
and hate Jerome. They were the only ones he always considered the bitterest
of his enemies.223
221Ibid., l. 1187: novum theologorum genus; ll. 795ff.: omnium bonarum litterarum
prorsus rudes et mala degustata Aristotelis philosophia freti, pedibus ac manibus illotis
irruant in theologiae professionem; 1193ff.: ex divina faciunt sophisticam, aut thomisticam, aut scotisticam, aut occamisticam (tr. Brady and Olin, 42 and 52).
222Ibid., ll. 1226ff.: magis theologice.
223Ibid., ll. 15341565: Illud hactenus offecit Hieronymo, quod ut a plerisque non legitur, ita a paucissimis intelligitur . At posthac quando per universum orbem christianum
revixerunt bonae litterae et non pauca bonae spei ingenia ad veterem illam ac germanam
theologiam exergisci coeperunt, Hieronymum veluti renatum communibus studiis
complectamur omnes: hunc singuli sibi ceu peculiarem vindicent . Hunc omnis sexus,
omnis aetas discat, evolvat, imbibat. Nullum doctrinae genus est, quod hinc non queat
adiuvari; nullum vitae institutum, quod huius praeceptis non formetur. Soli haeretici
Hieronymum horreant et oderint, quos ille solos semper acerrimos hostes habuit (tr.
Brady and Olin, 6162).
296
The Life of Jerome and the prefaces to the Novum Instrumentum provide
Erasmuss perspective on the new theological question of the early sixteenth century, but its center of radiation was fixed in the Encomium of
St. Thomas of 1457. In this way Vallas oration acted as an essential break
between two historical moments of Christian philosophical and theological thought: between medieval scholasticism and the humanist culture of
the Renaissance, between Thomas Aquinas and Erasmus of Rotterdam,
the two emblematic poles that encompass the trends and structures of the
science of faith.
Lorenzo Valla and his work thus play a founding role for humanist theology and, at the same time, provide a retrospective view that historicizes
medieval systematic theology, encasing it within a specific period of
Christianitys development. The Encomium of St. Thomas, which synthesizes Vallas whole corpus, is perhaps the most conscious portrayal of the
crisis that came to a head in Christianity between the early fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth. This crisis was organic to the
political and civic crisis of the same period (acutely identified by the historiography of civic humanism224), but it culminated as a religious and
theological crisis. That is, it was a crisis of Christian existence and categorical systematics, of Church (ecclesia) and ecclesiology, of evangelical faith
and the science of faith. Valla was the first directly to confront, on a theoretical and a practical level, this crisis of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century
Christianity, and he did so by extending the use of the philological criticism of humanism into the realm of theological and scriptural study.225
224[For civic humanism, see at least Hans Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian
Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Republican Liberty in an Age of Classicism and Tyranny,
2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955); and James Hankins (ed.), Renaissance
Civic Humanism: Reappraisals and Reflections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000). Eds.]
225For a full discussion of the crisis of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see
Salvatore I. Camporeale, Umanesimo e teologia tra 400 e 500, in Problemi di storia della
Chiesa nei secoli XV-XVII (Napoli: Edizioni Dehoniane, 1979), 137164.
LORENZO VALLA
ENCOMIUM OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
Patrick Baker (ed. and tr.)
Note on the Text: The Latin text, which is provided here as a supplement to
the English translation and as a source for the quotations in Camporeales
essay, is substantially that of the critical edition of Stefano Cartei: Lorenzo
Valla, Encomion sancti Thome Aquinatis, ed. S. Cartei (Firenze: Polistampa,
2008). Camporeale based his own work on direct consultation of the available manuscripts and the earlier edition of Francesco Adorno (Lorenzo
Valla, Oraciones y Prefacios, ed. F. Adorno [Santiago: Universidad de Chile,
1955], 290321), but it has seemed preferable to adopt Carteis more correct text. A deciding factor was that Cartei follows what he demonstrates
to be a more reliable manuscript tradition; that is, he argues convincingly
that ms. Paris, Bibliothque Nationale de France, Lat. 7811 A (= P) is more
trustworthy and closer to the author than both ms. Rome, Biblioteca
Angelica, 1500 (= R), on which Adorno primarily relied, and ms. Modena,
Biblioteca Estense Universitaria, Lat. 151 (alpha T.6.15) (= M). While following Carteis readings and emendations (none of which represents a
significant departure from the version Camporeale used), I have repunctuated the text, followed my own judgment regarding capitalization, and
preferred classical orthography in the interests of accessibility to a broader
audience. I have also reformatted the text in a manner suggested by
Camporeales interpretation, dividing it, moreover, as he does, into the
five sections exordium, narratio, probatio, refutatio, and peroratio.
In preparing my own English rendering I have consulted the following
existing translations: the Italian version of Giorgio Radetti, in Lorenzo
Valla, Scritti filosofici e religiosi (Firenze: Sansoni, 1953), 455469 (= In lode
di S. Tommaso dAquino); the Spanish version of Francesco Adorno in Valla,
Oraciones y Prefacios (= Encomio de Santo Toms de Aquino); and the
English version of M. Esther Hanley in Leonard A. Kennedy (ed.),
Renaissance Philosophy: New Translations (The Hague: Mouton, 1973),
1727 (= In Praise of Saint Thomas Aquinas).
Laurentii Vallae
Encomion Sancti Thomae Aquinatis
[Exordium]
10
15
20
25
[1] Moris fuit vetustissimis temporibus cum apud Graecos tum vero
apud Latinos ut qui orationem aliqua de re maiore vel ad iudices vel ad
populum esset habiturus, is fere ab invocatione caelestis numinis exordiretur. Quem ego ritum a veri Dei cultoribus reor introductum, ut sacrificia, ut
primitias, ut caerimonias, ut ceteros divinos honores, mox ut illa, ita hunc
quoque a vera religione ad falsas fuisse translatum. Nam id profecto exstitit
in rebus humanis immanissimum nefas et paene caput malorum omnium,
cultum religionis immortali Deo et soli creatori debitum tribuere mortalibus ac rebus creatis. Haec consuetudo cum per aliquot saecula in utraque
natione viguisset, paulatim in desuetudinem versa est, desitumque numina
invocare non modo ab iis qui malas sed etiam ab iis qui bonas causas agebant: ab iis quidem qui malas quod aut nullos esse deos crederent aut eos
invocare extimescerent quisquis enim deos implorat ideo implorat ut
veritati atque iustitiae assint, quod mali fieri nolunt; ab iis autem qui bonas
agebant, partim quod iuri suo citra deorum praesidium fidere videri vellent, partim quod sese praestantiores atque viriliores visum iri putarent, si
non protinus tamquam feminae ad implorandos deos confugerent muliebre namque iam videbatur, non virile, numina implorare, unde apud
Sallustium Cato inquit: non votis neque suppliciis muliebribus auxilia
deorum parantur. Verum sicut improbe illi hunc vetustissimum morem
summoverant et quasi de possessione deiecerant, ita probe fecerunt qui in
integrum restituerunt in possessionemque reduxerunt, non ut gentiles,
quod absit, imitarentur, sed ne a gentilibus superari viderentur; nam si illi
falsis diis tantum honoris tribuebant ut eos in exordiis invocandos putarent, quanto nos magis hunc honorem Deo vero tribuere debemus? Quare
istorum ego institutum tam egregium hodie imitari et debeo et volo, laudes
sancti Thomae Aquinatis relaturus, et, ut consuetum est, sanctissimam Dei
matrem eamdemque semper virginem invocare, salutans eam angelicis
verbis: Ave Maria
Lorenzo Valla
Encomium of St. Thomas Aquinas
[Exordium]
[1] It was customary in ancient times among the Greeks as well as the
Latins for whoever was going to give a speech on some important matter,
either to judges or to the people, in general to begin with a divine invocation. I think this rite was introduced by the worshipers of the true God, just
like sacrifices, the offering of the first-fruits, ceremonies, and the other
divine honors; and like them, it too soon passed from the true religion to
false ones. Now, to accord to mortals and created things the religious worship due to immortal God, the lone creator, stands out as quite the most
monstrous of all human transgressions and perhaps the chief of all evils.
After this custom had reigned among both peoples for several centuries, it
slowly fell into disuse, and divinities ceased to be invoked not only by those
pleading bad causes, but also by those pleading good ones. Those pleading
bad ones either believed that there were no gods or were afraid to invoke
them for whoever beseeches the gods beseeches them to attend to truth
and justice, something the evil do not want to happen. As for those pleading good causes, in part they wanted to seem to put greater trust in their
law than in the protection of the gods, in part they thought they would
seem more distinguished and manlier by not continually taking refuge like
women in prayers to the gods. For then it seemed effeminate and unmanly
to invoke deities, wherefore Cato says (in Sallust): the aid of the gods is not
procured with vows and womanish prayers.1 But just as those men were
wrong to cast off this most ancient custom as if banishing it from their possession, others did well to take it back into their possession and restore it
intact. This they did not do, as some might think, to imitate the pagans, but
rather so as not to be seen to be outdone by them. For if the pagans gave
such great honor to their false gods that they thought they should invoke
them when beginning their speeches, how much more ought we bestow
this honor on the true God? Therefore before beginning my praise of
St. Thomas Aquinas, it is my duty and my pleasure today to imitate that
outstanding institution of theirs. And so, as is our custom, I invoke the most
holy mother of God, the eternal virgin, greeting her with the angelic words:
Ave Maria 2
1Sallust, De coniuratione Catilinae, 52, 29.
2The exordium ends with a recitation of the Ave Maria.
300
encomion s. thomae
[Narratio]
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
[2] Etsi omnes qui in Domino moriuntur beati sunt et sancti, tamen eos
demum beatos et sanctos promulgat ecclesia quos cognovit vel mortem pro
religione, pro veritate, pro iustitia oppetisse, vel vita caste integreque traducta divinis signis ac miraculis claruisse. Horum priores graeco vocabulo
martyres, posteriores latino confessores appellat ecclesia, licet utriusque
nominis vis eodem fere tendat. Quid enim martyres aliud tolerandis tormentis et obeunda morte fecerunt, nisi Christum nolentes abnegare confessi sunt? Quorum illa frequentissima in tormentis exstitit vox se non
negare Christum sed esse Dei filium confiteri. Ergo idem est martyrem esse
quod confessorem. Rursus quid aliud confessores egerunt quam pie
vivendo pieque scribendo veritati testimonium perhibuerunt? Siquidem
Ioannes Baptista, qui ad perhibendum testimonium de lumine id est de
veritate missus erat, non minus illud perhibuit praedicando quam mortem obeundo. Ergo cum hoc confessores fecerint, nimirum martyres exstiterunt: martyr enim transfertur latine testis et martyrion testimonium.
[3] Hoc quamquam ita sit, tamen Ecclesia, ut dixi latina dumtaxat
superiores tantum martyres appellandos censuit et praerogativa ordinis
honorandos, quod videlicet milites strenui et fortes cum in ceteris militiae
operibus tum praecipue in proeliis imperatori suo probantur. Martyres
autem, qui fuere Christi milites, pro imperatore suo in acie steterunt sanguinemque ac vitam profuderunt. Confessores vero, et ipsi milites Christi,
solum labores militares, magnos illos quidem atque diutinos, pertulerunt,
parati et mortem pro imperatore Deo subire, verum ipsis ut eam subirent
aut in acie starent non contigit. Idcirco martyres ampliore honore fuisse
afficiendi videntur. Quod etsi iure ac merito factum est, quis tamen
negaverit esse quosdam e numero confessorum qui nonnullis martyribus
non modo aequari possint verum etiam anteferri? Quod divino quoque testimonio declaratur, cum videamus multos confessores fuisse quam quosdam martyres longe miraculis illustriores.
[4] Quorsum autem haec? Ut appareat Thomam nostrum Aquinatem,
etsi confessorem, non tamen esse continuo post martyres reponendum, ut
mea fert opinio, nihilo inferiorem, ne longius exempla repetam, aut Petro
eiusdem ordinis, qui ob tutandam veritatem
encomium of st. thomas301

