CLB FC 0X Se Rep 0096 - C1

BP Doc Number: CLB-FC-0X-SE-REP-0096 Rev C1
Explosion Overpressure Protection Strategy
REVISION CHANGE NOTICES

Revision
Location of Changes
Brief Description of Change
D1
Throughout
First Issue of Document
A1
Throughout
Incorporation of comments from AMEC
B1
8.2 Equipment support

loads
B1
QU GT explosion scenario
B2
throughout
B2
Table 8.3
B2
throughout
Now includes HVAC ducting, SIMOPS equipment

loads
B2
Section 8.1
Identifies deck loads near to (<5m from) blast walls.
B2
Sections 8.2 and 8.3
Identifies well isolation as criticality 1 must

withstand the DLB
B3
Appendices E and F
Appendices added
B3
Table 8.1
Flare boom base moved to Compressor area
B3
Table 8.3
Emergency generator containerised
B3
Appendices
Extra Appendices introduced, Stair towers, cladding
B3
Section 2.1
B3
Table 8.1
B3
Section 8.1
B3
Throughout
Disclaimer on information supplied by AMEC to CB&I

and RDS.
DES and DSM entries expanded to give design wall
capacities. South crane pedestal design pressure
now 0.7 bar
150 mm limit for encroachment on escape ways from
blast wall deflections
300mm separation required for equipment behind
blast walls
Wind wall location and design capacities
B4
Tables 7.1, 7.2,7.3
B4
Executive Summary
B4
Table 8.3
B4
Section 8.3
B4
Section 8.4.2
Revised and reduced after discussions with BP

Supplied by BP
Firewater systems to resist far field effects of DLB
explosions
Vertical and longitudinal loads on vessels and
equipment identified
New summary tables explosion simulations,

requirements for equipment loading
New section 1
Updated for new equipment locations/Tag numbers
from updated plot plan for DP issued November
2012.
Key diagrams included to illustrate and clarify out of
balance loads and use of Table 8.3
Critical pipework requiring explosion protection
recommendations updated from piping explosion
screening study.
Page 2 of 193

B4
Tables 8.4a,b,c
Recommended protection for piping systems.
B4
Section 9 Conclusions
B4
Table F1
North central stairtower and LQ stairtowers included
C1
Appendix J
C1
Holds removed
Area protection drawings updated to latest versions

as of issue date C1
West stair tower GM and piping blast resistance
C1
Sections 10.1, 10.2 and

10.3
C1
Appendix H
C1
Table 8.3
C1
Holds removed
C1
Appendix I
C1
9.2.2
Updated with PIMS action status
New information on drag loads near decks, blast

walls and in deck central areas.
Protection to the LQ to prevent local rupture of the
LQ wall
Update tag numbers and location to correspond with
C1 DP plot plans May 2012
Strong shock response set at 0.5g
Strong shock response analysis - included
Protection of HP flare scrubber liquid side pipework
required.
Holds Table
Location
Hold
Action
By
Page 3 of 193

Table of Contents
Executive Summary
Explosion Risk and Goals
Explosion Scenarios
Criticality
Explosion Loads
Explosion Requirements
10
Structural Explosion Requirements
11
Introduction
12
Scope of Document
12
2.1
Disclaimer
12
2.2
Document Overview
12
2.3
The use of this document
15
Purpose of Document
16
Acronyms
16
Explosion Strategy
18
5.1
Inherently Safer Design
18
5.2
Explosion Hazard Management
18
5.3
Safety Critical Elements
19
5.4
Criticality Ranking and Explosion loads
19
Implementation of the Explosion Protection Strategy
21
6.1
21
Design Load Cases
Clair Ridge - Summary of explosion requirements
23
7.1
Main Results from Simulations:-
23
7.2
Equipment, vessels and piping in an area where an explosion occurs
26
7.3
Equipment, vessels and piping adjacent to an area where an explosion occurs
27
7.4
Blast/fire barriers (including decks)
28
7.5
Blast Division Capacities
28
7.6
Fire and Explosion
28
7.6.1 Blast followed by fire
28
7.6.2 Fire followed by blast
28
Page 4 of 193

8
Explosion Loads
29
8.1
29
8.2
8.3
9
Structures
8.1.1 Far field effects
30
8.1.2 Enclosure frame design
30
8.1.3 Decks
31
8.1.4 Direct Explosion loads on structures
31
8.1.5 Explosion loads on associated equipment items outside enclosures
31
8.1.6 Strong shock explosion loads
57
Loads on Vessels and Equipment
58
8.2.1 Vessel and equipment general design requirements
58
8.2.2 Vessel hydrocarbon containment requirements
58
8.2.3 Pressure difference on vessels and equipment
59
8.2.4 Worked example Separator vessel (Hydrocarbon containing)
61
8.2.5 Hazard control and Hazard mitigation systems
62
General notes on Table 8.3 Explosion loads on vessels and equipment
63
Design of Critical Pipework and associated equipment
104
9.1
BP Requirements
104
9.2
Piping explosion loads screening study
104
9.3
9.2.1 Classification of releases
105
9.2.2 System criticality and recommended protection
106
9.2.3 P&ID mark-up
109
Recommendations for piping explosion protection
10 Explosion loads on piping and nozzles
112
113
10.1 Variation of direct drag loads by location
114
10.2 Vertical drag load distribution - elevations
116
10.2.1
The Wellbay area vertical drag loads
116
10.2.2
The Process area vertical drag loads
117
10.2.3
The Compression area vertical drag loads
117
10.3 Horizontal peak drag load distribution plan views
118
10.3.1
The Wellbay area horizontal drag loads
119
10.3.2
The Process area horizontal drag loads
119
10.3.3
The Compression area horizontal drag loads
121
10.4 Drag loads on non-circular sections
122
10.5 Equivalent wind velocities
123
10.6 Far field drag loads
123
10.7 Indirect loads on piping
123
Page 5 of 193

10.8 Other Systems equipment items and vessels
10.8.1
124
Access platforms
125
11 Conclusions Recommendations and Actions
126
12 References
128
Appendix A Inherent Safety Features to Reduce Explosion Risk
130
Appendix B Additional Safety Critical Systems explosion design requirements
133
Appendix C Explosion Load Time Histories
135
Appendix D Determination of Out of Balance Loads on Vessels and Equipment
138
Appendix E Segregation of the Wellhead and Process areas
142
Appendix F Blast Loading on Stair Towers
144
Appendix G Further Information Supplied by BP
152
Appendix H The Alimak goods lift required explosion resistance
180
Appendix I Strong shock response analysis
183
Appendix J Area Protection and Fire/Blast Division Layout elevation drawings
191
List of Tables
Table 7.1
Main results of explosion simulations
23
Table 7.2
Summary of Requirements for equipment within the area of an explosion
26
Table 7.3
Summary of Requirements for Equipment in an Adjacent area
27
Table 8.1
Direct Explosion loads on Structural Elements - DP
32
Table 8.2
Direct Explosion loads on Structural Elements - QU
49
Table 8.3
Explosion Loads on Vessels and Equipment
65
Table 9.1
Recommended protection by system Compression deck
106
Table 9.2
Recommended protection by system Production deck
107
Table 9.3
Recommended protection by system Cellar and Mezzanine deck
107
Table 9.4
Recommended explosion protection Flare system
108
Table 9.5
P&IDs Marked up for explosion protection
109
Table 9.6
Summary of piping explosion protection requirements
112
Table 10.1
Design over-pressures for pipework to avoid crushing failure
114
Table 10.2
Drag Coefficients for non-circular sections
122
Page 6 of 193

Table 11.1
Actions arising from the implementation of the Explosion Strategy
126
Table A1
Inherent Safety Features to Reduce Explosion Risk
130
Table B1
Additional Safety Critical Systems explosion design requirements
133
Table C1
Range of positive phase load durations
136
Table F1
QU Stair Towers Design Explosion Capacities
148
Table F2
DP Stair Towers Design Explosion Capacities
150
Table G1
Explosion loads by area
152
Table G2
Far field Explosion Loads buildings and enclosures
155
Table I1
DP Monitoring point locations
184
Table I2
QU Monitoring point locations
185
Table I3
DP Monitoring point locations and peak design accelerations
188
Table I4
QU Monitoring point locations and peak design accelerations
190
Page 7 of 193

Executive Summary
This document presents the principles of explosion assessment and describes how they should be
applied to the Clair Ridge facilities.
This report also identifies which items need to be designed against explosion loads and defines the
load types, magnitudes and durations to be used when assessing the response to these loads.
For all detailed design requirements refer to the main body of the text. This Section provides a
general overview of the explosion protection strategy adopted by the Clair Ridge project.
Explosion Risk and Goals

Explosion risk is defined as the risk from the initiating event and subsequent escalation.
The means of ensuring that this risk is reduced to as low as reasonably practicable can
be broken down into a number of high level goals.
These goals include:
the identification of all areas of the installation where there is potential for
explosion events to occur
the elimination of the potential for explosion events to occur, or if this is not
achievable the minimisation of the consequence of explosion events
Explosion Scenarios
Explosions can be represented by two design scenarios, ductility level blast (DLB) and
strength level blast (SLB).
Ductility Level Blast (DLB)
The DLB is defined as the design level explosion used to represent the extreme design
event. It occurs with an exceedance frequency of approximately 10-5 per year.
After this event the essential safety systems should remain operational with escape
routes useable. Plastic deformation is acceptable, provided collapse does not occur and
barriers remain in place. Design should minimise uncontrolled escalation to major
inventories. Clair Ridge has adopted the additional requirement that non-redundant
primary structure must remain elastic.
Strength Level Blast (SLB)
The SLB is a more frequent design event where it is required that the structure,
equipment supports and piping supports do not deform plastically and that the relevant
equipment remains operational. It has a third of the magnitude of the DLB or an event
with exceedance frequency of less that 10-4 per year (whichever is greater).
This event should result in an elastic response of the primary structure. Local damage
of tertiary steelwork is acceptable. Vessels should remain on their supports and
potentially the installation should be able to re-start safely after the event.
Criticality
Criticality classification determines whether structure, equipment supports and piping
systems should be designed to withstand SLB, DLB or have no special performance
requirements over and above inherent strength limits.
Page 8 of 193

Criticality Classification:
Criticality 1 Items whose failure in explosion could cause impairment of TR or

evacuation facilities. These items should be designed to withstand both SLB and DLB
blast loads. Examples from Clair Ridge are safety critical structure, supporting structure
of hydrocarbon containing vessels/equipment and supporting structures for the DES.
Criticality 2 - Items whose failure in explosion could cause major escalation resulting in
fatalities in addition to those caused by original explosion. These items should be
designed to withstand SLB design blast loads. Examples from Clair Ridge are all
hydrocarbon containing vessels and equipment and the supports of non-hydrocarbon
containing vessels/equipment subject to SLB loads.
Criticality 3 Items whose failure in explosion is considered tolerable. These items

need not be designed to withstand any specific design blast loads. For Clair Ridge this
criticality is applied to all safety critical systems which are not criticality 1 or 2.
Explosion Loads
Explosion loads can be split into four types, overpressure, out of balance, drag and
strong shock loads. Below is a brief description of the loads and shows where they
apply.
Overpressure
Overpressure loads are applied to exposed surfaces and determine the strength
requirements for blast walls, decks, enclosures, barriers, crane pedestals and the
bridge.
The overpressure pulse consists of a positive part followed by a longer suction/negative
part which represents the re-entry of gas/air into the module after the positive pressure
has subsided.
Out of Balance Loads
Out of balance pressure loads give the requirements for support and integrity of
equipment and vessel items > 1m in effective diameter.
The out of balance pressure load is calculated ahead of the flame front, the pressure
pulse is considered to propagate with the speed of sound in the unburnt air/fuel mixture
C (about 340 m/s).
Drag Loads
Drag loads result from the effects of gas flow around equipment and piping <1m in
effective diameter.
Drag loads are applied to Critical Pipework, valves, the flare and blowdown systems,
flowlines and process manifolds. Blowdown systems, critical vent and relief headers,
well kill lines and flowlines shall be designed to resist the DLB.
Strong shock loads (Section 8.1.6 and Appendix I)
The movement of the platforms and topsides under explosion loads will result in deck
accelerations which give rise to inertia loads on equipment throughout the topsides. A
design value of 0.5g is recommended.
Page 9 of 193

Summary of Explosion Simulations
Area
Compression Area
Process Production
Deck
Process Mezz. and
Cellar Decks
Wellbay area
Gas Turbine/ Power
Generation
TR wall East
Blast wall rating(s)

(Bar)
DLB 0.7, 150ms
SLB 0.25, 200ms
DLB 2.7, 80ms
SLB 0.9, 100ms
DLB 1.5, 100ms
SLB 0.5, 150ms
DLB 1.1, 100ms
SLB 0.4, 150ms
DLB 0.3, 150ms
SLB 0.1, 150ms
DLB 0.3, 150ms
SLB 0.1, 150ms
General Area
overpressure (Bar)
DLB 0.7, 150ms
SLB 0.25, 200ms
DLB 1.4, 100ms
SLB 0.5, 150ms
DLB 0.72, 100ms
SLB 0.25, 150ms
DLB 1.1, 100ms
SLB 0.4, 150ms
DLB 0.3, 150ms
SLB 0.1, 150ms
N/A
Critical Pipework
Drag loads
DLB 12 kN/m2
SLB 5 kN/m2
DLB 30 kN/m2
SLB 20 kN/m2
DLB 30 kN/m2
SLB 10 kN/m2
DLB 20 kN/m2
SLB 8 kN/m2
DLB 10 kN/m2
SLB 3.3 kN/m2
N/A
Far Field Effects

Far field effects from explosions are explosion loads in areas resulting from an
explosion in another area. These will determine the required explosion resistance
capacities of enclosure walls, wind walls, stairtower cladding in non-hazardous areas,
walls of the DES and DSM.
DLB far field pressures are used to identify design requirements in order to prevent
escalation in other areas and to enable escape of personnel to the TR.
When a blast wave impinges on a flat vertical surface, e.g of an enclosure or blast wall,
the pressure at the wall is the sum of the incident pressure wave and the resulting
reflected wave. For normal incidence the wall will see a peak pressure close to double
the incident pressure wave and must be designed to resist this received pressure.
The far field loads on vessels and equipment in non-hazardous areas are the same as
the incident pressure loads. This is also the case for small enclosures/containers. In
these cases reflection effects do not contribute.
Explosion Requirements
Within the Area of an Explosion
In resisting a DLB explosion equipment and their supports may deform plastically, for a
SLB explosion the response should be elastic. Essential safety critical equipment
should be available for use after an explosion has occurred.
Equipment Within the Area of an Explosion
Supports
Vessel Integrity
No
Equipment Type
DLB
SLB
Check
Check
Hydrocarbon Containing

(SLB)
Venting and Flare Systems

(DLB)
Well Control Systems

(DLB)
Non-Hydrocarbon Containing

Safety Critical

Page 10 of 193

Hydrocarbon and safety critical non hydrocarbon pipework must resist the relative
movement effects of the vessel on its supports and connections to decks and walls.
They must resist direct drag loads for the SLB event elastically.
Outside the Area of an Explosion
Equipment outside the area of explosion is also affected and needs protection from far
field effects and drag loads, as well as indirect loads such as pipe support
displacements due to wall and deck deflections.
Equipment in an Area Adjacent to an Explosion
Equipment Type
Hydrocarbon/safety critical Piping
equipment
Safety Critical Non-Hydrocarbon
Containing
Other Non-Hydrocarbon
Containing
Resist Deck/Blast
Wall Movements
(DLB)
Resist Far field

effects
(DLB drag
effects)
(DLB)
(DLB)
(DLB)
(DLB)
Supports
(SLB)
Structural Explosion Requirements

Fire and Blast Walls
After a DLB event fire/blast walls shall survive the DLB without rupture and be able to
resist subsequent fires long enough for escape to be possible for those not in the
immediate area of the blast. After the explosion the wall should not impinge on
equipment on the non loaded side.
SLB loads should be resisted elastically. Fire/blast panels should be designed to resist
loads due to SLB explosion without buckling or damage to the PFP.
During an SLB or DLB event blast walls should not encroach into escape ways by more
than 150mm. They should resist, where possible, any secondary projectiles. If a
penetration through the wall is present they shall deflect/deform less than +/- 40mm.
Wind Walls
Far field loads on wind walls in non-hazardous areas act inboard towards the deck
centres. Wind walls in hazardous areas are designed to fail outboard under direct
explosion loading.
Decks
Fire/blast resistant decks shall survive the DLB without rupture and resist the SLB
explosion loads elastically.
A plated deck area (floor or roof) within 5m of a blast wall on the loaded side shall be
designed to the same DLB pressure as the blast wall.
Grated areas should be designed to withstand drag loading from either side. The
grating should not pop out when loaded from below by an SLB explosion event.
Page 11 of 193

Introduction
The Clair Ridge Project is the second part of a phased development of the Clair Field
located on the UKCS.
The Greater Clair Field is located 75km West of Shetland. It extends over an area of
220km2 in water depths of approximately 140m.
The first development phase (Clair Phase 1) was sanctioned in 2001. It was developed
with a single fixed platform with production and process topsides facilities supported by a
steel jacket and associated oil and gas export facilities. Phase 1 achieved first production
in February 2005.
The second phase of the development (Clair Ridge) is planned to target the part of the
field to the north of Clair Phase 1. The Clair Ridge facilities have two fixed steel Jacket
Platforms & Topsides, bridge-linked, comprising of a Drilling and Production (DP) platform
and a Quarters and Utilities (QU) platform. The new Clair Ridge facilities will tie in to the
existing oil and gas export pipelines to the Shetland Islands. There is also provision on
DP for future subsea tie-backs. The target for first oil production is Q2 2016.
Scope of Document
The scope of application of this document includes all relevant equipment, facilities,
systems and processes that form part of the BP Clair Ridge development regardless of
the primary responsible design contractor. Any exceptions will be explicitly highlighted
within the relevant sections of the document. This document is applicable for the Detail
Design phase which is part of the EXECUTE Stage.
This document describes:-
2.1
The approach taken to manage the explosion risk on the Clair Ridge Installation
(the QU and DP platforms).
The approach used for the selection of the explosion loads to be applied in the
design of the structure, vessels, equipment and pipework on Clair Ridge.
Disclaimer
Information relating to the scope of supply by third parties (RDS and CB&I) is provided by
AMEC in this document. It is the responsibility of the third parties to seek confirmation
from the originator of the information (BP Exploration Operating Company Ltd.)
2.2
Document Overview
The first Section is the Executive Summary for this document.
Sections 2 to 3 give a brief introduction to the Clair Ridge project and describe the
scope and purpose of this document.
Section 4 is a list of Acronyms used.
Section 5 gives guidance on the implementation of Inherently Safer Design

principles. Section 5.4 describes the method of ranking the criticality of structures,
vessels, equipment and piping determined by their impact on escape and
evacuation and escalation consequences.
Section 6 describes the design load cases for explosions based on exceedance
probabilities and return periods.
Page 12 of 193

Section 7 gives a summary of the explosion resistance requirements to be applied

in the Clair Ridge design.
Section 8.1 deals with the performance requirements for fire/blast barriers, decks
and enclosures. Tables 8.1 (for DP) and 8.2 (for QU) give detailed definitions of
the design pressures and durations by location.
Section 8.2 details the loads to be applied to vessels and equipment items in
order that the supports and deck connections, nozzles and connected pipework
may survive the required load levels appropriate to the nature of the equipment
and its location. Table 8.3 gives a detailed definition of the required explosion
resistance for equipment items depending on their location. This Table has been
updated to reflect the equipment locations and Tag numbers from the C1 revisions
of the QU and DP plot plans.
Section 9 deals with items typically smaller than one metre in diameter. The BP
requirements for the resistance of pipework are listed. Piping systems identified as
critical based on the BP requirements are identified. Indirect (prescribed
displacement) and direct drag explosion loads derived for Clair Ridge explosion
simulations are defined.
Sections 9.2 and 9.3 identify the lines requiring blast protection (support) by
system and function according to the likely inventory which would be released
after an explosion.
Sections 10.1 to 10.3 describe the variation of drag loads on piping due to
location, in particular their proximity to decks and walls.
Sections 10.4 to 10.7 discuss drag loads in the far field and indirect loads on
piping.
Section 10.8 deals with the survival requirements for hazard control and hazard
mitigation systems by reference to Table B.1
The main Conclusions, recommendations and actions are listed in Section 11.
Table 11.1 lists the actions on other disciplines required to implement the
Explosion Strategy.
Appendix A describes the Inherent Safety Features to reduce explosion risk
Appendix B identifies the explosion design requirements for additional safety

critical systems.
Appendix C reports the explosion load requirements from BP [1,2]
Appendix D is a summary of the method used to determine out of balance loads

on equipment and vessels
Appendix E A note on the segregation of the wellhead and process areas
Appendix F The design pressures for the Stair Tower cladding, and the design
approach for stairtowers exposed directly to explosion loads.
Appendix G records further information received from BP in response to e-mail

requests
Appendix H Describes the requirements for the goods lifts on QU and DP
Appendix I Summarises the Strong shock response analysis

Page 13 of 193

Appendix J The elevation drawings for the area protection requirements for QU
and DP are included.
Page 14 of 193

2.3
The use of this document

Overpressure
Structural requirements for blast walls, decks,
enclosures, barriers crane pedestals and bridge
Go to Section
8.1 Structures
for introduction
Table 8.1 Direct

explosion loads
on Structural
elements on DP
DP or QU?
Table 8.2 Direct

explosion loads
on Structural
elements on QU
Out of Balance Pressure Loads

Requirements for support and integrity of equipment
and vessel items > 1m in effective diameter.
Search on equipment Tag Number and the relevant
section should appear.
Go to section 8.2 for

introduction and
description of calculation
of out of balance loads
Table 8.3 Explosion loads on Vessels and

Equipment by Area, Equipment item
Out of balance loads for design of supports/ Design
loads for vessel integrity
Drag Loads
Loads on Critical Pipework, valves, flare and
blowdown systems, flowlines process manifolds.
(<1m in effective diameter)
Go to sections 9 and 10 for introduction and

description of direct drag loads and indirect
displacement load requirements
Page 15 of 193

Purpose of Document
The purpose of the Explosion Overpressure Protection Strategy is firstly to describe the
Inherently Safer Design (ISD) principles which have been applied to the design and to
identify Safety Critical Elements with respect to the explosion hazard.
The report then takes the results of FLACS CFD explosion simulations performed by BP
as communicated to AMEC in Site Instructions [1 and 2] and applies them to structures
and equipment items on DP and QU. These SIs together with a subsequent Engineering
Query [34] define the Design explosion load levels to be applied and the durations of
these loads.
Design Explosion loads are given for structures, blast walls, pipework and decks from the
Site Instructions CLB-BP-AM-SI-000164 and CLB-BP-AM-SI-000171 [1 and 2]. Out of
balance and direct loads on equipment and equipment supports have largely been
inferred from the supplied information. AMEC do not have detailed knowledge of the
simulation results, scenarios, or the determination of the design explosion load cases.
The report identifies which items need to be designed against explosion loads and
defines the load types, magnitudes and durations to be used when assessing the
response to these loads.
Acronyms
Acronym
Description
ALARP
As Low As Reasonable Practicable
AVM
Anti-vibration Mounts
BDV
Blow Down Valve
CAD
Computer Aided Design
CFD
Computational Fluid Dynamics
DES
Drilling Equipment Skid
DLB
Ductility Level Blast 100,000 year return evacuation event
DP
Drilling and Production platform
DSM
Drilling Support Module
EDP
Emergency Depressurisation Valves
EER
Emergency Escape and Rescue
ESD
Emergency Shutdown
ESDV
Emergency Shutdown Valve
F&G
Fire and Gas
GT
Gas Turbine
ISD
Page 16 of 193

Acronym
Description
LER
Local Equipment Room
LQ
Living Quarters
ms
Millisecond (1,000th of a second)
NPD
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
PA/GA
Public Address/General Alarm
PDMS
Plant Design Management System
PFP
Passive Fire Protection
QRA
Quantitative Risk Assessment
QU
Quarters and Utility platform
RESDV
Riser Emergency Shut Down Valves
SCDM
Safety Critical Design Measure
SCE
Safety Critical Element
SCS
Safety Critical System
SFU
Southern Fields Unit
SI
Site Instruction
SLB
Strength Level Blast 10,000 year return design explosion event
TEMPSC
Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft
TR
Temporary Refuge
UKCS
U.K. Continental Shelf
Page 17 of 193

5
5.1
Explosion Strategy
The Clair Ridge platforms are being designed according to Inherently Safer Design
principles.
Inherently Safer Design, is focused on the choice of design solutions that by preference
eliminate hazards or reduce risk, rather than relying on complex protective systems that
only react once a hazardous situation starts to develop.
The following is an illustration of an inherently safer design approach hierarchy which
takes into account the established principles of Inherently Safer Design:
1.
2.
3.
Eliminate the hazard at source;

Eliminate the risk by removing the need for personnel to be present;
Reduce the scale of the hazard, e.g. by reducing the quantity of hazardous material,
substituting less hazardous materials, reducing the frequency or scale of releases;
Reduce the risk by reducing the time that personnel are directly exposed to the
hazard;
Utilise passive hazard management measures;
Utilise simple robust active hazard management measures that are fail safe
4.
5.
6.
Method 1 is the most effective form of inherently safer design whereas method 6 is
potentially the least effective hazard management solution. The application of inherently
safer design principles to Clair Ridge is discussed in detail in the Technical Safety
Philosophy [3].
5.2
Explosion Hazard Management

Explosion risk is defined as the risk from the initiating event and subsequent escalation.
The means of ensuring that this risk is reduced to as low as reasonably practicable can
be broken down into a number of high level goals.
These goals include:
the identification of all areas of the installation where there is potential for
explosion events to occur
the elimination of the potential for explosion events to occur, or if this is not
achievable
the minimisation of the frequency of explosion events
the minimisation of the consequence of explosion events
the implementation of a safety management system which ensures that the above
goals are consistently achievable.
The general approach to dealing with explosions within the design process of the Clair
Ridge Facilities has been firstly to apply the principles of inherent safety to address the
above goals.
The measures implemented to reduce explosion risk are detailed in Appendix A.
Page 18 of 193

5.3
Safety Critical Elements

Safety Critical Elements are defined as any part of an installation or plant (including
computer programmes):
The failure of which could cause or contribute to a major accident; or
A purpose of which is to prevent, or limit the effect of, a major accident.
The Safety Critical Elements on Clair Ridge have been identified in Reference 9 and are
discussed in the corresponding performance standards.
Consideration of safety-critical elements shall include systems for the prevention,
detection, control and mitigation of major accidents. Items improving reliability by
providing redundancy or diversity should also be considered.
Explosion protection requirements for Safety Critical Systems not included in Tables 8.1,
8.2 or 8.3 are given in Appendix B, Table B.1 which describes the treatment of these
systems with respect to explosion loads.
5.4
Criticality Ranking and Explosion loads

Two levels of design explosion loading are recommended for explosion assessment
[10,11,12]. The ductility level blast (DLB) is the design level overpressure used to
represent the extreme design event.
The strength level blast (SLB) represents a more frequent design event where it is
required that the structure, equipment supports and piping supports does not deform
plastically and that the relevant equipment remains operational.
These levels are defined in Section 6 on Design Load Cases.
For the purposes of classification of Safety Critical elements (Vessels, equipment, piping,
Safety Systems and fire/blast barriers) the following levels of criticality are defined [10].
The intention is that the items in the higher criticality categories are examined in more
detail, perhaps using more sophisticated methods of analysis. These definitions have
been based on GP 24-22 [13] and the UK Oil and Gas Fire and Explosion Guidance [10].
The purpose of the criticality classification is to determine whether structure, equipment
supports, and piping systems should be designed to withstand SLB, DLB, or have no
special performance requirements over and above inherent strength limits. The
recommended approach [13] is as follows:
1. Criticality 1: Items whose failure in explosion could cause impairment of TR or
evacuation facilities. These items should be designed to withstand both SLB and DLB
blast loads. Performance standard these items must not fail during the Ductility Level
Blast (DLB) or Strength Level Blast (SLB); ductile response of the support structure is
allowed during the DLB. In addition, for Clair Ridge, structural support for hydrocarbon
containing equipment has been considered to be Criticality 1 and therefore must also not
fail during the DLB or SLB.
Page 19 of 193

2. Criticality 2: Items whose failure in explosion could cause major escalation resulting in
fatalities in addition to those caused by original explosion. These items should be
designed to withstand the SLB design blast loads.
3. Criticality 3: Items whose failure in explosion is considered tolerable. These items need
not be designed to withstand any specific design blast loads. These items have no
functional significance in an explosion event and must not become or generate projectiles
(small detached fragments).
Based on these criticality levels, it is considered that the Clair Ridge Safety Critical
Elements/Systems can be categorised as follows:
Criticality 1:
Safety critical structure including LERs, the TR, i.e. primary

beams, blast/fire walls, decks, ESD and blowdown system,
flare, and well isolation equipment shall be designed to
withstand the DLB and SLB.
Supporting
structures
of
hydrocarbon
containing
vessels/equipment (see Section 8.2 Table 8.3) to remain
intact when the vessels/equipment are subjected to the SLB
and DLB blast loads (blast loads on the structure and
drag/out
of
balance
pressure
loads
on
the
vessels/equipment they support).
Supporting structures for the DES including the skid beams
and supporting structural steelwork.
Criticality 2:
All hydrocarbon containing vessels and equipment have

been designated as Criticality 2 due to their potential to
cause a major hydrocarbon release and escalation affecting
more than one area and therefore should be designed to
withstand the SLB.
Other non-hydrocarbon containing vessels/equipment to
remain in-place when subjected to the SLB loads.
Criticality 3:
Other SCSs (see Appendix B).
Page 20 of 193

Implementation of the Explosion Protection Strategy
6.1
Design Load Cases

Usually the worst case, absolute maximum overpressure is far too large to be withstood
by the structure. ALARP arguments are appropriate and can be used to demonstrate that
risk levels have been reduced to acceptable levels. The worst case peak overpressure
will often correspond to an event with a return period out of proportion with the design life
of the installation. A frequency of between 10-4 and 10-5 exceedance per year is
considered a reasonable frequency for the ductility level explosion (DLB) event by
analogy with the treatment of environmental, earthquake and ship impact loads which are
often considered at the 10-4 per annum level.
The Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety Cases document [20] states that the
frequency with which accidental events result in loss of integrity of the temporary refuge
within the minimum stated endurance time, does not exceed the order of 1 in 1,000 per
year. The NPD code [21] also gives an allowable upper limit on TR impairment frequency
of 10-3 per year.
It is reasonable and conservative to assume that the threat from fires exceeds that from
explosions by a factor of 10 and an impairment frequency of 1 in 10,000 per year is a
reasonable estimate for explosion impairment. Hence a target of 10-4 to10-5 exceedance
per year for an explosion event which directly impinges on the TR is reasonable. An
explosion event in the process area will be separated from the TR by a barrier or blast
wall which should withstand the load and have an impairment probability of much less
than 10 %, giving a target frequency for such an event of the order of 10-4 exceedance
per year.
On Clair Ridge a more conservative approach has been taken. Exceedance curves have
been used to determine the DLB and SLB load cases on the basis that the DLB event will
be that which occurs with an exceedance frequency of approximately 10-5 per year and
the SLB being either a third of the magnitude of the DLB or an event with exceedance
frequency of less than 10-4 per year whichever is the greater. These levels of exceedance
for the DLB are recommended in the BP document [11].
The early explosion simulations are reported in the Preliminary Explosion Assessment,
March 2010 [36] The aim was to identify the effects of grating decks and the inclusion of
the blast wall on grid line 4, between the wellbay and process areas. The conclusion was
that the overpressures experienced in the wellbay do not show any significant change
with or without the additional blast wall on the east side of the wellbay. It was
recommended in the Conclusions that the blast wall on the east side of the wellbay area
should be included in the design. This is discussed in more detail in Appendix E.
A second set of simulations were performed in June/July 2010 following the scope given
in reference [37]. The exceedance curves required to define the DLB and SLB explosion
overpressures were generated by Atkins and partially reported in [38].
The upper limit of exceedance of 10-5 per year for the DLB explosion events has been
adopted at this stage of the Clair Ridge project to account for the uncertainties in the blast
analyses as below:Page 21 of 193

