REPUBLIC V.

ROXAS
G.R. No. 157988; December 11, 2013

FACTS: Petitioner Republic, represented by the BFD, filed with the RTC a Complaint for
Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion against respondents Roxas and the ROD over the
subject property, docketed as Civil Case No. R-3110. Petitioner Republic alleged that the
subject property was within the Matchwood Forest Reserve and could not be the subject of
private appropriation and ownership; and possession of said property, no matter how long
would not convert the same into private property. The Director of Lands could not dispose of
the subject property under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act, thus, OCT No. P-5885 issued in respondent Roxass name was null
and void ab initio. Petitioner Republic also averred that respondent Roxas acquired OCT No.
P-5885 through fraud and misrepresentation, not only because the subject property was not
capable of registration, but also because respondent Roxas was disqualified to acquire the
same under the provisions of the Public Land Act, not having exercised acts of possession in
the manner and for the length of time required by law. The Director of Lands was only misled
into approving respondent Roxass application for homestead patent. Petitioner Republic
additionally mentioned that the subject property, as part of the Matchwood Forest Reserve,
was included in the lease agreement of petitioner Republic with petitioner PTFI.
Issue: WHETHER questions of fact can be reviewed on appeal?
HELD: Before delving into the merits, the propriety of these Petitions for Review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court should first be addressed. We note at the outset that except for the
third issue on estoppel and prescription, the other two issues involve questions of fact that
necessitate a review of the evidence on record. In Decaleng v. Bishop of the Missionary
District of the Philippine Islands of Protestant Episcopal Church in the Unites States of
America, we presented the general rule, as well as the exceptions, to the same:
Prefatorily, it is already a well-established rule that the Court, in the exercise of its power of
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is not a trier of facts and does not normally
embark on a re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial of the case, considering that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive
and binding on the Court. This rule, however, admits of exceptions as recognized by
jurisprudence,
to
wit:
(1) [W]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when
the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
The case at bar falls under several exceptions, i.e., the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and
the findings of fact are contradicted by the evidence on record. As a result, we must return

to the evidence submitted by the parties during trial and make our own evaluation of the
same.
TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v. PILIPINAS SHELL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170007; April 7, 2014

FACTS: The union thereafter filed a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
88178, in the Court of Appeals on January 13, 2005. The union alleged in its petition that the
Secretary of Labor and Employment acted with grave abuse of discretion in grossly
misappreciating the facts and issue of the case. It contended that the issue is the unfair
labor practice of the company in the form of bad faith bargaining and not the CBA deadlock.
Anchoring its position on item 8 of what the parties agreed upon as the ground rules that
would govern the negotiations, the union argued that, at the time the Order dated
September 20, 2004 was issued, there was no CBA deadlock on account of the unions nonconformity with the declaration of a deadlock, as item 8 of the said ground rules provided
that a "deadlock can only be declared upon mutual consent of both parties." Thus, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment committed grave abuse of discretion when she assumed
jurisdiction and directed the parties to submit position papers even on the economic issues.
Moreover, according to the Court of Appeals, Article 263(g) of the Labor Code vests in the
Secretary of Labor and Employment not only the discretion to determine what industries are
indispensable to national interest but also the power to assume jurisdiction over such
industries labor disputes, including all questions and controversies arising from the said
disputes. Thus, as the Secretary of Labor and Employment found the companys business to
be one that is indispensable to national interest, she had authority to assume jurisdiction
over all of the companys labor disputes, including the economic issues. Finally, the Court of
Appeals noted that the unions contention that the Secretary of Labor and Employment
cannot resolve the economic issues because the union had not given its consent to the
declaration of a deadlock was already moot. The Court of Appeals observed that the union
filed on February 7, 2005 another Notice of Strike citing CBA deadlock as a ground and, in an
Order dated March 1, 2005, the then Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment, Manuel
Imson, granted the companys Manifestation with Motion to Consider the Second Notice of
Strike as Subsumed to the First Notice of Strike.

ISSUE: Whether a question of fact can be raised on Appeal?

HELD: No. A question of fact cannot properly be raised in a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. This petition of the union now before this Court is a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The existence of bad faith is a question of fact
and is evidentiary. The crucial question of whether or not a party has met his statutory duty
to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the individual case, and good faith or
bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. The issue of whether there was already
deadlock between the union and the company is likewise a question of fact.

ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, AURORA J. CIFRA, FLORDELIZA J. ARCILLA, LOURDES J.

CATALAN, ETHELINDA J. HOLT, BIENVENIDO R. JONGCO, ARTEMIO R. JONGCO, JR.
and JOEL JONGCO, v. ISMAEL VELOSO III
G.R. No. 171365; October 6, 2010

FACTS: The RTC-Branch 227-QC issued a Resolution dismissing respondents complaint in

Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 for violating the rule against splitting of cause of action, lack of
jurisdiction, and failure to disclose the pendency of a related case. The RTC-Branch 227
adjudged that Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 involved the same facts, parties, and causes of
action as those in the unlawful detainer case, and the MeTC had already properly taken
cognizance of the latter case. Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 227 decision in
Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 on September 26, 2003. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
said judgment on October 10, 2003, which RTC-Branch 227 denied in an Order dated
December 30, 2003. Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 227 order denying his
Motion for Reconsideration on February 20, 2004, and he filed his Notice of Appeal on March
1, 2004. However, the RTC-Branch 227, in an Order dated March 23, 2004, dismissed
respondents appeal for being filed out of time. Respondent received a copy of the RTCBranch 27 order dismissing his appeal on April 30, 2004 and he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the same on May 3, 2004. The RTC-Branch 227, in another Order dated
May 31, 2004, granted respondents latest motion because it was convinced that it is but
appropriate and fair to both parties that this matter of whether or not the Appeal was filed
on time, be resolved by the appellate court rather than by this Court. The RTC-Branch 227
then ordered that the records of the case be forwarded as soon as possible to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings. On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 82610. The Court of Appeals fully agreed with the RTC-Branch
227 in dismissing respondents second cause of action (i.e., breach of contract).