[Narratio]
[2] Although all who die in the Lord are blessed and saints, nevertheless
the Church expressly designates as blessed and saints those whom it recognizes either as having met death for religion, for truth, for justice, or as having achieved fame for leading a chaste and spotless life accompanied by
divine signs and miracles. It uses the Greek word martyrs (martyres) for the
former and the Latin one confessors (confessores) for the latter, although
both terms have approximately the same meaning. For what else have martyrs done in enduring torture and meeting death than confess themselves
unwilling to deny Christ? Under torture they repeatedly refused to deny
Christ but rather confessed that he was the son of God. Therefore a martyr is
the same as a confessor. On the other hand, what else have confessors done
in living piously and writing piously than bear witness to the truth? John the
Baptist was sent to bear witness to the light that is, to the truth and he did
so no less by preaching than by meeting death.3 Thus by acting in this way,
surely confessors have shown themselves to be martyrs. For martyr is translated in Latin as witness (testis), and martyrion testimony (testimonium).
[3] Although this is the case, the Church, as I have said at least the
Latin one has decided that only the former are to be called martyrs and
honored with the privilege of that rank, because, as vigorous and brave soldiers, they are recognized by their commander for their military service
and especially for their deeds in battle. The martyrs, then, who were soldiers of Christ, stood in the battle line for their commander and poured out
their blood and life. The confessors were themselves also soldiers of Christ,
but they merely performed military labors (albeit great and lasting ones);
and although they were prepared to undergo death for their commander,
God, they did not actually undergo it or stand in the battle line. For that
reason it seems that martyrs ought to have been accorded greater honor.
The justice of this view notwithstanding, who could deny that there are
certain confessors who not only equal but even surpass some martyrs?
Divine testimony makes this clear, as we see that many confessors were
much more renowned for miracles than certain martyrs.
[4] What is the point of these considerations? To show that our Thomas
Aquinas, although a confessor, should not necessarily be placed below the
martyrs. In my opinion he is in no way inferior not to look too far afield
for examples either to Peter the Dominican,4 whose defense of the truth
3John 1:68.
4St. Peter of Verona (St. Peter Martyr).
302
65
70
75
80
85
90
encomion s. thomae
a rustico quodam furioso falce interfectus est, aut Thoma episcopo

Cantuariensi, qui tamquam pastor bonus pro grege suo, ne clerus bonis
spoliaretur, occubuit. Quod eo quoque probatur argumento quod, cum
utrique horum Thomae nomen fuerit, tamen huic nostro non ab homine,
sed divinitus illud impositum, cum sua interpretatione Thomas hebraice
tum abyssus tum geminus transfertur, qualis vere Thomas Aquinas fuit, vel
abyssus quaedam scientiae vel geminus ob scientiam et virtutem, utramque
singularem atque incredibilem, veluti quidam sol fulgore doctrinarum
lucidissimus et fervore virtutum ardentissimus. Propter fulgorem quidem
doctrinarum inter Cherubim, propter fervorem autem virtutum inter
Seraphim collocandus, quas nunc referam.
[5] Verum enimvero eas referre conanti mihi videntur quidam occurrere
et quasi manus obiicere reclamantes: quid ais? quid tibi cum ista hyperbole vis, amica stultis, inimica prudentibus? Nullamne tu veritatis, nullam
conscientiae tuae, nullam horum tot gravissimorum sapientissimorumque
hominum, qui te audiunt, rationem habebis? Non es contentus Thomam
Aquinatem aequasse martyribus et permultis eorum praetulisse, nisi eum
efferas usque ad Cherubim, super quos Deus sedet, nisi etiam, quo nullus
est ordo angelorum altior, ipsis Seraphim aequiperes? Quid plus Thomae
apostolo tributurus? Quid plus doctori gentium Paulo, tamquam uni ex
Cherubim? Quid plus Ioanni Evangelistae, tamquam uni ex Seraphim?
[6] Huic ego respondeam me quidem sentire omnes qui scientia rerum
divinarum imbuti sunt aliquid habere commune cum Cherubim, omnes
item qui sunt Dei caritate perfusi socios esse Seraphim, nedum Thomam
scientia et caritate plenissimum, tamen me iuste ab eo vel reprehendi
vel admoneri. Quapropter huius ordinis fratres exoratos velim ut mihi
dent veniam in referendis istius sancti laudibus temperamento potius
quam licentia utenti, nec eas omnes sed maximas quasque referenti.
Perstringendae enim sunt illae apud hos patres conscriptos, non explicandae, ne taedium afferant, utique tantae et tam magnae ut si verbis eas coner
extollere ante diem clauso componat Vesper Olympo, ut poeta inquit.
roused some mad peasant to kill him with a sickle, or to Thomas, bishop of
Canterbury,5 who, like the good shepherd protecting his flock, died to keep
the clergy from being despoiled of its goods. That he is not inferior is further demonstrated by the following argument: although both men had the
name of Thomas, our Thomas received it not by human but by divine will,
since the meaning of Thomas in Hebrew is both bottomless pit (abyssus)
and twin (geminus). And Thomas Aquinas truly was such a one: a kind of
bottomless pit of knowledge, and a twin due to the pairing of knowledge
and virtue in him, both of which were without parallel and beyond belief.
He was like a kind of sun, shining forth in the dazzling splendor of his
learning and burning bright with the ardor of his virtues. He is to be placed
among the Cherubim for the splendor of his learning, among the Seraphim
for the ardor of his virtues. Of these qualities I shall now speak.
[5] But in my attempt to do so, some people seem to me to be objecting
and just about throwing up their hands, crying, What are you saying? What
are you aiming at with this hyperbole of yours, which is the friend of the
foolish, enemy of the prudent? Will you have no regard for the truth, for
your own conscience, or for your audience, which is composed of numerous men of the greatest importance and wisdom? Are you not content to
make Thomas Aquinas the equal of the martyrs and to prefer him to many
of them? Must you raise him up to the level of the Cherubim, above whom
God sits? Must you also compare him to the very Seraphim, the highest
order of angels? What more will you accord to the apostle Thomas? What
more to Paul the teacher of the Gentiles that he is one of the Cherubim?
What more to John the Baptist that he is one of the Seraphim?
[6] Let me respond that I do indeed think that all who are imbued with
the knowledge of divine truths have something in common with the
Cherubim, just as all who are infused with the love of God are the fellows of
the Seraphim to say nothing of Thomas, so incredibly full of knowledge
and love. Still, I have been justly reproached and warned. Therefore I entreat
the brothers of this order to pardon me if I relate the praises of its saint with
greater temperance than I otherwise might have done, and if I do not mention all of them but focus only on those of the greatest importance. For to
this august body they ought to be narrated briefly, not treated at length, lest
they grow tiresome. And if I tried to praise such great and powerful virtues
with words, the day would sooner than the tale be done,6 as the poet says.
5St. Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury.

