G.R. No Lnkl/.

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G.R.No.174629
SECONDDIVISION
REPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINES,G.R.No.174629
RepresentedbyTHEANTIMONEY
LAUNDERINGCOUNCIL(AMLC),Present:
Petitioner,
QUISUMBING,J.,
Chairperson,
versusAUSTRIAMARTINEZ,*
CARPIOMORALES,
TINGA,and
HON.ANTONIOM.EUGENIO,VELASCO,JR.,JJ.
JR.,ASPRESIDINGJUDGEOF
RTC,MANILA,BRANCH34,
PANTALEONALVAREZandPromulgated:
LILIACHENG,
Respondents.February14,2008
xx
DECISION
TINGA,J.:
ThepresentpetitionforcertiorariandprohibitionunderRule65assailstheordersandresolutions
issued by two different courts in two different cases. The courts and cases in question are the
[1]
RegionalTrialCourtofManila,Branch24,whichheardSPCaseNo.06114200 andtheCourt
[2]
ofAppeals,TenthDivision,whichhearedCAG.R.SPNo.95198. Bothcasesaroseaspartof
[3]
the aftermath of the ruling of this Court in Agan v. PIATCO nullifying the concession
agreementawardedtothePhilippineInternationalAirportTerminalCorporation(PIATCO)over
theNinoyAquinoInternationalAirportInternationalPassengerTerminal3(NAIA3)Project.
I.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/feb2008/174629.htm
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FollowingthepromulgationofAgan,aseriesofinvestigationsconcerningtheawardoftheNAIA
3contractstoPIATCOwereundertakenbytheOmbudsmanandtheComplianceandInvestigation
Staff(CIS)ofpetitionerAntiMoneyLaunderingCouncil(AMLC).On24May2005,theOffice
oftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG)wrotetheAMLCrequestingthelattersassistanceinobtainingmore
evidencetocompletelyrevealthefinancialtrailofcorruptionsurroundingthe[NAIA3]Project,
and also noting that petitioner Republic of the Philippines was presently defending itself in two
[4]
international arbitration cases filed in relation to the NAIA 3 Project. The CIS conducted an
intelligence database search on the financial transactions of certain individuals involved in the
award, including respondent Pantaleon Alvarez (Alvarez) who had been the Chairman of the
[5]
PBAC Technical Committee, NAIAIPT3 Project. By this time, Alvarez had already been
[6]
charged by the Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(j) of R.A. No. 3019. The search
[7]
revealedthatAlvarezmaintainedeight(8)bankaccountswithsix(6)differentbanks.
[8]
On27June2005,theAMLCissuedResolutionNo.75,Seriesof2005, whereby the Council
resolved to authorize the Executive Director of the AMLC to sign and verify an application to
inquireintoand/orexaminethe[deposits]orinvestmentsofPantaleonAlvarez,WilfredoTrinidad,
Alfredo Liongson, and Cheng Yong, and their related web of accounts wherever these may be
found, as defined under Rule 10.4 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations and to
authorize the AMLC Secretariat to conduct an inquiry into subject accounts once the Regional
TrialCourtgrantstheapplicationtoinquireintoand/orexaminethebankaccountsofthosefour
[9]
individuals. The resolution enumerated the particular bank accounts of Alvarez, Wilfredo
Trinidad(Trinidad),AlfredoLiongson(Liongson)andChengYongwhichweretobethesubject
[10]
oftheinquiry.
Therationaleforthesaidresolutionwasfoundedonthecitedfindingsofthe
CISthatamountsweretransferredfromaHongKongbankaccountownedbyJetstreamPacific
[11]
Ltd.AccounttobankaccountsinthePhilippinesmaintainedbyLiongsonandChengYong.
TheResolutionalsonotedthat[b]yawardingthecontracttoPIATCOdespiteitslackoffinancial
capacity, Pantaleon Alvarez caused undue injury to the government by giving PIATCO
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his official administrative
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, in
[12]
violationofSection3(e)ofRepublicActNo.3019.
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UndertheauthoritygrantedbytheResolution,theAMLCfiledanapplicationtoinquireintoor
examinethedepositsorinvestmentsofAlvarez,Trinidad,LiongsonandChengYongbeforethe
RTCofMakati,Branch138,presidedbyJudge(nowCourtofAppealsJustice)SixtoMarella,Jr.
[13]
TheapplicationwasdocketedasAMLCNo.05005.
TheMakatiRTCheardthetestimonyof
the Deputy Director of the AMLC, Richard David C. Funk II, and received the documentary
[14]
evidence of the AMLC.
Thereafter, on 4 July 2005, the Makati RTC rendered an Order
(Makati RTC bank inquiry order) granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the
subject bank accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being
satisfiedthatthereexisted[p]robablecause[to]believethatthedepositsinvariousbankaccounts,
detailsofwhichappearinparagraph1oftheApplication,arerelatedtotheoffenseofviolationof
AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act now the subject of criminal prosecution before the
[15]
SandiganbayanasattestedtobytheInformations,ExhibitsC,D,E,F,andG.
Pursuanttothe
Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS proceeded to inquire and examine the deposits,
[16]
investmentsandrelatedwebaccountsofthefour.
Meanwhile,theSpecialProsecutoroftheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,DennisVillaIgnacio,wrotea
letter dated 2 November 2005, requesting the AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez,
PIATCO, and several other entities involved in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to
probable cause to believe that the bank accounts were used in the commission of unlawful
activities that were committed in relation to the criminal cases then pending before the
[17]
Sandiganbayan.
Attached to the letter was a memorandum on why the investigation of the
[accounts]isnecessaryintheprosecutionoftheabovecriminalcasesbeforetheSandiganbayan.
[18]
InresponsetotheletteroftheSpecialProsecutor,theAMLCpromulgatedon9December2005
[19]
ResolutionNo.121Seriesof2005,
whichauthorizedtheexecutivedirectoroftheAMLCto
inquire into and examine the accounts named in the letter, including one maintained by Alvarez
with DBS Bank and two other accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank. The
ResolutioncharacterizedthememorandumattachedtotheSpecialProsecutorsletterasextensively
justif[ying] the existence of probable cause that the bank accounts of the persons and entities
mentionedintheletterarerelatedtotheunlawfulactivityofviolationofSections3(g)and3(e)of
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[20]
Rep.ActNo.3019,asamended.
Following the December 2005 AMLC Resolution, the Republic, through the AMLC, filed an
[21]
application
beforetheManilaRTCtoinquireintoand/orexaminethirteen(13)accountsand
two(2)relatedwebofaccountsallegedashavingbeenusedtofacilitatecorruptionintheNAIA3
Project.AmongsaidaccountsweretheDBSBankaccountofAlvarezandtheMetrobankaccounts
ofChengYong.ThecasewasraffledtoManilaRTC,Branch24,presidedbyrespondentJudge
AntonioEugenio,Jr.,anddocketedasSPCaseNo.06114200.
On12January2006,theManilaRTCissuedanOrder(ManilaRTCbankinquiryorder)granting
the Ex Parte Application expressing therein [that] the allegations in said application to be
impressedwithmerit,andinconformitywithSection11ofR.A.No.9160,asamended,otherwise
known as the AntiMoney Laundering Act (AMLA) of 2001 and Rules 11.1 and 11.2 of the
[22]
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Authority was thus granted to the AMLC to
inquireintothebankaccountslistedtherein.
[23]
On25January2006,Alvarez,throughcounsel,enteredhisappearance
beforetheManilaRTC
inSPCaseNo.06114200andfiledanUrgentMotiontoStayEnforcementofOrderofJanuary
[24]
12, 2006.