ISSUE: Whether respondent timely filed his appeal

HELD: Yes. Jurisprudence has settled the fresh period rule, according to which, an ordinary
appeal from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule
41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the
original judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial court
dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. The respondent
received a copy of the Resolution dated September 2, 2003 of the RTC-Branch 227
dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 on September 26, 2003. Fourteen
days thereafter, on October 10, 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said
resolution. The RTC-Branch 227 denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration in an Order
dated December 30, 2003, which the respondent received on February 20, 2004. On
March 1, 2004, just after nine days from receipt of the order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration, respondent already filed his Notice of Appeal. Clearly, under the fresh
period rule, respondent was able to file his appeal well-within the prescriptive period of 15
days, and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving due course to said appeal in CA-G.R. CV
No. 82610.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSELITO MORATE Y TARNATE

G.R. No. 201156, January 29, 2014

FACTS: Accusedappellant appealed his case to the Court of Appeals. He questioned his
conviction on the basis of what he claimed as noncompliance with the rule on chain of
custody of seized illegal drugs. He further claimed that the trial court should not have given
full weight and credence to the prosecutions evidence as there was failure to prove the
integrity of the seized drug. Such failure on the part of the prosecution means failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In particular, the accusedappellant points to the
following violations of the chain of custody requirement under Section 21(1) of Republic Act
No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations: the seized items were marked and
subjected to inventory not at the scene of the buybust but at the police station; the
marking and inventory of the seized drugs were conducted in the presence of the buybust
team, together with Marbella and Cea, but without the accusedappellant or his
representative; and, no photographs were taken during the inventory. For the Court of
Appeals, the circumstances above show that the chain of custody of the seized items was
properly established: the items seized from the accusedappellant at the scene of the crime
were also the items marked by the arresting officers, turned over to the investigator, sent to
the Crime Laboratory, and returned after yielding positive results for Marijuana. Accused
appellant is now before this Court insisting on the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt on account of the prosecutions noncompliance with the chain of
custody requirement under Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 and its implementing
rules and regulations.

ISSUE: Whether objection to evidence can be raised for the first time on appeal?

HELD: No. The Court held that objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the
form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on
appeal. In this case, the accusedappellant never questioned the chain of custody during
trial. Specifically, the records show that the accusedappellant never assailed the propriety
and regularity of the process of marking and inventory of the seized items during the
prosecutions presentation of evidence on that matter during the testimony of PO1
Manamtam. Also, when the prosecution formally offered the Certification of Inventory as
evidence for the purpose of proving the immediate and accurate inventory, marking and
packing of the purchased and the seized marijuana to maintain and preserve [their]
identities and integrity and the four sachets of marijuana as evidence for the purpose of
proving the identities and integrity of the purchased and the seized marijuana as those
were immediately inventoried, marked and documented/recorded, the accusedappellants
comment was simply Denied as to the purposes for which they are being offered for being

self-serving pieces of evidence and said nothing about noncompliance with the chain of
custody requirement.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANASTACIO AMISTOSO y BROCA

G.R. No. 201447; January 9, 2013

(Note: Nakalagay sa doc is ang issue dito is death ng nag aappeal pero di naman
namatay yung accused sa case)
FACTS: Amistoso was charged for VIOLATION OF ANTI-RAPE LAW OF 1997. That on or about
the 10th day of July 2000, at about 8:00 oclock in the evening thereof, at x x x Province of
Masbate, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with lewd design and with intent to have carnal knowledge with AAA, a 12-year old
girl, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal
knowledge with the victim against her will and without her consent. With the aggravating
circumstance of relationship, accused being the father of the victim. When arraigned on July
23, 2002, Amistoso pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The RTC rendered its Decision
finding Amistoso guilty of qualified rape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed Amistosos
conviction for qualified rape but modified the penalties imposed. Amistoso argues that the
defense of denial and alibi should not be viewed with outright disfavor. Such defense,
notwithstanding its inherent weakness, may still be a plausible excuse. Be that as it may,
the prosecution cannot profit from the weakness of Amistosos defense; it must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and establish Amistosos guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Amistoso asserts that the prosecution failed even in this regard.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DOMINGO PANITERCE

G.R. No. 186382; April 5, 2010

FACTS: Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Hedy S. Aganan charged Paniterce with four counts
of rape of his daughter AAA. In two Amended Informations, both dated December 3, 2002,
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Daniel M. Salvadora charged Paniterce with two counts of
rape of his other daughter BBB. When arraigned, Paniterce pleaded not guilty to all the
charges. The RTC rendered a Decision, finding the accused guilty. Paniterce filed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01001. The appellate
court rendered a Decision on August 22, 2008 affirming the RTC judgment. Paniterce,
through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals conveying his intention to
appeal to us the aforementioned Decision dated August 22, 2008 of the appellate court. The
Court of Appeals gave due course to Paniterces Notice of Appeal. However, Paniterce had
died on August 22, 2009 at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital. Paniterces Death Certificate was
attached to said letter.