6Virgil, Aeneid, I.374, tr. Dryden.
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encomion s. thomae
[Probatio]
[7] Merito igitur talis vir ut de virtutibus eius prius dicam, dicturus
postea de scientiis merito debuit antequam nasceretur mundo praedici,
eius ortus prophetari, vita promitti, mors etiam nuntiari. Etenim matri eius
ventrem ferenti anachoreta quidam, vir Dei qui ad hoc ipsum denuntiandum venerat, gratulabundus dixit genituram esse filium quem Thomam
appellaret, in quo excellentia huius nominis impleretur. Solet Deus, quo100 tiens aliquid eximium ac novum terris dare destinavit, id signis aut vaticiniis enuntiare. Cuius rei sunt non parum multa exempla, sed brevitatis
gratia uno et domestico ero contentus.
[8] Sic beati Dominici, huius familiae progenitoris, magnitudo matri
suae, cum gravida esset, praedicta est. Non dicam utrum praestantius fuerit
105 vaticinium, ne inter patrem et filium videatur, quantum in nobis est, esse
certatio. Sint paria de utroque vaticinia, paria amborum vitae merita.
Neuter alteri praeponatur: sint tamquam duo consules, quo nullus erat
maior magistratus, pari veneratione nobis honorandi, omnibus uterque virtutibus, infinitis uterque miraculis clari. Quorum etsi alterum modo lau110 dandum habeo, tamen utrumque coniungam, primum quia, cum pares
ambos faciam, sic magis liquebit quousque dignitatis et celsitudinis putem
Thomam esse provehendum, deinde quia institutum Praedicatorum est
fratres binos ire, non singulos.
[9] Dominicus igitur domum Praedicatorum condidit, Thomas eius pavi115 menta marmore vestivit. Dominicus parietes struxit, Thomas picturis eos
egregiis adornavit. Dominicus fratrum columen exstitit, Thomas specimen.
Dominicus plantavit, Thomas irrigavit. Ille dignationes atque episcopatus
ultro oblatos refugit atque adversatus est, hic nobilitatem, opes, propinquos, parentes tamquam sirenes effugit. Ille castitatem et continentiam
120 Pauli, hic virginitatem Ioannis Evangelistae reddidit. Illius humilitate
quam significantius graeci tapeinophrosynen vocant nihil admirabilius,
huius tanta humilitas fuit ut etiam de aliorum tumore atque iactantia
miraretur, in se numquam id vitium expertus, ut apud quosdam fratres simpliciter confessus est, cum tamen tot et tanta in se agnosceret ornamenta.
125
[10] Hae sunt propriae virtutum laudes. Illa vero testimonia virtutum et
praemia et quasi in hac vita paradisus revelationes, visiones, miracula
quae tanta in his fuerunt, ut cetera taceam,
95

