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To cite this article: Susana Martnez Guillem (2013) Rethinking Power Relations in Critical/
Cultural Studies: A Dialectical (Re)Proposal, Review of Communication, 13:3, 184-204, DOI:
10.1080/15358593.2013.843716
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15358593.2013.843716
This essay argues for the need to rethink dialectics as part of our understanding of
power relations, and as a fundamental component of critical/cultural approaches in
Communication Studies. As a first step in this project, I will critique the main
contributions by Michel Foucault, highlighting his influential theorization of discourse,
knowledge and power as intrinsically related constructs, as well as how this perspective
has enabled the revisiting of other keywords in critical theorysuch as Gramscis
hegemony. I will then (re)introduce the notion of dialectics as theorized in the work
of Antonio Gramsci and Raymond Williams. My goal is to emphasize underestimated
aspects of these authors contributions that, in my opinion, may help us construct
alternative starting points for a critical/cultural project in communication scholarship
and, more specifically, for a theory of power that can create the space needed to
account for peoples (in)capability to overcome adverse social conditions.
Keywords: Antonio Gramsci, critical/cultural studies, dialectics, power relations,
Raymond Williams
It is impossible to discuss communication or culture in our society without in the
end coming to discuss power.1
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govern them, are constituted in a society, that is, how different discursive
formations regulate social organization. Importantly, because of the constitutive
skepticism of all kinds of knowledge that informs this account, this kind of critique
can never be carried out within a normative framework; it is instead a critique of a
form, a technique of power through the emphasis on mechanisms of subjection
that Foucault considers as important as mechanisms of exploitation and
domination.28
Nancy Fraser provides a useful starting point to reflect on the implications of these
assumptions for the critical/cultural project. She strongly criticizes Foucaults latest
notions of disciplinary power, biopower, or power/knowledge as based on the
suspension of the standard modern liberal normative framework which distinguishes
between the legitimate and illegitimate exercise of power. This, according to Fraser,
allows Foucault to look at power in new and interesting ways, but it also precludes
him from asking particularand necessaryquestions. Furthermore, it leads to the
simultaneous embracement of contradictory accounts of power as both politically
engaged and normatively neutral. Based on this assessment, Fraser concludes that
Foucaults work ends up inviting questions which it is structurally unequipped to
answer, since one cannot argue for the need to resist domination without
introducing some normative notions that tell us why this is preferable.29 Along
similar lines, Whiteside argues that if all we can do is change forms of domination
and if no form of domination can be judged less oppressive than another, then there
seems to be no ground for demanding change.30 Thus, ultimately, the unwillingness
to distinguish between acceptable an unacceptable forms on power clearly undermines Foucaults compelling arguments against crude ideologism, statism and
economism.31 In the next section I address in more detail the ways in which
Foucaults project has influenced some contemporary understandings of another
keyword in the study of power relations: Gramscis hegemony.
Gramsci Revisited: Hegemony and/as Discourse
Foucaults prolific mind and his thought-provoking writings earned him a very
influential place in contemporary social thought, and certainly within critical/cultural
approaches to communication. His groundbreaking link between discourse, knowledge, and power relations opened the door for all kinds of analyses focusing, for
example, on how different kinds of subjects are constituted and disciplined via
discourse.32 At the same time, and perhaps more importantly for the purposes of this
discussion, this framework also enabled a revisiting of other critical keywords, and
most notably of Gramscis notion of hegemony. Thus, on its way towards an
unavoidable buzzword in critical/cultural scholarship, hegemony has often been
incorporated into a Foucauldian understanding of power, even though the affinities
between the broader political projects behind these two constructs are, I would argue,
far from apparent.
As different critics have shown,33 Gramscis notes were far from offering a clear,
straightforward view on hegemonic processes. Not surprisingly, then, we can find
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world by politics in the specific circumstances in which he wrote.47 In line with his
rereading of Marxist dialectics, Gramsci argued that the philosophy of praxis
conceives the development of the structure and superstructure as intimately
connected and necessarily interrelated and reciprocal, and that it does not tend
towards the peaceful resolution of the contradictions existing within history but it
theorizes those contradictions instead.48 This is the framework within which
Gramsci developed his notion of hegemony.
