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The OSG did not file a motion for reconsideration on the ground of double jeopar
dy. Chua, on the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration:J<) on August 8,
2007.a Resolution41 dated October 3, 2007, the CA denied Chua's motion for reco
nsideration and its supplement on the ground that acquittal is immediately final
and the re-examination of the record of the case would violate the guarantee ag
ainst double jeopardy. It also denied the motions lor reconsideration of both pa
rties on the civil aspect of the case. Hence
Lacks legal personality
In Villareal v. we upheld the doctrine that it is only the OSG, as representativ
e of the State, which may question the acquittal of the accused via a petition f
or certiorari under Rule 65, viz: .11 x x x The authority to represent the Sta
te in appeals of criminal cases hefon tlw Supreme Court and the CA is solely vest
ed in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35 (I), Chapter 12, Tit
le lJI, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumenta
lities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation
or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have specific powers and
functions to the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA, an
d all other courts or tribunals in all civil act.ions and special proceedings in
which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party
. The OSG is the law office of the Government. To he sure, in criminal cases, th
e acquittal of the accused or the dismiss:tl of the case against him can only be
appealed hy the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private c
omplainant or the offended pmiy may question such acquittal or dismissal only in
sofar as the civil liability or the accused is concerned. In a catena of cases,
this view has been time and again espoused and nrnintained by the Court. In Rodr
iguez v. Gadiane, it was categorically stated that if the criminal case is dismi
ssed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal
aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf' of the
State. The capability of the private complainant to question such dismissal or
acquiual is limited only to the civil aspect of the case. The same determination
was also arrived at by the Court in Metropolitan Bonk and Trust Company v. Veri
diano II. In the recent case of Jr. v. Bangayan, the Court again upheld this gui
ding principle. xxx Thus, the Court has delinitively ruled that in a criminal ca
se in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complai
nant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising the
BP 22
ourt herein dismissed the instant case on the ground that the MeTC Jacked jurisd
iction over the offense charged, it did not decide the same on the merits, let a
lone resolve the issue of respondent's guilt or innocence based on the evidence
proffered by the prosecution.34 The appellate court merely dismissed the case on
the erroneous reasoning that none of the elements of BP 22 was committed withi
n the lower comi's jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidenc
e failed to show respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore,
such dismissal did not operate as an acquittal, which, as previously discussed,
may be repudiated only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court showing a grave abuse of discretion. Thus, petitioner's resort to Rule
45 of the Rules of Court cannot be struck down as improper. In a petition for re
view on certiorari under Rule 45, the parties raise only questions of law becaus
e the Court, in its exercise of its power of review, is not a trier of facts. Th
ere is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of the pro
bative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.35 In De
In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments
of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time o
f the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law fo
r the crime charged at the time of its commission.38 Thus, when a case involves
a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the juris
diction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a quest
ion of Jaw that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.39 More impo
rtantly, moreover, since the dismissal of the instant case cannot be considered
as an acquittal of respondent herein, he cannot likewise claim that his constitu
tional right to protection against double jeopardy will be violated.
rty, which in criminal cases is the State as represented by the prosecutor, agai
nst the accused. Like a pleading, the Information is also filed in court for app
ropriate judgment. Undoubtedly then, an Information falls squarely within the am
bit of Bar Matter No. 1922, in relation to Bar Matter 850.
In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought abo
ut by a counsel's failure to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and dat
e of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued an En
Banc Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealin
g the phrase "Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismi
ssal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records" and repla
cing it with "Failure to disclose the required information would subject the cou
nsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action." Thus, under the amendatory
Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the num
ber and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longe
r result in the dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the r
ecords. Nonetheless, such failure will subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine
and/or disciplinary action.
