G.R. No.

L-19550

June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS

and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director,
National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL
VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE
AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN
CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch,
and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon
City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and
Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant
Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor
General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and
Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named
on the margin1 hereinafter referred to as RespondentsProsecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates,3 a total of
42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the
any peace officer, to search the persons above-named
and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following
personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,

correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and
proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be
used as the means of committing the offense," which is
described in the applications adverted to above as "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null
and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of
Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be
disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962,
said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original
action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction,
and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present
case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or
representatives from using the effects seized as
aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation
cases already adverted to, and that, in due course,

thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested

search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and
commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court,
the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or
confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that
the contested search warrants are valid and have been
issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said
warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3)
that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the
alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and
seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution
dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or
dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things
seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned
are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as
regards the papers, documents and things found and seized
in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the
alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split
into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and
seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein
have no cause of action to assail the legality of the

contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance

thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have
their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein
may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners
herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against
them of the documents, papers and things seized from the
offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above,
since the right to object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom
the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of
papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did
it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were
unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or
any one were invaded, they were the rights of the
corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next,
it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can
be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded.
Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not
been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits
of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was
with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the

question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an

alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the
personal defendants but embraces only the corporation
whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co.
vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis
supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in
the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned
resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in
effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from
using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two
(2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1)
whether the search warrants in question, and the searches
and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or
not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the
negative, whether said documents, papers and things may
be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search
warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there
of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the

persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that
the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person
therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had
been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued
the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause,
for the same presupposes the introduction of competent
proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter
of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege
any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would
be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody
of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,"
as alleged in the aforementioned applications without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be
to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the

sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication

and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or
passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to
be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted
to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to
imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife,
when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to
wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this
Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart,
under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification,
the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the
application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects
to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of
records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners
herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or
illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of

the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,

whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized
be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1),
Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches
and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the
documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in
evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature
deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion
that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American
common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to
go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16
upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means
other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17
such as the common-law action for damages against the
searching officer, against the party who procured the
issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting
in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal
punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful
seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided
by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given
up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary
rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned
Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of

evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully
acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of
enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the
action of trespass against the offending official may have
been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in
case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme
Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an
offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his
rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of
no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts
of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by
years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in
subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. 20 After
reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in
Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional
documentation of the right of privacy free from
unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on
our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door
remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness

in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons

as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful
conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been
declared enforceable against the States through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against
them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against
the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as
without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable
federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words,"
valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that
rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so
ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus
with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the
time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was
applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the
cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held
that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included
the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its
provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition.
The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against
the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of
the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had
always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and
Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive
protections of due process to all constitutionally
unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically
and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine
an essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted

upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly

recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the
new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of
its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the
exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced
to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise
is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege
and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized
that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way by removing the incentive to
disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State
tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional
restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having
once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the
Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and
that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy
by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can
no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like
effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process
Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law
enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our
decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the
individual no more than that which the Constitution
guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to
which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts,
that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration
of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the
letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction

against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if

the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence
to establish probable cause of the commission of a given
crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended,
then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply
with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the
other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is
not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable
cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the
warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for
its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is
indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable
cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those
who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect
the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks
the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By
agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging
to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not
have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority
usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting
agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact
that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21
of securing their conviction, is watered down by the
pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality
had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the
Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners
allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments,
House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436,
Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club,

should be included among the premises considered in said

Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S.
Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck,
respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and
other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above
referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners
and other effects under their exclusive possession and
control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing
under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal
courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their
alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned
records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal"
nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or
amended petition herein, but in the Motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June
29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the
approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be
reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the
affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said
motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof,
contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations
inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners
herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the
allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration,
and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other
papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently
established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application
of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At
any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our

opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for

determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the
Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the
warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein
petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962,
are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein
made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers
and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein
petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed
for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other
effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby,
denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the
writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers
and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places,
offices and other premises enumerated in the same
Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and
Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion and from the import of the deliberations
of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct
conclusions:

1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of

Investigation in this case are general warrants and are
therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of
section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the
authority of the said search warrants were consequently
illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs.
People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the
petitioners are expressly declared null and void the searches
and seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal;
and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued
against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized
in the said residences is made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings
satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal standing to
move for the suppression of the documents, papers and
effects seized in the places other than the three residences
adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief Justice
refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such
warrants served at such other places and as illegal the
searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter
open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."

served at places other than the three residences, and the

illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under the
authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating
passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the
environmental political and moral developments of this case
should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the
law not only for this case but as well for future cases and
future generations. All the search warrants, without
exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and
roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and
indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches
and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the
petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no
legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers,
things and effects seized from places other than their
residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter
or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search
warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and
seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners
possess legal standing the said warrants are void and
remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and
remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of
the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a
determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or
of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.

It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice

summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph
(numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.

On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction

that, upon the pleadings submitted to this Court the
petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the
suppression and return of the documents, papers and
effects that were seized from places other than their family
residences.

I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly

declare, at this time, the nullity of the search warrants

Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was

derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the

United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial

construction and interpretation of the said constitutional
provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal
the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by
federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move
for the suppression or return of documents, papers and
effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and
seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership of
documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession actual or
constructive of premises searched gives "standing"; and
(c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search
warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are
"primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the
"aggrieved person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will
readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against
the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners
were named personally, followed by the designation, "the
President and/or General Manager" of the particular
corporation. The three warrants excepted named three
corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said
three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by
or under the control of the petitioners in all the other search
warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the
President and/or General Manager" of the particular
corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2,
1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and
were actually made, in the

"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the

control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the
petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and
gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of
seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)
(narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the
defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53
(5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of
corporation of which the defendant was president), United
States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an
apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs.
United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized
from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant);
Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir.
1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in
exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on
December 12, 1966), it was held that under the
constitutional provision against unlawful searches and
seizures, a person places himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office,
his hotel room or his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the
fundamental nature and scope of Fourth Amendment
protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the
security a man relies upon when he places himself or his
property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his
home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There

he is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion.

And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his
desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will
be secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable
seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not
tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers,
the purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or
the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman.
Countless other cases which have come to this Court over
the years have involved a myriad of differing factual
contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment
have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will
bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we either
foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth
Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408
(December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48,
72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the
records and documents seized, the petitioners have
standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of
their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the
premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold
interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for
reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to
emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or
indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room
91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club;
Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street);
maintained personal offices within the corporate offices
(IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such
offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which the
papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and

individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the

controlling stock of the corporations involved. The
petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the
premises searched therefore independently gives them
standing to move for the return and suppression of the
books, papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court
delineated the nature and extent of the interest in the
searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to
suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the
unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court
decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the
lower courts. We are persuaded, however, that it is
unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions,
developed and refined by the common law in evolving the
body of private property law which, more than almost any
other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose
validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which
they derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of
those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See
Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying
out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305.
Distinctions such as those between "lessee", "licensee,"
"invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought
not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately
referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs.
United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest
in the premises searched must own the property seized in

order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress.

In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a
Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment
the corporate records were seized successfully moved for
their return. In United States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53
F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's
president successfully moved for the return and suppression
is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized
from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and
property, "either his own or the corporation's was entitled to
protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under
the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure
were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return
of seized article and the suppression of the evidence so
obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest
in either the place searched or the articles seize had the
necessary standing to invoke the protection of the
exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335
U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice
Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may
expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against
criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view
of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United
States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in
1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S.
Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere guest
in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court
nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected
him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include
"anyone legitimately on premise where the search occurs."

Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a
corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution against
him to demand the return and suppression of corporate
property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th
Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude that the defendant had
standing on two independent grounds: First he had a
sufficient interest in the property seized, and second he
had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like
in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully
searched the corporation' premises and had seized most of
the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the
court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify
one as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been
precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search
and seizure of the corporation's books and records merely
because the appellant did not show ownership or possession
of the books and records or a substantial possessory interest
in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F.
2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F.
2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police officers
seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place
of employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of
either; he asserted that several employees (including
himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the
employee had a protected interest and that there also was
an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano considered
also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at"

the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at

682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed
his files in storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to
move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury
subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files.
The Government contended that the petitioner had no
standing because the books and papers were physically in
the possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena
was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the
contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and
unrelinquished personal rights in the books and papers as
not to enable the question of unreasonable search and
seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural device
of compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and
deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855,
861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s
primarily directed against said person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United
States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.).
The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and
papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at
the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. *
Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in
the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's
affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management."
The papers turned out to be private, personal and business

papers together with corporate books and records of certain

unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim
ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the case
at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid
by the court which held that even though Birrell did not own
the premises where the records were stored, he had
"standing" to move for the return of all the papers and
properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra;
U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F.
2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S.,
supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in
question were directed solely and exclusively against Birrell.
The only person suggested in the papers as having violated
the law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the
records as having been used "in committing a violation of
Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the
mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search
warrant was captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell
M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership,
gives standing to move to suppress. Such was the rule even
before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive
possession of the records stored with Dunn, it matters not
whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See
also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d
498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459
(1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for
reargument; the United States did not appeal from this

decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to

the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many
personal and corporate papers were seized from premises
not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches
were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY"
against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were
suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the
case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises
raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the
quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these were
directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word,
as long as the documents were personal papers of the
petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate
papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under
their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events,
should order the return to the petitioners all personal and
private papers and effects seized, no matter where these
were seized, whether from their residences or corporate
offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted
sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various
pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that
amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and
other places were personal and private papers and effects
belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents,
papers and things which where the objects of the unlawful
searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they
were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices,
warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed

(actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the

search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the
void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers
belonging to corporations. Under such categorization or
grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized
papers, documents and things are personal/private of the
petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to
the lower courts which issued the void search warrants in
ultimately effecting the suppression and/or return of the said
documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above
cited, the petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to
move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as
"President and/or General Manager" of the corporations
involved as specifically mentioned in the void search
warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the
cases cited in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions,
the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal
searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their
protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

G.R. No. 81561

January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accusedappellant.

BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special
Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX)
convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b),
Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)
(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are
as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m.,
the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex,
Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift
wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and
no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The
appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending
the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the
transaction, writing therein his name, passport
number, the date of shipment and the name and
address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ,

Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p.

6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could
examine and inspect the packages. Appellant,
however, refused, assuring her that the packages
simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were
gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's
representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on
inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were
then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by
two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at
the bottom and on top of the packages before the
box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the
box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of
Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for
final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity
aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside.
Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of
one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the
cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the
contents thereof(tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987;
Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the
shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the
cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's
shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National

Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in

the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He
was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section.
Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the
shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes
and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went
to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30,
October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's
packages were placed and, in the presence of the
NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styrofoam and took out the cellophane wrappers from
inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found
to have been contained inside the cellophane
wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis
supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was
likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the
package contained bricks or cake-like dried
marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly
contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It
turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly
stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6,
1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge
of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a
"Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects
(tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to
no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the
Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance
from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987,
appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office,
was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted
shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the

Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to

the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It
turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering
tops as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief,
pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for
violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following
errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED
OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT
HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE
UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT
OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW
THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION
(Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the
imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and
seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III,
Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be
held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the
1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such,
the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United

States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts

which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v.
Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct.
1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v.
Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any
evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and
seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier
adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948])
wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by
the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art.
IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over
up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the
exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional
safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures.
(Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim
v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos,
144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687
[1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No.
81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted
to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the
State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or
other authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar
character since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person,
acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances,
can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been
violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private

individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional

rights, be invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345
[1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable
search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's
person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government, included in which is his residence, his
papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as
such have the access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his
castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion
by government, which is called upon to refrain from
any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the
privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California,
384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US
616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547;
65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against
unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in
previous cases, its protection applies to
governmental action. Its origin and history clearly
show that it was intended as a restraint upon the
activities of sovereign authority, and was not
intended to be a limitation upon other than

governmental agencies; as against such authority it

was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure
the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of
his dwelling and the possession of his property,
subject to the right of seizure by process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d
661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who searched the
automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana
instead, without the knowledge and participation of police
authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for
illegal possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d
121), it was held that the search and seizure clauses are
restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon
private individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d
621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391
S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517
(1967). The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however,
was made by a private citizen the owner of a
motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in
which he left behind a travel case containing the
evidence***complained of. The search was made on
the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he
became suspicious, called the local police, informed
them of the bag's contents, and made it available to
the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it
do not require exclusion of evidence obtained
through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the
amendment only proscribes governmental action."

The contraband in the case at bar having come into

possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search
and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same
should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI
agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence
later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his
conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be
clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument stands
to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily
foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an
illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise.
Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job
Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was
reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part
of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of
packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts
(TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original
Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing
the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and
later summoned the agents to his place of business.
Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the
shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the
NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and
seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate
of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a

warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the

Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in
plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is
open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof,
is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the
contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the
part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is
prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71
L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10
L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was
likewise held that where the property was taken into custody
of the police at the specific request of the manager and
where the search was initially made by the owner there is no
unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional
meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds
support in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the
fundamental law of the land must always be subject to
protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner
Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights
answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of
fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection
against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its
concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals.
What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to
any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of
Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional

Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis

supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a
warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at
the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the
case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals
so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the
1935 Constitution has been modified by the present
phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring
as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure,
it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police
authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p.
8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution,
in laying down the principles of the government and
fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern
relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be
emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987
Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of

either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the

responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof
(SeeSoliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No.
13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987].
The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to
whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable
search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed
with the State and did not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search
and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an
individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign
authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private
individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be
construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal
complications and an absurd interpretation of the
constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an
individual effected through private seizure equally applies,
in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as
it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and
communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that
the lower court erred in convicting him despite the
undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while
under custodial investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully
examined the records of the case and found nothing to
indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not
informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave
statements without the assistance of counsel. The law
enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of
his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have
regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and
their testimonies should be given full faith and credence,
there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from

the records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to

give any written statement while under investigation as
testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job
Reyes. What about the accused here, did you
investigate the accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with
the girl but the accused availed of his constitutional
right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN,
October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was
not contradicted by the defense on cross-examination. As
borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the
defense that appellant gave uncounselled confession while
being investigated. What is more, we have examined the
assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there
any reference made to the testimony of appellant while
under custodial investigation which was utilized in the
finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error
is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error,
appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner
of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather
a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met
in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the
packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the
shipment since the German national was about to leave the
country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).

Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find

appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and
contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated.
An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an
hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment
of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose
and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the
undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated
by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust
contraband and of considerable value at that as the
marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00
to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on
the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking
to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a
complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p.
19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the
errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in
law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs.
Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect
considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was
previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve
Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982
and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter
Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug
abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's
residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p.
66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances
(People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van

Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA
651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]);
Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further
show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full
name, his complete address or passport number.
Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner
of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in
the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40).
On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner
and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption
that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of
ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At
this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim
otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial
court in rendering the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-26177 December 27, 1972

OSCAR VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE JOSE R. QUERUBIN, Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Yulo and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Solicitor
Pedro A. Ramirez and Assistant City Fiscal (Bacolod) Andres
M. Bayona for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p
In accordance with the policy to which this Court is
committed, namely, that a colorable claim of a denial of a
constitutional right should not be ignored, petitioner, in
this certiorari and prohibition proceeding, succeeded in
having his alleged grievance against respondent Judge, the
Honorable Jose R. Querubin, now retired, heard. He would
have us nullify the lower court order of June 1, 1966
requiring him "to return and deliver to the Provincial
Commander, Bacolod City, the amount of P10,350.00 and
the wooden container stated in the receipt issued by the
accused dated April 1, 1966, within forty-eight (48) hours
upon receipt of this order." 1 The money in question formed
part of the things seized in accordance with a search
warrant previously issued by respondent Judge himself.
Petitioner therefore, to lend plausibility to his plea, was
under the necessity of alleging that less than full respect

was accorded his constitutional right to be free from

unreasonable search and seizure. 2 He would impress on us
that full fealty was not shown to what is ordained by such a
guarantee. Assertion of such a disregard of a constitutional
command is one thing; proof is another. What is more, there
is included in the petition itself 3 a written promise of
petitioner to return such amount when required.
Accordingly, as will be explained, petitioner did fail to show
that he is entitled to the writs of certiorariand prohibition
prayed for.
It was alleged in the petition that on April 23, 1966, in a
motion filed with respondent Judge by an assistant city fiscal
of Bacolod City and a special prosecutor of the Department
of Justice, it was set forth that on March 16, 1966, the
residence of petitioner was raided by a constabulary and
police team on the strength of a search warrant issued by
such respondent Judge, in the course of which, there was a
seizure of the amount of P10,350.00, which was not
however deposited in court, as thereafter its possession was
restored to petitioner. It was further stated that an
information for the violation of Article 195 of the Revised
Penal Code was filed with the City Court of Bacolod against
petitioner. 4 There was an opposition on the part of
petitioner to such motion wherein after asserting that the
lower court was without jurisdiction and that the matter had
become moot and academic, because the money was spent
in good faith by him for the payment of the wages of his
laborers, it was contended that there was a violation of his
constitutional rights not to be deprived of property without
due process of law and to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 5Subsequently, after a reply to such
opposition and a rejoinder were submitted, the respondent
Judge issued the challenged order dated June 1, 1966, the
dispositive portion of which reads: "[In view thereof], the

accused Oscar Villanueva is hereby ordered to return and

deliver to the Provincial Commander, Bacolod City, the
amount of P10,350.00 and the wooden container stated in
the receipt issued by the accused dated April 1, 1966, within
forty-eight (48) hours upon receipt of this order." 6
There was a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on
June 11, 1966. 7 Hence this petition. In view of the stress laid
therein as to the failure of respondent Judge considering the
circumstances of the case to yield deference to the
command of the right against unreasonable searches and
seizure, and the assertion that unless there is a writ of
preliminary injunction issued, respondent Judge will cause
the enforcement of the challenged order, thus exposing him
to contempt proceedings and other disciplinary actions if he
could not comply with it, this Court adopted a resolution on
June 21, 1966 which reads as follows: "The respondents in L26177 (Oscar Villanueva vs. Hon. Judge R. Querubin, etc., et
al.) are required to file, within 10 days from notice hereof, an
answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition for
prohibition and certiorari; upon petitioner's posting a bond
of two thousand pesos (P2,000.00), let preliminary
injunction issue." 8
In the answer filed by the then Solicitor General Antonio P.
Barredo, now a member of this Court, the question of the
alleged violation of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure was squarely met, thus:
"Neither will the assailed orders result in unreasonable
search and seizure for as already said earlier the money and
wooden box in question were confiscated during a gambling
raid pursuant to a search warrant issued by the respondent
court after due and appropriate proceedings during which
the petitioner and his witnesses were examined under oath
by the respondent court." 9 The point thus raised was sought

to be refuted in petitioner's written memorandum, but in a

manner far from persuasive. For he did raise the specious
argument that after the service of the search warrant on
March 16, 1966, the motion of April 23, 1966 for the return
of the money came too late, ignoring that the Rules of Court
does require that the things seized be deposited in
court. 10 Moreover, to counter the damaging effect of a
written promise, which commendably he did not omit from
his petition, that the amount of P10,350.00 "will be returned
... if the higher authorities will require the return of the same
by legal orders,...," 11 he would rely on his alleged rights as
owner. Thus: "While he agreed to return the money by 'legal
orders', this cannot be considered as a limitation on his right
of ownership, because when an agreement conflicts with the
provision of law, the latter must prevail. (Article 1306, Civil
Code)." 12 There was no adequate appreciation of the
controlling norms as to the effects of a seizure under a valid
search warrant or one not so challenged. It is on the basis of
such contentions that petitioner would have us issue the
writs ofcertiorari and prohibition.
A perusal of the pleadings yields the conclusion that
petitioner failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that
there was a denial of a constitutional right sufficient to oust
the court of jurisdiction. On the contrary, what appears
undeniable is that the actuation of respondent Judge was in
accordance with law. There can be no question then of a
violation of the safeguard against unreasonable search and
seizure.
1. This constitutional right refers to the immunity of one's
person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government, included in which is his residence, his papers,
and other possessions. Since, moreover, it is invariably
through a search and seizure that such an invasion of one's

physical freedom manifests itself, it is made clear that he is

not to be thus molested, unless its reasonableness could be
shown. To be impressed with such a quality, it must be
accomplished through a warrant, which should not be issued
unless probable cause is shown, to be determined by a
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, with a
particular description of the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of
this right, but it could be also looked upon as a recognition
of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home,
but not necessarily thereto confined. 13What is sought to be
guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed
entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his
individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who
shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he
wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does
not as such have access except under the circumstances
above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house,
however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon
to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect
the privacies of his life. 14 In the same vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work 15 could fitly characterize this
constitutional right as the embodiment of "a spiritual
concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and
person and to afford its constitutional protection against the
long reach of government is no less than to value human
dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in
case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards." 16

2. Necessarily, then, if petitioner's alleged grievance,

consisting of a disregard of the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure, were substantiated, he
could validly raise a constitutional question of sufficient
gravity to entitle him to the remedies sought. For a failure to
respect a constitutional command resulting in a deprivation
of a constitutional right is visited by loss of
jurisdiction. 17 Such is not the case, however. He did not
even put in issue the validity of the search warrant, as a
result of which there was a seizure of the money in question.
For what were the facts on which the challenged order was
based, facts binding on this Court? As set forth therein: "As
a result of the raid conducted by a party of the Philippine
Constabulary led by Lt. Alexander Aguirre at 4:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of March 16, 1966, in virtue of a search
warrant issued by the undersigned on March 14, 1966, the
raiding party was able to arrest eight (8) participants in the
game of "Monte" held in one of the rooms of the house of
Oscar Villanueva at 6th Street, Bacolod City. Among the
gambling paraphernalias seized during the raid is cash in
the amount of P10,570.00, which the raiding party
submitted to this Court in endorsing the search warrant,
thus subjecting the gambling paraphernalia seized by the
raiding party under the control of this Court. On March 24,
1966 the City Fiscal of Bacolod City filed an information for
Violation of Art. 195 of the Revised Penal Code against the
eight (8) apprehended persons named in the endorsement
of the Philippine Constabulary. All the accused pleaded
guilty and [were] convicted by the City Court. Upon
recommendation of the Fiscal, however, only the amount of
P220.00 was ordered forfeited in favor of the government
and the amount of P10,350.00 was ordered to be returned
to Oscar Villanueva, the owner of the house, who issued the
receipt for the amount with the condition that he will return
the money if the higher authorities will require the return of

the said amount." 18 Then respondent Judge, after referring

to Philips vs. Municipal Mayor, 19 stated further in the order
now under scrutiny: "In the light of the aforequoted ruling of
the appellate court, it is clear that the Court of First Instance
that issued the search warrant has jurisdiction over the
amount of P10,350.00 and its wooden container. With regard
to the contention of the counsel for the accused that the
return of the amount of P10,350.00 is a moot question
because the said amount is already spent by the accused,
whatever defenses the accused may invoke to resist the
return of the amount of money in question is futile and
untenable by estoppel. The accused in issuing the
corresponding receipt of the amount of P10,350.00 and the
wooden box container, agreed to return the said amount
and the box if the higher authorities may so require. The
return of the amount of P10,350.00 and its wooden
container. With regard to the contention money in the box is
a part and parcel of the gambling paraphernalia seized by
the raiding party of the Philippine Constabulary in the house
of the accused Oscar Villanueva who is at present facing the
charge for violation of the gambling law." 20
Even if the recital of the antecedents of the challenged
order were less compelling in thus lending support to what
was done by respondent Judge, still petitioner had failed to
make out a case. For, had he entertained doubts as to the
validity of the issuance of the search warrant or the manner
in which it was executed, he was called upon to establish
such a claim in court. He could rely on authoritative
doctrines of this Court precisely to seek a judicial
declaration of any illegal taint that he could, with
plausibility, assert. 21 That he failed to do. The Rules of Court
made clear what is to be done after the seizure of the
property. Thus: "The officer must forthwith deliver the
property to the municipal judge or judge of the city court or

of the Court of First Instance which issued the warrant,

together with a true inventory thereof duly verified by
oath." 22 The legal custody was therefore appropriately with
respondent Judge, who did authorize the issuance of such
search warrant. Even if the money could validly be returned
to petitioner, had it happened that in the meanwhile some
other officer of the law had it in his possession, still, under
the ruling of this Court in Molo v. Yatco, 23 there should be a
motion for its restoration to petitioner that must be
affirmatively acted upon by respondent Judge. Thus: "It
appears from the present case that the documents and
other papers belonging to the petitioner Mariano Molo,
which were seized by a special agent of the Anti-Usury
Board by virtue of a warrant issued by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, came into the possession of said board,
and while it does not appear how said board came to have
them in its possession, it is presumed that it was by virtue of
an authority given by said court (see. 334, No. 31, Act No.
190). By virtue of said authority the board became an agent
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in the custody of the
documents in question, with the obligation to return them to
said court upon the termination of the investigation for
which the board needed them. As the Anti-Usury Board had
found no sufficient evidence to warrant a criminal action
against the petitioner for violation of the Usury Law, and as
said board had dismissed the case under investigation, it
was duty bound to return said documents and papers to the
Court of First Instance of Rizal so that the latter might order
the return thereof to their owner."24
Much less could the seizure, the validity of the search
warrant being admitted, be open to question. As was set
forth by Justice Malcolm in People v. Veloso: "The police
officers were accordingly authorized to break down the door
and enter the premises of the building occupied by the so-

called Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then had the

right to arrest the persons presumably engaged in a
prohibited game, and to confiscate the evidence of the
commission of the crime. It has been held that an officer
making an arrest may take from the person arrested any
money or property found upon his person, which was used
in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime,
or which may furnish the person arrested with the means of
committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used
as evidence on the trial of the cause, but not otherwise." 25
3. There is an equally insurmountable obstacle to the grant
of petitioner's prayer for the writs of certiorari and
prohibition. There is included, as one of the annexes to his
petition, the following: "Received from Assistant City Fiscal
Jesus V. Ramos the sum of [Ten Thousand Three Hundred
Fifty] (P10,350.00) Philippine Currency. This money will be
returned to him if the higher authorities will require the
return of the same by legal orders, otherwise the same will
not be returned." 26 It was executed on April 1, 1966 and
duly signed by him. As previously noted, he would dispute
the legality of the order requiring the return to enable him to
avoid the effects of such a promise. Not only would he thus
ignore his plighted word, but what is worse, he would
impress on this Court a rather unorthodox notion of what
legality connotes. His contention as to the failure of the
challenged order to meet such a test is that he is the owner
of such an amount. What he would conveniently ignore was
the seizure thereof under a valid search warrant. The very
constitutional guarantee relied upon does not preclude a
search in one's home and the seizure of one's papers and
effects as long as the element of reasonableness is not
lacking. It cannot be correctly maintained then that just
because the money seized did belong to petitioner, its
return to the court that issued the search warrant could be

avoided when precisely what the law requires is that it be

deposited therein. As a matter of fact, what lacks the
element of legality is the continued possession by petitioner.
Resort to a higher tribunal then to nullify what was done by
respondent Judge is futile and unavailing.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition and certiorari is
dismissed and the writ of preliminary injunction under the
resolution of this Court of June 21, 1966, lifted and set aside.
With costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 80508 January 30, 1990

EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA
DACUNES, VIOLETA SEVILLA, QUERUBIN BILLONES,
ESTELITA BILLONES, GORGONIA MACARAEG,
LAUREANA JOAQUIN, CRESTITA LICUP, SOLIDAD
ABURDO, ROSALINA VILLARDA, CONRADA HOBALANE,
ERLINDA RESTORAN, VERIDIAN FLORA, ROSELA
CONDE, SOSIMA COSTO, JOSEFINA ALDIANO,
ROSALINA DOMINGO, ARESTIO YANGA, MILAGROS
GONZALES, ESTRELITA ESTARES, BONIFACIA ANTIVO,
PATRIA VALLES, ERLINDA LEE, MELANIO GAROFIL,
ERIBERTO MATEO, FRANCISCO HORTILLANO,
ANATALIA PESIMO, LOSENDO GARBO, VIRGINIA
LORESTO, LYDIA ELA, RAFAEL VILLABRILLE, MA.
RECHILDA SABALZA, EDITHA MAAMO, ELENIETA
BANOSA, ALEXANDER LABADO, ANDREW GO,
WYNEFREDO REYES, ROSARIO SESPENE, ROSA
MARTIN and JAIME BONGAT, petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN.
ALFREDO LIM, and COL. JESUS GARCIA, respondents.

