Liability of public officers

Tabuena vs Sandiganbayan GR 103501 17 February 1997

Facts: Luis Tabuena as General Manager of MIAA received direct order from Marcos
to pay directly to his office sum of 55mio in cash to pay for MIAAs liability to PNCC.
He then received Presidential Memorandum from Fe Gimenez (secretary). The
money was delivered in cash in three withdrawals, no vouchers prepared to support
the disbursement although Gimenez issued a receipt on the third delivery for the
entire amount. Tabuena was accused and convicted of the crime of malversation by
Sandiganbayan for defrauding the government, taking and misappropriating money
when there is no outstanding obligation between MIAA and PNCC. Petitioner
contended that he was acting in good faith when the office of the president directed
him to deliver the said amount to his office person who acts in obedience to an
order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.

Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan violated due process on the ground of

departing from that common standard of fairness and impartiality?

Decision: Sandiganbayan decision reversed and set aside. Tabuena and Peralta are
acquitted of the crime of malversation. The majority believes that the interference
by the Sandiganbayan Justices was just too excessive that it cannot be justified
under the norm applied to a jury trial, or even under the standard employed in a
non-jury trial where the judge is admittedly given more leeway in propounding
questions to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence.

It is never proper for a judge to discharge the duties of a prosecuting attorney.

However anxious a judge may be for the enforcement of the law, he should always
remember that he is as much judge in behalf of the defendant accused of crime,
and whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of the state, for the
purpose of safeguarding the interests of society.

CORREA vs CFI OF BULACAN No. L-46096. July 30, 1979

FACTS: There were two policemen involved that were illegally dismissed by the
petitioner during his incumbency as the Mayor of Norzagaray, Bulacan (reason fo
the said dismissal was not mentioned in the case). December 13, 1968, CFI of
Bulacan rendered judgment in favor of the policemen and ordered personally to pay
the salaries which the policemen failed to receive by reason of their illegal dismissal
from office until they are actually reinstated. August 24, 1976, CA affirmed the

decision of the CFI and became final and executory. On April 22, 1977, respondent
Court issued the Order denying the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution. Petitioner
thus came to this Court, maintaining that he could no longer be required to pay the
back salaries of the private respondents because payment on his part presupposes
his continuance in office, which is not the case. He contends that it is the
Municipality of Norzagaray that is liable for said payment, invoking Aguador v.
Enerio.3 and Sison v. Pajo.4 Further, petitioner alleges that the fact that he is no
longer municipal mayor of Norzagaray, constitutes a substantial change in the
situation of the parties which makes the issuance of the writ of execution
inequitable. Petitioner prays, among others, that judgment be rendered declaring
that the payment of back salaries of private respondents should be made by the
incumbent mayor and by the municipality of Norzagaray; Bulacan, and that
petitioner is no longer liable for the payment thereof; and annulling the Order dated
April 22, 1977 of respondent court denying the motion to quash the writ of
execution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Correa as a public official (Mayor) who wrongfully/illegally

dismissed an employee during his incumbency is still liable to the case personally.

HELD: YES. Liability of public official who wrongfully dismissed an employee is

personal; Principle of personal liability applicable to cases where public officer
discharges an employee wrongfully. In the discharge of governmental functions,
municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and
when, and only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in
conformity with the requirements thereof. A public officer who commits a tort or
other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected
by his office and is personally liable therefor like any private individual. This
principle of personal liability has been applied to cases where a public officer
removes another officer or discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases
saying that by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of law in respect to
removal from office, the officials were acting outside their official authority. Instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

