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Facts:
1.
2.
3.
4.
The witnesses
include:
evidence
for
insanity
Atizado v People
Facts: On June 20, 1994, the petitioners ( Atizado
and Monreal,17 at the time the crime was
committed) were charged the following offenses:
murder with treachery by killing Rogelio Llona y
Llave, a Sangguniang Bayan member of Castilla,
Sorsogon.
Petitioners and Danilo pleaded not guilty to the
information on November 7, 1994, the trial
ensued.
During the fiesta the wife of the victim witnessed
the crime and she saw Atizado shooting his
husband and Monreal also pointed his gun at her
while moving to and fro. Then the petitioners fled
the scene of the shooting. So she rushed to the
house of barangay captain Juanito Lagonsing
unemancipated
children
on
wards
the
petitioner
Monreal
is
still
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
of
Appeals
through
prohibition.
In
petition
the
assailed
constructive
marriage
as
of
notice
of
the
subsequent
1975;
hence,
prescription
And
for
these,
he
contracts
the
may
be
anywhere,
under
which
People v De la Cruz
Facts: On 18th day of August, 2002 in Bulacan
Victoriano (husband) killed his wife with intent his
Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, with whom he was
united in lawful wedlock, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, use personal violence and stab her hitting
the latter on her trunk and on the different parts
of her body, thereby inflicting upon her serious
physical injuries which directly caused her death.
Prosecution: A witness testified that the couple
was fighting. But he didnt see that actual act of
killing. Suddenly the accused asked for help. So
they rushed to the hospital but the wife died. The
police did an investigation and the accused was
turned over to them. Also a Doctor stated that the
victim died because of "hemorrhagic shock as a
result of a stab wound, trunk."
Defense: The accused testified that he was drunk
and they were really fighting. But he didnt kill his
wife. She just pushed his wife so he could go out
but she fell on a jalousie window and she he
helped her standing up he noticed that her back
was punctured by a piece of shattered glass.
RTC: Convicted beyond reasonable doubt of
Parricide under Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
late Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz the following
sums of money.
CA: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The award of
civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00 and the
award of exemplary damages is deleted.Hence,
this appeal for reversal of CAs decision.
Issue: WON marriage being binding among
spouses can even be used as grounds for
conviction?
Held: The crime of Parricide is defined and
punished under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), to wit:
Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of
parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death.
Facts:
Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997,
Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal)
sought Omaa's legal advice on whether they
could legally live separately and dissolve their
marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaa
then
prepared
a
document
entitled
"Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" and was notarized
by a staff only without the presence of the lawyer.
Espinosa found out that the contract was invalid
from a law graduate. So they filed for a complaint
in the SC.
Issue: WON dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval is valid even
if notarized?
Held: No. This Court has ruled that the
extrajudicial
dissolution
of
the
conjugal
partnership without judicial approval is void.
The Court has also ruled that a notary public
should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extrajudicially
dissolving the conjugal partnership,which is
exactly what Omaa did in this case.
Espinosa v Atty.Omana
NCC 19 -21
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully
or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
Muslim
Code
22
Article
22. Breach
of
contract. Any person who has entered into a
contract to marry but subsequently refuses
without reasonable ground to marry the other
party who is willing to perform the same shall pay
the latter the expenses incurred for the
preparation of the marriage and such damages as
may be granted by the court.
Hermosisma V CA
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Abanag V Mabute
FACTS: The complainant alleged that respondent
courted her and professed his undying love for
her. Relying on respondents promise that he
would marry her, she agreed to live with him.
the
the
and
and
He
believes
that
the
complainants
letter complaint, which was written in the
vernacular, was prepared by Tordesillas who is
from Manila and fluent in Tagalog; the respondent
would have used the "waray" or English language
if she had written the letter-complaint.
The complainant filed a Reply, insisting that she
herself wrote the letter-complaint. She belied the
respondents claim that she was being used by
Tordesillas who wanted to get even with him.
The
Investigating
dismissal
of the
respondent.
Judge
recommends
complaint
against
the
the
is
The
Court
has
repeatedly
held
that
voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman
who are not married, where both are not under
any impediment to marry and where no deceit
exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled
act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary
action.
While the Court has the power to regulate official
conduct and, to a certain extent, private conduct,
it is not within our authority to decide on matters
touching on employees personal lives, especially
those that will affect their and their familys
future.
We cannot intrude into the question of whether
they should or should not marry.
However, we take this occasion to remind
judiciary employees to be more circumspect in
their adherence to their obligations under the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The conduct of
court personnel must be free from any taint of
impropriety or scandal, not only with respect to
their official duties but also in their behaviour
outside the Court as private individuals. This is
the best way to preserve and protect the integrity
and the good name of our courts.
D. Requisites for a valid marriage
Mariategui v CA
Facts: Lupo
Mariategui
contracted
three
marriages during his lifetime. On his first wife,
marriage:
the
solemnizing
officer
and
their
formal
requisites
shall
render
the
marriage
such
party
after
coming
to
reason,
freely
liable. (n)
Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen
years
the
or
upwards
not
under
any
of
wife;
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained
guardians;
parties
believing
in
good
faith
that
the
incurable; or
so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except
and
RPC 350-251
marriage
is
in
disregard
of
Ruling;
legal
library
PROCESSES.
De Mijares v Villaluz
Facts: Respondent a Justice of the Court of
1.
Essential requisites
of
law.
a.
Legal Capacity
FC Art. 2
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless
these essential requisites are present:
through
contribution
of
their
money,
actual
joint
property,
or
the
and
evidences of credit.
reassignment.
contrary,
their
contributions
community
or
conjugal
partnership
denied.
bad
faith. (144a)
change
of
name
is
is
ridiculous,
tainted
with
as
to
sex
reassignment.
on
the
The
ground
Court
of
sex
denied
the
petition.
b.
Age
Art. 5. Any male or female of the age
of eighteen years or upwards not
under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may
contract marriage
Art.35 Void at the beginning