The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal
age, bona fide residents of Metro Manila and taxpayers and
leaders in their respective communities. They maintain that
they have a common or general interest in the preservation
of the rule of law, protection of their human rights and the
reign of peace and order in their communities. They claim to
represent "the citizens of Metro Manila who have similar
interests and are so numerous that it is impracticable to
bring them all before this Court."
The public respondents, represented by the Solicitor
General, oppose the petition contending inter alia that
petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they
are not the proper parties to institute the action.
According to the petitioners, the following "saturation
drives" were conducted in Metro Manila:
1. March 5, 1987 at about 9:30 PM in Tindalo, Kagitingan,
and Magdalena Streets, Tondo, Manila.
2. June l9, 1987 at about l0:00 PM in Mata Street, Panday
Pira Extension and San Sebastian Street, Tondo, Manila.
3. July 20, 1987 at about 8:00 AM in Bangkusay Street,
Tondo, Manila.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
to prohibit the military and police officers represented by
public respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings"
or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila.

4. August 11 to l3, 1987 between 11:00 PM and 2:00 AM in

six blocks along Aroma Beach up to Happy Land, Magsaysay
Village, Tondo, Manila.
5. August 19, 1987 at 9:00 PM in Herbosa Extension, Quirino
Street, and Pacheco Street, Tondo, Manila.

6. August 28, 1987 at l0:30 PM, in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan

Navotas, Metro Manila.
7. August 30, 1987 at 9:30 PM at Paraiso Extension,
Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.
8. October 12, 1987 at 12:00 midnight in Apelo Cruz
Compound, Quezon City.
9. October 17, 1987 at 11:00 PM in Quirino Street, Tondo,
Manila.
10. October 23, 1987 at 2:30 A.M. in Sun Valley Drive,
Manila International Airport, Pasay City.
11. November 1, 1987 at 4:00 A.M. in Cordillera Street, Sta.
Mesa, Manila.
12. November 3, 1987 at 5:00 A.M. in Lower Maricaban,
Pasay City, Metro Manila.
According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or
saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the
military and police as places where the subversives are
hiding. The arrests range from seven (7) persons during the
July 20 saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one
thousand five hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on
November 3 during the drive at Lower Maricaban, Pasay
City. The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a
common pattern of human rights abuses. In all these drives,
it is alleged that the following were committed:
1. Having no specific target house in mind, in
the dead of the night or early morning hours,

police and military units without any search

warrant or warrant of arrest cordon an area of
more than one residence and sometimes
whole barangay or areas of barangay in Metro
Manila. Most of them are in civilian clothes
and without nameplates or identification
cards.
2. These raiders rudely rouse residents from
their sleep by banging on the walls and
windows of their homes, shouting, kicking
their doors open (destroying some in the
process), and then ordering the residents
within to come out of their respective
residences.
3. The residents at the point of high-powered
guns are herded like cows, the men are
ordered to strip down to their briefs and
examined for tattoo marks and other
imagined marks.
4. While the examination of the bodies of the
men are being conducted by the raiders,
some of the members of the raiding team
force their way into each and every house
within the cordoned off area and then proceed
to conduct search of the said houses without
civilian witnesses from the neighborhood.
5. In many instances, many residents have
complained that the raiders ransack their
homes, tossing about the residents'
belongings without total regard for their

value. In several instances, walls are

destroyed, ceilings are damaged in the
raiders' illegal effort to 'fish' for incriminating
evidence.
6. Some victims of these illegal operations
have complained with increasing frequency
that their money and valuables have
disappeared after the said operations.
7. All men and some women who respond to
these illegal and unwelcome intrusions are
arrested on the spot and hauled off to waiting
vehicles that take them to detention centers
where they are interrogated and 'verified.'
These arrests are all conducted without any
warrants of arrest duly issued by a judge, nor
under the conditions that will authorize
warrantless arrest. Some hooded men are
used to fingerpoint suspected subversives.
8. In some instances, arrested persons are
released after the expiration of the period
wherein they can be legally detained without
any charge at all. In other instances, some
arrested persons are released without charge
after a few days of arbitrary detention.
9. The raiders almost always brandish their
weapons and point them at the residents
during these illegal operations.

10. Many have also reported incidents of onthe-spotbeatings, maulings and

maltreatment.
11. Those who are detained for further
'verification' by the raiders are subjected to
mental and physical torture to extract
confessions and tactical information. (Rollo,
pp. 2-4)
The public respondents stress two points in their Comment
which was also adopted as their Memorandum after the
petition was given due course.
First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct
saturation drives. And second, they allege that the
accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard
for human rights are total lies.
Insofar as the legal basis for saturation drives is concerned,
the respondents cite Article VII, Section 17 of the
Constitution which provides:
The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied )
They also cite Section 18 of the same Article which provides:
The President shall be the Commander-inChief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call

out such armed forces to prevent or suppress

lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. ...
There can be no question that under ordinary
circumstances, the police action of the nature described by
the petitioners would be illegal and blantantly violative of
the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If the military
and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush
out and catch criminal elements, such drives must be
consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of all
the people affected by such actions.
There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies
the authority of the Chief Executive, invoked by the Solicitor
General, to order police actions to stop unabated criminality,
rising lawlessness, and alarming communist activities. The
Constitution grants to Government the power to seek and
cripple subversive movements which would bring down
constituted authority and substitute a regime where
individual liberties are suppressed as a matter of policy in
the name of security of the State. However, all police
actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights.
The Government cannot adopt the same reprehensible
methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and of
the left, the enlargement of whose spheres of influence it is
trying hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions may still
be fragile but they are not in the least bit strengthened
through violations of the constitutional protections which are
their distinguishing features.
In Roan v. Gonzales (145 SCRA 687; 690-691 [1986]), the
Court stated:

One of the most precious rights of the citizen

in a free society is the right to be left alone in
the privacy of his own house. That right has
ancient roots, dating back through the mists
of history to the mighty English kings in their
fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly
subject had his own castle where he was
monarch of all he surveyed. This was his
humble cottage from which he could bar his
sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.
That right has endured through the ages
albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their
number, regrettably, continues to dwindle
against the onslaughts of authoritarianism.
We are among the fortunate few, able again
to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past
despotism. We must cherish and protect it all
the more now because it is like a prodigal son
returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following
provisions of Article IV of the 1973
Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
not be violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant

and the witnesses he may produce, and

particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Only last year, the Court again issued this reminder in 20th
Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals(164 SCRA
655; 660- 661 [1988]):
This constitutional right protects a citizen
against wanton and unreasonable invasion of
his privacy and liberty as to his person,
papers and effects. We have explained in the
case of People vs. Burgos(144 SCRA 1)
citing Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345)
why the right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at
the core of this right, but it could be also
looked upon as a recognition of a
constitutionally protected area, primarily
one's home, but not necessarily thereto
confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US
293 [1966]) What is sought to be guarded is a
man's prerogative to choose who is allowed
entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge,
his individuality can assert itself not only in
the choice of who shall be welcome but
likewise in the kind of objects he wants
around him. There the state, however
powerful, does not as such have access
except under the circumstances above noted,

for in the traditional formulation, his house,

however humble, is his castle. Thus is
outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to refrain
from any invasion of his dwelling and to
respect the privacies of his life. (Cf.
Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966],
Brennan J. and Boyd v. United States, 11 6
630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in
his authoritative work (Search and Seizure
and the Supreme Court [1966]), could fitly
characterize constitutional right as the
embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief
that to value the privacy of home and person
and to afford its constitutional protection
against the long reach of government is no
less than to value human dignity, and that his
privacy must not be disturbed except in case
of overriding social need, and then only under
stringent procedural safeguards. (ibid, p. 74.)
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rochin
v. California, (342 US 165; 96 L. Ed. 183 [1952]) emphasizes
clearly that police actions should not be characterized by
methods that offend a sense of justice. The court ruled:
Applying these general considerations to the
circumstances of the present case, we are
compelled to conclude that the proceedings
by which this conviction was obtained do
more than offend some fastidious
squeamishness or private sentimentalism
about combatting crime too energetically. This
is conduct that shocks the conscience.
Illegally breaking into the privacy of the

petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and

remove what was there, the forcible
extraction of his stomach's contents this
course of proceeding by agents of
government to obtain evidence is bound to
offend even hardened sensibilities. They are
methods too close to the rack and the screw
to permit of constitutional differentiation.
It is significant that it is not the police action perse which is
impermissible and which should be prohibited. Rather, it is
the procedure used or in the words of the court, methods
which "offend even hardened sensibilities." InBreithaupt v.
Abram (352 US 432, 1 L. Ed. 2nd 448 [1957]), the same
court validated the use of evidence, in this case blood
samples involuntarily taken from the petitioner, where there
was nothing brutal or offensive in the taking. The Court
stated:
Basically the distinction rests on the fact that
there is nothing 'brutal' or 'offensive' in the
taking of a sample of blood when done, as in
this case, under the protective eye of a
physician. To be sure, the driver here was
unconscious when the blood was taken, but
the absence of conscious consent, without
more, does not necessarily render the taking
a violation of a constitutional light; and
certainly the rest was administered here
would not be considered offensive by even
the most delicate. Furthermore, due process is
not measured by the yardstick of personal
reaction or the sphygmogram of the most
sensitive person, but by that whole
community sense of 'decency and fairness

that has been woven by common experience

into the fabric of acceptable conduct....
The individual's right to immunity from such invasion of his
body was considered as "far outweighed by the value of its
deterrent effect" on the evil sought to be avoided by the
police action.
It is clear, therefore, that the nature of the affirmative relief
hinges closely on the determination of the exact facts
surrounding a particular case.
The violations of human rights alleged by the petitioners are
serious. If an orderly procedure ascertains their truth, not
only a writ of prohibition but criminal prosecutions would
immediately issue as a matter of course. A persistent
pattern of wholesale and gross abuse of civil liberties, as
alleged in the petition, has no place in civilized society.
On the other hand, according to the respondents, the
statements made by the petitioners are a complete lie.
The Solicitor General argues:
This a complete lie.
Just the contrary, they had been conducted
with due regard to human rights. Not only
that, they were intelligently and carefully
planned months ahead of the actual
operation. They were executed in coordination
with barangay officials who pleaded with their
constituents to submit themselves voluntarily
for character and personal verification. Local

and foreign correspondents, who had joined

these operations, witnessed and recorded the
events that transpired relative thereto. (After
Operation Reports: November 5, 1987, Annex
12; November 20, 1987, Annex 13; November
24, 1987, Annex 14). That is why in all the
drives so far conducted, the alleged victims
who numbered thousands had not themselves
complained.
In her speech during turn-over rites on
January 26, 1987 at Camp Aguinaldo,
President Aquino branded all accusations of
deliberate disregard for human rights as 'total
lies'. Here are excerpts from her strongest
speech yet in support of the military:
All accusations of a deliberate disregard for
human rights have been shown- up to be total
lies.
...To our soldiers, let me say go out and fight,
fight with every assurance that I will stand by
you through thick and thin to share the
blame, defend your actions, mourn the losses
and enjoy with you the final victory that I am
certain will be ours.
You and I will see this through together.
I've sworn to defend and uphold the
Constitution.

We have wasted enough time answering their

barkings for it is still a long way to lasting
peace. . . . The dangers and hardships to our
men in the field are great enough as it is
without having them distracted by tills
worthless carping at their backs.
Our counter-insurgency policy remains the
same: economic development to pull out the
roots-and military operations to slash the
growth of the insurgency.
The answer to terror is force now.
Only feats of arms can buy us the time
needed to make our economic and social
initiatives bear fruit. . . Now that the extreme
Right has been defeated, I expect greater
vigor in the prosecution of the war against the
communist insurgency, even as we continue
to watch our backs against attacks from the
Right. (Philippine Star, January 27, 1988, p. 1,
Annex 15; emphasis supplied)
Viewed in the light of President Aquino's
observation on the matter, it can be said that
petitioners misrepresent as human rights
violations the military and police's zealous
vigilance over the people's right to live in
peace and safety. (Rollo, pp. 36-38)
Herein lies the problem of the Court. We can only guess the
truth. Everything before us consists of allegations. According
to the petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were arrested in

the saturation drives covered by the petition. No estimates

are given for the drives in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan,
Navotas; Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig; and Sun Valley Drive
near the Manila International Airport area. Not one of the
several thousand persons treated in the illegal and inhuman
manner described by the petitioners appears as a petitioner
or has come before a trial court to present the kind of
evidence admissible in courts of justice. Moreover, there
must have been tens of thousands of nearby residents who
were inconvenienced in addition to the several thousand
allegedly arrested. None of those arrested has apparently
been charged and none of those affected has apparently
complained.
A particularly intriguing aspect of the Solicitor General's
comments is the statement that local and foreign corespondents actually joined the saturation drives and
witnessed and recorded the events. In other words, the
activities sought to be completely proscribed were in full
view of media. The sight of hooded men allegedly being
used to fingerpoint suspected subversives would have been
good television copy. If true, this was probably effected
away from the ubiquitous eye of the TV cameras or, as the
Solicitor General contends, the allegation is a "complete lie."
The latest attempt to stage a coup d'etat where several
thousand members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
sought to overthrow the present Government introduces
another aspect of the problem and illustrates quite clearly
why those directly affected by human rights violations
should be the ones to institute court actions and why
evidence of what actually transpired should first be
developed before petitions are filed with this Court.

Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the

police or military may go in force to the combat areas, enter
affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels
and otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion without having
to secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of
Rights. This is exactly what happened in the White Plains
Subdivision and the commercial center of Makati during the
first week of December, 1989.
The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to
flush out subversives and criminal elements particularly
because of the blatant assassinations of public officers and
police officials by elements supposedly coddled by the
communities where the "drives" were conducted.
It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and
respondents, however, that there was no rebellion or
criminal activity similar to that of the attempted coup d'
etats. There appears to have been no impediment to
securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any
houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were
arrested. There is no strong showing that the objectives
sought to be attained by the "areal zoning" could not be
achieved even as the rights of squatter and low income
families are fully protected.
Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by
the Constitution is involved, it is the duty of the court to
stop the transgression and state where even the awesome
power of the state may not encroach upon the rights of the
individual. It is the duty of the court to take remedial action
even in cases such as the present petition where the
petitioners do not complain that they were victims of the
police actions, where no names of any of the thousands of
alleged victims are given, and where the prayer is a general

one to stop all police "saturation drives," as long as the

Court is convinced that the event actually happened.
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations
were actually committed. This is so inspite of the alleged
pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents "to
submit themselves voluntarily for character and personal
verification." We cannot imagine police actions of the
magnitude described in the petitions and admitted by the
respondents, being undertaken without some undisciplined
soldiers and policemen committing certain abuses.
However, the remedy is not to stop all police
actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We see
nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in
troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent
demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A
show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights
of people are protected and not violated. A blanket
prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit
all police actions to one on one confrontations where search
warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individuals
are easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and
the police decide to sit down in their offices because all
concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally
prohibited.
The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought
through a taxpayers' suit. Where not one victim complains
and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not
initially for the Supreme Court. It is basically one for the
executive departments and for trial courts. Well meaning
citizens with only second hand knowledge of the events
cannot keep on indiscriminately tossing problems of the
executive, the military, and the police to the Supreme Court
as if we are the repository of all remedies for all evils. The

rules of constitutional litigation have been evolved for an

orderly procedure in the vindication of rights. They should
be followed. If our policy makers sustain the contention of
the military and the police that occasional saturation drives
are essential to maintain the stability of government and to
insure peace and order, clear policy guidelines on the
behavior of soldiers and policemen must not only be
evolved, they should also be enforced. A method of
pinpointing human rights abuses and identifying violators is
necessary.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human
Rights. A high level conference should bring together the
heads of the Department of Justice, Department of National
Defense and the operating heads of affected agencies and
institutions to devise procedures for the prevention of
abuses.
Under the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no
erring soldier or policeman whom we can order prosecuted.
In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly
procedure, no permanent relief can be given at this time.
Further investigation of the petitioners' charges and a hard
look by administration officials at the policy implications of
the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted.
In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing
that some abuses were probably committed and could be
committed during future police actions, we have to
temporarily restrain the alleged banging on walls, the
kicking in of doors, the herding of half-naked men to
assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks, the
violation of residences even if these are humble shanties of
squatters, and the other alleged acts which are shocking to
the conscience.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby REMANDED to the

Regional Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon, and Pasay City
where the petitioners may present evidence supporting their
allegations and where specific erring parties may be
pinpointed and prosecuted.
Copies of this decision are likewise forwarded to the
Commission on Human Rights, the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of National Defense, and the Commanding
General PC-INP for the drawing up and enforcement of clear
guidelines to govern police actions intended to abate riots
and civil disturbances, flush out criminal elements, and
subdue terrorist activities.
In the meantime, the acts violative of human rights
alleged by the petitioners as committed during the police
actions are ENJOINED until such time as permanent rules to
govern such actions are promulgated.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Grio-Aquino, J., I join JJ. Cruz, Padilla and Sarmiento's
dissents.

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI
SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES,
INC.,petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY,
THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY
COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET
AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo,
Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene
Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on
December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano,
Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
[Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses
of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and
other articles used in the printing, publication and

distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous

papers, documents, books and other written literature
alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper,
were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the
seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief
Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge
Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their
representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates,
substitute or successors" be enjoined from using the articles
thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose
Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were
required to answer the petition. The plea for preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on
June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the
Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while
opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not
use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the
aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of
the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this
manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory
injunction was rendered moot and academic.

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on

the ground that petitioners had come to this Court without
having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants
before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before
impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court,
should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the
court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw
notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view
of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues
raised not to mention the public interest generated by the
search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in
Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.
The existence of this special circumstance justifies this
Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In
the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case
of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the
power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or
to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on
ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact that
while said search warrants were issued on December 7,
1982, the instant petition impugning the same was filed only
on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than
six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5

Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the

reason for the delay in the filing of the petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they
now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with
the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16,
1983, more than half a year after the
petitioners' premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners
no other choice. If they had waited this long
to bring their case to court, it was because
they tried at first to exhaust other remedies.
The events of the past eleven fill years had
taught them that everything in this country,
from release of public funds to release of
detained persons from custody, has become a
matter of executive benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners,
upon suggestion of persons close to the
President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter
to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio
Coronet asking the return at least of the
printing equipment and vehicles. And after
such a letter had been sent, through Col.
Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal
Officer of the Presidential Security Command,
they were further encouraged to hope that
the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months,
petitioners finally decided to come to Court.
[pp. 123-124, Rollo]

Although the reason given by petitioners may not be

flattering to our judicial system, We find no ground to punish
or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary,
the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite
evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned
their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby
refuting the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as evidence some of
the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is
now estopped from challenging the validity of the search
warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents. These
documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and
he can do whatever he pleases with them, within legal
bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does
not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of
the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by
petitioners to nullify the search warrants in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to
conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the abovequoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court . 6 This objection, however, may properly
be considered moot and academic, as petitioners
themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983,
that an examination had indeed been conducted by
respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were
used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6,

Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon

Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to
the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter
address on the ground that the two search warrants
pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed
therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This
assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 2082[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as
instruments and means of committing the
crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885
as amended and he is keeping and concealing
the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error.
Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and issued
because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct
premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for
respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for
one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the
places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in
the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who
headed the team which executed the search warrants, the
ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the
typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is
that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was
applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the
opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is
the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he
issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].

In the determination of whether a search warrant describes

the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it
has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge
as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This
would seem to be especially true where the executing officer
is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and
when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant
intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has
also been said that the executing officer may look to the
affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in
the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants
is the fact that although the warrants were directed against
Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his copetitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos
Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the
personal properties that may be seized under a search
warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A
search warrant may be issued for the search
and seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the
offense;
[b] Property stolen or
embezzled and other proceeds
or fruits of the offense; and

[c] Property used or intended to

be used as the means of
committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be
seized should be owned by the person against whom the
search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by
him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted
Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen
property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one
other than the person in whose possession it may be at the
time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of
no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against
whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of
the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos,
Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and
property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real
properties were seized under the disputed warrants. Under
Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
"machinery, receptables, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of
land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said
industry or works" are considered immovable property.
In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal provision
was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is
movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by
the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so
when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person
having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as
the agent of the owner.

In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners

of the land and/or building on which the machineries were
placed. This being the case, the machineries in question,
while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property
susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by
respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N.
Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The
application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of
Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of
the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col.
Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises
prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants
on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the
abovementioned documents could not have provided
sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon
which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by
law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable
cause for a search is defined as such facts and

circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and

prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search
warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the publication of
subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application
and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he
has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization
will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's
application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his
control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news
publications and other documents which were used and are
all continuously being used as a means of committing the
offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree
885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and
does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft
of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence
of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for
the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for
respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of
probable cause is the statement contained in the joint
affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that
the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly
shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles
and things above-described were used and are continuously
being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and
to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the
Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and
April 6 Movement." 13

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon

probable cause to be determined by the judge, ... after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution
requires no less than personal knowledge by the
complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the
issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v.
Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said
joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the
test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under
consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are
in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia,
paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters,
cabinets, tables, communications/recording
equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and
the like used and/or connected in the printing
of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and
all documents communication, letters and
facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM"
newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets,
books, and other publication to promote the
objectives and piurposes of the subversive

organization known as Movement for Free

Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6
Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the
distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM"
and other subversive materials and
propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored
yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored
white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate
No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored
white with Plate No. PBP 665;
and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck
with Plate No. NGV 427 with
marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which
authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards,
receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other
written instruments concerning the Communist Party in
Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for
being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any
evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or
otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a

search warrant which authorized the seizure of any

"paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of
the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with
the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant,
and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles
sought to be seized under the search warrants in question
cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind
a notable chapter in English history: the era of disaccord
between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when
"Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to
search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy
the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference
herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it
is not the policy of our government to suppress any
newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of nonconformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to
state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the
business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and
the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search
and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed,
with the further result that the printing and publication of
said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or
censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes
a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is patently
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert
and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the

printing machines on the ground that they have been
sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885,
as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of the
property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in
subversive activities against the government and its duly
constituted authorities ... in accordance with implementing
rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of
National Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration
could validly be effected in view of the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the
Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily
Express, it was reported that no less than President Marcos
himself denied the request of the military authorities to
sequester the property seized from petitioners on December
7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by
government prosecutors for sequestration of
the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing
presses, according to Information Minister
Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government
agents went to the We Forum offices in
Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of
the equipment and all materials in the
premises.
Cendaa said that because of the denial the
newspaper and its equipment remain at the

disposal of the owners, subject to the

discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been
sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then
Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated
February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall
addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the
"WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983,
Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos
turned down the recommendation of our
authorities to close the paper's printing
facilities and confiscate the equipment and
materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a]
and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7,
1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly
set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for
the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all
articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to
petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 120915 April 3, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:
With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its
pernicious effects on our society, our law enforcers tend at
times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug
offenders to the extent of failing to observe well-entrenched
constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and
arrests. Consequently, drug offenders manage to evade the
clutches of the law on mere technicalities.
Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and
charged with violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information
reads:
That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of
December, 1988, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without being lawfully
authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly engage in transporting approximately
eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of dried
marijuana packed in plastic bag marked "Cash
Katutak" placed in a traveling bag, which are
prohibited drugs.

Upon arraignment, she pleaded "not guilty." After trial on the

merits, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted
and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos. 1
The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of
P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose
Domingo. Based on their testimonies, the court a quo found
the following:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his
informant, known only as Benjie, that a certain "Aling Rosa"
would be arriving from Baguio City the following day,
December 14, 1988, with a large volume of marijuana.
Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed
of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar
Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at
around 4:00 in the afternoon of December 14, 1988 and
deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline
station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group,
made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant
posted themselves near the PNB building while the other
group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number
474 and the letters BGO printed on its front and back
bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30
in the evening of the same day from where two females and
a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant

pointed out to the team "Aling Rosa" who was then carrying
a traveling bag.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was "Aling Rosa,"
the team approached her and introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling Rosa" about
the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried
marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked "Cash
Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with the
Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his
signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the
NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of Property
Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.
Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the
PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj.
Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical
Report stating that said specimen yielded positive results for
marijuana, a prohibited drug.
After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting
officers and of the above technical report, the prosecution
rested its case.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a
"Demurrer to Evidence" alleging the illegality of the search
and seizure of the items thereby violating accusedappellant's constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.
The said "Demurrer to Evidence" was, however, denied
without the trial court ruling on the alleged illegality of the

search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the

items seized to avoid pre-judgment. Instead, the trial court
continued to hear the case.
In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her
behalf. As expected, her version of the incident differed from
that of the prosecution. She claimed that immediately prior
to her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater where
she watched the movie "Balweg." While about to cross the
road, an old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder
bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo
arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM
Office.
During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any
knowledge as to the identity of the woman and averred that
the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was
arrested. Moreover, she added that no search warrant was
shown to her by the arresting officers.
After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the
defense filed a "Comment and/or Objection to Prosecution's
Formal Offer of Evidence" contesting the admissibility of the
items seized as they were allegedly a product of an
unreasonable search and seizure.
Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional
Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted accused-appellant of
transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of
marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of
Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and
sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of

twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary

imprisonment in case of insolvency. 2
In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:
1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM
agents could not apply for a warrant for the search of
a bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because
one of the requirements for applying a search
warrant is that the place to be searched must be
specifically designated and described.
2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if
a search warrant was applied for by the NARCOM
agents, still no court would issue a search warrant for
the reason that the same would be considered a
general search warrant which may be quashed.
3. The trial court erred in not finding that the
warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accusedappellant violated the latter's constitutional rights.
4. The trial court erred in not holding that although
the defense of denial is weak yet the evidence of the
prosecution is even weaker.
These submissions are impressed with merit.
In People v. Ramos, 3 this Court held that a search may be
conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search
warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution which provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition
against all searches and seizures as it operates only against
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. The plain import of
the language of the Constitution, which in one sentence
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the
same time prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is
that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable
unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or
warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection
accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between
person and police must stand the protective authority of a
magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue
search warrants or warrants of arrest. 4
Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable
searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence
pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill
v. Diokno. 5 This exclusionary rule was later enshrined in
Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this
or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.