Alvarez alleged that he fortuitously learned of the bank inquiry order, which was
issuedfollowinganexparteapplication,andhearguedthatnothinginR.A.No.9160authorized
[25]
theAMLCtoseektheauthoritytoinquireintobankaccountsexparte.
ThedayafterAlvarez
[26]
filedhismotion,26January2006,theManilaRTCissuedanOrder
stayingtheenforcementof
itsbankinquiryorderandgivingtheRepublicfive(5)daystorespondtoAlvarezsmotion.
[27]
The Republic filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
of the 26 January 2006 Manila
RTCOrderandlikewisesoughttostrikeoutAlvarezsmotionthatledtotheissuanceofsaidorder.
[28]
For his part, Alvarez filed a Reply and Motion to Dismiss
the application for bank inquiry
[29]
order. On 2 May 2006, the Manila RTC issued an Omnibus Order
granting the Republics
MotionforReconsideration,denyingAlvarezsmotiontodismissandreinstatinginfullforceand
effecttheOrderdated12January2006.Intheomnibusorder,theManilaRTCreiteratedthatthe
material allegations in the application for bank inquiry order filed by the Republic stood as the
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probablecausefortheinvestigationandexaminationofthebankaccountsandinvestmentsofthe
[30]
respondents.
[31]
Alvarezfiledon10May2006anUrgentMotion
expressinghisapprehensionthatthe
AMLC would immediately enforce the omnibus order and would thereby render the motion for
reconsideration he intended to file as moot and academic thus he sought that the Republic be
refrained from enforcing the omnibus order in the meantime. Acting on this motion, the Manila
[32]
RTC,on11May2006,issuedanOrder
requiringtheOSGtofileacomment/oppositionand
remindingthepartiesthatjudgmentsandordersbecomefinalandexecutoryupontheexpirationof
fifteen(15)daysfromreceiptthereof,asitistheperiodwithinwhichamotionforreconsideration
[33]
couldbefiled.AlvarezfiledhisMotionforReconsideration
oftheomnibusorderon15May
[34]
2006,butthemotionwasdeniedbytheManilaRTCinanOrder
dated5July2006.
[35]
On 11 July 2006, Alvarez filed an Urgent Motion and Manifestation
wherein he
manifested having received reliable information that the AMLC was about to implement the
ManilaRTCbankinquiryordereventhoughhewasintendingtoappealfromit.Onthepremise
that only a final and executory judgment or order could be executed or implemented, Alvarez
sought that the AMLC be immediately ordered to refrain from enforcing the Manila RTC bank
inquiryorder.
[36]
On 12 July 2006, the Manila RTC, acting on Alvarezs latest motion, issued an Order
directingtheAMLCtorefrainfromenforcingtheorderdatedJanuary12,2006untiltheexpiration
of the period to appeal, without any appeal having been filed. On the same day, Alvarez filed a
[37]
NoticeofAppeal
withtheManilaRTC.
[38]
On24July2006,AlvarezfiledanUrgentExParteMotionforClarification.
Therein,he
alleged having learned that the AMLC had began to inquire into the bank accounts of the other
[39]
personsmentionedintheapplicationforbankinquiryorderfiledbytheRepublic.
Considering
thattheManilaRTCbankinquiryorderwasissuedexparte,withoutnoticetothoseotherpersons,
Alvarez prayed that the AMLC be ordered to refrain from inquiring into any of the other bank
depositsandallegedwebofaccountsenumeratedinAMLCsapplicationwiththeRTCandthat
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theAMLCbedirectedtorefrainfromusing,disclosingorpublishinginanyproceedingorvenue
[40]
anyinformationordocumentobtainedinviolationofthe11May2006RTCOrder.
On 25 July 2006, or one day after Alvarez filed his motion, the Manila RTC issued an
[41]
Order
whereinitclarifiedthattheExParteOrderofthisCourtdatedJanuary12,2006cannot
beimplementedagainstthedepositsoraccountsofanyofthepersonsenumeratedintheAMLC
ApplicationuntiltheappealofmovantAlvarezisfinallyresolved,otherwise,theappealwouldbe
[42]
rendered moot and academic or even nugatory.
In addition, the AMLC was ordered not to
discloseorpublishanyinformationordocumentfoundorobtainedin[v]iolationoftheMay11,
[43]
2006 Order of this Court.
The Manila RTC reasoned that the other persons mentioned in
AMLCs application were not served with the courts 12 January 2006 Order. This 25 July 2006
ManilaRTCOrderisthefirstofthefourrulingsbeingassailedthroughthispetition.
[44]
Inresponse,theRepublicfiledanUrgentOmnibusMotionforReconsideration
dated27
July2006,urgingthatitbeallowedtoimmediatelyenforcethebankinquiryorderagainstAlvarez
and that Alvarezs notice of appeal be expunged from the records since appeal from an order of
inquiryisdisallowedundertheAntimoneyLaunderingAct(AMLA).
Meanwhile,respondentLiliaChengfiledwiththeCourtofAppealsaPetitionforCertiorari,
[45]
Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
dated10July2006,directedagainsttheRepublicofthePhilippinesthroughtheAMLC,Manila
RTCJudgeEugenio,Jr.andMakatiRTCJudgeMarella,Jr..Sheidentifiedherselfasthewifeof
[46]
Cheng Yong
with whom she jointly owns a conjugal bank account with Citibank that is
coveredbytheMakatiRTCbankinquiryorder,andtwoconjugalbankaccountswithMetrobank
that are covered by the Manila RTC bank inquiry order. Lilia Cheng imputed grave abuse of
discretiononthepartoftheMakatiandManilaRTCsingrantingAMLCsexparteapplicationsfor
a bank inquiry order, arguing among others that the ex parte applications violated her
constitutional right to due process, that the bank inquiry order under the AMLA can only be
granted in connection with violations of the AMLA and that the AMLA can not apply to bank
accounts opened and transactions entered into prior to the effectivity of the AMLA or to bank
[47]
accountslocatedoutsidethePhilippines.
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On 1 August 2006, the Court of Appeals, acting on Lilia Chengs petition, issued a
[48]
TemporaryRestrainingOrder
enjoiningtheManilaandMakatitrialcourtsfromimplementing,
enforcingorexecutingtherespectivebankinquiryorderspreviouslyissued,andtheAMLCfrom
[49]
enforcing and implementing such orders. On even date, the Manila RTC issued an Order
resolvingtoholdinabeyancetheresolutionoftheurgentomnibusmotionforreconsiderationthen
pending before it until the resolution of Lilia Chengs petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals Resolution directing the issuance of the temporary restraining
orderisthesecondofthefourrulingsassailedinthepresentpetition.
[50]
Thethirdassailedruling
wasissuedon15August2006bytheManilaRTC,actingon
[51]
theUrgentMotionforClarification
dated14August2006filedbyAlvarez.Itappearsthatthe
1August2006ManilaRTCOrderhadamendeditsprevious25July2006Orderbydeletingthe
last paragraph which stated that the AMLC should not disclose or publish any information or
[52]
documentfoundorobtainedinviolationoftheMay11,2006OrderofthisCourt.
Inthisnew
motion,AlvarezarguedthatthedeletionofthatparagraphwouldallowtheAMLCtoimplement
thebankinquiryordersandpublishwhateverinformationitmightobtainthereuponevenbefore
[53]
thefinalordersoftheManilaRTCcouldbecomefinalandexecutory.
Inthe15August2006
Order, the Manila RTC reiterated that the bank inquiry order it had issued could not be
implementedorenforcedbytheAMLCoranyofitsrepresentativesuntiltheappealtherefromwas
[54]
finallyresolvedandthatanyenforcementthereofwouldbeunauthorized.
