Documente Academic
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INTS 4735
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Abstract
This case-study design is intended to present an introduction to the nature of the Iranian nuclear
program – peaceful intent or non-peaceful intent. Using materials from a range of sources and a
multiple case study looking at states which have developed nuclear weapons and those that have
abandoned their nuclear weapons programs, the goal is to provide illumination into the intent of
Introduction
Over the past five years many in the global community have expressed increasing concern over
the intent of Iran’s nuclear program. Reams of data from many different sources, governmental as
well as from non-governmental, have provided a wide range of differing conclusions on the intent
As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Iran is entitled to have a peaceful
nuclear program (Text of the NPT). For the intents and purposes of this case-study design the
research question is in the intent of Iran’s nuclear program. Numerous statements from Iran’s
government pledge that Iran is pursuing an exclusively peaceful program. Statements from
NGOs, intelligence agencies of various states (including the United States) and organs of the
United Nations indicate that Iran has been duplicitous in its presentations on its nuclear program
and has attempted to evade the controls of the NPT and its enforcing arm – the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The implication of evasiveness on Iran’s part is that Iran if
seeking to defy the IAEA then it has something to hide – which would be pursuing a non-
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The intent of Iran’s nuclear program is the essential research question in this case-study design.
Using data provided by governmental and non-governmental sources this design will attempt to
lay out the intentions of the Iranian government’s nuclear program using the framework provided
by the NPT, including the inspections regime, as well as declarations by Iran and the intelligence
The use of “intent” is intended to place a framework around the Iranian nuclear program which
will define the intended outcome of the program. A nuclear program can be defined as having
two purposes – peaceful (designed for research or the production of power) or military (designed
for the accumulation of the nuclear by-products necessary to create a nuclear weapon).
The framework of the NPT is designed to allow the IAEA an unencumbered view into the state’s
program in order to monitor its intent. States which allow an unencumbered inspections regime
by the IAEA are considered to be in compliance with the protocols of the NPT and thus are not
suspected of intending to pursue a non-peaceful nuclear program. States which do not, in this case
Iran, are considered to be contravening the NPT and thus are under suspicion of pursuing a
nuclear program for non-peaceful means. Iran’s intent will be illuminated by its compliance with
demands from the IAEA and the United Nations Security Council as well as the analysis by the
intelligence agencies of different states and NGOs as laid out in the literature review to follow.
Literature Review
The literature review portion of this case-study design will be broken out into two categories in
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1. Information provided by a governmental source (Iran, UN, US)
2. Information provided by an NGO or think-tank
Each piece of literature used for this case-study design provides information designed to help
clarify the intent of the Iranian nuclear program. In addition each piece of literature helps provide
an framework for WHY Iran has chosen to either continue to not continue its nuclear weapons
program.
The unclassified portion of the United States National Intelligence Estimate of November 2007,
entitled “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities” attempted to answer 5 key questions, the first
The Estimate then provides an “explanation of estimative language” which gives a range from
“remote” to “almost certainly” in relation to the assessments made by the National Intelligence
The report judges with “high confidence” that “Iran halted its nuclear weapons program” in fall
2003 and with “moderate to high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the
The report states that pressure from the international community is what led to the suspension of
a nascent Iranian nuclear program, indicating that Iran uses a “cost-benefit approach rather than a
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rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic and military costs” (Iran: Nuclear
Intentions and Capabilities). This indicates that the leadership in Iran, at least according to
In September 2009 the Representative of the Iran to the IAEA provided a response to the IAEA’s
last report on the implementation of safeguards designed to prevent the divergence of Iran’s
In this report Iran notes its cooperation with the IAEA in improved safety measures at its Natanz
enrichment facility and the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, its cooperation with unannounced
inspections, the agency’s verification of the “non-diversion of declared nuclear materials in Iran
and the agency’s note of “no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities” (IAEA 3).
Iran continues to claim that it is in compliance with IAEA demands for inspections and that it has
The Center for Arms Control and Negotiation makes very clear in its report on Iran’s nuclear
program that it feels Iran does not pose a threat to the United States, that it will be “more than a
decade” until Iran can develop nuclear weapons and that resolving the nuclear dispute should
involve only negotiation and diplomacy and not the use of force.
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In its report the Center asks, in reference to US intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program, “how
credible is the intelligence?” It answers this question by saying that US intelligence on Iran “is as
bad or worse than it was in Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion” (Iran’s Nuclear Program).