ISSUE: Whether the death of the accused results to the extinguishment of the action?

HELD: Yes. The death of an accused pending his appeal extinguished not only his criminal
liabilities but also his civil liabilities solely arising from or based on the crime committed.
Clearly, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on Paniterces appeal. Whether or not he was
guilty of the crimes charged has become irrelevant since, following Article 89(1) of the
Revised Penal Code and our disquisition in Bayotas, even assuming Paniterce had incurred
criminal liabilities, they were totally extinguished by his death. Moreover, because Paniterces
appeal was still pending and no final judgment of conviction had been rendered against him
when he died, his civil liabilities arising from the crimes, being civil liabilities ex delicto, were
likewise extinguished by his death.

JORGE Q. GO v. VINEZ A. HORTALEZA

A.M. No. P-05-1971; June 26, 2008

FACTS: The respondent seized and levied upon the complainants Toyota Corolla car with
Plate No. ADV-767. Respondent impounded and stored said vehicle at the parking lot of the
Hall of Justice in Dagupan City, which according to complainant exposed it to the elements.
To secure the release of the car, complainant deposited, under protest, the amount of
P161,042 with the OCC. A Resolution was issued by the MTC denying complainants Motion
for Reconsideration but granted his Motion for Release of Motor Vehicle. Accordingly, upon
order of the MTC, respondent released to the complainant, through Melanio Balolong,
complainants Toyota Corolla. However, according to complainant, before effecting the
release of the said vehicle, respondent demanded from complainants representative,
Melanio Balolong, the amount of P5,000.00, which purportedly would answer for the
expenses in the implementation of the writ of execution. Respondent did not deny his
receipt of the said sum of money as he in fact issued an ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT.
Complainant claimed to have repeatedly demanded to no avail the return of the said
P5,000.00 or the issuance of an official receipt if the aforementioned expenses could
properly be charged to complainant, the losing party in the MTC case. As required by the
Court Administrator, respondent filed his comment dated June 24, 20041 which prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint. Respondent cited Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, requiring the
requesting party to pay sheriffs expenses incurred in enforcing writs of execution. He
explained that he paid P4,000.00 to a mechanic and P500.00 to a key master and the
balance of P500.00 was spent for his transportation expenses and other expenses in serving
the writ. The mechanic removed the vehicles wheel to prevent it from being taken by bad
element and also watched over the same while it was stored in the courtyard.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent properly applied the Rules in implementing a writ
of execution?
HELD: No. Respondent sheriff departed from the procedure prescribed by the Rules in the
collection of payment for sheriffs expenses in implementing a writ of execution. Respondent
as an officer of the court should have shown a high degree of professionalism in the
performance of his duties. Instead, he failed to comply with his duties under the law and to
observe proper procedure dictated by the rules. the steps that must be followed before an
interested party pays the sheriffs expenses are: 1) the sheriff must make an estimate of the
expenses to be incurred by him; 2) he must obtain court approval for such estimated
expenses; 3) the approved estimated expenses shall be deposited by the interested party
with the Clerk of Court and ex-officio sheriff; 4) the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount

to the executing sheriff; and 5) the executing sheriff shall liquidate his expenses within the
same period for rendering a return on the writ.1

CALIFORNIA BUS LINES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 145408; August 20, 2008

FACTS: MIAA filed a civil action for ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. 127-93, against
CBL with the Pasay City MTC, Branch 46. The MTC rendered a decision dated July 30, 1993,
in favor of MIAA, and ordered CBL to vacate the leased premises and to pay rental in arrears,
attorneys fees and costs. The MTC decision became final and executory for failure of CBL to
appeal the same. Thus, MIAA filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution dated
August 2, 1993 which was granted on August 9, 1993. On November 3, 1993, the parties
entered into a Compromise Agreement which was approved by the MTC. However, CBL failed
to comply with the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement. Hence, MIAA filed a
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, which was granted by the MTC. Again, CBL failed to
comply with the schedule of payment stipulated in the Compromise Agreement prompting
MIAA to file a Motion for the Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution. This was granted by the MTC
and the assailed Alias Writ of Execution was issued. In reaction to the issuance of the
aforementioned writ, CBL filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure with the Pasay City RTC, Branch 108. In the RTC, CBL insisted that the alias
writ of execution was issued by the MTC with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether the MTC exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the challenged Alias Writ of
Execution

HELD: The petition must fail. CBL contends that when the Compromise Agreement was
approved by the MTC, its earlier decision dated July 30, 1993 was already final and
executory. Thus, the Compromise Agreement substantially altered the July 30, 1993 MTC
decision, and the subsequent application for an Alias Writ of Execution after more than
seven (7) years cannot be entertained since it is fundamental that a final and executory
decision cannot be amended or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes. It is also well
settled that the court is authorized to modify or alter a judgment after the same has become
executory, whenever the circumstances transpire rendering its execution unjust and
equitable. The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments or
actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights. Far from sleeping on their rights,
MIAA persistently pursued their rights of action. It is utterly unjust to allow CBL to further

evade the satisfaction of its obligation because of sheer literal adherence to technicality,
which CBL itself had put aside to serve its own interest, the well-being of its employees and
the interest of the riding public. After all, procedural rules are liberally construed in order to
promote their objective and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM V. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF

PASIG CITY, BRANCH 71
G.R. No. 175393; December 18, 2009

FACTS: On May 7, 1990, Antonio, represented by Santiago, filed an action for reconveyance
of the excluded lots against GSIS in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City (Branch 71),
presided over by Hon. Celso Lavia (respondent judge), docketed as Civil Case No. 59439
and entitled Eduardo M. Santiago, et al. v. GSIS. After a court battle between Antonio and
Santiago wherein the former sought the revocation of the Special Power of Attorney in favor
of the latter, Antonio was substituted by Eduardo Santiago who, upon his death on March 6,
1996, was later substituted by his widow, Rosario Enriquez Vda. de Santiago (private
respondent), as plaintiff in the case. After trial, respondent judge rendered a Decision dated
December 17, 1997, finding that neither prescription nor laches had set in. Petitioner
appealed the aforesaid decision to the CA, which, in a decision dated February 22, 2002,
affirmed the same. GSIS went up to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
The first CA decision was affirmed in toto by the Supreme Court in a decision dated October
28, 2003, which became final and executory on February 24, 2004.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the subject case having become final and executory, the petition
should be dismissed?
HELD: Yes. It is settled that when a final judgment is executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to
be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is
founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time.The
only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of socalled nunc pro tunc entries in which case there is no prejudice to any party, and
where the judgment is void. None of these has been shown to be present to justify
the "modification" of the judgment. Parenthetically, the modification was made not
by the same court that rendered the judgment. None of the exceptional
circumstances to this doctrine exist in this case. The modification that would result

should the petition be granted would not involve merely clerical errors, but would
entail presentation of alleged newly-discovered evidence that should have been
raised as affirmative defenses during trial. Moreover, the judgment involved herein
has been upheld, and not declared void, by this Court.

UNIVERSITY PHYSICIANS SERVICES, INCORPORATED v. MARIAN CLINICS, INC. and

DR. LOURDES MABANTA
G.R. No. 15230; September 1, 2010

FACTS: Marian Clinics, Inc.and University Physicians Services, Incorporated entered into a
Lease Agreement whereby the former leased to the latter the Marian General Hospital
and four schools for a period of ten years. The land, buildings, facilities, fixtures and
equipment appurtenant thereto, including the soledad Building, were included in the
lease, for which a monthly rental of P70,000 was agreed upon. Later, UPSI filed a
complaint for specific performance against MCIand prayed for the delivery of the
Certificates of Occupancy of the buildings leased, for the correction of the defects in the
electrical installations thereon, and damages. UPsi sent a letter to MCI, informing it of
the filing of the complaint and the suspension of payment of the monthly rentals until
the resolution of the case. On November 7, 1975, MCI sent a demand letter to UPSI for
the payment of the rent. Thereafter, MCI and Dr. Lourdes F. Mabanta filed a Complaint
for Unlawful Detainer against UPSI which was later on dismissed the on the finding that
(1) UPSIs suspension of rental payments was justified; and (2) there was no ground to
cause the rescission of the lease and warrant the ejectment of UPSI.
During the pendency of these cases, MCI ceded to the Development Bank of the
Philippines some of the leased buildings, including certain facilities, furniture, fixtures
and equipment found therein, in full settlement of MCIs debt to DBP. The Deed of
Cession of Properties in Payment of Debt (Dacion en Pago) contained an annex which
listed the properties ceded to DBP. Upon the execution of the dacion en pago, UPSI paid
P60,000 of the monthly rental to DBP as the new owner of the properties subject of the
dacion
en
pago.
The RTC of Manila affirmed the City Court Decision dismissing MCIs unlawful detainer
case. The intermediate appellate court rendered its Decision reversing the rulings of the
lower courts. According to the CA, the absence of the certificates of occupancy for two
of the leased buildings, being a matter between the owner of the building and the city
government, did not impair the peaceful and adequate enjoyment by UPSI of the
premises and the alleged defective electrical installations on the premises leased is no
justification for the refusal to pay rentals, as, under Article 1663 of the Civil Code, the
lessee may have said installations properly reinstalled at the expense of the lessor.
Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether the writ of execution conform substantially to the essentials of the
promulgated judgment?
HELD: The Court rules in the affirmative. It is settled that a writ of execution must
conform substantially to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated.
Execution not in harmony with the judgment is bereft of validity. It must conform, more
particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.