The extent and position of the wind walls and stair tower cladding, giving rise to
reduced ventilation and an increased probability of the occurrence of an
explosion, was not represented in the explosion simulations.
The extent and position of plated areas on the process production and mezzanine
decks were not known.
The level of congestion in the process area is very high as a result of the decision
to retain the deck elevations used on Clair 1 and the two train design adopted for
Clair Ridge. This congestion has a crucial effect on the overpressure. At the time
of execution of the explosion simulations, the level of congestion was unknown
and was estimated by BP from past experience.
A number of equipment items have been moved between and within the Process
and Compressions areas. An opening has been created in the compression roof
which could affect the far field explosion overpressures in the vicinity of the
Compression area roof.
The horizontal extent of the blast wall on line 4 at Cellar deck level has been
reduced, this may impact on the far field loads in the Wellbay area resulting from
an explosion in the Process area and vice-versa.
The SLB and DLB events have the following design implications: Strength Level Blast (SLB)
This should result in elastic response of the primary structure. In this case primary
and secondary steelwork should remain within elastic limits. Local damage to
tertiary steelwork is acceptable. Blast/fire walls shall remain gas proof and
attached to the structure. Vessels should remain on their supports and potentially
the installation should be able to re-start safely after the event.
The strength level blast represents a more frequent design event where it is required that
the structure, equipment supports and piping supports do not deform plastically. A simple
linear elastic, dynamic analysis may be used for response calculations.
Essential safety systems should remain operational with escape routes useable
after the event. Plastic deformation of the structure is acceptable provided
collapse does not occur and barriers remain in place. The duration of fire
resistance following a DLB event is intended to be long enough for escape to be
possible for those not in the immediate area of the blast. Immediate catastrophic
(structural) failure should not occur and the design should minimise uncontrolled
escalation to major inventories. The overall structural integrity of the QU and DP
platforms is required to be maintained for 1 hour to allow for mustering and
evacuation [33].
The additional requirement adopted for Clair Ridge [18] is that primary structure without
redundancy (where there is no alternative load path available) should remain elastic
during the DLB.
The SLB load case will often identify weaknesses in the design which the DLB may not
identify, in particular deck rebound effects. If the reserves of strength of ductile structures
are taken into account, the same structure should withstand both the DLB and the SLB
with only minor modifications. The load durations and load time histories to be used for
design are identified in Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. A detailed explanation of their origin (SI
CLB-BP-AM-SI-000171 Reference 2) is given in Appendix C.
Page 22 of 193

Clair Ridge - Summary of explosion requirements
7.1
Main Results from Simulations:-
The Table below summarises the main results of the FLACS explosion simulations performed by BP.
Table 7.1 Main results of explosion simulations
Area
Blast wall
/enclosure
rating(s) (Bar)
Compression Area DLB 0.7, 150ms
SLB 0.25, 200ms
Process Production DLB 2.7, 80ms
Deck
SLB 0.9, 100ms
Process Mezz. and DLB 1.5, 100ms
Cellar Decks
SLB 0.5, 150ms
Wellbay area
DLB 1.1, 100ms
SLB 0.4, 150ms
DP Utility area (far DLB 0.1 to 0.2,
field)
200ms: SLB 0.05,
200ms
Gas Turbine/ Power DLB 0.3, 150ms
Generation (QU)
SLB 0.1, 150ms
TR wall East
DLB 0.3, 150ms
SLB 0.1, 150ms
QU
DLB 0.15 to 0.2,
Production/Mezz. 150ms.
Decks (far field)
SLB 0.05, 150ms
QU Cellar Deck (far DLB 0.1, 150ms
field)
SLB 0.033, 150ms
General Area
overpressure (Bar)
[note 1]
DLB 0.7, 150ms
SLB 0.25, 200ms
DLB 1.4, 100ms
SLB 0.5, 150ms
DLB 0.72, 100ms
SLB 0.25, 150ms
DLB 1.1, 100ms
SLB 0.4, 150ms
DLB 0.1, 200ms
SLB 0.05, 200ms
Critical Pipework
Drag loads
[notes 2, 3]
DLB 12 kN/m2
SLB 5 kN/m2
DLB 30 kN/m2
SLB 20 kN/m2
DLB 30 kN/m2
SLB 10 kN/m2
DLB 20 kN/m2
SLB 8 kN/m2
1/3 of overpressure
DLB 0.3, 150ms

SLB 0.1, 150ms
N/A
DLB 10 kN/m2
SLB 3.3 kN/m2
N/A
DLB 0.06, 150ms

SLB 0.06, 150ms
1/3 of overpressure
(1 Bar = 100 kN/m2 )
DLB 0.06, 150ms

SLB 0.06, 150ms
1/3 of overpressure
(1 Bar = 100 kN/m2 )
Notes:
1.
These are generalised values applied to decks and equipment items. For a detailed
breakdown see Tables 8.1 to 8.3
2.
In the area of an explosion some critical pipework requires protection to the DLB
level (Section 8.4).
3.
For equipment/piping far field loads, take DLB for Safety critical equipment and SLB
otherwise.
Figure 7.1 below is a summary of the maximum overpressures for the hazardous areas of
Clair Ridge.
Page 23 of 193

TR Wall East
DLB 0.3,
150ms
SLB 0.1, 150ms
Gas Turbine/ Power

Generation Module
General Area: DLB 0.3, 150ms
SLB 0.1, 150ms
Roof DLB 0.3,
Floor DLB 0.2
QU Platform
Flare Boom
Bridge
DP Platform
Compression Module
General Area: DLB 0.7,SLB 0.25
Blast W all rating: DLB 0.7, 150ms
SLB 0.25, 200ms
Rated Decks: DLB 0.7, SLB 0.25
Blast Walls
main deck
production deck
Process Production Deck

General Area:DLB 1.4, SLB 0.5
Blast Wall rating:DLB 2.7, 80ms
SLB 0.9, 100ms
Rated Decks:DLB 1.4, SLB 0.5
mezzanine deck
cellar deck
Bridge (Far field effects)

General Area: DLB 0.1,SLB 0.05
Walkway and heat shielding: local DLB
0.2 bar, 200ms SLB 0.1, 200ms
DP Utility Area (Far field effects)

General Area: DLB 0.1, SLB 0.05
Blast wall: DLB 0.1 to 0.2, 200ms
Cellar deck rating: DLB 0.1 bar,
SLB 0.05 bar
Well Bay area

General Area: DLB 1.1, SLB 0.4
Blast wall rating: DLB 1.1, 100ms
SLB 0.4, 150ms
Main Deck lower surface: DLB 1.5,
SLB 0.5
Process Mezzanine and Cellar

Decks
General Area:DLB 0.72, SLB 0.25
Blast Wall rating:DLB 1.5, 100m s
SLB 0.5, 150ms
Rated Decks:DLB 0.72, SLB 0.25
Data based on Site Instruction

CLB-BP-AM-SI-000164-01
Figure 7.1 Peak Overpressures for the affected areas on Clair Ridge
Page 24 of 193

The area within 5m of the blast wall has the higher pressures indicated applied to the
walls and the decks. These pressures should also be used when considering piping
collapse under external pressure in these areas.
Page 25 of 193

7.2
Equipment, vessels and piping in an area where an explosion

occurs
In resisting a DLB explosion, equipment items and their supports may deform
plastically. For a SLB explosion the response should be elastic. Essential safety critical
equipment should be available for use after an explosion has occurred.
Table 7.2 Summary of Requirements for equipment within the area of an explosion
Equipment Within the Area of an Explosion
Supports
Vessel Integrity
No
Equipment Type
DLB
SLB
Check
Check

(SLB)
Venting and Flare Systems

(DLB)
Well Control Systems

(DLB)
Non-Hydrocarbon Containing

Hydrocarbon piping

(SLB)
Safety Critical

Hydrocarbon and safety critical non hydrocarbon pipework must resist the relative
movement effects of the vessel on its supports and connections to decks and walls.
They must resist direct drag loads for the SLB event elastically.
Hydrocarbon containing vessels and equipment
Must remain in place during the DLB plastic deformation of the supports is allowed but
failure should not occur.
Must remain in place during the SLB supports must remain elastic.
Must resist the peak SLB overpressure applied to the vessel shell and nozzles without
plastic deformation.
Must resist the peak SLB out of balance pressure applied to the vessel shell and
nozzles.
Venting and flare systems vent headers and sub headers
failure/rupture should not occur.
Must resist the peak DLB overpressure applied to the piping, vessels and valves.
Must resist the peak DLB out of balance pressure/drag loads applied to the piping,
vessels and valves.
Well control systems
failure/rupture should not occur.
Including well head valves, flowlines and well kill lines must resist the peak DLB
overpressure values.
Must resist the peak DLB out of balance pressure/drag loads applied to the piping,
vessels and valves.
Deluge system must resist the DLB drag loads in the Wellhead area.
Non- hydrocarbon containing vessels and equipment
Must remain in place during the SLB supports must remain elastic.
No integrity checks of the equipment itself against explosion loads.
Page 26 of 193

Safety Critical Non-hydrocarbon pipe-work

Consider redundancy, disparate routes as an option.
Must resist the relative movement effects of the vessel on its supports and connections
to decks and walls, for the SLB event without plastic deformation.
Must resist direct drag loads for the SLB event elastically.
Hydrocarbon piping
Must resist the relative movement effects of the vessel on its supports and connections
to decks and walls, for the SLB event without plastic deformation.
Must resist direct drag loads for the SLB event elastically (no leakage).
7.3
Equipment, vessels and piping adjacent to an area where an

explosion occurs
Equipment outside the area of explosion is also affected and needs protection from far
field effects and drag loads, as well as indirect loads such as pipe support
displacements due to wall and deck deflections.
Table 7.3 Summary of requirements for equipment in an adjacent area
Equipment in an Area Adjacent to an Explosion
Equipment Type
Hydrocarbon/safety critical
Piping
Safety Critical NonHydrocarbon Containing
Other Non-Hydrocarbon
Containing
Resist Deck/Blast
Wall Movements
(DLB)
Safety
Critical

Resist Far
field effects
(DLB
drag effects)
(DLB)
(DLB)
Supports

(DLB)
(DLB)
(SLB)
Hydrocarbon/critical piping
Must resist the deck/blast wall movement effects for a DLB explosion in an adjacent
area.
Drag loads are estimated to be 1/3 of overpressure loads.
Must resist the far field direct drag effects from a DLB explosion in an adjacent area.
Hydrocarbon containing vessels and equipment
area.
Must resist the far field direct explosion load effects from a DLB explosion in an
adjacent area.
Safety Critical Non- hydrocarbon containing vessels and equipment
area.
Must resist the far field direct explosion load effects from a DLB explosion in an
adjacent area.
Non- hydrocarbon containing vessels and equipment
Page 27 of 193

Supports must be designed so that vessels and equipment remains in-place and elastic
under far field SLB loading.
7.4
Blast/fire barriers (including decks)

Must retain their integrity without rupture against the DLB event.
Must remain elastic during the SLB event.
Displacements must be limited to avoid damage to vessels, piping and equipment on the
side not directly impacted by a DLB explosion.
7.5
Blast Division Capacities

The design capacities for barriers/enclosure walls and decks under the DLB explosion
events are given in Table 7.1, Figure 7.1 and the area protection and fire/blast division
layout drawings, References 15 and 16. Details are supplied for each wall and deck in
Tables 8.1 and 8.2.
Where values are given for enclosures outside the areas where an explosion can occur
these correspond to the far field DLB explosion overpressures including the influence of
pressure doubling or reflection effects at surfaces.
7.6
Fire and Explosion

BP only require the consideration of escalation events when the secondary event (fire or
explosion) is more severe than the initiating event.
7.6.1
Blast followed by fire

This is considered the more likely scenario where a primary release from a hydrocarbon
inventory results in an explosion which then gives rise to secondary hydrocarbon releases
which are ignited immediately by residual hot surfaces giving rise to a fire.
For a substantial explosion, at the SLB level, the isolation system and blowdown system
are assumed to be operating during a secondary release, because of the time taken to
accumulate a sufficiently large flammable gas cloud and the late ignition which occurs
when the cloud has reached sufficient size.
Research conducted for the Clair Ridge project indicates that the PFP on major blast
walls under the DLB, will only be damaged locally and mainly at stiffeners away from the
wall plate surface. It is expected that the fire performance of the walls will not be
significantly affected by this.
7.6.2
Fire followed by blast

This scenario combination is not considered credible.
A large fire will heat up local surfaces and provide an immediate ignition source for any
secondary releases. The delayed ignition needed for a significant blast is not likely to
occur.
Page 28 of 193

8
8.1
Explosion Loads
Structures
The structural barriers to be designed are identified in the Area protection and fire/blast
division layouts for DP and QU, references [15, 16]. Copies of these drawings are
included in Appendix J.
The fire/blast walls and fire/blast resistant decks shall survive the ductility level blast
(DLB) without rupture and the strength level blast (SLB) explosion loads elastically. These
blast levels are identified in Tables 7.1, 8.1 and 8.2.
Suction phase loads will be included as discussed in Appendix C.
The SLB loads should be resisted elastically without plastic deformation.
The fire/blast panels shall be designed to resist all imposed loads from
transportation, SLB explosion and lift load cases without buckling or damage to
the PFP.
The walls shall be designed to survive the DLB without rupture and be able to
resist subsequent fires for long enough for escape to be possible for those not in
the immediate area of the blast. Immediate catastrophic failure should not occur
and the design should prevent uncontrolled escalation to major inventories.
Fire/blast barriers decks and enclosures in areas where an explosion could occur
should resist where possible, secondary projectiles (small objects picked up by
the blast wind) with energies of the order of 5 to 10 kJ [13].
Displacement limits given in the Structural Design documents [17,18, 29] should
be satisfied in order to allow design of piping and vessel supports. Performance
Standards [7,19] should be taken into account.
Blast walls should not encroach into escape ways more than 150mm under the
SLB or DLB event [11, Section 8.7].
Equipment should be located more than 300mm from a blast wall. A wall
subjected to a DLB explosion event shall not impinge on equipment on the nonloaded side.
Blast walls shall deflect/deform less than +40mm or -40mm where a penetration
through the wall is present in order to satisfy the requirements of [41].
For structures with diameter less than 1 metre the drag loads given in Section 10
should be used.
For the location of enclosures and fire/blast barriers, see [15], [16] and Appendix
J.
More detailed structural requirements are given in the Design Brief for blast design,
Reference 29.
Page 29 of 193

8.1.1
Far field effects

Far field effects from explosions are explosion loads in areas resulting from an explosion
in another area. These will determine the required explosion resistance capacities of
enclosure walls, wind walls, stairtower cladding in non-hazardous areas. In addition the
walls of the DES and DSM will have their required capacities determined by these far field
loads. DLB far field pressures are used to identify design requirements in order to prevent
escalation in other areas and to enable escape of personnel to the TR.
When a blast wave impinges on a flat vertical surface the pressure at the wall is the sum
of the incident pressure wave and the resulting reflected wave. For normal incidence the
wall will see a peak pressure close to double the incident pressure wave and must be
designed to resist this received pressure. The pressures given in Tables 8.1 and 8.2
include this effect and relate to received values.
A full listing of the design pressures and a description of the design approach to be used
for cladding/heat shields on the stairtowers on Clair Ridge is included in Appendix F.
The far field loads on wind walls in non-hazardous areas act inboard towards the deck
centres. Wind walls in hazardous areas are designed to fail outboard under direct
explosion loading. The design capacities for wind walls in non-hazardous areas are
determined by the far field explosion loads. These are given in drawings listed as
Reference 42, produced by the Architectural group.
The far field loads on vessels and equipment in non-hazardous areas are the same as
the incident pressure loads. This is also the case for small enclosures/containers. In
these cases reflection effects do not dominate. The design pressures for these items are
given in Table 8.3.
8.1.2
Enclosure frame design

In Table 8.1, Pressures on enclosure walls (and roofs) are given specifically for each
enclosure. These pressures act on the wall surfaces and the maximum pressure must be
considered on each surface and the support framing for the wall panels must take this
load.
In considering the overall stability of the enclosure (frame action), the out of balance
effects can be considered, as described in Appendix D where there is enough space
around the building to allow the blast wave wrap around. It is considered that a space of
5m between the building under consideration and adjacent walls or other solid
obstructions will be sufficient.
Where there is less than 5m around the building, engulfment cannot be relied on and the
out of balance load is the full load on the front face including reflection effects.
Out of balance loads can be modelled by applying the full received load to one wall and
the simultaneous credible reduced load on the opposite wall. The reverse loading
direction may also need to be considered.
Page 30 of 193

8.1.3
Decks
In designing deck structures to resist the DLB event, the reaction loads from all
equipment and vessel supports at the DLB level should be included in the analysis for
consistency. These may be obtained in Table 8.3 from the entries for hydrocarbon
containing vessels and equipment.
Part of a plated deck area (floor or roof) within 5m of a blast wall shall be designed to the
same DLB pressure as the blast wall.
Grated areas will experience a different load from plated areas such as the interiors of
bunds. Grated areas should be designed to withstand a drag loading from either side
appropriate to the area in which they are located, typical values are 10 to 30kN/m2. The
load on a grating panel should be applied to the total/gross area of the panel.
Grating should not pop out when loaded from below by an SLB explosion event. If the
grating forms part of an escape route, then the escape route should be useable after a
DLB explosion event. It is understood that all escape routes shall be plated.
8.1.4
Direct Explosion loads on structures

Tables 8.1 and 8.2 below identify structural items on DP and QU and the Design
explosion loads to be applied.
Owing to the uncertainty associated with duration of overpressure events, a range of
durations has been included for each explosion event. These follow the method described
in Appendix C. It should be ensured that the design meets the required overpressure
criteria for the given durations in each case. This applies to the entries in Tables 8.1, 8.2
and 8.3.
8.1.5
Explosion loads on associated equipment items outside enclosures

Certain items of equipment such as ducting, radiators, penetrating piping, cables etc. will
be located on the outside walls of enclosures. Generally these will be subject to the same
explosion loads as the enclosure walls or roofs to which they are connected.
HVAC ducts are connected to LER rooms and enclosures in 'non-hazardous' areas on
DP and QU. The HVAC ducting should withstand the far field DLB explosion loads
associated with the LER and TR enclosures they serve. Deformation of the ducting is
allowed so long as the duct continues to function. The supports should be designed to
prevent the ducting becoming detached.
Page 31 of 193

Table 8.1
Area
Compressor
Area
Direct Explosion loads on Structural Elements DP
Table 8.1 Direct Explosion loads on Structural Elements - DP

Description
Over pressure Design Comments/
Criteria
Recommendations
Plated areas of the
compressor
roof
(load from below).
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
0.7 Bar, Pulse durations: 90,
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
-0.35 Bar, Pulse duration:
180, 300 and 360ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
0.25 Bar, Pulse durations:
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
-0.125 Bar, Pulse duration:
250, 400 and 500ms.
Compressor
Area
Compressor
Area
Floor
(compressor
main deck load from
above)
Blastwall
between
compressor area and
Drill
Derrick
(compressor
area
side)
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms
Negative Pulse
-0.35 Bar, Pulse durations:
180, 300 and 360ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
The
maximum
deflection for the DLB
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
Hatches in the roof
should
be
secured
against these loads so
that they remain closed.
The structure should
resist the SLB without
permanent deformation.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
Page 32 of 193

Area
Flare Boom

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
Flare Boom (Base)
beneath Compressor
area roof.
Flare Tip
Flare Boom Flare Tip
Process
Production
Deck Area
Roof (Main Deck and

Compressor
area
Deck) more than 5m
from the blast wall on
line 4. Loads from
below.
Process
Production
Deck Area
Roof (Main Deck and

Compressor
under
deck area) less than
5m from the blast
wall on line 4. Loads
from below.
See Appendix G6
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
-0.35 Bar, Pulse durations;
180, 300 and 360ms.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
rupture of members or
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
0.25 Bar, Pulse Durations:
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
DLB Event
0.1 Bar, Pulse durations 90,
150 and 180ms.
Plated areas
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
120, 200 and 240ms.

SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
80 and 100ms.
Negative Pulse
100, 160 and 200ms.
(negative overpressure must
be greater than -1 bar which
is a vacuum)
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
120, 200 and 240ms.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
Grated areas should be
designed to withstand a
drag loading of 20
2
kN/m . Grating should
be designed not to pop
out under loading from
below.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
drag loading of 20
2
below
Page 33 of 193

Area
Process Area
Production
Deck

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
Floor
deck)
(Production
Process Area
Production
Deck
Blast wall between

process area and
well bay Process
area side.
Process Area
Production
Deck
All Primary Steel and

supports for blast
walls and panels.
Load on process area
side.
Plated areas loaded from

above
DLB Event
Positive pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
-0.3 Bar, Pulse durations 120,
200 and 240ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
300 and 360ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
80 and 100ms.
Negative Pulse
100, 160 and 200ms.
is a vacuum)
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
120, 200 and 240ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
80 and 100ms.
Negative Pulse
100, 160 and 200ms.
is a vacuum)
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
120, 200 and 240ms.

drag loading of 20
2
from
above.
kN/m
Grating
should
be
designed not to pop
2
out under 20 kN/m
loading from below.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
Page 34 of 193

Area
Process Area
Cellar and
Mezzanine
Decks

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
Roof
Deck)
(Production
Plated areas loaded from

below
DLB event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
-0.45 Bar, Pulse durations
180, 300 and 360ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
Process Area
Cellar and
Mezzanine
Decks
Mezzanine Deck
Loads from above.
Grated areas 10kN/m

pressure
on gross area
downwards.
Plated areas of Mezzanine

deck loaded from above.
DLB event
Positive Pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
60, 100 and 120ms.
SLB event
Positive pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative pulse
90, 150 and 180ms.

drag loading of 20
2
below.
These loads have a
20% safety margin
applied to take into
consideration
the
potential effects from
the wind walling. These
wind walls were not
included
in
the
explosion simulations
by BP.
Deck is partly grated
and this area should be
designed to withstand
drag loading.
Grating designed not to
pop out under loading
from below.
These loads have a
20% safety margin
consideration
the
wind walls were not
included
in
the
by BP.
Page 35 of 193

Area
Process Area
Cellar and
Mezzanine
Decks
Process Area
Cellar and
Mezzanine
Decks (contd.)

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
Mezzanine Deck
Loads from below
Grated area
pressure upwards.
10kN/m
Plated areas of Mezzanine

deck loaded from below.
DLB event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Floor (Cellar Deck)

more than 5m from
the blast wall on grid
line 4.
See Appendix G6
SLB event
Positive pulse
0.3 Bar, Pulse durations ms.
Negative pulse
150 and 180ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
Deck is partly grated

and this area should be
designed to withstand
drag loading.
Grating designed not to
pop out under loading
from below.
These loads have a
20% safety margin
consideration
the
wind walls were not
included
in
the
by BP.
These loads have a
20% safety margin
consideration
the
wind walls were not
included
in
the
by BP.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
The deck structure
should resist the SLB
without
permanent
deformation.
Page 36 of 193

Area
Process Area
Cellar and
Mezzanine
Decks (contd.)

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
Floor (Cellar Deck)
less than 5m from the
blast wall on grid line
4.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
120, 200 and 240ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms
Process Area
Cellar and
Mezzanine
Decks (contd.)
Blastwall
between
process area and
well bay load on
process side.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
120, 200 and 240ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms
These loads have a

20% safety margin
consideration
the
wind walls were not
included
in
the
explosion simulations.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
This structure should
These loads have a
20% safety margin
consideration
the
wind walls were not
included
in
the
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
Page 37 of 193

Area
Process Area
Cellar and
Mezzanine
Decks (contd.)

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
supports for blast
walls and panels.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
120, 200 and 240ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
Wellbay Areas
Production
Deck area
Roof (Main deck) on

wellbay side.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
120, 200 and 240ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
These loads have a

20% safety margin
consideration
the
the wind walls. These
wind walls were not
included
in
the
The
maximum
deflection
for
the
primary
steel
and
supports in the DLB
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
The Main deck has a
number of hatches to
cover
penetrations
required for the drill
string and workover
equipment. The unused
hatches should remain
closed during and after
the DLB event.
Page 38 of 193

Area
Wellbay Areas
Production
Deck area

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
Roof (Main deck and
skid beams) load
from above.
Loads on upper surface of

main deck (from far field
effects
from
events
in
Process, Compression and
gas turbine areas).
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
Wellbay Areas
Production
Deck area
Floor
(Production
Deck) Loads from
above and below
from explosion in
wellbay.
Loads on plated and grated

areas from above and below.
2
Grated area - 20 kN/m force

upwards or downwards.
Loads on plated laydown
areas on intervention deck.
North and South.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
120, 200 and 240ms.
This is a far field

incident blast wave of
0.1 bar (DLB). The
received load on the
deck will be the same
value. The maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
The Main deck has a
number of hatches to
cover
penetrations
required for the drill
string and workover
equipment.
These
hatches must remain
in-place.
Cover plates (grated)
need to be designed to
remain in place for a 20
2
kN/m load from below.
One section is likely to
be open during the
event.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
permanent deformation
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
300 and 360ms.
Page 39 of 193

Area
Wellbay Areas
Production
Deck
area
(Contd.)
Wellbay Areas
Production
Deck
area
(Contd.)
Wellbay Areas
Cellar to
Main deck

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
Blastwall
between
Process area and
Wellbay wellbay
area side.
Blastwall
between
wellbay and utility
area wellbay area
side.

supports for blast
walls panels and
platforms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
120, 200 and 240ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
300 and 360ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
120, 200 and 240ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
120, 200 and 240ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
Page 40 of 193

Area
Wellbay Areas
Cellar/
Mezzanine
Deck (Contd.)
Wellbay Areas
Cellar/
Mezzanine
Deck (Contd.)
Wellbay Areas
Cellar/
Mezzanine
Deck (Contd.)

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
(Mezzanine deck)
Floor (Cellar Deck)
Blastwall
between
process
cellar/mezzanine
area and wellbay
wellbay side.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
120, 200 and 240ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
120, 200 and 240ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
-0.1 Bar, Pulse durations;
250, 400 and 500ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
120, 200 and 240ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
300 and 360ms.
This deck is open.

Primary jacket bracing
and escape routes at
North and South ends,
will be loaded.
The maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
The maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
Page 41 of 193

Area
Wellbay Areas
Cellar deck
to main deck
North
Crane
pedestal (DP)
South Crane
pedestal (DP)

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
Blastwall
between
wellbay and utility
area utility area
side.
Crane pedestal
L - 89003
Crane pedestal
L - 89004
See Appendix G10
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
100 and 120ms.
Negative Pulse
120, 200 and 240ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
The maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
These are far field
loads from explosions
in the
process/compression
areas on DP.
Refs. [1,2], Appendix E
The
values
given
represent the maximum
overpressure to which it
could be subject - from
Production Area.

The
values
given
represent the maximum
overpressure to which it
could be subject - from
Compression Area.
Page 42 of 193

Area
DP Utility Area

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
The Fire pumps on
DP
are
now
containerised.
The loads given are
on the containers.
See Appendix G9
DP Utility Area
All West walls of

Emergency
switchroom,
HVAC
plantrooms, HV and
LV switch room, LER
room and workshop.
Loads applied to 5m
wrap
around
on
North, South walls
and
roofs
where
exposed.
See Appendix G9
DP Utility Area
External
walls
of
Emergency
switchroom,
HVAC
plantrooms, HV and
LV switch room, LER
room and workshop
not included in entry
above.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180 ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360 ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180 ms..
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360 ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180 ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360 ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180 ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360 ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
Explosion Source GT
area on QU.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside.
These loads include
reflection effects.
Explosion Sources
GT
area
on
QU
Process, Wellbay and
Compressor areas.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside.
These loads include
reflection effects.
Explosion Source
Wellbay and GT area.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside.
These loads include
reflection effects.
Page 43 of 193

Area
DP Utility Area

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
All walls of
North
West
South West
towers.
and
stair-
See Appendix F for a

full breakdown of
cladding/stairtower
explosion
design
capacities level by
level.
Bridge
Whole structure
For design of heat
shielding/deck plate,
pressure
doubling
effects apply giving a
peak local design
pressure of 0.2 bar.
See Appendix G2
DES
Entire,
exposed
equipment,
decks
and exposed primary
structure.
Design values for
walls are dealt with in
the following entries.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
0.08 Bar, Pulse Durations:
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
Incident
blast
wave
characteristics are given.
These could apply from any
direction
depending
on
source of explosion.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
Explosion Sources
Wellbay area, GT area
on QU platform.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside or impairs the
stairs as an escape
route
These
overpressures
are based on far field
effects from DP and the
GT on QU explosion
events, and are the
incident
blast
overpressures used for
global design.
The deck supports at
the QU and DP ends
will each accelerate
horizontally at 0.5g
during
explosion
events, and will move
an expected 4-5cm.
Source - DLB far field
effect of explosions in
GT, Process, Wellbay
or Compression areas.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in
adjacent
areas,
member rupture or
toppling of the derrick
structure
onto
the
platform.
Page 44 of 193

Area
DES
East,
North
and
South walls.

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
There will be a 5m
wrap around of 0.2
bar onto the West
wall from the North
and South walls and
on exposed decks.
Design capacities of
these walls are given.
See Appendix G9
DES West wall
DSM East and

West walls.
this wall are given
except for the wrap
around area from the
North
and
South
walls.
There will be a 5m
wrap around of 0.2
bar onto the North
and South walls and
on exposed decks.
these walls are given.
See Appendix G9
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
200
and
250ms.
(BP
instruction Appendix G5)
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.

The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.

The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
Page 45 of 193

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
Area
DSM
North
and
South
walls
and
exposed
equipment.
Entire
exposed
equipment external
Structure. Pipe deck
open on East side.
these walls are given
except for the 5m
wrap around of 0.2
bar from the East and
West walls.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
DSM and DES

stairtowers
and cladding
LER
and
HVAC Room
enclosure on
compression
area roof.
All external walls of

LER
and
HVAC
Room on compressor
roof.
Note this has now
moved to the NW
corner
of
the
compressor
area
roof.
Design capacities are
given.
North
South
Boom
and
boom.
and
Crane
Rests
flare
Overpressures
are
given.
Reflection
effects will not be
significant for these
structures. These are
hence half the values
for the LER enclosure
on the compression
area roof.
Drag loads in the far
field are taken as 1/3
of the overpressure
values
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.

effect of explosion in
GT,
process
or
compression areas. ..
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
in adjacent areas.
The design pressures
for
cladding
and
stairtower structures on
the DSM and DES are
given in detail in
Appendix F.
compression area. .
Assumed to be applied
to all external surfaces
on all sides.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside.
compression area. .
Assumed to be applied
on all sides in all
directions.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment.
Page 46 of 193

Area
LER room on
Main Deck

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
All external walls of
LER (to the west of
the blast wall gridline
6).
Design capacities are
given.
Riser
ESDV
Platforms
External wind
walls NOT
adjacent
to
hazardous
areas
Access
platform
below cellar deck
Wind walls below

main
deck
level
which may be loaded
on
their
outside
surface.
These
must
not
themselves
form
projectiles into the
platform areas.
The design capacities
for wind walls in nonhazardous areas are
determined by the far
field explosion loads.
These are given in
drawings listed as
Reference
42,
produced
by
the
Architectural group.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
0.07Bar, Pulse durations:
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
250, 400 and 500ms.
Far field DLB Event
Positive Pulse
0.1 to 0.2 Bar, Pulse
durations: 90, 150 and
180ms.
Negative Pulse
-0.05 to -0.1 Bar, Pulse
360ms.
Far field SLB Event
Positive Pulse
180ms.
Negative Pulse
-0.02 to -0.04Bar, Pulse
360ms.
(Ref. [34])
Explosion Source Process area.

The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside.
Explosion source
Process areas.
permanent deformation
The overpressures are
based on far field
effects from DP events,
These
overpressures
effects
from
DP
Process, Wellbay and
Compressor
area
explosion scenarios.
Wind walls must remain
in place for far field
effects of DLB.
Wind
walls
must
respond elastically to
far field SLB effects.
Page 47 of 193

Area
External wind
walls
adjacent
to
hazardous
areas Directly
Loaded from
inside.