199087 People v. Punzala, Nov 11, 2015
In assailing the validity of the search warrant, accused-appellants claim that t
he PDEA agents who applied for a search warrant failed to comply with the requir
ements for the procurement of a search warrant particularly the approval of the
PDEA Director General. Accused-appellants also contended that the court which is
sued the search warrant, the RTC of Manila, Branch 17 had no authority to issue
the search--warrant since the place where the search is supposed to be conducted
is outside its territorial jurisdiction. We are not persuaded. A.M. No. 03-8-02
-SC, entitled "Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges
and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties" as approved by the Court in
its Resolution of January 27, 2004, as amended, provides: SEC. 12. Issuance of s
earch warrants in special criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts of Manila
and Quezon City. -The Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave
of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judg
es of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applicat
ions filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine Nationa
l Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involv
ing heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunit
ions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff a
nd Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enact
ed by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court. The applications shall
be endorsed by the heads of such agencies or their respective dulv authorized o
fficials and shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/o
r the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The E
xecutive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if
justified, which may be served outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said
co mis. In the instant case, aside from their bare allegation, accused-appellan
ts failed to show that the application for search warrant of the subject premise
s was not approved by the PDEA Regional Director or his authorized representativ
e. On the contrary, the search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 17 sa
tisfactorily complies with the requirements for the issuance thereof as determin
ed by the issuing court, thus: Pursuant to Section 2, Article 3 of the 1987 Cons
titution, Sections 2 to 5, Rule 126 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, mod
ified by Section 12 of Supreme Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 03-08-02-SC
dated January 27, 2004, and Certification dated October 28, 2009, it appearing t
o the satisfaction of the undersigned after personally examining under oath Agen
t Liwanag B. Sandaan and Agent Derween Reed both of Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency Metro Manila Regional Office, that there is probable cause, there are goo
d and sufficient reasons, to believe that undetermined quantity of assorted dang
erous drugs, particularly shabu, including the proceeds or fruits and those used
or intended to be used by the respondents as a means of committing the offense,
you are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day or
night of the premises above described and forthwith seize and take possession of
the undetermined quantity of assorted dangerous drugs including the proceeds vi
fruits and bring said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law d
irects. 19 Moreover, we find no merit in accused-appellants' claim that the RTC
of Manila, Branch 17, had no authority to issue the assailed search warrant sinc
e the place to be searched is outside its territorial jurisdiction. As aforecite
d, Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC clearly authorizes the Executive
Judges and the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTC of Manila and Quezon City to is
sue search warrants to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdictio
n in special criminal cases such as those involving heinous crimes, illegal gamb
ling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of th
e Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as in this case, for as long as the
parameters under the said section have been complied with.
People v. Posada 196502 2 September 2015
The search warrant was valid.
The Office of the Solicitor General correctly argued that any question
as to the validity of the search warrant was closed by the September 21,
2006 Resolution of the RTC, which the accused-appellants opted not to
question further. As mentioned by the CA, the judicial finding of probable
cause in issuing a search warrant should not be doubted when the judge
personally examines the applicant and/or witnesses and there is no basis to
doubt his reliability and competence in evaluating the evidence before him.4
With regard to the designation of the place to be searched, the RTC
sufficiently justified that the search warrant particularly described the place
to be searched: a sketch showing the location of the house to be searched
was attached to the application and the search warrant pointed to only one
house in the area.5
A long-standing rule is that a description of the place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertai
n
and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points
out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers
unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.6
Taking from
American Jurisprudence, [t]he determining factor as to whether a search
warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity is
not whether the description is sufficient to enable the officer to locate and
identify the premises with reasonable effort. 7
mission is necessary.2
Clearly, no arrest preceded the search on the person of the petitioner. When Ta
n and Tangcoy allegedly saw the petitioner jaywalking, they did not arrest him b
ut accosted him and pointed to him the right place for crossing. In fact, accor
ding to the RTC, Tan and Tangcoy immediately accosted him and told him to cross [
at] the designated area. 29Tan and Tangcoy did not intend to bring the petitioner
under custody or to restrain his liberty. This lack of intent to arrest him was
bolstered by the fact that there was no criminal charge that was filed against
the petitioner for crossing a no jaywalking area.
The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest was emphasized in Luz vs. People of the Philippines.
