The Lost Two-Thirds Kuwaits Territorial

Journal of Arabian Studies 2.1 (June 2012), pp.
1937
The Lost Two-Thirds:

Kuwaits Territorial Decline between 1913 and 1922
Downloaded by [Farah Al-Nakib] at 11:50 09 June 2012
FARAH AL-NAKIB
Abstract: This paper analyses the formation of the Kuwait-Saudi boundary, particularly
focusing on the period between the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913 and the Uqair
Conference of 1922. Specifically, it seeks to understand how and why two-thirds of the
territory allotted to Kuwait in the former agreement became part of the territory of presentday Saudi Arabia in the latter. The various factors that led to the decline of Kuwaits
territorial fortunes are explored, with particular focus given to the growing enmity between
the Al Sabah and the Najdi ruler Abdulaziz ibn Saud from 1913 onwards. Though this
subject may not be entirely new to Gulf historiography, this paper re-examines the
developments that led to the drawing of the Kuwait-Najd boundary of 1922 from the
perspective of a loss of territory for the al-Sabah rather than the expansion of territory for
the Al Saud.
Keywords: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait-Saudi boundary, Uqair, Ibn Saud, Salem al-Sabah,
Sir Percy Cox, H.R.P. Dickson, Battle of Jahra, borders, tribes
Introduction
In 1913 the British and Ottomans found the broad territory under both fixed and loose al-Sabah
jurisdiction to be 160 miles broad and 100 miles long.1 By the time Kuwaits borders were
officially ratified a decade later, this territory was reduced to 6,000 square miles.2 This paper
examines how Kuwait shifted from its 1913 boundaries to the 1922 settlement. Did Britain
simply give away two-thirds of Kuwaits land at the stroke of a pencil as claimed by the prominent British colonial figure H.R.P. Dickson in his memoirs?3 To address this question, this paper
analyses the impact the changing dynamics of power between the Al Sabah and the Najdi ruler
Abdulaziz ibn Saud had on the two rulers territories during this period. In a region where boundaries were based largely on the extent of tribal loyalty a ruler claimed in the desert, Kuwaits loss
of territory to Najd by 1922 may be attributed to the fact that, as Joseph Kostiner argues, Ibn
Sauds efforts in attracting tribal support and consolidating their loyalty proved to be far superior
to all his rivals in the Peninsula.4 Nonetheless, the story behind Kuwaits declining territorial fortunes between 1913 and 1922 is more complex than the shifting of tribal loyalties, and must be
Farah Al-Nakib is Assistant Professor of History and Director of the Center for Gulf Studies at the American University of Kuwait, PO Box 3323, Safat 13034, Kuwait, falnakib@auk.edu.kw
1
Hakki Pasha to Foreign Office, London, 15 Apr. 1912, R/15/5/65, IOR, London.
Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours (1956), p. 276.
3
Ibid., p. 274; Schofield, Britain and Kuwaits Borders, 19021923, in Kuwait: The Growth of a Historic Identity, ed. Slot (2003), p. 93.
4
Kostiner, Saudi Arabias Territorial Expansion: The Case of Kuwayt, 19161921, Die Welt des
Islams 33 (1993), p. 234.
2
ISSN 2153-4764 print/ISSN 2153-4780 online