[55]
ThepresentConsolidatedPetition
forcertiorariandprohibitionunderRule65wasfiled
on2October2006,assailingthetwoOrdersoftheManilaRTCdated25Julyand15August2006
andtheTemporaryRestrainingOrderdated1August2006oftheCourtofAppeals.Throughan
[56]
UrgentManifestationandMotion
dated9October2006,petitionerinformedtheCourtthaton
22 September 2006, the Court of Appeals hearing Lilia Chengs petition had granted a writ of
[57]
preliminaryinjunctioninherfavor.
Thereafter,petitionersoughtaswellthenullificationofthe
22 September 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, thereby constituting the fourth ruling
[58]
assailedintheinstantpetition.
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[59]
The Court had initially granted a Temporary Restraining Order
dated 6 October 2006
[60]
and later on a Supplemental Temporary Restraining Order
dated 13 October 2006 in
petitionersfavor,enjoiningtheimplementationoftheassailedrulingsoftheManilaRTCandthe
[61]
CourtofAppeals.However,onrespondentsmotion,theCourt,throughaResolution
dated11
December2006,suspendedtheimplementationoftherestrainingordersithadearlierissued.
Oral arguments were held on 17 January 2007. The Court consolidated the issues for
argumentasfollows:
1. Did the RTCManila, in issuing the Orders dated 25 July 2006 and 15 August 2006
whichdeferredtheimplementationofitsOrderdated12January2006,andtheCourtofAppeals,
inissuingitsResolutiondated1August2006,whichorderedthestatusquoin relation to the1
July2005OrderoftheRTCMakatiandthe12January2006OrderoftheRTCManila,bothof
which authorized the examination of bank accounts under Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 9160
(AMLA),commitgraveabuseofdiscretion?
(a) Is an application for an order authorizing inquiry into or examination of
bankaccountsorinvestmentsunderSection 11 oftheAMLAexparte in nature or
onewhichrequiresnoticeandhearing?
(b)Whatlegalproceduresandstandardsshouldbeobservedintheconductof
theproceedingsfortheissuanceofsaidorder?
(c)Issuchordersusceptibletolegalchallengesandjudicialreview?
2.IsitproperforthisCourtatthistimeandinthiscasetoinquireintoandpassuponthe
validityofthe1July2005OrderoftheRTCMakatiandthe12January2006OrderoftheRTC
Manila,consideringthependencyofCAG.R.SPNo.95198(LiliaChengv.Republic)wherein
[62]
thevalidityofbothorderswaschallenged?
Aftertheoralarguments,thepartiesweredirectedtofiletheirrespectivememoranda,which
[63]
theydid,
andthepetitionwasthereafterdeemedsubmittedforresolution.
II.
PetitionersgeneraladvocacyisthatthebankinquiryordersissuedbytheManilaandMakati
RTCsarevalidandimmediatelyenforceablewhereastheassailedrulings,whicheffectivelystayed
theenforcementoftheManilaandMakatiRTCsbankinquiryorders,aresulliedwithgraveabuse
of discretion. These conclusions flow from the posture that a bank inquiry order, issued upon a
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finding of probable cause, may be issued ex parte and, once issued, is immediately executory.
Petitioner further argues that the information obtained following the bank inquiry is necessarily
beneficial,ifnotindispensable,totheAMLCindischargingitsawesomeresponsibilityregarding
the effective implementation of the AMLA and that any restraint in the disclosure of such
information to appropriate agencies or other judicial fora would render meaningless the relief
suppliedbythebankinquiryorder.
PetitionerraisesparticularargumentsquestioningLiliaChengsrighttoseekinjunctiverelief
beforetheCourtofAppeals,notingthatnotoneofthebankinquiryordersisdirectedagainsther.
Her cryptic assertion that she is the wife of Cheng Yong cannot, according to petitioner,
metamorphose into the requisite legal standing to seek redress for an imagined injury or to
maintainanactioninbehalfofanother.Inthesamebreath,petitionerarguesthatAlvarezcannot
assertanyviolationoftherighttofinancialprivacyinbehalfofotherpersonswhosebankaccounts
are being inquired into, particularly those other persons named in the Makati RTC bank inquiry
orderwhodidnottakeanysteptoopposesuchordersbeforethecourts.
Ostensibly,theproximatequestionbeforetheCourtiswhetherabankinquiryorderissued
inaccordancewithSection10oftheAMLAmaybestayedbyinjunction.Yetinarguingthatit
does, petitioner relies on what it posits as the final and immediately executory character of the
bankinquiryordersissuedbytheManilaandMakatiRTCs.Implicitinthatpositionisthenotion
thattheinquiryordersarevalid,andsuchnotionissusceptibletoreviewandvalidationbasedon
whatappearsonthefaceoftheordersandtheapplicationswhichtriggeredtheirissuance,aswell
astheprovisionsoftheAMLAgoverningtheissuanceofsuchorders.Indeed,totesttheviability
ofpetitionersargument,theCourtwillhavetobesatisfiedthatthesubjectinquiryordersarevalid
inthefirstplace.However,evenfromacursoryexaminationoftheapplicationsforinquiryorder
andtheordersthemselves,itisevidentthattheordersarenotinaccordancewithlaw.
III.
AbriefoverviewoftheAMLAiscalledfor.
Money laundering has been generally defined by the International Criminal Police
Organization(Interpol)`asanyactorattemptedacttoconcealordisguisetheidentityofillegally
[64]
obtainedproceedssothattheyappeartohaveoriginatedfromlegitimatesources.
Evenbefore
thepassageoftheAMLA,theproblemwasaddressedbythePhilippinegovernmentthroughthe
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issuance of various circulars by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Yet ultimately, legislative
proscriptionwasnecessary,especiallywiththeinclusionofthePhilippinesintheFinancialAction
TaskForceslistofnoncooperativecountriesandterritoriesinthefightagainstmoneylaundering.
[65]
TheoriginalAMLA,RepublicAct(R.A.)No.9160,waspassedin2001.Itwasamendedby
R.A.No.9194in2003.
Section4oftheAMLAstatesthat[m]oneylaunderingisacrimewherebytheproceedsof
an unlawful activity as [defined in the law] are transacted, thereby making them appear to have
[66]
originated from legitimate sources.
The section further provides the three modes through
whichthecrimeofmoneylaunderingiscommitted.Section7createstheAMLCanddefinesits
powers,whichgenerallyrelatetotheenforcementoftheAMLAprovisionsandtheinitiationof
legalactionsauthorizedintheAMLAsuchascivilforefeitureproceedingsandcomplaintsforthe
[67]
prosecutionofmoneylaunderingoffenses.
Inadditiontoprovidingforthedefinitionandpenaltiesforthecrimeofmoneylaundering,
the AMLA also authorizes certain provisional remedies that would aid the AMLC in the
enforcementoftheAMLA.ThesearethefreezeorderauthorizedunderSection10,andthebank
inquiryorderauthorizedunderSection11.
RespondentspositthatabankinquiryorderunderSection11maybeobtainedonlyuponthepre
[68]
existenceofamoneylaunderingoffensecasealreadyfiledbeforethecourts.
Theconclusion
is based on the phrase upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of this Act, the
wordcasesgenerallyunderstoodasreferringtoactualcasespendingwiththecourts.
Weareunconvincedbythisproposition,andagreeinsteadwiththethenSolicitorGeneral
whoconcededthattheuseofthephraseincasesofwasunfortunate,yetsubmittedthatitshould
be interpreted to mean in the event there are violations of the AMLA, and not that there are
[69]
alreadycasespendingincourtconcerningsuchviolations.