30 The Court held that the shabu confiscated from the accused in that case was i
nadmissible as evidence when the police officer who flagged him for traffic viol
ation had no intent to arrest him. According to the Court, due to the lack of in
tent to arrest, the subsequent search was unlawful. This is notwithstanding the
fact that the accused, being caught inflagrante delicto for violating an ordina
nce, could have been therefore lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending
officers. In the light of the discussion above, the respondent s argument that the
re was a lawful search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest for jaywalking ap
pears to be an afterthought in order to justify a warrantless search conducted o
n the person of the petitioner. In fact, the illegality of the search for the s
habu is further highlighted when it was not recovered immediately after the alle
ged lawful arrest, if there was any, but only after the initial search resulted
in the recovery of the knife. Thereafter, according to Tan, Tangcoy conducted a
nother search on the person of the petitioner resulting in the alleged confiscat
ion of the shabu. Clearly, the petitioner's right to be secure in his person was
callously brushed aside twice by the arresting police officers.
the accused for the offense charged and proven during the trial.
In US v. Vitug,9 the Information charged that the accused committedthe specific
acts therein attributed to him, and that he committed those actsin conspiracy
with his co-accused. We ruled that the commission of thespecific acts c
harged against the accused constituted the offense charged,and the failure t
o establish the conspiracy in no way prevented conviction ofthe accused for the
offense charged and proven
PDIC v. Hon. Casimiro, et al. 2 Sept 2015 G.R. No. 206866
In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigati
on proceedings
whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor
is geared only
to determine whether or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent
for trial for the supposed crime that he committed. In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr
.,22 the Court defined probable cause and the parameters in finding the existenc
e thereof in the following manner: Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a c
riminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engende
r a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is p
robably guilty thereof. The term does not mean actual or positive cause nor does i
t import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief
. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient ev
idence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable c
ause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In dete
rmining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without r
esorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technic
al knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been commit
ted, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for tria
l. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction.23 (Emphases and underscoring supplied) Verily, preliminary
investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not ther
e is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the pe
rson charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion an
d belief, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether
there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.24 [A preliminary investigati
on] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of [the prosecution s]
evidence. The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary i
n nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown t
rial on the merits. 25 Hence, the validity and merits of a party s defense or accusat
ion, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventil
ated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. 26Guided by
the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely abused
its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint against private respondents
for lack of probable cause, as will be explained hereunder
In view of such grave accusations against them, Cu and Zate resorted to mere den
ials, while Apelo ignored the complaint by not filing a counter-affidavit despit
e due notice, thus, miserably failing to debunk the charges hurled against them.
Indubitably, the foregoing establishes probable cause to believe that private r
espondents may have indeed committed such acts constituting the crimes charged a
gainst them. As such, they must defend themselves in a full-blown trial on the m
erits.
Finally, it was error on the part of the Ombudsman to simply discredit Gomez s aff
idavit as inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay. It is noteworthy to point
out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the techn
ical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings.32
ormation whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. 20 The question t
hat must be answered is whether such allegations are sufficient to establish the
elements of the crime charged without considering matters aliunde.21 In proceed
ing to resolve this issue, courts must look into three matters: (1) what must be
alleged in a valid Information; (2) what the elements of the crime charged are;
and (3) whether these elements are sufficiently stated in the Information.
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information
is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offen
se given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission
of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. When an offense
is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the compl
aint or information. xxx Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. -The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating ci
rcumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily
in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person o
f common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qual
ifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
This Court, in Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan, 22 explained the two important purposes
underlying the rule. First, it enables the accused to suitably prepare his defe
nse.23 Second, it allows the accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction i
n a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.24 Thus, this Court held that th
e true test in ascertaining the validity and sufficiency of an Information is "w
hether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as t
o apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged."