YOLANDA LEACHON CORPUZ v. SERGIO V. PASCUA, Sheriff III. Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Trece Martires City, Cavite.
A.M. No. P-11-2972; September 28, 2011

FACTS: On June 2, 2010, Yolanda, Juanitos wife, and her daughter were in her office at the
Cavite Provincial Engineering Office of Trece Martires City. At around three oclock in the
afternoon, Sheriff Pascua arrived at Yolandas office and demanded that Yolanda
surrender the Toyota Town Ace Noah with Plate No. 471, which was registered in
Yolandas name, threatening to damage the said vehicle if Yolanda would refuse to do so.
Sheriff Pascua tried to forcibly open the vehicle. Yolanda called her brother to ask for
help. Yolandas brother arrived after one hour. Yolanda, with her daughter and brother,
went out of the office to face Sheriff Pascua. Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and to
avoid further indignities, Yolanda surrendered the key to the vehicle to Sheriff Pascua,
but she did not sign any document which Sheriff Pascua asked her to sign. Offended,
humiliated, and embarrassed, Yolanda was compelled to file the present administrative
complaint against Sheriff Pascua. In addition to the aforementioned incident on June 2,
2010, Yolanda alleged in her complaint that Sheriff Pascua kept possession of the
vehicle and even used the same on several occasions for his personal use. Yolanda
attached to her complaint pictures to prove that Sheriff Pascua, instead of parking the
vehicle within the court premises, in accordance with the concept of custodia legis,
parked the vehicle in the garage of his own house. Yolanda also claimed that her vehicle
was illegally confiscated or levied upon by Sheriff Pascua because the Writ of Execution,
which Sheriff Pascua was implementing, was issued against Juanito, Yolandas husband.
Yolanda further pointed out that Sheriff Pascua has not yet posted the notice of sale of
personal property, as required by Rule 39, Section 15 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether the sheriff properly levied the properties?
HELD: No, the Court finds that Sheriff Pascua, in levying upon Yolandas vehicle even though
the judgment and writ he was implementing were against Juanito, then parking the

same vehicle at his home garage, is guilty of simple misconduct. A sheriff is not
authorized to attach or levy on property not belonging to the judgment
debtor. The sheriff may be liable for enforcing execution on property
belonging to a third party. If he does so, the writ of execution affords him no
justification, for the action is not in obedience to the mandate of the writ.
Sheriff Pascua totally ignored the established procedural rules laid down under Section
9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court when he did not give Juanito the opportunity to either
pay his obligation under in cash, certified bank check, or any other mode of payment
acceptable to Panganiban; or to choose which of his property may be levied upon to
satisfy the same judgment, Sheriff Pascua immediately levied upon the vehicle that
belonged to Juanitos wife, Yolanda. The levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor
may be had by the executing sheriff only if the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part
of the full amount stated in the writ of execution. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all
or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check, or other mode acceptable to the
judgment obligee, the judgment obligor is given the option to immediately choose which
of his property or part thereof, not otherwise exempt from execution, may be levied
upon sufficient to satisfy the judgment.

SPOUSES JESSE CACHOPERO and Bema Cachopero v. Rachel Celestial

G.R. No. 146754; March 21, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner Jesse Cachopero, married to co-petitioner Bema Cachopero (spouses

Cachopero), is the younger brother of respondent Rachel Celestial (Celestial). Celestial
owned an old residential house (old house) situated on Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC) Psd105462 (hereinafter, Celestials lot) at Poblacion 8, Midsayap, Cotabato, Philippines. 2[4] A
major portion of this house stood on the eastern part of the 344-square meter-lot
(subject land) immediately adjoining Celestials lot. The subject land was formerly part of
the Salunayan Creek that became dry as a result of the construction of an irrigation
canal by the National Irrigation Administration. Celestial filed an Ejectment case,
Celestial alleged that the spouses Cachopero had been living in her house for free and
out of tolerance since 1973. Celestial claimed that when the condition of the old house
had become uninhabitable, she decided to have it demolished. However, the spouses
Cachopero refused to vacate the premises. Celestial and the spouses Cachopero entered
into a Compromise Agreement. The MTC rendered a judgment, approving the
Compromise Agreement. The then Deputy Sheriff Benedicto F. Flauta issued the Sheriffs
Return in the above Ejectment case. However, as the portion of the house beyond
Celestials lot was not demolished, Celestial filed a Motion for the Issuance of an Alias
Writ of Execution, with a prayer to cite the Deputy Sheriff in Contempt for not executing
the Writ of Execution. Celestial filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 18, of Midsayap, Cotabato, praying that the MTC be ordered to issue
an Alias Writ of Execution in the Ejectment case and that the Sheriff be directed to

enforce such Alias Writ of Execution. The RTC issued an Order dismissing the petition
for mandamus for lack of merit. Celestial brought this matter to the Court of Appeals
and claimed that the RTC itself found that part of the old house, subject of the
compromise agreement, was still standing or undemolished. In finding merit in
Celestials appeal, the Court of Appeals said that a compromise judgment is immediately
executory and once judicially approved, has the force of res judicata between the
parties, which should not be disturbed except for the vices of consent or perjury.
ISSUE: Will Mandamus lie to compel the Regional Trial Court to issue an alias Writ of
Execution to execute a compromise agreement which the Provincial Sheriff, the
Municipal Trial Court, and the Regional Trial Court ruled to have been properly executed?
HELD: Yes. To justify the stay of immediate execution, the supervening events must have a
direct effect on the matter already litigated and settled. Or, the supervening events
must create a substantial change in the rights or relations of the parties which would
render execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable making it
imperative to stay immediate execution in the interest of justice. The writ of mandamus
is aimed to compel a respondent, who failed to execute his/her legal duty, or unlawfully
excluded another from the enjoyment of an entitled right or office, to perform the act
needed to be done in order to protect the rights of the petitioner. In addition,
mandamus applies as a remedy when the petitioners right is founded clearly in law and
is not doubtful. In the case at bar, Celestials petition for mandamus is anchored on her
rights emanating from the Compromise Agreement she executed with the spouses
Cachopero.