From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot

simply intrude indiscriminately into the houses, papers,
effects, and most importantly, on the person of an
individual. The constitutional provision guaranteed an
impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and
seizures. As such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of the
person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of
restraint. 6
Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any
unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his
liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule
or situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a
warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly
construed and their application limited only to cases
specifically provided or allowed by law. To do otherwise is an
infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a
right so basic and deserving of full protection and
vindication yet often violated. 7
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by
law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements
of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the
valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit
of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently

discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure
of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by
the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search; 9
6. Stop and Frisk; 10 and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. 11
The above exceptions, however, should not become
unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to trample
upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental
right of persons against unreasonable search and seizures.
The essential requisite of probable cause must still be
satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be
lawfully conducted.

Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete

definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to be searched. 12
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable
cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence
of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on
the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men
have in abundance. The same quantum of evidence is
required in determining probable cause relative to search.
Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by
substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact
seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity,
and that the items will be found in the place to be
searched. 13
In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is
necessary for probable cause to be present. Absent any
probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted
and used as evidence against the person arrested. Probable
cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable
ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been
committed or is about to be committed.

In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information

has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure.
In People v. Tangliben, 14 acting on information supplied by
informers, police officers conducted a surveillance at the
Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando,
Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors
and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic of
dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen
noticed a person carrying a red traveling bag who was
acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him
to open his bag but herefused. He acceded later on when
the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police
officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night
of his arrest.
In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior
knowledge from their informant regarding Aruta's alleged
activities. In Tangliben policemen were confronted with an
on-the-spot tip. Moreover, the policemen knew that the
Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as
their "business address". More significantly, Tangliben was
acting suspiciously. His actuations and surrounding
circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that
Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant case, there is no
single indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously.
In People v. Malmstedt, 15 the Narcom agents received
reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana. They likewise received information that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs on his
person. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search
warrant, especially since the identity of the suspect could

not be readily ascertained. His actuations also aroused the

suspicion of the officers conducting the operation. The Court
held that in light of such circumstances, to deprive the
agents of the ability and facility to act promptly, including a
search without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence
and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of
society.
Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the
instant case. In present case, the police officers had
reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant.
Second, Aruta's identity was priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta
was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched
aboard a moving vehicle, a legally accepted exception to
the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the other hand, was
searched while about to cross a street.
In People v. Bagista, 16 the NARCOM officers had probable
cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the north
to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential
information they received from their regular informant that a
woman having the same appearance as that of accusedappellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They
likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellant's
belongings since she fitted the description given by the
NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid warrantless
search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained in the
course of said search is admissible against accusedappellant. Again, this case differs from Aruta as this involves
a search of a moving vehicle plus the fact that the police
officers erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to the
requirements of a search warrant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People, 17 the policemen
conducted a surveillance in an area of the Kalookan

Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were

roaming therein. Upon reaching the place,
they chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who
appeared to be "high" on drugs. He was observed to have
reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner.
Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen.
When approached and asked what he was holding in his
hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it
contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had
sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine if
he was actually "high" on drugs due to his suspicious
actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information,
this area was a haven for drug addicts.
In all the abovecited cases, there was information received
which became the bases for conducting the warrantless
search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances
were present which, when taken together with the
information, constituted probable causes which justified the
warrantless searches and seizures in each of the cases.
In the instant case, the determination of the absence or
existence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination of
the facts. The following have been established: (1) In the
morning of December 13, 1988, the law enforcement
officers received information from an informant named
"Benjie" that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be leaving for
Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back in the
afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume
of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14,
1988, accused-appellant alighted from a Victory Liner Bus
carrying a traveling bag even as the informant pointed her
out to the law enforcement officers; (3) The law
enforcement officers approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When asked by Lt.

Abello about the contents of her traveling bag, she gave the
same to him; (5) When they opened the same, they found
dried marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then
brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police
received information two days before the arrival of
Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on
board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known, the vehicle
was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the
information they had received, the police could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed,
to justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a
warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin.
When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was
held to be illegal; hence any item seized from Aminnudin
could not be used against him.
Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police
likewise received confidential information the day before at
4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada
would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V
Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the following day. This
intelligence information regarding the culprit's identity, the
particular crime he allegedly committed and his exact
whereabouts could have been a basis of probable cause for
the lawmen to secure a warrant. This Court held that in
accordance with Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular
No. 19, series of 1987, the lawmen could have applied for a
warrant even after court hours. The failure or neglect to
secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating
Encinada's constitutional right.
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not
armed with a warrant of arrest. To legitimize the warrantless

search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag, accusedappellant must have been validly arrested under Section 5
of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
xxx xxx xxx
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a
crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she
just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely
crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that
would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM
agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a
crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accusedappellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of
the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The
NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accusedappellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant
because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record,
there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that
accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the
pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could neither
sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance
with the rigid requirements of probable cause and
warrantless arrests.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM

agents to effect a warrantless search of accused-appellant's
bag, there being no probable cause and the accusedappellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated
otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically
follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it
being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must
perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the
articles seized could not be used as evidence against
accused-appellant for these are "fruits of a poisoned tree"
and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec.
3(2) of the Constitution.
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that
the search be incidental to a lawful arrest, in order that the
search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it
is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search
of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first
undertaken, and an arrest effected based on evidence
produced by the search, both such search and arrest would
be unlawful, for being contrary to law. 18
As previously discussed, the case in point is People
v. Aminnudin 19 where, this Court observed that:
. . . accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his
arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he
was about to do so or that he had just done so. What
he was doing was descending the gangplank of the
M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication
that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was
like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the
informer pointed to him as the carrier of the

marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so

subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that
triggered his arrest. The identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by
the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to
pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal
warrantless arrest, the search and seizure of accusedappellant's bag would also not be justified as seizure of
evidence in "plain view" under the second exception. The
marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as
shown by the fact that the NARCOM agents still had to
request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its
contents.
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellant's
bag be justified as a search of a moving vehicle. There was
no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as
accused-appellant was apprehended several minutes after
alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was
accosted in the middle of the street and not while inside the
vehicle.
People v. Solayao, 20 applied the stop and frisk principle
which has been adopted in Posadas v. Court of Appeals. 21 In
said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his
companions were accosted by government agents. In the
instant case, there was no observable manifestation that
could have aroused the suspicion of the NARCOM agents as
to cause them to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant. To
reiterate, accused-appellant was merely crossing the street
when apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned cases,
accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the
NARCOM agents when the latter identified themselves as

such. Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity of

probable cause that would sufficiently provoke a suspicion
that accused-appellant was committing a crime.
The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be
categorized under exigent and emergency circumstances,
as applied in People v. De
Gracia. 22 In said case, there were intelligence reports that
the building was being used as headquarters by the RAM
during a coup d' etat. A surveillance team was fired at by a
group of armed men coming out of the building and the
occupants of said building refused to open the door despite
repeated requests. There were large quantities of explosives
and ammunitions inside the building. Nearby courts were
closed and general chaos and disorder prevailed. The
existing circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime was
being committed. In short, there was probable cause to
effect a warrantless search of the building. The same could
not be said in the instant case.
The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the
warrantless search and seizure would be consent given by
the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to
amount to a waiver of her constitutional right. The Solicitor
General argues that accused-appellant voluntarily submitted
herself to search and inspection citingPeople
v. Malasugui 23 where this Court ruled:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents
to have it made on his person or premises, he is
precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.)
The right to be secure from unreasonable search
may, like every right, be waived and such waiver
may be made either expressly or impliedly.

In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the

testimony of Lt. Abello, thus:
Q When this informant by the name
of alias Benjie pointed to Aling Rosa,
what happened after that?
A We followed her and introduced
ourselves as NARCOM agents and
confronted her with our informant and
asked her what she was carrying and if
we can see the bag she was carrying.
Q What was her reaction?
A She gave her bag to me.
Q So what happened after she gave
the bag to you?
A I opened it and found out plastic
bags of marijuana inside. 24
This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General's
contention for the Malasugui case is inapplicable to the
instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for the
warrantless arrest thereby making the warrantless search
effected immediately thereafter equally lawful. 25 On the
contrary, the most essential element of probable cause, as
expounded above in detail, is wanting in the instant case
making the warrantless arrest unjustified and illegal.
Accordingly, the search which accompanied the warrantless
arrest was likewise unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the

articles seized from the accused-appellant could not be used

as evidence against her.
Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act
of herein accused-appellant in handing over her bag to the
NARCOM agents could not be construed as voluntary
submission or an implied acquiescence to the unreasonable
search. The instant case is similar to People
v. Encinada, 26 where this Court held:
[T]he Republic's counsel avers that appellant
voluntarily handed the chairs containing the package
of marijuana to the arresting officer and thus
effectively waived his right against the warrantless
search. This he gleaned from Bolonia's testimony.
Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from
the motor tricycle, what happened
next?
A: I requested to him to see his chairs
that he carried.
Q: Are you referring to the two plastic
chairs?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada
agreed to allow you to examine the
two chairs that he carried, what did
you do next?

A: I examined the chairs and I noticed

that something inside in between the
two chairs.
We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that
consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, we believe
that appellant based on the transcript quoted above
did not voluntarily consent to Bolonia's search of his
belongings. Appellant's silence should not be lightly taken
as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the
search, if there was any, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent
at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Furthermore, considering that the search was conducted
irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate
consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of
the performance of duty." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, accused-appellant's lack of objection to the search is
not tantamount to a waiver of her constitutional rights or a
voluntary submission to the warrantless search. As this
Court held in People v. Barros: 27
. . . [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have
waived the unlawful search conducted on the
occasion of his warrantless arrest "simply because he
failed to object"
. . . To constitute a waiver, it must
appear first that the right exists;
secondly, that the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of
the existence of such right; and lastly,

that said person had an actual

intention to relinquish the right (Pasion
Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698).
The fact that the accused failed to
object to the entry into his house does
not amount to a permission to make a
search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80
Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice
Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de
Garcia v. Locsin (supra):
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is
not dependent upon any affirmative
act of the citizen, the courts do not
place the citizen in the position of
either contesting an officer's authority
by force, or waiving his constitutional
rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or
seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration
of regard for the supremacy of the law.
(Citation omitted).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights." 28 (Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual
intention to relinquish the right. As clearly illustrated

inPeople v. Omaweng, 29 where prosecution witness Joseph

Layong testified thus:
PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:
Q When you and David Fomocod
saw the travelling bag, what did you
do?
A When we saw that traveling bag,
we asked the driver if we could see the
contents.
Q And what did or what was the
reply of the driver, if there was any?
A He said "you can see the contents
but those are only clothings" (sic).
Q When he said that, what did you
do?
A We asked him if we could open
and see it.
Q When you said that, what did he
tell you?
A He said "you can see it".
Q And when he said "you can see
and open it," what did you do?

A When I went inside and opened

the bag, I saw that it was not clothings
(sic) that was contained in the bag.
Q And when you saw that it was not
clothings (sic), what did you do?
A When I saw that the contents
were not clothes, I took some of the
contents and showed it to my
companion Fomocod and when
Fomocod smelled it, he said it was
marijuana. (Emphasis supplied)
In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to
any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his
Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. If one had been made, this Court would be the first
to condemn it "as the protection of the citizen and the
maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest
duties and privileges of the Court." He willingly gave prior
consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it
conducted on his vehicle and traveling bag, which is not the
case with Aruta.
In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the
Solicitor General next argues that the police officers would
have encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as
it could be secured only if accused-appellant's name was
known, the vehicle identified and the date of its arrival
certain, as in the Aminnudin case where the arresting
officers had forty-eight hours within which to act.
This argument is untenable.

Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:

. . . [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to
those and only those, particularly described in the warrant
so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they shall seize to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made. 30
Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant,
they could have secured one without too much difficulty,
contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The
person intended to be searched has been particularized and
the thing to be seized specified. The time was also
sufficiently ascertained to be in the afternoon of December
14, 1988. "Aling Rosa" turned out to be accused-appellant
and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was
identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM
agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot
where Victory Liner buses normally unload their passengers.
Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to particularize the
vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them from
securing a search warrant. The above particulars would
have already sufficed. In any case, this Court has held that
the police should particularly describe the place to be

searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever

and whenever it is feasible. 31 (Emphasis supplied)
While it may be argued that by entering a plea during
arraignment and by actively participating in the trial,
accused-appellant may be deemed to have waived
objections to the illegality of the warrantless search and to
the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the
same may not apply in the instant case for the following
reasons:
1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to
the illegality of the arrest as her plea of "not guilty" and
participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary
submission to the court's jurisdiction. 32 The plea and active
participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the
search and transform the inadmissible evidence into objects
of proof. The waiver simply does not extend this far.
2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless
search becomes admissible upon failure to object thereto
during the trial of the case, records show that accusedappellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and objected and
opposed the prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence.
It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros, 33 which
stated:
It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of
evidence secured through an invalid warrantless
arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be
waived by an accused person. The a priori argument
is that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless
arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective warrant

of arrest may be waived by applying for and posting

of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop an
accused from questioning the legality or
constitutionality of his detention or the failure to
accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not
believe, however, that waiver of the latter
necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of
the former an argument that the Solicitor General
appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the nonadmissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless
arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is not
casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right
against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its
vitality for the protection of our people. In the case at
bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on
constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton
box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these
were formally offered in evidence by the
prosecution. We consider that appellant's objection
to the admission of such evidence was made clearly
and seasonably and that, under the circumstances,
no intent to waive his rights under the premises can
be reasonably inferred from his conduct before or
during the trial. (Emphasis supplied).
In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents
not to procure a search warrant considering that they had
more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is
again an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous
tree," hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in
evidence.
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means
of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary

rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition

against unreasonable searches and seizures. 34
While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search
and seizure may be held criminally and civilly liable,
theStonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have
realized that the exclusionary rule is "the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against
abuse. This approach is based on the justification made by
Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution which
itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit
by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed." 35
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against
which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection.
While the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and
the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government. 36
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified
in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of
order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty.
As Justice Holmes declared: "I think it is less evil that some
criminals escape than that the government should play an
ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to
violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law
violated is the Constitution itself. 37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish

her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA

ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered
RELEASED from confinement unless she is being held for
some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997
ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially
criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there
is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant,
policemen should employ limited, flexible responses like
"stop-and-frisk" which are graduated in relation to the
amount of information they possess, the lawmen being ever
vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly
the citizen's constitutional rights against unreasonable
arrest, search and seizure.
The Case
This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
19, 1993 and its Resolution dated January 20, 1994 in CA

G.R. CR No. 07266, entitled "People of the Philippines vs.

Alain Manalili y Dizon."
In an Information dated April 11, 1988, 1 Petitioner Alain
Manalili y Dizon was charged by Assistant Caloocan City
Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II
of Republic Act No. 6425, allegedly committed as follows: 2
That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in
Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused without any authority of law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
custody, possession and control crushed marijuana
residue, which is a prohibited drug and knowing the
same to be such.

of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY; and to pay a fine
of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs.
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant remained on provisional liberty. 7 Atty. Benjamin
Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of
Appeal 8dated May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent
Court 9 promulgated its assailed Decision, denying the
appeal and affirming the trial court: 10
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated
May 19, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
Costs against appellant.
Respondent Court 11 denied reconsideration via its assailed
Resolution dated January 20, 1994, disposing:

Contrary to Law.
Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded
"not guilty" to the charge. 3 With the agreement of the public
prosecutor, appellant was released after filing a P10,000.00
bail bond. 4 After trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal
Court, rendered on May 19, 1989 a decision 5 convicting
appellant of illegal possession of marijuana residue. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads: 6
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court
finds the accused ALAIN MANALILI Y DIZON guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8,
Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended
(Illegal Possession of Marijuana residue), and hereby
sentences (sic) said accused to suffer imprisonment

ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellant's motion for

reconsideration is, as is hereby DENIED.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows: 12
At about 2:10 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11,
1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a
surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in
front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen
were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas
and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was driving a

Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the

Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was
being made because of information that drug addicts
were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City
Cemetery.
Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the
policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then
chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery
who appeared high on drugs. The male person was
observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a
swaying manner. When this male person tried to
avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and
introduced themselves as police officers. The
policemen then asked the male person what he was
holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist.
Pat Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could
see what said male person had in his hands. The
latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo
Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the
wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed
marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its
marijuana contents.
The male person was then brought to the AntiNarcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo
Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned
over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its
suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out
to be the accused ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.
Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana
residue from Pat. Espiritu, Cpl. Tamondong wrapped
the same with a white sheet of paper on which he

wrote "Evidence "A" 4/11/88 Alain Manalili". The

white sheet of paper was marked as Exhibit "E-3".
The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller sheet
of folded paper. (Exhibit "E-4").
Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip
addressed to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section
requesting a chemical analysis of the subject
marijuana residue (Exhibit "D"). Cpl. Tamondong
thereafter prepared a Joint Affidavit of the
apprehending policemen (Exhibit "A"). Pat. Angel
Lumabas handcarried the referral slip (Exhibit "D") to
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including
the subject marijuana residue for chemical analysis.
The signature of Pat. Lumabas appears on the left
bottom corner of Exhibit "D".
The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received
the aforesaid referral slip and the subject marijuana
residue at 7:40 o'clock in the evening of April 11,
1988 as shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit
"D".
It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the
microscopic and chemical examinations of the
specimen which she identified. (Exhibit
"E") 13 Mrs. Pascual referred to the subject specimen
as "crushed marijuana leaves" in her Certification
dated April 11, 1988 (Exhibit "F"). 14 These crushed
marijuana leaves gave positive results for marijuana,
according to the Certificate.
Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic
examination of the specimen. In this examination,

she also found that the "crushed marijuana leaves"

gave positive results for marijuana. She then
prepared a Final Report of her examinations (Exhibit
"G").
After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual
placed the specimen in a white letter-envelope and
sealed it. (Exhibit "E"). She then wrote identification
notes on this letter-envelope. (Exhibit "E-1").
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as
Exhibit "F" from the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section
to Cpl. Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl.
Tamondong prepared a referral slip addressed to the
City Fiscal of Kalookan City. (Exhibit "C")
On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not
riding a tricycle but was walking in front of the cemetery
when he was apprehended. 15
Version of the Defense
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense
witnesses as follows: 16
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11,
1988, the accused ALAIN MANALILI was aboard a
tricycle at A. Mabini street near the Kalookan City
Cemetery on the way to his boarding house. Three
policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop
because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger
were under the influence of marijuana. The
policemen brought the accused and the tricycle
driver inside the Ford Fiera which the policemen were

riding in. The policemen then bodily searched the

accused and the tricycle driver. At this point, the
accused asked the policemen why he was being
searched and the policemen replied that he
(accused) was carrying marijuana. However, nothing
was found on the persons of the accused and the
driver. The policemen allowed the tricycle driver to
go while they brought the accused to the police
headquarters at Kalookan City where they said they
would again search the accused.
On the way to the police headquarters, the accused
saw a neighbor and signalled the latter to follow him.
The neighbor thus followed the accused to the
Kalookan City Police Headquarters. Upon arrival
thereat, the accused was asked to remove his pants
in the presence of said neighbor and another
companion. The policemen turned over the pants of
the accused over a piece of bond paper trying to look
for marijuana. However, nothing was found, except
for some dirt and dust. This prompted the companion
of the neighbor of the accused to tell the policemen
to release the accused. The accused was led to a
cell. The policemen later told the accused that they
found marijuana inside the pockets of his pants.
At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on the same
day, the accused was brought outside the cell and
was led to the Ford Fiera. The accused was told by
the policemen to call his parents in order to "settle"
the case. The policemen who led the accused to the
Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat. Espiritu and Cpl.
Tamondong. Pat. Lumabas was the policeman who
told the accused to call his parents. The accused did

not call his parents and he told the policemen that

his parents did not have any telephone.
At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of the same
day, the accused was brought in the office of an
inquest Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal that
no marijuana was found on his person but the Fiscal
told the accused not to say anything. The accused
was then brought back to the Kalookan City Jail.
Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was
allegedly with the accused when he and the accused
were stopped by policemen and then bodily searched
on April 11, 1988, testified. He said that the
policemen found nothing either on his person or on
the person of the accused when both were searched
on April 11, 1988.
Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified
that he followed the accused at the Kalookan City
Police Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He said that
the police searched the accused who was made to
take off his pants at the police headquarters but no
marijuana was found on the body of the accused.
Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal
witness, presented several pictures showing that tricycles
were allowed to ply in front of the Caloocan Cemetery. 17

"neutral and disinterested" witnesses, testifying only on

what transpired during the performance of their duties.
Substantially they asserted that the appellant was found to
be in possession of a substance which was later identified as
crushed marijuana residue.
The trial court disbelieved appellant's defense that this
charge was merely "trumped up," because the appellant
neither took any legal action against the allegedly erring
policemen nor moved for a reinvestigation before the city
fiscal of Kalookan City.
On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the
decision of the trial court was based on speculations,
surmises or conjectures. On the alleged "serious"
discrepancies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, the
appellate court ruled that the said inconsistencies were
insubstantial to impair the essential veracity of the
narration. It further found petitioner's contention that he
could not be convicted of illegal possession of marijuana
residue to be without merit, because the forensic chemist
reported that what she examined were marijuana leaves.
Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of
Respondent Court:
I

The Rulings of the Trail and the Appellate Courts

The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of
marijuana residue largely on the strength of the arresting
officers' testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were

The Court of Appeals erred in

upholding the findings of fact of the
trial court.

II
The Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the conviction of (the)
accused (and) in ruling that the guilt of
the accused had been proved (beyond)
reasonable doubt.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in not
ruling that the inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were material and
substantial and not minor.

prosecution which are inadmissible in

evidence.
Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the
admissibility of the evidence against him, (2) the credibility
of prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial and
the appellate courts of the defense of extortion, and (3) the
sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his
conviction.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized
During a Stop-and-Frisk

IV
The Court of Appeals erred in not
appreciating the evidence that the
accused was framed for the purpose of
extorting money.
V
The Court of Appeals erred in not
acquitting the accused when the
evidence presented is consistent with
both innocence and guilt.
VI
The Court of Appeals erred in
admitting the evidence of the

Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves

found in his possession, contending that they were products
of an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his Comment
dated July 5, 1994, which was adopted as memorandum for
respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of the
marijuana leaves was waived because petitioner never
raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he object
to their admissibility in evidence. He adds that, even
assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the search
was legal because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest
under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was
valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case
of Terry vs. Ohio, 18 a stop-and-frisk was defined as the
vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop

a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for

weapon(s):
. . . (W)here a police officer observes an unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identified
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of
the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for
his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly
be introduced in evidence against the person from
whom they were taken. 19
In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court
held that the interest of effective crime prevention and
detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in
appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even though there
is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. This
was the legitimate investigative function which Officer
McFadden discharged in that case, when he approached
petitioner and his companion whom he observed to have
hovered alternately about a street corner for an extended
period of time, while not waiting for anyone; paused to stare
in the same store window roughly 24 times; and conferred
with a third person. It would have been sloppy police work

for an officer of 30 years' experience to have failed to

investigate this behavior further.
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stopand-frisk, the US Supreme Court held that what justified the
limited search was the more immediate interest of the police
officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must,
whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures through the warrant procedure,
excused only by exigent circumstances.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search
and seizure must be validated by a previously secured
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is
unconstitutional and subject to challenge. 20Section 2, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned

provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a "fruit of the
poisonous tree," falling under the exclusionary rule:
Sec. 3. . . .
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of . . . the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
This right, however, is not absolute. 21 The recent case
of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized
exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and
seizure, viz.: "(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2)
search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4)
customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves
of their right against unreasonable search and
seizure." 22 In People vs. Encinada, 23 the Court further
explained that "[i]n these cases, the search and seizure may
be made only with probable cause as the essential
requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition,
probable cause for a search is, at best, defined as a
reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man
in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to be searched."

warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, 24 the Court held

that there were many instances where a search and seizure
could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. In said case,
members of the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped
petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting
suspiciously. They found inside petitioner's bag one .38-cal.
revolver with two rounds of live ammunition, two live
ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade. In
upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to
require the police officers to search the bag only after they
had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless,
futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a
situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a
suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his
identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more
information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and
allow a crime to occur.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions
observed during their surveillance that appellant had red
eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City
Cemetery, which according to police information was a
popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a
member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City
Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug
addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore had
sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was
actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they
found marijuana in petitioner's possession: 25
FISCAL RALAR:

Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another

exception to the general rule against a search without a

Q And why were you conducting

surveillance in front of the Caloocan

Cemetery, Sangandaan, Caloocan

City?
A Because there were some
informations that some drug
dependents were roaming around at A.
Mabini Street in front of the Caloocan
Cemetery, Caloocan City.

Q How were you able to say Mr.

Witness that that person that you
chanced upon was high on drug?
A Because his eyes were red and he
was walking on a swaying manner.
Q What was he doing in particular
when you chanced upon him?

xxx xxx xxx

A He was roaming around, sir.
Q While you were conducting your
surveillance, together with Pat. Angel
Lumabas and one Arnold Enriquez,
what happened, if any?
A We chanced upon one male person
there in front of the Caloocan
Cemetery then when we called his
attention, he tried to avoid us, then
prompting us to approach him and
introduce ourselves as police officers
in a polite manner.
xxx xxx xxx

Q You said that he avoided you, what

did you do when he avoided you?
A We approached him and introduced
ourselves as police officers in a polite
manner, sir.
Q How did you introduce yourselves?
A In a polite manner, sir.
Q What did you say when you
introduced yourselves?

Q Could you describe to us the

appearance of that person when you
chanced upon him?

A We asked him what he was holding

in his hands, sir.

A That person seems like he is high on

drug.

Q And what was the reaction of the

person when you asked him what he
was holding in his hands?
A He tried to resist, sir.

Q When he tried to resist, what did you

do?
A I requested him if I can see what was
he was (sic) holding in his hands.
Q What was the answer of the person
upon your request?

deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its
violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as
distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases
where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is
generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues
not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on
appeal. 27
Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence

A He allowed me to examine that

something in his hands, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers'

testimony contained "polluted, irreconcilable and
unexplained" contradictions which did not support
petitioner's conviction.

Q What was he holding?