Second, we may want to recall that Gramsci was, above all, a political activist. His
writings, therefore, had the major purpose of mobilizing what he saw as the
subordinate groups in his society in order to overcome oppressive conditions. With
this cause in mind, identifying the weak aspects of a hegemonic project was a crucial
step because, according to Gramsci, this would allow individuals to act upon these
weaknesses in order to develop an alternative hegemonic project that would better
their condition. As Morgan puts it, the objective was to create a socialist hegemony
in Italy.49 For Gramsci, therefore, it was important to look at relations of force but,
as he explained, such analyses cannot and must not be ends in themselves [] but
acquire significance only if they serve to justify a particularly practical activity, an
initiative of will. They reveal the points of least resistance, at which the force of will
can be most fruitfully applied.50
It seems, therefore, that the both the weak and the strong aspects of the concept of
hegemony stem from its tight association with grounded social criticism (understood
here as a reconciliation between theory and praxis). Thus, on the one hand, if
hegemony is abstracted as a theory from its historical praxis, then ambiguities
emerge. Moreover, an understanding of hegemony as dissociated from reality,
history, and ultimately from material existence defeats the ultimate purpose laid out
in Gramscis philosophy of praxis. If, on the contrary, hegemony is always conceived
as linked to a political project, this ambiguity turns into a dialectical strength that can
account for the contradictions embedded in our everyday practices. I would argue
that it is through this praxis-oriented, normative link that Gramscis work can better
inform a theory of power in critical/cultural studies.
(Re)thinking Cultural Materialism
As a second and last rethinking move, in this section I will show how explaining
Gramscis work in materialist, historical, and dialectical terms allows us to shed a
more comprehensive light on the contributions by Raymond Williams, another
foundational intellectual figure in cultural studies that, I would argue, has been often
ignored or too easily dismissed in critical/cultural academic circles in our discipline. I
argue that, as a continuation of Gramscis nuanced critique of dialectics, Williamss
framework constitutes a prolific starting point to account for the relationship
between power dynamics and social change, mostly through an engagement with his
groundbreaking cultural materialist perspective (Williams, 1976).
As Aune pointed out in his account of Rhetoric and Marxism, the work of
Raymond Williams was never considered fundamental for U.S. versions of cultural
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studies. For Aune, this lack of engagement stemmed from the fact that the
specificities of the U.S. context made it hard for American authors to identify with
the working class-based sense of community that Williams so enthusiastically
celebrated some times.51 The best exponent of this distant and even distrustful
relationship with Williamss writings is Lawrence Grossberg, whose influential
account of Strategies of Marxist cultural interpretation arguably shaped the ways
in which the current generation of critical/cultural scholars came to understand the
(im)possibilities of critique.52
In spite of his more sympathetic interpretation of Williamss project, and the
acknowledgment of its potential contributions to a comprehensive kind of cultural
studies in the U.S., Aunes account ultimately presents this approach as too
preoccupied with the fictional moment of the cultural over other elements, a
preference that he implicitly links to a contemporary overemphasis, in critical
communication research, on the cultural dimension of communication, especially television, film, and popular music, together with a drift away from class
analysis.53 Along similar lines, Dana Cloud situates Williamss interest in culture as
a fundamental site of production and reproduction as a bridge for a nondialectic kind
of thinking that, according to her, would eventually excise class-based relations from
critical scholarship in communication. As she puts it: beginning with Williamss
articulation of a cultural materialist and his rejection of the base-superstructure
dialectic, cultural studies has on the whole focused entirely on political relations in
discourse rather than economics.54 In what follows, I offer a slightly different
account of Williamss framework, one that emphasizes, not a rejection, but a
rethinking of dialectics through the notion of cultural materialism, as well as the
potential contribution of such rethinking for critical/cultural approaches in
communication.