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
Wind walls below
main
deck
level
which may be loaded
on their outboard or
inboard surface.
These must fail outwards if

directly loaded from inside at
0.1 bar to limit the reaction
loads transmitted to their
supports and into the decks.
These
design
capacities are given
in drawings listed as
Reference
42,
produced
by
the
Wind walls must remain in

place for far field effects of
DLB. (loaded from outside
see previous entry).
Wind walls must respond
elastically to far field SLB
effects
These
must
fail
outwards at 0.1 bar to
limit the reaction loads
transmitted to their
supports and the decks.
Page 48 of 193

Table 8.2
Table 8.2
Area
Living
Quarters East
wall and 5m
wrap around
Direct Explosion loads on Structural Elements QU

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
East wall and 5m
wrap around on
North, South and roof
areas.
See Appendix G2
Living
Quarters,
North, South,
and
West
walls
Wall and roof areas

not covered by the
entry above.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
Overpressures based
on
QU
GT
area
explosion scenario.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
(Ref. [34])
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside.
Overpressures based
on
QU
GT
area
explosion scenario.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
(Ref. [34])
These
are
design
pressures for the wall
averaged over the wall.
These
are
design
pressures for the walls
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside.
Page 49 of 193

Table 8.2
Area

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
Living
quarters
Compressor
and
control
panel
enclosure on
East
wall,
levels 1 and 2
of LQ
External
walls
of
enclosure (offshore
installed)
Living
Quarters,
Helideck rooftop rooms and
enclosures
East facing walls and

roof
of
easterly
enclosure with 5m
wrap around onto
North
and
South
walls.
Living
Quarters,
Helideck rooftop rooms and
enclosures
All walls and roof

areas not covered in
the previous entry.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
Overpressures based
on
QU
GT
area
explosion scenario.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
(Ref. [34])
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside.
Overpressures based
on
QU
GT
area
explosion scenario.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
These
are
design
These
are
design
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
See Drawing Ref. 35 for
location of these enclosures.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside.
Overpressures based
on
QU
GT
area
explosion scenario.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
See Drawing Ref. 35 for
location of these enclosures.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside.
These
are
design
Page 50 of 193

Table 8.2
Area
Generator
(GT)
area
above module
roof
5m
wrap around
on North and
South sides.

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
GT area underside of
generator
area
module roof and 5m
wrap around on North
and
South
sides
upper
surface
of
module roof.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
See Table 8.3 for

loads on equipment
items on module roof.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
See Appendix G2
Generator
(GT)
area
module roof
area
more
than 5m from
North
and
South edges.
GT
area
upper
surface
and
equipment
on
generator
area
module
roof
not
within 5m of the edge
on the North and
South sides.
See Table 8.3 for
loads on equipment
items on module roof.
See Appendix G3
Generator
(GT)
area
module deck.
GT area on generator
area load on upper
surface of module
Main deck.
See Appendix G2
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
Overpressures based
on
QU
GT
area
explosion scenario.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage
to
equipment/critical
piping on the unloaded
side of the deck.
Overpressures based
on
QU
GT
area
explosion scenario.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage
to
equipment/critical
piping on the unloaded
side of the deck.
Overpressures based
on
QU
GT
area
explosion scenario.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
Page 51 of 193

Table 8.2
Area
Generator
(GT)
area
module
underside of
roof
QU East of
Gridline 3A

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
GT area integrated
control rooms and
other enclosed areas
in GT area.
For total out of
balance loads on
generator sets use
0.2
Bar
Pulse
durations: 90, 150
and 180ms. See
also entry in Table
8.3
The control rooms
may be designed to
the
SLB
Event
pressure loads.
See Appendix G15
Area between Cellar
and Main Decks
See Appendix
and G3
G2
For grated areas use

2
3 kN/m drag load for
fixings and grating.
Helideck
Helideck area.
See Appendix G2
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
-0.02Bar, Pulse durations:
180, 300 and 360ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
Overpressures based
on
QU
GT
area
explosion scenario.
The
maximum
deflection for the SLB
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside the integrated
control rooms and other
enclosed areas.
Overpressures based
on
QU
GT
area
explosion scenario.
Taken
as
double
incident
0.05
bar
pressure field, to allow
for pressure doubling
on enclosure walls.
References 1 and 34.
These
overpressures
effects
from
GTs
explosion scenario.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms
Page 52 of 193

Table 8.2
Area
LQ enclosed
Stair
tower
and lift. LQ
Stairtower
South
and
North.

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
These are design
capacities including
reflection effects as
supplied by BP.
Loads the same as on the

West, South and North faces
of the LQ and the utility
modules below the LQ.

full breakdown of
cladding/stairtower
explosion
design
capacities level by
level.
Between
Cellar
and
mezzanine deck levels.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
The LQ is designed
by CB&I/HHI
It
is
the
responsibility of
the third parties to
seek confirmation
from
the
originator of the
information
(BP
Exploration
Operating
Company Ltd.)
See Appendix G5
These
overpressures
effects
from
GTs
explosion scenario.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
Above mezzanine deck
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
Page 53 of 193

Table 8.2
Area
QU Fire Pump
Enclosure/
Container.

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
External surfaces.
See Appendix G2
QU
Utility
module below
LQ
Emergency
switchroom
Enclosure.
and walls for
open room in
which
Emergency
generator
containers are
located
Roof
areas
at
production deck level.
See Appendix G4
and entries in Table
8.3 for breakdown of
equipment loads.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
90, 150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
Emergency
generator
container
QU
Utility
module below
LQ
Mezzanine
level.
All enclosure walls

between mezzanine
and production deck
levels.
See Appendix G4
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
These
overpressures
effects
from
GTs
explosion scenario.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside.
These
overpressures
effects
from
GTs
explosion scenario.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside.
See entries in Table 8.3
QU
Emergency
generator
associated
equipment.
These
overpressures
effects
from
GTs
explosion scenario.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside.
Page 54 of 193

Table 8.2
Area
QU
Utility
module below
LQ
Cellar
deck
level.

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
All enclosure walls
between cellar and
mezzanine
deck
levels.
See Appendix G4
Crane on (QU)
Crane pedestal
See Appendix G4
Workshop
enclosures,
on
QU
Production
deck level
All external surfaces.

Design loads are
given.
See Appendix G4
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
These
overpressures
effects
from
GTs
explosion scenario.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside.
These
overpressures
are based on blast
loads from an explosion
in the GT area of QU.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment.
These
overpressures
effects
from
GTs
explosion scenario.
The
maximum
case should not be
such that it causes
damage to equipment
inside.
Page 55 of 193

Table 8.2
Area
External wind
walls

Description
Criteria
Recommendations
Wind walls below
main
deck
level
which may be loaded
on outside surface.
The design capacities
for wind walls in nonhazardous areas are
determined by the far
field explosion loads.
These are given in
drawings listed as
Reference
42,
produced
by
the
See Appendix G4
Loads on outside surface.

DLB Event
Positive Pulse
180ms.
Negative Pulse
-0.1 to -0.05 Bar, Pulse
360ms.
All external surfaces
See Appendix G4
Wind walls must remain

in place for far field
effects of DLB events.
Wind
walls
must
respond elastically to
far field SLB effects.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
180ms.
Negative Pulse
-0.04 to -0.02Bar, Pulse
360ms.
Stairtowers
and stairtower
cladding
on
QU.
Generator
spares store
on main deck
These
overpressures
effects
from
GTs
explosion scenario.
Loads on outside surface.

DLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.

full
breakdown
of
cladding/stairtower
explosion
design
capacities
level
by
level.
These
overpressures
effects
from
GTs
explosion scenario.
SLB Event
Positive Pulse
150 and 180ms.
Negative Pulse
180, 300 and 360ms.
Page 56 of 193

8.1.6
Strong shock explosion loads

The response of the structure resulting from explosions on topsides can give rise to
possibly damaging accelerations and inertia forces on the topsides and equipment.
Relative displacements between modules may also threaten the integrity of piping
associated with safety systems and the bridge.
A simplified strong shock response study was completed in collaboration with the
Structures Group. The study was executed to enable completion of the Performance
Standards with respect to recommended blanket design accelerations to be resisted by
essential safety systems such as fire water pumps, emergency generators, rotating
equipment mounted on anti-vibration mounts and lifeboats [28]. The strong shock
response study is described in Appendix I.
The overall, blanket accelerations included in the Performance Standards have been set
at 0.5g so that general checks can be made for equipment throughout both platforms and
the living quarters/TR. This is a deck acceleration and hence equipment and the living
quarters supported on anti-vibration mounts may be subject to different accelerations.
Because of their position at the extreme Western end of the platform and because of the
motion of the LQ the lifeboats (TEMPSCs) on QU also experience a vertical acceleration
of a similar value.
Specific major items requiring assessment of the strong shock acceleration effects are
included in Table 8.3. More general systems where this effect should be considered are
given in Table B1 Additional Safety Critical Systems explosion design requirements.
Often these general systems may not need to be designed against this load due to
redundancy and duplication.
Page 57 of 193

8.2
Loads on Vessels and Equipment
8.2.1
Vessel and equipment general design requirements

This section provides specific guidance on how the identified loads should be
incorporated into the equipment design.
Loads should be applied in all horizontal directions. Vertical loads should also be
considered where they are likely to occur, for example above and below grated decks.
Hydrocarbon containing equipment should be designed to survive a DLB level explosion
without breaking free from their supports and hence, causing possible loss of
containment. The equipment is not generally required to function after a DLB event.
Exceptions to this are the venting and flare systems (including vent headers) and the well
isolation systems. The BP Group Practice GP 24-22 [13] sections B10.7 and B.11.10
state that these systems should be considered Criticality 1 and hence should be
operational after the DLB explosion event.
Safety critical equipment and supports in areas outside areas where explosions could
occur should survive the far field effects of credible DLB explosions.
An increase in basic allowable stresses to 90% yield will be accepted for the DLB
event for vessels.
Strength Level Blast (SLB)
All hydrocarbon containing equipment should be designed to remain in position and
maintain containment, subject to inspection. These equipment/vessel items should be
fully functional after an SLB level explosion.
Non-hydrocarbon containing equipment should only be required to remain in place during
the SLB explosion event.
Pressure vessel code allowable stresses should be used for calculations.
Operating Conditions
The following conditions should be assumed to exist coincident with a DLB or SLB blast
event:
normal operating levels,
normal operating pressure,
normal operating temperature,
no wind loading
Vessels and equipment with effective diameter less than 1 metre should be subject to
drag loads only and should be treated as described in section 8.4.
8.2.2
Vessel hydrocarbon containment requirements

The hydrocarbon containing equipment and vessels themselves should resist direct
explosion loads at the SLB level without loss of containment [13].
Page 58 of 193

The peak SLB overpressure value should be considered as an external pressure
attempting to collapse the equipment. The out of balance loads should also be applied to
vessel shells to check for loss of containment due to this load component.
Non-hydrocarbon containing vessels need not be checked for loss of containment.
Pressure difference on vessels and equipment

All hydrocarbon containing vessel/equipment supports and deck connections should be
examined for their resistance against and response to explosion loads including the
higher Ductility Level blast loads. The connections of the equipment items to the skid
shall be designed by the vendor. These loads are in total the same as the deck
connection out of balance loads given in Table 8.3 except that some sail area reduction
may be appropriate in some cases.
Transverse pressure difference = 2 x peak overpressure x effective diameter /(C X pulse
duration)
Here C is the speed of sound taken to be 340 m/s. The pressure difference is always
less than the peak overpressure.
See References 29, 30 and Appendix D for more information on the calculation of out of
balance pressure loads.
Transverse loads
The out of balance transverse pressure x sail area should be treated as a force which is
attempting to move the equipment. The out of balance pressure is expressed as a force
per unit area.
300
For the calculation of transverse

loads, the projected or sail area
should be taken as:
EffDia x EffLength
EffDia
= effective
diameter of the vessel.
external
Dia
Where:
(Inner diameter)
8.2.3
EffLength =
FOR A HORIZONTAL VESSEL:
effective overall length of the vessel

from crown of head to crown of
head.
For A VERTICAL VESSEL:
effective overall length from crown
of top head to underside of
skirt/legs.
300mm is often used as an extension on the dimensions to allow for nozzles, platforms,
clips, pipes, insulation, or other appurtenances. In the case of the HP separator on the
Production Deck, the EffDia = Diameter +600mm and the EffLength = Length + 600mm.
Page 59 of 193

This load should also be considered to act in the vertical direction where it is likely to
occur e.g. for vessels on grated decks such as the Mezzanine deck in the Process area.
The longitudinal and transverse out of balance loads do not act simultaneously.
Longitudinal loads
Loads in the longitudinal direction should also be considered to ensure that vessels do
not become detached from their supports for this load direction.
300
Projected area
300
Dia
(Inner diameter)
The out of balance pressure in the longitudinal direction may be taken as the transverse
pressure times the ratio of the length to the effective diameter. If this value is greater than
the peak pressure then the peak pressure should be taken instead.
The out of balance loads are then calculated from the out of balance pressure times the
sail area.
For the longitudinal load the sail area should be taken as x EffDia2 /4. Multiply this by
the longitudinal out of balance pressure.
On Clair Ridge, all major vessels are oriented parallel to the blast walls.
The range of load durations to be considered are given in Table 8.3 in each case.
The out of balance load column in Table 8.3 defines the out of balance pressure load
component and should be used for the design of vessel supports i.e. the connection
between the vessel and skid and the connections of the skid to the deck.
In hydrocarbon vessel design this may involve the application of the peak DLB pressure
to one side of the vessel shell and the peak pressure minus the out of balance pressure
to the other side.
A similar approach should be followed for the derivation of the out of balance SLB loads,
but in this case the support structure is required to remain elastic. See References 29, 30
and Appendix D for more information.
For the DLB case, the dynamics of the mass of the vessel and contents, and the stiffness
of the supports should be taken into account when calculating the reaction loads at deck
level. A static analysis would give over conservative results resulting in a heavier
structure than necessary.
The longitudinal and transverse out of balance loads do not act simultaneously.
Page 60 of 193

8.2.4
Worked example Separator vessel (Hydrocarbon containing)

To help with the interpretation of the tables for a large vessel, a sample calculation is
included for the HP Separator in this Section.
Use Table 8.3 below
Consider the HP Separator Train 1 V-21101.
Calculate sail areas
Effective Diameter = 5300 + 2 x allowance for appurtenances = 5300 + 600 = 5900mm =
5.9m.
Effective length = 15900 + 2 x 300 = 16500mm = 16.5m
Sail area for transverse loading = EffDia x EffLength = 97.35m2
Sail area for longitudinal loading = x EffDia X EffDia / 4 = 27.34m2
Calculate out of balance loads for support design
Locate the entry in Table 8.3 for the HP separator Train 1 V-21101 (Process area
Production Deck Process systems and hydrocarbon utility systems)
This vessel is a hydrocarbon containing vessel and so we need to calculate the out of
balance load for the SLB and DLB cases for the design of the supports and deck
connections.
Column 2 gives the out of balance pressures.
DLB case:- transverse out of balance pressure = 0.8 bar or 80 kN/m2
The peak transverse out of balance load is then 80 x sail area = 7788 kN
Three durations are given for the load. Each load time history is assumed to be a
symmetric triangular load time history with a peak equal to the peak load and duration as
given.
The peak longitudinal out of balance pressure=
Transverse out of balance pressure x EffLength / EffDia = 80kN/m2 x 16.5/5.9 =
223.7kN/m2 or 2.23 bar.
But this is higher than the peak DLB overpressure of 1.4bar for the area at deck level
from Figure 7.1 which cannot be exceeded as an out of balance load. We therefore take
1.4bar or 140kN/m2 as the longitudinal out of balance pressure.
The peak longitudinal out of balance load is then 140kN/m2 x longitudinal sail area = 3827
kN.
These out of balance loads may then be used to design the supports for the vessel, in
this case plastic deformation is allowed as long as rupture does not occur.
Column 2 also gives the SLB case:- transverse out of balance pressure = 0.2 bar or 20
kN/m2
The SLB peak transverse out of balance load is then 20 x sail area = 1947 kN
Three durations are given for the load. Each load time history is assumed to be a
symmetric triangular load time history with a peak equal to the peak load and duration as
given.
The peak longitudinal out of balance pressure=
Transverse out of balance pressure x EffLength/EffDia = 20kN/m2 x 16.5/5.9 =
55.9kN/m2 or 0.56bar.
Page 61 of 193

But this is higher than the peak SLB overpressure of 0.5bar for the area at deck level
from Figure 7.1 and column 2 of the entry in Table 8.3 which cannot be exceeded as an
out of balance load. We therefore take 0.5bar or 50kN/m2 as the longitudinal out of
balance pressure.
The peak longitudinal out of balance load is then 50kN x longitudinal sail area = 1367 kN.
These out of balance loads may then be used to design the supports for the vessel, in
this case the response must remain elastic with no permanent deformation.
This load should also be considered to act in the vertical direction where it is likely to
occur e.g. for vessels on grated decks such as the Mezzanine deck in the Process area.
(For non-hydrocarbon containing vessels the SLB case is the only one which needs to be
considered.)
Check vessel integrity
Column 3 gives the loads to be applied to the vessel skin to test the integrity of the vessel
against both crushing and out of balance loads.
The vessel capacity against crushing is tested against the peak area SLB overpressure
which it will experience which is given as 0.5bar or 50kN/m2. This is applied to the whole
exposed vessel area and nozzles simultaneously. Alternatively a vacuum case check
may be used as a substitute for this check if considered adequate by the Mechanical
discipline engineer. This is a balanced load and does not contribute to the support loads
The vessel resistance against lateral or transverse out of balance loads is checked by
applying the peak SLB pressure for the area (50kN/m2 from column 2) to one side of the
vessel skin and (Peak SLB pressure minus out of balance pressure) to the other
simultaneously.
This gives a pressure of 50kN/m2 on one side and 30kN/m2 on the other, giving an out of
balance pressure of 20kN/m2 .
No permanent plastic deformation of the vessel is allowed.
(For a non-hydrocarbon containing vessel an integrity check is not required unless it is
part of a safety critical system).
8.2.5
Hazard control and Hazard mitigation systems

Hazard control and Hazard mitigation systems should survive for long enough to perform
their safety function for both the SLB and DLB events. Some are protected in enclosures
others are duplicated and located at disparate locations to increase the robustness of the
systems and hence may not need protection from direct explosion loads.
Page 62 of 193

8.3
General notes on Table 8.3 Explosion loads on vessels and

equipment
Supports for hydrocarbon containing vessels and equipment should resist the DLB
explosion loads, although plastic deformation is allowed.
The integrity of hydrocarbon containing vessels and equipment is checked by

applying the peak SLB pressures and SLB out of balance loads to the vessel
shell, nozzles and supports.
Supports for non-hydrocarbon containing vessels and equipment should be

checked only against SLB explosion loads.
For structures/vessels with diameter less than 1 metre the drag loads are given in
the Table.
The range of pulse durations used in Table 8.3 below are taken from the SI [2] as
described in Appendix C. The lower upper and mid range values for pulse
duration should be examined.
In order to avoid over-conservatism in the design of supports for the smaller

vessels and where the load duration is relatively long, account is taken of the
resulting reduction of out of balance pressures (See Appendix D, Figure D2).
Table 8.3 gives the loads to be applied to all exposed vessels and equipment.
Explosion load de-composition

Total Load
Out of balance load

For Supports
Balanced Load
For Vessel Integrity
Page 63 of 193

Key to Table 8.3
Area
Equipment
Item
Design Out of Balance Design loads for vessel/

loads for design of vessel/ equipment item integrity
equipment supports
Area of Hydrocarbon
explosion containing
DLB and SLB events
Area of Nonexplosion hydrocarbon

containing
SLB event only
SLB event
No
explosion
resistance
requirement except that the
units must not disintegrate and
form projectiles.
Some criticality 1 vessels need to be integrity checked against the DLB balanced load as
identified in Table 8.3.
Page 64 of 193

Table 8.3

Design Out of Balance loads for design of Design
loads
for
vessel/ equipment supports
equipment item integrity
Area
Equipment item
DP
Compressor
area
Non
hydrocarbon
containing
equipment
Export Gas H2S Chemical Injection Package Z85103

Subsea methanol vessel V-85001 (future)
Subsea methanol injection pumps P-85001-A/B
(future)
Subsea Methanol Injection Pump P-85001-A
(future)
Subsea Methanol Injection Pump P-85001-B
(future)
Subsea Methanol Vessel (Future) V-85001
Safety shower SSH-66037 no protection
required.
Nitrogen bottle packs Z-16001-A/B/C should not
become projectiles.
BOP accumulator bottle racks 1,2 and 3 V70416, V-70417 and V-70418 should not
become projectiles.
Peak out of balance pressure (barg)
No explosion resistance requirement

except that the units must not disintegrate
and form projectiles.
All vessels/equipment ~6m in effective diameter.

SLB Event transverse out of balance pressure: 0.08
2
bar ( 8kN/m ), Load durations 125, 200 and 250ms
For vessels/equipment less than 6m metres in effective
diameter use see graph in previous column.
The supports must remain elastic for the SLB case.
For vessels/equipment <1 metre in effective diameter
2
use drag load 5 kN/m .
Longitudinal out of balance pressures should be taken
as the ratio of length/diameter times the transverse out
of balance pressure or the peak pressure whichever is
smaller.
References [1,2].
0.3
Pressure difference (bar)
The out of balance load (Pressure x area) should be

treated as a force which is attempting to move the
equipment.
0.25
0.2
DLB
0.15
SLB
>4
0.1
0.05
0
1
vessel/
Effective diam eter (m )
Page 65 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
DP
Compressor
roof level
LP Flare Tip Z-38101

HP Flare Tip Z-37101
North Pedestal Crane L-89003
South Pedestal Crane L-89004
Safety shower SSH-66031, no
requirement

loads
for
Flare Boom Flare Tip.
0.1 Bar, Pulse durations 90, 150 and 180ms.
protection
Crane pedestals and crane boom rests are also dealt

with in Tables 8.1 and 8.2.
vessel/
Strong shock explosion loads from an

explosion on DP should be applied to the
cranes and represented by a 0.5g
acceleration in all horizontal directions.
Crane booms shall be designed to resist out of balance

loads of 0.1bar applied in any direction. See Appendix
G15a. Crane cabs should retain glass and resist a load
of 0.1bar with a pulse duration of 200ms. See Appendix
G4. Shatterproof glass shall be used.
Page 66 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
DP
Compressor
Area
Process
Systems and
Hydrocarbon
Utility
Systems
LP Compressor Train 1 C-31001

MP Compressor Train 1 C-31101
HP Compressor Train 1 C-31201
LP Compressor Train 2 C-32001
MP Compressor Train 2 C-32101
HP Compressor Train 2 C-32201
VRU Compressor Z-33001
VRU Suction Cooler X-33001
VRU Suction Scrubber V-33001
HP Compressor Suction Scrubber
31201
LP Compressor Suction Scrubber
31001
MP Compressor Suction Scrubber
31101
HP Compressor Suction Scrubber
32201
LP Compressor Suction Scrubber
32001
MP Compressor Suction Scrubber
32101

loads
for
Train 1 V-
1. Design using the loads below is

intended to prevent vessel/equipment
failure and possible release of inventory.
Transverse out of balance pressures
Peak SLB pressure 0.25bar (25 kN/m )

The peak pressure load should be
applied to the total exposed area of
vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.
All vessels/equipment ~6 m in effective diameter.

DLB Event transverse out of balance pressure: 0.28
2
bar (28 kN/m ), Load durations: 90, 150 and 180ms
For vessels/equipment less than 6 metres and >1metre
in effective diameter see graph in previous column.
2
use drag load 12 kN/m . Plastic deformation of the
supports is allowed for the DLB case.
Train 2 VTrain 2 VTrain 2 V-

0.3
The out of balance load (pressure x area) should be

equipment.
Train 1 VTrain 1 V-
vessel/

2
2
2. The SLB out of balance pressure load

should be treated as a force applied to the
vessel skin which is trying to crush the
vessel.
The peak SLB pressure should be applied
to one side and the peak minus the out of
balance pressure to the other with
magnitudes as used for the design of
vessel supports. Loads should be applied
in all directions in turn.
No permanent plastic deformation is
allowed.
0.25
0.2
DLB
0.15
SLB
>4
0.1
0.05

smaller.
0
1
References [1,2].
All high speed rotating equipment in this

area should survive Strong shock loads
from an SLB explosion in the Process or
Wellhead areas.This shall be represented
by a 0.5g deck acceleration in all
horizontal directions.
Page 67 of 193

Table 8.3

loads
for
Area
Equipment item
DP
Compressor
Area
Process
Systems and
Hydrocarbon
Utility
Systems
(Continued)
Crude inlet heater train 1 X-21101-A-B-C-D

Crude inlet heater train 2 X-22101-A-B-C-D
LP compressor suction cooler train 1 X-31001
MP compressor suction cooler train 1 X-31101
MP compressor discharge cooler train 1 X31102-A/B
HP compressor discharge cooler train 1 X31201
LP compressor suction cooler train 2 X-32001
MP compressor suction cooler train 2 X-32101
MP compressor discharge cooler train 2 X32102 A/B
HP compressor discharge cooler train 2 X32201
Glycol Contactor V-34102
HP Compressor Balance Line Cooler Train 1
X-31204
HP Compressor Balance Line Cooler Train 2
X-32204
Propane bottle rack Z-37202 should not generate
projectiles
0.3

equipment.


vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.

2
2
2
2

vessel.
allowed.
0.25
0.2
DLB
0.15
SLB
>4
0.1
0.05

smaller.
0
1
vessel/
References [1,2].
Page 68 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
DP
Compressor
area
Flare system
associated
equipment
Flare Ignition Panel Z-37201

LP Flare gas Re-cycle Cooler X-33003

loads
for
0.3
0.25
0.2
DLB
0.15
SLB
>4
0.1
0.05
0
1
vessel/
The out of balance load (Pressure x area) should be

equipment.

Peak DLB pressure 0.7 bar (70 kN/m ).

vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.

2

2
2. The DLB out of balance pressure load

vessel.

smaller.
The peak DLB pressure should be applied

allowed.
Page 69 of 193

Equipment item
Process
area
Production
Deck
Process
Systems and
Hydrocarbon
Utility
Systems
Fuel Gas Filter/Coalescer F-83001

VRU Suction Scrubber Pump P-33001-A
VRU Suction Scrubber Pump P-33001-B
HP Separator Train 1 V-21101
LP Separator Train 1 V-21201
HP Separator Train 2 V-22101
LP Separator Train 2 V-22201
Test Separator V-23101
Contactor Inlet Scrubber V-34101
Fuel Gas Scrubber V-83001
Test Separator Heater X-23101
Fuel Gas Heater X-83001-A-B
Glycol Regeneration Package Z-34201
Sales Gas Metering analysis shelter - IMS-35002
Sales Gas Metering skid Z-35001
Oil recovery pumps A/B, P-82102-A/B

loads
for
equipment .
2
For vessels/equipment of smaller diameters use the
chart below. Plastic deformation of the supports is
allowed for the DLB case.
vessel/

2

vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.
2. The out of balance pressure load
vessel.
DLB Peak transverse out of balance

pressure Vs. Effective diameter
Pressure
difference (bar)
Table 8.3
Area
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
2
Effective diameter (m)
All vessels/equipment.
2
bar (20 kN/m ), Load durations 90, 150 and 180ms

to one side and the peak pressure minus
the out of balance pressure to the other
side. Loads should be applied in all
directions in turn.
For vessels/equipment less than 2 metres
2
in effective diameter use 20kN/m .for the
transverse pressure difference.
allowed.
References [1,2].

smaller.
Page 70 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
Process
Area
Production
Deck
Process
Systems and
Hydrocarbon
Utility
Systems
Near
the
blast wall.
Production Manifold Train 1 Y-21001-A

Production Manifold Train 1 Y -21001-B
Production Manifold Train 1 Y-22001-A
Production Manifold Train 1 Y-22001-B
Production Test Manifold Y-23001-A
Production Test Manifold Y-23001-B
Gas Lift Manifold Y-35201-A
Gas Lift Manifold Y-35201-B

loads
for
The component items are generally less than 1

metre in effective diameter. For other diameters
in this area use the out of balance pressures in
the chart below.
Pressure
difference (bar)
Peak transverse out of balance pressure

Vs. effective diameter
2
1.5
DLB

equipment .

DLB event transverse out of balance pressure

For vessels/equipment less than 1 metre in effective
2
diameter use 30 kN/m applied in all directions in turn.
Load durations: 50, 80 and 100ms. Sum the loads for all
pipework in the production manifold.
For larger diameter items refer to the chart to the left.
Plastic deformation of the supports is allowed for the
DLB case.

The peak pressure load should be applied
to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.
SLB event transverse out of balance pressure

2
diameter use 20 kN/m applied in all directions. Load
durations: 60, 100 and 120ms. Sum the loads for all
pipework in the production manifold.
For larger diameter items refer to the chart to the left.
SLB
0.5
References [1,2], Appendix G6.
0
1
DLB and SLB Events transverse out of

balance pressures
vessel/

equipment surface which is trying to crush
the equipment.
The peak pressure should be applied to
one side and the peak pressure minus the
out of balance pressure to the other with
magnitudes as used for the design of the
supports. Loads should be applied in all
directions in turn.
Side 1
2
Side 2
SLB pressure 0.7bar (70kN/m2)
Load durations 60, 100 and 120ms
allowed.
Page 71 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
Process
Area
Production
Deck
Non
hydrocarbon
containing
equipment
Produced Water Chemical Injection Package

Z-85101-01
Produced Water Chemical Injection Package
Z-85101-02

loads
for
equipment .
vessel/

All vessels/equipment
2
bar (30 kN/m ), Load durations 90, 150 and 180ms.
smaller.
References [1,2].
Page 72 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
Process
Area
Mezzanine
Deck
Non
hydrocarbon
containing
equipment
Produced Water Hydrocyclone Train 1 V-41101A

Produced Water Hydrocyclone Train 1 V-41101B
Produced Water Hydrocyclone Train 2 V-41201A
Produced Water Hydrocyclone Train 2 V-41201B
Produced Water Skimmer Train 1 V-42101
Produced Water Skimmer Train 2 V-42201
Coalescer Transformer Train 1 ETR-21301
Coalescer Transformer Train 2 ETR-22301
Glycol circulation pump skid Z-34202
Safety Shower and Eyebath SSH-66034 No
function after an explosion in the area No
protection required.

loads
for
equipment .
.
vessel/


All Vessels/equipment .
2
This load should be applied in horizontal and vertical
directions.
2
use 10 kN/m .
directions.
smaller
References [1,2].
Page 73 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
Process
Area
Mezzanine
Deck
Hydrocarbon
containing
equipment
HP Separator Train 1 Oil Filter A F-21101

HP Separator Train 2 Oil Filter A F-22101
Test Separator Oil Filter A F-23101-A
Test Separator Oil Filter A F-23101-B
Subsea Centre Slug catcher V-17501
Test Separator Hydrocyclone V-41001
Oil Heater Train 1 X-21103-A
Oil Heater Train 1 X-21103-B
Oil Export Cooler Train 1 X-21601-A
Oil Export Cooler Train 1 X-21601-B
Oil Heater Train 2 X-22103-A
Oil Heater Train 2 X-22103-B
Oil Export Cooler Train 2 X-22601-A
Oil Export Cooler Train 2 X-22601-B

loads
for
A 20% contingency has been added to the
overpressures to take account of wind-walling not
included in the simulations.
equipment.
All vessels/equipment greater than 4m in effective
diameter.
2
bar (30 kN/m ), Load durations: 90, 150 and 180ms.
2
For vessels with effective diameters <4m, use 20 kN/m .
DLB case.
2
These loads should be applied in horizontal and vertical
directions.
smaller
References [1,2].
vessel/
A 20% contingency has been added to

the overpressures to take account of
wind-walling
not
included
in
the
simulations.
2
Load durations 125, 200 and 250ms.
to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.
the equipment.
The peak pressure should be applied to
one side and the peak pressure minus the
out of balance pressure to the other with
magnitudes as used for the design of the
supports. Loads should be applied in all
directions in turn.
allowed.
Page 74 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
Lifeboat on
DP Process
Cellar Deck
Survival Craft No.5 RSC-65105

Hydraulic Power Unit No.5 RSW-65105
Davits and support structure

loads
for
TEMPSCs and associated equipment.
equipment .
smaller.
DLB far field Event transverse out of balance
pressure:
2
Positive phase 0.05 bar (5 kN/m ), Load durations 90,
150 and 180ms.
Negative phase -0.025 bar (2.5kN/m2), Load durations
180, 300 and 360ms.
vessel/
Design using the loads below is intended

to prevent equipment failure.
2
Peak pressure 0.05bar (5 kN/m )

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment simultaneously.
Out of balance loads should be applied in
all directions.
Indirect (inertia) loads from explosions in
the wellbay and compressor area should
be taken as 0.5g horizontally and
vertically. These loads are referred to as
strong shock response loads. See section
8.1.6 and Appendix I.
This is the far field effect of explosions in the wellbay

and compression areas of DP.
Page 75 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
Process
Area Cellar
Deck
Hydrocarbon
containing
equipment
Oil Export Pump Train 1 P 24101 - A

Oil Export Pump Train 2 P 24201 - B
Oil Export Pump Spare P 24301
Oil export pig launcher V-15001
Gas export pig launcher (temp) V-16001
Subsea centre pig receiver (fut/temp) V-17401
Oil export metering skid Z-24401
Oil Skimmer Pump Train 1 P-42101-A
Oil Skimmer Pump Train 1 P-42101-B
Oil Skimmer Pump Train 2 P-42201-A
Oil Skimmer Pump Train 2 P-42201-B
Subsea TUTU (future) SS Centre Z-17602
Subsea TUTU (future) J Tube Z-17605
Subsea TUTU (future) J Tube Z-17606
Oil sampling system cabinet ISP-24402

loads
for
equipment .
All vessels/equipment greater than 4m in effective
diameter.
2
For vessels with diameters less than 4m in diameter use
2
0.2 bar, 20 kN/m .
DLB case.
2
smaller.
vessel/

wind-walling
not
included
in
the
simulations.
2

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.
the equipment.
2
For all vessels/equipment use 10kN/m .

allowed. Refs. [1,2].
Page 76 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
Process
Area Cellar
Deck
Non
hydrocarbon
containing
equipment
Coalescer Water Pump Train 1 P-21501-A

Coalescer Water Pump Train 1 P-21501-B
Coalescer Water Pump Train 2 P-22501-A
Coalescer Water Pump Train 2 P-22501-B
Recycle Water Pump Train 1 P-41101
Recycle Water Pump Train 2 P-41201
Jetting Pump P-42002
Produced Water Pump Common Standby P43001
Produced Water Pump Train 1 P-43101
Produced Water Pump Train 2 P-43201
Subsea TUTU SSIV Z-17601(not in C1 plot
plans)
Oil In Water Analyser Z-82101
Produced Water Filter Package Z-43301
Subsea Chemical Injection Package (future) Z17301
Subsea TUTU SSIV UJB-15101
SSIV Hydraulic package Z-15111
Goods Lift DP LEL-89101 (and on other levels
see Appendix H)

loads
for
equipment .
vessel/


All Vessels/equipment .
2
directions.
2
use 10 kN/m .
smaller.
References [1,2].
Hydraulic Valve HPU IHPU-50001 (CPA and

DCN D454 moved to a non-hazardous area
6/2/12)
Page 77 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
Process
Area Cellar
Deck
Flare
and
blowdown
system
HP flare scrubber V-37001

LP flare scrubber V-38001

loads
for
equipment .
smaller.
2
For vessels with effective diameters less than 4m in
2
diameter use 0.3 bar, 30 kN/m .
DLB case.
vessel/

wind-walling
not
included
in
the
simulations.
2
Peak DLB pressure 0.72bar (72 kN/m )

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.
2. The DLB out of balance pressure load
the equipment.
Page 78 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
Process
Area Cellar
Deck
adjacent to
blast wall.
Hydrocarbon
containing
equipment
Electro Coalescer Train 1 V-21301

Electro Coalescer Train 1 V-22301
Coalescer Oil Pump Train 1 P-21401-A
Coalescer Oil Pump Train 1 P-21401-B
Coalescer Oil Pump Train 2 P-22401-A
Coalescer Oil Pump Train 2 P-22401-B

loads
for
Longitudinal out of balance pressures should be

taken as the ratio of length/diameter times the
transverse out of balance pressure or the peak
pressure whichever is smaller.