A He was holding his wallet and when
we opened it, there was a marijuana
(sic) crushed residue.
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's
contention that petitioner effectively waived the
inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he
failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial.
A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the
constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires
the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right
to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had
knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she
had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 26Otherwise,
the Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not
deduce acquiescence from the failure to exercise this
elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is

We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the
trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses,
particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this
case, is accorded great weight and respect, since it had the
opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as
they testified before it. Unless substantial facts and
circumstances have been overlooked or misappreciated by
the trial court which, if considered, would materially affect
the result of the case, we will not countenance a departure
from this rule. 28
We concur with Respondent Court's ruling:
(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that
there had been some inconsistencies in the
prosecution witnesses' testimonies, We do not find
them substantial enough to impair the essential
veracity of their narration. In People vs. Avila, it was
held that "As long as the witnesses concur on the

material points, slight differences in their

remembrance of the details, do not reflect on the
essential veracity of their statements.
However, we find that, aside from the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty, the bestowal of full
credence on Pat. Espiritu's testimony is justified by tangible
evidence on record. Despite Pat. Lumabas' contradictory
testimony, that of Espiritu is supported by the Joint
Affidavit 29 signed by both arresting policemen. The question
of whether the marijuana was found inside petitioner's
wallet or inside a plastic bag is immaterial, considering that
petitioner did not deny possession of said substance. Failure
to present the wallet in evidence did not negate that
marijuana was found in petitioner's possession. This shows
that such contradiction is minor and does not destroy
Espiritu's credibility.30
Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug. 31

The substance found in petitioner's possession was

identified by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Pascual to be
crushed marijuana leaves. Petitioner's lack of authority to
possess these leaves was established. His awareness
thereof was undeniable, considering that petitioner was high
on drugs when stopped by the policemen and that he
resisted when asked to show and identify the thing he was
holding. Such behavior clearly shows that petitioner knew
that he was holding marijuana and that it was prohibited by
law.
Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have
not been given sufficient grounds to believe the extortion
angle in this case. Petitioner did not file any administrative
or criminal case against the arresting officers or present any
evidence other than his bare claim. His argument that he
feared for his life was lame and unbelievable, considering
that he was released on bail and continued to be on bail as
early as April 26, 1988. 32Since then, he could have made
the charge in relative safety, as he was no longer in the
custody of the police. His defense of frame-up, like alibi, is
viewed by this Court with disfavor, because it is easy to
concoct and fabricate. 33
The Proper Penalty
The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) by
sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six years and
one day of imprisonment, aside from the imposed fine of six
thousand pesos. This Act requires the imposition of an
indeterminate penalty:

Sec. 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for

an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused
to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the
offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence,
the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall
not be less than the minimum term prescribed by
the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)
Sec. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted
of offenses punished with death penalty or lifeimprisonment; to those convicted of treason; to
those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion,
sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy;
to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who
shall have escaped from confinement or evaded
sentence; to those who having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have
violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum
term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, not
to those already sentenced by final judgment at the
time of approval of this Act, except as provided in
Section 5 hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P.
179, imposes the following penalty for illegal possession of
marijuana:

Sec. 8. . . . .
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years
and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from
six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall possess or use Indian hemp.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the
proper penalty is an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve
years. 34
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is
sentenced to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS, as
minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum, and to PAY
a FINE of SIX THOUSAND PESOS. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994

ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON
LUAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional
Trial Court of Kalookan City; HON. TIRSO D.C.
VELASCO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch
88, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Alexander A. Padilla for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.

REGALADO, J.:
Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with
another primae impressionis case through the present
petition wherein the parties have formulated and now pose
for resolution the following issue: Whether or not a court
may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant
in connection with an offense committed outside its
territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to
conduct a search on a place outside the court's supposed
territorial jurisdiction. 1
The factual background and judicial antecedents of this case
are best taken from the findings of respondent Court of
Appeals 2 on which there does not appear to be any dispute,
to wit:

From the pleadings and supporting documents

before the Court, it can be gathered that on
March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of
the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central
Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City an application for search
warrant. The search warrant was sought for in
connection with an alleged violation of P.D.
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport
St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon City.
On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of
Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No. 9590. On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m.,
members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject
search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the
offense alluded to, where a labor seminar of
the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education
and Research (EILER) was then taking place.
According to CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property
Seized," firearms, explosive materials and
subversive documents, among others, were
seized and taken during the search. And all
the sixty-one (61) persons found within the
premises searched were brought to Camp
Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were
later released, with the exception of the
herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who
were indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 in
Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757 before Branch
88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
presided over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C.
Velasco.

On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a

"Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search
Warrant and For the Suppression of All
Illegally Acquired Evidence" before the
Quezon City court; and a "Supplemental
Motion to the Motion for Consolidation,
Quashal of Search Warrant and Exclusion of
Evidence Illegally Obtained.

WITH AN OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY

COMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
AND TO ISSUE A WARRANT TO
CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A
PLACE LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
xxx xxx xxx

On September 21, 1990, the respondent

Quezon City Judge issued the challenged
order, consolidating subject cases but denying
the prayer for the quashal of the search
warrant under attack, the validity of which
warrant was upheld; opining that the same
falls under the category of Writs and
Processes, within the contemplation of
paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines, and can be served not only within
the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court
but anywhere in the judicial region of the
issuing court (National Capital Judicial
Region);. . .
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
said Order under challenge, having been
denied by the assailed Order of October 5,
1990, petitioners have come to this
Court via the instant petition, raising the sole
issue:
WHETHER OR NOT A COURT
MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AN
APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH
WARRANT IN CONNECTION

Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment, 3 in effect

affirming that of the trial court, by denying due course to
the petition for certiorari and lifting the temporary
restraining order it had issued on November 29, 1990 in
connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is
now impugned in and sought to be reversed through the
present recourse before us.
We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced
by petitioners in support of their submissions. Their
disquisitions postulate interpretative theories contrary to the
letter and intent of the rules on search warrants and which
could pose legal obstacles, if not dangerous doctrines, in the
area of law enforcement. Further, they fail to validly
distinguish, hence they do not convincingly delineate the
difference, between the matter of (1) the court which has
the competence to issue a search warrant under a given set
of facts, and (2) the permissible jurisdictional range in the
enforcement of such search warrant vis-a-vis the court's
territorial jurisdiction. These issues while effectively cognate
are essentially discrete since the resolution of one does not
necessarily affect or preempt the other. Accordingly, to
avoid compounding the seeming confusion, these questions
shall be discussedseriatim.

I
Petitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of
criminal actions to invalidate the search warrant issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City because it is
directed toward the seizure of firearms and ammunition
allegedly cached illegally in Quezon City. This theory is
sought to be buttressed by the fact that the criminal case
against petitioners for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 was subsequently filed in the latter court. The
application for the search warrant, it is claimed, was
accordingly filed in a court of improper venue and since
venue in criminal actions involves the territorial jurisdiction
of the court, such warrant is void for having been issued by
a court without jurisdiction to do so.
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating
the application for and the obtention of a search warrant
with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a
trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special
criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all
courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over
which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence.
It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and
purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely
different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a
search warrant, merely constitutes process. 4 A search
warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing
issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by
a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to
search for personal property and bring it before the
court. 5 A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal
process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and

peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary

because of a public necessity. 6
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our
jural concept and provisions on search warrants, 7 such
warrant is definitively considered merely as a process,
generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a
court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this
fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this
opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant,
subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law;
also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial
proceedings, 8 or all writs, warrants, summonses,
andorders of courts of justice or judicial officers. 9 It is
likewise held to include a writ, summons, or order issued in
a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his
property, to expedite the cause or enforce the
judgment, 10 or a writ,warrant, mandate, or other process
issuing from a court of justice. 11
2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a
judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an
incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted,
or in anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency, as in the
case at bar, it would involve some judicial clairvoyance to
require observance of the rules as to where a criminal case
may eventually be filed where, in the first place, no such
action having as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be
filed in a territorial jurisdiction other than that wherein the
illegal articles sought to be seized are then located. This is
aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be
filed in different venues under the rules for delitos

continuados or in those instances where different trial courts

have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same criminal
offense.
In fact, to illustrate the gravity of the problem which
petitioners' implausible position may create, we need not
stray far from the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court on the venue of criminal actions and which
we quote:
Sec. 15. Place where action to be instituted.
(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal
prosecutions the action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or
territory wherein the offense was committed
or any one of the essential ingredients thereof
took place.
(b) Where an offense is committed on a
railroad train, in an aircraft, or any other
public or private vehicle while in the course of
its trip, the criminal action may be instituted
and tried in the court of any municipality or
territory where such train, aircraft or other
vehicle passed during such trip, including the
place of departure and arrival.

(c) Where an offense is committed on board a

vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal
action may be instituted and tried in the
proper court of the first port of entry or of any
municipality or territory through which the
vessel passed during such voyage, subject to
the generally accepted principles of
international law.
(d) Other crimes committed outside of the
Philippines but punishable therein under
Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be
cognizable by the proper court in which the
charge is first filed. (14a)
It would be an exacting imposition upon the law
enforcement authorities or the prosecutorial agencies to
unerringly determine where they should apply for a search
warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to
the ultimate venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It
would be doubly so if compliance with that requirement
would be under pain of nullification of said warrant should
they file their application therefor in and obtain the same
from what may later turn out to be a court not within the
ambit of the aforequoted Section 15.
Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the
present vintage, and, for that matter, the Judiciary Act of
1948 12 or the recent Judiciary Reorganization Act, 13 have
never required the jurisdictional strictures that the
petitioners' thesis would seek to be inferentially drawn from
the silence of the reglementary provisions. On the contrary,
we are of the view that said statutory omission was both
deliberate and significant. It cannot but mean that the
formulators of the Rules of Court, and even Congress itself,

did not consider it proper or correct, on considerations of

national policy and the pragmatics of experience, to clamp a
legal manacle on those who would ferret out the evidence of
a crime. For us to now impose such conditions or
restrictions, under the guise of judicial interpretation, may
instead be reasonably construed as trenching on judicial
legislation. It would be tantamount to a judicial act of
engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted but
which someone believes ought to have been embraced
therein. 14
Concededly, the problem of venue would be relatively easier
to resolve if a criminal case has already been filed in a
particular court and a search warrant is needed to secure
evidence to be presented therein. Obviously, the court
trying the criminal case may properly issue the warrant,
upon proper application and due compliance with the
requisites therefor, since such application would only be an
incident in that case and which it can resolve in the exercise
of its ancillary jurisdiction. If the contraband articles are
within its territorial jurisdiction, there would appear to be no
further complications. The jurisdictional problem would
resurrect, however, where such articles are outside its
territorial jurisdiction, which aspect will be addressed
hereafter.
3. Coming back to the first issue now under consideration,
petitioners, after discoursing on the respective territorial
jurisdictions of the thirteen Regional Trial Courts which
correspond to the thirteen judicial regions, 15invite our
attention to the fact that this Court, pursuant to its authority
granted by
law, 16 has defined the territorial jurisdiction of each branch
of a Regional Trial Court 17 over which the particular branch
concerned shall exercise its

authority. 18 From this, it is theorized that "only the branch of

a Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the place
to be searched could grant an application for and issue a
warrant to search that place." Support for such position is
sought to be drawn from issuances of this Court, that is,
Circular No. 13 issued on October 1, 1985, as amended by
Circular No. 19 on August 4, 1987.
We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both
circulars were not intended to be of general application to
all instances involving search warrants and in all courts as
would be the case if they had been adopted as part of the
Rules of Court. These circulars were issued by the Court to
meet a particular exigency, that is, as emergency guidelines
on applications for search warrants filed only in the courts of
Metropolitan Manila and other courts with multiple salas
and only with respect to violations of the Anti-Subversion
Act, crimes against public order under the Revised Penal
Code, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunitions,
and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words,
the aforesaid theory on the court's jurisdiction to issue
search warrants would not apply tosinglesala courts and other crimes. Accordingly, the rule sought by
petitioners to be adopted by the Court would actually result
in a bifurcated procedure which would be vulnerable to legal
and constitutional objections.
For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners'
contention that Administrative Order No. 3 of this Court,
supposedly "defining the limits of the territorial jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Courts," was the source of thesubject
matter jurisdiction of, as distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction by, the courts. As earlier observed, this
administrative order was issued pursuant to the provisions

of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the pertinent

portion of which states:
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory
appurtenant to each branch. The Supreme
Court shall define the territory over which
a branch of the Regional Trial Court
shall exercise its authority. The territory thus
defined shall be deemed to be the territorial
area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all writs,
proceedings or actions, whether civil or
criminal, . . . . (Emphasis ours.)
Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, not by a procedural law and,
much less, by an administrative order or circular. The
jurisdiction conferred by said Act on regional trial courts and
their judges is basically regional in scope. Thus, Section 17
thereof provides that "(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be
appointed to a region which shall be his permanent station,"
and he "may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any
branch or city or municipality within the same region as
public interest may require, and such assignment shall not
be deemed an assignment to another station . . ." which,
otherwise, would necessitate a new appointment for the
judge.
In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner,
Circulars Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction
on the covered regional trial court or its branches, such that
non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The
administrative order merely defines the limits of
the administrative area within which a branch of the court
may exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction

conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The circulars only

allocated to the three executive judges the administrative
areas for which they may respectively issue search warrants
under the special circumstance contemplated therein, but
likewise pursuant to the jurisdiction vested in them by Batas
Pambansa Blg, 129.
Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept
the conclusion that the grant of power to the courts
mentioned therein, to entertain and issue search warrants
where the place to be searched is within their territorial
jurisdiction, was intended to exclude other courts from
exercising the same power. It will readily be noted that
Circular No. 19 was basically intended to provide prompt
action on applications for search warrants. Its predecessor,
Administrative Circular No. 13, had a number of
requirements, principally a raffle of the applications for
search warrants, if they had been filed with the executive
judge, among the judges within his administrative area.
Circular No. 19 eliminated, by amendment, that required
raffle and ordered instead that such applications should
immediately be "taken cognizance of and acted upon by the
Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose
jurisdiction the place to be searched is located," or by their
substitutes enumerated therein.
Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was
never intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction on said
executive judges. In view of the fact, however, that they
were themselves directed to personally act on the
applications, instead of farming out the same among the
other judges as was the previous practice, it was but
necessary and practical to require them to so act only on
applications involving search of places located within their

respective territorial jurisdictions. The phrase above quoted

was, therefore, in the nature of an allocation in the
assignment of applications among them, in recognition of
human capabilities and limitations, and not a mandate for
the exclusion of all other courts. In truth, Administrative
Circular No. 13 even specifically envisaged and anticipated
the non-exclusionary nature of that provision, thus:
4. If, in the implementation of the search
warrant properties are seized thereunder and
the corresponding case is filed in court, said
case shall be distributed conformably with
Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974, of
this Court, and thereupon tried and decided
by the judge to whom it has been assigned,
and not necessarily by the judge who issued
the search warrant. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has
jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue the search
warrant, as would be the consequence of petitioners'
position that only the branch of the court with jurisdiction
over the place to be searched can issue a warrant to search
the same. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that
where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was
filed, or the assigned branch thereof,
has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and
where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the
executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and
for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall
have primary jurisdiction.
This should not, however, mean that a court whose
territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be
searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the

obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and justified

by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and
place. Conversely, neither should a search warrant duly
issued by a court which has jurisdiction over a pending
criminal case, or one issued by an executive judge or his
lawful substitute under the situations provided for by
Circular No. 19, be denied enforcement or nullified just
because it was implemented outside the court's territorial
jurisdiction.
This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on the
permissible jurisdictional range of enforcement of search
warrants.
II
As stated in limine, the affiliated issue raised in this case is
whether a branch of a regional trial court has the authority
to issue a warrant for the search of a place outside its
territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners insistently answer the
query in the negative. We hold otherwise.
1. We repeat what we have earlier stressed: No law or rule
imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same
manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of
arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the American
jurisdiction, there were limitations of the time wherein a
warrant of arrest could be enforced. In our jurisdiction, no
period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of
arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of the
warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be
made to the issuing judge, 19 said warrant does not
become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until
the same is enforced or recalled. On the other hand, the

lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly set in our

Rules at ten days 20 but there is no provision as to the extent
of the territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is
implemented on and within the premises specifically
described therein which may or may not be within the
territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court.
We make the foregoing comparative advertence to
emphasize the fact that when the law or rules would provide
conditions, qualifications or restrictions, they so state.
Absent specific mention thereof, and the same not being
inferable by necessary implication from the statutory
provisions which are presumed to be complete and
expressive of the intendment of the framers, a contrary
interpretation on whatever pretext should not be
countenanced.
A bit of legal history on this contestation will be helpful. The
jurisdictional rule heretofore was that writs and processes of
the so-called inferior courts could be enforced outside the
province only with the approval of the former court of first
instance. 21 Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the
enforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs
the approval of the regional trial court. 22 On the other hand,
while, formerly, writs and processes of the then courts of
first instance were enforceable throughout the
Philippines, 23 under the Interim or Transitional Rules and
Guidelines, certain specified writs issued by a regional trial
court are now enforceable only within its judicial region. In
the interest of clarity and contrast, it is necessary that said
provision be set out in full:
3. Writs and processes.

(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus,

quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction
issued by a regional trial court may be
enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a
regional trial court or a metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit
trial court may be served anywhere in the
Philippines, and, in the last three cases,
without a certification by the judge of the
regional trial court. (Emphasis ours.)
We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further
belabored or enmeshed in unwarranted polemics. The rule
enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by
a regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial
region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other
writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the
same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As
earlier demonstrated, a search warrant is but a judicial
process, not a criminal action. No legal provision, statutory
or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a
jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability.
On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the interim
Rules expressly authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the
country, since it is not among the processes specified in
paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made
regarding the processes contemplated in
paragraph (b).
2. This is but a necessary and inevitable consequence of the
nature and purpose of a search warrant. The Court cannot
be blind to the fact that it is extremely difficult, as it
undeniably is, to detect or elicit information regarding the

existence and location of illegally possessed or prohibited

articles. The Court is accordingly convinced that it should
not make the requisites for the apprehension of the culprits
and the confiscation of such illicit items, once detected,
more onerous if not impossible by imposing further niceties
of procedure or substantive rules of jurisdiction through
decisional dicta. For that matter, we are unaware of any
instance wherein a search warrant was struck down on
objections based on territorial jurisdiction. In the landmark
case of Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno,et al., 24 the searches in
the corporate offices in Manila and the residences in Makati
of therein petitioners were conducted pursuant to search
warrants issued by the Quezon City and Pasig branches of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal and by the Municipal
Courts of Manila and Quezon City, 25 but the same were
never challenged on jurisdictional grounds although they
were subsequently nullified for being general warrants.
3. A clarion call supposedly of libertarian import is further
sounded by petitioners, dubiously invoking the
constitutional proscription against illegal searches and
seizures. We do not believe that the enforcement of a search
warrant issued by a court outside the territorial jurisdiction
wherein the place to be searched is located would create a
constitutional question. Nor are we swayed by the professed
apprehension that the law enforcement authorities may
resort to what could be a permutation of forum shopping, by
filing an application for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It
need merely be recalled that a search warrant is only a
process, not an action. Furthermore, the constitutional
mandate is translated into specifically enumerated
safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure for the issuance of a search warrant, 26 and all
these have to be observed regardless of whatever court in
whichever region is importuned for or actually issues a

search warrant. Said requirements, together with the tenday lifetime of the warrant 27 would discourage resort to a
court in another judicial region, not only because of the
distance but also the contingencies of travel and the danger
involved, unless there are really compelling reasons for the
authorities to do so. Besides, it does seem odd that such
constitutional protests have not been made against
warrants of arrest which are enforceable indefinitely and
anywhere although they involve, not only property and
privacy, but persons and liberty.
On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that
the authorities have to contend now and then with local and
national criminal syndicates of considerable power and
influence, political or financial in nature, and so pervasive as
to render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search warrant
in the very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should
we overlook the fact that to do so will necessitate the
transportation of applicant's witnesses to and their
examination in said places, with the attendant risk, danger
and expense. Also, a further well-founded precaution,
obviously born of experience and verifiable data, is
articulated by the court a quo, as quoted by respondent
court:
This court is of the further belief that the
possible leakage of information which is of
utmost importance in the issuance of a search
warrant is secured (against) where the issuing
magistrate within the region does not hold
court sessions in the city or municipality,
within the region, where the place to be
searched is located. 28

The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were

taken into account in the foreign judicial pronouncement
that, in the absence of statutory restrictions, a justice of the
peace in one district of the county may issue a search
warrant to be served in another district of the county and
made returnable before the justice of still another district or
another court having jurisdiction to deal with the matters
involved. 29 In the present state of our law on the matter, we
find no such statutory restrictions both with respect to the
court which can issue the search warrant and the
enforcement thereof anywhere in the Philippines.
III
Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction
(or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where
the criminal case is pending in one court and the search
warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of
personal property intended to be used as evidence in said
criminal case. This arrangement is not unknown or without
precedent in our jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted,
this very situation was anticipated in Circular No. 13 of this
Court under the limited scenario contemplated therein.
Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down
the following policy guidelines:

1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have

primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by
and for purposes of said case. An application for a search
warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme
and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove
to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not
give due course to the application depending on the validity
of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court
with primary jurisdiction thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion
to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by
said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the
appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the
resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections
then available, existent or known shall be raised in the
original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in
or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may
move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the
suppression as evidence of the personal property seized
under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said
purpose. Since two separate courts with different
participations are involved in this situation, a motion to
quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence
are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to
prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall
consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule,
provided, however, that objections not available, existent or
known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant
may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The
resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall

likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate

higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies
the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise
prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal
property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be
transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is
pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation
therefor.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the
same criminal offense is charged in different informations or
complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent
original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue
of which court will try the case shall have been resolved,
such court shall be considered as vested with primary
jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants
incident to the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition
is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 126379 June 26, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
Provincial Prosecutor FAUSTINO T. CHIONG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 80,
Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD
SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM and
MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:
In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected
the appeal at bar under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from
the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the
Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals. 1 Said judgment
dismissed the People's petition for certiorari to invalidate (i)
the Order of Judge Caesar A. Casanova of Branch 80 of the
Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996. 2 as well (ii)
that dated May 28, 1996 denying the People's motion for
reconsideration. 3 Those orders were handed down in
Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of illegal possession of
explosives, after the accused had been arraigned and
entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. More particularly,
the Order of February 9, 1996:
1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95])
issued by Judge Marciano I. Bacalla of Branch
216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City
on December 15, 1995, 4

2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the

items seized under the warrant, and
3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S.
$5,750.00 to the Court within five (5) days "to
be released thereafter in favor of the lawful
owner considering that said amount was not
mentioned in the Search Warrant."
The antecedents, "culled from the records" by the Appellate
Court, are hereunder set out.
1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James
Brillantes applied for search warrant before
Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr.
Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his
possession firearms and explosives at Abigail
Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong
Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan.
2. The following day, December 15, 1995,
Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr.
Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety
Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent
(to) Abigail Variety Store resulting in the
arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the
seizure of their personal belongings, papers
and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair
of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses
and travelling bags including cash amounting
to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from
US$5,175.00 (receipted) which were never
mentioned in the warrant. The sum of

$5,175.00 was however returned to the

respondents upon order of the court on
respondents' motion or request. Included
allegedly are one piece of dynamite stick; two
pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one
(1) fragmentation grenade. But without the
items described in the search warrant are; (a)
three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4)
gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e)
assorted chemical ingredients for explosives;
and (f) assorted magazine assg and
ammunitions.
3. On December 19, 1995, three days after
the warrant was served, a return was made
without mentioning the personal belongings,
papers and effects including cash belonging
to the private respondents. There was no
showing that lawful occupants were made to
witness the search.
4. On January 22, 1996, private respondents
upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged; **" and on the same date,
submitted their "Extremely Urgent Motion (To
Quash Search Warrant and to Declare
Evidence Obtained Inadmissible)," dated
January 15, 1996;
5. ** According to the private respondents in
their pleading (consolidated comment on
petition forcertiorari **): On January 29, 1996,
an ocular inspection of the premises searched
was conducted by respondent Judge and the
following facts had been established as

contained in the order dated January

30.1996 ** to wit:
1) That the residence of all the
accused is at Apartment No. 1
which is adjacent to the
Abigail's Variety Store;
2) That there is no such number
as "1207" found in the building
as it is correspondingly called
only as "Apartment No. 1, 2, 3
and 4;"
3) That Apartment No. 1 is
separate from the Abigail's
Variety Store;
4) That there are no connecting
doors that can pass from
Abigail's Variety Store to
Apartment No. 1;
5) That Abigail's Variety Store
and Apartment No. 1 have its
own respective doors used for
ingress and egress.
There being no objection on the
said observation of the Court,
let the same be reduced on the
records.
SO ORDERED.