Much like Gramsci, Williams (1977) was concerned with the supposed-to-be
simplistic explanations of the relationships between the different levels of society
attributed to Marxism. He thus tried to offer an alternative reading of Marx that
would overcome the problematic base determines superstructure equation without
completely dismissing dialectics. Williamss project was motivated by what he saw as
a received version of Marxism, and thus he argued for a different understanding of
dialectics that, still within Marxism, would allow for an exploration of distinctive
areas of society such as economics, institutions, forms of consciousness, or political
and cultural practices, not as separate from each other, but as interrelated. In his own
work, Williams strived to retake this approach as his starting point, emphasizing the
need to study all the activities and their interrelations, without any concession of
priority to any one of them we may choose to abstract.55 This kind of thinking
translates into Williamss claim that the allegedly superstructural aspects of society
are not a mere reflection of those that have been isolated as the base, although, as I
will explain below, this did not necessarily imply seeing those aspects as completely
autonomous elements.
A key element in his rethinking and expanding of the notion of dialectics is
Williamss rereading of the concept of determination. Importantly, Williamss goal
was not to get rid of the notion of determination as a whole, but to overcome its
restriction to a limiting process. As he explained, [a] Marxism without some
concept of determination is in effect worthless. A Marxism with many of the
concepts of determination it now has is quite radically disabled.56 He thus
reconceptualized determination as a dialectical movement through which the
economic base sets the limits and exerts pressure over other societal spheres,
whereas at the same time the cultural sphere exists not as a mere result of these
pressures, but can also react to them and exert its own influence over the base.
This conceptual framework, far from understating the importance of economic
factors as agents of change, leaves room for the possibility of an alternative and
even an oppositional kind of social organization that emerges from the relationship
between the different levels of society and is not just a result of particular external
conditions and the interests of a few.
In the process of developing his approach, Williams found in the work of Gramsci
an important source of inspiration, adding to it a particular sensibility for culture as a
crucial and material site of production. For Williams, the notion of hegemony was
especially useful because, just like his own framework, it incorporated a flexible
understanding of determination, refusing to equate consciousness with the articulate
formal system which can be and ordinarily is abstracted as ideology.57 For him,
such a view accounted for the human capacity to break through oppressive dynamics,
since it emphasized the unstable character of hegemonic processes. As Williams put
it: hegemony is a lived system of meanings and valuesconstitutive and
constituting; therefore, it is always a process which is historically sensitive and
constantly defended and challenged. This understanding thus incorporates the
possibility to grasp the hegemonic in its active and formative but also its
transformational processes.58
Hegemony, in Williamss account, also allows for a reconciliation of macro
structures and micropractices, since it relates whole social processes to specific
distributions of power and influence. Williams advanced this necessary reconciliation through his notion of cultural materialism, which he defined as a theory of
the specificities of material cultural and literary production within historical
materialism.59 Thus, for Williams, incorporating the materiality of cultural practices
was a necessary step in theorizing the possibilities for change, and it was something
that classic Marxism had failed to do. As Eagleton put it, Williamss account will
out-Marxize the Marxists by going the whole hog, extending materialism fullbloodedly to cultural practices too.60At the same time, however, the historical and
political determinants of cultural practices could not be overlooked.61 Rather, the
overall goal of a cultural materialist approach goal was to engage the relationships
between different societal levels in order to account for how, to use a well-known
slogan within Marxism, change happens. As Williams put it: we cannot understand
the process of change in which we are involved if we limit ourselves to thinking of
the democratic, industrial and cultural revolutions as separate processes.62
Williamss understanding of communication as a whole social process, rather
than a separate entity that we can then relate to society, constitutes a fundamental
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What turned out to be, when developed, a materialist (but non-positivist) theory of
language, of communication and of consciousness was assigned, along the way, to
idealism just because, in received Marxist theory, these activities were known to
be superstructural and dependentso that any emphasis on their primacy (a
primacy coequal with other forms of the material social process, including those
forms which had been abstracted as labour or production) was known a priori
to be idealist.70
Overall, following Raymond Williamss rescuing of the concept of culture from the
realm of the superstructure and its insertion into the material, productive level of
society, we can argue for and legitimate the study of those aspects of society that were
previously thought of as mere reflections of bigger, more primary dynamics and
therefore not relevant objects of analysis, while still seeing them as part of the
economy, institutions, or public policy. What a culturalist perspective has to offer,
therefore, is a commitment to study not just cultures constitutive role in making
power relations but also the embededness of power, including economic power, in
cultural relations.71 Ultimately, such view can help us bridge the gap between
political/economic and cultural analyses, a project that has been identified as crucial
for the next generation of critical/cultural communication scholarship.72
Conclusions: Planting Seeds of Life
There are ideas, and ways of thinking, with the seeds of life in them, and there are
others, perhaps deep in our minds, with the seeds of a general death. Our measure
of success in recognizing these kinds, and in naming them making possible their
common recognition, may be literally the measure of our future.73
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later contributions, is usually (and ironically) presented as the only valid point from
which to narrate the (im)possibilities for social change in our current times.