2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2012.686234
www.tandfonline.com
20
Farah Al-Nakib
understood in the context not only of Ibn Sauds own expansionist ambitions (and the methods he
adopted to fulfil them) but also his deteriorating relationship with Kuwaits rulers after Mubarak
al-Sabahs death in 1915.
While the rivalry between Ibn Saud and the Al Sabah began, like most desert rivalries, as a
quarrel over tribal affairs, the advent of World War I exacerbated these relations by creating new
clashing political and financial interests for both rulers. After 1915 the historic friendship between
the Al Sabah and Ibn Saud, who rose to power in Najd largely under Mubaraks patronage, turned
into a bitter enmity. Once the war was over, Ibn Saud employed his militant Ikhwn forces to
challenge Al Sabah authority within their own territory, and subsequently pushed for a permanent
settlement of a boundary between the two rulers at a moment when the state of desert affairs was
in his favour. For centuries Arabian rulers would rise and fall and their boundaries would ebb and
flow as a natural part of the process. However, with the intrusion of the British, shifting frontiers
gave way to permanent borders, and once the Kuwait-Najd boundary was fixed in 1922 by
the British who arguably appeased the state that shared a substantially larger border with
their new Hashemite mandate in Iraq the Al Sabah were never able to reclaim their lost
territory.
Most critical analyses of the delineation of the Kuwait-Najd boundary in scholarly discourse
address the issue from the perspective of Saudi territorial expansion in the early twentieth
century. Important works, such as Kostiners article Saudi Arabias Territorial Expansion: The
Case of Kuwayt, 19161921 and Moudi Abdul-Azizs King Abdul-Aziz and the Kuwait
Conference, 19231924,5 analyse similar issues as this paper but from the Saudi vantage
point. Kuwaiti historiography has focused largely on the drawing of Kuwaits northern boundary
with Iraq, the work of David Finnie and Richard Schofield being the most prominent.6 The focus
on Iraq is, of course, attributable to the fact that the Kuwait-Iraq boundary has been seriously
challenged in recent decades, most notably in 1961 and 1990. And yet despite these contestations,
the actual boundary line between Kuwait and Iraq has more or less remained the same since the
beginning of the twentieth century. The southern and western boundary with Najd, on the other
hand, went through much more dramatic shifts before being officially settled in 1922. A discussion on the establishment of this boundary from Kuwaits vantage point (that is, from the
perspective of a loss of territory for the Al Sabah rather than the expansion of territory for the
Al Saud) is, therefore, lacking in Kuwaiti historiography. Such an analysis is important not
only because it deepens our understanding of how Kuwait got her borders and became a
bounded nation-state, but also as it provides a more critical insight into Kuwaits historic relationship with Saudi Arabia.
The reign of Mubarak I
As Richard Schofield argues, until 1902 there was no pressing need to consider what constituted
the territorial limits of Kuwait.7 Historically the desert boundaries between Kuwait, Najd, and Iraq
were extremely fluid. Hala Fattah maintains that the only semblance of boundaries that existed in
the region until the early twentieth century were those that delimited tribal dras tracts of desert
over which a particular tribe exercised habitual grazing rights though these she accurately
describes as natural and shifting frontiers rather than fixed borders.8 Bedouin paid protection
5
Ibid.; and Abdul-Aziz, King Abdul-Aziz and the Kuwait Conference, 19231924 (1993).
Finnie, Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwaits Elusive Frontier With Iraq (1992); Schofield, Kuwait and
Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes (1993).
7
Schofield, Britain and Kuwaits Borders, p. 68.
6
The Lost Two-Thirds
21
money, usually in the form of the Islamic zakt, to whichever local ruler could offer them greatest
protection from inter-tribal raids. The breadth of a given rulers territory in the desert thus
extended beyond the town in which he was based, to include the dras of his protgs.9 As
tribal loyalties could often pass from one ruler to another, territories and boundaries were constantly shifting and, therefore, impermanent.10 As John G. Lorimer noted in 1904, The boundaries of the Kuwait principality are for the most part fluctuating and undefined; they are, at any
given time, the limits of the tribes which then, either voluntarily or under compulsion, owe allegiance to the Shaikh of Kuwait.11
Mubarak who came to power in 1896 by assassinating his brothers Mohammed (the ruler)
and Jarrah was Kuwaits first ruler to claim a wider area of jurisdiction than the immediate
neighbourhood of the [town], by securing a greater level of tribal loyalty than any of his predecessors (or successors) was able to achieve.12 This was partly due to his long-standing history
with the Bedouin since his brothers had put him in charge of their tribal forces before he
usurped power.13 More important, however, was Mohammed al-Rashid of Hails capturing of
Riydh from the Al Saud in 1887 the second Saudi defeat since they rose to power in
1745 after which Abdulrahman Al Saud sought refuge in Kuwait. With the Al Rashid in
power and the Al Saud in exile, many of the tribes in the hinterland between Kuwait and
Riydh shifted to the Al Sabah.
The first attempt to lay down the limits of Kuwaits territory was made during Mubaraks
reign by the British and Ottomans. Though Mubarak had retained the nominal title of Ottoman
qaimaqm (which the Al Sabah held since 1871) when he came to power in 1896, in 1899 he
signed a secret non-alienation bond with the British. In exchange for British protection,
Mubarak pledged not to receive the agent or representative of any power or government in
Kuwait, nor to cede any part of his territory without the previous consent of the British Government.14 The British had not attempted to delimit the rulers boundaries in this agreement. The
Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne admitted in 1902 that when the Foreign Office promised
Mubarak its good offices, its assumption was that our engagements with Koweit do not
extend beyond the district adjoining or close by the bay of that name, and did not specifically
include the islands or outskirts over which Mubarak might have tenuous hold.15 The previous
year Britain had entered into an agreement with the Ottomans after revealing to them the
details of their 1899 agreement with Mubarak. Both empires agreed to uphold the status quo:
the Ottomans would not send troops to Kuwait and Britain would not establish an official protectorate there.16 Over the next few years, however, the Ottomans attempted to determine the extent
Fattah, The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia, and the Gulf: 17451900 (1997), pp. 301.
Onley, The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the Nineteenth Century, New Arabian Studies 6 (2004), p. 42.
10
Trevor (Political Residency, Bushehr) to More (Political Agent, Kuwait), 6 Sept. 1920, R/15/5/105,
IOR, London.
11
Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia 2: Geographical and Statistical, ed.
Birdwood (1908, reprinted 1986), p. 1059.
12
Government of India, Administration Report of the Kuwait Political Agency for 1918, reprinted in
Persian Gulf Administration Reports 7: 19121920 (1989), p. 57.
13
Rush, Al-Sabah: History and Genealogy of Kuwaits Ruling Family, 17521987 (1987), p. 102.
14
Agreement of 23rd January 1899 with Ruler of Kuwait, reprinted in Abu-Hakima, The Modern
History of Kuwait, 17501965 (1983), p. 184.
15
Memorandum by the Marquess of Lansdowne, 21 Mar. 1902, FCO 78/5251, TNA, London, reprinted in Bidwell (ed.), The Affairs of Kuwait: 18961905, vol. 2 (1971), p. 54.
16
Memorandum Communicated to the Ottoman Ambassador, 29 July 1911, reprinted in Schofield
(ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10 (1992), p. 167.
9
22
Farah Al-Nakib
of territory that Britain was prepared to defend for Mubarak by encroaching into areas along the
Kuwait-Iraq frontier. Britains inability to definitively ascertain if these advances were in violation
of the status quo, along with the increasing possibility of a German railway into the Gulf, eventually prompted them to determine the extent of their control in the area.
In 1908 Lorimer published his Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, in
which he identified for the first time Britains perception of Kuwaits territory. In determining
Kuwaits borders to the south and west with Najd, Lorimer relied mainly on statements made
by Mubarak in 1904.17 In 1911 the Secretary of State for India decided that Britains obligations
to Mubarak extend to the whole of the Sheikhs territory as described in Lorimers Gazetteer
and communicated this to the Porte.18 This constituted an area 160 miles broad and 100 miles
long. The Ottomans did not agree and argued that Al Sabah influence did not extend more
than 20 kilometres from town.19 However, two successive British Political Agents in Kuwait,
Major Stuart Knox (190409) and Captain W.H.I. Shakespear (190914), had by then carried
out extensive tours over this area without finding traces of any influence there except that of
the Sheikh.20 Like Lorimer, Shakespear emphasized the importance of the zakt in maintaining
tribal loyalty and, in turn, of tribal loyalty in determining boundaries:
All Arab Shaikhs base the territorial extent of their power upon their ability to maintain or enforce some
order over the adjacent tribes, their power to enforce the payment of zikat by Bedouin and their capacity
to prevent and avenge outrages and raids within the territorial limits claimed. Judged by these standards
there can be no question that Mubarakh is the paramount chief within the limits described.21
Though some tribes like the Dhafr shifted their loyalties from Mubarak back to Ibn Saud when
the latter began to reassert his control over Najd in the early twentieth century, Shakespears report
showed that Mubaraks sway amongst the desert tribes remained strong by 1911. He still controlled the Awzim, all of the Mutair except for two or three distant sections in Najd, most of
the Ajmn, the Bani Khled, and several smaller tribes.22
Eventually the India Office came up with the following arrangement to satisfy Ottoman concerns without giving up British jurisdiction over Kuwait: while Kuwait Town and its immediate
surroundings were completely autonomous, the remainder of the territory as determined by
Lorimer should be
recognised as being under the administrative influence of the Shaikh of Koweit and that the Porte
should agree neither to place military posts nor take any other action within it without the previous
joint consent both of the sheik and of ourselves.23
This was the first indication of what Schofield refers to as the zonal territorial scheme of
diminishing Kuwaiti authority.24 Before proposing this to the Ottomans, the Foreign Office
17
Lorimer, Gazetteer, p. 1061.

