Motherlan

d
(Babyland)

Cyprus – Causes and Escalation Analysis Paper

INTS 4495 – Civil Wars and International Responses
Josef Korbel School of International Studies – University of Denver

Shane Hensinger
2
INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................................4
HISTORY........................................................................................................................................................4
BRITISH RULE..................................................................................................................................................5
INDEPENDENCE.................................................................................................................................................6
POST- INDEPENDENCE.......................................................................................................................................7
THE INVASION OF “ATTILA.”.............................................................................................................................9
VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF THE DECLINE OF BICOMMUNAL VILLAGES IN CYPRUS.................................................10
AFTERWARD..................................................................................................................................................10
PEACEMAKING AND PEACEBUILDING STRATEGIES..................................................................10
ENVIRONMENT...............................................................................................................................................11
SPORTS.........................................................................................................................................................12
WOMEN’S ISSUES...........................................................................................................................................13
EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES..............................................................................................................................14
CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................................14
WORKS CITED ..........................................................................................................................................15

3
Introduction
The conflict in Cyprus resulting in the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974
and stalemating in the subsequent partition and frozen dynamics which exist
today, represents in many ways the latest conflict between the Greek and
Turkish states or a “significant part of the larger Greco-Turkish issue with a
thousand year history” (Yelmaz 35). Both the Greek-Turkish war of 1920 and
the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 ensured that both Greece and Turkey have
“unmixed” their populations to a degree quite remarkable considering the
multiethnic nature of each state prior to these events. Cyprus is the last
territory where large numbers of ethnic Cypriot Greeks and ethnic Cypriot
Turks once lived together and where Greece and Turkey still have major roles
to play in resolving (or prolonging) conflict between the two communities. A
major, unresolved irritant in relations between the two states is Cyprus and
the problems of that island have followed a path which closely parallels that
of each respective community’s “benefactors” in Greece and Turkey.

The dynamics of conflict in Cyprus between the ethnic Turkish community

and the ethnic Greek community have been heavily influenced by the fact
that each community is watched over and “guaranteed” by an outside power
– Greece takes a paternal interest in the Greek community and Turkey does
the same with the Turkish community (the title of this project refers to what
Turks refer to as “Motherland and Babyland,” “Motherland” being Turkey and
“Babyland” being Cyprus). This arrangement, guaranteed by the 1960
Constitution of Cyprus, has resulted in the two communities following the
same dynamic their ethnic kin in Turkey and Greece have followed in relation
to one another – namely the “interpretation of present events through the
mental representation of past traumas, as well as glories” (Yelmaz 35).

The challenge then is to wean each community away from this dynamic and
encourage the development of a Cypriot identity separate from reliance on
the ethnic or religious identity of either of the guarantors of Cyprus’s two
major communities. In this report as well as the ones following it we will
make specific recommendations to assist in peacebuilding and peacemaking
measures which we hope will build the confidence of both communities in one
another and in the Cypriot state outside of its current reliance on the
“guarantor” powers of Turkey and Greece.

History
There is significant disagreement as to relations between the two
communities before the British assumed control of Cyprus in 1878. Greek
Cypriot writers tend to mention the 1832 execution of the Cypriot Orthodox
archbishop and clergy by the Ottoman Empire for alleged sympathies with

4
those seeking independence for Greeks (Yelmas 39). But in the period after
the British took control of Cyprus it can generally be agreed that “Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalism and intercommunal distrust
intensified in series of steps or “rachets.”” (Kaufmann 209).

British Rule

The British “allowed the communities to set up separate school systems, both
of which imported teachers from the respective mainlands who taught
children to see themselves as “Greek” or “Turkish, not “Cypriot.” History in
each community, from well before the possibility of Cypriot independence
until today, has represented its own people as consistently heroic and the
other as consistently barbaric” (Kaufman 209).

This account is supported by Greek Cypriot writer Yiannis Papadakis who

writes that in school in Cyprus he learned “the Turks were nomads, people
with no civilization, people of the horse and the sword, descendants of the
Mongols, infidels, people of no real religion. People of the Koran, Muslim
fanatics… Every important date in our history as Greeks bespoke our
encounters with Turkish barbarism. And I was a product of that history”
(Papadakis 6-9).