Overall, with this rethinking exercise I hope to have shown that there is certainly
value in a discursive turn that points out the existence of complicated societal
process that cannot be translated into perfect formulae to predict human behavior,
and uncovers how unequal systems are reproduced with our own consentespecially
in places where a superficial look would suggest the opposite. However, I would
argue that we are still, for the most part, missing something. That something is the
ability to conceive of power dynamics in a way that allows us to envision social
transformation. Thus, even though attention to everyday, local practices can
definitely help us overcome simplistic and overdeterministic accounts of society, a
rejection of absolute values doesnt need to imply the (absolute) rejection of all
values,75or what McLaren refers to as a substitution of the tyranny of the whole by
the dictatorship of the fragment.76 Instead, we might argue, the evaluation and
explanatory stages are necessary moves within any project committed to social justice
and critique.
As I think this review has shown, the theoretical contributions by Foucault,
Gramsci, and Williams can all be seen under different lights and with different
emphases. There are, importantly, similarities in their work that need to be
highlighted, most notably the motivation to overcome a binary way of understanding
the world, and more specifically, the relationship between individuals and their
societies. Thus, a common view in all three authors is that people are both shaped by
processes that they cannot control, while at the same time they possess the capacity
to act upon the world. This dialectical impulse can be seen at the core of notions such
as Williamss cultural materialism, Foucaults discourse, or Gramscis hegemony, although it has not always been explicitly acknowledged or emphasized.
However, I believe that the present review also reveals that each author takes this
starting assumption in different directions and with different goals in mind. This is
partly due to the array of commitments and motivations that guide their projects, as
well as to the fact that their accounts address different audiencesWilliams, for
example, was embedded in the literary criticism tradition, whereas Foucaults
account could be seen as working across various areas such as philosophy and
sociology. It is important, therefore, to reflect on how these different motivations and
their corresponding emphases may contribute to a critical/cultural project in
communication that incorporates a comprehensive theorizing of power relations.