Ocampo vs. Ombudsman [G.R. No. 114683. January 18,

2000.]
Facts: On 21 March 1988, K.N. Paudel of the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal
(ADBN) wrote a letter to Niaconsult Inc., a subsidiary of the National Irrigation
Administration, requesting a training proposal on small-scale community irrigation
development. On 17 November 1988, Jesus C. Ocampo as the training coordinator
of the Niaconsult, sent a letter-proposal requested by ADBN. Another letter was sent
by Ocampo on 31 January 1989 to Dr. Peiter Roeloffs of ADBN confirming the
availability of Niaconsult to conduct the training program and formally requesting

advance payment of 30% percent of the training fees in the amount of US

$9,600.00 or P204,960.00. Niaconsult conducted the training program for 6
Nepalese Junior Engineers from 6 February to 7 March 1989. ADBN, thru its
representative, Deutsche Gesselschaft Technische Zusummenarbeit (GTZ) Gmbh
Technical Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany paid to Ocampo the
agreed training fee in two installments of P61,488.00 and P143,472.00. On 1 April
1991, Niaconsult, through its president, Wilfredo S. Tiongco, wrote a letter to
Ocampo demanding the turn-over of the total training fee paid by ADBN which
Ocampo personally received. Despite receipt of the letter, Ocampo failed to remit
the said amount prompting Niaconsult through its president, Maximino Eclipse, to
file an administrative case before the Ombudsman for serious misconduct and/or
fraud or willful breach of trust.
Finding enough basis to proceed with the administrative case, the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau of the Ombudsman, on 17 February 1992, issued an order
requiring Ocampo to file his counter-affidavit within 10 days from receipt with a
caveat that failure to file the same would be deemed a waiver of his right to present
evidence. Despite notice, Ocampo failed to comply with the said order. A year later,
or on 17 March 1993, the Ombudsman issued another order giving Ocampo another
chance to file his counter-affidavit and controverting evidence. Again, Ocampo
failed. Thus, on 14 April 1993, Eclipse was required to appear before the
Ombudsman to present evidence to support its complaint. On 18 November 1993,
the Ombudsman (OMB-Adm-O-92-0020) issued the a Resolution recommending that
Ocampo discharged from the service, with forfeiture of benefits and special
perpetual disqualification to hold office in the government or any governmentowned or controlled corporation; without prejudice to any civil action Niaconsult
may institute to recover the amount so retained by Niaconsult. On 16 February
1994, Ocampo moved for reconsideration and to re-open the case claiming that he
was denied due process. On 28 February 1994, the Ombudsman denied the motion.
Hence, the petition for certiorari.
While the case is pending, Ocampo filed a Manifestation on 24 May 1997 stating
that the criminal complaint for estafa and falsification filed against him based on
the same facts or incidents which gave rise to the administrative case, was
dismissed by the RTC on 24 February 997. With the dismissal of the criminal case,
Ocampo manifests that the administrative case can no longer stand on its own and
therefore should be dismissed.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the assailed
Resolutions of Ombudsman.
1. Dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action; Quantum
of evidence required in criminal, civil and administrative cases The dismissal of the
criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against Ocampoo or give
him a clean bill of health in all respects. The RTC, in dismissing the criminal
complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of
Ocampo beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack
or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any

evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though

insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases;
this is preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the substantial evidence rule
in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus,
considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure
followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the
findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.
2. Essence of due process; Oral and written arguments; Judicial and Administrative
due process The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. One may be
heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even many times
more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In
administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due
process in its strict judicial sense.
3. Ocampo amply accorded opportunity to be heard Ocampo has been amply
accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was required to answer the complaint
against him. In fact, Ocampo was given considerable length of time to submit his
counter-affidavit. It took more than one year from 17 February 1992 before Ocampo
was considered to have waived his right to file his counter-affidavit and the formal
presentation of the complainants evidence was set. The 17 March 1993 order was
issued to give Ocampo a last chance to present his defense, despite the private
Niaconsults objections. But Ocampo failed to comply with the second order.
4. He who chooses not to avail opportunity to answer charges cannot complain of
denial of due process Ocampos failure to present evidence is solely of his own
making and cannot escape his own remissness by passing the blame on the graft
investigator. While the Ombudsman has shown forbearance, Ocampo has not
displayed corresponding vigilance. He therefore cannot validly claim that his right to
due process was violated. A party who chooses not to avail of the opportunity to
answer the charges cannot complain of a denial of due process.
5. Waiver; Ombudsman need not issue another order notifying accused that he has
waived right The orders of the Ombudsman requiring Ocampo to submit his counteraffidavit and which was admittedly received by the latter explicitly contain a
warning that if no counter-affidavit was filed within the given period, a waiver would
be considered and the administrative proceedings shall continue according to the
rules. Thus, the Ombudsman need not issue another order notifying Ocampo that he
has waived his right to file a counter-affidavit. In the same way, Ocampo need not
be notified of the ex-parte hearing for the reception of NIAConsults evidence. As
such, he could not have been expected to appear at the ex-parte hearing.
6. Ocampo indeed dishonest and untrustworthy based on records of case
The record of the case indisputably shows that Ocampo is guilty of dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the government when he failed to remit the payment of the
training program conducted by Niaconsult. The evidence presented sufficiently