Ifthecontrarypositionisadopted,
thenthebankinquiryorderwouldbelimitedinpurposeasatoolinaidoflitigationoflivecases,
andwhollyinutileasameansforthegovernmenttoascertainwhetherthereissufficientevidence
tosustainanintendedprosecutionoftheaccountholderforviolationoftheAMLA.Shouldthatbe
the situation, in all likelihood the AMLC would be virtually deprived of its character as a
discovery tool, and thus would become less circumspect in filing complaints against suspect
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account holders. After all, under such setup the preferred strategy would be to allow or even
encouragetheindiscriminatefilingofcomplaintsundertheAMLAwiththehopeorexpectation
thattheevidenceofmoneylaunderingwouldsomehowsurfaceduringthetrial.SincetheAMLC
could not make use of the bank inquiry order to determine whether there is evidentiary basis to
prosecutethesuspectedmalefactors,notfilinganycaseatallwouldnotbeanalternative. Such
unwholesomesetupshouldnotcometopass.ThusSection11cannotbeinterpretedinawaythat
would emasculate the remedy it has established and encourage the unfounded initiation of
complaintsformoneylaundering.
Still,evenifthebankinquiryordermaybeavailedofwithoutneedofapreexistingcaseunder
the AMLA, it does not follow that such order may be availed of ex parte. There are several
reasons why the AMLA does not generally sanction ex parte applications and issuances of the
bankinquiryorder.
IV.
ItisevidentthatSection11doesnotspecificallyauthorize,asageneralrule,theissuanceexparte
ofthebankinquiryorder.Wequotetheprovisioninfull:
SEC. 11. Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits. Notwithstanding the provisions of
RepublicActNo.1405,asamended,RepublicActNo.6426,asamended,RepublicActNo.8791,
andotherlaws,theAMLCmayinquireintoorexamineanyparticulardepositorinvestmentwith
anybankinginstitutionornonbankfinancialinstitutionuponorderofanycompetentcourtincases
of violation of this Act, when it has been established that there is probable cause that the
depositsorinvestmentsarerelatedtoanunlawfulactivityasdefinedinSection3(i)hereofora
moneylaunderingoffenseunderSection4hereof,exceptthatnocourtordershallberequired
incasesinvolvingunlawfulactivitiesdefinedinSections3(i)1,(2)and(12).
ToensurecompliancewiththisAct,theBangkoSentralngPilipinas(BSP)mayinquireinto
orexamineanydepositofinvestmentwithanybankinginstitutionornonbankfinancialinstitution
whentheexaminationismadeinthecourseofaperiodicorspecialexamination,inaccordancewith
[70]
therulesofexaminationoftheBSP.
(Emphasissupplied)
Ofcourse,Section11alsoallowstheAMLCtoinquireintobankaccountswithouthaving
toobtainajudicialorderincaseswherethereisprobablecausethatthedepositsorinvestmentsare
[71]
relatedtokidnappingforransom,
certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
[72]
Act of 2002,
hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and
murder.Sincesuchspecialcircumstancesdonotapplyinthiscase,thereisnoneedforustopass
commentonthisproviso.Sufficeittosay,theprovisocontemplatesasituationdistinctfromthat
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which presently confronts us, and for purposes of the succeeding discussion, our reference to
Section11oftheAMLAexcludessaidproviso.
Intheinstanceswhereacourtorderisrequiredfortheissuanceofthebankinquiryorder,nothing
in Section 11 specifically authorizes that such court order may be issued ex parte. It might be
arguedthatthissilencedoesnotprecludetheexparteissuanceofthebankinquiryordersincethe
sameisnotprohibitedunderSection11.Yetthisargumentfallswhentheimmediatelypreceding
provision,Section10,isexamined.
SEC. 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. The Court of Appeals, upon
application ex parte by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that any
monetaryinstrumentorpropertyisinanywayrelatedtoanunlawfulactivityasdefinedinSection
3(i)hereof,mayissueafreezeorderwhichshallbeeffectiveimmediately.Thefreezeordershall
[73]
beforaperiodoftwenty(20)daysunlessextendedbythecourt.
Although oriented towards different purposes, the freeze order under Section 10 and the bank
inquiryorderunderSection11aresimilarinthattheyareextraordinaryprovisionalreliefswhich
the AMLC may avail of to effectively combat and prosecute money laundering offenses.
Crucially, Section 10 uses specific language to authorize an ex parte application for the
provisional relief therein, a circumstance absent in Section 11. If indeed the legislature had
intendedtoauthorizeexparteproceedingsfortheissuanceofthebankinquiryorder,thenitcould
haveeasilyexpressedsuchintentinthelaw,asitdidwiththefreezeorderunderSection10.
Evenmoretellingly,thecurrentlanguageofSections10and11oftheAMLAwascrafted
atthesametime,throughthepassageofR.A.No.9194.Priortotheamendatorylaw,itwasthe
AMLC, not the Court of Appeals, which had authority to issue a freeze order, whereas a bank
[74]
inquiryorderalwaysthenrequired,withoutexception,anorderfromacompetentcourt.
Itwas
throughthesameenactmentthatexparteproceedingswereintroducedforthefirsttimeintothe
AMLA,inthecaseofthefreezeorderwhichnowcanonlybeissuedbytheCourtofAppeals.It
certainly would have been convenient, through the same amendatory law, to allow a similar ex
parteprocedureinthecaseofabankinquiryorderhadCongressbeensominded.Yetnothingin
theprovisionitself,oreventheavailablelegislativerecord,explicitlypointstoanexpartejudicial
procedureintheapplicationforabankinquiryorder,unlikeinthecaseofthefreezeorder.
ThattheAMLAdoesnotcontemplateexparteproceedingsinapplicationsforbankinquiryorders
isconfirmedbythepresentimplementingrulesandregulationsoftheAMLA,promulgatedupon
thepassageofR.A.No.9194.WithrespecttofreezeordersunderSection10,theimplementing
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[75]
rules do expressly provide that the applications for freeze orders be filed ex parte,
but no
[76]
similar clearance is granted in the case of inquiry orders under Section 11.
These
implementing rules were promulgated by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Insurance
[77]
Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission,
and if it was the true belief of
theseinstitutionsthatinquiryorderscouldbeissuedexpartesimilartofreezeorders,languageto
that effect would have been incorporated in the said Rules. This is stressed not because the
implementingrulescouldauthorizeexparteapplicationsforinquiryordersdespitetheabsenceof
statutorybasis,butratherbecausetheframersofthelawhadnointentiontoallowsuchexparte
applications.
[78]
EventheRulesofProcedureadoptedbythisCourtinA.M.No.051104SC
toenforcethe
provisionsoftheAMLAspecificallyauthorizeexparteapplicationswithrespecttofreezeorders
[79]
underSection10
butmakenosimilarauthorizationwithrespecttobankinquiryordersunder
Section11.
TheCourtcoulddivinethesenseinallowingexparteproceedingsunderSection10andin
proscribingthesameunderSection11.AfreezeorderunderSection10ontheonehandisaimed
atpreservingmonetaryinstrumentsorpropertyinanywaydeemedrelatedtounlawfulactivitiesas
definedinSection3(i)oftheAMLA.Theownerofsuchmonetaryinstrumentsorpropertywould
thusbeinhibitedfromutilizingthesameforthedurationofthefreezeorder.Tomakesuchfreeze
orderantecededbyajudicialproceedingwithnoticetotheaccountholderwouldallowfororlead
tothedissipationofsuchfundsevenbeforetheordercouldbeissued.