[Probatio]
[7] Justly, therefore, such a man let me speak first about his virtues and
later about his knowledge justly was he destined to be foretold to the world
before he was born, his birth prophesied, his life predicted, even his death
announced. For when his mother was with child, a certain hermit, a man of
God who had come precisely to bring her this news, congratulated her and
told her that she would bear a son whom she would call Thomas and who
would be filled with the excellence of this name. God, whenever he has
resolved to give something extraordinary and new to the world, is wont to
announce it with signs or prophecies. There are very many examples of this,
but, for the sake of brevity, I shall be content with one from the family.
[8] In the same way the greatness of the blessed Dominic, the founder of
this family, was foretold to his mother when she was pregnant. I will not say
which prophecy was more extraordinary, in order to avoid (to the extent
possible) the appearance of a contest between father and son. Let the
prophecies about each man be equal, equal the merits of both their lives.
Let neither be placed before the other. Let them be like two consuls, the
highest of magistracies. We must honor them with equal veneration, both
of them renowned for all the virtues, both for miracles without number.
Although I am only here to praise one of the two, nevertheless I will join
them together. First, because by setting them equal it will become all the
clearer to what heights of lofty dignity I think Thomas should be raised.
Second, because the rule of the Preachers is that the brothers go in twos,
not singly.
[9] So then, Dominic founded the house of the Preachers; Thomas
covered its floors with marble. Dominic built its walls; Thomas decorated
them with the finest paintings. Dominic was the pillar of the brothers,
Thomas their shining example. Dominic planted; Thomas gave water. The
one shunned and resisted the honors and episcopacies bestowed upon
him; the other fled nobility, wealth, kinsmen, and parents as if they
were sirens. The one imitated the chastity and continence of Paul, the
other the virginity of John the Evangelist. Of the one nothing was more
admirable than his humility (which the Greeks more meaningfully call
tapeinophrosyn). The other had so much humility that he was even astonished at the boasting and bragging of others; he never felt this vice in himself, as he frankly confessed to some brothers, although he still recognized
his own great and numerous talents.
[10]These are the praises of their virtues. Now for the testimonies of their
virtues and their rewards, the revelations, visions, and miracles which are like
paradise on earth. They were so great in them that, to speak of nothing else,
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encomion s. thomae
ut uterque sanctos Apostolos Petrum et Paulum sive re vera sive per speciem,
uterque sanctissimam Dei matrem, uterque Dominum Salvatorem sive in
130 corpore sive extra corpus et viderit et audierit, deque obitu suo imminenti
certior factus sit. Nam adeo ferventes in orationibus erant ut interdum sublimes a terra, Deo miraculum quibusdam fratribus indicante, cernerentur.
[11] Denique, ut finem comparationis faciam, ille optimam fratrum
regulam scripsit, hic plurimos ac praestantissimos libros. At plus est, dicas,
135 libros composuisse quam regulam. Cur ita plus esse ais? Dum hic scribundis libris operam dat, ille regundis provinciis incumbit et, ut optimus rector, suis populis bene vivendi regulam ac legem tradit, et certe non plures
transmittit in caelum scriptis suis Thomas quam Dominicus sua regula.
Concedatur ergo in virtutibus, in miraculis, in gloria pares esse Dominicum
140 et Thomam, non magis inter se differentes atque discretos quam Lucifer est
et Hesperus.
[Refutatio]
[12] Dixi de virtutibus ac miraculis Thomae breviter et nude, nulla usus
amplificatione atque exornatione, ne minus quam pro rei dignitate, ut in
hac temporis angustia, dicerem. Credo iam a me expectari ut quid de huius
145 sancti scientia, quod secundo loco proposui, dicam, quibus eum praeponam, quibus aequiperem.
[13] Non me fugit quosdam, qui de hac re hoc die ex hoc loco orationem
habuerunt, non modo nulli doctorum ecclesiae secundum Thomam fecisse
sed etiam omnibus anteposuisse. Qui, cur nulli secundum facere debeant,
150 ex eo probabant quod quidam integerrimae vitae frater inter orandum
viderit Augustinum, quem summum theologorum statuunt, et una
Thomam, mirabili utrumque praeditum maiestate, Augustinumque dicentem audierit Thomam esse sibi in gloria parem. Cur autem eumdem possint omnibus praeponere, hinc demonstrabant quod dicerent eum ad
155 probationem theologiae adhibere logicam, metaphysicam atque omnem
philosophiam, quam superiores doctores vix primis labiis degustassent.
[14] Lubricus hic mihi et anceps locus, non modo propter sancti cuius de
laudibus loquimur dignitatem, sed etiam propter inolitam apud plerosque
opinionem neminem posse sine dialecticorum, metaphysicorum, cetero160 rum philosophorum praeceptis evadere theologum.
they saw and heard the holy Apostles Peter and Paul (either truly or in a
vision), the most holy mother of God, and the Lord our Savior (either in the
body or out of the body7). Both men were told about their imminent deaths.
What is more, they prayed so heatedly that now and then they were seen
levitating, God revealing the miracle to certain brothers.
[11] Finally, to complete the comparison: the one wrote the brothers
most excellent rule, the other the most outstanding and the greatest number of books. But, you might say, it is a greater thing to have written books
than a rule. Why do you say this? While Thomas devotes himself to writings, Dominic rules the provinces and, as an excellent leader, gives his peoples a Rule and law for living well. Certainly Thomas sends no more men to
heaven with his writings than Dominic does with his Rule. Therefore let it
be granted that virtue, glory, and miracles are equal in Dominic and
Thomas, who are no more different and distinct from one another than the
morning from the evening star.
[Refutatio]
[12] I have spoken of Thomass virtues and miracles briefly and simply,
aving made no use of exaggeration and embellishment, lest, in the short
h
time available, I say less than the dignity of the subject requires. I believe
you would now like me to say something about this saints knowledge,
which I proposed to treat second, saying whom I would set him above and
whom I would call his equal.
[13] It has not escaped me that certain people who held an oration here
today on the same subject not only made Thomas second to none of the
doctors of the Church but also placed him above them all. They claim that
they ought to consider him second to none because a certain friar of the
utmost purity supposedly saw Augustine, whom they count as the greatest
theologian, together with Thomas. Both were endowed with wonderful
majesty, and he heard Augustine say that Thomas was his equal in glory. The
reason they gave for being able to put him above everyone is that for proof
in theology he used logic, metaphysics, and all philosophy, which the earlier
doctors are supposed to have barely tasted with the tips of their tongues.
[14] This is a slippery and perilous place for me, not only on account of
the dignity of the saint we are praising, but also because of the deep-set
opinion, held by so many, that no one can become a theologian without the
precepts of the dialecticians, metaphysicians, and the other philosophers.
72 Cor. 12:2.
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Quid igitur agam? Reformidabone, tergiversabor, dissimulabo quid sentiam dicere, et lingua a corde dissentiet? Quoniam huc ascendi non mea
sponte sed exoratus a fratribus nec tacere mihi integrum est, non committam ut quisquam putet me scientem esse mentitum.
165
[15] Ego in sancto Thoma eximiam quidem scribendi subtilitatem etiam
atque etiam laudo, diligentiam admiror, copiam, varietatem, absolutionem
doctrinarum stupeo. Addo quod plerique tribuere nolint id quod ab
ipso dictum esse memorant, eum omnino nullum legisse librum quem non
plane intellexerit, quod haud scio an ulli nostri temporis contigerit, vel
170 iurisperito in iure civili, vel medico in medicina, vel philosopho in philosophia, vel oratori in antiquarum rerum lectione, et item in ceteris artibus
atque scientiis, nedum uni in omnibus.
[16] Ista autem quae vocant metaphysica et modos significandi et alia id
genus, quae recentes theologi tamquam novam sphaeram nuper inventam
175 aut planetarum epicyclos admirantur, nequaquam ego tantopere admiror,
nec ita multum interesse arbitror an scias an nescias, et quae forte sit satius
nescire tamquam meliorum impedimenta. Neque id meis argumentis planum faciam, etsi possem facere, sed veterum theologorum auctoritate, qui
tantum abest ut haec in libris suis tractaverint ut ne nomina quidem ipsa
180 scripta reliquerint: Cyprianus, Lactantius, Hilarius, Ambrosius, Hieronymus,
Augustinus.
[17] An scilicet ob ignorationem? Qui fieri potest? Nam sive in nostra
lingua fundamentum haec habent, illi latinissimi fuerunt, recentes autem
omnes paene barbari; sive in graeca, illi graeca noverunt, isti ignorant. Cur
185 igitur non tractaverint? Quia tractanda non fuerunt, et forte etiam ignoranda. Idque duabus de causis, una rerum, altera verborum.
[18] Rerum quidem, quod ista nihil ad scientiam rerum divinarum conducere videbantur. Id quod etiam visum est theologis graecis, Basilio,
Gregorio, Ioanni Chrysostomo ac ceteris eius aetatis, qui neque dialectico190 rum captiunculas neque metaphysicas ambages neque modorum significandi nugas in quaestionibus sacris admiscendas putaverunt, ac ne in
philosophia quidem suarum disputationum fundamenta iecerunt, cum
Paulum clamantem legerent:
What am I to do then? Shrink in fear, make an about-face, disguise what