2
diameter use 30 kN/m .
Plastic deformation of the supports is allowed. Loads
should be applied in all directions.
Peak transverse out of balance pressure

Vs. effective diameter
Pressure difference
(bar)

equipment .
Vessels/equipment ~ 6m in effective diameter.
2
For vessels with other diameters see chart in the
previous column.
2
2
use 10 kN/m .
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
1
vessel/

the overpressures to taker account of
wind-walling
not
included
in
the
simulations.
2

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.
2. The SLB out of balance pressure loads
given in last column, should be treated as
a force applied to the equipment surface
which is trying to crush the equipment.
No plastic deformation is allowed.
Refs. [1,2].
Peak transverse out of balance pressure Vs.

effective diameter
Page 79 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
DP
below
Cellar deck
Non
hydrocarbon
containing
12 J-tube for subsea CTR 2 Umbilical J1 M91301

12 J-tube for subsea CTR 3 Umbilical J2 M91302
12 J-tube for Subsea CTR 3 power supply J3
M-91303
12 J-tube for Umbilical J4 M-91304
12 J-tube for GL manifold umbilical J5 M91305
12 J-tube for Subsea CTR Umbilical J6 M91306
12 J-tube for SSIV Umbilical J7 M-91307
spare
Base Oil Storage Vessel V-72601
Drilling Cuttings Discharge Caisson Q-75101
Firewater caisson No. 4 Q-91305
Firewater caisson No. 5 Q-91306
Drillwater Storage Vessel V-72701
Drillwater Storage Vessel V-72702

loads
for
equipment ,
vessel/


smaller.
All Vessels/equipment
SLB Event transverse out of balance pressure:
2
0.07bar (7 kN/m ), Load durations 125, 200 and 250ms.
Loads should be applied in all directions.
Reference - Appendix G4.
Page 80 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
DP
below
Cellar deck
hydrocarbon
containing
Hazardous Open Drain Tank T-82101

HP Flare Scrubber Heater EEH-37001
LP Flare Scrubber Heater EEH-38001
HP Flare Scrubber Pump P-37001-A
HP Flare Scrubber Pump P-37001-B
HP Flare Scrubber Pump P-38001-A
HP Flare Scrubber Pump P-38001-B
Open Drains Caisson Pump P-82101
Oil Recovery Pump P-82102-A
Oil Recovery Pump P-82102-B
DP area Open Drain Caisson Q-82101

loads
for
vessel/

equipment ,

Vessels/equipment.
2

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.

2
DLB case.
smaller.
2. The out of balance pressure loads

given in the column to the left, should be
treated as a force applied to the
the equipment.
Plastic deformation is allowed.
See Appendix G4.
Page 81 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
Wellbay
Areas
Cellar Deck
Hydrocarbon
containing
equipment
Flowlines, well kill lines, valves and manifold in

Wellbay area.
Mud/gas separation system.
Xmas trees, tag numbers
WXT-11010 to WXT-11260
WXT-12010 to WXT-12040
WXT-12110 to WXT-12160

loads
for
equipment ,
Vessels/equipment ~6 metre in effective diameter.
2
For vessels with other diameters see chart below:Peak transverse out of balance pressure Vs. Effective
diameter
Pressure difference
(bar)
0.7
All these items are required to survive the DLB

explosion event without rupture [13].

2

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.
0.6

0.5
0.4
Riser Drainage Pump P-82109
vessel/
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
2
Effective Diameter (m)

2
DLB case. Refs. [1,2].
2
smaller.
Plastic deformation of the supports is

allowed for the DLB case.
allowed for the SLB case.
References [1,2].
Page 82 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
Wellbay
Areas
Cellar
and
Production
Deck, nonhydrocarbon
containing
equipment.
Production Deck
Tundishes and associated piping below main
deck (Treated as piping see Section 8.3).
Wellbay Gantry Crane South LTG-89005
Wellbay Gantry Crane North LTG-89006
Cellar Deck
Cuttings Re-injection Pump Skid Z-75101
Cuttings Re-injection Buffer Tank Skid Z-75102
Base Oil Booster Pumps A,B P-72601-A, P72601-B
Drill Water Booster Pumps A,B P-72701-A, P72701-B
Chemical oil spill kit 3. No protection required

loads
for
equipment .

Wellbay Gantry cranes:2

DLB out of balance pressure : 0.2 bar (20 kN/m ),
Plastic deformation is allowed so long as the crane does
not become a projectile.
SLB Event out of balance pressure: 0.08 bar (8
2
kN/m ), Load durations 90, 150 and 180ms.
Pressure
loads
should
be
applied
vessel/
in
All Vessels/equipment (the re-injection pump skid

on the Cellar deck).
2
of balance pressure or the peak pressure (0.4 bar)
whichever is smaller.
References [1,2].
Page 83 of 193

Equipment item
Wellbay
areas
Intervention
Deck
SIMOPS
equipment.
The equipment items will vary depending on the

type of operation to be performed. These items
will be operated whilst the platform is producing
hence they are referred to as SIMOPs
equipment items.
The criticality of equipment will be determined on
a case by case basis by BP Operations.
The loads given here are for hydrocarbon
containing equipment and piping. For nonhydrocarbon containing equipment see
previous entry.

loads
for
equipment ,
Vessels/equipment ~6 metre in effective diameter.
2
For vessels with other diameters see chart below:Peak transverse out of balance pressure Vs. Effective
diameter
0.7
Pressure difference
(bar)
Table 8.3
Area
vessel/

2

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.
0.6
2. The SLB out of balance pressure loads

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
2

Effective Diameter (m)
References [1,2].
2
DLB case. Refs. [1,2].All vessels/equipment.
2
smaller.
Page 84 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
DP
Utility
Area
Production
and
Mezz.
Deck
Non
hydrocarbon
containing
Production Deck
Power Transformers ETR-88044-A/B
Power Transformers ETR-88041-A
Power Transformers ETR-88041-B
Power Transformers ETR-88042 (enclosed no
direct load)
Brine Storage Tank No.1 T-74001
Brine Storage Tank No.2 T-74002
Brine Transfer Pump No. 1 P-74001
Brine Transfer Pump No. 2 P-74002
In deck Nitrate Storage Tank T-86101

loads
for
equipment .
2
Out of balance pressure: 0.05 bar (5 kN/m ), Load
durations 90, 150 and 180ms.
vessel/


The supports must remain elastic for this case.
References [1,2].
Mezzanine Deck
LoSal Water Suction Manifold Y-46101
Produced Water Suction Header Y-46101
Produced Water Reinjection Manifold Y-46501
LoSal Water Injection Manifold Y-46502
Calcium Nitrate Pump Pkg. Z-86101
Produced Water Suction Manifold Y-43401
Glycol Circulation Pump Skid Z-34202 (not
shown on C1 plot plan)
HVAC chilled water system
Feed and expansion tank T-95001
HCW-95001-A/B Chilled water cooling pumps
HCW-95002-A/B Chilled water cooling pumps
Page 85 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
DP
Utility
Area Cellar
Deck
Non
hydrocarbon
containing
Cellar Deck
HP Water Injection Pump 1 P-46101
HP water Injection Pump Recycle Cooler
46101
46201
46301
46401
Nitrogen Booster package Z-10101

loads
for
equipment .
X-


smaller.
XX-
2
Out of balance pressure: 0.05 bar (5 kN/m ), Load
X-
Wellhead Control Panel & Hyd. Power unit 1

ICP-10101
Wellhead Control Panel & Hyd. Power unit 2
ICP-10102
North Hose Loading Reel Z-89101, No
protection required
South Hose Loading Reel Z-89102, No
protection required
vessel/
The supports must remain elastic for this case.

Enclosed equipment does not attract any direct
explosion loading.
References [1,2].
The well head control panels are contained in unrated
enclosures and must remain in-place during the SLB
2
event. Use 30kN/m in view of their proximity to the blast
wall.
Page 86 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
DP
Utility
Area Cellar
Deck
Safety
Critical
Equipment
Cellar Deck
Water Mist Skids
Foam Storage Pumping Skid Z-63101
Fire water pump skids No. 2 Z-62201 (Includes
Fire water caisson containerised)
Fire water pump skids No. 3 Z-62301 (Includes
Fire water caisson containerised)
Foam storage pumping skid Z-63101
Deluge valve packages N0s. 1,2 and 3 Z63202/Z-63203/Z-63205 (containerised no
blast load)
Diesel Day Tank T -62200 (inside container)
Diesel Day Tank T -62300 (inside container)
No protection required no function after
significant blast
Hose handling unit North Z-89101
Hose handling unit South Z-89102
Safety showers

loads
for
vessel/

equipment .

All Safety Critical vessels/equipment.

Transverse out of balance pressure: 0.1 bar (10
2
Apply this load in all horizontal directions.
Plastic deformation of the supports is allowed.

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment/enclosure and nozzles
simultaneously.

Reference [34].
explosion loading.

a
force
applied
to
the
equipment/enclosure surface which is
trying to move and crush the equipment.
Plastic deformation is allowed.
Page 87 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
DES
and
DSM
exposed
equipment
items
DSM PIPEDECK EL+76.230

PIPEDECK CRANE LKC-71501
WIRELINE TOOL SHACK D-76102
RADIO ACTIVE STORE
WIRELINE DRUM D-76104
EHP GENERATOR D-76103
DSM LOWER DECK EL+63.000 AND
DSM INTERMEDIATE DECK EL+66.800
BARITE POWDER TANK V-74201
BENTONITE POWDER TANK V-74202
BARITE POWDER TANK V-73001
BENTONITE POWDER TANK V-73002
VERTICAL TANKS POSITIONED BETWEEN
LOWER DECK AND INTERMEDIATE DECK
DES UPPER DRILL FLOOR EL+82.050
HVAC AHU,s HAH-70701A/B
TOP DRIVE COOLING WATER SKID EQUIP,
No. Z-71202
DRAWWORKS PACKAGE LDW-71101
PERSONNEL ELEVATOR LEL-71001

loads
for
vessel/
The incident pressure field from explosions on DP and

QU.
For hydrocarbon containing equipment

and vessels.
DLB Event (Safety critical equipment only)

Positive Pulse
0.1 Bar, Pulse durations: 125, 200 and 250ms.
Negative Pulse
-0.05 Bar, Pulse durations: 250, 400 and 500ms.
There is no explosion resistance

integrity
requirement
for
nonhydrocarbon containing vessels and
equipment although their supports
must resist the SLB.
SLB Event (Other equipment items)

Positive Pulse
Negative Pulse

The out of balance loads for equipment support design

may be calculated using the method given in Appendix
D using the dimensions/effective diameters of the
equipment item.
A conservative value which may be used is 0.04 bar (4
2
kN/m ).
The Make secure generator should survive Strong
shock loads from an SLB explosion in the Process,
compression or Wellhead areas. This shall be
represented by a 0.5g deck acceleration in all horizontal
directions.
For critical pipework use the method described in
Section 8.4. The drag loads are likely to be less than the
10,000 year design environmental wind loads (circa 5
2
kN/m ).

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.
2. The calculated out of balance pressure
loads, should be treated as a force
applied to the equipment surface which is
trying to crush the equipment.
Page 88 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
DES
and
DSM
exposed
equipment
items
(Continued)
DES DRILL FLOOR EL+77.750

IRON ROUGHNECK LPH-71404
MPD FILTER SKID DES-001
SAFETY SHOWER AND EYE BATH
SSH66006 no protection requirement
SPOOLER REELS 001/2/3
CHOKE AND KILL MANIFOLD CK-70901
MPD CHOKE MANIFOLD CK-70901
MPD BACK PRESSURE PUMP P-70901
DES MEZZANINE DECK EL+72.750
HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT HPU-70201
SHALE SHAKERS SH-72301/2/3/4
SAFETY SHOWER AND EYE BATH
SSH66007
SHALE SHAKER EXTRACT FANS
HAH70702A/B
DES INTERMEDIATE DECK EL+69.550
BOP ACCUMULATOR BOTTLE RACK
V70416
INSTRUMENT AIR RECEIVER DES V-84301
BOP CONTROL UNIT BOP-70415
BOP CONTROL PANEL BOP-70415-CP
CENTRIFUGE RETURNS TANK T-72310
CENTRIFUGE SUCTION TANK T-72309
DEGASSER SUCTION TANK T-72307
SAND TRAP T-72308
TRIP TANK T-72501

loads
for
vessel/

QU.

and vessels.

Positive Pulse
Negative Pulse

integrity
requirement
for

Positive Pulse
Negative Pulse


equipment item.
2
kN/m ).
2
kN/m ).

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.
Page 89 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
DES
and
DSM
exposed
equipment
items
(Concluded)
DES LOWER DECK EL.+63.700

CSU EXTRACT AHU,s HAH-70703A/B
HP WASHDOWN No.1 Z-81952
BOP
STACK
EQUIP
No.
BOP70401/70404/70405/70406/70407 AND Y-70422
CUTTING SLURRIFICATION UNIT SKID
Z75002

loads
for
vessel/

QU.

and vessels.

Positive Pulse
Negative Pulse

integrity
requirement
for

Positive Pulse
Negative Pulse


equipment item.
2
kN/m ).
2
kN/m ).

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.
Page 90 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
QU
Generator
module roof
level central
region >5m
from North
and
South
edges
nonhydrocarbon
containing
WHRU Generator Package No. 1 X-87102


loads
for
vessel/

equipment.

DLB event transverse out of balance pressure: 4.5

2
kN/m , Load durations 90, 150 and 180ms.


to
the
total
exposed
area
of
SLB event transverse out of balance pressure 1.8

2
kN/m . Load durations 90, 150 and 180ms
The supports must remain elastic for this load case,

smaller.
See Appendix G3.
Page 91 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
QU
Generator
module roof
level
edge
region <5m
from North
and
South
edges
nonhydrocarbon
containing
Cooling Medium Expansion Drum V-81401

Heating Medium Expansion Drum V-81501
Heating Medium Trim Cooler X-81504
Generator NO1 Lube Oil Cooler X-87101
QU Pedestal Crane L-89001
LO Rundown-Cooldown Tank Gen1 T-87101
Seawater Ultrafiltration Buffer Tank T-44001
Tote Tanks (typical)
Items with no functional significance after
explosion event but must not become or
generate projectiles no other pressure
resistance requirement
Safety shower and eye bath SSH-66061
Crane spares cabinet
Hose Rack
Lube Oil Tank Generators
Temporary generator
Alimak Lift - LEL-89102

loads
for
vessel/

equipment.



2
For vessels/equipment < 1m in effective diameter use
2
10 kN/m
The supports must remain elastic for this load case.
See Appendix G3.
The pedestal crane boom shall be designed to resist an
out of balance explosion load of 0.1bar Load durations
90, 150 and 180ms. See Appendix G15a.

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
The pedestal crane, pedestal, boom and
boom rest should survive Strong shock
loads from a DLB explosion in the Main
Generator area. This shall be represented
by a 0.5g deck acceleration in all
Crane cab should retain glass and resist a
load of 0.1bar with a pulse duration of
150ms. See Appendix G4. Shatterproof
glass shall be used.
Page 92 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
Helideck
area
Oscillating Monitor SMO-63601-A

Oscillating Monitor SMO-63601-B
Foam Concentrate Storage Tank-T-63601-A
Foam Concentrate Storage Tank-T-63601-B

loads
for
equipment.
vessel/

2
smaller.
See Appendix G2
Page 93 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
QU
Generator
module roof
and adjacent
LQ roof,
hydrocarbon
containing
and
safety
critical
equipment
Aviation Fuel Dispenser Z-82002

Aviation fuel tote tank T-82001
Aviation fuel tote tank T-82002

loads
for
vessel/

equipment .


2

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.

DLB case.
2
smaller.
See Appendix G5.

given in the column to the left, should be
treated as a force applied to the
the equipment.
2
For vessels/equipment use 5kN/m .

allowed.
Page 94 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
QU
Main
deck
Hydrocarbon
containing
Gen No. 1 Fuel Gas Filter Coalescer F-87101

Power Generation Package No. 1 Z-87101
Aviation re-fuelling skid Z-82001 (on LQ roof)
Generator No.1 Fuel Gas Filter Coalescer F87101
See also Entry in Table 8.2 for GT area loads.

loads
for
vessel/

equipment .


2
2
DLB case.

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.
2


smaller.
For vessels/equipment use 10kN/m .

Reference [34]. See Appendix G2.

allowed.
All high speed rotating equipment in this
area should survive Strong shock loads
from an explosion in the area.This shall
be represented by a 0.5g deck
acceleration in all horizontal directions.
Page 95 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
QU
Main
deck/LQ roof
Non
hydrocarbon
containing
and Safety
critical
equipment
Potable Water Header Tank T-81101

Potable Water Header Tank T-81102
Water Wash Trolley Z-87601
Injection Water De-aeration Package Z-45001
Safety critical equipment
Deluge Valve Skid No. 1 Z-63201
DIFF system deluge Skid Z-63204

loads
for
vessel/
The out of balance load should be treated as a force

(pressure x area) which is attempting to move the
equipment .


smaller.
Safety Critical Equipment Only
2
Reference [34]. See Appendix G2, G3

2

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.
a
force
applied
to
the
No plastic deformation is allowed
Page 96 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
QU
Production
deck Non hydrocarbon
containing
but
safety
critical
Clean Diesel Storage Tank T-81704
QU
Production
Deck
Nonhydrocarbon
containing
Ultra-filtration Skid Z-44001

LoSal RO Membrane Package Z-44201
LoSal CIP Skid Z-44301
LoSal Chemical Injection Skid Z-44401
Water Chemical Injection Pkg. Z-86001

loads
for
vessel/

equipment .

2
Event out of balance pressure: 0.1 bar (10 kN/m ),
The force should be applied in all horizontal and in the
vertical direction.
The supports must remain elastic (up to 90% of yield)
for this load case.
Reference [34] See Appendix G4.

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.

equipment .

a
force
applied
to
the
2
Event out of balance pressure: 0.06 bar (6 kN/m ),
The force should be applied in all horizontal directions.
Reference [34] See Appendix G3.
Page 97 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
QU
Mezzanine
deck
Non
hydrocarbon
containing
Raw Diesel Filter/Coalescer F-81701

Diesel Filter/Coalescer F-81702
Diesel Pre-filter F-81703
Diesel Filter F-81801-A
Diesel Filter F-81801-B
LoSal HP Pump P-44101-A
LoSal HP Pump P-44101-B
LoSal HP Pump P-44101-C
LoSal HP Pump P-44101-D
Heating Medium Circulating Pump P-81501-A
Heating Medium Circulating Pump P-81501-B
Heating Medium Startup Pump P-81503
Diesel Transfer Pump P81801-A
Diesel Transfer Pump P81801-B
Fresh water Storage Tank T-81001
Fresh water Storage Tank T-81002
Fresh water Break Tank T-81003
LoSal HP Pump LO Skid Z-44101-A
LoSal HP Pump LO Skid Z-44101-B
LoSal HP Pump LO Skid Z-44101-C
LoSal HP Pump LO Skid Z-44101-D
Fresh Water Maker Skid Z-81001
Potable Water Sterilizer Pkg. Z-81101
Hypochlorite Generator Pkg. - Z-81301

loads
for
equipment.
vessel/

2
For vessels/equipment <1m in effective diameter use
2
5kNm drag load.
The load must be applied in both horizontal directions
and in the vertical direction.
smaller.
Reference [34]. See Appendix G3.
Page 98 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
QU
Emergency
generator
associated
equipment
(Safety
critical)
Equipment subject to direct pressure loads

Emergency generator Pkg. Z-87501 (in
container)
Emergency Generator Diesel Day Tank T87501 (inside container)
Emergency Generator Watermist Skid SWM87501 (inside container)
Associated HVAC ducting
The walls/decks now exposed due to the removal
of outer walls will need to be blast rated to 0.2
bar.
Emergency generator Radiator X-87501
Only Additional check due to location:2
Permanent plastic deformation is allowed so long
as the equipment still functions.

loads
for
vessel/

which is attempting to move the equipment .
Loads on equipment exposed to direct

blast pressure loads only
This equipment is non-hydrocarbon containing but

is safety critical. Loads for exposed equipment.


2

2
DLB case.

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment
and
nozzles
simultaneously.
2

given in the last column should be treated
as a force which is attempting to move the
equipment .

smaller.
Permanent plastic deformation is allowed

so long as the equipment still functions.
The Emergency generator and associated
equipment shall survive Strong shock
loads from an explosion in the Generator
area.This shall be represented by a 0.5g
deck acceleration in all horizontal
directions.
Page 99 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
QU Injection
water
deaeration
tower
This vessel spans all decks on QU from the

cellar to the Main deck. It does not contain any
hydrocarbons.
Injection water de-aeration tower V-45001

loads
for
which is attempting to move the equipment .
vessel/


2
bar (5 kN/m ), Positive phase duration 125, 200 and
250ms. Negative phase durations 250, 400 and 500ms
2
with a peak pressure of -0.025 bar (2.5 kN/m ).
This load should be applied in all horizontal directions.
Page 100 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
Lifeboats on
QU
(TEMPSCs)

Davits and support structure

loads
for
TEMPSCs and associated equipment.
equipment .
DLB Event transverse out of balance pressure:
2
Positive phase 0.05 bar (5 kN/m ), Load durations 90,
150 and 180ms.
Negative phase -0.025 bar (2.5 kN/m2), Load
smaller.
This is the far field effect of explosions in the process,
compression and wellbay areas of DP.
vessel/
Design using the loads below is intended

to prevent equipment failure.
2

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
Out of balance loads should be applied in
all directions.
Strong shock explosion loads from an
explosion in the GT area should be
represented by a 0.5g acceleration in the
vertical and horizontal directions. This
need not be considered to act at the same
time as the out of balance pressures as
they are from different explosion
scenarios.
Page 101 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
QU
Cellar
Deck
Non
hydrocarbon
containing
Power Transformers ETR-88001-A/B/C/D

Fresh water Filter F-81001-A
Fresh water Filter F-81001-B
Bulk Loading panel ICP-89103
Water Inj. Booster Pumps P-46001-A/B/C
Fresh Water Pump P-81001-A/B
Fresh water Distribution Pumps P81003-A/B
Seawater Lift Pump P-81201-A/B/C
Cooling medium Circulating Pumps P-81401A/B
QU Open Drains Caisson Pump P-81601
Seawater Lift Pump tanks T-81201-A/B/C
Instrument/Utility Air Receiver V-84004
Jacket leg Compr. Air receiver V-84202
Cooling medium Seawater Heat Exchangers X81401/2/3
Seawater Filter Package Z-81201
Oil in Water Analyser Z-81601
Nitrogen Generator Package Z-83101
Nitrogen Storage Rack s Z-83103-A/B
Air Compressor Skids Z-84001-A/B/C/D
Air Dryer Package Z-84011
Macerator Z-93101
Firewater Jockey Pumps P-81204-A/B

loads
for
equipment .
vessel/

2
Note - this load is less than the expected design wind
load in this area.
This load should be applied in all horizontal directions.
Reference [34].
explosion loading.
smaller.
See Appendix G2
Page 102 of 193

Table 8.3
Area
Equipment item
QU
Cellar
Deck
Safety
critical
equipment
FW Pump Exhaust Silencer M-62101

Firewater Pkg. Watermist Skid SWM-62101
Firewater Pump Skid No. 1 Z-62101

loads
for
vessel/

equipment .

All Safety Critical vessels/equipment.

2
Out of balance DLB pressure: 0.05 bar (5 kN/m ),
Apply this load in all horizontal directions.

to
the
total
exposed
area
of
vessel/equipment/enclosure and nozzles
simultaneously.
Reference [34].
explosion loading.
See Appendix G2

a
force
applied
to
the
trying to move the equipment.
allowed.
Page 103 of 193

Design of Critical Pipework and associated equipment

This Section deals with items with effective diameters in the region of 1 metre or less.
This includes, but is not limited to, pipework, valves, pumps, pig launchers, pig traps, and
vents.
9.1
BP Requirements
To quote the BP General Practice, GP 24-22 [4],
For the DLB event:Supports for large vessels and piping containing flammable inventories and classed as
criticality 1 in explosion criticality survey should be capable of withstanding DLB events
without excessive deformation or loss of containment.
Venting and flare systems, particularly vent headers, should be considered criticality 1.
These requirements have been met by the requirements described in Section 8.3.
Under the SLB event:Explosion overpressure and drag loads should not cause loss of containment of
hydrocarbons or flammable substances through failure or permanent deformation of
structural vessel supports or pipe systems.
The congestion, space and weight impact of this requirement on piping supports has
motivated the study described in this Section and which is reported in detail in [49].
The purpose of the study is twofold. Firstly, it is intended to identify the critical piping
which needs to be supported to resist explosion drag loads. Secondly, to refine the
design explosion loads to be applied by area and position within the Clair Ridge facilities.
9.2
Piping explosion loads screening study

Three investigations have been performed to rationalise and focus the pipe support
design effort:1.
Prioritisation of required pipework protection by isolatable inventory and system.
This study examined the criticality of releases which could occur from various systems for
various hole sizes based on release rates and inventories available. This criticality
classification followed the definitions given by the HSE report on Offshore Hydrocarbon
Releases [45].
2.
P&ID mark-up. The P&IDs corresponding to the systems in the main Process Flow
Diagram CLB-FC-0X-PR-PFD-003 together with the fire water and fuel gas systems were
examined and the critical lines identified according to the conclusions of the prioritisation
study.
3.
Refinement of design drag loads for pipework, pipe supports and pipe racks. Taking
into account the location of pipework within the hazardous areas and its proximity to
decks and blast walls. The approach assumes that in particular vertical loads near decks
will be reduced because the direction of flow of gas, air and combustion products will be
constrained to be parallel to the deck surface. Similarly areas near blast walls will be
exposed to blast wind parallel to the walls. High pressure regions in the centre of decks
will be exposed to smaller drag loads than vent areas on the deck peripheries.
Page 104 of 193

These studies are summarised in this Section and reported fully in the Piping explosion
load screening study [49].
Critical Piping and the deluge system in the wellbay area is required to be protected
against the DLB explosion. Hydrocarbon piping in the GT area on QU is minimal and the
relatively low loads indicate that full protection will not have significant weight impact.
Protection against indirect loading (displacement induced failure) is also relevant to
prevent escalation after an explosion. See Section 10.7. Critical pipework outside the
hazardous areas is designed to resist DLB explosion induced displacements.
9.2.1
Classification of releases
The classification of the severity of releases has been performed following the
recommendations of the HSE, which classifies releases into Major, Significant, and Minor
as described in Reference [45].
Definitions
MAJOR: "Potential to quickly impact out with the local area e.g. affect the TR, escape
routes, escalate to other areas of the installation, causing serious injury or fatalities." A
major leak, if ignited, would be likely to cause a "major accident", i.e. it would be of a size
capable of causing multiple casualties or rapid escalation affecting TR, escape routes,
etc.
Criteria
MAJOR:
(i) Gas Releases:
EITHER [Quantity released > 300 kg]
OR [Mass release rate>1kg/s AND Duration >5 mins]
This could result in a jet fire of over 10 m length (>1kg/s) capable of causing significant
escalation after 5 minutes duration, or a flash fire/explosion on reaching LFL. Where 300
kg equates to approx. 3000 m3 explosive cloud at NTP, enough to fill an entire module or
deck area, and to cause serious escalation if ignited.
(ii) Liquid Releases (Oil/Condensate/Non-process):
EITHER [Quantity released > 9,000 kg]
OR [Mass release rate>10kg/s AND Duration >15 mins]
This could result in a pool fire over 10 m in diameter (>10kg/s) filling a module or cutting
off a deck, hindering escape and affecting more than one person directly if lasting for over
15 minutes duration.
Significant and minor releases have not been considered in this analysis as they do not
lead to escalation to other areas of the plant, whereas a major release has the potential to
do so.
The size of the flammable gas cloud before ignition and the associated release rates
indicate that an explosion would occur later than one minute after the initiation of the
primary release. The time for detection, inventory isolation and commencement of blow
down is less than one minute.
Page 105 of 193

It is therefore assumed that blowdown will be active during any subsequent releases
following an explosion.
The explosion could give rise to secondary releases from pipework connected to
isolated inventories in the affected area. These releases are likely to become immediately
ignited as they will be surrounded by hot surfaces resulting from the explosion.
9.2.2
System criticality and recommended protection

This section lists the systems and identifies the releases of Major criticality and the
dominant factor for the severity classification.
Tables 9.1 to 9.4 prioritise piping systems by the release rate resulting from holes of
various diameters and the inventory which could be released.
For the purposes of this classification the minimum hole size giving major releases has
been identified with the line sizes which require protection. The recommendations for
liquid side lines and liquid only systems follow the PFP requirements given in the Fire
Protection Strategy [47].
Table 9.1 Recommended protection by system Compression Deck
Compression Deck
2
Drag SLB 5 kN/m , DLB 12

2
kN/m
Recommended protection
Gas Side
Liquid Side [1]
HP Separator Trains 1 & 2
Protect >=3" No major liquid
Inlet to VRU Suction Cooler
No protection No major liquid
VRU Compressor
Protect >4"
Inlet to LP Compressor
Trains 1 & 2
No protection No Significant Liquid
Protect all
Comments
All gas side piping >3" Protect all
gas side piping
Liquid side release may become

gas but the system is isolated
during blowdown.
Inventory 7.5kg of gas
LP Compressor Trains 1 & 2 Protect all
No Significant Liquid All gas side piping >=2" protect all

gas side piping. Compressor
systems may isolate sections.
Blow down no effect in 2 mins.
Liquid side release may become
gas
MP Compressor Trains 1 & 2 Protect all
No Significant Liquid All gas side piping >=1" protect all

gas side piping. Compressor
systems may isolate sections
Glycol System
No Significant Liquid Inventories on both decks

included
Protect all
HP Compressor Trains 1 & 2 Protect all
No Significant Liquid Liquid side release may become

gas. All gas side piping >=1/2"
protect all gas side piping.
Compressor systems may isolate
sections
Page 106 of 193

Table 9.2 Recommended protection by system Production Deck

Process Production Deck
2

2
kN/m
Gas Side
Liquid Side [1]
Comments
Production Manifold 1 & 2
Protect >4"
No Major Liquid
High pressure system in high