Ontheotherhand,abankinquiryorderunderSection11doesnotnecessitateanyformof
physicalseizureofpropertyoftheaccountholder.Whatthebankinquiryorderauthorizesisthe
examinationoftheparticulardepositsorinvestmentsinbankinginstitutionsornonbankfinancial
institutions. The monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial
institutionsarenotseizedinaphysicalsense,butareexaminedonparticulardetailssuchasthe
accountholdersrecordofdepositsandtransactions.Unliketheassetssubjectofthefreezeorder,
therecordstobeinspectedunderabankinquiryordercannotbephysicallyseizedorhiddenbythe
accountholder.Saidrecordsareinthepossessionofthebankandthereforecannotbedestroyedat
theinstanceoftheaccountholderaloneasthatwouldrequiretheextraordinarycooperationand
devotionofthebank.
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Interestingly,petitionersmemorandumdoesnotattempttodemonstratebeforetheCourtthatthe
bankinquiryorderunderSection11maybeissuedexparte,althoughthepetitionitselfdiddevote
some space for that argument. The petition argues that the bank inquiry order is a special and
peculiarremedy,drasticinitsname,andmadenecessarybecauseofapublicnecessity[t]hus,by
itsverynature,theapplicationforanorderorinquirymustnecessarily,beexparte.Thisargument
isinsufficientjustificationinlightofthecleardisinclinationofCongresstoallowtheissuanceex
parte of bank inquiry orders under Section 11, in contrast to the legislatures clear inclination to
allowtheexpartegrantoffreezeordersunderSection10.
Without doubt, a requirement that the application for a bank inquiry order be done with
noticetotheaccountholderwillalertthelatterthatthereisaplantoinspecthisbankaccounton
thebeliefthatthefundsthereinareinvolvedinanunlawfulactivityormoneylaunderingoffense.
[80]
Still,theaccountholdersoalertedwillinfactbeunabletodoanythingtoconcealorcleanse
hisbankaccountrecordsofsuspiciousoranomaloustransactions,atleastnotwithoutthewhole
heartedcooperationofthebank,whichinherentlyhasnovestedinteresttoaidtheaccountholder
insuchmanner.
V.
ThenecessaryimplicationofthisfindingthatSection11oftheAMLAdoesnotgenerally
authorize the issuance ex parte of the bank inquiry order would be that such orders cannot be
issuedunlessnoticeisgiventotheownersoftheaccount,allowingthemtheopportunitytocontest
theissuanceoftheorder.Withoutsuchaconsequence,thelegislateddistinctionbetweenexparte
proceedingsunderSection10andthosewhicharenotexparteunderSection11wouldbelostand
rendereduseless.
Therecertainlyisfertilegroundtocontesttheissuanceofanexparteorder.Section11itself
requires that it be established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are
relatedtounlawfulactivities,anditobviouslyisthecourtwhichstandsasarbiterwhetherthereis
indeedsuchprobablecause.Theprocessofinquiringintotheexistenceofprobablecausewould
involve the function of determination reposed on the trial court. Determination clearly implies a
function of adjudication on the part of the trial court, and not a mechanical application of a
standard predetermination by some other body. The word "determination" implies deliberation
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[81]
andis,innormallegalcontemplation,equivalentto"thedecisionofacourtofjustice."
ThecourtreceivingtheapplicationforinquiryordercannotsimplytaketheAMLCsword
that probable cause exists that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity. It
willhavetoexerciseits
own determinative function in order to be convinced of such fact. The account holder would be
certainlycapableofcontestingsuchprobablecauseifgiventheopportunitytobeapprisedofthe
pendingapplicationtoinquireintohisaccounthenceanoticerequirementwouldnotbeanempty
spectacle. It may be so that the process of obtaining the inquiry order may become more
cumbersomeorprolongedbecauseofthenoticerequirement,yetwefailtoseeanyunreasonable
burdencastbysuchcircumstance.Afterall,asearlierstated,requiringnoticetotheaccountholder
shouldnot,inanyway,compromisetheintegrityofthebankrecordssubjectoftheinquirywhich
remaininthepossessionandcontrolofthebank.
Petitioner argues that a bank inquiry order necessitates a finding of probable cause, a
characteristic similar to a search warrant which is applied to and heard ex parte. We have
examinedthesupposedanalogybetweenasearchwarrantandabankinquiryorderyetweremain
tobeunconvincedbypetitioner.
The Constitution and the Rules of Court prescribe particular requirements attaching to
search warrants that are not imposed by the AMLA with respect to bank inquiry orders. A
constitutional warrant requires that the judge personally examine under oath or affirmation the
[82]
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
such examination being in the form of
[83]
searching questions and answers.
Those are impositions which the legislative did not
specificallyprescribeastothebankinquiryorderundertheAMLA,andwecannotfindsufficient
legalbasistoapplythemtoSection11oftheAMLA.Simplyput,abankinquiryorderisnota
searchwarrantorwarrantofarrestasitcontemplatesadirectobjectbutnottheseizureofpersons
orproperty.
EvenastheConstitutionandtheRulesofCourtimposeahighproceduralstandardforthe
determinationofprobablecausefortheissuanceofsearchwarrantswhichCongresschosenotto
prescribeforthebankinquiryorderundertheAMLA,Congressnonethelessdisallowedexparte
applicationsfortheinquiryorder.Wecandiscernthatinexchangefortheseproceduralstandards
normally applied to search warrants, Congress chose instead to legislate a right to notice and a
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right to be heard characteristics of judicial proceedings which are not ex parte. Absent any
demonstrable constitutional infirmity, there is no reason for us to dispute such legislative policy
choices.
VI.
TheCourtsconstructionofSection11oftheAMLAisundoubtedlyinfluencedbyrightto
privacyconsiderations.Ifsustained,petitionersargumentthatabankaccountmaybeinspectedby
thegovernmentfollowinganexparteproceedingaboutwhichthedepositorwouldknownothing
would have significant implications on the right to privacy, a right innately cherished by all
notwithstandingthelegallyrecognizedexceptionsthereto.Thenotionthatthegovernmentcould
be so empowered is cause for concern of any individual who values the right to privacy which,
afterall,embodieseventherighttobelet
[84]
alone,themostcomprehensiveofrightsandtherightmostvaluedbycivilizedpeople.
One might assume that the constitutional dimension of the right to privacy, as applied to
bank deposits, warrants our present inquiry. We decline to do so. Admittedly, that question has
provedcontroversialinAmericanjurisprudence.Notably,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtinU.S.
[85]
v.Miller
heldthattherewasnolegitimateexpectationofprivacyastothebankrecordsofa
[86]
depositor.
Moreover, the text of our Constitution has not bothered with the triviality of
allocatingspecificrightspeculiartobankdeposits.
However, sufficient for our purposes, we can assert there is a right to privacy governing
bankaccountsinthePhilippines,andthatsuchrightfindsapplicationtothecaseatbar.Thesource
ofsuchrightisstatutory,expressedasitisinR.A.No.1405otherwiseknownastheBankSecrecy
Actof1955.TherighttoprivacyisenshrinedinSection2ofthatlaw,towit:
SECTION2.All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in

thePhilippinesincludinginvestmentsinbondsissuedbytheGovernmentofthePhilippines,
itspoliticalsubdivisionsanditsinstrumentalities,areherebyconsideredasofanabsolutely
confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
governmentofficial,bureauoroffice,exceptuponwrittenpermissionofthedepositor,orincases
ofimpeachment,oruponorderofacompetentcourtincasesofbriberyorderelictionofdutyof
public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.(Emphasissupplied)
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BecauseoftheBankSecrecyAct,theconfidentialityofbankdepositsremainsabasicstate
[87]
policyinthePhilippines.