established that Ocampo received the payments of ADBN through its

representative, GTZ, Philippines the amount of US $9,600.00 and that he failed to
account this and remit the same to the corporation. All these acts constitute
dishonesty and untrustworthiness.

A.M. No. P-89-290 January 29, 1993

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
vs.
RAMON G. ENRIQUEZ, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a letter dated 19 January 1987, one Eliodoro C. Cruz of Compania Maritima, Inc.
informed this Court that the company's lawyer filed with the Tanodbayan on 12
December 1986 a complaint for falsification of a public document, use of falsified
documents, robbery and the violation of R.A. No. 3019 against herein respondent
Ramon G. Enriquez, Deputy Sheriff of Branch XXXI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila and others. The said company lawyer requested that an investigation be
conducted on the administrative aspect of the case.

In his 20 January 1987 letter to Mr. Cruz, then Court Administrator Leo D. Medialdea,
who later became a member of this Court, informed the latter that as a matter of
policy, the administrative aspect of the case "will be undertaken by this Office upon
the filing of a corresponding information by the Tanodbayan before the
Sandiganbayan."

Consequently, an Information for falsification of a public document was filed against

the respondent with the Sandiganbayan on 6 October 1988. The case was docketed

as Criminal Case No. 12987 and was assigned to the Second Division. A copy of the
Information was furnished the Office of the Court Administrator on 17 October 1988.

On 1 February 1989, then Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro, pursuant to this

Court's en banc resolution of 12 March 1981 and on the basis of the Information
filed with the Sandiganbayan, administratively charged the herein respondent with
the crime of falsification of a public document and with conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service committed in the manner alleged in the said
Information, to wit:

That on or about May 12, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, a public officer, being then a
Deputy Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 31, taking advantage of his official position and, committing the offense in
relation to his official duties, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
forge and falsify, or cause to be forged and falsified, Sheriff's (sic) Certificate of Sale
dated May 12, 1986, which is a public document, wherein he is legally bound to
disclose the truth, by stating therein that the payment for the properties which he
levied and sold at public auction was made on May 12, 1986, and that the amount
of P1,325,000.00, representing the bid price for the aforesaid levied properties, was
paid to him on May 12, 1986, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well
knew, the payment thereof was actually made on May 23, 1986 to Genstar
Container Corporation through its attorney-in-fact, to the damage and prejudice of
public interest.

The respondent was directed to file his answer/explanation within ten (10) days
from receipt of the charge.

Instead of filing the answer/explanation as ordered, the respondent forwarded to the

Court Administrator a letter on 20 February 1989 informing the latter that Criminal
Case No. 12987 was still pending resolution before the Sandiganbayan and that
therefore, he (respondent) should not be held administratively liable.

On 15 May 1989, the Sandiganbayan, acting on a demurrer to evidence,

promulgated a Resolution granting the same and dismissing the case against the
respondent "for insufficiency of evidence." This conclusion is based on its findings
that (a) the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale, presented and admitted without
qualification or limitation and objection as to purpose, showed that the public
auction was held on 12 May 1986 and that the movable properties were sold to
Rolando Patriarca for P1,325,000.00; this fact was confirmed by prosecution witness
Rizalina Cailian, (b) the private prosecutor's contention that there was no public

