Scots Philosophical Association

University of St. Andrews

Mind-World Identity Theory and Semantic Realism: Haldane and Boulter on Aquinas
Author(s): Gabriele De Anna
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 198 (Jan., 2000), pp. 82-87
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the
University of St. Andrews

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GABRIELE DE ANNA

82

MIND-WORLD IDENTITY THEORY AND SEMANTIC

REALISM: HALDANE AND BOULTER ON AQUINAS
BY GABRIELEDE ANNA
In a recent article,Stephen Boulter takes issue withJohn Haldane's proposed
account of the relationshipbetweenmind and worldbased on Aquinas' theoryof
cognition.'While acceptingthe directrealismof Haldane's theory,accordingto
whichmindand worldare (potentially)
identical,Boulterarguesagainst
structurally
Haldane's attemptto square metaphysicalrealismwithsemanticanti-realism.He
has threemain objections.First,Haldane's Aquinas would be a truncatedone, i.e.,
only a truncatedreadingwould supportthe suggestionthatAquinas holds metaphysicalrealism(hereafterMR) in conjunctionwith semanticanti-realism(SAR).
Secondly,the 'complete'Aquinas does not in factaccept SAR. Thirdly,Aquinas'
MR and SAR are incompatible.In consideringtheseobjections,I shall argue that
even if MR and a full-bodiedSAR may be incompatible,fromthe stance of the
mind-worldidentitytheory,one may neverthelessmaintainMR togetherwith
thenegationof semanticrealism(SR). Further,I shallsuggestthatthisis whatHaldane actuallyclaimed,and moreoverthatAquinaswould have acceptedit.
I

Haldane's Aquinas holds (a) that one can talk about x only if one's intellectis in
withit. Boulter(p. 509) emphasizes(b) thatAquinas reallyrecognizes
conformity
twowaysofacquiringknowledgeofthenaturalworld:
one can come to knowsomething
informed
by beingliterally
by theobjectin
directly
questionin themannerHaldane has discussed;or one can cometo formsomeidea of
It is thissecond
theexistenceand natureof something
by notingitseffects.
indirectly
modeofknowing
(muchthepoorerofthetwo)whichHaldanehas ignored.
It is contentiousthat(b) is inconsistent
with(a). Even if it were truethatHaldane
does not deal withindirectknowledge(cf.Haldane p. 32), (a) merelyclaimsthatone
can thinkabout x onlyifone has therelevantconcepts.There is no restriction
ofthe
ways in whichone may arriveat thoseconcepts,i.e., whetheronlydirectlyor also
Even ifan accountofindirectknowledgemay stillbe needed,(a) does not
indirectly.
i SJ. Boulter,'Could Aquinas Accept SemanticAnti-Realism?',ThePhilosophical
Quarterly,
48 (I998), pp. 504-I3;JJ. Haldane, 'Mind-WorldIdentityTheoryand the Anti-RealistChalandProjection
Representation
(OxfordUP, I993),
lenge',inJ. Haldane and C. Wright(eds),Reality,
pp. I5-37.
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MIND-WORLD IDENTITY THEORY AND SEMANTIC REALISM

83

of such an account.Accordingly
one could endorseAquinas'
implytheimpossibility
claim thatcognitionrequiresformalidentitybetweenmind and thing,and at the
same timesuggestthatit is possibleto possessthe formof somethingone has not
directlyencountered.Haldane's Aquinas may need to be completed,but it is
notclearthathe is truncated.
II
Accordingto Boulter,the second mode of knowledge,indirectknowledge,is importantboth for science and natural theology,and it entailsthat 'according to
Aquinas, one can understanda propositionp withouteverbeing able to recognize
of SAR'. In supportofthisclaim he notes(p. 509) that
thatp, a directcontradiction
Aquinas allowsone can knowsomethingthroughmereacquaintancewithitseffects:
one willbe able to claimpartialknowledgeofx,perhapsno morethanthatx exists
is adequateto thecause,i.e., a memberof thesame naturalkind).
(unlesstheeffect
of
But thisis enoughto formulate
thenatureofx, as thehistory
theoriesconcerning
scienceclearlyillustrates.
An example mightbe forcefields:we have experienceof bodies movingthrough
regionsof space in wayswhichcan best be accountedforifwe postulatethe existforcesin thoseregions.However,our knowledgeof
ence of particularly
structured
those forcesis imperfect:we do not know what theyare nor what encountering
themwould be like,we knowonlytheireffects.
Accordingto Boulter,Aquinas can
allow thiskindof knowledgeonlybecause he endorsesSR. In summarystructure,
Boulter'sargumentis as follows(pp. 508-10):
I.

