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Only tyranny can solve the ecological crunch this
card is long and fantastic.
Mathew Humphrey 7, Reader in Political Philosophy at the University of
Nottingham, UK, 2007, Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory: The
Challenge to the Deliberative Ideal, p. 14-15
In terms of the first of these points, that our democratic choices reflect
Ophuls. He claims that we are now 'so committed to most of the things that
cause or support the evils' with which he is concerned that 'we are almost
1977: 227): currently left to these devices, the American people 'have so far
evinced little willingness to make even minor sacrifices... for the sake of
environmental goals' (Ophuls, 1977: 197). Laura Westra makes a similar
argument in relation to the collapse of Canadian cod fisheries, which is taken
to illustrate a wider point that we cannot hope to 'manage' nature when
powerful economic and political interests are supported by 'uneducated
democratic preferences and values' (Westra, 1998: 95). More generally
'tragedy' argument in 1998, Hardin held that '[i]ts message is, I think, still
true today. Individualism is cherished because it produces freedom,
critical stress and that the developed countries are the main culprits. It
was necessary to make a transition to economies that provide increased
human welfare and less consumption of energy and materials. It seems
Nations Environment Program, the World Bank, and the World Resources
Institute. The state of the worlds agricultural, coastal forest,
Ethics Framing
Extinction outweighs tyranny
1) Survival comes first we cant have ethics or
value to life when were all dead. Nye 86:
Nye 86
Is there any end that could justify a nuclear war that threatens
the survival of the species? Is not all-out nuclear war just as self contradictory in the real
world as pacifism is accused of being? Some people argue that "we are required
to undergo gross injustice that will break many souls sooner than
ourselves be the authors of mass murder." 73 Still others say that "when a
person makes survival the highest value, he has declared that there is nothing he will not betray. But for
a civilization to sacrifice itself makes no sense since there are not
survivors to give meaning to the sacrifical [sic] act. In that case,
survival may be worth betrayal." Is it possible to avoid the "moral
calamity of a policy like unilateral disarmament that forces us to
choose between being dead or red (while increasing the chances
of both)"?74 How one judges the issue of ends can be affected by how one poses the questions. If
one asks "what is worth a billion lives (or the survival of the species ),"
it is natural to resist contemplating a positive answer. But suppose one asks, " is it possible to
imagine any threat to our civilization and values that would justify
raising the threat to a billion lives from one in ten thousand to
one in a thousand for a specific period?" Then there are several plausible
answers, including a democratic way of life and cherished freedoms that give meaning to life beyond mere
Logical priority does not make it an absolute value. Few people act as though survival were an absolute
[Paul Wapner is associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy
Program at American University, DISSENT / Winter 2003]
Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And
everyone should be wary about those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including when
environmentalists and students of global environmental politics do so). But we should not doubt the
environmental preservation.
bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person
in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his
is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through
By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act,
one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate
persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction . In such
a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the
unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the
conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and
our failure to act?
choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational
nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves
thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit
unconditional value of