Subsequentlaws,includingtheAMLA,mayhaveaddedexceptions
to the Bank Secrecy Act, yet the secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule. It falls
[88]
within the zones of privacy recognized by our laws.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution
[89]
likewiserecognizedthatbankaccountsarenotcoveredbyeithertherighttoinformation
under
[90]
Section 7, Article III or under the requirement of full public disclosure
under Section 28,
[91]
ArticleII.
UnlesstheBankSecrecyActisrepealedor
amended, the legal order is obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine
bankdeposits.
Anyexceptiontotheruleofabsoluteconfidentialitymustbespecificallylegislated.Section
2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be
examined by any person, government official, bureau or office namely when: (1) upon written
permissionofthedepositor(2)incasesofimpeachment(3)theexaminationofbankaccountsis
uponorderofacompetentcourtincasesofbriberyorderelictionofdutyofpublicofficialsand
(4)themoneydepositedorinvestedisthesubjectmatterofthelitigation.Section8ofR.A.Act
No. 3019, the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this Court as
[92]
constitutinganadditionalexceptiontotheruleofabsoluteconfidentiality,
andtherehavebeen
[93]
othersimilarrecognitionsaswell.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the
AMLCmayinquireintoabankaccountuponorderofanycompetentcourtincasesofviolationof
theAMLA,ithavingbeenestablishedthatthereisprobablecausethatthedepositsorinvestments
are related to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering
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G.R.No.174629
offense under Section 4 thereof. Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the
[94]
deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for ransom,
certain violations of the
[95]
ComprehensiveDangerousDrugsActof2002,
hijackingandotherviolationsunderR.A.No.
6235,destructivearsonandmurder,thenthereisnoneedfortheAMLCtoobtainacourtorder
beforeitcouldinquireintosuchaccounts.
It cannot be successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order under
Section11oftheAMLAisalitigationencompassedinoneoftheexceptionstotheBankSecrecy
Act which is when the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. The
orientationofthebankinquiryorderissimplytoserveasaprovisionalrelieforremedy.Asearlier
stated,theapplicationforsuchdoesnotentailafullblowntrial.
Nevertheless,justbecausetheAMLAestablishesadditionalexceptionstotheBankSecrecy
Actitdoesnotmeanthatthelaterlawhasdispensedwiththegeneralprincipleestablishedinthe
older law that [a]ll deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
[96]
Philippines x x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature.
Indeed, by
forceofstatute,allbankdepositsareabsolutelyconfidential,andthatnatureisunalteredevenby
thelegislatedexceptionsreferredtoabove.Thereisdisfavortowardsconstruingtheseexceptions
insuchamannerthatwouldauthorizeunlimiteddiscretiononthepartofthegovernmentorofany
party seeking to enforce those exceptions and inquire into bank deposits. If there are doubts in
upholding the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits against affirming the authority to
inquireintosuchaccounts,thensuchdoubtsmustberesolvedinfavoroftheformer.Suchastance
would persist unless Congress passes a law reversing the general state policy of preserving the
absolutelyconfidentialnatureofPhilippinebankaccounts.
Thepresenceofthisstatutoryrighttoprivacyaddressesatleastoneoftheargumentsraised
bypetitioner,thatLiliaChenghadnopersonalitytoassailtheinquiryordersbeforetheCourtof
Appealsbecauseshewasnotthesubjectofsaidorders.AMLCResolutionNo.75,whichservedas
thebasisinthesuccessfulapplicationfortheMakatiinquiryorder,expresslyadvertstoCitibank
[97]
Account No. 88576248 owned by Cheng Yong and/or Lilia G. Cheng with Citibank N.A.,
whereasLiliaChengspetitionbeforetheCourtofAppealsisaccompaniedbyacertificationfrom
Metrobank that Account Nos. 3008524360 and 7001498017, both of which are among the
[98]
subjectsoftheManilainquiryorder,areaccountsinthenameofYongChengorLiliaCheng.
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PetitionerdoesnotspecificallydenythatLiliaChengholdsrightsofownershipoverthethreesaid
accounts,layingfocusinsteadonthefactthatshewasnotnamedasasubjectofeithertheMakati
or Manila RTC inquiry orders. We are reasonably convinced that Lilia Cheng has sufficiently
demonstrated her joint ownership of the three accounts, and such conclusion leads us to
acknowledge that she has the standing to assail via certiorari the inquiry orders authorizing the
examination of her bank accounts as the orders interfere with her statutory right to maintain the
secrecyofsaidaccounts.
While petitioner would premise that the inquiry into Lilia Chengs accounts finds root in
Section11oftheAMLA,itcannotbedeniedthattheauthoritytoinquireunderSection11isonly
exceptional in character, contrary as it is to the general rule preserving the secrecy of bank
deposits.Eventhoughshemaynothavebeenthesubjectoftheinquiryorders,herbankaccounts
neverthelesswere,andshethushasthestandingtovindicatetherighttosecrecythatattachesto
said accounts and their owners. This statutory right to privacy will not prevent the courts from
authorizingtheinquiryanywayuponthefulfillmentoftherequirementssetforthunderSection11
oftheAMLAorSection2oftheBankSecrecyActatthesametime,theowneroftheaccounts
havetherighttochallengewhethertherequirementswereindeedcompliedwith.
VII.
Thereisafinalpointofconcernwhichneedstobeaddressed.LiliaChengarguesthatthe
AMLA, being a substantive penal statute, has no retroactive effect and the bank inquiry order
couldnotapplytodepositsorinvestmentsopenedpriortotheeffectivityofRep.ActNo.9164,or
on 17 October 2001. Thus, she concludes, her subject bank accounts, opened between 1989 to
1990, could not be the subject of the bank inquiry order lest there be a violation of the
constitutionalprohibitionagainstexpostfactolaws.
[99]
Noexpostfactolawmaybeenacted,
andnolawmaybeconstruedinsuchfashionasto
permitacriminalprosecutionoffensivetotheexpostfactoclause.AsappliedtotheAMLA,itis
plain that no person may be prosecuted under the penal provisions of the AMLA for acts
committedpriortotheenactmentofthelawon17October2001.Asmuchwasunderstoodbythe
lawmakerssincetheydeliberatedupontheAMLA,andindeedthereisnoseriousdisputeonthat
point.
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DoestheproscriptionagainstexpostfactolawsapplytotheinterpretationofSection11,a
provisionwhichdoesnotprovideforapenalsanctionbutwhichmerelyauthorizestheinspection
of suspect accounts and deposits? The answer is in the affirmative. In this jurisdiction, we have
definedanexpostfactolawasonewhicheither:
(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent
whendone,andpunishessuchanact
(2)aggravatesacrime,ormakesitgreaterthanitwas,whencommitted
(3)changesthepunishmentandinflictsagreaterpunishmentthanthelawannexedtothe
crimewhencommitted
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimonythanthelawrequiredatthetimeofthecommissionoftheoffense
(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivationofarightforsomethingwhichwhendonewaslawfuland
(6)deprivesapersonaccusedofacrimeofsomelawfulprotectiontowhichhehas
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
[100]
proclamationofamnesty.(Emphasissupplied)
PriortotheenactmentoftheAMLA,thefactthatbankaccountsordepositswereinvolved
inactivitieslateronenumeratedinSection3ofthelawdidnot,byitself,removesuchaccounts
fromtheshelterofabsoluteconfidentiality.PriortotheAMLA,inorderthatbankaccountscould
be examined, there was need to secure either the written permission of the depositor or a court
order authorizing such examination, assuming that they were involved in cases of bribery or
derelictionofdutyofpublicofficials,orinacasewherethemoneydepositedorinvestedwasitself
thesubjectmatterofthelitigation.ThepassageoftheAMLAstrippedanotherlayerofftheruleon
absolute confidentiality that provided a measure of lawful protection to the account holder. For
that reason, the application of the bank inquiry order as a means of inquiring into records of
transactions entered into prior to the passage of the AMLA would be constitutionally infirm,
offensiveasitistotheexpostfactoclause.