auction on that date runs counter to the Information which is based on the fact that
a public auction was held on 12 May 1986, (c) it is presumed that the respondent
regularly performed his official duty when he sold, during the said public auction, all
the properties levied upon, and (d) the fact stands in bold relief that payment was
actually made; whether the same was to the respondent or to Genstar, the fact also
stands out that if the payment was to Genstar it was because the amount was due it
as a judgment creditor; if made to the respondent "it was in effect to and intended
for Genstar," thus having the same net effect; as a result, the assertion that the
bid price was paid on 12 May 1986 to the respondent is not absolutely false but has
some truth to it. The Sandiganbayan went on to state that the rule is settled that if
the statements are not altogether false, there being some colorable truth to them,
the crime of falsification is not deemed to have been committed; it further declared
that the records "do not show that the rights . . . of the parties involved would not
be substantially the same if the bid price was paid on May 12, 1986, through the
accused (respondent), as when the payment was done 11 days thereafter directly to
Genstar, or vice-versa." Hence, the integrity of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was
not affected.

On 10 April 1991, respondent filed a Manifestation informing this Court of the

promulgation of the above resolution and praying that "by virtue of the dismissal of
the Criminal Case filed against the respondent before the Sandiganbayan, the
Administrative Case . . . be likewise dismissed."

On 6 May 1991, this Court resolved to refer the case to the Office of the Court
Administrator for investigation, report and recommendation.

In his Memorandum of 11 December 1991, then Court Administrator, now a member

of this Court, Josue N. Bellosillo, opined that the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
12987 by the Sandiganbayan does not necessarily warrant the dismissal of the
administrative case against the respondent considering that the quantum of
evidence needed to sustain a judgment of conviction in a criminal case is proof
beyond reasonable doubt, while in administrative proceedings, only moral certainty
is required; by way of comment to the Sandiganbayan's statement to the effect that
the records do not show that the rights and obligations of any of the parties
involved would have been substantially affected if the bid price was paid either on
12 May 1986 or 23 May 1986, he avers that in the crime of falsification of public or
official documents, whether by public officials or private persons, it is not necessary
that there be present the idea of gain or intent to cause damage to a third person
for the reason that in contradistinction to falsification of private documents, the
principal act punished in the former is the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. 1 Court Administrator
Bellosillo then recommended the referral of the case to the Executive Judge of the
RTC of Manila for investigation, report and recommendation.

Acting thereon, this Court, in the Resolution of 5 February 1992, referred the instant
case to the said Executive Judge for investigation, report and recommendation.

Thereupon, Executive Judge Bernardo P. Pardo conducted an investigation; after

completing the same, he submitted on 5 August 1992 his Report and
Recommendation wherein, on the basis of the following summation of evidence and
findings:

In his testimony, Atty. Redentor R. Melo stated that on May 12, 1986, at 9:00 o'clock
in the morning, he personally went to El Varadero de Manila Compound in Cavite
City to attend the auction sale of property levied upon by deputy sheriff Ramon G.
Enriquez and advertised for sale at auction scheduled on said date and time. He
waited until past 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon without sheriff Enriquez appearing.
Then, he left and returned to Manila. At about 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon, he
was advised that Sheriff Enriquez appeared at past 4:00 o'clock but that no auction
sale was conducted.

In a sheriff's partial report dated May 23, 1986, respondent deputy sheriff Enriquez
stated that on May 3, 1986, he served a copy of a writ of execution issued by Judge
Regino T. Veridiano of the Regional Trial Court of Manila upon Gregorio Coronel at
the El Varadero de Manila dockyard at Sangley Point, Cavite City. Immediately
thereafter, he made a levy of personal property of the defendant and scheduled the
sale on May 12, 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning at El Varadero de Manila,
Sangley Point, Cavite City, to satisfy the writ of execution. On May 8, 1986, third
party claims were filed involving the levied property. On May 12, 1986, the
judgment creditor posted the necessary indemnity bond duly approved by the court.
After the bond was posted, deputy sheriff Enriquez conducted the sale and one
Rolando Patriarca was the highest bidder in the total amount of P1,325.000.00 and
which amount was credited to the partial satisfaction of the writ (copy of the
Sheriff's Partial Report dated May 23, 1986 as filed in the record of Civil Case No.
85-30134 is hereto attached Annex "B" for ready reference). In the minutes of the
sheriff's sale dated May 12, 1986, it is made to appear that the bidding started at
3:55 p.m. and was finished at 5:00 p.m. on May 12, 1986 with Rolando C. Patriarca
as the highest bidder (copy of the said minutes is hereto attached as Annex "C").