Notes summarising the situation, undated, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes
10, p. 180.
19
Hakki Pasha to Foreign Office, 15 Apr. 1912, R/15/5/65, IOR, London.
20
Joint minute by Sir A. Hirtzel and Mr. Parker on the Ottoman Governments memorandum communicated on 15 Apr. 1912, ibid., p. 170.
21
Shakespear (Political Agent, Kuwait) to Cox (Political Resident, Bushehr), 12 Aug. 1912, R/15/5/65,
IOR, London.
22
Ibid.
23
Cox (Political Resident, Bushehr) to Foreign Office (London), 6 July 1912, reprinted in Schofield
(ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 184.
24
18
The Lost Two-Thirds
23
requested final evidence demonstrating the control over the tribes by Sheikh Mubarak within
[Lorimers] limits from the men on the spot.25 The Political Resident used Shakespears findings
from 1910 to adjust Lorimers southern boundary.26 Though the updated boundary was slightly
less extensive, it was a good deal more definite and, therefore, effectively safeguards the
Shaikhs rights and influence over his tribes at strategic points and at the same time has the substantial advantage of affording a well defined frontier.27
Both Lorimer and Shakespear determined that the Summn area formed the southern edge of
Kuwaits frontier. Shakespear, however, put the Summn wells inside Mubaraks boundary:
It may be taken for granted that nomad Arabs recognise authority in the desert according to wells, and
never in all my tours have I heard it suggested that the [Summan] wells of Hafar, As-Safa, al-Garaa,
and al-Haba (all along the Shaikhs southern boundary) were not in Kuwait territory and jurisdiction.28
Both Shakespear and the Political Resident were certain that these areas were firmly within
Mubaraks territory. The al-Safa wells, for instance, were used exclusively by the tribes under
Shaikh Mubaraks control29 and were also on one of the main caravan routes to and from
Kuwait, and up to this point caravans using that route consider themselves under Kuwait protection.30 Hafar was also of great strategic importance to Kuwait as it was halfway to Buraydah,
Riydh, and Hail, and its possession by Shaikh Mubarak and the tribes under his control
never seems to have been seriously questioned.31 Shakespear also spoke to the inhabitants of
the various villages and found that Antaa, the southernmost village within Mubaraks realm,
looked to Kuwait for its employment and important necessities of life, and the people regarded
themselves as Al Sabah subjects. Their Shaikhs frequently visit Kuwait to pay their respects
to Shaikh Mubarak, on whom their authority and position depend in considerable measure.32
In 1913 the Anglo-Ottoman Agreement was drafted to define beyond all doubt the status and
limits of [Kuwait].33 The agreement identified Mubaraks undisputed territory as beginning with
Kuwait Town at its centre and including all areas inside a radius of forty miles in all directions,
marked out by a red semi-circle on the accompanying map (Figure 1). In this undisputed area the
ruler of Kuwait exercised complete autonomy. The agreement also recognised as subordinate to
the ruler of Kuwait the tribes within a radius of 140 miles from the town centre, largely based on
Shakespears findings and marked by a green line. The southern limit of this outer zone was
formed by the more or less natural line extending from Antaa in the east, across (and including)
the Warba, al-Gara, al-Haba, and al-Safa wells, to Hafar in the west. The boundary then ran
north-east from Hafar along al-Btin, a low depression habitually used for grazing by the
camels of Kuwaiti merchants and where depredations were always referred back to Mubarak.34
At the northern end of al-Btin the boundary followed a natural line to Jabal Sanam, then east to
25
Secretary of State for India (London) to Cox (Political Resident, Bushehr), 26 July 1912, reprinted in
Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 190.
26
Shakespear to Cox, 12 Aug. 1912, R/15/5/65, IOR, London.
27
Cox (Political Resident, Bushehr) to McMahon (Foreign Secretary, London to the Govt of India), 4
Aug. 1912, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, pp. 191, 193.
28
Shakespear (Political Agent, Kuwait) to Trevor (Political Residency, Bushehr), 30 Apr. 1913, R/15/5/
65, IOR, London.
29
Cox to McMahon, 4 Aug. 1912, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 192.
30
31
Cox to McMahon, 4 Aug. 1912, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 192.
32
33
Koweit Draft Agreement: Between His Britannic Majestys Government and the Ottoman Empire,
26 Mar. 1913, ibid.
Farah Al-Nakib
24
Figure 1: Anglo-Ottoman Agreement of 1913, showing the red and green lines [Al-Bassam, Footsteps in
the Sand: Kuwait and Her Neighbours, 1700 to 2003 (2004), p. 107].
just outside Safwn. Within this outer zone Mubarak was authorised to collect zakt and to conduct
such administration as may be necessary in his capacity as Turkish kaimakam. The Ottomans could
not set up any administration in this area apart from that of the ruler of Kuwait, nor could they
station any garrisons or take military action there without British consent.35
34
Shakespear (Political Agent, Kuwait), Note on the Boundaries of Kuwait Principality, 9 Aug. 1912,
reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 196.
The Lost Two-Thirds
25
The 1913 agreement thus recognised diminishing al-Sabah authority in the inner and outer
zones. Shakespear, however, urged that Mubaraks complete autonomy be extended to the
entire area as in reality his authority in both portions was identical in character. He worried that,
the division of [Mubaraks] territory into two portions, over which he will have authority different
in degree and kind, will be unintelligible to the Shaikh and will moreover lead to constant friction
the suggested division of his territory will undoubtedly hamper the Ruler of Kuwait in his dealings
with the tribes.36
Despite his concerns, no amendments were made to the draft agreement. Though the British Government did consider the outer zone as much within Mubaraks territory as the inner, they framed
it thus to appease the Ottomans into believing they still held some sway over Kuwait. Meanwhile,
though the 1913 boundaries meant the extension of Britains good ofces to areas well beyond
those explicated by Lansdowne in 1902, the zonal scheme [absolved] Britain from the responsibilities of actively defending this extent of territory and thereby of risking serious embroilment
with the turbulent Arabian interior.37 At the time, this therefore seemed the best solution for all;
except, as Shakespear feared, for Mubarak, the party most interested yet least consulted.38
The 1913 agreement was never ratified due to the outbreak of the First World War. However,
Shakespears fear that the division of Mubaraks territory would open up the area outside the zone
of complete autonomy to intrigue and friction was legitimised during and after the war.39
With the Ottomans engaged in the battlefield, Abdulrahmans son Abdulaziz ibn Saud, who
reclaimed Riydh in 1902, emerged as the greatest threat to Kuwaits jurisdiction. It is noteworthy
that Ibn Saud was never mentioned during the 1913 negotiations. That the ascendant power in
Najd40 was not a factor in determining Kuwaits boundaries in the same year he expelled the
Ottomans from al-Ahs indicates the strength of Mubaraks hold over the southern territory in
question. And yet, by the time Kuwaits borders were officially drawn under British arbitration
at the Uqair conference in 1922, Kuwait lost most of the area between the red and green lines
which Lorimer, Knox, and Shakespear had all found to be undisputedly Al Sabah territory
to Ibn Saud. Though the 1913 agreement was never ratified, its zonal division of Kuwaits
territory, largely developed to appease the Ottomans, made it possible to conceive of these
areas as different and, ultimately, as severable.
The Ajmn question
Ibn Saud learned much of his political knowledge growing up in Mubaraks court, and it was with
Mubaraks moral and financial support that he successfully seized back power from the Al Rashid
in Riydh in 1902. Over the next several years he reasserted Saudi authority over Najd for the
third time. Ibn Saud harboured strong expansionist aims from the start of his reign. His goal,
like those of previous Saudi chiefs, was to rule over all Arabia. Although Kuwait had historically
been coveted by his Wahhabi ancestors who from the late eighteenth century periodically made
35
Anglo-Turkish Agreement between His Britannic Majestys Government and the Ottoman Empire,
29 July 1913, R/15/5/65, IOR, London.
36
Shakespear (Political Agent, Kuwait) to Cox (Political Resident, Bushehr), 30 Apr. 1913, reprinted in
Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 211.
37
38
Shakespear to Cox, 30 Apr. 1913, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 212.
39
Ibid., p. 211.
40
26
Farah Al-Nakib
unsuccessful attacks against the town Ibn Saud never made any overt claims over Mubaraks
territory while his mentor was alive. It was not until relations between the Najdi ruler and the
Al-Sabah soured during the First World War that Ibn Saud found his own justifications to
stake his claim over what Lorimer had referred to as Kuwait principality but that the Najdi
ruler viewed as his ancestral lands.
The first point of contention between the two ruling houses was the Ajmn tribe. Prior to
1913 when Ibn Saud expelled the Ottomans from al-Ahs, the Ajmns tribal headquarters,
the Najdi ruler had been on good terms with the tribe. Once in power, however, he imposed a
new poll tax on the Ajmn and prevented them from exacting dues from caravans passing
through their territory41 (a common practice in tribal dras).42 In response to these new economic
measures, the Ajmn started to rebel against Ibn Saud.43 In July 1915 he appealed to Mubarak for
assistance in an expedition against the tribe, and Mubarak sent his son Salem with a large tribal