The report goes on to state that only through the use of diplomacy involving the P5+1 (Britain,
France, Germany, China, Russia and the United States), the IAEA and the United Nations
Security Council can Iran’s nuclear program be constrained. Military force, as the US practiced in
Iran’s nuclear program has advanced due to disorganization in the P5+1. While Iran does not
possess a nuclear weapon it is “within striking distance of breakout capability” (the capacity to
produce a nuclear weapon). The Institute of Science and International Security (ISS) recommends
1. Increase sanctions
2. Hold direct talks
3. Recommit to incentive package
4. Seek improved transparency from Iran
5. Take steps towards diplomatic relations
6. Engage Russia and China
7. Support regional arms control and security arrangements
8. Establish regional constraints on nuclear energy
9. Oppose a military solution
ISS offers a look at the nuclear histories of Pakistan and South Africa as possible predictors of
Iran’s possible moves in the future. In this portion of the report it is emphasized that “once the
goalposts are set that enrichment is acceptable, as in the case of Pakistan, it is near impossible to
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ISS judges it “enormously difficult” for any intelligence agency to predict whether Iran’s nuclear
program has resumed “nuclear weaponization activities since 2003” (Albright 15). Despite the
judgment of the United States in 2007 that Iran halted nuclear weaponization in 2003 ISS
concludes that “halting work in 2003 would not cause a significant delay in actually building a
nuclear weapon at the appropriate time, once Iran had accumulated enough highly enriched
The case of Libya’s nuclear program provides an interesting parallel with that of Iran’s. The
Arms Control Association lays out a chronology of Libya’s nuclear program including dates of
sanctions imposed in response to Libya’s sponsorship of terrorism – this is important because it
appears sanctions were instrumental in convincing Libya to stop sponsoring terrorism and give up
its nuclear weapons program.
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• 2002: US sanctions tightened further, threshold for imposition of sanctions on companies
investing in Libyan oil industry lowered to $20 million (Crail 2).
• 2003: US invades Iraq, less than a month after invasion Libyan officials approach the
British about eliminating their WMD programs, US subsequently offers to resume full
diplomatic relations with Libya if it “comes clean” on it’s WMD program (Crail 2)
• 2004: German and Italian authorities inspect and seize ship carrying prohibited
centrifuges for uranium enrichment to Libya. Subsequently Libya publically renounces
its WMD program. US, British and IAEA officials verify dismantlement of Libyan
WMD program. US resumes diplomatic relations with Libya (Crail 3).
While Libya did sign IAEA safeguard accords it managed to evade detection by the IAEA of
attempts to weaponize its program. This is a cautionary note that no safeguards regime is
foolproof. “The factors that induced Libya to give up its weapons programs are debatable. Bush
administration officials have emphasized the US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq as well as the October
2003 interdiction of a ship containing nuclear-related components destined for Libya, as key
factors in Libya’s decision. But outside experts argue that years of diplomatic efforts were more
Looking at the chronology of events surround Libya’s program one can see that throughout the
years covered there was consistent pressure applied to Libya by the US and the international
community as a result of its policy of supporting international terrorism. We can also see that
Libya, despite its claims to the contrary and including its signing of the NPT, was actively
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Carrots for Iran?
Lessons from Libya.
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy argues that Libya gave up its weapons program in
exchange for normalization of relations with the United States. Stating “Sticking to your guns
works” the Institute urges a steadfast policy of sanctions and the willingness to use force (as
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demonstrated by the US invasion of Iraq) towards Iran will eventually produce the same results as
There are a multitude of misconceptions about Iran’s nuclear program and its intentions.
I. Iran’s IAEA safeguards violations were minor breaches and fully in the past. “Iran’s
violation of its obligations under the verification requirements of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) is one of most significant breaches of this treaty” (Albright 1)
II. All of Iran’s nuclear facilities are under safeguards or monitoring, or alternatively the
IAEA has found no evidence that Iran has any secret nuclear facilities
“Many [of Iran’s] key nuclear activities and facilities are not under any type of IAEA
monitoring. This lack of Iranian transparency poses one of the most difficult challenges to
determining whether Iran has undeclared nuclear activities and materials and is conducting
nuclear weapons work” (Albright 1)
III. Iran is full in compliance with its safeguard obligations.
“Even under the relatively minimal requirements agreed under INFCIRC/153 and its
implementing agreements, Iran has refused multiple IAEA requests to verify design
information for the Arak heavy water reactor and its associated facilities currently under
construction” (Albright 1)
IV. Iran would need to conduct a full-scale nuclear test in order to build a nuclear weapon.
“Developing an implosion-type nuclear weapon can be done without needing a full-scale
test.” “Most states pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program have sought to avoid
the need for full-scale testing (South Africa, Pakistan)” (Albright 1)
V. Iran does not currently posses nuclear weapons capability
“Iran’s gas centrifuge program is currently large enough to provide Iran several ways to
produce weapon-grade uranium. The time needed to produce enough weapon-grade
uranium for a nuclear weapon is measured in months or a few years at most” (Albright 1)
The previous literature review section looked at a number of different elements of Iran’s nuclear
program in order to judge intent. Different hypothesis from different actors offered differing
conclusions – the United States judged, with reasonable certainty, that Iran was not developing
nuclear weapons. Iran itself stated it was not developing nuclear weapons. ISIS stated that Iran’s
breaches of its obligations under the NPT were serious and concluded that Iran could be
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The case of the Libyan WMD program provides a useful comparison for the current case of Iran.