6. On February 9, 1996, respondent

Judge **issued its order duly granting the
motion to quash search warrant**; 5
7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents
filed the concomitant motion to dismiss** ;
8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor Rolando Bulan filed a motion for
reconsideration and supplemental motion on
the order quashing the search warrant**;
9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996,
private respondents filed opposition/comment
and supplemental opposition/comment on the
motion for reconsideration** ;
10. On May 28, 1996, respondent
Judge **issued its order denying the motion
for reconsideration**; (and on) June 11, 1996,
private respondents filed extremely urgent
reiterated motion to dismiss**.
Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanova's quashal Order of
February 9, 1996 above referred to, the Solicitor General
forthwith commenced a special civil action of certiorari in
the Court of Appeals. The action did not prosper, however.
As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth Division of the
Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11,
1996, dismissing the case for lack of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions,
to wit: 6

1. The place actually searched was different

and distinct from the place described in the
search warrant. This fact was ascertained by
the Trial Judge through an ocular inspection,
the findings wherein, not objected to by the
People, were embodied in an order dated
January 30, 1996. The place searched, in
which the accused (herein petitioners) were
then residing, was Apartment No. 1. It is a
place other than and separate from, and in no
way connected with, albeit adjacent
to, Abigail's Variety Store, the place stated in
the search warrant.
2. The public prosecutor's claim that the
sketch submitted to Judge Bacalla relative to
the application for a search warrant, actually
depicted the particular place to be searched
was effectively confuted by Judge
Casanova who pointed out that said "SKETCH
was not dated, not signed by the person who
made it and not even mentioned in the Search
Warrant by the Honorable Judge (Bacalla,
who) instead **directed them to search
Abigail Variety Store Apartment 1207** in the
Order **dated December 15, 1995" this,
too, being the address given "in the
Application for Search Warrant dated
December 14, 1995 requested by P/SR INSP.
Roger James Brillantes, the Team Leader." The
untenability of the claim is made more patent
by the People's admission, during the hearing
of its petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals, that said sketch was in truth "not
attached to the application for search

warrant ** (but) merely attached to the

motion for reconsideration." 7
Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court
were the following observations of Judge
Casanova contained in his Order of May 28,
1996, viz.: 8
d) ** ** it is very clear that the
place searched is different from
the place mentioned in the
Search Warrant, that is the
reason why even P/SR. INSP
Roger James Brillantes, SPO1
Prisco Bella and SPO4 Cesar D.
Santiago, who were all
EDUCATED CULTURED and
ADEPT to their tasks of being
RAIDERS and who were all
STATIONED IN BULACAN were
not even able to OPEN THEIR
MOUTH to say TAGALOG with
Honorable Judge who issued the
Search Warrant the words
"KATABI", or "KADIKIT" or
"KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY
STORE ang papasukin namin"
or if they happen to be an
ENGLISH speaking POLICEMEN,
they were not able to open their
mouth even to WHISPER the
ENGLISH WORDS "RESIDE" or
"ADJACENT" or "BEHIND" or
"NEXT to ABIGAIL VARIETY

STORE, the place they are

going to raid."**.
3. The search was not accomplished in the
presence of the lawful occupants of the place
(herein private respondents) or any member
of the family, said occupants being
handcuffed and immobilized in the living room
at the time. The search was thus done in
violation of the law. 9
4. The articles seized were not brought to the
court within 48 hours as required by the
warrant itself; "(i)n fact the return was done
after 3 days or 77 hours from service, in
violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court. 10
5. Judge Casanova "correctly took cognizance
of the motion to quash search warrant,
pursuant to the doctrinal tenets laid down
in Nolasco vs. Pao (139 SCRA 152) which
overhauled the previous ruling of the
Supreme Court in Templo vs. de la Cruz (60
SCRA 295). It is now the prevailing rule that
whenever a search warrant has been issued
by one court or branch thereof and a criminal
case is initiated in another court or branch
thereof as a result of the search of the
warrant, that search warrant is deemed
consolidated with the criminal case for orderly
procedure. The criminal case is more
substantial than the search warrant
proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the
criminal case has the right to rule on the

search warrant and to exclude evidence

unlawfully obtained (Nolasco & Sans cases).
6. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be
imputed to the respondent Judge, in light of
"Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
7. The proper remedy against the challenged
Order is an appeal, not the special civil action
ofcertiorari.
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing
verdict ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following errors,
to wit:
1) sanctioning "the lower Court's precipitate
act of disregarding the proceedings before the
issuing Court and overturning the latter's
determination of probable cause and
particularity of the place to be searched;"
2) sanctioning "the lower Court's conclusion
that the sketch was not attached to the
application for warrant despite the clear
evidence** to the contrary;"
3) ignoring "the very issues raised in the
petition before it;"
4) "holding that the validity of an otherwise
valid warrant could be diminished by the
tardiness by which the return is made;"

5) hastily applying "the general rule

that certiorari cannot be made a substitute for
appeal although the circumstances attending
the case at bar clearly fall within the
exceptions to that rule;" and
6) depriving petitioner of "the opportunity to
present evidence to prove the validity of the
warrant when the petition before it was
abruptly resolved without informing petitioner
thereof."
The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether
or not a search warrant was validly issued as regards the
apartment in which private respondents were then actually
residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that particular
apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.
The Government insists that the police officers who applied
to the Quezon City RTC for the search warrant had direct,
personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. It claims that one of said officers, in fact,
had been able to surreptitiously enter the place to be
searched prior to the search: this being the first of four (4)
separate apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and
they were also the same police officers who eventually
effected the search and seizure. They thus had personal
knowledge of the place to be searched and had the
competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly
what objects should be taken therefrom; and they had
presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause.
That may be so; but unfortunately, the place they had in
mind the first of four (4) separate apartment units (No. 1)
at the rear of "Abigail Variety Store" was not what the

Judge who issued warrant himself had in mind, and was not
what was ultimately described in the search warrant.
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers'
own faulty depiction of the premises to be searched. For in
their application and in the affidavit thereto appended, they
wrote down a description of the place to be searched, which
is exactly what the Judge reproduced in the search warrant:
"premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207. Area-F,
Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan." And the scope of the search was made more
particular and more restrictive by the Judge's
admonition in the warrant that the search be "limited only to
the premises herein described."
Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant,
there were at least five (5) distinct places in the area
involved: the store known as "Abigail's Variety Store," and
four (4) separate and independent residential apartment
units. These are housed in a single structure and are
contiguous to each other although there are no connecting
doors through which a person could pass from the interior of
one to any of the others. Each of the five (5) places is
independent of the others, and may be entered only through
its individual front door. Admittedly, the police officers did
not intend a search of all five (5) places, but of only one of
the residential units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store:
that immediately next to the store (Number 1).
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of
the physical configuration of the store and the apartments
behind the store, the police officers failed to make Judge
Bacalla understand the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in
the warrant. Even after having received the warrant
which directs that the search be "limited only to the

premises herein described," "Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207"

thus literally excluding the apartment units at the rear of
the store they did not ask the Judge to correct said
description. They seem to have simply assumed that their
own definite idea of the place to be searched clearly
indicated, according to them, in the sketch they claim to
have submitted to Judge Bacalla in support of their
application was sufficient particularization of the general
identification of the place in the search warrant.
The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is
sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, 11 allegedly
to the effect that the executing officer's prior knowledge as
to the place intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may,
in case of any ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be
searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.
Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search
warrants which, upon perusal, immediately disclosed an
obvious typographical error. The application in said case was
for seizure of subversive material allegedly concealed in two
places: one at "No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City," and
the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City;" Two (2) warrants issued No. 20-82
[a] and No. 20-83 [b]). Objection was made to the execution
of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at "784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City" because both search warrants
apparently indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City) as the place where the supposedly
subversive material was hidden. This was error, of course
but, as this Court there ruled, the error was obviously
typographical, for it was absurd to suppose that the Judge
had issued two warrants for the search of only one place.
Adverting to the fact that the application for the search
warrants specified two (2) distinct addresses, and that in

fact the address, "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon

Avenue, Quezon City" appeared in the opening paragraph of
Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that evidently, this
was the address the Judge intended to be searched when he
issued the second warrant (No. 20-82[b]); and to clear up
the ambiguity caused by the "obviously typographical
error," the officer executing the warrant could consult the
records in the official court file. 12
The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction
of an "obvious typographical error" involving ambiguous
descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but
the search of a place different from that clearly and without
ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In Burgos, the
inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately
perceptible on the face of the warrants in question. In the
instant case there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The
ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the
absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be
searched between the applicants for the warrant and the
Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to
substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in
the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in
their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair
nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different
from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place
actually searched although not that specified in the
warrant is exactly what they had in view when they
applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their
supporting evidence. What is material in determining the
validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself,
not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the court
issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers' theory, in
the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment

units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been

fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot
be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal
knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in
support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is
proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the
search warrant to particularly describe the place to be
searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It
would concede to police officers the power of choosing the
place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the
warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search
process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant
that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed
from them. The particularization of the description of the
place to be searched may properly be done only by the
Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the
discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
The Government faults Judge Casanova for having
undertaken a review of Judge Bacalla's finding of probable
cause, "as if he were an appellate court." A perusal of the
record however shows that all that Judge Casanova did was
merely to point out inconsistencies between Judge Bacalla's
Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant itself, as
regards the identities of the police officers examined by
Judge Bacalla. 13 In Judge Casanova's view, said
inconsistencies, being quite apparent in the record, put in
doubt the sufficiency of the determination of the facts on
which the search warrant was founded.
The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily
established probable cause before Judge Bacalla for the
issuance of a search warrant. While this may be conceded,

the trouble is, to repeat, that the place described in the

search warrant which, of course, is the only place that
may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof was not
that which the police officers who applied for the warrant
had in mind, with the result that what they actually
subjected to search-and-seizure operations was a place
other than that stated in the warrant. In fine, while there
was a search warrant more or less properly issued as
regards Abigail's Variety Store, there was none for
Apartment No. 1 the first of the four (4) apartment units
at the rear of said store, and precisely the place in which the
private respondents were then residing.
It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution, providing that: 14
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
things to be seized.
it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed
valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally
determined by the judge after examination under
oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it
particularly describe the place to be searched, 15 the

manifest intention being that the search be confined

strictly to the place so described.
There was therefore in this case an infringement of the
constitutional requirement that a search warrant particularly
describe the place to be searched; and that infringement
necessarily brought into operation the concomitant
provision that "(a)ny evidence obtained in violation ** (inter
alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 16
In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to
discuss such other points sought to be made by the Office of
the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the sketch of the
building housing the store and the residential apartment
units the place to be searched being plainly marked
was in fact attached to the application for the search
warrant; or (2) the search had been conducted in the
presence of the occupants of the place (herein petitioners),
among others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant was
diminished by the tardiness by which the return was made,
or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly refused to
receive "evidence which ** (the People) had earlier been
denied opportunity to present before the trial court;" or (5)
the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari in the
Court of Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The
resolution of these issues would not affect the correctness of
the conclusion that the search and seizure proceedings are
void because the place set forth in the search warrant is
different from that which the officers actually searched, or
the speciousness of their argument that anyway the
premises searched were precisely what they had described
to the Judge, and originally and at all times had in mind.

Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor

General's Office opines that where a search warrant has
been "issued by a court other than the one trying the main
criminal case," the "proper recourse" of persons wishing to
quash the warrant is to assail it before the issuing court and
not before that in which the criminal case involving the
subject of the warrant is afterwards filed. 17 In support, it
cites the second of five (5) "policy guidelines" laid down by
this Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals 18 concerning
"possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the
exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending
in one court and the search warrant is issued by another
court for the seizure of personal property intended to be
used as evidence in said criminal case." Said second
guideline reads: 19
2. When the latter court (referring to the court
which does not try the main criminal case)
issues the search warrant, a motion to quash
the same may be filed in and shall be
resolved by said court, without prejudice to
any proper recourse to the appropriate higher
court by the party aggrieved by the resolution
of the issuing court. All grounds and
objections then available, existent or known
shall be raised in the original or subsequent
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant,
otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search
warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based
on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in
another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the
warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be
filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed

for the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which
the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is
alternative, not cumulative. The Court first taking
cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion of the
other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the
Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping.
This is clearly stated in the third policy guideline which
indeed is what properly applies to the case at bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash the search
warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing
court, the interested party may move in the
court where the criminal case is pending for
the suppression as evidence of the personal
property seized under the warrant if the same
is offered therein for said purpose. Since two
separate courts with different participations
are involved in this situation, a motion to
quash a search warrant and a motion to
suppress evidence are alternative and not
cumulative remedies. In order to prevent
forum shopping, a motion to quash shall
consequently be governed by the omnibus
motion rule, provided, however, that
objections not available, existent or known
during the proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant may be raised in the hearing of the
motion to suppress. The resolution of the
court on the motion to suppress shall likewise
be subject to any proper remedy in the
appropriate higher court.
In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and
issued by, Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon
City, and the return was made to said court. On the other

hand, the criminal action in connection with the explosives

subject of the warrant was filed in Branch 80 of the Regional
Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash
the search warrant, or for the return of the personal
property seized (not otherwise contraband) could have
properly been presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was
ever filed. It was only after the criminal action had been
commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash
and to suppress evidence was submitted to the latter. The
case thus falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in
accordance with which the latter court must be deemed to
have acted within its competence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the
Court of Appeals of September 11, 1996 which dismissed
the Peoples petition for certiorari seeking nullification of the
Orders of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated
February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 43M-96 is, for the reasons set out in the foregoing opinion,
hereby AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 124461 September 25, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA,
PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 83, QUEZON CITY;
and AIDEN LANUZA, respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.:
The People of the Philippines, through this petition for
review, seeks the reversal of the order of respondent Judge
Estrella T. Estrada, dated December 7, 1995, which granted
private respondent Aiden Lanuza's motion to quash Search
Warrant No. 958 (95), as well as the order dated April 1,
1996 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
earlier order.
On June 27, 1995, Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of
the Legal, Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of the
Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, an application for the
issuance of a search warrant against "Aiden Lanuza of 516
San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City," for
violation of Article 40 (k) of Republic Act 7394 (The
Consumer Act of the Philippines).
In her application for search warrant, Atty. Cabanlas alleged,
among others, as follows:
1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as
Attorney V and Chief of LICD, I received

reports from SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the

Regional Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence
Command of the PNP that certain
1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San
Jose de la Montana Street,
Mabolo, Cebu City sold to said
Officer Cabiles various drug
products amounting to Seven
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty
Two Pesos (P7,232.00) on May
29, 1995;
1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her
address at 516 San Jose de la
Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu
City has no license to operate,
distribute, sell or transfer drug
products from the BFAD;
1.c. Distribution, sale or offer
for sale or transfer of drug
products without license to
operate from BFAD is in
violation of Art. 40 (k) of RA
7394 (or "the Consumer Act").
2. In support of the report, the subscribed
affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his report and the
various drug products sold and purchased
contained in a (sic) plastic bags marked
"Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza Bag 2 of 2"
were enclosed; and the same are likewise
submitted herewith.

xxx xxx xxx.

(Emphasis supplied)

The application, however, ended with the statement that the

warrant is to search the premises of another person at a
different address:
3. This is executed to support affiant's
application for a search warrant on the
premises of Belen Cabanero at New Frontier
Village, Talisay Cebu. 2 (Emphasis supplied)
In support of the application, the affidavit of SPO4 Manuel P.
Cabiles, a member of the Regional Intelligence Group IV of
the PNP Intelligence Command, Camp Vicente Lim,
Canlubang, Laguna, was attached thereto, wherein he
declared that:
1. Upon the request for assistance by BFAD,
he conducted surveillance for persons
distributing, selling or transferring drug
products without license to operate from
BFAD.

4. Earlier than May 29, 1995, affiant saw a

delivery of drug products from the residence
of Ms. Lanuza in 516 San Jose de la Montana
St., Mabolo, Cebu City to another person.
5. Accompanying this affidavit are the various
products sold to/and purchased by the affiant
contained in two (2) plastic bags marked
"Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza Bag 2 of 2."
This is executed in support of the affiant's
report to BFAD and for whatever legitimate
purpose this may serve. 3 (Emphasis supplied)
The BFAD also submitted with the application a copy of the
sketch 4 of the location of Aiden Lanuza's residence at her
stated address.
On the same day the application was filed, the respondent
Judge issued Search Warrant No. 958 (95), which reads in
full:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

2. On May 29, 1995, a certain Aiden Lanuza of

516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu
City sold to him various drug products
amounting to P7,232.00 and
3 Upon further verification in the BFAD
registry of licensed persons or premises, the
said person and place have in fact no license
to operate.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 83 QUEZON CITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plai
nti
ff,
-versus- SEARCH WARRANT NO.
958 (95)
AIDEN LANUZA,
Def
en
da
nt.
X-------------------------------X
SEARCH WARRANT

It appears to the satisfaction of this Court,

after examining under oath Atty. Lorna
Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal
Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of
the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) and her
witness. Manuel P. Cabiles, member of the
Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence Command,
PNP, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna,
that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that a violation of Article 40(k) in relation to
Article 41 of Republic Act No. 7394 (Consumer
Act) has been committed or about to be
committed and there are good and sufficient
reasons to believe that Ms. Aiden Lanuza of
516 San Jose dela Montana Street, Cebu City
has in her possession and control at said
address the following described properties:
medicines and drugs of
undetermined quantity among
which are Bricanyl Tablet,
Bisolvon Tablet, Buscopan
Tablet, Buscopan Ampoule,
Mucosolvan Ampoule, Persantin
Tablet, Tegretol Tablet, PZA-Ciba
Tablet, Voltaren Tablet, Zantac
Ampoule, Ventolin Tablet,
Ventolin Inhaler, Dermovate
Cream, Fortum Vial, Zinacef
Vial, Feldene 1M Ampoule,
Norvasc Tablet, Bactrim Forte
Tablet, Rochephin Vial, Tilcotil
Tablet, Librax Tablet, Methergin
Tablet and Tagamet Tablet

which she is selling, distributing and

transferring without the necessary license
from the Department of Health.
You are hereby commanded to make an
immediate search at any time of the DAY or
NIGHT of the premises above-described and
forthwith seize and take possession of the
undetermined amount of drugs and medicines
subject of the offense and to bring the same
to this Court to be dealt with as the law
directs.
You are further directed to submit a return of
this Search Warrant within ten (10) days from
today.
This Search Warrant is valid within a period of
ten (10) days from the date of issue.
GIVEN UNDER THE HAND AND SEAL of this
Court this 27th day of June 1995 at Quezon
City.
(Sgd.) ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA
Second Vice Executive Judge

(Emphasis supplied)
On June 28, 1995, the search warrant was served at private
respondent Lanuza's residence at the indicated address by a
composite team of policemen from the PNP 7th Criminal
Investigation Command, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City.

How the search warrant was implemented was briefly

narrated in the Joint Affidavit, 6 dated June 29, 1995, of SPO2
Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and SPO2 Marckbilly Capalungan, both
members of the search and seizure team. They stated in
their affidavit that their team, armed with the search
warrant, "conducted a raid at the premises of one AIDEN
LANUZA of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu
City . . .;" that "the raid was witnessed by Luis Rivera,
Demetrio Panimdim and Francisco Ojales, both (sic) Brgy.
Tanod of Kasambagan, Cebu City;" that "the service of the
(search) warrant resulted in the confiscation of fifty-two (52)
cartoons (sic) of assorted medicines from the possession
and control of AIDEN LANUZA;" and that the "said items
were brought to the 7CICRO office for detailed inventory
headed by Atty. Lorna F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal
Information and Compliance Division of the BFAD,
Manila." 7 (Emphasis supplied)
The present petition, however, narrates a different account
of what actually happened during the implementation of the
search warrant. Paragraph 5 of the petition states: "At the
commencement of the search, the members of the team
discovered that the premises described as 516 San Jose de
la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City was actually a five
thousand (5,000) square meter compound containing at
least fifteen (15) structures which are either leased
residences, offices, factories, workshops or warehouse. The
policemen proceeded to search the residence of private
respondent Lanuza at Lot No. 41 of said address. Finding no
drug products thereat, they proceeded to search a nearby
warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound and
address above stated. This search yielded fifty-two (52)
cartons of assorted drug products which were then
inventoried in due course. . . . ." 8 (Emphasis supplied)

In an order 9 dated July 3, 1995, the respondent Judge noted

the inventory of the seized drugs and authorized the BFAD
to retain custody of the same, to have samples of the drugs
analyzed and be brought to the registered drug
manufacturers for parallel testing.
On August 22, 1995, private respondent Aiden Lanuza filed
a verified motion 10 praying that Search Warrant No. 958
(95) be quashed and that the seized articles be declared
inadmissible in any proceeding and ordered returned to the
warehouse owned by Folk Arts Export & Import Company
located at Lot No. 38 inside the compound at 516 San Jose
de la Montana Street, Cebu City. The motion is based on the
grounds that the search warrant is illegal and null and void
because: (1) it was applied to search the premises of one
Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but
was issued to search the residence of private respondent
Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu
City; (2) it was issued for a non-existing offense; (3) Atty.
Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas was not duly authorized by
applicant BFAD to apply therefor; (4) it failed to particularly
describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized; (5) the applicant's witnesses had no personal
knowledge of the facts upon which it was issued; and (6) its
implementation was unreasonable as it was enforced on a
different or wrong place which was lawfully occupied by a
different or wrong person. 11
Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas, who appeared for the BFAD,
opposed 12 the motion to quash the search warrant, to which
the private respondent countered with a reply.
After the contending parties had submitted their respective
positions without further oral arguments, the respondent
Judge issued the assailed order 13 dated December 7, 1995,

quashing Search Warrant No. 958 (95). Accordingly, the

order dated July 3, 1995 was revoked and all the articles
seized were declared inadmissible in any and all
proceedings against private respondent Aiden Lanuza. Also,
the BFAD was ordered to return at its expense all the seized
items to the warehouse of Folk Arts Import & Export
Company at Lot No. 38, 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City within a period of fifteen (15) days from
notice of the said order. 14
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the December 7,
1995 order was denied in an order 15 dated April 1, 1996,
impelling petitioner to file the present petition asserting that
the respondent Judge erred:
a) In holding that the defect
appearing in BFAD's application
for a search warrant is so
"grave" in nature as to warrant
quashal of the search warrant
issued thereunder, considering
that such variance is actually a
harmless clerical error.
b) In holding that Atty. Cabanlas
was not, authorized by the
BFAD to apply for a search
warrant concerning the
unlicensed distribution of drugs,
considering that the grant of
BFAD authorization upon her to
investigate fake, misbranded
adulterated or unregistered
drugs necessarily contemplates
the authority to investigate the

unlicensed activities above

noted.
c) In holding that applicant
BFAD had failed to discharge
the burden of proving probable
cause for issuance of a search
warrant, by failing to present
documentary proof indicating
that private respondent had no
license to sell or distribute drug
products, considering that
under the authority of Carillo v.
People (229 SCRA 386) the
BFAD only had the burden of
proving the negative ingredient
of the offense charged on the
basis of the best evidence
procurable under the
circumstances.
d) In holding that the place
sought to be searched had not
been described with sufficient
particularity in SW No. 958 (95),
considering that Aiden Lanuza's
residence at Lot No. 41, 516
San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City was not so
conspicuously or notoriously
represented to the public as
such by her as to contradict the
investigating and serving
officers' perception of the
outward appearance of her

dwelling, which led them to

believe that the more general
address of 516 San Jose de la
Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City
referred to her dwelling.
e) In ordering the return of the
things seized, the possession of
which is prohibited. 16
We granted, the petitioner's application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order in a resolution 17 dated June 26,
1996 and restrained the implementation of the assailed
orders, effective immediately and until further orders from
this Court.
Private respondent Aiden Lanuza later filed her
comment 18 on the petition, but petitioner's reply thereto
was not admitted by this Court in a resolution 19 dated
January 13, 1997, for failure by the Solicitor General to file
the same within his first extension of thirty (30) days, that
was granted, but with a warning that no further extension
would be given. Instead of filing his reply, the Solicitor
General asked for two (2) more extensions of time, which
were denied.
Now to the assigned errors of the respondent Judge raised
by petitioner.
The requirements for the issuance of a search warrant are
inscribed in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to
wit:

Sec. 2. THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE

SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS,
AND EFFECTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES, SEIZURES OF WHATEVER NATURE
AND FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE
INVIOLABLE, AND NO SEARCH WARRANT OR
WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT
UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED
PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER
EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OF AFFIRMATION
OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES
HE MAY PRODUCE, AND PARTICULARLY
DESCRIBING THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED
AND THE PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE SEIZED.
(Emphasis supplied)

Plai
ntiff
,
-versus- SEARCH WARRANT NO.
958 (95)
AIDEN LANUZA, For: Violation of Article
516 San Jose de la 40 (k) in relation to
Montana Street, Mabolo, Article 41 of Republic
Cebu City, Act No. 7394 (or the
Def
en
da
nt.
Co
nsu
me
r
Act
)

In quashing the subject search warrant, it is the finding of

the respondent Judge that the application for its issuance
suffered from a "grave" defect, "which escaped (her)
attention," considering that it was applied to search the
premises of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village,
Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the residence of
herein private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de
la Montana St., Cebu City. 20
We nonetheless find such error in the application for search
warrant a negligible defect.
The title of the questioned application, which reads:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x 21
(Emphasis supplied)
and the allegations contained therein, pertinent
portions of which we quote:

1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as

Attorney V and Chief of LICD, I received
reports from SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the
Regional Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence
Command of the PNP that certain
1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San
Jose de la Montana Street,
Mabolo, Cebu City sold to said
Officer Cabiles various drug
products amounting to Seven
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty
Two Pesos (P7,232.00) on May
29, 1995;
1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her
address at 516 San Jose de la
Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu
City has no license to operate,
distribute, sell or transfer drug
products from the BFAD.
xxx xxx xxx
2. In support of the report, the subscribed
affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his report and the
various drug products sold and purchased
contained in a (sic) plastic bags marked
"Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza Bag 2 of 2"
were enclosed, and the same are likewise
submitted herewith.

unmistakably reveal that the said application was

specifically intended against private respondent
Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street,
Mabolo, Cebu City. She has been the only one
identified in the application, as well as in the
aforequoted affidavit of SPO4 Manuel Cabiles upon
which the application was based, as having allegedly
sold to said SPO4 Cabiles various drugs amounting to
P7,232.00 on May 29, 1995, without any license to
do so, in alleged violation of Article 40 (k) of R.A.
7394. It is noteworthy that, as stated in the abovequoted paragraph 2 of the application, the plastic
bags which contained the seized drugs and which
were submitted together with the application, were
marked as "Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza Bag 2 of
2." These markings with the name "Lanuza"
obviously refer to no other than the herein private
respondent. And when the respondent Judge issued
the search warrant, it was directed solely against
private respondent Aiden Lanuza at her address: 516
San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
The Solicitor General explained the error in the application
by saying that on the same day applicant Atty. Lorna
Frances Cabanlas filed the questioned application on June
27, 1995, another application for search warrant was also
filed against one Belen Cabanero at her residence at New
Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu City. This can be deduced from
the following examination conducted by respondent Judge
on Atty. Cabanlas:
(COURT)

xxx xxx xxx. 22 (Emphasis

supplied)

Q. And who is
your respondent?

A. Mrs. Aiden
Lanuza and the
other one is
Belen Cabanero.
Q. Where are
they situated?
A. Mrs. Lanuza is
situated in No.
516 San Jose de
la Montana
Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City.
Q. About the
other?
A. New Frontier
Village, Talisay,
Cebu.
Q. Do you have
any specific
address at New
Frontier Village?
A. It was reported
by Mr. Manuel
Cabiles.
Q. Will he be
testifying?