2
drag load area (SLB 20 kN/m ).
Two phase lines present
Test Manifold
Protect >4"
No Major Liquid
High pressure system in high

2
drag load area (SLB 20 kN/m ).
Test Separator
Protect >=3" Protect all
Fuel Gas Heaters A & B
Protect >4"
No Significant Liquid
Fuel Gas Scrubber
Protect all
No Significant Liquid All gas side piping is >=1" so

protect/support all gas side
piping.
Fuel Gas Filter Coalescer on Protect all

DP
No Significant Liquid
Gas Lift and export system
Protect all
No Significant Liquid Future
LP Separator Trains 1 & 2
Protect all
Protect all
Split between decks 75mm hole

size not major at 1 min or 2 min
into blowdown. All gas side
pipework >=3"
HP Separator Trains 1 & 2
Protect all
Protect all
Split between decks, All gas side

piping is >=3" except for the lines:
2"-WH-221011-B03E-PP and
2"PL-221008-D01D-WT.
VRU Compressor
Protect >4"
No Major Liquid
Split between decks. Isolated

during blowdown.
Glycol scrubber
Protect all
No Significant Liquid Split between decks, high

pressure gas system.
Table 9.3 Recommended protection by system Mezzanine and Cellar Decks

Process Mezzanine and
Cellar Deck
2

2
kN/m
Gas Side
Liquid Side [1]
Comments
Subsea Production Slug

Catcher (future)
Protect all
Protect all
All gas side piping is >=3" so

protect/support all gas side piping
LP Separator Trains 1 & 2
Protect all
No Major Liquid
Split between decks 75mm hole

size not major at 1 min or 2 min
into blowdown. All gas side piping
is >=3" so protect/support all gas
Page 107 of 193

Process Mezzanine and

Cellar Deck
2

2
kN/m
Gas Side
Liquid Side [1]
Comments
side piping
Oil Export Pumps
No Gas
No Major Liquid
Electrostatic Coalescer
Trains 1 & 2
No Gas
Protect all
Coalescer Oil Pumps
No Gas
No Major Liquid
Oil export Pig Launcher in

use every 2 weeks.
No Gas
No Significant Liquid Assume gas pig launcher not in

use, Protect downstream of
pipeline isolation valve.
Oil metering skid
No Gas
Protect all
No Major liquid inventory
Table 9.4 Recommended explosion protection Flare system

Process cellar deck
2
Drag DLB 30 kN/m , SLB 10
2
kN/m
Gas side
Liquid (scrubber)
Comment
HP Flare - (Maximum Gas

Case)
Protect all
Protect all
Protect to DLB level. All piping

>=2"
LP Flare
Protect all
Protect all
Protect to DLB level. All piping

>=3"
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Where protection is required protect up to the first normally closed or isolation

valve defining the boundary of the isolatable inventory.
The process lines between process equipment items and within the boundaries
of isolatable inventories should be considered according to the protection
requirements given in Tables 9.1 to 9.4.
All blowdown and pressure relief lines should be protected against the higher
ductility level blast (DLB). Export cooler blowdown is treated as vent/pressure
relief.
The input lines to the flare headers and the headers themselves will need
protection against the DLB (and SLB) explosion events
Cold HP flare headers on QU will need DLB level protection although these are
largely exposed to small far field explosion loads.
Page 108 of 193

9.2.3
P&ID mark-up
The process P&IDs have been marked up with a red or yellow colour indicating that they
require protection according to the criteria set in Tables 9.1 to 9.4. The special DLB
protection requirements for flowlines, well kill lines, blowdown, pressure relief lines and
flare headers mean that these lines are also coloured. The fuel gas system and fire water
supply P&IDs have also been similarly marked up.
The marked up P&IDs are listed in Table 9.5 below:Table 9.5
P&IDs Marked up for Explosion Protection
Title
Title
Test Separator Oil Filters
Test manifold
Test Separator Heater
Test Separator
Production Manifold Train 1
Recycle Connections to Separation Train 1
Crude Inlet Heater Train 1
HP Separation Train 1
Oil Heaters Train 1
HP Separator Oil Filter Train 1
LP Separator Train 1
Electrostatic Coalescer Train 1
Coalescer Water Pumps Train 1
Coalescer Oil Pumps Train 1
Oil Export Cooler Train 1
Oil Export Pump Train 1
Oil Export Pump Common Standby
Oil Metering Skid
Oil Export and Pig Launcher
VRU Suction Cooler
VRU Suction Scrubber
VRU Suction Scrubber Pumps
VRU Compressor
LP Compressor Suction Cooler Train 1
LP Compressor Suction Scrubber Train 1
LP Compressor Train 1
MP Compressor Suction Cooler Train 1
MP Compressor Suction Scrubber Train 1
MP Compressor Train 1
MP Compressor Discharge Cooler Train 1
Contactor Inlet Scrubber
Glycol Contactor
HP Compressor Suction Scrubber Train 1
HP Compressor Train 1
HP Compressor Discharge Cooler Train 1
HP Compressor Balance Line Cooler Train
1
Sales Gas Metering
Drawing Number
Drawing Number
CLB-FC-0X-PR-PID-231003
Revision
Revision
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Page 109 of 193

Title
Drawing Number
Gas Lift manifold
Sales gas Export
Firewater Pump No.1
CLB-FC-0X-SE-PID-621001
Firewater Pump No.2
Firewater Pump No.3
Firewater Distribution
(sheets 1 to 6)
Foam Storage/Pumping Package
Foam Concentrate Distribution System
Deluge Valve Package North
Deluge Valve Package South
Production
Deck/Wellbay/Compression CLB-FC-0X-SE-PID-632005
Module Deluge Valve Package
Fuel Gas Heater A/B
(sheets 1 & 2)
Fuel Gas Scrubber
QU/DP Bridge Distribution
Main Power Generation Package 1 Piping CLB-FC-0X-PR-PID-871001
Interface
Cold HP Flare and Bursting Disc Collection CLB-FC-0X-PR-PID-370001
Fuel gas Filter/Coalescer & Distribution
LP Flare Collection (DP)
(sheet 1)
LP Flare Collection (QU)
(sheet 2)
QU/DP Bridge Distribution
LP Flare Scrubber and Pumps
LP Flare Gas Compressor Recycle Cooler CLB-FC-0X-PR-PID-330006
LP Flare Gas Recovery Compressor
(sheet 2)
Bursting Disk HP Flare Collection
(sheet 3)
Cold HP Flare Collection (DP)
(sheet 1)
Cold HP Flare Collection (QU)
(sheet 2)
HP Flare Collection
(sheets 1 & 2)
HP Flare Scrubber and Pumps
Revision
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. B1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Rev. C1
Where appropriate, the markups refer to Trains 1 and 2.

The marked-up P&IDs are available in the Safety Folder in:R:\projects\Clair Ridge\Engineering\Design Safety\Safety\Explosion Work\piping\Piping
screening study\P&IDs
Page 110 of 193

The lines marked yellow on the P&IDs relate mainly to the protection of the pressure
relief lines which may be subject to backflow from the blowdown system. The red marked
lines are lines connected to systems which could give rise to major releases as defined
by the HSE and are assumed to need explosion protection. Both coloured lines need
explosion protection.
Specific lines needing protection
The following lines are marked red and yellow in the P&IDs.
Lines containing blow down valves (design to DLB).
Flare system headers/scrubbers and downstream lines (design to DLB).
Systems in the high explosion load area (process production deck - near the blast
wall e.g. manifolds).
Large gas and two phase lines on systems with high inventories (>300kg gas or
9000kg liquid).
High pressure gas lines (MP and HP compressors)
Fuel gas lines not isolated from the scrubber.
Firewater and deluge.
Flow lines, well kill lines (design to DLB)
Gas venting lines upstream of flare headers/scrubbers
Fuel gas lines on the bridge and on QU low blast loads some near the TR.
All lines in GT area.
Pressure relief systems empty during normal operation could be filled by backflow
from headers and other flare systems and need protection to DLB levels.
Specific lines not requiring protection
The following lines are unmarked in the P&IDs and will not need full explosion protection
to SLB levels.
Non-hydrocarbon and non safety critical lines.
Instrument lines.
Heating/cooling medium lines including Glycol form their own non-hazardous
isolatable inventory.
Various process utility systems nitrogen, instrument air, fresh water, LoSal, air
compression etc.
Diesel systems (unless for supply of emergency generator, fire pumps, make
secure generator)
Drainage/liquid lines downstream of the first normally closed valve.
Notes:
1. The Low pressure flare scrubber is used as a closed drains tank during normal
operations used by the LP separator and VRU only flow is through the scrubber to the
LP flare.
2. VRU compressor this system is isolated during blowdown
3. Lines for some systems are subject to indirect loading due to support displacement will
need protection to prevent of escalation from other areas.
Page 111 of 193

9.3
Recommendations for piping explosion protection

The requirements for protection of piping exposed directly to explosion loads is
summarised below.
Table 9.6
Summary of piping explosion protection requirements

System/lines
Requirements
Process and fuel gas pipework including valves.
Protect by System/ line size as in

Tables 9.1 to 9.4
Pressure relief and vent lines to the flare.
Protect relief and vent lines to DLB.
Protect flare headers/scrubbers to
DLB.
Blow down lines
Protect lines to DLB
Closed drains lines to the first normally closed Protect by system/line size where
valve.
recommended
by
the
Fire
Protection Strategy.
All pipework associated with the safety systems in Protect all lines to SLB level.
the affected area including deluge, fire water and Nozzles and small lines are
foam systems.
duplicated and may not need to be
protected.
Export lines, pig launchers and receivers.
Pig
launchers
protect
downstream of isolation valve to
pipeline.to DLB level.
Process manifolds.
Protect by system/line size to SLB
(high pressure high load area)
All actuated valves, including actuators
ALARP measure adopted of 30
kN/m2 drag load protection will be
achieved.
Xmas trees, flowlines, well kill lines.
Require protection to DLB
Refer to marked up P&IDs for detailed breakdown by line,.
For general area overpressure loads, see Figure 7.1, where the DLB and SLB peak
overpressures are given by area.
Page 112 of 193

10
Explosion loads on piping and nozzles

The following guidance and background is provided with regard to the implementation
into the design of explosion loads on piping and nozzles.
Drag loads (as opposed to overpressure loads) are assumed to dominate for
equipment/vessels and pipework of less than one metre in effective diameter. The
effective diameter includes an increase to the diameter allowing for appurtenances.
Direct drag loads should be applied in all directions to the pipework unless it is
adjacent to and shielded behind secondary steelwork such as deck beams on a plated
deck section.
The range of pulse durations appropriate to the area and as given in Tables 8.1 and
8.2 should be applied if a dynamic analysis is to be performed. To determine the
explosion durations considered in each area see Tables 8.1 to 8.3.
ESDVs and BDVs (including their actuators) on blast critical pipework are to be
designed to withstand at least the same level of drag forces as the associated pipework.
As an ALARP measure, it has been agreed that on Clair Ridge all actuators and the
valves themselves shall be designed to resist a drag load of 30kN/m2.
Protection of all Riser ESDVs should be to the same load level as ESDV platforms
i.e. DLB pressure 0.2 bar (20 kN/m2), SLB pressure 0.07 bar (7kN/m2) and drag 7kN/m2 is
required in view of the potential to release very large pipeline inventories. As an ALARP
measure, it has been agreed that on Clair Ridge all actuators and the valves themselves
shall be designed to resist a drag load of 30kN/m2.
The magnitudes of drag pressure in kN/m2 are based on data derived directly by BP
from the FLACS simulations. The lateral design load per metre of piping (kN/m) is given
by multiplying the drag pressure by the effective diameter (for circular sections).
The drag pressures are given for piping of circular section and a drag coefficient
(Cd) of 1.2. For sections of differing shape the coefficients given in Table 10.2 in Section
10.4 should be used.
If it is considered a significant load case, pipework should also be checked for its
capacity to resist the peak SLB overpressure applied as a uniform load around the
perimeter. The hydrocarbon contents during normal operation should be assumed to be
present. For flare headers and flowlines the DLB pressure should be used.
The Table below gives the overpressures to be resisted by pipework and nozzles to avoid
collapse due to crushing under external pressure. The piping in the region adjacent to the
West blast wall (within 5m of the wall) attracts higher overpressures than more distant
locations.
Page 113 of 193

Table 10.1 Design over-pressures for pipework to avoid crushing failure
Location/Deck
Compression
area
Main
Deck
underside
Production Deck
upper surface
Production Deck
underside
Mezzanine Deck
upper surface
Mezzanine Deck
underside
Cellar
Deck
upper surface
10.1
Adjacent to West Blast Wall Distant from West Blast Wall

<5m from wall
>5m from wall
DLB
SLB
DLB
SLB
0.7 Barg
0.25 Barg
0.7 Barg
0.25 Barg
2.7 Barg
0.9 Barg
1.4 Barg
0.5 Barg
2.7 Barg
0.9 Barg
0.6 Barg
0.2 Barg
1.5 Barg
0.5 Barg
0.9 Barg
0.3 Barg
1.5 Barg
0.5 Barg
0.75 Barg
0.25 Barg
1.5 Barg
0.5 Barg
0.9 Barg
0.3 Barg
1.5 Barg
0.5 Barg
0.72 Barg
0.25 Barg
Variation of direct drag loads by location

The nominal drag loads by area shown in Figure 10.1 may be reduced to take account of
location in the deck and their proximity to blast walls and decks following the
recommendations of Sections 10.2 and 10.3.
Figure 10.1, below gives the nominal direct drag load levels as supplied by BP [[1].
Drag loads should be applied to critical pipework and vessels of circular section and less
than one metre in effective diameter.
Page 114 of 193

QU Platform
Bridge
DP Platform
Flare Boom
For DES and DSM see Table 8.1

Blast rated decks
Blast Walls
main deck
production deck
Compression Module
SLB Blast wind for critical
systems
= 5KN/m2
(DLB 12 kN/m2)
mezzanine deck
cellar deck
Blast rated deck

Generator Module
DLB drag = 10KN/m2
SLB drag = 3.3kN/m2
Data based on Site Instruction
CLB-BP-AM-SI-000164-01
Well Bay part of Production

Module West
Blast wind for flowlines, well control and
well kill systems DLB = 20KN/m2
Blast wind for firewater(W F)
systems DLB = 20 KN/m2
(SLB drag in area is 8 kN/m2)
ESD and Flare Pump

Platforms.
Blast wind for all
critical systems
= 7KN/m2
Process Module (DP East)

DLB Blast wind for flare headers/scrubbers, blowdown systems
and flowlines =30 KN/m2 (all levels)
SLB Blast wind for other critical systems on Production deck
=20KN/m2
SLB Blast wind for critical systems on Mezzanine and
Cellar decks =10KN/m2
Figure 10.1 Areas subject to blast nominal design drag loads

Page 115 of 193

Loads on small diameter equipment items can be a mixture of out of balance pressure
loads and drag loads depending on whether their effective diameter is > or < 1m. The out
of balance pressure loads for items with effective diameter >1m should be taken directly
from section 8.2.
AMEC Technical Safety has been requested to consider the directionality of drag loads
by area, to take account of the proximity of decks and blast walls.
The figures below illustrate the conclusions of this investigation and draw on the
experience from other projects on this topic.
The drag loads identified are labelled with the percentages of the un-factored, nominal
loads given in Figure 10.1.
Generally, it is recommended that a maximum of 50% of the horizontal drag load is
applied vertically.
The directionality of drag loads by area has been considered, to take account of the
proximity of decks and blast walls. The figures below illustrate the conclusions of this
investigation and draw on the experience from other projects on this topic.
10.2
Vertical drag load distribution - elevations

Figures 10.2, 10.3 and 10.4 show elevations of the areas where an explosion may occur
on DP.
The elevations show, as a red line plotted against the elevation, the percentage of the
drag loads by area given in Figure 10.1, which should be applied in the vertical direction.
Vertical loads should be applied upwards and downwards.
10.2.1 The Wellbay area vertical drag loads
Figure 10.2 Wellbay area elevation Vertical drag loads shown as a percentage of the peak
horizontal drag load
Page 116 of 193

Figure 10.2 shows that in the Wellbay area the vertical drag load should be taken as 50%
of the nominal drag load given in Figure 10.1 for the section between the Mezzanine deck
and elevation 51.2m. This vertical drag load may be further reduced near the main and
cellar decks as the gas flow is deflected in a horizontal direction.
10.2.2 The Process area vertical drag loads
Figure 10.3 Process area elevation - Vertical drag loads shown as a percentage of the
peak horizontal drag load view from North
Figure 10.3 shows an elevation of the process area. The vertical drag load should be
taken as 50% of the drag load given in Figure 10.1 for the section between the
Mezzanine deck and elevation 51.2m. This load may be further reduced near the main
and cellar decks, as the gas flow at peak drag load is deflected in a horizontal direction by
these plated decks.
10.2.3 The Compression area vertical drag loads
Figure 10.4 Compression deck area
Figure 10-4 shows an elevation through the Compression deck. Because of the geometry
of the plated decks above and below, the gas flow and drag load is deflected parallel to
the deck giving a reduction of vertical load. As an explosion develops and the flame front
diverges from the ignition point the gas flow becomes more and more constrained to be in
a horizontal direction.
At early stages of the development of an explosion there will be vertical gas flow, of a
lower magnitude, than at later times. To represent this effect, a nominal 25% of the drag
loading shown in Figure 10.1 should be applied as vertical loads, upwards and
downwards throughout the area.
Page 117 of 193

10.3
Horizontal peak drag load distribution plan views

Figures 10.5 and 10.6 show plans of the areas on DP where an explosion may occur.
The percentages shown should be applied to the values of the nominal drag loads by
explosion area as given in Figure 10.1 to give the horizontal drag loads to be applied in
each area of the deck. The red arrows indicate the predominant flow directions present in
each deck area bounded by the blue lines in the figures.
The central areas of the decks, where the 50% figure is shown, is an area of relatively
small drag loading, where the pressures will be typically at their highest.
As an explosion develops the flame front expands out from the ignition point and
increases in area. This area increase results in a higher combustion rate and higher gas
velocities away from the centre. The drag forces experienced will actually be larger for
obstacles far from the ignition point than for those closer. As an ignition may occur at any
point on the deck, obstacles in the central deck area will be closer to possible ignition
points than obstacles around the edges in the vent areas. As a result the drag loads in
the vent areas will be larger than in the central area of the deck.
For areas where the pressure gradient is high, for example near vent areas, the gas flow
velocities will be greatest.
Page 118 of 193

100%
100%
100%
1/3
100%
50%
50%
1/3
50%
1/3
100%
100%
100%
Figure 10.5 Wellbay and process production deck - distribution of peak horizontal drag load
directions, (apply at all levels)
10.3.1 The Wellbay area horizontal drag loads

Figure 10.5 shows that in the Wellbay area, West of gridline 4 the horizontal flow is
constrained to be predominantly parallel to the bounding blast walls on grid lines 3 and 4.
The central area is an area of low drag where the horizontal flow is still predominantly
parallel to the walls but may be taken to be reduced to 50% of its nominal value given in
Figure 10.1.
10.3.2 The Process area horizontal drag loads

Each deck in the Process area is represented by the area to the East of the blast wall on
gridline 4 as shown in Figure 10.5.
The blue lines indicate the boundaries of the areas, in plan, where the direction and
magnitude of the drag loads are given. The directions of gas flow, and hence the drag
load directions, are indicated by red arrows on the figures. The boundaries are not sharp
delineations and should be interpreted with due regard to design practicality and
engineering judgement.
Page 119 of 193

Where the piping is near to the blast walls, the gas flow is assumed to be parallel to the
wall. The region labelled 50% near the blast wall is where only 50% of the load need be
applied but in this region the horizontal drag loads may occur in any direction. The extent
of these three regions in the Process area is indicated by the boundary in blue and the
blast wall itself.
In the vent areas on the periphery, the drag loading should be applied in the range of
directions indicated. A reverse load of half the magnitude should be applied in these
regions to represent the suction phase of the explosion as the flow reverses and flow is
into the deck area (this should not critically affect the design).
In the central areas where the figure of 50% appears, 50% of the drag load should be
applied. This load should be applied in all horizontal directions (even in the region near to
a blast wall).
Load direction ranges are indicated in each region. The angles formed by all oblique lines
and arrows angles in the figure are approximately 45.
Page 120 of 193

10.3.3 The Compression area horizontal drag loads
100%
100%
1/3
50%
1/3
50%
50%
100%
1/3
100%
100%
Figure 10.6 Compression area deck - distribution of peak horizontal drag load directions
Figure 10.6 shows the distribution of the horizontal drag loads throughout the deck. The
pattern is similar to that applied in the process area.
The blue lines indicate the boundaries of the areas, where the direction and magnitude of
the drag loads are given. The directions of gas flow, and hence the drag load directions,
are indicated by red arrows on the figures. The boundaries are not sharp delineations and
should be interpreted with due regard to design practicality and engineering judgement.
Page 121 of 193

Where the piping is near to the blast walls, the gas flow is assumed to be parallel to the
wall. The region labelled 50% near the blast wall is where only 50% of the load need be
applied but in this region the horizontal drag loads may occur in any direction. The extent
of these three regions in the near wall area is indicated by the boundary in blue and the
blast wall itself.
In the vent areas on the periphery, the drag loading should be applied in the range of
directions indicated. A reverse load of half the magnitude should be applied in these
regions to represent the suction phase of the explosion as the flow reverses and flow is
into the deck area (this should not critically affect the design).
In the central areas where the figure of 50% appears, 50% of the drag load should be
applied. This load should be applied in all horizontal directions (even in the region near to
a blast wall).
Load direction ranges are indicated in each region. The angles formed by all oblique lines
and arrows angles in the figure are approximately 45.
10.4
Drag loads on non-circular sections

The calculation of drag loads for non-circular sections should be calculated using the
following drag coefficients.
Table 10.2
Drag coefficients for non-circular sections
Page 122 of 193

For example the drag pressure for a face-on cubic obstruction should be:The given drag pressure times Cd for a face on cube divided by the Cd for a circular
cylinder (in kN/m2)
i.e. divide the given value for drag pressure by the drag coefficient for a circular cylinder
and multiply this by the drag coefficient for the shape of the obstacle considered.
For more information see BP References 11 and 13.
10.5
Equivalent wind velocities

A wind pressure of 20kN/m2 corresponds to a wind speed of 167m/s and 30kN/m2 to a
wind speed of about 204 m/s. The design environmental wind (100 year 3 second gust) is
67.2 m/s, this corresponds to about 3.5kN/m2.
In many cases the far field blast loads are comparable to this and so blast analysis of
these equipment items and piping may not be necessary.
(This assumes circular section obstacles have a drag coefficient Cd of 1.2. Different
shaped obstacles will have different equivalent wind speeds.)
From:P = 1/2 rho Cd V2
Hence
V = sqrt( 2 * P /( rho * Cd))
Where
P = wind pressure (kN/m2)
f = wind force (kN/m) = P*deff
rho = density of air (1.2 kg/m3 )
deff = effective diameter in metres
Cd = Drag coefficient (1.2 for circular sections)
V = wind velocity (perpendicular to pipe axis)
10.6
Far field drag loads

Where piping design is required for safety critical equipment in areas not directly
impacted by an explosion the drag load should be estimated to be 1/3 of the peak
overpressure (see Appendix G7). In most cases this will not govern the design as
environmental wind loads may be greater.
For example, a 0.05 bar far field overpressure corresponds to 5 kN/m2 pressure. The
corresponding explosion drag load will be approximately 1.5 kN/m2 compared with the
typical design wind load of 3.5kN/m2.
10.7
Indirect loads on piping

A major consideration in the design of piping to resist an explosion event are the applied
displacements due to the response of supporting structures and decks, which give rise to
indirect loads in the pipework. The structural discipline will supply the design deck
displacements under explosion events.
Page 123 of 193

The intention is that a DLB explosion event in one area should not give rise to escalation
through loss of containment in another area. The piping attached to blast barriers and
decks subject to explosion loads on the other side should withstand the DLB applied
displacements without rupture. This is to prevent escalation of explosion consequences to
other areas.
Displacement limits given in the Structural Design documents [17,18,29] should be
satisfied in order to allow design of piping and vessel supports to prevent escalation into
other areas.
The upper bound deck response deflection limit is L/40 where L is the deck span (DLB).
Piping attached to blast walls/deck outside, but adjacent to, the area where a blast can
occur will be designed to resist these DLB applied displacements without rupture if
specific values from the Structures discipline are not available. For elastic response the
upper bound deflection limit in the SLB event is L/200.
Piping supports should be designed to allow the relative movements without imposing
excessive strains in the pipework.
Penetrations through blast walls should be designed to be de-coupled from the wall
response or be positioned away from the mid span to limit the peak wall displacements to
+/-40mm.
10.8
Other Systems equipment items and vessels

Hazard control and Hazard mitigation systems should survive for long enough to perform
their defined safety function for both the SLB and DLB events [13]. Some of these
systems are protected in enclosures, others are duplicated and located at disparate
locations to increase the robustness of the systems and hence may not need protection
from direct explosion loads,
Elements and Systems not included in Tables 8.1 to 8.3, or included in the Table of
Safety Critical systems in Appendix B should be treated as follows:The supports for all non-critical vessels and equipment should resist the SLB explosion
for the deck on which they are supported unless they are protected within enclosures.
There is no explosion protection requirement for the non-critical vessels and equipment
items themselves.
The supports for cable trays should withstand the SLB explosion loads appropriate to
where they are located. The cable trays should not become projectiles for the SLB event.
The enclosures for a nucleonic emitters attached to items of equipment shall not become
detached during an SLB explosion. For more information on systems required to survive
major accidental hazards see [54].
There are three goods lifts proposed for Clair Ridge, two on QU and one on DP. The lifts
are treated in the same way as non-hydrocarbon containing vessels and may need to be
restrained at selected landing levels to prevent the cars becoming projectiles. The Safety
Design requirements are given in Appendix H.
Page 124 of 193

10.8.1 Access platforms

The drag reduction factors described in Sections 10.2 and 10.3 should not be applied to
access platforms unless the following is taken into account. The drag loads given in
Figure 10.1, represent the best estimate we have for representing a number of
scenarios/ignition points resulting in gas flow in different directions.
In order to make a full assessment of the loads on grated platforms, a case by case
approach should be used. The following needs to be considered:1. Whether drag loads dominate over pressure/pressure-difference loads.
2. The geometry and loaded areas and which are drag dominated and the proportion of
the total load attributable to drag loads.
3. The location - shielding
4. The local flow field by scenario each scenario should be considered separately. The
loads from each scenario/flow direction should not be combined unless the loads act
at the same time.
However, in the case of access platforms located in the central regions of decks, the area
indicated where 50% of horizontal drag loads apply, both the vertical and horizontal drag
loads may be reduced to at most 50% of their nominal values. In this case regardless of
the direction of gas flow, the magnitude of the drag load will be reduced. These reduced
drag loads may hence be used for the design of access platforms in these areas.
The drag loads may occur in any direction in these regions.
Page 125 of 193

11
Conclusions Recommendations and Actions

This report identifies which items need to be designed against explosion loads and
defines the load types, magnitudes and durations to be used when assessing the
response to these loads.
A Summary of the explosion requirements for Clair Ridge is included in Section 7.
Table 11.1
Action
No.
9.1.1
9.1.2
9.1.3
9.1.4
Actions arising from the implementation of the Explosion Strategy

Description of action
The design of blast/fire barriers, decks and

enclosures should follow the approach given
in Section 8.1, Tables 8.1 and 8.2 and Section
7.2.
The design of decks and supports for vessels
and equipment should incorporate the loads
given in Table 8.3. If failure of these supports
at the SLB level is not expected then the DLB
values should be used to calculate deck
reactions.
The design of vessels/equipment and their
supports should follow the recommendations
given in Sections 8.2 and 7.2. The design of
decks and supports for vessels and
equipment should incorporate the loads given
in Table 8.3. The integrity checks for
hydrocarbon
containing
vessels
and
equipment should follow the requirements of
Table 8.3.
The design of exposed HVAC ducting should
follow the recommendations given in Table
8.3, Section 8.1.5 and Table A1.
HVAC to confirm compliance through design
documentation and Issue of G.A.'s
9.1.5
9.1.6
9.1.7
9.1.8
The supports for cable racks should withstand

the SLB explosion loads without failure. The
cable racks must not become projectiles.
(Sections 8.1.5, 8.4 and Table 8.3)
Fire water, fire pumps, foam and watermist
skids should withstand the far field DLB
overpressures without permanent damage.
SIMOPS equipment in the wellbay area
should be designed according to the
requirements given in Table 8.3.
A strong shock response analysis should be
performed to identify inertia loads on essential
safety systems such as fire water pumps,
emergency generators, rotating equipment
mounted on anti-vibration mounts and
Status
(PIMS actions CLB-ENG-RV-038-nnn)
Raised 7/11/11
(PIMS 001 Larry
completion 1/9/12.
Structural to confirm
documentation
(PIMS 002 Larry
completion 1/9/12.
Structural to confirm
documentation
Biggs)
OPEN,
expected
compliance through design

Biggs)
OPEN,
expected
compliance through design
(PIMS 003 Ray Youlden Mechanical)

Data sheets issued and compliant (except Alimak
lift)
CLOSED 9/1/12
(PIMS 004 Phil Knot HVAC)

Response submitted 25/1/12 - As agreed with
Safety, ductwork serving LERs and TR have been
designed for blast rating in accordance with the
Explosion Overpressure Strategy. This generally
involved making ductwork circular where possible
and of thicker material. Supports will also be
designed to suit the blast rating.
Structural/electrical/instruments
CLOSED
Ref. e-mail Nick Zampos structures 21/12/11
Tech. Safety
CLOSED
BP Operations OPEN
Structural/Tech Safety
Calculations by structural indicate a general
design acceleration of 0.5g should be used on DP
and QU. See Appendix I for a description of the
approach and assumptions used. CLOSED
Page 126 of 193

Action
No.
9.1.9
9.1.10
9.1.11
9.1.12
9.1.13
Description of action
lifeboats [28]. If it can be demonstrated that

more severe inertia loads result from ship
impact and transportation then the analysis
will not be necessary.
All hydrocarbon gas containing critical
pipework and supports shall be designed to
the requirements of sections 9 and 10.
Structural documents containing overpressure
and drag load data should be updated to refer
to the current version of the Explosion
Strategy document for up to date values.
Including References [17],[18] and [29]
A definition of major inventories in the sense
of GP 24-22 Section B.3.4 needs to be
confirmed with BP. This may need to be
investigated on a case by case basis by
AMEC process/Tech. Safety.
RDS to supply a list of the exposed equipment
and piping items on the DES and DSM
modules with their major dimensions (effective
diameter and length).
Riser ESDV (RESDV) protection should be
provided at the DLB level. Explosion wind
(drag loads of 30 kN/m2) shall also be
resisted by all the remotely operated valves
and actuators.
Agreement to approach confirmed by Tech
Safety 31/10/11.
CLOSED
Status
(PIMS actions CLB-ENG-RV-038-nnn)
Raised 7/11/11
(PIMS 005 Steve Silver Piping stress)

OPEN, expected completion 31/8/12
Piping Stress group to confirm compliance
through Stress Dossier.
(PIMS 006 Larry Biggs Structures)
CLOSED 7/12/11
Structural confirmed compliance through issued
updates of specifications and philosophies. E.g.
CLB-FC-0X-ST-DSB-0004 Rev B1
HSE definition (Ref. 45) used in Piping screening
study.
CLOSED
(PIMS 007, Tony Murphy RDS Safety)

CLOSED 14/12/11
Compliance confirmed by e-mail Mike Thomas 27

Oct 2011.
Instrument specifications for control valves, relief
valves, actuated on/off valves and the wellhead
control panels specify drag force requirements of
20 kN/m2 as per advised previously. Further
to your response below it appears that we should
amend all Instrument valve specifications to
specify worst case of 30 kN/m2 as there would be
a cost and schedule implication to identify blast
force requirements for each individual valve
Page 127 of 193

12
References
Ref Description
No.
Document Number
1
2
3
4
CLB-BP-AM-SI-000164
CLB-BP-AM-SI-000171
CLB-FC-0X-SE-PHI-0001
CLB-FC-0X-SE-REP-0040
15
SI - Explosion overpressure results (11 Jan 2011)

SI - Duration summary table (17 Jan 2011)
Technical Safety Philosophy
Safety Critical Elements and Performance Standards
Layout (LAY 01)
Energy Institute Model Code of Safe Practice, Area
Classification Code for Installations Handling Flammable
Fluids
Relief and Blowdown Philosophy
Performance Standard (FEX 08) Blast Rated Barriers
Review of Adequacy of a Single Bridge between QU and
DP
Safety Critical Elements and Performance Standards
Oil and Gas UK Fire and Explosion Guidance May 2007
Guidance on Practice for Fire and Blast (F&B) Structural
Loading and Response Guideline
Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore
Facilities Against Fire and Blast Loading
th
Vapour Cloud Explosion Hazard Analysis, 28 March
2009.
Biggs J.M., 'Introduction to Structural Dynamics', McGraw
Hill, 1964
Area protection and fire/blast division layouts DP
16
Area protection and fire/blast division layouts QU
17
18
19
20
Topsides Structure Design Premise

Design Brief for Blast Design
Performance Standard (STR 02) Topsides Structure
Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety cases
(APOSC)
Acts, Regulations and Provisions for the Petroleum
Activity, Volume 2, NPD, December 1992.
Corr R.B. and Tam V.H.Y., Gas Explosion generated drag
loads in offshore installations, Conference proceedings,
ERA London December 1997.
Performance Standard - Process Systems (HYC 03)
Process Shutdown Systems (HYC 06)
Emergency Shutdown Systems (FEX 02)
Blowdown and Flare Systems (FEX 05)
Active Fire Protection (FEX 06)
The Escalation Consequences of Accidental Shock Loads,
Walker S. and Klair M., ERA Conference Proceedings
1994.
Design brief for fire and blast design
Explosion Loading on Topsides Equipment: Parts 1and 2
Treatment of Explosion Loads, Response Analysis and
Design
Protection of piping systems subject to fires and
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
IP Code Part 15, Edition 3, 2005
CLB-FC-0X-PR-PHI-0001
CLB-FC-0X-SE-TEC-0007
GN 66-260
st
API-RP-2FB, 1 Edn. April 2006

GP 24-22
CLB-FC-1X-SE-LAY-0050
to
0056
to
0055
CLB-FC-0X-ST-BOD-0001
CLB-FC-0X-ST-DSB-0004
HSE Books, HSG181.ISBN 0
7176 1238 4, HMSO 1998
CLB-FC-0X-ST-DSB-0004
HSE Reports OTO 1999 046/7.
HSE Report rr285, 2005.