Turkish teachers came to Cyprus bearing the new ideologies of “Kemalism”

from Turkey’s new secular ruler – Ataturk. Ataturk had switched the
communal, Islamist vision of the former Ottoman rulers to his new Turkish-
based Kemalist ideology, which emphasized nationalism as the binding force
of Turkish identity – abandoning allegiance to the caliphate, which Ataturk
abolished in 1924. “By identifying with Ataturk’s vision of Turkish nationalism,
the Turks of Cyprus were also asserting their sense of separate identity from
their Greek Cypriot neighbors” (Yelmaz 43).

Language was also a source of separation on the island with few Greek
Cypriots speaking Turkish but approximately 40% of Turkish Cypriots
speaking Greek. As the two communities began their process of self-
segregation less and less members of the “other” community learned their
neighbor’s language - meaning contacts between the two became
increasingly limited (Fisher 309).

Strengthened by the acquired knowledge that each respective community

was in the “right” and the other in the “wrong” both communities began the
process of gradual separation from one another and greater identification
with their ethnic/religious kin in the “mother/fatherland.”

For Greek Cypriots this took the form of enosis (union) with the Greek state.
In 1912 and 1931 there were pro-enosis riots in Cyprus. These were followed
by a growing sense of Turkish Cypriot nationalism which led to demands for
taksim (partition) of the island.

5
After WWII the anti-colonialist wave which swept much of the world also
reached Cyprus. In 1955 EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) was
formed to fight the British for Cypriot independence. EOKA was also closely
identified with the cause of enosis and the Orthodox church and was
exclusively Greek – thus encouraging another, exclusively Turkish
organization called TMT (Turkish Defense Organization) to form which further
divided the two communities. Distrust built further because TMT aligned itself
with British colonialists and engaged in “limited intercommunal fighting with
the Greek Cypriots until a ceasefire was implemented in 1958” (Fisher 310).
This trend of separate structures and institutions for each community also
manifested itself in politics as well – with no cross-community parties or
movements competing for both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot votes
before independence or after (Kaufmann 210).

The period between 1891 and 1931 saw the unmixing of previously
ethnically-mixed villages in Cyprus, from 43% to 36%.

Independence

Cyprus gained independence in 1960 following the armed struggle for

independence waged by EOKA since 1955. Under the 1960 constitution
power was to be shared between a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish
Cypriot vice-president who was given veto power. The 1960 constitution was
remarkably complex and created a power-sharing system which allowed the
Turkish Cypriot population a larger share of seats in the legislature (30%),
civil service (30%), army (40%) and police (30%) than their share of the
population at that time, which was estimated to be around 20% of the total of
Cyprus (Kaufmann 210). The constitution also “incorporated the guarantee
treaty between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Britain” which outlawed enosis
and taksim and allowed Greece, Turkey or Britain to take steps to unilaterally
remedy a breach of the treaty. Finally the constitution separated Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot voters into separate ethnic rolls which further
institutionalized ethnic separation and prevented the development of cross-
community candidates from emerging at all. “This meant that Greek Cypriots
could only vote for Greek Cypriot candidates and Turkish Cypriots could only
vote for Turkish Cypriot candidates. Political parties with candidates of
different ethnic affiliation could not stand for elections” (Jarstad 28).

This complex document, designed with what the negotiators thought were
the best interests of both communities at heart, instead held the seeds of the
destruction of bicommunal existence on Cyprus. The president of Cyprus at
the time, Archbishop Markarios, never supported the constitution and insisted
it wouldn’t be binding on Greek Cypriots after independence (Kaufmann 210).
The constitution “institutionalized ethno-communalism, because it failed to
take into account “the psychological and sociological fact that the power-
protection system” increased “suspicions, antagonism and conflict between

6
the communities because of the discriminations and uncertainties involved.”
“The sectarian and divisive provisions of the 1960 arrangement constituted
the seeds that led to its collapse three years later” (Michael 26).

The consocialistic model of power sharing as laid out in the 1960 Cypriot
constitution was a failure for the reasons stated above and because it did
nothing to encourage consensus between competing factions within the
government (Large & Sisk 100). Of course there existed no ability in Cyprus
to field an integrative approach to governance because there existed no
cross-community political parties, societies or institutions. The Cypriot
constitution of 1960 cemented this state of affairs and did nothing to
ameliorate it.