One way to start this reflection could be to consider why these authors may have
been interested in addressing power relations. As Edward Said has wittingly
commented, ones concept of power is importantly shaped by the reason why one
wishes to think about power in the first place. Said continues to argue that
Foucaults imagination seems to be with rather than against power, in the sense
that he understands the world from the perspective of the ruling groups and is not
necessarily interested in exploring how the present conditions may be improved for
those who find themselves at a material disadvantage.77
In agreement with Said, I would argue that, on the one hand, Foucaults
framework is extremely useful when exploring how, in a given scenario, specific
processessubjectification or disciplining, for exampleare geared towards maintaining the status quo, often by means of incorporating in them the appearance of
change. As I mentioned above, most of the current research under the critical/
cultural studies label emphasizes these kinds of processesand I would certainly
include some of my own work here. From this perspective, the focus is on how
structures are reproduced, and how even our own agency is part of that
reproduction. At the most, all we can do is be aware of this reality and, when
possible, strategically appropriate dominant practices. On the other hand, Gramsci
and Williamss conceptual frameworks seem better equipped to account for
instability and change. Through their emphasis on constant movement and on the
transformational aspects of societal processes, they leave more room for individuals
to produce new relationships that may be liberating, instead of paralyzing any
possibility of consciousness-raising and therefore any human action that may result
in social transformation. As Chouliaraki and Fairclough argue:
we agree with the post-structuralist view that all social practice is embedded in
networks of power relations, and potentially subordinates the social subjects that
engage in it, even those with internal power. At the same time, we believe that
the view of modern power as invisible, self-regulating and inevitable subjecting
[] needs to be complemented with a view of power as domination [that]
establishes causal links between institutional social practices and the positions of
subjects in the wider social field.78
Ultimately, my review tried to highlight the problems of operating within what I see
as a predominantly conformist theoretical framework, while at the same time calling
for radical activism and intervention. In this context, I would argue that recovering a
more nuanced understanding of dialectics can be a fruitful starting point for the
development of a type of critical/cultural work that retains a fundamental aspect: the
capability to understand and explain the interrelations among different societal
spheres, as well as the contradictions that they generate, against the background of a
set of normative assumptions, and incorporated into a given political project. When
put into practice, this should allow scholars to identify viable paths towards a
different kind of social of organization in which the well-being of some does not
come at the expense of the oppression of many. As Threadhold puts it, we need a
theory of power that recognizes that our practical daily activity contains an
understanding of the worldsubjugated perhaps, but present.79 In other words,
our understanding of power needs to recognize the difficulty, not the impossibility, of
creating alternatives.
I must recognize the appeal of some aspects of Foucaults framework for current
research agendas in general. It is undeniable that this type of account seems to fit
better with most of what happens in the world around usalthough the recent
Arab spring, the arousal of social movements like the Spanish Indignados, the
North-American Occupy, or the heated student protests in countries like Chile,
Israel, the U.K. or Canada, even with all their internal contradictions, may be good
201
indicators of the saturation of such model, both within and outside of the scholarly
bubble. However, I wonder if part of the attractiveness of the focus on reproductive
aspects of power and agency is the result of some kind of trained incapacity that
does not allow us to explore our objects of study in different ways. And I wonder, like
Raymond Williams did, if the academy, as it stands nowadays, can account for the
kinds of questions that this essay has framed as fundamental.80
Notes
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[27]
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[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
Kirby Moss, The Color of Class: Poor Whites and the Paradox of Privilege. (Philadelphia:
Pennsylvania UP, 2003); John Preston, Whiteness and Class in Education (Dordrecht,
Netherlands: Springer, 2007); Simon Springer, Neoliberalism as Discourse. Between
Foucauldian Political Economy and Marxian Postructuralism. Critical Discourse Studies
9 (2012): 13347.
Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Raymie E. McKerrow, Foucaults
Relationship to Rhetoric Review of Communication 11 (2011): 25371.
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, [1969] 1972); Michel
Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York, NY:
Vintage Books, 1973[1966]); Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison
(New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1977[1975]).
Mark Philp,Michel Foucault, in The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences, ed.
Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985): 6581, 68
In Philp, 1985, 69; See also Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1986.
Philp, 1985.
Michel Foucault, The history of Sexuality: An Introduction (London: Penguin, 1981).
Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other Writings 19721977, ed.
Colin Gordon (New York, NY: Pantheon, 1980), 78108.
Foucault, 1980, 198.
In Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, 185.
Nancy Fraser, Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions,
PRAXIS International, 3 (1981): 27287.
See Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, 10. For a summary of implications in the area of rhetorical
studies, as well as responses to these criticisms, see Dana L. Cloud, Materiality of
Discourse, in Encyclopedia of Communication Theory, eds. Steven W. Littlejohn and Karen
A. Foss (London: Sage, 2009).
Cloud, 1994, 143.
William Riordan, Prolegomena to Sartres Materialist Dialectic: Towards a Recovery of the
Subject (unpublished manuscript, University of Colorado, 1988), 98.
Terry Threadhold, Feminist Poetics: Poiesis, Performance, Histories (London: Routledge,
1997), 6070.
Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, 212.
Fraser (1981, 273; 281)
Kerry H. Whiteside, Merleau-Ponty and the Foundation of Existential Politics (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 301.
Fraser, 1981, 280.
See, for example, Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004); John M.
Sloop, A Van with a Bar and a Bed: Ritualized Gender Norms in the John/Joan Case,
Text and Performance Quarterly 20, 2000: 13050.
See, for example, Perry Anderson, The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci, New Left Review
100 (1976): 578.
Burnham, 1991; Condit, 1996; Cox, 1994; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Zompetti, 1997, 2008);
Peter Burnham, Neo Gramscian Hegemony and the International Order, Capital & Class
45 (1991): 7393; Celeste Condit, Hegemony, Concordance and Capitalism: Reply to
Cloud, Critical studies in Mass Communication, 13 (1996): 38284; Robert W. Cox,
Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method, Millennium.
Journal of International Studies 12 (1983): 16275. Joseph Zompetti, Unravelling Gramsci:
Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Economy, Argumentation and Advocacy
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
203
(New York, NY: American Forensic Association, 2008); Joseph Zompetti, Toward a
Gramscian Critical Rhetoric, Western Journal of Communication 61 (1997): 6686;
Nicholas Thoburn, Patterns of Production: Cultural Studies after Hegemony, Theory,
Culture & Society 24 (2007): 7994. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and
Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1986).
Arrighi, 1994; Aune, 2004; Cloud, 1994, 1996; Taylor, 1996). Giovanni Arrighi, The Long
Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of our Times (London: Verso, 1994);
James A. Aune, An Historical Materialist Theory of Rhetoric, American Communication
Journal 6 (2004): 117; Dana L. Cloud, Hegemony or Concordance? The Rhetoric of
Tokenism in Oprah Winfreys Rags-to-Riches Biography, Critical Studies in Mass
Communication, 13 (1996): 11537; Peter J. Taylor, The Way the Modern World Works:
World Hegemony to World Impasse (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 1996).
Fraser, 1987, 271.
See Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism
(London: Verso, 1977); Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes
Towards an Investigation, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York, NY:
Monthly Review Press, 1971).
Stuart Hall, Gramscis Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, Journal of
Communication Inquiry 5 (1986): 224, 15. See, for example, Laclau and Mouffe, 1985. In
communication, see Condits notion of social concord, which she defines as the active or
passive acceptance of a given social policy or political framework as the best that can be
negotiated under the given conditions, arguing for need to emphasize the active and
voluntary role that people play in accommodatingtogether with the rest of political
entitiesinto a best possible concord that can incorporate the interests of a wide variety
of groups. Condit, 1994, 1996; Celeste Condit, Clouding the Issues? The Ideal and the
Material in Human Communication, Critical Studies in Mass Communication 14 (1997):
197200.
Richard Johnson, Post-hegemony?: I Dont Think So, Theory, Culture & Society 24
(2007): 95110, 98. See also Clouds response to Condits arguments, where she offers a
critique of a discourse-centered appropriation of Gramsci, arguing for the need to pay
attention to the limits of compromises within the available conditions, and the ways in
which a social order remains stable by generating consent to its parameters through the
production and distribution of ideological texts that define social reality for the majority of
the people. Cloud, 1994; 1996: 118.
Jackson, 2005; Johnson, 2003; Helene A. Shugart, Crossing Over: Hybridity and Hegemony
in the Popular Media, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 4 (2007): 11541.
Halaulani and Nakayama, 2010, 9.
Terry Eagleton, After Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 16.
Antonio Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York, NY:
International Publishers, 1971), 190.
Gramsci, 1971, 190.
Anderson, 1976.
Hall, 1986.
David Forgacs, The Antonio Gramsci Reader (New York, NY: New York University Press,
2000), 12, emphasis in original.
Gramsci, 1971, 193; 196.
W. John Morgan, Antonio Gramsci and Raymond Williams: Workers, Intellectuals and
Adult Education, Convergence 29 (1996): 6174, 65.
Gramsci, 1971, 202; 209.
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