Deputy Sheriff Ramon G. Enriquez did not present any evidence during the
investigation. He submitted the case on the basis of the Sheriff's Return dated May
23, 1986. He stated that he received the bid money on May 12, 1986 on which date
he issued the certificate of sale. Respondent Enriquez admitted that he did not
require the judgment creditor to pay the sheriff's percentage of commission.

In his testimony, Atty. Jose C. Sison, counsel for judgment creditor stated that the
auction took place May 12, 1986 on which date the bid price was given to him in
check by the highest bidder Rolando Patriarca; that he would not have agreed if the
payment was made on May 23, 1986.

Much as we would like to accept the testimony of Atty. Sison as the truth, we find
that he is sadly mistaken. In its resolution dated May 15, 1989, the Sandiganbayan,
on the basis of stipulation (sic) of facts and the evidence adduced, held that on May
23, 1986, the highest bidder Rolando Patriarca offered the three (3) vessels M/V
Dadiangas, T/B Marinero and T/B Timonel out of several other personal properties
bidded (sic), to Rizalina Ingco-Cailian, a businesswoman engaged in the sale of
scrap iron. These vessels were sold to Cailian for the price of P1,325,000.00. Cailian,
highest bidder Patriarca and his wife repaired to the Navotas Branch of the
Philippine National Bank that same day. Cailian bought cashier's check No. 273290
dated May 23, 1986 for P1,325,000.00, which, upon request of Patriarca, who said
he had no money to pay for the vessels, was made payable to the order of "Genstar
Container c/o Atty. Jose C. Sison" the judgment creditor (resolution, p. 4, p. 84, rec.).
This piece of evidence is certainly eloquent proof of the fact that there was no
payment of the bid price by the bidder Rolando Patriarca on May 12, 1986 to the
sheriff amounting to P1,325,000.00. As found by the Sandiganbayan, it was the
bidder's buyer (sic) Rizalina Ingco-Cailian who paid the bid price directly to the
judgment creditor. This took place on May 23, 1986. Indeed, if the bid price was
given to the respondent deputy sheriff on May 12, 1986, it was his duty to deposit
the amount immediately with the court's cashier. He did not do this. He did not also
require the judgment creditor to pay the sheriff's percentage of collection.

Consequently, the inevitable conclusion is that the respondent sheriff was remiss in
his duties and that the sheriff's certificate of sale was falsified because the truth is
that the bid price was not paid by the highest bidder on May 12, 1986. In fact, there
was no auction conducted on that date because it was already past 4:00 o'clock, the
(sic) sheriff was not yet at the place of auction which was indeed scheduled at 10:00
a.m., May 12, 1896. The bid price was actually paid by a third who bought the three
(3) vessels out of several other properties levied upon. She paid therefor directly to
the judgment creditor. The sheriff 's percentage of commission was not paid.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we respectfully submit that the respondent Deputy Sheriff

Ramon G. Enriquez is guilty of the charge of falsifying the sheriff's certificate of sale
dated May 12, 1986 in Civil Case No. 85-30134 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

he recommended the following:

WHEREFORE, we respectfully recommend that respondent Deputy Sheriff Ramon G.

Enriquez be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, if any.

We find the above findings of Executive Judge Pardo to be supported by the

evidence. His conclusions and recommendation are therefore in order.