The “birth” of Cyprus as an independent state more closely resembled that of

an arranged marriage neither party wanted – with both parties in love with
different suitors who hovered at the edge of the wedding yet refused to say “I
object” when asked. “Independence” wasn’t wanted by the vast majority of
Greek Cypriots, who desired enosis with Greece, nor by the Turkish Cypriots,
who saw independence as a stalking horse for enosis by the Greek Cypriots.
The mood of the new state was bleak, “there were no festivals, no ringing of
church bells, no parades, no dancing people in the streets of Cyprus
celebrating independence” (Yelmaz 55). The mood of the people of Cyprus
was predictive –the years ahead wouldn’t hold much joy or celebration for
either Greek or Turkish Cypriots.

By independence in 1960 the proportion of ethnically-mixed villages in

Cyprus had declined from 36% in 1931 to 18% (Kaufmann 210).

Post- Independence

The constitutional arrangement quickly proved unworkable because “both

identity groups remained adversarial… with each seeking to gain advantages
within the new arrangements” (Fisher 310). “None of it functioned – except
one provision that permitted Greece and Turkey to maintain several hundred
troops on the island, who became trainers and commanders of the nationalist
militias in both communities” (Kaufman 210). The 1960 constitution froze the
situation and provided an unworkable framework in which to resolve issues of
dispute – which neither party was willing to do. Both sides adhered strictly to
their ethnic identity and no mechanisms were put in place to foster even the
beginning of a Cypriot identity separate from ethnicity. Statements from both
Greek and Turkish Cypriots contributed to this sense of ethnic exclusion, with
Makarios saying when first elected president in 1959 that “For the first time
in centuries, the government of the island passes into Greek hands” and
Turkish Cypriot leaders saying they couldn’t be “tools of Turkey” because
they were part of Turkey (Yelmaz 58-59).

7
In addition the agreement was dependent on stable power relations between
the two sides and the other parties to the agreement (Greece, Turkey and
Britain). When one side felt the power relations had shifted it could simply
abandon the agreement or seek to change it unilaterally – as Makarios did
later. Power relations can shift because of changing military capacities,
demography or, as in the case of Cyprus, international actors (Jarstad 21).

In 1963 after Makarios unilaterally threatened to change the constitution the

two sides embarked “on a hostile and protracted process of separation and
segregation” (Fisher 310). Intercommunal violence broke out “shortly before
Christmas 1963” when British forces left their sovereign bases and
intervened to halt the violence – establishing the “Green Line” which still
divides Nicosia today (Souter 662). They were followed by the deployment of
a United Nations peacekeeping force (UNFICYP), which remains in Cyprus. In
1964 Turkey threatened to intervene in Cyprus but after strong warnings
from the United States used only air power in support of its Turkish brethren
instead (United States 1).

The outcome of Makarios’s rejection of the constitution and the following

intercommunal violence was a large number of internally displaced persons
(IDP), mainly Turkish Cypriots, who coalesced into a series of small fortified
“enclaves run by the community’s political leaders” (Souter 662). These
enclaves occupied less than 3% of Cyprus’s total land area but held almost
18% of its population. Movement to and from the enclaves was restricted and
those inside felt powerless and fearful of attacks by Greek Cypriots.

“It is difficult to overestimate the magnitude of the 1964 crisis for the Turkish
Cypriot community. This was a seminal event for them. The Greek Cypriots
failed to comprehend the significance of the 1964 crisis in the Turkish Cypriot
narrative. Their inability to to grasp the centrality of this “chosen trauma”
only compounded the “mistrust factor” in any prospective endeavor toward
coexistence and reunification. Cast in bereaved language, the 1964-1974 trial
would underline all future negotiating predispositions for the Turkish
Cypriots” (Michael 27). After the events of 1964 “the remainder of the 1960s
and the early 1970s saw continuing hostility and increasing segregation
between the two communities, punctuated by intermittent crises sparking
Turkish involvement and repeated calls for enosis by nationalist elements in
the Greek-Cypriot community” (Fisher 310).