I think, and have my tongue contradict my heart? Since it was not of my
own accord but at the entreaty of the brothers that I rose to speak, and
since it is not my way to remain silent, I shall not give anyone cause to think
that I have not spoken my mind.
[15] I highly praise the exceptional simplicity of St. Thomass writing;
I admire his carefulness; I am amazed at the fullness, the variety, the completeness of his teachings. I add another thing, with which many people
would not credit him but which he himself is supposed to have said: that he
never read any book that he did not fully understand. This is something
that I doubt has happened to anyone of our time: no jurist in civil law, no
doctor in medicine, no philosopher in philosophy, no humanist in the reading of ancient texts, nor anyone else in the remaining arts and sciences,
much less one man in all fields.
[16] But those things which they call metaphysics and modes of signifying and the like, which modern theologians regard with wonder like a
newly discovered sphere or like the epicycles of the planets, I regard with
no great wonder at all. Nor do I think, therefore, that it matters much
whether one knows them or not. And perhaps it would be preferable not to
know them, as they are like impediments to better things. This I will make
clear not with my own arguments (although I could) but by citing the
authority of the ancient theologians Cyprian, Lactantius, Hilary, Ambrose,
Jerome, Augustine who were so far from treating such matters in their
works that they did not even mention them.
[17] Was it because they were ignorant? How could that be possible? For
if these things have a basis in our own language, those men were as Latin as
can be, whereas modern theologians are nearly all barbarians. And if in
Greek, the ancient theologians knew it, but these moderns of yours do not.
Why, then, should they not have treated these subjects? Because they were
not supposed to be treated, and perhaps they were not even supposed to be
known and this for two reasons: one having to do with their contents, the
other with their words.
[18] Regarding their contents: because these subjects did not seem to
lead to the knowledge of divine truths. Such also seemed to be the case to
the Greek theologians Basil, Gregory, John Chrysostom, and the others of
that age. They did not think that the sophisms of dialectics, the obscurities of metaphysics, or the trifles of the modes of signifying should be
mixed in with sacred questions. Nor did they even lay the foundations
of their disputations in philosophy, for they heeded Pauls exclamation:
310
195
200
205
210
215
220
encomion s. thomae
non per philosophiam et inanem fallaciam. Quod etiam usu ipsi intelligimus. Quid enim in philosophia non dico in rationali, quae tota in verbis est,
de qua et dixi et dicam, sed morali et naturali quod sit indubitatum
ratumque, nisi quod in naturali aut medicorum aut aliorum experimenta
deprehenderunt?
[19] Verborum autem, quod alia est condicio linguae graecae alia latinae,
quae longior foret ad disputandum materia et quaestio ab hoc tempore aliena. Hoc dixisse sit satis, hos doctores ecclesiae latinos reformidasse vocabula quae auctores latinos, id est suos in loquendo magistros, graecarum
litterarum eruditissimos nunquam viderant usurpasse, quae novi theologi
semper inculcant: ens, entitas, quidditas, identitas, reale, essentiale, suum
esse, et verba illa quae dicuntur ampliari, dividi, componi, et alia huiusmodi.
Ergo haec non minima ex parte nugatoria aut non tractanda fuerunt illis
aut ignoranda, ne magis ignorarent.
[20] Neque vero hoc dico ut recentibus theologis derogem cur enim
derogare velim praesertim saeculo meo? sed ut veteres iniuste reprehensos sugillatosque defendam, qui non sunt hunc in modum theologati sed se
totos ad imitandum Paulum apostolum contulerunt, omnium theologorum
longe principem ac theologandi magistrum. Cuius is est dicendi modus, ea
vis, ea maiestas ut quae sententiae apud alios etiam apostolos iacent eae
sint apud hunc erectae, quae apud alios stant apud hunc proelientur, quae
apud alios vix fulgent apud hunc fulgurare et ardere videantur, ut non ab re
gladium, quod est verbum Dei, manu tenens figuretur. Hic est verus et, ut
dicitur, germanus theologandi modus, haec vera dicendi et scribendi lex,
quam qui sectantur ii profecto optimum dicendi genus theologandique
sectantur. Quare non est ut illis veteribus, vere Pauli discipulis, hoc nomine,
quod ab his philosophia theologiae non admisceatur, aut detrahant novi
theologi aut noster Thomas sit praeponendus.
not through philosophy and vain deceit.8 This we know from experience
as well. For what is there in philosophy? I do not mean dialectics, the whole
of which lies in words; I have already spoken about it and will do so again.
No, I mean moral and natural philosophy. What is there in them that is
indubitable and settled except the things discovered in natural philosophy
through the observations of doctors and others?
[19] Regarding their words: because the nature of Greek is different from
that of Latin. This would be a rather tedious subject to discuss, and it is a
question for another time. Let it suffice to have said that the Latin doctors
of the Church dreaded words which the great Latin authors (who were
their teachers in the language), although experts in Greek, never used,
words that are continually pressed into service by modern theologians: ens,
entitas, quidditas, identitas, reale, essentiale, suum esse, as well as those
terms which are given names like ampliari, dividi, componi, and other such
things.9 Thus these largely worthless trifles were either not to be treated, or
else they were to be disregarded, lest they lead to greater ignorance.
[20] I am not saying this to detract from modern theologians why
would I want to detract from my very own age? but to defend the ancients,
who are unjustly blamed and abused for not having theologized according
to this method. Instead they devoted themselves wholly to imitating the
apostle Paul, by far the prince of all theologians and the master of theologizing. His manner of speaking, his power, his majesty were such that what
fell flat when spoken by others, even the apostles, he uttered loftily; what in
the mouths of others stood its ground, rushed from his into battle; and
what from others shone dimly, from him seemed to flash and burn, so that
it is not off the mark for him to be represented holding in his hand a sword,
i.e. the word of God.10 This is the true and, so to speak, the genuine mode of
theologizing. This is the true law of speaking and writing, and those who
pursue it doubtless pursue the very best manner of speaking and theologizing. Therefore the ancients, the true disciples of Paul, should not be criticized by modern theologians or placed second to our Thomas on account
of not having mixed theology with philosophy.
8Col. 2:8.
9The first set of words (being, entity, quiddity, identity, real being, essential being,
its own being) are terms of scholastic philosophy that in Vallas view represent incomprehensible jargon. Ampliari (to be ampliated or ampliation) is a term proper to supposition
theory, a part of scholastic philosophy that deals with the proper referents and significations
of names. Componi (to be composed or composition) and dividi (to be divided or division) refer to types of logical fallacies treated by scholastic philosophers.
10Eph. 6:17.
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[Peroratio]
225
230
235
240
245
[21] Quid autem? Aequandus? Omnibus eum aequare non ausim, plerisque tamen etiam facile praetulerim, quos, ne parum id esse videatur, nominatim recensebo. Praepono Thomam Ioanni Cassiano, quem tamquam
optimum doctorem sanctus Dominicus fertur lectitare solitus. Praepono
Anselmo, in primis acuto atque exculto. Praepono Bernardo, doctori erudito, suavi, copioso, sublimi. Praepono Remigio, omnium suae aetatis viro
doctissimo. Praepono Bedae, his omnibus doctiori. Praepono Isidoro, quem
sui amatores negant esse ulli secundum. Quid dicam <de> Magistro
Sententiarum atque Gratiano, qui magis seduli collectores quam veri auctores dici merentur? Praepono item, etsi de numero recentium theologorum sunt, fratribus omnibus tam huius ordinis quam ceterorum, Alberto
Magno, Aegidio, Alexandro Alensi, Bonaventurae, Ioanni Scoto reliquisque
suo ipsorum iudicio tam magnis ut sese antiquis aequare fastidiant.
Praepono praeterea Lactantio atque Boethio, dumtaxat in theologia, nam
in ceteris nulla est comparatio. Idem dico de Cypriano. Addo etiam,
licet invitus, Hilarium; cuius scriptis quid tandem sanctius, doctius,
eloquentius?
[22] An ne hoc quidem Thomae satis est? O quanti et quanta laude digni
sunt hi quibus Thomam anteposui! An etiam illos quattuor omnium summos, paene alteros Evangelistas, in dubium certamenque vocabimus et
aliquem de illa quadriga detrahemus ut in eius loco Thomam reponamus?
Quorum vix scio quem cui praeferam in sua quemque dote mirabilem. Nam
etsi Augustinus omnibus vulgo praefertur, quia plures tractavit in theologia
quaestiones et est in multis haud dubie omnibus praeferendus, tamen, si
scripta Ambrosii cum altero tanto scriptorum Augustini comparentur, meo
iudicio non sint posthabenda. Nec Hieronymus ulla in parte cedit ingenio
Augustini, in omni autem doctrinarum genere adeo maior ut mihi Augusti
nus tamquam mediterraneum mare, Hieronymus tamquam oceanus, quem