A. Yes Ma'am.
Your Honor, this
is the vicinity of
the New Frontier
Village, Cebu
(witness
presenting a
sketch) (sic)
Q How about this
San Jose de la
Montana. This is
just in Cebu City?
A At 516 San Jose
de la Montana
Street, Mabolo,
Cebu
City. 23
From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that the name
and address of one Belen Cabanero were erroneously copied
in paragraph 3 of the application in question. Such defect,
as intimated earlier, is not of such a gravity as to call for the
invalidation of the search warrant.
There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the
search warrant.
Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying
the search warrant as she was not convinced that there was
probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of the
applicant to present documentary proof indicating that

private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell

drugs.
It must be noted that in the application for search warrant,
private respondent is charged with the specific offense of
selling drugs without the required license from the
Department of Health, which is in violation of Article 40 (k)
of R.A. 7394, and penalized under Article 41 thereof. The
said application was supported by the affidavit of SPO4
Manuel Cabiles where, in paragraph 3 thereof, he declared
that he made a "verification in the BFAD registry of licensed
persons or premises" and discovered that private
respondent Aiden Lanuza had "no license" to sell drugs.
We agree with the respondent Judge that applicant Atty.
Lorna Frances Cabanlas should have submitted
documentary proof that private respondent Aiden Lanuza
had no such license. Although no explanation was offered by
respondent Judge to support her posture, we hold that to
establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify
the issuance of a search warrant, the applicant must show
"facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." 24
The facts and circumstances that would show probable
cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained
under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence
is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the
existence or the negative ingredient of the offense charged
for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as
in the present case and such evidence is within the
knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily
produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be

secured at the time of application, the applicant must show

a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the
judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural
safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give
meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the
privacy of his home and personalties. As well stated by this
Court through former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando
in Villanueva vs. Querubin: 25
It is deference to one's personality that lies at
the core of this right; but it could be also
looked upon as a recognition of a
constitutionally protected area, primarily
one's home but not necessarily thereto
confined (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293 [1966]). What is sought to be guarded is
a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed
entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge,
his individuality can assert itself not only in
the choice of who shall be welcome but
likewise in the kind of objects he wants
around him. There the state, however
powerful, does not as such have access
except under the circumstances above noted,
for in the traditional formulation, his house,
however humble, is his castle. Thus is
outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to refrain
from any invasion of his dwelling and to
respect the privacies of his life (Cf. Schmerber
v. California, 384 US 757 Brennam, J. and
Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616, 630). In
the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative
work, Search and Seizure and the Supreme
Court (1966), could fitly characterize this

constitutional right as the embodiment of a

spiritual concept: the belief that to value the
privacy of home and person and to afford its
constitutional protection against the long
reach of government is no less, than to value
human dignity, and that his privacy must not
be disturbed except in case of overriding
social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards (Ibid, p. 47). (Emphasis
supplied)
In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the
circumstances to prove that private respondent Aiden
Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to
that effect from the Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel
Cabiles could have easily procured such certification when
he went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed
persons or entity. No justifiable reason was introduced why
such certification could not be secured. Mere allegation as to
the non-existence of a license by private respondent is not
sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant.
The presumption of regularity cannot be invoked in aid of
the process when an officer undertakes to justify it. 26 We
apply by analogy our ruling in 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et.al.: 27
The presentation of the master tapes of the
copyrighted films from which the pirated firms
were allegedly copied, was necessary for the
validity of search warrants against those who
have in their possession the pirated films. The
petitioner's argument to the effect that the
presentation of the master tapes at the time
of application may not be necessary as these
would be merely evidentiary in nature and not

determinative of whether or not a probable

cause exists to justify the issuance of the
search warrant is not meritorious. The court
cannot presume the duplicate or copied tapes
were necessarily reproduced from master
tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was
directed against video tape outlets which
allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized
sale and renting out of copyrighted films
belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D.
49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the
similarity or at least substantial similarity of
the purported pirated works to the
copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must
present to the court the copyrighted films to
compare the with the purchased evidence of
the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine
whether the latter is an unauthorized
reproduction of the former. This linkage of the
copyrighted films to the pirated films must be
established to satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Mere allegations as to the
existence of the copyrighted films cannot
serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant. (Emphasis supplied)
Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been
described with sufficient particularity in the questioned
search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden
Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San
Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs

sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38

within the same compound. The said warehouse is owned by
a different person. Again, the respondent Judge is correct on
this point.
This Court has held that the applicant should particularly
describe the place to be searched and the person or things
to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. 28 In the
present case, it must be noted that the application for
search warrant was accompanied by a sketch 29 of the
compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu
City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of
private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square.
Within the same compound are residences of other people,
workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this
sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to
describe the residential house of private respondent with
sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other
buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the
search warrant merely indicated the address of the
compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo,
Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too
general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private
respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the
residence of private respondent sought to be searched has
characterized the questioned search warrant as a general
warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement.
While the questioned search warrant had all the
characteristic of a general warrant, it was correctly
implemented. For, the searching team went directly to the
house of private respondent Aiden Lanuza located at Lot No.
41 inside the compound known as 516 San Jose de la
Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. However, the team did
not find any of the drug products which were the object of

the search. Frustrated, and apparently disappointed, the

team then proceeded to search a nearby warehouse of Folk
Arts Export & Import Company owned by one David Po
located at Lot No. 38 within the same compound. It was in
the warehouse that drug products were found and seized
which were duly receipted. In the Joint Affidavit of SPO2
Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and SPO2 Markbilly Capalungan,
members of the searching team, is a statement that the
confiscated 52 cartons of assorted medicines were found in
the possession and control of private respondent Aiden
Lanuza. This is a blatant falsehood and is aggravated by the
fact that this was committed by officers sworn to uphold the
law. In searching the warehouse of Folk Arts Export & Import
Company owned by one David Po, the searching team went
beyond the scope of the search warrant. As the trial court
aptly observed:
. . . . The verified motion to quash and reply
also show that the search at the house of
defendant-movant yielded negative result and
the confiscated articles were taken from
another place which is the warehouse of Folk
Arts Import and Export Company owned by
another person. In the return of the search
warrant, it is stated that Search Warrant No.
958 (95) was served at the premises of 516
San Jose dela Montana St., Cebu City and that
during the search, drug products were found
and seized therefrom which were duly
receipted. Accompanying, said return is the
Joint Affidavit of two (2) members of the
searching team, namely: SPO2 Froctuoso Bete
and SPO2 Markbilly Capalingan, both of the
7th Criminal Investigation Command, PNP,
with station at Camp Sotero Cabahug,

Gerardo Avenue, Cebu City which also

mentioned only the address as 516 San Jose
dela Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City and the
confiscation of 52 cartoons(sic) of assorted
medicines purportedly from the possession
and control of defendant-movant. However, as
indicated in the sketch attached to the
application for search warrant, said Folk Arts
Import and Export Company is owned by one
David Po, which is a concrete proof that the
searching team exceeded their authority by
conducting a search not only in the residence
of defendant-movant Lanuza but also in
another place which the applicant itself has
identified as belonging to another person,
David Po. The foregoing are strong reasons to
support the conclusion that there has been an
unreasonable search and seizure which would
warrant the quashal of the search warrant. 30
The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the motion
to quash the search warrant.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued in a resolution dated June 26, 1996
is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-41957

August 28, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SANTIAGO SY JUCO, defendant.
TEOPISTO B. REMO, petitioner-appellant.
Laurel, Del Rosario and Sabido for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
Upon petition of the agent and representatives of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, named Narciso Mendiola, who
alleged that, according to information given him by a person
whom he considered reliable, certain fraudulent bookletters
and papers or records were being kept in the building
marked No. 482 on Juan Luna Street, Binondo, Manila,
occupied by Santiago Sy Juco, a warrant to search the
building in question was issued against said person on
March 7, 1933, by the Court of First Instance of Manila,
through Judge Mariano A. Albert. In said warrant, the peace
officers to whom it was directed for execution were required
to seize the above-stated articles for the purpose of
delivering them to the court, for the proper action to be
taken in due time. After making the required search the
officers concerned seized, among things, an art metal filing
cabinet claimed by Attorney Teopisto B. Remo to be his and
to contain some letters, documents and papers belonging to
his clients. Inasmuch as said officers later refused to return
the filing cabinet in question to him, he filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, praying that the Collector
of Internal Revenue and his agents be prohibited from
opening said art metal filing cabinet and that the sheriff of

the City of Manila likewise be ordered to take charge of said

property in the meantime, on the ground that the warrant
by virtue of which the search was made is null and void,
being illegal and against the Constitution. A similar petition
was later filed in the same case by the Salakan Lumber Co.,
Inc., the same agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
having also seized some books belonging to it by virtue of
the above-mentioned search warrant.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance through Judge
Delfin Jaranilla, decided to overrule both petitions, declaring
that the art metal filing cabinet and the books and papers
claimed by the Salakan Lumber Co., Inc., would be returned
to Attorney Teopisto B. Remo and to the company,
respectively, as soon as it be proven, by means of an
examination thereof to be made in the presence of the
interested parties, that they contain nothing showing that
they have been used to commit fraud against the
Government. Only Attorney Teopisto B. Remo appealed from
the decision of the court and he now contends that it
committed the nine errors assigned by him as follows:
1. The lower court erred in not holding that the
search warrant, Exhibit B, issued in the case at bar is
unconstitutional and void ab initio and hence can
confer no legal right upon the Government to seize,
much less to retain or open the filing cabinet in
question, Exhibit 3.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the
search warrant, which is void ab initio may not be
legalized by evidence secured subsequent to the
issuance, or in consequence, of said illegal search
warrant.

3. The lower court erred in not holding that the

doctrine of the case of People vs. Rubio (G. R. No.
35500, 57 Phil., 384), is not applicable to the case at
bar.
4. The lower court erred in not holding that the
search warrant, Exhibit B, was procured in order to
obtain evidence against the defendant Santiago Sy
Juco.
5. The lower court erred in not holding that the
search warrant, Exhibit B, was issued solely against
the premised occupied by the defendant Santiago Sy
Juco, and hence cannot be used against the premises
occupied by a stranger, or the petitioner, Teopisto B.
Remo.
6. The lower court erred in not holding that the filing
cabinet, Exhibit 3, is the personal property of the
petitioner, Teopisto B. Remo, and not of the
defendant Santiago Sy Juco.
7. The lower court erred in not upholding the
inviolability of the contents of the filing cabinet,
Exhibit 3, the same being confidential documents
entrusted to the herein petitioner, Attorney Teopisto
B. Remo, by his clients, in his professional capacity
and in connection with cases pending before the
courts of justice and administrative tribunals.
8. The lower court erred in not holding that the
Internal Revenue agents gave infringed the penal
laws not only by procuring the search warrant,
Exhibit B, against the premises of the defendant,

Santiago Sy Juco, without just cause, but also by

exceeding their authority in enforcing said search
warrant against the premises of the petitioner,
Teopisto B. Remo, who is stranger to said search
warrant, which acts also constitute a violation of the
domicile of said petitioner; and in not endorsing the
matter to the city fiscal for proper action.
9. The lower court erred in not ordering the return of
the filing cabinet, Exhibit 3, intact and unopened, to
its lawful owner, the petitioner Teopisto B. Remo.
The pertinent part of the search warrant in question was
couched in the following language:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before
me, Mariano Albert, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, by
the complainant on oath of Narciso Mendiola, special
investigator, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Manila, that
the defendant, Santiago Sy Juco, of No. 482 Juan
Luna, Manila, keeps illegally and feloniously
fraudulent books, correspondence, and records and
that he verily believes upon probable cause that the
said books, correspondence and records at No. 482
Juan Luna, Manila, and the said (personal) property is
now being used in the commission of fraud of the
revenue of the Government.
You are therefore commanded to take with you the
necessary and proper assistance and to enter, in the
daytime, into the said premises and there diligently
search for fraudulent books, correspondence and

records and that you seize and bring them before the
court to be disposed of according to law.
Given under my hands this 7th day of March, 1933,
in the City of Manila.

I. Narciso Mendiola, being duly sworn, depose and

say that I have read the foregoing questions and
answers and that I found the same to be correct and
true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
(Sgd.) NARCISCO MENDIOLA.

[SEAL]
(Sgd.) MARIANO A. ALBERT
Judge of Court of First instance of Manila
The affidavit or deposition referred to in the warrant abovequoted contained the following questions and answers:
TESTIMONY TAKEN BEFORE HON. JUDGE MARIANO A.
ALBERT, Narciso Mendiola, being duly sworn, testifies
as follows:
Q. What is your name, residence and occupation?
A. Narciso Mendiola, special investigator, Bureau of
Internal Revenue, Manila.
Q. Are you the applicant for this search warrant? A.
Yes, sir.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of

March, 1933, in the City of Manila, P. I.
[SEAL]
(Sgd.) MARIANO A. ALBERT
Judge, Court of First Instance, Manila
It appears clear to this court that the question that the
appellant wishes to raise by means of the allege errors
attributed by him to the lower court, may be reduced to the
following:
1. Is the search warrant in question valid or not,
taking into consideration the provisions of the law
and of the Constitution relative thereto?

Q. do you know the premises situated at No. 482

Juan Luna, Manila? A. Yes, sir.

2. Does the art metal filing cabinet seized by the

agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue belong to
Santiago Sy Juco or to Teopisto B. Remo?

Q. Do you know who occupy said premises? A.

According to the best of my information, the house is
occupied by Santiago Sy Juco.

3. Could the search warrant in question affect

Attorney Teopisto B. Remo, not being the person
against whom it was directed?

Q. What are your reasons for applying for a search

warrant? A. It has been reported to us by person
whom I considered reliable that in said premises are
fraudulent books, correspondence and records.

4. Had the court authority to order the opening of the

cabinet in question for the purpose of determining,
by an examination of the books, documents and

records contained therein, whether or not same were

used to commit fraud against the Government?
1. A question which is very similar to the first one herein
raised by the appellant, has been decided by this court in
the negative in its judgment rendered in the case of Alvarez
vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Anti Usury Board,
p. 33, ante. According to our laws in force on the date in
question, which do not differ substantially from the
provisions of the Constitution of the Commonwealth in
matters regarding search, in order that a search warrant
may be valid, the following requisites, among others, must
be present: That the application upon which it is issued be
supported by oath; That the search warrant particularly
describes not only place to be searched but also the person
or thing to be seized and that there be probable cause (sec.
97, General Orders, No. 58: sec. 3, Jones Law; Article III, sec.
1, paragraph 3, Constitution of the Commonwealth).
In the above-cited case of Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance
of Tayabas and Anti-Usury Board, supra, and in that of
United States vs. Addison (28 Phil., 566), this court held that
the oath required must be such that it constitutes a
guaranty that the person taking it has personal knowledge
of the facts of the case and that it convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual seeking the issuance of the
warrant or the person making the averment by hearsay, of
the existence of the requisite of probable cause. It has
likewise been held by this court that by probable cause are
meant such facts and circumstances antecedent to the
issuance thereof. It has furthermore been held that the true
test of the sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a
search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a
manner that perjury could be charged thereon in case the
allegations contained therein prove false (Sate vs.

Roosevelt, 244 Pac., 280), and that the provisions of the

Constitution and the statutes relative to searches and
seizures must be construed liberally in favor of the
individual who may be affected thereby, and strictly against
the State and against the person invoking them for the
issuance of the warrant ordering their execution (Elardo vs.
State of Misissippi, 145 So., 615; Fowler vs. U. S., 62 Fed.
[2d], 656; Saforik vs. U. S. Feed. [2d], 892; Boyd vs. U. S.,
116 U. S., 616; 29 Law. ed., 746), for the simple reason that
the proceedings of search and seizure are, by their very
nature, summary and drastic ones (Alvarez vs. Court of First
Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury Board, supra, and the
authorities cited therein).
By reading the affidavit which gave rise to the issuance of
the search warrant in question, it will be seen that the latter
does not fulfill the necessary conditions in support of its
validity. In the first place, it is not stated in said affidavit that
the books, documents or records referred to therein are
being used or are intended to be used in the commission of
fraud against the Government and, notwithstanding the lack
of such allegation, the warrant avers that they are actually
being used for such purpose. In the second place, it
assumes that the entire building marked No. 482 on Juan
Luna Street is occupied by Santiago Sy Juco against whom
the warrant was exclusively issued, when the only ground
upon which such assumption is based is Narciso Mendiola's
statement which is mere hearsay and when in fact part
thereof was occupied by the appellant. In the third place, it
was not asked that the things belonging to the appellant
and to others also be searched. In otherwords, the warrant
in question has gone beyond what had been applied for by
Narciso Mendiola and the agent who executed it performed
acts not authorized by the warrant, and it is for this and the
above-stated reason why it is unreasonable, it being

evidence that the purpose thereof was solely to fish for

evidence or search for it by exploration, in case some could
be found. It is of common knowledge that search warrants
have not been designed for such purpose (Gouled vs. U. S.,
255 U. S., 298, S. C. R., 65 Law. ed., 647; Uy Kheytin vs.
Villareal, 42 Phil., 886) much less in a case as the one under
consideration where it has not even been alleged in the
affidavit of Narciso Mendiola what crime had been
committed by Santiago Sy Juco or what crime he was about
commit. On this point said affidavit merely contained the
following allegation: "It has been reported to us by a person
whom I considered reliable that in said premises are
fraudulent books, correspondence and records." Therefore,
the first question raised should be decided in the negative.
2. The resolution of the second question depends entirely on
the nature of the evidence presented and the relative
preponderance thereof. The only witness who testified that
the art metal filing cabinet belongs to the accused Santiago
Sy Juco, is Macario Garcia. Against Garcia's testimony, we
certainly have that of the appellant himself and his
witnesses Rufino C. Wenceslao, Vicente del Rosario, Jose
Jeuquenco and Feliciano Belmonte, besides Exhibits E, F, G,
H and L, which conclusively proves that the furniture in
question was purchased by said appellant at the beginning
of January, 1933, and that he had it precisely in a room on
one of the upper floors of building No. 482 on Juan Luna
Street, which he was then subleasing from Santiago Sy Juco,
to keep his records and those of his clients. On the
otherhand, it is unimportant now to determine whether the
furniture in question belongs to Santiago Sy Juco or to the
appellant Attorney Topisto B. Remo. It should have been
alleged at the time he applied for the issuance of the search
warrant, to show with the other allegations, reason and
evidence that the issuance thereof was justified because of

the existence of probable cause, the latter being a requisite

without which the issuance of the judicial warrant
authorizing such search would be unwarranted. For these
reasons, this court concludes that the second question
raised calls for an answer in the negative.
3. After the considerations just made, the third question
cannot be resolved except in the negative. The search
warrant in question could not and should not in any way
affect the appellant attorney on the ground that he is not
the person against whom it had been sought. It is Santiago
Sy Juco alone against whom the search warrant could be
used, because it had been obtained precisely against him;
so much so that Narciso Mendiola, who applied for it,
mentioned him expressly in his affidavit and again did so in
his report to his superior, that is, the Collector of Internal
Revenue (Exhibit C); and at the trial of this case, it was
insisted that there was necessity of making the search in the
premises occupied by Santiago Sy Juco because an
investigation was then pending against him, for having
defrauded the Government in its public revenue. The
doctrine laid down in the case of People vs. Rubio(57 Phil.,
384), invoked against the appellant, is not applicable to the
case at bar because, unlike in the above-cited case, neither
books nor record indicating fraud were found in his
possession, and it is not he against whom the warrant was
issued.
4. It is clear that the court could not and can not order the
opening of the art metal filing cabinet in question because,
it having been proven that it belongs to the appellant
attorney and that in it he keeps the records and documents
of his clients, to do so would be in violation of his right as
such attorney, since it would be tantamount to compelling
him to disclose or divulge facts or things belonging to his

clients, which should be kept secret, unless she is

authorized by them to make such disclosure, it being a duty
imposed by law upon an attorney to strictly preserve the
secrets or communications made to him. Such an act would
constitute a qualified violation of section 383, No. 4, and of
section 31 of Act No. 190, which read as follows:
An attorney can not, without the consent of his client,
be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of professional employment; nor can an
attorney's secretary stenographer, or clerk be
examined, without the consent of client and his
employer, concerning any fact, the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such capacity. (Sec. 383,
No. 4, Act No. 190.)
A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the
confidence and preserve the secrets of his client. He
shall not be permitted in any court without the
consent of his client, given in open court, to testify to
any facts imparted to him by his client in professional
consultation, or for the purpose of obtaining advice
upon legal matters. (Sec. 31, Act No. 190.)
For all the foregoing reasons, and finding that the errors
assigned by the appellant are very well founded, the
appealed judgment is reversed, and it is ordered that the art
metal filing cabinet, together with the key thereof seized by
the internal revenue agent by virtue of the judicial warrant
in question, which is hereby declared null and void, be
immediately returned unopened to the appellant; and that a
copy of this decision be sent to the Solicitor-General for him
to take action, if he deems it justified, upon careful
investigation of the facts, against the internal revenue agent

or agents who obtained and executed the warrant in

question, in accordance with the provisions of article 129 of
the Revised Penal Code, without special pronouncement as
to costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 96597-99 October 6, 1994

COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORP.,
PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORP., TWENTIETH CENTURY
FOX FILM CORP., UNITED ARTISTS CORP., UNIVERSAL
CITY STUDIOS, INC., WALT DISNEY COMPANY and
WARNER BROS., INC., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, TUBE VIDEO ENTERPRISES
and EDWARD CHAM, BLOOMING ROSE TAPE CENTER
and MA. JAJORIE T. UY, and VIDEO CHANNEL and LYDIA
NABONG, respondents.
G.R. No. 97156 October 6, 1994
COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., ORION
PICTURES CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES
CORP., TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP.,
MGM/UA COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, UNIVERSAL
CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, and
WARNER BROS., INC., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FOX'S VIDEO, INC. and
ALFREDO ONGYANGCO., respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioners.
Herminio T. Banico, Jr. & Associates for private respondent
Lydia Nabong.
Molo, Padua, Salazar, Roldan & Associates for Blooming
Rose Tape Center/Ma. J.T. Uy.
RESOLUTION

VITUG, J.:
On 07 April 1988, the National Bureau of Investigation
("NBI"), through its Agent Lauro C. Reyes, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig
(Branch 159) three applications for search warrant against
private respondents Tube Video Enterprises and Edward C.
Cham (ASW No. 95), the Blooming Rose Tape Center and Ma.
Jajorie T. Uy (ASW No. 96), and the Video
Channel and Lydia Nabong (ASW No. 97), charging said
respondents with violation of Section 56 of Presidential
Decree ("P.D.") No. 49, otherwise known as the Decree on
the Protection of Intellectual Property, as amended by P.D.
No. 1988.
In the three applications for search warrant, NBI Agent
Reyes stated under oath that the respondents had in their
possession and control
1. (p)irated video tapes of the copyrighted
motion pictures/films the titles of which are
mentioned in the attached list;
2. (p)osters, advertising leaflets, flyers,
brochures, invoices, journals, ledgers, job
order slips, delivery slips, stickers and books
of account bearing and/or mentioned the
pirated films with titles . . ., or otherwise used
in the videogram business or activities of the
defendants; sold, leased, distributed or
possessed for the purpose of sale, lease,
distribution, circulation or public exhibition,

journals, ledgers, job order slips, delivery

slips, stickers and books of accounts used in
the unlawful videogram business or activities
of the defendants; (and)
3. (t)elevision sets, video cassette and/or
laser disc recorders, dubbing machines,
rewinders, film projectors, U-matic machines,
image enhancers, dubbing machines, tape
head cleaners, converters, accessories,
equipment and other machines and
paraphernalia, materials or empty/erasable
video tapes and master copies used or
intended to be used in the unlawful exhibition,
showing, reproduction, sale lease or
disposition of videograms they are keeping
and concealing in the premises
abovedescribed. 1
Acting on the applications, then Regional Trial Court Judge
Maria
Alicia M. Austria conducted a joint hearing during which she
made a personal examination of the applicant and his
witnesses. Finding just and probable cause for granting the
application at the time, Judge Austria issued the
corresponding Search Warrants ("SW") numbered 95, 96,
and 97.
Private respondents filed their respective motions to quash
the three search warrants, citing as grounds therefor the
following:
In SW No. 95

1. There is no probable cause nor the

existence of a satisfactory fact upon which
the search warrant is based;
2. The National Bureau of Investigation has no
authority nor the jurisdiction to initiate the
filing of suit against the defendants;
3. The confiscation of defendants' seized
articles based on the questioned search
warrant violated the latter's constitutional
right against deprivation of properties without
due process.
4. The films in question are not protected by
Pres. Decree
No. 1988 in that they were never registered in
the National Library as a condition precedent
to the availment of the protection secured by
that decree. The complaint has acquired no
right under the same.
5. The mere publication by complainant of its
alleged ownership over the films in question
does notipso facto vest in the right to proceed
under P.D. No. 49 as that law requires official
registration. Moreover, the said publication
took place only after the application for the
questioned search warrant. 2
In SW No. 96
1. The complainants, one Rico V. Domingo and
one Rene C. Baltazar, in representation of the

Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.,

have not proven nor established their
ownership over the films listed in Annex "A" of
the search warrant issued by this Honorable
Court against the defendants herein.
2. The information provided by the National
Bureau of Investigation agents and the
representatives of the MPAA, Inc. are replete
with generalities insofar as the description of
the items to be concerned in violation of the
provisions of Sec. 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court. Their allegations as to the offense are
presumptuous and speculative in violation of
the same section of the Rules of Court. 3
Private respondents in SW No. 97 adopted the motions filed
for the quashal of both SW No. 95 and SW No. 96.
Herein petitioners (the private complainants in the three
cases), namely, Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc., Orion
Pictures Corporation, Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corporation, MGM/UA Communications Company, Universal
City Studios, Inc., Walt Disney Company and Warner Bros.,
Inc., submitted their oppositions to the motions to quash.
The movants, herein private respondents, filed their replies
to the oppositions and sought, simultaneously, the release
of the items seized. After a rejoinder was filed, the court a
quo considered all the incidents submitted for resolution.
In a Joint Order, issued on 09 December 1988, Judge Austria
defined the issues raised in the motions to quash thusly:

1. Whether or not the NBI had authority to file

the application for search warrant; whether or
not it is the Videogram Regulatory Board
under P.D. No. 1987 which has exclusive
jurisdiction to file suits against violators of
said law.
2. Whether or not this Court observed due
process of law before issuing the search
warrants in question.
3. Whether or not search warrants Nos. 95, 96
and 97 are general warrants and therefore
void.
4. Whether or not there was probable cause in
the issuance of the search warrants pursuant
to Section 3, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure and Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines.
5. Whether or not private complainants who
are members of the Motion Picture Association
of America, Inc. (MPAA for brevity) through
their counsel, Atty. Rico Domingo, have
sufficiently proven their ownership over the
alleged pirated video tapes of the copyrighted
motion pictures/films.
6. Whether or not the items seized by the NBI
agents by virtue of SW Nos. 95, 96 and 97
may be ordered released to defendants. 4

Anent the first three issues, Judge Austria ruled that the NBI
had the authority to apply for the search warrants; that in
the issuance of the search warrants, due process of law was
duly observed; and that the questioned search warrants
were not general in character since the provision of law
violated, i.e., Sec. 56 of P.D. No. 49, as amended by P.D. No.
1988, was clearly specified. Judge Austria, nonetheless,
reversed her former stand initially finding probable cause for
the issuance of the search warrants and ordered the quashal
of the search warrants giving the following reasons:
1. Private complainants were uncertain of
their ownership of the titles subject of the
seized video tapes;
2. Complainants did not comply with the
requirement that the master tapes should be
presented during the application for search
warrants; and
3. Private complainants cannot seek the
protection of Philippine laws as they failed to
comply with the deposit and registration
requirements of P.D. No. 49 as amended by
P.D. No. 1988. 5
Judge Austria thus ordered the return of all the items seized
by virtue of the warrants.
Petitioners appealed the order of Judge Austria to the Court
of Appeals, docketed CA-G.R. CV No. 22133-22135,
assigning the following alleged errors:

1. The Court a quo erred in ruling that private

complainants were uncertain of their
ownership of the titles subject of the pirated
video tapes.
2. The Court a quo erred in ordering the
quashal of the search warrants on the ground
that the requirement of producing the "master
tapes" during the application for a search
warrant, as enunciated in the 20th Century
Fox case, promulgated on 19 August 1988,
was applicable to the facts of the instant case
which transpired on 07 April 1988, and that
the same was not complied with.
3. The Court a quo erred in ruling that
appellants do not have a protectable
copyright under Philippine laws for their
failure to comply with the deposit and
registration requirements of Presidential
Decree No. 49, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1988. 6
On 31 October 1990, the Court of Appeals, through Justice
Salome A. Montoya, rendered its decision sustaining
petitioners' first and third assignment of errors but rejecting
petitioners' second assignment of error. It, therefore, still
affirmed the quashal of the search warrants.
Hence, this petition (G.R. No. 96597-99). Another decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals in another case (CA-G.R.
No. 20617), involving the same petitioners on substantially
identical facts and issues, was also brought before this Court

(G.R. No. 97156). In a Resolution, dated 06 March 1991, this

Court consolidated the two petitions.
We affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals.
This Court, in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals (164 SCRA 655) has already laid down the rule that
a basic requirement for the validity of search warrants, in
cases of this nature, is the presentation of the master tapes
of the copyrighted films from which pirated films are
supposed to have been copied. We quote:
The presentation of the master tapes of the
copyrighted films from which the pirated films
were allegedly copied, was necessary for the
validity of search warrants against those who
have in their possession the pirated films. The
petitioner's argument to the effect that the
presentation of the master tapes at the time
of application may not be necessary as these
would be merely evidentiary in nature and not
determinative of whether or not a probable
cause exists to justify the issuance of the
search warrants is not meritorious. The court
cannot presume that duplicate or copied
tapes were necessarily reproduced from
master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was
directed against video tape outlets which
allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized
sale and renting out of copyrighted films
belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D.
49.

The essence of a copyright infringement is the

similarity or at least substantial similarity of
the purported pirated works to the
copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must
present to the court the copyrighted films to
compare them with the purchased evidence of
the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine
whether the latter is an unauthorized
reproduction of the former. This linkage of the
copyrighted films to the pirated films must be
established to satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Mere allegations as to the
existence of the copyrighted films cannot
serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant.
We also fully concur with the Court of Appeals when, in
resolving petitioners' motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R.
CV No. 22133-35, it ratiocinated thusly:
It is not correct to say that "the basic fact" to
be proven to establish probable cause in the
instant cases is not the "unauthorized
transfer" of a motion picture that has been
recorded but the "sale, lease, or distribution
of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films."
In applying for the search warrants the NBI
charged violation of the entire provisions of
Section 56 of P.D. No. 49 as amended by P.D.
No. 1988. This included not only the sale,
lease or distribution of pirated tapes but also
the transfer or causing to be transferred of
any sound recording or motion picture or
other audio visual work.