2.

3.

One can come to know somethingdirectly

by being literallyinformedby the
objectin question... or one can come to formsome idea of the existenceand
natureofsomethingindirectly
by notingitseffects
The effects
ofan unobservedx serveas thenominal
nominis)
definition
(or significatio
ofx, and whenx is used in a propositionthetermis initiallytakento mean no
morethan'thecause ofcertaineffects'2
Once the existence[ofx] has been established,one can move on to formulate
some idea of its essentialcharacteristics
[accordingto Aquinas, termsforobservableentitiescan be appliedto unobservableones throughanalogy].

Therefore
4.

of entitiesknown imThis semantictheory... providesa way of conceiving

itdoes notextendone's recognitional
capacities
throughtheireffects;
perfectly

2 The
of an
expression'serveas' is ambiguous:it may takento mean eitherthatthe effects
or thattheycan be used insteadofthe propersignficatio
unobservedx are itssignificatio
nominis,
when thisis unavailablebecause x is unobservable.The latterseems to be the correct
nominis
if consistencywith (3) is to be maintained:a proper nominal definitionof a
interpretation,
thingdefineswhat sortof thingit is, and thiscan onlybe givenwhen the essentialcharacteristicsofthatthingare determined.
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GABRIELE DE ANNA

84
5.

[Consequently]it is not necessarythatone be able to recognizethatp, even in

p.
principle,in orderto understandtheproposition

Claims (I)-(3) are paraphrasesfromAquinas, claims (4) and (5) are conclusions
drawnby Boulter.The crucialpointseemsto be (4), especiallyitssecond conjunct,
since ifthisis conceded,the defeatof the conjunctionof MR withthe rejectionof
SR seemsto go through.Claim (4),though,is ambiguous.First,ifitis takenliterally,
the second conjunctof (4) saysthatAquinas' semantictheorydoes not improvethe
recognitionalcapacitiesof speakers.If thiswere the claim,it would be not onlyunbut trivial,forit is not the taskof a semantictheoryto improvespeakers'
surprising
on this
conceptualabilitiesby allowingnew uses of theirlanguage. Furthermore,
reading,(4) does not entail (5), since the idea that a semantictheoryallows the
of analogical uses of terms,conjoinedwiththe idea thatthe same
meaningfulness
capacitiesofspeakers,does notentailthat
theorydoes notimprovetherecognitional
speakersmustbe able to understandpropositionsforwhichtheylack recognitional
capacities.For the recognitionalcapacitiesassociatedwiththe literaluses of terms
could be also at workwhenthetermsare used in an analogicalsense,at leastforthe
respectin which the analogical use is not completelyambiguous. Some further
argumentis neededto showthatthisis impossible.
Secondly,if (4) is takenless literally,it may be seen as claimingthatAquinas'
semantictheoryconcedes thatthe termsof a language can be used on occasions
wheretheygo beyondtheirliteralmeaning,i.e., used analogically,evenifit does not
concede that the recognitionalcapacities of speakersare wider than is normally
thought.'Normallythought'by whom? Since thisis said in referenceto Aquinas'
semantictheory,and sincethecore ofthattheoryis Aquinas' thesison analogy,then
the answerseemsto be 'by thosewho do not accept the thesisthatlanguagecan be
used analogically'.Would (4) followfrom(i)-(3) on thisreading?It seemsthatthere
is nothingin (i)-(3) which preventsone fromholdingthat the recognitionalcapacities of speakersare extendedwhen theyare also able to speak analogically.A
a sentenceis a sufficient
who believesthatunderstanding
consemanticanti-realist,
could
ditionforhavingthe capacitynecessaryforrecognizingits truth-conditions,
thusconsistently
accept (I)-(3). In orderfor(4) to followfrom(I)-(3) one mustfirst
Therefore,as an argumentagainstthe possibilitythatAquinas
rejectanti-realism.
thatconceptionis co-terminous
could accept the thesisof the semanticanti-realist
in principle,(i)-(5) is question-begging.
withrecognizability
Boulterbacksup hisreasoningwithexamplestakenfromAquinas' considerations
about science.Accordingto Aquinas, in some cases our argumentscannot prove
in thesenseof
theirconclusionwithcertainty.
They do notproducescience(scientia),
a systemof deductivedemonstrations,
but opinion or belief,i.e., they can only
establisha 'possiblesolution'('science'here mustnot be takenin the modernsense
discussed above: in Aquinas' terms,the unobservableentitiesof contemporary
physicswould probably be objects of possible solutions,ratherthan objects of
'science').Boultercomments(p. 5Io):
whenone 'arrivesat' a possiblesolutionone has simplyrecognizedwhatcouldbe the
whatactually
case - one has no warrantto assumethatthepossiblesolutionrepresents
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MIND-WORLD IDENTITY THEORY AND SEMANTIC REALISM