force. However, Ibn Saud chose to attack before Salem arrived; his force was repulsed, and his
brother Saad was killed. Salem was instructed to rescue the besieged Ibn Saud in Hofuf, and his
arrival changed the balance in Ibn Sauds favour and the Ajmn were thoroughly beaten.44
Shortly thereafter two Ajmn sheikhs came to Kuwait to sue for peace with Mubarak, which
the ruler accepted on a promise of future good behaviour, including submission to Ibn Sauds
authority in al-Ahs. Two days later a message arrived from Ibn Saud asking Mubarak not to
make peace with the Ajmn nor to grant them asylum, but by then 2,000 had already been
given refuge in Kuwait.45 When Mubarak died the following month, his son and successor
Jaber was faced with a dilemma. He was not strong enough to control Ibn Saud as his father
had been, but if he ejected the Ajmn they could retaliate and give him trouble in his own territory. He nonetheless gave in to Ibn Sauds insistence that they be ejected.
In November 1916 a meeting was held in Kuwait between Ibn Saud, Jaber, and Sheikh
Khazal of Mohammerah, under the aegis of Sir Percy Cox (then the Chief Political Officer in
Basra), during which all three chiefs openly declared their allegiance to the British government.
As part of their collective commitment to assist Britain against the Ottomans in the war, Ibn Saud
agreed to a truce with the Ajmn.46 In February 1917 Jaber died and his brother Salem came to
power. Ibn Saud had held a personal grudge against Salem since 1915; though the latter had commanded the force that rescued him in Hofuf, it was Salem who had directed the Ajmn sheikhs to
Mubarak to seek refuge. Soon after Salem came to power Ibn Saud, by way of retaliation on the
Shaikh of Kuwait for provocation offered, began to tax the Awzim, a long-standing Kuwaiti
tribe. Salem responded by allowing the Ajmn to move en masse to Kuwait territory, infuriating
Ibn Saud. He believed he had a right to tax the Awzim but was willing to return to the old
policy if Salem turned out the Ajmn.47 Though the two rulers agreed, Salem failed to reciprocate and the Ajmn stayed in Kuwait. The British finally decided to settle matters by taking the
tribe under their protection in 1918 and settling them north of Zubair.48 However, the damage was
done: Ibn Saud considers, and nothing will convince him of the contrary, that [Salims] allowing
41
Arab Bureau, Note on Relations with Ibn Saud, 12 Jan. 1917, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian
Boundary Disputes 10, p. 247.
42
Fattah, Politics, p. 31.
43
Note on Relations Between Ibn Saud and the Ajmn, undated, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian
Boundary Disputes 10, p. 233.
44
Ibn Saud and the Ajmn, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 232.
45
Ibid., p. 233.
46
Note on the Ajmn Question, undated, ibid., pp. 2534.
47
Philby, Report on the Najd Mission, 191718, ibid., p. 281.
48
Note on the Ajmn Question, ibid., p. 254.
The Lost Two-Thirds
27
[the Ajmn] to enter his territories is a distinctly unfriendly act He greatly dislikes Salim personally.49 He was consumed by his hatred for the Ajmn, and the asylum given by Mubarak and
his sons was one of the important factors leading to the unfortunate estrangement between Ibn
Saud and Salem from 1918 onwards.50
Britain and the First World War
Additional factors leading to this estrangement emerged largely as a result of Britains need to
employ the local Arabian rulers namely the Sharif Husayn of Mecca, Ibn Saud, and Salem
in their efforts against the Ottomans during the First World War, which exacerbated existing
rivalries between them. Though the Ajmn and Ibn Rashid were his immediate rivals, Ibn Sauds
main adversary in his quest to rule Arabia was Husayn. Ibn Saud had made it clear since 1913 that
he wanted to establish treaty relations with Britain in order to be recognised as an independent
ruler. His request was initially declined as Britain was in the throes of prolonged negotiations
with the Porte over regional affairs (including the Kuwait boundary) and did not want to
trigger any new issues.51 With the outbreak of war, the British reversed their decision and
sought to bring both Ibn Saud and Sharif Husayn on their side to ensure that Arabia did not
fall to the enemy. Ibn Saud wanted a formal treaty with Britain before he was willing to join
the war effort and compromise himself with the Ottomans; the process was, however, delayed
due to conflicts between himself and Ibn Rashid in 1915. The Najdi ruler also found himself
embroiled with the Ajmn during this period. As a result of unsuccessful operations against
both enemies, his reputation among the tribes and his position at home at this epoch was the
reverse of secure.52 Meanwhile, Husayn was positioning himself to fill the gap left by the Ottomans should the Allies win. Signing an agreement with Britain became crucial for Ibn Saud, not
least because he could use British financial subsidies to pay off tribes as Husayn was already
doing.53 A treaty was finally signed on 26 December 1915, in which Britain officially recognised
Ibn Saud as ruler of Najd, al-Ahs, al-Qatf, and Jubayl. In exchange, Ibn Saud undertook to
refrain from all aggression on, or interference with the territories of Kuwait, Bahrain, and of
the Shaikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast.54
When Husayn rose in open rebellion against the Ottomans in June 1916 and declared the independence of the Arabs, Ibn Saud grew apprehensive that the Hashemite ruler would claim authority over parts of Najd.55 Husayn not only had all the tribes of the Hejaz and neighbouring
districts on his side, but had also drawn the Ataybah and Harb tribes that Ibn Saud claimed as
belonging to him. Thousands of Najdi townsmen from Anayzah, Buraydah, Sharah, and
Midhnib had also joined the Sharifs forces, attracted by the high pay Husayn awarded from
his substantial British subsidies. Ibn Saud, on the other hand, was always in need of financial
and material assistance,56 and without sufficient resources he was having great difficulty in
managing the great confederation of tribes which acknowledge his religious and secular
Hamilton (Political Agent, Kuwait), Notes on Ibn Saud, Nov. 1917, ibid., p. 257.
Note on the Ajmn Question, ibid., p. 253.
51
Arab Bureau, Note on Relations with Ibn Saud, 1917, ibid., p. 247.
52
Ibid.
53
Hamilton, Notes on Ibn Saud, Nov. 1917, ibid., p. 257.
54
Quoted in Schofield, Britain and Kuwaits Borders, p. 90.
55
Arab Bureau, Note on Relations with Ibn Saud, 1917, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 247.
56
St. John Philby, Report on the Operations of the Najd Mission, 29 Oct 19171 Nov 1918, 12 Nov.
1918, ibid., p. 292.
49
50
28
Farah Al-Nakib
leadership.57 Ibn Saud was worried that if the Allies won the war and drove the Ottomans out of
Arabia, he would have to suffer the
mortification of finding his rival the Sharif firmly established as an influential and powerful monarch
able to count on the support of Great Britain and the Mahommedan world, while he (Ibn Saud)
remains a mere Bedouin chieftain as he was before the war but with the Shammar and Northern
Anizah irretrievably lost and the Sharif claiming overlordship over the border tribes.58
Cox stressed to the Najdi ruler how important Husayn was to the Arab cause and that all the
Arab chiefs, him included, should work together in co-operation with the British to expel the
Turks from Arabia.59 Ibn Saud therefore knew that to safeguard his own position he had to
get more actively involved in the war effort so as not to be outshone by the Sharif, of whom
he became consumed with jealousy.60 Part of his agreement with Britain in 1915 was to
assist in capturing Hail from Ibn Rashid (who sided with the Ottomans), though his preoccupation with the Ajmn prevented him from immediately carrying this out.61 During his 191718
mission to Najd, St John Philby determined that while Hail was no longer an urgent military
target, keeping Ibn Saud in active employment against Ibn Rashid could serve to distract him
from Husayn. The Government was, however, reluctant to strengthen Ibn Saud and run the
risk of a militant Wahhabi revival and decided not to have him undertake any extensive military
operations on their behalf. Instead, they offered him a much scaled-back present of ammunition
and the promise of handsome rewards if he managed to capture Hail on his own which, he
objected, he did not have the financial resources to do.62
Thus side-lined on the battlefield, Ibn Sauds main role in the war became the enforcement of
the Allies economic blockade to cut off supply routes to the Ottomans. The British were aware of
the enormous profits to be made in illicit supplies to the enemy; they could not, however, blockade the friendly Gulf ports. As such, they enlisted Ibn Saud to prevent any leakage of supplies
across his frontier to the enemy, and instructed Salem to refuse enemy agents access to the
Kuwaiti market. The experiment was a sheer failure, its only substantial result being to
enhance the bitterness and antipathy already existing between Ibn Saud and Ibn Subah.63 The
blockade was difficult to implement in Kuwait, and smuggling became widespread. Though
the Political Agent, Colonel Robert Hamilton, believed Salem was generally anxious to put a
stop to the illicit trade with Hail and Medina, he recognised that the local merchants were a
great force for Salem to contend with, as the enormous profits of the traffic have so far
proved too great a temptation for even the best among them.64 Even Cox admitted in 1918
that the British should have sent troops to Kuwait to enforce the blockade themselves rather
than place the onus of enforcing on the Shaikh.65
The existence of smuggling in Kuwait produced two problems for Ibn Saud. As Kostiner
argues, the war created new rivalries between Arabian chieftaincies that prompted them to
Hamilton, Notes on Ibn Saud, 1917, p. 258.