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 173616; June 25, 2014

FACTS: The ATO filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Miaque in the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City, Branch 3. The MTCC subsequently rendered a
Decisionfinding [Miaque] to be unlawfully detaining the following premises. Miaque
appealed the MTCC Decision to the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 24. The RTC, in its Decision
dated June 7, 2003, affirmed the MTCC Decision in its entirety. Miaques motion for
reconsideration was denied. Court of Appeals: CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 Miaque questioned
the RTC Decision in the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 79439, on September 25, 2003. In a Decision dated April 29, 2005, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC Decision. Miaque moved for
reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated January 5, 2006. Miaque brought
the case to this Court in a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 171099. In a
Resolution dated February 22, 2006, the petition was denied as no reversible error in the
Court of Appeals Decision was sufficiently shown. The motion for reconsideration of
Miaque was denied with finality.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and the subsequent writ of preliminary
injunction

HELD: The petition is meritorious. Section 21, Rule 70 provides that the judgment of the
RTC in ejectment cases appealed to it shall be immediately executory and can be
enforced despite the perfection of an appeal to a higher court. To avoid such immediate
execution, the defendant may appeal said judgment to the CA and therein apply for a
writ of preliminary injunction. In this case, the decisions of the MTCC, of the RTC, and of
the CA, unanimously recognized the right of the ATO to possession of the property and
the corresponding obligation of Miaque to immediately vacate the subject premises. This
means that the MTCC, the RTC, and the Court of Appeals all ruled that Miaque does not
have any right to continue in possession of the said premises. It is therefore puzzling
how the Court of Appeals justified its issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction with
the sweeping statement that Miaque "appears to have a clear legal right to hold on to
the premises leased by him from ATO at least until such time when he shall have been
duly ejected therefrom by a writ of execution of judgment caused to be issued by the
MTCC. The first characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is immediately executory -- is
emphasized by the fact that no resolutory condition has been imposed that will prevent
or stay the execution of the RTCs judgment. The second characteristic -- the judgment
of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom reinforces the first. The
judgment of the RTC in an ejectment case is enforceable upon its rendition and, upon
motion, immediately executory notwithstanding an appeal taken therefrom.

JIMMY T. GO v. THE CLERK OF COURT AND EX-OFFICIO PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF

NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, ILDEFONSO M. VILLANUEVA, JR., and SHERIFF
DIOSCORO F. CAPONPON, JR. and MULTI-LUCK CORPORATION
G.R. No. 154623; March 13, 2009

FACTS: On August 10, 1998, respondent Multi-Luck Corporation (Multi-Luck) filed a

collection suit against Alberto T. Looyuko (Looyuko) as sole proprietor of Noahs Ark
Merchandising Inc. (NAMI). The complaint pertained to three (3) dishonored United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) checks with an aggregate amount of P8,985,440.00
issued by Looyuko/NAMI to Mamertha General Merchandising. These checks were
indorsed to Multi-Luck, who claimed to be a holder in due course of such checks. On
January 27, 2000, upon Multi-Lucks motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Bacolod
RTC rendered a Decision ordering Looyuko/NAMI to pay Multi-Luck the value of the three
(3) UCPB checks. Looyuko/NAMI did not file an appeal. Hence, the Decision became final
and executory. The Bacolod RTC issued a writ of execution over a house and lot covered
by TCT No. T-126519 registered in the name of Looyuko and one share in the Negros

Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. in the name of NAMI. On October 25, 2000,
petitioner filed a complaint for injunction with a prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction against respondents before the RTC, Pasig City,
Branch 266. The complaint alleged that petitioner is a business partner of Looyuko and
that the former co-owned the properties of Looyuko/NAMI including the properties
subject of the aforementioned auction sales. It was further alleged that the intended
public auction of the subject properties would unduly deprive him of his share of the
property without due process of law considering that he was not impleaded as a party in
Civil Case No. 98-10404. Multi-Luck filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, among
others, that the Pasig RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioners
claim and over the public respondent sheriffs as well as over Multi-Luck. The Pasig RTC
issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining public respondent sheriffs Caponpon, Jr.
and Villanueva, Jr. from holding the public auction. Multi-Luck elevated the case to the
CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of restraining
order and/or injunction. The CA granted Multi-Lucks petition and reversed the ruling of
the Pasig RTC. The CA ruled that the November 23, 2000 Order issued by the Pasig RTC
interfered with the order of the Bacolod RTC, which is a co-equal and coordinate court.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC Pasig may validly issue a preliminary injunction?
HELD: The doctrine of non-interference is premised on the principle that a judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of
concurrent jurisdiction. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
adjudicated and to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner has the burden to
establish (a) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) a violation
of that right; (c) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ
to prevent serious damage. As correctly ratiocinated by the CA, cases wherein an execution
order has been issued, are still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still
proceedings in the suit. Since the Bacolod RTC had already acquired jurisdiction over the
collection suit (Civil Case No. 98-10404) and rendered judgment in relation thereto, it
retained jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts over its judgment,
including all incidents relative to the control and conduct of its ministerial officers, namely
public respondent sheriffs. Thus, the issuance by the Pasig RTC of the writ of preliminary
injunction in Civil Case No. 68125 was a clear act of interference with the judgment of
Bacolod RTC in Civil Case No. 98-10404.