The events of 1964 represent a “chosen trauma” by the Turkish Cypriots – an

event which has gathered in their historical memory and has become
mythologized by the group. Each group accuses the other of refusing to
understand or acknowledge its suffering and then mythologizes a particular
period of suffering, “Once a terrible event in a group’s history becomes a
chosen trauma, the truth about it does not really matter” (Yelmaz 10). “One
of the biggest problems is that people tend to forget what the others suffered
and remember only their own sufferings. We went through difficult times in
1963 but Greek Cypriots never mention these. But Greek Cypriots went

8
through difficult times in 1974. But the Cyprus problem did not start in 1974”
(Papadakis 109).

By 1970 the percentage of ethnically-mixed villages in Cyprus had fallen to

less than 10% (Fisher 310).

The Invasion of “Attila.”

Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 is the event which led to the partition
of the island and the forced displacement of over 250,000 Greek Cypriots. For
Greek Cypriots this event, hailed as “liberation” by Turkish Cypriots, was as
traumatizing as the 1964 crisis and subsequent exile to small enclaves was to
the Turkish Cypriots.

In response to a coup engineered in Athens by the right-wing junta then in

power and led by Cypriot Nikos Sampson, characterized as “an extremely
violent man… well-known for his hatred of Turks” who once advocated
“cleansing the island of the stench of Turks,” Turkey began a two-part
invasion designed to “establish facts on the ground.” (Webb & Groom 85,
Kaufmann 214).

The first part of the invasion, on July 20 th, was followed by ethnic cleansing of
Cypriot Turks from Greek-held areas almost immediately (Kaufmann 214). On
August 14th, following the end of talks in Geneva between the four guarantor
powers designed to seek a settlement to the previous round of fighting,
Turkey attacked again and pushed inwards from the beachheads it had
established, causing greater displacement of people, both Greek Cypriots
heading south (away from the Turkish invasion) and Turkish Cypriots heading
north (towards the occupied areas) and eventually occupying almost 37% of
the island (Yilmaz 65). For Greek Cypriots the events of 1974 leading up to
the invasion of Turkey, constitute their own “chosen trauma” in the same
manner the events between 1964 and 1974 mean to the Cypriot Turkish
population.

The toll on the people of Cyprus was fierce. 4000 Greek soldiers and Cypriots
were killed as well as 2000 Turkish soldiers. The Turkish army “committed
rapes and killed women and children” (Kaufmann 215). Over 1500 people
today are still considered “disappeared” by their families. Almost no Turkish
Cypriots remained in the south of Cyprus while less than 10,000 Greek
Cypriots remained in the north – many of whom would be later placed under
great pressure to leave. Subsequent agreements allowed a UN-supervised
population exchange which further reduced the mixed communities in each
state. Today less than 300 Greek Cypriots remain in the Turkish-occupied
areas of Cyprus, mainly in the remote Karpas Peninsula. Figures on the
number of Turkish Cypriots in the south – the internationally recognized
Republic of Cyprus, are unavailable but it is thought less than 1000 chose to
stay behind.

9
Each side has its own narrative for every significant event which has occurred
in the history of Cyprus. “The year 1974 perpetuated the image of the
“unspeakable” Turk as Orthodox Hellenism’s eternal enemy, out to expel
them from their ancestral homeland, in a melancholic fatalism colored by
betrayal, defeat and loss. Conversely 1974 is heralded as a “peace
operation” and celebrated by Turkish Cypriots as “an antidote to Greek
Cypriot oppression” (Michael 32). Neither side appears willing to acknowledge
the other’s narrative – not accept but acknowledge. The principle of “the ego
of victimization” doesn’t allow empathy for one’s compatriot’s pain – when
one suffers then the other must suffer in return (Yilmaz 66).

Visual Representation of the Decline of Bicommunal Villages in

Cyprus

Afterward

The conflict in Cyprus has been stalemated since 1974. Contrary to the low-
level ethnic violence which occupied the island from between 1955 and 1974
there have been very few incidents since the Turkish invasion – primarily or
wholly because the two populations are unmixed now to the point where
very, very few Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots still live in close proximity
to one another.

Because this project is broken into two parts – conflict and escalation analysis
followed by peacemaking analysis at a later date, we will not go any further
into the history of the conflict as the conflict has remained essentially frozen
since 1974.