We wish to add, however, that from the facts surrounding the case, it appears that
(a) no bidding was held on 12 May 1986; even if one was conducted, the alleged
highest bidder, one Rolando Patriarca, did not have the money to pay for his bid of
P1,325,000.00, thereby resulting in a failure of the proceedings; or (b) the sale was
consummated only on 23 May 1986, without the requisite bidding, to Rizalina IngcoCailian to whom Patriarca allegedly "sold" what he bought during the "bidding" of 12
May 1986. In his Notice of Levy and Sale dated 3 May 1986, the respondent
expressly stated that he "will sell at PUBLIC AUCTION to the highest bidder for CASH
and in Philippine Currency on May 12, 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning or soon
thereafter at El Varadero de Manila, Sangley Point, Cavite" the vessel M/V
Dadiangas, Tugboat Timonel, Tugboat Marinero and the other properties therein
described. The unrebutted testimony of Atty. Redentor R. Melo reveals that he went
to the auction site at 9:00 o'clock in the morning of 12 May 1986 and stayed there
until past 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Respondent did not show up to conduct the
auction sale. Later, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Atty. Melo, who had by
that time returned to Manila, was advised that the respondent appeared at 4:00
o'clock but that no auction was conducted. In his Minutes of Sheriff's Sale dated 12
May 1986, the respondent made it appear that he started the auction sale at 3:55
P.M. and concluded the proceedings at 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon with
Patriarca submitting the highest bid in the amount of P1,325,000.00. There is no
explanation as to why he could not start the bidding at 10:00 o'clock in the morning
as set out in his Notice. In the light of Atty. Melo's unrebutted testimony, it is evident
that the respondent falsified this entry in the Minutes. In his Sheriff's Certificate of
Sale also dated 12 May 1986, the respondent certified that the highest bidder
"thereupon did pay to the undersigned Deputy Sheriff the bid price of ONE MILLION
THREE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P1,325,000.00) PESOS, which amount
was credited to the partial satisfaction of the Writ of Execution." However, it is a fact
that as also found by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of 15 May 1989, which the
respondent cannot refute as he himself submitted the same to this Court and even
asked for the dismissal of the administrative case against him on the basis of the
said Resolution:

. . .on May 23, 1986, Patriarca offered the three vessels M/V Dadiangas, T/B
Marinero, and T/B Timonel to Rizalina Ingco-Cailian, a businesswoman engaged in
the buy and sell of scrap iron. Having agreed on the price of P1,325,000.00 for the

three vessels, Cailian, Patriarca, and his wife repaired to the Navotas Branch of the
Philippine National Bank that same day. Cailian bought Cashiers Check No. 273290
dated May 23, 1986, for P1,325,000.00 which, upon request of Patriarca who said he
had no money to pay for the vessels, was made payable to the order of "GEN. STAR
CONTAINER C/O ATTY. JOSE C. SISON," the judgment creditor.

On the same day, May 23, 1986, they went to Branch XXXI, RTC of Manila, where
Cailian met the accused for the first time. Atty. Jose C. Sison, and one Judge Luz.
Atty. Sison, Judge Luz, and Patriarca with his wife brought Cailian to the canteen of
the building housing Branch XXXI. She gave the cashier's check to Atty. Sison, and
Judge Luz prepared our Deed of Sale. It was dated May 20, 1986, the figure "20"
being handwritten, and appeared to have been acknowledged on the same date.

As a result of the transaction, Patriarca delivered to Cailian M/V Dadiangas and one
of the tugboats, which was later on taken back from her. The other tugboat was the
subject of a third-party claim of Compania Maritima alleged to be different from
Maritime, the judgment debtor.

Clearly, therefore, if indeed the public auction was held on 12 May 1986 and
Patriarca was the highest bidder therein, he did not at such time have the cash,
corresponding to his submitted bid, for delivery to the respondent and eventually,
the judgment creditor. Accordingly, pursuant to his own Notice, which of course is
binding on him, Patriarca could not be awarded the bid. The latter's inability to
produce cash is equivalent to a bidder's refusal to pay under Section 22, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court in which case, as provided therein, the sheriff "may again sell the
property to the highest bidder and shall not be responsible for any loss occasioned
thereby." Moreover, the sheriff may thereafter reject any subsequent bid of such
person. Since Patriarca had no available cash to pay for the bid, the respondent
could neither deliver the subject articles nor execute and deliver to the former a
certificate of sale as provided for in Section 25, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
even granting for the sake of argument that he did conduct the public auction on 12
May 1986, the respondent, in view of the non-payment of the purchase price,
violated said Section 25. Furthermore, he falsified his Sheriff's Certificate of Sale
upon entering therein the fact that Patriarca "thereupon did pay" to him the bid
price of P1,325,000.00 which was credited to the partial satisfaction of the writ of
execution. Assuming that Patriarca truly paid the purchase price, there could be no
possible explanation for the belated Sheriff's Partial Report dated 23 May 1986.