Page 128 of 193

Ref Description
No.
32
33
explosions.
Specification for HP and LP Flare Tips.
Document Number
CLB-FC-1X-ME-SPE-0032
Escape, Temporary Refuge, Evacuation and Rescue

Analysis
BP Response to EQ Request for Further Explosion
Overpressure Data
Area protection fire/blast plan on living quarters roof and
Gen. module main deck
Preliminary Explosion Assessment, March 2010
Level 2 Explosion Overpressure Modelling Scope of Work
Clair Ridge Project Explosion Curve Report, November
2010
Written Schemes of Examination
44
BP Clair Ridge Quantitative Risk Analysis, Atkins.

Technical Specification for Pipe Penetration Seals
Various GA floor plans showing wind walls and blast
capacities for DP and QU. Document numbers:CLB-FC-2D-AR-GAS-0221
CLB-FC-2D-AR-GAS-0222
CLB-FC-2W-AR-GAS-0121
DP Jacket Accidental boat impact analysis report Kvearner
Piping Stress Critical Line List
In preparation 1/2/12
CLB-FC-0X-PI-SPE-0012
CLB-FC-1E-AR-GAS-2131
CLB-FC-1C-AR-GAS-7121
CLB-FC-1C-AR-GAS-7221
CLB-AV-1J-JK-REP-7824
Rev.
C1
CLB-FC-0X-PI-LNL-0010 Rev. A1
45
46
Offshore hydrocarbon releases 2001-2008

Fire Hazard Analysis
47
Fire Protection Strategy
48
49
50
51
52
53
Relief and Blowdown Philosophy

Piping Explosion load screening study
DP Jacket Dynamic and Fatigue Analysis Report
Ship impact analysis report (QU Jacket)
Ship impact analysis report (DP Jacket)
Blast and shock induced vibrations in offshore jacket
installations
Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis
RR672 HSE, 2008

CLB-FC-0X-SE-REP-0004 Rev.
B3
CLB-FC-0X-SE-REP-0059 Rev.
B4
CLB-FC-0X-PR-PHI-0001
CLB-FC-0X-SE-TEC-0010
CLB-AV-1J-JK-REP-7823
CLB-FC-2J-JK-REP-0004
CLB-FC-1J-JK-REP-0004
HSE Report OTH 94 430, 1994
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
54
CLB-AM-BP-EQ-000244 Rev. 02
CLB-FC-0X-SE-SOW-0001
Atkins
Rep.
5096156/007/001/Rev 0
Page 129 of 193

Appendix A
Inherent Safety Features to Reduce Explosion Risk
The measures implemented are detailed in the table below:Table A.1: Inherent Safety Features to Reduce Explosion Risk
Goal to Minimise
Explosion Risk
Reduce as far as
possible
the
likelihood
of
occurrence of a
release and ignition
by:-:
Inherent Safety Feature
Material
selection
minimise corrosion
to
Comments
Material selection has been based on the

prevention of corrosion failures.
Materials will be specified as
compliant with NACE/ISO 15156.
Minimise number of pipe

joints
Maximise
joints
welded
Minimise
instrumentation
Minimise
pipework
small
pipe
being
Direct mounted instrumentation will be

provided where practicable to minimise
quantity of small bore tubing.
invasive
bore
Insulate hot surfaces or

design
of
electrical
equipment
to
T3
temperature
classification.
It has been confirmed that the auto ignition

risks associated with equipment or
surfaces in hazardous areas, which have a
surface temperature of 200 degC or
greater, are within the design basis
defined in the IP Code Part 15, Edition 3,
2005 [5].
Electrical equipment within a hazardous
area will be designed to T3 classification
to avoid auto-ignition of any released
hydrocarbon gas.
Minimise
equipment
ignition potential
All equipment located on DP should be

certified for Zone 2 use as a minimum.
Hazardous area drawings have been
developed to identify all Zone 1 areas
In the event that hydrocarbon gas is
detected within the various HVAC inlets,
the HVAC system for the particular room
will be shutdown.
Safety systems which need to operate
after a release should be classified to
Zone 1.
Page 130 of 193

Table A.1: Inherent Safety Features to Reduce Explosion Risk (Continued)
Goal to Minimise
Explosion Risk
Minimisation of potential
explosive cloud size by
maximising
natural
ventilation potential.
Comments
Efficiency of natural ventilation will be

confirmed by CFD assessment to ensure
that the natural ventilation rates meet the
performance standard of greater than 12
air changes per hour.
The DP platform and all hazardous areas
are orientated such that natural ventilation
will supply at least 12 air changes per hour
95% of the time.
Control
the
consequences
as
far as possible to
prevent escalation
Gas detection
The fire and gas detectors have been

chosen for their high reliability and
positioned to ensure efficient and rapid
detection. A F&G Mapping exercise will
be undertaken as part of the design
process
to
ensure
the
detection
performance targets are met. Process
isolation and blowdown will be initiated
where appropriate to limit the inventory
released.
Orientation and layout of

equipment
The orientation of the main equipment has

been arranged to minimise the potential
blockage within an area.
Maximise
natural
ventilation grating of
deck where practicable
and
orientation
of
equipment
See above.
Provision of blastwalls to
segregate the hazardous
and non-hazardous/utility
areas and the TR.
Combined Fire and Blast walls have been

provided to the east and west of the
wellbay area and between the compressor
area and drill derrick to minimise the
potential for either explosion or fire
hazards escalating to impact personnel
and equipment in the adjacent areas. The
blast wall to the west of the wellbay area
also provides protection for the bridge.
See Performance Standard [7]
Gas detection
See above
Blowdown of inventories
Blowdown depressurises inventory to

below 6.9 barg within at least 15 minutes
[6].
Page 131 of 193

Table A.1: Inherent Safety Features to Reduce Explosion Risk (Continued)

Goal to Minimise
Explosion Risk
Mitigate
the
consequences
as
far as possible, to
reduce the effects
in line with the goal
for recovery
Provision of blastwalls to
segregate the hazardous
and non-hazardous/utility
areas and the TR.
Comments
See above
Segregation of
compressors, the
Production Deck and the
risers below Cellar Deck
by blast resistant decks.
Provide multiple escape
routes
All areas of DP and QU have been

provided with at least two escape routes
directing personnel towards the TR, within
the living quarters on QU. The Bridge is a
single escape route which has been
justified by a specific study [8].
All drilling and processing

activities are located on a
separate jacket from the
TR.
The TR is located within the LQ on the

west side of the QU platform. All drilling
and processing activities are located on
DP.
Only
limited
quantities
of
hydrocarbons (fuel gas) are located on
QU. Therefore it is considered unlikely that
the effects of an explosion on DP will
impair the TR.
Minimisation of manning
exposure to blast, i.e.
reduce the time required
for personnel to be
located on DP
The main control room for DP is within the

LQ.
No permanently manned areas within the
DP processing areas. Manned areas, such
as drill floor/Derrick are protected by blast
walls.
Page 132 of 193

Appendix B
requirements
Table B.1
Safety Critical
System
Additional Safety Critical Systems explosion design
Additional Safety Critical Systems explosion design requirements

Design Explosion Loads
Rationale
Emergency
All actuated valves and actuators shall Note - field cables are considered
Shutdown
and resist a blast drag load of 30kN/m2.
to be included in the Performance
F&G Systems
Standard relating to the field
devices.
Any software required for the safe
operation of ESD Panel or Fire &
Gas Panel is considered to be part
of that panel.
Egress
and No specific design overpressure identified. At least one escape route to be
Evacuation Routes However, it should be noted that whilst passable in a major accident.
escape routes in the area in which an
(Escape Routes)
explosion occurs may suffer damage,
those in adjacent areas are expected to
survive as a result of the protection
provided by the structure and blastwalls
Escape
/ No specific
Evacuation Route identified
Lighting
protection
requirements Sufficient numbers to be provided

to allow for damage
Communications
protection
requirements Duplication
and
physical
segregation of the PA/GA system.
Sufficient numbers of PA/GA
items inside the process area to
be provided to allow for damage.
No specific
identified
TEMPSCs on QU and supporting

Evacuation
and
structure:Escape Systems
Explosion simulations on DP and QU
(TEMPSC)
indicate that the peak overpressures
experienced are of the order of 0.05 bar.
TEMPSC on DP
The TEMPSC on DP is not expected to be
used in the event of an explosion in the
Process Area on DP. The loads given in
Table 8.3 are far field loads from the
Wellbay and Compression areas on DP
and the Generator area on QU.
Page 133 of 193

Safety Critical
System
Gas Detectors
Fire/
Detectors
Passive
Protection
Rationale
No specific
identified
protection
requirements Sufficient numbers of detectors

are likely to survive to initiate an
alarm and shutdown signal.
Diversely routed cable supplies
provided for detectors.
smoke No specific
identified
protection
requirements Sufficient numbers of detectors

are likely to survive to initiate an
alarm and shutdown signal.
Diversely routed cable supplies
are provided for detectors.
Non-Hazardous
Area Venting
Hazardous
Venting
Design Explosion Loads
Blast dampers have been provided where

HVAC ducts penetrate blast rated walls.
These dampers shall be designed for the
same overpressure as the walls in which
they are located. If a blast resistant duct
re-enters a compartment without a free
end it will not require a blast damper.
Area No specific
identified
protection
requirements
Fire PFP to resist the effects of the DLB blast PFP to resist the effects of the
overpressures and blast wind.
DLB design blast overpressures in
the area where it is applied.
UPS
No specific
identified
protection
requirements
Nucleonics
The enclosure for a nucleonic emitter

attached to an item of equipment shall not
become detached during an SLB
explosion.
Page 134 of 193

Appendix C
Explosion Load Time histories
This appendix provides a detailed explanation of the origin of the load durations and
load time histories to be used for design are identified in Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. It is
taken from SI CLB-BP-AM-SI-000171, (Reference 2).
The overpressure trace shown in Figure C.1 is a typical trace from FLACS simulation
results.
Clair-Ridge 2011 Process Production deck Explosions:

Pressure Blast Wall - Ceiling
4.00
3.50
Pressure, bar
3.00
2.50
2.00
Ceiling-blast
wall ~3bar
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
0.90
-0.50
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
1.15
1.20
1.25
1.30
Time, seconds
Figure C.1
Typical Overpressure trace (within a module deck)
The pulse consists of a positive part followed by a longer suction/negative part which
represents the re-entry of gas/air into the module after the positive pressure has
subsided.
For the purposes of structural assessment, BP have recommended [2] that
overpressure traces should be represented by the trace shown in Figure C.2 below:-
Page 135 of 193

Figure C.2
Idealised Over-pressure Trace
The pulse consists of a positive part of duration td and peak Pmax, followed by a
suction phase of
2td and negative minimum of Pmax/2. The rise time is half the
positive pulse duration. The negative minimum cannot be less than -1 bar as this
represents a vacuum.
The pulse durations stated in Site Instruction CLB-BP-AM-SI-000164 [1] are the
positive durations for the given overpressures in Table C.1 below.
Table C.1 Range of positive phase load durations td.
Pulse Duration Range (ms) to be
Pulse positive used in structural design
phase duration
td from FLACS Lower bound
Upper bound
(milliseconds)
(tdmin)
(tdmax)
80
50
100
100
60
120
150
90
180
200
125
250
The left hand column contains the nominal durations directly from the FLACS
simulations. As the Design explosion loads (DLB and SLB) represent a sample of
scenarios with peak pressures around the calculated exceedance levels there will
be some variability in the load durations between scenarios.
In order to represent this variability, it is proposed that a range of positive phase
pulse durations (td) between the lower and upper bounds be used for the structural
design.
Page 136 of 193

These ranges are chosen to ensure conservatism in the response calculations. The
upper bound duration tdmax represents a pulse with higher impulse and to take
account of resonance where the target structure natural period is above the mid
range pulse duration. The lower bound duration tdmin is chosen to encompass the
resonance cases where the natural period of the target structure T is below the mid
range value of the pulse duration.
The load durations for the suction phase should correspond to the positive
durations used (i.e. 2 x td for the suction phase).
Page 137 of 193

Appendix D Determination of Out of Balance Loads on Vessels and

Equipment
This Appendix describes the method used to determine the out of balance pressure
loads on vessels and equipment. Use Table 8.3 to find the required out of balance
loads for specific equipment items.
The best way of determining pressure difference time histories across vessels is to
place monitoring points on either side of the vessel and obtain the loads directly
from explosion simulation (e.g. using FLACS). As there may be a number of Design
level explosion scenarios, an assessment should be made to determine a
representative value for design.
It is possible to estimate the pressure difference force from an explosion pressure
trace by assuming, or from knowledge of, the speed of propagation of the pressure
disturbance.
Ahead of the flame front, the pressure pulse is considered to propagate with the
speed of sound in the unburnt air/fuel mixture C (about 340 m/s).
A time interval t may be associated with the diameter of the vessel dv through:
dv = C x t
The pressure difference across the vessel P may be read off the trace as
indicated in Figure D.1.
Assuming a triangular positive phase overpressure trace of duration td, with a peak
overpressure of Pmax.
Figure D.1 Calculation of out of balance pressure
Length of rising part of pulse = td/2 * C

For a vessel diameter = dv
By similar triangles:-
Page 138 of 193

Pmax / (C x td/2) = P /dv
(N.B. If C is in m/s, td is in seconds and dv < C x td/2 )
The pressure difference across the vessel will be:P = 2 x Pmax x dv /(C x td)..(D1)
Therefore, the bigger the vessel the bigger the pressure difference, the shorter the
pulse duration the bigger the pressure difference.
Implementation
In Figure D.2 the pressure difference has been plotted against pulse duration td for
a range of vessel diameters.
Out of balance pressure load DeltaP (bar)

Pmax = 1 bar
0.80
0.70
DeltaP (bar)
Vessel 1 m
0.60
DeltaP (bar)
Vessel 2 m
0.50
DeltaP (bar)
Vessel 3 m
0.40
0.30
DeltaP (bar)
Vessel 4 m
0.20
DeltaP (bar)
Vessel 5 m
0.10
DeltaP (bar)
Vessel 6m
0.00
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Pulse duration td (milliseconds)
Figure D.2 - Pressure difference loads calculated for vessels on Clair Ridge
The more severe explosion scenarios (e.g. DLB in Production Process deck area)
tend to have shorter pulse durations than lesser events. Each design load level has
a range of scenarios and durations associated with it. The maximum pressure
difference load occurs for the largest vessel (5m) and the shortest pulse duration
(50 ms). The shortest, lower bound duration should be used to allow for
asymmetry in the wave and the reduced rise time which may result. Lower bound
durations are given in Table 8.3 and Appendix C derived from [2].
The values given in Figure D.2 correspond to a 1 bar peak pressure Pmax. The left
hand axis indicates that for a 50ms pulse acting on a 5m diameter vessel, a
pressure difference of 0.6 bar results.
Page 139 of 193

In the case of a vessel near the blast wall (within 5m of the wall) on the production
deck in the process area, the corresponding peak pressure difference load would
be 2.7 x 0.6bar = 1.62 bar.
For a 4m vessel under a 150 millisecond pulse the pressure difference is only 0.15
times the peak overpressure.
In calculating the out of balance pressures, the area overpressure given for the
blast wall from [1] has been used. As there is a pressure doubling (reflection)
effect associated with the presence of the wall this would, at worst, apply to vessels
adjacent to the walls. In this context a vessel is considered to be adjacent to a wall
if the half pulse length (C x td/2) is longer than the minimum distance of the vessel
surface from the blast wall. On Clair Ridge this distance is taken to be 5m as
advised by BP.
At other locations further from the wall, the greater of the deck, roof or floor
overpressure values given by BP in [1] have been used. In this case vessels will
not be subjected to both the incident and reflected pulse from the wall at the same
time.
In the case of the Process Production deck this has reduced the Pmax used from
2.7 bar to 1.4 bar. The nearest large vessel is 15m East of the wall.
Vessels in the centre of the deck will not be loaded by drag loads in the same way
as vessels obstructing the venting areas at the deck edge. For this reason large
drag and pressure difference loads are not experienced by the same vessels and
drag is not considered for large diameter vessels as pressure difference loads will
dominate. The ignition points which give the largest overpressures will generally be
far from the venting areas.
Whilst the vessels on Clair Ridge are orientated parallel to the blast walls there are
some scenarios where the blast wave travels across the deck in a North/South
direction. The out of balance loads in the longitudinal direction, along the length of
the vessel, must therefore be considered.
By the same argument as was used above for transverse pressure difference
loads, the pressure difference along the length of the vessel may be calculated as
below:Length of rising part of pulse = td/2 * C
For a vessel length = L
By similar triangles:Pmax / (C x td/2) = P /L
(N.B. If C is in m/s, td is in seconds and L < C x td/2, the length of the rising part of
the pulse)
The pressure difference along the vessel will be:Plong = 2 x Pmax x L /(C x td)(D2)
If L is longer than half the pulse length then this pressure difference, P will be
greater than the maximum pressure Pmax which is the maximum pressure
difference which can be developed. If this is the case then Pmax should be taken
for the peak pressure difference.
Page 140 of 193

If the transverse pressure difference P is known then equations D1 and D2 give

Plong in terms of P as below :Plong = 2 x Pmax x L /(C x td) = P x L / dv
As long as this longitudinal pressure difference is less than Pmax.
Page 141 of 193

Appendix E
Segregation of the Wellhead and Process areas
E.1 Fires
The benefits of segregation between the Wellhead and Process areas with respect
to the fire hazard are:
Limiting escalation between the two areas, in particular protection of the large
inventories at high pressure in the well bay area from the effect of fires in the
process area.
Reduction of the size of the fire water system and associated pumps to that
needed for protection of each area separately.
Protection of personnel and escape ways in either area from fires in the other.
E.2 Explosion loads
The Preliminary Explosion Assessment [36], performed by BP ETP and reported by

Amec in March 2010 addressed the issue of incorporating a blast wall between the
wellbay area and the process area.
The conclusion was that the overpressures experienced in the wellbay do not
show any significant change with or without the additional blast wall on the east
side of the wellbay. It was recommended in the Conclusions that the blast wall on
the east side of the wellbay area should be included in the design to prevent
escalation.
The introduction of a barrier can often reduce the ventilation level in an area which
may give rise to the increased occurrence of large flammable gas clouds. In the
case of the wellbay the orientation of the walls parallel to the prevailing wind
direction (South South West) actually means that there is little change in the way
gas clouds are dispersed/diluted due to the presence of the east wall.
The wellbay area contains a relatively small number of leak sources with little
congestion in the upper area. Potentially large inventories can be released at
wellhead pressure (circa 200 bar). This indicates that large, low frequency events
will dominate. The low frequency ensures that the design event or DLB is relatively
small (circa 1.1 bar).
This makes the area a very high escalation risk if wellhead releases are initiated
due to explosions (or fires) in the process area. The wellbay east blast wall
prevents this escalation from occurring.
The process area contains a relatively large number of possible release points
although typical pressures, inventories and release rates are much lower than in
the wellhead area (<7 bar). This means that there will be relatively large number of
smaller explosions and fires in this area which must be prevented from impacting
the wellheads.
The Preliminary Explosion Assessment indicated that some increase in the
overpressures was possible in the process area for large gas clouds. This has to
be balanced against the probability of these large gas clouds occurring which
determines the design overpressures to be applied to the structure. General design
overpressures are 1.4 bar at the production deck reducing to about 0.7 bar at cellar
deck level. Higher overpressures occur in the process area near (within 5m of) the
Page 142 of 193

blast wall due to reflection effects. The ratings of the wall are 2.7 bar (DLB) at
Production deck level (on the process side) reducing to 1.5 bar at the Cellar deck
level. The rating of the wellhead side of the wall is 1.1 bar (DLB).
If the East wall is not present then this higher overpressure region would be located
in the wellbay area, exposing the high pressure pipework and large inventories to
these higher pressures.
E.3 Occupancy
It must also be noted that the occupancy of the wellbay area at about 13 people is
much higher than the average occupancy of the process area which is typically less
than 2 [40]. The individual risk and potential loss of life for the installation is much
reduced by the introduction of the wellbay east wall. Some protection is also given
to the drilling crew in the modules above the main deck by this wall as the DES is
much less vulnerable to process initiated explosions. Typically 22 personnel will be
present in the drilling modules at any time.
E.4 Degraded blast wall
If the wall between the process and wellbay areas is degraded such that it only
resists fires or resists a lower level of blast than the Ductility Level Blast (DLB),
then escape routes would be vulnerable to larger explosions from either side.
The DLB explosion event is classed as an Evacuation event in the BP GP Vapour
Cloud Explosion Hazard Analysis [13]. To protect personnel outside the immediate
vicinity of the event blast walls should survive the DLB without rupture. Permanent,
plastic deformation of the walls is allowed.
A blast wall rated to a pressure less than the DLB in any associated area is not
compatible with the intentions of [13].
Page 143 of 193

Appendix F
F1.
Blast Loading on Stair Towers
Introduction
The Tables below identify each section of stair tower, the loads applied to the
cladding/heat-shields from inboard (direct explosion loads) and outboard (far field
explosion loads) together with the required design resistance of the cladding
panels.
Cladding, wind walls and heat shields are referred to as cladding in what follows.
F2.
Stairtower strength requirements
We require that stairtowers do not become disconnected from the main structure in
the event of explosions on the QU or DP platforms either at the Strength level blast
(SLB) or Ductility level blast (DLB) levels.
If cladding is not used then stairtowers will only be exposed to maximum drag
levels of loading of 10 to 30 kN/m2. This is Technical Safetys preferred option as
then all stair towers can be designed to remain available for escape. There is,
however, a requirement for wind walls. These may also have the advantage of
giving partial protection against far field explosion overpressures which are of the
order of 0.1 to 0.2 bar resulting from DLB explosions in other areas.
Stairtower main structures are required to withstand far field explosion loading on
the projected area of the attached cladding without plastic deformation.
Figure F1
QU Platform Stair Towers (LQ South stairs not shown)
Page 144 of 193

Figure F2
F3.
DP Platform Stair Towers (North Central Stairtower not shown)
Load durations
The load durations supplied by BP correspond to far field DLB explosion loads from
areas where explosions can occur. The largest loads are taken for each stair tower
in turn from these scenarios. The durations given in the Tables correspond to the
governing scenario for each stair tower group and are given as mid range values
for the positive Phase of the load.
Following Appendix C:
A mid range positive phase duration of 200 milliseconds should be examined for
positive phase durations of 125, 200 and 250 milliseconds with an associated
negative phase of half the magnitude and twice the duration.
A mid range positive phase duration of 150 milliseconds should be examined for
positive phase durations of 90, 150 and 180 milliseconds with associated negative
phase durations of half the magnitude and twice the duration.
F4.
The North East and South East Stairtowers on DP
A major explosion in the process or compressor areas will load any cladding up to
the full value of the blast levels on the west blast walls. Design of this cladding to
resist these loads is unnecessary and counter-productive.
The presence of such blast resistant cladding will increase confinement in the area
and reduce ventilation thus increasing the frequency of the development of large
gas clouds. Both these effects result in an increase of design overpressure. The
main structure of the stairtowers will have to resist the support loads if it is not to
Page 145 of 193

end up in the sea. The stairtower deck attachments will also need to be
strengthened with subsequent weight increases. Complete protection would be
impossible without the use of blast doors resulting in access problems.
The blast proof stairtower would also act as a conduit for blast waves travelling
from one level to another.
It is proposed that all cladding supports are designed to fail at 0.1 bar and become
detached from the stairtower structure. Outboard cladding will be allowed to be
projected over the sea. Inboard cladding may then block the stairtower which
cannot then be guaranteed to be available.
There are structural challenges in designing cladding supports which fail at a
predetermined pressure but this may be dealt with by using brittle/non ductile
connection details. It is also important that the failure occurs quickly (within about
60 milliseconds of the load commencing) for the venting through the gap to be
effective.
A simple solution would be to use blast relief panels for the effected area. The
hinged type could be used on the inboard side to limit blockage. The vent area
through the stairtower will then be largely maintained limiting overpressures. The
stairtower could then still be used as part of an alternative escape route after the
event.
Then stairtowers will then only be exposed to drag levels of loading appropriate to
the deck locations on the remaining skeletal structure. The main structure should
remain in place and resist the SLB elastically and the DLB with plastic deformation
allowed.
F5.
Cladding minimal performance requirements
All cladding outboard of the stairs may be exposed to far field explosion loads and
should not become detached from their supports hence blocking the stairtowers.
Excessive deformation could have the same effect and will be eliminated by
design.
Inboard cladding may be exposed to the same far field loads and has the same
performance requirements as a minimum.
It is for this reason that the capacity of cladding and its supports is set to 0.1 to 0.2
bar as a minimum.
F6.
Stairtowers on QU exposed to direct explosion loading
An explosion in the GT area on QU could give a peak overpressure of 0.3 bar. This
corresponds to the DLB explosion event.
It has been agreed that stairtowers in the immediate vicinity and their associated
cladding should be designed to resist the 0.3 bar DLB load with plastic deformation
allowed. The corresponding SLB load 0f 0.1 bar should be resisted elastically. The
cladding should not become detached so that the stair wells will still be available
after the event. The specific sections of the stairtowers involved are listed in the
Tables F1 and F2.
F7.
Escape issues relating to NE, North Central and SE stairtowers on DP
The stairtowers in question are the DP South East, North East and North Central
stairtowers. Sections of these stairtowers pass by the process and compression
Page 146 of 193

areas and in the case of fires in either area give the possibility of escape to another
level.
A major explosion is taken to be greater than the SLB level in what follows.
In the event of a major explosion in the compressor area, people on the
compressor roof, in the wellbay area or in the process area will be able to escape
westwards on the same level and change levels further west. It is unlikely that there
will be survivors in the compressor area but there are still two disparate escape
routes at compressor deck level along which survivors could escape. (SLB = 0.25
bar).
The DP TEMPSC at cellar/mezzanine deck level is designed to withstand and be
operational in the event of major fires or DLB explosions in the compressor and
well bay areas.
In the event of a major explosion in the process area, people on the compressor
roof, in the compressor area, or in the wellbay area will be able to escape
westwards along deck level.
(SLB at process production deck level = 0.5 bar or 0.9 bar near to blast wall at
east). It is unlikely that anyone on the upper levels will survive this event.
The DP TEMPSC is likely to be unavailable. (SLB = 0.5 bar on cellar/Mezzanine
deck).
In the event of a major explosion in the well bay area people in other areas should
be able to make their way above main deck level westwards. If this is not possible
the DP TEMPSC will be available.
Page 147 of 193

Table F1
QU Stair Towers Design Explosion Capacities
QU Stair Towers
From Deck
To Deck
QU South East/
QUID-SE
Cellar
below Main
QU South East
(Gen. Stair tower
South) GM-SE
Main
into GT area
QU Generator
stairtower West/
GM-SW
Main GT
area
GT roof
QU North-East
stairtower (Gen.
stairtower East)/
GM-NE
Cellar
below Main
QU North-East
stairtower QUID-NE
Main
QU Enclosed stair
tower and lift/ West
stairs and lift
enclosure/ QUID-W
Cellar
QU Enclosed stair
tower and lift/ West
stairs and lift
enclosure/ QUID-W
Mezz
LQ Stairtower
North/ North West
stairtower/ QUID NW
Cellar
LQ Stairtower
North/ North West
stairtower/ QUID NW
Mezz
Far field
Local explosion
Explosion load - loads outwards on
inwards on
inboard walls *
outboard walls
Far field
Source
Inboard
Walls
capacity
Performance
standard
Outboard
Walls
capacity
Performance
standard
Stairtower Structure
none
GT DLB 0.3 bar

SLB 0.1 bar
0.2 bar
remain in place plastic deformation

allowed
0.2 bar

allowed
Stair structure remains in

place at 0.2 bar
no walls
GT DLB 0.3 bar

SLB 0.1 bar
DP platform
Compression,
Process,
Wellhead
no wall
N/A
no wall
N/A
Small stairtower into GT

area - no cladding Stair
structure remains in place
for DLB 0.3 bar
0.1 bar
GT DLB 0.3 bar

SLB 0.1 bar
DP platform
Compression,
Process,
Wellhead
0.3 bar

allowed
0.3 bar
none
DP platform
Compression,
Process,
Wellhead
0.2 bar

allowed
0.2 bar

allowed

place - elastic response
at 0.2 bar
GT DLB 0.3 bar

SLB 0.1 bar
DP platform
Compression,
Process,
Wellhead
0.3 bar

allowed
0.3 bar

allowed

place for DLB 0.3 bar escape route from roof.
Near Bridge no debris
allowed
none part of LV
switchroom
DP platform
Compression,
Process,
Wellhead, GT
N/A
N/A
0.1 bar
remain in place elastic response

required as part of TR
support.
Stair structure remains

elastic for 0.1 bar
none part of TR
DP platform
Compression,
Process,
Wellhead, GT
N/A
N/A
0.15 bar


elastic for 0.15 bar
none part of TR
support
DP platform
Compression,
Process,
Wellhead, GT
0.1 bar

support.
0.1 bar

support.

unaffected for 0.1 bar
none part of TR
DP platform
Compression,
Process,
Wellhead, GT
0.15 bar

0.15 bar


0.2 bar
Mid range
Duration 150 ms
Mid range
Duration 150 ms
0.2 bar
Mid range
Duration 150 ms
below GT
roof
Mezz
0.1 bar
Mid range
Duration 150 ms
0.1 bar
Mid range
Duration 150 ms
Production
0.15 bar
Mid range
Duration 150 ms
Mezz
0.1 bar
Mid range
Duration 150 ms
Production
0.15 bar
Mid range
Duration 150 ms
remain in place - 0.3 Stair structure remains in

bar from inboard,
place for DLB 0.3 bar plastic deformation
escape route from roof.
allowed
Above production deck
no debris allowed
Page 148 of 193

QU Stair Towers
From Deck
To Deck
LQ Stairtower South
Cellar
Mezz
Far field
Local explosion
inwards on
inboard walls *
outboard walls
0.1 bar
Far field
Source
Inboard
Walls
capacity
Performance
standard
Outboard
Walls
capacity
Performance
standard
none part of TR
DP platform
Compression,
Process,
Wellhead, GT
0.1 bar

0.1 bar


none part of TR
DP platform
Compression,
Process,
Wellhead, GT
0.15 bar

0.15 bar


Mid range
Duration 150 ms
LQ Stairtower South
Mezz
Production
0.15 bar
Mid range
Duration 150 ms
Page 149 of 193

Table F2
DP Stair Towers Design Explosion Pressures
DP Stair Towers
From Deck
To Deck
DP North West and