Peacemaking and Peacebuilding Strategies

The conflict in Cyprus is complex and clouded with issues of ethnic
nationalism, discrimination (and fear of discrimination), the use of enemy
images to stereotype the “other” as barbaric and less than human, the over-
10
involvement of guarantor powers Greece and Turkey in their co-religionists
affairs which has resulted in a stunted and nearly non-existent Cypriot
identity and a decades-long enforced separation which has allowed all of
these elements and more to harden together until each side is almost
incapable of moving from its rehearsed role and seeing half-way to the
other’s position. The adoption of chosen traumas, chosen glories, the egoism
of victimization and hard-held religious and ethnic identities by both sides in
the dispute present a dizzyingly complex problem from which to embark on
successful peacemaking and peacebuilding strategies.

Yet there are areas of agreement which can be approached as cross-border

efforts and which do not require huge sacrifices on either side. These areas
can then be used as confidence-building measures to draw the two sides
closer to one another and to work towards building a Cypriot identity free of
reliance on religious or nationalistic shibboleths. Several of the issues
(women and the environment) recommended here for cross-community
cooperation are mentioned as “instrumental in confidence building and in
establishing a settlement that can be acceptable to the larger population” in
other research, particularly in those dealing with conflict in Afghanistan, Sri
Lanka and Aceh (Strand 187).

The European Union (EU) has taken the initiative in some of these areas but
unfortunately in the EU, where the Republic of Cyprus is a full member and
the north and Turkey are not, “Greek Cypriots… have eagerly used all the
levers available to them to pursue what they see as their national interest
and need for justice” (ICG 3). If opportunities for building cross-border
cooperation are stymied in the EU then countries should make the decision to
pursue these opportunities unilaterally – as Britain and the United States
appear to be doing in certain areas – including the ones mentioned below.

 Environment
 Sports
 Women’s Issues
 Educational Exchanges

Environment

Cyprus occupies a unique spot in the Mediterranean and features a huge

number of species, plant and animal, which aren’t located elsewhere. In
addition Cyprus serves as a nesting location for numerous rare sea turtles
which have actually rebounded in number since the Turkish invasion due to
the low number of tourists known to visit the Turkish-occupied north. As
writer Alan Weisman wrote when visiting abandoned Varosha, “At night, the
darkened beachfront, free of moonlight bathers, crawls with nesting
loggerhead and green sea turtles” (Weisman 97).

11
The resurgence of the natural environment into the void left by humans can
be a comforting and uniting factor if managed well. The Environment and
Security Initiative (ENVSEC), a project formed between the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Development Programe (UNDP)
could serve as a framework within which to develop a process for cross-
border cooperation on issues of mutual concern between the two parts of
Cyprus today (United Nations 25).

A main issue sure to arise is that the Republic of Cyprus doesn’t want to
provide legitimacy to the Turkish-occupied north, which declared
independence in 1983. But the environment is an issue which doesn’t respect
artificial boundaries across land, air or sea. Tackling issues of joint concern
between both communities, issues like ensuring sea turtles have clean
beaches on which to nest, the status of Cyprus’s native donkey population or
discussing ways to mitigate the effects of a dropping water table can be
approached as joint-initiatives, if necessary done outside the framework of
government-to-government contacts through NGOs or multilateral
organizations.

The water issue, in particular, has been mentioned as having the potential to
“function both as a unifier promoting collaboration between entities at
different levels and scales but also an irritant worsening already bad
relations” (Strand 191). Using Cyprus’s dropping water table as “an
opportunity to ensure structure dialogue with groups in the two communities”
could be enormously valuable in building ties between the two groups
(Strand 192).

Sports

Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus is not an internationally-recognized state

so it does not have the right to participate in sporting events outside of
Turkey. Forming joint sports teams between the Republic of Cyprus and the
Turkish-occupied north could form a valuable source of cross-border
attachment and appreciation. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC) has a football team which, because of the TRNC’s disputed status,
cannot play in international FIFA tournaments. A team from Cyprus playing
together, perhaps under a jointly agreed upon symbol, would act to bring the
two sides together in a way they haven’t been for decades.