85

a possiblesoluis thecase. The pointsofconcernforus ... are (a) thatby definition,

tionis a theory
whosetruth-value
eludesus; and (b) thatall we can produceconcernis a possiblesolution.However,one has
inaccessible
to senseobservation
ingentities
thatone understands
thesepropositions,
everyreasonto believethatAquinasmaintains
we can neverdetermine
theirtruth-value.
despitethefactthat,inprinciple,
There are at least threeremarksto be made about this.First,primafacie,this
seems a strangeconsideration.If the fact that Aquinas allows that some of our
claims lack certaintywere enough to make him a semanticrealist,then it would
mean thatthesemanticanti-realist
has no resourceswithwhichto drawa distinction
between belief and knowledge. This would be contentious,to say the least.
of the
Secondly,withregardto (a), Aquinas could maintainthat the truth-values
or
propositionsof a theorymay elude us because theyare evidence-transcendent,
because theyare undecided.If the latterdisjunctis accepted,Aquinas' view would
be compatiblewithsemanticanti-realism.
Thirdly,(b) seems false,since thereare
to be foundin Aquinas: especiallyapt,perhaps,is thefactthathe
counter-examples
ofGod to be demonstrable
withcertainty,
believedtheexistenceand some attributes
eventhoughGod is notan objectofthesenses.
Boulterraises the interesting
case of the anti-realist
rejectionof bivalence and
He claims thatAquinas does not reject
Aquinas' treatmentof futurecontingents.
bivalence,and therefore
acceptssemanticrealism.Is thisa properreading?Accordto
"'true"
thatwhat is the case is said to be the case, a thing
Aquinas,
signifies
ing
[being]truein theway in whichit is or exists....But whensomethingis yetto come,
it does not existin itself.'3Future contingentsdo not existin themselves,but in
somethingelse, i.e., in a mind. Consequentlywhen a mental contentis about a
futurecontingent,
realitylacksthosefactswhichmay decide ifthatcontentis a good
or not. Thus a statementabout a stateof affairswhichdoes not yet
representation
existcannotbe said to be trueor false,i.e., to have a truth-value:
is
itstruth-value
not decidable. If thisreadingis plausible,thenAquinas' view may not clash with
anti-realism.

It may be counteredthatthisholds onlyforfuturecontingents.

Given Aquinas'
theoryof truth,the truth-valuesof statementsconcerningthe far past may be
decided even when the truth-conditions
of those statementsare beyond our
recognitionalabilities.Somethingwhichwas the case had existencein itself,to use
Aquinas' expression,and so it can trulybe said to have been the case, even ifthe
abilities.If
ofa statement
whichexpressesittranscendsour recognitional
truth-value
thisis so, thenAquinas and the semanticanti-realist
do disagreeafterall: forwould
not the anti-realist
maintainthatthe truth-values
of statements
beyondour recognitionalcapacitiesare undecided?
At this point the mind-worldidentitytheoristmay distinguishtwo senses in
whichsomethingmay be said to be beyondour recognitional
capacities:in thefirst
sense,we cannot recognizeit because we lack the relevantconceptsor the intellectualabilityto formthem;in the second sense,we cannotrecognizeit because we
cannot have empiricalaccess to it. Thus, againstthe semanticrealist,mind-world
3 PeriHermeneias
I xiii

2-3, quotedby Boulterp. 51I.