But even assuming, as appellants argue, that

only the sale, lease, or distribution of pirated
video tapes is involved, the fact remains that
there is need to establish probable cause that
the tapes being sold, leased or distributed are
pirated tapes, hence the issue reverts back to
the question of whether there was
unauthorized transfer, directly or indirectly, of
a sound recording or motion picture or other
audio visual work that has been recorded. 7
With due respect to petitioners, the Court does not see a
compelling reason to reexamine its previous position on the
issue.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions
are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111267 September 20, 1996

COLUMBIA PICTURES ENTERTAINMENT, INC., MGM
ENTERTAINMENT CO., ORION PICTURES
CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORP.,
UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT DISNEY
COMPANY and WARNER BROTHERS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 14TH DIVISION and
JOSE B. JINGCO of SHOWTIME ENTERPRISES,
INC., respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Petitioners Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., MGM
Entertainment Co., Orion Pictures Corporation, Paramount
Pictures Corp., Universal City Studios, Inc. The Walt Disney
Company and Warner Brothers, Inc. question the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Order
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 168, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding that the issuance of the
questioned warrants was not supported by
probable cause, the "Urgent Motion (to Lift
Search Warrant [No. 23] and for the Return of
Seized Articles) is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Videogram Regulatory Board
(VRB) and/or any Police Agency or other
representatives of the VRB are hereby
directed to return to the defendant/movant or

his representative all articles/items in their

possession seized under and by virtue of
Search Warrant No. 23.
SO ORDERED.
The antecedent facts leading to the disputed Order are:
Alfredo G. Ramos, intelligence officer of the Videogram
Regulatory Board (VRB), received information that private
respondent Jose B. Jinco had in his possession pirated
videotapes, posters, advertising materials and other items
used or intended to be used for the purpose of sale, lease,
distribution, circulation or public exhibition of the said
pirated videotapes. Ramos ascertained the information to be
true and filed a verified Application for Search Warrant
dated July 28, 1986 with prayer for the seizure of the
properties described in the search warrant.
On the same date, a hearing was conducted by Judge
Florentino A. Flor of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch
168, wherein Ramos and his two witnesses, Analie Jimenez
and Rebecca Benitez-Cruz testified on the need for the
issuance of search warrant.
On July 28, 1986, the prayer for the issuance of the search
warrant was granted and, on the same date, Search Warrant
No. 23 was issued.
On July 2, 1987, private respondent filed a Motion to Quash
Search Warrant No. 23 on the grounds that the Search
Warrant did not state a specific offense and that, even
assuming it stated a specific offense, it covered more than
one specific offense. The VRB opposed the Motion to Quash

stating that Search Warrant No. 23 was issued for a single

specific offense namely, violation of Section 56 and other
related sections of Presidential Decree No. 49 as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1988.
On September 30, 1987, the trial court denied the Motion to
Quash finding that the Search Warrant was issued for one
specific offense. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but
the same was likewise denied.
Private respondent then filed an Urgent Motion To Lift the
Search Warrant and For the Return of the Seized Articles
alleging that Search Warrant No. 23 is a general warrant,
and that it was issued without probable cause.
On May 22, 1989, the assailed order was issued by Judge
Benjamin V. Pelayo, now presiding over Branch 168 of the
Pasig RTC, granting the Motion to Quash and ordering the
return of all seized articles to private respondent.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the said Order in toto.

alleged pirated tapes were never shown to the lower court.

The Court affirmed the lifting of the search warrants
holdings that the presentation of the master tapes was
necessary for the validity of the search warrants against
those who have the pirated films in their possession.
When the trial court granted the Motion to Quash Search
Warrant No. 23 on May 22, 1989, it used as its justification
the fact that, as the master copies were not presented to
the court in its hearing of July 28, 1986, there was no
probable cause to issue the said warrant, based on the
pronouncements in 20th Century Fox.
Petitioners now question the retroactive application of
the 20th Century Fox decision which had not yet been
promulgated in 1986 when the search warrant was issued.
Petitioners further argue that, contrary to the trial court's
finding, the search warrant was not a general warrant since
the description of the items to be seized was specific
enough. It removed from the serving officer any discretions
as to which items to seize inasmuch as it described only
those items which had a direct relation to the offense for
which the search warrant was issued.

Hence, this petition.

In granting the Motion to Quash, the trial court relied on the
Court's ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, et al. 2 which involved violation of Presidential
Decree No. 49, (otherwise known as the Decree on the
Protection of Intellectual Property). In said case, video
outlets were raided pursuant to search warrants issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati. However, the search
warrants were later lifted by the same court on the ground
of lack of probable cause because the master tapes of the

The threshold issued that must first be determined is

whether or not petitioners have the legal personality and
standing to file the appeal.
Private respondent asserts that the proceedings for the
issuance and/or quashal of a search warrant are criminal in
nature. Thus, the parties in such a case are the "People" as
offended party and the accused. A private complainant is
relegated to the role of a witness who does not have the

right to appeal except where the civil aspect is deemed

instituted with the criminal case.
Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that as the offended
parties in the criminal case, they have the right to institute
an appeal from the questioned order.
From the records it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners
were involved in the proceedings which led to the issuance
of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, 3 the Court
declared that while the general rule is that it is only the
Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the
Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the
Court of Appeals, if there appears to be grave error
committed by the judge or a lack of due process the petition
will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein as
if were filed by the Solicitor General. In line with this ruling,
the Court gives this petition due course and will allow
petitioners to argue their case against the questioned order
in lieu of the Solicitor General.
As regards the issue of the validity of Search Warrant No. 23,
there are two questions to be resolved: first, whether
the 20th Century Fox decision promulgated on August 19,
1988 is applicable to the Motion to Quash Search Warrant
No. 23 (issued on July 28, 1986).
We hold in the negative.
In the recent Columbia Pictures, et al., v. Court of Appeals,
et al. 4 case which resolved the same issue involving the
same petitioners but with different respondents, the
Court en banc held:

Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the

doctrine of stare decisis and the rudiments of
fair play, it its our considered view that
the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be
retroactively applied to the instant case to
justify the quashal of Search case to justify
the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053.
Herein petitioners' consistent position that the
order of the lower court of September 5, 1988
denying therein defendants' motion to lift the
order of search warrant was properly issued,
there having been satisfactory compliance
with the then prevailing standards under the
law for determination of probable cause, is
indeed well taken. The lower court could not
possibly have expected more evidence from
petitioners in their application for a search
warrant other than what the law and
jurisprudence, then existing and judicially
accepted, required with respect to the finding
of probable cause.
xxx xxx xxx
It is consequently clear that judicial
interpretation becomes a part of the law as of
the date that law was originally passed,
subject only to the qualification that when a
doctrine of this Court is over-ruled and a
different view is adopted, and more so when
there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively and should
not apply to parties who relied on the old
doctrine and acted in good faith. (People v.
Jabinal, L-30061, February 27, 1974, 55 SCRA

607; Unciano Paramedical College, Inc., et al.

v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 100335,
April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 285; Tanada, et al. v.
Guingona, Jr., etc., et al., G.R. No. 113888,
August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 507). To hold
otherwise would be to deprive the law of its
quality of fairness and justice then, if there if
no recognition of what had transpired prior to
such adjudication. (De Agbayani v. Philippine
National Bank, et al. L-23127, April 29, 1971,
38 SCRA 429).
Likewise, the Court ruled therein that presentation of the
master tapes in such cases is not an absolute requirement
for as search warrant to issue:
More to the point, it is felt that the
reasonableness of the added requirement
in 20th Century Foxcalling for the production
of the master tapes of the copyrighted films
for determination of probable cause in
copyright infringement cases needs revisiting
and clarification.
xxx xxx xxx
In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said
case regarding the necessity for the
presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity of search
warrants should at most be understood to
merely serve as a guidepost in determining
the existence of probable cause in copy-right
infringement cases where there is doubt as to

the true nexus between the master tape and

the pirated copies. An objective and careful
reading of the decision in said case could lead
to no other conclusion than that said directive
was hardly intended to be a sweeping and
inflexible requirement in all or similar
copyright infringement cases. Judicial dicta
should always be construed within the factual
matrix of their parturition, otherwise a
careless interpretation thereof could unfairly
fault the writer with the vice of over
statement and the reader with the fallacy of
undue generalization.
xxx xxx xxx
It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the
ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do,
that in copyright infringement cases, the
presentation of master tapes of the copyright
films is always necessary to meet the
requirement of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant. It is true that
such master tapes are object evidence, with
the merit that in this class of evidence the
ascertainment of the controverted fact is
made through demonstration involving the
direct use of the senses of the presiding
magistrate. (City of Manila v. Cabangis, 10
Phil. 151 [1908]; Kabase v. State, 31 Ala, App.
77, 12 So. 2nd, 758, 764). Such auxiliary
procedure, however, does not rule out the use
of testimonial or documentary evidence,
depositions, admissions or other classes of
evidence tending to prove the factum

probandum, (See Phil. Movie Workers

Association v. Premiere Productions, Inc. 92
Phil. 843 [1953]) especially where the
production in court of object evidence would
result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out
of proportion to is evidentiary value. (See 3
Jones on Evidence, Sec. 1400).
The instant case also differs from 20th Century Fox in that
what herein private respondent put in issue was the
application of the ruling in that case, not the conduct of
Judge Flor in the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. From
the records, it is clear that Judge Flor observed all the
requirement necessary before the search warrant was
issued: he heard the testimonies and studied the
dispositions of the witnesses for the petitioners, namely, Ms.
Rebecca Benitez-Cruz, Ms. Analie I. Jimenez and the VRB's
Intelligence Officer, Alfredo G. Ramos on the existence of
probable cause before issuing the warrant.

Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record.

The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under
oath the complainant and any witnesses he
may produce on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits
submitted.
Having satisfied these requirements, Judge Flor committed
no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant.
Private respondent contends that Search Warrant No. 23
also violates the constitutional requirements of particularity
of the description of the warrant, being a general warrant
and thus, is null and void.
In several cases, this Court had held that:

Under Sec. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, the

requirements for the issuance of valid search warrant are:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.
A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined by the judge
or such other responsible officer authorized by
law after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
thing to be seized.

To be valid, a search warrant must be

supported by probable cause to be
determined by the judge or some other
authorized officer after examining the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.No less important, there must be a
specific description of the place to be
searched and the things to be seized, to
prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of
the warrant (Sec. 3, Art. IV, 1974 Constitution,
now Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1986 Constitution;
Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court;
Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, Lime v.

Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299; Uy Kheytin v.

Villareal, 42 Phil. 886; People v. Veloso, 48
Phil. 169; People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384; Bache
& Co., (Phil.) Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823; Roan v.
Gonzalez, 145 SCRA 687) 5 (emphasis
supplied)
When may a search warrant be deemed to satisfy the legal
requirements of specificity?
In Bache and Co., (Phil.) Inc. v. Ruiz, we said
A search warrant may be said to particularly
describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v.
Rubio, 57 Phil. 384); or when the description
expresses a conclusion of fact not of law
by which the warrant officer may be guided in
making the search and seizure (idem., dissent
of Abad Santos, J.); or when the things
described are limited to those which bear
direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126,
Revised Rules of Court). . . . If the articles
desired to be seized have any direct relation
to an offense committed, the applicant must
necessarily have some evidence, other than
those articles, to prove the said offense; and
the articles subject of search and seizure
should come in handy merely to strengthen
such evidence. . . .

An examination of Search Warrant No. 23 shows that it was

worded in such a manner that the enumerated items to be
seized bear a direct relation to the offense of violation of
Sec. 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49, as amended, which
states:
(1) Transfer or cause to be transferred,
directly or indirectly any sound recording or
motion picture, or other audio-visual work that
has been recorded on a phonograph record,
disc, wire, tape, film or other article on which
sounds, motion pictures, or other audio-visual
works are recorded, with intent to sell, lease,
publicly exhibit or cause to be sold, leased or
publicly exhibited, or to use for cause to be
used for profit, such article on which sounds,
motion pictures, or other audio visual works
are so transferred, WITHOUT THE WRITTEN
CONSENT OF HIS ASSIGNEE; or
(2) Sell, lease, distribute, circulate, exhibit,
offer for sale, lease, distribution, circulation or
public exhibit, offer for sale, lease,
distribution, or possess for the purpose of
sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public
exhibition, any such article to which the
sounds, motion pictures or audio-visual
recordings thereon have been so transferred,
without the written consent of the owner or
his assignee; or
(3) Offer or make available for a fee, rental or
any other form of compensation, directly or
indirectly, any equipment, machinery,
paraphernalia or any material with the

knowledge that such equipment, machinery,

paraphernalia or material, will be used by
another to reproduce, without the consent of
the owners any phonograph record, disc, wire,
tape film or other article on which sound,
motion pictures, or other audio-visual
recordings may be transferred.
In other words, it authorized only the seizure of articles used
or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease and other
acts in violation of the said decree. The search warrant
ordered the seizure of the following properties:

intended to be used in the unlawful sale or lease of pirated

tapes. Therefore, the pending of the appellate court that
Search Warrant No. 23 is a "general" warrant of devoid of
basis.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals, and necessarily inclusive of
the order of the trial court dated May 22, 1989, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order of the trial court dated
July 28, 1986 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No.
23 is hereby REINSTATED.
Costs against private respondent.

(a) Pirated video tapes of the copyright

motion pictures/films the titles of which are
mentioned in the attached list;
(b) Posters, advertising leaflets, brochures,
invoices, journals, ledgers, and books of
accounts bearing and/or mentioning the
pirated films with titles (as per attached list);
(c) Television sets, video cassettes records,
rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories,
equipment and other machines and
paraphernalia or material used in the unlawful
sale, lease, distribution, or possession for
purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation
or public exhibition of the above-mentioned
pirated video tapes which he is keeping and
concealing in the premises above-described.
Clearly, the above items could not be anymore specific as
the circumstances will allow since they are all used or

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 122092 May 19, 1999

PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, EVARISTO M. NARVAEZ JR., RICARDO G.
SANTIAGO, ROBERTO A. DORMENDO, REYDANDE D.
AZUCENA, NICEFORO V. AVILA, FLORENTINO M. MULA,
FELIX O. BAITO, HAROLD B. CELESTIAL, ELMEDENCIO
C. CALIXTRO, CARLITO S. LEGACION, ALBINO T.
LUBANG, JEREMIAS I. ABAD and HERMINIO V.
VILLAMIL, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge,
Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City;
STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B. DACERA III; and the
SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT OF THE PNP TRAFFIC
MANAGEMENT COMMAND, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the requisites for the
issuance of search warrant must be followed strictly. Where
the judge fails to personally examine the applicant for a
search warrant and the latter's witnesses, or where the
witnesses testify on matters not of their own personal
knowledge, the search warrant must be struck down.
The Case
Before us is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 praying
for (1) the nullification of Search Warrant No. 799 (95) and
the Orders dated March 23, 1993 and August 3, 1995,

issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of

Quezon City; 2 and (2) the issuance of temporary restraining
order (TRO) or an injunction against State Prosecutor Leo B.
Dacera III, ordering him to desist proceeding with IS No. 95167.
In its October 23, 1995 Resolution, 3 this Court issued the
TRO prayed for and required the respondents to comment
on the said Petition. On December 20, 1995, Respondent
PNP Traffic Management Command filed its 31-page
Opposition 4 to the Petition, together with 90 pages of
annexes. 5 On February 22, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor
General filed its Comment 6 agreeing with petitioners that
the writs prayed for must be granted. After petitioners filed
a Reply to the Opposition, the Court gave due course to the
Petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
In view of the contrary opinion of the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Court, in its February 5, 1997
Resolution, 7 required State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera to
prepare the memorandum for the public respondents. After
issuing a show-cause order to Dacera on June 23, 1997,8 the
Court in its September 24, 1997 Resolution gave him a nonextendible period ending on October 31, 1997 within which
to file the required memorandum. In view of Dacera's
manifestation that he was only a nominal party and that he
had yet to receive the records of the case from the PNP, the
Court, in its December 8, 1999 Resolution, ordered the
Special Operations Unit (SOU) of the PNP Traffic
Management Command to file its memorandum within thirty
days from notice; "otherwise, the petition will be deemed
submitted for decision." 9 Even after the expiration of the
said period, the required pleading was not yet received by
this Court.

Hence, this Court considered Respondent SOU's

refusal/failure to submit its memorandum as a waiver of its
privilege to do so.
The Facts
On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B.
Pascua applied for a search warrant before the said RTC of
Quezon City, staring: 10
1. That the management of Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines, located at
PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice
President Ricardo G[.] Santiago, is in
possession or ha[s] in [its] control high
powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives,
which are the subject of the offense, or used
or intended to be used in committing the
offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and
conceal[ed] in the premises herein described.
2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to
enable any agent of the law to take
possession and bring to this Honorable Court
the following described properties:
Seventy (70) M16 Armalite
rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US
rifles, two (2) AK-47 rifle[s], two
(2) UZI submachinegun[s], two
(2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s]
cal. 40mm, ten (10) cal.45
pistol[s], ten (10) cal.38

revolver[s], two (2) ammunition

reloading machine[s], assorted
ammunitions for said calibers of
firearms and ten (10)
handgrenades.
Attached to the application 11 were the joint Deposition of
SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, 12 as well
as a summary of the information and the supplementary
statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno.
After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search
warrant, 13 the pertinent portion of which reads:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the
undersigned, after examining under oath,
SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, that there is probable
cause to believe that the management of
Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, located at PICOP Compound,
Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur,
represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo
G. Santiago, has in its possession or control
the following:
Seventy (70) M16 Armalite
rifles cal 5.56
Ten (10) M14 US rifles
Two (2) AK-47 rifle(s)
Two (2) UZI submachinegun[s]

Two (2) M203 Grenade

Launcher[s] cal. 40mm.

02 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 (Tampered)

Elisco

Ten (10) cal 45 pistol[s]

03 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 171702 Elisco

Ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s]

04 M16Rilfe 5.56 Defaced Elisco

Two (2) ammunition reloading

machine[s]

05 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174253 (Tampered) Elisco

06 M16Rifle 5.56 RP173627 (Tampered) Elisco

Assorted ammunitions for said

calibers of firearms

07 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171337 Elisco

Ten (l0) handgrenades

08 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171114 Elisco

in violation of the Provisions of PD 1866

(Illegal Possession of Firearms, Ammunition
and Explosives), and the same should be
seized and brought before this Court.

09 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171114 (Tampered) Elisco

10 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171167 (Tampered) Elisco
11 M16Rifle 5.56 170881 (Tampered) Elisco

NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby authorized

to make an immediate search daytime
between 8:00 a.m. [and] 4:00 p.m. of the
aforementioned premises and to seize and
bring the articles above-described and make
an immediate return there[of] 14
On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant
at the PICOP compound and seized the following: 15
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND
01 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 Elisco

12 M16Rifle 5.56 RP170897 Elisco

13 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171509 Elisco
(With pending
case-Casaway Case)
14 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171754 Elisco
15 M16Rifle 5.56 RP170881 (Tampered) Elisco
16 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174637 Elisco

17 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171366 Elisco

03 Carbine M1 171 pcs.

18 M16Rifle 5.56 RP1714637 (Tampered)

Elisco

04 BAR 19 pcs.
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

19 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174610 Elisco

01 M16 2,023 rounds
20 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171367 (Tampered) Elisco
03 Carbine M1 276 rounds
01 M14 7.62 1499694 Elisco
04 M-60 Cal. 7.62 1,800 rounds
02 M14 7.62 889163 Elisco
05 M1 Garand 1,278 rounds
01 BAR Cal. 30 865975 Royal
06 Rifle Grenade 11 rounds
01 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 384181 US Carbin
07 Hand Grenade 4 pcs.
02 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 998201 US Carbin
AMMO DAM POST NO. 24
01 Garand M1 Cal. 30 1194008 Springfield
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND
02 Garand M1 Cal. 30 3123784 Springfield
01 M16 5.56 171425 (Tampered) Gyno Corp.
01 Shotgun 12 Gauge H359704 Omega
02 Machine Pistol .22 651 (Tampered)
Landmann

02 Shotgun 12 Gauge 9211 Homemade

(Paltik)

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

01 M1 (short) 3 pcs.

01 M16 (long) 29 pcs.

02 M16 (long) 1 pc.

02 M16 (short) 48 pcs.

03 M14 8 pcs.

04 Clip M1 Garand 3 pcs.

01 M16 (long) 3 pcs.

05 Mag Assy Cal .22 1 pc.

02 M16 (short) 4 pcs.

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

03 Intratec 1 pc.

01 M16 73 rounds

04 US Carbine (defective) 2 pcs.

02 M14 160 rounds

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

03 M1 Garand Cal .30 30 rounds

01 M16 147 rds.

04 Rifle Grenade 1 round

02 Cal .30 5 rounds

MANAGEMENT INTEL/INVEST UNIT

03 12 gauge Shotgun 7 rounds

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

04 Carbine 5 rounds

01 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 171725 Elisco

05 Rifle grenade (AVA-0051-84/0056-84) 2

rounds

02 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 170799 (Tampered)

Elisco
03 M16 5.56 RP 132320 Elisco

06 9 MM 30 rounds
NEW ARMORY POST NO. 16

04 Machine 9 MM 54887 Intratec

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

Pistol

01 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359910 Armscor

05 Three (3) 12 Gauge Surit-Surit (H)

02 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359716 Armscor

Shotguns

03 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359706 Armscor

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

04 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359707 Armscor

05 Shotgun 12 Gauge 1036847 Armscor

01 Carbine (defective) 76 pcs.

06 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359702 Armscor

02 Cal. 22 -do- 16 pcs

07 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359732 Armscor

03 M16 (long-defective) 2 pcs.

08 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359728 Armscor

04 M16 (short-defective) 2 pcs.

09 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359708 Armscor

05 Thompson (defective) 8 pcs.

10 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359711 Armscor

06 Shotgun 12 Gauge (defective) 17 pcs.

11 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359723 Armscor

07 BAR (defective) 2 pcs.

12 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359713 Armscor

13 Shotgun 12 Gauge 1031271 Armscor
14 Shotgun 12 Gauge A262338 SB
15 Shotgun 12 Gauge A261619 SB
16 Shotgun 12 Gauge Defaced Not
Indicated
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.
01 12 GAUGE shotgun 306 rds.
02 M16 2,349 rds.
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search

unreasonable, the petitioners filed a "Motion to
Quash" 16 before the trial court. Subsequently, they also
filed a "Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash" and
a "Motion to Suppress Evidence." 17
On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order
which denied petitioners' motions. 18 On August 3, 1995, the
trial court rendered its second contested Order 19 denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. 20
Hence, this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following
grounds in support of their cause: 21
I

Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge

Asuncion has committed grave abuse of
discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in
refusing to quash Search Warrant No. 799(95).
Probable cause [has] not . . . been sufficiently
established and partaking as it does of the
nature of a general warrant.
II
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge
Asuncion has committed grave abuse of
discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in
refusing to quash Search Warrant No. 799(95)
on the ground that it was unlawfully served or
implemented.
III
Petitioners respectfully submit that State
Prosecutor Dacera is acting with grave abuse
of discretion his jurisdiction in continuing with
the proceedings in IS No. 95-167 on the basis
of illegally seized evidence.
In the main, petitioners question the validity of the search
warrant. As a preliminary matter, we shall also discuss
respondents' argument that the Petition should be dismissed
for raising factual questions.
This Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.

Preliminary Issue:
Alleged Factual Questions
In their Opposition, respondents argue that the Petition
should be dismissed for raising questions of fact, which are
not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. They
maintain that the Petition merely assails the "factual basis
for the issuance of the warrant and regularity of its
implementation. 22
This argument is not convicting. It is settled that "there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the
falsity of alleged facts." 23 In the present case, petitioner do
not question the truth of the facts as found by the judge;
rather, they are assailing the way in which those findings
were arrived at, a procedure which they contend was
violative of the which those Constitution and the Rules of
Court. We agree that the Petition raises only question of law,
which may be resolved in the present case.
Main Issue:
Validity of the Search Warrant
The fundamental right against unreasonable and searches
and seizures and the basic conditions for the issuance of a
search warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, which reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be

inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant

of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis
supplied)
Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision,
Section 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, 24 detail the
requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant as
follows:
Sec. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant.
A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record.
The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under
oath the complainant and any witnesses he
may produce on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits
submitted.

More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant

are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is
determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant
and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally
examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or
affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on
facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. 25
In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because
(1) the trail court failed to examine personally the
complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero
Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance
or the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that
petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject
firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described
with particularity.
No Personal Examination
of the Witnesses
In his Order dated March 23, 1995, the trial judge insisted
that the search warrant was valid, stating that "before
issuing the subject warrant, the court propounded searching
questions to the applicant and the witnesses in order to
determined whether there was probable
cause . . .." 26 (Emphasis supplied.) This was supported by
the Opposition to the Motion to Quash, which argued that "it
is erroneous for PICOP to allege that the Honorable Court did
not propound searching questions upon applicant P/Chief
Inspector Napoleon Pascua and the witnesses he
produced." 27 The records, however, proclaim otherwise.

As earlier stated, Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a

search warrant was supported by (1) the joint Deposition of
SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Moriro, (2) a
summary of information and (3) supplementary statements
of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for Pascua and
Bacolod however, none of the aforementioned witnesses
and policemen appeared before the trial court. Moreover,
the applicant's participation in the hearing for the issuance
of the search warrant consisted only of introducing Witness
Bacolod: 28

WITNESS:
Yes Ma'am.
STENOGRAPHER:
Please state your name, age,
civil status, occupation, address
and other personal
circumstances.

COURT:

WITNESS:

Where is the witness for this

application for search warrant?

SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, 42

years old, married, policeman,
c/o Camp Crame, Quezon City,
SOU, TMC.

P/Chief Insp. NAPOLEON

PASCUA:

xxx xxx xxx

SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, Your
Honor.
COURT:
Swear the witness.
STENOGRAPHER: (To the
witness)
Please raise your right hand, sir.
Do you swear to tell the truth,
the whole truth and nothing but
the truth before this Court?

Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he said

nothing more. In fact, he failed even to affirm his
application. Contrary to his statement, the trial judge failed
to propound questions, let alone probing questions, to the
applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod (whose
testimony, as will later be shown, is also improper).
Obviously, His Honor relied mainly on their affidavits. This
Court has frowned on this practice in this language:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in
writing of the complainant and the witnesses
he may procedure and attach them to the

record. Such written deposition is necessary in

order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of
the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury
the person giving it if it will be found later that
his declarations are false.
xxx xxx xxx
It is axiomatic that the examination must be
probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary
or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is
to be established. The examining magistrate
must not simply rehash the contents of the
affidavit but must make his own inquiry on
the intent and justification of the
application. 29
Bacolod's Testimony Pertained Not to
Facts Personally Known to Him
Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively
examined by the judge. But his testimony showed that he
did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in
violation of PD 1866, were not licensed to possess firearms,
ammunitions or explosives. In his Deposition, he stated:
Q How do you know that said
the properties were subject of
the offense?
A Sir, as a result of our
intensified surveillance and

case build up for several days,

we gathered informations from
reliable sources that subject
properties [which] are in their
possession and control [are] the
herein described properties
subject of the offense.
(Summary of Information dtd
Oct. '94. SS's of Mario Enad and
Felipe Moreno both dtd 30 Nov
'94 are hereto attached). 30
When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that
he believed that the PICOP security guards had no license to
possess the subject firearms. This, however, does not meet
the requirement that a witness must testify on his personal
knowledge, not belief. He declared:
Q This is an application for
Search Warrant against Paper
Industries Corporation located
at PICOP Compound Barangay
Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
How come that you have
knowledge that there are illegal
firearms in that place?
A At Camp Crame, Quezon City,
I was dispatched by our
Commander to investigate the
alleged assassination plot of
Congressman Amante.