Arab Bureau, Note on Relations with Ibn Saud, 1917, pp. 2489.
59
Ibid.
60
Hamilton, Notes on Ibn Saud, 1917, p. 259.
61
Arab Bureau, Note on Relations with Ibn Saud, 1917, p. 249.
62
Philby, Report on the Najd Mission, 1918, pp. 28990. For more information on Philbys mission to
determine Ibn Sauds potential role in the war, see Silverfarb, The Philby Mission to Ibn Saud, 1917
1918, Journal of Contemporary History 14 (1979), pp. 26986.
63
Ibid., p. 282.
64
Kuwait News for week ending 19 February 1917, R/15/5/19, IOR, London.
65
Cox (Civil Commissioner, Baghdad) to Government of India, 7 Aug. 1918, R/15/5/103, IOR, London.
57
58
The Lost Two-Thirds
29
consolidate their grip over tribes, and compete with each other over new strategic and economic
attractions.66 Smuggling was certainly one of these economic attractions for the port town of
Kuwait, making its market extremely attractive to Saudi tribes. As a result, by September
1917 Ibn Saud was reported to have lost influence last year and is almost powerless against
the combined trading community of Kuwayt and Qasim (south of the Djabal Shammar) and
their smuggling activities.67 He also suffered a loss of customs revenue in his own Ahs
ports, which as it was only brought in about 20% of his annual resources (another 30%
came from land revenues, and 50% from the British subsidy of 5,000 per month, hence the
importance of maintaining his commitment to Britain).68
In addition to loss of revenue, smuggling in Kuwait hindered Ibn Sauds role in Britains war
efforts, thereby diminishing his prestige and jeopardising his rivalry with the Sharif. Throughout
1917 and 1918 the number of caravans coming to Kuwait and the inordinately large stock of
goods in the market became too numerous for Salem to control.69 In September 1917 a
Shammar caravan of 3,000 camels was allowed to load with supplies in Kuwaits market,
though the tribe was known to be working with the Ottomans, because they carried a passport
signed by Ibn Sauds son Turki. The latter claimed the pass had been given to allow safe
passage through Najd, not to buy supplies. When remanded by the British, Ibn Saud claimed
that while the merchants of Qasm in his territory were making small profits as a distributive
centre, Kuwait was the source of enemy supply. To solve the matter, the British decided that
Ibn Saud should give passes to his legitimate subjects to allow for export from Kuwait.70
That April, however, when Najdi caravans arrived in Kuwait for the usual spring journey to
load up on supplies for summer, Hamilton became suspicious by the enormous quantities of
goods they wanted.71 He instructed Salem to turn them away empty. The ruler was unwilling
to do so himself and Hamilton, therefore, ordered the headmen to leave until further instructions
were received from Ibn Saud.72 According to Philby, the whole of Najd, suddenly faced with the
prospect of spending the summer without supplies, was in a ferment.73 Though the issue was
swiftly resolved, it put Ibn Saud in a precarious position with his tribes, who began to criticise
his policy of friendship and alliance with the British government. While it was the British officers
who had turned away the caravans, Ibn Saud was said to be fuming with rage and again thirsting
for Salems blood.74
5
The Ikhwn-Kuwait crisis of 1920
With the inevitable clashing of political and financial interests that the war brought, the traditional friendship of the houses of Saud and Subah gave place to enmity.75 However, Ibn
Saud was still bound by his 1915 agreement with Britain, in which he pledged not to carry
out any direct aggression against Kuwait. Furthermore, the ruler was wise enough to recognise
Kostiner, Saudi Arabia, p. 221.
Quoted in Kostiner, Saudi Arabia, p. 222.
68
Philby, Report on the Najd Mission, 1918, p. 288.
69
Cox (Civil Commissioner, Baghdad) to Loch (Political Agent, Kuwait), 29 May 1918, R/15/5/101,
IOR, London.
70
Philby, Report on the Najd Mission, 1918, pp. 2823.
71
Loch (Political Agent, Kuwait) to Philby (Riydh), 6 May 1918; Loch to Cox (Civil Commissioner,
Baghdad), 14 May 1918, R/15/5/101, IOR, London.
72
Government of India, Administration Report of the Kuwait Political Agency for 1918, p. 58.
73
74
Philby (Riydh) to Loch (Political Agent, Kuwait), 24 Apr. 1918, IOR, London.
75
66
67
30
Farah Al-Nakib
that he was not and could not be strong enough under modern conditions to extend his frontiers.76 After the defeat of the Ottomans he had even asked Britain to guarantee him protection
from his enemies: the Sharif, Ibn Rashid, the Shammar, the Ajmn, and Salem.77 He thus knew
that he could not make it on his own, so he set out to establish his rule through the use of the
militant Wahhabi revivalist movement known as the Ikhwn. The Ikhwn contained men from
different tribes who shared the rights and privileges of religious brotherhood with one another
while retaining the rights and privileges they shared with their unconverted tribesmen. The movement thus served as a link between the disparate tribes of Najd, and the ancient practice of intertribal raiding was replaced with the collective fight for (and defence of) the faith. It was on this
foundation [that] Ibn Saud built the edifice of his political power after the war, and the Ikhwn
became part of the rulers military force.78
With the war over and Ibn Saud no longer obligated to work with his fellow Arab leaders
against the Turks, the Ikhwn began targeting Kuwaiti tribes. Kostiner argues that Ibn Saud
sought to avoid political complications with the Kuwayti ruler and the British, but was often
led by the Ikhwn into skirmishes.79 Indeed, Philby was unsure of Ibn Sauds ability to
control a movement based on religious fanaticism, particularly if seriously provoked.80 Nonetheless, Ibn Saud certainly used the hornets nest of Wahhabism to his advantage, particularly in
his long-standing feud with Salem.81 In the spring of 1920 he gave permission to the Duwsh clan
to build a new Ikhwn settlement (hijra) in Balbl, which was inside the green line of the 1913
Anglo-Ottoman Agreement. Less than two years previously this area was still considered part of
Salems territory. In response to Ajmn raids of Saudi caravans in the Kuwaiti hinterland in the
summer of 1918, it had been decided that British forces would guard the Safwn wells, Salem
would guard Jahra and other nearby watering holes, and Ibn Saud was given permission by
Salem to guard the Hafar wells on [the] boundary of Kuwait territory.82 In other words, as
of August 1918 Ibn Saud and the British still recognised Shakespears southern boundary for
Kuwait. Allowing Faisal al-Duwsh to establish a hijra inside this boundary in 1920 can thus
be interpreted as an act of aggression by Ibn Saud, who began using the Ikhwn to challenge
Salem within his own territory. In response, Salem began building a palace in Balbl, no
doubt to stake his jurisdiction there, but stopped when asked by the British.
In April 1920 Ibn Saud allowed a group of Ikhwn Mutair to build a settlement at Jariyah, a
place well within the green line where Kuwaiti tribes customarily camped in the summer.83 In
May a large Mutairi force carrying both Saudi and Ikhwn flags attacked a group of Salems tribesmen headed by Duaij al-Sabah that was camped at Hamdh just south-east of the Jariyah
wells.84 Ibn Saud believed Salem had sent Duaij to the area to drive away the Mutair and
had, therefore, provoked the attack. The Ikhwn also attempted to raid Kuwaiti Awzim, but
were repulsed.85 It was soon believed that a large force from Ibn Saud was advancing to
76
Ibid., p. 292.
Ibid., p. 291.
78
Ibid., p. 297.
79
80
81
Ibid., p. 297.
82
Cox (Civil Commissioner, in Kuwait) to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (London), 20 Aug.
1918, R/15/5/103, IOR, London.
83
84
More (Political Agent, Kuwait) to Cox (Civil Commissioner, Baghdad), 20 May 1920; Dickson (Political Agent, Bahrain) to Trevor (Political Residency, Bushehr), 24 May 1920; Dickson to Trevor, 26 May
1920, R/15/5/99, IOR, London.
85
Dickson to Trevor, 24 May 1920, ibid.
77
The Lost Two-Thirds
31
attack Kuwait Town itself, and Salem ordered a wall to be built to protect it.86 Ibn Saud claimed
that he had not approved the attack at Hamdh, and even in Kuwait people were doubtful of the
Najdi rulers power to restrain the Mutair against their will.87 Nonetheless, Ibn Saud knowingly
moved the hornets nest into Salems territory, aware of the fact that a provocation could ensue
that he most probably would not be able to control. Thus, Salem was attacked without Ibn Saud
actually breaching his 1915 agreement with Britain.
The Jariyah affair brought the question of boundaries and subjects to the fore of the conflicts
between the two rulers. Ibn Saud believed his sway in the desert extended as far north as had his
grandfathers. According to an 1865 report by Lewis Pelly, then Political Resident in the Persian
Gulf, this would bring the Kuwait frontier to within 20 miles of the town.88 The territory Salem
claimed, on the other hand, was the area within the green line of the 1913 agreement.89 The Political Agent in Kuwait, Major J.C. More, summed up the situation as follows: Ibn Saud appears
to base his claim on the unwritten law of the desert, while Shaikh Salem bases his on a document
as would a civilised state.90 Nonetheless, when Salem appealed to Cox to inform Ibn Saud that
Jariyah was within his boundary, he received a disappointing response. He was told that the unratified 1913 agreement had been negotiated under different circumstances when the Ottomans
were still in al-Ahs, and that it had been superseded by Ibn Sauds 1915 agreement with
Britain, which stated that the frontier between Kuwait and Najd was still to be determined.
Salem had never been informed of this, and had been led to believe by successive political
agents that the British still upheld the territory within the green line as his beyond dispute.91
Indeed, Kuwaits boundary identified in the British Government of Indias annual Administration Report of the Kuwait Political Agency for 1919 reflected this.92 Once he realised that
the British Government might not uphold what he believed to be his rightful territory, Salem preferred to leave the frontier undecided than to have it decided against him.93 Ibn Saud, on the
other hand, pushed for a boundary settlement. Seeing as his family had lost power twice before the
creation of the third Saudi state in 1902, he must have been eager to officially demarcate his
borders at a moment that was most favourable to him, when he had the first-class expansionist
tool of the Ikhwn to help him.94 The Ikhwn were known to take the long-standing rules of
tribal raiding beyond the prescribed and accepted limits of desert warfare, and their forcible
submission of tribes to Ikhwnism, and thereby to Ibn Sauds authority, did not adhere to
common desert practice.95 In 1919 the Political Agent in Kuwait wrote that recruitment for
[Ikhwn] membership seems now to have passed the stage of mere conversion and frightfulness
appears to be the order of the day.96 This was exacerbated by the fact that Jaber and Salem had
not controlled Kuwaits tribes and hinterland as effectively as their father; as reported when Salem
came to power in 1917, Jabir was too easy going and the country close to Kuwait was gradually
becoming unsafe.97
86
More to Cox, 20 May 1920, ibid.