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GABRIELE DE ANNA

86

thattranscend
identitytheoristsmay accept thatwe cannotunderstandstatements
our recognitional
capacitiesin thefirstsense,but may not followthe semanticantirealistin requiringthatrecognitional
abilitiesin thesecondsenseare also neededfor
In thisway theymay object to SR withoutembracingat the same
understanding.
time a full-bodiedSAR. This seems consistentwithAquinas' views as considered
above, and seemsalso to be Haldane's point.He does not claim thathe is an antiand a supporterof his view may be allied in
realist,but only that an anti-realist
arguingagainstthe conceptionof truthof a metaphysicalrealistwho does not hold
themind-worldidentity
thesis(cf.Haldane p. 34).
III
The kindof metaphysicalrealismproposedby Haldane is markedby the idea that
mind and world are structurally
identical,which means thatthe wide contentsof
and that the world is intrinsically
intelthoughtare intrinsically
representational
ligible. Haldane's debts to Aquinas, though,seem to forcehim to accept other
Thomistictheses,such as the idea thatthe human intellectcannotknowall of created reality,and thattruthand realityare convertible.The latterclaim means that
the set of all possibletruesentencesrepresents
all thefactswhichexistin theworld.
From thesetwo premises,Boulterquite rightly
drawsthe conclusionthatthereare
truthsconcerningexternalrealitythat are beyond human knowledge.The latter
claim,though,seems to be in tensionwiththe thesisthatthe worldis intrinsically
Boultersuggests(p. 5I2) thatonly the acceptance of SR can reconcile
intelligible.
thesetwoclaims:
theportionofrealitywhichlieswithinhumanpurviewis renderedintelligible
onlyif
one is able to posittheexistenceofcausalentities
and processeslyingbeyondtheimmediaterecognitional
capacitiesofhumanbeings.
This conclusioncan be avoided ifone notesthatwhat the thesisof the intrinsic
of the worldimpliesis thattheworldis conceptualizableor thinkable.
intelligibility
It is consistent
to
withthisimplicationthattheworldmay be onlypartlyintelligible
humans.Intelligibility
and intelligence,on thisview, come in degrees.The more
intelligentsubjectsare, i.e., the more extendedand profoundtheirrecognitional
capacitiesare, the wider the part of realityavailable to them will be. Given the
mind-worldidentitythesis,therewill be no room for the traditionalscepticism
originatingfromthe conjunctionof MR and SR. Since knowledgein less than
omniscientbeingsis possiblebecause of a partialidentitybetweenthe world and
theirminds,thereis no riskthattheadditionoffurther
information
about theworld
here does not refer
may cause all of theirbeliefsto be false.'Furtherinformation'
to the factswhich have not yet been encounteredbut which belong to a kind for
whichthe subjectsalreadyhave therelevantrecognitional
capacities(in eithersense
of thisexpression).For we are alreadyassumingideal epistemicconditionsforthe
in questionis theavailabilityofa portionof
information
subjects.Ratherthefurther
realitywhichwas not open to the subjectsbefore,i.e., it is due to an improvement
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MIND-WORLD IDENTITY THEORY AND SEMANTIC REALISM

87

oftheirrecognitionalabilities.The new information

willenlargetheirrecognitional
identicalto theworld),and allow
capacities(i.e., make theirmindsmoreextensively
thediscoveryofnew truthsbesidesthosealreadyacquired.
At thispointa metaphormay be helpful.If we want to reproducean object,we
may decide to take a cast or imprintof it. If we use finelygrainedplaster,the cast
will reproduceall the smallerdetails of the object. If on the otherhand we use
rougherclay,the cast willmisssome of the surfacedetailsof the object.Both casts
are reproductions
of the object,reproducingitsshape and structure.
But theformer
does so in greaterdetail than the latter,i.e., with regard to surfacestructureit
exhibitsa moreextensiveisomorphism.
of humanconcepSimilarly,the limitations
tualitylie on the side of the intellect,not on the side of reality.The claim thatthe
worldis necessarily
such as maybe fullycomprehendeddoes notimplyeitherthatit
is,or even thatitmaybe, fullyknownby us.
In conclusion,it can be said that,fromthe standpointof mind-worldidentity
theory,MR is consistentwith the rejectionof a full-bodiedSR, since the mindworldidentity
theoristmaymaintainthatthereis nothingin realitywhichcannotbe
known.As we
conceptualized,whileagreeingthatnot all truthscan be empirically
have seen, thisis consistentwithAquinas' semanticconception,whichinvolvesthe
analogicaluse ofterms,and maybe suggestedby hisviewsabout futurecontingents.
Finally,thisis all thatHaldane claimed,since,as we have seen,he did not tryto
supportSAR, but onlyto show thatsome of the anti-realist
complaintsagainstSR
theorist.4
mayalso be acceptedby a mind-worldidentity
andUniversity
University
ofSt.Andrews
ofPadova

4 I wouldliketo thankJohnHaldane, and anonymousrefereesof ThePhilosophical

Quarterly,
fortheircommentson a previousdraftofthispaper.

CONCEPTUAL CONTINGENCY AND

ABSTRACT EXISTENCE
BY MARK COLYVAN

Mathematicalstatementssuch as 'There are infinitely

many primenumbers'and
'2?0 > o0'are usuallythoughtto be necessarilytrue.Not everyoneis convincedof
ofmathematics
this,though.HartryField,forinstance,thinksthatall thestatements
are falsebecause thereare no mathematical
(exceptnegativeexistentialstatements)
objects.In thispaper, I want to focuson the modal statusof Field's claim - he
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2000
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