The Olympics are designed to bring the world’s states together in peace and
harmony, united under the Olympic banner and committed to the ancient
ideals of sportsmanship. Because the TRNC isn’t a recognized state it has no
Olympic committee, any athlete who wanted to participate would be forced
to get a Turkish passport and compete under the flag of Turkey. And the
Republic of Cyprus up to this point has never won a metal in the Olympics –
winter or summer. Approaching the Olympic committee in the south to

12
accept and train athletes from the north, who could perhaps compete under a
neutral banner until reunification was achieved (in the same manner as
Taiwan) could serve as a visible and successful example of cooperation
across the divide. If objections were to arise bringing the issue of Greece’s
adoption of ethnic Greek minorities from the Pontus (Paraskevi Patoulidou)
and Albania (Pyrros Dimas) to compete for Greece in the Olympics (each who
won a gold metal) could serve as an important reminder of the role athletes
from the TRNC could play in the Olympics on behalf of all Cypriots.

Women’s Issues

Reams of data show us that the less participation of women in government

and society the more repressive and warlike a state turns out to be.
Disenfranchising half of one’s population is a road to ruin whereas
enfranchising women can act as a locus for advancement and prosperity.

Recognizing the valuable role women can play in peacebuilding the United
Nations Security Council passed resolution 1325 in 2000, which called for
broader participation for women in conflict resolution and “that involve
women in all the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements”
(Strand 188).

Because “in conflict societies, the ‘national problem’ historically dominates

downplays social issues, including women’s issues” too often the concerns of
women and their ideas for resolving conflict have been downplayed or
ignored (Hadjiipavlou 238). Women are enlisted in the conflict as “sacrificing
mothers” who “internalize their ethnic and national duty roles in safeguarding
the nation” (Hadjiipavlou 238). As such they “are denied their right to be full
participants in the peace process” on both sides. “In the last 30 years of
official negotiations, no Cypriot women has ever been appointed a member of
the negotiating team” (Hadjiipavlou 238). Because Cyprus is seen as a
patriarchal culture this is accepted as normal but even within societies
viewed as patriarchal women still have opinions and unique perspectives –
and their absence from the political discourse is neither healthy nor wise for
government, society or for women themselves.

The UNDP has funded (2006 – 2008) a $30,000,000 project in Cyprus based
on mainstreaming women’s participation in peacemaking efforts on the island
(UNDP). A report is expected soon on its results but a greater effort must be
made to bind women from the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC together in
cross-border groups discussing issues of concern to women. As the UNDP has
taken a lead role so far it could continue to do so – or delegate additional
responsibilities to gender-based NGOs eager to help build the process of
peacebuilding forward (Georgiadu 1).

13
Educational Exchanges

Because of the international isolation of the TRNC students from the statelet
often have to procure Turkish passports to study abroad and are only allowed
to study in Cyprus once they obtain a Republic of Cyprus passport. Creating
an exchange mechanism whereby students of both the Republic of Cyprus
and the TRNC could study on each side of the dividing line would be
enormously beneficial in breaking down the negative stereotypes each
community holds of the other. A more immediate impact would be a growing
number of citizens of each ethnic group with the ability to speak the
language of the other. It would also lift some of the sense of siege which the
Turkish Cypriot community feels under and encourage greater ties between
the two educational communities.

Conclusion

Each of the recommendations in this report for encouraging peacemaking

and peacebuilding are predicated on direct contact between the citizens of
Cyprus living in the north and the south. Encouraging contact and community
building between the two communities is designed to begin the long-
neglected process of forging a strong Cypriot identity free from the
meddlesome influence of either Greece or Turkey – both of which have acted
as negative, dominating factors on their co-religionists for decades.

The conflict in Cyprus was escalated and perpetuated by the involvement of

the guarantor powers – both of which used Cyprus as a proxy to re-fight
conflicts of the past. The results of this have been catastrophic for both the
Turkish and Greek Cypriots and have resulted in a bifurcated state with two
people who live entirely separate lives in states almost entirely disconnected
from one another. In addition the security guarantees in the constitution of
1960 caused both sides to harden their positions and refuse to take any risks
at all to bring peace to themselves and their communities. This dynamic
going forward must be broken for Cyprus to realize its true potential as the
jewel of the Mediterranean. Doing so will require the Greek Cypriot south to
stop looking at Turkey as a security threat and vice-versa and require both
communities to focus their hopes and fears inward – onto the island they both
occupy instead of the two states which have long manipulated and
dominated their affairs.

14
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