Libya, as Iran, is a signatory to the NPT. Libya also breached its obligations under the NPT and
developed a parallel nuclear weapons development program while at the same time assuring the
world community and the IAEA that it was pursuing exclusively peaceful methods of nuclear
research (Crail 1). Libya availed itself of the same suppliers used by Iran (the Khan network
The issue explored in this case-study design is intent. States have an obligation under
international law to abide by treaties to which they are signatories and both Iran and Libya are
signatories to the NPT. Duplicitous actions are therefore taken as signs of intent to evade the rules
and restrictions imposed by the treaty. Past cases of states which were signatories to the NPT,
namely the Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Libya, which have attempted to
evade the rules have shown those states were intent on pursuing nuclear weapons programs. Yet
Libya eventually chose to abandon its nuclear weapons program while the DPRK withdrew from
The case of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program provides a second example with which we
can contrast Iran’s program and its intent. Pakistan was not a member of the NPT (while Iran is)
which means there was less room for the international community to pressure Pakistan – that
burden mainly fell on the United States. The US pressured Pakistan and convinced France not to
sell Pakistan a nuclear reactor but Pakistan, led by its chief weapons scientist A.Q. Khan,
managed to steal plans from the Netherlands and built its own reactor (Albright 15). After this the
US “essentially gave up trying to end Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program and accepted its
existence” (Albright 15). By accepting Pakistan’s enrichment program the US essentially gave
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Pakistan a green light to continue producing the supplies of enriched uranium necessary to
produce a weapon.
The two examples looked at so far, Libya and Pakistan, are instructive in that they teach us the
following about a state which is attempting to evade IAEA safeguards, as in the case of Libya, or
which has begun a nuclear enrichment program outside the NPT regime, as in the case of
Pakistan:
• States which maintain hidden weapons enrichment sites, secret uranium mining facilities
or secret research facilities are doing so because they have something to hide. The cases
of the DPRK, Libya and Pakistan are all instructive in this regard (Albright 16).
Conclusion
This case study is designed to research the question of the intent of Iran’s nuclear program using
analysis from the intelligence gathered by governmental agencies and by NGOs. The literature
review section utilized statements from the Iranian government, the IAEA and the United States
To test the hypothesis of the case study multiple cases were chosen of states which have
previously been in violation of the NPT (Libya) as well as contravening the laws of the United
States regarding nuclear proliferation (Pakistan). Both states were chosen to allow a comparison
between a state which ended up abandoning its nuclear weapons program (Libya) and one which
went on to develop nuclear weapons (Pakistan). Utilizing this case-study design will allow a
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researcher to move closer to developing hypotheses on the intent of Iran’s nuclear program using
historical multiple case-studies as well as the current literature available on this subject.
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Works Cited
Albright, David, and Jacqueline Shire. "Misconceptions about Iran’s Nuclear Program."
Albright, David, Jacqueline Shire, Paul Brannan, and Andrea Scheel. Nuclear Iran: Not
Inevitable. Rep. Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 2009.
Print.
Bollfrass, Alex. "Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Iran." Country Resources. Arms Control
Clawson, Patrick. Carrots for Iran? Lesson from Libya. Issue brief no. 928. Washington, DC:
Clawson, Patrick. Influencing Iran's Nuclear Activities through Major Power Cooperation. Issue
brief no. 936. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004.
Print.
Crail, Peter. "Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States." Arms
Crail, Peter. "Iran?s Outstanding Nuclear Issues at a Glance." Arms Control Association: the
authoritative source on arms control. Arms Control Association, 14 July 2009. Web. 7
Current Status of Iran's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Program. Issue brief. Washington, DC: The
IAEA. Communication dated 4 September 2009 received from the Resident Representative of the
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Iran. IAEA: Documents and Reports. IAEA, 7 Sept. 2009. Web. 7 Nov. 2009.
<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2009/infcirc768.pdf>.
Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. Issue brief. Washington, DC: National Intelligence
Council, 2007. Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. National Intelligence Council,
<http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf>.
Iran's Nuclear Program: Time to Negotiate. Issue brief. Washington, DC: Center for Arms
"Text of the NPT." Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). United Nations,
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