More to Cox, 2 June 1920, ibid.
88
More to Cox, 13 June 1920, ibid.
89
Salem al-Sabah to More (Political Agent, Kuwait), 17 Sept. 1920, R/15/5/105, IOR, London.
90
More to Cox, 13 June 1920, R/15/5/99, IOR, London.
91
92
Governmentt of India, Administration Report of the Kuwait Political Agency for 1919, p. 67.
93
94
95
Freeth, A New Look at Kuwait (1972), p. 169.
96
Quoted in Kostiner, Saudi Arabia, p. 226.
97
Hamilton (Political Agent, Kuwait) to Cox (Chief Political Officer, Basra), 6 Feb. 1917, R/15/5/19,
IOR, London.
87
32
Farah Al-Nakib
As the boundary dispute escalated in the summer of 1920, Ibn Saud declared that he did not
recognise that Ibn Subah has any boundaries [in the hinterland] nor do I recognise that he has any
tribesmen who depend on him, or on whom he depends, nor do I recognise that he has any shore in the
hinterland of Koweit beyond the surrounding walls of Koweit town and this has been the situation
from the days of his forefathers and mine.98
In a letter to Salem, Ibn Saud framed the situation as a justiable reclamation of his ancestral lands:
From the very beginning there was never any question about boundaries and subjects between the
Subah and Saud families, nor was there ever any misunderstanding between them: the Subah
stopped in Kuwait and the Saud controlled the tribes, and there was no friction.99
Then, according to Ibn Saud, evil days fell on Najd and the country was split into two, one
part under the Ottomans and the other under Ibn Rashid. Some tribes who were unhappy with this
new arrangement went to Kuwait and Mubarak began taking zakt from them, to which Ibn Saud
did not object, as it was all in the way of friendship. When Mubarak died, Ibn Saud began
reclaiming some of the tribes he had lost by once again collecting zakt from them. Ibn Saud
referred to the disputed territory as an amnah, a voluntary gift entrusted by one party to the
other for the purposes of care and protection. As such, it was his right as the giver to take
them back.100 This was not entirely a reflection of reality the tribes had gone over to the Al
Sabah of their own volition, mostly before Ibn Saud had come to power but rather of how
Ibn Saud perceived the situation. Salem, on the other hand, referred to the tribes and territories
between Kuwait and Najd, according to old rules and usage, as a miynah, a common property or interest of both making the frontier between them less defined than Ibn Sauds more
fixed interpretation.101 Given these conflicting views, it is not surprising that the contestation over
tribes persisted. In November Ibn Saud complained that Salem was continuously bribing the
most foolish of his Najdi tribesmen to switch loyalties, and if I neglect him, the number of
men who will be thus persuaded to go over to him will go on increasing.102 The Najdi ruler
thus inadvertently admitted that he did not have a sufficient hold over the tribes in the hinterland
around Kuwait to which he was laying claim. Salem insisted that he had done nothing to seduce
the tribes from their allegiance to Ibn Saud and that they had come to him entirely on their own;
he could not in honour send them away.103
Meanwhile, in April 1920 Ibn Saud declared that tribes and merchants of the Qasm and
northern Najd were no longer allowed to import goods by way of Kuwait but had to use the
Saudi ports of Uqair and Qatf.104 Though the Political Agent in Bahrain interpreted this as a
revenue-generating move, it certainly expedited the settlement of the boundary question. The
trade blockade caused great alarm among the merchants in Kuwait, who had long controlled
and financed trade with Najd. As the conflict between Salem and Ibn Saud dragged on, many
merchants began to pressure Salem to reach a settlement with the Najdi ruler, otherwise trade
between Kuwait and Najd will remain at a standstill. The people of Kuwait were much more
concerned with the re-opening of trade than the fixing of a frontier, but, as More identified,
friendly relations between the two rulers could be re-established only with the settlement of
98
Ibn Saud to Dickson (Political Agent, Bahrain), 5 Sept. 1920, R/15/5/105, IOR, London.
Ibn Saud to Salem al-Sabah, 21 June 1920, R/15/5/99, IOR, London.
100
Ibid.
101
Salem al-Sabah to Ibn Saud, undated, R/15/1/522, IOR, London.
102
Ibn Saud to Dickson (Political Agent, Bahrain), 23 Nov. 1920, R/15/5/100, IOR, London.
103
More (Political Agent, Kuwait) to Cox (High Commissioner, Baghdad), 8 Jan. 1921, ibid.
104
Dickson (Political Agent, Bahrain) to Cox, 6 Apr. 1920, R/15/5/25, IOR, London.
99
The Lost Two-Thirds
33
the boundary dispute.105 As such, Salem was faced with both internal and external pressure to
settle the boundary question with Ibn Saud.
The two rulers agreed in the summer of 1920 to [invoke] the friendly arbitration of the British
Government.106 In the meantime both parties were instructed not to commit any aggression
within the disputed territory.107 Construction at Jariyah continued, however, causing resentment
in Kuwait as the boundary was still under arbitration.108 In September Ibn Saud learned that a
large raiding party from Kuwait had collected at Jahra with the avowed intention of attacking
Jariyah.109 In Kuwait the movement was described simply as a reconnaissance.110 Nonetheless,
on 8 October a large Ikhwn force was seen making its way towards Jahra, and Salem immediately prepared to defend the village.111 The Ikhwn attacked Jahra on 10 October, and within
hours the village was in their hands. Salem and about six hundred men were besieged in the
village fort overnight until relieved by a Shammar force. The following morning the Ikhwn withdrew from Jahra and settled at Subaihiyah thirty-two miles south of Kuwait Town, where they
were believed to be preparing for another attack. Hundreds had been killed and wounded on
both sides.112 When envoys of the Ikhwn arrived in Kuwait to negotiate with Salem, they
were emphatic that their action was in accordance with Ibn Sauds order.113 Ibn Saud,
however, denied that he ordered the attack on Jahra.114 He claimed that Duaij had led a
raiding party towards Riydh, and that al-Duwsh and the Mutair chased them back to Jahra
(which the British found unlikely).115 The following month Ibn Saud warned that should
Salem or his forces leave the territory of Kuwait or approach any of the wells at Jahra or Subaihiya, then I shall not be responsible for the result but he alone will be to blame, as I am bound, in
that case, to defend my country.116 Ibn Saud was now claiming areas well within the red line of
the 1913 convention as his own. And indeed, later that month the Ikhwn unexpectedly attacked
Kuwaiti tribes just west of Jahra.117 The need for a settlement of the boundary dispute reached
critical point.
In February 1921 Cox officially informed Ibn Saud about the 1913 negotiations regarding
Kuwaits boundary. He intimated that the territory within the red line was recognised by the
British as definitely appertaining to Kuwait and not open to dispute. The area between the
red and green lines was to be regarded as neutral ground in which neither party must
occupy wells or build permanent habitations until the question could be permanently
settled.118 Salems nephew Ahmed al-Jaber visited Ibn Saud in an attempt to find a friendly
solution to the troubles. But, while in Najd, news arrived that Salem had suddenly died. Ibn
Saud immediately told Ahmed that the two houses were once again united in perfect
105
More (Political Agent, Kuwait) to Cox (High Commissioner, Baghdad), 1 Dec. 1920, R/15/5/100,
IOR, London; More to Cox, 15 Oct. 1920, R/15/5/105, IOR, London.
106
Cox to More, 9 July 1920, R/15/5/99, IOR, London.
107
Cox to Dickson (Political Agent, Bahrain) and More, 19 Aug. 1920, R/15/5/105, IOR, London.
108
More to Trevor (Political Residency, Bushehr), 16 Sept. 1920, ibid.
109
Dickson (Political Agent, Bahrain) to Cox, 14 Sept. 1920, ibid.
110
More to Trevor, 16 Sept. 1920, ibid.
111
More (Political Agent, Kuwait), The Ikhwan Attack on Jahrah, 19 Oct. 1920, ibid.
112
Ibid.
113
More to Cox, 24 October 1920, ibid.
114
Dickson (Political Agent, Bahrain) to More, 15 October 1920, ibid.
115
116
Ibn Saud to Dickson (Political Agent, Bahrain), 12 Nov. 1920; Dickson to Cox (High Commissioner,
Baghdad), 5 Dec. 1920, R/15/5/100, IOR, London.
117
Salem al-Sabah to More (Political Agent, Kuwait), 29 Dec. 1920, ibid.
118
Cox to More (Political Agent, Kuwait), 26 Apr. 1921; Cox to Salem al-Sabah, 17 Feb. 1921, ibid.
34
Farah Al-Nakib
friendship and that there was no longer any need of a fixed frontier between their territories,
to which Ahmed agreed.119 The British decided to end the question of arbitration for the time
being, but Cox wondered how far Ibn Saud may make good in the area enclosed between the
red and the green lines.120
Indeed, now that Ibn Saud knew that in 1913 this area was not specifically marked as part of
the Al Sabahs undisputed territory, it was not long before he re-opened the boundary question
and staked his claim to it, thereby legitimising Shakespears concerns with the 1913 zonal
scheme. In October 1921 Ibn Saud insisted that the zone between the red and green lines was
the undisputed property of Najd, and had been acknowledged as such by Ahmed, the new
ruler of Kuwait, during his visit in March.121 Ahmed, however, claimed that nothing had been
fixed during his visit, and that Ibn Saud had simply said, there is no boundary between you
and me but the boundaries of both are one.122 Although Ahmed was hesitant to have the boundary question raised while he was on friendly terms with Ibn Saud, he was not willing to relinquish
his claims to the larger frontier.123
6 The Kuwait-Najd boundary agreement: Uqair 1922

