Why Were Britain And France Willing To Go To War In 1939 And Not 1938?

Alexander Lynskey
ZHSS1201-History1A
March 24, 2016

Why were Britain and France willing to go to war in 1939 and

not 1938?

The willingness of both the French and the British to go to war in 1939 and not
previously in 1938 is best viewed in light of the developments that took place on
the European continent post World War One. The Anglo-French experiences of
WWI and resulting social attitudes, a crippled economy as well as the pursuance
of collective security arrangements through the League of Nations are pivotal
reasons as to why both Britain and France adopted a policy of appeasement. It is
for these reasons that both Britain and France were willing to enter the war in
1939 and not 1938.

The effects of World War One had an enduring significance upon both
populations, defining the Anglo-French lack of will for war in 1938. A mood of
pacifism1 had certainly set over the publics psyche, with the sentiment in both
countries being surmised as never again2. Virtues of courage, heroism and
patriotism had been undermined by the inhuman nature of modern mechanical
warfare on the Western Front. Whilst for the last 150 years the people of Britain
had accepted war as part of the natural order of events3, there were
widespread doubts as to the morality of Britain and Germany entering into a
conflict4. Befitting the liberal democracy that Britain was, the government had a
duty to carry out the will of the people and it was extremely difficult to see how

1

Robbins, Keith. Appeasement. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1997, p. 24

Ibid., p. 25.
3
Gilbert, Martin. The Roots of Appeasement. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966, p.1.
4
Ibid., p. 4.
2

any British government could ever prepare to take the country to war again5.
Appeasement was a reflection of the public sentiment and experience of WWI
and a determination to prevent by all mean a second accidental, guiltless war,
which expounds the willingness of Britain to enter the war in 1939 and not 1938.

These sentiments were mirrored in France. France, much like Britain, had a
fervent revulsion of war, a belief in the vitality of the League of Nations and a
strong support of demilitarisation6. Throughout the Paris Peace Conference,
Clemenceau had lobbied extensively for the creation of a neutral buffer-state
along the Rhine, in order to shield France from future acts of German
aggression7. Clemenceau did not receive his wishes, settling for a Rhineland
compromise consisting of French occupation of the Rhine until 1925 followed by
the demilitarisation of the region8. When the Rhineland was remilitarised by
Hitler in March 1936, there was little will in France, and equally within Britain to
pressure the French, to enter into a war with Germany, even over areas of land
considered vital to the defence of France9. France, much like Britain was
pursuing foreign policy that aimed to stop the outbreak of war in mainland
Europe rather than ignite conflict through acts of political aggression. It is for
this reason that France was not willing to enter the war until 1939 when German
aggression posed a direct and significant threat to French interests and vitality.

Ibid., p.25.
Bell, P. M. H. The Origins of the Second World War in Europe. London: Longman, 1986, p. 101.
7
Jeanneson, Stanislas. "French Policy in the Rhineland." Diplomacy & Statecraft 16, no. 3 (2005): 475-86. Accessed March 17,
2016. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592290500207792.
8
Ibid.
9
Robbins, op cit. p. 72.
6

The Great Depression had a significant effect upon Anglo-French relations10,

savaging the worlds capitalist economy.11This economic environment coupled
with the financial burden of rearmament was a key reason as to why Britain and
France were willing to declare war in 1939 and not 1938. Whilst Britains
industry had begun to gather momentum and show signs of stabilisation, the
French economy remained stagnant12. The difference in economy had a
deepening impact upon how both countries projected their international power.
Indeed, the financial situations of both France and Britain dictated what they
could or could not do in the world13. The period following WWI was not
conducive to any power rearming in preparation for another major conflict. The
First World War heavily indebted both Britain and France to the United States
and unemployment in both countries was at unacceptable levels and continued
to rise. The intense rearming of both nations in later stages of the 1930s,
following Britain abandoning its Ten Year Policy in 193214, constituted an
onerous drain on the economy. The economic restrictions faced by both Britain
and France, led to the adoption of a more conciliatory foreign policy15 of avoiding
war in 1938 until absolutely necessary in 1939.

The Anglo-French lack of will to enter the war in 1938 was also a reflection of
the changing international political system of Europe post WWI. The emergence
of the League of Nation ushered in a new era of international cooperation and
the belief of peace through collective security. Concessions to Hitler were the

10
Thomas, Martin. Britain, France and Appeasement: Anglo-French Relations in the Popular Front Era. Washington, D.C.:
Berg, 1996, p.14.
11
Levy, James P. Appeasement and Rearmament: Britain, 1936-1939. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006.
p.14.
12
Ibid., p. 15.
13
Robbins. Op cit. p. 50.
14
Bell, P. M. H. op cit. p. 235.
15
Thomas, op cit. p. 15.

result of Britain realising that its military was too weak to support a large far-
flung Empire, whilst dealing with simultaneous threats in Asia, India and the
Middle East and the European mainland16. Politicians on both sides of the
Channel thought it prudent to believe in a world that had an underlying
harmony between nations17. Whilst both sides were not blind to the threat that
Nazism posed to Europe, both did not grasp the dynamic nature of Hitlers
regime, nor a deep understanding of the practices, ideals and beliefs of Nazi
policy18 that were at odds to British and French foreign policy. The final
agreement signed by Hitler and Chamberlain in Munich is reflective of this.
Chamberlain believed the agreement, settling the dispute over the Sudetenland,
would result in a British-German friendship that would stop the rearmament
race and stabilise the European continent19. Hitlers views were markedly
different. Hitler regarded the agreement as a defeat for German interests,
launching a violent attack on Churchill, Eden and Duff Cooper on the 9th of
October 193820. German aggression was not halted following the agreement,
with Germany increasing pressure on the Czechoslovakian government for lands
not covered under the Munich agreement. This was a precursor for its
withdrawal from the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1934 and
the London Naval Agreement of 1935, leading to the invasion of Poland
commencing World War Two. The Anglo-French pursuance of this foreign policy
is why both countries avoided war in 1938 until absolutely necessary in 1939 for

16

Levy. Op cit. p.59.

Robbins, op cit. p. 89.
18
Ibid., p. 88.
19
McDonough, Frank. Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement, and the British Road to War. Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1998, p. 71-72.
20
Ibid.
17

the peace and security of Europe, that was crumbling under increased German
military aggression.

Whilst Britain and France were willing to go to war in 1939, their lack of will to
enter into conflict a year earlier is reflective of the policy of appeasement. The
pursuance of such a policy is a reflection of deeply rooted ideals in the
immorality of war, economic constraints and in a belief that it would be
inconceivable for governments to deliberately use force21. The British and
French decision to enter the war in 1939 was as a result of the threat that
Hitlers Germany posed to the security of not only France and Britain, but also
Europe, with military action the only suitable solution to resolve the threat of
German influence.













21

Robbins. Op cit. p.89.

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