South West
Stairtowers/ DPWM
- NW and DPWM SW
Cellar
above Main
Far field
Local explosion
inwards on
inboard walls *
outboard walls
0.2 bar
none
Far field
Source
Inboard
Walls
capacity
Performance
standard
Outboard
Walls
capacity
Performance
standard
GT
Part of fire
pump
room

allowed
0.2 bar

allowed

Mid range
Duration 150 ms
DP North West and above main

South West DSM
stairtowers/ DSM NW and DSM - SW
pipedeck
DP West DES stair above main

tower/ DES - W
pipedeck
DP East DES stair

tower/ DES - E
above main
pipedeck
DP South East
Stairtower/ DPEM SE
Cellar
Production
DP South East
Stairtower/ DPEM SE
Production
below Main
0.2 bar
none
GT
0.2 bar

allowed
0.2 bar

allowed

none
GT
0.2 bar

allowed
0.2 bar

allowed

unaffected for 0.2 bar.
none
GT
0.2 bar

allowed
0.2 bar

allowed

Mid range
Duration 150 ms
0.2 bar
Mid range
Duration 150 ms
0.2 bar
Mid range
Duration 150 ms
DP South East
below main
below
Stairtower/ CM - SE
compression
roof
(TBC by BP)
0.1 bar
Process area DLB

DP platform
0.1 bar Remain in place at 0.1 0.1 bar
Remain in place at 0.1 Not used as an escape
1.5 bar SLB 0.5 bar Compression, heat shield bar from outboard, (heat shield bar from outboard, route in event of explosion
Mid range
Wellhead, GT
detach from main
on north,
detach from main
in process area. Stair
Duration 200 ms
structure above 0.1
east and
structure above 0.1 structure remains in place,
Elastic design to 0.1 bar,
bar.
west sides)
bar.
Elastic design to SLB drag
loads and plastic design to
DLB drag loads on
skeletal structure [1,2].
0.1 bar
Process area DLB

DP platform
Remain in place at 0.1
2.7 bar SLB 0.9 bar Compression, heat shield bar from outboard, (heat shield bar from outboard,
Mid range
Wellhead, GT
detach from main
on north,
detach from main
Duration 200 ms
structure above 0.1
east and
structure above 0.1
west sides)
bar.
bar.
0.1 bar
Mid range
Duration 200 ms
Compression area
DLB 0.7 bar SLB
0.25 bar
DP platform
Process,
heat shield bar from outboard, (heat shield bar from outboard,
Wellhead, GT
detach from main
on north,
detach from main
structure above 0.1
east and
structure above 0.1
bar.
west sides)
bar.
As above
Not used as an escape

route in event of explosion
in compression area. Stair
structure remains in place,
DLB drag loads on
Page 150 of 193

DP Stair Towers
From Deck
To Deck
DP South East
Stairtower/ CM
SE and DP North
East Stairtower
below
above
0.25 bar on LER
on roof
compression compression
roof
roof
Mid range
Duration 200 ms
DP North East
Stairtower/ DPEM NE
Cellar
Production
DP North East
Stairtower/DPEM NE
Production
below Main
DP North East
Stairtower/ CM-NE
below main
below
compression
roof
DP North Central
Stairtower
Mezzanine
Production
Far field
Local explosion
inwards on
inboard walls *
outboard walls
none
Far field
Source
Inboard
Walls
capacity
Performance
standard
Outboard
Walls
capacity
Performance
standard
DP platform
compression,
Process,
Wellhead, GT
no wall
N/A
0.25 bar on
LER on roof

allowed
As above
0.1 bar
Process area DLB

DP platform
Remain in place at 0.1 not used as an escape
1.5 bar SLB 0.5 bar Compression, heat shield bar from outboard, (heat shield bar from outboard, route in event of explosion
Mid range
Wellhead, GT
detach from main
on south,
detach from main
Duration 200 ms
structure above 0.1
east and
structure above 0.1 structure remains in place,
bar.
west sides)
bar.
DLB drag loads on
0.1 bar
Process area DLB

DP platform
2.7 bar SLB 0.9 bar Compression, heat shield bar from outboard, (heat shield bar from outboard,
Mid range
detach from main
on south,
detach from main
Wellhead, GT
Duration 200 ms
structure above 0.1
east and
structure above 0.1
west sides)
bar.
bar.
0.1 bar
Mid range
Duration 200 ms
0.1 bar
Compression area
DLB 0.7 bar SLB
0.25 bar
DP platform
Compression, heat shield bar from outboard, (heat shield bar from outboard,
detach from main
on south,
detach from main
Process,
Wellhead, GT
structure above 0.1
east and
structure above 0.1
bar.
west sides)
bar.
Process area DLB

DP platform
2.7 bar SLB 0.9 bar Compression,
Mid range
Wellhead, GT
Duration 200 ms No cladding present
No
cladding
No cladding
No cladding
No cladding
As above
not used as an escape

in compression area. Stair
DLB drag loads on
not used as an escape
DLB drag loads on
Page 151 of 193

Appendix G
Further Information Supplied by BP
This Appendix records supplementary information received from BP by as Engineering

Query responses, SIs and presentations.
G1
Pressures values by area (Extract From SI overpressure results CLB-BP-AMSI-000164)
Table G1
Area
Compression
Area
Criteria/
Explosion Loads by Area
Roof
Floor
DLB - 0.7
bar
0.7 barg
0.7 barg
150 ms
150 ms
SLB - 0.25
bar
0.25 barg
0.25 barg
200 ms
200 ms
DLB - 1.5*
bar
Roof is grated
use drag loads
for pipework
0.72* barg
SLB - 0.5*
bar
Roof is grated
use drag loads
for pipework
0.25* barg
Source
Process Area
(Cellar/Mezz)
DLB - 2.7
bar
1.4 barg
100 ms
Process Area
(Prod Deck)
SLB - 0.9
Wellbay Area
(Cellar/Mezz)
0.5 barg
150 ms
150 ms
200 ms
East
Blastwall
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Floor is
grated use
drag loads for
pipework
N/A
Floor is
grated use
drag loads for
pipework
N/A
West
Blastwall
0.7 barg
150 ms
0.25 barg
200 ms
1.5* barg
100 ms
0.5* barg
150 ms
2.7 barg
80 ms
0.9 barg
100 ms
DLB 1.1
bar
Roof is grated
use drag loads
for pipework
0.6 barg
1.1 barg
1.1 barg
100 ms
100 ms
100 ms
SLB - 0.4
bar
Roof is grated
use drag loads
for pipework
0.2 barg
0.4 barg
0.4 barg
200 ms
150 ms
150 ms
Page 152 of 193

Area
Wellbay Area
(Prod Deck)
Area
Criteria/
Source
Roof
Floor
East
Blastwall
West
Blastwall
DLB - 1.1
bar
1.5 barg
1.1 barg
1.1 barg
100 ms
100 ms
100 ms
SLB - 0.4
bar
0.5 barg
0.4 barg
0.4 barg
150 ms
150 ms
150 ms
Criteria/
Source
Load
DLB - Max P
it can see
DP North
Crane
Pedestal
From
Process
Production
full gas cloud
SLB - 1/3
DLB
DP South
Crane
Pedestal
DLB - max P
it can see
from
Compression
full gas cloud
SLB - 1/3
DLB
DP Utility
Area
Flare Boom
(base)
0.25 barg
200 ms
0.09 barg
200 ms
1.0*** barg (now 0.7
barg)
100 ms
0.35 barg
200 ms
DLB - 1.1
bar wellbay
N/A
SLB - 0.4 bar

wellbay
N/A
DLB - 2.7
bar process
SLB - 0.9 bar
process
0.9 barg
100 ms
0.3 barg
200 ms
Page 153 of 193

Bridge (DP
end)
Riser ESDV
Platforms
QU East of
Gridline
3
between
Cellar
and
Main decks
QU East of
Gridline 3
above Main
deck
DLB - Max P
it can see
0.10 barg
SLB - 1.1 bar

in wellbay
0.05 barg
DLB - 2.7
bar in
process
0.15 barg
SLB - 1.2 bar

in process
0.05 barg
DLB max
overpressure
from DP
events
SLB
DLB max
overpressure
from DP
events
SLB
Helideck
DLB max
overpressure
from DP
events
SLB
200 ms
200 ms
200 ms
200 ms
0.05** barg
200 ms
N/A
0.05** barg
200 ms
N/A
0.05** barg
200 ms
N/A
Page 154 of 193

Table G2 Far field explosion loads

Buildings & Enclosures
Building all walls
External faces
of LER Room
on
Compressor
Roof
DLB - 0.7 in
compression area
0.25 barg
SLB - 1/3 DLB
0.09 barg
200 ms
200 ms
External faces
of LER Room
on Main Deck
(to west of
blastwall on
gridline 6)
DLB - 2.7 in process

area
0.2 barg
SLB - 1/3 DLB
0.07 barg
Walls of DP
Fire Pump
Rooms
DLB - 1.1 wellbay
200 ms
200 ms
0.1 barg
200 ms
SLB - 1/3 DLB
0.04 barg
200 ms
Emergency
Switchroom
(DP)
DLB - 1.1 wellbay
0.1 barg
200 ms
SLB - 1/3 DLB
0.04 barg
200 ms
HVAC
Plantroom
DLB - 1.1 wellbay
0.1 barg
200 ms
(DP)
SLB - 1/3 DLB
0.04barg
200 ms
DES
DLB - highest of the

2.7 in process, 0.7 in
compression or 1.1 in
wellbay
0.1 barg
SLB - 1/3 DLB
0.04 barg
200 ms
200 ms
Page 155 of 193

DSM
Walls of QU
Fire Pump
Enclosure
DLB - max P can be

seen Compression
full cloud
0.35*** barg (now 0.1

barg)
SLB - highest of the

2.7 in process, 0.7 in
compression or 1.1 in
wellbay
0.08 barg
DLB - max
overpressure from DP
events
0.05** barg
SLB
0.05** barg
150 ms
200 ms
200 ms
ms
External
Faces of LQ
and Utility
Module below
LQ
DLB - max
overpressure from DP
events
0.05** barg
SLB
0.05** barg
200 ms
200 ms
*
A safety factor of 20% has been applied here due to the addition of wind walls for
protection of personnel. These wind walls were not modelled in the explosion analysis
**
Explosion overpressure based on far field effects from DP events, subsequent explosion
modelling around the GTs on QU may result in a increased overpressure design criteria
NOTES:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Structural loads use the same as blast wall loads

For grated decks or ceilings use the drag load value for pipework
North Crane DLB loads based on maximum gas in Process production
South Crane DLB based on maximum gas in Compression module
Wellbay assume that the East and West Blast walls will see the same explosion load
symmetry
Wellbay use same loads for cellar and production decks
QU Loads from DP events are quite small use 0.05 bar
QU loads on QU from events in the QU turbine might give higher explosion loads need
to be considered. (Note since this was written these loads have been supplied by BP)
For equipment if large use SLB loads if small the drag loads can be used small is less
than 1m diameter
Page 156 of 193

G2
From Presentation of results from GT explosion simulation BP - March 2011
From the combine dispersion and explosion results the loading on surfaces and safety
critical systems for the maximum flammable gas volume calculated of approximately 10000
m3 are:
LQ wall
0.3 bar
Power Gen deck
0.2
Power Gen ceiling
0.3
Lifeboats
0.01
Helideck
0.06
Fire Pumps (cellar)
0.05
Crane cab
0.04
Workshop (production)
0.05
Additional information:All loads above applied at 150 ms nominal duration

QU end of bridge incident field 0.1 bar
The fire pump (cellar), and Workshop (production deck) loads are the free field values no
pressure doubling is included.
G3
Meeting 14/4/11 at BP Sunbury Clair Ridge explosion overpressures
From: Walker, Steve

Sent: 14 April 2011 15:32
To: Savvides, Chris; Gemma.MacLellan@UK.BP.com
Cc: Mellor, Nigel
Subject: Meeting 14/4/11 at BP Sunbury Clair Ridge explosion overpressures
Chris,
I need to summarise the main points for the record and to keep the relevant people up to date as below:Direct examination of output from FLACS indicated that the peak out of balance pressure for the HP
Separator (V-21101) calculated from the floor and ceiling blanket overpressures (0.84bar at 60ms) would be
acceptable for use as a recommended design value. This value is conservative.
Page 157 of 193

(Ref. e-mail 6 April 2011 15:20 to Gemma Maclellan/Nigel Mellor Estimates of equipment out of balance
loads for comparison with direct simulation results)
It was concluded that the method described in the Explosion Overpressure Protection Strategy document
should be applied to all vessels unless they are near to a blast wall where the wall overpressure value
should be used. Here near means less than one half of the pressure pulse width from the wall. (for Clair
Ridge a distance of 5m has been adopted)
Further values were agreed, as given below, for the peak overpressures resulting from the explosion
scenario in the GT area. This scenario should be considered a DLB event. SLB peak overpressure values
should be taken to be 1/3 of the DLB values with the same positive pulse durations.
QU end of the bridge same as DP end - 0.1bar.
Positive pulse duration for all peak pressures below = 150ms
Emergency generator enclosure roof

- 0.2 bar
Above GT deck (assumed fully plated) a 5m wrap around at 0.3 bar with the remaining area at 0.1
bar.
The peak out of balance and direct pressure load on the GTs within the area to be taken as 0.3 bar.
(subsequent discussions and examination of the simulations now gives the out of balance
loads as DLB 0.2 bar)
The GT scenario overpressure to result in a peak overpressure of 0.1 bar on the DSM, which is the
same as the peak from the DP explosion scenarios considered.
The equipment on the QU production deck to be loaded to level equal to the production workshop
(0.06 bar DLB). Where appropriate the equivalent SLB value will be applied.
For small equipment enclosures peak overpressure values supplied are for the incident pressure
field.
I was also very impressed by the contour plots of pressure contours presented for some of the relevant
scenarios making up the DLB level events on the production deck.
One in particular showed that the cantilever at the North end of the main blast wall (line 4) can be as highly
loaded as the middle of the deck. This is very useful as there may be a push from structures to ask for a
reduced design load in this and other cantilevered areas.
Please let me know if you do not agree with any of the information above.
I hope we will be able to have further meetings to resolve any further issues as the project progresses.
Cheers and thanks,
Steve
Steve Walker - Principal Safety Engineer
G4
Further explosion values for confirmation by BP
From: Walker, Steve

Sent: 04 May 2011 12:11
To: Savvides, Chris
Cc: Gemma.MacLellan@UK.BP.com
Subject: Further explosion values for confirmation by BP
Page 158 of 193

Chris,
We are now in a position to issue the Explosion Strategy at B1, apart from some points raised during
checking of the document and questions from mechanical and others in AMEC.
Please could you let me know if any of the following assumptions/values are not acceptable? These mainly
relate to small enclosures and far field effects.
Explosion values for confirmation by BP
Flare tip nominal 0.1 bar with 150ms positive pulse estimate from distance from compressor
area explosion scenario.
If grating forms part of an escape route, then the escape route should be useable after the DLB
explosion event.
Riser ESDV equipment and piping to be designed to 0.2 bar in view of large inventories involved.
(Previously had 0.15bar for platforms and equipment).
External wind walls below main deck level on DP and QU which may be loaded from outside
DLB 0.1 bar at 150ms. (typical loading level for enclosure walls in DP utility areas and loads for GT
explosion at lower levels on QU).
Rooms on QU wall design pressures by level:-
Between cellar and mezzanine 0.1 bar

Between mezzanine and production deck 0.15 bar (these are in line with values supplied for fire
pumps/workshop and west wall of TR).
QU TEMPSCs use 0.05 bar from far field DP explosion scenarios (rather than 0.01 figure from
GT scenario) as these are safety critical.
Crane pedestal on QU DLB 0.3 bar just opposite GT area.
Crane cabs (all DP and QU) pressure rating should be the same as glass rating (0.1 bar), out of
balance load still set at 0.04bar as previously advised.
Generator main spares stores enclosure DLB 0.3 bar just adjacent to GT explosion scenario.
This small room has only just been identified.
Please give me a ring if appropriate. I am also happy to discuss these points in Sunbury if required.
Regards,
Steve
From: Savvides, Chris [mailto:chris.savvides@uk.bp.com]

Sent: 04 May 2011 12:46
To: Walker, Steve
Cc: Maclellan, Gemma
Subject: RE: Further explosion values for confirmation by BP
Steve - the only thing I will add is that for DLB event - the safety critical systems required for evacuation etc
will be able to be available for a set period of time as defined by the performance standards for example yhe
escape route should be there for what is defined (15 minutes, 30 minutes etc)
The rest looks Ok
Page 159 of 193

Chris
BP Exploration Operating Company Limited, a company registered in England and Wales with the company
number 305943 and whose registered office is Chertsey Road, Sunbury on Thames, Middlesex, TW16 7BP
G5
EQ
CLB-AM-BP-EQ-000244 Rev. 02
EQ
Request for further information on explosion simulations and approval of
methods used to infer specific explosion loads on Clair Ridge
1.
Introduction
In the Site Instructions CLB-BP-AM-SI-000164 and CLB-BP-AM-SI-000171, design Explosion

overpressures have been given for structures, blast walls, pipework and decks.
2.
Loads on Vessels and equipment
In the Explosion Overpressure Protection Strategy Rev. A1 CLB-FC-0X-SE-REP-0096, out of

balance pressures on equipment/vessels and their supports have been inferred from the supplied
information. The method is explained in Appendix D of CLB-FC-0X-SE-REP-0096. The suggested
approach follows that previously used on the BP ACG project. AMEC invites comments and advice
on the validity of the method for use on Clair Ridge.
The Oil and Gas UK Fire and Explosion Guidance Issue 1 May 2007 recommends that 1/3 of
the overpressure is applied to the vessels and equipment to design their supports and the deck on
which they are located (Table 2.9, Sections 6.11.1 and 8.2.2). This is much less than the design
values recommended in the current version of the Explosion Strategy. HSE Reports OTO 1999
046 and 047 refer to vessel loads from simulations being much less than the headline
overpressure but we do not have similar access to results on Clair Ridge. Available experience on
other projects confirms that lower values than the peak overpressure can be used (e.g. ACG).
The best way of determining pressure difference/dynamic pressure time histories across vessels is
to place monitoring points on either side of the vessel and obtain the loads directly from explosion
simulation (e.g. using FLACS). If BP have information that may help in a better determination of
these loads then AMEC Technical Safety request that this information is supplied.
AMEC are concerned that the method used to date may be over-conservative and, if applied, may
result in over design of the equipment/vessel supports and deck connections. This may result in an
un-necessarily heavy structure.
Detailed requests for clarification are listed below with direct reference to the Explosion Protection
Strategy and the original information supplied.
1. Can BP supply AMEC with information on the distribution of pressure loads throughout the
deck areas for the relevant scenarios, so that a better estimate of local vessel loads by
location can be made? A critical area is the west side of the production deck in the process
area. - BP will not be supplying overpressures for specific area of the deck. The design
event values should be used as supplied. Depending on the ignition location the values
across the deck could vary considerably.
Page 160 of 193

2. Should the largest of the floor and roof overpressure values in the area, given in SI CLBBP-AM-SI-000164 be used to represent the peak overpressure used in the out of balance
load calculation rather than the blast wall figures? For Vessels nearer to the blast walls than
half the pulse length, the provided blast wall peak overpressure figures may be appropriate
(9m to 15m for the process production deck) but for others this may be over-conservative. Yes, use the largest floor or roof, or when vessel close to the wall use the wall value.
3. Should the drag pressures (in the critical pipework column) of SI CLB-BP-AM-SI-000164
be added to the calculated out of balance pressures regardless of the position of the
vessel? AMEC would suggest that this is not done as these loads are unlikely to co-exist
with the pressure difference loads. - NO. Drag loads to be used on equipment less than
1m diameter. Anything greater than 1m diameter to use the out of balance pressures only.
3.
Additional Data Required
This Section contains details of further requests for information relating to the Table supplied by BP
in Site Instruction CLB-BP-AM-SI-000164.
Column
Question/Comment
Grated
areas
numerous
items
in
Explosion Overpressure
Protection Strategy.
AMEC cannot use the same drag loads as pipework, as the drag
coefficient differs. The gas flow velocity through grating will differ by
area and will not be the same as used for critical pipework loads? (see
Corr R.B. and Tam V.H.Y., Gas Explosion generated drag loads in
offshore installations, Conference proceedings, ERA London December
1997).
Were the correct grated/plated areas modeled in the explosion
simulation? See Detailing for Application of FRP Grating, CLB-FC-0XST-TEC-0005. - Main Deck, Cellar Deck and Compression module roof
fully plated. Mezz and Production deck grated apart from where there is
equipment (large areas of the deck) which was modeled as plated.
Whole table for QU
For GTs explosion simulation results, SLBs set at 1/3 of DLB where not
supplied. - Chris to run further simulation with updated grating. Loads
and pulse duration for the all sides on the LQ requested including roof
and floor - The LQ East face to be design for 0.3 bar and 150ms, this to
extend 5m from the edge of the East face to the other faces. The sides,
roof, floor of the LQ to be design for 0.15 bar at 150 ms.
Compressor Roof
Is the roof partly grated? What loads do we take? Roof is fully plated
Process
(Cellar/Mezz)
area
Mezzanine deck is partly grated, partly plated. No load is given for

plated areas need design loads from each side.
The 20% allowance for wind walls on overpressures may need to be
verified by simulation (not just as it affects pressure but also it affects
frequency because of the reduced ventilation) - See separate
spreadsheet attached
Process area (Production

deck)
Production deck (floor) is partly grated, partly plated. Need loads for
plated areas. - See separate spreadsheet attached
Roof (main deck) is partly plated. Need load for plated area. Venting
through grated areas is blocked by compressor area floor. - Roof / main
deck is fully plated
Page 161 of 193

Column
Question/Comment
Wellbay area (Prod Deck)
Floor (production deck) is partly plated. Need loads for plated areas. See separate spreadsheet attached
Flare boom (base)
Do we need to load upper part of flare from compression area explosion

scenarios. - No.
Bridge (DP end)
Same values have been used for the whole bridge. - Fine
Riser ESDV platforms
Same values used for ESDVs (0.15 bar/0.05 bar) as platforms. - Fine
DSM
Why is the design overpressure for the DSM (0.35bar) greater than the
overpressure for the DES and North crane pedestal, when the DES is
closer to the sources of the explosion. (SLB set to 1/3 of DLB for
consistency). - DSM to be designed to the same value of the DES i.e.
DLB 0.1 bar 200ms, SLB 0.04 bar 200ms.
DSM/DES
Much more detail is needed to design the DES/DSM modules in view of

the louvred wind walls, exposed equipment, large dimensions and
complex geometry of the two modules. See RDS drawings CLB-RD-1RME-LAY-0006, CLB-RD-1R-ME-LAY-0014. For exposed equipment
take same values as DES / DSM. Project will need to take a view as to
in which way they would prefer the wind walls to fail.
DP North
Cranes.
and
South
Do we need to recommend a pressure for the cab/windows blast

resistance? Would suggest 0.1 bar for the cab and glass. - yes, good
idea
DES pipedeck crane
Loading information is required for this. - take same values for DES
Missing/enclosures (QU
and DP Utility area)
Emergency generator etc. Need design pressures suggest use same

as other enclosures in areas. - Information supplied in .ppt file attached
From: Walker, Steve

Sent: 18 May 2011 12:12
To: Gemma.MacLellan@UK.BP.com
Cc: Mellor, Nigel; Savvides, Chris
Subject: Process area deck design loads
Folks,
In view of the fact that deck areas and equipment items near* the blast wall will experience higher
overpressures due to reflection effects, should these deck areas be designed for the higher values given for
wall design?
(Here 'near' means in the reflection region which is estimated to be 1/2 pulse duration x speed of sound about 15m)
Should the other areas further from the wall be designed for the floor area blanket pressures given in SI 164
[1]?
For example on the cellar deck in the process area:Wall peak pressure = 1.5 barg
General cellar deck peak pressure = 0.72 barg.
Page 162 of 193

Regards,
Steve
Reference
1. CLB-BP-AM-SI-000164 for deck design calculations.
AMEC
Clair Ridge Project - Technical Safety
8th Floor - 207, Old Street. London. EC1V 9NR
0207 324 3762 - X 3762
G6
Deck loads near blast walls
From: Savvides, Chris

Sent: 25 May 2011 15:48
To:
Maclellan, Gemma
Subject:
RE: Clair Ridge weight issues / explosion implications
Gemma
Yes - the deck loads near the blast walls will see as high a pressure as the wall - From the explosion
analysis this nearer to about 5 metres from the wall
_____________________________________________
From: Maclellan, Gemma
Sent: 25 May 2011 15:08
To:
Savvides, Chris
Subject:
RE: Clair Ridge weight issues / explosion implications
Chris thanks for your response.

Have you had time to consider the deck loads as per the email attached? Should the deck areas by the
blast wall be rated to the higher wall pressure as opposed to the lower general floor area?
G7
Drag loads on grating and in far field

Sent: 14 July 2011 17:27
To: Walker, Steve
Subject: RE: Questions on detailed application of explosion loads
I am in agreement with the suggestions below
Chris
BP Exploration Operating Company Limited, a company registered in England and Wales with
the company number 305943 and whose registered office is Chertsey Road, Sunbury on Thames,
Middlesex, TW16 7BP
From: Walker, Steve [mailto:Steve.Walker2@amec.com]
Sent: 14 July 2011 14:55
To: Savvides, Chris
Subject: Questions on detailed application of explosion loads
Page 163 of 193

Chris,
Hope you are well.
As we proceed into the design we (safety) are getting more and more very detailed questions about how
and when to apply the explosion loads you have supplied.
We are trying to answer these ourselves, but there are a couple of questions where it would be helpful if you
could indicate an agreement or not of our current position.
We have some Ductility level blast far field loads of 0.05 to 0.1 bar peak on DP for example. At the moment
we have told piping to ignore loads on piping and small (<1m) vessels in these areas but we have used the
overpressures to design exclosures in this area (with suitable pressure doubling factors for walls).
Do we need to consider drag loads (i.e. on obstacles < 1m in diameter) in the far field?
I would suggest 1/3 of the peak overpressure as a drag load if we do, which gives ridiculously small loads I
know.
Loads on grating.
We have been asked are the loads supplied in the form of a drag load to be applied to the gross area of the
grating (i.e. on each square metre) or on the net area of the grating (i.e. the solid part only)?
We think the gross area is the more conservative and obvious one to use.
Hope you can help to clear these.
Thanks
Steve
G8
Drag Loads in Far field

Sent: 15 July 2011 12:40
To: Walker, Steve
I understand - Yes they need to be designed to the SLB level if not safety critical - and to DLB for safety
critical
Middlesex, TW16 7BP
Sent: 15 July 2011 12:02
To: Savvides, Chris
Chris,
just a clarification.
Do we need to consider drag loads in the far field?
Regards,
Page 164 of 193

Steve

AMEC
G9
Loads on walls of drilling modules

Sent: 11 August 2011 12:33
To: Walker, Steve
Cc: Maclellan, Gemma; Mellor, Nigel; Dave, Chandra
Subject: RE: Design pressure for walls on the drilling modules.
Steve
The pressures given for the DES and DSM are free field over-pressures. So the walls should be designed
to take the reflected over-pressures with a rub around value for the other walls. The factor usually used for
reflected pressure values is 2.
Chris
Sent: 11 August 2011 10:08
To: Savvides, Chris
Subject: Design pressure for walls on the drilling modules.
Importance: High
Chris,
We have an urgent question which affects the design pressure on the walls on the drilling modules on the
main deck.
RDS want to set the design pressures for their modules.
The overpressure values supplied (by BP) for both the DES and DSM was 0.1 bar. This is the worst case
DLB far field explosion overpressure from the compressor area, wellbay area or process area.
The direction of this blast wave is predominantly from the East for explosions in the compressor and process
areas.
I understand that the peak pressure (0.1 bar) relates to the incident blast wave.
On impact with large flat vertical surfaces this pressure could be increased by reflection effects to a level
between 0.1 and 0.2 bar.
Should we recommend to RDS that the East wall of the DSM be designed to to 0.2 bar and not 0.1 bar?
Is there some intermediate received pressure that you could recommend?
A value I have seen used is 1.4 times the incident pressure which gives 0.14 bar.
I would keep the other wall design pressures at 0.1 bar except fro with a possible wrap around of 5m from
the East face.
For the DES, the direction of the blast wave from the wellbay area will be predominantly from the North or
South.
Page 165 of 193

Should we also recommend that the North and South walls of the DES be designed to a higher value than
0.1 bar?
I would really appreciate a swift response as RDS are waiting for an answer.
Best regards,
Steve
G10
Clair Ridge Explosion meeting Tuesday 15th Aug 2011 - Sunbury
From: Walker, Steve

Sent: 19 August 2011 12:18
To: Savvides, Chris
Cc: Gemma.MacLellan@UK.BP.com; Mellor, Nigel
Subject: Clair Ridge Explosion meeting Tuesday 15th Aug 2011 - Sunbury
Chris,
Thanks for the meeting on Tuesday, please find below notes for our records:1.
Apparent anomalies in current figures (north/south crane pedestals on DP, LER on Compression roof ).
It was agreed that the DLB peak overpressure should be set to 0.7 bar (max DLB in Compression area). The
LER/HVAC enclosure walls on the compression roof have a design peak pressure is 0.25 bar, as before.
2.
New layout changes (incl. wind walls) - need and scope for more simulations.
BP did not consider the changes (equipment moves/wind walls) would necessitate further unscheduled
explosion simulations as the results are not expected to change appreciably.
Action - CS to check on wind wall inclusion in the simulations.
3.
Far field loads separated by explosion scenario (TEMPSC on DP).
It was confirmed that the far field explosion loads supplied by BP were the maxima from DLB explosions in
the Process, Compression, Well bay and GT areas.
The design loads on the TEMPSC on BP hence were representative of far field DLBs in the wellbay and
compressor areas.
4.
Stair tower incident loads and design loads (west stairs on QU near bridge).
Because of the far field loads on the bridge of 0.1 bar, it was agreed that the cladding on the west stairs near
the bridge (below main deck) at the QU end would see 0.2 bar peak far field DLB loads.
5. Information BP has on explosion protection on other projects.
Chris will enquire within BP particularly scope of piping blast resistant design.
6. Review of results, SW questions on of phase 1 and 2 simulations (2010)
All questions were resolved.
7. Applicability of SLB performance requirements (TEMPSC, cladding etc.)
The installation could re-start safe operations with loss of the TEMPSC on DP and with cladding damage.
Page 166 of 193

The TEMPSC is not a primary means of evacuation in the event of an explosion in the process area. Hence
the TEMPSC need not survive damage from an SLB in the process area.
8. Low SLB values from Atkins analysis.
The rule of 1/3 of the DLB should be used for design. The low SLB values indicated by the Atkins
exceedance analysis are less than this and should not be used for design.
9. Negative phase duration/magnitude. (Current emphasis of SLB as dominant case for decks)
The assumed general time history with minus half the peak positive pressure for the suction phase makes
the SLB the design case in some areas. It is arguable that the suction phase negative peak should be of
smaller magnitude.
Bp will supply a small number (6) of pressure time histories at selected areas where this is an issue.
Action - SW to request specific areas.
Action SW to re-issue the Explosion overpressure protection strategy as B with any clarifications included.
Please let me know of any comments/corrections.
Have a good week-end.
Regards,
Steve
G11
Clair Ridge Pressure traces and other queries on explosion loads
From: Walker, Steve

Sent: 07 September 2011 11:00
To: 'Savvides, Chris'
Cc: Maclellan, Gemma; Mellor, Nigel
Subject: RE: Clair Ridge Pressure traces and other queries on explosion loads
Chris,
Just a note as usual to confirm the conclusions of our meeting yesterday.
1. Pressure time histories
BP will supply selected pressure time histories for the structures group and possible supply to CHARTEC as
follows:The areas of most interest to the Clair Ridge structures group are for the most highly loaded areas:The DLB level scenarios for the process side of the east blast wall (grid line 4), Production deck level and the
mezzanine/cellar deck level of this wall.
A characteristic time history for the underside of the main deck in the production deck area say 30m from the
wall. The trace for less than 5m from the wall will be the same as the wall.
The corresponding SLB level (0.9 bar) time history for the process side of the blast wall (grid line 4).
2. The maximum received load on the TR East wall. The averaged received pressure value of 0.3 bar is
the wall design capacity value.
Most local pressures are less - there is one local hotspot higher than 0.3 bar at the wall centre. This hotspot
pressure could design this local panel depending on the local framing and method of design adopted by the
LQ designer. We understand that the LQ will be designed to resist the load elastically.
It is not proposed to change the Explosion strategy entry, except to indicate more prominently that the 0.3
bar figure is an average over the East wall.
Page 167 of 193