A permanent settlement to the Kuwait-Najd boundary was finally reached at the Uqair Conference of December 1922, the primary purpose of which was the settlement of the Iraq-Najd frontier. When after six days of meetings no agreement could be reached on the Iraq-Najd boundary,
Cox allegedly took a red pencil and drew a map of Arabia that gave a large portion of the area
claimed by Ibn Saud to Iraq. Then, according to Dickson (who was in attendance), obviously
to placate Ibn Saud, he ruthlessly deprived Kuwait of nearly two-thirds of her territory and
gave it to Najd.124 According to the new arrangement, Kuwait maintained the area within the
red line of the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman convention but lost most of the area located between the
red and green lines to Najd, with a portion kept as neutral ground shared by both governments
(and local tribes) (Figure 2).125 When Ibn Saud later burst out into sobs that he had been
deprived of half his kingdom given to Iraq, Cox responded that it was for this reason I
have given you two-thirds of Kuwaits territory, admitting that he had no idea how Ahmed
al-Sabah, who did not attend and was represented at the meeting by Political Agent More,
would take the blow.126 Cox informed Ahmed a few days later in Kuwait that, he had been
obliged to give away to Ibn Saud nearly two-thirds of [his] kingdom. When the Kuwaiti ruler
asked why this had been done without his consultation, Cox made no mention of the Iraq-Najd
situation but rather told Ahmed that had he not conceded this territory, Ibn Saud would certainly
have soon picked a quarrel and taken it, if not more, by force of arms Thus, faced with a fait
accompli Shaikh Ahmad agreed to add his signature to the agreement.127
Coxs admission that he had given Ibn Saud two-thirds of Kuwaits territory underscores
the fact that the British still considered the territory between the red and green lines as belonging
119
More to Cox, 11 Mar. 1921, ibid.