SPS. GONZALO T. DELA ROSA & CRISTETA DELA ROSA, v. HEIRS OF JUAN VALDEZ
and SPOUSES POTENCIANO MALVAR AND LOURDES MALVAR,
G.R. No. 159101; July 27, 2011
FACTS: The instant Petition traces its roots to a Complaint for Quieting of Title and
Declaration of Nullity of Transfer Certificates of Title involving the subject property, filed
before the RTC by Manila Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (MCDC),
against Gonzalo and Cristeta dela Rosa (spouses Dela Rosa) and Juan, Jose, Pedro and Maria,
all surnamed De la Cruz, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-6015. Complaints-in-intervention
were filed in the said case by (1) North East Property Ventures, Inc. (NEPVI), and spouses
Valdez and spouses Malvar. The spouses Malvar were the grantees/assignees under a Deed
of Absolute Transfer/Conveyance over the subject property executed by the spouses Dela
Rosa on September 6, 2001. The RTC granted the joint prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction of the spouses Valdez and spouses Malvar. The spouses
Dela Rosa filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, but it was denied

by the RTC in another Order dated February 28, 2003. According to the RTC, the issues and
evidence presented by the spouses Dela Rosa in their Motion for Reconsideration merely rehashed those already thoroughly discussed in the Order. Aggrieved, the spouses Dela Rosa
filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. On June 10, 2003, the Court of
Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the spouses Dela Rosas Petition for Certiorari and,
thus, upholding the RTC Orders dated December 16, 2002 and February 28, 2003. The
appellate court agreed with the RTC that there are ample justifications for the issuance of
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of the spouses Valdez and spouses
Malvar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which placed the
spouses Valdez and spouses Malvar in possession of the subject property during the
pendency of Civil Case No. 00-6015. For this reason, the Court shall address and concern
itself only with the assailed writ, but not with the merits of the case pending before the RTC.
HELD: No. In the instant Petition, the Court finds that the RTC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of the spouses
Valdez and spouses Malvar. Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not commit any
reversible error in dismissing the spouses Dela Rosas Petition for Certiorari. The RTC Orders
dated December 16, 2002 and February 28, 2003 have settled nothing more than the
question of which party/parties is/are entitled to possession of the subject property while
Civil Case No. 00-6015 is still being heard. The findings of fact and opinion of the RTC, based
on the evidence that had so far been submitted by the parties, are merely interlocutory in
nature. Even with its issuance of said Orders, the RTC is not precluded from proceeding with
Civil Case No. 00-6015 to receive additional evidence and hear further arguments that will
help said trial court to determine with finality the rightful owner/s and possessor/s of the
subject property. Although as a general rule, a court should not by means of a preliminary
injunction, transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another, this
rule admits of some exceptions. For example, when there is a clear finding of ownership and
possession of the land or unless the subject property is covered by a torrens title pointing to
one of the parties as the undisputed owner. In the case at bar, the intervenors Valdez and
Malvar have established a clear and legal right of ownership and possession and the alleged
TCT of the defendants spouses dela Rosa is non-existent.

BP PHILIPPINES, INC. (FORMERLY BURMAH CASTROL PHILIPPINES, INC.) v. CLARK

TRADING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 175284; September 19, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner alleged that sometime in 1994 it had entered into a Marketing and
Technical Assistance Licensing Agreement and a Marketing and Distribution Agreement
(agreements) with Castrol Limited, U.K., a corporation organized under the laws of England,
and the owner and manufacturer of Castrol products. Essentially, under the terms of the
agreements, Castrol Limited, U.K. granted petitioner the title "exclusive wholesaler importer
and exclusive distributor" of Castrol products in the territory of the Philippines. Under the
July 22, 1998 Variation "territory" was further clarified to include duty-free areas. Petitioner
claimed that respondent, by selling and distributing Castrol Products not sourced from

petitioner in the Philippines, violated petitioners exclusive rights under the agreements.
Despite a cease and desist letter dated September 14, 1998 sent by petitioner, respondent
continued to distribute and sell Castrol products in its duty-free shop. Petitioner, citing Yu v.
Court of Appeals as basis for its claim, contended that the unauthorized distribution and sale
of Castrol products by respondent "will cause grave and irreparable damage to its goodwill
and reputation." The RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a TRO for a period of
twenty (20) days enjoining respondent "from selling and distributing Castrol products until
further order. The RTC denied petitioners prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, there being no sufficient justification for the relief. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner was not able to establish the existence of a
clear legal right to be protected and the acts which would constitute the alleged violation of
said right. The circumstances under which the Yu case was decided upon were different from
that of the present case.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to a permanent injunction and damages.

HELD: No. Petitioner was not able to establish the existence of a clear legal right to be
protected and the acts which would constitute the alleged violation of said right. The
circumstances under which the Yu case was decided upon were different from that of the
present case. Firstly, in Yu, the High Court did not make a final determination of the rights
and obligations of the parties in connection with the exclusive sales agency agreement of
wall covering products between Philip Yu and the House of Mayfair in England. Said case
reached the High Court in connection with the incident on the preliminary injunction and the
main suit for injunction was still pending with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The High
Court categorically stated that their "observations" do not in the least convey the message
that they "have placed the cart ahead of the horse, so to speak." This is the reason why in
the dispositive portion of said case, the High Court remanded the case to the court of origin.
In the instant case, the trial court already rendered its assailed Decision which found that
[petitioner] has not shown that it has a right which must be protected and that [respondent]
is not guilty of acts which violate [petitioners] right. Thus, We fail to see how the High
Courts "observations" in the Yu case should be cited as a controlling precedent by
[petitioner]. Writ of injunction would issue: [U]pon the satisfaction of two requisites, namely:
(1) the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) acts which are violative of said right. In
the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave
abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where
the complainants right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of
irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.