Still,wemustnotethatthepositionsubmittedbyLiliaChengismuchbroaderthanwhatwe
arewillingtoaffirm.Shearguesthattheproscriptionagainstexpostfactolawsgoesasfarasto
prohibit any inquiry into deposits or investments included in bank accounts opened prior to the
effectivity of the AMLA even if the suspect transactions were entered into when the law had
already taken effect. The Court recognizes that if this argument were to be affirmed, it would
createahorribleloopholeintheAMLAthatwouldinturnsupplythemeanstofearlesslyengage
in money laundering in the Philippines all that the criminal has to do is to make sure that the
moneylaunderingactivityisfacilitatedthroughabankaccountopenedpriorto2001.LiliaCheng
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G.R.No.174629
admitsthatactualmoneylaundererscouldutilizetheexpostfactoprovisionoftheConstitutionas
a shield but that the remedy lay with Congress to amend the law. We can hardly presume that
Congressintendedtoenactaselfdefeatinglawinthefirstplace,andthecourtsareinhibitedfrom
suchaconstructionbythecardinalrulethatalawshouldbeinterpretedwithaviewtoupholding
[101]
ratherthandestroyingit.
Besides,nowhereinthelegislativerecordcitedbyLiliaChengdoesitappearthattherewas
anunequivocalintenttoexemptfromthebankinquiryorderallbankaccountsopenedpriortothe
passageoftheAMLA.ThereisacitedexchangebetweenRepresentativesRonaldoZamoraand
JaimeLopezwherethelatterconfirmedtotheformerthatdepositsaresupposedtobeexempted
[102]
fromscrutinyormonitoringiftheyarealreadyinplaceasofthetimethelawisenacted.
That
statementdoesindicatethattransactionsalreadyinplacewhentheAMLAwaspassedareindeed
exempt from scrutiny through a bank inquiry order, but it cannot yield any interpretation that
recordsoftransactionsundertakenaftertheenactmentoftheAMLAaresimilarlyexempt.Dueto
the absence of cited authority from the legislative record that unqualifiedly supports respondent
LiliaChengsthesis,thereisnocauseforustosustainherinterpretationoftheAMLA,fatalasitis
totheanimaofthatlaw.
IX.
WearewellawarethatLiliaChengspetitionpresentlypendingbeforetheCourtofAppeals
likewiseassailsthevalidityofthesubjectbankinquiryordersandpreciselyseekstheannulmentof
saidorders.Ourcurrentdeclarationsmayindeedhavetheeffectofpreemptingthat0petition.Still,
inorderforthisCourttoruleonthepetitionatbarwhichinsistsontheenforceabilityofthesaid
bankinquiryorders,itisnecessaryforustoconsiderandruleonthesamequestionwhichafterall
isapurequestionoflaw.
WHEREFORE,thePETITIONisDISMISSED.Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
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DANTEO.TINGA
AssociateJustice
WECONCUR:
LEONARDOA.QUISUMBING
AssociateJustice
Chairperson
MA.ALICIAAUSTRIAMARTINEZCONCHITACARPIOMORALES
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice
PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice
ATTESTATION
IattestthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethe
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G.R.No.174629
casewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.
LEONARDOA.QUISUMBING
AssociateJustice
Chairperson,SecondDivision
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation,itisherebycertifiedthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereachedin
consultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.
REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice
*AsreplacementofJusticeAntonioT.CarpiowhoinhibitedhimselfperAdministrativeCircularNo.842007.
[1]
EntitledIntheMatteroftheApplicationforAnOrderAllowingAnInquiryIntoCertainBankAccountsorInvestmentsand
RelatedWebofAccounts,TheRepublicofthePhilippinesRepresentedbytheAntiMoneyLaunderingCouncil,Applicant.
[2]
Entitled Lilia Cheng v. Republic of the Philippines represented by the AntiMoney Laundering Council (AMLC), Hon.
AntonioM.Eugenio,AsPresidingJudgeoftheRTCManila,Br.24Hon.SixtoMarella,Jr.,asPresidingJudgeofRTC,MakatiCity,Br.
38andJohnDoes.
[3]
G.R.No.155001.
[4]
Rollo,p.96.
[5]
Id.at97.
[6]
Sec.3.Corruptpracticesofpublicofficers.Inadditiontoactsoromissionsofpublicofficersalreadypenalizedbyexisting
law,thefollowingshallconstitutecorruptpracticesofanypublicofficerandareherebydeclaredtobeunlawful:
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G.R.No.174629
(j)Knowinglyapprovingorgrantinganylicense,permit,privilegeorbenefitinfavorofanypersonnot
qualifiedforornotlegallyentitledtosuchlicense,permit,privilegeoradvantage,orofamererepresentativeor
dummyofonewhoisnotsoqualifiedorentitled.
[7]
Rollo,p.98.
[8]
Id.at96100.
[9]
Id.at99100.
[10]
Id.at98.
[11]
Id.
[12]
Id.at99.
[13]
Id.at101.
[14]
Id.
[15]
Id.
[16]
Id.at27.
[17]
Id.at104.
[18]
Id.
[19]
Id.at105107.
[20]
Id.at106.
[21]
Seeid.at109110.
[22]
Id.at109.
[23]
Id.at111.
[24]
Id.at111117.
[25]
Id.at111.
[26]
Id.at118.
[27]
Id.at119130.
24/28
2/23/2016
G.R.No.174629
[28]
Id.at131141.
[29]
Id.at142147.
[30]
Id.at146.
[31]
Id.at148149.
[32]
Id.at150.
[33]
Id.at151158.
[34]
Id.at167.
[35]
Id.at168169.
[36]
Id.at171.
.
[37]
Id.at172173.
[38]
Id.at174175.
[39]
Id.at174.
[40]
Id.at175.
[41]
Id.at6869.
[42]
Id.at69.
[43]
Id.
[44]
Id.at176186.
[45]
Id.at187249.
[46]
Id.at189.
[47]
Id.at200201.
[48]
Id.at7377.
[49]
Id.at78.
[50]
Orderdated15August2006,seeid.at71.
25/28
2/23/2016
G.R.No.174629
[51]
Id.at285287.
[52]
Id.at285286.
[53]
Id.at286.
[54]
Id.at71.
[55]
Id.at665.
[56]
Id.at299304.
[57]
Seeid.at310.
[58]
Id.at302.
[59]
Id.at297298.
[60]
Id.at312313.
[61]
Id.at549551.
[62]
Id.at752753.
[63]
Seerollo,pp.786828867910913936.
[64]
See
Funds
derived
from
criminal
activities
(FOPAC),
(http://www.interpol.int/Public/
FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/default.asp, last visited 8 December 2007). See also J.M.B. TIROL, THE ANTIMONEY
LAUNDERINGLAWOFTHEPHILIPPINESAnnotated(2nded.,2007),at3.
[65]
TIROL, supra note 64, at 46. The Financial Action Task Force was established in 1989 by the socalled Group of 7
countries to formulate and encourage the adoption of international standards and measures to fight money laundering and related
activities.Id.at28.
[66]
RepublicActNo.9160(2002),Sec.4.