Cox to More, 19 May 1921, ibid.
121
Cox to More, 4 Oct. 1921, ibid.
122
Ahmad al-Sabah to More (Political Agent, Kuwait), 21 Oct. 1921, ibid.
123
More to Cox, 24 Oct. 1921, ibid.
124
Dickson, Kuwait, p. 274.
125
Copy of the Najd-Kuwait Agreement of Uqair Conference, December 2nd 1922, R/15/5/100, IOR,
London.
126
127
Ibid., p. 279.
120
35
The Lost Two-Thirds
Figure 2: The territory of Kuwait after the drawing of the Kuwait-Najd boundary at Uqair in 1922. Neutral
zone is marked as N.T. [Freeth, A New Look at Kuwait (1972), p. 12].
to Kuwait before it was given to Najd.128 Perhaps, however, it was in Britains interest to placate
the ruler with the substantially larger border with their new mandate in Iraq, particularly as they
had just installed Faisal, the son of Ibn Sauds long-time adversary the Sharif Husayn, as the new
Iraqi king. Dickson summed up the situation as follows:
By this somewhat strange arrangement, which savoured of surrender pure and simple to a strong state
at the expense of a small and weak one, the obvious end in view being expediency and a desire to
mollify the powerful and troublesome Ibn Saud, the southern boundary of the recognised territory
128
Ibid., pp. 275, 279.
36
Farah Al-Nakib
of Kuwait was pushed back a hundred and fifty miles, reducing the kingdom to an area of six thousand
square miles.129
Cox, however, defended his action by arguing that al-Sabah power in the desert by 1922 was
significantly less than it had been under Mubarak when the Anglo-Ottoman Agreement had been
drawn up in 1913.130 More had similarly argued in the midst of the Ikhwn crisis in 1920 that
Salems influence can in no respect be compared with that of his father. This he attributed to the
fact that most of the Mutair had since adopted Ikhwnism.131 The trade blockade during the war
was another factor; as Hamilton identified in 1918, Britains insistence on his tightening the blockade
and discriminating between tribes, friendly or otherwise to us, in the matter of granting supplies had
contributed to Salems unpopularity amongst some tribes.132 There is, however, little hard evidence to
show the extent of Al Sabah tribal authority at that time, given that tribal loyalties were constantly shifting (even in the midst of the 1920 conflict). More also pointed out that, logical though the argument
was that Shaikh Mubarak was a strong man and Shaikh Salim is a weak, and that a frontier which was
suitable for the former is not so for the latter, Ibn Saud himself refuted this argument by signing the
1915 agreement with Britain. The agreement recognised the Al Saud as the independent rulers of
Najd, al-Ahs, al-Qatf, and Jubayl, and obviously some of his descendants may be weaker than
himself.133 Ahmeds own alleged reaction to the agreement reflects this historical rise and fall of
powerful rulers and the ebbing and flowing of boundaries that was a traditional part of the process:
If some day, said Shaikh Ahmad, Ibn Saud dies and I grow strong like my grandfather, Mubarak,
will the British Government object if I denounce the unjust frontier line and recover my lost territories? No! laughed Sir Percy. And may God bless your efforts.134
The reality was, however, that the drawing of permanent boundaries in the region under
British arbitration compounded by the arrival of the oil companies and the awarding of
exploratory concessions in the desert meant that neither Ahmed nor his successors had the
chance to reclaim their territory as previous rulers (including Ibn Saud himself) were once
able to do. By the time Ibn Saud died in 1953 desert boundaries were no longer contestable or
changeable as they had been for centuries. Kuwaits borders as drawn in 1922 have thus remained
more or less unchanged until today.
Conclusion
Though it certainly appeared as though Britain gave away two-thirds of Kuwaits land to Ibn Saud
at the stroke of a pencil, this paper has attempted to re-examine the period between 1913 and 1922 to
have a deeper understanding of the historical context within which this occurred. While Sir Percy
Cox, the architect of the 1922 agreement, argued that Al Sabah power in the desert had significantly
diminished after Mubaraks death in 1915, the factors leading to Kuwaits declining territorial fortunes were more complex than a question of tribal loyalty. It was largely the souring of the relationship between Kuwaits rulers and Ibn Saud of Najd beginning with the Ajmn crisis in 1913 and
129
Ibid., p. 276.
Ibid., p. 274.
131
132
Hamilton (Political Agent, Kuwait), Note on Situation at Kuwait, undated, reprinted in Schofield
(ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 322.
133
134
130
The Lost Two-Thirds
37
worsening as a result of their involvement in Britains war efforts that accelerated the establishment of a fixed Kuwait-Najd boundary. Ibn Sauds use of the Ikhwn as a tool of tribal and territorial expansion had made him a powerful force to contend with in the aftermath of the First World
War. As such, though the British recognised until 1919 that Kuwaits territorial limits extended to
the green line of the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Agreement, when the moment came to actually draw a
line in the sand in 1922 Cox chose to appease Ibn Saud at the expense of Ahmed. The creation of a
permanent boundary between the two territories in 1922 resulted in a substantial loss of territory for
Kuwait while also permanently altering the once fluctuating nature of desert boundaries at a
moment that was infinitely more favourable to Ibn Saud.
Bibliography
1 Primary sources
Arab Bureau, Note on Relations with Ibn Saud, 12 January 1917, reprinted in Richard Schofield (ed.), Arabian
Boundary Disputes 10: Saudi Arabia-Kuwait, 18291991 (Farnham Common, UK: Archive Editions, 1992).
Bidwell, Robin (ed.), The Affairs of Kuwait: 18961905, Vol. 2: 19021905 (London: Frank Cass and Co.
Ltd, 1971).
Dickson, H.R.P., Kuwait and Her Neighbours (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956).
Government of India, Administration Reports of the Kuwait Political Agency for 191820, reprinted in
Persian Gulf Administration Reports 7: 19121920 (Cambridge: Archive Editions, 1989).
Hamilton, Robert E.A., Notes on Ibn Saud, November 1917, reprinted in Richard Schofield (ed.), Arabian
Boundary Disputes 10: Saudi Arabia-Kuwait, 18291991 (Farnham Common, UK: Archive Editions, 1992).
India Office Records (IOR), British Library: R/15/5: Kuwait Political Agency, 190449.
Lorimer, John George, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia 2: Geographical and
Statistical, edited by Richard Lockington Birdwood (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government
Printing, 1915; reprinted by Archive Editions, 1986).
Philby, Harry St John B., Report on the Operations of the Najd Mission, 29 Oct 19171 Nov 1918, 12
November 1918, reprinted in Richard Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10: Saudi ArabiaKuwait, 18291991 (Farnham Common, UK: Archive Editions, 1992).
Schofield, Richard (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10: Saudi Arabia-Kuwait, 18291991 (Farnham
Common, UK: Archive Editions, 1992).
2 Secondary sources
Abdul-Aziz, Moudi M., King Abdul-Aziz and the Kuwait Conference, 19231924 (London: Echoes, 1993).
Abu-Hakima, Ahmad Mustafa, The Modern History of Kuwait, 17501965 (London: Luzac & Co., 1983).
Al-Bassam, Anne, Footsteps in the Sand: Kuwait and Her Neighbours, 1700 to 2003 (Kuwait: Kuwait
Bookshops Co. Ltd, 2004).
Fattah, Hala, The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia, and the Gulf: 17451900 (Albany: SUNY
Press, 1997).
Finnie, David, Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwaits Elusive Frontier With Iraq (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992).
Freeth, Zahra, A New Look at Kuwait (London: Allen & Unwin, 1972).
Kostiner, Joseph, Saudi Arabias Territorial Expansion: The Case of Kuwayt, 19161921, Die Welt des
Islams 33 (1993): 21934.
Onley, James, The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the
Nineteenth Century, New Arabian Studies 6 (2004), pp. 3092.
Rush, Alan, Al-Sabah: History and Genealogy of Kuwaits Ruling Family, 17521987 (London: Ithaca Press,
1987).
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, Britain and Kuwaits Borders, 19021923, in Kuwait: The Growth of a Historic Identity, edited by
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Silverfarb, Daniel, The Philby Mission to Ibn Saud, 19171918, Journal of Contemporary History 14
(1979), pp. 26986.

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Journal of Arabian Studies 2.1 (June 2012), pp.

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ISSN 2153-4764 print/ISSN 2153-4780 online

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The reign of Mubarak I

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Lorimer, Gazetteer, p. 1061.

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The Ajmn question

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Britain and the First World War

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Hamilton, Notes on Ibn Saud, 1917, p. 258.

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The Ikhwn-Kuwait crisis of 1920

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More to Cox, 20 May 1920, ibid.

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6 The Kuwait-Najd boundary agreement: Uqair 1922

More to Cox, 11 Mar. 1921, ibid.

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Ibid., pp. 275, 279.

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