[Peroratio]
[21] What then? Should he be their equal? I would not dare to call him
the equal of them all. Yet I would prefer him, and willingly, to many whom,
lest it seem of little account, I shall list by name. I set Thomas above John
Cassian, whom St. Dominic is said to have been in the habit of reading as
if the best doctor. I set him above Anselm,11 the sharpest and most refined.
I set him above Bernard,12 a learned, sweet, eloquent, and sublime doctor.
I set him above Remigius,13 the most learned man of his age. I set him above
Bede, more learned than all of them. I set him above Isidore, whom his
admirers deny is second to anyone. What should I say about the Master of
the Sentences14 and Gratian, who deserve more to be called assiduous compilers than true authors? Likewise, I set him above all the brothers of both
his order and the others (although here we are talking about modern theologians): Albert the Great, Giles,15 Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, John
the Scot,16 and the rest, who are so convinced of their own greatness that
they are loath to compare themselves to the ancients. Moreover I set him
above Lactantius and Boethius, although only in theology, for in other areas
there is no comparison. I say the same about Cyprian, and I add, albeit
unwillingly, Hilary as well; for what, finally, is holier, more learned, more
eloquent than his writings?
[22] Or is not even this enough for Thomas? How great and how praiseworthy are these men above whom I have set Thomas! Or shall we also call
into question and dispute the four greatest of all, who were like a second
team of evangelists? Shall we pull one of them out of that team so as to
replace him with Thomas? I barely know which of them to prefer to whom,
as each one had his own extraordinary gift. For although Augustine is commonly preferred to all, because he treated more theological questions and
is in many respects indubitably to be preferred, nevertheless, if Ambroses
writings were compared with an equal number of Augustines, I do not
think they would be ranked second. Nor does Jerome yield in any way to
Augustines intellect; he is so much the greater in all areas of learning that
Augustine seems to me like the Mediterranean, Jerome the ocean, upon
11Anselm of Canterbury.
12Bernard of Clairvaux.
13Remigius of Auxerre.
14Peter Lombard.
15Giles of Rome.
16John Duns Scotus.
314
encomion s. thomae
250 pauci nostrorum navigant, esse videatur. Gregorius his longe impar eruditione, sed cura et diligentia par, suavitate autem tanta atque sanctitate ut
angelicum paene sermonem repraesentet.
[23] Horum alicui parem facere Thomam vereor aut aliquem Latinorum.
Potius eos cum totidem Graecis comparaverim: Ambrosium cum Basilio,
255 cuius, ut video, exstitit aemulus; Hieronymum cum Gregorio Nazianzeno,
cuius auditorem et discipulum se fuisse profitetur; Augustinum cum Ioanne
Chrysostomo, quem multis in locis secutus est et in librorum copia aemulatus; Gregorium cum Dionysio, quem Areopagitam vocant, quod eius ipse
primus Latinorum, quantum invenio, facit mentionem (nam superioribus
260 quos nominavi, non modo Latinis verum etiam Graecis, opera Dionysii
fuere ignota). Ad hos proxime accedit Ioannes Damascenus, apud Graecos
auctor celeberrimus, ut apud nos Thomas: ergo iure optimo Damascenus et
Thomas copulabuntur, eo quidem magis quod Damascenus nonnulla logicalia et prope metaphysicalia conscripsit.
[24] Erunt itaque quinque paria theologiae principum ante thronum Dei
265
et Agnum concinentia cum viginti quattuor illis senioribus. Canunt enim
semper apud Deum scriptores rerum sanctarum. Primum par Basilius et
Ambrosius, canens lyra; secundum Nazianzenus et Hieronymus, canens
cithara; tertium Chrysostomus et Augustinus, canens psalterio; quartum
270 Dionysius et Gregorius, canens tibia; quintum Damascenus et Thomas,
canens cymbalis. Nec absurdum fuerit quinarium numerum nunc esse qui
erat quaternarius, cum apud musicos quinque sint tetrachorda non quattuor, nec Thomam cymbalis fieri canentem. Ut enim Thomas geminus
interpretatur, et ipse gemino sono theologiae pariter ac philosophiae
275 canere delectatus est, ita cymbala gemino constant instrumento laetum,
hilarem, plausibilem cantum reddentia.
[25] Talis est Thomae librorum cantus. Hac harmonia sanctus Thomas et
pios homines qui ipsum legunt et sanctos angelos qui nunc eum audiunt
oblectat. Semper enim apud Deum cum aliis sanctis doctoribus modulatur
280 et psallit, Agnum Dei assidue aut laudans aut pro nobis mortalibus obsecrans ut eodem perveniamus quo ipse pervenit. Quod nobis concedat qui
vivit et regnat in saecula benedictus. Amen.17
17In R, after Amen: Oration of Lorenzo Valla, a most learned and eloquent man, which
he held in praise of St. Thomas Aquinas in the Church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva, in the
city of Rome, a.d. 1457, the seventh day of March. He died in the same year on the first day
of August (Doctissimi viri ac eloquentissimi Laurentii e Valle oratio quam habuit in laudem Sancti Thomae Aquinatis in Ecclesia Sanctae Mariae Minervae, in urbe romana a.d.
1457, VII die Martii; obiitque eodem anno die primo Augusti). See Valla, Encomion sancti
Thome, 55.
which few of our contemporaries set sail. Gregory18 lags far behind all in
erudition, but he equals them in carefulness and diligence and is possessed
of such great sweetness and holiness that he seems to speak like an angel.
[23] I am afraid to set Thomas or any of the Latins equal to any one of
these men. Rather, I would compare them with the same number of Greeks:
Ambrose with Basil, whose rival I see he was; Jerome with Gregory
Nazianzen, whose pupil and disciple he claimed to have been; Augustine
with John Chrysostom, whom he often followed in his writings and emulated in the number of his books; Gregory with Dionysius the Areopagite,
because he is the first of the Latins, as far as I know, to mention him (for the
works of Dionysius were unknown to the others I named, not only the
Latins but the Greeks as well). Closest to these comes John Damascene, a
most famous author among the Greeks, as Thomas is amongst us. It will
therefore be perfectly right for John and Thomas to be paired together, and
all the more so because John wrote many logical and well-nigh metaphysical works.
[24] So there will be five pairs of princes of theology resounding before
the throne of God and the Lamb, in unison with the twenty-four elders. For
the writers of holy things always make music in the sight of God. The first
pair is Basil and Ambrose, playing the lyre; the second, Nazianzen and
Jerome, playing the cithara; the third, Chrysostom and Augustine, playing
the psaltery; the fourth, Dionysius and Gregory, playing the flute; the fifth,
John Damascene and Thomas, playing the cymbals. And it will not be
unharmonious for their number to be five now instead of four since for
musicians there are five tetrachords, not four nor to have Thomas playing
the cymbals. For as the name Thomas means twin, and as he enjoyed playing equally in the twin tones of theology and philosophy, thus the cymbals
are a double instrument emitting happy, cheerful, and pleasing music.
[25] Such is the tune of Thomass books. With this harmony Saint Thomas
delights both the pious men who read him and the holy angels who now
hear him. For he is always singing and playing before God with the other
holy doctors, perpetually either praising the Lamb of God, or entreating
Him that we mortals may reach the same place he has. May it be granted us
by Him who lives and reigns, praised unto eternity. Amen.
18Pope St. Gregory I (the Great).
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Symbolism in Western Art. New York: W. W. Norton, 1967, 137149.
. Secular musical practice in sacred art, Early Music 3 (1975): 221226.
Zeri, Federico. Pittura e Controriforma. Alle origini dell arte senza tempo. Torino: Einaudi,
1957.
Zippel, Gianni. Lautodifesa di Lorenzo Valla per il processo dellInquisizione napoletana
(1444), Italia medievale e umanistica 13 (1970): 5994.
. La Defensio quaestionum in philosophia di L. Valla e un noto processo dellInquisizione
napoletana, Bullettino dellIstituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano
69 (1957): 319347.
Zucchi, A. Il Collegio di S. Tommaso dAquino alla Minerva. Unpublished manuscript.
Rome, Santa Maria sopra Minerva, Archivio del Convento.
INDEX
Aaron79, 264, 267
Abelard, Peter206
Abraham84
Accius, Lucius268
Achilles101102
Accursius108
Actus beati Silvestri presulis94, 98
Adorno, Francesco297
Ahasuerus48
Albert the Great10, 149n5, 197, 281, 313
Alberti, Leon Battista131, 267n
Alexander of Hales197, 313
Alexander the Great45
Alfonso of Aragon3, 7, 24, 71, 135, 140142,
238, 240
Alighieri, Dante169
Ambrose, bishop of Milan911, 183,
198200, 218, 275, 309, 313, 315
Ananias34, 37
Angelico, Fra169, 202
Anselm of Canterbury197, 209, 313
Antoninus284
Antoninus Pius284n203
Antonio da Rho236237, 239240, 246
Apollinaris88
Aquinas, Thomas, see Thomas Aquinas
Aratus215
Arian146, 159
Aristophanes190n
Aristotle7, 10, 12, 149, 165166,
190n, 191, 193194, 208209, 229, 231,
250, 270
Arnold of Brescia65
Auerbach, Erich179
Augustine of Hippo911, 94, 101, 179, 183,
198200, 219n, 221, 223225, 275, 294,
307, 309, 313, 315
City of God73, 111113, 115, 119120,
123125, 127128, 131132
De doctrina christiana206, 213, 216220,
223, 225, 228, 292
De Trinitate213, 216, 222
Augustus39, 108, 284
Aureolus, Petrus231
Aurispa, Giovanni27, 139, 272274
Averroes146, 159, 180
Aymo99
Aymo, Nicola de99
Bade, Josse287n
Balbi of Genoa99
Basel, Council of140
Basil of Caesarea (the Great)1011, 185,
199200, 275, 309, 315
Baxandall, Michael263
Beccadelli, Antonio17, 242
Becket, Thomas169, 303
Bede197, 313
Bel88
Bernard of Clairvaux10, 197, 210, 313
Bertelli, Carlo162
Berthier, J. J.158n, 161162
Bible, books of
Acts34, 138, 142, 215
Apocalypse199
Colossians185186, 234, 252, 311
1 Corinthians213215
2 Corinthians307
Daniel8789
Deuteronomy116, 215, 221
Ecclesiasticus153
Ephesians30, 41, 311
Exodus217, 221
Galatians3334, 116
Genesis123
Isaiah214
Jeremiah34
John80, 89, 92, 98, 117n164, 138, 142, 301
Judith89
1 Kings117
Leviticus116
Luke92
Mark92
Matthew4041, 43, 51, 80, 9192
1 Timothy40
Titus215
Tobias89
Wisdom of Solomon159
Biondo, Flavio, see Flavio, Biondo
Boethius55, 159, 192193, 197, 203210, 231,
234236, 240, 245253, 281, 313
Consolation of Philosophy203205, 234,
246, 253n
De institutione musica200, 201n
see also Thomas Aquinas, Commentary
on Boethiuss De Trinitate
Boethius of Dacia9n24
332
index
Bologna, University of5

Bonaventure197, 214, 313
Boniface VIII, Pope21, 51, 59, 107
Bracciolini, Poggio1718, 25, 148149,
167n24, 176, 234, 242243, 277, 289290
Breviarium Romanum167
Bruni, Leonardo1718, 25
Brutus, Lucius Junius40
Bonaiuto, Andrea di157158, 160, 169
Caesar, Gaius Julius20, 39, 49, 126, 283n
Cajetan, Thomas (Tommaso de Vio)149,
151154, 156, 158n
Caligula39
Callixtus III, Pope177, 238
Camporeale, Salvatore I.12, 1115
Cantimori, Delio133
Cappella Carafa (Rome)156158,
161163
Cappellone degli Spagnoli
(Florence)156158, 160162
Capreolo, Giovanni149, 151152, 154, 156
Carafa, Oliviero158
Cartei, Stefano297
Cassian, John197, 313
Cato the Elder187
Cato the Younger299
Charlemagne102
Chiostro Verde (Florence), see Cappellone
degli Spagnoli
Cicero85n129, 121, 173, 178180, 187,
189n64, 191n64, 247, 250, 256, 259260,
268269, 278
Claudius39
Clement of Alexandria215
Cochlaeus, Johann132133
Codex, see Corpus Juris Civilis
Codex Theodosianus67, 69, 114
see also Theodosius
Columella, Lucius Junius
Moderatus200n83
Concordantia discordantium canonum, see
Gratian
Condulmer, Gabriele, see Eugenius IV
Constance, Council of157n
Constantine (the Great)4, 6, 17143
(passim)
Constantinople, Council of, Fourth78
Constitutum Constantini46, 13, 17143
(passim), 273
Corpus Juris Civilis
Codex71
Digest53, 117
Cosmas Indicopleustes184
Courcelle, Pierre Paul253n