Q In the course of your

investigation, what happened?
A We found out that some of
the suspects in the alleged
assassination plot are
employees of PICOP.

Q So, in that aspect, you were

able to investigate the
compound of PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you f[i]nd . . .?

Q Know[ing] that the suspects

are employees of PICOP, what
did you do?

A I found . . . several highpowered firearms being kept in

the compound of PICOP.

A We conducted the
surveillance in that area inside
the compound of PICOP in
Tabon.

Q Where are those located?

Q What did you find . . .?

Q Inside the compound?

A I found . . . several highpowered firearms.

A Located inside the compound.

A Sir, there are firearms kept

inside the ammo dam.

Q Then what?
Q How were you able to
investigate the compound of
PICOP?
A I exerted effort to enter the
said compound.

A Others, sir, were kept in the

security headquarters or office.
Q You mean to say that this
Paper Industries Corporation
has its own security guards?

Q By what means?
A Yes, they call it Blue Guards.
A By pretending to have some
official business with the
company.

Q You mean to say that their

own security guards guarded
the PICOP?

Q You mean to say that this

Blue Guard Security Agency has
no firearms of their own?

A Yes, sir.

A No high-powered firearms.

Q So, it is possible that the

firearms used by the security
guards are illegally obtained?

Q By the way, Mr. Witness, what

kind of firearms have you seen
inside the compound of PICOP?

A I believe they have no license

to possess high-powered
firearms. As far as the
verification at FEU, Camp
Crame, [is concerned,] they
have no license. (Emphasis
supplied.)

A There are M-16 armalite rifles.

Q Have you investigated the

Blue Guards Security Agency?
A I conducted the inquiry.
Q What did you find out?
A They are using firearms
owned by PICOP.
Q Using firearms owned by
PICOP?
A Yes, sir.

Q What else?
A AK-47, armalites, M-203
Grenade Launcher, M-14 US
rifles, .38 caliber revolvers, .45
caliber pistols, several
handgrenades and
ammos. 31 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms
seen inside the PICOP compound was licensed. Bacolod
merely declared that the security agency and its guard were
not licensed. He also said that some of the firearms were
owned by PICOP. Yet, he made no statement before the trail
court PICOP, aside from the security agency, had no license
to possess those firearms. Worse, the applicant and his
witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the application a
copy aforementioned "no license" certification from the
Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP or to
present it during the hearing. Such certification could have
been easily obtained, considering that the FEO was located

in Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also based.

In People v. Judge Estrada, 32 the Court held:
The facts and circumstances that would show
probable cause must be the best evidence
that could be obtained under the
circumstances. The introduction of such
evidence is necessary in cases where the
issue is the existence of the negative
ingredient of the offense charged for
instance, the absence of a license required by
law, as in the present case and such
evidence is within the knowledge and control
of the applicant who could easily produce the
same. But if the best evidence could not be
secured at the time of the application, the
applicant must show a justifiable reason
therefor during the examination by the judge.
Particularity of the

related to the probable cause requirement in that, at least

under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific
description will make it apparent that there has not been a
sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described
items are to be found in particular place. 35
In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to
described the place with particularly. It simply authorizes a
search of "the aforementioned premises," but it did not
specify such premises. The warrant identifies only one place,
and that is the "Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon,
Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur." The PICOP compound, however, is
made up of "200 offices/building, 15 plants, 84 staff houses,
1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL
depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous
structures, all of which are spread out over some one
hundred fifty-five hectares." 36 Obviously, the warrant gives
the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to
search all the structures found inside the PICOP
compound. 37

Place to Be Searched
In view of the manifest objective of the against
unreasonable search, the Constitution to be searched only
to those described in the warrant. 33 Thus, this Court has
held that "this constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a
spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of
home and person and to afford it constitutional protection
against the long reach of government is no less than to
value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then
only under stringent procedural
safeguards." 34 Additionally, the requisite of particularity is

In their Opposition, the police state that they complied with

the constitutional requirement, because they submitted
sketches of the premises to be searched when they applied
for the warrant. They add that not one of the PICOP
Compound housing units was searched, because they were
not among those identified during the hearing. 38
These arguments are not convincing. The sketches allegedly
submitted by the police were not made integral parts of the
search warrant issued by Judge Asucion. Moreover, the fact
that the raiding police team knew which of the buildings or
structures in the PICOP Compound housed firearms and
ammunitions did not justify the lack of particulars of the

place to be searched. 39 Otherwise, confusion would arise

regarding the subject of the warrant the place indicated
in the warrant or the place identified by the police. Such
conflict invites uncalled for mischief or abuse of discretion
on the part of law enforces.

submitted to the court issuing the warrant.

Indeed, following the officers' theory, in the
context of the facts of this case, all four (4)
apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety
Store would have been fair game for a search.

Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals, 40 this Court ruled that

the police had no authority to search the apartment behind
the store, which was the place indicated in the warrant,
even if they intended it to be the subject of their application.
Indeed, the place to be searched cannot be changed,
enlarged or amplified by the police, viz.:

The place to be searched, as set out in the

warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by
the officers' own personal knowledge of the
premises, or the evidence they adduced in
support of their application for the warrant.
Such a change is proscribed by the
Constitution which requires inter alia the
search warrant to particularly describe the
place to be searched as well as the persons or
things to be seized. It would concede to police
officers the power of choosing the place to be
searched, even if it not be that delineated in
the warrant. It would open wide the door to
abuse of the search process, and grant to
officers executing a search warrant that
discretion which the Constitution has precisely
removed from them. The particularization of
the description of the place to be searched
may properly be done only by the Judge, and
only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to
the discretion of the police officers conducting
the search. (Emphasis supplied.)

. . . In the instant case, there is no ambiguity

at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies
outside the instrument, arising from the
absence of a meeting of the minds as to the
place to be searched between the applicants
for the warrant and the Judge issuing the
same; and what was done was to substitute
for the place that the Judge had written down
in the warrant, the premises that the
executing officers had in their mind. This
should not have been done. It [was] neither
fairnor licit to allow police officers to search a
place different from that stated in the warrant
on the claim that the place actually searched
although not that specified in the warrant
[was] exactly what they had in view when
they applied for the warrant and had
demarcated in the supporting evidence. What
is material in determining the validity of a
search is the place stated in the warrant itself,
not what the applicants had in their thoughts,
or had represented in the proofs they

Seized Firearms and Explosives

Inadmissible in Evidence

As a result of the seizure of the firearms, effected pursuant

to Search Warrant No. 799 (95) issued by the respondent
judge, the PNP filed with the Department of Justice a
complaint docketed as IS No. 95-167 against herein
petitioners for illegal possession of firearms. State
Prosecutor Dacera, to whom the Complaint was assigned for
preliminary investigation, issued a subpoena requiring
petitioners to file their counter-affidavits.
Instead of complying with the subpoena, petitioners asked
for the suspension of the preliminary investigation, pending
the resolution of their motion to quash the search warrant.
They argued, as they do now, that the illegal obtained
firearms could not be the basis of the criminal Complaint.
Their motion was denied. A subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration met the same fate. In the present Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners assert that "State
Prosecutor Dacera cannot have any tenable basis for
continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95-167." 41
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the firearms,
explosives and other materials seized were "inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding." 42 As the Court noted in an
earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was
"the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures."43 Verily, they are the "fruits of the poisonous
tree." Without this exclusionary rule, the constitutional right
"would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means
evidence means of coercing evidence . . .." 44
In the present case, the complaint for illegal possession of
firearms is based on the firearms and other materials seized

pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95). Since these

illegally obtained pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the
Complainant and the proceedings before State Prosecutor
Dacera have no more leg to stand on.
This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out
criminality and to maintain peace and order in the country;
however, it reminds the law enforcement authorities that
they must do so only upon strict observance of the
constitutional and statutory rights of our people.
Indeed, "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right
time for the right reason." 45
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition is hereby GRANTED and Search Warrant No. 799
(95) accordingly declared NULL and VOID. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on October 23, 1995 is
hereby MADE PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 71410 November 25, 1986

JOSEFINO S. ROAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES, PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MARINDUQUE,
BRANCH XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF
MARINDUQUE; THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, PC-INP
MARINDUQUE, respondents.

CRUZ, J:
Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the
ground that it violates the Constitution. As we can do no less
if we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental law,
we do annul.
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free
society is the right to be left alone in the privacy of his own
house. That right has ancient roots, dating back through the
mists of history to the mighty English kings in their
fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his
own castle where he was monarch of all he surveyed. This
was his humble cottage from which he could bar his
sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.

That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few
libertarian regimes. Their number, regrettably, continues to
dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are
among the fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after
the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish and
protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son
returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
not be violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and
cor- respondence shag be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety and order require otherwise.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this
or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.

Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the

victim of an illegal search and seizure conducted by the
military authorities. The articles seized from him are sought
to be used as evidence in his prosecution for illegal
possession of firearms. He asks that their admission be
temporarily restrained (which we have) 1 and thereafter
permanently enjoined.
The challenged search warrant was issued by the
respondent judge on May 10, 1984. 2 The petitioner's house
was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in
the warrant was discovered. 3 However, the officers
conducting the search found in the premises one Colt
Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they
confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against
the petitioner. 4
To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable
cause to be determined by the judge or some other
authorized officer after examining the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce. No less important, there must be
a specific description of the place to be searched and the
things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate
use of the warrant. 5
Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v.
Chief of Staff 6 as referring to "such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched." As held in a long line of
decisions, the probable cause must refer to only one specific
offense. 7

The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under

oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce" was a refinement proposed by Delegate
Vicente J. Francisco in the1934 Constitutional Convention.
His purpose was the strengthening of the guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the condition
did not appear in the corresponding provision of the federa
Constitution of the United States which served as our model
it was then already embodied in the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Nevertheless, Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman
of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of that body, readily
accepted the proposal and it was thereafter, following a
brief debate, approved by the Convention. 8
Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided
in what was then Rule 126:
SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. The
municipal or city judge must, before issuing
the warrant, personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to the
record, in addition to any affidavits presented
to him.
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the
respondent judge in accordance with the above rule, but this
is not entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were
taken of the complainant's two witnesses in addition to the
affidavit executed by them. 9 It is correct to say, however,
that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar
interrogation.

Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:

The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P.
Quinosa personally filed his application for a
search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared
before me in the company of his two (2)
witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida,
both of whom likewise presented to me their
respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V.
Lining, a police investigator assigned to the
PC-INP command at Camp Col. Maximo Abad.
As the application was not yet subscribed and
sworn to, I proceeded to examine Captain
Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain,
among others, if he knew and understood the
same. Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to
the same before me. 10
By his own account, an he did was question Captain Quillosa
on the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain, among
others, if he knew and understood the same," and only
because "the application was not yet subscribed and swom
to." The suggestion is that he would not have asked any
questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed
when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask
his own searching questions. He limited himself to the
contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant's
deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together
with the affidavit presented to him.
As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona:

11

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his

witnesses are thus not sufficient. The

examining Judge has to take depositions in

writing of the complainant and the witnesses
he niay produce and attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in
order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of
the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury
the person giving it if it wifl be found later
that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is
tainted with illegality by the failure of the
Judge to conform with the essential requisites
of taking the depositions in writing and
attaching them to the record, rendering the
search warrant invalid.
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to
have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering that
he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the
information provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose
depositions as aforementioned had already been taken by
the undersigned." 12
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of
the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of
information personally known to him, as required by settled
jurisprudence." 13 The rationale of the requirement, of
course, is to provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in
case the applicant's declarations are found to be false. His
application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the
issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore necessary
for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal
information, to establish the apphcant's claims. 14

Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the

depositions only of the witnesses and not of the applicant
himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their
depositions.
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and
exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed
probable cause is to be established. The examining
magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the
affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application. 15
A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael
Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be
"intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a
mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits,
except that they were made in the form of answers to the
questions put to them by the respondent judge.
Significantly, the meaningful remark made by Tohilida that
they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a
follower of the opposition candidate in the forthcoming
election (a "Lecarista") 16 did not excite the respondent
judge's own suspicions. This should have put him on guard
as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to
possible misrepresentations from them.
The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the
witnesses' statement that they saw eight men deliver arms
to the petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. 17 This was
supposedly done overtly, and Tohilida said he saw
everything through an open window of the house while he
was near the gate. 18 He could even positively say that six of
the weapons were.45 caliber pistols and two were.38 caliber
revolvers. 19

One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent
judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to
the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window,
or whether it was on the first floor or a second floor, or why
his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related
were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses,
considering that these acts were against the law. These
would have been judicious questions but they were
injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declarations of the
witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant
sought was issued forthwith.
The above-discussed defects have rendered the search
warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General argues
that whatever defect there was, was waived when the
petitioner voluntarily submitted to the search and
manifested his conformity in writing. 20
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by
the military authorities, who practically coerced the
petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against
a possible challenge later to the validity of the search they
were conducting. Confronted with the armed presence of the
military and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the
petitioner had no choice but to submit. This was not, as we
held in a previous case, 21 the manifestation merely of our
traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for authority.
Given the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime,
there was here, as we see it, an intimidation that the
petitioner could not resist.
The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and
the eighteen have bullets seized from the petitioner were
illegal per se and therefore could have been taken by the
military authorities even without a warrant. Possession of

the said articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D. 1866 and

considered malum prohibitum. Hence, the Wegal articles
could be taken even without a warrant.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the
search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was
no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the
right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In
short, the military officers who entered the petitioner's
premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right
either to seize the pistol and bullets.
It does not follow that because an offense is malum
prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per
se.Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of
this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply
because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still
necessary. If the rule were otherwise, then the military
authorities could have just entered the premises and looked
for the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without
bothering to first secure a search warrant. The fact that they
did bother to do so indicates that they themselves
recognized the necessity of such a warrant for the seizure of
the weapons the petitioner was suspected of possessing.
It is true that there are certain instances when a search may
be validly made without warrant and articles may be taken
validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless
search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest, 22 as when
the person being arrested is frished for weapons he may
otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer. Motor
cars may be inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of
aliens and contraband 23 and even in the interior upon a
showing of probable cause. 24 Vessels and aircraft are also
traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because

of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's

jurisdiction. 25 The individual may knowingly agree to be
searched or waive objections to an illegal search. 26 And it
has also been held that prohibited articles may be taken
without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the
peace officer comes upon them inadvertently. 27
Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any
of the accepted exceptions. The respondents cannot even
claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the
fact is that these things were deliberately sought and were
not in plain view when they were taken. Hence, the rule
having been violated and no exception being applicable, the
conclusion is that the petitioner's pistol and bullets were
confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the
exclusionary principle.
Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later
expressly affirmed in the 1973 Constitution. While conceding
that there may be occasions when the criminal might be
allowed to go free because "the constable has blundered,"
Chief Justice Concepcion observed that the exclusionary rule
was nonetheless "the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction" against abuse. The decision cited
Judge Learned Hand's justification that "only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, know
that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be
repressed. "
The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as
evidence against the petitioner in the criminal action against
him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of
that case, however, the said articles must remain incustodia
legis.

Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before

coming to this Court, filed a motion for the quashal of the
search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with
the normal procedure. But as we said and did in Burgos,
"this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of
this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues raised. 28
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the
respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is hereby declared null
and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of
August 6,1985, is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 94902-0 April 21, 1999

BENJAMIN V. KHO and ELIZABETH
ALINDOGAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL and NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, respondents.

PURISIMA, J
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Order, dated July
26, 1990, of Branch LXXVII of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Paranaque, which denied petitioners' Motion to Quash
Search Warrants emanating from the same Court.
Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) from using the objects seized
by virtue of such warrants in any case or cases filed or to be
filed against them and to return immediately the said items,
including the firearms, ammunition and explosives, radio
communication equipment, hand sets, transceivers, two
units of vehicles and motorcycle.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the
issuance of search warrants by the respondent Judge
against Benjamin V. Kho, now petitioner, in his residence at
No. 45 Bb. Ramona Tirona St., BF Homes, Phase I,
Paranaque. On the same day, Eduardo T. Arugay, another
NBI agent, applied with the same court for the issuance of
search warrants against the said petitioner in his house at
No. 326 McDivitt St., Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque. The search

warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents had

conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in the
two houses referred to on the basis of confidential,
information they received that the said places were being
used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and "chopchop" vehicles. Respondent NBI sought for the issuance of
search warrants in anticipation of criminal cases to be
instituted against petitioner Kho.
On the same day, the respondent Judge conducted the
necessary examination of the applicants and their
witnesses, after which he issued Search Warrant Nos. 90-11,
90-12, 90-13, 90-14, and 90-15.
On the following day, May 16, 1990, armed with Search
Warrant Nos. 90-11 and 90-12, NBI agents searched subject
premises at BF Homes, Paranaque, and they recovered
various high-powered firearms and hundreds of rounds of
ammunition. Meanwhile, another search was conducted at
the house at No. 326 McDivitt St. Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque,
by another team of NBI agents using Search Warrant Nos.
90-13, 90-14 and 90-15. The said second search yielded
several high-powered firearms will explosives and more than
a thousand rounds of ammunition. The simultaneous
searches also resulted in the confiscation of various radio
and telecommunication equipment, two units of motor
vehicles (Lite-Ace vans) and one motorcycle. Upon
verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit in Camp
Crame, the NBI agents found out that no license has ever
been issued to any person or entity for the confiscated
firearms in question. Likewise, the radio agents found out
that no license has ever been issued to any person or entity
for the confiscated firearms in question. Likewise, the radio
transceivers recovered and motor vehicles seized turned out

to be unlicensed and unregistered per records of the

government agencies concerned.
On May 22, 1990, the raiding teams submitted separate
returns to the respondent Judge requesting that the items
seized be in the continued custody of the NBI (Annexes "O",
"P", and "Q", Petition).
On May 28, 1990, the petitioners presented a Motion to
Quash the said Search Warrants, contending that:
1. The subject search warrants were issued without probable
cause:
2. The same search warrants are prohibited by the
Constitution for being general warrants;
3. The said search warrants were issued in violation of the
procedural requirements set forth by the Constitution;
4. The search warrants aforesaid were served in violation of
the Revised Rules of Court; and
5. The objects seized were all legally possessed and issued.
On July 26, 1990, respondent Judge issued the assailed
Order denying the said Motion To Quash interposed by
petitioners.
Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants,
theorizing upon the absence of any probable cause therefor.
They contend that the surveillance and investigation
conducted by NBI agents within the premises involved, prior
to the application for the search warrants under controversy,

were not sufficient to vest in the applicants personal

knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or indicating
the commission of a crime by them (petitioners).
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Records show that the
NBI agents who conducted the surveillance and
investigation testified unequivocally that they saw guns
being carried to and unloaded at the two houses searched,
and motor vehicles and spare parts were stored therein. In
fact, applicant Max B. Salvador declared that he personally
attended the surveillance together with his witnesses (TSN,
May 15, 1990, pp. 2-3), and the said witness personally saw
the weapons being unloaded from motor vehicles and
carried to the premises referred to. NBI Agent Ali Vargas
testified that he actually saw the firearms being unloaded
from a Toyota Lite-Ace van and brought to the
aformentioned house in BF Homes, Paranaque because he
was there inside the compound posing as an appliance
agent (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 4-5). It is therefore decisively
clear that the application for the questioned search warrants
was based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and
their witnesses.
In the case of Central Bank v. Morfe (20 SCRA 507), this
Court ruled that the question of whether or not a probable
cause exists is one which must be determined in light of the
conditions obtaining given situations. InLuna v. Plaza (26
SCRA 310), it held that the existence of a probable cause
depends to a large extent upon the finding or opinion of the
judge who conducted the required examination of the
applicants and the witnesses.
After a careful study, the Court discerns no basis for
disturbing the findings and conclusions arrived at by the
respondent Judge after examining the applicants and

witnesses. Respondent judge had the singular opportunity to

assess their testimonies and to find out their personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances enough to create a
probable cause. The Judge was the one who personally
examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked
searching questions vis-a-vis the applications for search
warrants. He was thus able to observe and determine
whether subject applicants and their witnesses gave
accurate accounts of the surveillance and investigation they
conducted at the premises to be searched. In the absence of
any showing that respondent judge was recreant of his
duties in connection with the personal examination he so
conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for
doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and
impressions.
Petitioners brand as fatally defective and deficient the
procedure followed in the issuance of subject search
warrants, reasoning out that the same did not comply with
constitutional and statutory requirements. They fault
respondent Judge for allegedly failing to ask specific
questions they deem particularly important during the
examination of the applicants and their witnesses. To
buttress their submission, petitioners invite attention to the
following question, to wit:
"How did you know that there are unlicensed firearms being
kept by Benjamin Kho at No. 45 Bb. Ramona Tirona St.,
Phase I, BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila?" (TSN, Ali
Vargas, May 15, 1990, p. 4).

Petitioners argue that by propounding the aforequoted

question, the respondent Judge assumed that the firearms
at the premises to be searched were unlicensed, instead of
asking for a detailed account of how the NBI agents came to
know that the firearms being kept thereat were unlicensed.
This stance of petitioners is similarly devoid of any
sustainable basis. Nothing improper is perceived in the
manner the respondent Judge conducted the examination of
subject applicants for search warrants and their witnesses.
He personally examined them under oath, and asked them
searching questions on the facts and circumstances
personally known to them, in compliance with prescribed
procedure and legal requirements. It can be gleaned that
the sworn statements and affidavits submitted by the
witnesses were duly attached to the pertinent records of the
proceedings. It was within the discretion of the examining
Judge to determine what questions to ask the witnesses so
long as the questions asked are germane to the pivot of
inquiry the existence or absence of a probable cause.
Petitioners claim that subject search warrants are general
warrants prescribed by the Constitution. According to them,
the things to be seized were not described and detailed
out, i.e. the firearms listed were not classified as to size or
make, etc.
Records on hand indicate that the search warrants under
scrutiny specifically describe the items to be seized thus:
Search Warrant No. 90- 11.
Unlicensed radio
communications equipments

such as transmitters,
transceivers, handsets,
scanners, monitoring device
and the like.
Search Warrant No, 90-13.
Unlicensed radio
communications equipments
such as transmitters,
transceivers, handsets, radio
communications equipments,
scanners, monitoring devices
and others.
The use of the phrase "and the like" is of no moment. The
same did not make the search warrants in question general
warrants. In Oca v. Maiquez (14 SCRA 735), the Court
upheld the warrant although it described the things to be
seized as "books of accounts and allied papers."
Subject Warrant Nos. 90-12 and 90-15 refer to:
Unlicensed firearms of various
calibers and ammunitions for
the said firearms.
Search Warrant No. 90-14 states:
Chop-chop vehicles and other
spare parts.
The Court believes, and so holds, that the said warrants
comply with Constitutional and statutory requirements. The

law does not require that the things to be seized must be

described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room
for doubt on the part of the searching authorities.
Otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants
to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what
kind of things they are looking for. Since the element of time
is very crucial in criminal cases, the effort and time spent in
researching on the details to be embodied in the warrant
would render the purpose of the search nugatory.
In the case under consideration, the NBI agents could not
have been in a position to know before hand the exact
caliber or make of the firearms to be seized. Although the
surveillance they conducted did disclose the presence of
unlicensed firearms within the premises to be searched,
they could not have known the particular type of weapons
involved before seeing such weapons at close range, which
was of course impossible at the time of the filing of the
applications for subject search warrants.
Verily, the failure to specify detailed descriptions in the
warrants did not render the same general. Retired Justice
Ricardo Francisco's book on Criminal Procedure has this
useful insight:
A description of the property to be seized
need not be technically accurate nor
necessarily precise; and its nature will
necessarily vary according to whether the
identity of the property, or its character, is the
matter of concern. Further, the description is
required to be specific only so for as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow. . . .

In People v. Rubio (57 Phil 384), the Court held that, ". . . But
where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather general, it is not required that a
technical description be given, for this would mean that no
warrant could issue."
It is indeed understandable that the agents of respondent
Bureau have no way of knowing whether the guns they
intend to seize are a Smith and Wesson or a Beretta. The
surveillance conducted could not give the NBI agents a close
view of the weapons being transported or brought to the
premises to be searched. Thus, they could not be expected
to know the detailed particulars of the objects to be seized.
Consequently, the list submitted in the applications for
subject search warrants should be adjudged in substantial
compliance with the requirements of law.
Petitioners contend that the searching agents grossly
violated the procedure in enforcing the search warrants in
question. The petition avers supposedly reprehensible acts
perpetrated by the NBI agents. Among the irregularities
alluded to, are:
1. The raiding team failed to perform the
following before breaking into the premises:

a. Properly
identify
themselves and
showing
necessary
credentials
including
presentation of
the Search
Warrants;
b. Furnishing of
Search Warrants
and allowing the
occupants of the
place to
scrutinize the
same;
c. Giving ample
time to the
occupants to
voluntarily allow
the raiders entry
into the place
and to search the
premises.
2. The team entered the premises by climbing
the fence and by forcing open the main door
of the house.
3. Once inside the house, the raiders herded
the maids and the sixteen year-old son of

defendant Kho into the dining room where

they were confined for the duration of the
raid. In the case of the son, he was gagged
with a piece of cloth, his hands were tied
behind his back and he was made to lie face
down.
4. Defendant Kho's hands were immediately
tied behind his back (initially with a rag and
later with the electric cord of a rechargeable
lamp) and was restrained in a kneeling
position with guns pointed at him throughout
the duration of the search. It was only after
the search was completed and the seized
items stuffed in carton boxes (and a T-bag)
that his hands were untied so he can sign the
search warrants which he was forced to do.
5. All throughout the search, defendant Kho
and his companions were kept in the dining
room and continuously intimidated of being
shot while the raiders search all the rooms all
by themselves and without anybody seeing
whatever they were doing.
The question of whether there was abuse in the
enforcerment of the challanged search warrants is not within
the scope of a Motion to Quash. In a Motion to Quash, what
is assailed is the validity of the issuance of the warrant. The
manner of serving the warrant and of effecting the search
are not an issue to be resolved here. As aptly opined and
ruled by the respondent Judge, petitioners have remedies

under pertinent penal, civil and administrative laws for their

problem at hand, which cannot be solved by their present
motion to quash.
According to petitioner Kho, the premises searched and
objects seized during the search sued upon belong to the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) of
which he is an agent and therefore, the NBI agents involved
had no authority to search the aforesaid premises and to
confiscate the objects seized.
Whether the places searched and objects seized are
government properties are questions of fact outside the
scope of the petition under consideration. The Court does
not see its way clear to rule on such issues lest it preempts
the disposition of the cases filed by the respondent NBI
against the herein petitioners.
Considering that cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Explosives and Violation of Section 3 in relation to Section
14 of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the AntiCarnapping Act of 1972, have been instituted against the
petitioners, the petition for mandamus with preliminary and
mandatory injunction to return all objects seized and to
restrain respondent NBI from using the said objects as
evidence, has become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, or want of merit and on the ground that it has
become moot and academic, the petition at bar is hereby
DISMISSED. No pronoucement as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.