In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that Patriarca never acquired ownership
over the vessel M/V Dadiangas and the tugboats Marinero and Timonel. Neither
could he then have "sold" the same to Cailian. Hence, the latter stands on an
entirely different footing and must then be considered as the true vendee who

purchased the vessels on 23 May 1986 without any public bidding. In this regard,
the respondent, together with a certain Judge Luz and Atty. Jose C. Sison, became a
willing co-conspirator to conceal this illegal act by making it appear that Patriarca
sold the vessels to Cailian per a deed of sale which the said Judge Luz prepared on
23 May 1986, but which was dated 20 May 1986. In his haste to cover up for his
misdeeds, he even forgot to charge against the proceeds of the said "sale" the
sheriff's fee which is prescribed in Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court; such an
omission certainly prejudiced the government. It is unfortunate that the
Sandiganbayan failed to appreciate these illegal acts and despicable maneuverings.
Be that as it may, its dismissal of the criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence was never meant, as respondent doggedly believed and arrogantly
asserted, to foreclose administrative action against him or to give him a clean bill of
health in all respects. The Sandiganbayan, in dismissing the same, was simply
saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the respondent beyond
reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction 2 because of the
presumption of innocence which the Constitution guarantee an accused. 3 Lack or
absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any
evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though
insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases;
this is preponderance of evidence. 4 Then too, there is the "substantial evidence"
rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires in these cases such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. 5

Going back to Our findings, there is no doubt in Our minds that the respondent (a)
falsified the Minutes of Sale and the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale; (b) violated
Sections 22 and 25, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court by not conducting another bidding
assuming one was held on 12 May 1986 after the alleged highest bidder,
Patriarca, failed to pay the bid price, by executing in the latter's favor a certificate of
Sheriff's Sale and by delivering the auctioned vessels despite the failure to pay: (c)
illegally sold the vessels to Cailian on 23 May 1986 without a public bidding; and (d)
maliciously connived and conspired with Patriarca, Cailian and others to cover up
such illegal acts by making it appear, by means of an antedated deed of sale, that
Patriarca sold the vessels to Cailian.

Respondent is therefore guilty of gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct

prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He not only deliberately violated the
integrity of official acts of an employee of the court, but also undermined the faith
and trust of the public in the Judiciary. He has transgressed the constitutional
command that as a public office is a public trust, all public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and
lead modest lives. 6 In Jereos vs. Reblando, 7 We laid down the rule that the
conduct and behavior of every one connected with an office charged with the

dispensation of justice, such as the court of which the herein respondent is the
assigned sheriff, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized with propriety and
decorum, but above all else must be beyond suspicion.

While it is but proper that the respondent should not be kept a minute longer in the
Judiciary, his dismissal from the service should not end this case. In the light of the
above findings of conspiracy with other parties, including a certain Judge Luz who
prepared the alleged deed of sale in favor of Cailian, there is a need to dig deeper,
in a manner of speaking, in this case. This could open the door to the secret
chambers of a rumored syndicate which is in the business of fixing attachments and
execution sales.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS from the service, effective immediately,
respondent RAMON G. ENRIQUEZ, for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, with forfeiture of all benefits,
except the monetary value of his leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to his reemployment in any branch or service of the government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations.

The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to conduct a thorough

inquiry into and investigation of the circumstances surrounding the execution sale in
question, more particularly the true identity and alleged participation of a certain
Judge Luz as above indicated. For that purpose, it should avail of the records of
Criminal Case No. 12987 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan and take the
testimonies of, among others, the respondent, Ms. Rizalina Ingco-Cailian, Atty. Jose
C. Sison and Mr. Rolando Patriarca.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., took no part.

# Footnotes

People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 [1924].

Section 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court.

Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution.

Section 1, Rule 133, Rules of Court.

Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642 [1940].

Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution.

71 SCRA 126, 131-132 [1976].

Three fold liability rule

states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil,
criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently
of the others.