Croce, Benedetto12
Cyprian, bishop of Carthage9, 183, 197,
215, 218, 309, 313
Cyrus the Great48
Damian, Peter207210, 215, 231
Daniel87
David117
Decretum, see Gratian
Demosthenes165, 190n, 195
De Panizza Lorch, Maristella238240,
244, 248, 251, 253n
Digest, see Corpus Juris Civilis
Di Napoli, Giovanni145
ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite1011, 167,
199200, 233, 315
Dominic (de Guzmn)171172, 197, 305,
307, 313
Donation of Constantine, see Constitutum
Constantini
Dorp, Martin183
Eberhard of Bthune99
Ecclesiastical History, see Eusebius of
Caesarea
cole Normale Suprieure (Paris)11
Edict of Milan67, 69
Eighth Synod, see Constantinople, Council
of, Fourth
Ennius108
Epimenides215
Erasmus of Rotterdam36n47, 133, 164,
182183, 257, 287n, 291296
Estouteville, Guillaume d177
Eugenius IV, Pope7, 21, 2426, 28, 7071,
105, 135, 138140, 148, 242
Eupolis190n
Euripides268270
Eusebius (author of the Legenda
Silvestri)85, 97
Eusebius of Caesarea60, 64, 67, 69, 8788,
115, 131
Fabro, Cornelio149
Facio, Bartolomeo242243
Federici, Carlo dei148
Ferguson, Wallace K.293
Flavio, Biondo25, 125
Florence, Council of146, 285
Florence, University of11
Fois, Mario254
Frederick Barbarossa65
Fried, Johannes4n8
index333
Gaddi, Taddeo158n
Gaetano, see Cajetan
Gaius, see Caligula
Galba39
Gamaliel the Elder138, 142
Garin, Eugenio1112
Gaspare da Verona177
Gelasius I, Pope51, 59, 6364, 94, 98
Gellius, Aulus190n, 283n
Gentile, Giovanni12
George, Saint89
Gesta Sanctorum, see Jacopo da Voragine
Gesta Silvestri6364, 97
Giles of Rome197, 313
Giovanni da Fiesole,
see Angelico
Giovanni da Mantova254
Giovanni di Napoli, Fra145
Girolami, Remigio de147
Golden Legend, see Jacopo da Voragine
Grabmann, Martin150
Gramsci, Antonio14
Gratian5, 10, 6063, 69, 78, 102, 119120,
197, 313
Gregory I (the Great), Pope1011, 53, 61,
198200, 275, 315
Gregory Nazianzen1011, 185186,
199200, 215, 309, 315
Guarino Veronese18
Guglielmo da Tocco172
Guidi di Nepozzano, Uberto147, 174n
Jerome911, 46, 94, 183, 198200, 216, 219n,

221, 225, 235, 252, 271275, 288, 291296,
309, 313, 315
Commentary on Daniel87
Contra Rufinum273274
Letter to Ctesiphon (ep. 133)251253
Letter to Eustochium (ep. 22)212214,
255262, 272274
Letter to Pammachius, De optimo genere
interpretandi (ep. 57)287
Letter to Pammachius (ep. 66)212216,
219n
Letter to the Orator Magnus (ep.
70)212215, 218, 257, 263,
273274, 292
Jesus Christ4041, 5051, 7880, 87, 92,
117n164, 142, 162, 172, 218
Johannes de Sacrobosco184
John Chrysostom1011, 185, 199200, 275,
309, 315
John Damascene1011, 199202, 315
John Duns Scotus197, 313
John of Holywood, see Johannes de
Sacrobosco
John the Baptist303
John the Evangelist172, 305
Johns Hopkins University1
John XXII, Pope145
Judas Iscariot50
Judith89
Juvenal85
Heer, Friedrich133
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich14
Hermagoras180
Hilary of Poitiers9, 183, 197, 215, 218, 275,
309, 313
Huguccio of Pisa99
Hus, Jan75
Hutten, Ulrich von131132
Kristeller, Paul Oskar145, 150
Ibn Rushd, see Averroes

Innocent III, Pope21, 102
Isaac, Jean208209
Isaiah (prophet)214
Isidore of Seville99, 108, 197, 200, 313
Isocrates165, 166n, 186, 258
Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul
Rinascimento (Florence)11
Jacopo da Voragine6364, 89, 93,
95, 169
Jeremiah (prophet)34
Lactantius, Lucius Caecilius Firmianus9,

7677, 131, 136, 183, 189n64, 197, 215, 218,
275, 309, 313
Landriani, Gerardo37, 134138
Lateran Palace6061
Leclercq, Jean254
Leeman, A. D.193
Legenda aurea, see Jacopo da Voragine
Legenda sanctorum, see Jacopo da Voragine
Legenda Silvestri47, 60, 6265, 6869, 73,
76, 84101, 110, 114115
Ligorio, Pirro161
Lippi, Filippino157, 161, 163
Livy90, 91, 99
Lorch, Maristella, see De Panizza Lorch
Louis the Pious69, 101104
Lucian of Samosata136
Lucretia40
Luther, Martin1415, 131134, 163
Lysias179
334
index
Macrobius36n47, 190n
Malchus117
Mamertinus, Claudius166n
Marcus Aurelius284n203
Mariani, Valerio161
Marrou, Henri-Irne179, 216
Marsuppini, Carlo1718, 148
Martin of Dacia9n24
Mary (mother of Jesus)92, 172, 299
Medici, Cosimo de (il Vecchio)283
Melchiades, Pope60, 69
Melchizedek84
Menander215
More, Thomas36n47
Moses78
Mussato, Albertino254
Naaman98
National Institute for the Study of the
Renaissance, see Istituto Nazionale di
Studi sul Rinascimento
Nazarius166n
Nebuchadnezzar48
Nero39
Nestorius159
Niccoli, Niccol148149
Nicea, Council of67
Nicholas V, Pope3, 176177, 202, 238,
240241, 264, 281, 283286
Peter Lombard10, 150152, 154, 159160,

197, 313
Peter Martyr, see Peter of Verona
Peter of Verona8, 159, 169, 301
Peter, Saint26, 3335, 40, 50, 61, 78, 80, 83,
98, 117, 172, 307
Phasur34
Philoponus, John184
Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni12
Pius V, Pope152, 163
Plato190n, 257, 259261
Plautus77, 122n171, 257, 259
Pliny the Elder77
Pliny the Younger166
Poliziano, Angelo293
Pollio, Gaius Asinius36, 179180
Priscian278
Ptolemy of Lucca74n103
Pythagoras253
Quintilian27, 35n45, 58, 85, 86n, 8990,
95, 121, 143, 165n, 166, 170, 178181,
186189, 191, 193, 196, 200n83, 210, 221,
233, 237, 241243, 249252, 257258, 262,
267270, 273, 278279, 283, 285, 290
see also ps.-Quintilian
ps.-Quintilian (author of the
Declamationes)121, 123
Octavian, see Augustus

Odo of Chteauroux210, 229
Origen88, 215, 223
Orlandi, Stefano159
Otho39
Otto of Freising5
Radetti, Giorgio169, 251, 253n

Remigius of Auxerre197, 313
Rhetorica ad Herennium86n, 178179
Romulus40
Rufinus60, 64, 69, 115, 131, 273, 294
see also Eusebius of Caesarea
Rule of Saint Augustine173n43
Pacatus Drepanius, Latinus166n

Pactum Hludovicianum57, 60, 69, 101112,
132
Pacuvius, Marcus264, 268270
Pagina Privilegii21, 62
Panofsky, Erwin131, 263
Panormita, see Beccadelli, Antonio
Parentucelli, Tommaso, see Nicholas V
Paris, University of228
Paschal I, Pope6970, 102103
Passeri, Giuseppe158n
Patroclus101102
Paucupalea6263
Paul IV, Pope161, 163
Paul, Saint3335, 37, 40, 81, 83, 93, 116, 137,
172, 185186, 192, 194195, 203, 213215,
220n, 224, 232, 234235, 252253,
276277, 287n, 288, 303, 305, 307, 309, 311
Sadous, Alfred L. de216