2. The incident pressure on the West wall of the Drilling Support Module and east walls of the rooms
below on DP from the explosion in the GT area is 0.1 bar. This gives the required design capacity of 0.2 bar
on the West wall of the DSM, the West walls of enclosures and the facing stairtower cladding.
3. The incident pressure on the proposed LER on the compressor module roof is 0.125 bar giving an
enclosure design pressure of 0.25 bar as before.
4. The DLB drag loading to be taken in the GT module for grated structures in this area is estimated to be
0.06 bar or 6 kN/m2.
Thank you for agreeing to the meeting - it cleared up a number of points raised by the project.
Regards,
Steve
G12
Sample pressure traces from FLACS simulations

Sent: 08 September 2011 15:14
To: Walker, Steve
Subject: RE: Clair Ridge Pressure traces and other queries on explosion loads
Steve
Please find attached some pressure time histories (typical). These are for maximum pressures of about 3
bar, 1.5 bar and 0.9 bar
these can be applied to both the blast wall and the production deck ceiling
Let me know if these are OK
Chris
Page 168 of 193


4.00
3.50
Pressure, bar
3.00
2.50
2.00
Ceiling-blast
wall ~3bar
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
0.90
-0.50
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
1.15
1.20
1.25
1.30
Time, seconds

2.00
Pressure, bar
1.50
1.00
Ceiling-blast
wall ~1.5bar
0.50
0.00
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
1.15
1.20
1.25
1.30
-0.50
Time, seconds
Page 169 of 193


1.00
0.80
Pressure, bar
0.60
0.40
Ceiling-blast
wall - SLB
~0.9bar
0.20
0.00
0.90
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
-0.20
-0.40
Time, seconds
G13
Far field explosion loads on crane booms - KenzFigee cranes
From: Savvides, Chris [chris.savvides@uk.bp.com]

Sent: 07 December 2011 16:00
To: Walker, Steve
Subject: RE: Far field explosion loads on crane booms - KenzFigee cranes
The maximum crane boom pressure will be 0.1 bar From: Walker, Steve [mailto:Steve.Walker2@amec.com]
Sent: 29 November 2011 10:55
To: Savvides, Chris
Subject: Far field explosion loads on crane booms - KenzFigee cranes
Chris,
We have received some calculations on the blast response of crane booms which represent the far field
loads as a 0.12bar steep fronted pulse applied to each side of the boom in turn. This was for the North
Rankin Development NR2 project
(We appreciate that the out of balance load on the boom will be predominantly drag and would hence be at a
lower level than taken for their analysis.)
In order to approve the analysis for Clair Ridge we need to know the incident shock wave overpressure
magnitude on the crane booms due to DLB explosions in othere areas.
We have three cranes:The pedestal crane on QU - we believe that the peak overpressure load will be 0.1 bar on the boom due to
an explosion in the GT area and this will be OK (?).
Page 170 of 193

The North and South crane booms on DP. These cranes may be above the Compression area roof where
we have a 0.25bar peak pressure for the walls of the LER on the roof. This includes a factor of about 2 for
reflection effects.
Can we give a value for these DP crane booms in this position? (We have a 0.1bar value for the flare
tip, which is much more distant).
I will convert these overpressures to drag loads by dividing by 3 and advise the vendor of any increased
requirements for Clair Ridge.
Regards,
Steve
AMEC
G14
Cuttings re-injection skid effect of overpressures
From: Savvides, Chris

To: Maclellan, Gemma
Subject: RE: CLAIR RIDGE PROJECT - Blast Analysis DGN Files - DP QU & Bridge
Gemma
I had a look at what has been sent for the the Wellbay area, cellar and mezzanine decks and compare it,
with what we had in the model. We already had a blockage of the south part of the wellbay on the cellar
deck - There is something there. So replacing that blockage with the Cuttings Re-injection, over-pressure
within the wellbay should be similar for the 2 cases. The pressure loadings for the design cases should
not changed
Chris
Middlesex, TW16 7BP
From: Maclellan, Gemma
To: Savvides, Chris
Subject: RE: CLAIR RIDGE PROJECT - Blast Analysis DGN Files - DP QU & Bridge
Hi Chris,
Have you managed to take a look at the model yet? In particular the wellbay cellar deck area where we
have the potential issue with the Cutting Re-injection Skid increasing the overpressures in the wellbay?
Thanks
Gemma
From: Hinton, Tony N [mailto:tony.hinton@amec.com]
To: Maclellan, Gemma
Cc: Mellor, Nigel; Kennedy, John; Duke, Fred J
Subject: FW: Blast Analysis DGN Files - DP QU & Bridge
Gemma,
Page 171 of 193

We have now created DGN files to enable BP Sunbury to undertake their evaluation of blast overpressures
for the latest PDMS models, which have been uploaded to the required location on the www.ibackup.com
website. I have now confirmed from Martyn that the DP model reflects the study area CRI tanks and pump
skid, as discussed at last week's meeting on blast. In addition, he has confirmed that the QU model reflects
the latest HHI/CB&I model of the LQ (increased length).
Please can you forward this e-mail to BP Sunbury and confirm when we are likely to get confirmation of
acceptability on the proposed location of the CRI tanks and pump skid. We really need to confirm the
location as soon as possible to eliminate the need for any potential further rework.
Should BP Sunbury need any more information, please come back to us.
Regards
Tony
G15
GT packages out of balance loads

To: Walker, Steve
Cc: Maclellan, Gemma; Mellor, Nigel; Eades, Matt (Ambion)
Subject: RE: Explosion loads on GT packages - urgent issue for Clair Ridge
Steve
I had a look at all the explosion data for the design case
Based on the design gas cloud of ~10000 and an explosion pressure within the generators of 0.3 bar the
differential pressure will be between 0.1 and 0.2 bar - ( depending on the elevation and also on the northsouth location). The maximum differential does not exceed 0.2 bar.
For much higher explosion pressures (full gas cloud - not design case) the maximum differential pressure
will be 0.3 bar
I hope that this will allow the vendors to continue with their work
Chris
To: Savvides, Chris
Cc: Maclellan, Gemma; Mellor, Nigel; Eades, Matt (Ambion)
Subject: RE: Explosion loads on GT packages - urgent issue for Clair Ridge
Importance: High
Chris,
We are under vendor pressure to close out the issue of out of balance loads. He has stopped design work
pending the ordering of the anti-vibration mount supports for the GTs.
Our package engineer is getting calls every day as are we.
If you could get some time to look at this we would be very grateful.
Please give me a ring on the number below if you would like to talk this through.
Regards,
Steve
Page 172 of 193


AMEC
G15a Loads on Crane Booms

Sent: 07 December 2011 16:00
To: Walker, Steve
Subject: RE: Far field explosion loads on crane booms - KenzFigee cranes
The maximum crane boom pressure will be 0.1 bar From: Walker, Steve [mailto:Steve.Walker2@amec.com]
To: Savvides, Chris
Subject: Far field explosion loads on crane booms - KenzFigee cranes
Chris,
We have received some calculations on the blast response of crane booms which represent the far field
loads as a 0.12bar steep fronted pulse applied to each side of the boom in turn. This was for the North
Rankin Development NR2 project
(We appreciate that the out of balance load on the boom will be predominantly drag and would hence be at a
lower level than taken for their analysis.)
In order to approve the analysis for Clair Ridge we need to know the incident shock wave overpressure
magnitude on the crane booms due to DLB explosions in othere areas.
We have three cranes:The pedestal crane on QU - we believe that the peak overpressure load will be 0.1 bar on the boom due to
an explosion in the GT area and this will be OK (?).
The North and South crane booms on DP. These cranes may be above the Compression area roof where
we have a 0.25bar peak pressure for the walls of the LER on the roof. This includes a factor of about 2 for
reflection effects.
Can we give a value for these DP crane booms in this position? (We have a 0.1bar value for the flare
tip, which is much more distant).
I will convert these overpressures to drag loads by dividing by 3 and advise the vendor of any increased
requirements for Clair Ridge.
Regards,
Steve
AMEC
G16
Wind walls on DP design pressure

Sent: 05 October 2011 11:34
To: Walker, Steve
Page 173 of 193


Subject: RE: Wind walls on DP
Agreed

Sent: 04 October 2011 16:03
To: Savvides, Chris
Subject: Wind walls on DP
Chris,
Just a note to confirm that due to possible 'wrap around' effects from a DLB explosion in the Wellhead area
(0.6 bar general overpressure) the wind walls on the North and South sides of DP will have to withstand an
estimated 0.2 bar peak overpressure.
We require the walls to stay attached to their supports and not become projectiles such that escape ways
inboard are blocked.
The enclosure walls for the enclosures within the deck in the utilities area (emergency switchroom, LER and
HVAC plant room) remain rated at 0.1 bar, being within the platform deck perimeter.
Regards,
Steve
AMEC
G17 Updated SIMOPS congestion effect in the Wellbay area

Sent: 15 February 2012 21:49
To: Walker, Steve
Subject: RE: SIMOPS equipment and explosion modelling - new information
Steve - Apoplogies for not answering earlier - I was away for quite a bit for work - too many projects at the
moment
From an examination of the model we used it seems that a large part of the north and south part of the BOP
area (production deck) is fairly blocked. with also obstacles in the BOp area as well.
The wellheads area below will be responsible for generating the explosion over-pressures that we see.
There should not be any substantial increase in pressure as the blockages were accounted for and should
not affect the results on the production deck blast walls. Of course SIMOPS operations will have an impact
on the QRA (frequencies etc). The question is whether these operations were taken into account in the QRA
(most probably it was)
Chris
Page 174 of 193

From: Walker, Steve
To: Savvides, Chris
Cc: Gemma.MacLellan@UK.BP.com; Mellor, Nigel; Dave, Chandra
Subject: SIMOPS equipment and explosion modelling - new information
Importance: High
Chris,
Thank you for the swift response to our previous enquiry on this issue.
We have collected some more detailed and up to date information on the expected congestion in the wellbay
area caused by the SIMOPS equipment.
Plots showing the worst case congestion/confinement are attached.
I have also recovered the presentation we had from yourselves when the explosion simulations were
performed.
The plot below shows the South side of DP with artificial congestion included. We do not have plans or other
views, but the obstructions on the production (BOP) deck to the North and South in the wellbay seem
to substantially block the vent area on this level.
I understand from Gemma that Maggie Wang was asked to put a block 50% of height, 60% of width on the
laydown areas to the north and south to represent the drilling (SIMOPS) equipment. (Ref. e-mail Maggie
Wang/Gemma - sent separately because of size limitations).
The deck areas which were assumed grated at that time are are still grated in the latest plot plans. The main
deck is effectively plated.
The deck areas which were assumed grated at that time are are still grated in the latest plot plans. The main
deck is effectively plated.
Please could you find time to look at this new information and give your opinion on whether the overpressure
is likely to be substantially increased over that obtained from simulations and whether an update is required
at this late stage in the design?
Page 175 of 193

I would be happy to come over to Sunbury to discuss this and recent developments in the explosion
resistant design on Clair Ridge.
Best regards,
Steve
AMEC
G18
Variation of drag loads with location
From: Horne, Rod (AMEC) [mailto:Rod.Horne@uk.bp.com]

To: Walker, Steve
Cc: Lanan, Kevin T
Subject: RE: Variation of explosion drag loads by location - discussion note
Steve,
Matches our discuss and seems clear enough.
What isnt so clear to me is the blast wind loads were taking on grated areas and other items. Fig 8.1 in
overpressure protection strategy indicates 20kN/m2 on production deck, and then Tbl 8.1 suggests grating
is designed for 20kN/m2 on the gross area?
I would have expected grating to have a reduction in pressure load.
Rod Horne
BP Lead Topside Structural Engineer,
Clair Ridge Project,
To: Horne, Rod (AMEC)
Subject: Variation of explosion drag loads by location - discussion note
Rod,
Unofficial copy for you.
additional clarification - vertical and horizontal loads combined = supplied drag values. Hence reduced
horizontal load from vertical component.
Following on from our meeting on Wednesday, please find attached the Technical Safety discussion note
relating to explosion drag loading.
Comments are welcome.
This material will be included in the "Piping explosion load screening study" Technical note which is
currently in preparation.
Regards,
Steve
AMEC
Page 176 of 193

G19
Chemical Injection skids BP response no increase in overpressures expected

Sent: 20 March 2012 16:12
To: Savvides, Chris
Subject: Modelling of the produced water chemical injection skid
Importance: High
Chris,
We have a new design issue relating to the Produced water chemical injection skid.
This skid is located on the extreme northern edge of the DP Process production deck (East module) between
grid lines 6 and 7 (a vent area).
In case of re-sizing of this obstacle, please could you give us a screen shot of this equipment as modelled in
the Level 2 explosion simulations?
I believe these simulations are the latest and the ones which we have based our documentation. If a screen
shot is not available then a description of the dimensions and orientation of the chemical injection skid as it
appears in the model would be helpful.
As usual the project marches on and time is short.
Best regards,
Steve
AMEC
G19
Strong shock response analysis

Sent: 28 March 2012 11:26
To: Walker, Steve
Cc: Maclellan, Gemma; Eades, Matt (Ambion); Harper, Jim; Mellor, Nigel
Subject: RE: Strong shock response - urgent request
Steve - I am available Friday - lets say 1 or 2 pm
Sent: 28 March 2012 11:22
To: Savvides, Chris
Cc: Maclellan, Gemma; Eades, Matt (Ambion); Harper, Jim; Mellor, Nigel
Subject: Strong shock response - urgent request
Chris,
This is an important matter which impacts on a large number of performance standards.
We are looking at the strong shock response to a DLB level explosion scenario, for inertia loads on such
things as lifeboats, rotating machinery etc.
Page 177 of 193

The load we have applied so far is a peak explosion load across the whole blast wall area of the production
deck, process area simultaneously. Giving a load to the West.
This load pattern is OK for design - we need to design all panels, but for particular scenarios, at any instant
the whole wall is not loaded to its peak value.
During the explosion, there are also loads on vessels and other obstacles in the area which will be largely in
the opposite direction, to the east.
These effects will give a reduced net load to the West.
For the purposes of this analysis, would it be acceptable to assume that some reduction in the net out of
balance load on the wall and equipment results in a reduction of out of balance load to about half of the load
on the wall?
To resolve this we would need to have a look at loading patterns for the representative scenarios from the
simulations.
If you can allow a visit this week to try to resolve this important matter we would be very grateful.
Resolution of this matter is required for the issue of about half of our performence standards.
Please give me a ring on the number below if you want to dicuss this further.
Regards,
Steve
PS the other issue on modelling of the chemical injection skid has been largely resolved by AMEC by
examination of the layout information supplied to you.
AMEC
G20
Obstructions in the wellbay area cuttings re-injection skid
Steve - Yes
Sent: 19 June 2012 16:44
To: Savvides, Chris
Subject: RE: Wellbay equipment and explosion modelling - new information May 2012
Thanks Chris,
We previously discussed the cuttings re-injection buffer tanks which have now been arranged North/South.
The new issue is the rectangular block to the west of these which is a new obstruction Z-75101.
Would the conclusion for this new obstruction be similar?
Regards,
Steve
AMEC
Page 178 of 193

Sent: 19 June 2012 16:13
To: Savvides, Chris
Subject: Wellbay equipment and explosion modelling - new information May 2012
Importance: High
Chris,
Further to our discussions on the magnitude of the explosion in the wellbay area (e-mail below), we have
found a new obstacle which has appeared on the cellar deck of the wellbay.
Please see attached plot plan with Z-75101 identified as the cuttings re-injection pump skid.
This is a container with blockage dimensions 3.077m wide and 2.644m high. (The depth into the platform is
5.687m).
Please also see below a view of the modelled blockage in the level 2 FLACS run.
Please give your opinion on whether the overpressure is likely to be substantially increased over that
obtained from simulations and whether an update is required at this late stage in the design?
Regards,
Steve
AMEC
Page 179 of 193

Appendix H The Alimak goods lifts required explosion resistance
H1
General
There are three lifts one on DP on the North side and the others are on QU.
The lifts should be designed to resist the SLB (strength level blast) explosion loads
without disintegration and the formation of projectiles. The lifts themselves should not
detach from their rack and pinion mountings and become projectiles. The lifts are treated
in the same way as other non-hydrocarbon containing equipment. Where there is a threat
to the integrity of the TR more stringent requirements will govern.
We are not requiring that the lifts remain operational or un-deformed after exposure to the
SLB. These explosion resistance requirements are common to all exposed, nonhydrocarbon containing vessels and equipment.
We understand that the lift cars will spend most of their time in the docked or parked
position at some unloading/loading or landing point. A 99% figure has been given for the
proportion of time parked but this is to be confirmed. It is for this reason that we are
generally not insisting on the same level of protection in transit as we require in the
parked position.
If the lift is located inboard of other equipment or escape ways, then we require that the
lifts in the parked positions will not become detached from their supports and that some
restraining structure at these levels will be required. This could take the form of a
retention cage constructed of a supported wire mesh. Full blast walls, which themselves
would attract local overpressure loads, will not be required.
H2
The goods lift on QU next to the LQ
This travels between the production deck level (el. 44700) and the Galley lay down level
(el. 50850) on the outside of the living quarters module East wall.
Both levels are below the main explosion hazard source which is the GT area on the main
deck level. The lift could therefore be exposed to an SLB load of the order of 0.1 bar (10
kN/m2) from this source.
The car may also be exposed to a potential DLB (ductility level blast load) of the order of
0.3 bar or 30 kN/m2. The car is required not to breach the integrity of the LQ under these
conditions. In this case a full height cage (6.15m) between the production and Galley laydown deck may be required to cover the in transit case.
The performance requirements given above should be achieved. There are a number of
escape routes on the production deck which would potentially be targets if the lift
becomes disconnected at the galley lay-down level. The outer envelope of the LQ/TR
must not be compromised adjacent to the lift.
The rack and frame is adjacent to the LQ with the cab located to the East. The explosion
loads/blast wave will come from the East from an explosion in the Gas Turbine area. The
blast wave will hence act to force the cab onto the rack and frame. This wave may not be
normal to the cab East wall and hence there is likely to be an induced moment about a
vertical axis through the rack tending to twist the cab around this axis. The moment will
depend on the line of action of the total force. A moment equal to the load (30 kN/m2)
applied to the North or South sides of the cab can be taken as an upper bound.
There will also be a similar applied moment about a horizontal axis.
Page 180 of 193

CB&I have undertaken to provide additional protection to the LQ wall to prevent the
rupture of the wall due to local impact from the goods lift cab.
H3
The goods lift on QU North East corner
This lift extends from the cellar deck (el. 29700) through to the Generator Module roof (el.
74600).
The lift is outboard of escape ways and equipment on all levels and will be projected
away from the platform for all local explosion scenarios. The lift does not require any reinforcement against blast loads from the GT area but will require to be secured against
design wind loads. The blast loads will be from the inboard side and will act to push the
lift and frame towards the sea.
The three second 100 year return period wind gives about 5Kn/m2 on flat vertical
surfaces. This corresponds to a blast overpressure load of 0.05 bar or 5 kN/m2. Far field
explosion load from explosions on DP could give a similar load of 0.05 bar or 5kN/m2 on
the landing stations. Deformation of these landing stations is allowed under these
circumstances. The far field explosion loads should be resisted using the existing
environmental design conditions.
H4
The goods lift on DP
This travels between the cellar deck (el. 29300) and the Compression module/Main deck
(el. 59000) grid lines D and 6.
This lift passes through areas of potentially high overpressure and is inboard of other
equipment items and the escape ways. If disconnected, the lift may become a hazard to
escape ways on decks below.
The loads given below will be directed outboard from the deck central area. The precise
direction of the load will depend on the position of the ignition source initiating the
explosion event. This position is unknown. The lift is orientated with the rack and tower to
the inboard side (the South) with the cab on the north side of the rack. These forces will
tend to separate the cab from the rack. Moments will also be induced on the cab
connection to the rack for off-centre loads.
Cellar deck SLB peak 0.5 bar inboard of escape route on this level. The support load
will be less than this SLB peak estimated as 0.2 bar (20kN/m2). A retention cage will be
required at this deck level to prevent the threat to the escape route.
Mezzanine deck SLB peak 0.5 bar outboard of escape routes could be allowed to
be projected over the sea although is above escape routes on the Cellar deck. Support
SLB load 0.2 bar (20 kN/m2).
Production deck inboard of escape route on this level. The support load is estimated to
be 0.2 bar (20 kN/m2). A retention cage will be required at this deck level to prevent the
threat to the escape route.
Main deck landing is inboard of escape routes. The landing is protected from explosions
in the Compression area being to the West of the Compression area blast wall.
The main deck is a rated barrier between the above main deck area and the process
production deck below. When the lift is not at this level there will be a hole in the deck
which will vent any explosion overpressures (~1.4 bar) within the process production
area. We do not want this explosion to affect the DES or LER nearby.
One solution discussed with BP is to erect a blast deflection barrier around the lift on the
main deck. It is not necessary, or practical for this barrier and doors to resist the
Page 181 of 193

overpressures which will be present but to allow preferential barrier failure outboard to the
North side.
This could be achieved by having blast capacities of this face set at about 50mbar to 0.1
bar with the other barrier on the south side with a higher capacity.
It would be preferable for the lift to be re-orientated with the doors on the North side as
this is naturally the weakest side.
We would also suggest that the lift 'rest' position is set to be at the main deck largely
blocking the hole in the deck. This would reduce the probability that the hole would be an
open vent area. Some restraint structure should be provided to prevent the lift cab from
being projected vertically upwards in the event of an explosion below. The cab and lift
structure is not required to survive this event without substantial deformation.
Page 182 of 193

Appendix I
I1
Strong Shock Response Analysis
Introduction
The response of the structure resulting from explosions on topsides can give rise to
possibly damaging accelerations and inertia forces on the topsides and equipment.
Relative displacements between modules may also threaten the integrity of piping
associated with safety systems and the bridge.
A simplified strong shock response study was completed in collaboration with the
Structures Group. The study was executed to enable verification of the Performance
Standard requirements with respect to recommended blanket design accelerations to be
resisted by essential safety systems such as fire water pumps, emergency generators,
rotating equipment mounted on anti-vibration mounts and lifeboats [28].
The case to be considered for the DP platform is the worst SLB explosion load on the
process production deck level West wall. Equipment would be expected to survive and
operate under this loading scenario.
In view of the presence of the TR on the QU platform the case considered here was the
DLB explosion in the power generation module. The equipment in the TR, the emergency
generator and lifeboats are required to survive and be operable after this event.
The equipment items in the DES and DSM will be vulnerable to these shock loads due to
their high elevation. Equipment mounted on AVMs may be particularly vulnerable to these
loads.
If transportation and ship impact loads exceed the expected inertia loads/accelerations
from strong shock effects, the results of these analyses should be used as an alternative
[43]. Equipment not present during transportation such as equipment mounted on AVMs
and lifeboats should be checked.
I2
Modelling
Simplified SESAM jacket and foundation models of the DP and QU platforms were
combined with the topsides models to form combined ABAQUS 6.10 structural computer
models of the platforms and topsides. Essential parameters such as jacket mass, added
mass, foundation stiffnesses and natural periods were obtained from [50, 51 and 52] and
incorporated into the models. The FEED jacket models were considered sufficiently
accurate for this analysis.
The topside models for DP and QU are shown in Figures I1 and I2.
Page 183 of 193

Figure I1
ABAQUS model of the DP topsides
The DES, DSM and Compression Modules were modelled as point masses at the Main
deck level. Monitoring points are indicated in the Figure.
Monitoring
Point DP
Location
122
Cellar deck
518
Process Production deck
559
Main Deck East
620
Bridge support point DP
641
Main Deck West
3895
Main Deck West
Table I1
DP Monitoring point locations
Page 184 of 193

Figure 8.2
ABAQUS model of the QU topsides
The mass of the LQ was modelled at the LQ support points.
Monitoring
Point QU
Location
296
Cellar deck
365
Mezzanine deck
434
QU TEMPSC location
1517
Bridge support point QU
647
Production Deck (LQ

support)
650
Central Control Room

roof
69
Central Production Deck
1578
Table I2
QU workshops roof
QU Monitoring point locations
Loads on the DP platform
The out of balance loads on the DP platform for the worst SLB scenario were calculated
from the loads on the Process production deck West blast wall taking account of the
balancing loads on the equipment in this area. Loads in the Mezzanine and Cellar decks
from an ignited gas cloud in the Process Production deck area were assumed to give no
out of balance resultant when the loads on the West wall and the equipment in these
areas are considered together.
Page 185 of 193

Balancing loads from equipment and piping
During the chosen scenario, the loads on the blast wall towards the West will be balanced
to some extent by the out of balance loads on the equipment and piping [53].
The area blockage to the East at the production deck level and hence the balancing loads
on equipment and piping was calculated from the PDMS model. The model was
interrogated to produce a view of the equipment and piping looking East from the centre
of the deck, assumed to be the ignition point. This is shown in figure I3.
Figure I3
DP Production deck view looking East
The area blockage ratio was calculated section by section for equipment, piping and other
drag dominated components. The piping blockage area was factored down to reflect the
reduced load on these elements as compared with larger equipment items. The blockage
in this area was found to be 64%. It was therefore assumed that 36% of the load on the
West wall would act as an out of balance load. The SLB load on the West wall was
0.9bar. The unbalanced load was applied to the whole process production West wall area
simultaneously, with a positive phase duration of about 80ms.
Response of the DP platform
Acceleration and displacement time histories were obtained at all the monitoring points up
to 0.5s from the time of initiation of the explosions on DP. This was considered long
enough for the peak response to be experienced.
Page 186 of 193

0.08
A1_122
Displacement at X component, m
0.06
0.04
A1_518
0.02
A1_559
0
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
A1_620
-0.02
-0.04
A1_641
-0.06
A1_3895
-0.08
Time, s
Figure I4
DP Strong shock vibration Displacement time histories to 0.5s

(unfactored 1.0 bar load)
The displacement response of the platform follows the time history of the loading on the
Process Production West wall. The whole platform moves about the same amount but
with more distant points responding later due to topsides platform flexibility.
The displacements are small and as the East and West modules are structurally
connected there is little possibility of the rupture of hydrocarbon lines due to platform
movement.
20
Acceleration X component, m/s
A1_122
10
A1_518
A1_559
0
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
A1_620
A1_641
-10
A1_3895
-20
Time, s
Figure I5
DP Strong shock vibration Acceleration time histories to 0.5s

(unfactored 1bar load)
The acceleration time histories are much more complex than the displacements being the
second derivative of the displacements. The acceleration trace for the worst point, 641 on
the main deck West, initially follows the load on the wall and peaks at peak load. The
subsequent ringing of the platform does give rise to some peak values at other times for
other points. These results must be scaled by 0.36 to represent the out of balance load.
Page 187 of 193

Some of the peaks in the trace correspond to elastic waves travelling inside structural
members with high frequency and very small displacements. These have virtually no
effect when considering equipment items connected to the decks containing these
members.
The magnitude response of any target structure will depend on its mass and stiffness (or
natural period). Massive objects such as the compressors and the TR will have a
relatively long natural period which will be insensitive to short duration pulses in the
loading. Smaller objects such as light fittings will generally be more susceptible to the
peaks of the loading. It is for this reason that some filtering of the acceleration time history
is performed to derive design values.
The time history derived was filtered to remove pulses shorter in duration than 10 ms
(1/100th of a second) by generating moving averages with a period of 10ms. The last
column of Table I3 shows the peak values at the monitoring points with durations around
10ms or more. In Table I3, g is the acceleration due to gravity.
Monitoring
Point DP
Location
Design accelerations - SLB

(10ms averaging period)
122
Cellar deck
0.4g
518
Process Production deck
0.4g
559
Main Deck East
0.5g
620
Bridge support point DP
0.4g
641
Main Deck West
0.7g
3895
Main Deck West
0.4g
Table I3
DP Monitoring point locations and peak design accelerations
Loads on the QU platform
The LQ support points on the Production Deck West were loaded with the reactions from
the DLB loads from an explosion in the Power Generation Module.
The reaction loads from a DLB explosion in the Generator module were applied to the LQ
module support points. A load of 0.3 barg was applied to the whole East wall of the LQ
with a balancing load of 0.15bar on the West wall with a positive phase duration of
150ms. It is assumed for simplicity that both loads act at the same time. These are the
loads supplied by BP representing the DLB level explosion in the Generator Module. No
balancing loads on the gas turbines were taken into account in this analysis.
QU response
Typical acceleration and displacement plots for the QU simulations are given in Figures I6
and I7. (A 0.3bar un-factored load was used for these simulations).
Page 188 of 193

Figure I6
QU Strong shock vibration - Displacement time histories
Figure I7
QU Strong shock vibration Acceleration time histories
Again the acceleration time histories exhibit the sharp shot duration peaks. Just as for
DP, the time histories were filtered to remove peaks less than 10ms in duration. Table I4
gives the peak design accelerations for the monitoring points on QU. Because of their
position at the extreme Western end of the platform and because of the motion of the LQ
the lifeboats (TEMPSCS) on QU also experience a vertical acceleration of a similar value.
Page 189 of 193

Monitoring
Point QU
Location
Design accelerations - DLB

(10ms averaging period)
296
Cellar deck
0.14g
365
Mezzanine deck
0.19g
434
QU TEMPSC location
0.6g
1517
Bridge support point QU
0.3g
647
Production Deck (LQ

support)
0.3g
650
Central Control Room

roof
0.3g
69
Central Production Deck
0.15g
QU workshops roof
0.3g
1578
Table I4
QU Monitoring point locations and peak design accelerations
Conclusion
The overall, blanket design accelerations included in the Perfomance Standards have
been set at 0.5g so that general checks can be made for equipment throughout both
platforms and the living quarters/TR. This is a deck acceleration and hence equipment
and the living quarters supported on anti-vibration mounts may be subject to different
accelerations.
Page 190 of 193

Appendix J
drawings
Area Protection and Fire/Blast Division Layout elevation
This appendix contains copies of the Area Protection drawing elevations for the QU and
DP platforms. A full set of drawings including the Area Protection plans at all levels,
references [15] and [16] are included in the Fire Protection Strategy [47].
Page 191 of 193

Figure J1
DP Area protection and Fire/Blast division layout Elevation looking North

Page 192 of 193

Figure J2
QU Area protection and Fire/Blast division layout Elevation looking North

Page 193 of 193

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BP Doc Number: CLB-FC-0X-SE-REP-0096 Rev C1

Explosion Overpressure Protection Strategy

REVISION CHANGE NOTICES

Brief Description of Change

First Issue of Document

Incorporation of comments from AMEC

8.2 Equipment support

Now includes HVAC ducting, SIMOPS equipment

Identifies deck loads near to (<5m from) blast walls.

Sections 8.2 and 8.3

Identifies well isolation as criticality 1 must

Flare boom base moved to Compressor area

Emergency generator containerised

Extra Appendices introduced, Stair towers, cladding

Disclaimer on information supplied by AMEC to CB&I

Tables 7.1, 7.2,7.3

Revised and reduced after discussions with BP

New summary tables explosion simulations,

BP Doc Number: CLB-FC-0X-SE-REP-0096 Rev C1

Recommended protection for piping systems.

North central stairtower and LQ stairtowers included

Area protection drawings updated to latest versions

Sections 10.1, 10.2 and

Updated with PIMS action status

New information on drag loads near decks, blast

BP Doc Number: CLB-FC-0X-SE-REP-0096 Rev C1

Explosion Risk and Goals

Structural Explosion Requirements

The use of this document

Inherently Safer Design

Explosion Hazard Management

Safety Critical Elements

Criticality Ranking and Explosion loads

Implementation of the Explosion Protection Strategy

Design Load Cases

Clair Ridge - Summary of explosion requirements

Main Results from Simulations:-

Equipment, vessels and piping in an area where an explosion occurs

Equipment, vessels and piping adjacent to an area where an explosion occurs

Blast/fire barriers (including decks)

Blast Division Capacities

Fire and Explosion

7.6.1 Blast followed by fire

7.6.2 Fire followed by blast

BP Doc Number: CLB-FC-0X-SE-REP-0096 Rev C1

8.1.2 Enclosure frame design

8.1.4 Direct Explosion loads on structures

8.1.5 Explosion loads on associated equipment items outside enclosures

8.1.6 Strong shock explosion loads

Loads on Vessels and Equipment

8.2.1 Vessel and equipment general design requirements

8.2.2 Vessel hydrocarbon containment requirements

8.2.3 Pressure difference on vessels and equipment

8.2.4 Worked example Separator vessel (Hydrocarbon containing)

8.2.5 Hazard control and Hazard mitigation systems

General notes on Table 8.3 Explosion loads on vessels and equipment

Design of Critical Pipework and associated equipment

Piping explosion loads screening study

9.2.1 Classification of releases

9.2.2 System criticality and recommended protection

9.2.3 P&ID mark-up

Recommendations for piping explosion protection

10 Explosion loads on piping and nozzles