For as long as the ultimate facts constituting the offense have been alleged, an
Information charging a violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 need not state,
to the point of specificity, the exact amount of unwarranted benefit granted no
r specify, quantify or prove, to the point of moral certainty, the undue injury
caused. We have consistently and repeatedly held in a number of cases that an In
formation need only state the ultimate facts constituting the offense and not th
e finer details of why and how the crime .
d 29 was comm1tte . As alleged in
the Information, the unwarranted benefit was the privilege granted by Castillo t
o the Arciagas to operate the dumpsite without the need to comply with the appli
cable laws, rules, and regulations; the undue injury being residents and student
s were made to endure the ill-effects of the illegal operation. The details requ
ired by the Sandiganbayan (such as the specific peso amount actually received by
the Arciagas as a consequence of the illegal operation of the subject dumpsite
or the specific extent of damage caused to the residents and students) are matte
rs of evidence best raised during the trial; they need not be stated in the Info
rmation. For purposes of informing the accused of the crime charged, the allegat
ion on the existence of unwarranted benefits and undue injury under the Informat
ion suffices. Moreover, the rationale for the ultimate facts requirement becomes
clearer when one considers the period when a motion to quash is filed, that is,
before the accused's arraignment and the parties' presentation of their evidenc
e. It would be illogical, if not procedurally infirm, to require specific peso a
mount allegations of the unwarranted benefit and proof of undue injury -to the p
oint of moral certainty, no less -at this stage of the criminal proceedings.
Indeed, this Court held in Llorente that the "undue injury must be specified, qu
antified and proven to the point of moral certainty."30 The validity and suffici
ency of the Information, however, was not an issue in Llorente. The import of th
e ruling therein is that proof of undue injury must be established by the prosec
ution during the trial and not when the Information is filed. Nowhere in Llorent
e did we require that undue injury be specified, quantified and proved to the po
int of moral certainty at the time of the filing of the Information. Such an int
erpretation would effectively require the prosecution to include all the relevan
t evidence in the Information and to present such evidence of undue injury even
owledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revis
ed Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any
time as near to the actual date when the offense was committed an information is
sufficient.
In previous cases, we ruled that allegations that rapes were com
mitted before and until October 15, 1994,
sometime in the year 1991 and the days th
ereafter, sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent the
reto and on or about and sometime in the year 1988 constitute sufficient compliance
with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. (Emphasis
supplied) Notably, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Proced
ure, as amended, states that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or in
formation the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a materia
l ingredient of the offense. Such requirement is not applicable to the crime of
rape where the date of the commission of the offense is not an essential elemen
t. Also, said Section 11 expressly permits that a crime may be alleged to have
been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commissio
n. The information charging accused-appellant of rape sometime before December
24, 2002 when the crime was committed exactly on December 24, 2002 is sufficient
ly compliant with said Section 11. In addition, as correctly pointed out by th
e CA, the Information is valid as under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, an information is deemed sufficient if it states th
e name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the off
ended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the plac
e where the offense was committed.21The Court has also discussed the essence of
the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation ag
ainst him in Andaya v. People,22 to wit:It is fundamental that every element con
stituting the offense must be alleged in the information. The main purpose of re
quiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to e
nable the accused to suitably prepare his defense because he is resumed to have
no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. x x x (Emphas
is supplied) It is evident in this case that accused-appellant was able to testi
fy about the incident on December 24, 200223 because the date alleged was not va
gue or covering an unreasonable period as to deprive him the opportunity to prep
are his defense which is the essence of the right allegedly violated. It is wo
rthy to note that the records are bereft of any objection by the accused-appella
nt about the date of the commission of the crime at the time of arraignment,24 d
uring the formal offer of exhibits25 and at the time the prosecution put AAA on
the witness stand26 to establish the rape committed on December 24, 2002. In P
eople v. Gianan,27the Court held that an accused-appellant s failure to raise a ti
mely objection that the time difference alleged in the information covered a bro
ad period constitutes a waiver of his right to object. We further observe that
accused-appellant did not even disavow knowledge of the incident on that date bu
t, in fact, admitted that he spoke with AAA at their house on December 24, 20022
8 and even entered AAA s house.29 The testimony of accused-appellant leads us to
conclude that the allegation was sufficient to inform him of the date the crime
charged occurred which enabled him to prepare his defense. Thus, we find the al
legations in the Information and the subsequent conviction of accused-appellant
by the lower courts valid and lawful under the circumstances.