Palm Tree Estates, Inc. and Belle Air Golf and Country Club, Inc., vs. Philippine
Bank,
G.R. No. 159370; October 3, 2012

FACTS: PTEI entered into a seven-year term loan agreement with PNB for the amount of
P320 million, or its US dollar equivalent, in view of urgent need for additional funding for the
completion of its ongoing projects in Lapu-Lapu City. As security for the payment of the loan,
a Real Estate Mortgage over 48 parcels of land covering an aggregate area of 353,916 sq.m.
together with the buildings and improvements thereon, was executed by PTEI in favor of PNB

on February 21, 1997. On June 15, 1998, upon the request of PTEI, an Amendment to Loan
Agreement. On the same day, June 15, 1998, as a result of PTEIs transfer to BAGCCI of the
ownership, title and interest over 199,134 sq.m. of the real properties mortgaged to PNB,
PTEI executed an Amendment to Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB with BAGCCI as
accommodation mortgagor with respect to the real properties transferred to it by PTEI. As
PTEI defaulted in its payment of past due loan with PNB, the bank filed a Petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties on March 27, 2001. On April 23, 2001,
to enjoin PNB from foreclosing on the mortgage, PTEI and BAGCCI filed a Complaint in the
RTC of Lapu-Lapu City for breach of contracts, nullity of promissory notes, annulment of
mortgages, fixing of principal, accounting, nullity of interests and penalties, annulment of
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, injunction, damages, with prayer for temporary
restraining order, and writ of preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil Case No.
5513-L and raffled to Branch 27. Subsequently, the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City issued the Order
dated May 17, 2001 ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Reconsideration of the above order was denied in an Order dated September 3, 2001.
Thereafter, PNB filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that the RTC
of Lapu-Lapu City acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Orders dated May 17,
2001 and September 3, 2001.The Court of Appeals, in the assailed Decision dated March 21,
2003, found merit in PNBs petition. According to the Court of Appeals, PTEI and BAGCCI
failed to show a clear and unmistakable right which would have necessitated the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction, while PNB had the right to extrajudicial foreclosure under the
loan agreement when its debtors defaulted in their obligation.

ISSUE: whether the writ of injunction was issued by the trial court with grave abuse of
discretion, in which case the appellate court correctly set it aside.
HELD: The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that PTEI and BAGCCI failed to show a
clear and unmistakable right which would have necessitated the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. For the writ to issue, two requisites must be present, namely, the
existence of the right to be protected, and that the facts against which the injunction is to be
directed are violative of said right. A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event
which must be granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of
the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine
whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before
it. In the absence of the same, and where facts are shown to be wanting in bringing the
matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for
having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion. In the absence of a clear legal right, the
issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not
designed to protect contingent or future rights. It is not proper when the complainants right
is doubtful or disputed.

Solid Builders, Inc. and Medina Foods Industries, Inc. vs. China Banking
Corporation,
G.R. No. 179665, April 3, 2013
FACTS: During the period from September 4, 1992 to March 27, 1996, China Banking
Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI), which amounted to

P139,999,234.34, exclusive of interests and other charges. To secure the loans, Medina
Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBCs favor several surety agreements and
contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels ofland in the Loyola Grand Villas in Quezon
City and New Cubao Central in Cainta, Rizal. Subsequently, SBI proposed to CBC a scheme
through which SBI would sell the mortgaged properties and share the proceeds with CBC on
a 50-50 basis until such time that the whole obligation would be fully paid. SBI also proposed
that there be partial releases of the certificates of title of the mortgaged properties without
the burden of updating interests on all loans. On October 5, 2000, claiming that the
interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC were iniquitous and unconscionable and to
enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a Complaint To Compel
Execution of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 68105 and assigned to Branch 264.
ISSUE: Whether a preliminary injunction may be issued.
HELD: No. A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted
only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking
cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the
requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it. In this
connection, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon
the applicants showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be
protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that
right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable
injury. As debtor-mortgagors, however, SBI and MFII do not have a right to prevent the
creditor-mortgagee CBC from foreclosing on the mortgaged properties simply on the basis
of alleged usurious, exorbitant and confiscatory rate of interest. First, assuming that the
interest rate agreed upon by the parties is usurious, the nullity of the stipulation of usurious
interest does not affect the lenders right to recover the principal loan, nor affect the other
terms thereof. Thus, in a usurious loan with mortgage, the right to foreclose the mortgage
subsists, and this right can be exercised by the creditor upon failure by the debtor to pay the
debt due. Thus, the basis of the right claimed by SBI and MFII remains to be controversial or
disputable as there is still a need to determine whether or not, upon consideration of the
various circumstances surrounding the agreement of the parties, the interest rates and
penalty charges are unconscionable. Therefore, such claimed right cannot be considered
clear, actual and subsisting. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the
injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.