Saint Alberts (college)1
Saint-Gilles, Jean de210, 229
Saint John Lateran, Archbasilica of
(Rome), see Lateran Palace
Saint Paul, Basilica of (Rome)8182
Saint Peter, Basilica of (Rome)8182
Sallust86n, 299
Sandei, Felino17
Sanhedrin142
Santa Maria Novella (Florence)1, 147148,
158, 174n
see also Cappellone degli Spagnoli
Santa Maria sopra Minerva (Rome)78,
150, 155, 163, 174, 176177, 202
see also Cappella Carafa
Santa Reparata (Florence)148
Satan50
index335
Schlosser, Julius von157n
Scrivani, Melchior3
Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa11
Seigel, Jerrold E.219
Sentences, see Peter Lombard
Serra, Giovanni33
Setz, Wolfram35, 37, 45, 107, 119
Sigismund (Holy Roman Emperor)105
Silvestri, Francesco147
Soboul, Albert14
Solomon117, 267
Spina, Bartolomeo152154
Stephen II, Pope101
Steuco, Agostino133
Suetonius108
Susanna89
Sylvester I, Pope4, 6, 2829n32, 30, 40, 42,
44, 4954, 57, 61, 63, 66, 7980, 8285,
87, 98, 115
Symmachus (Prefect of Rome)67
Tarquinius Superbus40, 126, 207
Ten Commandments66
Terence86n
Tertulian252
Theodosian Code, see Codex Theodosianus
Theodosius45, 67, 110, 114
Thomas (apostle)303
Thomas Aquinas711, 145315 (passim)
Commentary on Boethiuss De
Trinitate203, 211228, 232233,
255257, 274, 286
Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et
religionem219n220n
Expositiones180
Expositio super librum Boethii de
Trinitate, see Commentary on
Boethiuss De Trinitate
Scriptum in libros Senentiarum152
Summa contra gentes159
Summa theologiae149152, 154, 158n,
161163, 175, 180, 182, 211, 226
Super Epistolas s. Pauli lectura287n
Thucydides42n60, 190n
Tiberius39
Tobias89
Tolosani, Giovanmaria dei133
Torquemada, Juan de202
Tortelli, Giovanni176
Tracy, James291
Traini, Francesco156, 169
Traversari, Ambrogio1719, 134
Trent, Council of146, 152, 154, 163
Trevisan, Ludovico28, 134136, 138140, 142
Trinkaus, Charles133
Tudeschi, Niccol dei140

Twelve Tables66
Ulpian283n
Valerius Maximus91
Valla, Lorenzo111, passim
Adnotationes in Novum Testamentum3,
22, 82, 92, 99, 155, 162, 176, 193, 195, 198,
206, 241, 243, 264266, 279280,
285288
Annotations on the New Testament, see
Adnotationes in Novum Testamentum
Antidota in Pogium167n24, 176, 242
Apologia135, 234, 242
Collatio Novi Testamenti, see
Adnotationes in Novum Testamentum
Comparison of Cicero and Quintilian, see
De comparatione Ciceronis
Quintilianique
De comparatione Ciceronis
Quintilianique1718, 139, 187, 241
De falso credita et ementita Constantini
donatione2, 47, 17143 (passim),
241, 272273, 289
De libero arbitrio3, 5455, 113, 167, 176,
203208, 210, 229232, 234, 241, 250,
261, 289
De professione religiosorum3, 234, 241
De vero bono, see De vero
falsoque bono
De vero falsoque bono3, 1719, 22, 36,
134, 167, 186, 196, 204205, 208,
234240, 243253, 261, 285286, 289
De voluptate, see De vero falsoque bono
Dialecticae disputationes3, 7, 2223, 27,
5456, 75, 9597, 123, 135, 138, 155, 167,
170n33, 181, 184n55, 189n64, 195, 204,
208, 235, 237245, 248, 251252,
285286, 288
Dialectical Disputations, see Dialecticae
disputationes
Donation of Constantine, see De falso
credita et ementita Constantini
donatione
Elegances of the Latin Language, see
Elegantiae linguae latinae
Elegantiae linguae latinae3, 82, 176, 181,
193, 204, 233, 241, 243, 254257,
263265, 270, 272273, 276278,
280281, 286288, 291, 293
Encomion sancti Thomae2, 711, 15, 34,
145297 (passim)
Encomium of Saint Thomas, see
Encomion sancti Thomae
336
index
Gesta Ferdinandi regis Aragonum165n

In principio sui studii, see Oratio in
principio sui studii
Invectivae in Facium242
On Free Will, see De libero arbitrio
On Pleasure, see De vero
falsoque bono
On the Profession of the Religious, see De
professione religiosorum
Oratio in principio sui studii155, 193, 264
Oration on the Falsely Believed and
Forged Donation of Constantine, see
De falso credita et ementita
Constantini donatione
Pruning of all Dialectic, see Dialecticae
disputationes
Quintilian, Insititutio oratoria
(glosses)85, 89, 165n, 166, 189n64,
200n83, 254, 283n
Repastinatio dialecticae et philosophiae,
see Dialecticae disputationes
Thucydides, History (translation)42,

155, 193, 280287
Varro, Marcus Terentius91
Vasari, Giorgio161
Vespasian39
Villa I Tatti, The Harvard University
Center for Renaissance Studies1
Vio, Tommaso de, see Cajetan
Virgil78, 303
Vitelleschi, Giovanni117
Vitellius39
Vitruvius201n
Weise, Georg164
Wezel65
William of Conches9n24
William of Ockham232
Wycliffe, John75, 157n
Zeno253
Zeri, Federico164

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Christianity, Latinity, and Culture

Studies in the History of

Paul C.H. Lim, Nashville, Tennessee

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/shct

Salvatore I. Camporeale, O.P.

With Lorenzo Vallas Encomium of Saint Thomas Aquinas

The editors dedicate this posthumous volume to the memory of

Lorenzo Valla between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance:

NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION

note on the translation

sources, I have generally tried to adhere to the interpretation Camporeale

introduction: salvatore camporeale and lorenzo valla3

introduction: salvatore camporeale and lorenzo valla5

Pope. How central would a document be in proving that this donation

record of any king, pagan or Christian, turning an empire over to priests),

introduction: salvatore camporeale and lorenzo valla7

veneration (unlike other Dominicans, such as Peter Martyr). Aquinass

Recognizing how risky it seems even to appear to criticize Aquinas on his

introduction: salvatore camporeale and lorenzo valla9

These two themes dominate the remainder of the Encomium. Valla

introduction: salvatore camporeale and lorenzo valla11

Italys two leading early twentieth-century philosophers, Giovanni Gentile

introduction: salvatore camporeale and lorenzo valla13

Camporeales attention to language predominates in his scholarship,

language comes to the fore; it also highlights another of Camporeales

introduction: salvatore camporeale and lorenzo valla15

on Vallas Encomium. Camporeale stops well short of saying that Vallas

LORENZO VALLA AND THE DE FALSO CREDITA DONATIONE:

of the humanists of the Roman curia, and in particular of Bracciolini.

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione19

that he uses these extraneous duties as an excuse to hide some kind of

Valla the humanist, from both a theoretical and a biographical point of

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione21

This method is no different in fact it is exactly the same except for

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione23

awareness for the purpose of overcoming the antinomies in question: My

vis rerum, the force (meaning) of things.19 Therefore by exposing in his

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione25

a new tyranny, since the usurpation of evangelical freedom in the

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione27

truth or non-truth, the authenticity or inauthenticity, of a given thing can

perspective that Valla intends to propose to Christendom, viewed against

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione29

Conceived as a procedure of rhetorical argumentation, Vallas Oration

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione31

legitimacy for the papacys exercise of political and spiritual power.

The abrogation of the Constitutum, together with the evangelical renewal

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione33

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione35

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione37

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione39

The final part of the section contains Sylvesters speech to Constantine.58

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione41

59Valla, De falso, 76.1277.15/78.1113/83.49/84.423/84.2885.4 (21, 2526): Princeps

The orations addressed to Constantine regarding the supposed transfer of

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione43

the document of donation (donationis pagina) as well as at exposing its

The document of donation, therefore, is placed by Valla within the

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione45

declaimed and put in a position to be compared to stress the falseness

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione47

Valla proceeds insistently, with greater urgency and still in accordance

introduction: salvatore camporeale and lorenzo valla3

introduction: salvatore camporeale and lorenzo valla5

introduction: salvatore camporeale and lorenzo valla7

introduction: salvatore camporeale and lorenzo valla9

introduction: salvatore camporeale and lorenzo valla11

introduction: salvatore camporeale and lorenzo valla13

introduction: salvatore camporeale and lorenzo valla15

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione19

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione21

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione23

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione25

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione27

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione29

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione31

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione33

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione35

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione37

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione39

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione41

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione43

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione45

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione47

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione49

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione51

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione53

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione55

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione57

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione59

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione61

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione63

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione65

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione67

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione69

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione71

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione73

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione75

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione77

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione79

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione81

lorenzo valla and the de falso credita donatione83

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