[67]
RepublicActNo.9160(2002),Secs.7(3)and(4).
[68]
Seerollo,pp.809810,932.
[69]
Id.at600601.
[70]
[71]
UnderArticle267oftheRevisedPenalCode.
[72]
ParticularlySections4,5,6,8,9,10,12,13,14,15,and16thereof.
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G.R.No.174629
[73]
[74]
Unlikeinthepresentlawwhichauthorizestheissuancewithoutneedofjudicialorderwhenthereisprobablecausethatthe
depositsareinvolvedinsuchspecificallyenumeratedcrimesaskidnapping,hijacking,destructivearsonandmurder,andviolationsof
someprovisionsoftheDangerousDrugsActof2002.SeeSec.11,R.A.No.9194,inconnectionwithSection3(i).
[75]
Rule10.1.WhentheAMLCmayapplyforthefreezingofanymonetaryinstrumentorproperty.
(a)afteraninvestigationconductedbytheAMLCandupondeterminationthatprobablecauseexiststhata
monetary instrument or property is in any way related to any unlawful activity as defined under section 3(i). The
AMLCmayfileanexparteapplicationbeforethetheCourtofAppealsfortheissuanceofafreezeorderonany
monetaryinstrumentorpropertysubjectthereofpriortotheinstitutionorinthecourseof,thecriminalproceedings
involvingtheunlawfulactivitytowhichsaidmonetaryinstrumentorpropertyisanywayrelated.Rule10.1,Revised
ImplementingRulesAndRegulationsR.A.No.9160,AsAmendedByR.A.No.9194.(Emphasissupplied)
[76]
SeeRule11.1,RevisedImplementingRulesAndRegulationsR.A.No.9160,AsAmendedByR.A.No.9194.Rule11.1.
AuthoritytoInquireintoBankDepositsWithCourtOrder.Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended
RepublicActNo.6426,asamendedRepublicActNo.8791,andotherlaws,theAMLCmayinquireintoorexamineanyparticular
depositorinvestmentwithanybankinginstitutionornonbankfinancialinstitutionANDTHEIRSUBSIDIARIESANDAFFILIATES
uponorderofanycompetentcourtincasesofviolationofthisAct,whenithasbeenestablishedthatthereisprobablecausethatthe
depositsorinvestmentsinvolvedarerelatedtoanunlawfulactivityasdefinedinSection3(j)hereoforamoneylaunderingoffenseunder
Section4hereofexceptincasesasprovidedunderRule11.2.
[77]
RepublicActNo.9160(SeeSection18,AMLA).
[78]
Effective15December2005.
[79]
See Title VIII, Sec. 44, Rule Of Procedure In Cases Of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, And Freezing Of Monetary
Instrument,Property,OrProceedsRepresenting,Involving,OrRelatingToAnUnlawfulActivityOrMoneyLaunderingOffenseUnder
RepublicActNo.9160,AsAmended.
[80]
[81]
SeeJ. Tinga, Concurring and Dissenting, Gonzalesv.Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, 10 August 2006, 498 SCRA 445, 501
citing12WordsandPhrases(1954ed.),p.478479and1BOUVIER'SLAWDICTIONARY(8thed.,1914),p.858.
[82]
CONST.,Art.III,Sec.2.
[83]
2000RULESOFCRIMINALPROCEDURE,Rule126,Sec.5.
[84]
PerhapstheprophecyofJusticeBrandeis,dissentinginOlmsteadv.U.S.,227U.S.438,473(1928),hascometopass:"
[T]imeworkschanges,bringsintoexistencenewconditionsandpurposes."Subtlerandmorefarreachingmeansofinvadingprivacy
have become available to the Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by means far more
effectivethanstretchingupontherack,toobtaindisclosureincourtofwhatiswhisperedintheclosetMoreover,"intheapplicationofa
constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what has, been but of what may be." The progress of science in furnishing the
Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping. Ways may someday be developed by which the
Government,withoutremovingpapersfromsecretdrawers,canreproducethemincourt,andbywhichitwillbeenabledtoexposetoa
jurythemostintimateoccurrencesofthehome.Id.at473474.
[85]
425U.S.435(1976).
[86]
Evenifwedirectourattentiontotheoriginalchecksanddepositslips,ratherthantothemicrofilmcopiesactuallyviewed
and obtained by means of the subpoena, we perceive no legitimate "expectation of privacy" in their contents. The checks are not
27/28
2/23/2016
G.R.No.174629
confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained,
including financial statements and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their
employeesintheordinarycourseofbusiness.Thelackofanylegitimateexpectationofprivacyconcerningtheinformationkeptinbank
records was assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require records to be
maintainedbecausethey"haveahighdegreeofusefulnessincriminal,tax,andregulatoryinvestigationsandproceedings."Ibid.The
passagebytheU.S.Congressin1978oftheRighttoFinancialPrivacyActwasessentiallyinreactiontotheMillerruling.TIROL,supra
note64,at155.
[87]
See TIROL, supra note 64, citing GABRIEL SINGSON, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE ON SECRECY OF BANK
DEPOSITS,46AteneoLawJournal670,682.
[88]
SeeOplev.Torres,354Phil.948(1998).
[89]
Therightofthepeopletoinformationonmattersofpublicconcernshallberecognized.Accesstoofficialrecords,andto
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policydevelopment,shallbeaffordedthecitizen,subjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw."
[90]
Subjecttoreasonableconditionsprescribedbylaw,theStateadoptsandimplementsapolicyoffullpublicdisclosureofall
itstransactionsinvolvingpublicinterest."
[91]
Chavezv.PCGG,360Phil.133,161,citingVRecordoftheConstitutionalCommission25(1986).
[92]
SeePhil.NationalBankv.Gancayco,etal.,122Phil.503,506507(1965).
[93]
Section8ofR.A.ActNo.6770,ortheOmbudsmanActof1989empowerstheOmbudsmanto [a]dminister oaths, issue
subpoena and subpoena ducestecum and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have
accesstobankaccountsandrecords.SeeSec.8,Rep.ActNo.6770(1989).InMarquezv.Hon.Desierto,412Phil.387(2001),theCourt,
interpreted this provision in line with the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits under the Bank Secrecy Act, infra, and
mandated:theremustbeapendingcasebeforeacourtofcompetentjurisdiction[]theaccountmustbeclearlyidentified,theinspection
limitedtothesubjectmatterofthependingcasebeforethecourtofcompetentjurisdiction[]thebankpersonnelandtheaccountholder
mustbenotifiedtobepresentduringtheinspection,andsuchinspectionmaycoveronlytheaccountidentifiedinthependingcase.Id.
at 397. With respect to the Ombudsmans power of inquiry into bank deposits, Marquez remains good law. See Ejercito v.
Sandiganbayan,G.R.Nos.15729495,30November2006,509SCRA190,224and226.
[94]
UnderArticle267oftheRevisedPenalCode.
[95]
ParticularlySections4,5,6,8,9,10,12,13,14,15,and16thereof.
[96]
[97]
Rollo,p.98.
[98]
AcopyofsuchcertificationwasattachedtoChengsCommentasAnnex2.Seeid.at421.
[99]
CONST.,Art.III,Sec.22.
[100]
IntheMatterofthePetitionfortheDeclarationofthePetitionersRightsandDutiesunderSec.8ofR.A.No.6132,146
Phil.429,431432(1970).SeealsoTanv.Barrios,G.R.Nos.8548182,18October1990,703.
[101]
Interpretatefiendaestutresvaleatquampereat.
[102]
Rollo,p.818,citingHouseCommitteeDeliberationson26September2001.
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SECTION2.All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in

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